
Woodrow Wilson
International
Center
for Scholars
Asia Program
Reaping the
DIVIDEND
Overcoming Pakistan's
Demographic Challenges
Edited By: Michael Kugelman
Robert M. Hathaway

REAPING THE DIVIDEND
OVERCOMING PAKISTAN'S DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES

Edited by
Michael Kugelman
Robert M. Hathaway

This publication is a collaborative effort between the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars' Asia Program and the Fellowship Fund for Pakistan.

www.wilsoncenter.org/asia
http://fffp.org.pk/

REAPING THE DIVIDEND
OVERCOMING PAKISTAN'S DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES

Essays by:

Sohail Agha
Shahid Javed Burki
Mehtab S. Karim
Saba Gul Khattak
Shazia Khawar
Michael Kugelman
Population Reference Bureau and
National Committee for Maternal and Neonatal Health
(Pakistan)
Zeba A. Sathar
Moeed Yusuf

Edited by:

Michael Kugelman
Robert M. Hathaway

Available from :

Asia Program
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20004-3027

www.wilsoncenter.org

ISBN: 1-933549-68-8

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, established by Congress in 1968 and headquartered in Washington, D.C., is a living national memorial to President Wilson. The Center's mission is to commemorate the ideals and concerns of Woodrow Wilson by providing a link between the worlds of ideas and policy, while fostering research, study, discussion, and collaboration among a broad spectrum of individuals concerned with policy and scholarship in national and international affairs. Supported by public and private funds, the Center is a nonpartisan institution engaged in the study of national and world affairs. It establishes and maintains a neutral forum for free, open, and informed dialogue. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Center publications and programs are those of the authors and speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center staff, fellows, trustees, advisory groups, or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to the Center.

The Center is the publisher of The Wilson Quarterly and home of Woodrow Wilson Center Press, dialogue radio and television, and the monthly news-letter "Centerpoint." For more information about the Center's activities and publications, please visit us on the web at www.wilsoncenter.org.

Contents

Glossary

CBR	Crude birth rate
CPR	Contraceptive prevalence rate
CSM	Contraceptive social marketing
DFID	UK Department for International Development
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Area
GDP	Gross domestic product
GNI	Gross national income
GNP	Gross national product
ICPD	International Conference on Population and Development
IMCC	Inter-Ministerial Coordination Committee
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
IUD	Intrauterine device
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
LHWs	Lady Health Workers
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MoYA	Ministry of Youth Affairs
MQM	Muttahida Qaumi Movement
NCMNH	National Committee for Maternal and Neonatal Health
NFC	National Finance Commission
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
NGR	Next Generation report

NVM	National Volunteer Movement
PBF	Performance-based financing
PGR	Population growth rate
PIA	Pakistan International Airlines
PRB	Population Reference Bureau
PSDP	Public Sector Development Program
PSI	Population Services International
RH	Reproductive health
Rs.	Rupees
SAP	Social Action Program
TFR	Total fertility rate
TTP	Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
WHO	World Health Organization
YPF	Young Parliamentarians Forum

Pakistan's Demographics: Possibilities, Perils, and Prescriptions

Michael Kugelman

On July 11, 2010, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani delivered a speech in Islamabad to commemorate World Population Day. He announced that in order to highlight the crucial connection between demographics and economic growth, 2011 would be designated "Population Year" in Pakistan. "All hopes of development and economic prosperity would flounder if we as a nation lose the focus and do not keep [the] population issue in the spotlight," he declared.[1]

Hopefully that spotlight comes with a long shelf life. Pakistan faces acute population challenges. If they are to be overcome, they will need to be illuminated for far more than a year.

Yet, there are exciting opportunities here as well. A long-term approach to managing the challenges presented by Pakistan's burgeoning population, if accompanied by effective policies and sustained implementation, could spark a monumental transformation: one that enables the country to harness the great promise of a large population that has usually been viewed as a hindrance to prosperity. Indeed, demographers contend that Pakistan's young, growing, and rapidly urbanizing population can potentially bring great benefits to the country. If birth rates fall substantially, and if young Pakistanis are properly educated and successfully absorbed into the labor force, then the nation could reap a "demographic dividend" that sparks economic growth, boosts social well-being, and promotes the rejuvenation of Pakistan.

Michael Kugelman is program associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

THE YOUNG AND THE RISING

Because Pakistan has not conducted a census since 1998, estimating the country's total population size is a highly inexact science. The Pakistani government lists the current figure at about 175 million people, while the United Nations believes the number is closer to 185 million. However, while the precise figure may be in doubt, the population's rapid rise is not. Though no longer increasing at the 3 percent-plus rate seen in the 1980s, Pakistan's population is still growing at a 2 percent pace. According to the UN Population Division's latest mid-range demographic projections, released in 2009, the population will rise to 335 million by 2050. More than 60 million people are expected to be added in just the next 15 years.[2]

This explosive increase, however, merely represents the best-case scenario, and will prevail only if the country's fertility rates drop from the current average of about four children per woman to two. Should fertility rates remain constant, the UN estimates the population could exceed 450 million by 2050, with a total population of nearly 300 million as early as 2030.

Pakistan's population is not only large and growing, but also very young, with a median age of 21. Currently, two-thirds of Pakistanis are less than 30 years old.[3] As a percentage of total population, only Yemen has more people under the age of 24. Additionally, given that more than a third of Pakistanis are now 14 years old or younger, the country's population promises to remain youthful over the next few decades.[4] In the 2020s, the 15-to-24 age bracket is expected to swell by 20 percent.[5] Pakistan's under-24 population will still be in the majority come 2030. And as late as 2050, the median age is expected to be only 33.[6]

Pakistan's demographic profile contrasts with what is happening in much of the rest of the world. Sub-replacement level fertility rates (about two births per woman) prevail not only throughout the developed world, but also across much of Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. As one commentator has noted, "the twenty-first century's hallmark [demographic] trend appears to be a fertility implosion."[7] South Asia, along with sub-Saharan Africa, is one of the last regional bastions of youthful, rapidly proliferating populations. Yet even within South Asia, Pakistan stands out. Excluding Afghanistan,

of all the member states of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation—Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka—Pakistan has the highest population growth, birth, and fertility rates; the youngest median age (tied with Nepal); and the largest percentage of people 14 years old or younger.[8]

SLOW FERTILITY DECLINE, HIGH UNMET NEED, AND MASS MIGRATION

While Pakistan's fertility rates may exceed those of its South Asian neighbors and of most nations across the globe, they have actually been in decline since the late 1980s. In this volume's first essay, the Population Council's **Zeba A. Sathar** contends that this shift is not attributable to contraception; prevalence rates hovered well below 20 percent for much of the 1980s and 1990s, and today are only about 30 percent. Instead, Pakistan's fertility decline is a consequence of the rising age at marriage (for women, this increased from 16 to 23 between 1961 and 2007) and the "widespread recourse" to abortions. Sathar estimates that one out of every seven pregnancies in Pakistan is aborted. "The evidence is compelling," she writes, that Pakistani women ages 35 and over, and with more than three children, "are using abortions to regulate fertility."

Though Pakistani fertility rates are falling, the pace of this decline slowed over the first decade of the 21st century. Sathar attributes this to a number of factors, one being international donor priorities. The international aid community has emphasized HIV/AIDS funding over that of family planning since the early 2000s—with grave implications for a social sector like Pakistan's, which is deeply dependent on international largesse. However, she deposits much of the blame for the limited success in lowering fertility on Pakistan's doorstep, arguing that the country has generally neglected population matters. "At no point," she writes, "has serious attention been devoted to studying Pakistan's large population numbers, their distribution, and the implications they hold for the country's development, politics, and ultimate stability." Politicians, the media, and academia have not seriously debated Pakistan's population issues, she says, while economists and planners have all but ignored them. Sathar argues that social development is a critical determinant of fertility change, and faults Islamabad for failing to improve the lowly status of

Pakistani women. Female literacy stands at 44 percent (some place the figure as low as 35 percent), while women's labor participation rates barely approach 20 percent.

Another indicator of women's status, reproductive health, constitutes the focus of this volume's second essay, a collaboration of the **Population Reference Bureau** (PRB) and Pakistan's **National Committee for Maternal and Neonatal Health** (NCMNH). In a nation where maternal mortality rates register at 276 per 100,000 live births (by contrast, many developed countries have less than 10),[9] it is unsurprising that the PRB/NCMNH contribution paints a dismal picture.

In Pakistan, this essay reports, only 22 percent of married women use modern forms of family planning. Yet this does not mean the remaining 78 percent all refrain by choice. Indeed, the rate of unmet need for family planning—a measure of how many women desire, but do not use, contraception—is 25 percent. Consequently, a staggering one out of every three pregnancies is unplanned. Such high levels of unmet need increase population growth, but also contribute to Pakistan's 900,000 annual abortions. Additionally, by increasing the number of people for whom the cash-strapped government must provide basic services, they also constrain economic development.

By fulfilling unmet need, argue the PRB and NCMNH, abortion rates would decrease, while 23,000 maternal deaths and more than a million child fatalities could be prevented by 2015. The essay also cites research concluding that increasing family planning spending by $136 million between 2007 and 2015 (the amount required to address Pakistan's unmet need) could have saved Pakistan's government about $400 million in basic services expenditures by 2015. It argues that "few interventions yield the number of benefits to health and socioeconomic development that family planning does," and concludes that given Pakistan's troubled economy, "family planning qualifies as a bonafide best buy."

Pakistan's population story is not solely one of high fertility and unmet need for family planning, but also one of large-scale migration. According to **Shahid Javed Burki**, a senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, mass movements of people—within, into, and out of the country—have had a "profound impact" on Pakistan's economic, political, and social development. The first

major migration occurred during Partition, when eight million Muslims arrived in newly independent Pakistan. Before independence, the number of Muslims in present-day Pakistan totaled 65 percent of the population; the figure swelled to 95 percent after the population transfer accompanying Partition. Burki suggests that without this "Muslimization," Pakistan may not have become the conservative, Islamic nation that it is today. A second large population movement, initiated soon after independence, was an influx of Pakistani Pashtuns from the northwest into the southern Sindhi city of Karachi. The Pashtuns found themselves living alongside not only Sindhis, but also Muhajirs who had migrated from India. This volatile ethnic mix, writes Burki, transformed Karachi into one of the developing world's most violent cities. A third mass movement, which transpired in the 1970s and 1980s, saw an exodus of four to five million Pakistani construction workers (many from what is now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province) to the Middle East. While this migration benefited Pakistan's economy by generating healthy amounts of remittances, it also exposed Pakistani expatriates to Salafist and Wahhabi Islam. Returning migrants, writes Burki, helped popularize these conservative branches of Islam and "facilitated the rise" of the Taliban in the 1990s. A fourth major migration was the 1980s arrival of millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Many were housed in camps along the Durand Line, which served as recruitment and mobilization centers for the anti-Soviet *mujahideen* fighters who would later form the vanguard of the Taliban.

Urbanization comprises the most recent migration. By the 2020s, at least 50 percent of the Pakistani population—113 million people—will reside in cities. Lahore's population will exceed 10 million, thereby becoming Pakistan's second megacity. Meanwhile, by 2025, the number of Pakistani cities with populations of half a million to a million will have doubled. "What these numbers show," writes Burki, "is that Pakistan is at the threshold of a major demographic transition, as important as some of those that have occurred before." Yet he says the country is ill-prepared for it. Pakistan's burgeoning urban masses, he writes, "will need goods and services the economy does not produce in adequate quantities." This gap, he warns, will widen unless Islamabad "takes careful stock" of Pakistan's urbanization.

PROSPECTS FOR A DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND

Despite this troubling demographic narrative, Pakistan's population can also be a tremendous boon—if the country manages to achieve what demographers refer to as a demographic dividend.

This concept is tied to a country's age structure. When the proportion of the working-age population is increasing, and that of the non-working age population is falling—as is presently happening in Pakistan—the country stands to gain economically. This is because the non-working, dependent minority of the population (children and the elderly) requires investments in education, healthcare, and social security. The working-age population, if gainfully employed, provides the labor that sparks these investments, freeing up more state resources to be allocated for other purposes, such as economic development and family welfare.[10] Population experts underscore that given the fluctuating nature of nations' age structures, opportunities to profit from demographic dividends are rare. As one demographer writes, Pakistan's rising working-age population and declining dependency ratio offer a "once-in-a-lifetime" opportunity.[11]

Tantalizing Thoughts

If Pakistan manages to reap a demographic dividend, the effects could be far-reaching. Key industries such as textiles—which constitute a majority of Pakistan's exports, yet struggle to compete in global markets with more value-added products from China and Bangladesh—would enjoy an immense infusion of fresh labor. The labor pool for the construction industry—crucial for a country in need of development—would be enhanced, as would that of Pakistan's up-and-coming sectors of pharmaceuticals, electronics, and information technology. Burki writes of the possibility of a million new employees in the IT industry, which could generate $20 billion in export revenue. Such growth, he argues, could then kick-start income-generating opportunities in the rapidly developing sectors of fashion, pop music, and sports.

Some commentators point to the prodigious economic benefits that could accrue from obtaining the human resources necessary to exploit

Pakistan's massive mineral reserves. One Pakistani financial analyst has argued that the nation is blessed with the world's second-largest salt mine, fifth-largest gold mine, seventh-largest copper mine, and fifth-largest coal reserves. He laments how Pakistanis "sit over a resource bank of trillions of dollars while we chase millions to survive."[12] In late 2010, a Pakistani nuclear scientist raved about the presence of nearly $275 million worth of copper and gold reserves in Baluchistan, and about newly discovered mineral reserves in North Waziristan. The country needs "thousands of mathematicians, chemical analysts, engineers, and other experts for exploration of mineral reserves at commercial scale," he observed. If the proper steps are taken, Pakistan could become "a developed rich state" in two decades' time.[13]

Realizing a demographic dividend in Pakistan would also advantage the global economy. With fertility levels in considerable decline throughout much of the world, and with global manpower growing at much slower rates than during the previous two decades, Pakistani labor could become a highly coveted resource for outsourcing purposes. Over the next two decades, Pakistan, together with Bangladesh and sub-Saharan Africa, are expected to produce about half the growth in the global working-age population. Pakistan and Bangladesh alone will constitute nearly one-eighth of the world's manpower growth.[14]

Some of the statistics behind Pakistan's youth demographics bolster the arguments of those who believe the country can achieve a demographic dividend. Though many commentators speak of young Pakistanis as an impoverished and uneducated monolith, the facts are more nuanced. The country as a whole is only 50 percent literate, but this figure is significantly higher—67 percent—for Pakistanis aged 15 to 24.[15] Meanwhile, every second Pakistani is a mobile phone subscriber—one of the highest rates in South Asia.[16] Finally, Pakistan's rapidly urbanizing youth will soon comprise a critical component of a 100-million-strong urban middle class—a powerful demographic cohort that could form the basis of a skilled workforce and mature into a growth engine and innovation source.[17]

Overwhelming Odds

This book's contributors all agree on what Pakistan must do to attain a demographic dividend: sharply lower its fertility rates, better educate its masses, and enlarge the economy so that it can accommodate scores of job seekers. This will entail drastically expanding access to family planning, repairing a deeply troubled educational system, and stabilizing an economy that often teeters on collapse. Attaining such goals will prove an extremely daunting task. Sathar notes that many rural women are obliged to travel, on average, 50 to 100 kilometers to obtain family planning services, while only 35 percent of 10-to-14-year-old Pakistanis (and even fewer 15-to-19-year-olds) are in school. In fact, of Pakistan's 70 million 5-to-19-year-olds, only 30 million are attending school.[18]

Pakistan's economic challenges are no less immense. While gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaged 7 percent over much of the 2000s, it fell significantly during the latter part of that decade. In late 2010, Nadeem ul Haque, the deputy chairman of Pakistan's Planning Commission, stated that GDP growth stood at 2.5 percent—yet projected that 9 percent growth would be needed to employ Pakistan's 80 to 90 million people under the age of 20.[19] Indeed, many observers conclude Pakistan's economy will not be able to put great numbers of people to work over the next two decades, given the trouble it has had filling jobs in the present. Half of Pakistan's population is not fully active in the labor market—a reality under which demographic dividend benefits "cannot be reaped," one demographer has stated bluntly.[20] One explanation for this inactivity could be that only one million new jobs are created each year. Yet by 2030, Pakistan could have 175 million potential workers.[21]

Setting aside the statistics, it is also important to acknowledge a basic fact: Pakistan is unstable, violent, and insecure. Government efforts to address the country's overwhelming health, education, and economic challenges compete—often unsuccessfully—with defense and national security imperatives. Additionally, the poor security situation constrains implementation; launching new family planning centers in regions wracked by militancy is a perilous task. Some would argue as well that Pakistan's insecurity limits the potential payoffs emerging from a demographic dividend; copper and gold deposits in North Waziristan, for

example, can be exploited only with great difficulty, given how unsafe and inaccessible the area is today.

LIGHTING THE FUSE

With no guarantee that Pakistan's growing and youthful masses will be healthy, educated, and employed in the decades ahead, the nation's demographic trajectory poses great risks. Predictably, many observers describe Pakistan's population situation as a ticking time bomb. It is "becoming the seed of a total disaster," warned a 2010 commentary in *The News*, and will likely expand "the spectacle of deprivation"—such as suicides and the selling of children—playing out in contemporary society.[22] International security analysts express concern that Pakistan's volatile demographics could have consequences for nuclear security. One observer has argued that Pakistan's "safeguards" against nuclear risk—including an effective military and pro-Western government—"could erode or disappear" with rising demographic pressures.[23]

Perhaps the most widely discussed risk associated with Pakistan's population profile is youth radicalization—the threat of millions of young, impoverished, and unemployed Pakistanis succumbing to the blandishments of extremism. In 2009, one expert argued that the "population dividend" could easily become a "dangerous overload" and fall prey to militancy.[24] Indeed, one could argue that large-scale radicalization represents the ultimate cost of the failure to achieve a demographic dividend.

Moeed Yusuf's essay in this volume examines the prospects of youth radicalization in Pakistan. Yusuf, an analyst at the United States Institute of Peace, identifies the presence of two supply-side factors that may "push" young Pakistanis toward extremism. One is the stratified nature of education, whereby three different school systems—public, elite-private, and religious—exist in complete isolation from each other. However, though graduates from each system emerge with very different outlooks on life, all three systems' curricula (especially those of public and religious schools) preach an Islam-and-Pakistan-under-siege mentality. According to Yusuf, this mindset, and the internal discord in society suggested by the isolation of the three school systems, are ripe for exploitation by Islamists—and are indeed reflected in the rhetoric of "virtually all Pakistan-based militant outfits."

The other push factor is socioeconomic inequality; a small Pakistani minority enjoys the majority of the country's luxuries and resources. Consequently, many Pakistani youth are unemployed, or, more commonly, underemployed—equipped with the education or skills for high-paying, challenging jobs, but passed over in favor of wealthy graduates of elite-private schools and obliged to accept menial positions. Pakistanis of all stripes value schooling, Yusuf writes, and even the poor make large sacrifices to enable their children to get a good education. When such efforts fail to lead to good jobs, an "expectation-reality disconnect" sets in that breeds alienation and resentment toward the Pakistani elite. Most militants in Pakistan, Yusuf writes, despise the country's well-to-do. Class divides figure prominently in militant rhetoric, and even in tactics; he recalls how the Pakistani Taliban's brief rule over Swat in 2008-09 featured the seizure of elite land possessions and a promise to redistribute them among the poor.

While supply-side factors suggest "high susceptibility" to radicalization, they do not guarantee it. Yusuf, however, identifies several demand-side "pull" factors prevailing in Pakistan that function as triggering mechanisms for radicalization. The major one—and the "single biggest challenge" to preventing Pakistani society from descending pell-mell into extremism—is the strong and widespread demand for extremists. The large market for militants in Pakistan, he writes, is a consequence of the state's "self-defined strategic need" to use extremism as a tool of foreign policy. In the 1980s, Islamabad offered its full support to the anti-Soviet Afghan *mujahideen*. It opened up its territory to these fighters for base camps, funded scores of madrassahs, and encouraged religious political parties to build ties with the *mujahideen*. In the 1990s, the government supported both insurgents fighting in Kashmir and the Afghan Taliban, which required fresh militant recruitment from within Pakistan. Throughout these years, state-supported religious parties and militants colluded "to spread their tentacles across Pakistani society." This deep penetration—which he describes as "irreversible in the short run"—has enabled Pakistani extremist groups to remain strong even after Islamabad, following the September 11 attacks, officially renounced its ties with them. Yusuf describes the dizzying array of militant organizations—both foreign and Pakistani—presently based in the nation, from Punjabi anti-Indian outfits and al Qaeda to the Pakistani Taliban

and anti-Shia sectarian groups. "For youth susceptible to the militant message," he concludes, "there is an array of potential patrons to choose from." And with Pakistan now a hotbed of militancy, the pull for these youth is "all too evident."

Yusuf insists that Pakistan has not yet "crossed the point of no return," underscoring that its young militants account for a small subset of the total population. Polls, he points out, depict young Pakistanis as "decidedly anti-extremist." One of the surveys he cites is the British Council's 2009 study, *Pakistan: The Next Generation*. In her essay, the Council's **Shazia Khawar** discusses this product, which polled 1,200 young people across rural and urban Pakistan. The report, she writes, takes aim at the "flawed" policy premise that Pakistani youth represent a problem waiting to be managed, rather than "a resource to be developed." It aspires to showcase young Pakistanis' intellectual potential, mobilizing power, and ability to act as "change agents" in society. What does the polling reveal? On the one hand, the report concludes that young Pakistanis are deeply disillusioned about their country and its institutions. Only 15 percent believe their nation is headed in the right direction, and only a third approve of democracy. Three-quarters regard themselves as "primarily" Muslims, not Pakistanis. Yet on the other hand, overwhelming majorities "love" their country and believe in the importance of education. Instead of wishing ill on the West, the polling subjects ask only that the international community sympathize more with the injustices and inequalities they continually experience.

POPULATION POLICIES, PAST AND PRESENT

Despite these encouraging sentiments, Yusuf writes that "the persistence" of the push and pull factors "may well test the determination" of young Pakistanis to resist radicalism's temptations in the coming years. Even now, youth radicalization has made considerable inroads; the instigators of nearly every terrorist attack in Pakistan after 9/11 have been under the age of 30. To reduce the possibilities of full-scale youth radicalization, he asserts, policy change is "an imperative."

A common thread running through the essays in this volume is the belief that Pakistan has reached a seminal moment in its demographic trajectory, and that population policies—and their degree of effective-

ness—will make or break Pakistan's ability to tackle its population challenges. Unfortunately, Pakistan's troubled population policy history suggests that achieving this objective will be far from easy.

A Troubled Historical Record

Burki and Sathar praise President Ayub Khan for launching a family planning program back in the 1960s. Khan was the first Pakistani leader to bring public attention to the population issue, arguing that Pakistan would not enjoy economic development unless it embraced family planning. Unfortunately, soon after the program's launch Khan left office, and it was promptly abandoned. Burki calculates that had even 75 percent of its goals been achieved, Pakistan's current population would be only 145 million today.

This story highlights the common denominator of Pakistan's past population policies—many good intentions, yet few lasting results. **Mehtab S. Karim** of George Mason University undertakes a comprehensive review of Islamabad's various demographics-related initiatives, most of them drawn from the population aspects of the country's five-year plans. While these efforts have set reasonable fertility-related targets and announced a raft of measures to increase access to family planning, he concludes that little has ultimately been done to achieve fertility decline goals. What accounts for this failure? Karim cites a wide variety of factors including funding constraints, backlashes from conservative and religious elements, and "overcentralized and top-heavy management." Coordination has also been poor, with federal ministries unable to see eye-to-eye with provincial authorities (or with each other). Yet perhaps the most significant factor is what Karim describes as the "faulty framework" of the population policy planning process: its disproportionate supply-side orientation. The policy process, he argues, "has lacked an assessment of real needs for services in various regions and segments of the population." Unless policy planners adapt a more demand-oriented focus that takes into account the actual needs and feedback of the population, family planning services will struggle to "truly and effectively" reach people.

Karim also examines what accounts for the effectiveness of family planning programs in Bangladesh and Iran, countries whose popula-

tion growth rates—unlike Pakistan's—have fallen dramatically over the last few decades. In Bangladesh, high priority was given to population issues immediately after independence, and both nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and the private sector made major contributions. NGOs focused their efforts on rural women's empowerment, while the business community involved itself in contraception distribution. In Iran, following the Islamic Revolution, religious leaders issued fatwas in support of contraception, and their recommendations for a family planning program were formally integrated into the country's development policies. Consequent measures stipulated that free family planning services be provided to all married couples. In essence, these two countries' population policies have featured important elements—consistency of approach, strong interministerial coordination, close ties to NGOs and the private sector, and buy-in from the religious leadership—rarely present in Pakistan.

Contemporary Challenges

For more than 40 years, Pakistan's population policies largely flowed from the country's multisectoral five-year plans. These plans are often derided for establishing unattainable targets and outcomes that ignore ground realities. "Why do we need five-year plans," groused a *Dawn* editorial in 2010, "when we cannot even properly implement our annual plans?"[25] A major step was taken in 2002, when Islamabad launched a formal population policy meant to curtail population growth and fertility. Its goals were to be accomplished through a variety of strategies that incorporated many of the elements Karim believes were lacking in earlier initiatives, including advocacy campaigns, shifts from target-oriented to people-centered needs and services, and stronger partnerships with corporations and NGOs. Unfortunately, the results were underwhelming, and targets were not met.

In 2010, Islamabad released a draft version of a new national population policy with a similar focus on family planning. Some commentators praised the document for its new emphasis on birth spacing—a family planning method that, unlike outright birth control, ensures that Pakistani women cannot be accused of evading maternal duties or "shirking their religious duty to procreate."[26] However, the policy

also came in for heavy criticism, which centered on its lack of creative solutions to shortfalls in service delivery.

To be fair, the government's efforts have yielded some success stories. The promotion of small-family norms has helped raise awareness about population issues, according to **Saba Gul Khattak**, the social sector member of Pakistan's Planning Commission. Overwhelming majorities of Pakistanis are aware of the need for family planning, and more Pakistani women are embracing birth spacing. Nonetheless, she acknowledges, population policy impacts have been limited. Khattak offers a government perspective on Pakistan's population policy challenges. One of the major constraints is a lack of funding. The 2008-09 global financial crisis, the costs of fighting militancy, and rising numbers of internally displaced persons have triggered a "severe financial resource crunch" and depleted the coffers of the Public Sector Development Program (PSDP), which allocates funding for Pakistan's population initiatives. As a result, she writes, from 2003 to 2008 the PSDP's budgetary allocation to the Population Welfare Ministry was far less than what the ministry requested, while the actual amount released was considerably less than the allocation. "In no year," Khattak notes, "did releases match allocations."

Another challenge arose in 2010, when Pakistan ratified its 18th constitutional amendment and passed the 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) Award—measures that increased, respectively, the administrative and fiscal autonomy of provincial governments. One major consequence was that the functions of the federal Population Welfare Ministry were transferred to provincial population welfare departments. (Some federal oversight remains, with certain planning functions delegated to the Planning Commission and data collection assigned to the Federal Bureau of Statistics.) With the federal ministry effectively abolished, Khattak writes, provincial authorities are now responsible for the financial liabilities of their population programs. However, even with the increase in funding set in motion by the NFC award (financial transfers from the central government to the provinces increased by nearly 70 billion rupees), provincial governments remain economically strapped and have demanded that the central government continue to take ownership over their population efforts for several more years. Additionally, provincial policymakers have inherited the problems—particularly the public

sector's limited capacities to deliver family planning—that previously consumed their counterparts in Islamabad.

BEYOND ISLAMABAD: OTHER POPULATION PLAYERS

Given its limited resources and capacities, the Pakistani government—whether central or provincial—cannot possibly overcome the country's population challenges by itself. Fortunately, it can count on assistance from a variety of different sources.

The Private Sector

Several of this volume's essays highlight the significant presence of the private sector, and advocate for an even more robust role. Sathar calls for the business community to boost efforts to recruit young job applicants. Burki argues that urbanization will generate a demand for goods and services—such as electricity—that the private sector can provide more efficiently than the government. Yet it is perhaps in the area of reproductive health where the vitality of the private sector can be seen most vividly. According to Khattak, private companies provide nearly 40 percent of Pakistan's family planning services.

Sohail Agha, of the global health organization Population Services International (PSI), takes a closer look at the private sector's reproductive health activities in Pakistan. One dimension of this involvement is the provision of contraception. The commercial sector has sold high-quality, relatively low-cost, imported condoms in Pakistan since the 1980s, and the number of private outlets (from pharmacies to tobacco shops) selling condoms skyrocketed from 7,000 to 100,000 between 1986 and 2009. Another private sector contribution, first initiated in the 1990s, is a large, well-trained network of family planning service providers (known as Greenstar, a Pakistan-based affiliate of PSI) that targets low-income urban dwellers. Since these initiatives were launched, Agha writes, condom use in Pakistan has increased sharply, while the share of condoms supplied by the private sector now reaches about 80 percent.

However, even with these successes, Agha notes a disappointment: In 2006-07, the private sector was inserting nearly half the intrauterine devices (IUDs) in Pakistan, yet the use of this form of birth control

was in "dramatic decline" from earlier in the decade. One possible explanation for this decrease, he writes, is that providers concluded that supplying IUDs would not boost their bottom lines. Agha cites survey research indicating that an overwhelming majority of clients (96 percent) come to private clinics for reasons other than family planning. With so little demand for family planning, the private provider has little financial incentive for recommending, much less inserting, IUDs. Agha suggests that in order to boost demand, the private sector should expand efforts to provide vouchers to clients opting for reproductive health services. He cites data indicating that providers working in facilities offering vouchers have been more likely to recommend IUD insertion, and have inserted more IUDs, than providers not offering vouchers. There is considerable incentive to formulate such demand-generating financing strategies: Agha notes that Greenstar's 7,500-strong provider network, though dispersed throughout 450 different areas, remains "an enormous underutilized resource."

Civil Society

Though they provide a more modest share of Pakistan's family planning services than the private sector (13 percent, according to Khattak), NGOs are also deeply engaged in population issues. Some, such as the Family Planning Association of Pakistan (the largest Pakistani social sector NGO), have provided services for decades. Other NGOs have spearheaded cutting-edge initiatives to improve service delivery. A consortium of Pakistani civil society groups has established Jaroka Telehealthcare, an Internet-based telemedicine network that enables clinicians and health workers in rural and remote areas of Pakistan to connect with doctors in major cities. Still others are forging partnerships with Islamabad. In 2010, the media development organization Intermedia announced an initiative with the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting to use state media to promote awareness about reproductive health.

The International Community

Despite the proliferation of HIV/AIDS-related international aid in recent years, Pakistan does receive significant overseas funding for population programs. Since 2001, USAID's family planning and reproductive health assistance to Pakistan has risen to nearly $45 million. Current projects focus on improving contraceptive supplies and logistics; expanding community-based services; and increasing awareness and commitment, including among religious leaders.

International assistance is not restricted to funding. Khawar's essay describes how the British Council has seized on the *Next Generation* report's emphasis on youth participation in policy development to cultivate a variety of partnerships with Islamabad. These efforts seek to engage the country's youth in Pakistani politics, and to spark dialogue between young Pakistanis and policymakers. Projects include placing interns in the National Assembly, and hosting seminars linking Pakistani youth with young parliamentarians. The Council also plans to provide leadership training to 11,000 young people, with the assistance of local governments, NGOs, and the private sector.

TOWARD A NATIONAL POPULATION STRATEGY: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Such contributions are important and necessary. However, given the immensity of Pakistan's population challenges, many more will be needed—and particularly from Islamabad and the provincial governments. The essays in this volume offer a range of suggestions for how Pakistan should tackle its demographic dilemma. Some of the major ones are listed below, not for the purpose of endorsement, but instead to provoke additional debate about how best to move forward in the months and years ahead.

1. *Make population policy a priority.* Despite their saliency, population issues have long been neglected in Pakistan. From the economic implications of high population growth to the sentiments of Pakistani youth, little about the country's demographics has been researched or discussed. All key stakeholders—both inside and outside Pakistan—

should develop authoritative analyses on Pakistan's population challenges. Government ministries charged with population-related matters should issue annual status reports, and be held accountable for the results. Both the Pakistani government (through the issuance of public statements in support of contraception) and media (through the dissemination of information about Pakistan's population challenges and the urgent need to take action) can play critical advocacy roles.

2. *Expand and diversify the economy.* If Pakistan is to achieve a demographic dividend, jobs are essential—and particularly for women, who are eager to work yet severely underrepresented in the labor force. Millions of Pakistanis will fail to find jobs if the labor economy cannot accommodate a wide variety of educational backgrounds and skill sets. Employment opportunities must expand beyond those of agriculture and into the nonfarm industries, including the growing sectors of IT, health services, the arts, and even sports.

The private sector should both help generate new jobs (particularly in cities) and invest in training for Pakistan's incoming labor force. Training programs must be established that are tailored to the actual needs of the employment market. This will entail the creation of a mechanism that can assess what skills are in fact in demand, so that young Pakistanis no longer need to consult available job openings to know what skills they must develop.

Economic policies must aspire for, and achieve, inclusionary growth and good governance. Such outcomes would improve prospects for job seekers, reduce socioeconomic inequality, and weaken incentives to embrace violence or radicalization.

3. *Education, education, education.* The woeful state of Pakistan's school system constitutes a prime reason for the country's limited development progress. Pakistan must achieve universal primary school enrollment within a five-year period, in order to ensure that young people entering the work force in the next 5 to 10 years have a chance of earning a livelihood. To maximize the effectiveness of a revamped education policy, a nonpartisan task force should oversee the development of a universal education plan.

Only if Pakistanis—and particularly Pakistani women—are sufficiently educated can they make responsible decisions about family size and birth spacing, become productive members of the labor force, and consequently enable their country to enjoy the fruits of a demographic dividend.

Additionally, the three-tiered, stratified structure of the educational system must be abolished; the Islam-under-siege narrative that fuels extremist rhetoric should be expunged from textbooks; and more peace and civic education offerings should be incorporated into school curricula.

4. *Emphasize clarity and coordination in family planning service delivery.* To eliminate Pakistan's 25 percent unmet need, access to family planning for poor and rural women must be expanded dramatically. This will necessitate the development of a multisectoral strategy with a clear delineation of roles. The private sector and civil society, which together already offer more than 50 percent of family planning services in Pakistan, should increase their contraception provision, and particularly in the country's growing urban areas. However, the government must step up its service provision in Pakistan's remote and rural areas, where markets operate poorly and the private sector has a weaker presence. The state must also provide an overall vision for service delivery, and set quality and market standards. Additionally, public-private partnerships can work well when civil society implements policies and the government monitors them.

Family planning efforts should also be more effectively coordinated between and within government ministries, and—particularly in light of new policies devolving greater autonomy to the provinces—between central and provincial government authorities. Additionally, population policy planners should establish greater links with untapped institutional resources. For example, Pakistan International Airlines and the national rail service each oversee a network of health outlets across the country. These facilities can serve as a basis for new family planning centers.

5. *Deepen demand-side strategies.* Pakistan's population programs and policies have largely been top-down affairs, with policymakers setting targets based strictly on available resources. Such strategies rarely yield success. Government efforts should instead develop more participatory

models that engage the general population and gauge its needs, and that are therefore based on actual ground realities.

