opinion generally is concerned, there will be a tendency to blame US for acts of commission and non-commission.

If this analysis is valid, it seems to me that we should with utmost insistence demand that United Nations be brought into picture. If Geneva conference arrives at an agreed cease-fire and armistice, conference should then request United Nations Security Council to assume responsibility for providing guarantees of armistice conditions and for supervision execution thereof. I do not see how Russians would be in a position to veto such a fair proposal and furthermore, from their policy point of view, they might find it advantageous to permit Security Council to assume jurisdiction here. Under President's recent pronouncement that no military action will be taken in this theatre without following constitutional processes, again it seems to me that recourse to United Nations would afford President much greater liberty of potential action since Senate has already consented to treaty which is United Nations Charter, and police action under Chapter 7 of Charter could in fact be contemplated in event Security Council's supervision of armistice were floated by Communists here. If Soviet veto aborted Security Council action we might still be able to work out some arrangement for collective self-defense under Article 51.

Forgoing is largely devoted to juridical aspects of problem. We should not blind ourselves to practical fact that if a cease-fire and armistice brings an ostensible end to military conflict in Indochina, it will have little effect on that clandestine but even more dangerous conflict which will continue; namely that cold war whereby Viet Minh can easily infiltrate all of this peninsula and eventually by legitimate democratic means take over this area.

McCulloch

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FILE 00/3-854 : Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (McCulloch) to the Department of State

SECRET

Saigon, May 8, 1954—10 a.m.

2977. Sent Geneva 66, Paris 786, London 50. We have given preliminary consideration to Bidault's proposed position at Geneva as set out Secto 106, repeated Paris 201, London 121, Saigon 33 and to valid comment of US delegation as indicated Secto 110, repeated Paris 203, London 123, Saigon 84. Department and USDel Geneva will have already seen De Jean's preliminary reactions as described my telegram 2976 today.

De Jean put his finger on essential point which is what guarantees will exist for fulfillment in good faith of terms of any cease-fire and armistice agreement which might ensue from Geneva conference. Obviously from oversimplified French view it would be splendid if US would take up this burden.

I am strongly opposed to such a concept. Situation in Indochinese war has reached point that very soon both French and Vietnamese, who presumably are our friendly clients, will seek to blame US for whatever disaster may befall them. Furthermore, so far as Asian

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1 Dated May 6, p. 694.
2 Dated May 5, p. 696.
3 Dated May 3; see volume xvi.

727
from Lantol firm instructions he sought and is accordingly anxious to have initial Indochina meeting today in effort to firm up open opinions as quickly as possible. Translation of proposals expects to table (Secto 143, repeated Paris 222, Saigon 41) is being separately telegraphed niat.c

We have made clear United States not in position to express any substantive views today and French fully understand and do not mind.

Head of Laotian delegation is here and Cambodian Ambassador Washington has agreed to be their seat. On Vietnamese side, Dac Khe is here and he is reluctant to attend in absence senior members his delegation but French trust they can persuade him to do so.

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SECRET      NIACT

The United States Delegation to the Department of State


Secto 143. Repeated information niat Paris 222, niat Saigon 41. Following is informal translation of proposal French will table at opening plenary session Indochina phase today:

I. Vietnam.

1. Grouping of the regular units of both parties in delimitated zones to be determined by the conference.

2. Disarmament of other combatants with exception of police forces which are recognized as necessary for maintenance of order.

3. Immediate freeing of prisoners of war and civilian internees.

4. Control of the carrying out of these clauses by International Commission.

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SECRET      NIACT

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1954—12:32 p.m.

Tedul 43. Eyes only Smith from Secretary.

1. At special meeting this morning NSC considered French proposals contained in Secto 136 which was read to meeting.

2. After discussion NSC took following decision:

"The United States will not associate itself with any proposal from any source directed toward a cease-fire in advance of an acceptable armistice agreement, including international controls. The United States could concur in the initiation of negotiations for such an armistice agreement. During the course of such negotiations, the French and the Associated States should continue to oppose the forces of the Viet Minh with all the means at their disposal. In the meantime, as a means of strengthening the hands of the French and the Associated States during the course of such negotiations, the United States will continue its program of aid and its efforts to organize and promptly activate a Southeast Asian regional grouping for the purpose of preventing further expansion of Communist power in Southeast Asia."

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1 Drafted by Bowie of S/P.
2 The 190th meeting of the National Security Council, May 8. For a memorandum of discussion of the meeting, see volume xxii.
3 Dated May 7, p. 714.
3. Referring your Dulte 54 * I would stress that position set out in para 2 was considered as minimum one from which U.S. shld not recede. NSC felt any cease-fire without acceptable armistice agreement would be such a disaster as to require us to dissociate ourselves from it.

4. NSC decision was based on assumption that armistice would be approved by Associated States as well as France. In event of split between them NSC would want to reconsider U.S. position.

5. Secto 143 * not received until after NSC meeting. Comments will follow.

DULLES

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* Dated May 8, p. 712.
* Supra.

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SECURITY

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, May 8, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 144. Repeated information nact Paris 223, Saigon 42. Dac Khe and Buu Kinh outlined views Vietnamese delegation with which they said Bao Dai in general agreement to Ambassador Heath as follows:

1. Vietnam had never wanted Geneva conference. They hoped it would fail though they would not sabotage it.

2. They were somewhat concerned over US headlines (New York Herald Tribune May 7) we were “writing off” Vietnam. Ambassador Heath assured them this not US intention.

3. Vietnamese feel most strongly military solution Indochina must be tied to political solution and accordingly they fear French desire to end war will lead them accept cease-fire without political guarantee.

4. Vietnamese would support French proposal for armistice provided it was part of a military political program, Lamel plan acceptable basis but should be expanded include UN inspection teams along Chinese border; Viet Minh shld lay down arms under amnesty guaranteed by UN. Some time after armistice national elections would occur followed then (and only then) in coalition government if election results so dictated.

5. Vietnamese plan discussed generally with French but without references UN which Vietnamese fear unacceptable to French.

6. Vietnamese believe Security Council safest UN form introduce their problems since the US or Chinese Nationalist veto could block unacceptable Soviet proposal. They seemed concerned re undesirable Indian leadership UNGA.

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INDOCHINA

7. On conference tactics, Dac Khe says Vietnamese desire to speak after Viet Minh in order follows 24 hours later with speech which would both rebut and attack while leaving responsibility Viet Minh for throwing first stone.

8. It was agreed US and Vietnamese delegations should maintain close contact.

Smyth

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SECURITY

SECRET

GENEVA, May 8, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 145. Repeated information nact Paris 224, nact Saigon 43. For his opening speech on Indochina Bidault originally planned something essence as follows: (British found text too strong for them fully to support but we considered it good).

“French Government, recognizing aspirations of people of three Associated States for independence and liberty, and noting their desire to be preserved from scourge of war, to practice toleration and to live in peace with other peoples as good neighbors, is firmly decided to follow policy which it is pursuing, of which essential is to assure these peoples their full national sovereignty as well as benefits of fundamental freedoms of peoples and individuals in exercise of their democratic liberty. To this end French Government is determined to take all appropriate measures to prevent any danger of external aggression the territorial integrity of these states and to counter (prevent) all attempts from whatever quarter to undermine their free institutions.”

However, this morning French delegation submitted following to Bidault which is obviously weaker and less satisfactory from our viewpoint:

“Recognizing the aspirations of the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos for national independence and liberty the French Government declares its decision to extend, for its part, to the sovereign states of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos the benefits of the undertaking to which it has subscribed in the term of the San Francisco Charter for the purpose of assuring the nations members of the UN of the respect for their national sovereignty and the benefits of fundamental liberties of peoples and of individuals and the functioning of democratic institutions.”

We are told Bidault is now studying two texts and will probably deliver speech hitting note somewhere between the two.

Smyth
CONFIDENTIAL

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

Secto 147. Repeated information London 137, Hong Kong 8, Moscow 52. In conversation with Thurston May 7, Trefry, (UK delegate) stated that as result his observations last eight months as UK Chargé Peking and here at Geneva believes it is flowing represent "minimum present requirements" Peking regime in Korea and Indochina:

1. Continuation status quo in Korea except for withdrawal UN and Chinese troops.
2. Peking requires establishment small Communist buffer state in northern Indochina (a) because it would lose face if present Ho Chi Minh Embargo at Peking were closed; (b) for military protection its southern border; and (c) to keep control of river system in Yunnan-Indochinese border region on which the tin mining industry of Yunnan depends for transportation.

SMITH

SECRET

First Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 8, 4:40 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

Secto 154. Repeated information Paris priority 227, Saigon priority 46, London 141, Tokyo 30, Moscow 56, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo pass CINCEF. Department pass Defense. First session Indochina phase held 4:40-7:45 p.m. today. Following opening speech by Bidault at conclusion which he tabled proposal contained Secto 143, repeated Paris 222, Saigon 41, Moscow 54, London 139, Tokyo 34. Minor modifications contained Secto 152, repeated Paris 225, Saigon 44, Moscow 55, London 140, Tokyo 35). Viet Minh immediately proposed invitation Pathet Lao and Khmer Issarak. Remainder of meeting devoted sharp procedural wrangle this point. I rejected invitations to these nonexistent governments and also noted improper invitation conveyed to Viet Minh in name Communist China as well as USSR (text my statement contained Secto 153, repeated 227).

A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/1) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 274. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 4:30 p.m. and adjourned at 7:20 p.m. The minutes are also printed in Conference de Genève, pp. 18-20. The speeches of Bidault, Pham Van Dong, Smith, Molotov, Sam Sary, and Phong Sanrangke are printed in Cus. 9192, pp. 107-116. The proposal made by the French Delegation during the meeting, Indochina Document K/L, May 8, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 274.

Dated May 8, p. 780.

Indochina

Eden opened session announcing chairmanship arrangements (he and Molotov alternating), official languages (English, French, Russian, Chinese). Bidault gave effective presentation French position in which he attacked Communists bitterly, particularly over failure grant evacuation wounded Dien Bien Phu. He stressed particularly independence already granted Associated States and fraudulent nature Viet Minh allegations of fighting for freedom Indochina. He then gave general outline French reasoning on what was required in Indochina and concluded by tabling proposal.

Viet Minh Vice President Pham Van Dong followed, (he spoke in Vietnamese) and devoted virtually entire speech plea for invitations to Pathet Lao and Khmer Issarak along strictly Communist lines (they represent struggle of those peoples for independence from foreign imperialism, etc.). He ended with formal motion invite these two.

I then made statement contained Secto 153 following which Chou En-lai immediately spoke holding conference had right discuss its own composition and calling for adoption Viet Minh motion. Molotov followed with harangue dedicated both Viet Minh proposal and my remarks on inviting powers. On former he alleged these regimes controlled much of territory of two countries and were leading war of national liberation. He spent most of time inviting powers problem, reading paragraph from Berlin communiqué re Indochina. He interpreted this meant one of five "named powers" had any special status, and accordingly said it was perfectly proper for Communist China join with Soviets in inviting Viet Minh. He concluded saying all nine powers present today had right propose additional states, and he thus hoped Viet Minh proposal to extend two more invitations would be accepted. In closing he referred to my suggestion that 4 Berlin powers meet to settle question and countered with proposal additional invitations be considered by five powers named Berlin communiqué.

Bidault and Eden supported US position. Bidault appealed to conference to avoid sterile procedural arguments while Eden characterized Viet Minh proposal as something quite new which four Berlin powers should discuss.

Cambodian delegate (Sam Sary) asked for floor saying he had not intended speak so soon but felt he must reject Viet Minh proposal. In effective rebuttal he said Cambodia at peace until invaded April 3, 1954 so any so-called government must have been created for purpose...
of Geneva conference. He stressed complete control Royal Cambodian Government except for minor shifting pockets of invaders. He said remaining dissidents were mostly foreign invaders and asking them represent Cambodia was like asking Pole to represent Soviet Union.

Finally he pointed out "Khmer Issarak" were nationalist rebels who rallied to King, and people using that name now were foreign Communists invaders.

Chou En-lai intervened again calling for acceptance Soviet proposal for five-power talks on Viet Minh proposal. Viet Minh followed with additional peroration denying Pathet Lao and Khmer Issarak were ghosts and calling also for acceptance Soviet proposal for five-power talks on invitation problem.

Eden noted he had two mutually irreconcilable proposals before him, US for four-power and Soviet for five-power talks. Accordingly he proposed simple adjournment, although Lactian had previously asked for recognition. Lactian, Phoumi Samanikone insisted on recognition and spoke on nonexistence Pathet Lao which dissolved itself in October 1949. He noted its "chief" was discredited member Royal family who had joined Viet Minh and to invite his regime would be to admit any dissident individual or group anywhere could claim recognition as a government.

SMITH

309.1 SIB/5-654: Telegram

First Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 8, 4: 35 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State


"The United States delegation takes this opportunity to recall that at Berlin, the US joined with France, the UK and the USSR in agreeing to organize a conference in Geneva to consider the problems of Korea and of Indochina. Subsequently, the same four powers reached agreement as to the composition of the Indochina phase of the conference, an agreement reflected in the presence here today of the nine delegations in this hall. As in the case of the Korean phase, there are only four inviting powers, the UK, France, the US and the USSR. Therefore, if, as has been stated in press reports, the invitation issued to the so-called democratic republic of Vietnam appears in the name of both the USSR and the Communist Chinese regime, that invitation is, in its form at variance with the clear understanding of the foreign ministers present at Berlin last February. Assuming the press reports to be accurate the US delegation can only regret that the Indochina phase of this conference should be initiated by a procedural evasion of previously reached agreements.

At Berlin we agreed that: the problem of restoring peace in Indochina' would be discussed at this conference by which representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic, and other interested states will be invited.

At Geneva the four inviting powers have agreed that in addition to the participation specified at Berlin there should be representatives at this conference of the governments of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, and of the Viet Minh.

The United States cannot agree to the suggestion which has just been made that non-existent so-called governments or states, such as the so-called Pathet Lao or free Cambodians, can in any way be considered as qualifying for invitations to this conference under the Berlin agreement.

The United States proposes that any idea of inviting these non-existent so-called governments be rejected. If there is opposition to this United States proposal, the United States suggests this meeting be adjourned to allow for further discussions on this point between the four inviting powers."

Summary of meeting follows. 1

MAY 9, 1954

TELEGRAF/5-654: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NACI GENEVA, May 9, 1954—noon.

Dulte 56. Personal for Secretary. Reference your Tedul 49. 1 I put the point covered in the reference paragraph of your speech to the French in a broad and unmistakable hint in my private talk with Bidault last Friday. I got the point and it had, I think, a great deal to do with stiffening his position.

SMITH

1 Dated May 8, p. 728.

1 Reported in telegram Dulte 54, May 8, p. 712.
INDOCHINA

geneva, May 9, 1964

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

ông secret

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

geneva, May 9, 1964—noon.

Dulles 37. The Communist maneuver of yesterday, reported in secto
154, could put us in a very difficult position if we allow the problem
to boil down to whether the Big Four, as proposed by me, or the "Big
Five", as proposed by Molotov, consider the participation of Pathet
Lao and Khmer. Should this occur, and thus delay or possibly prevent
serious discussions leading to the end of bloodshed in Indochina,
it will intensify and broaden the already critical attitude of segments
of European and Asiatic political and public opinion, which consider
our attitude on Communist China to be obstructive and intransigent.
I should think that in France it would ultimately have a particularly
bad effect, so it will seem to the French that we are prolonging a
procedural wrangle to maintain our position while French lives are
being lost. This would give the Communists an anti-EDC protago-
nists a particularly powerful weapon.

We cannot possibly acquiesce in Molotov's proposal, as to do so
would really make this a Big Five conference in every sense and
would immeasurably increase the position of Communist China.
I doubt that either Eden or I can persuade Molotov to drop his
"Big Five" proposal and go along with us. He stands to gain too
much even at the risk of broadening the war in Indochina and Asia.

The best way out to us seems to continue the debate in the plenary
sessions, letting the issue "Big Four versus Big Five" fade out, and
trying to concentrate the procedural issue on admission of the two
phantom governments. At the same time we and our associates would
continue to press discussion of the real question; i.e., ending the war
in Indochina on a satisfactory basis of security in SFA. The ad-
vanatge is that for the next few days at least it puts us in the superior
position. The disadvantages are that the Chinese will assert themselves
more and more, taking advantage of French weakness, lukewarm at-
titude of Britain, and support of Soviet Union. There is possibility
of them emerging from this phase recognized as a really dominant
factor, but this is likely to happen anyway.

We are trying today and tomorrow to develop British and French
positions and will report. Meanwhile, grateful for any suggestions on

above. I have just read Reston's story in Friday Times and in view
of his statements this message seems to post facto.

SMITH

1 In the New York Times of May 7, James Reston reported that the "United
States, Britain, and France are now in substantial agreement on a compromise
plan for a 'protected armistice' in Indo-China." He said it was "understood
that the Laniel Government in Paris has told Washington that it is prepared to fight
on in Indo-China unless the Communists agree to evacuate Laos and Cambodia
and withdraw to certain 'fixed areas' in the third independent state of Vietnam.
Bosted reported that the "Eisenhower Administration, determined to block the
Communist conquest of the whole peninsula, but unwilling to intervene at this
time in the war with United States military power, is prepared to go along with
Paris in its attempt to negotiate this compromise in Geneva." He indicated that
secretary of State Dulles was reported to have discussed the compromise arrange-
ment with members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and that
the Secretary "also outlined to them his own plans for the negotiation of an
'extended' Southeast Asia security arrangement that would be designed to guar-
tance the terms of any honorable armistice that could be arranged." (New York
Times, May 7, 1964, p. 1)

2 In a follow-up message (telegram Dulles 68, May 9), Under Secretary Smith
reported that the "British and French concurred in tactics recommended . . .
British believe that Communists will drop two phantom governments after an-
other day or two of discussion in plenary as they dropped East Germans at Berlin.
French commented that all six non-Communist delegations were resolute against
their admission and that continuation of Communist obstructionism during next
two or three days would help Bidault in Paris, assuming Western delegations con-
tinue to press for substantive discussions and keep onus of obstructionism on
Communists. French hoped that first day or two of substantive discussion would
bear short statements from U.S. and U.K. giving emphasis to broad lines of
French proposal, but with Associated States doing most of talking." (110.11
DU/5-96)

Secretary of State Dulles replied in telegram Tedul 45, May 9, that he agreed
"best course is to keep discussion of additional participants in plenary and to
stress shan character of Pathet Lao and Khmer regimes and relationship these
regimes to basic Communist techniques for subversion and takeover. Above course
seems best way to avoid getting bogged down in procedural discussion of Four
versus Five with bad effects you describe." (306.1 GE/5-964)

1 Dated May 8, p. 784.
1. Proposal contains major elements contained in previous French drafts (Secto 106* and Secto 182*) and comments already submitted (Secto 110*) remain valid.

2. Proposal continues differentiate between Vietnam one hand and Laos and Cambodia other, calling for evacuation of all regular and irregular Viet Minh forces from Laos and Cambodia, and disarming "all elements which do not belong either army or police forces" which on face of it would call for elimination all rebel forces of any character in Laos and Cambodia. We continue believe separation out of Laos and Cambodia issues is justified by facts of situation and is valid point.

3. Proposal contains important point hostilities should cease only after an agreement is reached which provides for (a) definition of assembly areas for regular units; (b) disarming of "elements not belonging either to the army or to police forces"; (c) release of POWs and civil internes, and (d) supervision under international commissions. Proposal thus has characteristics of armistice rather than simple cease-fire. But since assembly of troops and disarming of forces, according to proposal, will unavoidably follow rather than precede cessation of hostilities there is a major loophole here which could in effect make a simple cease-fire out of a paper armistice agreement.

4. Proposal contains new point, which has, however, been talked about by the French before, namely, that agreements "shall be guaranteed by the states participating in Geneva conference". It is unclear whether this refers, as presumably it does, only to states participating in Indochina phase of conference. This part of proposal obviously requires clarification and careful consideration since it might amount, on our part, to undertaking some obligation for underwriting a settlement which at best will be highly unstable. The responsibilities of the "guarantors" are, however, probably purposely left vague, consisting as they do of "immediate consultation" for the "purpose of taking appropriate measures either individually or collectively". It is probable that French set considerable store on an underwriting of settlement, particularly by the United States, and that United States response to this part of proposal will have an important bearing on how firm French will feel they can be in negotiating other conditions of an armistice.

It is possible that French view this provision as possible prelude to eventual UN membership and guarantees for the Associated States or that they are thinking of a link with possible collective action in Southeast Asia. This section, taken literally, could paradoxically require consultation between ourselves and the Communists in the event of Communist violation. The Communists might also, of course, attempt to steer such a provision in the direction of a Communist-sponsored all Asian security pact.

5. Another new point is suggestion that assembly areas in Vietnam should be defined by the conference "on the basis of proposals by the Commanders-in-Chief". This could be merely indication of the obvious requirement for military staff work, or it could be an entering wedge for on-the-spot technical conversations between the combatants which might, under certain circumstances, substitute for formal agreements, and thus might circumvent the conference proceedings.

6. On the whole French proposal is amorphous, and as compared with earlier French drafts somewhat more sketchy and loose. We fully realize danger that under pressures which French will experience they will move rapidly in direction of making so little insistence on nature of supervision or controls they will in fact agree to a simple cease-fire. The French proposal is purely an outline, and a vague one at that. The French will be under severe temptation make no efforts to fill it in satisfactorily.

7. If at this point United States does not support French in negotiations there can be little doubt that French would rapidly agree to a cease-fire, and that in process there would be severe damage, not only to United States interests in Indochina, but also to our relations with French. If we do support French proposal we certainly can run a major risk of becoming deeply involved in an unsatisfactory settlement, but we might be able strengthen French hand sufficiently so they will pursue negotiation of "an acceptable armistice agreement, including international controls" (NSC language) and come out with maximum salvage from Indochina situation, and without a radical dislocation of their relations with United States and of their world position.

8. We will probably be in better position win British and Australians and New Zealanders over to more active role in defense of Southeast Asia if at this stage we support French in these negotiations than if we keep hands off.

9. On balance, well realizing difficulties of situation and risks involved, we recommend that at this stage we give general support present French proposal in the negotiations, that we try strengthen French position by what we do here at Geneva and particularly by what we do at home, while continuing make it clear to French that our support is premised upon French not agreeing to cessation of hostilities without an acceptable armistice agreement.
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, MAY 9, 1954—8 p.m.

Secto 168. Repeated information, Paris 290, London 144, Saigon 49. Ambassador Heath saw Dac Khe of Vietnamese delegation this morning for discussion of positions taken at yesterday's plenary. Dac Khe expressed understanding and approval of US, France and UK positions on matters of inviting powers and on status of Lao and Khmer "ghost" governments. He expressed concern at French armistice proposal on following grounds:

(1) Vietnamese position (as set forth in Secto 144, repeated Paris 228, Saigon 42) is that military arrangements should be concluded at same time rather than independently of political settlement. Dac Khe fears that purely military armistice would result merely in highly illusory and dangerous cease-fire.

(2) Vietnamese criticize French armistice proposal which they consider vague and unsatisfactory from their standpoint on two counts:

(a) Franco-Vietnamese forces are apparently to be given same treatment in matter of withdrawal and regrouping as those of rebel Viet Minh. (We note that Laniel proposals referred only to Viet Minh troops).  

(b) French plan fails to make any provision for internationally supervised zone along Chinese border. Vietnamese consider establishment such zone imperative if any political or military arrangements are to have chance of stability.

It is to be noted, that French proposal which Dac Khe considers weaker than要求 his country's safety is probably stronger than proposal which this or a successor French Government will in long run adhere to under present circumstances, i.e., in absence injection new positive elements on our side.

The present tactical plans of Vietnamese delegation in the next two or three plenary sessions are as follows:

(a) Delivery of short speech against the admission to the conference of delegations of phantom "free governments" Cambodia and Laos.

(b) Immediately or twenty-four hours after the conclusion of Viet Minh delegation's opening address (which was interrupted by debate on the candidacies of Laos and Cambodia "governments") to address the conference or rather the Viet Minh delegation, urging the latter, now that Vietnam's independence has been obtained, to end the war, free themselves from foreign Communist direction and elements, and rally to the legal government. The delegation does not plan in its

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1 Dated May 5, p. 762.

2 Made on Mar. 5, reported in telegram 2949 from Paris, Mar. 6, p. 495.

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INDOCHINA

first address to spell out all of the details of its plan for eventual elections after an armistice will have brought peace to the country.

Vietnamese are anxious to know whether we will support their view that military armistice and political program must be in single agreement. Department instructions requested.

* See telegram Tedul 48, p. 747.

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TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, MAY 9, 1954—8:37 p.m.

Tedul 48. For Under Secretary from Secretary. Re Dulfas 51 and 53. Tedul 36 and 37. Eden's proposal reflects considerable progress in providing UK and French participation in some visible form of collective planning prior to conclusion Geneva Conference. But even as modified (Dulfas 53) it contains major defects from our point of view. The most serious is that the five powers represented on the Staff Agency are all non-Asian. If this becomes nucleus of military, political and economic planning, this will be resented by Asian public opinion as recalling colonial past, despite provision for possible participation by invitation of certain Asian countries. Communist propaganda machine can be expected to concentrate on absence any Asian charter membership. Incidentally we note absence specific mention Philippines in Eden draft which exclusion would not be acceptable to us.

US admittedly faced by dilemma resulting from (1) our desire quickly to establish common front with Western powers directly concerned with problem defense Southeast Asia for earliest possible establishment collective defense for that area and (2) our desire which UK apparently does share to avoid planning during Geneva Conference which would imply Associated States have been written off. To counter with argument that France would represent and speak for Associated States would merely underline in Asia existing skepticism as to their independence.

In the light of this dilemma, our objective must be to handle the discussions for a regional grouping in such a way as (1) to move forward rapidly to creation of minimum coalition, if Indochina should be lost, and (2) in so doing to avoid creating impression that Associated States are already written off and (3) to leave question of

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1 Drafted by the Secretary of State and MacArthur. Repeated to London as telegram 6069, eyes only for the Ambassador.

2 Dated May 5, p. 605.

3 Dated May 7, p. 710.

4 Dated May 9, p. 705.

5 Dated May 6, p. 709.
actual inclusion or exclusion of some or all of Associated States to be decided in light of outcome at Geneva.

In practical application we would propose to pursue two parallel lines concurrently.

The first would be five-power staff talks concerned exclusively with development military plans (hence our unwillingness to attach political and economic experts to such agency) which plans would be regarded as for benefit of all countries directly threatened by developments in Southeast Asia.

The second line would be the continued effort at political level to construct a collective defense grouping of the Western and Asian countries. As latter assumes definite form, five-power military group would contribute results of its work to entire group.

At its special meeting on May 8 NSC * again considered this question and reached decision (superseding that contained Tedul 36) "Agreed that the United States should be willing to participate in an examination by the US, UK, France, Australia and New Zealand of the military situation in Southeast Asia (including Indochina); provided that: (1) the purpose of such examination is to explore, through secret and existing military channels in Washington, means by which these participating governments may assist the countries of Southeast Asia in a cooperative effort to defend themselves. (2) It is made clear that such an examination is supplementary to continued efforts by the US to organize a regional grouping pursuant to NSC Action No. 1086-5 or 1104-5 and is neither a substitute for nor the nucleus of such a grouping." *

FYI. Reference in quoted NSC decision to "secret and existing military channels" reflected desire results of work would be secret but not intended preclude public knowledge such planning was under way. End FYI.

Form of public announcement, if any, of five-power military planning activity is of course crucial, particularly from point of view of Asian public opinion. Hence we are most anxious to see soonest suggested draft of such announcement. It may prove better, as suggested your Dults 53, to avoid any formal public statement. Radford favors Washington because the talks here could be less ostentations and avoid the degree of speculation inevitable in converting to high-level five-power military talks at Singapore.*

*The 106th meeting of the National Security Council, May 8; for the memorandum of discussion, see volume xii.

7 For these two NSC Actions, see footnotes 4 and 5, p. 705. Regarding the five-power examination of the situation in Southeast Asia, see volume xii.

For additional information on Radford's views, see Merchant's memorandum of a conversation held on May 9, printed in the regional compilation in volume xii.

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INDOCHINA

Meanwhile, we intend to continue consultations here with Ambassadors of those countries with whom I originally talked. I saw Munro of New Zealand May 8* and expect separately to see representatives of Australia, Thailand and Philippines May 10. Since only competent representatives Associated States are now in Geneva, you should talk to them having in mind that present talks are primarily to keep the idea alive pending outcome of exchanges of views with UK including your talks with Eden.

DULLES

*For the memorandum of conversation between the Secretary and Ambassador Munro, May 8, see volume xii.

392 1 GE/6-644: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1954—8:37 p.m.

Tedul 49. For Under Secretary from Secretary. You are authorized to support in general terms French initiative looking toward an Armistice agreement incorporating effective and adequate safeguards and under international supervision. You should throw in additional language reiterating established NSC policy concerning objective of assuring independence and freedom of Associated States. In so far as relates to a guarantee you should make clear that the US must reserve its position until it is known more clearly what would be the nature of the settlement to be guaranteed and the obligations of the guarantors.

DULLES

Drafted by the Secretary of State.

MAY 10, 1954

Conference files, lot 60 D 667, CP 345
Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)

SECRET

At the meeting of the Six* this morning the following was generally agreed:

a) An event that Molotov opens the meeting by reading the communication he has received from Chou En-lai regarding the candidates.

Drafted by Bonal.

The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and others, Regarding the Situation of the First Plenary Session, May 9, 1954

Record No. 206-Y0049

(Top secret)

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) The nine-country meeting on discussing the Indochina issue was finally convened yesterday. Bidault took the lead to speak at the conference. The main points of his speech were to deny the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as an opponent in the war, and to regard it as a rebelling force. Bidault’s proposal, similar to the proposals that Jiang Jieshi used to deal with us [in the Chinese civil war], concentrated exclusively on a military ceasefire. Bidault also favored the supervision by an international committee and the guarantee provided by the participants of the Geneva conference. The essence of this proposal represented a preparatory step by the United States toward measures of collective security in Southeast Asia, and it is apparent that it had been made in accordance with America’s ideas. This proposal, of course, should not be treated as something that deserved further discussion and bargaining. But still it revealed the great role that America’s intrigue on intervention played for the warlike factions in France. This French proposal mentioned noting about the political issue in Indochina. It is possible that Bidault intentionally left the political issue for Bao Dai in the next session, thus allowing Bao Dai to discuss it in a face pretending to be independent.

(2) After Bidault’s presentation, Comrade Pham Van Dong spoke, introducing the question of inviting the representatives of the two resistance governments in Laos and Cambodia to attend the conference. A debate immediately followed at the conference. For the details [please see] the report of the Xinhua News Agency. At last Eden as the chair of the session announced that the questions under debate should be left for discussion and solution outside of the conference.

(3) Considering the situation of the debate at the conference today, it is not proper to raise again the question of asking the conference to listen to the opinions of the representatives of the two resistance governments of Laos and Cambodia at formal sessions. Therefore, I plan to convey the proposal [inviting the representatives of the two resistance government to Geneva] to the Soviet side by letter, and let the Soviet side put forward this question in discussions outside of the conference.

(4) Comrade Pham Van Dong plans to speak next Monday, introducing the eight-point proposal that already has been prepared. In addition, to the conditions of ceasefire a term on organizing a committee of supervision by countries of neutrality will be added, so as to help the implementation of a ceasefire, as well as to counterbalance Bidault’s proposal on international supervision. The discussion with the Soviet and Vietnamese friends after the session reached the decision that for now we will not name which countries should participate in the committee of supervision by countries of neutrality. When it becomes necessary we will propose that India, Pakistan, and Poland and Czechoslovakia [be members of the committee]. If the other side insists that five members [of the committee] are needed, we may choose one more from Indonesia and Burma. Whether or not such a proposal is proper, we wait for the instruction by the Central Committee.

(5) The whole text of the French proposal is as follows. (omitted)

Zhou Enlai
May 9, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, Reply to Zhou Enlai's May 9, 1954
Telegram, May 9, 1954

Record No. 206-Y0049

(Top secret)

Comrade [Zhou Enlai]:
The telegram of May 9 has been received. We agree to adding one term on organizing a committee of supervision by countries of neutrality to the conditions of ceasefire; we also agree to your opinion concerning how the committee should be composed.

Central Committee
24:00, May 9, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
actual inclusion or exclusion of some or all of Associated States be decided in light of outcome at Geneva.

In practical application we would propose to pursue two parallel lines concurrently.

The first would be five-power staff talks concerned exclusively with development military plans (hence our unwillingness to attach political and economic experts to such agency) which would be regarded as for benefit of all countries directly threatened by developments in Southeast Asia.

The second line would be the continued effort at political level to construct a collective defense grouping of the Western and Asia countries. As latter assumes definite form, five-power military group would contribute results of its work to entire group.

At its special meeting on May 8 NSC 4 again considered this question and reached decision (superseding that contained Tedul 36) "Agreed that the United States should be willing to participate in an examination by the US, UK, France, and New Zealand of the military situation in Southeast Asia (including Indochina); provided that: (1) the purpose of such examination is to explore, through secret and existing military channels in Washington, means by which these participating governments may assist the countries of Southeast Asia in a cooperative effort to defend themselves. (2) It is made clear that such an examination is to supplement and not substitute for nor the nucleus of such a grouping.""  

FYI. Reference in quoted NSC decision to "secret and existing military channels" reflects the desire results of work would be secret but not intended preclude such planning was under way.

End FYI.

Form of public announcement, if any, of five-power military planning activity is of course crucial, particularly from point of view of Asian public opinion. Hence we are most anxious to see soonest suggested draft of such announcement. It may prove better, as suggested your Dulle 3 , to avoid any formal public statement. Radford favors Washington, because the talks here could be less ostentations and avoid the degree of speculation inevitable in converting to high-level five-power military talks at Singapore."

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"Drafted by the Secretary of State.

MAY 10, 1954

Conference file, lot 40 D 327, CP 285

Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)"

SECRET


At the meeting of the Six this morning the following was generally agreed:

a) In the event that Molotov opens the meeting by reading the communication he has received from Chou En-lai regarding the candidacy of "Drafted by Roosevelt.

The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

212-256-0 - 83 - 79 - 00 - 003
dacies of the Laotian and Cambodian resistance "governments", the six delegations on our side will express their opposition in the following order: Cambodia, Laos, France, UK, Viet-Nam, and the US. The purpose of having the US speak last is because of the understanding that you will address yourself not only to the proposal regarding the ghost governments but also wish to express your general support of Bidault's proposals.

b) The Vietnamese Delegation, for the purpose of getting the jump on the Vietminh, is sending a letter to the Chairman (Molotov) asking that the Conference take the position that it is necessary that the problem of the evacuation of the wounded from Dien Bien Phu be considered without delay and before the examination of the problems regarding the armistice and the restoration of peace in Indochina. The Vietnamese Delegation will not insist on immediate discussion of the proposal but he wishes it to be made known to the Conference.

c) In the event that proceedings are such that the Vietminh Delegate concludes his substantive speech, it is the present plan for the Cambodian Delegate who has a speech ready, to be the first to speak in reply. The Vietnamese Delegation wishes to reflect and to prepare his answer.

d) The further possibility is that Molotov will immediately recognize the Vietminh Delegate and ask him to proceed with his substantive speech. If this occurs you should arise on a point of order pointing out that the Conference still has before it the Vietminh proposal to admit delegations from Free Cambodia and Pathet Lao on which you desire to make some brief remarks.

Attached are (a) the text in French and English of Chou En-lai's communication to Molotov and (b) French text of the letter the Vietnamese representative is sending to Molotov on the wounded.*

*Not printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 2808)

110.11 DU/5-1954 : Telegram

Luns-Smith Meeting, Geneva, May 10: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

Geneva, May 10, 1954—3 p.m.

Dulles 65. Repeated information The Hague 12, Djakarta 2, Canberra 8. Luns called on me at his request May 10 to discuss united action in Southeast Asia. I told him that we regarded Dutch as one of our staunchest allies in Europe, and referred to early Dutch ratification of EDC and many evidences of close-working cooperation between our two countries. I said it was regrettable to have to tell one of our closest European states that it was not possible to invite their participation in alliance in Asia for reasons which were apparent to him.

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Luns said that he understood this completely. He said that Dutch have large investments and interests in Southeast Asia which they were prepared to defend. He said that they would not let New Guinea go and that Australians were in complete agreement on this point. He added that Dutch were sending additional forces to area, replacing territorials with Marines and adding cruiser and possibly two destroyers to their naval forces. He said that these units would be available if needed. All that was asked is that Dutch be kept informed of developments. I assured him that we would do this.

SMITH

500.1 GE/6-1954: Telegram

Second Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 10, 3 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

NACT


Secto 163. Repeated information Paris nact 283, Saigon 54, London 147, Tokyo 41, Moscow nact 59, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo for CNECF. Department pass Defense. Second plenary session Indochina phase opened 3 p.m. today with Molotov in chair. Following offer release Dien Bien Phu wounded (Secto 164#1), Viet Minh launched two-hour long Communist-line recital Indochina events leading to present situation. Theme was standard Viet Minh in reverse against French colonialists and American interventionists, but made frequent reference desire establish friendly relations with France, "on basis equality and mutual interest".

Presuming to speak for Pathet Lao and Khmer, gave account of events Laos and Cambodia and eventually associated them with proposals at end of speech.


1 A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/3) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 278. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p.m. and adjourned at 6:40 p.m. The minutes are also printed in Conference de Genève, pp. 61-67. The speeches of Pham Van Dong, Phoua Soumavong, and Eden, Cond. 6156, pp. 119-123. The proposals made by Vietnamese and Cambodian Delegations are printed in Indochina Documents 10/4 and 10/6, May 10, are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 278.

2 Dated May 10, p. 757.
Claimed Viet Minh victories, success of peace movement in France, and prospects peace opened by Geneva Conference caused anxious Americans plan common action. Ridiculed idea Indochinese peoples could be threat to security to US. Concluded US interventionists and French war advocates principal obstacles peace in Indochina. After expressing readiness Viet Minh delegation unite its efforts with other delegations proposals (Secto 162*) were tabled. Ended with accusation that French proposal submitted first session could not be taken seriously since it did not take account facts of situation, including military developments, and disregarded political matters.

Cambodian delegate then took floor beginning with denial Viet Minh claim to assist Cambodians in relieving themselves of French yoke. Pointing out that real Khmer Issarak were patriots who rallied to Royal Government once independence acquired, he claimed that actually none exist at present. Listed atrocities and invasion by Viet Minh and mentioned official complaint to United Nations. He pointed out difference situation in Cambodia and Laos from Vietnam; latter had both political and military problems while Cambodia and Laos only military. Ended with submission four-point proposal:

1. Evacuation from Cambodia all regular and irregular Viet Minh;
2. Disarmament of elements not in army or police;
3. Liberation or exchange prisoners of war and civil internees;
4. Control of first three measures by international commissions chosen by conference if possible from states not party to war.

Lao delegate followed with account developments democratic institutions his country since Second World War. Progress interrupted by Viet Minh invasions. Placed special emphasis on Viet Minh taking Lao children out of country to be educated as future Communist leaders. His proposal consisted of:

1. Withdrawal Viet Minh forces;
2. Prisoners of war to be returned;
3. Civilians to be repatriated;
4. Control by observers appointed by conference.

UK next with Eden making gracious gesture US. Said picture painted of US by Viet Minh could not be recognized by those who knew country and people. US strength used for independence and welfare all people; no one in world has been enslaved by US. Followed with statement of support for French proposal and advocated study and elaboration of its provisions.

* Dated May 10, p. 753.
"The United States has watched with sympathy the development of the peoples of Indochina toward independence. The United States and many other countries have recognized the three States of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. We have followed with great interest the negotiations which have been undertaken by France and the Associated States to perfect the independence of the Associated States.

"The United States has shown in many ways its sympathy for the effort of the Associated States to safeguard their independence. We have provided material aid to France and the Associated States to assist them in this effort and have given them support to enable them to resist open and covert invasion from without their borders. We will continue to do so, for the simple reason that it is the wish of the American people to assist any nation that is determined to defend its liberty and independence.

"The United States maintains that the first principle of any settlement in Indochina must be to assure the independence and freedom of the States of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

"The United States also maintains that any settlement in Indochina must give assurance of real and lasting peace. To this end, the United States believes that any settlement must be preceded by an armistice agreement which incorporates effective and adequate safeguards.

"The United States maintains that such an armistice agreement can be effective only under international supervision. The United States, therefore, believes that any settlement must include provisions for effective international supervision and assurance of powers and privileges on the part of the international supervising authority equal to enable it to carry out its various responsibilities.

"The United States welcomes the French initiative and believes the French representative has made a helpful contribution toward the restoration of peace in Indochina. The French proposals are consistent with the general principles to which any satisfactory settlement must conform. In our opinion, they should be accompanied by a program for the resolution of political problems. We look forward to hearing the views of the government of Vietnam on such a program.

"The United States notes the French proposal that 'agreements shall be guaranteed by the States participating in the Geneva Conference.' The United States has already demonstrated its devotion to the principle of collective security and its willingness to help in the development of collective security arrangements in Southeast Asia, as elsewhere. Until it is possible to see more clearly, the exact nature of the agreement to be guaranteed and to determine the obligations of the guarantors, we will, of course, not be able to express any judgment on this section of the proposal.

"The United States delegation suggests that the Conference adopt the French proposal as a basis of discussion and hopes that we will move forward constructively and rapidly in bringing about a restoration of peace in Indochina.

"The American delegation has listened with sympathy to the factual recital of the representatives of Cambodia and Laos and will study with interest their proposals for the restoration of peace in Cambodia and Laos."

SMITH

SECOND PLenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 10, 3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

NIACET

GENEVA, May 10, 1954.


"In order to achieve the re-establishment of peace in Indochina the following shall be deemed necessary:

1. Recognition by France of the sovereignty and independence of Vietnam throughout the territory of Vietnam and also the sovereignty and independence of Khmer and Pathet Lao.

2. Conclusion of an agreement on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of Vietnam, Khmer and Pathet Lao within the time-limits to be agreed upon between the belligerents. Pending the withdrawal of troops the dislocation of French troops in Vietnam shall be agreed upon, particular attention being paid to limit to the minimum the number of their dislocation points. Provision shall be made that the French troops should not interfere in the affairs of local administration in the areas of their dislocation.

3. Holding of free general elections in Vietnam, Khmer and Lao. Convening of advisory conferences of the representatives of the governments of both sides in Vietnam, Khmer and Pathet Lao, in each of the States separately and under conditions securing freedom of activity for patriotic parties, groups and social organizations in the preparation and the holding of free general elections to establish a unified government in each country; while interference from outside should not be permitted. Local commissions will be set up to supervise the preparation for and the carrying out of the elections.

"Prior to the establishment of unified governments in each of the above-mentioned States, the governments of both sides will respec-
tively carry out their administrative functions in the districts which will be under their administration after the settlement had been carried out in accordance with the agreement on the termination of hostilities.

"4. The statement by the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the readiness of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to examine the question of the entry of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam into the French Union in conformity with the principle of free will and on the conditions of this entry. Corresponding statements should be made by the Governments of Khmer and Pathet Lao.

"5. The recognition by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, as well as by Khmer and Pathet Lao of the economic and cultural interests of France existing in these countries.

"After the establishment of unified governments in Vietnam, Khmer, Pathet Lao the economic and cultural relations of these States with France should be subject to the settlement in conformity with the principles of equality and mutual interest. Pending the establishment of the unified governments in the three States, the economic and cultural relations of Indochina with France will temporarily remain without a change, such as they exist now. However, in the areas where communications and trade ties have been broken off, they can be re-established on the basis of understanding between both sides.

"The citizens of both sides will enjoy the privileged status to be determined later, in matters pertaining to domicile, movement and business activities on the territory of the other side.

"6. The belligerent sides undertake not to prosecute persons who collaborated with the other side during the war.

"7. Carrying out mutual exchange of prisoners of war.

"8. Implementation of measures referred to in paragraphs 1-7, should be preceded by the cessation of hostilities in Indochina and by the conclusion to this end of appropriate agreements between France and each of the three States which should provide for:

"a. Complete and simultaneous cease-fire throughout the whole of the Indochina territory by all armed forces of the belligerent sides: ground, naval and air. Both sides in each of the three States of Indochina for the purpose of strengthening the armistice will carry out a necessary settlement of territories and of the areas occupied by them, and it should also be provided that both sides should not hinder each other during the passage, for the purpose of the above-mentioned settlement, by the troops of the other side over the territory occupied by the other side;

"b. Complete termination of transportation into Indochina from abroad of new ground, naval and air units or personnel, or any kind of arms and ammunition;

"c. To set up control over the implementation of the terms of agreement on the cessation of hostilities and to establish for this purpose in each of the three States mixed commissions composed of the representatives of the belligerent sides.”

SMITH

394.1 GE/5-1254

Smith-Molotov Meeting, Geneva, May 10, 7:30 p.m.: Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Keppel)1

SECRET

GENEVA, May 10, 1954.

Participants: W. B. Smith, Under Secretary of State
Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister
Troyanovski, Soviet Delegation
J. Keppel, US Delegation

Place: Molotov’s Villa, Geneva

General Smith arrived at Molotov’s villa for a courtesy call at 1930 and was greeted by Molotov, Gromyko, and Kuusnetsov. Molotov then led General Smith into a small sitting room and, with Troyanovski and Keppel being the only others present, opened the conversation with a few remarks about Geneva.

When the conversation turned to the subject of the Conference, General Smith remarked that while he did not have Mr. Molotov’s experience in international conferences, it seemed to him that the present conference was “the worst” he could remember. Molotov exhibited mild surprise at this and General Smith amplified his remark by pointing to the extreme seriousness and explosive possibilities in the Indochinese situation. He indicated that while the US had come to the Geneva Conference hoping that progress could be made on the Korean issue, at least there was no fighting in Korea. The Indochinese situation, on the other hand, he said, was fraught with dangers.

Molotov agreed that the Indochinese situation was much “hotter” than the Korean question. During this part of the conversation he gave every appearance of understanding what General Smith was talking about and adopted a similarly serious manner. Molotov then said that it was too bad that Secretary Dulles had had to go home so early. He said that there had been all sorts of rumors in the press as to the reasons for the Secretary’s departure but added that, of course, one shouldn’t necessarily believe all such stories. General Smith agreed and explained the Secretary’s departure in terms of preventing certain

1 Summary of the conversation transmitted to the Department of State by telegram 105, May 11, not printed. (396.1 GE/5-1154)
extremists in both parties from disrupting bi-partisan support for US foreign policy. Molotov then indicated the hope that since General Smith was a military man rapid progress could be made at the Conference.

Returning to the Indochinese question General Smith said that the situation was made complex by the absence of clearly defined lines. Molotov agreed that this was so and asked what kind of a solution General Smith had in mind. The latter said that this was something about which he had thought a great deal but has as yet no final ideas. Molotov indicated his belief that something could be worked out. He said that despite the excitable nature of Pham Van Dong's speech he thought that the proposal which it contained represented a real attempt to find a solution. In particular, he said, it sought to solve the question of Indochinese-French relations, "up to and including participation in the French Union."

Molotov then asked General Smith how long he thought that they should all stay at the Conference. The General replied that he thought they should stay as long as there were any chance of making progress toward a solution of the Indochinese problem. He indicated that a certain number of speeches of a general character had to be made before one could get down to business and Molotov indicated his understanding and implied that these were of no real significance. General Smith then said that things were after all not too bad so long as they "were talking," a remark to which Molotov subscribed.

Toward the end of the conversation General Smith said that Eden had mentioned his anxiety to have both Vietnamese and French wounded evacuated from Dien Bien Phu. The General said he had agreed with Eden to take the matter up when he saw Mr. Molotov that afternoon. To evacuate both the Vietnamese and the French, instead of just evacuating the French as Pham Van Dong had apparently proposed would, the General said, be one step that could be taken to relax the tension somewhat. Molotov said that it was inconceivable to him that Dong had not had this in mind when he made his proposal. He said that he had discussed the matter with Chou En-lai after the session and that it had been Chou's understanding that Dong's proposal had contemplated the evacuation of both French and Vietnamese seriously wounded. A member of his own delegation, Molotov added, had also discussed the matter with the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Molotov and General Smith agreed that the press on both sides should be kept from building this question up into an issue owing to a misunderstanding of Dong's proposal.

After a few remarks of a courtesy nature General Smith took his leave. The conversation throughout was translated by Troyanovski.
Vietnamese delegation immediately asked Chairman Molotov what had happened to his letter asking conference take up this question, and regretted letter had not been brought to attention of conference before this time. Molotov replied letter just received and being translated. Bidault replied proposals by Viet Minh and Vietnam corresponded to wish of his government. Hoped Commandos in fact could take measures he had asked for since beginning of conference, saying better late than never.

Just before end session, Vietnamese interjected to call attention that written text Viet Minh proposal provided only for evacuation French wounded, and asked that Vietnamese be included. Bidault supported intervention, claiming it contrary to international law for commander to make distinction between troops on opposing side. Molotov ended session with hope all present would take note.

In courtesy call on Molotov after session, I raised question interpretation Viet Minh proposal and urged that Vietnamese wounded, as well as members French Expeditionary Force, be evacuated. Molotov said that while he had not discussed matter directly with Viet Minh representative, he was sure that Viet Minh proposal was intended to cover seriously wounded of both French and Vietnamese forces. He said that during session he had discussed matter with Chou En-lai and that this was Chou's understanding. He added that member of Soviet delegation had also discussed matter with Viet Minh delegation.

Molotov expressed hope possibility of misunderstanding would not be blown up press in view expected clarification, and said he had so informed his press office. I did the same. Molotov and I agreed effort should be made keep press on both sides from building up issue if in fact no difference of interpretation exists on matter.

SMITH

SECRET

Memorandum by Chester L. Cooper and Joseph A. Yager to the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath)¹

Subject: Joint State-CIA Estimate on Communist Intentions Regarding Indochinese Phase of Conference

In response to your request, State Department Intelligence and the

¹ In addition to this memorandum, Cooper and Yager drafted and circulated another intelligence paper entitled "Intelligence Notes—II." (208.1 GE/6-1054)
Intensions with Respect to Political Settlement

4. While indications of possible Communist terms for political settlement are at best vague, it is possible to ascribe some order of probability to various possible Communist demands. In any event, it is possible a cease-fire would be followed by long drawn out and inconclusive political negotiations.

5. Partition of Vietnam as a political solution appears to be made unlikely by the logic of the Communist position, not only on Indochina but also on Korea and Germany, and by popular resentment that would be aroused in Vietnam by proposals for permanent partition of the country. Insofar as private Communist hints concerning partition may reflect Communist policy, they must probably be taken as referring not to political settlement but to terms for a cease-fire.

6. Coalition government of some type, with or without elections, is a more probable Communist proposal. However, it should be noted that the Communists have taken great pains during recent weeks to build up the DRV as a regime recognized not only by the people it governs, but also by French-held areas, and even by France itself. The Communist view of the relative status of the DRV and the Government of Vietnam are not analogous to the Communist view of the status of two Korean or two German governments, since the latter have never governed all their respective countries. Therefore, if the Communists advance a coalition formula for Indochina it may differ somewhat from the German or Korean formulas. For example, Communists may offer merely to broaden the present DRV regime, possibly through new elections, to include members or supporters of the present government of Vietnam. Conversely, the Communists will almost certainly reject any formula providing merely for Communist participation in the present Bao Dai government.

7. Although the ultimate Communist objective is control of all Indochina, their immediate concern is victory in Vietnam. Communists have given little indication of their position with regard to Laos and Cambodia, although it appears probable that Communist demands for these countries, centering on claims of two Communist "regimes", will be advanced at Geneva, but only as a tactic to delay or even prevent agreement or as a likely bargaining counter. In any event, moreover, the Communists are unlikely to relinquish control over northern Laos.

The Head of the United States Delegation (Smith) to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden)

TOP SECRET


My Dear Anthony: The following summarizes the message which I had from Washington this morning and which we have just discussed:

"We are pleased at the progress reflected in Eden's proposal toward some visible form of UK and French participation in collective planning before the end of the Geneva Conference. From our point of view, there are, however, still major defects, most serious of which is that all five powers on the staff agency are non-Asian. Asian opinion would resent non-Asian staff agency becoming the nucleus of military, political and economic planning. Communist propaganda would seize on absence of Asian charter membership. Particularly unacceptable from US point of view would be absence of Philippines. We want to (1) move forward rapidly to create a coalition in case of loss of Indochina, (2) avoid any impression that Associated States have been written off, and (3) leave for decision in the light of Geneva outcome the question of inclusion or exclusion of some or all of Associated States.

To objective (1) to secure these objectives we move forward concurrently on two parallel lines: (1) The first line should be staff talks by the five powers, to be exclusively concerned with the development of military plans (and so without the attachment of political or economic experts), with such military plans being regarded as developed for the benefit of all countries directly threatened in Southeast Asia; (2) The second line would be a continued effort to construct, at the political level, a collective grouping of Asian and Western countries for defense. As this grouping assumes definite form, the results of the work of the five power military group would be contributed to the entire group.

The way public announcement is made, if at all, of five power military planning activity is crucial from point of view of Asian opinion. We are eager to see draft of possible announcement. It might, in fact, be better to avoid a formal statement. We are inclined prefer Wash-

Under Secretary Smith's letter was delivered to Eden on the morning of May 11 by Ambassador of the U.S. Delegation. Shuckburgh informed Reinhardt that Eden would have some comment on the letter later in the day and added, as his personal view, that "the only thing which seemed to be troubling Eden was whether or not we were moving a little too quickly with respect to the Tone." (Conference files, lot 60 D 87, CF 505)

Shuckburgh's reference to "the Tone" was probably to the issue of whether the five-power staff talks between Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States should be expanded to include additional nations such as Thailand, the Philippines, and some of the Colombo Powers (India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia, and Burma). For Eden's reply to Smith, May 11, see p. 774.

Telegram Tedd 49, May 9, p. 740.

Contents of telegram Tedd 49 presented orally to Eden on May 10; for a report of this discussion and other related comments, see telegram Duf 68, May 12, p. 791.
fields and frontier entry points would be controlled by neutral commission.

French would retain north part of Tonkin Delta including Hanoi and Haiphong. Viet Minh would be given Southern part of delta except Catholic areas of Phat Diem and Bui Chau which would be neutralized. A ten kilometer demilitarized zone would separate French Union and Viet Minh areas in Tonkin Delta.

Viet Minh would hold area from south edge of delta south to Song Giang (river). French would hold area from Song Giang to Faifo (inclusive). Viet Minh from Faifo (exclusive) to Qui Nhon (exclusive). French would continue to hold plateau area taken during operation Atlante and the coastal area south to Phan Thiet (inclusive). There would be four small Viet Minh zones in South Viet Nam.

Detailed Record

At Colonel de Brebiisson’s invitation above-named persons attended a briefing on preliminary plans for the implementation of the military phase of possible French agreement with the Viet Minh. Colonel de Brebiisson started the briefing saying that the French Government wanted to avoid the use of the term “armistice”. He said there were two reasons for this—one, juridical, and the other, psychological. Juridically, an armistice contains both military and political considerations and must be agreed to by a government, not a commander-in-chief. Therefore, it takes longer to negotiate. Psychologically, the French feel that people’s minds are still influenced by the Panmunjom negotiations and there is a tendency among the French to feel that an armistice would take several years to negotiate. In reply to a question as to what the French call their plan, it said it had no name but it could well be called a “cessation of hostilities” or “suspension of hostilities.” He added that a simple cease-fire would be dangerous and must be avoided. The French believe that a “cessation of hostilities” guaranteed by the great powers can be worked out at Geneva. This agreement would include the acceptance of regrouping zones for regular armed forces and the delimitation of these zones. The details could then be worked out in the field. The French suggested a neutral commission, with advisors from opposing forces attached, to supervise the implementation of this agreement in Indo China.

Colonel de Brebiisson said the French continue to consider Cambodia and Laos as separate problems which will be relatively easy to solve. The French will insist on the withdrawal of Viet Minh invaders in Laos and Cambodia. The Viet Minh could logically ask that all French military be withdrawn. During recent negotiations with Laos, the Laoians requested that a French mission remain with the Lao Army and, in addition, that the French maintain four bases with gar-
risons. The French had little interest in maintaining bases in Laos but finally agreed to keep Xieng Khouang and Seno. In view of the accords which they have signed, the French will insist on keeping those bases if the Laotians still want them to do so. In Cambodia, the French have no bases and no garrisons but they do have a small mission with the Royal Khmer Army. The French are prepared to listen carefully to Laotian and Cambodian suggestions for the cessation of hostilities and will give their views consideration.