Efforts to engage, and be engaged by, Pakistani youth are of particular importance. Young Pakistanis from all walks of life should play a participatory role in the population policy process, from development and planning to implementation. Pakistan and the international community should listen to, respect, and sympathize with the travails of the young, and grant them a measure of dignity that they believe is repeatedly denied to them.

6. *Devolve to the district level*. Provincial governments may now enjoy more administrative and financial autonomy, yet they still suffer from funding shortages and poor governance. If provincial-level population welfare departments are decentralized to the district level, population policy planning, management, and monitoring may well be enhanced. Such realignments would enable district governments to enjoy a sense of ownership over population programs that central and provincial authorities refuse to claim as their own.

7. *Invest in human development*. Social development is as important a driver of fertility change as is policy. Pakistan has expended immense sums on dams, roads, and other forms of infrastructural development, yet has grossly underinvested in human development. Pakistan's population challenges cannot be resolved without greater efforts to make the country's masses more healthy, educated, and employable. Chief among Pakistan's human development needs is improving the status of women. Investing more in women's reproductive health—especially family planning—could save hundreds of millions of dollars and several million lives.

8. *Underscore urbanization*. Though Pakistan's population remains about two-thirds rural and its economy is largely agricultural, the country is rapidly urbanizing. Urban planning must take into account the complex nature of Pakistan's urbanization, which involves megacities, outlying areas of megacities, medium-size cities, and towns—all of which face different types of challenges. Policymakers must begin preparing for this demographic shift by launching efforts to expand the provision of

housing and basic services within city limits. Given the government's inability to provide such resources to the current urban population, the private sector can play an important role as service provider. Islamabad's intention to conduct a national census and household survey in 2011 is commendable, as it will help authorities decide how to allocate urban resources.

9. *Court the clergy…* The active and widespread support of Iran's religious leadership is cited as a reason for the success of that country's family planning program. Such support has generally failed to materialize in Pakistan, where Islamists have deemed family planning policies sacrilegious, and where religious apprehensions about using contraception often go unaddressed. Winning over the religious authorities could go a long way toward boosting contraceptive prevalence and lowering fertility rates in Pakistan.

...and *engage the men*. In Pakistan, the husband's desire for, or opposition to, family planning is a chief determinant of a couple's decision to use contraception. For this reason, outreach and advertising campaigns that promote contraception should target men more emphatically.

These two groups must be better incorporated into population policy in Pakistan. Research has found that husbands' opposition and perceived religious proscriptions make up half the obstacles to contraception use among women.

10. *Recognize the regional dimensions*. Pakistan's neighbors provide instructive lessons for its family planning policies—particularly Bangladesh, which for a number of years had much faster population growth than did Pakistan. South Asia also serves as a backdrop for the migratory movements that play a key part in Pakistan's demographic history—such as the millions of people who have entered the country from India and Afghanistan.

Additionally, the region's volatile geopolitics may help shape the trajectory of youth radicalization in Pakistan. So long as Afghanistan remains unstable, and so long as Pakistan-India ties remain turbulent, Islamabad will likely remain ambivalent toward Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Pakistan-based cadre of the Afghan Taliban—two extremist groups that recruit young Pakistanis. Moreover, so long as the United States

maintains an active military presence in Afghanistan, Pakistani militants can exploit anti-American sentiment to convince Pakistanis that the United States constitutes the major threat to Muslims—hence strengthening one of the core ideological themes of Pakistani radicals.

11. *Ensure a cautious and complementary international role.* International assistance—particularly that which targets youth programs and family planning—has a vital role to play in helping overcome Pakistan's population challenges. However, the world's governments and aid donors should follow, not lead, Pakistan's population efforts. International partners should accommodate, not set, the priorities of Pakistan's population sector. Additionally, the international community—and particularly the West—must recognize and respect the conservative nature of Pakistani society, and take care not to aggravate sensitivities or cause undue offense with policies that could be perceived as imposed modernization or Westernization.

THE IMPLEMENTATION CONUNDRUM

Not all of these recommendations are new; some have already cropped up in policy debates and documents. At a 2009 Karachi conference on maternal health, female parliamentarians spoke eloquently and emphatically about the need to improve family planning service delivery, highlighting in particular the need for "meaningful interaction" between various government ministries.[27] The 2010 draft population policy calls for the use of religious leaders as "social mobilizers" to spread the word about contraception. And in December 2010, perhaps in an effort to demonstrate that the designation of 2011 as "Population Year" goes beyond the rhetorical, Islamabad's Population Census Organization announced that the country would undertake its long-delayed sixth national census between March and September 2011.

In Pakistan, commentators and policymakers alike often trot out the country's distressing population statistics, and generally speak with one voice in trumpeting what must be done: more extensive family planning, better education, and more job opportunities. Yet the story typically ends there. For while there is no shortage of policy proposals, there has been much less implementation. Pakistan's failure to execute popula-

tion policies arguably constitutes the biggest obstacle to overcoming its population challenges—a contention underscored often in this volume. A major reason for this failure, according to many inside and outside of these pages, is that Pakistan's population documents are formulated in a way that preempts any chances of implementation. One commentator, in a scathing denunciation of Pakistan's national youth policy, writes of "fancy ideas and plain old rhetoric about monumental change," and of the complete absence of information about how the policy is to be carried out. Without such mechanisms, she argues, it cannot even be called a policy. In fact, she says, "None of our state policies can be called that."[28]

Given the clear benefits of implementation, why has population policy execution lapsed? Sather ventures that politicians may find population issues "contentious and sensitive" for reasons of religion or natural resource allocation. Such concerns reveal another chief explanation for the lack of implementation: an absence of political will. Such unwillingness to act may well have deepened after the assassination, in early 2011, of Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab Province. Taseer was one of Pakistan's outspoken, progressive voices in government, and he was allegedly killed for his support of religious minorities. In such an environment, the government may struggle to find the political capital to carry out some of the more delicate and controversial recommendations above—such as revising textbooks and expanding family planning access in Pakistan's more remote and conservative areas.

SEIZING THE MOMENT

However, as the authors in this volume make clear, strong political will has never been more essential, and the imperative of implementing effective population policies never greater. Without them, at best Pakistan will continue to suffer from a lack of guidance over how to navigate population-related tensions—such as the controversy at a Karachi school in 2009 over whether seventh-grade biology textbooks should contain information about family planning.[29] At worst, Pakistan could succumb to the doomsday scenarios forecast by those in this volume and elsewhere: nationwide natural resource scarcities, teeming

cities overflowing with the homeless and the hungry, and droves of impoverished and unemployed young people drifting toward extremism.

With Pakistan facing so many competing priorities and suffering from so many different constraints, there has never been a more difficult time to tackle a challenge as daunting as population. Yet tackle it must, and with alacrity. As Sather writes, "What may seem like difficult investments today are not a choice but an imperative, to prevent the loss of human potential, to turn around the country's future, and to ensure that Pakistan develops into a secure and prosperous society."

Nonetheless, even while Pakistan's government, civil society, and private sector, with help from the international community, must move quickly, they must also tread carefully. They must ensure that the Pakistani people perceive their efforts for what they truly are—an essential quest to boost Pakistan's economic development and social well-being—and not for what they are not—a nefarious scheme to control Pakistan's population growth and meddle in the personal lives of its masses.

Population experts estimate that Pakistan's window of opportunity for effecting a demographic transition remains wide open now, but shall slam shut in just a few decades. The countdown, in effect, has begun.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

This book is the outgrowth of an all-day conference on Pakistani population issues, hosted in 2010 by the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Karachi-based Fellowship Fund for Pakistan (FFFP). Excluding this introductory chapter, each of the essays appearing in these pages was originally presented at that conference.

Together, the conference and the book mark the seventh in a continuing series on pressing Pakistani economic challenges. The FFFP generously supports this project, and the editors express their deep appreciation to Munawar Noorani, FFFP's chairman, and to other members of the FFFP board of trustees and advisory council for their wise counsel and very generous financial support.

This project owes its success to a number of other people as well. First and foremost, Sue Levenstein of the Asia Program handled the bulk of the

logistical and administrative elements for the conference. Her efficiency, resourcefulness, and chipper demeanor were on full display as always, and we are deeply grateful. Additionally, this enterprise marked another rewarding collaboration with the Wilson Center's Environmental Change and Security Program (ECSP). Former ECSP staffer Gib Clarke, and current ECSP staffers Geoff Dabelko, Meaghan Parker, and Kayly Ober, are all wholeheartedly thanked for their input and support. The editors also wish to recognize the Wilson Center's Comparative Urban Studies Program, along with Senior Scholar William Milam, for assisting with the conference. Finally, we thank Scott Radloff of USAID for his invaluable conference contribution.

A number of individuals provided useful suggestions and feedback during the planning stages. These include Christopher Candland, Maleeha Lodhi, Sabira Qureshi, Asad Sayeed, Daniel Simons, David Steven, and Fasi Zaka.

Finally, the editors express their deep gratitude to this book's contributors. They are to be commended for taking time out of their busy lives to be a part of this project, and for fielding our many requests promptly and effectively. The year 2010 was a particularly difficult one for Pakistan, yet the essay writers all remained unwavering in their commitment to our project, despite the many distractions that arose.

While this book focuses on Pakistan's young and future generations, it is essential not to lose sight of the importance of those closer to home. For that reason, this book is dedicated to our little ones: Adam, Alex, Connor, Dylan, Henry, Holly, Zoe, and any yet to come.

NOTES

1 "Economic Growth Must For Population Welfare: Gilani," *The Nation*, July 12, 2010, http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Regional/Islamabad/12-Jul-2010/Economic-growth-must-for-population-welfare-Gilani.

2 UN Population Division, "World Population Revisions: The 2008 Revisions," database available from http://esa.un.org/unpp/.

3 Elizabeth Leahy, *The Shape of Things to Come: Why Age Structure Matters to a Safer, More Equitable World* (Washington, DC: Population Action International, 2007), 29.

4 Ibid.

5 Neil Howe and Richard Jackson, "The World Won't Be Aging Gracefully. Just the Opposite," *Washington Post*, January 4, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/02/AR2009010202231.html.

6 Unless otherwise stated, the youth demographic projections presented in this paragraph are based on UN Population Division estimates from 2005 and 2006.

7 Nicholas Eberstadt, "The Demographic Future: What Population Growth—and Decline—Means for the Global Economy," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 6 (November/December 2010): 55.

8 Farzana Rizvi, "Demographic Profiles of South Asian Countries: A Comparative Analysis," *Regional Studies* 27, no. 4 (Autumn 2009): 29-49.

9 "Country Sees 276 Maternal Deaths per 100,000 Births," *Daily Times*, July 8, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C07%5C08%5Cstory_8-7-2010_pg13_4. Some sources, however, place this figure at 376. See, for example, "Maternal Mortality: How Many Women Die in Childbirth in Your Country?" *Guardian*, April 12, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/apr/12/maternal-mortality-rates-millennium-development-goals.

10 Michael Kugelman, "Don't Drop that Bomb on Me," CHUP!—Changing Up Pakistan blog, June 1, 2010, http://changinguppakistan.wordpress.com/2010/06/01/dont-drop-that-bomb-on-me-michael-kugelman/.

11 Durr-e-Nayab, "Demographic Dividend or Demographic Threat in Pakistan?" *The Pakistan Development Review* 47, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 3.

12 Saqib Omer Saeed, "Pakistan: Poor Economy, Rich Country," *The Express Tribune*, June 2, 2010, http://tribune.com.pk/story/18181/pakistan-poor-economy-rich-country/.

13 "Another Reko Diq in North Waziristan," *Dawn*, December 4, 2010, http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/04/another-reko-diq-in-north-waziristan.html.

14 Eberstadt, 56.

15 "Education For All: Mid-Decade Assessment, Country Report Pakistan," Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, Islamabad, 2008, http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Pakistan/Pakistan_EFA_MDA.pdf.

16 Population Reference Bureau, "2010 World Population Data Sheet," Washington, DC, 2010, http://www.prb.org/pdf10/10wpds_eng.pdf.

17 Murtaza Haider, "Developing Vision 2030: Urbanization Challenges in Pakistan," brief prepared for McGill University (Montreal) and National Institute of Urban Infrastructure Planning (Peshawar), January 30, 2006, http://www.regionomics.com/INDUS/Vision%202030%20urbanization%20Pakistan.pdf.

18 "Extended Interview: Mosharraf Zaidi," PBS Frontline, Pakistan: The Lost Generation, transcript of interview conducted in Islamabad, November 2009, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/pakistan901/zaidi.html.

19 Nadeem Ul Haque, presentation at International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, November 22, 2010.

20 Nayab, 12.

21 Ibid., 14.

22 Ghazi Salahuddin, "Time Bomb Ticking," *The News*, May 16, 2010, http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=239534.

23 Craig Cohen, "Pakistan 2020: The Policy Imperatives of Pakistani Demographics" (paper presented at the symposium Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Reining in the Risks, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Arlington, VA, July 2008), http://www.npolicy.org/files/20080928-Cohen-Pakistan2020.pdf.

24 Sania Nishtar, "Nuancing National Security," *The News*, August 22, 2009, http://www.thenews.com/pk/print1.asp?id=194209.

25 Editorial, "Another Five-Year Plan," *Dawn*, May 15, 2010, http://archives.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/another-fiveyear-plan-550.

26 See, for example, Huma Yusuf, "Population Policy: Will it Work?" *Dawn*, March 14, 2010, http://archives.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/columnists/huma-yusuf-population-policy-will-it-work-430.

27 Mukhtar Alam, "BHUs Stressed in Reducing Maternal Mortality Rate," *Dawn*, August 21, 2009, http://66.219.30.210/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/16-bhus-stressed-in-reducing-maternal-mortality-rate-hs-09.

28 Tazeen Javed, "A Critique of the National Youth Policy," *The Express Tribune*, October 3, 2010, http://tribune.com.pk/story/57994/a-critique-of-the-national-youth-policy/.

29 Huma Yusuf, "Informed Choices Vs. Morality," *Dawn*, August 31, 2009, http://archives.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/16-informed-choices-vs-morality-hs-01.

Demographic Doom or Demographic Dreams: Pakistan at the Crossroads

Zeba A. Sathar

Pakistan clearly stands at the crossroads of its destiny, and demography will continue to play a huge role, just as it has in the past. This crossroads lies 63 years after Pakistan's formation. With a current population of 175 million, Pakistan can boast itself as the world's sixth most populous nation. Growing at 2 percent per annum, it can forecast adding another 70 million, for a total of more than 245 million, by 2030.

But what lies ahead is also the opportunity to utilize today's youthful population to reap a demographic dividend—so long as investments are made right now in order to capitalize on the demographic gift coming its way. What may seem like difficult investments today are not a choice but an imperative, to prevent the loss of human potential, to turn around the country's future, and to ensure that Pakistan develops into a secure and prosperous society.

THE TRANSITION IN FERTILITY

Fertility levels in Pakistan began their transition in 1988-90, about 10 years later than in most of South Asia. Finally, the anti-natalist policy, in the form of the population program initiated in 1965, even with its diversions and diluted implementation, could claim some tangible results. Starting in the late 1980s, fertility fell over a period of 12 years from 6.5 or more births per woman to 4.2. The decline began predictably in

Zeba A. Sathar is Pakistan country director at the Population Council in Islamabad. The author would like to acknowledge the extended review and assistance offered by Batool Zaidi in writing this essay.

urban areas and followed about eight years later in rural areas, at roughly the same speed of decline. Contraceptive use doubled from 1991 until 1998, and things appeared to be following the typical, and possibly the fastest, Asian decline (Feeney and Alam 2003).

But the spurt of the decline did not continue, and the last six or possibly 10 years have seen a definite stagnation in contraceptive use—at about 30 percent—and a slowing of the pace of decline in fertility. Contraceptive use differentials have widened by economic class and urban/rural residence, mirroring the rising and persistently unmet need for family planning services. The gap between demand and supply of services, the unmet need, is 25 percent or higher, and the high proportions of dropout users, in the range of 20 percent, are now a cause for major concern, reflecting the failure to provide services to poor and rural families (Population Council 2009).

In fact, when the fertility transition is seen through economic, educational, and residential differential lenses, there are different scenarios for different subsections of society. The rich and the educated have fertility levels of two children less than their poor and uneducated counterparts. The fertility levels of two to three children among the most educated Pakistanis are close to educated elites elsewhere in Asia, while the poor and uneducated lag behind, not surprisingly, at levels of six or more children now found only in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa.

More surprising perhaps is that despite rapid urbanization (almost 40 percent of Pakistan is urbanized), this has not been the driver of lower levels of fertility. If anything, the urban/rural fertility differentials are diminishing over time. The differential that has emerged much more visibly and widely is that between the rich and the poor, even higher than that between the educated and uneducated. Once again, the differences in availability of family planning services appear to be the bottleneck in equalizing these fertility differentials (Zaidi 2009).

It could probably be argued quite convincingly that the contraceptive prevalence rate today is not enough to support a total fertility rate of four or fewer births per woman, and the main driver of the decline in fertility rates has most likely been the rising age at marriage and accompanying increase in the gap between generations—i.e., tempo of fertility. The singulate mean age at marriage[1] of females rose from 16 to 22.8, and of males from 18 to 26.4, between 1961 and 2007. This is an amazing

phenomenon quite outside the purview of any policy or program. Its contribution is probably greater than the meager rise in contraceptive use, not just to fertility decline but to population growth rates as well.

Added to this is the widespread recourse to the use of induced abortions, estimated in 2001 as one million a year, with one in seven pregnancies ending in an induced abortion. In other words, the evidence is compelling that Pakistani women, usually aged 35 or more with three plus children, are using abortions to regulate fertility (Sathar, Singh, and Fikree 2007).

EXPLANATIONS FOR LIMITED SUCCESS IN LOWERING FERTILITY

Population Issues Not Fully Understood, Therefore Not Seriously Tackled by Policy and Programs

While demographic issues are brought out periodically as a topic of deliberation when doomsday scenario forecasts are discussed, these issues are sidelined when times are economically good or when more pressing issues are at hand. At no point has serious attention been devoted to studying Pakistan's large population numbers, their distribution, and the implications they hold for the country's development, politics, and ultimate stability. In fact, the demography of Pakistan and population policy has largely been only the responsibility of a particular ministry and a handful of professionals and organizations, with virtual state denial apart from occasional statements from senior officials on World Population Day or similar occasions. No serious debate has taken place in the parliament, the senate, or for that matter, in any of the think tanks or universities, or by the media, which is quite vibrant and free and usually responsive to issues close to public hearts and minds.

General Ayub Khan was the country's first leader to announce emphatically, in 1965, that Pakistan did have a population issue that needed attention, and who assigned an important individual at the helm of the population program. Ironically, the military dictator's view about population issues was that of a beneficent leader; he made the connection between the well-being of the population, the country's resources, and its size. He did so at a time when the first Pakistan census, in

1961, revealed a total population of only 43 million (in West Pakistan), which preceded the real spurt in growth, which led to a doubling of the population to 84 million by 1981. Civil society was more advanced in its thinking, as it should be, recognizing even earlier (in 1958) that an active family planning program was the need of the moment. The Family Planning Association of Pakistan started its own voluntary non-governmental program at that time, and has had a huge imprint on the government program operating by its side for many years.

It is not surprising therefore that a nation such as Bangladesh (a former part of Pakistan) recognized much earlier that it had an issue of unsustainable population growth. Even a conservative country like Iran, where Imam Khomeini recognized the need and announced a policy only in 1992, has found the trajectories to achieve fertility reduction much more rapidly and much earlier than Pakistan. It is as if whatever happened in Pakistan's demographic transition apart from earlier declines in mortality has occurred outside of policy and accompanying programmatic frameworks.

While politicians may find population issues contentious and sensitive for religious reasons or for reasons having to do with allocation of national resources, it is curious that the country's economists and planners are guilty of neglect of this important matter, which is here to haunt them now and certainly will haunt them even more a few decades down the line. Undoubtedly, the Planning Commission's Third Plan onwards mentioned population growth impinging on resources, but the interlinkages and the reasons why Pakistan's population continued to multiply were not seen as central to development planning.

The Influence of International Politics

International population movements and politics have definitely affected the twists and turns of Pakistan's policies. The population doomsday scenario evolved out of Paul Ehrlich's "population bomb" idea and the Harvard Group planners who were wired into international anxieties about resources being out of balance with rapid population growth spurts worldwide. The International Conference in 1965 reflected that thinking, only to be upturned in 1975 at Belgrade by thinking regarding

development as the best contraceptive, which stalled the focus on family planning programs, only to be reversed in Mexico in 1984.

The real landmark was the UN International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in 1994, when the best possible balance was sought between population and development interlinkages. Ironically, this took its biggest toll on family planning programs. Instead of having the impact of penetrating and permeating to all aspects of development, ranging from education, women's development, environment, and health (to mention a few), the main result of the ICPD was the evolution of the term "reproductive health" (RH), which was a holistic concept encompassing many aspects of family planning and safe motherhood, gender-based violence, etc. RH was a great concept but a challenge to implement, since responsibility for RH cut across many ministries, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other partners. The diffuse and large set of programs to be implemented, combined with the dip in U.S. support for family planning, led to a dramatic reduction in resources internationally for both reproductive health but especially family planning. Furthermore, the AIDS epidemic caught attention, and international funding for HIV/AIDS increased several fold while funds for RH, especially family planning, dipped radically, falling to their lowest levels in the early years of the first decade of the present century.

Naturally, Pakistan, a country largely dependent on international funds, and social spending in particular, suffered financially. To the credit of the Pakistan government, it did not allow funds for the population program to suffer. In fact, the entire budget has come from the public exchequer for the last 10 years. However, in the very recent past, development funds have been more scarce and population issues somewhat lagging on the long priority list. The outcome has been flagging indicators for Pakistan; it is not surprising that the UN Population Commission in its 2009 meeting singled out only three countries outside of sub-Saharan Africa, including Pakistan, with much lower levels of development, populations of more than 40 million, and fertility rates of four or more (Sathar and Zaidi 2009).

The Impetus of ICPD and the Government Response

The ICPD did act as an impetus to revitalize the reproductive health sectors. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's important statement supporting reproductive rights at the 1994 ICPD conference provided additional impetus. Of the two major innovations that were the result of the ICPD, one was the launching of the Lady Health Workers program, a huge public sector program currently employing close to 100,000 women, with a basic mission to provide family planning and primary health care in remote rural areas and in urban slums. The second was the setting up of the National Trust for Volunteer organizations, a successor of a similar NGO Coordinating Council.

A new population policy was initiated in 1998, and passed in 2002 by the Cabinet as a statement supporting a commitment to population issues. The principles were strong but implementation details were weak. Essentially, elements of the policy underscored the need for an expeditious completion of the fertility transition, good intersectorial links, and intertwinement with development programs. Unfortunately, while tackling the fertility decline, not much attention was devoted to how exactly this would happen and the resources it would require. Once more, much was left to doing things the way they were, with some expansion in numbers of outlets and workers. Very little attention was given to details of coordination between the two main line ministries of health and population welfare, or to their respective provincial departments that are mandated to deliver services, or to the health system and lady health workers. There has also been insufficient heed and concern about the supply of contraceptive commodities, and on the role of the private sector through social marketing, which was expected to expand to rural areas but remained restricted to urban areas through the organizations like Key and Greenstar.[2]

In recent years there have been spurts of activity, such as the Population Summit 2005, which instigated the formulation of the National Population Commission. Unlike the debate that preceded the formulation of commissions in Indonesia and Brazil, the formation of the Pakistani commission resulted from a directive by the prime minister. The commission has had only a single meeting since then. In other words, a commission whose purpose was to coalesce support

for the population sector nationally, provincially, and intersectorially remains effectively dormant.

The Influence of Low Levels of Social Development

Investment in visible development has most definitely been a priority in Pakistan's development planning and policy ethos. This has contributed to a very encouraging outlook for improving the quality of physical life, with especially marked improvements in electricity, sanitation, and road access. However, not even a fraction of that level of effort has gone to the missed opportunity— investment in people and especially in women.

The sheer underinvestment in Pakistan's education and health sectors and consequent poor statistics regarding health, school enrollments, and literacy (not to mention the even more dismal statistics for female education) are clearly strong manifestations of the state not making human development a high priority. Roads, dams, and power stations have been foremost in the minds of planners and politicians, rather than literacy and schools and the vision to see an educated population as a compulsion for progress. The problem is beginning to come home to roost, since Pakistan has 49 million illiterate people, only 69 percent of children aged 5-9 enrolled in school, and maternal and infant mortality rates as high as 276 and 76 per 100,000 live births respectively.

In fact, if one were to single out a factor that has most impeded progress in development in Pakistan, particularly in terms of situating Pakistan to move forward at this point in its history, it would have to be the neglect of female education. It was pointed out as early as the early 1980s by no other than the well-known economist Lawrence Summers (in an address at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics) that Pakistan had to invest in all people, not just some people, singling out the drawdown effects of underinvesting in female education in particular (Summers 1992). While there have been some recent gains and female educational enrollments have caught up in the urban areas, female literacy (at an overall 44 percent) stands at 63 percent among 15-19 year olds, compared to 78 percent for men aged 15-19. Much more needs to be done. In particular, the indicators for girls, whether in enrollment, dropout, or type of schooling, reflect severely hampered chances in rural areas.

An interesting comparison is neighboring India, where the family planning program was initiated at about the same time as in Pakistan. However, the response in terms of fertility change was quite different in north and south India. Supposedly the same program was implemented differently in separate states, and produced quite a stark contrast in terms of initiation and pace of decline. Much of the explanation has been attributed to differences in women's status and educational levels, which are much better in the south than the north. To date, the contrast exists with states in the south (Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka) displaying almost replacement fertility and below, and states in the north (Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Jharkhand) with levels of fertility almost resembling Pakistan. The point is that policy alone is not sufficient to determine fertility changes. Social development and literacy, particularly among women, are also very important drivers of change. The resemblance of north Indian states with Pakistan in terms of fertility and women's status indicators supports this argument.

THE DIVIDEND COMES TO PAKISTAN

A second surge of interest in population issues occurred with the discovery by the government—reflected in its Vision 2030 document and the Pakistan Development Forum 2007—of the demographic dividend coming to Pakistan. The assumption in most circles was that Pakistan would experience benefits similar to those that impacted East Asia a decade earlier. While the opportunities in the form of more youthful age structures and shrinking of the child population were discovered, little attention was given then, nor subsequently, to understanding what else was entailed in reaping the dividend. The dividend is just a mere possibility to utilize more favorable age structures to enhance income, increase savings, and reduce consumption, and thereby benefit economic growth. But the conditionality on which this is contingent is formidable, and not widely understood or appreciated.

The changes in age structure have definitely become visible, and the age pyramid reflects a broadening, with a growing potential working-age population and a smaller child population. This change will continue until 2030 or 2050, depending on the speed of the fertility decline. The increases in the working-age population are in the millions, adding a

potential three million young persons to the labor force (Arif 2009). There are important caveats to consider in ensuring that this increase will be reflected in additional employment for as many young persons. These challenges require careful thought and attention by those who are serious about utilizing this opportunity for a turnaround in Pakistan's future.

Since urban fertility has declined to lower levels, the demographic transition features will impact urban areas before rural areas, and the educated rather than the uneducated, because of the fertility differentials discussed earlier. The transition-related age structural changes generally favor those sub-populations whose fertility declines first in the overall national transition. They will necessarily impact all households progressively as fertility decline becomes more pervasive. For instance, household size has declined for both poor and non-poor in the last 15 years, but the increase in working members and reduction in numbers of children at the household level are much more dramatic in richer households (Population Council 2009). The compilation of consecutive economic surveys shows that the demographic dividend favors non-poor households first and presumably poorer households after a considerable lag. These differences are likely to perpetuate inequalities further when poorer households underinvest in the education of their children, due mainly to limited resources.

A strong accompanying feature is that savings rise with greater numbers in the working ages. We find a close positive connection between savings and the number of youth of working age and the number of women of working age (Akhtar 2008). Higher consumption is associated with larger numbers of children in high dependency households; conversely more adults are associated with a greater savings propensity. This is especially augmented if the labor force offers adequate opportunities to employ all members (especially females) of working age.

Let us discuss in detail the three levers required for Pakistan at least to position itself to reap the demographic dividend.

First: Ensuring a Speedy Fertility Decline While Reducing Differentials

The most important priority is a policy dialogue about how exactly Pakistan is planning to reduce its fertility from its current levels of four

to replacement levels of two. How will we start to reduce unwanted fertility and differentials in fertility? This will necessarily entail an increase in access to services for those most desperate for maternal care, child care, and family planning services—services that are currently far more available to well-off and urban women. If we do not address differentials, we are effectively leaving out women with unmet needs in the most isolated, poorest areas.

Clearly, strong direct interventions must fill the gap between palpable demand for good quality family planning services and availability. Access to services is a serious constraining factor, stronger now perhaps than demand, which earlier impeded acceptance of contraception and hampered use of family planning. The number of outlets, particularly in the public sector meant to serve the poor and the poorest, is just too meager (barely 15,000), and most are located too far, particularly for rural women who have to travel an average of 50-100 kilometers, in contrast to urban women, who are more likely to live within a five kilometer radius of a family planning service outlet.

Above all, the issue facing Pakistan is how development goals will be implemented. Once more, given the geopolitics and the war on terror that is sapping the government exchequer, social funding is first to be cut. Further, the transfer of responsibilities to the provincial governments presents another challenge as this transition has not been easily worked out in terms of modalities and fund flows. Service delivery is likely to suffer as a result.

Poverty is also a huge factor, given the increasing differentials in fertility and in unmet need, demonstrating that it is the poor both in urban and rural areas who face the acute crisis of service delivery, and who also face the worst aftermath of raising children whom they can ill-afford to feed or clothe, let alone send to school.

Second: Human Development Must Be a Crash Agenda

While there have been recent improvements in schooling levels, the education base of those entering the labor force is still low. Only 35 percent of 10-14 year-olds are in school today, and even fewer 15-19 year-olds are still attending school. Far fewer young women than young men will be equipped with even a basic education to enter the labor

force. The numbers of the out-of-school population are absolutely daunting. The challenge is twofold: the first is to accelerate efforts to achieve universal primary enrollment for both boys and girls within the next five years, and the second is to develop skills and opportunities for recouping the capabilities of the out-of-school population. Universal primary education in five years will ensure that those young people entering the labor force in the next 5-10 years stand some chance of gaining sources of livelihood, and of contributing to household income and savings. The out-of-school stock that currently stands at 10-29 million will continue to increase, and out-of-school programs particularly for girls, where the deficit is much greater, will require immediate attention.

Furthermore, the educational system is far from uniform, with the medium of schooling being one source of variation and the system of education another. Children graduating from an Urdu medium school in a rural setting, a madrassah in the private sector, or a poor-quality private school posturing as an English medium school are all disadvantaged by the types of teachers and curricula, not to mention the schooling environment, to which they are exposed. Even taking into account these differences, what may fill the gap is an ideal training program tailored to the needs of the employment market. Young persons in Pakistan, even girls, are readily available for skill training, and with the minimal of inputs can learn new skills at these ages. However, at the moment there is no mechanism for assessing what skills are required, and what are not. Young people mainly rely on available job opportunities as a gauge of what skills they should pursue. Some educational institutions in the private sector fill the gap of providing those skills, albeit in a limited way. Market forces probably work best in this regard. Sadly, youth with fewer resources and less education do not have the ability to pay for the courses, the tuition, and the stint abroad to make the grade in terms of the scarce new job opportunities in computing, designing, and similar fields.

Third: The Economy Must Grow and Jobs Must Be Ensured

Perhaps the most critical component in this category will be planning (both in private and public sectors) for increased employment opportunities. The second would be to provide skills and education required to avail these opportunities, both at national and international levels. And lastly, the country must ensure that young women in particular, but women generally, are also in the mainstream of thinking regarding the provision of jobs.

A careful review of issues about employment must necessarily take stock of the economic situation and the outlook, which at the moment is extremely dire. New job opportunities are not going to appear automatically when the economy is growing so slowly. It is heartening to note that unemployment rates have not surged, that in fact the jobs created in the days of high economic growth rates a few years ago are based on national growth rather than linked to internationally created jobs. But clearly, greater unemployment is on the horizon. The good thing is that the government is aware of this. The private sector too has to play a greater role in job opportunities that must necessarily focus on opportunities for new entrants, those aged 15-24, into the labor force.

Labor force participation rates of women are barely 20 percent. However, women and young women in particular are eager to work. Job opportunities for women have to be deliberately created. At the moment, the trends are that women are taking up jobs left behind by men when they migrate to off-farm occupations. Some new off-farm opportunities like Lady Health Workers or the service industry in urban areas are creating a sea change, but these opportunities are too few and do not alter labor participation rates hugely.

In general, new industries, whether in services or elsewhere, have to be explored and cultivated. At the moment, almost half of employment is in agriculture. The most urgent need therefore is to move from agriculture to nonfarm industries.

THE CROSSROADS

Pakistan is at the crossroads of the decision to move forward with its 175 million plus population, and an almost 100 million under-25 population, with a positive outlook of investing in its people and viewing them not as a bane but a boon. The alternative is clear: to absolve all public responsibility for the quality of the population, its basic health, education, livelihood, and security, and throw one's hands up in despair at the demographic doom of ever increasing numbers that would in due course lead to the country's implosion. Many nations, including Islamic countries with large populations like Indonesia, Bangladesh, Iran, and Turkey, have taken destiny into their own hands and turned around the lives of future generations. Pakistan too has the potential to do so.

- For this turnaround to happen, there has to be open debate, discussion, and decisions about the priority of issues. Adequate services for poor and underserved families who are desperate not to have more children is a right to be ensured and no option exists. Such families have a right to quality primary health care services that include family planning.
- After having missed several decades of progress in education, and produced several generations of uneducated, illiterate Pakistanis, it is high time to ensure that every child today has a basic education.
- Above all, ensuring or at least looking ahead to plan a livelihood for our young population and to induct women into productive jobs or livelihood opportunities is absolutely essential. Today we stand on a precipice. If we do not ensure that women move rapidly into the labor force, we can very well fall off that precipice and face decades of human potential untapped, influencing future generations as well.

These three are not hard choices. It is just a question of planning ahead rather than accepting the alternative. Above all, we must not give up or blinker our vision and concentrate only on today and not even the tomorrow five years ahead.

REFERENCES

Akhtar, Sajjad. 2008. "Demographic Transition and Household Savings Evidence from Pakistan." In *Briefing Paper on Demographic Dividend*. Islamabad: Population Council.

Arif, G.M., and Amena Arooj. 2009. "Absorption of Growing Labour Force in Pakistan: Actualizing the Full Potential of Demographic Dividend." In *Pakistan's Demographic Transition in the Development Context*. Islamabad: Population Council.

Feeney, Griffith, and Iqbal Alam. 2003. "New Estimates and Projections of Population Growth in Pakistan." *Population and Development Review* 29, no. 3: 483–492.

Population Council. 2009. "Examining Fertility Change and its Impact on Household Poverty and Welfare." Background paper for World Bank Pakistan Poverty Assessment Report. Islamabad: World Bank.

Sathar, Zeba, Susheela Singh, and Fariyal Fikree. 2007. "Estimating Abortions in an Illegal Setting: The Case of Pakistan." *Studies in Family Planning* 38, no. 1: 11-32.