Considering the question of control measures, de Brebiisson said there would be no question of identification of Viet Minh units in Cambodia and Laos as General Navarre's headquarters had excellent order of battle information on these areas. However, the length and character of the frontier would complicate the control problem. The well-known hostility of the Cambodians and Laotians to the Vietnamese would facilitate the detection of Vietnamese border crossings since the population can be expected to report to neutral observers all known Vietnamese frontier crossings. Preliminary studies of control measures have indicated that a neutral group of three or four hundred people would be needed to observe and control the frontier. The Laotians and Cambodians have been given a general briefing of the French plan for their countries but have not yet been given the details. De Brebiisson said they would be given complete information soon, as obviously the French must have their consent to any proposal.

The control problem in Viet Nam is much more complicated because the troops of opposing forces are well mixed throughout the country. The establishment of regrouping zones would require giving up, to the Viet Minh, certain areas now controlled administratively by the Vietnamese Government. Also, there is the question of turning over areas in which the population has been friendly to the French and thus exposing these people to Viet Minh terrorist counter-measures. These areas could be moved to Vietnamese controlled zones if they wished, but that would raise additional problems. Certain zones, particularly Catholic areas, should be neutralized and possibly administered by the neutral commission.

At this point Major Debarnot, Deputy G-2 in General Navarre's headquarters, presented the military plan in some detail. As background he explained that there are two types of terrain in Indo China, first, mountain and hill country—generally covered with heavy vegetation, and second, rice paddies. The Viet Minh are expert at moving undetected in both of these types of terrain. Also, there are vast areas with low population density and, conversely, other areas which are extremely over-populated. Either condition facilitates undetected Viet Minh movement and infiltration. Another important consideration is the feeling of the population, which varies throughout Indo China.

Major Debarnot then gave a brief summary of the military situation in Indo China. This summary is omitted from this memorandum as it presented no new information.

Debarnot then stated that the military proposal that he was about to present was tailor-made for the unusual military situation in Indo China and that it had different solutions for different areas. He also stressed the fact that this proposal was based on a "preliminary" study. The guiding principles for this study were as follows:

(1) the proposal must guarantee the security and existence of French Union Forces during any cessation of hostilities;

(2) there must be adequate guarantees to prevent the Viet Minh from reinforcing during the truce or making troop movements to improve positions;

(3) the French must avoid any conditions which would in practice be more restrictive to French Union Forces than to the Viet Minh. As an example, certain movement restrictions might be very easy to enforce on French Union troops but difficult or impossible to enforce on Viet Minh;

(4) conditions must allow French Union Forces to be maintained in such a way that they would be able to fight to defend themselves or to recommence hostilities in case of a breakdown of negotiations.

As previously stated, the French expect that the general conditions for a cessation of hostilities would be agreed at Geneva and the following minimum conditions are desired for this initial agreement:

(1) cessation of hostilities must be complete in all areas and be accompanied by suitable inspections by a neutral commission.

(2) agreement should be made that opposing forces would give advance warning in the event of unilateral re-opening of hostilities.

(3) the Viet Minh must be prohibited from reinforcing or creating new units.

(4) there must be neutral control of ports, airfields and frontier entry points.

(5) movement of rations and maintenance supplies and the rotation of troops must be allowed.

(6) training should be authorized.

(7) the French Expeditionary Force should have the right of replacement by individual or unit from areas outside Indo China.

(8) in the case of French Union losses from attrition which are not immediately replaced, the French should be given credit for these losses in order to allow replacement at a later time.

(9) free movement in respective zones and on agreed inter-zone lines of communication must be guaranteed.

(10) the French must be guaranteed free use of air transport for supply, liaison and movement of replacements.

Major Debarnot next discussed the zones of relocation for opposing regular forces, pointing out that these zones were proposed by General Navarre's staff and have not yet been approved by the French Government. Movements for regrouping of troops must be gradual
and there must be agreement at Geneva on phasing of these movements.

The following zones were delimited: (See sketch, Incl. 1)\(^*\)

North Viet Nam—Delta: The French will retain the area delimited by the following points—RN-1 from Mon Cay to Hon Gay, RN-19 to Sept Pagedes, along river to Dap Can, Da Phuc, Kep Thrach, Viet Tri, Son Tay, Xuan Mai, Phu Xuyen, Hung Yen, along the Canal des Bambous to Ninh Giang and down the Song Thai Binh to the sea. A demilitarized zone, 10 kilometers wide, extending outside of this line will separate the present forces.

The Viet Minh would be required to regroup their regular forces in Thai Binh province. The area Phat Dien, Ninh Binh, Phu Ly, Nam Dinh, Quat Lam would be neutralized, probably under the control of a neutral commission. In northwest Tonkin certain areas between the Red and Black Rivers and the Red and Clair Rivers would be set aside for French Union marquis. In center Viet Nam, the Viet Minh would continue to hold the area from the south edge of the Tonkin Delta to the Song Giang River. The French would retain control of the area from the Song Giang south to, and including, Fairo. The Viet Minh would regroup in the area they presently hold between Fairo and RN-19, excluding Qui Nhon, and west to the eastern limit of Kontum Province. The French would relocate in the plateau, the area recently captured by operation Atlante and along the coast to Phan Thiet. In South Viet Nam there would be four Viet Minh zones—the western half of the Cao Mao peninsula, the Plain des Jones, “War Zone D” area northeast of Saigon, and along the Annam-Cochin Chinese border, excluding Phan Thiet. Many of the above delineations were quite vague. Major DeBarnot explained this by saying that they were recently transmitted from General Navarre’s headquarters by cable and that the cable had some omissions and garbles.

Viet Minh regional areas would be considered as regular troops and would be moved to Viet Minh controlled zones. The Viet Minh guerrillas or “Troupe Populaire” would be disarmed, although DeBarnot added that he thought this would probably be impossible.

DeBriesson stressed the fact that this is a military plan, not political, and it would be part of the larger overall Indo China solution. General Navarre considers it a minimum position that he could accept militarily in Indo-China and it is one that would leave the French Union Forces in a position to resume combat under relatively favorable conditions if that were required. The plan has not yet been discussed with the Vietnamese. It is admittedly a far from perfect solution but the French state they have been unable, after much study, to come up with anything better and they believe that it fits the situation as it actually exists in Indo-China. They believe it is imperative that opposing forces regroup after cessation of hostilities and that remain scattered throughout Indo-China as at present. A cessation of hostilities, with troops remaining in present dispersed positions, would expose French Union Forces to the possibility of a massacre such as they experienced in Tonkin on the night of 19 December 1946.

DeBriesson stated he believed that the problem in Viet Nam was primarily a political one. He said he would not be surprised if the Viet Minh would ask for a capital, probably Hanoi.

In reply to a question as to what the French military plan to do if negotiations break down at Geneva, DeBarnot stated it is obvious there is one thing they could do—continue fighting. He said General Navarre has asked for reinforcements and realizes that he may have to abandon certain areas of Indo-China in order to hold the more important ones. French air power in Indo-China is his greatest asset and it will be much more effective, now that the Dien Bien Phu operations is over, as targets will be much nearer the departure airfields. The history of the war in Indo-China has been one in which French Union Forces have repeatedly been given missions and objectives requiring an effort far greater than their capabilities. DeBarnot likened the war to a poker game where each side is continually raising the ante on logistical support. This year the Viet Minh had more artillery than before and next year they may have tanks and airpower. DeBriesson ended the briefing by saying that the French were open to suggestions and would appreciate any comments we might have on their proposal.

Members of the American delegation said they would study the proposal. No commitments were made.

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Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath)

CONFIDENTIAL

GÉNEVE, May 11, 1954

Participants: Cambodian Delegation: Kep Phan, Foreign Minister; Nong Kimmy, Cambodian Ambassador to Washington; Sam Sary and Sonn San, members of the Cambodian Delegation.

Under Secretary of State, Walter Bedell Smith

Ambassador to Cambodia, Donald R. Heath

Subject: The Cambodian Program for the Conference

The Under Secretary received the Cambodian Delegation and gave them our view of the conference to date, congratulated Sary on his

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\(^*\)Not printed.
M. Spaak believes the US should take the leadership in policy for Southeast Asia similar to that which has given such good results in Europe. His thought is that we should establish a line on our side of which the governments and peoples will give adequate support to the concepts of free world orientation and collective security. We should make it quite clear to the Communists that if they step over that line they will risk a generalized war. With regard to Indochina, about which M. Spaak states he has no "expert" knowledge, it is his belief that we should leave the French and Viennese and the Vietminh to work out the best possible solution, reflecting their relative potentialities and that we should not involve ourselves directly in the situation. I observed that we had already made a very considerable investment of prestige, material, and funds in Indochina.

M. Spaak is most discouraged about the French situation although he expressed great admiration for M. Bidault personally. He states that the French Government must force the EDC matter to an issue in the Assembly without any further delay. He states that if Europe is not "created" in the near future, the whole structure of security which has been erected during the past few years will be in danger of falling to the ground. It is his thought that the other EDC partners should issue a pressing appeal to the French Government to move forward.

In the course of our walk from the Hotel du Rhone to the Hotel Beau Rivage, we met General Bethouard who is in Geneva for two or three days. He expressed the gloomiest views regarding the French cabinet situation. He castigated the attitude of the Gaullists in most severe terms.

Conference file, lot 98 D 227, CP 568

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) to the Head of the United States Delegation (Smith)\(^1\)

**TOP SECRET**

**GENEVA, May 11, 1954.**

My Dear Bedell: Thank you for your letter of May 10, giving me a summary of the messages which you had received from Washington yesterday and which we discussed at noon.\(^2\)

\(^1\) Text of letter transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Duite 67, May 13 (705/5-1954).
\(^2\) For a summary of Eden's reply and other related comments, see telegram Duite 66, May 13, p. 781.\(^3\)
\(^3\) Also, p. 781.

I enclose a copy of the text for the joint statement which we agreed would be suitable for use if it is found necessary to make a public statement.\(^4\) Meantime you may care to know that in reply to questions in the House yesterday, the Minister of State used the phrases which you and I agreed upon,\(^5\) and my feeling is that no further public statement is now necessary.

As regards the substance, I think you agreed with me that we should make a start with the Five Power talks and should not commit ourselves, or appear to commit ourselves, at this stage to the exact composition of the wider group which we hope would eventually discuss South East Asia security arrangements.

My strong view remains that it would be fatal at this stage to begin discussions with a ten power group. To do this before the results of the Conference are known would destroy any prospect of bringing along the Asian powers who really matter.

What I do think will be useful is that we should inform and consult the Colombo Powers, Siam and the Philippines, and possibly others, about the progress of the work of the Five Power Staffs, in the hope that by the time we can see what prospects of Geneva are, they will be willing to take an interest in security arrangements of a wider character. We on our side shall also keep the Colombo Powers fully informed of the developments at Geneva and will do our best to bring them along.

This is, I am convinced, the best way of trying to bring Asian opinion along with us. As you personally are well aware, that has been one of my principal anxieties from the beginning. I do not understand how your Chiefs of Staff can have obtained a different idea of my purpose.

There is one further point. We discussed the question where the Five Power Staff Agency should have its first meeting. I had originally thought that Singapore would be the most suitable, but you thought it should start in Washington. I have now heard from our people in Singapore that they rather doubt whether Singapore is in fact suitable from the point of view of Asian opinion, and they throw doubt on Washington for this same reason. I wonder whether an alternative would be to have the first meeting in London?

I am available at any time in case you would like to discuss this further.

Yours ever,

Anthony

\(^4\) Attachment 1 below.
\(^5\) Attachment 2 below.
DRAFT Joint Statement for Issue by the Five Powers

Pending wider discussions of measures to support a stable peace in South East Asia, the Governments of Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States have agreed that their military representatives should undertake an examination of the situation in South East Asia.

This examination will be undertaken by existing staff agencies formed some time ago for the study without commitment of problems of common concern.

The problems to be reviewed will be of interest to a number of other countries, notably the Powers represented at the Colombo Conference, Siam, the Philippines, etc. These countries have been informed of the intention to initiate this study and, during the progress of the work, will be consulted and kept informed.

Mr. Warboys

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement on the proposed staff talks with the United States, France and other countries concerning Indo-China.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd

The existing military agencies have been examining and will, of course, continue to examine jointly the various contingencies with which we may be faced. The Five Power Staff Agency is one such organization. I must emphasize that any examinations undertaken are without commitment.

MAY 12, 1954

286.1 UR/5-1254: Telegram

Smith-Bidault—Eden Meeting, Geneva, May 12, Noon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

Geneva, May 12, 1954—7 p.m.

Secretary. Repealed information Paris 244, Saigon 59, London 152.

Eden's urgent request we met with him and Bidault this noon to discuss tactics on Indochina. If French and we agreed, he proposed to raise following questions this afternoon after Cambodians and Vietnamese had spoken:

Is it agreed that first step is to get fighting stopped in order to man it? It is assumed that arrangements dealing with would in hand at Dien Bien Phu if there is agreement on above question, following other questions require urgent answer:

1. Is it agreed that all troops on both sides will be concentrated in determined areas?

2. Is it accepted that Laos and Cambodia are in special category and that Viet Minh forces will be withdrawn from them?

3. Who is to work out areas of concentration for Vietnam? Is it to be commanders-in-chief?

4. Is it agreed that when all troops have been concentrated into determined areas, any irregulars shall be disarmed?

5. Are we in favor of international supervision? If so, in what form? UK would prefer UN. UN does not necessarily mean combatants or any of those here represented. There could be an agreed panel of countries.

There was agreement that handling these questions presented no difficulty with French or ourselves. Bidault did not wish to question Viet Minh directly but felt Eden's questions and Communist answers would help him let us to analyze Viet Minh proposals. On international supervision, Smith felt we should stick on principle that it be UN and that effectively we would have enough influence to insure acceptable composition. Eden felt composition in Korea had been mistake since the Communist nations blocked everything. He suggested four nations from each side, such as Sweden, Swiss, Latin American and Asian, probably Indian. Smith said Indian soldier, such as General Smimay might be acceptable but Indian politician would be unacceptable. Bidault also objected to any Indians but felt Thais might be acceptable. Eden pushed hard for India as great power of Asia or at least one great power in Asia and held its policy gradually moving our way. It was nevertheless agreed that we shall not at this time go beyond principle of UN supervision and fight at battle of composition later.

Then asked whether we should continue regular meetings on Indochina or go into restricted sessions. Bidault felt restricted sessions might be agreeable later but felt principles should be further clarified in general meetings. Smith agreed.

Smith

1 In telegram 158, May 12, the U.S. Delegation reported Bidault stated that Eden's questions may have saved the Laniel government. Bidault indicated that the threat of discussion would have considerable effect on former Gaultier. He said he was also holding to reserve his own threat of resignation which, carrying 100 MRP votes with it, he believed would be effective in avoiding undesirable instructions. (286.1 UR/5-1254)
CABLE BY THE SECRETARIAT
May 11, 1954

To: Regional and Municipal Executive Committees,

1. The Soviet Union Government has invited our Government to send a delegation to the Geneva Conference on the restoration of peace in Indochina. Our government has appointed Comrade Pham Van Dong to lead the delegation. On May 4, the delegation arrived in Geneva.

2. This is a victory of ours, at the same time a victory of our camp, because the imperialists have agreed to talk with our Government’s delegation, to which they have for long shown the unwillingness. We should explain to our people and cadres understand our victory, but at the same time be watchful to the illusion about easy peace among them, thus making them understand that if we want to have good outcome at the Geneva Conference, we must try to fulfill the immediate tasks. The struggle between the enemy and us is still a long and hard one.

3. We have to mobilize the people to support our delegation in the Geneva Conference. In the context of people’s meetings we should adopt letters of support to the delegation and opposition to the US increased intervention. (According to the Central Committee, we have done very little of this because importance has not been attached to it.) Letters should be sent to the Central Committee immediately via un-coded cables. In the occupied areas, we must mobilize the people to support our delegation, at the same time oppose the distorted accounts and propaganda of the puppets about the Conference as well as pay attention to the work of winning over and disintegrating the enemy.

   Executive committees must use radio transmitters to send report to the Central Committee on developments and trends of thoughts among the people and cadres about the Geneva Conference. Executive committees in the occupied areas must immediately report on the organization and mobilization of people’s struggles to demand the enemy to negotiate with our government, to oppose the US increased intervention, and to oppose acts of counter-propaganda by the puppets.

4. With regard to the modes for restoring peace in Indochina, which our delegation will present at the Conference, the Central Committee will provide instructions later.

THE SECRETARIAT
TOP SECRET

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION) TO
FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP WAR OFFICE DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden
No. 250 D: 11.58 a.m. May 12, 1954
May 12, 1954 R: 12.10 p.m. May 12, 1954

Urgent
TOP SECRET

Please pass following to War Office.

Personal for D.M.O. from Monckton.
Further to my telegram No. 224.

2. Briefing by Colonel De Bribisson yesterday enlarged on Navarre plan, but we were still not allowed to copy map as it is their only copy and whole plan not yet approved by French Government.

3. Your telegram No. 378 and Foreign Office 366 [M.A.]
[Saigon] have had full distribution.

4. Secretary of State hopes to see Bidault before Indo-China meeting today to find out if he intends to back this plan.

5. Changes in paragraphs 3 and 4 of my 224.

a. He said that as a result of my question to Debarnot yesterday he would like to make it clear that the term "armistice" should not now be used for this plan. He would rather the words "cease-fire with guarantees" or "true with guarantees" should be used. The French people connected the word armistice with Panmunjom and it would not, therefore, fit their case.

b. A further telegram from Navarre had arrived which confirmed the areas previously given, but included some new areas.

c. There would be two neutral areas in North Viet-Nam one south of the Delta - a Catholic area and one other small area not clearly defined.

d. In addition to the Viet-Minh enclave in the Phan Thiet area there would be three more similar areas in South Viet-Nam. One in the south-west tip area Phuoc Long and Ca Mau. The other two he had not yet got on a map, but said they were small and
he would let us have them later. He added that the Viet-Minh
were holding these areas at the moment.

5. In reply to my questions

a. He said he realised the plan would be a shock, but
it was no more than an acceptance of the facts as they were.
No areas were being given up except round the delta as the
Viet-Minh held all the others now.

b. He said they were the minimum terms that General
Navarre could accept.

c. If there was no agreement at Geneva he said that
naturally the French would fight on, but that we would have
to realise that large areas might have to be given up.

d. He realised the difficulty of guaranteeing security
of so many areas and that the French were now working out
how many supervisory teams would be needed.

7. He then gave the conditions for regroupment and
preliminary action required which are outlined in my
immediately following telegram.

8. Spoke to Debarnot alone afterwards who said that the
staff in Saigon thought that

a. The 3 Viet-Minh divisions used at Dien Bien Phu now
reformed could be used for a major attack on the delta in
a month's time.

b. Luang-Prabang would next be threatened

c. It was certain that in any settlement Viet-Minh
would want a capital and this would be Hanoi.

9. He was generally extremely pessimistic.
TOP SECRET

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (U.K. DELEGATION) TO
FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/CYP

WAR OFFICE
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden
No. 251
May 12, 1954

D. 12.32 p.m. May 12, 1954
R. 12.39 p.m. May 12, 1954

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Please pass following to War Office.
Personal for D. W. O. from Monckton.
My immediately preceding telegram.

2. Conditions for Regrouping.
   a. Main object security of our forces and their supply.
   b. Guarantees to stop enemy reinforcing during truce and to
      prevent them bettering their positions.
   c. Avoid being bound by conditions which would apply to French
      more than to Viet-Minh e.g. limitations of transport or
      aviation.
   d. Conditions must not be such as to prevent resumption of
      hostilities.

   a. General ceasefire of fighting effective over whole area
      supervised by control teams.
   b. Any unilateral decision to restart fighting must be preceded
      by adequate warning to other side.
   c. Enemy must not reinforce existing units or start new units.
      Controls necessary at all ports, airfields and certain
      border posts.
   d. Movement for supply relief and rotation to be allowed if
      not for reinforcement.

/6/
TOP SECRET

Geneva Conference (U.K. Del) telegram No. 23 to Foreign Office

-2-

c. Normal maintenance to be allowed and the French expeditionary corps to have right of relief and replacement from France. Any withdrawals now made would count as credit later.

d. Each side to have right of movement in own zones including air.

4. All above was read out in French and badly translated by an American at the briefing.

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to raise following questions 1 this afternoon after Cambodians and Vietnamese had spoken:

Is it agreed that first start is to get fighting stopped in orderly manner? It is assumed that arrangements dealing with wounded are in hand at Dien Bien Phu. If there is agreement on above question, following other questions require urgent answer:

1. Is it agreed that all troops on both sides shall be concentrated in determined area?
2. Is it accepted that Laos and Cambodia are in special category and that Viet Minh forces will be withdrawn from them?
3. Who is to work out areas of concentration for Vietnam? Is it to be commanders-in-chief?
4. Is it agreed that when all troops have been concentrated into determined areas, any irregulars shall be disarmed?
5. Are we in favor of international supervision? If so, in what form? UK would prefer UN. UN does not necessarily mean combatants or any of those here represented. There could be an agreed panel of countries.

There was agreement that his raising these questions presented no difficulty with French or ourselves. Bidault did not wish to question Viet Minh directly but felt Eden's questions and Communist answers would help him later to analyze Viet Minh proposals. On international supervision, Smith felt we should stick on principle that it be UN and that collectively we would have enough influence to insure acceptable composition. Eden felt composition in Korea had been mistake since two Communist nations blocked everything. He suggested four not from either side, such as Sweden, Swiss, Latin American and Asian, probably Indian. Smith said Indian soldier, such as General Thimmayas might be acceptable but Indian politician would be wholly unacceptable. Bidault also objected to any Indian but felt Thimmayas might be acceptable. Eden pushed hard for India as great power of Asia or at least one great power in Asia and held its policy gradually moving our way. It was nevertheless agreed that we should not at this time go beyond principle of UN supervision and fight out battle of composition later.

Eden asked whether we should continue regular meetings on Indochina or go into restricted sessions. Bidault felt restricted sessions might be agreeable later but felt principles should be further clarified in general meetings. Smith agreed.

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1 In telegram Secto 185, May 12, the U.S. Delegation reported Bidault stated that Eden's questions may have saved the Lao-Ci government. Bidault indicated that the threat of dissolution would have considerable effect on former Gaullists. He said he was also holding in reserve his own threat of resignation which, carrying 100 MEP votes with it, he believed would be effective in avoiding undesirable instructions.
three aforementioned states or of permanently impairing their territorial integrity or of placing in jeopardy the forces of the French Union in Indochina, or which otherwise contravened the principles stated in (4) above.

6. You should, insofar as is compatible with these instructions, cooperate with the Delegation of France and with the delegations of other friendly participants in this phase of the Conference.

7. If in your judgment continued participation in the Indochina phase of the Conference appears likely to involve the United States in a result inconsistent with its policy, as stated above, you should immediately inform your Government, recommending either withdrawal or the limitation of the US role to that of an observer. If the situation develops such that, in your opinion, either of such actions is essential under the circumstances and time is lacking for consultation with Washington, you may act in your discretion.

8. You are authorized to inform other delegations at Geneva of these instructions.

End verbatim text.

DULLES

SECRET

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath)

GENEVA, MAY 12, 1954.

Participants: Nguyen Quoc Dinh, head of the Vietnamese Delegation
Nguyen Duc Khe, a member of the Vietnamese Delegation
Donald R. Heath, Ambassador to Cambodia

Subject: The Vietnamese Conference Plan Tactics

Dinh told me yesterday that the Vietnamese Delegation was against Bidault's armistice proposal; the Delegation is against any armistice as they feared it would inevitably work toward the Communists' advantage. Nevertheless, the Delegation would not in the Plenary Session at this time raise any general opposition to Bidault's armistice plan, realizing that it is politically necessary for the latter to present some proposal for eventual cease-fire to the French parliament. The Vietnamese tactics were to discuss the proposal with the French, to point out its weak points and stall for time. They believe that if Bidault finds parliamentary backing he would prefer to keep up the fight rather than negotiate a necessarily unsatisfactory armistice.

Dinh inquired whether there was [were] any developments of [on] the Secretary's consultation with the President, Congress and our military authorities. I replied that we had no news of

1 Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4042, to Saigon as telegram 2388, and to London as telegram 6628.

2 In telegram Toce 47, May 9, the Secretary sent to Under Secretary Smith a draft of the instructions and said he would try to obtain Congressional approval.

3 The Secretary indicated that he had not yet submitted the instructions to the President or to the Department of Defense. (58/1 06/5-654) On May 10, the draft instructions were sent to the Department of Defense. (58/1 06/5-654)
it was of uncertain origin, had not been distributed to the open," + "occurred illustrated lack of Cambodian Government control, etc.
Lively interchange between Bidault, Viet Minh Representative, Cambodian representative and Molotov ensued, during course of which Molotov attempted ironic jokes which drew laughter from Communist side and dignified but stinging. From Bidault that death of human beings was not laughable matter, upon which Communist side, "full dead silent.

After getting session under control again Eden set next Indochina plenary for May 14.

SMITH

Third Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 12, 3:05 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

INDOCHINA

A military settlement, in order to end the hostilities and, — A political settlement, in order to establish peace on a real and durable basis.

A. Military Settlement

(1) The delegation of the state of Vietnam declares itself ready to examine any vowing paper to this effect submitted to the conference. These documents must present a serious and positive effort, susceptible of leading in good faith to a satisfactory military settlement.

(2) They must include guarantees sufficient to assure a real and durable peace, to prevent any possibility of a new aggression.

(3) They must not lead to a partition, direct or indirect, definitive or provisional, in fact or in law, of the national territory.

(4) They must provide for an international control of the execution of the conditions of cessation of hostilities.

B. Political Settlement

Concerning the relations between the state of Vietnam and France:

The relations will be settled on the base of the joint Franco-Vietnamese declaration of April 23, 1954, which foresees the signature of two fundamental treaties: The first of these treaties recognizes
the total independence of the state of Vietnam and its full and entire sovereignty; the second establishes a Franco-Vietnamese association in the French Union, based on equality.

Concerning the internal political settlement in Vietnam:
(1) Because of the territorial and political unity of Vietnam, recog-nization of the principle that the only state qualified legally to re-Port Vietnam is the state personified by His Majesty Bao Dai, Chief of State. This state is the only one invested with the powers flowing from the internal and external sovereignty of Vietnam.
(2) Recognition of the principle of a single army in the entire territory. This army is the National Army, placed under the direction and the responsibility of the state of Vietnam.

Settlement of the status of the Viet Minh soldiers in the framework of the legal army of the state of Vietnam, in conformity with the above principle, and by modalities to be determined.

International control of the application of the above settlement:
(3) In the framework and under the competence of the state of Vietnam, free elections throughout its territory, as soon as a determina-tion is made by the Security Council that the authority of the state is established throughout its territory and that conditions of freedom are found to exist. In order to assure the liberty and sincerity of these elections, an international control functioning under the auspices of the United Nations.
(4) Representative government formed under the aegis of His Majesty Bao Dai, Chief of State of Vietnam, following and according to the results of the elections.
(5) Engagement by the state of Vietnam to refrain from any action against persons having collaborated with the Viet Minh during the hostilities.
(6) International guarantee of the political and territorial integrity of the state of Vietnam.
(7) Assistance by friendly nations to develop the national wealth and to raise the standard of living of the country.

SMITH

S/10.00/5-1354 : Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation.¹
TO SECRET NARC
WASHINGTON, May 12, 1954—6: 12 p. m.

Tedul 60. Paris for Ambassador, Geneva for Under Secretary, Saigon eyes only and info only McPherson, from Secretary. Ambassador Bonnet called on me today at his request.² He referred to our talk

¹Drafted by MacArthur. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4048 and to Saigon as telegram 2289.
²For text of memorandum of conversation, May 12, see volume xii.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and others, Regarding the Second Plenary Session (Excerpt), May 12, 1954

Record No. 206-Y0049

(Top secret)

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) There is no session on the 5th (Sunday). The specific proposals raised by Comrade Pham Van Dong in his comprehensive presentation at the first plenary session on the 8th have caught the attention of many. The English language text of Pham's presentation has been dispatched to Beijing. At one point, the spokesperson of the French delegation rejected the proposal on the afternoon of the 8th. However, on the 11th, he took it back and said that the proposal should not be completely rejected. At the second session on the Indochina issue, convened on the 10th, that Pham Van Dong took the initiative to raise the issue of sick and wound prisoners has produced big impact. Eden and Smith spoke to support Bidault's proposal, contending that it should be taken as the basis of further discussion. Although the tone of Eden was relatively moderate, still he favored stationing military forces by dividing zones and taking measures to guarantee a ceasefire. Smith followed Dulles's stand as expressed in the statement of the 7th and threatened to do everything possible to support France and the three countries in Indochina for resisting "aggression" from outside. He also supported France's proposal for a ceasefire, and favored effective international supervision. However, he only said that he had noticed France's point on guaranteeing ceasefire by participants of the Geneva conference, and did not make a clearer statement [about this]. Smith also stressed that the United States was willing to help the development of collective security in Southeast Asia. Toward the end of the session, the representative of Bao Dai stated that the releasing of sick and wound prisoners should not be restricted to French prisoners but should also include prisoners of [State of] Vietnam. Pham Van Dong had no time to make a response then. After the session, the spokesperson of the Vietnamese delegation issued a statement to the effect that the releasing of sick and wound prisoners would also include prisoners of Bao Dai [troops]. I plan to make a comprehensive presentation to support Pham Van Dong's proposals and to rebut Bidau's proposal at the third session on Indochina this afternoon. The presentation notes were completed on the night of the 9th, and was agreed to by the Soviet side on the 10th. After repeated revision of the language and text, the notes have been finalized.

(2) (omitted)

Zhou Enlai
12:00, May 12, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
United Kingdom Delegation to the Geneva Conference,
Villa les Ormeaux,
GENEVA,
May 13, 1954.

Dear Willis,

You may find it useful to have the enclosed copy of our preliminary analysis and minutes on the Viet Minh proposals for a settlement in Indo-China.

2. Now that all the parties, except the Russians, have stated their opening positions, it looks as if we are nearing the stage at which the Conference will have to come to grips with the realities of the problem. Judging by the latest military reports from Indo-China and the political situation in Paris, we may be in for a difficult time. Another factor is the mood of frustration and impatience in Washington and the failure to understand that the problem of organizing the defence of South-East Asia is as much (if not more) a political rather than a military problem.


Yours very sincerely,

J.C. Tahourdin

(J.C. Tahourdin)

P.S. I hope all is well with you.

W. Paterson, Esq.,
South-East Asia Department,
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
VIEW MINH PROPOSALS

The proposals put forward by the Viet Minh delegate on May 16 (copy attached) are analysed in the attached memorandum by Mr. Vialat. Their most objectionable features are:

(a) paragraph 2, on which all the remaining proposals depend, would involve French negotiations with the Communist régime in Laos and Cambodia as well as with the Viet Minh and perhaps to the exclusion of the Associate States.

(b) The proposals entail the progressive elimination of the authority of the governments of the three Associate States.

(c) International supervision of the armistice and elections is excluded and, instead, the old formula of mixed commissions of both sides is introduced.

(d) Communist régimes are to be maintained in those parts of Laos and Cambodia invaded by the Viet Minh.

The Viet Minh proposals have, however, been cleverly formulated and Amin opinion might be deceived into considering them reasonable. It is accordingly important to print cut messages to the three Celtic Commonwealth Prime Ministers, before any of them (particularly Mr. Nehru) commit themselves to saying anything in favour of the Viet Minh proposals. The Secretary of State may accordingly care to send a personal message to the three Prime Ministers and a draft telegram is attached, which also incorporates:

(a) a word of encouragement for the movement of Indian opinion towards helping in the supervision and enforcement of an armistice in Indo-China;

(b) a reply to the message from the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan about the possibility of Pakistan joining in guaranteeing a settlement.

(signed) J.G. Vialat
May 17, 1946.

(signed) D. Allen

(signed) 3. or 5.

Good.

It is important to co-ordinate our line with France.

Two things are essential:

(a) that French should make up their minds as to what they will take and say so soon. We will back them.

(b) Americans should not press France to stand out far more than they can hope to get.

We should speak out firmly against any such United States tendency.

/5
(a) It might be useful if Ridout, Redall-Smith and I met this morning unless D. Allen can co-ordinate as happily at his level.

A. Eden
May 12, 1954.

MINUTE

GENEVA CONFERENCE

Analysis of Viet Minh proposals submitted on May 10

General

(1) The proposals submitted by the Viet Minh delegation are obscure in many respects, particularly as to the order in which the various steps will be taken. The following elements, however, have been for the present many of the points of detail and should be regarded as a preliminary analysis.

(2) The proposals in general apply without substantial distinction to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, and in the case of all three States, put the communists at least on a footing of equality with the legitimate governments. Their tendency is to ignore the legitimate governments as such.

Paragraph 1

Paragraph 1 of the proposals takes no account of the fact that the independence of the governments of the three Free States has already been recognized by France and by a large number of other countries. It seems to contemplate the ultimate recognition of these communist states.

Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4

These paragraphs provide for a cease-fire followed by withdrawal of foreign troops (paragraph 2) and elections for unified governments for the three States (paragraph 3).

(i) Stage 1 (paragraph 8)

(1) The cease-fire, for which paragraph 8 provides, would precede the other two stages. The cease-fire would be subject to certain conditions to be contained in agreements "between France and each of the three States."

(2) Paragraph 8 (a) contemplates a movement of the troops on both sides that could result in a division of territory in each of the three States into two consolidated parts. It is apparent, however, from paragraph 2 that, pending withdrawal, the French troops in Vietnam would be rendered ineffective by concentration in a number of assembly points.

(3) There would be no satisfactory control over the cease-fire agreement unless under paragraph 3 (c) the implementation of their terms in each of the three States would be under the control of mixed commissions composed of the representatives of the belligerent sides. This presumably means commissions on which each side would be equally represented.
represented, with the result that the Communists could always ensure deadlock in the commission and render it imperative.

(b) **Stage II** (paragraph 2)

The second stage in the process of forming unified governments in each of the three States appears to be the conclusion of agreements for the withdrawal of foreign troops within time limits to be agreed upon. It is not stated that this withdrawal would take place before the elections, but presumably that is the intention. As noted above, pending withdrawal, French troops in Vietnam would be concentrated at assembly points.

(c) **Stage III** (paragraph 3)

(1) The third stage would be the holding of "free general elections" in all three States. The conditions under which such elections would be held are very obscure. There would be an advisory conference composed of representatives of the governments of both sides in each of the three States but the functions of this advisory conference are left to the imagination. Presumably, there would be equal representation of the "governments of both sides" in each State. International supervision of the elections is excluded by the provision that interference from outside should not be permitted. The supervision, preparation for and carrying out of the elections is to be in the hands of "local commissions", but the composition and powers of these local commissions are unspecified. The only express condition for the elections is that there shall be freedom of activity for patriotic parties, groups and social organizations. This is apparently intended to provide cover for activity by Communist bodies.

(2) The second sub-paragraph of paragraph 5 provides for the conduct of local elections in each State to carry out their administrative functions in the districts which would be under their administration after the settlement has been worked out in accordance with the cease-fire agreement. This acknowledges that the legitimate governments would exercise administrative functions in areas under their control, but it also implies that the government of Viet Minh and the so-called Governments of Quang and Pathet Lao would have areas under their control where they would operate. The authority of all these governments would cease on the establishment of unified governments as a result of the elections.

**Paragraphs 4 and 5**

Paragraphs 4 and 5, which deal with economic and cultural relations between the three Associate States and France are largely window-dressing because they would leave to the future the negotiation of these relations and the negotiations would, no doubt, if carried out, give the Viet Minh proposals, be in the hands of Communist governments. The second sub-paragraph of paragraph 5, however, does contemplate the continuation of existing economic and cultural relations with France and the re-establishment of communications and trade ties where these have been broken off.

**Paragraphs 6 and 7**

No comment.

(signed) P.A. Vallet
May 21, 1954.
May 8 when I told him US was prepared to sit down to talk with French about "internationalizing" war in Indochina (Tosec 143). He said French Govt believes time has now come to have such discussions and wants to know US attitude and position in event Geneva does not lead to cessation hostilities and military situation in Indochina makes it imperative for French to ask for outside assistance. French Govt cannot wait until outcome of Geneva to know US attitude since by then military situation may have deteriorated in Indochina would be lost. French Govt knows US intervention must be within framework of collective action but doubts that Australia can move before May 23 elections and recognizes that UK because of preoccupations re both Hongkong and Nehru* may not be willing to join. It is therefore very important to know precisely what US is willing to do and when it might be able to act.

I told Bonnet we were prepared to begin discussions with French but doubted desirability of doing so until after vote of confidence by French Assembly tomorrow. I added that problems involved in US participation had been under continuous examination by us including highest level this govt and I felt we could useful begin talks at very early date after vote of confidence. Bonnet agreed and said he obviously was in position to discuss substance today.

Question then arose as to where discussions should be held. I said we would wish to keep in close touch with Laniel and tentatively thought Paris might be best place. Bonnet said he would put this question to Paris indicating there were probably advantages in having them in Paris and also advantages in having them in Washington. He would seek French views on this.

DULLES

* Dated May 9, p. 742.

346.4 GE/5-1354 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

WASHINGTON, May 12, 1954—6:50 p.m.

Tosec 143. Secretary says Mr. Spender May 10* briefing him along lines conversation with Muñoz May 8 (Tosec 121). Spender additionally raised question possible UN action. Secretary said he thought there should be some UN action but action should not be dependent UN.

* Drafted by Raynor of EUR/BNA. Repeated to Canberra as telegram 206, to Wellington as telegram 133, to USUN as telegram 584, and to Paris and London by pouch.

Text of memorandum of conversation is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 525.

1 For text of memorandum of conversation, May 8, see volume XIII; for telegram Tosec 121, May 10, see volume XII.

because procedural slowness and probable difficulty obtaining two-thirds favorable vote. Secretary mentioned by way of illustration possible appropriate action by UN could be sending peace observation commissions Laos and Cambodia where it is clearer than in case Viet Nam external aggression involved. Spender raised personal basis possibility Cambodia, Laos or Thailand submitting question to Security Council but with action to be deferred pending outcome Geneva Conference. Secretary replied that while suggestion might have merit would not desire encourage such step pausing clearer indication as to which direction French will take. He expressed apprehension that such step taken against wishes French might ratify against possibility French maintaining firm position.

DULLES

MAY 13, 1954

7514-005-1354 : Telegram

The Chargé at Vientiane (Rives) to the Department of State

SECRET

VIENTIANE, May 13, 1954—10 a.m.

34. Sent Saigon priority 103, priority Geneva unnumbered, repeated information Paris 23. Crown Prince informed me today that Laotian Government has sent instructions Laotian delegation Geneva to oppose invitation so-called Pathet Lao members on both political and military grounds. Laotian Government sees no reason recognition Pathet Lao in view danger to Laos comes from outside and fears usual infiltration into power if even de facto recognition given. Militarily, Laos Government foresees continued ability Communist Laotians call for help of Viet Minh or Chinese since their existence admitted.

Charge requests [forward?] Laotian Government plea that US stand firm in opposition invitation Pathet Lao participate conference.1

RIVES

1 The U.S. Delegation replied in telegram Seco 204, May 14, as follows: "You may assure Crown Prince US firm in opposition invitation Pathet Lao and Khmer resistance groups." 346.4 GE/5-1354.

356.4 GE/5-1354 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1954—4:17 p.m.

Tosec 152. For your background information and for your use as check list in connection with proposals already made by French

1 Drafted by Fisher of EUR/WE and Sturm of FE/PFA. Repeated to Saigon as telegram 5284, to Paris as telegram 4086.
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1952-1954, VOLUME XXV

788

(Secto 143 as modified by Secto 159 a) and any compromises which
French may appear to favor hereafter, following principles seem to
us basic to any acceptable settlement in Indochina:

1. The establishment of international control machinery in place
and ready to function prior to an actual cease-fire.

2. Representatives of the international control commission should
be guaranteed unrestricted movement in, and free access to all of
Indochina.

3. Such a commission should have sufficient military personnel and
logistic support to discharge its responsibilities in connection with the
armistice terms.

4. Provision for UN assumption of responsibility for supervision
of the international control commission. (Some other form of affec-
tive international control might well be a satisfactory substitute for UN
supervision.)

5. Measures to provide for the security of troops and populations,
and guarantees against abuses of the cease-fire by either party.

6. Provisions for the humane and orderly liberation of POWs and
internees.

7. Evacuation of Viet Minh forces from Laos and Cambodia.

8. Provision for examination of political and economic problems
following an armistice agreement.

9. No provisions in armistice of a political nature, such as for early
elections, or for troop withdrawals that would clearly lead to a
Communist take-over.

French proposal appears to us to depart from above criteria at fol-
loving points:

1. Hostilities are to cease immediately on signature of agreement
and no time is allowed for installation of control commission.

2. Proposal omits statement re measures to protect Franco-Viet-
namian military forces and civilian populations of Associated States,
which statement was contained in Secto 159 a and only measure this
nature proposed concerns regrouping of forces.

3. No provision is made for examination of economic and political
problems following a cease-fire.

French proposal needs much spelling out in detail if significance
is to be judged accurately. If French should proceed to attempt to
reconcile their proposal with that made by Communists in effort nego-
tiate compromise, careful attention must be paid to adherence or non-
 adherence to principles set forth above as well as to proposed details
of implementation in order to determine point at which a French pro-
posal would cross the line of what is not acceptable to US, thereby
requiring a decision in the light of the NSC action of May 8.

INDOCHINA

You are authorized to discuss contents this message as you may
deed appropriate with French and other friendly delegations.

DULLES

156.11 DU/6-1954: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1954—5:08 p.m.

Tedul 65. Personal for Under Secretary and Secretary. I hear the
finest reports of the way you have taken hold of the Geneva task. Cer-
tainly it is a tough one. But you should know that the President and
I are delighted with the way you are tackling it. At the moment of
dictating this, we await anxiously the results of the vote in Paris.1
Best regards, Foster.

DULLES

1 Drafted by the Secretary of State.

2 The French National Assembly discussion of the question of debate on
Indochina culminated in a vote of confidence late on the evening of May 15. The
Laniel government survived by a vote of 239 to 207. For the record of the dis-
2586-2346 and 2566-2366.

366.1 GE/5-1954: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, May 11, 1954—6 p.m.

Secto 197. Repeated information Paris 254, London 159, Saigon 64,
Moscow 68. Pass to Defense. Vietnamese proposal tabled yesterday
(text transmitted Secto 190)2 covers both military and political aspects
problem. In effect Vietnamese delegation proposes Viet Minh dissolve
their government and army under terms political amnesty supervised
and guaranteed by “international control”. Later Viet Minh soldiers of
this army would be taken into Vietnamese National Army and
there would be internationally supervised elections at some unspecified
future date as soon as security council determines Bao Dai Govern-
ment is established throughout Vietnam and that conditions of
freedom exist. This might be ideal solution from standpoint but
hardly acceptable to Viet Minh who make same proposal in reverse.

Vietnamese and Viet Minh proposals are obviously victor’s solution.

Vietnamese proposal, especially with regard incorporating Viet
Minh soldiers after they disarm and disband into Vietnamese Na-

1 Dated May 12, p. 738.
tional Army, will be quite unacceptable to other side. Vietnamese are
certainly aware this aspect problem and their proposition clearly
reflects basically differing French and Vietnamese objectives this
conference. Whereas termination hostilities with more or less satisfactory
guarantee is general French objective, Vietnamese, who have less
substantial military assets, are primarily concerned avoid loss seg-
ments their territory to Viet Minh or any settlement which endangers
their position as legal and effective government of Vietnam.

Following are comments on some of specific provisos:

1. Paragraph 8, Section A on military settlement categorically re-
jects partition in accordance with known Vietnamese position. From
wording it is clear Vietnamese wish avoid not only partition but by-
draws a line across their country but also by permanent or semi-
permanent establishment of zones, enclaves etc.

2. International controls and guarantees of execution military settle-
ment are envisaged (paragraph 4, Section A) but it is not made
clear how they will work.

3. Section B on political settlement contains philosophy Bao Dai
Government is sole legal representative Vietnam. This is expressed
more even strongly than Pham Van Dong's allocation regarding right
Viet Minh speak for country. Stemming from this, Vietnamese view
settlement is that Viet Minh Army should be merged into Vietnamese
National Army, position sure to be unacceptable to Viet Minh. It is
noted Vietnamese proposal further call international control of integ-
ration Viet Minh Army into National Army Vietnam, which would
doubtless be difficult and highly complex problem to execute.

4. While Viet Minh proposal called for elections to be organized by
democratic republic of Vietnam, Vietnamese of course insist Bao
Dai Government should organize them.

5. About only point resemblance between Viet Minh and Viet-
namese proposals is recommendation clemency for all persons collabo-
rating with other side during hostilities (paragraph 5, Section B).

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1954—6:58 p.m.

I believe that steps might now be taken to bring UN into
Southeast Asia picture by instituting UN Observation in Indochina
area. I think that presentation would be more effective than Cam-
bodia or Laos initiative, since it would come from experienced repre-
sentatives of an indisputably independent UN Member.

1 Drafted by Poper and Stein of UNA/UNP. Repeated to USUN as telegram
555, to Paris as telegram 6066, to London as telegram 6061, to Bangkok as tele-
gram 2294, and to Saigon as telegram 2291.

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, May 13, 1954—8 p.m.

Dulles 68, S/S-R pass Defense. I made an oral presentation to Eden
of your Tedul 48 1 and followed it by an informal written summary. 2
British accept Washington viewpoint that we should move forward
concurrently on two parallel lines, and are prepared at once to make a
start with the five power staff discussions, which they understand will
be exclusively concerned with the development of military plans. They
believe we should not commit ourselves, nor appear to commit our-
selves, at this stage to the exact composition of the wider group which
we would hope to eventually discuss Southeast Asia security arrange-
ments; in other words, the second of the two parallel lines of action
proposed by your Tedul 48. They think it would be useful to inform
and consult the Colombo powers, Thailand and the Philippines, and
possibly others, about the work of the five power staff. They doubt
that Singapore is suitable, but also question Washington as the loca-
tion, and suggested as an alternative that the first meeting might be in
London.

We concur with all but the final suggestion. Washington is without
question the most suitable place. However, I think the suggestion made

1 Drafted May 9, p. 745.
2 Letter to Eden from Smith, May 10, p. 761.
to me by the Australian and New Zealand representatives, who have been our strong supporters in this entire matter, is worth considering; that is, that while Washington is the appropriate location for staff discussions, it might be valuable to have the first meeting at Pearl Harbor. To us this has an added significance, because it is the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief Pacific.

The British now take the view that a joint statement is not necessary and, in fact, particularly desirable. As I mentioned before, so much has already been said that any agreed public statement might be an anti-climax. The Australian and New Zealand representatives here, on the other hand, have felt that some sort of announcement would be necessary. Eden and I together worked out the following, which the British could accept and which looks reasonably satisfactory to us in case a statement becomes necessary:

"Pending wider discussions of measures to support a stable peace in Southeast Asia, the Governments of Australia, France, New Zealand, the UK and the US have agreed that their military representatives should undertake an examination of the situation in Southeast Asia.

"This examination will be undertaken by existing staff agencies formed some time ago for the study without commitment to problems of common concern. The problems to be reviewed will be of interest to a number of other countries, notably the powers represented at the Colombo conference, Siam, the Philippines, etc. These countries have been informed of the intention to initiate this study and, during the progress of the work, will be consulted and kept informed."

I assume that Washington will now take the initiative in getting these staff talks under way, but I would like to be informed at the earliest possible moment so that I can tell Eden. It is a purely technical exercise which must be done as a matter of prudence, and will be the beginning, I believe, of something of much greater importance.

Smith

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET  PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 13, 1954—9 p.m.

Sought 199. Repeated information London 160, Paris 256, Saigon 65, Moscow 89. Following Korean Plenary Meeting today Eden raised with Bidault and myself "what do we do next" respect to Indochina. He suggested he see Molotov and/or Chou En-lai to tell them they were "playing a dangerous role" in abusing United States and to a lesser extent France at every meeting. Things cannot continue on present basis. Bidault offered no objection as long as it was understood it would not interfere with his plan for full analysis of Viet Minh proposal and comparison with French proposal at plenary tomorrow. I offered no objection and during course of discussion Bidault and I agreed that Eden would first bring matter up with Chou En-lai when Eden calls upon him tomorrow and, as co-chairman, tell Molotov what he has said to Chou En-lai.

Eden stated in addition foregoing he proposes raise with Chou En-lai and Molotov on his own responsibility and ad referendum to our side question of how to handle replies to questions he put in plenary yesterday, making mention possibility discussion in restricted subcommittees meeting which would include all participants Indochina phase or in restricted meeting principal delegates.

During course conversation Bidault stated Molotov believed he could "make France explode" but that he was mistaken. Bidault also expressed hope press conferences Indochina questions be avoided as much as possible as they "make things very difficult for people here."

Told Eden and Bidault that in my call on Molotov I had expressed view Indochina question highly inflammatory requiring careful and adroit handling to prevent unhappy results and that Molotov had agreed situation was "complex."

Before agreeing any restricted meeting on replies to Eden's questions, I intend insist that those on our side get together to concert views.

Smith

1 At the close of the Fourth Plenary Session on May 14 Molotov stated that the next meeting, scheduled for Monday, May 17, would be held in restricted session with participants limited to delegation chiefs and three advisers each. See telegram 392, May 14, p. 792.

Anchey Eden in his memoirs, Full Circle, p. 183, wrote on this matter as follows: "As is usual at international conferences, much of the real work was done in informal talks which took place daily, away from the conference table. The course of the negotiations was frequently influenced, as a rule adversely, by diplomatic events far away from Geneva. It quickly became clear to me that we should make little progress if we continued to discuss Indochina in plenary sessions, which merely provided a stage for the striking of attitudes by both sides. On May 13, I accordingly suggested to Bedell Smith and Bidault that we should continue our talks in restricted sessions, consisting of the heads of all six delegations with only two or three advisers apiece. No account of the proceedings would be given to the press. This proposal was agreed upon, and on the following day Molotov and Chou En-lai also accepted it."

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET  NLCST

GENEVA, May 13, 1954—9 p.m.


392, May 12. My answer to Eden's
TOP SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO GENEVA CONFERENCE (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION)

Cypher/OTP and by bag.

\[ 1071 \times 30 \]

NO. 128

May 11, 1954.

D. 1.55 p.m. May 11, 1954.

PRIORITY

TOP SECRET

Addressed to: Gadal Genova telegram No. 129 of May 11.

Repealed for information: Singapore

and Saving to: Paris No. 1189

Washington No. 1705.

On May 12 the Chiefs of Staff discussed the situation in Indo-China and the proposed Five-Power Staff talks. The following is a summary of their views:

2. General Navarre's plan for a cease-fire grouping of forces appears to make eventual abandonment of Vietnam by the French inevitable. Whatever territory is surrendered in the first stages of agreement would probably be lost irrevocably. We should try to dissuade the French from putting forward any plan which leaves the Communists in full possession of footholds all over the country from which they could expand and where the Franco-Vietnamese authorities would be denied all chance of getting control. Any plan such as Navarre's which has these major weaknesses would quickly lead to the isolation of non-Communist forces into widely separated areas and to an early collapse of any cohesive non-Communist administration. The only way of getting a realistic and satisfactory appreciation of the present situation and future practical possibilities would appear to be to send an experienced military Commander with staff and political advisers to examine the whole position on the spot. Any such Commander should have experience of Far Eastern conditions and of the administrative aspects of security operations in that theatre. He would also need to have the confidence of the three great powers involved and to be given full access to all information at the disposal of the French authorities and associated States.

3. The Chiefs of Staff point out that though it may be highly desirable to provide for the independence of Laos...
guarantees for Laos could be made effective by direct military means in view of the length of the frontier in relation to the forces likely to be available and the lack of internal stability. On the other hand indirect means of implementing a guarantee of the integrity of Laos could not prevent infiltration.

4. Any existing grouping or partition should enable us to confine the Vietminh within a boundary which had some prospect of being effectively controlled. The military and administrative resources likely to be available should be capable of clearing up all territory on the non-Communist side. At this distance it is not realistic to comment in detail on possible lines of defense but from the map it looks as if the most promising line for effective administrative control and defense might be one running parallel to, north of, and related to R.C.9. Unless it is certain that sufficient forces will be available to do both it would seem better from a military point of view to make certain of the whole of Southern Vietnam rather than to disperse resources by trying to retain a limited position in the Mekong Delta as well.

5. With regard to Five-Power Staff talks, the Chiefs of Staff considered that political decisions were necessary to enable the Five-Power Staff Agency to consider the immediate problems in Indo-China, but even without precise terms of reference they saw advantage in a general examination of the situation by the Agency because it might lead to a fuller understanding of the French of their military situation. An early examination by the Five-Power Staff Agency would also assist in determining the steps necessary and possible to prevent a French collapse if no agreement results at Geneva. The Chiefs of Staff stress the urgency of early joint agreement on what is to be done if no agreement is reached at Geneva.

6. Until more is known about the terms of settlement which may result at Geneva the immediate task of the Agency cannot be precisely determined, but the following terms of reference might provide the best basis for an ad hoc preliminary examination of the Indo-China problem: "The Five-Power Staff Agency Representatives undertake military planning studies in order to recommend possible courses of action to enable an effective line of resistance to further Communist expansion in South-East Asia to be established."
TOP SECRET

Foreign Office telegram No. 429 to Cedel Geneva

They would examine all possible courses of action in the light of the current situation and of the known capabilities of the anti-Communist countries concerned in South-East Asia and the Western Pacific.

7. With regard to the proposed meeting place, the Chiefs of Staff thought that in order to combine local knowledge and authoritative guidance, the Chiefs of Staff of each country should be represented as well as local commanders-in-chief. There was advantage in having the talks near to the scene of operations and Singapore therefore appeared preferable, in the military view, to London, Washington or Honolulu. Saigon would be even better from the point of view of the availability of full and up-to-date information on the actual situation. Also it might impress the Communists that some positive action was under consideration. Saigon would therefore be the best venue from a military point of view.

8. The Chiefs of Staff suggest that apart from the obvious political advantages, full participation in any agreement by India with her valuable forces would do more than anything else to increase the military resources available to provide supervision of the agreement and effective guarantee.
We believe prior opening five power talks Washington it is advisable to inform unofficially Thailand and Philippines and perhaps others regarding these talks and their objectives. This is to explore means by which five powers can assist countries of the SEA in cooperative effort to defend themselves. We could similarly inform Colombo powers. Subsequently we could decide in light of progress made particularly in getting on track SEA regional arrangements, extent to which participation in military talks by other Asian countries, notably Thailand and Philippines, is desirable.

FYI, our feeling is that if talks were held in London even to start with, this would suggest that UK view non-participation Indochina war had prevailed and that Indochina tacitly written off in current military planning. At this stage, this highly likely have particularly damaging effect French political situation.

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SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1954—4:29 p.m. 751G.05/5-1954: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

Walter Bedell Smith to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1954—4:29 p.m.

SECRET

Tosec 158. Deteriorating political and military situation Vietnam reflected in such telegrams as Saigon’s 2379 suggests need for urgent consideration of possible countermeasures.

Appears from here that first step this connection is to urge Bao Dai to return at once to Vietnam. If Bao Dai proves unresponsive, Heath’s approach you should discuss with Bidsault as possible further steps that could be taken.

We are of course aware however of uncertainty as to what role Bao Dai could or would play under existing circumstances. Nevertheless Bao Dai’s return to Vietnam is the one remedial measure we might put into effect most quickly. If Bidsault and USDAl concur, if Bao Dai does not respond affirmatively to first suggestion, might be put up to Bao Dai that unless his is willing accept our recommendation, French and US policy with regard to him and his regime will have to be reexamined.

I believe moreover that we must at once undertake fullest discussions with French at Geneva as well as Paris and Saigon concerning

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1 Drafted by Strum of FRYPBA. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4974, to Saigon as telegram 2800, and to Honolulu as telegram 586.

2 In telegram 3060 from Saigon, May 13, McCulloch reported that Defense Minister Than Huu Quat had stated, citing recent desertions that the internal situation had deteriorated that all semblance of government might disappear within ten days. The Charge further indicated that according to certain French authorities, unless Bao Dai returned and faced up to his responsibilities within ten days to three weeks there would no longer be a state of Vietnam. (751G.05/5-1954)

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Further steps which might be taken toward rectifying political situation Vietnam and toward preventing apparent disintegration of government authority from further compromising Franco-Vietnamese military posture.

Dulles

Confidential

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Advisor to the United States Delegation (Bonial)

TOP SECRET


Participants: Pote Sarasin, Ambassador to Washington and Member of Thai Delegation

The Under Secretary

Philip W. Bonsal

Subject: Security Arrangements in Southeast Asia and U.S. Military Assistance for Thailand

Ambassador Sarasin stated that he was interested in getting information on his own behalf and that of Prince Cuprathirat regarding progress being made on (a) the development of collective security arrangements in Southeast Asia and (b) measures for strengthening the Thai armed forces. He said he had been informed of the call which the Thai Chargé paid on the Secretary on May 10. Washington at which time it was the Chargé’s impression that progress on the united action concept, at least so far as immediate implementation is concerned, is held up by British unwillingness to act along at this time.