Sathar, Zeba, and Batool Zaidi. 2009. "Fertility Prospects in Pakistan." Submitted to UN Expert Group Meeting on Recent and Future Fertility Trends. New York: Population Division, United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs.

Summers, Lawrence. 1992. "Investing in *All* the People." *The Pakistan Development Review* 31, no. 4: 367-404.

Zaidi, Batool. 2009. "Ensuring Fertility Decline." In *Pakistan's Demographic Transition in the Development Context*. Islamabad: Population Council.

NOTES

1 The average years of single life among women who marry before age 50, including those who remain single.

2 For a discussion of social marketing, and of the Greenstar program, see the essay in this volume by Sohail Agha.

Pakistan on the Move: Family Planning, Reproductive Health, and Development in Pakistan

Population Reference Bureau and National Committee for Maternal and Neonatal Health

Pakistan has seen some remarkable changes over the last few decades, with improvements in health, education, and the economy. Child mortality has decreased from 180 deaths per 1,000 live births in the year 1970 to 108 in 2000, with the figure further decreasing to 87 in 2009.[1] Over a similar time period, the percentage of women ages 15 to 19 completing primary school has increased from about 10 percent in 1970 to almost 40 percent in 2000.[2] Furthermore, gross national income (GNI) per person has increased from $380 in 1975 to $2300 in 2005.[3]

However, GNI per person provides only one piece of the larger picture of economic growth. Although overall national income per person has increased, three out of five Pakistanis still live in poverty, which means that 60 percent of the country lives on less than $2 a day.[4] Such high levels of poverty impact not only the country's economic development, but also its national stability, as people struggle to survive.

THE CASE FOR IMPROVED REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH

One way to ensure that Pakistan's families are better off, and that fewer people are living in poverty, is by meeting the reproductive health needs

---

This essay is based on a multimedia presentation developed by the **Population Reference Bureau** and the Pakistan-based **National Committee for Maternal and Neonatal Health** under the ENGAGE Project.[5] The presentation was delivered at the June 2010 Wilson Center conference by Yasmeen Sabeeh Qazi (Pakistan Program, The David and Lucile Packard Foundation, Karachi), and adapted for print by Marya Khan (Population Reference Bureau).

of the country's couples. Research from Bangladesh published in 2009 shows that reproductive health services improve the health of mothers and children and increase their rates of survival—and also contribute to reducing poverty.[6]

Not only are women the primary caretakers of their children and families, but they also make an important contribution to household economies and to the national economy, making up one-third of Pakistan's labor force.[7] The potential for their contribution would be even greater with improved reproductive health. When women cannot decide how many children to have, and when to have them, then they are more likely to suffer from poor reproductive health, and it becomes harder for them to meet the needs of their families and to earn an income.

Studies in recent years show that women in Pakistan would like to have about three children.[8] Pakistan has made some progress in meeting women's desires to limit their family size, but not enough, and not nearly as much as some other countries in Asia. Women in Pakistan still have about four children each, while women in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Iran have between two and three children each (several decades ago, they had significantly more).[9] One reason that Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Iran—all Muslim countries—have made so much more progress in achieving desired family size is because the governments of these countries made a political commitment and financial investment toward family planning. As couples in these countries have had fewer children, the pace of population growth has slowed, which has meant that governments have been better prepared to provide for the needs of their populations.

Pakistan was actually among the first countries in its region with a population policy and program, but implementation has been slow. Pakistan currently has the sixth-largest population in the world—about 180 million people.[10] If current fertility remains constant (meaning women continue to have four children each), then by the year 2050, Pakistan would have a population of over 450 million people. However, if the number of children per woman declines to two, then by the year 2050, Pakistan's population size would be about 335 million.[11]

REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT

Even if women start having only two children each, the population is still going to continue to grow for many years. What is crucial to Pakistan's future is managing this growth. To address this issue, one of the objectives of the new draft of the Population Policy of Pakistan is to reduce fertility to three births per woman by the year 2015.

It is also crucial that fertility levels continue to decline, because Pakistan cannot sustain such a high level of population growth. The growing population means more people in need of public services, including housing, water, food, electricity, schools, and health care. The government is already outstripping its current resources, and struggling to provide for the needs of Pakistanis. The country's rising population will continue to put pressure on the government's budget, crowding out other spending and investments, which in turn could mean slower economic growth for the country.

By managing the size of its population, Pakistan can address these issues and contribute to national development at the same time. And one way the government can start is by meeting the reproductive health needs of Pakistan's couples so that they can plan and space their children.

Only 22 percent of married women in Pakistan use a modern method of family planning. While 30 percent of women in urban areas use modern family planning, only 18 percent of women in rural areas do.[12] Given that about two-thirds of Pakistanis live in rural areas, it is important to pay special attention to this rural demographic.[13]

In addition to these women who are using family planning, there are many more women who would like to plan their families, but are not using family planning. About 25 percent of Pakistani women would prefer to stop having children, or wait two or more years before having another child, but are not using any method of family planning. These women have what is known as an unmet need for family planning.[14]

WOMEN'S UNMEET NEED FOR FAMILY PLANNING

Looking at unmet need among different economic groups in Pakistan, about one-third of the poorest women have an unmet need for family

planning, compared with 20 percent among the wealthiest fifth of the population.[15]

As a consequence of these high levels of unmet need, one out of every three pregnancies in Pakistan is unplanned.[16] Large numbers of unplanned pregnancies can lead to higher levels of fertility and population growth, straining the country's economic development. Unplanned pregnancies can also lead to high-risk births and abortion, and if safe abortion is not available, to unsafely performed abortions. These are abortions that are carried out in an unclean environment, often by unskilled providers.

In Pakistan, every year there are about 900,000 abortions, most of which are unsafely performed.[17] These numbers are high, and they indicate that abortion is a significant means of preventing unplanned births in Pakistan. Most women who have abortions in Pakistan are age 30 or above, and have three or more children.[18]

Increased family planning use has the potential to decrease the number of abortions by preventing unplanned pregnancies. Comparing family planning and abortion across several countries, one can see that as the percentage of women using modern contraception increases, the general abortion rate goes down.[19] This relationship suggests that fewer

Table 1: Modern Contraceptive Use and Abortion



*The number of abortions per 1,000 women ages 15-44 or 15-49

Sources: Country demographic and health surveys, Guttmacher Institute, Studies in Family Planning, *ORC Macro, and* International Family Planning Perspectives.

abortions take place. As shown in Table 1, Pakistan has a relatively low level of family planning use and a relatively high rate of abortion.

By increasing family planning use, Pakistan could decrease the abortion rate, and in addition save the lives of mothers and children. When couples can time and space their children, they have fewer high-risk pregnancies, which means mothers and children are healthier and have improved chances of survival. Fulfilling the unmet need for family planning in Pakistan could prevent around 23,000 maternal deaths and close to 1.1 million child deaths by the year 2015.[20]

Women's lives can be saved not only through the improved use of family planning, but also through better abortion-related services. The current abortion law in Pakistan, which was amended in 1990, states that pregnancy can be terminated if carried out in good faith during the early stages of pregnancy in order to save the life of a woman or to provide "necessary treatment." Many providers are unaware that abortions are permitted to provide necessary treatment, and most abortions in Pakistan are performed under unsafe conditions.

Consequently, many women suffer from post-abortion complications that require medical care. Almost 200,000 women are treated in hospitals every year for complications from unsafely performed abortions in Pakistan.[21] Additionally, there are many more cases that do not reach hospitals.

Not only do unsafely performed abortions have an impact on women's health, but they also place a burden on the healthcare system. Data on costs to the healthcare system are limited. However, based on cost estimates developed for Latin America and Africa, an approximate cost for treating complications from unsafely performed abortions in Pakistan would be around $22 million.[22] This figure is an estimate, and the actual costs are likely much higher, since this number only takes into consideration post-abortion cases that reach hospitals—not other health facilities—and it does not include costs due to lost productivity from illness or death.

These costs are a drain on scarce resources, which could otherwise be invested in the country's economic development. For example, by increasing the use of family planning, many unsafely performed abortions could be prevented, reducing the costs to the healthcare system.

According to recent research by the Futures Group's Health Policy Initiative Project, if Pakistan's government had committed to increase investment in family planning by $136 million between 2007 and 2015—which would provide the necessary financial resources to address the country's unmet need for family planning—substantial savings could have been realized. As couples have fewer children, the costs to meet the needs of the population would go down, including the costs for maternal health, education, water and sanitation, tuberculosis, and immunization. By 2015, the government could have saved about $400 million, which is about three times the amount it would have spent on additional family planning services ($136 million).[23]

Table 2: Family Planning Costs and Social Sector Savings



Source: USAID Health Policy Initiative.

THE ROAD AHEAD

There are reasons to be optimistic about Pakistan's economic future. This is because many countries around the world, such as Indonesia and India, have been able to make economic progress in part by managing

their population growth. Countries with smaller family sizes tend to have higher gross national incomes per person. This relationship is not necessarily causal, and having fewer children is not the only factor that can contribute to economic growth. However, it is one of the factors. Having fewer children can have a direct effect on individual and household wealth, because with fewer children to support, feed, clothe, and educate, each person in the family will have more resources available—and more resources *could* help many poor families break out of a cycle of poverty. In addition, with a healthier, more educated population, the country would be better positioned for economic growth and development.

At about four children per woman and a gross national income of $2300 per person in the year 2005, Pakistan still has a long way to go to achieve higher levels of development, especially compared to a country like Indonesia, which has between two to three children per woman and a gross national income of about $3500 per person.[24]

This kind of economic progress is not automatic. In order for it to happen, Pakistan's government must make a series of investments. These include expanding reproductive health services—including family planning programs—so that couples can plan and space their children. Such investments will also entail expanding abortion-related services to save women's lives. Investing in health systems is also important in order to improve child survival and health in general. Another key investment is improving educational enrollment, and especially girls' enrollment. Education is directly related to women's empowerment, their family planning choices, and their overall economic contribution to the country. Finally, it is crucial to stabilize economic conditions so that more jobs can be created. It is essential that there are economic opportunities for young women and men entering the workforce.

In order to make economic progress, Pakistan must step up the pace of its policy and program efforts. If improvements in family planning services can fulfill the unmet need of thousands of Pakistani women, help manage population growth to better meet the growing demands of Pakistani families, and result in millions of dollars saved for the Pakistani government, then why has the government not invested more heavily in family planning?

To be sure, there are many competing priorities, but few interventions yield the number of benefits to health and socioeconomic development that family planning does. And in today's financially strapped environment, family planning qualifies as a bonafide best buy.

Through simple, cost-effective interventions, like family planning and abortion-related services, Pakistan can have healthier women, break the cycle of poverty among the nation's families, and build a more stable and prosperous country. By working together, the government and civil society can keep Pakistan moving forward to achieve its economic and development goals.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

Through increased investment in reproductive health programs, the federal and provincial governments can ensure that district-level governments and civil society have the necessary resources to implement effective programs. It is important for all levels of government to work together to:

- Ensure family planning and reproductive health programs, including abortion-related services, are priority interventions in provincial planning strategies and budgets.
- Strengthen budget allocations for contraceptives, especially at provincial and districts levels where many decisions are made, ensuring that funds are directed toward rural and poor women.
- Issue public statements supporting family planning to mobilize political and popular support.

NOTES

1 Childinfo: Monitoring the Situation of Children and Women (UNICEF database), child mortality statistics, "Trends in Under-Five Mortality Rates, 1960-2009," http://www.childinfo.org/mortality_ufmrcountrydata.php.

2 Wolfgang Lutz et al., "The Demography of Human Capital Formation," IIASA World Population Program and Vienna Institute of Demography, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Laxenburg and Vienna, Austria, 2007, http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/humancapital.html.

3 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator.

4 World Bank, "Poverty Data: A Supplement to World Development Indicators 2008," Washington DC, December 2008, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/WDI08supplement1216.pdf.

5 ENGAGE serves the reproductive health needs of women by raising the visibility of unmet need for family planning and the high levels of unplanned pregnancies, and by highlighting their costs, consequences, and solutions. The project aims to promote policy dialogue on strengthening family planning and selected reproductive health services. More information can be found at http://www.prb.org/About/InternationalPrograms/Projects-Programs/Engage.aspx.

6 James Gribble and Maj-Lis Voss, "Family Planning and Economic Well-being: New Evidence from Bangladesh," Population Reference Bureau Policy Brief, May 2009, http://www.prb.org/pdf09/fp-econ-bangladesh.pdf.

7 *Pakistan Labor Force Survey 2007-08* (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics, December 2008), http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/fbs/publications/lfs2007_08/lfs2007_08.html.

8 *Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 2006-2007* (Islamabad and Calverton, Maryland: National Institute of Population Studies and Macro International Inc., June 2008), http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR200/FR200.pdf.

9 *Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 2006-2007* and "World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision," UN Population Division, http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2006/wpp2006.htm.

10 United Nations, "World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision," UN Population Division, http://esa.un.org/UNPP/.

11 Ibid.

12 *Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 2006-2007.*

13 Population Reference Bureau (PRB), "2009 World Population Data Sheet," PRB, Washington, DC, http://www.prb.org/pdf09/09wpds_eng.pdf.

14 *Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 2006-2007.*

15 Ibid.

16 Zeba A. Sathar, Susheela Singh, and Faryal F. Fikree, "Estimating the Incidence of Abortion in Pakistan," *Studies in Family Planning* 38, no. 1 (March 2007): 11-22.

17 Ibid.

18 Population Council, "Unwanted Pregnancy and Post-Abortion Complications in Pakistan: Findings from a National Study," Population Council, Islamabad, October 2004, http://www.popcouncil.org/pdfs/Unwanted_Pregnancy.pdf.

19 *Uganda Demographic and Health Survey 2006* (Calverton, Maryland: Uganda Bureau of Statistics and Macro International Inc., August 2007), http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR194/FR194.pdf; Susheela Singh et al., "Unintended Pregnancy and Induced Abortion in Uganda: Causes and Consequences," Guttmacher Institute, New York, November 2006, http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2006/11/27/UgandaUPIA.pdf; *Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 2006-2007*; Sathar, Singh, and Fikree, "Estimating the Incidence of Abortion"; Charles F. Westoff, "DHS Analytical Studies 8: Recent Trends in Abortion and Contraception in 12 Countries," ORC Macro, Calverton, Maryland, 2005, http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/AS8/AS8.pdf; *Turkey Demographic and Health Survey 2003* (Ankara, Turkey: Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies and Ministry of Health, General Directorate of Mother and Child Health and Family Planning, October 2004), http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR160/FR160.pdf; *Uzbekistan Health Examination Survey 2002* (Calverton, Maryland: Uzbekistan Ministry of Health, Analytical and Information Center; Uzbekistan Ministry of Macroeconomics and Statistics, State Department of Statistics; and ORC Macro, April 2004), http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR143/FR143.pdf; and Gilda Sedgh et. al, "Legal Abortion Worldwide: Incidence and Recent Trends," *International Family Planning Perspectives* 33, no. 3 (September 2007): 106-116.

20 USAID, "Achieving the MDGs: The Contribution of Family Planning, Pakistan," USAID Health Policy Initiative, Washington, DC, July 2009, http://www.healthpolicyinitiative.com/Publications/Documents/294_1_MDG_Pakistan_final.pdf.

21 Sathar, Singh, and Fikree, "Estimating the Incidence of Abortion."

22 Michael Vlassoff et al., "Estimates of Health Care System Costs of Unsafe Abortion in Africa and Latin America," *International Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health* 35, no. 3 (September 2009): 114-121.

23 USAID, "Achieving the MDGs."

24 *Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 2006-2007*; UN, "World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision"; and World Bank World Development Indicators 2007.

Historical Trends in Pakistan's Demographics and Population Policy

Shahid Javed Burki

Demographics remains an under-researched field in Pakistan. It has not received the priority it deserves either from the state—the Planning Commission, for instance, has paid little attention to the subject—or from the private sector think tanks working in the area of economics. Although during its formative years the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics did some important work on population trends in the country, its focus remained on pure demography.[1] Very little analysis was done by the institution—or for that matter, by any other analyst working in the area of population—to link demography with other aspects of Pakistan's development. That is surprising since demography has had a profound impact on the country's politics, its economics, and the shaping of its society. More than for most countries, population has been an important part of Pakistan's development. This is particularly the case when we factor the movement of people into the study of population and urbanization trends. In this brief exploratory essay we will review how population trends should be looked at in light of other developments.

This essay has five parts. The first offers an analysis of some of the major population trends in the country and highlights how Pakistan has

Shahid Javed Burki, a former finance minister of Pakistan, is senior visiting fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore; chairman, Institute of Public Policy, Beaconhouse National University, Lahore; and Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The author is grateful to Shahidul Isla, research associate at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, for the statistical work done for this essay.

managed to increase its population more than six times in the space of only 63 years. There will be some slowdown in the rate of growth in the future, but not enough to prevent Pakistan from almost doubling the size of its population in the next four decades. According to the present trends, the country's population is likely to increase 11-fold between 1947, when it gained independence, and 2050. The most important conclusion of this analysis is that the sharp increase in the size of the population reflects the failure of public policy.

The second part of this essay deals with the movement of people in the country as well as out of the country. Pakistanis living and working abroad have formed a number of diasporas that have begun to impact both positively and negatively on the development of the homeland. Migration of one kind or another has played a more important role in the country's development than is normally the case for developing nations.

The third section looks at the future, highlighting not only the large increase in population that is anticipated in the next few decades, but also the burden this will impose on the economy, the society, and the political system. The increase in population that has already taken place as well as expected further growth will have a profound impact on some of the resources vital for sustained development.

The fourth part examines the process of urbanization and its impact on the country. The process of urbanization underway in the country is not peculiar to Pakistan. It is shared by other countries that are at about the same stage of development as Pakistan. However, Pakistan is about to enter a phase of urban growth that has no precedence in its history or that of other large populous developing countries.

The fifth part will examine how Pakistan could turn its large and young population into an economic asset, or alternatively, have it become a social and economic burden. If the latter happens, there will be serious consequences not only for the country but also for the world, given the fact that most of the terrorist attacks—committed or attempted—in the recent past can be traced back to Pakistan. In a widely noted cover story in *Newsweek*, Fareed Zakaria called Pakistan the "supermarket" of terrorism, implying that for anyone wanting to become a terrorist, advice, training, and material are all available off-the-shelf.[2]

BROAD POPULATION TRENDS

Pakistan's population has increased by a factor of 6.2, from 30 million at the time of its birth in 1947 to an estimated 185 million in 2010, 63 years later. This implies a rate of growth of 3.2 percent a year, one of the highest among the world's more populous countries. It should be noted that the official estimates of the current size of the Pakistani population are much lower than those provided by the United Nations Population Division.[3] Pakistan did not hold a population census in either 2008 or 2010—a census in 2008 would have followed the one conducted in 1998, at the normally accepted interval of 10 years between censuses, while one in 2010 would have brought Pakistan in line with all other countries in terms of the timing of censuses. As a consequence, both the government and the UN agency are relying on estimates based on demographic models.

The rate of population increase changed over time, following the trend found in most developing countries. It was relatively slow in the beginning, averaging about 2 percent a year over a 20-year period from 1950 to 1970. It picked up once the rate of mortality fell because of economic development—particularly advances in health services—and climbed to over 3.1 percent a year in the 20-year period between 1970 and 1990. It began to fall as economic development reached most segments of the population, declining to below 2.5 percent a year between 1990 and 2010.

The government maintains that the rate of growth is now well below 2 percent—perhaps as low as 1.8 percent—while the United Nations estimates it is higher than 2 percent (Table 1). As Table 1 also shows, this decline was not as rapid as was the case in, say, Bangladesh or India. The difference between Pakistan and some other populous countries that have not seen their populations increase as significantly is that the period of high fertility lasted longer in Pakistan. This is where public policy failed.

Had the large and, for its time, innovative population program launched by the government of President Ayub Khan been kept in place, and had even 75 percent of its stated goals been achieved, Pakistan's population today would be only 145 million.[4] The cost of abandoning

Table 1: Population Growth Rates (Medium Variant) of Selected Countries, 1950-2050 (Percentages)

Years	Bangladesh	China	India	Indonesia	Pakistan
1950-1955	2.11	1.87	1.79	1.67	1.55
1955-1960	2.22	1.53	1.95	2.08	1.84
1960-1965	2.36	2.07	2.06	2.22	2.13
1965-1970	2.54	2.61	2.14	2.35	2.58
1970-1975	2.67	2.21	2.21	2.32	2.86
1975-1980	2.68	1.48	2.30	2.20	2.96
1980-1985	2.61	1.42	2.24	2.04	3.48
1985-1990	2.32	1.62	2.14	1.77	3.27
1990-1995	2.05	1.17	2.01	1.53	2.38
1995-2000	1.89	0.90	1.79	1.39	2.55
2000-2005	1.68	0.70	1.62	1.31	2.26
2005-2010	1.42	0.63	1.43	1.18	2.16
2010-2015	1.27	0.61	1.27	0.98	2.13
2015-2020	1.15	0.50	1.10	0.81	1.92
2020-2025	0.99	0.31	0.92	0.70	1.70
2025-2030	0.82	0.13	0.73	0.61	1.52
2030-2035	0.65	0.00	0.58	0.50	1.37
2035-2040	0.51	-0.10	0.48	0.37	1.24
2040-2045	0.39	-0.20	0.37	0.23	1.10
2045-2050	0.26	-0.33	0.25	0.10	0.94

Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects, *2008.*

the program after Ayub Khan was forced out of office was the addition of perhaps 40 million people. One other way of answering this "what if?" type of question is to determine what would have happened to the size of the population had Pakistan followed the same pattern of growth

as Bangladesh. It is interesting to note that Pakistan in 1950 had 2.4 million fewer people than Bangladesh. It took Pakistan 40 years to catch up with Bangladesh, when both countries had the same population size. However, 20 years later (the present moment), Pakistan has 20.33 million

Table 2: Size of Populations in Selected Countries and Regions, 1950-2050 (Thousands)

Year	Bangladesh	China	India	Indonesia	Pakistan
1950	43595	544951	371857	77152	41177
1955	48442	598226	406661	83856	44499
1960	54138	645927	448314	93058	48778
1965	60931	716270	496934	103978	54267
1970	69178	815951	552964	116921	61750
1975	79049	911167	617432	131329	71238
1980	90397	980929	692637	146582	82609
1985	102993	1053219	774775	162348	98309
1990	115632	1142090	862162	177385	115776
1995	128086	1210969	953148	191501	130397
2000	140767	1266954	1042590	205280	148132
2005	153122	1312253	1130618	219210	165816
2010	164425	1354146	1214464	232517	184753
2015	175217	1395998	1294192	244191	205504
2020	185552	1431155	1367225	254218	226187
2025	195012	1453140	1431272	263287	246286
2030	203214	1462468	1484598	271485	265690
2035	209929	1462351	1527879	278382	284561
2040	215339	1455055	1564763	283503	302801
2045	219589	1440289	1593852	286717	319891
2050	222495	1417045	1613800	288110	335195

Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects.

more people than what was once its eastern wing. According to these projections, Pakistan in 2050 will have 112.7 million more people than Bangladesh. If the rate of growth had been similar in Pakistan to that in Bangladesh, today's population would be almost 42 million smaller. This is another illustration of the negative consequences of the absence of a credible public population policy.

MIGRATION AND THE MOVEMENT OF THE PAKISTANI PEOPLE

Pakistan's experience with migration has had a profound impact on its economic, political, and social development. The people who are now citizens of the country have had a tradition of migration. People from many parts of Pakistan are to be found in numerous countries around the globe.

There were four distinct episodes involving the movement of people. The first occurred in a brief period in 1947 before and after the partition of British India and the founding of the Pakistani state. The second involved the movement of workers to Karachi from the country's northern areas. This lasted over a period of a decade and a half, from 1947, when Karachi was chosen as the country's capital, to 1961–62, when those employed by the central government began to move to Islamabad, a new city that was to be built as the country's capital near the garrison town of Rawalpindi. The third involved the movement of millions of Pakistani workers to the Middle East to help with the construction of infrastructure in that part of the world. This phase also lasted for a decade and a half, from 1973, when the Arab oil producing and exporting countries first imposed an embargo on the sale of oil to the United States and then increased its price to protest the latter's support of the state of Israel, to 1991, when the construction boom came to an end following the first Gulf War. The fourth wave of migration involved the arrival of 3–4 million Afghan refugees when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Each phase profoundly affected Pakistan.

By now it is well known that today's Pakistan is the result of the massive movement of people into the country at the time of independence. In one of my earlier works I estimated that some 14 million people moved in and out of Pakistan within a matter of a few months

after the British took the decision to partition their Indian domain on the basis of religion. Eight million Muslim refugees arrived from India and six million Hindus and Sikhs left in the opposite direction. Pakistan was thus left with a surplus of 2 million people, adding to a population of 30 million.[5] This increase in the population of 6.7 percent resulted in a sudden jump in the number of people living in urban areas, a subject to which I will return in a later section. This 1947 movement of people remains one of the largest in human history. When Pakistan took its first census in 1951, one out of four citizens who got counted was born across the border in what was now independent India. Or, to put it differently, 25 percent of the Pakistani population in 1951 was made up of refugees from India.

The "ethnic cleansing" that accompanied the decision to partition British India had profound consequences for Pakistan. One of the more important ones was to "Muslimize" the country. Before independence, the proportion of Muslims in the population of the areas that were to become Pakistan was about 65 percent of the total. After the population transfer, the proportion increased to 95 percent. Another "what if?" question about Pakistan's development is to suggest that had this Muslimization not occurred, Pakistan today would not be such a conservative Islamic country. The presence of a large non-Muslim population would have prevented the move toward developing such a strong Islamic identity.

There were other consequences of this transfer of population. More than a million and a half refugees went to Karachi, selected to be the capital of the new country, overwhelming the indigenous population of about 400,000. There were a number of reasons why the refugees headed toward the cities, among them the fact that they came mostly from urban communities. These immigrants dominated the economic life of the new country and also its bureaucratic structure. They had the skills, education, and social background to be able to do that. Only with the arrival of General Ayub Khan, the country's first military president, did the process I have described in my earlier works as the "indigenization of politics and economy" begin to take place.[6] This sidelined the refugees politically and economically to the point that they founded a political party of their own, now called the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). The MQM now occupies important political space

in the country. The dominant role played by the refugees initially in the decision-making process led to the neglect of agriculture and focused attention instead on the industrialization of the economy. Had refugees with an urban background not dominated economic policy-making in the country's formative phase, agriculture—by far the most important sector of the economy at the time of independence and the one with the greatest potential—might have contributed significantly to economic development.

The second large-scale movement of people also involved Karachi. The construction boom that started in Karachi following its choice as Pakistan's first capital brought to the city a couple of million low-skilled workers from the country's northern areas, particularly from the province now known as Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa. Their arrival further diluted Karachi's Sindhi character. Since a significant proportion of this group of people were Pakhtuns, Karachi over time was to become one of the largest—if not the largest—Pakhtun city in the world. The arrival of this community eventually led to ethnic violence in the city in the 1990s, which was brought under control only after action by the military. It was this ethnic mix in the city that was to make Karachi one of the more violent urban places in the developing world.

The movement of millions of construction workers from Pakistan to the Middle East—at one point an estimated 4 to 5 million Pakistanis were working in the region—had many consequences for the country. Two of these are especially important. The first is their exposure to the conservative Salafist and Wahabi sects of Islam that were well established in the Middle East, particularly in Saudi Arabia. Since the construction workers were not allowed to take their families with them, the mosque became the place of social interaction for the migrant workers. It also became the place where the local imams were able to influence the mostly poorly literate workforce, many of whom were from the northern parts of Pakistan, including the province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. The returning migrants contributed to the popularization of this form of Islam in the areas to which they belonged. This facilitated the rise of the Taliban in the late 1990s.

The second impact of the migration to the Middle East was considerably more beneficial. The workers sent a significant proportion of their earnings home as remittances to their families. For several years in the

1970s and 1980s, remittances exceeded 10 percent of Pakistan's gross domestic product. Not only did this flow of funds help the country that was perennially short of foreign exchange. It also significantly helped in alleviating poverty in the areas from which the workers came originally.

Over time the Pakistani diaspora in the Middle East was reshaped as the migrant workers, having completed their fixed-term contracts, returned home, to be replaced by professionals and workers in the service sector. With this change in composition, the Middle East as a source of remittances declined in relative emphasis while the diaspora in North America gained in importance. The Pakistanis who had made Canada and the United States their homes were considerably more prosperous than the diasporas in the Middle East and Britain. Pakistani-Americans supported the development of such social sectors as education and health in their original homeland, making this community one of the most generous of the many communities of foreigners around the world.[7]

The fourth movement—the least studied of the four discussed here—involved the arrival of millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. They were mostly housed in dozens of refugee camps established along the long border between the two countries. These camps were used to motivate, train, and equip an army of mujahideen (freedom fighters) to fight the Soviet Union's occupation of their country. Much of the funding for this effort came from Saudi Arabia, equipment from the United States, and logistical support and training from Pakistan. While the mujahideen were successful in expelling the Soviet troops from Afghanistan—the last Soviet soldier left the country in February 1989—a faction became the core of the Taliban movement.

However, not all the refugees stayed in the camps. Tens of thousands seeped into and settled in Pakistan's major cities. The largest number went to Karachi, which already had a large Pakhtun population. This brought further instability to an already volatile city. The Afghans operating out of Karachi came to dominate the long-haul road freight industry. They also won large contracts from the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan for the transport of supplies from Karachi to points along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

This brief discussion of the various movements of people in Pakistan and their impact in shaping the country's economic, social, and political development suggests why various migrations should be given consider-

able attention in understanding Pakistan's history. Demographics is more than a study of broad population trends; it must also include how the movement of people must be analyzed in order to fully understand the impact on a society.

PAKISTAN'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE

As shown in Tables 1 and 2 above, Pakistan will have the fastest growing population in South Asia for decades to come. According to one estimate—the United Nations' "median variant"—its population will reach 335 million by the year 2050. In 1950, Pakistan's population was 11 percent that of India; a century later the proportion will increase to almost 21 percent.

As discussed above, this increase in the absolute number of people will be accompanied by a steady decline in the rate of fertility. This will have a consequence for the median age of the population as well as the dependency ratio. At present, Pakistan has one of the youngest populations in the world. This is reflected in the median age of the population, which is only 21.3 years. This means that more than 92 million people in the country are below this age. As shown in Table 3, the median population age will increase by five years in the next two decades, reaching 26.4 years. Even with this change, the population will still be very young, making it important for the state to invest in educating and training its

Table 3: Median Age (Years) in Pakistan

Year	Median Age
2000	19
2005	20
2010	21.3
2015	22.5
2020	23.7
2025	25
2030	26.4

youth. This is an area in which the Pakistani state has done poorly, as was discussed in an earlier publication by the Woodrow Wilson Center.[8]

There are a number of demographic variables in addition to the change in the median age of the population that can be looked at in order to gauge the impact of population growth on the economy. Density of population—the number of people per unit of land—is one measure of gauging the pressure on resources that inevitably results from an increase in population. As shown in Table 4, population density is likely to increase from 186 persons per square kilometer to 334 over a 30-year period from 2000 to 2030. This increase will have many consequences. One is on the per capita availability of water. According to a World Bank report, water availability declined from 5,000 cubic meters per capita in the early 1950s to less than 1,500 cubic meters in 2009.[9] A country is regarded as "water stressed" when per capita water availability becomes less than 1,000 cubic meters. This level will be reached in the coming decade. Already concern about water has begun to figure prominently in Pakistan's discourse with its neighbor India, which is the upper riparian for most of Pakistan's major rivers. There is an impression in Pakistan that India is not fulfilling its commitments under the Indus Waters Treaty of 1950, which apportioned the main rivers of the system between the two countries. In other words, demographics has begun to impact Pakistan's relations with its neighbors, in particular India.

Table 4: Population Density in Pakistan (Population per Square Kilometer)

Year	Population Density
2000	186
2005	208
2010	232
2015	258
2020	284
2025	309
2030	334

Another consequence of rapid population growth is on the dependency ratio, defined as the number of people supported by a person of working age. As shown in Table 5, the proportion of people in the working age—15 to 59 years—is likely to increase by nearly nine percentage points over a period of 30 years, from 53.1 percent to 61.9 percent. This means that the burden of a large population will be carried for some time by the young—people who are in the work force. Public policy should be concerned during this time in making it possible for people to have well-paying jobs. It is only later, as the population ages with declines in the rates of fertility, that the provision of social security becomes a major concern for the state.

Table 5: Population Aged 15-59 (Medium Variant)

Year	Thousands	%
2000	78595	53.1
2005	92033	55.5
2010	105668	57.2
2015	119767	58.3
2020	134203	59.3
2025	149225	60.6
2030	164572	61.9

URBANIZATION AND ITS IMPERATIVES

One of the most important changes in Pakistan's economic landscape is already underway. Unfortunately, neither the government nor the private sector is ready to deal with it. In the next decade 50 percent of the Pakistani population—perhaps an even greater proportion—will reside in cities of many sizes and shapes. By that time the population will have grown to 226 million. This means that 113 million people will live in towns and cities. These people will need goods and services the economy does not produce in adequate quantities at this time. Moreover, this gap between need and supply will increase unless the government—and within the government, the Planning Commission—

takes careful stock of the emerging situation and does adequate planning for the future.

The McKinsey Global Institute has, over the years, studied urban development patterns in the developing world and identified how governments can and should deal with them. Its latest report, pertaining to India and published in April 2010, paints a grim picture of what is coming to that country.[10] "Even today, India's cities are failing to provide a basic standard of living for their residents. But life could become much tougher as cities expand," write the authors of the report. "Demand for every key service will increase five to seven times in cities of every size and type." Among the many shortfalls that have to be provided for, McKinsey pays special attention to housing and infrastructure. Indian cities will need to add 700-900 million square meters of residential space in order to cope with the expected demand. This is equivalent to adding a Chicago every year. As much as $1.2 trillion worth of investment is needed to close the current supply-demand gap and cover the expected demand for the future.

There is no equivalent base of information available in Pakistan on which the government and the private sector can act. Why emphasize the private sector? There are many reasons for this, of which two are particularly important. The Pakistani government is short of the resources needed to meet the current and coming demand. The extreme shortage in the availability of electric power is an example of both lack of public resources to supply what is needed as well as the absence of long-term planning. The second reason for the emphasis on the private sector is that the coming rate of urbanization will increase the demand for goods and services that only the private sector can provide. That sector has to recognize what is needed and begin to plan for the future. There is money to be made by those who begin to invest now for meeting future demand. Most of the additional demand will come from urban areas. This means that the private sector needs to reorient its production to meet the needs of people living in towns and cities.

The United Nations Population Division has estimated the pattern of growth of Pakistan's urban population over the next couple of decades. It sees the urban population more than doubling between 2000, when it was estimated at 48 million, and 2025, when it is expected to total more than 104 million. At the start of this century, a bit more than 33 percent

Table 6: Pakistan's Demographic and Urbanization Profile

	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025
Rural population (thousands)	96476	102945	109158	115061	119245	120913
Urban population (thousands)	47884	55135	64192	75598	89070	104042
Urban (%)	33.2	34.9	37	39.7	42.8	46.3
	2000-2005	**2005-2010**	**2010-2015**	**2015-2020**	**2020-2025**	**2025-2030**
Rural annual growth rate (%)	1.3	1.17	1.05	0.71	0.28	-0.05
Urban annual growth rate (%)	2.82	3.04	3.27	3.28	3.11	2.8

Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects, *2008.*

of the population lived in the country's towns and cities. That proportion will increase to over 46 percent in 2025. There will be a steady decline in the rate of growth of rural population. The rate is likely to decrease from 1.3 percent in 2000-05 to only .28 percent in 2020-25. In 2025-30, the number of people residing in the countryside will actually decline. This means that the number of people migrating from rural to urban areas will outnumber the natural increase in the rural population.