The Ambassador indicated a full awareness of the requirements of the Thai armed forces in the matter of equipment and training. He said that a certain amount of small arms had recently been received. He said that the Thai Prime Minister is anxious to increase the Thai army from its present strength of between 50 and 60,000 to a total of 150,000. The manpower is readily available but there is the problem of training officers. There is also a financial problem. The Thai budget currently amounts to some million of which the armed forces absorb over $100 million. The Thai financial situation is very tight. This was confirmed by the International Bank when recently it refused to make a loan request by Thailand because of concern over Thailand’s public finances. The Ambassador concluded with an appeal for a statement of the extent to which US assistance might be counted on in developing Thailand’s armed forces and improving Thailand’s defense position.

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3 For memorandum of conversation between Secretary Dulles and Minister Thanuksev DeVakul, May 10, see volume XIX.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Wei Guoqing, and report to the CCP Central Committee (excerpt), May 13, 1954

Source: *Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949-1976*, vol 1, p. 367

The Western countries are using the question of the sick and wound soldiers in Dien Bien Phu to criticize the Soviet Union. Both the progressive personnel and the friends hope to know promptly how the question of the sick and wound soldiers in Dien Bien Phu has been handled. Therefore, concerning how the two sides have discussed the releasing of seriously wound enemy soldiers in Dien Bien Phu, and the specific progress that has been achieved in transporting them, please telegraph us and keep us informed at any time, so that we may convey [the information] to Comrade Pham Van Dong and the Soviet delegation, and we may carry out propaganda in accordance with the information, so as to smash the enemy's plots. In the meantime, it would be better if some of the captured senior officers of the enemy could be encouraged to issue statements concerning our humanist measures for giving preferential treatment of the prisoners and sick and wound soldiers, and [our practice of] releasing seriously wound enemy soldiers. However, please do not try to force them to do so.

*Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not cite or quote without permission from CWIHP.*
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (U.K. DELEGATION)

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP. FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL

DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden.
No. 279
May 14, 1954.

R. 10.05 p.m. May 14, 1954.

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 279 of May 14.

Repeated for information to Paris Washington
Delhi Karachi
Colombo Rangoon

Meeting on Indo-China.

I suggested to M. Bidault and General Bedell Smith on May 13 that, now the 5 questions had been made, it might be useful to pursue the Indo-China discussions in restricted sessions, consisting of the heads of all 9 delegations, with only 2 or 3 advisers each and no accounts of the proceedings given to the press. My colleagues agreed that as one of the joint chairmen I should approach first Mr. Chou En-Lai and then Molotov and put this suggestion to them.

2. When I spoke to Mr. Chou En-Lai this morning he agreed to consider the idea in consultation with the Soviet and Viet Minh Delegations. I suggested that my own questions might form a possible basis for discussion and Mr. Chou En-Lai agreed that the subject of my first question, namely the concentration of the regular troops of both sides in delimited zones, might well be the first point to be discussed. He said, however, that the political aspects of a settlement must not be lost sight of and remarked that the French Delegation had so far left the development of this aspect of their case to the Viet Nam Delegation, whose claim to control of the whole state seemed as extravagant as Chiang Kai-Shek's had been in China. I said that in my view the aim of decreasing tension among the 5 Great Powers would not be served if Ho Chi-Minh on his side persisted in asking for too much. The Indo-China situation was dangerous because of its possible external repercussions. Mr. Chou En-Lai said...
CONFIDENTIAL

Geneva Conference (U.K.,BEL) telegram No.272
to Foreign Office

- 2 -

China wished for recognition as a great power but would not make this a condition of any settlement. China wished to live in peace with her neighbours in accordance with the principles of non-aggression and non-interference laid down in the preamble of her recent agreement with India about Tibet.

3. M. Molotov whom I saw subsequently also agreed to consider my proposal that restricted meetings might soon be held. At the end of this afternoon's plenary meeting, at which both M. Molotov and M. Bidsault made prepared statements, M. Molotov announced from the chair that following discussions among the delegations the next meeting would be held on Monday in restricted session.

4. This is a useful advance and I think we have done well to reach so soon the stage at which serious negotiation on this difficult question may be begun.

Foreign Office please pass to Paris, Washington, Delhi, Karachi, Colombo and Rangoon as my telegrams Nos.65, 69, 27, 27, 30 and 9 respectively.

[Repeated to Paris, Washington and Rangoon]

[Copy sent to C.R.O. for repetition to Delhi, Karachi and Colombo]

ADVANCE COPIES:
Sir L. Kirkpatrick
Private Secretary
Minister of State
Mr. Speaight
Head of South East Asia Dept.
Head of News
We believe prior opening five-power talks Washington desirable inform confidentially Thalad and Philippines and perhaps others regarding background these talks and their objective which is to explore means by which five powers can assist countries of SEA in cooperative effort to defend themselves. UK could similarly inform Colombo powers. Subsequently we could decide if progress made particularly in getting on with SEA regional arrangements, extend to which participation in military talks other Asian countries, notably Thailand and Philippines, is desirable.

FYI, our feeling is that if talks were held in London even only to start with this would suggest that UV and non-participation Indochina war had prevailed and that Indochina tacitly written off in current military planning. At this stage this is likely have particularly damaging effect French political situation.

DULLES

7510.09/5-1954 : Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1954—4:29 p.m.

Tosec 18. Deteriorating political and military situation Vietnam reflected in such telegrams of Saigon's 2372 indicates need urgent consideration of possible countermeasures.

Appears here that first step this connection is to urge Bao Dai return at once to Vietnam. If Bao Dai proves unresponsive to Heath's approach you should discuss with Bidaulte possible further steps that could be taken.

We are of course aware however of uncertainty as to what role Bao Dai could or would play under existing circumstances. Nevertheless Bao Dai's return to Vietnam is the one remedial measure we might put into effect most quickly. If Bidaul and US Del concurred, and if Bao Dai does not respond affirmatively to first suggestion, be put up to Bao Dai that unless is willing accept our recommendation, French and US policy with regard to him and his regime will have to be reexamined.

I believe moreover that we must at once undertake fullest discussions with French at Geneva as well as Paris and Saigon concerning

DULLES

Further steps which might be taken toward stabilizing political situation Vietnam and toward prevention current disintegration of governmental authority from further compromising Franco-Vietnamese military posture.

DULLES

Confidential/Classified: 50 D 631, CP 288

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal)

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 14, 1954.

Participants: Pot Sarasin, Ambassador to Washington and Member of Thai Delegation
The Under Secretary
Philip W. Bonsal

Subject: Security Arrangements in Southeast Asia and U.S. Military Assistance for Thailand

Ambassador Sarasin stated that he was interested in getting information on his own behalf and that of Prince Wan regarding progress being made on (a) the development of collective security arrangements in Southeast Asia and (b) measures for strengthening Thai armed forces. He said he had been informed of call which the Thai Chargé paid on the Secretary on May 10th in Washington at which time it was the Chargé's impression that progress on the united action concept, at least as far as immediate implementation is concerned, is held up by British unwillingness to go along at this time.

The Ambassador indicated a full awareness of the requirements of the Thai armed forces in the matter of equipment and training. He said that a certain amount of small arms had recently been received. He also said that the Thai Prime Minister is anxious to increase the Thai army from its present strength of between 50 and 60,000 to a total of 150,000. The manpower is readily available but there is the problem of training cadre. There is also a financial problem. The Thai budget currently amounts to $250 million of which the armed forces absorb over $100 million. The Thai financial situation is very tight. This was confirmed by the International Bank recently when it refused to make a loan requested by Thailand because of concern over Thailand's public finances. The Ambassador concluded with an appeal for a statement of the extent to which US assistance might be counted on in developing Thailand's armed forces and improving Thailand's defense position.

1 For memorandum of conversation between Secretary Dulles and Minister Thanlithy Devakul, May 10, see volume xii.
The Under Secretary replied that while his information regarding progress on military assistance to Thailand was not entirely current, he could state that our JCS have been asked to examine and make recommendations with regard to a program which would include assistance in increasing the Thai army to 60,000; constructing the Saraburi Highway and certain other matters including an air base. The Under Secretary stated that his views had been requested and that he was making favorable recommendations. He said that he thought that ways and means would be found whereby existing resources might be made available to help the Thai Government.

The Under Secretary added that he had most strongly recommended the establishment in Thailand of an air base with fighter planes in the event that the Thai Government should request the installation of such a base. He stressed the top secret nature of this matter and the important part which such a base could play in free world defense of Southeast Asia against aggression.

The Under Secretary stated that, provided the necessary resources could be made available, the concept of assistance to be rendered the Thai Government in military matters would be broad and flexible. It would include financial support in view of the state of the Thai budget and assistance in the construction of housing and presumably in the provision of certain types of infrastructure (roads and air fields). The Under Secretary emphasized also the important assistance which we could render in training Thai officers and noncommissioned officers. He recalled the experience which the US Marine Corps has acquired in the peculiar problems of jungle warfare with modern weapons.

The Under Secretary then took occasion to reiterate the Secretary's appreciation of the strong stand taken by the Thai Government immediately after the Secretary had launched his united action concept. He said that this attitude had greatly strengthened the Secretary's hand. He added that he thought it important that the Burmese Government should now be encouraged to move away from its position of neutrality. He said that there were definite signs of a change. He expressed the hope that Thailand could be of assistance in accelerating this movement.

The Ambassador replied that Mr. Eden has requested Prince Wan to try to exert some influence with the Burmese. This matter is a delicate one because of some traditional factors in Thai-Burmese relations and also because of certain recent incidents, including the bombing of Thai territory by the Burmese air force. However, the Thai Government is taking a conciliatory and constructive attitude and hopes that it can be useful.

The Ambassador took occasion to express his satisfaction at the recent strengthening of the Cambodian Government as reflected by the fact that certain disaffected elements have rallied to the King. He cited these developments as illustrative of the dynamic effect of real independence. The Ambassador stated that he was in full agreement that the situation in Laos and Cambodia should be disassociated from the situation in Viet-Nam in any settlement of the Indochina war.

The Ambassador then asked the Under Secretary whether the US would proceed with the united action concept even if the UK should drag its feet or even refuse to go along in any useful manner. To this the Under Secretary replied that in his opinion the situation with which we are confronted in Southeast Asia makes it essential that we and other like-minded countries proceed as rapidly and as energetically as possible.

The Ambassador then reverted to his theme as to the importance of keeping India out of any defense arrangements in the area. He said that collective arrangements which included India would insure united inaction rather than united action. The Ambassador indicated that the Indians had been trying to influence the Thai authorities away from the united action concept. He said, however, that Pakistan would be a useful participant in any arrangement.

Confidential

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Martin)


Participants: Mr. Kenneth Young, U.S. Delegation
Mr. John Calhoun, U.S. Delegation
Mr. Edwin Martin, U.S. Delegation
Mr. Humphrey Trevelyan, British Delegation

Subject: Views of Mr. Humphrey Trevelyan, British Chargé at Peiping, on various subjects relating to Communist China.

During the course of a small dinner given by Mr. H. Trevelyan, British Chargé at Peiping, for three members of the U.S. Delegation, he expressed his views on several topics of interest relating to the Peiping regime and the Geneva Conference. A summary of his views follows:

1. British Recognition of Communist China

Mr. Trevelyan said that he felt strongly that there had been "no loss and some gain" by the maintenance of the British diplomatic mission
in Peiping even though the Peiping regime had failed to recognize the British Government. He cited U.S. press reports that the Chinese diplomatic representatives were laughed at in the streets as being not in accord with the facts. He had never felt any sense of being slighted or mocked at by Chinese in Peiping, because of his unrecognized status. On the other hand, he had personally made a very careful study of the treatment of British firms as compared to the treatment of firms of other Western countries which had formal diplomatic relations with the Peiping regime and had been unable to find any evidence that British firms were less favorably treated. Mr. Trevelyan evidently felt that the Western countries which had established formal diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communist regime had not been able to protect their interest in China any more effectively than had the so-called British negotiation mission.

Mr. Trevelyan said that he had discussed with members of the Chinese Communist Delegation here the question of Peiping's failure to recognize the UK. The principal justification offered by the Communist representatives for this policy is that the UK had failed to support Peiping's seating in the UN; therefore the British were "not sincere" in their recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. Trevelyan indicated that the Communists had also mentioned such matters as the handing over of CNAC and CATC planes "to Chennault" in connection with Peiping's non-recognition of the UK, but the impression conveyed is that the British position on Peiping's entry into the UN is the main consideration.

2. Peiping Foreign Policy

Mr. Trevelyan is convinced that, except for Indochina, the Chinese Communist regime is not interested in pushing forward externally for the time being but wishes to concentrate on internal developments (this is in line with views expressed by Ford of the British Delegation—see memo of conversation May 12 1). He expressed the belief that Peiping's tough talk and intransigent attitude both at the Geneva Conference and in their propaganda output is explained by the fact that the Chinese Communists are speaking primarily to an Asian audience and care little about the impression they make in the U.S. and Western Europe. Trevelyan does not believe that the Communists are disposed to bargain for admission to the UN but will continue to demand it as a right and are willing to wait indefinitely for admission rather than make concessions.

3. Internal Politics

In Trevelyan's view, the CCP's comment emphasis on "collective leadership" while reaching high into the party, even up to the Central Committee, does not affect the very highest strata. He feels that Mao Tse-tung's personal prestige and authority is stronger now than ever. He cited several recent events to support this thesis.

4. Economic Conditions

Trevelyan indicates that in conversation with Chinese Communist officials here, they have expressed great confidence in their ability to handle their economic problems. Trevelyan himself believes that the Communist regime has shown considerable flexibility in its economic policies in the sense of being able to reverse itself when a given policy proves to be ineffective or counter-productive. The Chinese Communists here have admitted to Trevelyan that there was no increase of food production in 1953, but they hope for a 6% increase in 1954. They explain the grain rationing program, which was formally introduced on January 1 though experimentally tried out as early as November 1953, in terms of the need for assuring an adequate supply of food grains to the rapidly growing urban population, particularly the industrial workers. Cadres have been sent out to explain to the peasants the need for the grain control program in these terms. Trevelyan, incidentally, quoted his local Chinese Communist contacts as saying the population of the city of Peiping is now approximately 8,000,000 and that of Shanghai is 7,000,000. Total population of the mainland is in excess of 500 million and increases at the rate of 8 to 10 million per year. This enormous annual increment to the Chinese population does not seem to worry the Communist regime, according to Trevelyan.

5. General Observations on Peiping and Environs

Trevelyan said no restrictions have been placed on his driving around the country side from Peiping. He has never been stopped on such excursions and does not know of any mileage limit imposed by the authorities. Frequently he walks in the Western hills and has never been molested. It is necessary, however, to get a permit to travel by train. He has experienced no difficulty thus far in getting a permit. In trips through villages in the environs of Peiping, Trevelyan has been impressed with the generally well-dressed and well-fed appearance of the inhabitants.

6. Impressions of Chinese Communist Delegation Members

Mr. Trevelyan says that on the whole his relations with the various members of the Chinese Communist Delegation have been pleasant and friendly. He apparently gets along best with Huan Hsiang, Ch'iao Kuan-hua and Kung Peng. On May 11 he was invited by Lei Jen-min, Vice Minister of Foreign Trade, to dinner. The guests included the four mentioned above and Huang Hua. 1 Not printed. (3961 GB/5-1154)
Minutes. Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Anthony Eden, May 14, 1954

Record No.: 206-C0055

Location: Premier Zhou’s Residence
British Participants: Anthony Eden, Harold Caccia, William D. Allen, Humphrey Trevelyan, Ford (interpreter)
Chinese Participants: Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Huan Xiang, Zhang Wenjin, Pu Shouchang (interpreter)

Eden: Thank you for allowing me to come to visit you. I have not had the opportunity to talk with you. Today I came to see you before my visit with Mr. Molotov, mainly to discuss with you as co-chairman how the conference should be carried on. I am more concerned with the Indochina issue. I am afraid that it is dangerous for everybody to be delivering speeches accusing each other. Therefore, I suggest that we have some restricted sessions to get down to actual negotiations. I have raised five questions. If you think these five questions are valid, then we can discuss them in the restricted sessions. If you think that these questions are not valid, I wonder whether there are other ways to conduct our talks.

Zhou Enlai: At the beginning of the conference, both sides need to state their positions. On the Korean question, if all sides have a common wish for the peaceful reunification of Korea, then the issue could be resolved peacefully. The Chinese delegation supports the proposal by Foreign Minister Nam Il. We are currently studying the five questions that you raised yesterday. On the Korean question, we have tried a restricted session, and we can try some more.

Eden: I’m more concerned with the Indochina question, for at least we are no longer fighting in Korea. But I agree with what you have said about trying another restricted session on the Korean question. The reason why I am concerned with the Indochina question is not because of some local problems—I’m not familiar with these problems—but because I’m afraid that the major powers would insist on their positions on the Indochina question, which would lead to dangerous situations. On this point, Mr. Eden, you know more than I do.

Eden: So far as I know, everyone wishes that the war would cease.
Zhou Enlai: Of the five questions that you raised, we are not exactly clear about one question, and that is the one regarding concentrating all troops on both sides in determined areas. I would like to ask you to explain it.

Eden: I am willing to discuss it. Our thought is to concentrate the troops on both sides in determined areas so as to avoid conflicts. These areas shall be worked out by commanders-in-chief on both sides, and then approved by our conference. This is for the purpose of avoiding conflicts.

Zhou Enlai: As I have said before, the solution to the Indochina question must be fair, reasonable and honorable for both sides. We believe that in its present position, the United Kingdom could do some more work to make both sides understand that the negotiations must be conducted on an equal basis. The current circumstances are that the other side does not think this way, and wants to impose some things on this side.

Eden: Where do you find inequality?
Zhou Enlai: That the French have not discussed the political questions of the military armistice.

Eden: Oh, you are referring to this question. On this point, both sides have some accusations.

Zhou Enlai: No, I am not referring to that. I mean that France had not answered Mr. Pham Van Dong’s political proposal, while only recognizing Bao Dai’s representing all of Vietnam and unifying Vietnam under him. This is a completely unreasonable thought.

Eden: France would like to let the members of the Associated States speak first. My understanding is that France might speak first this afternoon. We hope to achieve military armistice first and then discuss the political questions. Perhaps military armistice can be the first practical question to be discussed in the restricted sessions. The restricted sessions perhaps could be held next week, for the general debate will be continued this afternoon.

Zhou Enlai: Regarding the proposal for restricted sessions, we will have to discuss with the Soviet and Vietnamese delegations.

Eden: Certainly, certainly.
Zhou Enlai: I would like to know what your plans are of the restricted sessions.

Eden: I am thinking that besides the heads of the delegations, the sessions would consist of only two or three advisors from each delegation. No account of the proceedings would be given to the press. We tried this
method during the Berlin Conference, and it was very useful. The agreement to have the Geneva Conference was reached this way.

Zhou Enlai: On the Korean question, we have also proposed the withdrawal of foreign troops, including the Chinese People's Volunteer Army. Only so can peace and security be guaranteed.

Eden: I would like to say a few things as the British Foreign Secretary. We very much hope to see the four great powers, excuse me, I made a mistake. We very much hope to see the five great powers, that is, the United Kingdom, the United States, China, France, and the Soviet Union, would work together to decrease international tension and to conduct normal negotiations. But before this could be achieved, a resolution must be reached on the Indochina question. Indochina is important in itself, but what is more important is that this question not affect the relations among the five great powers.

Zhou Enlai: China deserves the status of a great power. This is an existing fact. We are willing to work with others for world peace, particularly for peace in Asia. But I must say candidly that this must not be made a condition.

Eden: No, I am not saying that it should be made a condition at all. I am only stating my opinion regarding this question. I am worried that Ho Chi Minh might be asking too much. He might be able to get it, but if he were to do so, it would affect the relations for the great powers.

Zhou Enlai: I think that the person who is asking too much is not Ho Chi Minh, but Bao Dai. In their proposal, the delegates from the State of Vietnam not only asked that Bao Dai be recognized as the only leader of Vietnam, but also that the United Nations guarantee Bao Dai's status as Vietnam's only leader after the elections. Ho Chi Minh has made no such demands.

Eden: What I was thinking just now is not the contents of the speech, but the thoughts behind the speech.

Zhou Enlai: I wonder if Mr. Eden has studied the proposal by Mr. Pham Van Dong. He mentioned in the proposal that before unification, both sides separately manage the areas under their respective current control. This is equal.

Eden: Our hope to concentrate the troops of both sides into determined areas means exactly this. It seems that the French proposal does not reject this point, and thus we have something in common with France on this point.

Zhou Enlai: France asked Bao Dai's representative to respond to the political section in Mr. Pham Van Dong's proposal. But his response was absurd. His response is very familiar to us. Jiang Jieshi once made such demands: one government, one leader, one army, and the rest are all to be eliminated. I believe that Mr. Allen and Mr. Trevelyan would be fully familiar with these. But we all know how Jiang Jieshi ended up.

Eden: Our wish is to reach military armistice first, and then discuss the political issues. The question of armistice could be the first practical point for discussion in the restricted sessions.

Zhou Enlai: Political issues must be discussed along with military armistice at the same time.

Eden: I would like to thank you again for allowing me to come to visit you. If you think there is anything I can do for you, I would come to visit again.

Zhou Enlai: We welcome you. If you welcome me, I will go to visit you.

Eden: Welcome. I would also like to thank you for sending your staff to talk with Mr. Trevelyan. They had a very good talk, and they both felt satisfied.

Zhou Enlai: Mr. Trevelyan raised some questions during his talk with Mr. Huan Xiang, many of which can be solved. In a few days, Mr. Huan Xiang will have a talk with Mr. Trevelyan again.

Eden: That would be great.

Zhou Enlai: We should both work to improve Sino-British relations.

Eden: Yes, and then we should bring other countries along, too.

Zhou Enlai: Yes! (pointing to Eden)

Eden: Right, that would be my task. Now I will go to meet with Mr. Molotov. I don't know if we can come up with some good ideas after our talk.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Tenth Plenary Session, May 14, 1954

Records No: 206-Y0049

Chairman Mao, Comrade Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

(I) The British and French delegations spoke for the first time yesterday at the tenth session regarding the Korean issue. Bidault and Eden not only reacted to our criticism, but also defended the United Nations and affirmed their position to the United States. In addition, Bidault made detailed proposals. He emphasized two things:

1) The unified government must be proportionally elected based on the number of citizens in both North and South Korea;

2) The elections must be monitored and certified by observers of neutral nations who have supervisory authority. The selection of members for the international supervisory body should be based on the most balanced conditions in order to guarantee the objectivity of their opinions. Only United Nations organizations are eligible to choose such observers. Elections as well as withdrawal or movement of foreign troops should also be placed under international supervision. In his speech, Bidault attacked the [North] Korean and Soviet delegations by name. However, he did not refer to China.

Eden said that the POW issue had already been resolved (we plan to let our spokesman denounce this declaration in a written statement). Afterwards he referred to the British attitude toward the Asian issue. Eden disagreed with the argument concerning “the tendency of Western countries to ignore or oppose Asian nationalist sentiment.” He boasted that India and Pakistan all decided to stay with the British Commonwealth of their own free will. Eden made five proposals on the Korean issue:

- Elections must be held. It is necessary to establish an all-Korean government;
- Elections should consider distribution of populations in both North and South;
- Elections should be based on universal adult suffrage and the secret ballot. They should be held under conditions of true freedom as soon as possible;
- The international supervision under the United Nations should be conducted by countries that are acceptable to this conference;
- Conditions that will enable foreign troops to withdraw should be created. The United Nations forces will withdraw after they achieve the establishment of peace and security in Korea. The main issues of Eden’s statement were international supervision, elections based on the distribution of population, and the subject of how to withdraw foreign troops. However, his speech was ambiguous. It is obvious that he is attempting to bargain with us.

(II) After yesterday’s meeting, Eden took the initiative in sounding us out through his secretary. He proposed coming to see me this morning at the villa. I agreed to see him. I have already consulted with the Soviet delegation about how to deal with him. I will report the result of the meeting later.

Zhou Enlai
10:00 a.m. May 14, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian, Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
SECRET


Participants: Prince Wan, Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Sarasin, Thai Ambassador to the United States
Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State
Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State

Subject: Revival of Thai Plan of June 1953 for UN Peace Observation Commission in Indochina

General Smith opened the conversation by summarizing Department's telegram to Geneva number 761. He reviewed the circumstances of last June when due to French opposition we had to reverse our position and request the Thais not to present a plan at that time. He stated that if they would now revive the petition, we would make a firm commitment to push it through the Security Council to a Soviet veto and then urgently convene the General Assembly.

Prince Wan said that he agreed in principle and that he felt his Government would agree in principle but there might be some question as to timing. He stated he strongly felt that although the 16 powers participating in the Geneva Conference represented the UN in a sense, the UN as an institution had not been brought into consideration of the Indochina question. He went on to say that neither Bidault's nor Eden's proposals for guarantees of the agreements that might be reached seemed to be within the framework of the UN, and that he had told Bidault that in his opinion the UN rather than the participants in the Conference should be the guarantor. As to timing, however, he questioned whether they had as good a case now as they had in June 1953 and that it might be advisable to wait until there was an invasion of Laos before reviving the request. The Cambodian complaint, he said, was already before the UN and at the moment they (the Thais) did not feel that there existed a threat to Thailand. However, if our intelligence had information to the contrary he would be glad to have it.

General Smith said that in his opinion the situation was more threatening now than it was last June, that there was mounting tension throughout the area, that no one knew when the attack would come or where and it was highly desirable to have the POC on the ground before the event, if possible, rather than afterwards. Time was of the essence as it would necessarily take time to get action by the Assembly. General Smith pointed out that the Russian tactic here at Geneva is to bypass the UN and he agreed with Prince Wan that the UN should be brought back into the situation as involving one of its primary responsibilities to preserve the peace. He said he thought that Thailand was the best country to ask for POC since it was an experienced and independent UN member. Prince Wan seemed impressed by these observations and said Ambassador Sarasin was leaving for Bangkok Sunday night and would discuss the matter with the Prime Minister. Prince Wan added that the composition of the POC had not been particularly considered last June, but in view of the experience in Korea was it not probable that Russia would attempt to load the commission with Communists or Communist sympathizers. General Smith replied that he thought we had strength enough in the UN to prevent the success of such a move and that we had in mind such countries as Pakistan, India, Uruguay, New Zealand and Sweden. General Smith asked Prince Wan's approval to discuss the proposal with the British and the French and Prince Wan agreed.

General Smith then referred to the conversation he had on yesterday with Ambassador Sarasin with reference to measures for strengthening Thai armed forces and asked Prince Wan about the offer of bases in Thailand for the free world attributed to the Thai Chief of Staff. Wan said he had no official knowledge of such an offer but realized the desirability of defensive air base facilities. General Smith stated that if Thailand is willing to grant such bases, it might be desirable to negotiate agreements now for a fighter wing base which he thought would greatly increase the strength of Thailand's position. Prince Wan said he would consult with his Government.

906.1 GE/5-1954: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 15, 1954—1 p. m.

Sec/215. Repeated information Paris 286; Saigon 75. Re: Paragraph 2, Sec/209. Following is unofficial translation letter delivered about midnight last night to Eden and Molotov (as Co-Chairmen Indochina Conference) by Bidault:

Mr. Chairman: On May 10 the Geneva Conference, basing its action on a letter of Mr. Nguyen Quoc Dinh and on a declaration of

1 Dated May 14, p. 806.
Mr. Pham Van Dong on the same day, gave its agreement in principle to the evacuation of the wounded from the former fortress of Dien Bien Phu. 2

The French Commander-In-Chief immediately got in touch with General Vo Nguyen Giap in order to arrange the practical steps in this evacuation.

"During the meeting which was held at Dien Bien Phu on May 14 it was noted that the first group of wounded designated by General Vo Nguyen Giap, that is to say 450 men, included no Vietnamese.

"It was made clear, however, in the declaration published on this subject by the Viet Minh delegation on the evening of May 10 that the Viet Minh command would not make any discrimination among the wounded based on considerations of race or nationality. Furthermore a new demand which was made by the representatives of General Vo Nguyen Giap. This in effect would have subjected the evacuation of the wounded to the condition that during the entire duration of this operation, which in view of the state of the terrain would have required about a fortnight, Provincial route number 41 should not be the object of any military action. No parallel can be established between the operation of evacuating the wounded from Dien Bien Phu, which has no military consequences, and the neutralization of the only major route existing in the area. This prolonged neutralization would have in effect permit major troop movements of such a nature as to modify profoundly the military situation in North Vietnam.

"I would therefore be most grateful if you would communicate the foregoing on a basis of extreme urgency to Mr. Pham Van Dong so that he may intervene with the Viet Minh command in order that the measures which shall be taken to evacuate the wounded may conform to the letter and spirit of the decision of the Conference."

"Please accept, Mr. Chairman, the assurances of my very high consideration."

SMITH

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The United States Delegation to the Department of State

Geneva, May 15, 1954—3 p. m.

Secto 219. Repeated information Saigon 77, Paris 272. Reference Secto 209, repeated Paris 265, Saigon 73, 1 and Secto 215 repeated Paris 268 and Saigon 75, 2 Following is text of letter from Smith to Molotov as "Co-Chairman, Geneva Conference on Indochina" transmitted this morning. Letter to Eden is identical except for substitution of "Mr. Molotov" for "you" in first and last sentences paragraph 2, and "Mr. Molotov" for "Mr. Eden" in last paragraph:

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1 Dated May 14, p. 506.
2 Dated May 15, supra.

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The United States Delegation to the Department of State

Geneva, May 15, 1954—3 p. m.

SECRET


"Excellency: It is with surprise that the US delegation has learned that the Viet Minh Military Command apparently is attempting to establish extraordinary conditions for the removal of the wounded from Dien Bien Phu. Most of these brave men have suffered under intolerable conditions for many weeks. I have shared the general hope that following the discussion of this matter at the plenary session on Indochina last Monday there would be no further obstacles to the prompt evacuation of all the wounded of General De Castries' command at Dien Bien Phu.

"When I spoke with you after our session on May 10th I raised the question of the interpretation of the Viet Minh statement. I said that I assumed it covered all of the wounded at Dien Bien Phu regardless of whether they were members of the French Expeditionary Corps or of the Vietnamese National Army, and also regardless of whether they were French or Vietnamese or belonged to other nationalities. It was my understanding that you had reached the same conclusion and that Mr. Chou En-lai likewise had made the same interpretation.

"I am informed that there are no Vietnamese among the Viet group designated for release. I thought it had been made clear that there should be no racial or national discrimination.

"Apart from the foregoing, I have also been informed that Viet Minh Command's representatives are apparently attempting to establish irrelevant conditions for the release of the wounded which would have the effect of giving marked military advantages to their side.

"I earnestly hope that you may find it possible immediately to bring the foregoing to the attention of the Viet Minh representatives here to the end that arrangements made by the Viet Minh Command for the evacuation of the wounded be in full accord with the letter and the spirit of the decisions made by our conference.

"I am transmitting a similar letter to Mr. Eden as Co-Chairman of our conference. (Signed) Walter B. Smith."

No public release of letter will be made until French decide whether and when release their letter.

SMITH

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1 In a letter to Smith, May 15, Molotov replied as follows: "I have received your letter of May 15 concerning the evacuation of the seriously wounded from Dien Bien Phu. Somewhat earlier I had received a letter on this same question from the Head of the French Delegation which I have today answered. I am sending you a copy of my reply to M. Bidault in which the question which interested you are dealt with." (Conferences files, lot 60 D 627, CF 393) See telegram Secto 224, May 16, p. 817.
and Secto 201, May 13, repeated Paris 287, Saigon 66 and London 161. Eden, Bidault and I have discussed tactics for Monday's restricted session on Indochina which will be devoted principally to answers to Eden's questions.

During discussion Eden stated Chou En-lai had yesterday told him Viet Minh proposal indicated their agreement on Eden's first question. I warned against anything that could become de facto partition and suggested we concentrate first on separating out Laotian and Cambodian questions. Bidault agreed and thought Commie case weak on this point. On Vietnam, he maintained we must do everything possible to avoid simple line across country which would cost us North Vietnam. He thought Commies would continue firm on having political settlement before military one and that this left no alternative but to continue "casting iron dice" (shooting). Political settlement at this time would mean loss of whole country and French had not fought eight years for that.

In response to my question as to who would be responsible authority outside delimited areas, Bidault mentioned possibility international supervision, principles of which he observed Molotov had not rejected. I pointed out Soviet concept of effective supervision very different from ours and advised them of second letter of Swiss and Swedes asking to be relieved of their obligations on Korean mission since Commie members prevented them accomplishing task. I asked whether we were agreed there should be UN supervision. Bidault said it should be UN but he would not exclude some other set-up if satisfactory alternative could be found. Eden said we must avoid Korean set-up of two and two. We agreed to discuss this further in light of results Monday when Commies might show more of their hand in restricted session and that we would make every effort to draw them out on all points in Eden's questionnaire.

Eden anticipated battle over separating Laos and Cambodia with Commies again proposing admission of ghost governments. Bidault felt their case on this ridiculous and that more they pushed more they would hurt themselves with French opinion. I suggested that Commie insinuence on this would show they did not want settlement. Bidault felt there would be difficulties with Vietnamese over delimiting areas and that we should first seek agreement that military settlement must come before political. I remarked it would be impossible to have political settlement while fighting continued and Eden said Western insistence on this would put Commies in position of being ones who are preventing cessation of hostilities.

We agreed first item should be Dien Bien Phu wounded, second separation Laotian and Cambodian cases from Vietnam and third principle that military settlement must precede political one. Eden will be in chair. We are coordinating this afternoon first with British and French and subsequently with Associated States.

SMITH

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 285

Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith):" SECRET


Subject: Restricted meeting on Indochina to be held Monday, May 17th.

After discussion of such details as the room, provision of interpreters, number of experts (3) and etc., following tentative procedure was agreed to at a tripartite meeting called this afternoon by Ambassador Chauvel:

1) Eden as chairman will call on Bidault to discuss the question of the wounded at Dien Bien Phu. Bidault will rehearse his own letter to Molotov and Molotov's reply and will then ask the Vietminh Delegation for their views on how to proceed to expedite this matter. (Bidault is favorably impressed by the Molotov letter which strikes him as favorable in substance, i.e., no discrimination between French and Vietnamese and generally conciliatory and courteous in tone.) Bidault may also ask whether there is any news about the nurse, the only French woman in the Dien Bien Phu garrison.

2) Eden will then bring up the matter of his five questions and will ask Bidault if he has any further comment he would like to make.

3) Bidault will then ask if there is agreement on the separation of the problems of Laos and Cambodia from the problem of Viet-Nam. If agreement on this principle can be obtained, Bidault will suggest the appointment of separate working committees containing representatives of all the delegations to endeavor to give form and content to practical solutions for Laos and Cambodia respectively. Perhaps the

1 Drafted by Bonsel.
2 Contained in telegram Secto 188, May 12, p. 776.
Minute of the Meeting of Wang Jiaxiang, Pham Van Dong and Gromyko, 5:00 p.m., May 15, 1954

Following the instructions of Molotov and Zhou Enlai, Gromyko, Pham Van Dong, Wang Jiaxiang and others met at the residence of the Soviet delegation.

Gromyko: Next week the secret meeting on the Indochina issue will be convened. We should consider how to go about this meeting. Both the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and France suggested that cease-fire issue be included. How should we discuss this issue? Regarding the procedure of the meeting, what is Comrade Pham’s view?

Pham: Will Eden be chairman next Monday?

Gromyko: Yes, the problem is how to proceed the discussion. Will it be based on our proposal or the French proposal? The French proposal does not include political solution, and is limited to military solution, but our proposal is comprehensive.

Wang: France does not like to present its view of political solution to the Indochina issue. I think that we can start discussion with the cease-fire issue, but we will not withdraw our view of political solution.

Gromyko: We should exchange our views, and ascertain our common positions, and it would be better to get them written down.

Wang: It seems that we can discuss point by point, and then incorporate additional views.

Gromyko and Pham: That will be fine.

Wang: The first is concerned with the French request of the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and Laos. See if the following answer is fine: although there are wars, the Vietnamese people’s armies are not there. So there is no issue of military withdrawal. Only Cambodian and Laotian own armies are there.

Gromyko: If France insisted that the Vietnamese troops withdraw from Cambodia and Laos, then Vietnam might officially declare that there are no Vietnamese troop in those countries. Of course, this issue does not exist.

Pham: Our declaration has already mentioned it.

Gromyko: It is necessary to make it clear once more and provide a more complete and comprehensive answer.

Kuznetsov: It is fine to remind them once more, lest they forget.

Pham: All right. If it is deemed necessary, we can mention it again. I think that the answer will be provided by the Vietnamese delegation leader’s proclamation.

Wang: I remember that the Vietnamese News Agency, probably last April, mentioned that Vietnamese volunteers were fighting in Cambodia and Laos.

Hoang Van Noan: I said that among Cambodian and Laotian troops there were Vietnamese volunteers.

Gromyko: If somebody talks about the volunteer, how should Comrade Pham deal with the issue?

Pham: My answer will be very clear. There are no volunteers sent by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Venglasov (name needs to be checked): If the French quoted the Vietnamese News Agency, what should we do?

Pham: We said that there were Vietnamese in Cambodian and Laotian troops, but those Vietnamese were Cambodian and Laotian nationals. They joined the armies there. It seems to me that that is the only answer we can offer. I think that the enemy cannot name the troop’s designations and the volunteers’ names.

Gromyko: I agreed to this answer.

Pham: I think that we will do our best to avoid this issue.

Gromyko: Of course. We will not broach this issue ourselves. Let’s move to the second point, which deals with the importance of considering the political issue and the cease-fire issue at the same time.
Pham: Should we insist on discussing both issues at the same time?

Gromyko: Both issues should be discussed at the same time. We have another option: first reach agreement on political issue, and then negotiate specific conditions of the cease fire. At the next Monday meeting, we will insist on the first option, but we should be careful - not to mention the other option accidentally.

Wang: How to make specific arrangements? We should imagine that the opposite side may want to negotiate the cease fire first, and then convene another meeting to deal with political solution, as in the Korean War. If that is case, what should we do?

Gromyko: If the opposite side made the suggestion, we should not answer then immediately, but declare that we will consider the possibility. I think that this would be better than to turn down the discussion of political solution.

Wang: It seems that Bidault hinted in his speech.

Pham: Yes, he seemed to have done so.

Pham: I think that we should insist on the first option.

Gromyko: Comrade Wang, do you have any comments and suggestion on the second point?

Wang: Politically, this view is right, but we should consider it according to changing situations.

Gromyko: The third deals with neutral states' monitoring. What is your opinion?

Wang: This is clear. Both China and Vietnam supported Molotov's proclamation. Regarding the participants, it is possible to mention Poland, Czechoslovakia, India, and Indonesia, and the other side may replace Indonesia by Pakistan, or may want to add Pakistan.

Gromyko: We have talked about this issue for a long time. Yesterday, Zhou Enlai and Molotov did talk about it. I remember the four countries are Poland, Czechoslovakia, India and Pakistan.

Wang: Yes, you are right. Before I came here, Comrade Zhou Enlai asked me to consult you about the option of replacing Pakistan by Indonesia, and in the future negotiation we can make concession, either replacing Indonesia by Pakistan or adding Pakistan.

Gromyko: The fourth issue deals with the guaranteeing issue. What are your opinions?

Pham: None but the French have mentioned this issue.

Wang: Bao Dai once mentioned the guaranteeing means guaranteeing his sovereignty, but what we mean is the guaranteeing of the cease fire.

Gromyko: We can discard Bao Dai's idea. So much for the fourth point. The fifth point deals with the cease fire and its preconditions. This is the most important issue.

Pham: Should we discuss this issue in principle or in detail?

Gromyko: The specific issues will be discussed by the representatives of both sides.

Comrade Ho Chi Minh has mentioned it before.

Gromyko: This proposal is similar to the French one. France has also proposed that negotiations should be conducted by the commanders-in-chief of the both sides on the spot.

Gromyko: I think that it is all right to negotiate on the spot or at Geneva. We have not mentioned anything new.

Wang: It depends on the situation of the meetings.

Pham: France suggested that the two commanders-in-chief should negotiate first and then report the results to the meeting.

Wang: This proposal seems to exclude other participants of the Geneva conference.

Gromyko: Yes. During the negotiation, other participants will not participate. It is not certain what will happen later.

Wang: The French delegate said in the first speech that it would be up to the commanders-in-chief to ascertain adjustment areas, but said in the second
speech that it would be up to the meeting to decide.

Gromyko: According to the instructions of Ho Chi Minh it is up to the both sides to negotiate, because at the Geneva conference, the odds are 6 to 3, but over there they are 1 to 1.

Wang: The most important issue among the preconditions is the cease fire line and concentration areas for the troops.

Kuznetsov: Does Comrade Wang have any specific ideas on this issue? It is not to our advantage to discuss it at this meeting, because the other side enjoys majority.

Pham: The direct negotiation is to our advantage. France opposes it, demanding guaranteeing and international monitoring. As long as the meeting agrees, it's principle to let both sides to conduct negotiations, the specific conditions are flexible.

Gromyko: If the other side opposes, we can think another way.

Pham: I agree.

Gromyko: The sixth deals with American intervention. This is also an agreed guideline.

Gromyko: The seventh point deals with disbanding informal troops. This is unacceptable.

Pham: France paid lots of attention to this issue.

Gromyko: Of course.

Wang: Besides formal troops, and guerrillas, there are militia.

Gromyko: We are certain that we oppose disbanding the informal troops, but the problem is how to say it. On this issue, Comrade Pham should give more consideration.

Wang: If peace, independence, unity and democracy of Indochina, the principles mentioned by Comrade Pham, are guaranteed, this issue will not exist.

Gromyko: Yes.

Pham: France should take responsibility for their own matters in their areas.

Kuznetsov: The issue is who is to disband the troops.

Pham: We will study this issue, and France pays lots of attention to this issue. What they fear most is the guerrilla. If the guerrillas survive, the French will find it difficult to deal with them. Pham: I am still not sure how we should put forward these points next Monday.

Gromyko: At the next Monday's meeting, we may talk about them, or may not talk about all of them.

Kuznetsov: All kinds of problems may crop up.

Gromyko: We may only talk about the issues related to the cease fire, but anyway we should make all preparations.

Pham: Who should put forth these issues, we or the Soviet comradess?

Gromyko: All our three delegations can talk about them, because we had talked about these issues before. We do not have to talk about them separately.

Wang: At the secret meeting, all speeches are not long, so we can talk about them in a complementary way.

Gromyko: There are three issues. The issue involving the guaranteeing and monitoring commission can be raised by the Soviet comradess. The third issue -- American intervention -- can be raised by China, because China is Vietnam's neighbor.

Pham: Is it not better to let Vietnam to raise the issue on intervention?

Gromyko: It is politically to our advantage to let China raise it, because what concerns China most is the American intervention in Vietnam.

Wang: Let's accept the suggestion right now, and all depend on the future situation.

Gromyko: Any other questions? You can either raise it now or later.

Hoang: Will we have secret meetings from now on?

Gromyko: Next Monday we will have a secret meeting, but this does not mean that we will not have an open session.

Hoang: Shall we openly express our attitude toward Bau Dai's proposal,
because this is good for us to win the support of the Vietnamese and French peoples?

Wang: I think that we should prepare to talk about it, and at the same time refute and lay bare France, its “political achievements” of ruling the Indochina before World War II, its breach of the 1946 agreement, and its invasion of Vietnam. We should also refute Bao Dai’s speech on opposing the partition of Vietnam.

Gromyko: Regarding Bao Dai, it is ideal for Comrade Pham to talk.

Wang: Of course.

Hoang: I think that this speech should point out Bao Dai's conspiracy to sabotage the Geneva meeting.

Gromyko: We should.

Pham: Bao Dai speaks for the Americans.

Gromyko: Like Syngman Rhee on the Korean issue.

Kuznetsov: Bao Dai has two masters.

Pham: It would be better to reveal Bisdault's attitude.

Gromyko: In principle it is necessary, but we should consider how to do it.

Wang: Bao Dai has two masters: the US and France. Syngman Rhee only has the US as his master.

Gromyko: Any other ideas?

All: No.
direction if they believe we are giving them a considerable measure of confidence. There will be disagreements and we will be obliged at times to tell them that we are going ahead whether they agree or not, but I think they would infinitely prefer this to be surprised with a press story.  

SMITH

*The Department of State in telegram 2635, May 17, instructed Under Secretary Smith that as the result of newspaper stories "we are informing British and ANZUS Ambassadors of general terms of the talks with France." The Department asked Smith to report "urgently any specific points in Tefeld 54 (telegram 4624 to Paris, May 11) which you did not cover with Eden." (751.00/6/1814) Smith's reply is contained in telegram Dulte 50, May 17, not printed. (Conference files, 605 D 527, CF 245)

Under Secretary Smith reported to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 50, May 17, that Eden had recommended to Churchill that he treat lightly in Parliament press reports of French-U.S. talks on U.S. intervention in Indo China, Eden "suggesting Prime Minister say that talks had not yet begun, that there had been eight slips in British not being informed such talks were in contemplation and that they had now been informed, that Eden was satisfied, and that he was sure they would come to be kept informed." Smith recommended that "we must continue to keep them informed and Eden would prefer that it be done here while he is here." (751.00/6/1814)

364.1 GB/5-1834: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, May 15, 1954—8 p.m.

Secto 228. Repeated information Saigon 70, Paris 273. Reference Saigon telegram to Geneva 96, repeated information Department 2572. Hoth, Achillies and Bonsal discussed with Chaumel, Roux and Cheysson of the French delegation today, the deteriorating political situation in Vietnam and the advisability of Bao Dai's returning to take over the reins of government. The French said that their reports noted political deterioration, but thought the answer was for Prime Minister Buu Loc to return forthwith to Saigon. They were inclined to doubt that Bao Dai's return would immediately change the situation for the better. In any case, they felt it very important, from their point of view, that Bao Dai stay in the neighborhood of delegation in Geneva as otherwise the Vietnamese delegation would hold up decisions and discussions at every point while they awaited instructions from Bao Dai. The Vietnamese delegation has firm instructions to take no position without prior authorization from Bao Dai.

SMITH

1 For summary of telegram 2372 from Saigon, May 13, see footnote 5, p. 800.
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, May 15, 1954—9 p.m.

Secrecy 225. Repeated information Paris 275, Saigon 81, London 187, Moscow 73, Phnom Penh and Vientiane unnumbered. Department passed Defense. Following are comments Molotov and Bidault speech fourth Indochina plenary yesterday:

(1) Molotov gave four-point program which he said was summary Viet Minh proposal. Comparison shows USSR four points (with one additional sentence which Molotov added) cover in brief form first seven points Viet Minh proposal, as well as most of Viet Minh point eight (which provided for cessation hostilities as condition precedent for other seven and which vaguely outlined controls for cease-fire). Soviets do not repeat Viet Minh reference to "settlement of territories and of areas occupied" given in second sentence point eight Viet Minh plan, which presumably covers regrouping concept also found in French plan.

Supplement to Viet Minh proposal importance of which Molotov stressed was in fact, substitution for Viet Minh plan for mixed commissions comprising belligerents only (paragraph eight C). USSR proposed "setting up of a neutral nations supervisory commission shall be provided for in the agreement."

Portion Molotov speaking various proposals already submitted and Soviet comments thereon was characterized by ostensibly conciliatory approach. He did not refer to Vietnamese plan (Sectio 193) at all, but stated drawback of French proposal was it did not deal with political problems which was inseparable from military stressing possibility any purely military settlement. French, of course, had indicated Vietnamese should take lead on proposing political settlements, but Vietnamese recommendations would doubtless be completely unacceptable to Soviets. He said no cessation hostilities should be just "shrewdly-arranged respite". On guarantees question, Molotov agreed idea nine States participating conference would be guarantors, but rejected French concept individual guarantees and spoke only of "collective measures" to implement guarantees. He expressed hope other delegations would also comment on French plan which he said was "an important proposal". Thus Soviets gave some appearance conciliatory approach to French plan.

Molotov also said Soviet delegation would reply to Eden's five points at later date.

[Signature]

1 Dated May 12, p. 705.

MAY 16, 1954

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, May 16, 1954—9 a.m.

Secrecy 228. Repeated information London 171, Limit distribution. Eden spoke to me briefly regarding call he had time his call on Chou En-lai morning May 14. Also gave Johnson detailed account Saturday and let him read in summary conversation made following meeting during which no notes were taken.

Allen stated to you very reserved and formal, unbending only slightly toward end of meeting. Eden opened by stating he wished first to co-chairman Indochina phase discuss how conference could get down to negotiations, particularly on Indochina and suggested...
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Requesting Instructions on the Korean Issue and Regarding the Situation at the Fourth Plenary Session on the Indochina Issue, May 15, 1954

Records No: 206-Y0049

Chairman Mao, Comrade Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

(1) Eden came to see me in the morning yesterday. He mostly wanted to gauge my opinion on the Indochina issue and said that he hoped to hold a restricted session. I did not answer his five questions on the Indochina issue directly except to give my support to Pham Van Dong's proposals. I simply asked him indirectly to explain what he meant by "all forces should be concentrated in the determined areas." He said that it meant that troops of both sides should be withdrawn to areas determined by their respective commanders, and that this plan should then be ratified by the Geneva Conference. I therefore replied that Britain does have a plan to delimit the country. However, it is still not clear that the British want to delimit the country between North and South, or to handle Haiphong differently. Nevertheless, it is obvious that France and the United States do not want to withdraw from the Red River Delta. I have already cabled the summary of my conversation with Eden separately. I agreed to hold a restricted session after consulting with the Soviet, Chinese and Vietnamese delegations.

(2) Molotov spoke first at the fourth session on the Indochina issue this afternoon. He attacked both Bidault's misrepresentation of history and Bao Dai's legal status, and supported Pham Van Dong's statement on anti-colonial rule and colonial war. The main point of Molotov's speech was to make the commission of neutral nations' supervision of the armistice a supplementary proposal. He said that he could not completely agree to the international guarantee stated in France's proposal. Specifically, he agreed to guarantee only the collective consultation and collective action, but refused to agree to individual actions. Please refer to TASS's broadcasts to see the full text of Molotov's speech. Bidault and the Laotian delegation also made speeches at the session. Bidault still behaved like a colonialist. He refused to recognize the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and expressed his support to Bao Dai and the Kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos. Although Bidault still repeated his unreasonable arguments, his tone was relatively milder than on the two previous occasions he spoke. He accepted Pham's basic position on peace, independence, unification and democracy. However, he said that all these had already been accomplished. Bidault also responded one by one to Pham Van Dong's eight proposals besides explaining three of his own. Bidault said that France had already recognized Vietnam's autonomy and independence throughout the country as well as the independence of Cambodia and Laos. Cambodia and Laos had already signed agreements with France and became members of the federation. Therefore, Pham Van Dong's first and fourth points became unnecessary. Concerning Pham's second point, Bidault said that French troops in a country which is an ally of France cannot be considered as typical "foreign" troops. However, France, on the advice of interested governments should be prepared to recall its own forces if invading troops will also be withdrawn. Bidault believed that the Laotian and Cambodian issues could be resolved simply by withdrawing the Vietminh (Vietnamese Allied) troops. However, he argued that in discussions the Laos and Cambodia issues should be separated from the Vietminh issue. Regarding Pham's third point, Bidault said that elections must be supervised. A political solution will only be possible after a military settlement. The process of negotiating a political solution will only delay the implementation of a military settlement. On Pham's fifth point, Bidault stated that since Vietnam had already consulted with France about the economic and cultural interests of France in Vietnam, these will never be conditions to concluding hostilities.

Bidault agreed to the sixth and seventh points that Pham raised. On the eighth point, Bidault said that 8(a) was ambiguous since it did not clarify whether or not the agreement on political conditions should be reached before the armistice. He emphasized that the ceasefire in Vietnam should be extended gradually from one region to another to reach a complete armistice. Bidault stated that Pham's proposals on concentration areas (for stationing troops) and readjustment areas are basically the same with the first point of the first section of the French proposal. Regarding the armistice in Laos, Bidault believed that it wouldn't be a problem as long as the Vietminh withdraw their troops. He pointed out that 8(b), on transporting weapons across the border, needs more and clearer regulations. On 8(c), on the issue of supervision, Bidault believed that international supervision is essential. Bidault also said that it was obvious that the Soviet delegation made the same argument in their speeches. He then proposed to disarm the irregular forces and once again raised the issue of the guarantee of all these ensured by participants of the Geneva Conference. The speech of the Cambodian delegation still focused on the same old story of the withdrawal of the Vietminh troops. It was announced at the end that there will be no meeting on the 15th, and a restricted session on the Indochina issue will be held next Monday.

(3) In yesterday's meeting, Molotov took the initiative and proposed to let the commission of neutral nations supervise the armistice. His speech had a great impact on the meeting and was believed to have carried the meeting one step forward. Eden's visits to the Chinese and Soviet delegations and the agreement on
holding a restricted session on the Indochina issue were also regarded as real progress. Thus the general discussion of the last three weeks finished. Discussions on substantial problems will start next week.

(4) The Chinese and Soviet delegations exchanged opinions on the Indochina issue after the meeting. We also decided to prepare to discuss on the 15th and 16th what is in common and what is different in both sides' plans. We will also discuss what part can be agreed to and what part should be held or worked on. I will report the result after the discussions.

(5) After the meeting between the Soviet, Korean and Chinese delegations, we concluded that the current situation on the Korean issue is this: it will come to a deadlock if our counterparts cannot make new proposals except to repeatedly emphasize elections based on distribution of populations under the supervision of the United Nations, and the withdrawal of the United Nations forces after achieving peace and security in Korea. As the next steps, we plan to make a compromise on the international supervision on elections. We will agree to let neutral nations supervise the elections, but not the United Nations. In addition, we will also emphasize two things: first, although we agree to let the neutral nations supervise the elections, these must be held after the withdrawal of foreign troops. Second, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) should be organized to supervise the elections and to prevent interference by domestic terror groups only after the all-Korean commission, in which both Koreas consult as equals, drafts an election law. This compromise can carry the meeting one step forward. However, we presume that our counterparts will make no concessions on the issue of equal rights. We plan to let the Chinese delegation propose this compromise. We would like to request the central committee's instructions on whether or not to raise the issue about neutral nations' supervision on the Korean elections and also how to raise this issue.

Zhou Enlai
May 15, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
(2) Bidault's speech was point-by-point refutation Viet Minh proposal. He first isolated problems Laos and Cambodia and then refuted in detail Viet Minh proposals as applied to Vietnam (see 121). For first time in plenary session, Bidault indicated French willingness withdraw troops from Laos and Cambodia under certain conditions.

Bidault statement did not disavow any of points previously made in French proposal submitted first plenary session. He did stress political settlement should follow military settlement and that discussion former should not delay latter. This may cause some difficulties with Vietnamese who, of course, emphasize inter-relationship two problems. Bidault did admit tie exists between two, but said political settlement would be consequence not preconception of military settlement.

In replying to Eden question on point number five, Bidault reiterated France had originally proposed international controls and said France "was prepared examine all proposals which might be made concerning the composition of commissions and the methods of control". He added, principle international control accepted, appropriate mixed group could be established by common agreement and operating under international authority. This is slight though probably significant modification French position as tabled first plenary session.

In general, Bidault gave impression that although talking to Viet Minh proposal his objective was refutation and France rejected Viet Minh plan as basis for discussion.

SMITH

MAY 16, 1954

396.1 GE/5-1954: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, MAY 16, 1954—9 a.m.

Secto 228. Repeated information London 171. Limit distribution. Eden spoke to me briefly regarding talk he had time his call on Chou En-lai morning May 14. Allen gave Johnson detailed account Saturday and let him read UK's summary conversation made following meeting during which no notes were taken.

Allen stated Chou very reserved and formal, unbending only slightly toward end of meeting. Eden opened by stating he wished first as co-chairman Indochina phase discuss how conference could get down to negotiations, particularly on Indochina and suggested
possibility restricted sessions next week. Chou responded with formal style statement that if everyone wanted peace, solution could be found that would be "honorable, fair and reasonable by both sides". Chou stated he had studied Eden's questions on Indochina as well as Eden's points on Korea and would discuss restricted Indochina sessions with USSR and Viet Minh. Stated China supports North Korea and Viet Minh views and complained French had not answered Viet Minh political proposal, leaving political questions to Vietnam.

Eden then stated that as Foreign Secretary he wanted to do what he could to decrease tension between "five great powers", and a settlement was necessary to achieve this. Chou responded by referring to preamble recent Chinese Communist agreement with India on Tibet which set forth principles Chinese Communist foreign policy, that is, mutual non-aggression and peaceful co-existence. Chou then stated China wished to obtain recognition as a great power but "was not making this a condition for any settlement".