There will be some change in the distribution of the urban population among cities of different sizes. Karachi will remain the largest city with its population increasing from an estimated 13 million in 2010 to 19 million by 2025. By then Lahore will join Karachi as a megacity, defined as those with populations of more than 10 million people. Lahore's population will increase from 7 million in 2010 to 10.5 million in 2025. However, there will be a slight decline in the proportion of these two cities in the total urban population, from 32.3 percent in 2000 to 28.5 percent in 2025. This is in keeping with the trend the United Nations believes will occur all over the developing world. The earlier belief that a few megacities will dominate the urban landscape has been abandoned in favor of the suggestion that secondary cities—those with populations of 1 to 5 million—will become the dominant form of urban presence in the emerging world. The McKinsey report on India finds that that

will indeed be the case for that country. However, the projections by the United Nations do not see that trend for Pakistan. In Pakistan the share of smaller cities in the range of 0.5 to 1.0 million more than doubles in the quarter century between 2000 and 2025, increasing from 3 to 7 percent. The number of cities in this category will increase from only two to 11 during this period (Table 7).

What these numbers show is that Pakistan is at the threshold of a major demographic transition, as important as some of those that have occurred before. This will create both problems and opportunities for the country, which it is presently not well equipped to handle. Demographers and development economists recognize five dimensions of the management of urban policy—funding, governance, overall planning, sectoral planning, and urban shape. The resource constraint the country faces is well recognized. The government's approach to overcome this is to go hat-in-hand to groups such as the Friends of Democratic Pakistan, which held yet another meeting in Islamabad on July 17, 2010, to which Islamabad presented its energy policy and asked the "friends" to finance it. This approach is not viable over the long run.

The "friends" are prepared to turn up at these meetings since Pakistan today is regarded as the epicenter of global terrorism. This threatens the entire world, and the entire world has concluded that one important step to deal with this situation is to stabilize Pakistan and develop its economy. That way the vast armies of youth produced by an unrelenting increase in population will get occupied with the economy and not be tempted to express their frustration through the use of violence directed at both internal and external targets. Depending on this international reading of the situation in Pakistan for a long-term approach to one aspect of the country's demographics is to postpone the important task of finding a solution that depends on domestic structures rather than on foreign help. This will require both policy and structural change to raise resources internally for building urban Pakistan. What the planners must be committed to is something other than preparing another strategy for financing by the Friends of Pakistan.

What is needed is a viable urban policy. The first step in that direction is to hold a population census. And with the census should come a household survey that will tell us how much people earn and spend and what the various categories of expenditure are. This information

Table 7: Urban Population (in Millions), Number of Cities, and Percentage of Urban Population

Year	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025
10 million or more						
Number of agglomerations	1	1	1	1	1	2
Population	10.019	11.553	13.052	14.855	16.922	29.606
Percentage of urban population	21	21	20	20	19	28
5 to 10 million						
Number of agglomerations	1	1	1	1	1	0
Population	5.448	6.259	7.092	8.107	9.275	0
Percentage of urban population	11	11	11	11	10	0
1 to 5 million						
Number of agglomerations	6	6	6	6	8	8
Population	8.433	9.742	11.137	12.851	17.116	19.593
Percentage of urban population	18	18	17	17	19	19
500,000 to 1 million						
Number of agglomerations	2	4	5	6	7	11
Population	1.208	2.553	3.513	4.637	4.795	7.724
Percentage of urban population	3	5	5	6	5	7
Fewer than 500,000						
Population	22.777	25.029	29.399	35.148	40.962	47.119
Percentage of urban population	48	45	46	46	46	45

is required in order for the government to provide services to people living in urban areas, and for the private sector to produce goods and commodities for their consumption.

WINDOW OF DEMOGRAPHIC OPPORTUNITY FOR PAKISTAN: POPULATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

Pakistan has yet to develop a robust public policy response to address the problem posed by a large, young, and rapidly growing population, or to make use of its demographic situation for the purpose of promoting economic and social development. As already indicated, the only time the state was deeply involved in population policy was during the period of Ayub Khan. Since then no particular attention has been paid by the government to demographics. The state needs to focus its attention on three aspects of public policy: reducing the rate of population growth; educating the young, improving their skill base, and providing the training to function in the modern sectors of the economy; and dealing with the problems posed by rapid urbanization. Here we will touch on the second and third issues; the first is adequately covered by other authors in this volume.

Most development economists now see some advantage in having a large and young population if the state is able to provide the youth with adequate training and education. This is because of the demographic asymmetry that now exists between the old industrial economies and populous emerging nations. The former have seen sharp declines in the rate of fertility, which have resulted in declining populations for many of them. The latter still have growing populations, rapidly for some such as Pakistan. Countries experiencing declines in population have become increasingly reliant on countries with large and growing populations. What is called "outsourcing" has become an apparent component of business and industrial processes all over the world. Most of the outsourcing is done by rich countries to less developed countries. India is a good example of the benefits that accrue from outsourcing when citizens can take advantage of the opportunities now available in Europe, Japan, and North America.[11]

Table 8: Windows of Demographic Opportunities

Country	Period of Demographic Transition	Span for the Window (Years)
Japan	1955-1995	40
Italy	1975-1995	20
China	1965-2007	42
Chile	1970-2015	45
India	1975-2035	60
Bolivia	1995-2040	45
Bangladesh	1975-2025	50
Pakistan	1995-2045	50

Source: World Bank, World Development Report, *1997, p.7; author's calculations for Bangladesh and Pakistan.*

Table 8 provides an estimate of the duration during which the demographic window of opportunity is open for Pakistan. According to these estimates, the window opened later for Pakistan than for many other developing countries. In India for instance, the window opened in 1975 and is expected to close in 2035. For Bangladesh, the window will remain open for a period shorter than for India and will close earlier than in other South Asian countries. During these periods states with populations in excess of their domestic needs can prepare them for producing services for export. There are opportunities in a number of sectors, and not just in information technology (IT). As India has demonstrated, there is a growing demand for health services, entertainment, education, and publishing—sectors in which workers do not have to travel to the points of consumption in order to export.

My discussions with some of the entrepreneurs in Pakistan's IT sector suggest that a million additional people could be gainfully employed in this type of economic activity over the next three to five years. Were that to happen, the IT sector alone could provide $20 billion in export earnings a year by 2013-15. This would have a profound impact on the levels of incomes for the middle and lower-middle classes and, through forward and backward linkages, create employment and income

opportunities in other sectors of the economy as well. Some of the skill-intensive sectors that Pakistan is developing rapidly and impressively include fashion, pop music, and visual arts. Sports—in particular cricket—could be added to the list. Once again India, by organizing the Indian Premier League competition in cricket—privately owned franchises that employ not only players from within India but also from the outside world, and earn large revenues through television advertising—has shown how a skill-intensive sector can become economically attractive for all participants. Pakistan's artists and cricketers are now in demand not only across the border in India, but also in a number of western countries where India has already created some space for South Asian culture and sports. However, for the realization of the potential of these human skill-intensive sectors, the country will have to invest large amounts of resources in education and training. Most of this can be done by the private sector with government support. Some of this began in the period of President Pervez Musharraf through the Higher Education Commission and the Board of Control for Cricket.

Urban policy is another area where the state needs to get involved in order to ensure that employment opportunities are available for the expanding work force. Some of the policy initiatives that need to be taken were discussed in the previous section. Here I would underscore one important feature of the Pakistani urban landscape. In developing an approach to take care of the rapidly increasing urban population, planners must distinguish among four different urban areas—large cities, areas on the peripheries of large cities, medium-sized cities, and towns. Each of these areas faces different problems and has different economic opportunities. A one-size-fits-all approach concerning urban policy will not work. The state needs to get engaged in this area quickly.

CONCLUSION

What I have offered in this essay is a quick overview of the increase and development of the Pakistani population since the country gained independence more than six decades ago. Two themes run through the essay. One, some of the ways in which the country's population has grown and dispersed over time are unusual for a country of the developing world. The movement of people has played an important role in this develop-

ment. Two, the country at this time is at a point in its history where demographic concerns and opportunities must receive a considerable amount of attention from policymakers. Pakistan will pay a high cost for continuing to ignore this area in the making of public policy.

NOTES

1 Dozens of articles on demographics were published in *Pakistan Development Review*, the journal of the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, in the 1960s and 1970s. There has been less emphasis on the subject in recent years.

2 Fareed Zakaria, "Terrorism's Supermarket," *Newsweek*, May 7, 2010.

3 United Nations Population Division, *World Population Prospects, 2008* (New York: United Nations, 2008).

4 In his autobiography, President Mohammad Ayub Khan placed considerable emphasis on the need to control the rate of population increase. He put a great deal of faith in a family planning program supported by the state. The president was of the view that without a working family planning program, the country would not be able to realize its economic potential. See Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

5 I made this estimate as a graduate student in Harvard University's economics department in 1967-1971. I used the censuses of 1941 conducted in British India and 1951 carried out in Pakistan as the basis of this analysis, comparing data from the districts that were heavily involved in the process of migration. These estimates are generally accepted by most scholars working on South Asia. I first reported my findings in Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-77* (London: Macmillan, 1980).

6 See, for instance, Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan: A Nation in the Making* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).

7 For the extent of philanthropy associated with the Pakistani-American diaspora, see Adil Najam, *Portrait of a Giving Community* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

8 Robert M. Hathaway, ed., *Education Reform in Pakistan: Building for the Future* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005).

9 *Pakistan Water Economy: Running Dry* (Washington: World Bank, 2005).

10 McKinsey Global Institute, *India's Urban Awakening: Building Inclusive Cities, Sustaining Economic Growth* (London, April 2010).

11 See, for example, Thomas Friedman, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005).

A Society on the Precipice? Examining the Prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan

Moeed Yusuf

On the eve of the 9/11 attacks, few Pakistanis could have predicted that their country would undergo such a massive upheaval within a decade's time. Yet today, Pakistan faces multiple challenges which many argue have put the state's very survival at stake. Much global attention has focused on the extremist threat from various militant outfits that have managed to make significant inroads into the Pakistani state and society. In 2008-09, some even believed that the state would capitulate in the face of the militant onslaught. While such fears have subsided after successful responses by the military, the possibility of a radicalized Pakistan in the medium to long term has not been written off. There is still genuine concern about the potential for an emerging Pakistan that increasingly buys into extremist, pro-violence rhetoric and ideology. Were this to happen, the Pakistani polity would transform from a conservative but moderate society into one that sympathizes with the Islamist narrative presently confined to extremist circles.[1]

RADICALIZATION IN PAKISTAN: INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

Clearly, "creeping Talibanization"—as some have termed this threat—would not happen overnight. It would necessarily be a gradual process, influenced by various domestic and international events that would ultimately force the society to regress toward a radical Islamist ideology. This puts the spotlight on Pakistan's upcoming generation—its youth. With one of the most bloated youth cohorts in the world, these young

Moeed Yusuf is the South Asia adviser at the United States Institute of Peace.

Pakistanis' absolute control over the direction their country takes in the future is undeniable. Will a sizable proportion of this segment of society buy into the extremist message and see value in a radicalized, pro-jihad Pakistan? Or will it fight for a peaceful, moderate, and tolerant country? What are the key factors that will determine the direction Pakistan ultimately takes?

This paper focuses on Pakistani youth, and considers the threat of radicalization within their ranks in the years ahead. Given Pakistan's demographic make-up, the emphasis on the upcoming generation is much more pertinent than in the case of other states. Pakistan possesses an under-24 population whose size is second only to Yemen in terms of proportion of the total population. Out of Pakistan's approximately 180 million people, 59 percent—101.95 million—are below the age of 24. If one includes the 25-29 range in the youth category, the grand total comes to approximately 116 million people.[2] Moreover, Pakistan's youth bulge is projected to continue past 2025, leaving the under-24 population in the majority even in 2030.[3] Such a bloated youth presence suggests that the direction the critical mass of this demographic segment chooses to take the country will inevitably become Pakistan's destiny. Indeed, a move by young Pakistanis toward radicalization could allow the ultra-right to gain support for its militant agenda. Equally, a reaction against extremist branding would result in resolute support for moderation and peaceful coexistence.

This paper stops short of making any bold projections about the extent of radicalization in tomorrow's Pakistan. The requisite information required to make such an assessment is simply not available. Analysis here is limited to the dynamics surrounding the key factors that may facilitate a gradual move of society toward accepting and perhaps even supporting radicalization and religiously motivated violence. The focus is on supply-side factors that may encourage youth to join extremist ranks as well as on the often-ignored demand side (whereby militant outfits present a ready cause to fight for and actively seek recruits for this purpose). This paper argues that Pakistani society faces both supply- and demand-side drivers of radicalization. The supply drivers include the type of mind set that the majority of Pakistani children are growing up with, along with the rising sense of "relative deprivation" evinced by the country's youth. The demand drivers revolve around the extensive

militant presence within Pakistan, the state's outlook toward the threat such militants pose, and Pakistan's regional context. The policy prescriptions flowing from this discussion are presented in the paper's concluding section.

THE ROAD TO RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENCE: THE SUPPLY SIDE

Radicalization is a rather amorphous concept, especially if one seeks to measure objectively its prevalence in a society. Most often, radicalization is seen as a first step toward violence, which is taken up by a subset of a radicalized polity. As the term is most often employed in literature on youth, all those who perpetrate any form of organized violence are, by definition, considered to be radicalized. However, the type of violence, if it in fact occurs, differs across cases and is driven by the context that radicalized youth find themselves in. In Pakistan's case, the focus has almost exclusively been on the use of Islam as a political ideology that justifies and promotes intolerance and violence against certain foreign and domestic segments of society. Youth involvement in religiously motivated militancy, be it through Pakistan-based transnational organizations, groups targeting the Pakistani state, or sectarian outfits, is seen as the principal manifestation of radicalization in today's Pakistan. While other manifestations of the problem also exist (such as organized crime, gangs, and ethnic insurgencies in the periphery), it is this strand that remains most critical to U.S. interests, and indeed, for regional security and stability in South Asia. Therefore discussion here is limited to the threat of today's youth buying into a pro-militancy narrative that has a clear religious underpinning.

Literature identifies two mechanisms through which youth in a society may be radicalized and in turn take to violence. The supply-side factors preoccupying much of the narrative are known to "push" youth to join extremist ranks. The demand-side dimension gets to the ability of militants to operate in a particular environment and to have a ready cause that they wish people to join. In that sense, they are able to "pull" youth toward their agendas. Often enough, the push factors are seen to increase the likelihood of radicalization, while the presence of the pull factors signifies the tipping point whereby young men are actually brought into the extremist fold to pursue a violent agenda.

Literature on supply-side factors presents a number of explanations for youth radicalization. The early discourse borrowed heavily from sociological theories that focused on the nature of interpersonal relationships. Jeffrey Seul has argued that people who fail to develop a positive identity flock to extremist outfits, specifically religious ones, because religion is able to provide a constant sense of shared meaning.[4] Ideological beliefs and convictions of individuals about particular religious causes are believed to play a major role in religiously motivated terrorism. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malečková have hypothesized that the motivation to join terrorist ranks is an outcome of the "passionate support" for a particular movement.[5] In a comprehensive study examining the reasons individuals join religiously motivated terrorist outfits, Jessica Stern highlighted the importance of ideology and religious conviction.[6] She found that virtually all individuals involved in terrorism believed in a spiritual call that ordained them to rid the world of immorality. The susceptibility to buy into this discourse is directly influenced by the type of societal exposure a person experiences. Messages delivered through education often have the most lasting impact. Families, public messaging channels, and broader social interactions also play a role in molding mindsets.

More recent literature has focused almost exclusively on socioeconomic concerns to explain why youth radicalize. Within this broad framework, perhaps most prominent is the "relative deprivation" hypothesis. High levels of inequality—in cases where a privileged few are able to attain employment and land lucrative income-earning opportunities, while the socioeconomically disadvantaged (usually a large segment) remain completely marginalized—is often singled out as a key push factor. Robert D. Kaplan has concurred with this view, arguing that discrimination against specific segments of society can cause the disadvantaged to resort to violence.[7] Indeed, a sense of alienation from, and resentment toward, larger society is found to be common among radicalized youth. Societal disparity is believed to be responsible for transforming this sense of disgruntlement into extremist violence. While some, such as Robert Pape,[8] have challenged this notion by presenting empirical studies that show little correlation between relative deprivation or poor education and terrorism, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita has effectively defended the socioeconomic framework.[9] He establishes that the presence of educated and relatively well-off terrorists is a function of the supply surplus in the

terrorist market, a likely occurrence if ample economic opportunities are not forthcoming. Consequently, militant outfits can apply quality standards to recruitment; they tend to choose more skilled and well-educated terrorists for masterminding and conducting attacks against sophisticated targets. The foot soldiers, an overwhelming majority, are still selected from the deprived classes. Moreover, even atypical militants are found to harbor strong resentment and maintain a sense of alienation from larger society; if they are not deprived themselves, they may develop this feeling on behalf of the marginalized.

Supply-Side Factors in the Pakistani Context

The supply-side factors discussed above prevail in Pakistan. While the presence of such factors by no means guarantees radicalization or violence, it does signal a high susceptibility to them. The Pakistani education system creates mindsets that could leave most young members of society somewhat receptive to the Islamist message. Moreover, there are reasons to believe that alienation and marginalization among the deprived segments of society are growing steadily. Pakistan's socioeconomic development has been discriminatory, and has left the nonelite disgruntled.

Education's Role in Increasing Susceptibility to Radicalization

Islamist organizations are known to indoctrinate young recruits to convince them of the militant cause once they are brought into the fold. However, most youth who are pulled into militancy already exhibit some level of susceptibility to such messages. This comes from the socializing process they go through while growing up. Education and the larger societal narrative lie at the heart of this process.

The Pakistani educational system is anomalous at various levels. Two deserve attention here. First, the school system is bifurcated; three parallel education systems stratified along socioeconomic lines function independently of each other. Second, each system produces graduates with very different outlooks on life and the world around them.

The socioeconomic stratification of these three systems—public sector schools, elite private schools, and religious seminaries—is fairly rigid. The third school system, that of the madrassah, largely caters to children of the poorest segments of society. The majority of public school students (and of those attending nonelite private schools) come from the lower-middle to middle socioeconomic strata, while the elite private schools are preferred destinations for the richest. The three systems are so isolated that their respective students are completely cut off from each other. Mechanisms of cross-communication are absent and in fact considered undesirable, especially by the elite. This is much different from the Pakistan of previous generations, when the quality of public education was far better and attracted children from all segments of society, thus allowing for regular interaction virtually across the entire spectrum. A lack of understanding about the "other" and a ready acceptability of stereotypical misperceptions are natural outcomes emerging from such isolation, and bode ill for harmonious coexistence across the three educational strata.[10]

Even more disturbing is the fact that the three systems teach their own curricula, follow their own methodologies, and create their own benchmarks for measuring learning outcomes. The seeds of an inherently polarized society are present in the fact that young graduates across the systems see the world very differently. The madrassahs are the biggest concern, as they provide an extremely tunneled and highly skewed vision of the meaning of existence to their students. Their training flows from narrow-minded conservative (though not necessarily radical) ideological bases. Even though claims of a causal link between madrassah education and militancy amount to a misrepresentation, madrassah students do graduate with views potentially more sympathetic toward Islamist messages.[11] Coupled with a lack of acceptance in the wider society and a lack of political representation, these cadres are much more likely, at least theoretically, to associate themselves with Islamists where they are welcomed and given a positive identity.

The public school system has seen a massive qualitative deterioration since the 1980s, when religious and historical curricula became the casualty of a decade of forced "Islamization." Today, the textbooks consumed by public school students—in total these students account for 62 percent of all Pakistani children in school—have an outright conser-

vative and anti-India bias. National history is misrepresented and builds on Muslim military conquests, Muslims being distinct from others (especially the Hindus of India), accounts of colonial heavy-handedness toward and bias against Muslims, and the like. A supranational narrative of allegiance to the Muslim *Ummah* is also emphasized, thereby creating an emotional attachment to global Muslim causes and casting a suspicious lens on the motivations of non-Muslim global powers.[12] Given that the encouragement of critical thinking is virtually absent from teaching methodology, students tend to develop an inherently paranoid outlook, again making them more susceptible to Islamist messages that aptly connect the need for militancy with an anti-West, pro-*Ummah* narrative.

Children educated in elite private schools—such students constitute 10-20 percent of total educational enrollment in Pakistan—are able to receive high-quality education that promotes some level of critical thinking. While they are also bound to follow the prescribed syllabus for religious and "Pakistan" studies, in reality the unregulated nature of elite private school curricula gives students greater leeway. This is not to say, however, that they completely escape the official narrative. While more open-minded in their outlook on global affairs, products of top-tier private schools still share the "Pakistan under siege" and "Islam in danger" mindset, albeit to a lesser extent then their public and madrassah school counterparts. As individuals, they may be liberal and admire the Western lifestyle, but at the political level they are still likely to be antithetical to Western policies and sympathetic to Muslim causes globally. Of course, Western foreign policy failures in places such as Palestine, or more recently Iraq, help reinforce such beliefs.

There are two obvious avenues for Islamists to cash in on. First, since an overwhelming majority of Pakistani children grow up believing in a meta-narrative of their country and religion being under siege, and of Muslims having lost their past glory, a carefully branded message that uses these themes to justify militancy could find sympathy among youth. Second, the isolation of students across the three educational systems implies internal discord within the society that can be exploited. For instance, the elite harbor great disdain for their madrassah counterparts, whom they consider backward and responsible for some of the violence inflicted on Pakistan in recent years. Similarly, those attending madrassahs blame the elite for their economic woes and consider them surro-

gates of the West.[13] There are others reasons for societal frustrations and internal discord as well, a major one being political grievances.[14] Avenues for political representation in Pakistan are limited to the elite, with the overwhelming majority of the population completely left out. Islamists present a ready outlet to disgruntled youth.

The situation becomes even more disturbing if one considers the effect of the interpersonal relationships that sociological theories on radicalization highlight. A negative socializing effect is inescapable for Pakistanis. Since the 1980s, an entire generation has made its way through the country's schools, in the process internalizing the messages discussed above. As they have begun to enter professional life, they have carried their worldviews into the national discourse. Increasingly, a mindset that reinforces the siege mentality represented in school curricula has become part of the national ethos. Family structures, workplaces, and press and media outlets have become self-referential in promoting the same idea. The most obvious example is the decidedly right-wing bias of the vernacular press, and more recently the electronic media in Pakistan (which incidentally is the single most popular source of information for young Pakistanis). Not to mention, intolerance in society is also fed by controversial legal injunctions such as blasphemy laws, which are often employed to discriminate against minorities. The socializing effect is society-wide; it implies that even those who may never have attended school or remained outside the formal education ambit grow up internalizing the very same biases literate Pakistanis do.

Strong indications are beginning to emerge that educational biases and the socializing process in Pakistan have indeed facilitated the militant agenda. An overwhelming majority of profiled militants in Pakistan have some educational experience, either in madrassahs or public schools. Moreover, while intimidation and coercion have been used by militant outfits in winning recruits—this is especially true post-9/11—information provided by a number of profiled militants suggests that most are already convinced of the logic of Islamist militancy before they join a particular outfit. In fact, many foot soldiers involved in carrying out attacks had voluntarily made an effort to travel to militant camps and to present themselves as willing recruits.[15]

That the mindsets young Pakistanis develop as they proceed to adulthood provides an opening to the militant enclave is also obvious

from the Islamist rhetoric promoted by the ultra-right. The branding of militant messages is carefully calibrated to exploit the vulnerabilities of Pakistani youth. The rhetoric emanating from virtually all Pakistan-based militant outfits reveals two major themes: Islam under attack from non-Muslim forces (predominantly U.S. or Indian), and Pakistan's problems arising as a result of certain segments of society moving away from following the "true" Islam (the latter theme aims to accentuate internal societal tensions). Even groups like the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), whose principal target is Pakistani Muslims, portray their mission as being directed against the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan. Pakistani security forces, they claim, are only being attacked to punish them for their support of the U.S. mission and for allowing tactics such as drone strikes.[16] This approach leaves Pakistanis less than certain of just who to pin the blame for their miseries on. Since the Islam-in-danger slogan resonates, it leaves many in society to lend a sympathetic ear to the ultra-right's rhetoric. Indeed, so successful was TTP's branding that, until the last few years of the 2000s, the organization managed to keep the Pakistani nation ambivalent about the real nature of the threat the group posed.

Relative Deprivation Among Young Pakistanis

In terms of relative deprivation, the two most important indicators to observe are inequality levels in a society and opportunities for employment requisite with individuals' skill sets. Pakistan falls short on both counts. A rather impressive macroeconomic track record over its 63-year history is marred by skewed development priorities and a neglected social sector. The growth model has been exclusionary, disproportionately returning benefits to the already rich. Even during periods of economic expansion, inequality levels have risen steadily; this trend has continued unabated since 1970.[17] Today, the ratio of the highest to the lowest income quintiles stands at a staggering 4.2.[18] In light of the fact that the richest 20 percent of the population continues to gain, and possesses virtually all available luxuries, the country's overwhelmingly impoverished youth are bound to feel increasingly alienated.

Adding to the conundrum is the fact that the majority of Pakistan's youth are unable to find jobs commensurate with their educational at-

tainment. Interestingly enough, this is despite the fact that Pakistan's unemployment rate has been fairly low over the years; it averaged less than 6 percent over the past two decades. However, digging deeper, one realizes that underemployment rates are substantially higher. In other words, those with skill sets suited for more challenging, and often better-paying assignments, are forced to accept relatively menial jobs. Underemployment stems, among other factors, from a population growth rate higher than the absorptive capacity of the economy. In a system like Pakistan's, which lacks meritocracy and where corruption is rife, underemployment reinforces inequality. This is because it is always the children of the poor, with generally little access to the corridors of power, who are denied the prized positions. Even in the private sector, where recruitment is somewhat more transparent, the skill set desired for most entry-level positions is one boasted only by graduates of the elite private schools. The vast majority of Pakistani youth, coming out of public, non-elite private, and madrassah institutions, are left to fetch positions that constitute underemployment. For educated young men, underemployment ends up having just as much of an alienating effect as unemployment.

One positive attribute of Pakistani society, demonstrated by both young men and women, is a strong desire to attain a high-quality education and requisite employment. Even in poor households, the trend in recent years has been to save up or to take loans to put children through school. That said, strictly in terms of radicalizing potential, education presents a double-edged sword. One could even argue that no education may be better than poor-quality education that does not lead to respectable employment. To appreciate this point, consider that education is an expectation-builder. Parents and students desire and expect a more prosperous future after investing in education; a failure to realize their ambitions leads to an expectation-reality disconnect. Those left out—in Pakistan's case, this would include all those with some level of education who are either unemployed or underemployed—feel disgruntled. This not only keeps potentially productive human capacity from engaging in constructive endeavors, but also results in the nonelite developing resentment toward their more fortunate elite counterparts. With virtually all avenues for political representation and appeal also blocked off for them, they see no realistic avenues to channel their

demands peacefully. Pushed beyond a point, this reinforces susceptibility toward violent behavior.[19]

It is difficult to say with any degree of certainty whether the relative deprivation thesis has played a role in nudging young Pakistanis to join militancy in the past few years. Militants would hardly ever present a sense of alienation stemming from relative deprivation as the ultimate justification for their ideological convictions. In their minds, they are always driven by the political ideology of the message—the Islam-in-danger and need-for-justice narratives. Socioeconomic concerns, at best, operate as lingering factors in the background. Nonetheless, the little information that is available does suggest that while Pakistani militants vary in terms of their socioeconomic backgrounds, virtually all young men driven to militancy seem to harbor disdain for their nonviolent Pakistani counterparts and often manifest extreme resentment against the more liberal and well-to-do segments of society. The haves-versus-have-nots rhetoric is part and parcel of this discourse.[20]

Interestingly, individuals are known to have joined militancy to propel themselves out of their socioeconomic marginalization. For instance, in the troubled areas of Swat and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), where the TTP's influence has been most prevalent, a number of individuals have joined the group to raise their clout in an otherwise hierarchical society. Within TTP's ranks are criminals and outlaws who grew beards and professed piety in order to enhance their social profiles—which would otherwise be impossible given their hereditary position in society.[21] Clearly, societal disparities were at the fore of this calculus.

Finally, the TTP leadership's own tactics in Swat suggest that they too understand the opportunity relative deprivation in society can offer. They played a Robin Hood-esque role during their brief reign over Swat in 2008-09, snatching land possessions from the elite and promising to redistribute them among the downtrodden.[22] They also took control of Swat's world-famous emerald mines, and offered employment to those who joined their ranks.[23]

DEMAND SIDE OF TERROR: THE STATE AS A FACILITATOR OF MILITANCY

The presence of supply-side "push" factors indicates high susceptibility to radicalization. However, these factors alone are not considered enough to tip individuals over the line to full-fledged radicalism. After all, poor or distorted education systems and relative deprivation are by no means unique to Pakistan. They are prevalent in much of the developing world. Yet only a small minority of states experience systemic radicalization and violence. This points to the necessity of a complementary triggering mechanism that would put radicalization and violence into motion. Demand-side factors provide a robust explanation.

Demand-side "pull" factors signify the presence of a ready-made outlet for susceptible youth. A buoyant demand for Islamist militants, a ready cause to fight for, and easy access to militants all greatly increase the possibility of alienated and disgruntled youth actually taking to violence. As argued below, in Pakistan's case, it is the long-standing demand for extremists that has led a number of youth to join militant ranks; it is also the persistence of this demand that presents the single biggest challenge to the Pakistani state in terms of preventing its society from moving down a radicalized path.

Pakistan is an anomalous case when it comes to demand for terror. Most literature examining countries that fall prey to large-scale militarized violence has identified as a common trigger the systematic erosion of the state's capacity to either co-opt or neutralize the radical enclave. State weakness has been considered a prerequisite for nonstate actors to use violence effectively; this effectiveness has in turn created a demand for terror, and attracted youth to join in large numbers. Much to the contrary, in Pakistan's case, a relatively strong state has deliberately responded to the international environment and the self-defined strategic need to institute militancy as a foreign policy tool. In the process, the state has created an artificial demand for terror.

A state's role in expanding the demand for terror can perhaps best be explained through the resource mobilization lens, which is usually applied to social movements. This framework helps recast attention on the role of an institutionalized authority (read the state). As the name

suggests, central to resource mobilization theory is the role of resources in initiating and sustaining social movements. The concept of resources is not limited to monetary funding; it also encapsulates infrastructure, communication networks, and human resources, among other aspects that are believed to facilitate organized movements.[24] Some experts have argued that a complex interplay of organizational capacity, the ability to mobilize support, and the political environment surrounding the group ultimately determines the success of a social movement.[25]

Critical to this discussion is the role played by the overarching political environment. In the context of militancy, it points to the importance of the political dispensation or regime under which the movement is initiated. A favorable political environment enhances the organizational capacity and the potential for successful mobilization of a movement. Although states are most often seen as challengers to social movements, their role in supporting such movements either directly or indirectly is nonetheless acknowledged. Direct support is most likely in campaigns where the state's objectives match those of the movement. States can also pick sides; they can engineer a suitable political environment in which their preferred groups are able to access resources with greater ease.[26]

Applied to the Pakistani context, militancy was a movement the state chose to back. For two decades, the state acted as the key resource provider and facilitator of militant activities. By facilitating resource mobilization, it created the very conditions required for terrorist outfits to become sustainable and to maintain a high demand for terror.

The Pakistani State's Role in Resource Mobilization

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 created a regional context that led Pakistan to join hands with the United States in an effort to force a Soviet retreat. Pakistan did so by initiating a decade-long system of support for the Afghan *mujahideen*, holy fighters battling for the cause of Islam. The CIA channeled support to the jihadis through the Pakistani intelligence outfit, Inter-services Intelligence (ISI).[27] Pakistani Islamic parties were also active in providing material and personnel support.[28] The state funded the proliferation of madrassahs; their number more than doubled in a relatively short period of time. Much of this increase reflected gains for the hardcore Deobandi and

Ahl-e-Hadith versions of Islam that are extremely rigid in their religious interpretations and are regularly misinterpreted (deliberately by vested interests) to glorify violence in the name of religion.[29] The Pakistan-Afghanistan border remained porous during the jihad, and Pakistan allowed its territory to be used as base camps for the *mujahideen*.[30] In essence, Pakistan had created a ready infrastructure for militant training, leading to a surplus of jihadi fighters; the state had promoted institutions that would impart ideologically motivated religious education; and the government of the time allowed handpicked religious political parties to forge ties with militants and to penetrate society to promote their drives for charity, religious education, and the like.

The 1990s saw a perpetuation of this mindset, and a further crystallization of the pro-militancy policy. Demand for terror was kept artificially high. A two-pronged strategy was employed: support for the insurgency in Indian Kashmir (which had erupted in 1989), and support for a strict Deobandi movement, the Afghan Taliban, which was helped on its way to power in Afghanistan by the middle of the decade. Critical from the resource mobilization perspective is the fact that this policy necessitated fresh recruitment from within Pakistan—many new jihadis came from the madrassahs set up in the 1980s and run by legitimate political parties; trained under state sanction in militant camps in Pakistan or the Taliban's Afghanistan;[31] and benefited from state financial resources that kept the machinery well-oiled. Right-wing political parties forged even closer links with the militant enclave. In Afghanistan, the ethnically Pashtun Afghan Taliban proceeded to institute an extremely dogmatic, rather violent (mis)interpretation of Sharia rule in their country. However, they retained deep support among Deobandi groups in Pakistan. Throughout the Taliban's rule in Afghanistan, there were huge pockets of supporters (and even members) present in Pakistani cities from Quetta to Peshawar to Karachi.[32]

On the eve of 9/11, the Pakistani state, over two decades, had actively mobilized resources to promote violent jihad outside its borders. Rather interestingly, at no point during this time had the state sought to radicalize the Pakistani polity itself. In fact, it took pains to hedge its policies and maintain plausible deniability in front of the Pakistani public. It never allowed militants to perpetrate violence freely within Pakistani borders; it actively discredited any discourse that sought to promote

violence against Pakistanis; it never owned up to its policy in Kashmir, instead publicly arguing that Kashmiri fighters only received moral support from Pakistan; and it presented the Afghan Taliban as an Afghan solution to an Afghan problem. The goal was fairly obvious: Militancy in Kashmir was a strategic tool, while the Taliban in Afghanistan ensured a friendly Afghanistan. Both were seen as critical by Pakistani military planners. Beyond that, however, the state had every interest in preventing these policies from triggering an internal fallout.