Eden then referred to dangers if Ho Chi Minh persisted in asking too much. He might feel that he could get it, and he "might even be able to get it", however wider considerations should be borne in mind or position could become dangerous. Chou responded by terming "Bao Dai's" proposals as unrealistic and his claims to absolute authority throughout Indochina as "absurd" as position taken by Chiang Kai-shek during the Civil War in China. He added that far eastern experts like Dennis Allen and Trevelyan who were present, would be fully familiar with the situation that had existed in China.

Eden suggested it would be better to discuss military aims to which Chou asked for explanation Eden's first question. Eden replied that if the fighting were to be stopped it would be necessary that the forces both sides be disengaged, and this would require some redeployment on their part. Chou said he could see that this might well be first point for discussion and would start situation.

Chou then made statement with regard to necessity both countries working for improvement of relations, implication being China would do little toward normalizing relations with UK until there was change in UK attitudes toward Communist China.

Eden then mentioned conversations between Trevelyan and Huan Hsiang, upon which Chou indicated he was closely following their conversations and giving detailed instructions to Huan Hsiang. Eden then stated it is important both countries also "bring other countries along too", to which Chou replied that it was in main British who could do this.

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Allen characterized conversation as not offering much hope any change Chinese Communist attitudes or policies.

Eden told me that while term UN was never mentioned in conversation, implication he drew from Chou's remarks and general approach was that Chou was asking obliquely whether if Chinese behaved would be admitted to UN. Eden said he made it very clear this was not a question to be handled by "deals", and that he was not making a proposal of any kind.

He also told me that just before leaving he had said he must add a word of caution about pushing the US too far—that we were "slow starters" but that when we did start we went all the way. This is not reflected in the memorandum.

SMITH

Conference Address, lot 60 D-852, CP 55:
Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heatley) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith): 1

SECRET.


Subject: French request concerning your visit to Bao Dai.

Ambassador Chauvel this morning showed a member of the U.S. Delegation a telegram from French Commissioner General Dejean in Saigon.

The telegram was concerned principally with the very bad reaction to the Secretary's press conference remarks on May 11 to the effect that Indochina was not indispensable to the defense of Southeast Asia. Dejean felt that this statement had destroyed the last French-Vietnamese trump at Geneva, the threat of U.S. intervention in Indochina. This feeling was strengthened by the fact that Secretary Wilson, General Van Fleet and General Hull were not planning to visit Indochina during the next tours of the area. However, Dejean understands that Secretary Wilson now intends to stop in Indochina.

With a view toward lessening the tension to the Secretary's remarks, Ambassador Chauvel (speaking, I understand for Bidault) asked if you could tell Bao Dai that the U.S. position on Indochina has not changed, that we still consider it the key defense of Southeast Asia, and that we are not planning to let it go to the Communists.

Ambassador Chauvel also said that M. Bidault agreed that Bao Dai should not come back to Viet-Nam for a week or ten days, since his absence would paralyze the Vietnamese Delegation. M. Bidault does feel

1 Reference to discussions on Sino-British relations between members of the Chinese and British Delegations at Geneva. For an outline of these discussions, see p. 506.

2 Drafted by Genz.

For summary of the Secretary's press conference, see footnote 1, p. 772.
After saying that you might inquire as to the plans and prospects for building a stronger and more efficient government and army capable of arousing unified national support. This is a first meeting so should not, I feel, start taking him sternly to task for his deficiencies as a ruler. He is still the best trump we have. But in discussing his willingness to do or say anything which would help us to keep him we can get across our thought that marked improvement in the performance of his Government and himself is necessary.

MAY 17, 1954

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 285

Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)

SECRET

A meeting of the Six was held this morning:

1) Ambassador Chauvel explained that there would be no press conferences after the meetings and that only jointly agreed communiqués were issued.

2) With regard to the Dien Bien Phu wounded, Bidault will review the situation in the light of latest developments including possibility that negotiations between the high commands in the field have broken off. Bidault will also ask for news of prisoners.

3) Bidault will then take up the Eden questions and endeavor to ascertain whether agreement can be reached on (a) separate and rapid consideration of the problems of Cambodia and Laos, and (b) priority over political problems for cessation of hostilities with appropriate guarantees and international supervision.

4) In the event that an agreement is reached on the question of Laos and Cambodia, Bidault will suggest the constitution of a special committee to deal with the problems and to report back to the Conference (the Cambodians insist that separate committees be appointed for Cambodia and for Laos but are willing to defer taking their stand on this point under the principle of separate treatment for the two countries is accepted by the other side).

5) If the priority of working out a satisfactory cessation of hostilities is accepted, Bidault would plan to suggest (probably not today) that the military commands in the field, i.e., the Franco-Vietnamese command and the Vietminh command be asked to designate officers who would come to Geneva and would here endeavor to work out a detailed proposal for the regrouping of forces for submission to the Conference.

1 Drafted by Bonsal.

6) There was some discussion of a Vietnamese proposal that there should be requested a cessation by both sides of military operations of any importance during the current negotiations. It was agreed that this proposal presents many difficulties and should not be made without a great deal of careful further study.

201 GE/5/1754 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 17, 1954—1 p.m.

Secto 252. Repeated information London 172, Paris 280, Moscow 73, Saigon 84, S/S-R pass Defense and CIA. Reference Secto 212. We believe Molotov’s speech most significant Communist pronouncement thus far in conference. Whatever may lie behind speech in terms Moscow-Peking relations, speech itself represents Moscow decision to take open initiative re Indochina question along following lines:

1. After presenting what they may feel is strong case from Communist viewpoint re “just” character Ho Chi Minh was against legitimate authorities Indochina, Soviets have through Molotov issued warning against intervention in Indochina or continuing US efforts to organize collective security front SEA. Speech includes significant statement that “establishing new American military bases in this region . . . cannot be regarded indifferently by those states, the security of which is affected by plans to create the above-mentioned bloc” (reference is to “new military bloc” in SEA). No doubt one purpose this threat is to provoke US reaction to enable Communists better to determine our intentions.

2. Latter part Molotov’s speech in marked contrast with foregoing and obviously intended represent constructive negotiating attitude re French proposal for guarantee by Geneva powers and British concept role for SOA Colombo powers.

3. By threatening as to consequences of US intervention through “united action” and simultaneously holding out hopes regarding possible modification of Communist demands re Indochina Molotov is treating French and British to familiar Soviet carrot and whip technique. Message intended is that if they will disassociate themselves from US strength and leadership, they will find Soviets not unreasonable regarding their interests in Indochinese settlement. Worth noting that Molotov makes “full termination of movement into Indo-

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1 Dated May 14, p. 786.
2 SOA-South Asia. Powers included India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma.
not distinguishable from outside of fresh troops and all types of arms and ammunitions, a condition precedent to any settlement.

4. That Communists intend to play present military advantage in Indochina to full is clearly indicated in Molotov's statement to conference that "termination of hostilities in Indochina (cannot be transformed into shrewdly-arranged respite for one side which would like to use it to prepare for extension of war...)." By coupling foregoing with statement that Geneva conference "must secure early cessation of hostilities and at same time reach such an agreement as will... satisfy legitimate demands of peoples of Indochina," Molotov also makes clear that Communist price for settlement is political turnover to Ho Chi Minh, however fancy may be the window-dressing in terms of French "honor" or prestige.

5. Boiled down practical aspects Molotov's speech looks like warning to west that if it wishes Indochinese settlement it had better set aside thoughts their direct military intervention Indochina or regional collective security moves SEA. Molotov by linking such threats with apparent parallel disposition toward negotiations hopes to exploit development negotiations so that latter may act as brake against US efforts organize collective security SEA. By combining this diplomatic tactic with full exploitation military possibilities Indochina Communists believe they can thwart our defensive efforts since it will be most difficult for us to build collective security enterprise around atmosphere of defeat.

6. Great danger for us is that if present situation continues to deteriorate Soviets, though still adhering to fundamental policy of avoiding risk global war, may now be so encouraged by what they believe to be weakness our local position SEA that they will take or permit steps necessitating counteraction on our part at later more unfavorable time from our viewpoint.

7. Communists may estimate that given present British and French attitudes and our present concentration on what at best will be long drawn-out effort to set up SEA collective security system, they now have excellent opportunity gain control Indochina and perhaps other SEA areas without undue risk.

It follows from foregoing that our willingness take concrete steps retrieve Indochinese position itself, expressed primarily through deeds rather than words, would have salutary effect in bringing Communists to their senses. Appreciate that strong US position might be viewed some non-Communist Asian quarters as having "colonial" or "imperialistic" implication. This could be counterbalanced in part by our assuming favorable position re participation Colombo Government in machinery for Indochinese settlement.

Smith

1942:5 GE/5-1764: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, MAY 17, 1954—1 P.M.


I expressed our view regarding the advisability of associating the UN with the Indochina conflict, and told him of my talks with Bidault and Prince Wan. He seemed in accord with the idea, but made no definite expression of approval, apparently desiring to discuss the matter with his ministers and also to ascertain that this proposal would not cross wires with the French.

Bao Dai agreed with me that Bidault was making a courageous stand to prevent a Communist take-over of Indochina, but Bao Dai pointed out that the chances of survival of the present government, with a majority of only two in the vote of confidence, were not brilliant. In these days of critical uncertainty whether France was going to stand by Vietnam in the fight or walk out, he felt it was necessary to remain near Geneva and Paris. He had been disappointed with the reaction to the fall of Dien Bien Phu. He had thought that in France, a great military nation, or at least a nation with a great military tradition, the reaction would be one of increased determination and effort to turn the tide. That reaction had not appeared and the chief concern seemed to be to place the blame on some one.

He still hoped, however, that France would see that her true interest was in fighting loyally alongside the Vietnamese Army in the great task of preventing a Communist take-over of all Indochina.

He was alarmed over the French proposals for termination of hostilities and was determined that if the French insisted on an armistice that it should not bind the Vietnamese Army, which was willing to fight on to the end, even if the struggle looked like a suicidal one. He was confident of the loyalty army and he had recently received a large number of telegrams, including one from Bishop Le Huu Thi, assuring him the senders were ready to fight on whatever the French did. In this situation, he intended in the next few days to ask the Laniel Government whether the French were determined to make peace and withdraw or whether they would fight on with the Vietnamese Army. He did not want to do anything to increase French political difficulties at this time, but he was sure that the government would understand the necessity of his putting the question bluntly and without delay.

May 16.
To my inquiry as to reports of political deterioration in Vietnam, he replied that there was some deterioration but no political disintegration. This deterioration was in part due to uncertainty as to the French attitude. It was natural that many individuals and groups should seek to find new positions in case the French withdrew. Such political difficulties were confined to the south. The north was united and determined to resist, because it was close to the war and knew the danger of communism. The difficulties of the south were also caused in part by intrigues of low level French officials and interests who were backing certain Vietnamese individuals and groups. He had no complaints to make of high level French conduct and policy.

To my inquiry as to reported friction between Defense Minister Quat and General Hinh, Bao Dai replied that friction between military commanders and defense ministers occurred in many countries. The situation I had referred to was not serious and this friction would disappear before the great defense task confronting Vietnam.

Bidault had expressed concern over the absence of Prime Minister Buu Loc from Vietnam in the moment of political deterioration, Bao Dai avoided answering my question whether he intended sending Buu Loc back at this juncture.

He went on to say that among the fence-sitters who in these last days had expressed allegiance to him, he had received a message from Ngo Dinh Diem, a leading Catholic lay figure and "fence-sitter" offering to return to Vietnam and serve Bao Dai to whom in the past he has been hostile.

Bao Dai said he had therefore appointed Ngo Dinh Diem's brother Luyen, as his personal observer at the conference and if I wished to communicate with or receive information from Bao Dai I need only to call on the latter.

Bao Dai said that a former minister of his, present in Geneva, had received a request for an interview from Phan Anh, Dong's principal assistant at the conference. Bao Dai told him by all means to see Anh. Bao Dai said it was possible that Anh and others in the Viet Minh delegation really wanted to get in touch with him and possibly rally to his side, but on the other hand he had to be on guard lest this were a Viet Minh maneuver. He could not understand why the Viet Minh delegation included such non-Communists as Anh and Buu. Bao Dai had gone to school with both of them and both had formerly held Cabinet posts under him.

Bao Dai expressed no opinion as to Navarre's competency, merely saying that he had been most correct in his relations with the Vietnamese Government and had obviously done his best to build up the Vietnamese National Army. Bao Dai did, however, criticize the manner of using the Vietnamese National Army by the French High Command. He said that the Vietnamese training schools would "manufacture" a battalion which would forthwith be swallowed up in the French Expeditionary Force. Often times the Vietnamese Minister did not know where a given Vietnamese battalion was. He said that there should be found means of maintaining some degree of separateness and control for the Vietnamese units and the Vietnamese National Army must be given more responsibilities.

SMITH

INDOCHINA

Vietnamese National Army. Bao Dai did, however, criticize the manner of using the Vietnamese National Army by the French High Command. He said that the Vietnamese training schools would "manufacture" a battalion which would forthwith be swallowed up in the French Expeditionary Force. Often times the Vietnamese Minister did not know where a given Vietnamese battalion was. He said that there should be found means of maintaining some degree of separateness and control for the Vietnamese units and the Vietnamese National Army must be given more responsibilities.

First Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 17, 3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

Geneva, May 17, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 240. Repeated information Paris 288, London 177, Saigon 86, Tokyo 68, Moscow 74. Department pass Defense, Tokyo pass CINCFE. At first restricted Indochina meeting today after discussion of Dien Bien Phu wounded,2 Bidault as first speaker stated that although he had answered Eden's five questions,2 he thought they should be clarified and supplemented. He proposed (1) that if there were agreement with the French position that Laos and Cambodia should be dealt with separately, there should be appointed an ad hoc committee for this purpose, and (2) that if there were agreement with respect to Vietnam on relative priority of the military over the political aspect of the problem and necessity for immediate cessation of hostilities, that the commanders-in-chief should send representatives to Geneva to study technical aspects of termination of hostilities and put forward their recommendations to conference.

Molotov said there were two proposals before conference, one French1 and the other Viet Minh.4 He said that Soviet delegation attached great importance to both military and political aspects of question, believing them closely linked but since military aspect was dealt with in both draft proposals whereas only one dealt with politi-

1 A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/1) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 27, CP 273. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 4; 15 p. m. The minutes are also printed in Conférence de Genève, pp. 101-105.
2 Discussion described in telegram Secto 241, May 17, infra.
3 Reported in telegram Secto 153, May 12, p. 770.
4 Reported in telegram Secto 162, May 10, p. 753.
cal, he would suggest that military questions be taken up first. After that one could go on to consider political matters. He suggested that conference (1) consider point by point the proposals in French and Viet Minh drafts, (2) since there were military provisions in both drafts, begin by considering those military provisions, and (3) while doing this, also consider the relevant questions advanced by Eden and at same time recall proposal made by Soviet delegation.

Laotian delegate then spoke of Eden's questions, all of which he answered in the affirmative and stressed importance of treating Laos and Cambodia separately by working sub-committee and achieving cease-fire as soon as possible.

Eden opined that there was not too much dissimilarity between Bidault's second question and Molotov's proposal. What was outstanding was question of how to deal with Laos and Cambodia. General Smith then suggested that Molotov amend his proposal so as to accept Bidault's wish for establishment of working sub-committee to deal with Laos and Cambodia and made statement supporting separate and early consideration of problems of these countries pointing out relative simplicity and ease with which Geneva conference could make solid step toward restoring peace to Indochina by its resolution.

After Chou had supported Molotov's proposal on procedure Molotov suggested that if conference accepted his proposal to use French and Viet Minh drafts as basis for discussion, this could be with understanding that substantive discussion would begin with question as to whether Laos and Cambodia should be dealt with separately. Vietnam delegate supported separate treatment for Laos and Cambodia and reminded conference that his delegation had also tabled proposal on Vietnam which it would expect to have considered as well.*

Viet Minh delegate in lengthy and somewhat confused statement eventually supported Molotov's proposal on procedure but ended with somewhat querulous assertion that they saw no real reason for considering Khmer and Pathet Lao first. After further clarification resulting in clear understanding that Molotov's proposal on procedure did not exclude consideration of substantive proposals already tabled in addition to French and Viet Minh, his proposal was accepted.

It was agreed to postpone substantive discussion to next meeting, tomorrow afternoon at 3:00 p.m. text of routine communiqué to be issued by delegations individually was agreed on. Eden reminded delegations they were not to exceed its terms.

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* Reported in telegram Secto 190, May 12, p. 783.

1 A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/1) is in Conference files, lot 80 D 627, CF 279.
of nondiscrimination and of avoidance of injecting strategic considerations into humanitarian matter.

CPR delegate supported DRV. Vietnamese delegate took sharp issue with DRV allegations re small number and/or conduct of Vietnamese troops at DRP.

Eden recorded agreement on nondiscrimination principle, on desirability that evacuation proceed rapidly and that contacts in field be supplemented by contacts in Geneva.

At intermission Chauvel told us Bidault did not feel discussion had been productive.

Later in meeting Bidault reverted this topic asking DRV delegate designate representative with whom French might pursue problem. Molotov then rather pointedly and looking at Dong expressed understanding of Soviet delegate that both parties would do everything to facilitate contacts both in field and in Geneva to which Dong nodded agreement.

SMITH

Editorial Note

On May 17 Prime Minister Winston Churchill made the following statement in Parliament on the proposed security pact for Southeast Asia.

"I am obliged to the right hon. Gentlemen and other hon. Members for postponing these Questions until now.

The Geneva Conference is now entering on its fourth week. The immediate object of the discussions about Indo-China is to bring the fighting to an end on terms acceptable to both sides. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary is doing all in his power to help in finding an agreed basis for this, and I am sure the House would not wish that anything should be said which might make his task more difficult. Moreover, the situation is in constant flux. As those who have put these Questions on the Paper have no doubt seen for themselves, it has undergone changes even since last Thursday. I certainly feel sympathy with the desire of many Members of the House to discuss more fully than is possible at Question time the whole foreign situation in all its bearings, but I cannot yet fix a suitable occasion. It certainly would be a great advantage — I think we should all agree to this — if the Foreign Secretary himself were present to give his own account of the events which have taken place and set his own proportion upon them.

"All I will therefore say today is that until the outcome of the Conference is known, final decisions cannot be taken regarding the establishment of a collective defence in South-East Asia and the Western Pacific. Meanwhile it will be clear from the statements already made

that Her Majesty's Government have not embarked on any negotiation involving commitments.

"These problems of future policy to which I have just referred are, of course, quite distinct from the question of the examinations undertaken without commitment by existing military agencies, to which my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State referred in reply to a Question on 10th of May. They are equally distinct from the conversations which, as reported in the Press, have been in progress during the past few days between the United States and French Governments about the situation in Indo-China.

"In our consideration of all these matters, we are maintaining the closest touch with the Governments of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, and also with the Government of Burma. All these Governments are being kept fully informed from day to day of the development of events at the Geneva Conference, since we fully realise that they will be closely affected by its outcome and may feel willing to make a contribution towards it. There is, of course, also very intimate consultation with the Governments of Canada, Australia and New Zealand through their Delegations at Geneva as well as through the usual channels of Commonwealth consultation.

"It should not, however, be thought that the terms of this statement cast any doubt upon our readiness to examine, when the outcome of the Geneva Conference is clearer, the possibility of establishing a system of collective security and defence in South-East Asia and the Western Pacific within the framework of the United Nations. We shall certainly do so. But our immediate task is to do everything we can to reach an agreed settlement at Geneva for the restoration of peace in Indo-China. Her Majesty's Government are resolved to do their utmost to achieve this aim and to exercise their influence to ensure that any acceptable settlement shall be backed by effective international guarantees." (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th Series, volume 527, columns 1692-1693)

700.S/5—1754: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET  PRIORITY

GEOGEVA, MAY 17, 1954—4 p. m.

Dulles 77. Repeated information Paris priority 283. Eyes only Ambassador. Reference: Tedux 67. In reply to question whether subject Southeast Asia collective security measures should continue to be dealt with here between Eden and General Smith or if future be handled between Washington and London, Cacci did said that from British point of view as long as Eden was here it would be better to carry on busi—

1 Dated May 14, p. 700.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee (Excerpt), May 17, 1954


Because of the victory in Dien Bien Phu and the initiative taken by our side to release seriously wounded French prisoners, the plots of sabotaging a ceasefire in Indochina by the United States and the factions for war in France have encountered big difficulties. The majority of members of the French parliament are in favor of a ceasefire, and those within the [French] government opposing a ceasefire belong to the minority. Therefore, as shown by the current situation, the possibility for a ceasefire has increased, and specific progress has been achieved in the negotiation. But the United States and the factions for war in France may strengthen the activities of sabotaging [the negotiation.]

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not cite or quote without permission from CWIHP.
Telegram, Reply from the CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai's Telegram of May 15, May 17, 1954

Records No: 206-Y0049

(Top Secret)

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai.

Received your telegram of May 15. Regarding our next steps on the Korean issue, after discussion, we agree to your suggestions. Specifically, that we should let neutral nations supervise the elections, not the United Nations. In addition, that we should also emphasize two things: first, that although we agree to let the neutral nations supervise the elections, these must be held after the withdrawal of foreign troops. Second, that the NNSC should be organized to supervise the elections and to prevent interference by domestic terror groups only after the all-Korean commission, in which both Koreas consult as equals, drafts an election law. If the Soviet and Korean sides believe that it is appropriate to let the Chinese delegation make this suggestion, then the Chinese side should do so.

CCP Central Committee
May 17, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
At this morning’s meeting of Six it was agreed:

1. that Laotian and Cambodian delegates would carry the ball, with US, UK and France generally supporting their statements either directly after them or after Communist speeches in between.

2. that general line would be that while the Vietnamese problem was both military and political, the Cambodian and Laotian problems were purely military and simpler than the Vietnamese military problem.

3. that they would deny the existence of the phantom govt and maintain that if Viet Minh forces left, problem would be solved.

4. Cambodia would be prepared to suggest international control over withdrawal of Viet Minh forces and to prevent their reentry.

5. that nothing would be said about elections except as a retreat position, in which case both Laos and Cambodia would refer to their constitutional provisions concerning periodic elections.

6. when Communists raise question of withdrawal of French forces, Cambodians and Laotians will suggest they withdraw except as provided by respective treaties or to the extent the two countries request them to remain.

7. that if Communists attempted to pass to other questions without agreement being reached on separating Laotian-Cambodian questions, determined effort would be made to resist it. (West could call for Plenary session on this point. There would be no point in appointing sub-committees until agreement had been reached in principle.)

Eden would like to sum up discussion but Chauvel suggested he might do so better tomorrow when he is in chair.

Chauvel commented that at yesterday’s meeting Molotov appeared to be seeking formula for separation Laotian-Cambodian cases, whereas Chou seemed cool and Dong opposed.

It was pointed out that Molotov might try to force discussion point by point on French and Viet Minh proposals.
He spoke for governments of Khmer and Pathet Lao only because they had been excluded from conference.

Eden stated British Government considered Laotian and Cambodian problems basically different from that of Vietnam. British information was that both countries had only recently been invaded, that the areas occupied were small and adjacent to Vietnam border, that there were no pockets of resistance, that the peoples were fundamentally different, that in 1947 Laos and Cambodia had obtained democratic constitutions and had since held free elections. Dissident movements in both countries had dissolved themselves or surrendered. USSR, China and Viet Minh had not recognized phantom governments. UK would take serious view of any further aggression by any one against other country.

Smith cited practical reasons as well as those of logic and justice for separating problems and held failure to reach agreements on Laos and Cambodia would bode ill for success of conference. He cited recent dates they had been invaded, ethnic and religious differences, and popular support of Laotian and Cambodian Governments reflected through democratic processes. We could countenance no solution which would give recognition to small dissident groups which with outside assistance were threatening frontier areas.

Chou reiterated that war was between colonialism and forces seeking liberation and independence in all three countries. Foreign intervention began with French violation of its agreement with Ho Chi Minh. Problem Indochina must be settled as a whole by simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina.

Vietnamese delegate asked for agreement on separation of problems as test of sincerity in seeking restoration of peace.

Molotov stated conference was hearing only one side regarding conditions Cambodia and Laos. He recalled earlier proposal that representatives resistance governments he invited and said not too late to do so. He stated DRV representative in closest contact with conditions Pathet Lao and Khmer. Information made available by DRV demonstrates struggle for national independence carried on not only by people Vietnam but also in other two countries. CPR statement bears this out. France carries on colonial war throughout Indochina. Molotov rejected thesis external factors governing events in Cambodia and Laos. Such countries as CPR and India have refuted this thesis. Nehru speaks of independence struggle throughout Indochina. Other Asian countries do the same. Molotov also alluded to Secretary’s May 7 statement which referred to Indochina as a whole and to alleged failure French to give real independence to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

According to Molotov, Secretary made no distinction between three states or between struggles for national independence going on in each. Molotov stated greater part Vietnamese territory under control DRV. Similarly in other two countries resistance governments control parts of territory. Soviet delegate therefore rejects separate approach for Cambodia and Laos. Such approach would also be contrary to Berlin communiqué which speaks of restoring peace in Indochina as a whole.

Cambodian delegate then briefly refuted DRV statements with particular reference to Son Ngoc Minh. Cambodian delegate stated this man represents nothing in Cambodia where unknown. He accused Viet Minh of imperialism and repeated thesis re absence indigenous Cambodian independence movement fighting royal government.

USDel then suggested adjournment in view lateness, but although indicating would wish to speak further this subject. There was some discussion as to whether Korea or Indochina should be conference topic tomorrow. Molotov indicated speakers inscribed for Korea. However USDel with strong support UKDel took view undesirable to top Indochina this stage and agreement finally reached for next Indochina restricted meeting tomorrow 3 p.m.

One sentence communiqué was agreed to as follows: “At restricted meeting of the 9 delegations on May 18, the consideration of the problem of restoring peace in Indochina was continued”.

US and USSR delegates reiterated agreement to effect delegation press officers should not go beyond terms of communiqué in informing press regarding proceedings the restricted session.

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THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

GOVNA, May 18, 1954—5 p.m.

DULLE 84. Repeated information Paris 293, London 182, Paris and London eyes only Ambassadors. DULLE 82. Eden handed me following copy draft terms of reference for Five-Power military staff talks which is submitting to London. I believe they are generally acceptable and would appreciate Department’s views as soon as possible. 3

1 Smith reported in telegram Dulles 83, May 15, not printed, that Eden stated he had received authorization from London to go ahead with the five-power military talks. (Conference files, lot 20 D 627, CP 245)

2 Department’s and Joint Chiefs of Staff’s views are contained in telegram Tedul 83, May 20, p. 858.
Begin verbatim text.

1. Venue—start in Washington, with the right to move elsewhere later, e.g. Singapore, if found advantageous.

2. Terms of reference—the Five-Power Staff Agency representatives will undertake military planning studies in order to recommend possible courses of action to enable an effective line of resistance to future Communist aggression or infiltration in Southeast Asia to be established. They would examine all possible courses of action in the light of the current situation and of the known capabilities of the anti-Communist countries concerned in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific.

3. Informing participating and non-participating powers.

   (a) Participating powers.
   - Australia and New Zealand to be informed in Geneva by UK.
   - France to be informed by US-UK in Geneva.
   - US Government to inform Singapore and Philippines.
   - HMG to inform Colombo powers and Canada.

   Non-participating powers to be informed that the object of the exercise is “to examine without commitment the various contingencies with which we may be faced, including practical means of help for those nations of SEA who may call for it”. This was the wording used in the House of Commons, and we would prefer it to the wording proposed by Washington, which was “to explore means by which the Five Powers can assist the countries of Southeast Asia in a cooperative effort to defend themselves”.

   Comment: I see no objection to British taking this line with Colombo powers, but believe we should feel free to inform Thailand and Philippines as we deem best. End comment.

4. Start of meeting—first meeting to be called by US military authorities in Washington through normal military channels.

5. Publicity—public announcement at the beginning of the talks, and no information to be given to the press as the talks proceed. Questions to be answered on the lines already taken in the House of Commons (see above) if there is a leakage.

End verbatim text.

*The Secretary's Special Assistant, Roderic L. O'Connor, in a memorandum to MacArthur, May 19, indicated that the Secretary had read telegram Dula 98 and had noticed that the concept of a cooperative effort had been left out of the proposed British text and felt strongly that this concept should be included in the statement. O'Connor said that the Secretary was also disturbed by the idea of an agreement with Eden on division of functions with the British talking exclusively to the Colombo powers. The Secretary wondered if “we had made any specific agreement with Eden, which would exclude us from dealing directly with the Colombo powers as we so desired. I told him that I did not think there had been any very specific agreement at all but that I would check.” (Conference files, let 60 D 627, CF 238)

SMITH

1 Memorandum of Conversation.

TOP SECRET

[GENEVA], May 18, 1954.

Participants: Ngo Dinh Luyen, Bao Dai's Personal Representative
              The Under Secretary
              Philip W. Bonsal

Subject: Alleged views of Bao Dai on Current Military and Political Situation in Vietnam

Mr. Ngo Dinh Luyen called at his request in his capacity as Bao Dai's personal representative in Geneva. He delivered a letter ² from His Majesty to the Under Secretary and also showed his credentials.

Mr. Ngo Dinh Luyen set forth the following views alleged to be those of Bao Dai:

1) Some six years ago when Bao Dai returned to Viet-Nam with the French, he did so, not because the political solution then adopted seemed to him ideal, but because he wished to avoid a situation in which the fight in Viet-Nam would be purely one between colonialism on the one hand and Communism on the other. Bao Dai wished to make a place in the struggle for true Vietnamese Nationalism and to insure that Vietnamese national interests would win out in the end over those of both the Communists and the colonialists.

2) Bao Dai has been thwarted throughout by the French, and has been unable to promote truly national policies which would rally the people behind his government and army. According to Ngo Dinh Luyen, even the most recent treaties signed with the French are regarded by Bao Dai as merely further "pieces of paper" which can in practice be nullified by French actions and restrictions. As a result, the mass of the people in Viet-Nam consider that the Vietminh represent the "good cause".

3) On the military side, the French for a long time refused to create a Vietnamese National Army and when they did so, they did not provide this army with the necessary artillery, armored elements or aviation so that it could function as an autonomous force. The Vietnamese national army at the present time is merely a source of light

² For text, see telegram Secto 265, May 20, p. 563.

1 Name of drafting officer not indicated; presumably it was Bonsal.

Summary of this conversation transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 265, May 20. The telegram contained the following comment: "Heath and Bonsal believe Luyen may be overstating Bao Dai's views, but that latter may indeed be considering Ngo Dinh Diem if assured US support. Recommend Paris contact Diem discreetly, now residing...[in Paris], in effort develop his views and degree to which Bao Dai-Diem reconciliation has progressed.

As regards Duyen's claim that many members of Bao Dai's Government were imposed on him by the French, Heath doubts that Bao Dai said it and remarks that if he did say it, it is not true. If, however, Bao Dai considering getting rid of this government, this claim might be an excuse for such action to present Vietnamese public opinion." (586.1 G2/5-2054)
infantry reinforcements which are fed into the battle as required by the French Command and are required more often than not destroyed before they achieve any real combat worthiness. As a result, Vietnamese military morale is low in contrast to the very high morale of the Vietminh armed forces.

4) Bao Dai recognizes that the presence of the French army is essential in Viet-Nam under present circumstances. Nevertheless, he believes that the presence of that army prevents the development of the national spirit which alone can truly vitalize the Vietnamese National Army. He believes that further French reinforcements are necessary as they may have to meet an immediate military emergency, will further destroy the military morale of the Vietnamese people and therefore further diminish the efficiency of the Vietnamese National Army.

After having set forth the above alleged factors in the situation at some length, Ngo Dinh Luyen stated that His Majesty was thinking seriously of adopting a new political program which would in effect rally behind him the true nationalist elements in Viet-Nam. Bao Dai is fully conscious of the need of insuring continued French support. He also realizes that the attitude of the US and of the UK toward the French must be a most prudent one and that we would not wish to bring any real pressure to bear on the French. Bao Dai wonders therefore whether he could count on our support for any radical political initiative which he might himself take and which would rally his people behind him although it might to some extent alienate the French. (It seems quite evident that to the extent that Ngo Dinh Luyen reflects Bao Dai's views, the latter is trying to find out whether the US is disposed to replace France in Indochina to an extent which would virtually free Bao Dai from the need for taking into account French views about the military and political requirements of the situation in Viet-Nam.)

General Smith commented briefly that in his opinion the French at the highest levels were sincere with regard to the independence of Viet-Nam. The General recognized that possibly some lower level officials, particularly in Indochina, might still harbor illusions based on a possible return to a vanished past. But he said he thought that the Vietnamese might well have confidence in Landel and Bidault adding that we should do everything possible to strengthen the hands of these courageous French political leaders. He advised that Bao Dai reserve his judgment as to the significance of the new treaties.

With regard to the Vietnamese army, General Smith agreed with much that Ngo Dinh Luyen had said. He recognized that the French had first delayed the fundamental decision to have a national army and had then failed to carry out that decision as energetically and rapidly as was desirable. He said that US influence had been constantly exerted in favor of the creation of a truly autonomous Vietnamese national army. He described our experience in Korea. He said that, of course, seventeen months are ideally required before combat worthy troops can be created and that more time is needed to create the necessary cadres at all levels. General Smith told Ngo Dinh Luyen that he believed the French attitude regarding participation in the training of Vietnamese troops by the US was being currently modified.

General Smith concluded by saying that he had listened with attention to Mr. Ngo Dinh Luyen's exposition and that if later he had any specific suggestions of comments to make for transmittal to His Majesty, he would arrange to do so.

Ngo Dinh Luyen indicated to Mr. Bonsal that Bao Dai is contemplating the early dismissal of Bui Loc as Prime Minister. He gave the strong impression that, if Bao Dai were in fact free to choose, he would now call Ngo Dinh Diem to power. He intimated, however, that the French would oppose his brother's nomination because of Ngo Dinh Diem's well known independent policy and that Bao Dai believed this opposition would, under present circumstances, be decisive.

Ngo Dinh Luyen took occasion to say that many members of the Bao Dai Cabinet have been imposed upon by His Majesty by the French and are not persons in which His Majesty can have confidence. Thus, for example, Bao Dai does not feel able to communicate with General Smith through members of his government but is obliged to seek a personal, unofficial representative such as Ngo Dinh Luyen.

Ngo Dinh Luyen later set forth for Mr. Bonsal's benefit another idea with which His Majesty is toying. It is the neutralization of Viet-Nam with guarantees by the powers participating at the Geneva Conference. This would apparently involve a complete break with the French Union.

Mr. Ngo Dinh Luyen made the somewhat startling statement that one of the ways in which the French control Bao Dai's movements is by limiting his transfers of piastres into foreign exchange. Ngo Dinh Luyen said that Bao Dai could hardly afford to stay at hotels and was obliged to spend much time at his own villa at Cannes, where he has now gone. On the other hand, he stated that Bui Loc had recently been authorized to transfer ten million francs for travel expenses.

Mr. Bonsal endeavored to stress to Ngo Dinh Luyen that, in the present emergency, the proper course of action was not one of recrimination and consequent destruction of existing assets but rather one of limited action in order to surmount the immediate crisis successfully. Unless that were done there would be nothing left to save. Mr. Bonsal expressed the hope that the elements which had remained apart from the situation would rally to the support of the government. (Ngo
Dinh Luyen has been away from his country for five years and his brother, Ngo Dinh Diem for about three.

(The analysis of the above in which Ambassador Heath and Mr. Bonsal concur is that Ngo, while he is probably what he represents himself to be, has perhaps overstated Bao Dai's views on the situation. On the other hand, Bao Dai is probably seeking to reconcile to himself every possible element of strength. He is undoubtedly carrying on a political flirtation with Ngo Dinh Diem who does have a certain amount of support particularly in Vietnamese Catholic circles. He might well play the Ngo Dinh Diem card if he could be sure we would support him; otherwise not. Ngo Dinh Diem is a visionary, doctrinaire individual with a high reputation for integrity and patriotism. He might well refuse to take office except on terms which would alienate much French support and facilitate the task of those Frenchmen seeking an apparently honorable exit from the Indochina scene. On the other hand he would strengthen the Vietnamese government in local eyes if he were to take office. It is recommended that direct contact with Ngo Dinh Diem be established—he is now in Paris.)

7536.00/S-1834
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor)

TOP SECRET
(WASHINGTON) May 18, 1954

Subject: Indochina; Southeast Asia
Participants: Sir Roger Makins, Ambassador, British Embassy
Mr. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. Raynor, Director, BNA

Ambassador Makins called this afternoon at his request. Sir Roger said he wished to raise a few questions with respect to our discussions with the French for the purpose of clarification. His first question pertained to the level of continued French military effort and said he understood from Mr. Merchant that our condition was that the French should maintain the present level of their effort. From French sources the British had obtained the idea that we had indicated that the French must increase their effort proportionately to the effort made by others. Mr. Merchant replied that we had made no effort to arrive at any mathematical formula on this question but that the principle which we had put to the French was to the effect that any outside assistance from the United States or others must be additive to the general situation and not substitutive for the present French effort. The only basis Mr. Merchant could possibly have for the French mis-

understanding our position on this matter was the fact that we did continue to feel that the size of the native forces should be augmented.

Sir Roger's second point was to the effect that the French in Geneva had given British officials the impression that the current talks had devolved from U.S. rather than from French initiative as Mr. Merchant earlier told Sir Roger. Mr. Merchant reaffirmed that the present talks commenced as a result of French initiative in Paris last Tuesday or Wednesday. He said, of course, the French had known for some time we were willing to discuss this matter with them.

Sir Roger then inquired as to our present views with respect to possible UN action on a peace observation commission. Mr. Merchant indicated that we had not arrived at any final position but our present inclination was leaning in favor of this action being initiated by the Thais inasmuch as they were members of the UN and seriously considered taking this type of action late last summer.

Sir Roger then inquired if, on the question of conditions, it was correct to assume that the ball was now in the hands of the French in the sense that we were awaiting replies from them. Mr. Merchant said this was correct although he would not describe the matter as one of conditions. He said rather what we had put forward to the French was essential elements.

Sir Roger then said that he had been informed that Mr. Eden would be advising General Smith today that the British are agreeable to the holding of five-power military staff talks immediately in Washington with fairly broad terms of reference but without commitments. Mr. Merchant raised the question as to whether the French had been consulted on this matter and Sir Roger said he did not know. He did say that he thought Mr. Eden would advise the Colombo powers with regard to the holding of the five-power talks as soon as agreement is formally reached. He inquired what reactions we had as a result of our talks with the Colombo powers. Mr. Merchant replied he understood Mr. Murphy had only general talks with them.

Mr. Merchant then referred to Churchill's statement in Commons. Sir Roger said that the statement in his opinion had been very very carefully worded in an effort to keep the door open for possible group discussion of South Asian collective security arrangements at a time when the situation at Geneva became clearer. In Sir Roger's view the language clearly indicated that Churchill had not meant to imply that these talks must await the actual conclusion of the Geneva talks. Sir Roger added, however, that he thought it would be unwise to press Churchill on this at least for the next few days.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and report to the CCP Central Committee, Regarding Pham Van Dong’s reply to Eden, May 18, 1954

Record No.: 296-00045-11 (1)

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

Regarding the question of transporting wounded soldiers, after the exchange of letters between Bidault and Molotov, Eden wrote to Pham Van Dong on the 15th, conveying to him the letter by Bidault, and asking Pham to make another statement about this matter at the session of the 17th. Pham wrote Eden on the 17th, making it clear that “it is appropriate that the concrete problems that are possible to be raised during the process of transporting wounded soldiers from Dien Bien Phu to be resolved on site.” He also agreed that Ambassador Zhang [Wentian] may read Pham’s letter at the session of the 17th.

Zhou Enlai
May 18, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
MAY 19, 1954

Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsai) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)

TOP SECRET


Subject: Further call of Bao Dai's personal representative, Mr. Ngo Dinh Luyen.

Mr. Ngo Dinh Luyen called on me this morning to say he had reported to Bao Dai on his interview with you yesterday.

According to Ngo Dinh Luyen, Bao Dai is most anxious to change the Vietnamese Government. He would bring in Ngo Dinh Diem as Prime Minister and replace most if not all present ministers. A new policy of independence based upon the creation of a real Vietnamese national army would be the program of the new government with which Bao Dai hopes to revitalize the Vietnamese struggle against Communism.

Bao Dai would like to know, however, to what extent he can count on US support. He would like to know whether, if the present Franco-Vietnamese military effort is insufficient to hold the Delta, the US would plan to intervene directly. He is also concerned lest the French Government, under the pressure of French political and public opinion, should decide to abandon the struggle. In that case, would the US intervene directly?

I replied that I saw no signs of a weakening of French determination to continue the fight. On the contrary, recent indications show a firming up of French determination. I said that I would convey Bao Dai's questions to you.

Bao Dai is also worried as to what the attitude of the Vietnamese Government should be in the event that the Geneva Conference shows signs of moving toward a situation which would in effect involve the abandonment of Viet-Nam to the Communists. Should the Vietnamese Delegation pull out? What is our advice?

Bao Dai is also interested in having US military assistance (MDAP) delivered directly to the Vietnamese national army or at least specifically earmarked for that army instead of being delivered as at present through the French. Bao Dai does not want to make a revolutionary change in present arrangements but would like to see our assistance specifically identified with Viet-Nam rather than with France. He would like your views on this point too.

In the event a new government under Ngo Dinh Diem takes over its first act would be the creation of a new Vietnamese army. In this army, Bao Dai would hope to consolidate the present elements of the Vietnamese army plus Vietnamese soldiers now serving with the French Expeditionary Corps plus all types of irregular and religious troops. He anticipates French opposition because according to him over half the French Union forces in Viet-Nam are Vietnamese and therefore those forces would be much weakened by Bao Dai's plan. Also, Bao Dai believes the French fear that a strong Vietnamese national army might make possible direct negotiations and agreement between Viet-Nam and the Vietminh. His Majesty, however, desires to create a fighting offensive-minded army. (I commented that such a plan while it might eventually help create a strong Vietnamese national army would in the mean time probably weaken the military potential of our side. In reply Ngo Dinh Luyen stated that it would be His Majesty's idea to proceed somewhat gradually.)

Recommendation

I recommend that for the present you authorize me to tell Ngo Dinh Luyen that I have communicated the above to you, that you are not prepared at once to reply to the questions raised by Bao Dai but that you have them under serious consideration. I might add that it is your view that under present critical circumstances all positive elements on our side must be united and that consequently all important decisions should so far as possible represent agreement between all concerned.

1 In a note of May 25 attached to the source text, Hennes informed Bonsai that "Regarding your attached memorandum, General Smith has approved your telling Ngo Dinh Luyen that you have communicated his report to General Smith. There is no reply, but General Smith may want to talk to Ngo Dinh Luyen at a later date."

2 In a handwritten marginal notation, Walter S. Robertson wrote "I suggest elimination of this instruction" in reference to the following part of the sentence: "that you are not prepared at once to reply to the questions raised by Bao Dai but that you have them under serious consideration."

861 GE/5-1954: Telegram

Smith-Eden-Bidault Meeting, Geneva, May 19, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, May 19, 1954—2 p.m.

Sect 253. Repeated information Press 296, London 183, Saigon 91. Discussed tactics for next few days with Bidault and Eden this morning. Since it appears undesirable to risk Korean plenary before Saturday at earliest and since tody's restricted Indochina meeting should exhaust discussion on separation Laos and Cambodia, I proposed plenary on Indochina tomorrow in order that six could make public
war in Vietnam has recently overflowed into Laos and Cambodia as result of events in those countries by foreign forces. Said latter two countries should be dealt with separately because simpler and can be handled more rapidly. Bidault stressed French not proposing priority for Laos and Cambodia over Vietnam but rather separate parallel and simultaneous procedures with Laos and Cambodia situation entrusted to subcommittee of conference. Viet Minh representative then made lengthy florid propagandist statement more suitable to plenary than to work session. He traced alleged national liberation movements in both countries from earliest days of French conquest last century. He then described condition surrounding “second French conquest” after 1954. He stated that in Cambodia resistance government controls large area not only along Vietnam border but in other parts of country and that same situation prevails Pathet Lao.

DRV del attempted to demonstrate undemocratic and fraudulent nature Cambodian and Laotian constitutions and elections. He referred to Franco-Laotian treaty of independence quoting obligation of Kingdom of Laos to join its resources with those of members of French Union for defense purposes, emphasizing coordinating function of French Government as proof hollow nature independence granted by France.

DRV del claimed that reality national liberation movements of three countries IC is why French authorities with expeditionary corps and so-called national armies amounting to over 1/2 million men had been unable conquer these movements. He attacked so-called national governments as former servants of French colonialism now in fact serving same interests and US interventionists after having collaborated with Japanese Fascism.

DRV del concluded problems of Vietnam, Pathet Lao and Khmer cannot be disassociated. DRV then proposed discussion proceed on basis point 8, and particularly point 8A, Viet Minh proposals and points 1 and 5 French proposals. (Point 8 Viet Minh proposals refers complete and simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina and points 1 and 5 French proposals are included in French section dealing only with Vietnam.) Following the recess first Cambodian and Laotian dels in turn refuted convincingly and in detail the assertion of Dong. Both insisted on independent and national character of their governments and on the synthetic nature of so-called liberation governments. Both stressed
point that all that was required to re-establish peace in Cambodia and Laos was the withdrawal of the foreign Viet Minh invader.

Chou En-lai then spoke in support of Viet Minh. He agreed that there were three separate nations and three states but in all three a colonial war was raging caused by same source. It must be stopped throughout the three countries as asked for by Berlin communiqué. He could not agree with French del that decision to treat two separately would aid progress of conference. He tried to prove existence and importance of national liberation movements in each of three countries and concluded with assertion that if peace were to be restored in Indochina, it would have to be by simultaneous cease-fire throughout whole area.

Eden suggested no meeting tomorrow to see if private contacts could contribute to overcoming difficulty blocking progress.

Molotov said he was not asking decision but wished to express desire of Soviet del at next meeting to conduct point by point discussion of military aspects French and Viet Minh drafts.

Eden closed meeting with statement that there was no agreement what would be done at next meeting, Friday May 21.

Comment: Meeting made no progress whatever. Communists showed no signs of any willingness to compromise. Viet Minh and Chinese Communist statements were propaganda banes rather than type of discussion expected in restricted session. Communists appear confident and in no hurry down to business. Difficulty assessment of session (supported by Molotov) to consider jointly military portion Viet Minh proposal (which is applicable whole area) and that portion French proposal dealing only with Vietnam and appeal this may have for French. End comment.

SMITH

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The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET PRIORITY
WASHINGTON, May 19, 1954

Teddy 88. For Under Secretary from Secretary. A news ticker report from London indicates British sources have informed the press there is no agreement on five-power talks. In view of firm UK agreement set forth in Dulle 88 that there would be no publicity whatsoever and

SMITH

1 For text, see volume XII.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai's telegram to Mao Zedong and others, Regarding the Second Restricted Session, May 19, 1954

Record No.: 206-Y0049

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

(1) The second secret session held on Indochina yesterday devoted all the time to the discussion on whether the question concerning Laos and Cambodia should be dealt with separately. The United States, Britain and France and three... [original unreadable] countries stood together to emphasize that the Cambodia and Laos question should be dealt with in separation with the Vietnam question. There exist no French troops in Cambodia and Laos, so only after the withdrawal of the Vietnamese People's Army will the question be resolved. We absolutely cannot agree to this point. Pham Van Dong, Molotov and I all spoke to rebut this point, pointing out that the armed struggle for national liberation by the Cambodian and Laotian people was caused by the military intervention of France. The resistance governments in Cambodia and Laos have their own troops. Therefore, an armistice means that a ceasefire should occur on the territory of their own motherlands. There exists no such an "issue" of withdrawing from Cambodia and Laos. Peace should be restored in the entire Indochina, and peace should not just be restored in Vietnam. The questions involving the three countries cannot be discussed by separating them. The two sides debated for three hours and [the session] was adjourned with any result. The other side attempts to use this issue as the first thing to test our attitude. Before the end of the meeting, Molotov as chair [of the session] proposed that next day the Korea issue should be discussed. However, Eden said that he was afraid that an impression would be created that the discussion on the Indochina issue failed immediately after its beginning, so the contention that discussion should be continued on the Indochina issue on the 19th. Our side has agreed to this.

(2) In previous several days the other side has used the sick and would soldiers at Dien Bien Phu as a means of political blackmailing and has conducted a series of propaganda of slander. To deal with this Hoang Van Hoan hosted a press conference on the 18th to publicize the facts and to expose the plots of the other side. Then the French delegation was questioned [on this issue] at a press conference it hosted. In particular, that the French military resumed bombardment on the 18th and killed fifteen French prisoners has caused heated repercussion. About this the Pravda has published commentaries consequently in the previous days. We are also organizing the reporters of the Xinhua News Agency to cooperate in our propaganda and expose [the French]. In the battle of propaganda, so long as we are able to command the material in a timely manner, we should be able to continuously expose the plots of the other side and to master the initiative.

(3) The French delegation has appointed a person to contact the Vietnamese delegation. The contact will begin today.

Zhou Enlai
May 19, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
point that all that was required to re-establish peace in Cambodia and Laos was the withdrawal of the foreign Viet Minh invaders.

Chou En-lai then spoke in support of Viet Minh. He again stated that there were three separate nations and three states but in fact the three had been labelled by the same cause. It must be stopped throughout the three countries as asked for by Berlin communiqué. He could not agree with French del that decision to meet two separately would add progress of conference. He tried to prove existence and importance of national liberation movements in each of three countries and concluded with assertion that peace were to be restored in Indochina, it would have to be by simultaneous cease-fire throughout whole area.

Eden suggested no meeting tomorrow to see if private contacts could contribute to overcoming difficulties blocking progress.

Molotov said he was not asking decision but wished to express desire of Soviet del at next meeting to continue point by point discussion of military aspects French and Viet Minh drafts.

Eden closed meeting with statement that all agreed there was no agreement what would be done in next meeting, Friday May 21.

Comment: Meeting made no progress whatever. Communists showed no signs of any willingness to compromise. Viet Minh and Chinese Communist statements were propaganda harangues rather than type of discussion expected in previous session. Communists appear confident and in no hurry get down to business. Difficult assess significance Dong’s suggestion (supported by Molotov) to consider jointly military portion Viet Minh proposal (which is applicable whole area) and that portion French proposal dealing only with Vietnam and appeal this may have for French. End comment.

SMITH

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1954—4 p.m.

Telegram 88. For Under Secretary from Secretary. A news ticker report from London indicates British sources have informed the press there was agreement in five-power talks. In view of firm UK agreement set forth in Dulle 84 that there would be no publicity whatsoever and no announcement to the press I find this development most disheartening. Unless you perceive objection, please mention this to Eden and tell him ticker report on information he put in London arrived at precise time that President was sure over his proposal which specifically stated nothing would be said to press.

DULLES

MAY 20, 1954

SECRET

386.1 GB/5-2054: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TO TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 20, 1954—9 a.m.

Secto 260. Repeated information Saigon 94, Paris 300. Heath comments on Saigon’s 2419, May 17,1 to Department that the thought of deposing Bao Dai and establishing a regency council is not a new one and has been advanced by some Vietnamese and has received some consideration by the French. Heath observes that a regency might conceivably be a future solution but is very strongly of the opinion that it should not be talked about with the French or anybody else at this time. Principal Vietnamese support for such proposals in the past has come from certain southern Vietnamese who propose regent be the Empress who is a southerner. It’s unlikely that the Empress or the Crown Prince would concur at deposing Bao Dai. A government headed by Tri and Premier Quat as proposed in reference telegram would be very unpalatable to the southern Vietnamese and Tri would be very unhappy heading a government in which Tam, whom he dislikes and distrusts, held the extremely important portfolio of the interior. The French would certainly not agree to such a proposal at the present time and without their consent, in view of the French armed forces in Saigon, the coup could hardly be pulled off. Bao Dai states that Ngo Dinh Diem has agreed to rally to him and this is confirmed by Diem’s brother, whom Bao Dai has appointed as secret personal observer for the conference and a channel of secret communication, if need should arise, between himself and the American delegation.

In short, Heath feels we must, at least for the time being, bear with the Bao Dai solution.

SMITH

1 For text, see volume XIII.
TOP SECRET  NACIIT  WASHINGTON, May 20, 1954—10:32 a.m.

Tedel 93. Under Secretary from Secretary rptd info and eyes only Ambss. JCS have submitted following comments on draft terms of reference for five-power military talks:

"1. The recommendations of the JCS on State Dulle 84 May 18, 1954 on above subject are as follows:

"2. para 1, meetings should be held and completed in Washington. JCS do not concur in British recommendation 'to move elsewhere later'.

"3. para 2, terms of reference should read as follows: 'Military representatives of participating powers (i.e., no reference to be made to a five-power staff agency) will meet in Washington and will undertake military planning studies, objective of which will be to examine, without commitment, security matters of mutual interest and to explore means by which military assistance could be rendered to countries of SEA which might request it.'

"4. Re subpara 3(A), US and UK should inform France, Australia, and New Zealand, simultaneously and jointly, in Geneva.

"5. Re subpara 3(B), US Govt should inform Japan, Republic of Korea, Nationalist Govt of China, Thailand, and Philippines. UK may inform Colombo powers and Canada.

"6. Unnumbered subpara following subpara 3(B), nonparticipating powers should be informed that purpose of exercise is 'to undertake military planning studies, objective of which will be to examine, without commitment, security matters of mutual interest and to explore means by which military assistance could be rendered to countries of SEA which might request it.'

"7. Re para 4, as to start of meetings, upon notification from Geneva of acceptance by France, Australia, and New Zealand, US military authorities would initiate call for first meeting.

"8. para 5, there should be no public announcement at beginning of talks and no information should be given to press as talks proceed. With reference to possibility of a leakage, in that eventually appropriate quotations from terms of reference should be used in answering questions.

8. Copy of this memorandum has been provided directly to Department of State in view of urgency this matter. For JCS: s/Arthur Radford, Chairman, JCS.'

I discussed above with Admiral Radford this morning and send following comments (on numbered paras in JCS memo) for your guidance in further talks with Eden:

1.e. I explained to Radford that in our opinion any decision to move elsewhere would have to be concurred in unanimously by all participants and is not subject to majority vote. This is our interpretation which you might confirm with Eden.

1.f. JCS attaches particular importance to this para dealing with terms of reference and we hope very much you can get Eden to accept.

1.g. Assume you can work out arrangements to inform France, Australia, and New Zealand simultaneously or jointly in Geneva of terms of reference when they have been agreed by US and UK.

1.h. We of course reserve right to inform other countries in general terms re exercise and would expect in fact to inform countries mentioned in JCS memo and possibly others.

1.i.e. Is designed to bring information to others in line with terms of reference proposed in 1.f above.

1.j. Self-explanatory.

1.l. Has been somewhat overtaken by events as result of yesterday's leak in London.

There is one point which has not been covered in Eden's memo which is informing Associated States. We are going on assumption this is oversight since notification of these States we regard as essential. Suggest you seek Eden's agreement to their being informed. Assume this would be done by French and possibly yourself also as representative of host govt.

DULLES

1 See telegram Tedel 88, May 19, p. 855.

305.1 GR/6-2054
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal)

TOP SECRET  GENEVA, May 20, 1954.

Participants: Ngo Dinh Luyen, Bao Dai's Personal Representative Philip W. Bonsal

Subject: Bao Dai's concern over the outcome of the Geneva Conference and his desire for direct US assistance for Viet-Nam

Mr. Ngo Dinh Luyen called at his request. After telling me that Bao Dai has almost decided to change his government, Mr. Ngo Dinh Luyen said that Bao Dai is somewhat worried about recent declarations by the President and the Secretary. Specifically, he would like to know whether the US is disposed to give assistance to Viet-Nam and in what form.

Bao Dai wonders whether help for the Vietnamese army could be immediate in view of the present situation. Although Bao Dai hopes that the Vietnamese army will be able to hold back the enemy, he would
like to know whether we have decided to give direct assistance if such assistance should be necessary. Bao Dai considers that the French military effort is becoming daily more insufficient.

According to Ngo Dinh Luyen, Bao Dai is very worried about the consequences of a take-over in the Delta by the Vietminh. The Delta is the great reservoir of recruits for the Vietnamese National Army and its loss would be a tremendous blow. Bao Dai would envisage direct US intervention if the French were to abandon the Delta.

I said that I saw no signs of a policy of abandonment of the Delta on the part of the French. In fact, I had been much encouraged by the reaction to the admittedly serious military situation on the part of Bidal and of the French Government in general. Ngo Dinh Luyen replied that Bao Dai fears that French public opinion may force the French Government to adopt a policy of appeasement.

According to Ngo Dinh Luyen, Bao Dai thinks that the Geneva Conference will probably result in a Communist victory. He is considering the attitude which the Vietnamese Government should adopt in that eventuality. He is weighing in his mind the apparent divisions of opinion between Western powers. He is trying to determine the attitude which the Vietnamese Government should adopt in the event that the Conference in Geneva takes a position contrary to the basic position of the Vietnamese Government.

Ngo Dinh Luyen mentioned a telegram which Bao Dai had received from Governor Tri in which the situation in North Viet-Nam is described as "tragique".

In describing the new policy which Bao Dai would like to adopt, Ngo Dinh Luyen stated that His Majesty is anxious to take an entirely new political stand and at the same time create a real Vietnamese National Army. He has, however, not finally decided to proceed actively at this time and would only do so with US support. Ngo Dinh Luyen asked whether that support would be forthcoming. In reply Bonsal made the customary statement regarding our unwillingness to interfere in internal Vietnamese affairs.

Ngo Dinh Luyen then said that Bao Dai's thinking was along the lines of bringing Ngo Dinh Diem in as Prime Minister and making a complete change in the cabinet. Ngo Dinh Luyen took occasion to say that the French have always dominated His Majesty and that French influence has had the result that many of the men whom His Majesty has called in to serve the governments have, as a consequence of that service, seen their influence and prestige in Viet-Nam seriously diminished. Ngo Dinh Luyen stated that Bao Dai would welcome political suggestions from us.

Ngo Dinh Luyen stated that he had conveyed to Bao Dai the remarks made by General Smith to Ngo Dinh Luyen concerning the time which it takes to form truly combat worthy troops (17 months) as well as the longer period required to train really effective officers at field and general levels. His Majesty's comment is that there are Vietnamese soldiers in the French Expeditionary Corps, in the national army and in various irregular paramilitary, and suppletif forces. It is His Majesty's intention to group all these forces in a new Vietnamese army. Bao Dai is aware that the French will oppose this move for two reasons. First, because they want to keep all French Union forces under their own control and over half of those forces are Vietnamese. (This is probably an exaggeration; the accurate proportion is perhaps 40%.) The second reason is that, according to His Majesty, the French fear a possible agreement between Viet-Nam and the Vietminh, an agreement which would be possible if the preponderance of forces on the Franco-Vietnamese side were to become that of the Vietnamese National Army controlled by the Vietnamese Government.

Bao Dai's general idea is to create a nucleus of combat-worthy troops which would largely be those taken from the present French Expeditionary Corps. His concept is that the army would be a highly mobile, aggressive, offensive-minded force. Ngo Dinh Luyen concluded this exposition of Bao Dai's alleged views by an appeal that we should understand His Majesty's position.

Bonsal asked whether the rather drastic measures proposed, while they might eventually result in the creation of a Vietnamese National Army along the lines envisaged by His Majesty, would not at least at first disorganize and weaken the major fighting units upon which the continuation of successful resistance to the Vietminh depends. In reply Ngo Dinh Luyen stated that of course His Majesty would envisage proceeding gradually and avoiding any such situation as that contemplated in Bonsal's question.

Bao Dai is anxious to obtain direct US assistance for the Vietnamese army. Ngo Dinh Luyen here was referring to MDAP assistance. Bao Dai's thought is that such assistance should come direct to the Vietnamese army instead of through the French authorities as at present or that, if this should prove impractical, there should at least be a specific earmarking of certain items of US assistance as being destined for the Vietnamese National Army. If such an arrangement could be made it should be supplemented by some sort of control machinery to see that earmarked items actually did get to the Vietnamese army.

1See memorandum of Smith-Ngo Dinh Luyen conversation, May 18, p. 843.
Luyen stressed that Bao Dai did not wish to introduce any revolutionary changes which might adversely affect the present combat situation even though theoretically such changes might be desirable.

In conclusion Bonsal told Ngo Dinh Luyen that he would convey the above to General Smith and would advise Ngo Dinh Luyen in the event the General wished to make any specific replies or comments at this time.

Conference file, lot 60 D 627, CP 267 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, May 20, 1954—2 p.m.

Secto 263. Dept pass USUN. Substance twice 2033 and Usun 745* to Dept discussed with Chauvel this morning:

1. He agrees quick action desirable and believes whatever Washington decides should be controlling.
2. He concurs with Lodge Thai case should go first to Security Council. He believes it should then go to Interim Committee rather than Assembly in interests of speed and avoiding possible complications in Assembly.
3. He believes appeal should be made at this time exclusively by Thailand. He concurs in Lodge's thinking and that for Asiatic state not participating in Indochina Conference to appeal to UN on grounds of tension in nearby areas would reinforce allied position at Conference and suggest externally successful settlement on Indochina unlikely at Geneva. For Laos and Cambodia to be associated with it at this time would carry connotation they and France had prematurely given up hope for successful conclusion at Geneva. He stated incidentally latest military information was that Vietminh were moving slowly towards Delta and not towards Laos.

He will consult Bidault on foregoing but is confident of his agreement.

SMITH

*Telegram Secto 261, May 20, contained report of conversation between Under Secretary Smith and Ngo Dinh Luyen on May 18. For memorandum of conversation, see p. 642.

365.1 GR/5-2004 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, May 20, 1954—6 p.m.

Secto 267. Repeated information Paris 307, London 191, Saigon 98. Eden advised Bidauld and me of his talks this morning with Chou along following lines:

Eden had argued case for separation of Laos and Cambodia. Chou had agreed that military and political aspects must be dealt with separately with priority for cease-fire. Cease-fire should take effect in all three States on same date. Political settlements might be different for three. Eden's advisers who had accompanied him felt that Chou wanted an early agreement for cease-fire. Chou had repeatedly stated that if no progress could be made on one line, another should be tried.

Bidault observed that situation with respect to cessation of hostilities was different in three countries. It could be brought about immediately in Cambodia and Laos where it was simply a problem of external forces, while some regrouping of forces would be essential.
in Vietnam. Any extension of this regrouping concept to Laos and Cambodia (as distinct from withdrawal) would complicate their situation by establishing pockets. He did not wish to free conference, but if we abandoned principle of separation, even temporarily, we would not know when or on what level we would be able to take it up again. Laos and Cambodia had said this morning they would not go along if we abandoned separation.

I said I believed Communists desire to produce troop concentrations which they could point to as areas controlled by resistance movements. It would be difficult to determine whether such concentrations were natives or invaders and much would depend on composition and effectiveness of supervision committee, which was matter of supreme importance. We must maintain our position regarding separate consideration Laos and Cambodia, but might explore Communist ideas regarding mechanism of an armistice.

Eden had said West denied so-called resistance movements in Laos and Cambodia had any existence whatever. Chou had said they might be minorities, but they existed and could not be swept out of countries.

French believed Viet Minh proposal (Secto 269, repeated information Paris 269, London 158, Saigon 93) to discuss their point 8(a) and French points one and five, indicated possibility Communists might still agree to separation. I said we would fully reserve our position on separation, but having done so, would agree look at these specific points.

Eden subsequently told me that he had warned Chou again that Indochina situation was dangerous and might lead to unpredictable and serious results. Chou had said he was counting on Britain to prevent this happening. Eden had warned him not to do so, since even though Britain desired moderation, in event of showdown, she would stand with United States.

I do not believe they will make any concessions. They have a big fish on the hook and intend to play it out. They must feel sure that one way or another they will get at maximum a major part or possibly all of Indochina, and at minimum a partition which would produce a Communist state comprising considerable part Vietnam with a slice of Laos and possibly even part of Cambodia. Believe they have decided to risk chance of our intervention, estimating that even if this occurs the result will be another, and for us a more expensive, Korea. They probably count on restraining influence of our allies to prevent us from extending war or striking directly at Communist China or even at the direct source of all the trouble. They must anticipate that the present French Government cannot long survive, and certainly cannot survive a complete impasse here, so it is to their interest to prolong this conference without making concessions. Churchill's statement that no commitments will be made till after Geneva should convince them that time is on their side. On Korea there is nothing whatever to be expected from them. Dean's latest message indicates that will be impossible to produce proposals agreed to by all 16. Best we can hope to do is avoid open opposition by our side when Pyun produces his 14 points. Others of the 16 will possibly then present proposals of their own or speak in support of Eden's points. We will continue, and try to induce others to continue, to hammer as hard as possible on repudiation by all Communist delegations of authority and moral force of United Nations. World public opinion seems becoming conditioned to negative results. Unless something unexpected happens the Korea phase will drag along with an occasional plenary session while Indochina discussions go on.

How long the Indochina phase will continue depends on length of time French are able to sustain the pressure and British believe, either honestly or for political effect, that they can continue to play the role of mediator. Best hope seems to be injection of the United Nations factor. I suppose I must stay here as long as Molotov, Eden and Bidault remain, and apparently they have no immediate intention of leaving. Molotov obviously attaches real importance to this meeting. We will certainly go on for another two weeks at very minimum, and probably longer. Our only strength lies in what you are doing in Washington. Were it not for that, I would suggest that you give serious consideration to coming here when we approach the break-off. If Molotov and Eden leave, I will ask you to replace me. If the conference really gets into an Indochina settlement we could have another Pannunjom.

SMITH

1. Dated May 19, p. 854.

395.1 GE/5-2054 : Telegram
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

Gina, May 20, 1954—6 p. m.

Dulles 92. Eyes only for Secretary. Your Tedul 79. It is difficult to estimate duration Geneva. Communists have not given an inch and a

1. In telegram Tedul 79, May 15, the Secretary asked Under Secretary Smith if he had "any estimate of duration Geneva or at least duration of your tour of duty there?" (395.1 GE/5-2054)
Mr. Eden

R: 6.30 p.m. May 20, 1954.
R: 7.35 p.m. May 20, 1954.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office  Telegram No. 386 of May 20
Bengkok. Peking.
Bali. Peking.
Belhi. Karabul.
Phnom Penh.

and Saving to: Tokyo. Ottawa.
Canberra. Wellington.
Lombe.

Indo-China.

Mr. Cheu En-lai called on me on May 20. The conversation lasted for nearly an hour and was entirely about Indo-China. I opened by referring to the statement which he had made in the restricted session on May 19 that a cease-fire should be effects simultaneously throughout Indo-China. I said that I believed that we were all agreed on this and I felt that it was a ray of hope in an otherwise very difficult situation. However, I felt that progress should now be made by treating the questions of Laos and Cambodia in a separate committee simultaneously with a discussion of the Viet-Nam question in the plenary meetings. There was no suggestion that priority should be given to the issues of Laos and Cambodia or that a decision should be taken on those issues before a decision on Viet-Nam. All that we wanted was that they should be separately and simultaneously discussed. The two States presented relatively simple problems, whereas the Viet-Nam question was full of difficulties.

2. .......

2. Mr. Chou En-lai said that they regarded the war as being a single colonial war which the French had started and considered that there must be a single indivisible cease-fire for the whole of Indo-China. Afterwards there would be political settlements in each of the states separately, and if it was correct that the resistance movements in Laos and Cambodia did not enjoy the support of the people, then the Governments of Laos and Cambodia had nothing to fear. It was essential that the conference should consider only one side. Those movements might be weak but they did exist and would not be expected to withdraw across the frontiers of their own countries before the negotiation of a political settlement was begun. It was no use trying to impose a one-sided settlement. The Chinese were prepared to consider both sides, including Bao Dai, although his government had a very bad reputation in Asia. Mr. Chou En-lai believed that it would be advisable, in order to make progress, to change the subject of discussion as had been done during the negotiations for the Korean armistice. He considered therefore that as proposed by Mr. Holstein, discussion should not centre upon point 1 of the French proposals for a cease-fire and the corresponding point 3(a) of the Viet Minh proposals. It was unfortunate that the representatives of Kheur and Pathet Lao were not present, and that their proposals for the representation of those governments had not been accepted. However, the delegate of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam was authorised to speak for them.

3. I said that our reports showed that the Kheur and Pathet Lao "governments" did not really exist and that these movements had only shown signs of activity after the Berlin conference. Our information was that after the French had given a large measure of independence to the two states, such opposition as there had been largely died down. Mr. Chou En-lai said that this was not correct. He had known of the resistance movements in Kheur and Pathet Lao even when he was negotiating with General Marshall, and they could not be ignored. It was true that French troops were not in Cambodia all the time, but the reason was that the Cambodian troops were under French command. I would remember, however, that the original demands of the North Koreans in the Korean armistice negotiations had in fact ultimately been accepted as the terms of the armistice agreement with the sole exception of the point of the prisoners. The French should not take the same view, as the Americans had in the early stages of the Korean negotiations.

/A. ....
SECRET

Geneva Conference (U.K. Del.) telegram No: 386 to
Foreign Office.

- 3 -

4. I pointed to the dangers which would arise from a
continuation of the war and said that there were a number of
people in the Western countries, including the United Kingdom,
who believed that the Viet Minh were trying to grab the whole
of Indo-China including Laos and Cambodia. Mr. Chou En-lai
again referred to the Korean war and said that the only result
of the one-sided view taken by the United Nations Command had
been an extension of the war and losses by them of men and
territory. The Americans had gained nothing from the two
years of delay. It was untrue that the Viet Minh wished to
take advantage of the situation for aggressive purposes. Bien
Bien Phu had fallen only on the day before the meetings on
Indo-China had begun. Mr. Phan Van Dong had prepared his
proposals before that and had not altered them as a result of
the fall of Bien Bien Phu. I again referred to the dangers
involved if we could not find a solution of the extremely
difficult questions now before us, and said that the people
of the United Kingdom were anxious for peace and a settlement,
but I was much concerned at the present outlook. As for our
relations with other nations, Mr. Chou En-lai would have no
doubt how very close and intimate were our relations with
the United States. Mr. Chou En-lai said that they also
wanted peace. He said that Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, the Indian
Health Minister, had visited him and had said that Indian
opinion was insistent on there being a cease-fire on the existing
positions in the same way as there had been in Kashmir. He
also referred to Mr. Nehru’s proposals for a cease-fire as being
substantially the same as what the Chinese now proposed.

5. I later gave M. Bidault and General Bedell Smith
a brief account of my conversation with Mr. Chou En-lai. I
said that the main point that emerged seemed to me to be that
he was likely to be very firm in insisting that the military
cease-fire must be considered as a single problem for the
whole of Indo-China, though it was just possible that he might
be prepared to admit that any eventual political settlement
should be discussed separately for each of the three Associate
States. M. Bidault said that the Cambodian and Laotian
delgations had given him to understand that they would part

company with....
company with the French delegation rather than make any concessions on the question of separate treatment for their two countries even in the initial military phase. There were clearly dangers in any such concessions since once the principle of troop concentration areas were accepted for Laos and Cambodia as well as for Viet-Nam, that would affect the nature of the ultimate political settlement in those two states. On the other hand French opinion would not be prepared to contemplate the breakdown of the conference on the present issue. M. Bidault accordingly proposed to consider carefully M. Molotov's suggestion that discussion should begin upon point 1 of the French proposals and point 8(a) of the Viet Minh proposals, in order to see whether it could not be accepted as a basis for our future work without prejudice to our position on Laos and Cambodia. General Bedell Smith indicated that he would be prepared to consider this also and it was arranged that we should meet again this evening before I left to dine with M. Molotov.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington, Paris, Bangkok, Peking, Saigon, Rangoon, New Delhi, Karachi, Phnom Penh and Saing to Tokyo, Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, Colombo as my telegrams Nos. 118, 90, 10, 38, 25, 21, 42, 38, 4 and Saing 3, 5, 5, 5, and 3.

[Repeated to Washington, Paris, Bangkok, Peking, Saigon, Rangoon, Phnom Penh and Saing to Tokyo. Copy to Commonwealth Relations Office for repetition to New Delhi, Karachi and Saing to Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington and Colombo.]

ADVANCE COPIES
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Private Secretary
Mr. Speaight
Head of South East Asia Department
Head of Far Eastern Department
Resident Clerk

JJJJJJ
TTTTT
2. Without redeployment of major units, the Viet Minh will have during the next two weeks the capability to increase the present level of their military operations throughout Indochina. In the Delta, the Viet Minh over the next two weeks will probably continue to mount attacks against French strong points and to cut temporarily the lines of communications between Hanoi and Haiphong. In addition, they will probably continue to augment their capabilities for sabotage and terrorist activities in Hanoi and Haiphong. However, while the scale of these activities will increase, they will probably not exercise these capabilities for sabotage and terrorism to the full during the next two weeks except in the event of large-scale military operations in the Delta. Outside the Delta, the Viet Minh will probably launch attacks in Central Vietnam, conduct raiding operations in Laos, and increase guerrilla operations in Cambodia.

3. We consider that, despite the defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the French Union forces still retain the will to defend key points. In the Delta, the French almost certainly will possess for at least the next two weeks the capability to hold major positions. They have redeployed one mobile group from Laos to the Delta, and they apparently intend to regroup forces already within the Delta even though this may require the abandonment of some outlying Delta strong points. Outside the Delta region, the French will probably have the capability to hold most positions during the next two weeks although they may abandon certain positions in order to concentrate their troops in critical areas elsewhere.

4. Military Developments Within the Next 30 Days

4. If major units now at Dien Bien Phu are redeployed as rapidly as possible, the Viet Minh can within the next 80 days attain a capability for launching a heavy assault against French positions in the Delta. Preparations are now being made for moving the bulk of the Viet Minh units from Dien Bien Phu toward their bases in the Delta area, and there are indications that redeployment has begun. We believe that approximately one division will remain initially in the vicinity of Dien Bien Phu. The major portion of the forces at Dien Bien Phu with their heavy equipment could not assemble in the Delta area before 7-15 June, although it is believed that their lightly equipped units could complete the movement by 31 May. However, the gradual increase in intensity of rains during the month of June, combined with French aerial attacks on Route 41, may slow down the movement.

5. In addition to the force at Dien Bien Phu, the concentration of 17 battalions at Thai Nguyen, a point approximately 25 miles north of Hanoi may be used to augment the Viet Minh capability for major attacks against the Delta. This group, 13 of which are regional battalions, appears to be undergoing advanced training. It is unlikely that these troops will be independently committed in major attacks on Delta strong points during the next 30 days. However, they might be used to attack French static defense units or to fill out a major attacking force made up of units now at Dien Bien Phu.

6. If military considerations alone dictate, we estimate that the Viet Minh will not launch an all-out assault against the Delta during the next 30 days. The major factors militating against such an assault...
are: the requirements for reorganization and recuperation of Dien Bien Phu main striking force, the limited period of time to prepare for major assaults against fortified positions, the possibilities of delay in movement of artillery units into position, the onset of the rainy season with resultant supply difficulties, and the flooding of areas within the Delta which restrict routes for troop movements and areas of maneuver. The most important deterrent, however, is the French strength in manpower, firepower, and airpower. However, the Viet Minh might undertake an assault on the Delta because of political requirements in relation to Geneva, or on the basis of their estimate that French Union forces had become demoralized and that Viet Minh capabilities for assault combined with sabotage, terrorism, and insurrection might prove decisive in the Delta. Barring a serious deterioration of the will to fight of the French Union forces as a result of political developments in Indochina or elsewhere, we believe that the French would be able to counter or blunt such an assault within the next 30 days.

7. On the other hand, we anticipate that, short of mounting an all-out assault on the Delta, the Viet Minh during the next 30 days will increase their present level of operations and will attack French strong points in the Delta and elsewhere. Although we consider it likely that the French will suffer some reverses from attacks on this scale, we believe that they will be able to retain possession of most of their key strong points throughout Indochina, and will be able to keep open the lines of communications between Hanoi and Haiphong except for frequent but temporary interruptions.

8. It is possible that defections by Viet Minh units will occur during the next 30 days and will thus reduce the capabilities of French Union forces. Some Vietnamese from militia units are believed to have deserted recently to the Viet Minh with their arms. On the other hand, since the fall of Dien Bien Phu, French and Vietnamese units have been engaged with no indication of impaired morale or will to fight. We estimate that, unless the Vietnamese become convinced that the French intend to sell out in Indochina or unless the Viet Minh achieve substantial military successes, the fighting capabilities of the French Union forces during the next 30 days will not deteriorate so severely as to preclude their employment as an effective military force. There is always the possibility however that some spectacular Viet Minh success in the Delta would convince the native population and Vietnamese troops there that victory in the Delta was imminent, in which case an extremely rapid deterioration of the situation in North Vietnam would ensue.

II. Political Developments

10. Barring the unlikely event of a large-scale Viet Minh invasion, or of a coup d’état, Laos and Cambodia will probably retain their present uncertain political stability during the next 30 days. The Laosian Government will almost certainly remain in power if the French continue to provide it with support. The Cambodian Government will probably retain control and will continue its efforts to solicit direct US aid.

11. Political stability in Vietnam will probably continue to deteriorate during this period. In the absence of both Bao Dai and Binh

Loc, factionalism has become extreme, and the Vietnamese central government is virtually paralyzed. It is possible that the Vietnam central government will disintegrate during the next 30 days. It is also possible that a coup may be attempted by General Hinh, who has obvious dictatorial ambitions. If the Vietnam central government should disintegrate, the French could almost certainly maintain civil control temporarily in the regions they occupy by working through Vietnamese regional governors and local officials. A large part of the Vietnamese troops in the French Union forces probably would continue at least temporarily to be responsive to the French High Command. Thus disintegration of the Vietnam central government, while it would complicate negotiations at Geneva, would almost certainly not cause an immediate collapse of French control in Indochina unless it were accompanied or preceded by a collapse of the French military position.

End text.
fire in Laos and Cambodia on basis of troop withdrawal but West might propose progressive withdrawal.

Bidault was not optimistic about Associated States reaction to this gambit nor did he believe Communists would buy it. However, he felt he must push detailed analysis of Viet Minh proposal clear to bottom before drawing positive conclusions. He had no intention of accepting single military and political treatment for three countries.

I pointed out that Viet Minh proposal contained elements (8 b) such as prohibition on movement of troops or arms into Indochina which would destroy our position. We would comply while they would not. Any such agreement would be fatal unless there were really effective supervisory machinery. Bidault recognized impossibility of controlling Chinese frontier and Mekong.

It was agreed we would propose setting up three committees, one for each country, or two with Laos and Cambodia lumped in one. This would be discussed by 6 tomorrow and decision then made between two or three. I stressed importance of making very clear to Associated States that we were in no way receding from our stand on separation. If Associated States were in full agreement, France would propose setting up committees, otherwise either US or UK would do so. If Communists refused this, we would be prepared on Monday to begin discussion of military provisions of French and Viet Minh proposals with respect to Vietnam, reserving our position on others.

SMITH

MAY 21, 1954

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT
WASHINGTON, May 21, 1954—2:44 P.M.

Tosec 228. Urgent Secto 273. Below is draft letter to SC President containing Department modifications as given to Sarasin last June. No memo of transmission required for SC proceeding.

Verbatim text:

"I have the honor, under instructions from my Government and in conformity with Articles 33 and 35, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, to bring to the attention of the Security Council a situation which, in the view of my Government, represents not only a threat to the security of Thailand but is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security of the region. Large-scale fighting has taken place in the immediate vicinity of Thai territory; there has been a clear possibility of direct incursions..."

1 Drafted by Steh S. USA/UNP. Repeated to USUN as telegram 574.
2 Not printed. (396.1 GE/5-2154)
Telegram, Zhou Enlai's telegram to Mao Zedong and others, Regarding the Situation of the Third Restricted Session, May 20, 1954

Record No.: 206-Y0049

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

(1) On the 19th, the secretive session on the Indochina issue continuously discuss whether the Cambodia and Laos question should be dealt with separately. After three hours’ debate, no progress was achieved. Bidault proposed that the Cambodia and Laos question be discussed by a committee appointed by the whole conference, yet he also stated that he did not mean to taking the resolving of the Cambodia and Laos question as a precondition to resolving the Vietnam question. I pointed out that a ceasefire need to be carried out in the whole of Indochina, and that I would not agree to separating the Cambodia and Laos question from the Vietnam question. Before yesterday’s session Eden proposed to Molotov that the meeting be adjourned on the 20th for activities outside of the conference, that the secretive session on the Indochina issue be resumed on the 21st, and that the plenary session on the Korea issue be held on the 22nd. Our side agreed to this plan. This is the rumor that Eden and Bidault plan to make a trip back to Britain and France during the weekend.

(2) On the Korea issue I plan to take the lead to speak on the question of having countries of neutrality supervise the election. The speech notes have been drafted and are in the process of revision. The other side has not introduced any plan for resolving the Korea issue. Probably they are discussing with Syngman Rhee and are waiting for Rhee’s response.

(3) I plan to pay a return visit to Eden on the morning of the 20th. The result of the conversation will be reported separately.

Zhou Enlai
May 20, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
fire in Laos and Cambodia on basis of troop withdrawal but West might propose progressive withdrawal.

Bidault was not optimistic about Associated States' reaction to this gambit nor did he believe Communists would accept it. However, he felt he must push detailed analysis of Viet Minh proposal clear to bottom before drawing positive conclusions. He had no intention of accepting single military and political treatment for three countries.

I pointed out that Viet Minh proposal contained elements (8) such as prohibition on movement of troops or arms into Indochina which would destroy our position. We would comply while they would not. Any such agreement would be fatal unless there were really effective supervisory machinery. Bidault recognized impossibility of controlling Chinese frontier and Mekong.

It was agreed we should propose setting up three committees, one for each country. Two with Laos and Cambodia lumped in one. This would be discussed by 8 tomorrow and decision then made between two or three. He pressed importance of making very clear to Associated States that there were no way receding from our stand on separation. If Associated States were in full agreement, France would propose setting up committees, otherwise either US or UK would do so. If Communists refused this, we would be prepared on Monday to begin discussion of military provisions of French and Viet Minh proposals with respect to Vietnam, reserving our position on others.

SMITH

MAY 21, 1954

SECRET

Secto 273. Repeated information Paris 313, London 195, Saigon 103, Moscow 79. Limit distribution. Eden told me at dinner last night Molotov made "personal" observation could get ahead with work on Indochina by examining certain proposals (within framework of French and Viet Minh proposals) for cessation of hostilities which would in any event inevitably apply to all three Associated States. Molotov specifically mentioned the question of supervisory machinery and the segregation of opposing forces. Molotov suggested after this has been done, conference could examine application to each country of the general proposals. Over and above foregoing, political issues with respect to each country could be dealt with separately. Molotov said he did not know what Chinese would say to such proposition and was putting it forward only as his own personal idea.

Eden stated he made no commitment. He reported conversation to Bidault after returning from dinner last night. Neither Eden nor I yet have any information on Bidault's reactions.

Eden said that Molotov was in very relaxed mood. At opening of their conversation had referred to various press rumors on US-UK differences, stating he did not believe them. Eden said he replied that Molotov was right. Molotov then went on to state we should not imagine the Soviet Union does not have its differences with its allies and stated it would be wrong to believe that Soviet Union controls China.

Eden stated he had impression Molotov really wanted to "get moving" on Indochina. Said much easier to deal with him than Chou En-lai who was personally stiff and unresponsive, usually giving a cold exposition of China's position in response to Eden's attempts at fruitful discussion. Eden stated throughout evening Molotov refrained from any criticism US and again adverts to Secretary's departure from Geneva with some puzzlement. Eden said he referred to Secretary's statements at Berlin that he would be unable to spend any length of time in Geneva. Eden agreed with my observation that Molotov was probably worried over what the Secretary is doing back in Washington, and that this was a good thing.
of foreign troops into its territory. This possibility continues to exist [despite the temporary recession of the direct threat of military incursions].

I have the honor to bring this situation of international tension to the attention of the Security Council to the end that the Security Council may provide for observation in the area under the Peace Observation Commission.

The Royal Thai Government makes this appeal to the Security Council not only as a firm supporter of the United Nations but as a power firmly determined to play its part in maintaining international peace and security in Southeast Asia.

Finally, I have the honor to request that you call a meeting of the Security Council to consider this matter and, as representative of Thailand, I may be invited, in conformity with rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, to participate in the Council discussion of the question.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Suggest bracketed portion of last sentence second paragraph be omitted.

Next following telegram contains text of draft resolution.

We are pursuing this draft text of the draft resolution in SC and Department. We are drafting a working version of the text in SC and GA. We are reviewing these working papers only and contain no firm positions.

DULLES

Brackets in the source text.

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1954—3 p.m.

Tosec 293. Urtel Sec 273. Following is text of draft resolution agreed between Thailand and Department last June:

Verbatim text:

"The Security Council, recalling General Assembly Resolution 331 (V) (uniting for a peace), part A, section B establishing a peace observation commission which could observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, finds that there exists in the general area of [and adjacent to] Thailand [and Laos] a condition of international tension and the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security, requests the Peace Observation Commission to establish a subcommission composed of his [sic] members, with the seat at the United Nations Headquarters, with authority:

(a) To despatch such observers as it may deem necessary to any part of the above area on the request of any state or states concerned, but only to the territory of the states consented thereto;

(b) To visit if it deems necessary the area in which observation is requested under subparagraph (a) is being conducted;

(c) To consider such data as may be submitted to it by its members or observers and to prepare and submit such reports as it deems necessary to the Peace Observation Commission and the Security Council for information to its member states."

Suggests as minimum dialogue exchanges:

(1) Omission brackets in words second paragraph. Words "and adjacent to" would raise possibility using POC in Vietnam if words "and Laos" are also omitted.

(2) Re paragraph three, Department has in mind subcommission of five (India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden and Uruguay) and believes it would be preferable name these states in resolution since if composition left to POC, there would be additional delay and greater risk appointment less desirable members.

DULLES

Brackets in the source text.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Fourth Restricted Session of Indochina, Geneva, May 21, 3 p.m.

The United States Delegation to the Department of State 1

SECRET

GENEVA, May 21, 1954—11 p.m.


1 A set of minutes of this session (FC Restricted/4) is in Conference Files, lot 60 D 627, CP 278. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p.m. and adjourned at 7:15 p.m. The minutes are also printed in Conference de Genève, pp. 122-130.

Date 18 May 19, p. 864.
Molotov in chair referred to “wish” expressed May 19 by Soviet delegation that discussion of paragraph 1 of French proposal and paragraph 8-α of DRV proposal be initiated.*

Bidault recalled that French proposal dealt only with Vietnam while DRV proposal covered all three countries. He accepted principle of examination of all current proposals including Vietnamese, Cambodian and others. He noted that DRV and USSR have apparently accepted the principle that priority be given to military questions, but that they object to separate treatment of Cambodia and Laos on one hand and Vietnam on other. While French delegate agrees object of present exercise is peace in all three states, French delegate never had in mind priority for one over other and agrees must be guarantees and controls international character to cover cease-fire in all three states. Nevertheless, fact that conditions in Laos and Cambodia are different from those in Vietnam must be taken into account.

DRV delegate stated that differences in three states were of degree but not of kind and rejected idea of dissociating Cambodia and Laos from Vietnam.

Cambodian delegate reiterated view that Cambodia was special case to be considered separately and on priority basis. Suggested however possibility discussion of Vietnam and then of Cambodia and Laos in alternate sessions. Laotian delegate spoke to same effect.

Chou En-lai spoke in favor of Molotov’s proposal on basis objective was working out of cease-fire throughout Indochina.

US delegate, making clear that he was not commenting on substance of proposals pointed out French proposals deal only with Vietnam which is principal problem. If way can be found of solving it we will have less trouble with others. He suggested application to Vietnam of French and Viet Minh paragraphs be discussed. US delegate maintained the view that Laos and Cambodia present a different and simpler problem from Vietnam.

Eden agreed with US and Cambodian proposal suggesting discussion application Vietnam one day and then next day application to Cambodia and Laos. He reserved position regarding details of proposals (as had US delegate).

Molotov then recalled that though some delegations had wished to start discussion political problems, compromise had been reached on suggestion of French delegate that military problems be discussed first. French and Viet Minh proposals accepted as basis for discussion. He said paragraph 5 of French proposal to be discussed in addition to one so as to match paragraph 8-α of Viet Minh proposal.

*For the Viet Minh and French proposals, see telegrams Secto 148, May 8, and Secto 162, May 10, pp. 730 and 735, respectively.

suggested that these paragraphs be discussed from the point of view first of finding what provisions would be applicable to all of Indochina. Conference would proceed to discuss questions peculiar to different parts of the area.

DRV delegate supported Soviets proposal stating that before going into problems of Vietnam, Khmer and Pathet-Lao it would be well to establish certain general principles applicable to whole area.

Bidault said he did not think any general rules could be worked out which would be applicable to these special and particular situations. He felt that if special character was not established no results would be achieved.

US delegate then said that although US delegation believes relatively simple problem of Laos and Cambodia should be handled separately, US delegation willing to discuss application French and Viet Minh paragraphs to Vietnam in order to ascertain whether such discussion can give us some general principles applicable elsewhere. US delegate supported Cambodian proposal of alternate meetings.

After recess Eden made two points: (1) if we were to discuss two texts and proposals they contained, we should also discuss separately their application to each of three states; and (2) all delegations should also be free to discuss related proposals such as those dealing with international control.

Molotov stated his understanding we would discuss general principles applicable to all three cases and then their application to each separately. He agreed to discussion of any closely related proposals. He then suggested discussion turn to substance.

Bidault thought there would be confusion and waste of time unless there were agreement as to questions which would be discussed as relating to all three. He suggested committee be established to draw up such list.

Molotov saw no need for committee and suggested we begin by discussing two questions: (1) simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina, and (2) zones for regrouping forces. This would not preclude discussion of other elements such as international supervision and non-introduction of foreign troops or arms.

Doug concurred with Molotov’s first point, amplified second by saying there must be readjustment in each of three countries of areas held by opposing forces, and proposed discussion also to cover non-interference with movements of troops into zones. Proposal for cessation of introduction of foreign troops and arms spoke for itself. He supported Soviet proposal for neutral commissions and guarantee of agreements by members of conference acting of course collectively.
Bidault cited reference in point 8 to agreements between France and each of three countries. He said France had agreements with each but they were allies rather than enemies and would be on same side any armistice agreement. Point 8 (a) ignored distinction between civil war in Vietnam and external invasion in Cambodia and Laos and was not acceptable as basis for discussion. He reiterated proposal committee draw up list of questions for discussion. He also suggested conference summon representatives of Commanders-in-Chief to Geneva to assist in separate discussion of problems of three countries.

Smith cited problem of who would determine whether hostile forces in Laos and Cambodia were Viet Minh invaders or indigenous and agreed with Bidault we should have list of basic questions before proceeding to substantive discussion.

Chou thought committee would be pointless if conference itself could not agree on agenda. First point for discussion should be general principles for simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina. He granted application would be different in three countries. He supported Soviet proposal on neutral commission and guarantees. Viet Minh proposal re cession of all entry of foreign troops and arms was essential to any effective cease-fire.

Bidault suggested two chairmen might be asked to establish list of questions.

Molotov said we had decided on May 17 to consider Viet Minh point 8 (a) and French points 1 and 5 and any other related questions. He saw five principal ones: first simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina. After decision in principle, this would require detailed consideration including fixing of time limits for carrying it out. Second was establishment of zones in each of three states. Third was non introduction of foreign troops or arms. Fourth was supervision over terms of agreement. Fifth is need for guarantees. Other questions might emerge from discussion.

Bidault said Molotov had listed five questions and he himself thought Bidault could agree to discussion of any of them provided it was on basis of dealing with fundamental principles rather than national application.

Eden suggested Molotov's five questions plus Bidault's three others be taken up at next session. He thought it well to consider getting representatives of two commands here since that would take some time.

Molotov reaffirmed that his five questions were not exclusive and that anyone could add others. His referred only to military aspects and political problems could be discussed later.

Cambodian delegate reiterated that in Cambodia there could be no question of regrouping troops in internal zones, only withdrawal of invaders.

DRV saw no need for representatives of two commands and said any delegation could call anyone it wanted.

Next meeting will be restricted one on May 24.

Smith

399.1 GE/5-2154

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath)

SECRET

GENEVA, May 21, 1954.

Participants: M. Marc Jacquet, French State Secretary for the Associated States.

Donald R. Heath, Ambassador to Vietnam and Cambodia

During the conference intermission today I spoke with Jacquet. He said:

1. The political situation in Paris was very shaky.
2. Reports of political deterioration in Vietnam were very disquieting.
3. He was also disturbed by the friction between Generals Cogny and Navarre. The latter had lost much of his former moral authority over his command.
4. To my question whether he had heard rumors of the reconciliation between Bao Dai and Ngo Dinh Diem, he said that last December he would have favored Bao Dai's appointing Ngo Dinh Diem as Prime Minister, now he is not so sure it would be a good idea to change Bao Loc.
5. He had heard rumors of contacts between members of the Vietnameses and Vietminh delegations which he found alarming. If there was a conciliation of the two factions it would be the Bao Dai crowd which would lose out. In that connection he recalled that Bao Dai during a recent conversation had made a cryptic remark which had disturbed him. Bao Dai had said "we should approach this situation as we did in 1945." Bao Dai would not explain this statement and Jacquet recalled that in 1945 Bao Dai had abdicated and accepted a post as Political Counselor to Ho Chi Minh.

Comment: It was rather interesting to hear Jacquet worry about contacts between the Vietminh and Vietnam Delegations. According to a memorandum \footnote{Not printed.} from Chester L. Cooper, "M. Marc Jacquet, with-
CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 22, 1954


Dear Dennis: With reference to our conversation of this morning, I am quoting below the draft letter to the President of the Security Council which the Thai government proposed to send last June. The only change which Washington believes need be made at this time is deletion of the bracketed portion at the end of the second paragraph.

I have the honor, under instructions from my Government and in conformity with Articles 34 and 35, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, to bring to the attention of the Security Council a situation which, in the view of my Government, represents not only a threat to the security of Thailand but is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security of the region. Large-scale fighting has taken place in the immediate vicinity of Thai territory; there has been a clear possibility of direct incursions of foreign troops into its territory. This possibility continues to exist despite the temporary recession of the direct threat of military incursions.

I have the honor to bring this situation of international tension to the attention of the Security Council to the end that the Security Council may provide for observation in the area under the Peace Observation Commission.

The Royal Thai Government makes this appeal to the Security Council not only as a firm supporter of the United Nations but as a power firmly determined to play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia.

Finally, I have the honor to request that you call a meeting of the Security Council to consider this matter and, as representative of Thailand, I may be invited, in conformity with rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, to participate in the Council discussion of the question.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

The following is the text of the draft resolution which the Thai government intended to propose last June. Washington believes that it is still suitable with deletion of the bracketed words in the second paragraph. The Department also has in mind a subcommittee of five—India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden and Uruguay—and believes it would be desirable to name these states in the resolution.

1 Repeated to New York as telegram 577, to London as telegram 627, to Paris as telegram 4202, to Saigon as telegram 2375, and to Bangkok as telegram 2375.

1 Dated May 20, p. 482.

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SECRET  PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1954—6 p. m.

To Secy State

Department agrees appeal at this time should be made exclusively by Thailand. Believe important you press for definitive French and United Kingdom agreement in order furnish basis press Thailand for immediate action.

Department has serious doubts regarding use inter committee for establishment POC subcommission and prefers use GA for following reasons.

We consider it most desirable obtain greatest possible Asian support: India would interpret bypassing GA over which Mrs. Pandit would press by reviving moribund body as slap at Indian Government; India and other Asians would react badly to deliberate choice forum which Soviets consider illegal and have hitherto boycotted, and Asians might not support establishment subcommission or agree serve on it. Reports by subcommission so established might not carry same weight as body created under unchallenged auspices. If Soviets should not take seats in inter committee, we would gain little if anything by reactivating it.

Use inter committee would give Soviets pretext for challenging legality POC operation; if POC set in motion by GA, Soviets could not convincingly oppose it. USSR did not oppose POC section of unifying for peace resolution and is member of full POC. USSR would not of course be appointed to POC subcommission.

Might also be fairly serious procedural complications. While terms of reference inter committee could be interpreted mean it can meet while GA recessed, practice has been for committee not to meet unless regular session GA has adjourned. Thus committee did not meet in 1951 or in 1953. GA is now in recess. There might thus be procedural wrangle at outset when inter committee is being organized.

While its terms of reference prohibit inter committee from itself taking any substantive action other than establishing subcommission, committee can recommend additional action to GA and convene special GA session. Particularly if piqued, Asians likely press for additional action and immediate GA session. Would be difficult prevent this and net result would be two debates on Indochina.

DULLES

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Additional action and immediate GA session. Would be difficult prevent this and net result would be two debates on Indochina.

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1 Brackets in the source text.
"The Security Council,

"Recalling General Assembly Resolution 337(V), (uniting for peace), part A, section B establishing a peace observation commission which could observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,

"Finds that there exists in the general area of [and adjacent to] Thailand [and Laos] a condition of international tension the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security;

"Requests the Peace Observation Commission to establish a sub-commission composed of . . . members, with its seat at the United Nations Headquarters, with authority:

(a) To despatch such observers as it may deem necessary to any part of the above area on the request of any state or states concerned, but only to the territory of states consenting thereto;
(b) To visit if it deems necessary, any area in which observation requested under sub-paragraph (a), is being conducted;
(c) To consider such data as may be submitted to it by its members or observers and to make such reports as it deems necessary to the Peace Observation Commission and the Security Council for the information of member states."

Sincerely,  

THEODORE ACHILLES

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885  FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1952–1954, VOLUME XVI

INDOCHINA  885

790.5/5–1954 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1954—11:08 a.m.

Tedul 106. Limit distribution. In May 20 meeting with Webb and Munro Secretary outlined JCS recommendations (Tedul 93 *) re UK terms reference (Dulte 84 * ) proposed five power military talks. Secretary said US believes talks should take place Washington and not transfer elsewhere later without full agreement of five. Webb expressed hope representation at talks would be high level in view importance New Zealand and world opinion. Secretary thought Defense tentatively had in mind two or three star general but indicated no decision yet taken. Subsequently it appeared New Zealand thinking of General Gentry, Chief of General Staff.

Secretary revealed background our recent discussions with UK re Southeast Asia action beginning with April 13 communiqué issued following London visit. He explained his concern that Eden had agreed to establish working group Washington but subsequently backed out just prior scheduled meeting, which then had to be changed to meeting of 16-power Korean group plus Associated States representatives. Secretary stated Churchill’s May 17 Commons statement was further repudiation original April 18 joint communiqué. Churchill modified statement on readiness examine possibility establishing collective defense by inserting additional phrase “when the outcome of the Geneva Conference is clear”. Churchill statement also omitted UK readiness make such examination “with other countries principally concerned”. Churchill changed April 13 statement “establishing a collective defense” to “establishing a system of collective security and defense”. Secretary felt establishment of “system” might unduly delay necessary and immediate measures, noting that NATO Treaty had taken over year to work out.

Secretary outlined reasons which led US in April to take initiative in creating ad hoc coalition to offset then impending fall Dien Bien Phu. He admitted UK change of position had not been helpful to US–UK relations.

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1 Drafted by Horsey of EUR/BNA and Draper of S/S. Repeated to London as telegram 6273, to Paris telegram 4225, to Wellington as telegram 166, and repeated from Wellington to Canberra as telegram 217. Memorandum of conversation, May 20, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 328.

2 Dated May 20, p. 588.

3 Dated May 18, p. 541.

4 For the Secretary’s briefing on Apr. 20, see the memorandum of conversation, p. 586.

5 For text of Churchill’s May 17 statement, see editorial note, p. 584.
which I now believe they are prepared to accept. Also, cannot forget that British are equally concerned and upset by President's statement regarding possible Southeast Asian pact "without Britain."

SMITH

At his news conference on May 19, the President, in response to a question whether "we could build an effective pact back there [in Southeast Asia] without Great Britain's support," answered: "Well, after all, you must remember that Australia and New Zealand are the countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations that are directly involved. I should say that with the proper Asian nations, which of course I lay down as a sine qua non, and Australia and New Zealand, we might possibly work out something that would be maybe not as satisfactory or as broad as you would like it, but could be workable." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, p. 491.)

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NAC T

GENEVA, MAY 22, 1954—1 p.m.

Dulles 97. Eyes only for the Secretary. Re Tedul's 98 and 88. Eden left early this morning for Paris and London before I had time to analyze or to speak to him regarding our JCS recommendations on the British text re five-power staff talks.

Since I received these comments in Tedul's 93, you have probably seen Avis Gento 32 of 21 May 1 reporting summary given him by Colonel Monckton, British military adviser. You will note that the British propose these talks be conducted at Chief of Staff level, Australia and New Zealand concurring. They intend to send to Washington the Army Chief of Staff, General Harding, with advisers of major general rank from the other three services. This automatically lifts talks above level of "five-power staff agency".

You will also note the comprehensive items for discussion proposed by British delegation here to British Chiefs of Staff, which I assume will be adopted.

Under these circumstances, I am extremely reluctant to open up again the whole matter with Eden on the basis of our JCS comments, some of which I think are no longer pertinent, and most of which I think should be settled by these senior staff officers themselves when they first meet in Washington.

Department's assumption that omission of informing Associated States from Eden's memo is an oversight, is correct. He understands

1 Dated May 20, p. 885.
2 Dated May 19, p. 886.
3 Not found in Department of State files. In a note (attached to the source text) Kitchen informed the Secretary that "we have made arrangements to obtain the reference Defense message (Avis Gento 32 of 21 May) from Defense as quickly as possible."
they will be informed. He also understands that the information which will be given to the several participants to their Asiatic protégés as to terms of reference will vary. His wording is that he proposes to use to those nations that will be informed by Britain, and I told him that we would probably modify it to a certain extent in speaking to the countries whom we are to inform.

I have pushed this matter pretty hard with Eden because I believe that these talks were desirable to lay some of the dust which has been raised about disunity, and also because I believe that serious military technical discussions are imperative.

So far as joint participation in staff conversations are concerned, the first objective has already been accomplished by the press. The scope and effectiveness of the second will depend very largely on the ability of the soldiers to get down to serious business, and as we have quite enough points of friction here, I would hope to be relieved of the necessity of going again to Eden on this matter unless a real major issue arises.

Monckton informed us that Eden is very concerned about the leak to the British press of details regarding the five-power talks and that a thorough investigation is being made both at London and at Geneva to determine the source.*

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* Memorandum of conversation, May 21, between Colonel Monckton, Colonel Ferguson, and Colonel Taber, not printed. (296.1 GE/5-2154)

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329.5/5-2254: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 22, 1954—1:51 p.m.

Teden 107. Eyes only for Under Secretary from Secretary. Re Dulles 97. You may advise Eden acceptance his proposal Dulles 84 on following understandings which we believe acceptable and understood by other participants:

1. Any decision to move from Washington would involve unanimous concurrence rather than majority vote;

2. We will ourselves prefer to call the group “military representatives of the participating powers” but since it is understood that no official announcement will be made this matter is presumably academic.

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329.5/5-2254: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 22, 1954—2:15 p.m.

Teden 108. Ur Dulles 96. My preliminary thinking is that we should not resist participation Southern countries. If they effectively as-

* Drafted by the Secretary of State.

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Dulles
Accordingly, it would seem advisable not to attempt to substitute for Bao Dai, but to avail ourselves of what he has to offer, meanwhile remaining alert to minimize his power to do harm if he should evince tendency to revert to his old habits or to adopt new ones contrary to our interests.

As we now conceive it, the provisional legislative body mentioned above (whose initial membership could come from among local councillors elected in January 1953, representatives chosen by religious and political groups, and other persons selected as far as possible from elements which have stood aloof from politics since beginning of present hostilities) would have to grow into its job. At outset, it should have right to approve the government then existing or new one chosen by Bao Dai in consultation with French and ourselves, or it might elect an executive committee from its own membership from which part or all of the cabinet would be chosen. Assembly could thereafter have right to question ministers and probably vote budget, but its primary attention should be directed toward writing constitution, aided by French and American constitutional experts.

While we should under no circumstances commit ourselves irrevocably to Bao Dai nor indicate a fixed opinion in favor of any particular governmental reform, we must seek what good we can derive from his cooperation at least for the time being. Thus far the worst in his character seems to have been indulged, with results which are all too apparent. If he should now prove to have better stuff in him, we shall have gained useful ally. End FYI.

I hope you will take earliest occasion to renew personal contact with Bao Dai. Because of his oriental reticence, perhaps it would be advisable for you to talk with him only in presence of an interpreter of his choice. In this interview you should draw him out as far as possible on following lines (FYI portion this message may be useful to you in formulating questions, and was included for that purpose, but you will of course avoid indicating trend of our thought to Bao Dai):

1. What can be done quickly to rectify political situation in non-Communist Vietnam?
2. What kind of "concerted action" does he have in mind?
3. What kind of working relationship does he see between himself and US?
4. What would be French reaction to such a working relationship, and how does he envisage operation of a Franco-US-Vietnamese partnership?

This conversation should of course be purely exploratory. Its purpose is to afford us a better current appreciation of one who may of necessity play important part in Vietnam for some time to come. You should assure Bao Dai you are ready to communicate with him di-

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1 Drafted by Sturm of FR/PSA and Guillen of S/P. Repeated to Paris as telegram 6226 and to Saigon as telegram 2888.
2 Telegram Seco 261, May 20, contained a report of a conversation between Under Secretary Smith and Ngo Dinh Luyen on May 18. For memorandum of conversation, see p. 845.
3 Dated May 20, p. 863.
rectly whenever he wishes. After interview, I would like you to make full report including your personal estimate of Bao Dai and of his probable utility in developing situation.

I know that you understand clearly the delicacy vis-à-vis Bidault and the French generally of our seeming to intervene in this regard. I leave tactics to your good judgment.

Request Delegation, Paris and Saigon comment on FYI section this message.

Dulles

751G.00/5-2854

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal)

TOP SECRET


Participants: Tezenas du Montcel, Minister of the Associated States Philip W. Bonsal

Subject: Visit to General Smith of Bao Dai’s Personal Representative, Ngo Dinh Luyen

Pursuant to General Smith’s approval of the recommendation contained in my memorandum of May 21, I asked Tezenas du Montcel to come to see me. He did so on Saturday evening, May 22.

Emphasizing the highly sensitive and confidential nature of what I was about to tell him, I gave Tezenas du Montcel a broad outline of the approach made to General Smith by Ngo Dinh Luyen in the capacity of Bao Dai’s personal representative. I indicated that the major purpose of the approach seemed to be in order to find out to what extent Bao Dai could count on American support in the event that present French support should appear to weaken for any reason. I told Tezenas du Montcel that General Smith had stressed in the most emphatic terms to Ngo Dinh Luyen his conviction regarding French resolution and determination under present circumstances. I added that no reply had as yet been given to Ngo Dinh Luyen with regard to the questions which he had asked. I said also that we are somewhat puzzled as to whether Ngo Dinh Luyen is in fact accurately stating the views of His Majesty. He may be serving more as a mouthpiece of his brother, Ngo Dinh Diem.

Tezenas du Montcel expressed great appreciation of General Smith’s action in seeing that the French were informed of this move. He assured me of his realization of the very sensitive nature of this information. He said that it was his impression there was no love lost between Bao Dai and Ngo Dinh Diem and that in the past when Bao Dai had spoken of the possibility of giving Ngo Dinh Diem the post of Prime Minister, it had been with the idea of breaking Ngo Dinh Diem’s back (“pour lui casser les reins”).

In conclusion Bonsal said that we had merely listened to Ngo Dinh Luyen and had given him no answers regarding our policies in certain contingencies. Bonsal said that we would not give such answers in the absence of coordination with the French.

751G.00/5-2854: Telegram

Smith-Molotov Meeting, Geneva, May 22, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

Geneva, May 23, 1954, 5 p. m.

Dulles 101. Repeated information Moscow 82. Moscow has only Ambassador. S/S limit distribution. At Molotov’s invitation, Robertson, Phleger, Johnson, Reinhart, and I dined last night at his house. We were cordially received and the atmosphere during dinner was reminiscent of the days toward the end of the honeymoon period. After dinner Robertson and I were steered into a room with Molotov, Gromyko, Zarubin, and Troyansky. The others were, by clearly calculated arrangement, conducted into another room, where they could hear only snatches of our conversation. Molotov was completely relaxed, quite friendly, and objective.

He began the conversation with a few remarks about the conference and led immediately into Indochina, asking me for my view of the situation as it existed in the separate states. I replied that as I had stated in the closed session of our conference, we believed the situation in Vietnam to be quite different from that which existed in Laos and Cambodia. In Vietnam we recognized that the forces of Ho Chi Minh were well organized, disciplined, formidable, and controlled a considerable portion of the territory of the country. Here, it was our feeling that while two completely hostile ideologies were in serious conflict there would have to be some sort of separation in the form of

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1 A memorandum dated May 21 from Bonsal to Under Secretary Smith has not been found in Department of State files.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai's telegram to Mao Zedong and others, on the situation of the fourth restricted session, May 22, 1954

Records No: 206-Y0049

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

(1) At the secret session on Indochina yesterday our side insisted that the Cambodia and Laos question should be dealt with separately. As a result of the discussion, the other side agreed to two points:
   a. First discuss the general principles regarding a ceasefire in the whole territory of Indochina related to the three countries, and then discuss the implementation of these principles, namely, how the questions concerning each of the three countries will be taken care of.
   b. The discussion will begin with the first, fifth clauses in the French proposal and the first item in clause eight of the proposal of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, although other suggestions can be considered at the same time.

After back-and-forth discussion, Molotov as chair of the session, by summarizing the opinions of all, put forward five main issues as follows:

1. The question of achieving a ceasefire in the whole territory of Indochina.
2. The question of defining zones for troop concentration.
3. The question of whether or not to allow troops and ammunition to be imported from outside of the region.
4. The question of having an international institution to supervise the implementation of the agreements.
5. The question of guaranteeing the agreements.

Molotov also stated that if there were questions apart from the above five, they could also be raised for discussion. Laos and Cambodia continuously insisted upon their uniqueness. Bidault proposed to establish a special committee to make agendas, and our side immediately expressed disagreement to it. Eden raised the question of the representatives of the military command of the two sides dispatching representatives to Geneva, and Pham Van Dong stated that this conference should only discuss matters of principles, and that the concrete issues could be discussed by the commanders of the two sides on site, although the representative of any country might call upon his own military advisors for providing assistant to his work, and this question would be discussed continuously next week.

(2) On the 20th Eden already expressed the willingness to search for compromise while having dinner together with Molotov. On the 21st, the other side made a step of compromise on the agenda issue. However, on the question of separately dealing with Cambodia and Laos they will be persistent. After the session, the Western press was of the opinion that the conference had made progress. They said that the Cambodia and Laos question had been tabled, but the reality is that they made concession on the procedures of discussion on this issue.

(3) Regarding the question of arranging a ceasefire and zones for troops concentration, on what principles (and their scopes) should be determined here, and how the discussions here and the discussions by the commanders on site should be defined, we will work out a plan and then report it to the Central Committee.

(4) On the plenary session on the Korea question today, it is our prediction that the other side will put forward the issue of having the United Nations supervise the election and the issue of "the Chinese Communists withdrawing first." So I plan to take the initiative to speak first, breaking up [the plot of the other side] by raising the point of having the countries of neutrality supervise the election in the whole of Korea. Bidault returned to Paris on the evening of the 21st, and Eden will be returning to England today. Menon will be arriving here today, and I am preparing to have a meeting with him.

Zhou Enlai
May 22, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
rectly whenever he wishes. After interview, I would like you to make
full report including your personal estimate of Bao Dai and its
probable utility in developing situation.
I know that you understand clearly the delicacy vis-à-vis of
France and the Chinese generally of our seeming to intervene in
the regard. I leave tactics to your good judgment.
Request Delegation, Paris and Saigon comment on full section this
message.