Fairly neat on paper, the plan was ill-fated from the very outset. The 1990s allowed religious political parties and militant outfits to work together—the strength and nature of these links varied from party to party—to spread their tentacles across Pakistani society. These moves were known to the security establishment, but were largely seen as benign at the time. The ultra-right established social and philanthropic networks; created greater appeal for its madrassahs; used imams to promote its views on Islam; and gained the trust of people over time, resultantly increasing its capacity to raise funds independent of the state. A number of the far-right's militant recruits returned to their villages in Pakistan to describe their herculean escapades and charmed more young men into joining militancy. Moreover, there were now any number of trained fighters, master trainers, indoctrinators, and above all relatively easily accessible militant training camps in Pakistan. Not to mention, in areas like FATA, there was deep reverence for jihad and for those who participated in it; an entire generation of Afghan refugees and Pakistanis had been brought up around the Durand Line in a culture of violence and intolerance. Finally, long before 9/11, it was becoming clear that the monster the state had helped create would not be easy to control. Sectarian militants groups, tied to ultra-right political parties, had sprung up and played havoc in major cities like Karachi during the 1990s.[33] The state had to expend tremendous efforts, including the use of force, to bring the situation under relative control.

9/11: The State's Resource Mobilization Framework is Upended

Until 9/11, the agendas of the Pakistani state and the militant enclave remained complementary. Neither did the state allow the militants to create disruption within Pakistan, nor did the militants feel the need to

do so given that they were guaranteed unequivocal support from the state if they continued to support its agenda (Sectarian groups were somewhat of an exception to this narrative). However, the tenuous nature of the state's hold over these groups was exposed as soon as the United States decided to attack Taliban-ruled Afghanistan as retribution for the 9/11 attacks. As Pakistan, under international pressure, sought to reverse its resource mobilization framework vis-à-vis militancy, it announced an abrupt u-turn on its Kashmir and Taliban policies. The same militant outfits that had been nurtured for years were now declared "terrorist organizations." However, within the militant enclave, few were receptive to this switch. In fact, just as the state was poised to pull back resources, the fervor for jihad against the "invading Americans" in Afghanistan was rising.[34] Subsequently, as General Pervez Musharraf's military moved, again under American pressure, to operate in FATA against pockets of newly declared terrorists, they instantly faced a massive backlash.

The societal penetration of the religious-cum-militant outfits during the 1990s now allowed these organizations to create their own resource mobilization framework independent—in fact in opposition to—the state. They sensed, and captured, the opportunity; they would soon manage to take the demand for terror to unprecedented levels. Foreign groups like Al-Qaeda teamed up with splinter factions of some of the Kashmir-specific militant groups as well as with newly formed militias resenting the Pakistani state's support for the United States. Over time, their mobilizing frame has expanded considerably. It now includes active recruitment of militants from across Pakistan; the aggressive use of madrassahs and mosques to generate sympathy for their message; vocal opposition to Pakistani military operations and condemnation for supporting America (through religious political parties); and a masterfully crafted public diplomacy strategy that emphasizes the classic Islam-in-danger slogan and the religious duty to support the fight against the "infidel" U.S. Army, while also exposing the hypocrisy of the Pakistani state's u-turn on the Taliban. Even financially, the militant groups have managed to generate a self-sustaining model that involves patronage from foreign groups like Al Qaeda, domestic and foreign charitable contributions diverted for their use, forced contributions, ransoms, shares in the narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan, thefts in Pakistani cities, and the like.[35]

Moreover, as the Army saw its initial military forays into FATA falter and public support for its actions dwindle between 2003 and 2006, the state began to pull back, signing peace deals with militants and allowing them de facto control of swaths of territory within the tribal belt.[36] Until this trend reversed itself in the last two years, militant outfits like the TTP had a completely free hand to run militant training camps and indoctrination centers within their strongholds. Successful military campaigns from 2008 onward have dented their ability to continue doing so, though they are still far from extinction. Punjab-based outfits have also built up an impressive presence. Some, like Jaish-e-Muhammad, a former state proxy in Kashmir, allegedly maintains sprawling complexes in cities like Bahawalpur and enjoys relative freedom.[37]

Today, despite impressive military campaigns in the northwest, Pakistan faces myriad militant groups that interact in complex and

Table 1: Militant Outfits in Pakistan

Principal Target	Predominantly Foreign	Predominantly Pakistani
Pakistan state	Al Qaeda; assortment of foreign militants based in FATA	Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan; Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami; Lashkar-e-Jhangvi; assortment of splinter groups of homegrown militant organizations popularly termed the Punjabi Taliban
United States/ NATO	Al Qaeda; assortment of foreign militants based in FATA; Mullah Omar's Taliban; Haqqani network; Hizb-e-Islami	Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban
India	Hizb-ul-Mujahideen; Al-Baraq	Lashkar-e-Tayyaba; Jaish-e-Muhammad; Al-Badr; Harkatul Mujahideen
Sectarian	Jandullah (Malik Ragi group)	Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan; Lashkar-e-Jhangvi; Sunni Tehrik; Sipah-e-Muhammad

ambiguous ways. For youth susceptible to the militant message, there is an array of potential patrons to choose from. Likewise, for the militant outfits, they can select cadres most suited to their group's profile while letting others in the business pull in the rest. Table 1 lists the various militant groups operating from Pakistani soil today and their principal targets.

While Table 1 highlights the differing principal targets of the various groups, it must be acknowledged that the relatively neat distinctions between the groups and their scope of operations that may have held pre-9/11 no longer do today. Individual members and missions frequently overlap, creating a complex and multipronged challenge for the Pakistani state. In fact, Western intelligence sources have maintained that while operational links are not always clear, all militant outfits in Pakistan have forged organic links. For instance, all the groups listed as targeting the Pakistani state and the United States/NATO in Table 1 are directly or indirectly linked to Al Qaeda and the TTP. Combined, these organizations span much of northwest Pakistan, the hinterland of southern Punjab, and parts of urban Baluchistan and Sindh. Sleeper cells of one or the other outfit are known to be present in all major Pakistani cities. Together, the anti-Pakistan state and sectarian groups have been responsible for well over 3,000 minor and major terrorist incidents since 9/11. Over 30,000 civilians and military personnel have lost their lives in these attacks, according to official figures.[38]

Pakistan has officially acknowledged a lack of capacity to tackle all militant outfits simultaneously. The military has taken a graduated response, only going all-out after the TTP, which it sees as the most imminent threat to the state. Against others, the state has employed a variety of law enforcement, coercion, appeasement, outsourcing, and ignoring tactics. Table 2 provides a summary of the state's approach against the main groups.

There is ample wisdom in this graduated and varied response. Yet implicit in it is also the admission that the terrorist menace and the militants' resource mobilization frame will take years to eliminate completely. From the perspective of the discussion here, it guarantees that some level of militant activity, and thus the demand for terror and accessibility to the militant infrastructure, will remain intact. The severity of the situation is evident from FATA's being branded as the global

Table 2: The Pakistani State's Case-Specific Response to Militancy

Group	State's Response
Al Qaeda; Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	• Military and paramilitary action in FATA • Law enforcement* action in rest of Pakistan • U.S. drone strikes
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan	• Military and paramilitary action in north-west • Law enforcement action in rest of Pakistan • Broader COIN strategy (development +)**
"Punjabi Taliban"	• Law enforcement • Broader COIN strategy (development +)
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba	• Containment and appeasement
Afghan Taliban; Haqqani network; Hizb-e-Islami; Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban	• "Blind eye" apart from minor containment • Constant negotiations/deals • U.S. drone strikes
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan; Sunni Tehrik; Sipah-e-Muhammad	• Law enforcement • Broader COIN strategy (development +)

* *Law enforcement refers to police and intelligence operations.*
** *Development + refers to nonmilitary aspects of counterinsurgency strategy aimed at instituting a more responsive state; usually includes rapid development, improved governance and service delivery, greater access to education and healthcare, etc.*

epicenter of terrorism. Global intelligence agencies warn that all major terrorist plots are now being hatched in Pakistan's tribal belt; it is the preferred destination for local and foreign militants seeking to conduct acts of terrorism. The jihadi literature produced by these organizations is also available relatively freely across the country in the form of books, pamphlets, and CDs. The penetration of the militant enclave through clerics, recruiters, active foot soldiers, and social and philanthropic fronts is well-known yet irreversible in the short run. A testimony to the success of the militant enclave's penetration lies in the fact that a

number of active collaborators exposed by intelligence organizations in the recent past were found to be respected members of society known to locals for years.[39] The "pull" toward militancy for susceptible Pakistani youth is all too evident.

Lack of capacity is undoubtedly the principal reason for Pakistan's inability to tackle all militant outfits on its territory within a short period of time. A graduated response is driven by the military's concern about spreading itself too thin by opening multiple fronts simultaneously. It is also worried that taking on all extremist groups (including those not currently targeting the state) may prompt Pakistan-based militants of various stripes to transform their present organic links with anti-Pakistan state outfits into full-fledged operational linkages. Politically, an all-out military operation may have been feasible in the country's northwest, but would be impossible to repeat in Punjab. Civilian law enforcement capacity is extremely weak, and thus cannot be relied upon to deliver on its own. The civilian capacity to hold, reconstruct, and govern areas cleared by the military is equally challenged and does not bode well for a lasting solution to the problem.

Capacity issues notwithstanding, it is also important to highlight the self-imposed constraint flowing out of Pakistan's strategic calculus that may prevent it from eliminating all mentioned groups even if the capacity were present. Consider that the Pakistani strategic calculus is India-centric. An effective counter to the threat from India, along with the avoidance of a "two-front" situation (in essence, the presence of a hostile dispensation in Afghanistan) are non-negotiable imperatives for the military. With an uncertain endgame awaiting in Afghanistan, the anti-United States/NATO Afghan groups mentioned in Table 1 present themselves as useful assets in terms of increasing Pakistan's bargaining leverage.[40] By the same token, many still argue that the ISI has not completely severed its ties with anti-India groups like LeT. If true—the Pakistani state denies these allegations, and there is no conclusive evidence either way—this reinforces the earlier observation that a pro-militant mindset and some level of recruitment will remain part and parcel of the equation for some time to come. As the experience of the 1990s has shown, a pro-militancy policy abroad cannot be completely insulated from what transpires at home.

GETTING THE HOUSE IN ORDER: REDUCING PAKISTAN'S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO RADICALIZATION AND MILITANCY

The above discussion highlights the presence of both supply- and demand-side challenges for Pakistani youth. The presence of an anomalous education system and relative deprivation feeds into the arguably more critical challenge: the out-of-control Frankenstein's monster that has a ready cause for susceptible youth to take on. This is of course not to say that Pakistan has already crossed the point of no return. While a large number of young people are indeed known to have taken to militancy—virtually all perpetrators of terrorist attacks in Pakistan since 9/11 have been under 30, and many have been in their teens—in proportional terms (relative to the total population), they represent a miniscule figure. To be sure, they represent a worrying trend but by no means signal that the society has bought into their message en masse.

Surveys that capture views and perceptions of Pakistani youth give some indication of where young Pakistanis stand on these issues. At least four representative youth-specific surveys have been conducted over the past two years.[41] Findings suggest that youth in the country see their religious and national identities as intrinsically linked. While a majority supports a strong role for religion in the affairs of the state, the overall conservative nature of Pakistani society should not be conflated with extremism. In fact, youth sentiment is decidedly anti-extremist. Most see extremism as a real danger to the country's future, and believe they have a role to play in countering the menace. Important to note, however, is that Pakistanis have traditionally differentiated (and continue to differentiate) between various militant groups; the most negative responses often refer to groups attacking fellow Pakistanis.[42] Extreme frustration with the poor performance of the political leadership and with dwindling economic prospects is evident. Qualitative responses in at least one of the surveys point to disillusionment with the lack of meritocracy and with the presence of corruption in the job market and workplace.[43] There is outright support for mainstream, moderate political parties. As for anti-U.S. sentiment, it runs deep and across socioeconomic lines, and is detected in the educated and uneducated classes alike. Finally, most seem to buy into conspiracy theories about the United States or into misrepresentations of history vis-à-vis archenemies like India.

These findings present a mixed picture. Education and the socializing effect discussed earlier seem to have impacted youth views considerably. For instance, misinformation regarding India and the primacy of religion as a tool of statecraft must be correlated to education and socialization to some extent. The message emanating from the ultra-right, which has sought to pin all of the blame for the instability in Pakistan post-9/11 on the United States, also seems to have found resonance. However, there is no shift in favor of Islamic political parties; young Pakistanis, despite their frustrations with the political elite, wish to be governed by moderate parties. By far the most important finding, however, is the overwhelming opposition to extremism in Pakistan—even if this does not translate into an outright rejection of all forms of violence. While no time series or panel data specific to youth are available, it is safe to assume that opposition to anti-Pakistan militant groups has intensified as a reaction to these groups' activities within Pakistan. Indeed, this reaction among Pakistani youth and civil society writ large is quite visible. Society, including the political class, forged a consensus in favor of domestic military operations in 2008-09, media debate has begun to criticize the militant enclave more openly, and a number of civil society organizations and individual celebrities in Pakistan have taken it upon themselves to denounce militancy publicly. Even respected clerics, despite being targeted by the TTP, have spoken out forcefully in the recent past.

The Pakistani state urgently needs to institute measures to support the goals of these moderate voices in society. The task ahead is a monumental one, and will require a concerted effort. The nation's youth may not be radicalizing en masse, but the persistence of the identified push and pull factors may well test the determination of Pakistan's young people to resist the temptations of radicalism in the years to come. A course correction is an imperative if today's youth are to find an environment conducive to progress and prosperity by the time they begin to take over leadership roles in the country.

Tackling the Supply-Side Factors

In terms of the supply-side constraints, the problems in the educational and socioeconomic realms are well understood. In the education sector,

the stratification of the school system needs to be removed, and avenues need to be created for students from across the socioeconomic spectrum to interact regularly. The public sector, with the majority of Pakistani students, has a pivotal role to play in changing student outlooks. Textbook reform will go a long way toward assisting this cause. A conscious effort needs to be made to present a more objective and less paranoid historical narrative to Pakistani children. Two other aspects must be stressed in educational curricula through specialized courses. One is peace education, which seeks to present a tolerant interpretation of religion and emphasizes peaceful conflict management and co-existence. The other is civic education, which helps emphasize citizens' responsibilities to their country. Fortunately, there is no disagreement within Pakistani policy circles about the need for such reforms. The political will and capacity to implement these, however, is absent to date.

In order to address relative deprivation, Pakistan's latest economic policies are already stressing the need to achieve an inclusionary growth model and better economic governance. Inequality is explicitly recognized as one of the key concerns; an inclusionary model, by ensuring more effective and direct trickle-down of economic gains, can be expected to affect inequality levels positively. Moreover, should high growth rates be achieved under an inclusionary model, the size of the economic pie would increase and the economy would be able to cater to a greater number of entrants into the labor market. An improved socioeconomic scenario would also help eliminate the expectation-reality disconnect, and dampen the concern about internal societal friction. Overall, a greater number would find avenues to channel energies positively, thereby reducing susceptibility to radicalization and violence.

Addressing the Demand-Side Factors

The need to address push factors notwithstanding, where Pakistani society stands in the medium to long-term will in large part be a function of how effectively the state manages to tackle the demand side. If the state fails to mitigate militancy and to curb the creeping penetration of the militant enclave, Pakistan in 2025 may well be much more willing to buy into the justification for religiously motivated violence across the board. At present, Pakistan's graduated response to militant outfits

operating from its territory is sensible given its capacity constraints. Ultimately, however, the complete elimination of the militant presence, and thus the demand for terror, cannot be achieved by a strategy that picks and chooses which militant outfits to target.

The South Asian regional context will be a major determinant of the progress Pakistan is able to make in this regard. Active U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan will continue providing militants, both Pakistan-focused and those with larger agendas, with enough space to fudge their actual motives. Their public messaging will remain attractive as long as extremists can convince an avidly anti-U.S. Pakistani nation that Washington, and not they, are the real threat to the Muslim world. Moreover, an Afghanistan in flux or one that is hostile to Pakistan will force Islamabad's hand to retain an ambivalent outlook toward certain insurgent groups. By the same token, Pakistani ambivalence toward anti-India groups like LeT cannot be completely ruled out unless India-Pakistan relations improve substantially. The Kashmir issue is the silver bullet: The dispute's amicable resolution would not only make anti-India militancy emanating from Pakistan's soil obsolete, but it would also bring lasting peace to South Asia. The international community's reluctance to proactively facilitate resolution of this dispute is shortsighted, to say the least, because this reluctance has directly undermined the West's interest in having militancy eradicated from the region.

The onus for providing a more conducive environment for Pakistan to tackle militancy lies as much with international actors like the United States as it does with Pakistan itself. This not only applies to policies regarding Afghanistan and Kashmir, but also to the West's diplomatic outreach in countries like Pakistan. Any Western policy that allows Islamists to paint the Pakistani national leadership as surrogates of the West, or as antithetical to Muslims in general, will backfire. If short-term interests continue to dictate decisions, the West's policies will continue to fuel the very discourse and mindset that it has been seeking to eliminate in Pakistan in the first place.

Western policies must also be extremely careful about Pakistani sensitivities. Pakistan is set to remain a highly conservative and Islamic state that is opposed to forced modernization or moves that could be construed as an attempt to impose Western values. All dealings must be conducted without any ambition to alter this framework. Finally,

policies toward the greater Muslim world, such as the decision to attack Iraq and ambivalence on outstanding issues like Palestine, are as detrimental as policies directly affecting South Asia.

NOTES

1 The term "Islamist" is used in its negative connotation throughout this paper. While this meaning does not represent the word's literal translation, it refers, as it does in popular literature, to the narrative emanating from the extremist enclave which uses Islamic interpretations to justify violence.

2 United Nations Population Division, "World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision," http://esa.un.org/unpp/, and Center for Civic Education, "Civic Health of Pakistani Youth: Study of Voice, Volunteering, and Voting Among Young People," Islamabad, 2009, http://www.civiceducation.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Civichealth.pdf.

3 United Nations Population Division, "World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision" http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2006/wpp2006.htm, and "World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision," http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/WUP2005/2005wup.htm.

4 Jeffrey Seul, "Ours is the Way of God: Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 5 (September 1999): 553-569.

5 Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malečková, "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?" *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 123.

6 Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 281.

7 Robert D. Kaplan, *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (New York: Random House, 1996).

8 Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (August 2003): 343-361.

9 Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, "The Quality of Terror," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (July 2005): 515-530.

10 For a more detailed description of the sentiments of youth across the three educational systems, see Moeed Yusuf, "Prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan: Implications for U.S. Policy," Brookings Institution, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Analysis Paper No. 14, October 2008, 4-5. See also Tariq Rahman, "Pluralism and Tolerance in Pakistani Society: Attitudes of Pakistani Students Towards the Religious 'Other,'" paper presented at conference on pluralism at the Aga Khan University-Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilization, London,

October 25, 2003, http://www.tariqrahman.net/language/Pluralism%20and%20Intolerance%20in%20Pakistani%20Society.htm.

11 There is a healthy debate on the role of madrassahs in molding the mindsets of Pakistani children. Initially the madrassah-militancy correlation was believed to be strong. More recent research, however, has shown that while the type of knowledge imparted in madrassahs may make students more susceptible to jihad, most madrassah students are not prepared for jihad in these institutions. Perhaps the most rigorous research on Pakistani madrassahs has been conducted by Christine Fair of Georgetown University. See Christine Fair, *The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2008), and Christine Fair, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Militancy-Madrasah Connection," *Asia Policy*, no. 4 (July 2007): 107-134. See also Rahman, "Pluralism and Tolerance."

12 For a detailed account of the biases in Pakistani educational curricula, see A.H. Nayyar and Ahmad Salim, eds., *The Subtle Subversion: The State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan*, a report of the project "A Civil Society Initiative in Curricula and Textbooks Reform" (Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute, 2004), 9-72.

13 Yusuf, "Prospects of Youth Radicalization," 5.

14 In Pakistan's case, the major political parties are internally undemocratic and consciously block off avenues for fresh and independent voices to join their ranks. The only parties that maintain a fairly open policy for youth participation are the right-wing outfits, especially the Jamaat-e-Islami.

15 This information is based on the author's discussions with a number of law enforcement officials involved in investigating terrorist incidents around the country. The information is corroborated by the few open-source accounts of profiled militants that appear in the Pakistani media from time to time.

16 This has been the central message of the TTP since it rose to prominence in 2007. It has never acknowledged its predominantly anti-Pakistan state agenda. A classic example of how it couches its message can be found in the statements it issues when claiming responsibility for a terrorist attack in Pakistan. As an example, see its admission to having conducted an attack in Lakki Marwat in 2007: "Taliban to Continue Attacks on Security Forces," *Express Tribune*, September 7, 2010, http://tribune.com.pk/story/47606/taliban-to-continue-attacks-on-security-forces/.

17 "Final Report of the Panel of Economists: Medium-Term Development Imperatives and Strategy for Pakistan," Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, April 2010, 156.

18 *Pakistan Economic Survey 2007-08* (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, 2008), 218.

19 Recent research suggests a strong role for political grievances in nudging individuals to join militancy in Pakistan. Jacob Shapiro and Christine Fair,

"Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan," *International Security* 134, no. 3 (Winter 2009): 110-115.

20 Author's discussions with law enforcement officials and journalists who have had access to detained/acquitted militants. One chilling account of the militant mindset, and how militants view the rest of society, was provided by a young and captured TTP suicide bomber in a TV interview with senior journalist Salim Safi. The interview can be watched at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nq88egK755k.

21 Author's preliminary discussions with residents of Swat and Waziristan in one-off focus group discussions organized in Islamabad, 2009-2010. The author is currently engaged in a larger project that seeks to study this dynamic in more detail.

22 Jane Perlez, "Taliban Exploit Class Rifts in Pakistan," *New York Times*, April 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/asia/17pstan.html.

23 "Taliban Take Over Swat's Emerald Mines," *Dawn,* March 25, 2009, http://news.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/nwfp/taliban-take-over-swat-emerald-mines--za.

24 Jo Freeman, "Resource Mobilization and Strategy: A Model for Analyzing Social Movement Organization Actions," in *The Dynamics of Social Movements*, eds. John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop, 1979), 172-75, and Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1978), 69.

25 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes—Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings,* eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1-20.

26 Charles Tilly, for example, highlights the ability of states to support a particular group over another. He argues in this context of states supporting moderate outfits to challenge the more radical ones, which are believed to be necessarily opposing the state. In extreme cases, states also have the option of employing their own personnel to quash radical movements. Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 238.

27 For an in-depth journalistic account of the "Afghan Jihad" during the 1980s and of the role played by various agencies, see Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004).

28 For an account of the role of the main Islamic party of the time, the Jamaat-e-Islami, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-i-Islami of Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 192-95.

29 During the 1980s, Pakistani ruler General Zia-ul-Haq openly favored the Deobandi school of Sunni Islam, while the Sunni Ahl-e-Hadith school grew in

prominence thanks to the flow of foreign funds from countries like Saudi Arabia. Deobandis today are believed to be running the majority of Pakistan's madrassahs, even though their share of the population is estimated to be well below that of the Barelvis, whose adherents form the majority of Sunni Muslims in Pakistan. The Ahl-e-Hadith also maintain disproportionate clout in relation to their share of the total population. See, for instance, Khaled Ahmed, "The Power of the Ahle Hadith," *The Friday Times*, July 15, 2002, http://www.hvk.org/articles/0702/106.html.

30 Craig Baxter, "Pakistan Becomes Prominent in the International Arena," in *Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia-ul-Haq*, eds. Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), 148.

31 During Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the ISI used Afghan territory to set up militant training camps to prepare cadres to join the insurgency in Indian Kashmir.

32 For a scintillating account of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and Pakistan's involvement with the regime, see Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2000).

33 In 1995, during the height of sectarian violence, as many as 1,742 people were killed in Karachi. Furthermore, bomb blasts that targeted religious gatherings of rival sects had become commonplace.

34 A number of religious clerics launched a call for jihad in Pushtun-dominated areas of Pakistan's northwest, and organized groups of young men to fight American troops. Perhaps the most high-profile of these recruiters was the now infamous Sufi Muhammad, leader of the Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi, who took 10,000 volunteers across the border before subsequently abandoning them and returning to Pakistan. See Imtiaz Ali, "Militant or Peace Broker? A Profile of the Swat Valley's Maulana Sufi Muhammad," Jamestown Foundation, *Terrorism Monitor* 7, Issue 7, March 26, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34758&tx_ttnews[backPid]=412&no_cache=1.

35 Muhammad Amir Rana, "Blocking the Financial Flow of Terrorists," in *Race Against Time: The Counterterrorism Challenge in Pakistan,* ed. Moeed Yusuf (forthcoming).

36 Pakistani authorities characterized peace deals during this period as critical, and depicted them as efforts to pacify militants through dialogue. However, in retrospect, these deals simply allowed space to insurgent outfits to regroup and strengthen their ranks. The 2005-06 peace deals in North and South Waziristan marked the beginning of the state's strategy to formally offer olive branches, which lasted until the concerted military response in 2009. To get a better sense of the deteriorating situation in FATA from 2005 onwards, see the timeline of annual events constructed by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Waziristan/timeline/2005.htm; http://www.satp.

org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Waziristan/timeline/2006.htm; http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Waziristan/timeline/2007.htm; http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Waziristan/timeline/2008.htm; http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Waziristan/timeline/2009.htm; and http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Waziristan/timeline/index.html. See also D Suba Chandran's interesting analysis of the 2006 North Waziristan peace deal, which is representative of the various formal and informal agreements struck since 2002: D Suba Chandran, "Peace Agreement in Waziristan: New Beginning or a False Dawn?" Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, IPCS Issue Brief no. 37, September 2006, http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/1669938918IB37-SubaChandran-PeaceAgreementInWaziristan.pdf.

37 Saeed Shah, "Al-Qaeda Allies Build Huge Pakistan Base," *Telegraph,* September 13, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/6180118/Al-Qaeda-allies-build-huge-Pakistan-base.html.

38 According to Pakistani military data released in February 2010, 30,452 citizens have been killed in terrorism-related incidents since 9/11. "Global War on Terror Claims 30,000 Pakistani Casualties," *ThaIndian News,* February 18, 2010, http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/global-war-on-terror-claims-30000-pakistani-casualties_100322480.html.

39 A number of such accounts have surfaced in the past two to three years. For instance, in July 2009, a blast in a madrassah in Mian Chunnu, in southern Punjab, killed 16 students and injured 120 others. The explosives that ignited were being stored clandestinely by the madrassah teacher, Riaz Ali, who had ostensibly been imparting religious education to children from the locality for years. He was later found to have been a member of a banned militant organization.

40 For a brief background on Pakistan's current position vis-à-vis Afghan insurgent groups, see Moeed Yusuf, "The U.S.-Pakistan Relationship and Finding an End State in Afghanistan," *CTC Sentinel* 3, Issue 9 (September 2010): 8-11.

41 The British Council, *Pakistan: The Next Generation*, November 2009, http://www.britishcouncil.pk/pakistan-Next-Generation-Report.pdf; *Herald*, "Youth Speak," Vol.41, No.1, January 2010, 52-105; Center for Civic Education, "Civic Health of Pakistani Youth," and Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, "Radicalization: Perceptions of Educated Youth in Pakistan," September 2010, http://san-pips.com/index.php?action=survey&id=main_1. The British Council, *Herald*, and Center for Civic Education surveys were conducted at the national level, while the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies survey was focused on universities and post-graduate institutions. The British Council survey drew from a sample of 1,226 for young men and women between ages 18 and 29. *Herald*'s sample was 845, and the target age was 15 to 25. The Center for Civic Education decided on a scope that was narrower than that of the previous two polls; the survey focused mainly on questions relating to civic education. Its sample size was 1,855, and the targeted age bracket was high teens to 30. The Pakistan Institute for

Peace Studies survey targeted 16 public and private universities and postgraduate institutions across the country, and had a total sample size of 345.

42 See, for example, Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro, "Islam, Militancy, and Politics in Pakistan: Insights from a National Sample," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 4 (October 2010): 495-521.

43 The British Council, *Pakistan: The Next Generation*, 15.

Full Circle: *Pakistan: The Next Generation* Report and the Perspective of Pakistani Youth

Shazia Khawar

"At the World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, the Youth Caucus called on us to 'see young people as a resource, not a problem.' How right they were. Young people are the most precious resource our planet possesses... Providing for youth is not just a moral obligation; it is a compelling economic necessity. Study after study has shown the benefits to the young and to their communities of investing in education, reproductive health, job skills and employment opportunities for young people."

Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General

Pakistan is at a critical moment in its history. It has experienced an incomplete demographic transition from high mortality and fertility to low mortality and fertility. Its population is young but steadily aging. Half of Pakistan's citizens are currently below the age of 20. Pakistan could gain considerable social and economic benefits from this window of demographic opportunity—*if* it can provide its young people with a good education and healthcare, expand its labor markets to offer them productive jobs, and provide opportunities for them to save in their most productive years. On the other hand, there is also clear danger. An underemployed "baby boomer" generation with few opportunities is a proven determinant of social and political unrest. The

Shazia Khawar is head of programs for the British Council in Pakistan, and oversaw the Council's 2009 *Next Generation* report, a survey of research and interviews with Pakistani youth and feedback from Pakistani leaders on the country's youth.

future success, economic security, and wider stability of Pakistan are inextricably linked to Pakistan's ability to secure a better future for its young people.

According to the 2010 DFID-CSO *Youth Participation in Development* report,

> "Today's generation of young people is the largest in history. Over 3 billion people—nearly half of the world's population—are under the age of 25. Almost 90% of all young people live in developing countries. Young people are a valuable asset to their countries and investing in them brings tremendous social and economic benefits. They also face challenges—including violence and crime, unemployment and HIV/AIDS—that undermine their rights and create significant social and economic costs to society.[2]"

In this context the British Council Pakistan treats its work with young people as a high priority.[3] As part of its youth program it works with young people to build their leadership skills. Another important component of the program is a policy dialogue strand. Development of young people cannot take place without their participation in decisions which affect them, and this has to go beyond a general focus on youth empowerment. It is critical to involve young people in policy, planning, and implementation in programs of development—in other words, to mainstream youth participation in development. It is important for policymakers to understand those for whom policies are being developed, and for young people to own these interventions.

It is equally important for policymakers to recognize that young people are the key to the country's development, and ensure that this recognition is reflected in government programs and policies.

Past interventions have worked on a flawed premise that youth are a "problem" waiting to be managed rather than a resource to be developed. Most initiatives, therefore, aim at harnessing the physical energy of youth—hence the plethora of activity-based initiatives, including sports facility provision and skill development. The intellectual potential, their power to mobilize, to act as change agents in society is, thus, undermined and remains untapped. There are very few opportunities available to the young to strengthen their participation in social and political domains.

Given this situation, it is important to understand the perspectives, thoughts, aspirations, and motivations of young people, an area not researched enough in Pakistan. In fact, one of the main reasons why many youth-related initiatives have met with little success is that they have been conceptualized and developed without consulting young people or taking their perspective into account.

It is also important to seek and work with a broad range of the youth population, both those organized through formal youth organizations and structures and those who are outside these mechanisms. Explicit efforts have to be made to include those young people who face obstacles, such as cultural norms, economic circumstances, and lack of access to information and necessary skills. Here, too, experience has shown that many initiatives tend to be exclusive, mainly targeting educated, urban, male youth, who are better positioned to avail opportunities than other youth. There is also the need to explore innovative models promoting youth engagement outside the conventional forums.

This essay aims to briefly review *Pakistan: The Next Generation*, a report released by the British Council in November 2009. This paper will then discuss how the key messages of the report have helped bring the perspective of Pakistani youth to the forefront, and how young people can influence change through participation in development. In other words, how we come full circle from young people to policy to young people.

INFLUENCING CHANGE: LINKING UP WITH THE BIG PICTURE

The rationale for including a full-fledged advocacy component in the British Council Pakistan's youth program stems from a growing realization among various key stakeholders, both within and outside the government, that there is a dearth of research-backed policy in the country. For youth-centered work particularly, the challenge is compounded since it tends to become a "cross-cutting area" among various stakeholders, diluted in most cases and losing focused attention as a policy issue. The Youth Ministry itself is seen as low priority. Most ministries (such as health, education, and population) do not specifically focus on youth,

and feel that it is the remit of the youth ministry—which, however, does not have the priority or clout to follow through.

The entire discourse around youth has taken on a new dimension in Pakistan, as the country faces a window of opportunity in the shape of a "demographic dividend." There is a renewed vigor in the policy discourse and a growing realization that reaping the demographic dividend is not automatic—it depends on an informed policy environment. The policy dialogue in the program hence comes at an opportune time. As a first step, the emphasis has been on knowledge production, on carrying out innovative research with a view to bringing to policymakers the voices of youth, their perceptions, viewpoints, and proposed solutions. Efforts towards this have led to the development of a landmark report on youth: *Pakistan: The Next Generation* (NGR).[4]

There is a strong case for inclusion of youth in policy and planning. Now that their limitations are better understood, youth development frameworks are gradually moving away from deficit models (those lacking youth participation), valuing instead young people for their potential and designing interventions to build a set of core competencies needed to participate successfully as adolescents and adults. This approach considers young people through a more holistic lens, addressing the broad range of their social, moral, emotional, physical, and cognitive competencies. And this cannot happen unless the voices of the youth are heard, their perceptions understood, and their viewpoints considered while developing their policies and programs.

In Pakistan the shift to this paradigm has been very slow. The NGR takes a step in this direction by surveying the perspectives, thoughts, and aspirations of youth and linking them with policy discourse.

PAKISTAN: THE NEXT GENERATION

The NGR is an investigation into the attitudes and needs of Pakistan's youth through a collective undertaking by academic institutions, research organizations, and a task force. By actively consulting young people and seeking their viewpoints on the many social, economic, and political challenges they face, the report sets out to contest the flawed premise in policy making, which sees youth as a "problem to be managed" rather than problem solvers themselves.

The timing of the report could not have been better. It offers an opportunity to provide a much-needed push in setting the direction of the policy discourse as Pakistan stands today at a critical juncture, with the highest proportion of young people in its history. Pakistan confronts a delicate balance that can tip either way, resulting in a demographic dividend powering an economic rise, or turning into a disaster, with a giant underclass prone to extremism and violence if the country fails to harness this potential. The NGR, thus, marks an opportunity to turn the debate on youth for the better.

Described as "one of the first representative survey reports of its kind" by the *Daily Times*,[5] the NGR follows an innovative research design. Beginning with an independent committee comprised of a wide range of experts from various sectors—government, non-government, academia, media, and research institutions—the report went on to consult and seek input from the youth itself, some 1200 young men and women who participated through an interactive online survey. Reaching across borders, the report also featured an appearance by UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband on a national radio show as he launched the online survey for the report.

With a wide ownership from various quarters, the report was able to make a mark and catch public attention. As reported by the *Nation*, "The research cannot be written off as a commonplace study of the country's youth."[6]

One of the major factors that has contributed to the success of the NGR is the use of good external communications and media strategy, particularly at various important milestones in the course of the research. The launch of the online survey and subsequent coverage by local and international media, with over 50 press citations including articles in the *New York Times*, the *Guardian*, and the *Times of India,* brought the youth of Pakistan onto an international stage. The use of the online survey as a research tool led to successfully soliciting feedback from the youth itself, which resulted in a much wider ownership of the research and was one of the key highlights of this innovative research. This was followed by validation of the research findings and subsequent endorsements by a large cross-section of stakeholders.

"The Youth Don't Like Pakistan but They Love It."

The report concentrates on the economic implications of Pakistan's current age structure, where 70 percent of the population is classified as youth, the opinions of these young people, and the "one window" opportunity to take advantage of the current demographics.

Right now, Pakistan is in the period of a "demographic dividend." This is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for every country, where the youth outnumber the old. With fewer old people to take care of, and more people to work, this should be a boon time for Pakistan. Unfortunately, it is not, and that is where a national crisis simmers below the surface.

The economic benefits of a youthful population do not just accrue, however. They have to be earned with investment in health and education. If not, then the dividend becomes a demographic disaster with masses of youth who are not able to get jobs because they do not possess skills, nor have an economy which can absorb them. Politically, this is a recipe for instability. Pakistan entered this demographic dividend period, this window, in 1990, and has wasted a full 20 years without doing anything about it. The window closes in 2045, and we are still far from the mindset needed to take advantage of this opportunity.

The NGR team also carried out a major exercise in opinion polling to understand what youth think about themselves and the conditions around them. The results are both depressing and a cause for optimism. Just 15 percent thought the country was headed in the right direction. Despite this, the overwhelming majority love their country, a pocket of goodwill that can still be tapped into. A quarter of the youth surveyed were illiterate, yet more than 92 percent of the respondents thought education was important. It further compounds the tragedy of a lack of educational opportunities when there is such a strong desire for education. What is also troubling, and this is a reflection of their current mindset, is a cynical view on democracy; only 33 percent approve of it. In terms of identity, 75 percent see themselves as Muslims first, whereas only 14 percent view themselves as Pakistanis first.

The youth brought out some interesting observations regarding the causes of violence and the role of the West. Almost 58 percent of the youth thought that violence in the country was caused by two major factors,

everyday injustice and poor economic conditions. They felt let down by the international community. "The war on terror and the corresponding instability in the country has gone a long way to isolate the Pakistani youth from the rest of the world," notes one respondent. "Stop treating us like an uncivilised bunch of hooligans who don't know anything," writes another. Young people feel they are stereotyped by the rest of the world: identified either as terrorists, as corrupt, or both. Western governments are criticized for having focused too heavily on security rather than considering broader development issues. But the youth of Pakistan define security entirely differently. For them security is merit. It is the confidence of going to a job interview without fearing people of influence will get the position. It is walking freely without fearing they will have to unjustly pay a bribe, or taking an exam knowing everyone will be awarded marks on the basis of their papers. If the West wants to give anything to Pakistan, they say, give us merit, give us everyday justice. The despondency of the 85 percent who do not feel things are right with their country will wither away just by addressing this. One of the reasons a full one-third of the youth want sharia is simply because they want an alternative to what they see now, and do not like.

NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FORUM

The report sparked a debate on how Pakistan can transform itself to harness the potential of its young people. Through various initiatives British Council Pakistan has taken this forward, seeking to impact the current policy-level discussions on supporting the development of young people.

One initiative is the creation of a Partnership Forum in collaboration with VSO, an organization with considerable experience in youth development and volunteerism, as the main driver for youth-centered policy advocacy. While the NGR provides the basis for policy advocacy, the Forum provides the necessary impetus to take it further. It has steadily gained credibility, evident from a growing membership base comprising representatives from both within and outside government. The Forum provides an opportunity to sustain the momentum generated by the report by keeping the issue alive in the policy discourse.

National Volunteerism Policy Development

For bringing the policy discourses to center stage, the third Partnership Forum meeting focused on a policy dialogue on the National Policy on Volunteerism. As a demonstration of the Forum's commitment for collaboration and forging partnerships, the meeting was jointly organized with the National Volunteer Movement (NVM). A well-attended event, the meeting brought together government and civil society representatives from all across the country.

NVM lies within the Ministry of Youth Affairs and set itself a target of getting cabinet approval of a National Volunteering Policy within 2010. The Forum is playing a key role in the development of the policy. It is facilitating the consultation process as well as providing advisory support in the drafting process.

Partnership with the Ministry of Youth Affairs

A letter of agreement between the British Council and the Ministry of Youth Affairs (MoYA) focuses on the contribution of the British Council to the facilitation of an Inter-Ministerial Coordination Committee (IMCC) for delivering the Youth Policy Implementation plan and collaboration on youth exchange programs between the United Kingdom and Pakistan. The first IMCC meeting took place in early 2010, and brought together members from various ministries such as education, health, labor, population, information, and Navtec (National Vocational and Technical Commission Pakistan) to gain a holistic view of youth interventions being implemented by various ministries. It was agreed that IMCC would provide a platform for sharing knowledge and enhanced coordination for youth-related programs.

Another initiative planned with MoYA's National Internship Program (NIP) will place 65 young interns with standing committees at the National Assembly for a period of one year, providing them with an opportunity to gain an insight into political processes.

JOINT SEMINAR WITH PLANNING COMMISSION

The NGR drew attention from various policymaking institutions and contributed to bringing the potential/challenge of the demo-

graphic dividend center stage. The joint British Council and Planning Commission seminar on February 25, 2010, is a case in point. The keynote speech was given by the finance minister at that time, Shaukat Tareen. The seminar was attended by over 100 participants from key government departments, including health, education, and population. The minister asserted that "a paradigm shift was required to fully address the demographic dividend." Other speakers pointed out the need for inter-sectorial coordination.

While presenting a paper on "Demographic Transition and Dividend: International Experiences," Gavin Jones from Singapore University made the point that the period when very large cohorts are moving into and through the working ages, while the population of children is growing only slowly, is potentially highly favorable to economic development, investment in the social system, and human development. This "demographic dividend" began for Thailand in 1970, Indonesia in 1975, Vietnam in 1980, Bangladesh in 1985, and Pakistan only in 1995.

Because Pakistan's fertility has remained very high, population growth has been very rapid. Between 1980 and 2010, Pakistan's population grew 124 percent (compared to Thailand's 44 percent). The growth of the school-age population was even more rapid compared to other countries. In Pakistan this population between 1980 and 2010 grew 106 percent. The equivalent figure for Thailand is 19 percent, and 13 percent for Indonesia. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan has not progressed as rapidly as Indonesia and Thailand in raising school enrollment ratios over the 1980–2010 period.

Jones asserted that taking advantage of the demographic window of opportunity depends crucially on

- ensuring that the human capital of the large numbers entering the working ages is increasing, so that these workers have the potential to raise overall levels of productivity in the economy, and
- ensuring that job opportunities are increasing rapidly enough to absorb the new workers into productive employment.

He went on to note that "a window of opportunity can turn into a disaster if large numbers of half-trained young people are turned out

into a labor market unable to absorb them. This can be a recipe for dissatisfaction, political unrest, and instability." Jones further pointed out that "the Pakistan situation has one particular feature which further complicates the issue of taking advantage of the window of opportunity." This would be the low level of women's participation in the labor force. In addition, great efforts are also needed to improve the skills of those already in the labor force. "Thus programs of on-the-job training and learning by doing are of great importance."

He concluded that "effective governance, sound policies and the generation of a passion for education in the Pakistani population at large are needed...to meet the challenges."

Based on the *Next Generation* report, a series of seminars and discussions are planned with the Young Parliamentarians Forum (YPF), which consists of 80 members of the National Assembly. The YPF is headed by the deputy speaker of the National Assembly and includes office bearers from diverse political parties. The objective of this discourse is to involve young parliamentarians in the demographic debate and harness their support. This is also an opportunity to involve youth themselves in discussions with the parliamentarians, with the underlying goal of increasing youth participation at all levels.

The first of these seminars took place on November 9, 2010, in collaboration with Dunya News, a Pakistani national television channel, to initiate a dialogue between young people and members of the National Assembly on key issues highlighted by the *Next Generation* report. The first session focused on the issue of corruption, which young people feel makes them highly insecure about their future. The program was aired as part of the "Dunya Today" show, with a viewership of 20 million people.[7] This program was the first of a four-part series of seminars with the YPF.

MEDIA AND OTHER OUTREACH

The general lack of awareness and knowledge about the demographic challenge facing Pakistan means that the segment of the population most affected has limited information about its impact. Creating among young people the desire to become a part of the development agenda of the country is essential for bringing about a change. The media has a key

role to play in promoting a mindset change. Using the media interest generated by the NGR, potential partnerships have been explored for a series of youth programs beginning in January 2011 to highlight young people actively involved in bringing about a change in their community through community engagement and advocacy. These programs will aim to bring into focus young people actively participating in education, health, environment, skill development, and livelihood programs.

In 2010, the British Council's Active Citizens Program will provide leadership training to 11,000 young people. These young people will develop partnerships with local governments, community leaders, and civil society organizations, and be actively involved in the decision making and life of their communities (both locally and globally). These young people will also undergo a training program on social entrepreneurship in partnership with Shell Pakistan.

NATIONAL STRATEGY TO OVERCOME PAKISTAN'S DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES

Long-Term Vision for the Next Generation

Times of crisis drive short-term thinking, but we urgently need to switch the focus from the symptoms of Pakistan's problems to root causes. That means setting goals that will transform the next generation's prospects by 2030, while building support for an ambitious but realistic program to implement them.

Mainstreaming Youth Participation in Development

Government "should provide windows for the engagement of youth in the decision-making process," another young Pakistani writes. "No decision about us without us."

Pakistan's demographic challenges must be addressed by the involvement of those most affected by mainstreaming youth participation in development and by involving them in planning policy and by giving them ownership.

In 2007 the Youth Working Group of the DFID-Civil Society Children and Youth Network commissioned a youth mapping study. The study advocated that "development assistance should work for the

benefit of youth (as target beneficiaries) with youth as partners and be shaped by youth as leaders." Why work with young people? Because they are an asset, an investment in the future, and collectively they can be an asset locally, nationally, and globally. There is increasing interest in youth participation—but restricted to one-off interventions where they give input but have no practical policy decisions.

According to DFID's *Youth Participation in Development* report, young people's participation is about far more than gathering their views in surveys or listening to limited numbers of representatives. Formal consultation and dialogue is useful to the extent that it a) guides decisions, and b) genuinely represents a body of opinion and experience. However, it should be part of a process whereby young people progress to greater rights and responsibilities (citizenship)—from being the targets of outreach, to being actively engaged in the planning and implementation of development interventions.

Delivery Integration Across all Policy Issues

Some key national policies which focus on youth are the education policy, sexual and reproductive health policy, population policy, and employment strategy and gender policy. However, coordination between ministries is a major challenge, with most operating independently. The lack of integration between various ministries and departments for planning and implementation of these policies leads to duplication and wastage of resources. Integrated delivery across all policy issues is the most feasible way forward to meaningfully invest in the youth of the country.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Pakistan has some good education, youth, and employment policies, but implementation is generally disappointing. The next step is to put young people at the heart of every government policy, building a national mission for a new Pakistan focusing on the following:

First Priority: Invest in Young People

Without quality education for all, the next generation will never reach its potential. Rapid progress toward universal education is possible, especially given recent budget commitments. But Pakistan needs a balanced nonpartisan task force to create and guide a credible plan for delivery.

Second Priority: Release the Economic Potential of the Young

Pakistan needs 36 million jobs in the next decade. It must equip young people with the skills demanded by the global economy, and help many more young women find employment opportunities. Good jobs must be the primary objective of all economic reforms, while new approaches are needed to tackle scarcities in energy, water, food, and other resources.

Third Priority: Create Policies that Help

Many next generation members are already raising their own children, often with few resources and in a dangerous and unstable environment. By engaging with young people as parents, we can turn them into advocates for peace and security, for better education and health, and for the rights of the young mothers who will have the greatest influence on the future of Pakistan.

Fourth Priority: Help Young People Become Active Citizens

Next generation challenges can only be solved with the enthusiastic involvement of young people themselves. New opportunities for participation are needed at all levels of society, with a fresh generation of leaders put in positions of authority as soon as they demonstrate their worth. There is fresh energy in the grassroots—it is time to tap it.

The International Community Must Live up to its Responsibilities

Over the past decade, its obsession with security has done nothing to make Pakistan a safer place. Now is the time for the world to invest in Pakistan's future, supporting the government and wider society as Pakistanis develop a serious program to meet the needs of the next gen-

eration. International actors should also seize the opportunity to work with young people—helping rebuild the relationship between Pakistan and the world.

Delivery to the Next Generation Must be Based on Robust Evidence

The government, civil society, the business community, and international organizations should work together to create and share authoritative analyses on the needs of the next generation, building on the start we have made in the *Next Generation* report. The Ministry of Youth Affairs wants to commission an Annual Status Report on Youth. It is now time to put this into practice along with other ministries. These ministries should also be accountable for results. Why not prepare an annual report accounting for the impact and effectiveness of investment in the next generation? All this should form the basis of a contract with the next generation, setting out what young people can expect from their society and what their country expects them to deliver in return. So far, the next generation has been failed by its leaders. It deserves a solemn and binding commitment that this will now change.

The most urgent need for Pakistan in terms of addressing the demographic challenge is developing policies for the long term. These are changes that cannot be brought about in a few years. They need long-term commitments from successive governments at all levels—federal, provincial, and district. A national consensus is required within Pakistani society that change has to be brought about. The key to these initiatives has to be the drivers for change—the young people themselves. It needs to be a full circle from young people to policy and back to young people. Youth participation, ownership, and commitment are crucial for bringing Pakistan back from the brink of the demographic disaster toward which it is now heading.

NOTES

1 Kofi Annan, Foreword, in David Woollcombe, *Youth-led Development: Harnessing the Energy of Youth to Make Poverty History* (Green Books, 2007).

2 Foreword, DFID-CSO Youth Working Group, *Youth Participation in Development: A Guide for Development Agencies and Policy Makers* (March 2010), available at http://www.ygproject.org/.

3 The British Council is the United Kingdom's international organization for educational opportunities and cultural relations and is represented in 110 countries worldwide. The Council is a major channel for the UK's public diplomacy in Pakistan, and works to put Pakistani people in touch with people in the UK. In the UK the British Council is registered as a charity (not-for-profit organization), and operates as an executive non-departmental public body. Her Majesty The Queen is the patron of the British Council, and His Royal Highness, The Prince of Wales, is the vice-patron.

4 *Pakistan: The Next Generation*, a report by the British Council, November 2009. For the report, go to http://www.britishcouncil.pk/pakistan-Next-Generation-Report.pdf.

5 "Pakistan Wasting Demographic Dividend: British Council Report," *Daily Times*, November 21, 2009.

6 "A Resilient Youth," *The Nation*, November 21, 2009.

7 See http://pkpolitics.com/2010/11/10/dunya-today-10-november-2010/ and http://pakistanherald.com/Program/Our-young-generation-and-current-politic-November-10-2010-Dr-Moeed-Pirzada-5422.

Pakistan's Demographic Scenario, Past and Present: Population Growth and Policies, with Lessons from Bangladesh and Iran

Mehtab S. Karim

This paper is divided into two sections. First, it looks at the general demographic scenario in Pakistan. Second, it reviews the history of Pakistan's population policy programs. In both cases, comparisons are made with Bangladesh and Iran. These are two predominantly Muslim countries that only a few decades ago had fertility rates as high as Pakistan's, yet in recent years have reduced their fertility substantially through effective family planning programs, leaving Pakistan much behind.

POPULATION GROWTH IN PAKISTAN

The first post-independence census conducted in Pakistan occurred in 1951, and counted 33.8 million people. By the time Pakistan's third census was conducted in 1972, its population had almost doubled. The population growth rate peaked at over 3 percent per annum during the 1960s, 1970s, and much of the 1980s, when the population again doubled (according to the 1998 census). In less than 50 years (between 1951 and 1998), about 100 million people were added to Pakistan's population. Since no census has been conducted for the past 12 years, current population estimates vary between Pakistan government projections of 171 million (Government of Pakistan 2010) and international projections of 185 million (United Nations 2010). Thus, just during the past 12 years, Pakistan's population has increased between 41 and 51 million, more than the country's total population about 50 years earlier.

Mehtab S. Karim is a distinguished senior fellow and affiliated professor with the School of Public Policy at George Mason University.

Table 1: Population Growth in Pakistan, 1951-2010

Year	Population (Number in 000)	Annual Rate of Increase (Percent)
1951	33,740	-
1961	42,880	2.4
1972	65,309	3.6
1981	84,254	3.1
1998	132,600	2.6
2010*	171,365	2.0
2010**	184,753	2.2

Sources: 1951-1998: Pakistan Population Censuses.
** Estimated by Pakistan Population Census Organization (December 2010).*
*** Estimated by United Nations Population Division.*

During the past four decades, birth and death rates have both declined. However, as shown in Table 2, the crude birth rate remained fairly high until the early 1990s, and has shown a sharp decline during the past decade only. On the other hand, the crude death rate was already low in the 1960s, resulting in a high population growth rate. Since then it has further declined to a fairly low level, as a result of a sharp decline in the infant mortality rate from 136 per 1,000 live births in the early 1960s to 95 in 1998 and 64 currently. This decline has been mainly driven by improvements in the medical field and by increased access to health services—which laid the basis for the population growth that started in the 1950s. This demographic breakthrough was an international phe-

Table 2: Trends in Crude Birth and Death Rates

Year	Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000 Population)	Crude Death Rate (per 1,000 Population)
1962-65	45	13
1976-79	42	11
1985-88	41	10
1990-93	39	10
2000-03	28	8
2005-07	26	7

Source: Government of Pakistan (1962-65: Population Growth Estimation Project; 1976-79: Population Growth Surveys; 1985-2007: Pakistan Demographic Surveys).

nomenon, and not exclusively characteristic of Pakistan. However, for several decades, birth rates in Pakistan remained high due to an absence of flexibility among couples about family size.

Demographic Trends in Bangladesh, Iran, and Pakistan

Figure 1 illustrates trends in population growth in three predominantly Muslim countries. From 1950 to 1980, Pakistan's population grew by 100 percent. During the same period, Bangladesh's population rose by 107 percent, and Iran's by 133 percent. However, between 1990 and 2010 Pakistan's population growth rate increased, to 123 percent, while that of both Bangladesh and Iran declined to 82 and 91 percent, respectively. The United Nations Population Division's projections suggest that in 2010, Pakistan's population will have experienced growth of 63 percent, while that of Bangladesh will have grown by 31 percent and Iran's by 26 percent. Thus, while in 1950 there were 2 million more

Figure 1: Population Growth in Bangladesh, Iran, and Pakistan, 1950-2040



Source: United Nations Population Division.

people in Bangladesh than in Pakistan (43.6 and 41.2 million, respectively), in 2040 Bangladesh will have 215 million and Pakistan 309 million—less than a five-fold increase in the former and more than a seven-fold increase in the latter.

This phenomenal increase in Pakistan's population is due to persistently high fertility, which only started declining in earnest in recent years (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Trends in Total Fertility Rates (Average Number of Children per Woman) in Bangladesh, Iran, and Pakistan, 1960-2009



Source: United Nations Population Division.

In fact, while the total fertility rate (TFR)—the average number of children a woman is expected to bear over her reproductive lifespan—has declined from 7.3 to 1.8 in Iran (a reduction of 5.5 children per woman) since the 1960s, over the same period the TFR in Pakistan has only declined from about seven to four. This is more than twice that of Iran's TFR, and 67 percent higher than that of Bangladesh, which has experienced a decline of 4.4 children per woman since the 1960s.

One of the main reasons for the sharp decline in fertility in Iran and Bangladesh is the increasing use of contraception among currently married women. Conversely, this increase in Pakistan has been very slow, as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Trends in Contraceptive Prevalence Rates (CPR) of all Methods Among Married Women of Reproductive Ages (15-49) in Bangladesh, Iran, and Pakistan, 1974-2009 (Percent)



Source: United Nations Population Division.

REVIEW OF POLICY AND PROGRAMMATIC RESPONSES TO POPULATION CHALLENGES IN PAKISTAN, BANGLADESH, AND IRAN

Pakistan

A review of the population policies and programs in place in Pakistan since the 1960s indicates that not until the 1980s were significant gains made in attaining defined targets. Moreover, the centrality of population could not be operationalized in the general development planning

process, thereby not fully accounting for the possible pressure on various social and economic sectors (Karim et al. 2004). The immediate focus in Pakistan's early years pertained to restraining population growth.

Pakistan's Second Five-Year Plan (1960–65) spoke of a "demographic transition," but the plan listed no specific targets to be achieved. The plan constituted the first formal elaboration of the public sector's attempts to reduce the population growth rate, and spelled out a limited scope of work. However, funding and other resources allocated to this work were limited. Additionally, despite the strategy's inclusion of awareness-building about the merits of small families, no rigorous motivational campaign was developed to target couples, and government-owned health facilities were rarely involved in program implementation.

In the Third Five-Year Plan (1965-70), the marked dilution of past economic advances because of high population growth became the underlying driving force to bring a decline in fertility. Consequently, the plan sought to bring down the birth rate from 55 to 45 per 1,000 people. It declared a firm objective to "avert the menacing growth of population by taking decisive steps towards population control." It also acknowledged a high growth rate of 2.6 percent and the expectation that it would rise in the coming years. Based on projected progressive declines in mortality rates by 1985, the plan envisioned the negative effects of a "population explosion," mentioning how this could imperil the targets of tripling per capita income and universal literacy. With its specific target for bringing down birth rates, the plan involved crisp problem identification and verticality in program strategy. However, the focus and role of other sectors like education, health, and information were not adequately addressed.

Another notable aspect of this plan was that it stressed motivational aspects to counter social norms. The backbone was a motivational campaign led by *dais* (illiterate traditional birth attendants). Unfortunately, due to the increased visibility of program activities, this period witnessed tremendous resistance from conservative and religious segments of the population, who portrayed the program as a "foreign ploy and sacrilegious."

The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1970–75) outlined the principal objectives of maintaining economic development, enhancing self reliance, reducing regional disparities, and establishing a just society. It also

identified a significant rise in unemployment, and attributed it to high population growth. Consequently, the plan aimed to reduce the birth rate to 40 per 1,000 live births by 1975, and to raise the contraceptive prevalence rate to 34 percent by the same year. Even with the high expenditures and achievements of the past planned targets, the population growth rate had continued to rise to above 3 percent. Policy planners admitted that this situation diluted the development efforts and achievements made during the 1960s. Earlier emphases on intrauterine forms of birth control were found not to be supporting stated goals, and thus additional methods were added, including those involving oral pills. A new concept was developed in which teams of family planning workers were to visit couples four times a year to provide information, motivation, and supplies. Nationwide expansion of the workers program took place in 1973, but the poor recruitment of female staff and ineffective male staff led to modifications in 1975. The team concept was eventually abandoned, with workers doing their jobs separately. Expenditures earmarked to communication strategies went to publicity and to creating awareness about the population problem, but such campaigns were sporadic, presented very general ideas, and did not target the real audience. Consequently, inadequate information could not bring necessary behavioral changes.

The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1977-83), though launched two years after the completion of the fourth plan, inherited a situation where family planning activities were not showing any significant impact on achieving stated targets, with continuous rises in population both in the growth rate and in absolute numbers. A wide gap remained between strategies and operational activities besides ad hoc measures. There was neither a firm foundation to pursue programmatic agendas consistently, nor a reasonable acceptance of organizational set-ups on provincial levels. Although family planning services were being provided at government health facilities, these services were increasingly not seen as health activities by employees of the Health Ministry. The fifth plan tried to address various gaps in the health sector, keeping in view a broad-based framework of economic goals and targets. The concept of "development is the best contraceptive" had set the tone for several developing countries to redefine their policies and framework within the economic development process. Accordingly, keeping the development process as

the main beneficiary, the main aim of the fifth plan was to reduce population growth by reducing the crude birth rate (CBR) from 44.5 to 35.5 by 1982–83, and by increasing the contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) from 6 to 18 percent by 1983.

Even though the Fifth Five-Year Plan envisaged providing family planning services under the health cover, its health sector plan provided no family planning services. Meanwhile, as part of its mandate, the health plan of the Pakistan government's Planning Commission focused on expanding, among other activities, maternal and child health services. It sought to bring down the crude death rate to 10.2 per 1,000 people, and the infant mortality rate to 79 per 1,000 live births by the end of the plan period. However, there was no specific mention of the provision of family planning services. Another notable development was that due to a weak understanding of population issues by health managers, and to the need to strengthen coordination, the Population Welfare Program was placed under the Planning and Development Ministry in 1980. During this plan period, policies were continuously viewed as a means to reduce family size, with no emphasis on preventive activities.

The Sixth Five-Year Plan (1983–88), for the first time, laid out a population welfare policy with elaborate objectives. The document announced itself as Pakistan's first population policy statement, noting that it was the basis for multisectoral strategies with a focus on fertility management. It aimed at reducing CBR from 40 in 1983 to 36 in 1988. During this period, the Ministry of Population Welfare's Population Welfare Program was devolved into several projects: core, complementary, and support. While the Population Welfare Program remained under the Ministry of Planning and Development, all project implementation activities were handed over to Pakistan's provinces by September 1983. During the course of implementation, private-sector involvement evolved, and a pilot social marketing initiative was undertaken. The focus during the plan period remained on strengthening administration, achieving commodity distribution targets, and on financial aspects. Due to an overemphasis on these matters and a consequent lack of focus on clients, quality of services, access, and coverage, little progress was made in the fertility transition process in Pakistan.

This plan witnessed two initiatives in the private sector that depended heavily on donor assistance: (a) The establishment of a Nongovernmental

Organization (NGO) Coordinating Council through the involvement of NGOs for service and training for capacity-building, and (b) The initiation of a social marketing project for the distribution of condoms through commercial outlets. These initiatives helped promote coverage and access to family planning services. However, a number of areas remained untouched, including coordination with health, education, and other sectors to seek their support. Furthermore, the devolving of authority was never realized. In 1985, the federal government issued a policy statement requiring all health facilities to provide family planning services. However, it was never taken seriously by provincial authorities, and the matter was never discussed. Though 81 percent of budget allocations were reportedly utilized, the results were no different than before.

The Seventh Five-Year Plan (1988-1993) incorporated the formal declaration of the Mexico City World Population Conference of 1984, which highlighted population issues as "a matter of urgency," and implored countries to make family planning services universally available. Thus, the government of Pakistan continued to recognize the "gravity" of the population problem, and remained committed to increasing the level of investment in birth control service delivery and in an intensive motivational program. Consequently, it was envisaged to reduce CBR from 42.3 to 38 over the plan period by increasing CPR from an estimated 12.9 percent to 23 percent. The population program was funded, planned, managed, and monitored by the federal government, while implementation was delegated to provincial, divisional, and district levels.

Unfortunately, overcentralized and top-heavy management were the program's main characteristics. Low interaction with other departments at provincial and district levels created a gulf between desired targets and actual achievements. In public sector outlets, no special programs or activities were undertaken to address issues related to children less than five years of age. At the same time, the early 1990s witnessed a series of events expressing government commitment toward the population issue. These included the establishment of an independent Ministry of Population Welfare in 1990; the initiation of an accelerated Population Program within the Seventh Five-Year Plan in 1991; and the launching of a pilot village-based family planning worker scheme in 1992.

Lowering the population growth rate had become a permanent feature of Pakistan's five-year plans, as successive previous plans could not achieve targeted goals. In the absence of a national population census, the government used a high growth rate of 3.1 percent as the basis for the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1993-1998). Its population sector plan was launched in 1993, and was based on the critical successes made during the early 1990s with the Village-Based Worker Scheme and social marketing of contraceptive activities, with a bit of help from an open media campaign. The plan continued to recognize the consequences of rapid population growth on social and economic development, and the government resolved to support the population program. The plan targeted CPR increases to 24 percent and TFR reductions to 5.4 births per woman and CBR reductions to 36 per 1,000 live births. It also recognized poor performance and low coverage of rural areas. Program funding witnessed a major rise during the first two years, followed by a period of serious financial crunch in terms of releases and utilization, despite the support made available under the Social Action Program (SAP), a government initiative to increase the involvement of civil society in Pakistan's development through funding and capacity-building. Other aspects included:

- A village-based scheme to hire more than 12,000 workers in villages with more than 2,000 people. This expansion took place after a field evaluation that reflected a significant rise in contraceptive use and the high acceptability of such workers by village communities.
- Social marketing of contraception activities enjoyed additional funding, with assistance from the United Kingdom's Department for International Development. These activities also expanded the scope of the commodities marketed, and covered almost all urban areas of Pakistan.
- A large number of NGOs were involved in service delivery by the reorganized Pakistani agency known as the National Trust for Population Welfare, using United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) funds and World Bank credit.
- UNFPA supported field monitoring of all Ministry of Population facilities, resulting in some improvements in service delivery.

- Credit made available under the World Bank (through the SAP) was utilized to fill a vacuum in grant fund availability for the procurement of contraceptive commodities. This vacuum was created when the U.S. Agency for International Development, in view of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, withdrew its economic support to Pakistan (including support covering its family planning program).
- Mobile service units continued to face bureaucratic impediments to optimal performance. Planned expansion was delayed based on poor performance revealed in an evaluation study in 1994.
- The public sector media campaign was supported by the private sector's social marketing campaign, and significantly modified its messages and targeted audience.

The Eighth Five-Year Plan acknowledged high population growth as a problem being faced by the health sector. This plan established an initiative involving health workers for doorstep service delivery in primary health care. Consequently, the prime minister's Program for Family Planning and Primary Health Care (PHC) targeted the hiring of 33,000 workers, and linked them all with the nearest rural health facility. The whole program was federally funded. It was piloted in two districts per province, prior to full-scale implementation. This program, working under PHC strategy, provided oral pills and condoms to its clients while other methods were made available through the Basic Health Units and Rural Health Centers network. The pilot was undertaken in 1993-94, with its gradual replication launched in 1995-96. According to World Bank research on the program, the proportion of first-level-of-care health facilities reporting family planning services was highest in Punjab (50 percent), with significantly lower figures in Sindh and Baluchistan. Government health facilities were found to have failed to make family planning services widely available. The Bank raised the issue of family planning services quality in health facilities as a factor for low service provision—especially in Sindh and Baluchistan.

The Ministry of Population Welfare, though professing to be working within the health perspective to promote family planning, could not produce any data or report reflecting its contribution to female health or

improvement brought to the health of children under age five. Moreover, the performance of mobile units was not improved at all from the 1994 level, and thus its expansion remained suspended. Coordination with the Health Ministry showed limited improvements at the federal level, but was not translated into the regular provision of family planning services through rural outlets. At the field level, an absence of coordination between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Population Welfare resulted in a number of serious management problems, including the duplication of family planning services. Meanwhile, contraceptive stock outages at health outlets were blamed on poor distribution and poor pricing. The population program by design did not try to build local ownership, especially at provincial and district levels. The contribution of NGOs remained modest, and their focus continued to be on urban slums and peripheral areas, while negligible in rural areas. Consequently, the change in fertility among rural women was not significant. Highly centralized decision making reflected a lack of trust, and a poor management system added to the frustrations of field staff, who were otherwise expressing a demoralized attitude due to a number of personnel-related problems of job security, promotions, career planning, etc.

Major governance issues also affected the program's performance. These included inadequate authority given to implementers to carry out decisions and to attain timely implementation; nonexistent authority to take disciplinary actions or to hire or fire low-grade staff; and weak female supervision (though staff absences were in fact brought down). Human resource depletion was quite significant, and no substantive action plan was evolved to address the matter. The high retirement rate of personnel and a ban on fresh hiring, especially of administrative posts, severely affected program activities. Despite these administrative problems, the Eighth Population Welfare Plan can be categorized as the best plan so far in terms of overall available funding, input performance, and family planning outputs and impact. The CPR rose from just 12 percent to 24 percent. However, there was also an equivalent rise in unmet need for contraceptives (defined as married women who do not desire to have more births or who would like to space future births, but who are not currently practicing any contraceptive method). This reflected a decrease in demand for births but also the continued nonuse of contraceptives. The TFR declined to 4.8 births.

For the period of 1998-2003, no formal five-year plan document was finalized, though sectoral programs were agreed to and approved. The Ninth Plan's population program took shape amid an encouraging backdrop: A decline in the growth rate as reflected in the 1998 census, and continuous declines in fertility shown by various representative household surveys. The eighth plan period had witnessed major political and administrative support for family planning activities, and Pakistan also endorsed the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) Plan of Action, which called for taking action toward human development and population growth stabilization. The ICPD sought greater investment in improving human health, education, and rights and family planning services within the context of comprehensive reproductive health care. Population being an integral part of the Social Action Program, elements of the SAP provided support to the Eighth Plan to focus on higher visibility of the population issue, and emphasized higher allocations, coordination, and joint planning with the Health Ministry. Targets to be achieved by the end of the plan period included increasing CPR from 24 percent to 40 percent, and reducing the annual growth rate from 2.4 to 2 percent and CBR from 32 to 29 per 1,000 people.

In June 2002, a merger between village-based workers programs and the Lady Health Workers Program (an initiative to involve female community health professionals in bringing basic health services to local populations in Pakistan) was agreed to and finalized. All responsibilities pertaining to provision of family planning services at the doorsteps of rural communities now rested with the Ministry of Health. Furthermore, the population program was defederalized, with no firm role defined for the Ministry of Population Welfare. Some progress was seen in selected indicators, such as CPR, which showed an increase reaching 30 percent by 2000. However, the rise was much slower than desired to attain the target of 40 percent by the end of the plan period. The population growth rate recorded a decline to 2.1 percent. CBR was 29 per 1,000 in 2002, and in 2000 TFR was 4.3 births per woman.

Since the late 1990s, several initiatives have been taken by the central government that aim to bring population issues to the forefront. These have included (as a follow-up to the ICPD Plan of Action) finally taking up the goal of reproductive health, with increasing inputs to the

country's health and population sectors. The Ministries of Health and Population Welfare, through extensive consultation with other stakeholders, released a comprehensive Reproductive Health Service Package in August 1999 that had the following components: (i) provision of comprehensive family planning services for males and females; (ii) maternal healthcare including safe motherhood and pre- and post-natal care for complications; (iii) infant health care; (iv) management of reproductive health-related problems of adolescents; (v) management of other reproductive health-related problems of women; (vi) prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, sexually transmitted diseases, and HIV/AIDS; (vii) management of infertility; (viii) detection of breast and cervical cancers; and (ix) management of reproductive health-related issues of men.

The Reproductive Health Package has been gradually introduced through family planning service outlets and health facilities. In addition, the government has also recognized the key roles of national NGOs, community-based organizations, and the private sector for service delivery. The Reproductive Health Package illustrated the realization among the government and its partners that the promotion of family planning methods alone cannot meet the entire requirements of a comprehensive population program. This understanding necessitated a broader vision of what women's and men's lives should be, and how a strong reproductive health package can assist people in attaining their full human potential. This requires the development of a partnership between the government, NGOs, and the private sector in which international donor agencies play a crucial role.

The country's National Population Policy, approved by the Cabinet in July 2002, aimed at poverty reduction and sustainable development. It addressed the need to reduce the rate and incidence of unwanted fertility, to promote small family norms, to make an investment in the youthful population, and to focus on male involvement. The policy aimed to achieve a decrease in the population growth rate from 2.1 percent in 2001 to 1.82 percent in 2004 and 1.6 percent by 2012, through increases in family planning program coverage from 65 percent in 2001 to 76 percent in 2004 and 100 percent by 2010. The policy targeted an increase in the contraceptive prevalence rate from 30 percent in 2000 to 43 percent in 2004 and 53 percent in 2012, and sought to attain these

targets by merging the resources of the Ministry of Population Welfare and Ministry of Health to boost doorstep family planning coverage and thereby reduce unmet need.