Dulles

7510.00/5-2254
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser, United States
Delegation (Bonsal)

TOP SECRET


Participants: Tezenas du Montcel, Minister of the Associated States
Philip W. Bonsal

Subject: Visit to General Smith of Bao Dai's Personal Representa-
tive, Ngo Dinh Luyen

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that present French support should appear to weaken for any reason.
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most emphatic terms to Ngo Dinh Luyen his conviction regarding
French resolve and determination under present circumstances.
I added that Tezenas du Montcel had already been given to Ngo Dinh
Luyen with regard to the conditions and questions which he had asked. I said also that we were
somewhat surprised as to whether Ngo Dinh Luyen was in fact accurately
stating the views of His Majesty. He may be serving more as a mouth-
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1 A memorandum dated May 21 from Bonsal to Under Secretary Smith has not
been found in Department of State files.
an armistice and a withdrawal of the regular contingents to specified areas with probably prolonged discussions leading toward a political settlement, all under supervision of some genuinely neutral authority. With respect to Cambodia and Laos, the situation was entirely different. Our information was good and we were convinced that the statements made by the representatives of the Cambodian and Lao Governments were substantially correct. I had, I stated, on our staff officers who had visited all parts of both Laos and Cambodia and who were able from personal observation to confirm the fact that in both states the dissident elements were not indigenous and controlled very little, if any, of the country. Molotov replied that he agreed generally with regard to Vietnam, and he also agreed that there was a great difference in the problem of Vietnam as against that of Cambodia and Laos. However, he said, from what information he had, which was not very complete, he had arrived at the impression that the governments of the two countries actually controlled only about half of their territory, and that all of their troubles were not by any means due to external causes. I replied that apparently our information was different, and how did he suggest the question be resolved? He said that this was difficult, and repeated that he was inclined to the view that the governments of both states were weak and really controlled only about half of their respective territories. I said that there was one way of finding out and that was to have an inspection made by a genuinely neutral committee who could determine the real facts. Molotov said that would hardly be possible to do this during the period of our conference, but that the matter must of course be resolved. He then repeated that he did not challenge the fact that the problems were considerably different. There was a good deal of discussion of this subject, during all of which Molotov took the same apparently detached and objective position. It is our view that he visualizes the solution lying in some form of a cease-fire operation which would ultimately divide Vietnam, but he did not object when I remarked that the conditions in Cambodia and Laos were not such as to justify even considering slicing off pieces of their territory to provide for the concentration of dissident elements. He said that we were not making much progress in the conference and he thought it might be advisable to have the parties most concerned, namely, the French, Vietnamese, and Viet Minh, meet and see if they could not come to some solution among themselves which they could present to the conference. I said I did not know how the French would react to this; that I could not recommend it to the French, but that I would not oppose it. Our position here with regard to Indochina was different from Korea. We wanted to be helpful. We were not a belligerent, although we were assisting France and the Associated States with money and equipment. Our interest was great.

as France was our ally, and Britain, another ally, was in Malaya. Also we had a treaty with the Philippines, where we had a special interest. Molotov said he understood this, but there were reports that US did not want fighting to stop. I said thing we wanted most was an honorable cessation of hostilities, on just terms, but we would not associate ourselves with any capitulation to what we believed to be aggression.

I then mentioned Korea, pointing out that discussion in plenary session today had again emphasized deep cleavage and bitterness of feeling between North and South Korea. Molotov agreed and said that this was obviously a matter which would require a great deal of time to produce a solution. He thought that political settlement in Korea would come about possibly as a result of some years of living together. I mentioned a recent statement of Nehru's, saying that while I did not by any means subscribe to most of his statements, his recent one regarding Korea had interested me. Mr. Nehru, I understood, had said in effect, that he did not expect a political solution for Korea to arise from Geneva conference, but that it might be that some loose association as a result of trading together would, after a period of time, reduce the tension and produce some form of agreement. The interpretation I gave was, I now understand, a good deal different from what Nehru actually proposed. Molotov repeated that a period of "living together" and some form of commercial or other contact over a period of time might reduce the bitterness and permit some political solution. He obviously expects none here.

The conversation then passed to the subject of our general relationship, and via that, to China. I said that I believed, with regard to the Soviet Union, as I expected Mr. Molotov to believe with regard to the United States, that we genuinely desired peace. We had come, I hoped correctly, to think in the United States that although we went through periods of public name-calling, we could, in the last analysis, work down at the conference table with the Soviet Union and work out some form of solution for our major problems. We did not have this same feeling about some of their associates; we had sensed a lack of restraint and an intransigence which caused us grave concern. Molotov looked up immediately at me and said China. I said yes, China. Well, he said, you must remember that China is still a very young country, and you must also remember that China is always going to be Chinese. It is never going to be European. The Soviet Union, he went on, had worked out a relationship with Communist China. I should also remember that we had done a good many things to irritate Communist China and cause them difficulties. I replied that the Soviet Union and Communist China had one point in common, they had a common political ideology which made it easier for them to arrive at common
 understanding. We did not share that common ideology with Communist China. Molotov said that, in effect, we weren't the only ones that are worried, the Soviet Union would like to devote all of its time and resources to improving its internal situation, but from time to time events took place which made it necessary for them to realize that they would have to devote their attention and resources to matters outside their borders. He said China was only five years old and she also needed time to devote her attention and resources to her internal problems. I said that President Eisenhower believed in world trade but the Chinese made any contact impossible. He said there was a great deal in our attitude which gave the Soviets ground for serious thought. Here he groped for a word to imply hostility or aggressiveness without being discourteous. I supplied the word and said we sensed the same attitude in the Soviet Union. The question which concerned us both was war or peace, and if there was any doubt in his mind as to the pacific intentions of the United States, I would demonstrate to him that they were unfounded. We had intervened in Korea as a result of deep-rooted moral principles. When we reversed the situation and the Chinese Communists intervened, we could have dealt with Communist China without difficulty had we been willing to go into general mobilization and use all of the resources at our disposal. We had not done so, and had taken thousands of casualties rather than commit the full prestige of the United States and possibly that of the Soviet Union in an issue which would have involved broadening the conflict and possibly brought on global war. I would remind him of the first official conversation that I had when I arrived in Moscow, and suggested that when he returned he get out a memo of that conversation and re-read it. He said he recalled it. I then said that he would also recall that I told him at that time that there was a line beyond which compromise could not go; that we were willing to reach honorable compromise, but compromise was a two-way street and we would not abandon our principles. He replied in a perfectly friendly way that he understood, and again he said that China was a very young country. He also said, and this is very interesting, that it will become known some day that in the Korean matter the Soviet Union had acted as a restraining influence. He repeated that we had done some things to irritate Communist China. Robertson said that the Chinese Communists had done many things to irritate US, one illustration of which was the matter of American citizens and air force personnel, none guilty of any crimes, now imprisoned, and also those unable to get exit visas. Some of these people had died in prison, and they have been mistreated. Molotov obviously was completely informed in the matter.

He at once replied that there were some Chinese students in the United States who had been unable to leave. Robertson said that this was correct, but they were neither imprisoned nor ill treated, and that under proper arrangements they could be permitted to go. Molotov said he saw no reason why a matter of this kind could not be very readily adjusted. I said that although the number involved was few, incidents like this made it almost impossible even to consider moving close toward an understanding. The American people reacted very strongly to what they considered unjust or inhumane treatment that they would take hundreds of casualties, but that they would never abandon efforts to obtain the release of one single prisoner. Molotov again said that this should be easily resolved. He went on to say that the Soviet Union, along with US, had for a long time done all it could do to uphold Chiang Kai-shek, and had only abandoned him when further support became completely impracticable. Neither Robertson nor I felt there was any purpose in replying to this comment.

Robertson remarked at this point that he had heard much said here about Colonialism. This was no longer an issue. Britain had given complete freedom to India, Pakistan, Burma, etcetera, and Holland to Indonesia. Our record in the Philippines was well known. We were perfectly willing and should be able to live at peace with people of a different political ideology, but it ought to be recognized that our differences were not Colonialism but ideological. Molotov replied that this was so.

The thing that impressed me most last night was the difference in Molotov's attitude now from what it was when Stalin was alive. He went further, was much more frank, made no charges, by implication or otherwise, no recriminations, and it was as though he were looking at the whole situation through a magnifying glass and analyzing its various aspects. There is apparent much greater self-confidence and authority. It is interesting that Molotov, having toasted every one of his guests, then proposed a toast to the heads of our respective states, "the President of the United States, General Eisenhower, and the President of the Supreme Soviet, Marshal Voroshilov". This is the first time I ever heard such a toast given by a top Communist official which placed the President of the Supreme Soviet in the position of head of the state. Molotov also commented again on your departure from Geneva and asked again how long I would be here. I said my movements depended on his decisions. We had gone to Pamnunjom expecting to stay three weeks, and had stayed 27 months. If we did not complicate the problems of Laos and Cambodia, it should not take too long.
tion of united action had been one of timing; but the British were beginning to change their minds on the necessity of awaiting the outcome of the Geneva Conference, as the Communist position was already becoming clearer. On the other hand, General Smith acknowledged that the U.S. may have tried to hurry things up a little too much, and the British have a point in feeling that too precipitate action might alienate such countries as Burma which otherwise might be brought along to some form of participation. Amb. Aickin commented that the British attitude on timing was probably also affected by the need for dealing with British political opposition groups.

On leaving Amb. Aickin expressed appreciation for the information which General Smith had given him. General Smith said that he hoped they would be able to see him soon again.

Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)

SECRET

Geneva, May 24, 1954

Subject: Meeting of the Six

1. Agreed to accept the French list of questions as a basis of discussion. 1

2. Agreed that France would speak first, Cambodia second, Laos third, and we fourth.

3. It is possible the French may seek to revise the order of questions and move the question “international control of the execution of agreements” from fourth place to second.

4. The French delegation is unwilling at this stage to take the position that international control should be exercised only by the United Nations. Cheysson (Cheysson), of their delegation, however, raised the point, if the control commission was not under the United Nations, under whose authority would it be?

5. The suggestion was made that the Six discuss in an early meeting just what real neutral might usefully serve on the control commission. Ambassador Chauvel made the point that any effective international control would have to have several countries since the smaller countries could not provide sufficiently large contingents of control troops.

1 See report of the Fourth Restricted Session in telegram Sect 279, May 21, p. 577.
it existed. He said France continued insist on Article 5 (section 1) May 8 proposal.  

(2) Bidault said he defined "regular troops" as being all those permanently organized, noting Viet Minh had many so-called irregulars who were just as well-organized as so-called regulars. He said in Cambodia and Laos problem was simply evacuating Viet Minh, while for Vietnam France proposed delimited zones for regular forces both sides with demilitarized zones between probably required to avoid danger contact between opposing forces. He agreed there appeared little difference between French and Viet Minh proposals this point. He said Viet Minh point re passage of troops through opposing zones might be acceptable if under adequate controls and not used to permit strengthening forces or areas either side.  

(3) Bidault said forces both sides not required for army or internal security should be disbanded. He said this was important since Cambodian and Laotian armies and Franco-Vietnamese troops in Vietnam would be imperiled if grouped in delimited zones and irregulars free to harass them.  

(4) On introduction new forces, Bidault stated we should return to problem when vital question of nature controls determined.  

(5) France has asked immediate freeing of prisoners of war and civilian internees since May 8. This operation should be subject same controls as remainder agreement.  

(6) Bidault said French had asked for effective international controls since beginning. He said France open to suggestion on structure and membership control committee. He added we could not go further into detail on nature control entity until we know details of agreements which committee would supervise. He said France suggested (for Vietnam only) mixed committee two opposing military staffs to operate under international control group.  

(7) On guarantees, Bidault said France had proposed conference guarantees agreement and nine parties should consult immediately in case violation and proceed to appropriate individual or collective measures.  

In conclusion, Bidault said France would not accept solution any individual point but only "package deal" on all.  

Chou En-lai said he had no objection general discussion these questions but reminded conference of Molotov's point political was inseparable from military. He reserved right reply Bidault later.  

Cambodian representative made point conference should not insist on simultaneity cessation hostilities all three countries since this unfair those with simpler problems. He noted Viet Minh withdrawal would solve Cambodian problem.  

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*Article 5, Part 1, of proposals submitted by the French Delegation at the First Plenary Session on Indochina, May 8, read as follows: "Hostilities to cease as soon as the agreement is signed. The assembly of troops and disarmament of forces as above provided to begin not later than x days (the number to be fixed by the Conference) after the signature of the agreement." (US Verb Min/ May 8, 1964, Conference Files, lot 90 D 822, CP 276)*
problem of independence dominates events in Indochina. Vietnam has negotiated independence from France and must defend that independence against all foreign dangers. Vietnam delegate urged this question be debated.

Eden expressed hope there would be general agreement with US delegate’s suggestion leading to fruitful further discussion military aspects beginning with cessation hostilities. He expressed hope discussion general principles be brief and that conference get down to application. He agreed with Democratic Republic Vietnam suggestion that application in Vietnam be first topic after general principles.

Molotov, after speaking of desirability of effective cease-fire leading to durable peace, urged direct contacts be established either in field or at Geneva between parties directly concerned. Molotov then reminded conference of agreement take French and Viet Minh proposals as basis for discussions and pointed out these deal with both military and political matters. Molotov urged political problems be taken up without delay and urged that following tomorrow’s meeting on military problems that next meeting be devoted to political problems. He apparently contemplated alternate meetings on military and political problems.

Bidault stated that he could not accept proceeding to political problems until some real progress had been made on military problems. He said that to link two questions now would cause confusion and might lead to failure of conference.

Chou En-lai agreed with Soviet proposal to take up political matters day after tomorrow and also with proposal that parties directly concerned, whom he defined as France and Democratic Republic Vietnam, should make direct contact.

US delegate supported Bidault’s point of view regarding delay in taking up political problems until military questions further advanced. He also stated parties at interest include not only France and Democratic Republic Vietnam but also Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.

Viet Minh delegate advocated rotating discussion political and military problems. He accepted Soviet proposal for contacts between directly interested parties and referred to precedent already established on Dien-Bien-Phu wounded.

Bidault stated that while contacts in Geneva had been relatively satisfactory, it would be necessary to have all interested parties and not only these. He denied any agreement to take up military and political problems together and said it was wholly impractical and undesirable to go on to political problems without having at least provided for stopping bloodshed. He proposed that at tomorrow’s restricted session decision might be taken regarding next session.

Molotov then made very strong brief statement to effect that agreement already reached to take up French and Viet Minh proposals made necessary discussion both military and political problems.

Eden said no one denied political problem would eventually have to be discussed, but questioned helpfulness their injection at this stage. Suggested conference reflect on this point and discuss further tomorrow.

US delegate said that rather than challenge Molotov’s recollection of agreements earlier reached he proposed adjournment.

However, Cambodian delegate said that he would hope military problem would be cleared up first since Cambodia has no political problem, Cambodia independent sovereign country represented only by Cambodian Government.

Comment: Appeared Communists concerned at trend toward discussion military matters before political question and were attempting recover ground lost in this regard. Molotov appeared particularly concerned and his specific suggestion following tomorrow discuss political questions discourages hope Communists might, while reserving their position, permit substantive discussion on military matters proceed without simultaneously injecting political issues. Conclusion is that Communists still playing for time on premise time is on their side in Indochina.

SMITH

906.1 GR/1-2454: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation
Confidential
Washington, May 2, 1954—6:50 p.m.

Tosee 292. For Suydam. Public opinion polling results based on interviews May nineteen through twenty-two.

Sixty-nine percent say if other countries join us, US should “take part in Indochina fighting to keep Communists from taking over all of Indochina”. Twenty-three percent say No, remainder no opinion. Those approving were asked should US take part in fighting even if other countries not willing, sixty-two percent, No forty-four percent, No opinion four percent, total sixty-nine percent.

NATO approved by eighty-five percent, and fifty-nine percent approve “US signing agreement for defense Southeast Asia, along with such countries as Philippines, Siam, Australia”.

1 Drafted by Foster of P/PS.
(meaning that the non-participating nations of the UN could mediate between the 16 participants on the one side, and the Communists on the other).

(b) Agreement could be reached on Indochina. He estimated Chou En-lai as a man "with whom one could do business", and Molotov as "quite different and much improved".

(c) There should not be a partition in Indochina, but after a standstill the opposing forces should be gradually gathered into "pockets".

(d) It is unrealistic to think that all military problems can be settled without some corresponding political settlements. For instance, Cambodia and Laos had been invaded, but there were indigenous elements associated with the invaders. All the aggressors should stand still and ground their arms while a neutral authority sorted out the invaders. Presumably the indigenous elements remaining in opposition would have some significance in an alliance. Also, without some political understanding, in which all three states participated, Cambodia and Laos would have no assurance against repetition of trouble.

(e) I asked (because I knew) what his ideas were about a supervisory authority. He said that it would be effective if it would have to be accepted by all five major participants. India, if agreed to by all and requested to do so, would probably accept the responsibility along with some European nation. He thought Norway was the only one left that might accept and be acceptable to everyone. I mentioned several others, such as Sweden, etc., and he said they would probably not accept or would not be acceptable to the Communist side because of close association with NATO. A Latin American country would not do because considered part of the "American Bloc". Canada, though otherwise very good, was probably out for the same reason. Thailand, though Asian, was considered generally aligned with the American Bloc. Burma might be acceptable, but had local troubles. However, Burma might be able to provide some "token representation". The United Nations as a direct supervisory authority would, he thought, be rejected by Communist China.

(f) The only way an agreement could be reached on a supervisory authority is to have discussions among heads of the five delegations themselves. If India's services were desired, it would have to be a governmental decision; therefore India should not become a bone of contention.

He will be here until Wednesday, will probably talk with Eden again; and may ask to see me once more before he goes to New York.

SMITH

MAY 25, 1954

3661 GE/3-2554: Telegram
Smith-Buu Loc Meeting, Geneva, May 25, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, May 25, 1954—9 p.m.

Secto 298. Repeated information Paris 328, Saigon 108. Prince Buu Loc called on me this morning prior to his return to Paris today and
other Ministers now engaged in such negotiations back to Saigon to govern and reorganize the country.

SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 25, 1954.

1. We agreed yesterday that this afternoon we would talk about cessation of hostilities in Vietnam. I believe that we can achieve a cessation of hostilities in Vietnam if agreement can be reached on four points:

2. Withdrawal of Vietminh forces from Laos and Cambodia.

3. Withdrawal into specified areas of regular forces in Vietnam.

4. Disarmament and disbanding of irregular forces.

5. Establishment of adequate safeguards and creation of an international supervisory commission whose composition and terms of reference would permit it to function effectively.

2. On the first point I will merely repeat again what has been said so many times. Hostilities in Laos and Cambodia can be stopped by arranging for the withdrawal from those two countries of the invading Vietminh forces. I hope this arrangement can be made immediately.

3. On the second point Mr. Bidault has made a proposal for assembling all regular units in assembly areas. If such a regrouping were based on the assumption that this is a preliminary step to provide for the unification of all Vietnam under its recognized government, I would support Mr. Bidault’s proposal. If on the other hand, these concentrations, in our judgment, appeared to be a preliminary to the partition of Vietnam, the United States could not associate itself with such a proposal. I will thus have to examine specific proposals which may be advanced before my delegation can take a definitive position on this question.

4. With reference to the third point the United States believes that agreements for the cessation of hostilities should include provisions for the disarmament of all irregular forces. From the statements made yesterday it appears that there is a general consensus on this point.

5. Finally it seems to us of the utmost importance that there should be effective safeguards to provide for the security of armed forces and the civil populations and to ensure against abuses of the cease-fire by either party. The United States maintains these safeguards must be exercised under competent international supervision and that the competent authority is the United Nations. To be effective it seems

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1. Drafted by Benail.
2. Attachments 2 and 3 below.
3. Attachment 1 below.

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clear to me that adequate UN control machinery must be in place and ready to function before there is an actual cease-fire.

If progress here indicates that an effective agreement for the cessation of hostilities may be realizable in the near future, we should take up with corresponding urgency the establishment of adequate control machinery.

Representatives of the control commission must have guarantees of unrestricted movement in and free access to all parts of the area in which peace is restored. Such a commission would also have to have sufficient personnel and logistic support to be able to discharge its responsibilities.

If we could reach agreement here on the four points I have outlined it would be possible to put an end to fighting in Indochina.

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**British Proposal Made at Meeting of Six Delegations May 25 But Not Accepted by Other Delegations**

**Cessation of Hostilities**

A. Agreed Principles.

1. To take place simultaneously throughout all three States as soon as the necessary military agreements are concluded.
2. To be effective for all armed forces of both sides.
3. To take effect by means of:
   (a) immediate standstill of all forces;
   (b) immediate subsequent regrouping of forces into areas determined by prior agreement; and
   (c) unhindered passage for the purposes of (b) of forces of one party through areas allotted to the other.

B. Immediate Action.

1. The areas in (b) above to be worked out for Vietnam.
2. Representatives of the two commands to meet in Geneva for this purpose.
3. These representatives to report their findings and recommendations to the Conference as soon as possible.
4. The Conference meanwhile to proceed with examination of other military matters, beginning with arrangements for international supervision.

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**Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Young)**

[Extract]

CONFIDENTIAL

GINNEA, MAY 25, 1954.

Subject: Questions Relating to Southeast Asia and Korea

Participants: Prince Wan, Thailand Delegation
             Walter S. Robertson, U.S. Delegation
             Kenneth T. Young, Jr., U.S. Delegation

Prince Wan informed Mr. Robertson that the Government of Thailand had decided to proceed with an appeal to the United Nations regarding aggression in Cambodia and Laos and had instructed its representative in New York to discuss the Thai communication to the United Nations with Ambassador Lodge before filing it. Mr. Robertson expressed his gratification that the Thai Government had taken this action and hoped that it would be carried out as quickly as possible. Prince Wan also informed Mr. Robertson, who agreed, that it would be better to hold off discussion on certain military matters until Ambassador Sarasin had returned to Geneva, which now would be
Saturday. He explained that Ambassador Sarasin would have the benefit of the views of the Prime Minister.

6. Vietnamese National Army set up under a legal government and there should be no agreement which would result in restrictions on Vietnamese troops.
7. Concentration of troops should take into account security.
8. It would be necessary to take measures to prevent any further aggression.

Irregular troops must be disarmed if minimum security precautions were to be met. He proposed procedure be worked out for handling this.

All delegations in agreement on release of POWs and internees. Cease-fire must be on international basis and internationally guaranteed. Such action required if Vietnam to be assured against further aggression. Withdrawal of foreign troops must be taken up after agreement reached on all other issues.

All points interdependent and there must be an agreement on all before conference can succeed.

Eden submitted a proposal which he hoped would enable the conference to deal with certain points and then move on to other points. He stated that his proposal related principally to international supervision. Text read:

"In order to facilitate early cessation of hostilities it is necessary to determine areas within which the forces of both sides shall be regrouped.

To this end it is proposed that:

1. Representatives of two commands meet immediately in Geneva.
2. Their first task should be to work out regrouping areas for Vietnam.
3. They should report their findings and recommendations to conference as soon as possible.
4. Conference meanwhile should proceed with examination of other military matters, beginning with arrangements for international supervision.

DRV representative stated cessation of hostilities means complete cessation to include not only ground action but air and sea action as well. After cessation of hostilities his government would not tolerate French aircraft in the air over territory nor would they permit the French engage in warfare against their fishermen.

He stated that separation of the problem of cessation of hostilities would mean that the conference is moving away from the stated intention of general cessation of hostilities. Separate cessation of hostilities would result in a concentration of forces in areas where hostilities
achieve a cessation of hostilities if agreement can be reached on three points:

"(1) Withdrawal into specified areas of regular forces in Vietnam;
"(2) Disarmament and disbanding of irregular forces;
"(3) Establishment of adequate safeguards and creation of an international supervisory commission whose composition and terms of reference would permit it to function effectively.

"On the first point, Mr. Bidault has made a proposal for assembling all regular units in assembly areas. I can wholeheartedly support Bidault's proposal.

"In the meanwhile, Mr. Eden has submitted a proposal which is preliminary to achieving a cessation of hostilities. I believe that we should proceed with an examination of it immediately.

"With reference to the second point, the US believes that agreements for cessation of hostilities should include provisions for the disarmament of all irregular forces. It was my understanding yesterday that there was agreement on this point.

"Finally, it seems to us to be essential that there be effective safeguards to provide for the security of armed forces and the civil population, and to secure against abuses of the cessation of hostilities agreement by either party. It seems unlikely that men who have been fighting for months will ground arms and keep the peace unless they are under competent international supervision. From our point of view, the most competent authority in existence for such purposes is the United Nations.

"I have addressed myself exclusively to the problem of Vietnam because it was my understanding that was our agreement. However, I shall repeat what I have said before that hostilities in Laos and Cambodia can be stopped by arranging for the withdrawal from those two countries of the invading Viet Minh forces. I would hope that this arrangement can be made without delay. I will not say anything further on this point at this time."

Molotov concluded by stating that Eden's proposal would be circulated to permit quick consideration. He then stated that he hoped that he would be expressing a common view if he proposed recess.

Following recess, Molotov proposed certain amendments to Eden's draft text: In preamble, addition of words "and simultaneous" between "early" and "cessation"; in paragraph 1, addition of the phrase "in order that this would contribute also to the establishment of contacts between interested parties on the spot"; and paragraph 9, to read "their task should be to work out the reorganizing areas for the two sides and first of all for Vietnam". He had no amendments for paragraph 3 but thought that paragraph 4 was hardly necessary because

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2 Correction in Under Secretary Smith's statement transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 304, infra.
it dealt with matters which related to conference as a whole and not to immediate problem.

Bidault supported Eden’s proposal but Cambodian delegate asked whether it applied to all Indochinese states or just to Vietnam. Eden replied that preamble intended to be general but that paragraph 2 was for Vietnam. To this, Cambodian entered reservation in order “not to mix up those things which should be kept distinct”. Furthermore, he could not accept any of the Soviet amendments.

General Smith thought that British delegate’s proposal extremely well-drafted and got by two opposing positions now occupied without doing violence to either and offered possibility of progress. On other hand, he thought that amendment to paragraph 1 proposed by chairman was sensible and reasonable. Facilitating their contacts in field would help work at Geneva and US delegation could accept this. The other suggestions he would find too difficult to accept and believe so would other delegations. He would explain his reasons to his colleagues. US delegation had made position very clear regarding situation he believed existed in Laos and Cambodia. Yet in effort to be helpful and contribute to work of the conference, the delegation had gone along with examination of various proposals but making it very apparent that it was not abandoning its position. British proposal would make it possible to make progress without surrendering this point. He suggested conference accept Molotov’s amendment to paragraph 1 and eliminate others, namely to preamble and paragraph 2, returning to original draft. This would permit conference to proceed without further obstacle or damage to US position.

Bidault then stressed that British proposal must be applicable only to Vietnam, that it was only there that a regrouping of military forces was required. He was agreeable to establishment of contacts at Geneva and in the field.

Vietnam delegate expressed view that first sentence of British proposal prejudiced situation in Cambodia and Laos. He supported Bidault’s statement and requested specification that first sentence where reference was made to regrouping of forces only applied to Vietnam.

Eden supported General Smith’s analysis of meaning of his text and proposed amendments. He had simply tried to put down greatest common measure of agreement without prejudging any issues. He had not tried to deal with that of Laos and Cambodia but simply with great task of work regarding Vietnam which sooner or later conference had to deal with. He expressed hope that agreement could be reached on Molotov’s amendment to first paragraph and that his other amendments would not be pressed.

Molotov offered to withdraw his amendments excepting that to paragraph 1 but added that in order to avoid controversial issues he coupled this with proposal that text be restricted to paragraph 1. If necessary, paragraph 3 could remain as new paragraph 2, although its content was obvious. Bidault replying first to Vietnam statement, assured him that conference had not been convened to tear apart unity of Vietnamese nation. He then expressed view that suppression paragraphs 2 and 4 from Eden proposal would render document null and void. He proposed that if whole text with Soviet amendment to paragraph 1 could not be accepted, that time be taken to ponder the problem. It might be advisable to devote tomorrow to full examination of all proposals made so far in order to understand complete situation where there was agreement and where not.

Cambodian delegate then announced it was his duty to state that he could not accept UK proposal since in some points it applied to Cambodia. It was his understanding that today was to be devoted to Vietnam. He appreciated Eden’s efforts at conciliation but was obliged to make firm reservations regarding any decisions which might be taken affecting his country.

A final effort by General Smith to obtain agreement to Eden’s proposal with Soviet amendment to paragraph 1 only impelled Molotov to accept Bidault’s suggestion that tomorrow be devoted to clarification of delegation’s views on this and other proposals.

Following agreement of routine communiqué, next restricted meeting Indochina phase agreed for Friday, May 27.

Comment: It is clear from foregoing that separate treatment Laos and Cambodia remains fundamental issue on which Communists despite procedural dialectics are not yet prepared to compromise. DRV proposal is clear bid for partition. All delegations excepting Laos and Cambodia have agreed to contact between representatives High Commands both in Geneva and in field.

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*Date of next restricted meeting, Indochina phase, given incorrectly; it should read Thursday, May 27. (Corrected in telegram Seco 304, infra.)*
Sixth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 25, 3 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 26, 1954—11 a.m.


"When we left yesterday I was under the impression that we would talk today about a cessation of hostilities in all of Indochina, with specific reference to examining the problem of Vietnam."

"If I understand the proposal of the Viet Minh representative, he is now proposing to partition Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. I do not believe we should seriously consider this proposal. I believe, however, that we can achieve a cessation of hostilities if agreement can be reached on three general points: (1) withdrawal into specified areas of regular forces in Vietnam; (2) disarmament and disbanding of irregular forces; (3) establishment of adequate safeguards and creation of an international supervisory commission whose composition and terms of reference would permit it to function effectively.

"On the first point, M. Bidault has made a proposal for assembling all regular units in Assembly areas. If such a regrouping is a preliminary step to provide for the ultimate unification of all Vietnam under its recognized government, I can support M. Bidault's proposal. However, we will want to examine the specific suggestions which may be advanced.

"In the meanwhile, Mr. Eden has submitted a proposal which is an inevitable preliminary to achieving a cessation of hostilities. I believe that we should accept it and proceed with it immediately.

"With reference to the second point, the US believes that agreements for cessation of hostilities should include provisions for the disarmament of all irregular forces. From the statements made yesterday, it appears that there is a general consensus of opinion on this point.

"Finally, it seems to us to be essential that there be effective safeguards to provide for the security of armed forces and the civil population, and to assure against abuses of the cessation of hostilities agreement by either party. It seems unlikely that men who have been fighting for months will ground arms and keep the peace unless they are under competent international supervision. From our point of view the most competent authority in existence for such purpose is the United Nations. To be effective, it seems clear to me that adequate UN control machinery must be in place and ready to function at the time of actual cessation of hostilities.

"I have addressed myself exclusively to the problem of Vietnam because it was my understanding that was our agreement. However I shall repeat what I have said before that the situations of Laos and Cambodia present a special case, and hostilities in Laos and Cambodia can be stopped by arranging for the withdrawal from those two countries of the invading Viet Minh forces. I would hope that this arrangement can be made without delay. I will not say anything further on this point at this time."

The foregoing text being circulated to other delegations.

Additional correction: Date of next restricted meeting Indochina phase given incorrectly Secto 302. Should read Thursday May 27.

SMITH

366.1 G5/5-2454 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1954—4:53 p.m.

Telid 123. Reference Dulles 105 and 107. Your talk with Bauda effectively clears way for developing direct personal contact between you and Bao Dai. Reports your further conversations with Bao Dai will assist us in decisions which may have to be taken quickly.

Despite rapid course of events in Vietnam, we fear that Bao Dai and Bao Loc government lack sense urgency and believe we should do all possible to encourage them to initiate prompt and radical action.

As indicated, FYI portion Telid 110 was intended serve only as background and not as subject specific discussion.

DULLES

1 Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4244 and to Saigon as telegram 2463.
2 Dated May 24, p. 980.
3 Dated May 24, p. 992.
4 Smith reported in telegram Dulles 115, May 26, that "through intermediary appointed by Bao Dai I have suggested a conversation with Bao Dai but have indicated I might take place after French Assembly debate on Indochina new scheduled for June 1st." (366.1 G5/5-2054)
5 Dated May 22, 982.

Conference Bus. Lot 60 D 027. 242 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1954—6:51 p.m.

Telid 123. Final distribution. Hope your talk with Eden resulted in British agreement go along on Thai initiative in SC, since we are eager begin proceedings without delay.

1 Drafted by Pepper of UNA/UNP. Repeated to USUN as telegram 588.
2 Regarding the Thai decision to make an appeal to the United Nations, see the memorandum of conversation, p. 919.
4. What votes in support of the draft resolution would there be in the Security Council and the General Assembly? Would there be a sufficient majority in the latter?
5. Would it be possible to control the debates especially in the General Assembly?
6. What would be the effect of the draft on the position in Indochina and on the Geneva Conference?
7. What would be the relations between the functions of the sub-committee and any agreements on Indochina that may emerge from the Geneva Conference?
8. What would be the timing of proceedings in the United Nations, especially in relation to the Geneva Conference?”

SMITH

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

Dulles 173. Limit distribution. In conversation with Eden this morning, he showed me in great confidence, message from High Commissioner in India, the text of which is given below, which is illuminating and shows some of the considerations which are conditioning United Kingdom thinking regarding our maneuvers with respect to Southeast Asia:

“1. Indians realize that if Geneva Conference fails, dangerous situation will arise throughout Southeast Asia and the Far East, carrying with it whole series of alarming possibilities. These are seen as ranging in order of gravity from large scale Western intervention in Indochina (involving another ‘Korean’ campaign with every risk this that the conflict could not be localized) to abandonment of Indochina, but formation under Western auspices of a collective defense organization designed to safeguard neighboring territories. In Indian eyes, former at best, would be a tragedy, not least for the people of Indochina themselves; worst, would be suicidal as opening way for general war. Latter might enable peace to be preserved for a while, but in Indian estimation, further clash would only be a matter of time. And either course would involve renewed Western domination in a large part of Southeast Asia which would not only offend Asian nationalist sentiment everywhere, but would, in Indian view, be futile and self-defeating policy. They are convinced, indeed, that peace can never be established on any lasting basis, unless Western powers keep their hands off Asia and leave Asian countries on a basis of full independence to settle their affairs amongst themselves.

2. But while such considerations may be at back of their minds, Indians have not yet brought themselves to think seriously of possibility of failure of Geneva Conference. It is all-important to them that it should succeed, and they view progress to date, though slow, as not unsatisfactory. They feel that there is now good hope of a cease-fire. Once that stage is reached, the rest should, in their view, be much easier, even though negotiations for a political settlement are bound to be prolonged.

“1. In the above circumstances, any new deal between the United States and Siam on the lines indicated in your telegram would be regarded here as quite disastrous. It would be looked on as a new attempt by the United States to sabotage the Geneva Conference and one which almost certainly would have that result. All hopes built on present negotiations would be shattered and it would be felt that last opportunity for peaceful settlement has been wantonly thrown away. American stock, already very low here, would sink to rock-bottom and political reactions would be very serious.

“2. Apart from impact on Geneva Conference, proposal would be bound to cause indignation from India’s own standpoint. With United States/Pakistan deal on one side, and United States/Siamese deal on the other, India would feel herself being contained by United States and her associates; distrust and suspicion of United States motives would be magnified, and there would be serious risk of anti-American feeling taking an anti-Western form.

“3. From the angle of this post, therefore, I must hope that advantage will be taken of any opportunity that arises to impress on Americans extreme unwisdom of pursuing any such proposal while Geneva Conference is in session. If Conference fails, whole situation will no doubt have to be considered de novo, and this might be part of the defensive measures that may then become necessary. But if trouble here is to be avoided, it is essential that current negotiations should be given every chance before there is any airing of measures which, from Indian standpoint, are bound to appear provocative to the other side.”

SMITH

May 26, 1954

110.11 DC/5-2594: Telegram

Smith-Eden-Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, May 25, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

Dulles 121. Repeated information from Paris 338, Saigon 718, London 211. This morning Eden and Chauvel at midday’s absence, and I discussed tactics for next few days, particularly with respect to Laos and Cambodia and question international control.

Eden wondered at what point we are going to stand on Cambodia and Laos. Their problem is separate but complementary to that in Vietnam and he saw no reason why simultaneous cease-fire was in itself objectionable. He thought an acceptable formula would be:

(1) Cease-fire, (2) withdrawal of troops into areas near frontier and (3) withdrawal of all foreign forces within six months. He rec-
FROM GENETTA CONFERENCE (U.K. DELEGATION)  
TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP.  FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND WHITEHALL  
SECRET (CABINET) DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden.  D., 1.28 a.m., May 25, 1954.
Neville.  R., 1.45 a.m., May 26, 1954.

May 25, 1954.

PRIORITY

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 447 of May 25.
Repeated for information to Washington and to Paris.

I received a visit from Mr. Molotov this morning. He said that he wished to give an impetus to the work of the Conference, which was now entering its second month. He suggested that the best way to proceed would be for direct contact to be established between the two commands, either here in Geneva or in the field. While they were discussing practical questions the Conference might adjourn for a few days or attend to other matters.

2. I said that I had been thinking along the same lines but that for such direct contacts to be fruitful the commands must be assigned specific tasks.

3. I then put to him a set of proposals which we had previously shown to the French and United States Delegations, and to the Delegation of the Associated States, and to which at the official level they had not seriously demurred. The proposals were as follows:

We should first agree on the following principles:

(1) That cessation of hostilities should take place simultaneously throughout all three States as soon as the necessary military agreements were concluded.

(2) That it should be effective for all armed forces of both sides.

(3) That it should take effect by means of
(a) immediate standing of all forces;
(b) immediate subsequent regrouping of forces into areas determined by prior agreement; and
(c) unhindered passage for the purposes of (b) of forces of one party through areas allotted to the other.

Secondly,
SECRET

Geneva Conference (U.K. Delegation) telegram No. 447 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

Secondly, we should agree on the following immediate action:-

1. The areas in 3(b) above to be worked out for Viet Nam.

2. Representatives of the two commands to meet in Geneva for this purpose.

3. These representatives to report their findings and recommendations to the Conference as soon as possible.

4. The Conference meanwhile to proceed with examination of other military matters, beginning with the arrangements for international supervision.

Mr. Molotov said that he thought he could agree to these proposals but he must discuss them with China and Viet Minh. He would also wish the Conference to discuss political problems. This could perhaps be done while the military representatives were at work.

5. I said that I had no objection to political problems being discussed but that it was important that we should be seen to be making progress. The Prime Minister had said to me that we should be much criticised if the Viet Minh captured Hanoi while the Conference was meeting.

6. Mr. Molotov took this sally well.

7. I later saw General Bedell Smith and told him what had passed. He found my proposals acceptable, and said that he would see no objection to my tabling them at this afternoon's meeting.

Subsequently I called on M. Bidault. He said that he could on no account accept the principle that cessation of hostilities should take place simultaneously throughout all three States. To do so would have a serious effect on the morale of the French Union forces. Moreover it was not logically necessary to agree on such a principle before the two commands met to discuss the re-grouping of forces into areas. He suggested that all the proposed "agreed principles" should be discarded from my proposals and that I should simply put forward my suggestions for immediate action. A revised version of these was accordingly prepared for tabling at this afternoon's meeting.

8. Please see my immediately following telegram.
Indo-China

THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR called this morning and expressed both surprise and regret that Sir Winston Churchill's statement yesterday should have revealed no sense of urgency. Surely our only chance of a settlement at Geneva was to create the impression that we must bring matters quickly to a head. As I am getting rather tired of Monsieur Massigli's carping criticisms and unhelpful intervention, I told him acidly that the Secretary of State and Beatrix Smith were both inspired by a sense of urgency; and I gave the Ambassador the substance of Codet telegram No. 430 reporting M. Bidault as quite satisfied with the Conference's slow progress. I said that Sir Winston Churchill would have looked rather silly if, in accordance with the Ambassador's prescription, he had yesterday used any suggestion that our policy was to bring matters to a head only to have to admit to-day that the Conference had recessed and that the delegates were sitting idly on the banks of Geneva.

M. Massigli expressed surprise that M. Bidault's attitude should have been known to Sir Winston Churchill by Question Time yesterday. I replied disingenuously that Sir Winston Churchill was keeping in very close touch with events at Geneva. The Ambassador had no reply and left me in an obviously deflated mood.

May 26, 1974.

Top: South-East Asia Department (to enter)

Copies: Secretary of State
         Minister of State
         Lord Reading
         Mr. Nutting
         Mr. Dodds Parker
         Sir H. Caccia
         Mr. Speaight.
private channels and that if you were willing you could get word to him by phone Friday afternoon, or Saturday morning. I am inclined to think this would be useful and we should pass it through Allen Dulles' channel as I do not want anyone here to know about it.²

SMITH

²Allen W. Dulles informed the Department of State at 6:22 p.m. on May 28 that he had received the above message from Smith and that Smith wanted the Secretary to see it immediately. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Telephone conversations) O'Connor indicates that the Secretary saw a cable letter. Concerning the Dulles-Hammarskjold meeting June 3. see p. 1012.

MAY 27, 1954

7510.00/5-2754

Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)³

SECRET


Subject: Meeting of the Six Delegations May 27.

1) At this morning's meeting the French Delegation submitted an entirely new paper regarding establishment of contact between military commands for the determination of regrouping zones in Vietnam. Under general principles, the paper reproduces the language of the Viet Minh proposal for exchanges of territory based on a variety of political, demographic, and economic principles. French military and political experts (Major Debarnot and Cheysson) spoke briefly in favor of the proposal. The Vietnamese Delegation took strong issue with the proposed acceptance of the Viet Minh language which he said would merely lead to partition; (in this he was conservative; acceptance of the Viet Minh principles would very probably set the Viet Minh a firm springboard from which they could rapidly absorb the entire country). It was finally agreed that if the French make their proposal, they will include only strictly military considerations plus a positive statement against any arrangements leading to partition.

2) This current French proposal takes as a point of departure Eden's May 28 proposal.

3) The British paper providing for the regrouping in Viet-Nam of Viet Minh troops in Laos and Cambodia was read but was not given thorough consideration: It appears that the problem of the simultaneity of the cessation of hostilities is recognized to be a practical rather than a theoretical one.

4) The Cambodian Delegation strongly restated the well known Cambodian position regarding the necessity for a withdrawal of all Viet Minh forces from Cambodia.

CONFIDENTIAL

FRANCE PROPOSAL FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE MILITARY PROBLEM OF VIETNAM

(Further proposals will be put forward in the immediate future for Laos and Cambodia and it is understood that nothing agreed for any one area will prevent the entry into force of a cease-fire in all areas simultaneously.)

1. Representatives of Commanders-in-Chief of the two parties will meet at Geneva on ________.

2. They will examine, in the first place, the demarcation of the zones of regrouping in Vietnam.

3. They will present their recommendations and observations to the Conference.

4. It will be their task to propose the basis upon which the regroupment will be carried out, taking into account the following two principles: (a) the regroupment must not lead to a dismemberment of Vietnam, and (b) the regroupment has for its objective the reestablishment of peace and security in Vietnam.

5. If it should be considered necessary, they will be able to request the Conference to define such points as they consider useful.

6. During this time the Conference will continue to study other problems relative to the peace in Indochina.

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSAL OF THE U.K. DELEGATION

In order to facilitate the early and simultaneous cessation of hostilities it is necessary to determine the areas within which the forces of both sides shall be regrouped:

To this end, it is proposed that:

1. Representatives of the two commands should meet immediately in Geneva in order that this should also contribute to the establishment of contacts between the two parties on the spot.

2. Their first task should be to work out the regrouping areas for Vietnam (the two sides and five of all for Vietnam).²

3. They should report their findings and recommendations to the conference as soon as possible.

² Brackets in the source text.
4. The conference meanwhile should proceed with examination of other military matters, beginning with arrangements for international supervision.

396.1 GR/0-2764 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

Geneva, May 23, 1954—10 a.m.

Dule 123. Eyes only Secretary. Reference Tedul 127. I would like to reserve final recommendation till Monday or Tuesday of next week. Believe it very likely that following ten days will be the critical period. As your own departure caused some comment here, and as Molotov, Eden and Bidault apparently intend to stay on through next ten days or so, my own view and that of Phleger to whom I have talked privately, is that we should also remain. Don't imply that Murphy and others could not do quite as good a job or even a better job.

The probability is that general interpretation, no matter what was said, would be that we had written off the conference and were pulling out by degrees, or even that we were sabotaging at critical moment.

If you were leaving the US, it would, of course, be different. On the other hand, I do not think you should cancel out this very important trip. If you feel you cannot maintain adequate direction by phone, etcetera, and that I should be there, possibly I could come home for period of your trip with understanding that I was returning in few days, leaving Robertson to carry on. Trouble is that Phleger, whose judgment is very valuable, will be leaving at same time. I have reasonable excuse for short trip home as I was scheduled to receive honorary degree at New York University June 9.

SMITH

1 Dated May 20, p. 865.

116.11 DU/5-2764 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET NAC


Tedul 131. Re Dule 124.

1. Our military authorities are today inviting representatives of other four powers to meet Washington June 8.

2. This invitation is for moment secret because Australians have

1 Drafted by MacArthur. Repeated to London as telegram 6374, to Paris as telegram 4276, to Canberra as telegram 224, and to Wellington from Canberra as telegram 174.

2 In telegram Tedul 124, May 27, Smith said he urgently confirmed "my own view has been cleared for several days for beginning Five Power talks. Eden has same view and confirms dispatch instructions to UK military Washington mentioned first paragraph reference telegram." (116.11 DU/5-2764)

Usun 577 and termed persuasive in Usun 759 [579]. Three alternative methods of convening GA discussed in working paper sent Rome May 20. We lean toward emergency session under "unifying for peace resolution since under rule 10 of GA rules it would be most difficult add other items (i.e., Korea, Morocco) to agenda.

2. (A) We believe Chinese representation problem must be dealt with in SC and GA under moratorium agreement that, if any proposals to be ruled out of order or deferred.

(B) Expect Thailand only to be invited to SC talks. Would hope associated states would not participate in SC. However, they could express support for Thai move in written communication to SC.

3. (A) Terms draft resolution given in Secio [Tosee] 229, repeated Usun 765. When POC subcommittee established would and associated states could request observation.

(B) Subcommission membership at India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, Uruguay satisfactory and we hope feasible. Key question will be India's willingness serve. Hope UK will strongly urge Indians to agree serve.

4. Would expect nine votes in SC and more than necessary two-thirds majority in GA.

5. We would hope to control debate in GA through strenuous advance consultation to discourage submission any other agenda item and to support presiding officers in focusing discussion.

6, 7, 8. Agree with Smith's comments.

Our purpose at this time is limited to obtaining in smoothest and quickest way establishment of UN observation. Statements in SC should therefore stress incontestable existence of international tension and need for ascertaining facts and should as far as possible avoid detailed accounts of military and political situation.

DUKE

1 Usun 577 dated May 21, p. 865; Usun 579 not printed.

* Dated May 21, p. 870.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 198th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 27, 1954

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 198th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States;

1 Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on May 25.
the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 1 through 6); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Items 5 and 6); Assistant Attorney General Barnes and Rankin; Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., Department of State (for Item 9); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Mr. Robert Amory, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency; the White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

10. Southeast Asia (NSC 5405; NSC Actions Nos. 1086-5 and -6, 1104-5, 1110 and 1112).

Mr. Cutler then asked the Secretary of State if he would report any recent developments regarding the Geneva Conference.

Secretary Dulles replied that he had nothing of significance to report from Paris or Geneva. Everything was awaiting the return of General Ely from Indochina, which had just occurred. General Trum- nall had reached Paris at about the same time, but had not yet seen General Ely.

Dr. Fleming inquired of Secretary Dulles the significance of Mr. Eden’s proposal at Geneva for a cease-fire. Secretary Dulles replied that acceptance of the Eden proposal would bring about a de facto partition of all three of the Associated States. Beyond that, the Communists would certainly infiltrate the areas assigned to the other side, with the result that sooner or later they would obtain complete control of all three States.

Secretary Dulles went on to express his great concern over the deterioration of the Bao Dai regime, and mentioned the possible need for drastic action if Bao Dai did not regain control of his government.

SECRET

PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 27 (27), 1954—noon.


Eden recalled his proposal last meeting and Molotov amendments and then referred new French proposal (see Secto 327) asked Bidault to comment thereon.

Bidault commented on number of proposals before meeting and desirability concentrating attention on arranging meeting of representatives of commands in Geneva for purpose establishing regrouping zones in Vietnam. He pointed out eight out of nine delegations had agreed in principle and ninth had not expressed opposition to this concept. In tabling proposal dealing with Vietnam he stated French delegation would present in very near future proposals re Laos and Cambodia. He supported principle of simultaneous cease-fire provided this did not result in delaying cessation of hostilities in any given territory. He expressed view conditions in each of three states should be taken up on merits.

In commenting on proposal Bidault said principle of regrouping zones in Vietnam seems generally agreed as well as idea that representatives of commands meet in Geneva. There would also be required exchange of views with commands in field. Bidault urged haste stating time saved Geneva saves blood Indochina and time wasted Geneva wastes blood there.

Bidault suggested June first as date for meeting of representatives of commands in Geneva and asked delegates express themselves re date.

Chou En-lai then presented six-point proposal (see Secto 326) on basic principles pertaining to cessation of hostilities. He reiterated need for simultaneous cease-fire. He stated he shared belief that situation different in three states but regrouping needed in all three. He expressed agreement to contact both at Geneva and in field between commands of two sides in order determine zones for regrouping and other matters. He said Bidault’s suggestion of demilitarized zones

1 A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/7) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, OF 27A. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 8 p.m. and adjourned at 5:15 p.m. The minutes are also printed in Conférence de Genève, pp. 154-155.

2 Dated May 27, p. 946.

3 Dated May 27, infra.
warranted further consideration and might be topic for discussion
directly between parties. He expressed himself strongly on need for
preventing introduction further troops and military matériel into
Indochina after cessation of hostilities. He said Russian armistice
proceedures offered precedent and took occasion to stress importance
he attached to stopping introduction into Indochina by US of mili-
tary personnel and weapons. On question of supervision of armistice
Chou En-lai endorsed DRV proposal of joint committee of belligers-
ents and in addition Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission along
lines followed in Korea. He spoke in most laudatory terms of perfor-
amance of NNSC in Korea adding that failure by US forces to abide by
provisions of armistice including those concerning prisoners of war
had created difficulties. He painted picture of smoothly functioning
armistice supervision by NNSC in Korea. With regard to interna-
tional guarantees Chou En-lai said he shared view of French and
Soviet delegations (to which he stated no objection had been taken)
that all Geneva states join in guarantee. In case of violation, there
should be consultation leading to collective rather than to individual
measures. He anticipated no difficulties regarding prisoners of war
and civil internes.

Chou En-lai envisaged agreement on principles followed by discuss-
ion regarding concrete application.

Vietnamese delegate then delivered earnest statement of Vietnamese
views on imperative necessity of avoiding immediate or eventual par-
tition through establishment of proposed regrouping zones. He stated
DRV proposal would lead to this end due broad nature of economic,
political, demographic and other considerations introduced by DRV
in proposal as factors in determining zones. He recalled that confer-
ence designed not only ascertain and recognize facts but also achieve
respect for justice and law. He recalled UN Charter provision re con-
ditions for peaceful settlement of international disputes and also
Stimson doctrine as applied Manchuko. He recalled Stimson doctrine
of non-recognition of results of acts of force had been approved by
League of Nations members including some states represented at con-
ference. He said partition would only lead to further war and pre-
sented proposal reading "The regroupment zones will be so established
as not to impair the territorial and political unity of Vietnam."

During recess Bidault, Eden and Smith agreed that Eden should
seek Molotov's agreement to adoption of either French proposal or of
Eden's proposal of May 25 with preamble and paragraph one amended
to read, "In order to facilitate the early and simultaneous cessation of
hostilities it is proposed that: 1. Representatives of the two com-
mands should meet immediately in Geneva in order that this should
also contribute to the establishment of contacts between the two par-
ties on the spot." with paragraphs two, three and four as originally
presented (Secto 320 [302] 4).

Molotov declined to accept either in absence of some indication
there would be regrouping in Laos and Cambodia as well. Western
three refused to concede on this and proposed that, rather than con-
tinuing discussion this afternoon, "drafting committee" should meet
tomorrow at 11 : 00 to consider Eden, Bidault and Chou proposals and
attempt to come up with common one. This was agreed. Phleger, Allen
and Chauvel will represent Western three on drafting committee.

Comment: In private meeting of three at recess Bidault took
strong stand, which I supported, against suggestions by Eden which
would have had effect of so far by-passing issue as to permit Commu-
nists interpret as capitulation to their point of view. We much prefer
French draft and will press for something along these lines in drafting
committee.

It was clear Communists are in no hurry, and thus far entirely un-
willing make any concession which would even temporarily bridge
gap so as permit work start on Vietnam. Apart from events in Indo-
china they may well also be influenced by scheduling of Indochina
debate for next Tuesday in French Assembly.

It was a day of complete frustration and we encountered absolute
intransigence on Communist side.

Smith

*Telegram Secto 302, dated May 26, p. 920.

396.1 GE/5-2754: Telegram
Seventh Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 27, 3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State
SECRET PRIORITY

Secto 326. Repeated information priority Paris 344, priority Saigon
121, Tokyo 94, London 214, Moscow 90. Department pass Defense;
Tokyo pass CINFCE. Saigon pass Phnom Penh and Vietsname.
Following is text Chinese Communist proposal presented at seventh
restricted meeting:

"The participants of the Geneva Conference have agreed upon the
following basic principles pertaining to the cessation of hostilities in
Indochina:

1. A complete cease-fire by all the armed forces of the two bel-
gerent parties—ground, naval and air forces—is to be simultaneously
carried out throughout the territory of Indochina."
"2. The two parties are to begin negotiations on appropriate readjustments of the area of their occupied zones, the passage of troops of the two parties during the readjustments and other related questions that may arise.

"3. The introduction into Indochina from outside of all kinds of fresh troops and military personnel as well as all types of arms and ammunition is to cease simultaneously with the cessation of hostilities throughout the territory of Indochina.

"4. Joint committee composed of representatives of the commands of the two parties are to supervise the implementation of the terms of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities.

"International supervision by a neutral nations commission over the implementation of the aforesaid agreement is also to be carried out.

"The question as to the composition of the neutral nations commission is to be examined separately.

"5. The states participating in the Geneva conference undertake to guarantee the implementation of the agreement.

"The question as to the nature of the obligations to be undertaken by the states concerned is to be examined separately.

"6. War prisoners and interred civilians are to be released by the two parties.

INDOCHINA

(a) The regroupment must not lead to a dismemberment of Vietnam, and

(b) The regroupment has for its objective the re-establishment of peace and security in Vietnam.

5. If it should be considered necessary, they will be able to request the conference to define such points as they consider useful.

6. During this time, the conference will continue to study other problems relative to the peace in Indochina."

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Meetings with the President

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

[Extract]

SECRET

PERSONAL AND PRIVATE


When these [travel] plans were made, I had expected that General Bedell Smith would be back. With reference to his possible return and replacement by Murphy, I am inclined to feel that to pull him out at this time, particularly with Eden, Bidault and Molotov staying on, might be interpreted as an effort on our part to sabotage the conference, especially as around June 9 or 10 may be the critical time.

My disposition, therefore, is to have Bedell stay and plan to make my trip with the understanding that the Army can set up communications for me with Washington, and I can, of course, come back on short notice.

Does this have your approval? 1

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

1 A handwritten notation by President Eisenhower on the source text indicated that the President approved the Secretary's decision to leave Under Secretary Smith at Geneva.

Conference files, lot 69 D 327, CP 242 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

TOP SECRET

Washington, May 27, 1954—5:58 p.m.

Tedul 135. No distribution. Eyes only Under Secretary from Secretary. Your Tedul 127. 2 Subject matter discussed with President who

Drafted by the Secretary of State.

Dated May 26, p. 668.
SECRET
FROM PARIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/CTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
MINISTRY OF ECONOMY
DISTRIBUTION

Mr G. Jebb
No. 378
May 27, 1954

D. S. 37 p.m., May 27, 1954
R. B. 47 p.m., May 27, 1954

PRIORITY
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 378 of May 27.
Repeated for Information to Codel Geneva and Washington.

Codel Geneva telegram No. 450.

I am as puzzled as you and Bedell Smith are by Bidault’s attitude. Since you know him much better than I do my comments may be superfluous, but I nevertheless submit the following reflections:

1. There are three possible explanations of Bidault’s attitude:

(a) A long period of excitement and strain may have affected his judgment and he may not be thoroughly conscious of what he is doing; in particular, he may think that he has only got to be very tough and everything will eventually come his way. In fact he may be suffering from a sort of euphoria.

(b) He may be consciously playing for a failure at Geneva in the belief that, confronted with such failure, the Americans will arrive in force, in which case he could be represented as the saviour of the country. This, after all, is a conceivable policy though admittedly a very risky one. From the point of view of his own continuance in power a lot would depend on the timing.

(c) He is still bluffing and does not want to reach any agreement with the other side until the last possible moment, hoping thereby to improve the terms. Such a policy (with which I had credited him up to now) would be risky enough, but if he has very good nerves and is lucky he might pull it off.

2. You can say much better than I whether there is anything in possibility (a). As regards possibility (b) I am struck by the analogy with an argument which I have heard several times recently that a breakdown at Geneva will improve the chances of the E.D.C. I am sure that this argument, like the similar argument which was current at the time of the Berlin Conference, is wrong. It assumes that the convertible opposition to E.D.C. comes from people who are not yet convinced of Russian bad faith. But in fact such people are mostly unconvertible. It is much more likely that a settlement at Geneva will favour the E.D.C. because France, guilt of the war in Indo-China, will feel better able to assume her full responsibilities in Europe. The argument is only true

/to the extent
SECRET

Paris telegram No. 378 to Foreign Office

-2-

to the extent that if a Geneva settlement is represented as being less
due to yours than to Molotov's good offices, it may positively increase
the number of those Frenchmen who are still unconvinced of the evil
intentions of the Russians. Perhaps I should say that those who suspect that
(b) is the right interpretation of Bidault's attitude would be supported to some
extent by his remark about waiting for General Elia's report which, after
all, is concerned with restoring the military, rather than the political
situation.

4. I need hardly add, for what it is worth, that a large section of the
non-Communist left has all along distrusted Bidault's sincerity at Geneva.
Such people's motives may be suspect; but it does now seem at least
possible that they may be right in this respect.

Foreign Office please pass to Codel Geneva and Washington (both
PRIORITY) as my telegrams Nos. 81 and 107 respectively.

[Repeated to Codel Geneva and Washington]
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (U.K. DELEGATION)

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTR

Mr. Esen
Re: 475
May 27, 1954

D. 9.00 p.m. May 27, 1954
R. 9.03 p.m. May 27, 1954

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 475 of May 27.

Repeated for information to: Washington

Paris

Bisault reappeared this morning from Paris, but gave us no serious account of the position there or the views of his government. After our meeting of the three, I asked him what was the position in Paris. I suppose that the French Government were gravely worried. He replied — not at all; that Ely was a fine man and had brought back proposals, and that the French Government had decided to send out more troops.

2. We continue to be puzzled by Bisault’s attitude which seems to have little relation to our reports or to American ones from Indo-China.

Foreign Office pass Paris and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 104 and 149 respectively.

[Repeated to Paris and Washington].

DISTRIBUTED TO:
South East Asia Department
United Nations (Political) Department
Western and Southern Department
News Department
American Department
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (U.K.DEL.) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/CFP

Mr. Eden
No. 476
May 27, 1954.

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

D. 11.45 p.m. May 27, 1954.
R. 12.7 a.m. May 28, 1954.

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 476 of May 27.
Repeated for information to Washington

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Indo-China.

I went to see Chou En-lai this morning. The atmosphere was easier than on the occasions of my previous interviews with him. He seemed confident that we should get an agreement for a cease-fire and said that he thought that it was possible to make real progress even during the remaining half of this week.

2. I spoke first about international supervision and suggested that India would have to play an important rôle. I said that it was no good having a supervisory body composed as in Korea of an equal number from each opposing side and that we should have to draw representatives from really neutral states. Chou En-lai agreed with this view and that India must undoubtedly be a member. He observed that it would not be necessary to have armed forces which had only been required in Korea for guarding prisoners. He agreed however that there would have to be military teams which would have to deal with possible conflicts or allegations that fresh troops or supplies were being brought into the area. He also said that he agreed with the idea that there might be demilitarised zones.
CONFIDENTIAL

Geneva Conference (U.K. Dol) telegram No. 479 to Foreign Office

-2-

3. I then raised the general question of Laos and Cambodia which I had seemed to be the most difficult problem. I mentioned the difference between the situation there and in Viet Nam and pressed the view that the Viet Minh forces in Laos and Cambodia would have to be regrouped outside their border. Cheu En-lai admitted that the situation in Laos and Cambodia was different from that in Viet Nam but said that there really were native resistance movements in the two states which could not be evacuated. I said that I thought that everybody was agreed that there must be a simultaneous cease-fire in all the states but that progress was more likely if the military discussions could be held separately for the three states whether there would finally be three separate agreements or one agreement in three parts. Cheu En-lai said that he felt that the Conference must agree on general cease-fire principles and then decide their practical application to each of the three states separately though the cease-fire should not come into force anywhere until agreements had been reached on all three.

4. I said that I agreed with Mr. Molotov that we must give a

proposition to the Conference. I thought that it was important that we should avoid for direct contact between the staff immediately after the two points given in my telegram No. 449. Once the two points had been decided the discussion of practical military questions we should probably find that a number of our present difficulties disappeared. Cheu En-lai agreed with this view and said that the staffs would have to discuss each area by stages. He said that the discussions by the staffs would inevitably bring up certain political points which would have to be dealt with soon.

5. After my talk with Cheu En-lai I had a meeting with

M. Bidault and General Bedell Smith in order to discuss procedure for the afternoon's meeting. General Bedell Smith and I were in favour of pressing for agreement on the procedural proposals which I had made at the last meeting and on which Mr. Molotov had suggested amendments. M. Bidault, however, while claiming to be content with the outcome of his visit to Paris, seemed still to be in an indefinite state of mind and insisted that it was desirable to get on with the discussions in order to retain the support of the associates and that he should table a new proposal of his own. After much
CONFIDENTIAL

Geneva Conference telegram (U.K. Del.) No. 176 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

discussion it was finally agreed that he should do this but that, I should see Molotov before the meeting in order to explore further with him the possibility of agreement on the basis of my own proposal.

6. When I later saw Molotov I fairly quickly reached agreement with him upon wording which both he and I could accept and which left open the question of regrouping areas in Cambodia and Laos. But I had to reserve the position of my other colleagues and was in fact doubtful whether the proposed compromise would be acceptable to the French and their associates. During the opening stages of this afternoon's meeting while M. Bidault was introducing his own proposal we accordingly prepared possible alternative variants of my proposal for discussion with the French, Americans and Russians during the interval.

7. Please see my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington, Paris, Moscow, Peking, Saigon, Singapore, Bangkok, Rangoon, Delhi, Karachi and Phnom Penh as my telegrams Nos. 150, 105, 39, 55, 43, 40, 20, 17, 55, 49, 7 respectively and saving to U.K. Del. New York, Tokyo, Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington and Colombo as my saving telegrams Nos. 14, 14, 16, 16 and 20 respectively.


ADVANCE COPIES TO:

Private Secretary
Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Minister of State
Mr. Speight
Head of South East Asia Department
of other four governments. While recognizing desirability of avoiding extravagant speculation which might arise for example when Australian and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff depart for Washington, there was agreement it would otherwise be desirable avoid public statement and particularly joint announcement five capitals. FYI. Watt had received same instructions from Canberra as had Spender and had replied as above. End FYI.

Eden will have to refer to London in view of questions which last sentence of text may raise as to whether UK has agreed to wider conversations and if so, on what basis. It was recognised that Bidault had most serious problem and that his views, which he will not be able to obtain until morning, should be given major weight.

Subject to change as result of London's or Bidault's views in morning, consensus was that there should not be simultaneous announcement in five capitals but that each should talk from text given in reference telegram as and when necessary to prevent or counteract press speculation. I think best thing possible would be to say nothing and just let things happen.

SMITH

MAY 28, 1954

296.1 GE/5-2854 : Telegram

Smith—Eden Meeting, Geneva May 28, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Geneva, May 28, 1954—3 p.m.

Secto 328. Department pass USUN New York 2. Reference Tosec 271. In conversation this morning I showed Eden copy Tosec 271. Eden said report had just been received of meeting between Dixon, Hoppenot and Lodge. Eden particularly referred to Hoppenot's suggestion that Security Council might put Thai appeal on its agenda but postpone debate until Geneva Conference was over. Eden stated he was informing Dixon that he thought this was not a bad suggestion and was well worth further consideration.

With reference last sentence paragraph 2B, Tosec 271, Eden stated he understood your view was Associated States would keep out of matter entirely until POC established when Cambodia and Laos might invite POC to attend observation their areas. I confirmed this was strong view of US, fell here, and we should so recommend to Department.

Eden stated he was seeing Krishna Menon again tomorrow morning and would discuss with him question Indian role on POC. I told Eden in conversation I had with Menon last night he had initially taken strong position against Indian participation, but at end had softened his attitude.

Eden said UK was not so sanguine of two-thirds majority in GA at present moment, being particularly doubtful attitude Arab bloc which in addition to traditional attitudes toward "French colonialism" might wish to repel USSR for its veto on Palestine case.

SMITH

Geneva, May 28, 1954—11 a.m.

IC/DC/1

Participants:

United Kingdom

Lord Reading
Mr. Allen
Mr. Tahourdin
Mr. Vallat

United States

Mr. Phieger
Amb. Heath
Mr. Stelle

U.S.S.R.

Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Novikov
Mr. Trosyanovskiy

Vietnam

Mr. Dac Khe
Mr. Thanh
Mr. Buu Kinh

Laos

Amb. Nong Kimny
Mr. Sam Sary
Mr. Son Sann

Communist China

Chang Wen-tien
Li Ke-niung
Pu Shou-chang
Ch'en Chia-k'ang

Lord Reading stated that he had had discussions with Mr. Gromyko as to the question of Chairmanship. Since this committee was formed in yesterday's restricted session, they had thought it should be treated

\[1\] Drafted by Stelle. Minutes indicate that meeting convened at 11 a.m. and adjourned at 1 p.m. Summary of minutes was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 333, May 28. (296.1 GE/5-2854)
as a carry-over from that session when Mr. Eden was in the Chair rather than a committee which would be attached to the next session of the Ministers when Mr. Molotov would be in the Chair. Mr. Gromyko and he had thought, therefore, that it might be appropriate to have him in the Chair. He wondered whether this was generally agreeable to the other delegations.

Chauvel stated that the French delegation was in full accord with this idea. If meetings similar to this one should be held, the same arrangement might be carried out. The other delegations signified their agreement.

Reading stated that he thought the purpose of the meeting as set by the Ministers was to consider three drafts—the UK draft of the day before yesterday, and the French and Chinese Communists' drafts which had been tabled at yesterday's sitting. He thought it would be remembered that Mr. Molotov had proposed certain amendments to the UK draft, that these amendments had been discussed, but that in the end it had proved impossible to reach agreement. Lord Reading distributed drafts of a UK proposal which follows:

"In order to facilitate the early cessation of hostilities it is necessary to determine the areas within which the forces of both sides shall be regrouped. To this end it is proposed that:

a. Representatives of the two commands should meet immediately in Geneva.
b. Their first task should be to work out regrouping areas for Vietnam.
c. They should report their findings and recommendations to the Conference as soon as possible.
d. The Conference meanwhile should proceed with examination of other military matters, beginning with arrangements for international supervision."

He stated that the UK itself would like to make one amendment. He would like to delete in the preamble the phrase "It is necessary to determine the areas within which the forces of both sides shall be regrouped. To this end".

This amendment would leave the effective part of the proposal unchanged. Reading stated he did not want to take advantage of being in the Chair to talk too much, but he would like to make one suggestion on the procedure of this meeting. During the last few days at the restricted meetings we have been making a vigorous effort to arrive at a point where action at last could be taken. It would be a relief and incentive to all of us if we felt we were making genuine progress towards a settlement. It would also be a satisfaction to the whole world which was watching these proceedings.

He stated that we have been searching for common ground but to him two points seemed agreed upon. The first was the necessity for direct contacts between the commanders either in Geneva or on the spot, or perhaps preferably both. The second was the extreme desirability for a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina. He wondered whether it was not possible and urgent to get representatives of the commanders together to begin work on the terms and methods of cessation of hostilities while the conference proceeded with other matters. The conference could then at any time enlarge the terms of reference upon which the military representatives could work. The important thing to do was to get them started on something, and we might get them working on something more later on. He thought it well to recall that the commanders or their representatives could only present proposals to the conference. Only the conference itself could approve or disapprove those proposals. He thought the UK proposal did not conflict in any way with the proposal which had been tabled by Mr. Chou En-lai even though the ideas contained in the Chinese proposal were perhaps expressed in different language. He thought that the first two of the Chinese proposals might be referred to the military representatives and that others might be taken up perhaps later on. He was sorry that he had talked at such great length, but he had thought that it might be useful to give expression to the sense of urgency which he was sure all delegations shared. He hoped that the other delegations would express their opinions.

Chauvel gave thanks from the French delegation to the Chairman for a clear and lucid exposition of the task of the committee. He thought the committee was not meant at this level to replace the conference and to repeat its work but rather to facilitate the work of the conference. He thought that if the committee could find points of common agreement it could achieve positive results. He thought the task of the committee should be approached in a positive way and that to this end it should limit the scope of the matters with which it dealt. He thought the committee should address itself to specific matters.

The last meetings of the Ministers have been concerned with the question of bringing together representatives of the commanders-in-chief. He thought the question should be put as to whether the conference wants these representatives to meet and to undertake certain tasks for the conference. He thought it was not very difficult for the committee to arrive at useful results. There were quite a few points of common agreement although the angles from which those points were approached were not necessarily the same. He thought that in the..."
various proposals some were addressed to immediate tasks whereas some—such as, for example, some of those of the Chinese Communists' proposal—were larger in scope and addressed to principles. Even in the Chinese Communists' proposal, however, there were certain immediate tasks which were in common with those of the other proposals. He did agree that proceeding toward finding items of common agreement should be the purpose of this meeting. Finally, of the three proposals he thought that Point a of the UK proposal, covered the same ground as the first point of the French proposal; Point b of the UK proposal was similar in purpose to the second point of the French proposal; Point c of the UK proposal could be equated with the third point of the French proposal and Point d of the UK proposal with the sixth point of the French proposal.

Chauvel stated that the Chinese proposal was much broader in scope and covered very much the whole ground of the discussions of the conference. However, Paragraph 2 of the Chinese Communists' proposal did cover points which were referred to in the British and French drafts. If his memory was correct he believed that Chou En-lai had noted the desirability of contact between the commanders in General. The same statement had been made in one form or another by many other delegations. He thought, therefore, that without difficulty this could be extracted as a point of common agreement. He might further say that he had had the feeling that the proposal which the French had made on the 27th of May was not far removed from Mr. Dong's proposal and that it did not conflict with what the Viet Minh representative had put forward.

The Cambodian, Ambassador Nong Kimny, took note of the amendment which the UK had made to the proposal which it had itself distributed. He stated that the head of the Cambodian delegation had the other day mentioned that the British proposal might raise certain misunderstandings. The head of the Cambodian delegation had at the same time addressed to Mr. Eden questions as to whether the UK proposal applied to all three countries or whether it applied only to Vietnam. Eden had replied, he believed, that the preamble applied to all three countries and the rest to Vietnam. The Ambassador thought he should again address these questions to Lord Reading. He believed that to start with the UK draft might again give rise to a series of amendments and objections. He thought it might be better to start with the French plan, particularly since Paragraph 4 of the French plan removed some of the difficulties which were raised by the proposals of the UK delegation. He would like to propose that the committee begin by considering point by point the French proposal in which case it might then attack directly the question of achieving contact between the two commands.

Lord Reading stated that the UK proposals were general and intended to apply to all three states. Only the specific Paragraph 4 was directed to Vietnam since this was a question of the greatest urgency. He thought it was for the meeting to decide which proposal it should consider. He himself had no personal objection to considering the French draft.

Gromyko referred first of all to the proposal tabled by the Chinese delegation. He understood that there had been some agreement among the Ministers that these proposals should be considered tomorrow at the next meeting of the Ministers. He thought that at this meeting the committee should begin work at the point where the Ministers had stopped which was, as he saw it, in reconciling the various texts of Eden's proposal for achieving contacts between the commanders of the two sides. He believed that to save time discussions should be started with the last draft presented by the representative of the UK which as he understood it had been formulated taking into consideration the various opinions expressed around the table. From the observations of the UK representative he understood that this draft had been also formulated in such a way as to represent the ideas proposed by the French delegate. He would like to speak first about the preamble. He thought it would be desirable to insert the phrase "and simultaneously" between the words "the earliest" and the phrase "cessation of hostilities". He thought that proceeding from the fact that there had been at one time no objections from other delegations to the insertion of such a phrase he did not see why such a very general statement should be unacceptable to any delegation. He thought that if all delegations concurred, the committee could agree on the preamble in its new form.

As to Paragraph 4 of the UK proposal he would suggest the addition of the phrase "and also to establish contact on the spot". From the fact that this addition had also been discussed in various meetings and had not evoked disapproval, he believed that Mr. Bidault had spoken of the desirability of contacts on the spot.

At this point Lord Reading raised the question as to whether the Russian amendment might read more smoothly if it read "and contact also be established on the spot". Gromyko acquiesced in Reading's version.

Gromyko proposed that Paragraph 5 of the UK text be amended to read "their task should be to work out regrouping areas for the two sides" or alternatively it should be amended to read, "their task should be to work out regrouping areas for the two sides beginning
with Vietnam". Gromyko accepted Paragraph c. He stated that he still held the view that there was no need at all for Paragraph d. He justified his feeling that there was no need at all for Paragraph d by stating that the Ministers had agreed that the re-establishment of peace should begin with a discussion on how to bring about a cessation of hostilities. There had been already considerable discussion on this point and this committee was addressing itself to these matters. The conference had still to talk political matters.

The question of when they should discuss these was something which the Ministers themselves should decide. There was no reason for the committee to commit them in that respect. In his own view, Gromyko said, if the French and the DRV delegations were agreeable he thought it might be well to give a date when the contacts between the commanders should be established and to amend the British draft on that respect. Gromyko concluded by advocating that it was advisable to take up the last UK draft read, to take into consideration the amendments he had proposed, and to prepare a text for consideration by the Ministers.

Phleger raised a point of inquiry as to whether the USSR had accepted the UK delegation in the preamble of the British draft. Lord Reading thought the USSR had accepted that amendment and read the text including the Russian amendments and deletion of the phrase the UK had recommended to be deleted. Gromyko said he had had in mind the Russian text which had been distributed and that the text as he had it in mind would read "in order to facilitate the earliest and simultaneous cessation of hostilities it is necessary to determine the areas within which the forces of both sides shall be regrouped". (This made it evident that Gromyko did not accept the UK delegation.)

Reading asked whether Gromyko would have objection to the amended form which he stated was intended only to simplify the proposal. Gromyko said that simplification was good within certain limits but it was not useful when the limits were surpassed. He therefore thought that it was more useful to use the fuller formula of the original UK text.

Sananikone, the Laoiian representative, stated his pleasure that after two weeks the conference was about to reach a constructive stage. As to which paper the committee should consider the Laotian thought that it was preferable to extract common points of agreement. He thought that all were agreed on the desirability of the meeting of the commanders. He questioned why that point should not be presented to the conference for a decision. He had one question, however, to address to Lord Reading. He had understood Reading to say that all except Paragraph 6 of the UK proposal applied to all of Indochina. If this were so, he wanted to know what commanders were referred to in Paragraph 5. If the reference were to the Laotian commander and the Viet Minh commander, he thought it should be again made clear that there was no question of any regrouping but merely a question of simple withdrawal of Viet Minh forces.

Dac Khe thought that progress could be made by leaving the level of the abstract and progressing to the concrete. He thought that progress had been made by beginning a concrete examination of the problems of Vietnam leaving aside for the moment those of Cambodia and Laos, which would be settled later on their merits. He pointed out that the French proposal clearly refers to Vietnam and only Vietnam. Moreover Paragraph 4 of that proposal contained elements which he thought it was necessary for the commanders to have for guidance in their work. He therefore proposed that the committee take the French draft as a basis for discussion.

Lord Reading stated that he fully realized the reasons advanced by the representatives of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, but he wondered whether in view of the fact that the British proposal was so similar to the French, and since it had been already commented upon by the USSR whether it would not be useful for the committee to come back to the UK text and to deal with Gromyko's amendments as well as certain other amendments which he himself was prepared to make, and amendments which others might care to make. He thought the question needed considering, but he wondered if we could not return for the moment to the British text.

Chauvel commented that he had no pride of authorship, that he did think that the French proposal, particularly with the points which were made in Paragraphs 4 and 5, had some advantage and that there was also an advantage in the fact that the French proposal had no preamble. His mind, however, was open to any text. As regards the UK text, he endorsed the deletion in the preamble which the UK had recommended. He thought that whatever text the committee considered it was running the risk of making no progress unless it realized that principles were one thing and implementation another. He thought it was important to begin with the problems of Vietnam which was the most important theatre of operations. If it were attempted at the same time to deal with the problems of Laos and Cambodia, this might temper whatever draft was arrived at and complicate it. He thought the committee should limit its objective and start with Vietnam. It could immediately thereafter address itself to work on Laos and Cambodia if the conference should so decide. Chauvel commented that if we were dealing with Vietnam alone the notion of a simultaneous cease-fire had no application or meaning. He was concerned that the committee
should reach a practical conclusion. If the conference wanted military people to meet and to take up the problems of Vietnam, we should say so simply. If at a later date the conference wanted the same military people to take up the problems of Laos and Cambodia, it could say so at that time. With regard to the question of simultaneous cease-fire, the French delegation admits as this a practical possibility, and as a matter of fact, the first part of the French proposal contained mention of the possibility. Chauvel thought that it would be an improvement if the UK proposal could be clearly headed “Proposal for Vietnam.”

As to the question of timing which had been raised by Mr. Gromyko, Chauvel would like to inform the committee that military representatives of the Franco-Vietnamese High Command would be arriving in Geneva Monday.

Phleger stated that his understanding of the terms of reference of the committee was that the committee was to examine the various proposals and the discussions concerning those proposals which had been put forward in the last few days and to extract from them those points on which there was agreement. It was not the task of the committee to make suggestions on matters on which there had been no meeting of the minds. From examination of the proposals and the discussions of the last few days it seemed to him that there were only two clear points on which there was general agreement. First there was general agreement that representatives of the Franco-Vietnamese commanders should meet in Geneva. Second there was agreement that these military representatives should explore means and methods of working out regrouping areas for Vietnam. If there were general agreement on these two points it should be possible to find a way to express this agreement clearly and simply.

Phleger said it was equally clear from an examination of the discussions and proposals that there was not a meeting of the minds on two subjects: (a) There was no agreement that the three countries should be treated in the same manner. (b) There was no general agreement that there must be a simultaneous cessation of hostilities. There might eventually be agreement to that effect, but as yet there existed no such agreement. It therefore seemed to him that all language which referred to agreement on simultaneous cessation of hostilities should be excluded from proposals drafted by the committee. Application of the test as to areas of agreement lead him to the view that as amended by the UK the UK proposal was one which clearly stated points on which there was general agreement. It is clear that the task of the military commanders applied solely to Vietnam. The amendments suggested by the USSR on the other hand introduced matters on which there had not been agreement and therefore he did not think that the amendments proposed by the Russian representative should be acceptable. Phleger stated that in a desire to be helpful he made the suggestion that the UK proposal be restricted to Paragraphs a, b and c, that the preamble be dropped and that in line with the views of the Russian representative Paragraph d be omitted also. He thought it would be useful if the names of the commanders referred to were inserted. The proposal would therefore read:

1. “Representatives of the Franco-Vietnamese and Vietminh commands should meet immediately in Geneva.
2. “Their first task should be to work out regrouping areas for Vietnam.
3. “They should report their findings and recommendations to the conference as soon as possible.”

Lord Reading stated that several delegations had requested to speak, that there was a plenary on Korea this afternoon, that since it was one o'clock already he did not believe agreement could be reached on the various proposals at this meeting. He recommended an adjournment and asked whether it would be agreeable to the others to meet again at 10:30 Saturday morning. The other delegations indicated readiness to meet on Saturday morning. Lord Reading stated that there was just one point he would like to make in closing the meeting—the military representatives would be here Monday, and he thought it would be absolutely a tragedy if we did not have something for them to do.

110.11 DU/6-5804: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, May 29, 1954—3 p.m.

Dulte 131. For the Secretary from the Under Secretary. Limit distribution. If we succeed obtaining agreement on beginning military staff talks on Indochina, we will shortly thereafter be facing up to question of supervisory organization. What would you think of asking Colombo Conference countries (Pakistan, India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia) to undertake role, they to invite participation of European neutral which I would assume would be Norway?

It seems to me this would have certain definite advantages. It would place responsibility on Asians for policing their own back yard, the participation of a European state being justified by European interest in Indochina. It would be difficult for India to refuse association with Pakistan if placed in this context, and such association might contribute to reduction tension between the two. Indian and Pakistan Armies should be able to get along in such a role, they having common traditions and training under UK.
SECRET
FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (U.S. DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Cypher/OTP

Mr. Eden
No. 498
May 29, 1954

D. 11.56 a.m. May 29, 1954
R. 12.07 p.m. May 29, 1954
IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 498 of May 29
Repeated for information to Washington Paris

My telegram No. 494 [deleted] Indochina.

After this somewhat unsatisfactory meeting we again tried our hand at producing a new variant of our proposal designed to bridge the gap over regrouping areas, and thus enable agreement to be reached on the basis upon which representatives of the two Commandos might begin work next week. The text of this revised proposal is in my immediately following telegram:

2. I had a meeting with Bidault and Bedell Smith after the afternoon meeting on Korea. Bedell Smith, despite objections from his legal adviser, said that he could accept it. Bidault also said that since the measure about the call-up agree by the French Cabinet that morning, he felt he could afford to be more liberal. He also authorized me to put the proposal to Molotov on the understanding that the words "and simultaneous" in the opening sentence should be kept in reserve and only inserted if Molotov pressed for them. It was agreed that I should put the proposal to Molotov as from myself, but with an indication that this was our final effort towards compromise and that I should not be able to persuade my allies to go any further.

3. I arranged to see Molotov in the evening on his return from a day's visit to Berne. He took the proposal well and at once recognized that it contained elements of compromise. He asked for the inclusion of the words "and simultaneous" which I said I could give him though I could accept no further amendments. He thereupon said that the proposal was acceptable to him and indicated that he was hopeful of being able to obtain the agreement of the Chinese and the Viet Minh, whom he would
SECRET

Geneva Conference (U.K. Bel.) telegram No. 198 to Foreign Office

-2-

he would see the same night. I explained that the new text had not yet been shown to the three Associated States, and added that I would not say anything, even to the French and Americans, until I had Molotov's answer in the morning. Molotov said he assumed that if this proposal was accepted we should then be able to discuss the Chinese delegation's proposals at our next restricted meeting.

1. Molotov had now sent me a message this morning to say that the Chinese and Viet Minh agree.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 162 and 113.

[Repeated to Washington and Paris]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:
Private Secretary
Minister of State
Mr. Mason
Mr. Spensight
Head of South East Asia Department
Head of Far Eastern Department
Resident Clerk

bbbb
by non-Asian support. Accordingly, I feel that for the time being we should neither make nor support a recommendation that a non-Asian state be included in a military commission for Indochina.

MURPHY

No. 1 GE/5-2454. Telegram
Eighth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 29, 3 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA. May 28 [29], 1954—midnight.


Eden stated informal talks yesterday had, he hoped, produced agreement on text which was merely attempt to express generally accepted view without anyone accepting at this stage undertakings they found impossible (text telegraphed separately ¹). If agreed, date for meeting of representatives of commanders should be fixed.

Bidault held it important to begin concrete discussions between representatives of commanders and that Eden text permitted such discussions to start. French did not object, it being understood talks would begin on regrouping in Vietnam. France reserved its point of view on other problems, notably on difference between Laotian and Cambodian problems, and that of Vietnam. Other questions dealt with in general discussion such as controls and guarantees must also be solved before any agreement could be considered valid. Military experts would work merely on behalf of conference and their findings could not commit it without its explicit approval. Representatives of French and Vietnam Commands would be available here as of June 1.

Dung in long prepared statement said regrouping essential but must not interfere with essential unity of country. Two armed forces must first be separated but peace could only be based on recognition of national rights and independence of people of Vietnam. Essence of military problem was cease-fire. Essence of political problem was independence and territorial unity. Establishment of zones was only transitory and provisional measure looking toward national unity to be attained through free elections. Progress toward peace and unity was disconcerting to US interventionists but their obstinacy deserved no more than inerrant to [sic] ¹. 

One, particularly in Indochina. Bao Dai's army and administration were falling apart. Viet Minh proposals were greeted with unanimous enthusiasm by Indochinese in France as well as Indochina. He thought Chinese proposals should be accepted as synthesis of views so far expressed and conference then pass on to other questions. British proposal contained essential element of direct contact between military and was acceptable. It would take some time to get Viet Minh representatives here. Local contacts between commanders would be even more important than those in Geneva. (He distributed statement on completion of evacuation of 558 wounded of 21 nationalities from Dien Bien Phu with what he stated was agreed report on evacuation by field representatives of both parties.)

Molotov remarked sharply that Viet Minh statement covered several points not dealt with in Eden proposal. They could be dealt with later. Eden proposal was subject of discussion at present. No objections had been raised to it. If it was agreed, conference could pass on to other work.

Bidault said that although Viet Minh statement on evacuation of wounded contained many misstatements, he would not enter into polemics other than to say evacuation of wounded had not been completed. French Government for its part was prepared unilaterally to liberate a large number of wounded Viet Minh.

Chou in single sentence favored adoption of Eden proposal.

Cambodian delegate stated understanding Eden proposal concerned Vietnam only. Cambodia had no objection to simultaneous cease-fire provided arrangements were made for withdrawal of foreign invaders from Cambodia. Since no Cambodian representative would participate in discussions, he reserved right to contest any prejudicial recommendations. Regrouping could not apply to Cambodia. If his reservations were accepted by all other delegations, UK proposal was acceptable as starting point for military experts, who should be instructed to consider regrouping in Vietnam only.

Lao accepted Eden proposal on understanding regrouping could be applied only to Vietnam.

Vietnam representative agreed representatives of two Commands should meet here soonest but their work would be purely technical. It must be guided by general principles, one of which as included in French proposal was that regrouping should not be detrimental to Vietnamese political and territorial unity. Press had been nearly unanimous in regarding Viet Minh proposals as calling for a partition. Even if it were called provisional, same had been true of division of Korea. He asked that statement of this principle be added to Eden proposal.

¹ A set of minutes of this session. (IC Restricted/3) is in Conference file, 605 D 627, CS 375. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p.m. and adjourned at 7 p.m. The minutes are also printed in Conférence de Gênes, p. 160-167. The communiqué issued by the Conference is printed in Con. 5168, p. 169.

È Telegram Sect 355, dated May 28, p. 605.
Smith made statement given in Secto 343 * and Secto 344.4

Molotov stated Soviet delegation considered Eden proposal acceptable and would in due course express its views on matters covered therein. Speaking again as chairman, he wished to sum up discussion. Meeting was discussing question of whether Eden proposal was acceptable. Account must be taken of the reservations already made and others which might be made by other delegations. He believed all were proceeding on assumption UK draft did not exhaust questions upon which it touched but that on other hand it was acceptable in its present form as all had spoken favorably of it as step forward. If it were acceptable to all, date should be fixed and he suggested June 1 as French had earlier proposed.

Dinh said that as representative of most interested party, he must return once more to question of safeguarding Vietnamese political and territorial unity. Without assurance on this point, it would be difficult for him to accept Eden proposal which neither provided for nor excluded partition.

Molotov expressed desire to help. He suggested it was common view of all that we should proceed from principle of Vietnamese unity and that this matter could not provoke any discussion.

Dong expressed agreement.

Molotov again inquired as to date.

Dong recalled his reservation as to delay in arrival of his military representative and suggested continuing and expanding contact already established between his delegation and French.

Bidault suggested that if Viet Minh representatives were not here by June 1 talks could start with whomsoever they had on hand. Chou referred to mechanical difficulties of transport and suggested meeting recess. Smith believed any mechanical difficulties could be easily overcome and asked estimate of time necessary.

Following recess during which Communist delegates met, Viet Minh delegation, after smilingly turning down US delegation offer of plane of “agggressor state” to bring Viet Minh military representative to Geneva, repeated Viet Minh “taking necessary dispositions” and finally said would advise prior June 1 date when Viet Minh military representative would arrive Geneva.

Molotov then embarked on lengthy commentary of problems set forth in CPR proposal of May 27 (Secto 329*). He said all delegations seemed to agree regarding simultaneous cease-fire applicable all armed forces in Indochina and that direct negotiations between parties con-

cerned both in Geneva and on spot should lead to implementation this principle. Question of adjustment of territories, grouping of troops and passage of troops across areas held by each side and other matters could also be discussed by military representatives in Geneva and on spot.

Molotov strongly endorsed CPR position regarding importance of stopping entry of troops and war matériel into Indochina. This problem leads to problem of controls and supervision. Molotov stated that supervision by an international commission had been proposed by the French delegation and others and that the Soviet delegation had proposed supervision by commission of neutral countries. After an agreement in principle on this point, question of composition could be taken up. Molotov also endorsed Viet Minh proposal supported by CPR regarding principle of control by commission made up of representatives of two Commands. He discussed this as an indisputable proposal to which no one had objected. Molotov then referred to French proposal that agreements be guaranteed by Geneva conference states and said Soviet delegation had expressed agreement. He continued that no other delegation had expressed objection. Following agreement in principle on guarantee Molotov envisaged discussion of character of commitments to be entered into as suggested by CPR. Molotov said that USSR believes in consultation which would then provide approach collective action. Molotov believed no difficulty would be encountered regarding prisoners of war and civil internees.

Molotov suggested it would be well to record agreement regarding principles involved in CPR proposals. Their adoption would facilitate discussion of other matters on which agreement not yet reached.

US delegate stated he could not accept all of “interesting summary” made by Molotov, adding that there are objections to CPR proposals. He added that some of CPR proposals already taken care of in UK proposal adopted. He stated nothing more important than questions of supervision. He suggested that at next meeting conference devote its attention to such matters as type, quality and composition of supervisory authority, stating that if this matter could be disposed of practically all others might fall into line; if not, problem very difficult indeed.

Molotov then read draft communiqué (see Secto 347*).

US delegate stated that while there was agreement on communiqué various delegations have made reservations or statements establishing their positions regarding UK proposal. US delegate stated he reserved right to make US position clear and to make statement to press along...
lines brief statement he had previously made (see Secto 343 and Secto 344).

Cambodian delegate made statement endorsing US delegate’s statement and stating that Cambodian delegate would make Cambodian reservation available to press.

Soviet delegate said that if each delegation could give its point of view regarding communiqué, nature and purpose of communiqué might be vitiated. He suggested perhaps conference had better resume plenary sessions.

US delegate stated this case and suggested perhaps a sentence could be added to communiqué to effect various delegates reserved opinion on certain matters of principle.

Eden, who during this discussion had been showing signs great impatience and irritation then said perhaps terms of UK proposal might be altogether omitted from communiqué (see below).

Chou En-lai said communiqué had better be left as read and asked whether US delegate proposal would not empower every delegation to make its views known through a press conference.

US delegate expressed appreciation for Chou En-lai observation. Stressed that US delegation has observed press ethics in manner of restricted sessions. He pointed out however this peculiar situation in which US delegation authorized not to accept and not to oppose UK proposal but rather to record certain principles. He stressed he did not intend, in dealing with press, to go beyond framework of brief remarks he had made.

Molotov then suggested that agreement be reached to adopt communiqué without additions, to take note of observations made by delegates regarding their reservations and not to restrict delegations in their dealings with press on this topic. This was generally agreed.

Comment: It was clear that while there had been prior coordination between Molotov and Chinese, Viet Minh had not been given their instructions prior to meeting and were somewhat slow in responding to Molotov’s clear directions that they agree to meeting of Commanders in Geneva if possible by June 1.

Although I had discussed with Eden at intermission fact that we would have to make our position clear on various reservations of principle we had taken, when I raised subject in meeting both Eden and Reading gave a startling public exhibition of impatience and pique which included an irate aside by Reading, audible throughout room to effect UK should withdraw its proposal. In contrast Molotov remained calm and finally accepted that it would be understood each delegation would be able to make clear positions it had taken with regard to resolution.

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

GEOFFREY W. SMITH


Secto 347. Repeated information Pk 43363, Moscow 98, London 227, Saigon 131, Tokyo 99, Phnom Penh and Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Department of Defense. The nine delegations met in a restricted meeting on May 29, and continued their discussion of the problem of the re-establishment of peace in Indochina. The meeting
SECRET

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND WHITEHALL SECRET (CABINET) DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden
No. 507
May 29, 1954

R: 0.32 A.M. May 30, 1954

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 507 of May 29.
Repeated for information to Washington
Paris

My telegram No. 506: India-China.

It is disappointing that after having at last got our draft proposal agreed by the Conference, Beedell Smith should have felt obliged to reserve his right to give to the Press some accompanying comment which is bound to reduce the public effect of our agreement. There will, of course, inevitably now be similar public statements by other delegations emphasising the reservations which they, too, had made in accepting the proposal.

2. Beedell Smith had given me no prior notice of his intention to act as he did. Had he told me yesterday when he accepted my draft of the reservations he was going to make, I should have been able to argue the point with him. He must, I think, have received instructions from Washington since agreeing to my proposal yesterday, compelling him to act as he did.

3. The truth seems to be that the Americans are mortally afraid of any agreement, however innocuous, reached with the Communists. Their delegation here have recently been expressing concern about the contacts which they say they know are taking place between the French and Viet Minh delegations and seem to fear that they will do a deal on their own. I see no reason why we should worry about this. All such contacts can only serve to bring a settlement nearer and may save us much trouble.

Foreign Office please pass Washington and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 169 and 177 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington and Paris]

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Phnom Penh telegram No: 39 to Foreign Office
- 2 -

intended as a step towards that end and that in any case we
recognized the difference between the problem of Viet Nam,
where there was an state of civil war, and that of Cambodia
which was the victim of foreign aggression. I remarked,
as the Cambodian and United Kingdom delegations were in daily
contact in Geneva, there was little that I could usefully
add to the discussion, but I undertook to report his Government’s
anxiety.

4. The Government’s fears rest on the fact that Viet
Minh elements exist in every province and are believed to be
numerous in Phnom Penh itself. They do not at present,
however, control any important sector or occupy any town.
If they were to be re-grouped and concentrated they would be
able to exercise a political influence which would make the
holding of elections (for which there is a constant popular
demand), a dangerous operation. There is a large Viet Nameese
minority in Cambodia and it is virtually impossible to
separate the loyal Viet Nameese from the Viet Minh. At the
same time the Government is afraid, should the known Viet Minh
be concentrated in a key zone on Cambodian territory, it would
be impossible to eject them without foreign intervention.

5. In spite of the clumsy fashion in which the Cambodian
delegation have chosen to handle this question, I and my
French colleague feel, in view of the existence of the Viet Nameese
minority, Government fears are justified. The French High
Commissioner has telegraphed to Paris to express the hope that
in spite of the need for obtaining a settlement which will
relieve pressure on French Union forces in Viet Nam, the
political problems of Cambodia will not be overlooked.

6. The young Cambodian Army is making good progress
under its new commander and there is some reason to hope,
if no fresh Viet Minh battalions are sent into Cambodia, the
military situation can be held during the rainy season. On
the other hand the political situation remains unstable.
The Bonzos and the Opposition are lying low but a military
reversal or failure of the Cambodian delegation at Geneva
to obtain satisfactory settlement might be sufficient to
cause the King to lose his nerve once again and withdraw his
support from General Tioulong.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai's telegram to Mao Ze-dong and others, Regarding the Situation of the Eighth Restricted Session, May 30, 1954

Record No.: 206-Y0049

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

(1) At the secretive session on the Indochina issue yesterday, it passed the three-point proposal concerning the meeting between the representatives of the two military commands at Geneva (see the telegram before).

(2) During the discussion the other side continuously stressed that they reserve their own different opinions toward the Laos and Cambodia issue, stating that "the concentration of formal forces in Vietnam should not be detrimental to the political and economic integrity of Vietnam." Smith particularly stated that the conference should have the right to make new decisions over the proposals put forward by the military representatives of the two sides on the Vietnam and Laos question.

(3) Pham Van Dong pointed out in his presentation that for the purpose of reaching a ceasefire it was absolutely necessary to adjust zones, and he exposed that America's opposition to division of zones and America's emphasis upon unification were actually excuses used for the its attempt to block progress of the conference. Pham requested that the conference adopt our comprehensive proposal, as the conference would have to achieve agreement on the general principles concerning stopping all hostile activities. Pham also explained the importance of the on-site contact between the military representatives of the two sides, taking the on-site agreement reached at Dien Bien Phu on the issue of retrieving sick and wounded soldiers as an example. He pointed out that despite the other side unilaterally tore up the agreement and bombarded Route 41, due to the efforts of our side, altogether 858 wounded soldiers (of 21 nationalities) of the French expedition army had been retrieved by May 28. Thus Pham delivered a satisfactory explanation on the wounded soldiers issue at the conference.

(4) Molotov affirmed in his presentation the items on which the conference had reached agreement to a different degree. He began with explaining that the first step toward restoring peace in Indochina should be that all troops of both sides in confrontation should stop fighting simultaneously in the whole of Indochina, and that this was exactly the spirit of the communiqué of the Berlin conference and the task of this conference. Molotov made explanations of the six points—point by point—introduced in my comprehensive proposal, and expressed his support to them.

(5) Toward the end of the discussion, when a resolution was about to be passed, Smith outrageously stated: "The government of the United States authorizes me neither to accept nor to object the principles of the British proposal." And he also said that he reserved the right to explain to the press the attitude of the US delegation. However, because the atmosphere in the conference hall favored passing the resolution, and also because Molotov's handling of the session was very well, Smith's statement only made himself embarrassed and also revealed the contradictions between Britain and the United States. Eden expressed then and there that he was not happy with Smith's statement.

Zhou Enlai
May 30, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.


Zhou dispatched a long telegram to Beijing on 30 May, summarizing what he saw as the main problem existing in the Communist negotiation strategy, that is, the lack of a proper understanding of the complexity of the Indochina question.

The national and state boundaries between the three associate countries in Indochina are quite distinctive and have been strictly defined. The boundaries had existed before France established its colonial reign in Indochina, and among the people of the three countries these [boundaries] have also been well recognized. In the past, we in our own country have not regarded this issue with a serious enough attitude.... The royal governments in Cambodia and Laos remain being regarded as the legitimate governments by the overwhelming majority of their people, and they are the governments that have been recognized by more than thirty countries in the world.... This time after having contacts with them at the Geneva conference, we begin to understand that the Indochina question is not so simple. We must strictly regard them as three different countries.

Zhou further pointed out that on the ceasefire question in Indochina, the two sides would "now enter discussions of substance, which involves three key issues, namely, dividing zones, ceasefire supervision and international guarantee." Zhou recognized that "on all three issues, there exist huge differences between the two sides." Therefore, Zhou mentioned, both he and the Soviets believed that the Communist side would "need to develop a more clearly-defined solution that will better fit the current situation, and otherwise we will be unable to express our opinions in the negotiations, and will fall into a passive position." Zhou thus proposed that "we should persistently take the initiative to pursue peace, so that the Geneva conference will end with some achievement."

*Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not cite or quote without permission from CWIHP.*

File Series No. 206-C0068

(Top Secret)

Time: 5:30pm, 30 May 1954
Location: Gleysst Mansion (Home of Paul-Boncour’s Mother-in-Law)
Chinese participants: Wang Bingnan and Dong Ningchuan (translator)
French participants: Paul-Boncour, Jacques Guillermez, and Jean Chauvel (who arrived late)*

(1) Arrangement for Foreign Minister Zhou to Meet Bidault

Paul-Boncour: I had a long conversation with Bidault after our last meeting. He expressed that since it is possible to meet, the earlier, the better (because he will probably attend the Congress of the People’s Republican Party soon). He suggested next Monday or Tuesday.

We have a concern on how to keep the meeting secret. If Foreign Ministers Zhou and Bidault invite each other and have dinner together, the Swiss security would know. All the Swiss policemen communicate through their network, and the information about the meeting would leak to the public. So our suggestion is that the two foreign ministers have a meeting after the sun sets, about 9:00 or 9:30pm in the evening. Therefore, the foreign ministers can have a long conversation. If they would like to, they could talk until 12:00 or even 1:00am. Regarding their meeting location, we suggest this mansion. The mansion is close to where both foreign ministers are staying. It is convenient for all of us. There are no neighborhoods around so there won’t be any disruptions from outside. [We’d like to know] if Foreign Minister Zhou agrees with the arrangement.

Wang Bingnan: What is your security plan?
Paul-Boncour: If we use Swiss security guards, the information will leak. So we suggest Foreign Minister Zhou use his own bodyguards. They may come to the mansion about 9:00pm.

Wang Bingnan: How is Mr. Bidault coming here?
Paul-Boncour: He will come here himself. The Swiss security guards as usual will notice it when he leaves his place. They won’t, however, know where

he is going. During the conference hours, the Swiss security guards always escort [Bidault] as they do for all the heads of the delegations. But, off the conference hours, Bidault goes out quite often by himself. On Sundays, when his chef took time off, he and Chauvel went to the country themselves and ate at local restaurants. If Foreign Minister Zhou wants to use the Swiss security guards, we don’t have a problem. We just don’t feel it the best way.

Wang Bingnan: Has Mr. Bidault ever come to this place?
Paul-Boncour: He has never been here before.
However, his wife has been here several times. I still have to repeat one of the points we discussed at the last meeting, that is, to keep the meeting absolutely secret before it starts. The two foreign ministers can decide themselves whether a press release or other documents may be necessary after their meeting.

(Chauvel arrived at this point.)
Chauvel: We can decide whether the Swiss security guards will come or not. If they don’t come, they may just guess. If they do come, they will definitely know the whole arrangement. So it is better not to have them here.

Regarding who will attend the meeting from the delegations, the French participants will probably include Bidault, I, and Mr. Guillermez. We consider it proper not to have many participants from each delegation.

(After the meeting, Guillermez said it may be appropriate to add Paul-Boncour to the list, since he is the host.)
Wang Bingnan: I will report all of your suggestions to the head of our delegation.

(2) The Issues at the Indochina Conference
Chauvel: At the last meeting, Mr. Molotov summarized and outlined the opinions from all sides. Mr. Smith suggested discussing the supervision issue only. The French Delegation considers the supervision a very complicated issue. If it can be solved first, the conference is certainly making good progress.

The two specific but important issues at the present are to reach a military agreement on troop regroupings, and to reach a political agreement on the supervision. If these two problems are solved, other problems can be dealt with easily.

All of the six points proposed by the Chinese Delegation should be discussed. We suggest discussing the supervision that we believe is a central issue. It doesn’t mean no other issues could be discussed. If a positive result derives from the solution of the central issue, it will help the discussions on other issues.

We are very much impressed by the recent talks. Especially at the meeting yesterday—we saw genuine progress.

*Jean Chauvel was then the French Ambassador to Switzerland and a member of the French Delegation to the Geneva Conference.
**Wang Bingnan:** I would also like to talk about our positions. We believe that:
1. The first task is to stop the bloodshed and resume peace in Indochina;
2. Different problems should be dealt with by adapting different methods;
3. Discussions must follow the importance of each issue and then decide which issue should go first;
4. A cease-fire can be achieved after all the issues are discussed satisfactorily.

The composition of the supervisory commission must be discussed specifically by both sides. We believe that the supervisory commission of the neutral nations has two tasks:
1. Domestically prevent civil conflicts from occurring again;
2. Internationally stop the entry of foreign troops and war materials into the region.

We also concern about some specific problems of the supervision. Our position is that a supervisory location can be identified either in land or in territorial waters to impose a supervision. In short, what we hope for is to establish effective supervision.

The nine nations attending the conference should play a role to guarantee the implementation of the agreed settlement. A neutral nation should be among other proper nations besides these nine conference nations. The six points proposed by our Foreign Minister Zhou on the 27th are not for restoring a temporary peace in Indochina, but necessary for establishing a lasting peace in the region. This peace will benefit Asia, France, and the world. We have pointed out during the previous meeting that this war should not become complicated and internationalized.

**Paul-Boncour:** Please allow me to repeat to Mr. Chauchel what I said to Mr. Wang Bingnan at the last meeting. I had said that, if France was forced to accept some terms that it could not ask, and it had no way to cope with, it would have to ask for external assistance. After Dien Bien Phu fall, the situation changed drastically. If a similar incident takes place in Hanoi, France has no choice but to willingly hand the war over to the others in order to save the lives of its own people.

**Chauchel:** I am in full accord with what Mr. Wang Bingnan said. The tasks of the supervisory commission of the neutral nations are to prevent domestic conflicts from occurring again, and prevent foreign troops and war materials from getting into the country. We also agree that locations for land and offshore supervisions can be found, and the debates over the definition of a neutral state can be settled. According to Mr. Menu's activities at Geneva, he seems interested in this issue, and has talked to the press about his opinions.

Mr. Zhou Enlai has a systematic view of the problems of Indochina. He said that each of the three member countries in the Associated States has its own characteristics. Mr. Bidault is not quite familiar with Mr. Zhou Enlai's points of view because they don't know each other. Since there is now an opportunity to exchange their opinions, hopefully Mr. Zhou Enlai can talk to Mr. Bidault just about any issue.

At this conference, France considers some of the countries as its friends. It must give enough attention to their opinions. It can't agree with any settlement they disagree with. Among these friendly countries to France is the United States. If the U.S. disrupts a conference settlement, it will not endorse its implementation. This is dangerous. America's attitude toward the conference is not much different than that of France. But America attracts more suspicions. We should pay attention to it.

Talking about handing over the war to the others, there are two ways: handing it over to the left or to the right. If France hands the war over to the United States, then the other people will worry. If France hands it over to the other side, then the U.S. will worry. It is the hope of France that solutions can be reached and agreed by all sides. When we say to you that a certain problem will cause danger, please believe us, it is true. It must be avoided.

**Wang Bingnan:** Peaceful solution is beneficial for everyone. Handing the war over to the others doesn't fit into French national interests. We believe that our current efforts to strive for peace are justified. Problem solutions will arrive one by one. This has been proven by the agreement made yesterday — our efforts have achieved some success. As long as both sides are sincere, the difficulties can be overcome. Our goal is to reinstate Indochina's peace. Our desirability is to reach that goal through common efforts by all conference delegates. It is not our
intension to exclude any nation from the conference agreement. We need to
overcome the obstacles, instead of being disrupted by them. Any solution should
be based upon a nation's own interest so that the result will bring about satisfaction.

With regard the discussions of the supervisory commission between Mr.
Menon and our Foreign Minister Zhou, they did not touch the specific matters as
far as I know. What are these neutral nations besides the nine nations? What are
the French suggestions?

Chauvel: I can't answer that question at this point. The French Delegation
will listen to the suggestions from all the delegations at the meeting tomorrow.
Then, it will make its statements.

If there is any opportunity from now on, I hope to exchange our opinions
anytime. I am very interested in China's issues. I lived in Beijing for three years
and have been in charge of Asian affairs in Paris for five years.

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consideration, as well as the fact that the period referred to in Tosec 302* as "for time being" is likely to be very short unless I am to be continually exposed to pressures from several Foreign Ministers who are becoming very impatient, and irate.

Therefore, while I am glad to know what our final position should be, I also need most urgently to know, if it can now be estimated, what our final position may be on this important question. I am still of the opinion that the Colombo powers, in association with a neutral European nation of their selection, would be the best solution. I did not, in my previous message on this subject, imply that the US should propose it.

The other important matter which will come up in a few days is the question of international guarantees, either by the nations represented at this conference, or by some other body such as the UN. I very much need to know the Secretary's views about this, and I hope you will get them to me at the earliest. The Communists will insist on consultation and collective action which builds in a veto. We might accept consultation, but should maintain the principle that action be taken "jointly or severally" on receipt of a plea from the supervisory authority.

SMITH

1 Dated May 26, p. 969.
2 The Department's reply is in telegram Tedul 144, May 31, p. 969.

MAY 31, 1954

Conference File, lot 60 D 627, CP 285

Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith) 1

SECRET


Subject: Meeting of the Six regarding this afternoon's restricted session on Indochina.

1) In reply to Chanvel's question, I state that your remarks Saturday regarding supervision and controls did not indicate that you were ready to submit definite proposals on this subject. I added that we were not taking the initiative in submitting proposals on this or other questions, leaving this to the countries more directly interested. The Cambodian Delegate pointed out that on this question the Vietminh and the Communist Chinese have advanced rather definite proposals whereas our side is still talking general principles. Chanvel made it clear that Bidault is not yet ready to talk about the composition of the international supervisory authority but that he might ad-

dance some ideas regarding the tasks of that authority (a) keeping the belligerent armies apart and (b) supervising frontiers and ports of entry).

2) It was brought out that the other side will probably wish to talk about point 3 of the Chinese Communist proposal relating to the introduction of fresh troops and weapons. We should take this position, as was implicitly stated in your remarks last Saturday, that this issue can only be taken up after agreement has been reached regarding the supervisory authority.

3) It was tentatively agreed that this afternoon Eden would begin with a general statement regarding the position of the Conference in the light of Saturday's developments, that you would then talk briefly expanding the remarks you made on Saturday (draft being prepared) and possibly recounting our experiences with NNSC in Korea thus refuting the rosy picture painted by Chou En-lai. Bidault might then make a few remarks regarding the tasks of the supervisory machinery in Indochina.

4) It seemed generally agreed that our side does not have very much to say today and that we need to develop a coordinated position on the supervisory authority. Therefore it was tentatively agreed that we would try to avoid a meeting on Indochina tomorrow holding the next one on Wednesday, June 2nd.

5) The Cambodian Delegate expressed the hope that at the meeting following the one this afternoon the cases of Cambodia and Laos could be taken up again. He made the point that until Vietminh troops were evacuated from Cambodia, Cambodia could not agree to no restrictions on Cambodia's right to introduce reinforcements and weapons.

6) The Vietnamese representative expressed regret that the Conference agreement regarding the unity of Viet-Nam had not been incorporated in the communiqué. He may raise this issue. We could probably support a public statement on this subject if other delegations approve (we should not, however, carry the torch on this one).

396.1 GE/5-5154: Telegram

Ninth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 31, 3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State 1

CONFIDENTIAL


Secto 355, Repeated information Paris 369, London 232, Saigon 137, Tokyo 203, Moscow 101, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo

1 A set of minutes of this session (10 Restricted/9) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 279. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 7 p. m. The minutes are also printed in Conference de Genève, pp. 168-175.
for CINCPFE. Department pass Defense. Ninth restricted session, Monday, May 31, Eden presiding:

Eden stated conference had Chinese proposal of May 27 (Secto 326) before it. First two paragraphs covered by military negotiations agreed last session. Most important remaining provisions refer to supervision on which US delegate spoke last meeting.

Gromyko who led Soviet delegation in Molotov’s absence pointed out CPR proposal dealt other matters which must be discussed also. US delegate agreed stating CPR paper contained two most important points: Supervision and guarantees. US delegate, after stressing fact restricted meetings make it possible for delegates to speak plainly without worrying about public effect, spoke of great importance of supervisory machinery to be available as soon as fighting stops. He said this could at first be of an interim, local character but function must be taken over at earliest possible moment by international supervision.

US delegate then referred to Korean experience with NNSC “which we hopefully called neutral” and to Chou En-lai’s remarks concerning Korean experience. He said UN side had acted in good faith toward Commission and Communists had not. He read from letters of May 4 and 7 from Swedish and Swiss members of Commission to prove his point by impartial testimony. He concluded that armistice supervision by Neutral Nations Commission will not be effective unless:

(a) Commission composed of truly neutral nations
(b) Agreed system for checking reinforcements not dependent primarily on good faith opposing forces, and
(c) Personnel of NNSC unrestricted geographically in activities.

Chou En-lai took strong issue with Smith’s statement. After criticizing Swiss and Swedes for lack of complete impartiality, he turned to report of Repatriation Commission in which there was majority report agreed by Indians; Poles and Czechs and minority report submitted by Swedes and Swiss. Chou En-lai said, however, NNSC had been basically successful and he referred to supervision over rotation of military personnel and replacement of arms and munitions. There has been no incident reported basically detrimental to armistice such as recurrence of hostilities. He denied reports that there have been armistice violations by North Koreans or Chinese volunteers. He referred to charge made on October 12, 1953, by senior delegate of UN Command to effect North Koreans and Chinese had shipped aircraft into North Korea. A thorough inspection on ground by NNSC revealed this was without foundation. On other hand, UN Command’s requests to investigate North Korean Army to determine if POWs captured from ROK Army were serving there had been denied as beyond terms of armistice agreement. If this were not so, Communist side might well request right to investigate on UN side and even on Taiwan to find 48,000 prisoners held by force. Such request if made by Communists would also be denied as exceeding armistice agreement.

As to matter introduction fresh troops or matériel, Chou En-lai alleged NNSC inspection teams stationed at entry ports have full facilities. Those teams receive from North Korean-Chinese volunteer side reports in advance and may make inspections at any time including spot checks. He mentioned particularly possibility of making inspection of trains on which no advance report had been submitted. He referred also to fact that UN side had insisted on inspection teams located at two ports of entry which Communist side not using for rotations or replacements.

Chou En-lai “acknowledged fact” NNSC has met difficulties created by UN side. He referred to statements by Czech and Polish members April 15 and April 30. He mentioned four items:

(1) 14,000 prisoners of war shipped out of Korea at Inchon in violation Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission agreement. NNSC not allowed make inspection this movement. This was violation of agreement.
(2) In ten months UN side has brought in over 7,500 combat aircraft allegedly as replacements but NNSC inspection has reported in addition 186 aircraft shipped in illegally resulting in increase of combat strength in violation of agreement.
(3) There have been violations in matters of spare parts and other items which UN side has not allowed NNSC to inspect. This also increases combat strength and constitutes violation.
(4) UN side only allows inspection of ships reported but refuses to permit inspection of ships not reported.

Chou En-lai concluded that Neutral Nations Commission should be able reflect views both sides and take care interests both belligerents while supervising terms of armistice impartially. He also favored joint commissions of representatives of two sides charged with implementation of armistice agreement.