In view of the wider acceptance of family planning and the rapidly changing scenario related to fertility transition in the region, the goals set in this new policy were modest and achievable within the proposed time frame. However, the National Population Policy of 2002, despite articulating a clear vision and set of goals, did not take into account the specific situation prevailing in each province.

In the early 2000s, an interim Population Sector Perspective Plan 2002-12 was formulated that aimed to attain population mainstreaming of national planning and development programs. This was to be done through a multisectoral strategy toward population issues by establishing synergy between population dynamics, economic revival, and poverty alleviation programs. The plan also prioritized the expansion of service delivery and the improvement of quality, all with an eye toward tackling the high unmet need for family planning services. The plan sought to bring family planning services into the fold of health outlets by: (i) strengthening community-based services with the help of female and male community workers at the grassroots level; (ii) developing linkages with the institutional service delivery system, including provincial government infrastructure and arrangements with other public institutions and private entities; (iii) strengthening and upgrading existing family welfare centers by offering, in addition to family planning and reproductive health services, other basic social services through community participation; (iv) fostering public-private partnerships in urban as well as rural areas by encouraging social marketing projects; (v) involving men in the context of getting support for contraceptive use, arranging for skilled care during pregnancy, and avoiding delays in seeking emergency obstetric care; and (vi) improving and ensuring service quality through enhancing service accessibility, improving the attitudes and technical skills of service providers, and giving proper attention to counseling and follow-up at all service outlets.

The Ninth Five-Year Plan (2003-08) established the Prime Minister's Program (now known as the National Program) for Family Planning and Primary Health Care. It was created in great part to provide training to the village-based Lady Health Workers (LHWs), focusing on rural

coverage and access. A major initiative in health included the launching of the Women Health Project, supported by the Asian Development Bank and focusing on Reproductive Health Package priority areas in 20 districts across all four of Pakistan's provinces. Unfortunately, the LHWs program experienced a major financial crunch, with a complete stock outage of all contraceptives for months. The Ministry of Population Welfare and the provincial health departments could not formalize good working relationships for sharing resources that included joint monitoring, contraceptive stocks, and information systems and training materials. Meanwhile, the Women Health Project depended on the Ministry of Population Welfare's contraceptive supplies, which could not be operationalized due to a disagreement over pricing. As a result, women in the 20 districts were deprived of contraceptive supplies. Furthermore, the Population Welfare Ministry's Population Welfare Program was defederalized, with no firm role defined for the Federal Ministry of Population Welfare. Yet the plan still aimed high, targeting a CPR of 40 percent—much higher than the 28 percent recorded in 2000.

Continuing this glum narrative, the results of the Pakistan government's 2006-07 Demographic and Health Survey were disappointing. They indicated a contraceptive prevalence rate of just 30 percent, with unmet need for contraception at 25 percent (National Institute of Population Studies 2008). Consequently, a new national population policy was formulated in 2010 by the central government, and subsequently approved by the Cabinet. It reaffirms the government's commitment to informed choice in availing family planning/reproductive health services. Emphasis is also given to increasing outreach in support of a comprehensive package of family planning/reproductive health services by the public, private, and corporate sectors. The policy stipulates that all stakeholders, including all public and private healthcare outlets and providers, offer family planning services. Furthermore, religious and opinion leaders are to be mobilized, with the support of media, to actively promote pregnancy spacing.

Pakistan's family planning program has not shown any significant result in achieving its desired goal of fertility decline, mainly due to poor access to family planning facilities, and to the continued poor quality of services (a result of shortages of supplies and a lack of adequate information and choice on various methods). The provision of family planning

services has been deficient because of inadequate coverage of the population in both urban and rural areas; one survey has found that family welfare centers were accessible to only 10 percent of the population, with only 5 percent living within easy walking distance of clinics (Rosen and Conly 1996). Research evidence also shows that the husband's desire for no additional children is more important in increasing the likelihood to use contraceptives. Such strong fertility attitudes of husbands suggest the need for a greater focus on men in promoting more contraceptive use. Similarly, spousal discussions on fertility matters are found to have a strong relationship with contraceptive use (Mahmood and Ringheim 1997). Open discussion among couples is limited in Pakistan, and this absence of discussion is considered a serious constraint to increased contraceptive use.

Despite an increase in contraceptive prevalence during the 1990s, the unmet need for contraception remained high. Various contraceptive prevalence surveys revealed a persistent increase in unmet need from 28 percent in 1990-91 to 37.5 percent in 1996-97. The proportion and level of unmet need for contraceptives in Pakistan is one of the highest in the developing world. The factors underlying unmet need that act as obstacles to the use of family planning are the husband's disapproval, fear of side effects, and cultural and religious hindrances to accepting family planning as a social norm. Moreover, lack of education and the limited autonomy of women further hinder their decision to use family planning. Unmet need is higher among younger women, while limited need is higher among older women. There are also supply-side constraints contributing to the persistence of unmet need among women. These relate to lack of information regarding contraceptive methods and source of supply, limited access and low quality of services, side effects and costs associated with use of modern methods, and travel. Pakistan's family planning program has greatly suffered due to changed strategies in every five-year plan and to the lack of a political commitment (Karim et al. 2004).

In the late 1990s, evidence from small-scale surveys in major urban areas like Karachi indicated an increasing prevalence of induced abortions as a method of ending unwanted pregnancies (Saleem and Fikree 2001). A larger study conducted in Pakistan in 2004 by the Population Council (Sathar, Singh, and Fikree 2007) estimated that about 890,000 induced

abortions are performed annually. Thus, about one-fifth of pregnancies are terminated as abortions. This situation illustrates how large unmet need among women with supply-side constraints has resulted in an increase in the use of methods that fall outside the activities of family planning programs. Keeping in view recent trends in fertility and family planning, it clearly implies that a group of reproductive health services, including family planning services, needs to be made accessible and affordable to all couples with the provision of safe methods of their choice.

The population policy planning process itself has been based on a faulty framework. The planning process has always been supply-oriented, and based on incremental changes in existing budgetary allocations, service delivery, and infrastructure. This process has catered to available financial resources, but has lacked an assessment of real needs for services in various regions and segments of the population. Even though the unmet need for contraception concept has been in existence for over two decades, it has not been used to make necessary changes in the planning process. A demand orientation—involving needs assessment surveys, feedback-gathering from stakeholders, and the development of plans and programs in consultation with users and beneficiaries—has been a major missing element. What the country needs to do is to test and institutionalize a participatory planning process, and to establish effective linkages with the budgetary process. Unless this is done, top-down planning will continue to be an impediment to the attainment of positive outcomes in which family planning services truly and effectively reach people.

A detailed look at the history of population program planning in Pakistan reveals that most are macro plans which have been linked to availability of funds, and that no set plans exist regarding critical commodity procurements; field monitoring and supervision; manpower and staff planning; and information, education, and communication campaign planning at the micro level. The absence of this level of planning in the Ministry of Population Welfare has led to serious shortages and delays in the provision of services. Furthermore, population program strategies have been changed frequently, yet always with very limited political support.

The situation in Pakistan's population sector has now changed dramatically as a result of the 18th amendment of the Constitution (ratified in 2010), which calls for devolution of program planning and implemen-

tation of all family planning activities to the provinces. To this end, the Federal Ministry of Population Welfare was shut down on December 1, 2010. While a few of its functions have been placed in the Planning Commission, most program planning, implementation, and monitoring functions have been transferred to the provinces. This will make the provinces more responsible for framing their own policies and funding their own programs. Given the lack of provincial capacity, such devolution may face obstacles to success, as shown by a strategic review of the family planning program of Sindh Province (Karim and Ward 2007). Nonetheless, success can be achieved in the population sector in Pakistan if there is more emphasis on private-public partnerships, such as arrangements in which programs are implemented by civil society with strict monitoring by the government. Additionally, according to the former federal secretary of the Ministry of Population Welfare, the central government has proposed the establishment of a Commission on Population and Development, to be chaired by the prime minster and a full-time vice chairman (Durrani 2010). This could give Pakistan's population policy a new lease on life. Furthermore, if the proposed commission is managed by professionals without any bureaucratic interference, then Pakistan's population sector may well achieve its desired, yet so far elusive, results.

Bangladesh

At the time of its independence in 1971, Bangladesh inherited Pakistan's family planning program. However, in Bangladesh's First Five-Year Plan (1973-77), high priority was given to population (Robinson 2007). Rather than keeping the family planning program as a separate entity, it was placed under the Ministry of Health and Family Planning. The program also adopted a multisectoral approach, which allocated some of the responsibilities for family planning to eight different ministries (Barkat-e-Khuda 2005). Implemented in 1975, progress was slow between 1975 and 1985, particularly due to bureaucratic in-fighting within various ministries over budgets. One advantage for Bangladesh during this period was the experiments being carried out at the International Centre for Diarrhoel Research, which demonstrated that when family planning services were delivered directly to people's

doorsteps in rural areas, prevalence rates of contraceptives increased dramatically, resulting in substantial declines in fertility. In 1983, this experiment was extended to other rural areas, and with positive results. Consequently, contraceptive prevalence rates tripled from 8 percent in 1975 to 24 percent in 1985.

Another sector that played a substantially positive role in the promotion of family planning was civil society. NGOs had a major presence in the rural areas involved in family planning and other development activities. These included large NGOs such as Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee and Grameen Bank, as well as hundreds of others promoting family planning activities and women's empowerment through education and income-generating schemes (Cleland et al. 1994).

The private sector also played an important role by distributing condoms and oral pills through social marketing outlets. Furthermore, Bangladesh's family planning program was heavily funded by international donors, who thus played an important role in influencing government policy. In essence, the government's efforts have been coordinated with those of NGOs and the private sector. However, about one-third of modern contraceptive users obtain methods from a public facility for which government field workers and satellite clinics are the two crucial elements. A consistent approach is perhaps the most important factor in the success of family planning programs in Bangladesh.

Iran

The results of the second census conducted in Iran, in 1966, showed a population growth rate of over 3 percent. Alarmed by this growth rate, the government initiated an official family planning program the very next year. The program mostly focused on younger urban women, who were mainly provided oral pills by clinics through primary care services. This heavy reliance on clinics required patients to go to such facilities for initial supplies of oral pills, followed by re-supply visits once a month. However, until the mid-1970s, contraceptive prevalence remained fairly low. While major emphasis was placed on clinical services, much less emphasis was given to understanding and resolving the social, cultural, and economic barriers to birth control, which were considered the major drawback of Iran's family planning program (Mirzaie 1998).

Following the Islamic Revolution, the family planning program was kept alive by obtaining *fatwas* (rulings) issued by religious leaders in support of contraception (Mehryar 2005). However, the government adapted a pro-natalist policy, and the results of the 1986 census indicated an annual population growth rate of 3.9 percent between 1976 and 1986. Consequently, a national seminar organized jointly by several government entities recommended the adoption of a national population policy aiming at birth control. In 1989, two important seminars were arranged on "Islamic Perspectives in Medicine" and "Islam and Population Policy." These seminars were attended by theologians and influential clergy. Later, their recommendations in support of a family planning program were incorporated into the First Five-Year Development Plan (1989-1993), which was approved by Iran's parliament in 1989. In the new plan, the Ministry of Health and Medical Education was given a mandate and resources to reduce the total fertility rate from 6.4 in 1986 to 4 by 2011. This entailed the provision of free family planning services to all married couples, and the inculcation of smaller family norms. This was done in collaboration with other government ministries and broadcasting organizations.

In 1990, an interdepartmental Family Limitation Commission was established under the chairmanship of the minister for health and medical education, and included the ministers of education, higher education, labor and social affairs, national guidance, and plan and budget. The commission's objective was to "monitor, supervise and coordinate all government policies and activities bearing on the control of the population growth rate, to report on steps taken by member agencies, to make recommendations on the formation of a High Council on Family Planning and … to review proposals made for changing laws and regulations that may encourage or inhibit population growth" (Jahanfar and Jahanfar 2000). Attention was also given to infant mortality reductions, women's education and employment, and social security retirement benefits. All these policy changes affected contraceptive use.

CONCLUSIONS

In the 1960s, planners in Pakistan, Bangladesh (then part of Pakistan), and Iran realized that rapid population growth was a major hurdle to development. Consequently, Pakistan's official family planning program

was initiated in 1962, and then launched, with much fanfare, in 1965. However, since then, program strategies have changed several times and have suffered from bureaucratic control. On the whole, the program has remained largely a vertical one. By contrast, program strategies developed in Bangladesh and Iran have not been changed frequently.

Additionally, although Pakistan's national program on family planning and primary health care (launched in the late 1990s) tried to integrate service delivery at the grassroots level, the desired coordination between the Ministry of Population Welfare and the Ministry of Health has generally been lacking. Indeed, unlike in Bangladesh and Iran, integration is essentially missing. Furthermore, Pakistan's program did not take along the other stakeholders—including the religious leadership. Finally, a mechanism for an interdepartmental approach to the promotion of family planning activities has not been in place. This is unfortunate, as such an arrangement would give due importance to other social sector programs (as in Iran) and to NGOs (as in Bangladesh). As a result, Pakistan's contraceptive prevalence rate lags much behind, and the country consequently has a much higher total fertility rate than that of Iran or Bangladesh.

Can Pakistan learn any lessons from Iran and Bangladesh? Each country adopted different approaches within its own sociocultural context. Iran utilized the services of its religious leadership to convince its people that there is sufficient evidence in favor of family planning in Islam. In this process, substantial support was provided by the Ministry of Health. On the other hand, in Bangladesh, NGOs and the private sector were at the forefront, while the government made a strong political commitment to the promotion of small family norms and the delivery of contraception. In Pakistan, these strategies have not been adopted. In fact, at all times, the government's family planning program has remained under the strict control of bureaucrats at different levels without any involvement of professionals. The program has also suffered from the uncooperative attitudes of managers toward health professionals and civil society organizations. Hopefully, with the setting up of the Commission on Population and Development, which envisages a greater role for professionals and cooperation with other stakeholders, Pakistan will achieve a breakthrough in achieving its population goals. However, it will only be successful if there is strong political support at all levels.

REFERENCES

Barkat-e-Khuda. 2005. "Fertility Decline in Bangladesh: Role of Family Planning Program and Socio-economic Changes." In *Islam, the State and Population, eds.* Gavin W. Jones and Mehtab S. Karim. London: C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd.

Cleland, J., J.F. Philips, S. Amin, and G. M. Kamal. 1994. *The Determinants of Reproductive Change in Bangladesh: Success in a Challenging Environment*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Durrani, Shaukat Hayat. 2010. Federal Secretary, Ministry of Population Welfare, Government of Pakistan. Personal communication with author, November 26.

Government of Pakistan. Various years. *1976-79: Population Growth Surveys.* Islamabad: Federal Bureau of Statistics.

Government of Pakistan. Various years. *1962-65: Population Growth Estimation Project*. Karachi: Central Statistical Office.

Government of Pakistan. Various years. Pakistan demographic surveys. Islamabad: Federal Bureau of Statistics.

Government of Pakistan. 2010. 2010 Population data, http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/. Islamabad: Population Census Organization.

Jahanfar, M., and S. Jahanfar. 2000. "Population and Family Planning" [in Persian]. *Studies in Family Planning* 31, no. 1: 19-34. Cited by Mohammad Jalal Abbasi, Amir Mehryar, Gavin Jones, and Peter McDonald. 2002. "Revolution, War and Modernization: Population Policy and Fertility Changes in Iran." *Journal of Population Research* 19, no. 1: 25-46.

Karim, M.S., and S. Ward. 2007. "Strategic Plan for Population Welfare Department, Sindh." Submitted to Technical Assistance Management Agency To The National Health And Population Facility, Karachi.

Karim, Mehtab S. 2004. "Socioeconomic Development, Population Policies, and Fertility Decline in Muslim Countries." *Pakistan Development Review* 43, no. 4: 773-789.

Karim, Mehtab S. et al. 2004. "A Review of Pakistan Population Program." In *Maternal and Child Health in Pakistan: Challenges and Opportunities,* ed. Z.A. Bhutta. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Mahmood, Naushin, and Karin Ringheim. 1997. "Knowledge, Approval, and Communication about Family Planning as Correlates of Desired Fertility among Spouses in Pakistan." *International Family Planning Perspectives* 23, no. 3: 122-29 & 145.

Mehryar, A. H. 2005. "Shi'ite Teachings, Pragmatism and Fertility Change in Iran." In *Islam, the State and Population,* eds. Gavin W. Jones and Mehtab S. Karim. London: C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd.

Mirzaie, M. 1998. "Swings in Fertility Limitations in Iran." Working paper in Demography No. 72, Australian National University, Canberra.

National Institute of Population Studies. 2008. *Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey: 2006-07.* Islamabad and Calverton, MD: National Institute of Population Studies and Macro International Inc.

National Institute of Population Studies. 1992. *Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey: 1990-91.* Islamabad and Calverton, MD: National Institute of Population Studies and Macro International Inc.

Robinson, Warren C. 2007. "Family Planning Programs and Policies in Bangladesh and Pakistan." In *The Global Family Planning Revolution: Three Decades of Population Policies and Programs,* eds. Warren C. Robinson and John A. Ross. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Rosen, J.J., and S.R. Conly. 1996. "Pakistan's Population Program: The Challenge Ahead." Country Study Series No. 3, Population Action International, Washington, DC.

Saleem, S., and F. F. Fikree. 2001. "Induced Abortions in Low Socio-economic Settlements of Karachi, Pakistan: Rates and Women's Perspectives." *Journal of the Pakistan Medical Association* 51, no. 8: 275-79.

Sathar, Zeba A., Susheela Singh, and Faryal F. Fikree. 2007. "Estimating the Incidence of Abortion in Pakistan." *Studies in Family Planning* 38, no. 1: 11-22.

United Nations. 2010. Population Division, Population Estimates and Projections Section, http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=2.

The Challenges of Population Policy and Planning in Pakistan

Saba Gul Khattak

This paper provides an overview of population planning challenges in Pakistan and government responses. First, it places the population question within the broader parameter of public sector development planning to highlight the overall context of constraints in policy and implementation. Second, the paper discusses the shortcomings of Pakistan's population program due to inadequate outreach, limited synergies with other public and private sector initiatives, and human resource constraints. Third, the paper discusses how the government has responded to population challenges through the 7th National Finance Commission Award and the 18th Constitutional Amendment, two important developments from 2010 that increase the fiscal and administrative autonomy of Pakistan's provincial governments. It concludes by looking at the broad but critical trends emerging on the Pakistan development scene, and outlines the challenges that lie ahead.

INTRODUCTION

Pakistan is the world's sixth most populous country. It has an estimated population of 173.51 million and a population growth rate of 2.05, which results in the addition of 3.5 million people annually.[1] Changes in Pakistan's population size and growth rate over the last few decades are shown in Table 1.

Saba Gul Khattak is the social sector member of the Pakistan government's Planning Commission. She would like to acknowledge and thank Saleh Mohammad, research associate at the Planning Commission, and Shahzad Malik, chief of the Population Section at the Planning Commission, for their input and support.

Table 1: Population Size and Growth Rate, 1951-2010

Census Year	Population (Million)	Average Annual Intercensal Growth Rate (%)
1951	33.82	1.8
1961	42.98	2.5
1972	65.32	3.6
1981	84.25	3.1
1998	133.32	2.6
2003*	147.69	2.03
2010*	173.51	2.05

Source: Pakistan Institute for Development Economics (excluding 2003 and 2010 figures).[2]
**Population figures for 2003 and 2010 reflect Pakistan government estimates, because no census was conducted in either of these years.*

Table 1 demonstrates that population growth rates have tended to come down since the early 1970s, but have more or less stagnated over the last decade. If current population growth trends persist, the total population shall reach 191.71 million by the year 2015, and 210.13 million by 2020.[3]

Pakistan's demographic profile consists of 52 percent men and 48 percent women, and 33 percent of people living in urban areas and 67 percent in rural areas (though rural-to-urban migration is taking place at a high rate). According to population projections, women of reproductive age will remain unchanged at 26 percent over the next 10 years, while men will outnumber women by more than 7 million. The 0-15 age group at the base of the population pyramid is expected to narrow very slowly from 35 percent of the total population in 2010 to 31.8 percent over the next 10 years, and to 27 percent by 2030. Pakistan's other demographic indicators show an estimated 13,000 maternal deaths annually, and a maternal mortality rate estimated at 276 per 100,000 live births. The infant mortality rate is 72 deaths per 1,000 live births, and the under-five mortality rate is 102.7 deaths per 1,000 live births. As such, Pakistan is far behind Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets and commitments for reducing infant and child mortality and for improving maternal health.

Population size and growth impact social policy planning. As such, population trends are critical for development priorities. The overall vision of the Pakistani government's population program has been to pursue the stabilization of population as a development priority. However, Pakistan's public sector has had to confront a serious mismatch between resources and an almost-unmanageable growing population. Policymakers have to ensure that economic growth results in accelerated social development through the expansion of employment and health and educational opportunities, along with the provision of other basic rights such as safe drinking water, clean air, and social protection. Specifically, Pakistan will need to boost its capacities to support more schools, and renew its emphasis on skills training and the development of more mid-level professionals in the service-providers cadre. Finally, family planning services will need to expand.

POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

The government's last national population policy, enunciated in 2002, reinforced the importance of the population issue, and identified the curbing of population growth as a national priority. It also emphasized the provision of accessible and better-quality family planning services to meet client needs. In fact, it envisaged universal access by 2010, and set a target for reducing the fertility rate to replacement levels of 2.2 by 2020.[4] However, as evidenced by the low contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) (currently 30 percent) and high rate of unmet need for family planning (25 percent), such targets remain unmet.

In 2010, a draft national population policy was finalized and submitted to the national cabinet for approval. This policy identified bottlenecks, and prioritized the mainstreaming of population planning. In addition, the draft 10th Five-Year Plan (2010-2015) chapter on population was aligned with the draft population policy. Both documents highlighted access, quality, human resource development, monitoring, research, and evaluation. Both were developed after extensive deliberations among stakeholders. However, new political developments—in particular the 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) Award and the announcement of the 18th Constitutional Amendment—required that both documents be shelved, because the greater provincial autonomy

established by such developments means that the federal government can no longer set social sector policies for provinces. (Both the NFC Award and the 18th Amendment are discussed in greater detail later in this essay.) Nonetheless, the original recommendations and proposals remain in institutional memory, and shall inform key decisions at provincial and federal levels.

PLANNING AND RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS

The challenges related to Pakistan's population program constitute a subset of the larger planning milieu, which encompasses social sector policymaking and planning. Pakistan's major challenges in social sector investments—particularly chronic underfunding—are tied to multiple external and domestic factors. According to Pakistan's MDGs Report, Pakistan's lackluster performance in the social sector pertains to the following:

- The global financial crisis affected the country negatively when it was already facing a balance of payments crisis stemming from high food and fuel prices in world markets. This resulted in unsustainable current account and fiscal deficits and unprecedented high levels of inflation—more than 20 percent in fiscal year 2008-09.
- The deteriorating law and order situation in Pakistan and the domestic costs of fighting militancy imposed a major burden on government funds.
- The growing tide of internally displaced persons put additional strains on government finances.

In essence, Pakistan has had to respond to several crises simultaneously. In doing so, it has faced a severe financial resource crunch to cover past as well as mounting pressures for new commitments. Economic growth, the main vehicle for ensuring the flow of funds, has slowed down. This has meant that the country's Public Sector Development Program (PSDP), which acts as a catalyst for the development process, has had to shrink. Table 2 presents federal PSDP as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), which has fluctuated in recent years and stayed

especially low during the last two years. It is notable that PSDP was 2.9 percent of GDP in 2007-08, yet fell to only 1.7 percent the very next year—and registered at that level again in 2010-11.

Table 2: Federal PSDP

Years	Allocation (Current Prices, Billion Rs.)	Percent of GDP
2003-04	113	2.0
2004-05	148	2.3
2005-06	204	2.7
2006-07	250	2.9
2007-08	300	2.9
2008-09	219	1.7
2009-10	285	1.9
2010-11	280*	1.7

Source: Planning Commission. Note: Rs. is Pakistani rupees.
**Due to the summer 2010 floods, the PSDP suffered a 50 percent cut in December 2010, and was reduced to 140 billion rupees.*

The overall development portfolio has grown in an unsustainable manner. Compared to 950 projects in 2002, it currently consists of approximately 1,900 projects, with a liability of 3 trillion rupees. This implies it could consume several years' worth of annual budgets. Additionally, a breakdown of the government's development projects, undertaken by the Planning Commission in 2010, indicates that 59 percent of expenditures are incurred on bricks and mortar, 15 percent on equipment, and only 7 percent on human resource development. Clearly, there needs to be a shift from excessive infrastructure to human resource capacity development.

Under current circumstances, it is clear that resources are spread too thin. As a result, almost all projects face constant delays due to late and insufficient releases that often do not match allocations or demands. These result in project overruns and cost escalations, and are accompanied by challenges of ownership and implementation at the provincial

and local level. Such challenges increased considerably in 2010. With the federal government devolving power to the provinces, tensions have arisen about how to assign financial responsibility for the huge federal projects that were implemented in the provinces prior to devolution. Provincial governments are unwilling to take responsibility for these projects because they have scarce resources, and because they have little sense of ownership over them.

Given the limited resources currently available, the general priority has been to focus on achieving results through the pursuit of high-impact projects that spur economic growth. Also, priority has been given to the completion of projects that are 80 percent complete, while taking on new projects only after rigorous scrutiny. However, even though approximately 500 projects have been deleted from the PSDP list, there is still a throw-forward of 2.5 trillion rupees (that is, funds that have been committed but not released). These obligated funds, coupled with the continuous approval of projects, generate added pressure for funds to be released, especially due to insufficient cash-flow.

THE POPULATION PROGRAM IN PERSPECTIVE: LIMITED RESOURCES AND LIMITED IMPACTS

The Population Welfare Program, in the words of the now-devolved Population Welfare Ministry that oversaw it, aimed to bring about "social and economic development through rational choices about family size and reproductive behavior." The functions of the Population Welfare Ministry included planning and developing policies, as well as monitoring and evaluating program activities. Its organizational structure included a service delivery network of 3,314 centers, some of which were nonfunctional. The breakdown is provided in Table 3.

The ministry's challenges and constraints were numerous. While it had a total of 32,000 employees, the Population Welfare Program suffered from a persistent ban on new recruitment. Additionally, although family planning service delivery points increased steadily over the years, and contraceptive prices remained unchanged over the last few years, access to the family welfare centers—situated across a vast geographic terrain with varying levels of population density and settlement patterns—remained a challenge. The neglect of service delivery

Table 3: Population Welfare Ministry Organizational Structure

Service Delivery Outlets	Number
Family Welfare Centers	2,846
Mobile Service Units	292
Reproductive Health Services	176
Total	3,314

Source: Pakistan Government, Ministry of Population Welfare, Directorate Technical.

points for men also persisted. The issue of investing in human resource development (especially at the grassroots level), along with attaining the right mix of skills, shall be critical for future success.

Furthermore, as discussed earlier in the overall context of the PSDP, the Population Welfare Program suffered from severe budgetary constraints. Demand persistently outstripped allocations, and allocations almost always outstripped actual releases. For example, the overall PSDP allocation over 2003-2008 amounted to Rs. 4.7 billion and Rs. 14.2 billion for, respectively, the Federal and Provincial Population Welfare Programs. The actual releases made by the Finance Ministry amounted to, respectively, Rs. 4 billion and Rs. 13.1 billion, against which utilizations of Rs. 3.2 billion and Rs. 11.36 billion were reported. Tables 4 and 5 provide a detailed breakdown of the allocations made by the Ninth Five-Year Plan, the PSDP allocations, and the actual releases and expenditures. It is noteworthy that in no year did releases match allocations. In fact, there was a lag of approximately 500-900 million rupees over the entire period, excluding 2004-05.

The challenges of the Population Welfare Program were not restricted to the decreased and late release of funds. For almost two decades, it was wholly funded through the federal PSDP, meaning that salaries were also funded through the development budget. Therefore, reduced releases by the Finance Ministry meant uncertainty in paying salaries. And if salaries were paid, there was little left for procurement and implementation—which also created insecurity among workers. Until recently, the absence of major donors (such as USAID), as well as shifts in the priorities of other donors toward reproductive health in general

Table 4: Allocations and Releases, Ninth Five-Year Plan and PSDP, 2003-08 (Million Rs.)

Years	Five-Year Plan Allocation	PSDP Allocation	Releases	Expenditure	Percentage Utilization Against Releases
2003-04	2655.198	3114.889	2346.368	2169.004	92.4
2004-05	3135.097	2586.000	2431.413	2139.758	88.0
2005-06	4744.337	4473.848	3581.184	3047.422	85.1
2006-07	5217.913	4369.010	3898.507	3313.084	85.0
2007-08	5266.266	4327.597	3534.613	3599.627	101.83
Total:	21018.811	18871.344	15792.085	14268.895	90.35

Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Population Welfare, Directorate Finance and Management.

Table 5: Allocations and Releases, PSDP, 2008-10 (Million Rs.)

Years	PSDP Allocations	Releases	Expenditure
2008-09	4315.00	2610.181	3257.430*
2009-10	5250.00	3419.960	4043.591*

Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Population Welfare, Directorate Finance and Management.
**Expenditure exceeds releases because provincial governments utilized the previous years' unspent amounts, which had been withheld by provincial finance departments and not surrendered to the federal government.*

and HIV/AIDS in particular, obliged the Pakistani government to rely almost entirely on its own meager funds.

After the Ministry of Population Welfare devolved considerable administrative and operational control to the provinces in July 2002, the federal government was expected to continue funding the population program for three years, or until the finalization of the next National Finance Commission Award. It would not be until 2010 that the award was finalized, at last allowing financial control to be devolved to the provinces. This long delay in the finalization of the NFC Award, along

with the resource constraints of the provincial governments, resulted in a lack of ownership of the program by the provinces—a setback to the federal exchequer, as resource scarcities and implementation challenges continued to grow at the grassroots level.

Weaknesses in the monitoring system, superimposed by a target-oriented approach, prompted inflated reporting. Inadequate infrastructure, poor coverage and an irregular supply of contraceptives, low human resource capacity, lack of follow-up care, and unreliable contraceptive methods and fears about their side effects made the population program ineffective. It is no surprise, therefore, that the coverage provided by the Population Welfare Ministry and provincial population welfare departments accounted for only 18 percent of the total service provision for family planning in Pakistan.

The program operated in isolation, having developed few linkages with other stakeholders/public sector institutions (such as provincial government health departments, implementation arms of provincial government departments, the railway service, and Pakistan International Airlines, or PIA). The railway service and PIA have health service outlets across Pakistan, but do not offer family planning services—yet with coordination from the population program, efforts could have been made to offer them. In 1994, the Ministry of Health launched a national primary health care and family planning program, which was administered by an extensive network known as the Lady Health Workers (LHWs). The LHWs were initially very effective in delivering family planning services. However, according to an evaluation conducted by the Oxford Policy Group in 2010, the LHWs' constantly expanding workload in recent years, particularly in regards to the administration of the polio vaccine, has resulted in lackluster performance in the provision of reproductive health services. More importantly, coordination between the Ministry of Population Welfare and the Ministry of Health was weak at all levels. As a result, the goal of increasing access to family planning services by 2010 could not be attained.

The nonintegration of the population welfare and health ministries at the service delivery level meant that a more effective implementation plan could not be pursued—an unfortunate result, given that the Health Ministry (17 percent) and Population Welfare Ministry (18 percent) accounted for more than a third of total family planning services.

Pakistan's private sector (39 percent) and NGOs (13 percent) account for over 50 percent of family planning services. However, all of these percentages pertain to only 14 percent (3.5 million) of men and women of reproductive age.

In terms of overall impact, there is recognition that family planning services have not kept pace with increased demand. The high unmet need for family planning services, the high levels of unwanted fertility, and the large number of induced abortions to avoid having and rearing an unwanted child are all a reflection of this reality. These outcomes largely result from the inaccessibility of contraceptives and of good-quality information and services to prevent unwanted pregnancies.

The consequences of the low priority given to family planning during the last few years are illustrated by the stagnation of the contraceptive prevalence rate (mired at 30 percent), which indicates a disconnect between demand and the provision of family planning services. More than one out of three women want birth spacing, yet they cannot access and therefore use contraceptives. Some important trends are provided in Table 6.

Table 6 demonstrates the limited impacts of the population program. As against the target of reducing the PGR to 1.72 percent and the TFR to 3.37 per woman, these instead stand at 2.05 percent and nearly 3.6

Table 6: Trends in Contraceptive Use

Indicators	Benchmarks, 2002-03	Targets, 2008-09	Actual, 2008-09
Pop. Growth Rate (PGR)	2.06%	1.72%	2.05%
Total Fertility Rate (TFR)	4.23	3.37	3.56
Contraceptive Prevalence Rate (CPR)	34.28%	44.92%	30%
Awareness of Family Planning Methods	94%	100%	97%

Sources: Planning Commission (spring 2010) and Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey *for 2006-07 and 2008-09.*
Note: TFR is expressed as the number of children per woman.

per woman. The decline in TFR—from 4.2 to 3.56—has been largely a result of rising ages at marriage and high abortion rates, rather than changes in contraceptive prevalence. According to the *2006-07 Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey*, the CPR declined from 32 percent in 2003 to 29.6 percent in 2007. The 2008 CPR target of 44.92 percent remained unmet in 2009, when the CPR was only 30 percent. The ever use rate of contraception—a measure of how many people have ever used (but do not currently use) contraception—is almost 50 percent. However, the rate of current use is 30 percent, which indicates a large proportion of dropouts and a serious failure of take off in the provision of family planning services. As against the target of reducing unmet need for family planning and reproductive health services to 20 percent, it has remained at 25 percent.

Despite the above, there are certain signs of progress, such as demand creation and the 97 percent awareness of the need for family planning. The strategy of promoting small-family norms has been successful in raising the level of awareness about population issues, especially in urban areas. Research indicates that more and more women want to space their next pregnancy, implying that the latent demand for family planning services is high but fragile, particularly among rural communities—where female mobility and literacy are limited, and where outreach is modest at best. Other shortcomings mainly relate to access to information and to the quality of counseling, which have remained poor because the fear of the side effects of contraceptives has not been effectively addressed. Service providers, though given training on interpersonal communication and information, education, and communication (IEC) skills, lack the professional expertise to motivate and counsel eligible couples to adopt contraception. Meanwhile, religious and sociocultural apprehensions about family planning have not been fully tackled either. In addition, the population program failed to develop synergies with the NGO sector, whose vast physical infrastructure could be utilized for social mobilization and service delivery more effectively than what has been done until recently.

THE 18TH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, THE NFC AWARD, AND DEVOLUTION OF THE POPULATION PROGRAM

In April 2010, Parliament unanimously adopted the 18th Amendment to the Constitution, a detailed and comprehensive document that heralded extensive changes. Among other important achievements, this amendment provided for provincial autonomy by abolishing the Concurrent Legislative List. This list had consisted of 47 subjects that came under the simultaneous autonomy of the federal and provincial governments, and included most social sector ministries. The Population Welfare Ministry had been on this list. Consequently, the functions of the ministry have been transferred completely to provincial departments of population welfare, while some overall national-level planning functions have been given to the Planning Commission, and data collection to the Federal Bureau of Statistics.

The 7th National Finance Commission Award gave greater fiscal autonomy to provincial governments, increasing their share vis-à-vis the federal government from 48.75 percent to 56 percent in 2010-11, and further increasing to 57.5 percent in 2011-12. In actual terms, this fiscal redirection to the provinces meant that an additional Rs. 68 billion was transferred to the provinces from the federal government. The NFC award also recognized that population density would not be the sole criterion for determining provincial share; it introduced a multiple-factor formula that includes poverty, revenue contribution, and inverse population density, thereby making the award comparatively equitable.

Given that the Concurrent Legislative List stands abolished and the provinces have been given greater financial resources, the financial liabilities of provincial population welfare programs are to be transferred to provincial governments. However, there is now a degree of tension between the provinces and federal government, because the provincial governments have demanded that the federal government continue to take responsibility for the population program during the transition period to the provinces, effectively for the next two to three years. One possible option to ease these tensions is for provincial population welfare departments to be restructured and devolved to districts. District-level

program planning, management, and monitoring may yield better results. In any case, an effective and efficient management structure with well-defined roles and responsibilities, commensurate financial and administrative authority at all levels, and linked with accountability throughout, are all vital for the successful implementation of sound family planning services. These steps would lead to district governments' ownership of the Population Welfare Program.

Service Delivery under the New Dispensation

Without the presence of the federal Population Welfare Ministry and a centralized and relatively inefficient system for project allocations and releases, provinces now have autonomy over their programs. However, provincial programs could also face challenges that are not necessarily new in terms of financial and human resource scarcities. For the population program to be effective, service delivery will need to be improved. This will require a realistic appraisal of the current state of affairs in terms of resources available to provincial governments, and of the effectiveness of public sector service delivery through provincial health and population welfare departments and their proposed integration. In addition, alternative models of service delivery need to be explored through better-coordinated programs with the private and not-for-profit sectors, and then assimilated on different levels.

The private sector has expanded considerably in the area of family planning services through social marketing, i.e. taking responsibility for reproductive health provision, advertising, and training. As mentioned earlier, this sector has been able to expand its coverage and today accounts for 39 percent of Pakistan's family planning services. NGOs and community-based organizations account for another 13 percent of family planning services, and together with the private sector outstrip the public sector's provision of services. NGOs not only provide clinical services (including contraceptive surgery), but also play important advocacy and community mobilization roles. Public-private partnerships, along with the empowerment of key institutions (known as Target Group Institutions) that boast a network of independent health outlets, have also been identified as important avenues for promoting family planning.

Provincial population programs need to note the limited services available through the public sector, the low demand for public sector services (accounting for 35 percent, versus 62 percent for private sector and NGO services), and the high costs of public sector services. In addition to these realities, the rapidly expanding population of Pakistan has outgrown a once-comprehensive public sector delivery system. Clearly, the private sector is able to deliver family planning and reproductive health services for less. Therefore, greater reliance upon the private sector, especially in urban areas, is a critical area for further promotion. However, remote rural areas will still need to be served by the public sector, as the private sector is less likely to work in such areas.

Shrinking state services in comparison with an expanding population mean that the public sector will have to concentrate on providing an overall vision and an enabling environment for that vision, and to ensure equity in access by stepping in where markets do not operate. It will continue to be responsible for setting standards for quality and for monitoring quality. Such steps can promote the effective use of scarce resources. The trend set by the NFC Award and the 18th Constitutional Amendment, which form the basis of decentralization, can be accentuated through rational planning and harmonization between the public and private sectors.

In essence, even in a market-based model, the state plays a critical role: to be responsible for those who fall outside the market safety net, and therefore to ensure social justice. This also means that a holistic social policy approach, which keeps women's empowerment at the center, has to be the focus of a successful population program. In addition, strengthening links between health and education, and pursuing a comprehensive social protection program with conditional transfers (e.g. tying cash grants to the use of contraceptives, child registration, vaccination, or education), constitute effective vehicles for encouraging family planning through an integrated social policy approach. The role of international partners needs to tie into the priorities of Pakistan's population sector.

CONCLUSION

In light of the 18th Constitutional Amendment, which has devolved the federal population program to the provinces, the next steps are to

ensure that the transition is smooth and that Pakistan does not slip up in its commitment to a reduction in the population growth rate. The critical factor for the success of program implementation is ownership of the population program at provincial and district levels. To ensure this, the provinces will need to address four critical issues: a) human resource capacity within the provincial and district governments, b) devolution of the program to districts, c) lateral and vertical coordination with other public sector institutions, especially those related to health and education, and d) incentives as well as careful planning so that the private sector, already active in urban centers, can expand to rural areas, while the public sector concentrates more on remote inaccessible areas and on vulnerable communities. A clearly defined division of labor between the public and private sectors, public-private partnerships, and partnerships with bilateral and multilateral institutions all constitute important channels for policy planning and implementation.

NOTES

1 Unless otherwise stated, data provided in this essay comes from the Pakistan government's Planning Commission.

2 A.R. Kemal, Mohammad Irfan, and Naushin Mahmood, eds., *Population of Pakistan: An Analysis of 1998 Population and Housing Census* (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Development Economics, 2003).

3 The population estimates cited here are based on projections carried out in the spring of 2010 by the Sub-Group II on Population Projections for the Draft 10th Five-Year Peoples Plan (2010-15), which was deferred in June 2010. The sub-group consisted of representatives of the National Institute of Population Studies (NIPS), Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS), and Planning Commission.

4 Replacement level fertility is the level of fertility at which a couple has only enough children to replace itself. Such a threshold reflects an ideal demographic situation in which a country's population growth is producing enough young people to replace and support aging workers, yet is not so high that it taxes national resources.

The Role of the Private Sector in Reproductive Health Service Delivery in Pakistan

Sohail Agha

Initiated in the mid-1960s, Pakistan has one of the world's longest-running family planning programs. Yet experts agree that the program has had limited demographic impact.

The private sector is the primary supplier of health care in Pakistan. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), about 85 percent of total health expenditures in Pakistan are funded as out-of-pocket expenses, and spent almost entirely in the private sector. While it provides the bulk of curative health care in Pakistan, the private sector's contribution to the provision of preventive health care has started only more recently. Private sector strategies, including contraceptive social marketing (CSM) and social franchising, were initiated by Population Services International (PSI) and Greenstar Social Marketing in the 1980s and the 1990s, respectively.

PSI is a global social marketing organization with reproductive health (RH), HIV, child survival, and malaria programs in more than 60 countries. PSI's affiliate in Pakistan, Greenstar Social Marketing, is a leading Pakistani nongovernmental organization that has been involved in building the private sector's capacity to deliver RH services in Pakistan for nearly two decades.

This essay examines the role of the private sector in reproductive health service delivery in Pakistan since the mid-1980s. Specifically, it investigates the extent to which the two major strategies implemented through the private sector, CSM and social franchising, have been suc-

Sohail Agha is a Karachi-based senior technical advisor for Population Services International, a global health organization.

cessful. The paper suggests future directions for the private RH sector in order to have greater demographic impact.

STRATEGY I: SOCIAL MARKETING

Social marketing of contraceptives began in Pakistan in 1986; the first social marketing condom brand *Sathi* was introduced in January 1987. *Sathi* condoms have now been on the market for 23 years. Social marketing uses the four Ps of marketing to promote changes in behavior that benefit society. The CSM model used in Pakistan is described below.

Product

In 1987, *Sathi* condoms were introduced as a birth spacing method with the theme "Until you want another baby, rely on *Sathi*." The marketing of *Sathi* as a birth spacing method was a departure from the communications approach used by the national family planning program, which promoted family planning as a means of limiting childbearing under the slogan "Two children are best." A second social marketing condom brand, *Touch*, was introduced in 1996, to provide more choices to consumers. Marketed as a more upscale condom brand, *Touch* targeted a different segment of the population: those who could pay more for a premium brand. Both *Sathi* and *Touch* condoms are high-quality imported condoms that are electronically tested according to international specifications.

Place

A retail survey conducted in 1986 showed that condoms were available in 7,000 retail outlets, primarily pharmacies and a few general stores, but not visibly displayed or advertised (Domestic Research Bureau 1986). Condom distribution was rapidly expanded after the launch of *Sathi*; regional distributors in 110 cities across the country were employed to sell *Sathi* to wholesale and retail outlets. Condom retail shops now included smaller general stores or *Kiryana* stores, *paan* shops which sold tobacco or beetle-nut, medical stores in small cities, and pharmacies and larger stores in large cities. Between 1986 and 2009, the number

of retail outlets selling condoms increased from 7,000 to 100,000 (Agha and Meekers 2010).

Price

Prior to the marketing of *Sathi*, private entrepreneurs had been importing and selling commercial condom brands for many years. These brands sold for about nine U.S. cents per condom (Domestic Research Bureau 1986). At the time of their launch in 1987, a four-pack of *Sathi* condoms was sold for one rupee or one-and-a-half U.S. cents per condom (Davies and Agha 1997). Over the years, *Sathi's* pricing has remained consistent with the benchmark for pricing condoms for low-income couples in developing countries: according to Harvey (1994), the price of one year's supply of condoms should not exceed 1 percent of per capita GNP. By 2009, a one-year's supply of *Sathi* condoms cost about 1 percent of per capita GDP based on purchasing power parity. The cost of one year's supply of the higher-priced *Touch* condom was 3.3 percent of per capita GDP based on purchasing power parity (Agha and Meekers 2010).

Non-financial costs of contraceptive adoption are as or more important than financial costs. Embarrassment in purchasing condoms and in negotiating their use with a partner, along with reduction in sexual pleasure, are some of the costs associated with condom use (Helweg-Larsen and Collins 1994). Commercial sector advertising approaches are used to lower these costs to potential consumers.

Promotion

Mass media advertising of condoms was not permitted in 1987, when *Sathi* was launched. Therefore, early promotional efforts were focused at the retail level. These retail promotions treated *Sathi* just like any other consumer product, not as a product that was unusual or sensitive (Davies and Agha 1997). Government-imposed restrictions continued to hamper the promotion of condoms throughout the 1990s. For example, the name *Sathi* could be used in television advertising, but the word "condom" could not. Consequently, advertisements referred to condoms indirectly, by playing on the word *Sathi*/companion. By 2003 and 2004, advertisements showing condom packets could be shown, although use

of the word "condom" was still not permitted. The opening-up of the media environment in 2006, with the emergence of private television channels (some telecast from Bangkok), provided greater flexibility in advertising condoms. It was now possible to launch aggressive advertising campaigns promoting condoms (Agha and Meekers 2010).

STRATEGY II: SOCIAL FRANCHISING

Social franchising, a relatively new private sector approach, began to be implemented in the mid-1990s, starting with the major cities of Karachi and Rawalpindi and expanding subsequently to smaller urban areas. Inspired by the success of commercial franchising approaches such as McDonalds and Starbucks, social franchising in health care uses franchising methods to achieve social goals such as the provision of health care services that meet a certain standard of quality (Montagu 2002). In Pakistan, a network of family planning service providers who owned and/or managed clinics and catered to a low-income urban clientele was created under the *Sabz Sitara* (Urdu for Greenstar) brand.

Provider Recruitment

Female medical doctors with MBBS degrees (Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery) and Lady Health Visitors (LHV) (paramedics with 18 months of training in basic nursing care and the provision of maternal and child health services) were recruited into the Greenstar network.

Training

Providers were required to complete a training focused on intrauterine device (IUD) insertion and removal, infection prevention, and clinical skills before being certified as Greenstar network members. The provision of voluntary surgical contraceptive services through the network began in 2002. The provision of maternal and child health services through the network was initiated in 2005. By 2010, nearly all Greenstar providers had received training in the provision of antenatal care, postnatal care, delivery care, child care, and neonatal care.

Field Support/Performance Monitoring

Quarterly monitoring and support visits to providers were made by Greenstar-employed medical doctors who would answer technical questions, assist with procedures, and solve problems faced during service delivery (McBride and Ahmed 2001). Doctors employed by Greenstar also expanded the network of providers by identifying new providers and training them to provide RH services.

Contraceptive Supply

Regular supply of a range of subsidized contraceptive methods was assured to network providers through a distributor. Medical representatives conducted sales visits during which contraceptive products were discussed, providers were supplied information about contraceptives, and orders were booked for IUD re-supply. Product supply across the network and through retail was the responsibility of a national distributor.

Demand Creation

Demand generation activities primarily relied on outreach activities at the community level. Outreach workers made door-to-door visits in neighborhoods surrounding Greenstar clinics in order to invite residents to visit the clinics during *clinic sahoolat* days. A *clinic sahoolat* (Urdu for "clinic convenience") is a day-long activity during which free family planning services are provided to low-income women. Each *clinic sahoolat* is conducted after three days of outreach activities in the catchment area of a clinic. Two *clinic sahoolats* are usually conducted at the clinics of new network providers, each after three days of outreach work.

What Was in it for the Provider?

Opportunities for training and continuing education are relatively limited for private providers in Pakistan. The promise of improving knowledge and skills in RH service delivery as well as the provision of an "IUD kit" containing essential instruments were key to drawing

providers to the Greenstar network. Affiliation with a nationally advertised network of clinics also attracted providers with less established practices (Agha, Squire, and Ahmed 1997). While knowledge, skills, and community-level publicity were important in attracting providers to the network, the most significant inducement for participation in the Greenstar network was clinician prosperity resulting from increased client flow and higher business volumes (McBride and Ahmed 2001).

Figure 1 shows the social franchising model. A franchise organization enables the professional development of private providers by training them in the supply of a specific set of services that are to be provided at a specific standard of quality. These standards of service provision, which are monitored by the franchise organization, increase client satisfaction with the quality of services provided. Satisfied clients, in turn, recommend the clinics to their friends or continue to receive services from the clinics, thereby increasing the clinic's business. Advertising and marketing activities conducted by the franchise organization also

Figure 1: The Social Franchising Model



contribute to higher client volumes, although to a lesser extent. Greater business volumes, in turn, increase the provider's attention to the supply of franchised services and strengthen the provider's capacity to delivery quality services.

SURVEY FINDINGS

Condom Social Marketing

Figure 2 shows the use of reversible contraceptive methods in Pakistan between 1975 and 2006-07, based on nationally representative surveys conducted among married women of reproductive age. The findings show that condom use increased slowly between 1975 and 1984-85 and more rapidly after 1984-85. Condom social marketing was initiated in

Figure 2: Use of Reversible Modern Methods, Pakistan: 1975—2006-07



Note: OC=Oral contraceptive. Vertical axis denotes percentage of married women of reproductive age.

1986. Condom use increased slowly in the first 10-year period, from about 0.8 percent in 1975 to 1.8 percent in 1984-85, grew more rapidly during the next 10-year period to 3.7 percent in 1994-95, and continued its upward trajectory (although at a slightly slower rate) until 2006-07 when it reached 6.8 percent. Since 1984-85, every national survey conducted in Pakistan has shown an increase in condom use.

Figure 3 shows the private sector's share of condoms between 1990-91 and 2006-07, the two years when Demographic and Health Surveys asked identical questions to consumers about their source of contraceptives. Figure 3 shows that, by 1990-91, 80 percent of condoms were supplied by the private sector. Moreover, the private sector remained the primary driver of growth in condom use during the next 16 years. As condom use more than doubled between 1990-91 and 2006-07, the private sector continued to supply nearly 80 percent of condoms. The estimated number of women reporting condom use increased from 469,000 in 1990-91 to 1,729,000 in 2006-07. This was equivalent to an annual addition of about 79,000 condom users during this 16-year period.

Impact evaluations of condom advertising campaigns have shown substantial increases in condom use as a result of specific campaigns (Agha and Beaudoin 2009; Agha and Meekers 2010) and indicate the continued vibrancy of the condom social marketing approach being used.

Social Franchising

Figure 2 shows that IUD use among married women did not increase between 1975 and 1984-85. During the next decade, between 1984-85 and 1994-95, IUD use increased from 0.7 percent to 2.1 percent. This upward trajectory was maintained after the initiation of social franchising, with IUD use jumping to 4.4 percent by 2003. However, there was a sharp drop in IUD use between 2003 and 2006-07, as IUD use fell by two percentage points to 2.3 percent.

The reasons for the dramatic decline in IUD use between 2003 and 2006-07 need further investigation. However, the net result was a one percentage point increase in IUD use between the 1990-91 and the 2006-07 Demographic and Health Surveys, from 1.3 percent to 2.3 percent—an extremely modest increase.

Figure 3: Increase in Use of Condoms, by Source of Supply, Pakistan: 1990-91—2006-07



Note: Vertical axis denotes percentage of married women of reproductive age.

Figure 4 shows the share of the private sector supply of IUDs in 1990-91 and 2006-07. Only 12 percent of IUDs were being provided by the private sector in 1990-91. The private sector share increased to 44 percent by 2006-07. Hence, by 2006-07, the private sector was inserting nearly half of the IUDs in Pakistan. The estimated number of women reporting IUD use increased modestly during this period, from 226,000 in 1990-91 to 585,000 in 2006-07.

Figure 4: Increase in IUD Use by Source, Pakistan: 1990-91—2006-07



Note: Vertical axis denotes percentage of married women of reproductive age.

Why Did Social Franchising Lead to Only Modest Improvements in IUD Use?

The social franchising model assumes that benefits to providers will drive their continued active interest in the supply of services. One possible explanation for the modest impact of social franchising on IUD use is that the benefits promised to the provider did not translate into increased business profits resulting from higher client volumes. In other words, the demand generation efforts made may not have been sufficient to increase the provider's profits from IUD insertions.

In 2009-2010, a national survey of private providers of RH was conducted by Greenstar Social Marketing through AcNielsen Pakistan. The survey collected information on the quality and volume of services

provided, and on the flow of clients to clinics. Analysis of data on reasons for client visits collected from more than 6,000 women at over 400 private sector clinics across Pakistan showed that only 4 percent of clients at private provider clinics visited for family planning. Figure 5 shows reasons for visiting private providers in Pakistan. Most clients who visited private providers did so to obtain curative care (45 percent) or to obtain antenatal care (33 percent). Family planning clients are a very small part of the business of private providers in Pakistan.

Figure 5: Reason for Visit to Private Sector Clinics Across Pakistan (Percentage of Clients Coming to 423 Private Clinics Across Pakistan)



Can Family Planning be Made a More Important Part of the Private Provider's Business?

Including RH services in a private health insurance scheme is one potential way of increasing the availability of family planning services. However, private insurance is a small part of the health care market in Pakistan; only 1.6 percent of health expenditure in the country is covered through health insurance or philanthropic grants. The bulk of health expenditures are covered by out-of-pocket payments (Nazir 2008). The findings of Greenstar's national survey of providers suggest that out-of-pocket payments for family planning are a relatively low priority for Pakistani women. Hence, the prospect of private insurance having an impact on the provision of family planning services through private providers seems remote at present.

However, other opportunities to make family planning a larger share of the private providers' business must be considered. Performance-based financing (PBF) schemes may be a promising strategy in the short run. In particular, demand-side financing strategies such as vouchers for RH services can be a means of both increasing the providers' business and reaching the poor in a targeted manner.

Operations research on vouchers for maternal health and family planning is currently underway in Jhang and Charsadda districts of Pakistan. Figure 6 shows initial findings from an assessment of the performance of private providers who are part of a demand-side financing voucher project in Jhang district. Provider likelihood of recommending IUDs to women of different ages, parity, and conditions when there were no contraindications was determined on a knowledge scale ranging from 1 to 15 points. The first set of bars in Figure 6 shows that the voucher project increased providers' likelihood of recommending IUDs to women of different ages, parity, and conditions when there were no contraindications. Private providers who were not part of the franchise scored 8.6 points, franchised private providers scored 9.5 points, and franchised private providers who were part of the voucher intervention scored 10.3 points.

However, the largest impact of the PBF project was on provider behavior. The second set of bars in Figure 6 shows that providers who were part of the voucher project reported an average of 10 IUD inser-

tions per month, compared to five insertions per month among providers who were part of the social franchise but were not part of the voucher project, and four IUD insertions per month among non-franchise private providers. These findings show that, on average, participation in the social franchise resulted in increasing the monthly IUD insertion rate per private provider by one, while participating in the social franchise *and* the voucher intervention increased the monthly IUD insertion rate per private provider by five.

Figure 6: Knowledge and Behavior Among Greenstar Affiliates Who Participated in a Voucher Intervention and Others



IMPLICATIONS

This study investigated the impact of two major private sector strategies that have been implemented as part of the national family planning program in Pakistan. Social marketing of condoms was introduced

in the mid-1980s and was associated with a faster rate of increase of condom use at the national level. The condom is, in fact, the only reversible modern method of family planning that has shown an increase in use since 1984-85. Moreover, impact assessments of specific social marketing advertising campaigns have shown significant increases in condom use that can be attributed to the campaigns.

Social franchising was introduced in the mid-1990s with a primary focus on the provision of the IUD. Hormonal methods were also provided through social franchising, and Voluntary Surgical Contraception (VSC) was added to the franchise after 2002. An increase in IUD use was observed immediately after the introduction of social franchising; IUD use increased from 2.1 percent in 1994-95 to 4.4 percent in 2003. However, this increase in IUD use was followed by a sharp decline in IUD use during the next few years; IUD use dropped dramatically to 2.3 percent by 2006-07. Careful analysis is needed regarding reasons for the substantial decline in IUD use over such a short period of time. Findings of a national survey of private provider clinics show that the promise of increased business volumes that was offered by participation in the franchise network is not being met. Only a small minority of clients at private clinics across Pakistan visited these clinics for family planning services. Consistent with small family planning client volumes, private providers in the franchise network only provided one additional IUD per month compared to private providers who were not part of the network. The modest effect of the present model of social franchising appears unlikely to translate into significant demographic impact. Efforts are needed to strengthen the present model.

The scale of Greenstar's social franchise is large; about 7,500 private providers trained in the provision of IUDs and hormonal methods are part of this network. More than 350 of these providers also provide VSC. These 7,500 providers are located in about 450 small and large urban centers across Pakistan and in some rural areas. They represent an enormous underutilized resource. New strategies are needed to fulfill the promise of social franchising. These strategies must in some way impact the private providers' bottom line by making RH a more profitable part of their business.

Experimental work in PBF being conducted by Greenstar shows that vouchers for subsidized family planning services, reimbursable at private

clinics that are part of the Greenstar network, have the potential for substantially increasing the provider's family planning clientele. At scale, PBF interventions implemented with Greenstar's social franchise may be an extremely effective way of rapidly increasing the use of reversible modern methods of family planning in Pakistan and of having significant demographic impact. Experimental work in private health insurance is also needed to determine how the potential for delivery of RH services through private providers may be tapped and how such an approach may be scaled up.

REFERENCES

Agha, S., and C.E. Beaudoin. 2009. "Impact of a Thematic Condom Advertising Campaign on Condom Use in Urban Pakistan." Working Paper no. 2, Greenstar Research Department, Greenstar Social Marketing, Karachi.

Agha, S., and D. Meekers. 2010. "Impact of a Social Marketing Campaign on Condom Use in Urban Pakistan." Working Paper no. 4, Greenstar Research Department, Greenstar Social Marketing, Karachi.

Agha, S., C. Squire, and R. Ahmed. 1997. *Evaluation of the Greenstar Pilot Project*. Washington, DC: Population Services International.

Carton, T.W., and S. Agha. 2009. "Changes in Contraceptive Use and the Method Mix in Pakistan: 1990-91 to 2006-07." Working Paper no. 3, Greenstar Research Department, Greenstar Social Marketing, Karachi.

Davies, J., and S. Agha. 1997. "Ten Years of Social Marketing in Pakistan: An Assessment of Management, Outputs, Effects, Costs and Cost-Efficiency." Working Paper no. 7, PSI Research Division, Population Services International, Washington, DC.

Domestic Research Bureau. 1986. *Social Marketing of Contraceptives Project: Survey of the Trade, 1986*. Karachi: Lever Brothers Pakistan Ltd.

Hakim, A. 2001. "Population Policy Shifts and Their Implications for Population Stabilization in Pakistan." *The Pakistan Development Review* 40, no. 4: 551-573.

Hakim, A., and P.C. Miller. 2000. "Family Planning in Pakistan: A Turning Point." In *Fertility Transition in South Asia*, eds. Zeba Ayesha Sathar and James F. Philips. International Studies in Demography. New York: Oxford University Press.

Harvey, P. 1994. "The Impact of Condom Prices on Sales in Social Marketing Programs." *Studies in Family Planning* 25, no. 1: 52-58.

Helwig-Larsen, M., and B.E. Collins. 1994. "The UCLA Multidimensional Condom Attitudes Scale: Documenting the Complex Determinants of Condom Use in College Students." *Health Psychology* 13, no. 3: 224-237.

McBride, Julie, and Rehana Ahmed. 2001. *Social Franchising as a Strategy for Expanding Access to Reproductive Health Services. A Case Study of the Green Star Service Delivery Network in Pakistan*. Washington, DC: Commercial Market Strategies.

Montagu, D. 2002. "Franchising of Health Services in Low-Income Countries." *Health Policy and Planning* 17, no. 2: 121-130.

Nazir, M.H. 2008. *Challenges Facing the Growth of Health Insurance in Pakistan*. Karachi: Allianz EFU Health Insurance Limited.

Mahsud-Dornan, S. 2007. "Pakistan, Population Programs and Progress." *Ulster Medical Journal* 76, no. 3: 122-123.

Sultan, M., J. Cleland, and M. Ali. 2002. "Assessment of a New Approach to FP Services in Rural Pakistan." *American Journal of Public Health* 92, no. 7: 1168-1172.

RECENT ASIA PROGRAM PUBLICATIONS

PAKISTAN PROGRAM PUBLICATIONS

HUNGER PAINS: PAKISTAN'S FOOD INSECURITY

Zafar Altaf, Kaiser Bengali and Allan Jury, Gautam Hazarika, Michael Kugelman, Kenneth Iain MacDonald, Roshan Malik, Sohail Jehangir Malik, Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Saadia Toor, 2010

RUNNING ON EMPTY: PAKISTAN'S WATER CRISIS

Samia Altaf, Kaiser Bengali, Anita Chaudhry and Rabia M. Chaudhry, Adrien Couton, Sarah J. Halvorson, Simi Kamal, Feisal Khan, Michael Kugelman, Shams ul Mulk, James L. Wescoat Jr., 2009

HARD SELL: ATTAINING PAKISTANI COMPETITIVENESS IN GLOBAL TRADE

Manzoor Ahmad, Shaghil Ahmed, Mirza Qamar Beg, Shahid Javed Burki, Abid Farooq, Edward Gresser, Douglas A. Hartwick, Parvez Hasan, Gary Hufbauer and Agustin Cornejo, Esperanza Gomez Jelalian, Shahrukh Rafi Khan, Michael Kugelman, Zareen F. Naqvi and Ijaz Nabi, Karin Astrid Siegmann, 2008

FUELING THE FUTURE: MEETING PAKISTAN'S ENERGY NEEDS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Mukhtar Ahmed, Saleem H. Ali, Shahid Javed Burki, John R. Hammond, Dorothy Lele, Robert Looney, Sanjeev Minocha, Bikash Pandey, Sabira Qureshi, Asad Umar, Vladislav Vucetic and Achilles G. Adamantiades, Aram Zamgochian, 2007

EDUCATION REFORM IN PAKISTAN: BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE

Shahid Javed Burki, Christopher Candland, Grace Clark, Ishrat Husain, International Crisis Group, Jonathan Mitchell, Salman Humayun, Irfan Muzaffar, Tariq Rahman, Michelle Riboud, Ahsan Saleem, Salman Shah, United States Agency for International Development, World Bank (South Asia Human Development Department), 2005

ISLAMIZATION AND THE PAKISTANI ECONOMY

Khurshid Ahmad, Shahid Javed Burki, Isobel Coleman, Parvez Hasan, Ishrat Husain, Charles Kennedy, Vali Nasr, Omar Noman, Saeed Shafqat, 2004

ASIA PROGRAM PUBLICATIONS

INDIA'S CONTEMPORARY SECURITY CHALLENGES

Bethany Danyluk, Michael Kugelman, Dinshaw Mistry, Arun Prakash, P.V. Ramana, Siddharth Srivastava, Nandini Sundar, Andrew C. Winner, 2011

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 145 – GREATER CHINA? MIGRATION AND CHINESE TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITIES

Philip A. Kuhn, Sara L. Friedman, Vanessa L. Fong, Kenneth J. Guest, January 2011

FINDING DOLLARS, SENSE, AND LEGITIMACY IN BURMA

Bradley O. Babson, Mary Callahan, Jürgen Haacke, Susan L. Levenstein, Ken MacLean, Morten B. Pedersen, David I. Steinberg, Sean Turnell, Min Zin, 2010

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 144 – GREEN TIGERS: THE POLITICS AND POLICY OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN NORTHEAST ASIAN DEMOCRACIES

Yves Tiberghian, Hoesung Lee and Jin-Gyu Oh, Chi-Jen Yang and Hui-Chen Chien, August 2010

THE JAPAN-U.S. PARTNERSHIP: TOWARD A WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: REPORT OF THE JAPAN-U.S. JOINT PUBLIC POLICY FORUM, AKASAKA, TOKYO, OCTOBER 21-22, 2009

Yukio Satoh, William J. Perry, March 2010

LAND GRAB: THE RACE FOR THE WORLD'S FARMLAND

Carl Atkin, Gary R. Blumenthal, David Hallam, Michael Kugelman, Chido Makunike, Ruth Meinzen-Dick and Helen Markelova, Raul Q. Montemayor, Alexandra Spieldoch and Sophia Murphy, 2009

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 143 – TAIWAN AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC STORM

Thomas Bellows, Peter Chow, Yu-long Ling, T.Y. Wang, October 2009

GOING GLOBAL: CHINESE OIL AND MINING COMPANIES AND THE GOVERNANCE OF RESOURCE WEALTH

Jill Shankleman, July 2009

KUALA LUMPUR CALLING: AL JAZEERA ENGLISH IN ASIA

Trish Carter, Marwan M. Kraidy, Michael Kugelman, Drew McDaniel, Veronica Pedrosa, Shawn Powers and Mohammed el-Nawawy, Atria Rai-Tene, November 2008

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 142 – FOREIGN ADDICTION: ASSESSING INDIA'S ENERGY SECURITY STRATEGY

Mikkal E. Herberg, Juli A. MacDonald, Tanvi Madan, Ron Somers, October 2008

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 141 – JAPAN'S DECLINING POPULATION: CLEARLY A PROBLEM, BUT WHAT'S THE SOLUTION?

Robin LeBlanc, Jennifer Robertson, Leonard Schoppa, Keiko Yamanaka, July 2008

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 140 – CHINA'S GALLOPING ECONOMY: PROSPECTS, PROBLEMS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Cong Cao, Steven Dunaway, Jeffrey Logan, Barry Naughton, May 2008

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 139 – JAPAN'S POLITICAL MESS: ABE FAILED, CAN FUKUDA DO BETTER?

Shinju Fujihira, Sherry L. Martin, Robert Pekkanen, Jun Saito, January 2008

TEN YEARS AFTER: REVISITING THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS

David Burton, J. Soedradjad Djiwandono, Ilene Grabel, Worapot Manupipatpong, Jomo Kwame Sundaram, Robert H. Wade, Mark Weisbrot, Meredith Jung-En Woo, October 2007

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 138 – TAIWAN'S DILEMMA: A DEMOCRACY DIVIDED OVER NATIONAL SECURITY

Thomas J. Bickford, Elizabeth W. Hague, Shirley Kan, Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang, September 2007

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 137 – MORE THAN A CONCRETE JUNGLE: URBANIZATION IN JAPAN

Theodore J. Gilman, Carola Hein, Ronald K. Vogel, Merry I. White, April 2007

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 136 – THE POLICY SPACE DEBATE: DOES A GLOBALIZED AND MULTILATERAL ECONOMY CONSTRAIN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES?

Carlos Correa, Heiner Flassbeck, Jomo Kwame Sundaram, Elaine Zuckerman, April 2007

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 135 – THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY: SHOULD THE UNITED STATES BE WORRIED?

Dennis J. Blasko, Bernard D. Cole, Kristen A. Gunness, Litai Xue, December 2006

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 134 – SIX-PARTY STALL: ARE SOUTH KOREA AND CHINA PART OF THE PROBLEM OR PART OF THE SOLUTION?

Kerry Dumbaugh, Kirk W. Larsen, Sung-Yoon Lee, Bojiang Yang, November 2006

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 133 – THE AVIAN FLU CHALLENGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE POTENTIAL OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

Tjandra Yoga Aditama, Peter Gourlay and Maryjane Lacoste, David Reddy, September 2006

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 132 – EDGING TOWARD FULL EMPOWERMENT? SOUTH KOREAN WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE AND THE POLITICAL ARENA

R. Darcy, Seungsook Moon, Kyung-ae Park, Jean R. Renshaw, September 2006

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 131 – CHINA AND DEMOCRACY: A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS?

Richard Baum, Merle Goldman, Suisheng Zhao, Yongming Zhou, June 2006

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 130 – ONE YEAR AFTER THE TSUNAMI: POLICY AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS

Roberta Cohen, Bambang Harymurti, Muhammad Qodari, Courtland Robinson, May 2006

A copy of any publication can be obtained free of charge by visiting the Asia Program online at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/asia. A more complete list of Asia Program publications may also be found online.

The Woodrow Wilson Center Asia Program
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20004-3027
Ph: 202-691-4020 Fax: 202-691-4058
Email: asia@wilsoncenter.org, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/asia

WOODROW WILSON CENTER PAKISTAN SCHOLAR PROGRAM

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, in partnership with the Fellowship Fund for Pakistan, holds an annual competition for the Wilson Center's Pakistan Scholar Program. One Pakistan Scholar, either from Pakistan or of Pakistani origin, is selected each year to spend nine months in residence at the Woodrow Wilson Center, in the heart of Washington, D.C., where (s)he will carry out advanced, policy-oriented research and writing.

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars is one of Washington's leading independent, wide-ranging, non-partisan institutes for advanced research, where vital current issues and their historical and cultural background are explored through research and dialogue. Created by the Congress of the United States as the nation's official memorial to its twentieth-eighth president, the Center seeks to commemorate through its residential fellowship program both the scholarly depth and the public policy concerns of Woodrow Wilson.

The Pakistan Scholar competition is open to men and women who are from Pakistan or who are of Pakistani-origin (from any country). Applications will be accepted from individuals in academia, business, journalism, government, law, and related professions. Candidates must be currently pursuing research on key public policy issues facing Pakistan, research designed to bridge the gap between the academic and the policymaking worlds.

For more information on this program, go to http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1462&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=497724

WILSON CENTER PAKISTAN SCHOLARS

Huma Yusuf, 2010-11. "The Fourth Estate in Flux: Media, Politics, and Public Policy in Pakistan"

Dr. Sabiha Mansoor, 2009-10. "Maps for Lost Teachers: A Professional Development Strategy for Higher Education in Pakistan"

Ambassador Riaz Mohammad Khan, 2008-09. "Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict and Resistance to Modernity"

Dr. Samia Altaf, 2007-08. "Improving Aid Effectiveness: A Case Study of the Health and Population Sectors in Pakistan"

Khaled Ahmed, 2006-07. "Sectarian Violence in Pakistan and Its Linkages to Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States"

Dr. Mushtaq Khan, 2005-06. "9/11 and the Pakistan Economy: A Look at the Impact on the Financial Sector"

Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa, 2004-05. "Military Inc., Political Economy of Militarization in Pakistan"

Asia Program
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20004-3027

www.wilsoncenter.org/asia