US delegate repeated that Czechs and Poles on NNSC not neutral and added view Communists cannot be neutral.

After recess, DRV representative took issue with US delegate’s view regarding neutrality of Communists. He then announced designation by Viet Minh High Command of Ta Quang Bu (member of Viet Minh delegation here and currently Vice Minister of Defense) as off-
cial delegate to meetings of representatives of two High Commands. He will have several military advisers. Colonel Ha Van Lau of Viet Minh delegation will be prepared meet with Brebisson and others on French side on June 1 to prepare opening meeting representatives two High Commands.

Bidault accepted proposal for meeting and later indicated Franco-Vietnamese representative at military representatives meetings is to be General Deltialet assisted by high French and Vietnamese officers including Colonel Brebisson.

Cambodian delegate supported US delegate’s position regarding desirability appointing true neutrals to supervising authority and impossibility of Communist neutrality. He also reiterated that Chinese Communist proposals could refer only to Vietnam not to Cambodia. He stated he would submit a proposal dealing with Cambodia.

Gromyko then rehearsed Communist Chinese proposal (Secto 326) along very much the same lines followed by Molotov on May 29 (Secto 346*). He advocated recording agreements which had already been reached on these principles, namely;

(1) That cessation of hostilities should be simultaneous;
(2) That parties have now agreed to enter into military contacts to make appropriate readjustments of territories held by them;
(3) That it is indispensable to control introduction into Indochina of fresh troops and matériel;
(4) Need for international supervision and for proposed joint committee of belligerents to help supervise armistice;
(5) Desirability of guarantees by Geneva powers with provision for consultation and collective action; and
(6) Release of prisoners of war and civilian internees.

In speaking of supervision, Gromyko referred to alleged general approval of concept of joint commissions representing two commands. He also said there was general agreement regarding a neutral nations commission. He agreed, with US delegate’s view that this matter of neutral nations commission required full discussion. He suggested a neutral nations commission composed of India, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Pakistan, stating that such a commission could supervise the implementation of the terms of the cessation of hostilities. He said it would have every reason to insure an impartial approach and every facility for carrying out its task. It would have the “necessary international authority”.

Gromyko took issue with US delegate’s statement regarding impossibility Communist nation being true neutral. He said this position might be turned in opposite direction but that he refused to reach any such gloomy conclusion. He said ideology is one thing and cooperation and the maintenance of peace is another thing.

Gromyko concluded by expressing hope conference could adopt a resolution setting forth agreements on principle which he had outlined in general support of CPR proposal.

Bidault said his understanding of agreements reached was not as broad as Gromyko’s. He considered international control as fundamental preliminary to any regrouping of forces and agreement on guarantees. International control must be effective, equitable and respected. He indicated he would be prepared later to give views.

With regard to Cambodia and Laos, Bidault said main task of control commission would be to insure withdrawal of invading troops. In Vietnam, task would be considerably more complex including internal organization, inspection of regrouping areas and of lines separating zones and disarmament of irregulars. He indicated acceptance of concept of joint commissions representing belligerents as adjuncts to international commission. He stressed, however, responsibility of control would rest with international commission which would have supreme authority to see to implementation of agreements. He said conference must define:

(a) Functions of international commission;
(b) Composition to be drawn from countries truly neutral; and
(c) Permanent authority to which commission would report.

As to composition, Bidault refrained from entering controversy as to whether Communist countries can be neutral but he said Gromyko’s proposed commission bore a great resemblance to composition already accepted in Korea. Bidault noted with approval views of US delegate on results there. He suggested conference would be justified in seeking some new approach and said that he might later have some proposals.

Cambodian delegate then took strong issue with Gromyko’s statement on paragraph 2 of China’s proposal dealing with regrouping zones. He stressed that military conversations will deal only with Vietnam. He recalled that Molotov, as chairman at last meeting, had taken note of Cambodian and other reservations but that today Gromyko had referred only to communiqué. Cambodian delegate asked that Cambodian reservation be included in today’s communiqué. Eden turned down this request with statement situation was as left at last meeting, namely, that conference took note of reservations and delegates were free to make these reservations public.

* Dated May 29, p. 970.
Agreement was then reached on communiqué (Secto 355 4). It was agreed, on Eden proposal, that a day for contacts and reflection would be useful. The next restricted meeting will be June 2.

Original draft of communiqué spoke of “military representatives of France and the DRV”. As a result of point made by Vietnamese representative and proposal of Soviet delegate language finally adopted was “military representatives of the two sides”.

(Comment: Although this may be somewhat ambiguous, record of discussion makes clear that military representatives included on the one hand French High Command including French and Vietnamese officers and on the other hand representatives of DRV High Command.)

(Comment: Chou En-lai was obviously caught unprepared by Smith’s statement on NNSC and after period of silence during which there were no speakers finally spoke extemporaneously and with more animation than he has thus far shown while aides scurried out to obtain material brought in piece-meal while he was speaking.

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<td>The text of the communiqué, transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 355, May 31, was as follows: “The nine delegations continued in restricted session their discussion of the problem of restoring peace in Indochina. The conference was informed that a preliminary meeting would be held on June 1 between military representatives of the two sides in order to make arrangements for the meetings of the representatives of the two commands. The next meeting of the conference will be held on June 2.” (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, G 388)</td>
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7310.00/5-3156: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

Top Secret

Geneva, May 31, 1954—4 p.m.

Dulles 135. Repeated information Paris 367, Saigon 135. Re Tosec 260 (repeated Paris 4272 and Saigon 2418)1 and Paris 4556 to Department (repeated Geneva 304 and Saigon 549).2 Am advised Bidault wishes to discuss with me in near future question of clarifying independence. Am told he is in general agreement with line of thinking Tosec 260 but has some ideas of his own on how to proceed.

My own views remain those expressed in Dulles 120.3

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<td>1 See footnote 1 to telegram Secto 381, p. 965.</td>
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<td>2 See footnote 2, p. 956.</td>
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<td>3 Dated May 30, p. 936.</td>
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1Drafted by Gulson of S/P, Tyler of WE, Popper of UNR, and Sturm of PSA. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4653, to Saigon as telegram 2448, and to London as telegram 4654. |

2Dated May 30, p. 931. |

3June 1. |

4Dated May 31, p. 926. |

5Dated May 29, p. 975. |

6For text, see volume xvm. |
Nam, we might have seriously to consider extent if any to which we could associate ourselves with such a settlement.

Doubtful attitude of British as reflected by Eden would not prevent us from making this independent assessment.

II. Composition of Control Authority.

We are opposed to any "counterpart of the NNSSC". Our preferred solution is control commission organized as suggested out Tosec 362.7 You are authorized, however, support commission which included Norway or another friendly European nation provided Asian powers who might be expected make up control commission should indicate no insuperable objection. If, as counterpart to friendly European nation, Soviets should propose European satellite, this would be unacceptable and we would prefer stand for purely Asian membership.

III. International Guarantees.

In my view necessary sanctions against violation should preferably be supplied through UN. It is increasingly clear here that if US must eventually intervene, public and congressional opinion would much more readily support action within UN framework. Moreover, this solution would commend itself to Asian nations, particularly Associated States.

Asian nations acting alone without UN would have neither will nor ability prevent or penalize violations; in fact, they may even be unwilling assume field supervision functions without some relationship to UN.

Action by signatory powers alone would have relatively narrow base. Moreover, on practically every issue action would be inhibited by sharp divisions between Communist and free world components. If intervention were then undertaken "jointly or severally" by free nations it might have of an action by interested powers backed by disinterested support of third parties.

In UN there exist established procedures for intervention which could be rapidly utilized, whereas these would have been devised and spelled for intervention by signatory powers, doubtless over opposition of Communists.

Despite SC veto, UN charter and procedures provide effective means for individual or collective defense against armed aggression.

For above reasons, UN responsibility from outset is preferable but we could accept solution in which: 1) signatories pledge responsibility for no breach in armistice by participants their side; 2) signa-

* Dated May 29, p. 980.

Indochina agree as part of armistice that if control commission reports breach in armistice, any signatory may refer matter immediately to UN.

Murphy

Conference files, lot 60 D 827, CT 810

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET


Dear Foster: During your absence as brief as it has been, it seems to have become increasingly clear that the basic decision which confronts you regarding Geneva is whether you want the United States to be parties to an agreement on Indochina which, in the light of the Geneva conversations, cannot be happy from the American point of view. Nothing has happened so far which provides encouragement for belief that a satisfactory understanding would eventuate. I doubt you have expected that. The United States is not a belligerent in the Indochina hostilities and barring overt Red Chinese participation, perhaps will not enter at this late hour. In view of the British obvious determination to see some form, almost any, of settlement, and what appears an unmistakable trend in Paris on the political side to achieve a settlement, we have the concomitant of a French effort to nudge us into some form of military participation. I think you have said that if the latter effort is designed to strengthen the position at Geneva, there will be no objection; but if it will lead to compromising the conditions laid down by the United States for participation, that was to be avoided. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, it is suggested that giving instructions to Bedell without a clear-cut conviction whether in the end we wish to parties to an agreement of settlement for Indochina, whether termed "honorable" or not, is an exceedingly difficult undertaking. The arguments for and against are fairly clear. Our tactical position would be best protected if the United States would not be parties. I hope that we can have the benefit of your guidance on this basic consideration after your return.

We have elaborated some thoughts on both Korea and Indo-China which are enclosed in the forms of a copy of our Tosec 316 1 and a staff memorandum on Indo-China, Tedul 144.2

I hope the short break you had was beneficial.

Yours,

Robert Murphy

1 Dated May 29, p. 326.
2 Supra.
I do not know with what success. Incidentally, today the Russians made the first bid: India, Pakistan, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

If I could have your own personal thoughts on these matters it would be of great help to me. Signed Bedell.

JUNE 1, 1954

Smith–Eden–Bidault Meeting, June 1, 1954, Noon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

Dulles 138. Eden asked for a private meeting this noon with Eden and myself. After apologizing for passing out “the usual British bit of paper”, he handed each of us the following, saying at the same time, that “British would support the position of France in Indochina and would go along with Americans in Korea”.

"I. Indochina.

1. How do the French and Americans see the future development of the conference? Is it or is it not urgent to get an agreement today, and are the chances of getting the main lines of an agreement worked out by the end of next week?

2. Will the French have ready for tomorrow’s meeting their own detailed proposals on international control under M. Bidault’s headings:

   “(a) Form and functions.
   “(b) Composition.
   “(c) Ultimate authority.

3. In particular, can we make a counterproposal on composition?

   Can we propose the five Colombo powers?

   4. Have the French also begun to work out their ideas of a guarantee, the introduction of new material and personnel and the remaining questions covered by the Chinese proposals?

5. What may we say to Chou En-lai tonight? May we say something about the Colombo powers?

[Here follows Part II which dealt with Korea; for text, see S33.]

After some discussion we agreed with regard to point one—Indochina—it is urgent to clear the thing up with the main lines of agreement worked out by the end of next week in order that the issues will not be fuzzed up by a mass of supplementary proposals.

With regard to points 2 and 3, it was agreed that the Soviet proposal made yesterday was completely unacceptable. We agreed on a tactical procedure that the US would make the first counterpropos
as suggested by Toec 289. Neither the US nor British should propose the Colombo powers, but France might do so on the basis of a compromise, and we would then see how it might develop. My own view is that this is the best solution we are likely to get, and it has marked advantages from many points of view.

With regard to point 4, the decision will depend on what develops in connection with the cease-fire and the ultimate authority for supervision, and we will not touch on that matter.

With regard to point 5, it was decided that Eden would say tonight to Chou En-lai simply that the Soviet proposal was completely unacceptable; that the Americans had very strong views which were supported by France and British and they would probably make a counterproposal.

Here follows a portion of the telegram which dealt with discussion of Part II on Korea: for text, see page 833.]

**SMITH**

**JUNE 2, 1954**

**INDOCHINA**

3. In view of the misconduct of Poland and Czechoslovakia on NNHC, we should under no circumstances give any acquiescence to their playing a like role in relation to Indochina. Furthermore, I do not see why Indonesia should play supervisory role merely because of the accident that it happened to attend a single meeting at Colombo which was called for a different purpose. It has nothing to contribute but its own fears. By every test of stability and ability to contribute, Thailand [out]franks Indonesia. So also does the Philippines. It seems to me that the key role in supervision might be assumed by India and Pakistan as the only two Asian nations of the area which are perhaps generally acceptable and which can make any contribution. These two might pick up their own associates.

4. My view in general is that on this matter we should make suggestions which indicate our best judgment but that we should not take any "final" position in the sense of, stating that one setup is acceptable and another setup unacceptable. Our necessary reservation with reference to the ultimate solution forbids, it seems to me, action on our part other than contribution of friendly advice at this juncture.

**MURPHY**


3. Dated May 31, p. 969.

4. Dated May 31, p. 969.


7. Dated May 31, p. 969.


SECRET

FROM: GENEVA CONFERENCE (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION)
TO: FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP.

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET (CABINET)
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden
No: 67
June 1, 1954.

D: 7:46 p.m. June 1, 1954.
R: 8:02 p.m. June 1, 1954.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No: 547 of June 1

My telegram No: 543.

I had luncheon today with Paul Bocour. Chauvel was there, and afterwards both were frank to the point of indiscretion about our present situation. Paul Bocour thought that the next ten days were a race between war and peace. He feared that if we were not within sight of a settlement by the end of next week, we might at that time be faced with a Viet Minh attack on Hanoi. Then the Americans would declare their willingness to help, and the price of that help would be the end of the Geneva talks. The French might then find themselves in a Dien Bien Phu atmosphere once again, and constrained to accept American help.

2. Chauvel arrived at this point, and remarked that while Bedell Smith was perfectly reasonable, he himself was much perturbed at the tone from Washington. Dulles was like a man who had been bitten by a mosquito. He seemed determined upon action of some kind. Chauvel mentioned as an example of this that he had seen Dulles' telegram to the American delegation urging that we should get on without delay with the Siamese appeal to the United Nations. This had been couched in the most violent terms (we have separate confirmation of this). Chauvel clearly shared Bocour's fears of the consequences of failure to reach any arrangements here in the next ten days.

3. On the...
SECRET

Geneva Conference (U.K., Del.) telegram No: 547 to
Foreign Office

- 2 -

3. On the other hand he bemoaned the French difficulties. Viet Nam, he declared bluntly, did not want a settlement here, and since the Viet Namese Ministers here virtually represented nothing, they could be all the more difficult. He had to struggle with them, and with Cambodia, who were better, and Laos, who were best, before the French could table their proposals for supervision tomorrow.

4. As a further example of the confusion existing in the French ranks, Chauvel mentioned that the Viet Nam officers from the French command had just arrived to take part in the staff talks in Geneva. Unfortunately Navarre had failed to brief them or even to see them before they left, and they were completely uninformed.

Foreign Office please pass to Paris and Washington as my telegrams Nos: 134 and 187 respectively.

[Repeated to Paris and Washington]

ADVANCE COPIES:
Private Secretary.
Sir I. Kirkpatrick.
Minister of State.
Mr. Speaight.
Head S.E. Asia Dept.
Resident Clerk.

JJJJJ
Minutes, Zhou Enlai’s Meeting with Bidault, June 1 1954

Record No. 206-Y0007

(Top Secret)

Time: 10:15pm-11:20pm, 1 June 1954
Location: Gleyysat Mansion
Chinese participants: Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, and Dong Ningshan
(French participants: Georges Bidault, Jean Chauvel, Jacques Guillermaz, and one translator)

Zhou Enlai: We are sorry for arriving a little bit late.

Bidault: Thank you very much for coming. We can discuss the future of this conference together. The conference has entered a critical juncture by now. It can’t be delayed, since a delayed conference would not bring any positive result.

I consider the following two specific issues need immediate solutions:

1. The meetings of the military representatives from both high commands should determine the regrouping areas for their troops.

2. The restricted sessions should arrive at an agreement over the supervision issue.

Since there is no one else around, hopefully we can exchange our opinions sincerely on these two existing and imminent problems in order to reach our common goal—peace. I think that time is running out. If the quartet continues, the situation in Indochina will get worse, and will aggravate the international situation seriously. Thus, my desirability is that the commanders can quickly determine the areas on their maps within which the forces of both sides shall be regrouped, and that the restricted sessions can reach an agreement on the supervision issue as soon as possible. Only the danger of a worsened situation could be prevented by solving these problems. Nobody wants to see a deteriorated situation, but it is almost inevitable. I believe an enlarged war will hurt everyone.

Zhou Enlai: The reason for us to come to Geneva and attend the conference is to preserve peace in Indochina. Our participation shall help make the conference a success, not cause its failure. As long as we have the same determination, the conference will make genuine progress toward a settlement. We are in the position to push the meeting forward. Hopefully, solutions will soon develop to deal with these problems. Certainly, it needs our common efforts.

Mr. Bidault said a little while ago that the military representatives from both high commanding headquarters have met and discussed the troop regrouping. We consider such a direct meeting as the best way. Mr. Pham Van Dong pointed out in his proposal of 25 May that the discussions on these specific matters can start as soon as the principal issues are settled. So far, the commanders from the two sides have been enabled to fully exchange their opinions. Both sides were separate in the past. They have established their contacts so it is now easier to solve the problems.

Mr. Bidault again mentioned a risk of the war’s expansion. In our opinion, the war should be ended according to the interests of the Indochinese people and the national interests of France. Speaking as a neighboring state and for international affairs, we believe that the war can be ended, and should be stopped. We should not anticipate a possible enlargement of the war.

If China can make any contribution to the conference at this stage, we must try our best to bring this war to an end, and by all means not allow an internationalization of the war. Based upon Mr. Pham Van Dong’s proposal, the opinions from both sides are approachable. The basic requests in his proposal do not go beyond the reality. He doesn’t want to get from the conference table what he didn’t get from the battle ground.

In our opinion, the risk exists—America’s intervention. It will hurt France, Indochina, and Southeast Asia; and will threaten the security of Asia and China. That is what we are concerned about.

Bidault: I am in full accord with Mr. Zhou Enlai’s statement. The purpose for us to come to Geneva is to restore peace in Indochina. Nevertheless, we must recognize a fact that, if the conference fails, it is inevitable that the situation will take a turn for the worse. We are a country with a long military tradition, and we don’t like failure. Our conversation may just not need to bring in America. Our common interests need to end the Indochinese war, and to eliminate all the possibilities for the war’s expending. Our desirability is a reasonable settlement. But, if we can’t obtain this, I have to suggest to my government a laissez-faire policy. I believe that your government does not want to see this happening. Thus, we should think reasonably and realistically about the problems.

Zhou Enlai: I remember Mr. Bidault’s statement that France shall achieve a glorious peace. We agree that the glorious peace can be achieved. The restoration of peace is glorious for both sides. So there is no need to mention the laissez-faire policy. Mr. Pham Van Dong emphasized in his speech that after Vietnam receives its independence, it will consider joining the French Union. In his proposal, Mr. Pham Van Dong also accepts the Bao Dai [regime]. These are based upon the spirit of mutual equality. Our expectation is that both sides can make their common efforts on equal ground. The French people are peace-loving. To reinstall a peace is the hope of French people.
Bidault: As Mr. Zhou Enlai said, the French people love peace. We, however, have to live with our history and tradition. Hopefully, this is understood. Currently, our specific requests are: (1) The two commands conclude their negotiations in a timely fashion on the troop regrouping, otherwise the war will continue; (2) The conference reaches an agreement on the International Supervisory Commission issue soon in order to avoid additional delay.

Zhou Enlai: These two problems should be solved. In the respect of your first issue, the military representatives from both sides have their meetings. The direct contacts are the most efficient approach. Regarding your second issue, the conference is discussing the problem, and it will be solved. What I am saying is that we should think about how to reach an agreement, but should not worry about what if there is no settlement, or how to reinforce the military and internationalize the war. If the war spreads out, it will not help with the glory of France. Its outcome is nothing but just like our Chinese saying describes another "fisherman’s catch." The peoples of Indochina and France will suffer miserably, and the traditional glory of France will be damaged. I think this is obvious.

Bidault: Of course, it is obvious. All we ask for is peace, nothing else. What I have brought up are the facts that are evident to anyone. If the problems are not solved reasonably and promptly, a worsening situation could be imminent. As you know, I don’t want to see an internationalization of the war. Mr. Zhou Enlai’s points will be well taken into our consideration.

Zhou Enlai: Therefore, I see that Mr. Bidault has a responsibility to prevent such a risk from taking place.

Bidault: The newspapers always say, even though I never read them, that I came to Geneva to prepare World War III. This is so naive. While asking for an agreement, we can’t accept any kind of agreement. We want a reasonable settlement, not a preparation for war. I have experienced two global wars, and I am really tired of war. During the first war, I served as corporal. During the second war, I was sergeant. I don’t want to be promoted to a staff sergeant in the third war. I’d like to repeat one more time here what we request: (1) to conclude an agreement promptly, at least a reasonable, temporary agreement; (2) to have the commanders of both sides to draw a map of regrouping areas; and (3) to solve the supervision problem.

Zhou Enlai: All of these three points are for peace. We fully support any suggestion that is favorable for peace. Peace is our goal. Hopefully, we can cooperate in order to arrive at a point where our common goal can be achieved. A worsening situation is unfavorable for either side. Thereby, the three main problems pointed out by Mr. Bidault need to be, and can be solved soon.

Bidault: We will be very happy, if these problems can be solved. Thank you very much, Mr. Zhou Enlai, for your being willing to spend time here tonight and exchange our opinions. I’d like to take this opportunity to present Mr. Zhou Enlai with my precious book as a gift in order to show my respect.

Zhou Enlai: To achieve peace, we are willing to make more efforts and work harder with you. But there are indeed some people intending to utilize threats. I hope that Mr. Bidault can stop the attempt of destroying peace so that it can be achieved faster in a more practical way.

Since we have established our contact by now, this kind of contact should continue in order to make our efforts for peace together. I had been in France and had known a lot about wonderful traditions of the French. French people have a strong sense of national pride. I hope to see that the national status of France in the world rise through your strive for peace.

Bidault: Thank you so much, Mr. Zhou Enlai, for your wonderful memories and appraisal of France. We hope to not mention the threat, but follow the reality, when we work out solutions for the problems later on.

France hopes to achieve a Southeast Asian settlement that can be accepted by all the parties. Thereafter, the people in this region can be eventually released from disastrous war condition, breathe freely, and hopefully the entire world won’t be disturbed by either the Cold War or hot war.

Zhou Enlai: The Cold War and any hot war should stop. What we want is peace.

Bidault: As long as we have confidence, we can achieve peace and enjoy a relaxation.

Zhou Enlai: This needs our joint efforts. Getting closer between China and France will help improve the situation.

Bidault: I have a firm belief in it. Hopefully, Franco-Chinese closeness, which depends on the conference’s progress, will advance forward. I hope there will be other opportunities to see you again. Regrettfully, Mr. Zhou Enlai arrived this evening after the sun set. Otherwise, you could have enjoyed the beautiful view of the lake here.

Zhou Enlai: There are plenty opportunities. We are neighbors, it is very convenient to see each other.

Bidault: Our opinions have already got pretty close, just like next door neighbors.

Zhou Enlai: The closeness of our residences can also bring our opinions closer.

Translated for CWHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWHP.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at
the Ninth Restricted Session, June 1, 1954

Records No: 206-Y0050

(Top Secret)

Chairman Mao, Comrade Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

(1) Comrade Molotov flew back to Moscow on the morning of the 30th. He
has already arrived today. On the afternoon of the 30th, the Chinese and the Soviet
sides discussed their estimation of the general situation of the conference. Molotov
met with Eden before he left. Regarding the Korean issue, Eden tended to hold
restricted sessions and present proposals there. Molotov did not accept that, nor did
he refuse immediately at the time. He said that there should be a conclusion of the
Korean issue so that it could consolidate the situation of the armistice in Korea to
benefit peace. Eden agreed with that. We believe that we can hold restricted
sessions. [We should] put aside Yuen Yung Tai's proposals, and solely discuss
basic principles for the peaceful resolution of the Korean issue and seek common
ground for both sides so that we can reach some agreements. [We should present
our proposal] as we presented the six-point proposal for the Indochina issue in
order to make it more difficult for our counterparts to reject it completely. If our
counterparts reject it completely, they are obviously unreasonable. After that, it
will be natural to let Nam II present the second plan from our side. The Soviet
friends basically agree with our opinions, and we also discussed with and obtained
approval from Comrade Nam II. We have already made out a draft for our side's
principled agreement (see attachment).

Concerning the Indochina issue, Molotov told Eden that after the six points
of our proposal reached pricipled agreement or after discussing some political
issues, the Foreign Ministers can return first and let the delegates stay to supervise
and urge the negotiations of the representatives of both sides' commanders. Eden
agreed with that as well. He had already let the media know. We believe that it will
take at least two weeks for the conference to accomplish the above tasks. Eden
believes that the first two points of our six-point proposal regarding the principles
of complete ceasefire and delimitation have already been solved through the
resolutions passed on the 29th. Our counterparts want to discuss in particular the
following four points, especially the issues concerning international supervision
and international guarantee.

(2) At the ninth restricted session on the Indochina issue on the 31st, our
counterparts presented the issue of international supervision as we expected.

[Although] Smith did not present the issue of United Nations supervision at the

meeting, he emphasized that the experience of the NNSC on Korea was not good
and argued that our side did not act in good faith. He said that Poland and
Czechoslovakia obstructed the NNSC's work and made it impossible for the
NNSC to carry out its work in communist areas. Smith especially emphasized that
communist countries could not be neutral and cited several paragraphs from the
letters that Switzerland and Sweden sent to the Military Armistice Commission on
May 4th and May 7th to prove his argument. I immediately spoke to refute Smith's
statement. I first explained that the [North] Korean and Chinese sides do follow the
armistice agreement, and Poland and Czechoslovakia are impartial. The several
reports of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission are agreed to by Poland,
Czechoslovakia and India. The biased ones are the other two members: Switzerland
and Sweden. I affirmed that the work of the Korean NNSC had been
basically successful, although they had met difficulties, and their difficulties came
from the side of the United Nations forces. I used facts listed in Poland's and
Czechoslovakia's two reports on April 15th and April 30th to prove that the United
Nations forces created those difficulties for the NNSC. My conclusion is that we
can use the experience of the Korean NNSC for reference. I also explained that we
should relate with other views when we discuss the issue of supervision. Also, we
should have a joint commission consisting of members of both belligerents to
supervise [the ceasefire] and to take charge of the implementation of the provisions
of the [armistice] agreement. [Andrei] Gromyko spoke to support China's six-point
proposal, and explained and affirmed it point by point. 'In speaking of the membership of the organization of neutral nations' supervision, Gromyko
suggested that India, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Pakistan [should be the
members]. Our counterparts did not respond to this on the spot. Bidault's statement
had two main points:

□ The main task of the international supervision in Laos and Cambodia is to insure
the withdrawal of the invading troops of Vietnam (Vietnamese Allied), not to
supervise the armistice.

□ The representatives of both sides [of belligerents] join the work of the
international supervision committee. However, the Neutral Nations Commission
should have supreme authority over and lead the joint commission.

Bidault also presented the issues of the composition of the NNSC and the authority
to which the NNSC should be responsible. He hinted that the NNSC should be
responsible to the United Nations. In addition to giving his support to Smith's
proposal, the Cambodian delegate also repeated that the regrouping zones do not
exist in Cambodia, [and claimed that] the proposal of the Chinese delegation can
only deal with the old ways of Vietnam. Pham Van Dong spoke to refute Smith's
argument that only non-Communist countries could be neutral countries and gave
his support to the Chinese delegation's conclusion on the supervision issue. Pham
Van Dong claimed at the meeting that he had already appointed Ta Quang Buu [?] representative of the command. He also proposed that Ta Quang Buu’s assistant [?] meet with the French military representative on June 1st to discuss and decide technical questions such as the date that representatives of the commanders of both sides start working.

(3) After the meeting, the Soviet, Vietnamese and Chinese sides agreed to draft some principles concerning the joint commission, the NNSC, and the international guarantee in order to unify the understanding of the three delegations of our side.

(4) There is no meeting today and we had outside conference activities. Eden invited me for dinner tonight. Bidault said that he wanted to meet with me outside the conference. However, he was afraid that the Americans know this and asked us not to let the journalists know in advance. I already agreed with that and agreed to visit him tonight at 10:00 pm after Eden’s banquet.

Zhou Enlai
June 1, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
as suggested by Tosec 283. Neither the US nor British should propose the Colombo powers, but France might do so. The basis of a compromise, and we would then see how it might develop. My own view is that this is the best solution we are likely to reach, and it has marked advantages from many points of view.

With regard to point 4, the decision will depend on what develops in connection with the cease-fire and the ultimate stability for supervision, and we will not touch on that matter.

With regard to point 5, it was decided that Eisenhower would say tonight to Chou En-lai simply that the Soviet proposal was completely unacceptable; that the Americans had very strong views which were supported by France and British and that we would probably make a counterproposal.

[Here follows a portion of thetelegram which dealt with discussion of Part II on Korea for text see page 292]

SMITH

Dated May 29, p. 906.

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

TOP SECRET NMACT

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1954—3:37 p.m.

Tedul 146. For Under Secretary from Secretary in New York.

Reference: Dulles 138 and Tedul 144.

1. In these matters we must bear in mind the basic Presidential instructions, of which Congressional committees were informed, from which we should not depart without previously informing these committees.

2. It seems unlikely that the basic settlement will be one with which we would accept to be formally identified or attempt to guarantee. Certainly this cannot be known at this juncture. Therefore discussion of control commission is awkward without knowing what it is that will be conducted or US responsibility in relation thereto. Under these circumstances it seems that in any suggestions or arguments we make, real composition of control commission must be carefully safeguarded so as to avoid other parties feeling that because they have deferred to our views regarding composition of control commission we are committed to some basic decision or solution.

JUNE 2, 1954

A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/10) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 227, CP 275. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p.m. and adjourned at 0:25 p.m. The minutes are also printed in Conference de Genève, pp. 176-180. The speech by Biaux is in Conference files, lot 60 D 227, CP 252, and the speech by Pham Van Dong, Indochina Document E10/16, June 3, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 227, CP 289A.
paragraphs in which Swedish and Swiss members record refutations allegations of Poles and Czechs and full compliance of armistice agreement by UNC.

US delegate stated Gromyko proposal on composition unacceptable since it would result in arrangement exactly like Korea. With reference India and Pakistan, US delegate stated this might be helpful suggestion meriting serious consideration. He concluded: "It seems to us that India and Pakistan, in association with other genuinely neutral states, might provide the basis for a satisfactory and really effective supervisory commission".

Chou En-lai made feeble reply referring again to reports of Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission where India sided with views of Poles and Czechs rather than with those of Sweden and Switzerland proving, on basis India's unquestioned neutrality, that Poles and Czechs neutral rather than Swiss and Sweden.

Chou En-lai also stated he would distribute Polish-Czech communications dated April 15 and 20 and May 8 and 9. He concluded that rejection of Communists as neutrals unacceptable since as such neutral states because world divided between ideologies. He defined neutrals as countries not having participated in Indochina war and willingly contribute peace there.

Chou En-lai supported Gromyko proposal as to composition Indochina NNUC (Indonesia, Pakistan, Poland, Czechoslovakia) pointing out that Poland and Czechoslovakia have diplomatic relations with DRV while India and Pakistan have them with France. (Chou En-lai defined two belligerents as DRV on one hand and on other hand France and her Associated States.)

Chou En-lai concluded by quoting paragraph 37 of Korean Armistice Agreement in which neutral nations defined as nations whose combat forces have not participated in Korean hostilities. He assured this definition applicable to Indochina.

Bidault took issue with assertion of Soviet and CPR delegates regarding extent and number of points on which agreement reached. He said his delegation not bound by formal agreement on simultaneous cease-fire although believes this would be desirable if achievable in all three countries. However, if cease-fire can be achieved in one country at once, so much the better.

Principle of regrouping is acceptable to French delegation and to other eight delegations only so far as Vietnam is concerned. Military representatives currently studying regrouping in Vietnam. Results of these studies will be brought before the conference which will then be to examine consequences of proposals, methods of implementation, movement of troops, administration of zones, etc. Bidault stressed that questions of Laos and Cambodia remained entirely open and must be taken up as soon as possible by conference.

Bidault said he thought there was general agreement on principle of release prisoners of war and civilian internees and that this agreement could be recorded.

Turning to controls and guarantees, Bidault said that it would be an exaggeration to say there is any general agreement. Nine delegations have gone no further than to state there should be international neutral control in all three countries of Indochina. Little has been said regarding functions, structure, composition and supreme authority.

Bidault limited his remarks to Vietnam stating he would later give his views regarding Laos and Cambodia. He said function of international commission would be control of all clauses of armistice agreement and particularly:

1. Those dealing with regrouping including movement of troops;
2. Supervision of demarcation lines separating regrouping zones and, if necessary, of demilitarized sectors and territorial waters;
3. Execution of proviso concerning prisoners of war and civilian internees and other problems.

Bidault noted that problem of prevention introduction fresh arms and troops following cessation of hostilities would arise only in case Vietnam since in other two countries cessation of hostilities would result achievement final peace. He expressed surprise Chou En-lai had referred only to introduction American personnel and troops and that both Chou En-lai and DRV had failed refer material assistance other side received at Dien Bien Phu and elsewhere from Communist China, USSR, Czechoslovakia, etc. He said French delegation could not accept control which was not complete and equitable.

Bidault envisaged central control commission choosing own headquarters and able set up necessary number of local commissions (also of international character) at locations related to tasks. Number of these local commissions would be scattered over territory at frontier points, ports and elsewhere. Central commission would also set up ad hoc international subcommittees for special tasks such as supervising release of prisoners of war and local manufacture of arms. Bidault stressed need for adequate modern transportation and communication facilities so that groups can be mobile and efficient. International commission would be able in its discretion to create and use joint bodies representative of two belligerents which, however, would function under the authority, responsibility and direction of international commission for performance certain special duties. Bidault again stressed importance that kernel of international organization would ground at time of cessation of hostilities.
Bidault suggested that at all levels of international control decisions be taken by majority. Conference need not otherwise set up rules of procedure determination of which could be left to international commission.

Regarding composition of international commission, Bidault agreed with US delegate's appraisal of Korean experience. He said that commission which merely balanced opposite tendencies would be impotent which was equivalent of neutral. With regard to thesis that Communist countries cannot be neutral, Bidault read following quotation from statement by Mao Tse-tung in "new democracy" in 1949:

"At a time when rivalry between the Socialist states of Soviet Russia and the imperialist states of England and America is becoming still more acute, China must take sides. Such is the inevitable tendency. Can China be neutral and avoid taking a side? That is a daydream. The whole world will find itself included in these two battle lines. In the world, from now on, the word 'neutrality' is only good for deceiving the peoples."

Bidault concluded with statement French delegation prepared examine any proposal on composition which would meet requirements of objectivity and disinterestedness.

Eden spoke after recess. Referring to Bidault's proposal he stated some parts dealing with structure and functions of the neutral commission are inevitably technical in character. After consideration has been given to proposal it should be referred to a technical committee to work out details. Technical committee would then report back to restricted session.

Eden then referred to paragraph 4 of Chinese proposal, which suggested that joint committee be established consisting of representatives of two commands. Eden stated joint committee could render help to international commission provided the committee is subject to command of neutral commission.

Referring to composition of neutral commission, Eden stated it must be composed of truly neutral countries, not involved in Indochina conflict, and must not be deadlock between two opposing views. It must act independently and impartially. Eden stated he could not agree that Korean Armistice Agreement provides acceptable precedent for Indochina neutral commission, and that two European countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia, would not be acceptable.

Viet Minh representative stated question of cease-fire must be considered as a whole. He then listed matters to be studied—implementation plans on zones and transfer of troops; prohibition of introduction of forces and equipment into Indochina; and organization for controlling cease-fire, including joint committee to supervise reading of zones and transfer of troops; and neutral commission to work with joint committee. Neutral commission would supervise non-introduction of troops and equipment into Indochina. He stated joint committee and neutral commission must work impartially. Dong mentioned responsibility for implementation of cease-fire would be up to joint commission which would be equivalent to armistice commission and would have representatives of two commands. Stated if two sides want peace, and presumably that is why they are at Geneva, it is up to conference to see that details of agreement will work.

Dong stated violations of armistice would be referred to joint committee which would take steps to refer matter to proper side for action to comply with armistice. Believes solution is simple and logical. If both sides—French and Viet Minh—really want peace, they should take action to obtain it with help of friendly countries.

Referring to relationship between joint committee and neutral commission, Dong stated their relationship would be one of coordination, not subordination. He then indicated Viet Minh agreement with Soviet proposal for neutral commission consisting of Poland, Czechoslovakia, India and Pakistan.

Dong stated international control for Indochina should not be under the United Nations and charged UN not really representative since one of great powers not represented there.

Molotov stated Eden's recommendation for technical committee would best be considered after basic issues have been clarified by the conference. At that time, a technical committee could work out detailed arrangements.

Molotov referred to various proposals—Chinese, French and statements by other delegates—mentioning that there are a number of areas of basic agreement. The conference should record areas upon which there is agreement and then move on to areas of disagreement. Molotov noted only proposal for neutral commission for Indochina had been made by the Soviet delegation. There have been critical remarks on the Soviet proposal but not counterproposals. He stated criticism followed two lines—practical consideration and considerations on matter of principle. On former, he referred only to NNSC operations in Korea; on latter, he referred to statements by General Smith earlier in session. He stated position taken by US delegation might mean US has no desire for reaching agreement, does not want settlement of problem and such position will hamper settlement. Stated much could be said about this matter and he might do so on another occasion. Further stated Soviet Union's view on whether Communist nations neutral obvious and no comment necessary.
Referred to Soviet proposal for neutral commission which he stated recalls Korean neutral nations supervisory commission. Recognized NNSC had deficiencies and both sides at conference had criticized operation of NNSC. He stated regardless how much Swedish and Swiss members NNSC criticize Polish and Czech members, comments of latter much more solid than Swedish and Swiss comments. He then referred to comments by Chou En-lai on documents refuting statements of Swedish and Swiss members NNSC. He stated all four countries acknowledge US violations to Korean armistice and referred to statements of NNSC dated September 11, 16 and December 22, 1953, respectively. Referred to specific violations reported by Polish and Czech representatives NNSC, including 177 military aircraft, 466 guns and Howitzers, 1365 machine guns. Stated Polish and Czech representatives NNSC also drew attention that during October 1953-February 1954 UN Command used up tremendous number of shells including 130 million cartridges and 1,100,000 shells. This he indicated during period in which there were no hostilities.

Molotov stated in spite of weaknesses in NNSC, Soviet delegation, in interest of getting ahead with work, desired to make neutral commission in Indochina a workable organization. Molotov stated in considering matter of a neutral commission it would be inappropriate to draw upon references as to whether neutrality possible between Communism and imperialism as a question of principle. He stated question of neutral commission should be approached in the same manner as in Korea.

Molotov then repeated Soviet proposal for neutral commission for Indochina to be composed of India, Pakistan, Czechoslovakia and Poland. He stated Soviet proposal for Indochina calls for two Asian and two European. Stated neutral commission should not be composed of countries having diplomatic relations with only one side, but having relations with one side and two with other side. This would lead to better understanding and more secure armistice.

Cambodian representative challenged statement made earlier in session regarding non-introduction of arms and equipment into Indochina. Stated reference had been made to all of Indochina including introduction of arms and equipment into three states. Stated Cambodia would never agree and referred specifically to French proposal which had referred only to Vietnam.

Cambodian representative stated would again like to ask when end of Cambodia would be taken up by conference. If conference is to succeed, would be necessary to carry out coordinated and parallel examination of problem in Indochina.

In concluding meeting, Molotov read following communiqué, which was approved:

"At the restricted meeting on June 2, the nine delegations continued their discussion of the re-establishment of peace in Indochina. The next restricted meeting on this subject is to be held on June 3."

Comment: At the tenth session, lines were clearly drawn on two points:

(a) Composition of neutral nations commission. Communist side supported Soviet proposal for commission including India, Pakistan, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Our side rejected Czechoslovakia and Poland and favored Asian neutrals as basis.

(b) Status of international commission in relation to supervision of armistice. On this point, Bidault clearly upheld authority and responsibility of international commission while DRV gave major responsibility to joint bodies made up of belligerents with international commission merely in a vague coordinating, auxiliary role. Molotov has not yet indicated whether DRV has Soviet support on this point although Chou En-lai appears to have given his approval to DRV general concept at May 31 meeting.

In course of Molotov's remarks addressed to US delegation contention Communist state cannot be neutral, Troyanovsky, translating for Molotov, gave impression Molotov indicated countries not Communist must be imperialist. This was caught by Gromyko and correction rapidly made to general effect that question was neutrality between "Communism and imperialism."

SMITH

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

TOP SECRET NIAC

Washington, June 2, 1954—5:33 p.m.

4565. Eyes only Under Secretary and Ambassador from Secretary.

We are at present not able to believe you should warn Laniel that no statement implying anything like final agreement has been made. Unless we are given an assurance that this is not the case we must insist that the French government continue to insist on an end to the war before any discussion of armistice arrangements is possible.

We have been informed that Laniel stated that we should go along with French policy until the war is ended. This is not the impression we have had up to the present. Our impression is that the French government is still in the process of negotiating, and is still in the position of accepting whatever the United States agree to a proposal made by Laniel "that Franco-US military negotiations be held in Washington next week." (70160/8744) For the full text of telegram 4566, see volume XIII.
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (U.K. DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden
No. 554
June 2, 1954

D. 2.32 p.m. June 2, 1954
R. 2.48 p.m. June 2, 1954

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 554 of June 2
Repeated for information to Washington Moscow
Paris Peking

Chou En-lai dined with me last night. He was in a good
humour and the party went well.

2. I raised the question of the composition of the body
to supervise the Indo-China Agreement and suggested that there
was much to be said for its being all-Asian. Chou En-lai found
it somewhat difficult to answer this, but stuck to the line that
it should be partly European and partly Asian. In the course
of the discussion he made a pointed reference to the recent
Pakistan-American Agreement.

3. I said that the Conference had lasted for five weeks,
but that we still did not know what the Viet Minh wanted, and
emphasised the need for moderation on the Communist side in view
of the inherent dangers of the situation. I told him that
there was a considerable section of American opinion which were
hoping that we should get a solution of the Indo-China problem
here and particularly mentioned Bedell Smith's sincere efforts to
help towards this. Chou En-lai agreed that there was strong
American opinion in favour of a peaceful solution and said that
he felt that this opinion was held even by some members of the
United States Government. I said that I was sure that the
President for one was strongly of this view.

1. The subject of Anglo-Chinese relations then came up and
I felt bound to comment upon the fact that we had a Chargé
d'Affaires in Peking whereas the Chinese had not reciprocated.
To this Chou En-lai immediately said that they would be willing
to send to London a counterpart to Trevelyan. This presumably
meant that
CONFIDENTIAL

Geneva Conference (U.K. Del.) telegram No. 554 to Foreign Office

-2-

meant that they would send a Chargé d'Affaires. I also said that Trevelyan was returning to Peking shortly and I hoped that he would be able to continue the discussions which he had had here, to which Chou En-lai assented.

5. I discussed in general terms the difficulty of the international questions with which we are now faced and suggested that the Chinese should realise that one of the penalties of membership of the United Nations was responsibility for facing many difficult international problems. Chou En-lai immediately said that he did not know why I should assume that they wanted to become a member of the United Nations. It is possible to interpret this as showing that they have decided to give up their previous stand that recognition of us depends upon our voting for them in the United Nations, but do not want to appear to be giving up a point.

6. After he left, Chou En-lai went on to see Bidault. I said that I was very glad that they were having this meeting and that I hoped it would be possible to encourage the French and Viet Minh to get down to serious talks together. He agreed.

Foreign Office please pass Washington, Paris, Moscow and Peking as my telegrams Nos. 190, 136, 48 and 74 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington, Paris, Moscow and Peking]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:
Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Private Secretary
Minister of State
Mr. Harrison
Far Eastern Department
continued French participation and some form of UN association and assurances of cooperation from other countries in the area. I would wish to take the line that any important action now taken by either France, by Vietnam or by the US as the three active partners in the enterprise to save Vietnam from Communist control should be carefully coordinated with other partners in order to make sure that any single action will in fact result in net addition to strength of the partnership as a whole.

I shall say that particularly in France there are dangerously strong forces of defeatism which will seize upon any pretext or excuse to diminish or even abandon the French contribution. I shall say to Bao Dai that in my judgment for the present and probably for many months to come that contribution is vital and irreplaceable.

I shall tell Bao Dai that I have been encouraged by the French plans for reinforcing the expeditionary corps and at the general willingness of the French to envisage a more direct US participation in the training and perhaps also the supplying of the Vietnamese national army. I shall state that I would hope his relations with the French would be constantly characterized by the mutual confidence and consultation which has existed in the past.

I shall add, however, that if the present relatively favorable situation should change I should hope immediately to have consultations with Bao Dai in order to concert with him such measures as might seem appropriate. I would expect him to take no decisions, based upon a French withdrawal from the struggle, until he had given me and other representatives of our government a full opportunity to discuss the situation with him and to see what measures might be required.

Urgent guidance requested.*

SMITH

*Department's reply contained in telegram Tel 159, June 5, p. 1044.

365 (GE/6-254) : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, June 3, 1954—9 p.m.

Secto 361. Repeated information Moscow 109.

1. Dennis Allen (UK) informed Johnson today regarding Eden's discussion with Chou En-lai at private dinner last night. While Chinese were friendly and congenial, they left immediately after dinner and nothing of particular significance resulted from meeting. Four points of interest came up during conversation:

(a) Eden raised question of Chinese Communist treatment of Trevelyan in Peking after he returns there. Eden asked that he be accorded the usual courtesies and privileges and be allowed to see appropriate Chinese Communist officials. Hsu Huai Hsiang of European and African Department in the Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry, said he would see that these things were done and looked at Chou En-lai who concurred. Allen commented this would be helpful but UK will wait and see if Chinese Communists actually carry it out.

(b) There was no discussion of diplomatic relations or exchange of Ambassadors or of UN representation for Chinese Communists. However, Chou remarked cryptically during evening "what makes you think we want a seat in the UN?" Allen commented perhaps sense of obscure remark was to effect Chinese Communists should be in UN by right and that its seat is not negotiable in relation to anything else.

(c) On the question of embargo, Eden inquired of Chou regarding Chinese Communist construction projects, particularly Hual River development. He asked if Chinese Communists could get all the machinery and equipment they needed for these projects and remarked that the embargo probably was limiting this development. Chou responded only that they needed equipment and machinery from wherever they could get it but admitted economic restrictions were giving them difficulties.

(d) Regarding Indochina, Eden emphasized again to Chou that it was a dangerous situation and that UK and other delegations on outside really did not know whether the Chinese Communists and particularly the Viet Minh really wanted a settlement. He wanted to make it clear to Chou that it even looked as if the Communists did not have real intention to seek genuine settlement here. However, these remarks drew no useful response from Chou since he replied Vietnam delegation was not helpful.

(e) Eden told Chou he hoped he understood UK and other delegations believed control, authority and supervision is particularly important aspect Indochina problem. Eden said Soviet proposal for Poles and Czechs on commission is totally unacceptable to UK. Also UK does not believe Poles and Czechs, as European countries and as Communist countries, have any competence or knowledge deal with Indochina, and UK not only cannot understand why they should be suggested but is convinced such proposal is not helpful or acceptable. Chou replied that there are four European nations supervising the armistice in Korea which has "worked out well" whereas on Indochina Soviet Union proposed two Asian countries both of which have close relations with UK and one of which has "treaty" with US. Chou thought this could be much more satisfactory from UK point of view than Korean setup. He insisted that it was essential to have some countries which would "reflect the interests of the Viet Minh and in which the Viet Minh would have confidence."

2. Molotov came to see Eden briefly this morning ostensibly to find out from him his co-chairman about any developments re Indochina.
and what would be taken up at restricted session this afternoon. Eden stressed the importance of adequate control, authority and supervision and said session today should continue discussion of that problem to work something out. Molotov replied that that was an important consideration but there were other items in the Chinese Communist's proposal particularly the matter of the introduction of arms into Indochina. Eden acknowledged that was also factor. Eden then told Molotov that Soviet proposal made in his absence regarding Poland and Czechoslovakia was totally unacceptable to the UK. He took same lines as Cheu En-lai and stressed necessity for having Poland and Czechoslovakia to reflect point of view of the Viet Minh. He said that there had to be countries on the commission acceptable to the Viet Minh.

SMITH

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1954—9:56 a.m.

Tosec 354. Following is summary of conversation between Secretary-General Hammarskjold and Secretary June second:

"After exchange of courtesies, etc., Mr. Hammarskjold mentioned pending Thai application. He said he was afraid result of this might be to reduce chance of success at Geneva. He said while Thai application did not necessarily involve any agreement about Indochina matter being discussed at UN, the Russians probably would feel called upon to cover entire territory, and that this might precipitate chain of events which might end up with certain duplication of Geneva talks.

I said that 'success' at Geneva seemed to me to involve something more than merely getting an agreement but involved getting the right kind of agreement. That, I thought, would be impossible unless French had some alternative to complete surrender and US was trying to provide that. One of preconditions to any contingent US action would be some participation in area by UN. Also it was important from standpoint of getting MSA appropriations. We had followed the course which seemed to us least likely to involve Geneva. I did not see how the Russians could very well make this reason for breaking off at Geneva if only reason why UN talks covered Indochina was because Russians themselves brought that element in.

Hammarskjold then spoke of possible UN Assembly action following prospective Soviet veto in SC. He said he doubted whether we could get two-thirds vote, or certainly not more than bare two-thirds vote, if matter came up while Geneva was still offering some hope. I

1 Drafted by Popper of UNA/CNP. Repeated to USUN as telegram 622.

JUNE 3, 1954

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1954—2:59 p.m.

Tosec 354. In future negotiations re Thai SC issue for UN observation, may be helpful for you to know British have been making strenuous efforts in New York to ensure that Thai request is for UN observation limited to Thailand alone. British have pressed USUN to use influence with Thai Del to restrict opening Thai SC statements accordingly. USUN has refused, stating our position clear from outset POC subcommission must be given authority observe in other states in general area if those states so request, though we would expect Laos and Cambodia would not at this time make such a request. Khoman told USUN yesterday he would not accept restriction POC subcommission authority to Thailand alone; said public opinion his country would not consider it provided adequate protection for Thailand.

DULLES

SECRET

THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1954—3:29 p.m.

Dulles 142. Repeated information Paris 375. Paris limit distribution. I told Eden this morning that with the deteriorating military situation Indochina and the Vietnam-French military talks now going on here I was seriously concerned that if within the next week or two the Communists offered France a cease-fire the French would be in a weak position to resist and might have to accept without any agreement on effective international control machinery or with machinery which would be purely nominal. Eden said he fully shared my fears in this regard.

SMITH
Telegram. Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong regarding Contact with Eden and Bidault. June 2, 1954

Record No. 206-Y0050

1. (Excised)

2. Yesterday, military representatives from both sides began contact. Preliminary agreements have been reached regarding the date and other procedures of formal talks by the representatives of commanders-in-chief of both sides. Formal talks will begin today.

3. Last night I attended the banquet held by Eden. Eden mainly mentioned four issues:

   a. Eden informally expressed that he did not support the participation of Poland and Czechoslovakia in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. He said that it would be better if the supervision was carried out by Asian countries. I said that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on Korea consisted only of European countries, and that some people opposed it. A commission consisting entirely of Asian countries would have disadvantages (I gave the example that it would be inappropriate for China as an Asian country to have supervision of the Kashmir problem). This time around it would be best if the Commission could include both Asian and European countries, as proposed by Gromyko.

   b. Eden expressed the wish that the representatives of the commanders-in-chief of both sides would open the maps and solve some specific problems.

   c. Eden asked whether the conference would come to a conclusion in ten to fifteen days. I replied that it would depend on the efforts by both sides to reach an agreement.

   d. Eden said that since the United Kingdom has Trevelyan (representative for negotiations) in Beijing, he hoped that China would send its counterpart of Trevelyan to the United Kingdom. I have agreed.

4. I visited Bidault at 10:00 yesterday evening. One the one hand, Bidault explained that he wanted to reach an agreement and not fight World War III; on the other hand, he threatened that if an agreement could not be reached, there would be danger. I pointed out that the danger would be intervention by the United States, and the threat to China's security—these are the things that concern us the most. Bidault expressed his hope that the representatives of the commanders-in-chief of both sides could solve some specific problems. He also emphasized that the issue of international supervision should be addressed well. Although Bidault had said that he wanted to discuss some problems beforehand, he did not go deeply into the problems yesterday evening, nor did he bring up specific questions.

Zhou Enlai
June 2, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
and what would be taken up at restricted session this afternoon. Eden stressed the importance of adequate control, authority and supervision and said session today should continue discussion of that problem to work something out. Molotov replied that that was an important consideration but there are also other items in the Chinese Communist's proposal particularly the matter of the introduction of arms into Indochina. Eden acknowledged that was also factor. Eden then told Molotov that Soviet proposal made in his absence regarding Poland and Czechoslovakia was totally unacceptable to the US. He took same lines as Chou En-lai and stressed necessity for removing Poland and Czechoslovakia to reflect point of view of the Viet Minh. He said that there had to be countries on the commission acceptable to the Viet Minh.

SMITH

Dulles-Hammarskjöld Meeting, June 9, 1954: The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1954—9:56 a.m.

T Bose 354. Following is summary of conversation between Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and Secretary Jane second:

"After exchange of courtesies, etc., Mr. Hammarskjöld mentioned pending Thai application for aid, he would have his arrangements with the US also to reduce the number of US forces. He said while the Thai had not necessarily felt the need to make any agreement about Indochina matter being discussed at UN, the Russians probably would feel called upon to cover the entire territory, and that this might precipitate chain of events which might lead up with certain duplication of Geneva talks.

I said that 'success' at Geneva seemed to me to involve something more than merely getting an agreement but involved getting the right kind of agreement. That, I thought, would be impossible unless French had some alternative to complete surrender and US was trying to provide that. One of preconditions to any contingent US action would be some participation in area by UN. Also it was important from standpoint of getting MSA appropriations. We had followed the course which seemed to us least likely to involve Geneva. I did not see how Russia could very well make this reason for breaking off at Geneva. If only reason why UN talks covered Indochina was because Russians themselves brought that element in.

Hammarskjöld then spoke of possible UN assembly action following prospective Soviet veto in SC. He said he doubted whether we could get two-thirds vote, or certainly not more than bare two-thirds vote, if matter came up while Geneva was still offering some hope.

1 Drafted by Popper of UNA/UNP. Repeated to USUN as telegram 242.

JUNE 3, 1954

INDOCHINA

304.1 OR/5-354: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1954—12:30 p.m.

T Bose 334. In future conversations re Thai SC appeal for UN observation, may be helpful for you to know British have been making strenuous efforts in New York to ensure that Thai request is for UN observation limited to Thailand alone. British have pressed USUN to influence with Thai Del to restrict opening Thai SC statement accordingly. USUN has refused, stating our position clear from outset POC subcommittee must be given authority observe in other states in general area if those states so request, though we would expect Laos and Cambodia would not at this time make such a request. Kibon told USUN yesterday he could not accept restriction POC subcommittee authority to Thailand alone; said public opinion his country would not consider it provided adequate protection for Thailand.

DULLES

1 Drafted by Popper of UNA/UNP. Repeated to London as telegram 6020 and to Bangkok as telegram 2625.

345.003/6-854: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 3, 1954—3 p.m.

Dulles 142. Repeated information Paris 376. Paris limit distribution. I told Eden this morning that with the deteriorating military situation Indochina and the Vietnam-French military talks now going on here I was seriously concerned that if within the next week or two the Communists offered France a cease-fire the French would be in a weak position to resist and might have to accept without any agreement on effective international control machinery or with machinery which would be purely nominal. Eden said he fully shared my fears in this regard.

SMITH
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 3, 1954—3 p. m.

Dulles 143. For Secretary from Smith. Our messages cross rather often. Believe this summary will help to clarify:

[Here follows the portion of this message pertaining to the Korean phase of the Conference; for the text, see page 339.]

B. Todt 146 and Dulles 198.

Your recent instructions have given us a clear line of procedure for next few days. Gromyko’s proposal of supervisory authority consisting of India, Pakistan, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and our rejection, supported by our associates, of Poland and Czechoslovakia or any other Communist states in the Soviet orbit, leave us at an impasse which Eden thought last night might be a breaking issue. At the closed session on Indochina this afternoon the French will probably make some counter-proposals. I do not yet know what these may be but if it becomes necessary I will throw in Thailand and the Philippines; otherwise, will make no statement.

I believe the Communists are convinced that once military talks reach point of producing some sort of cease-fire formula acceptable to France, that then nothing can stop the cease-fire and that when this occurs the composition of a supervisory authority will become almost academic and they will get about what they want. Meanwhile, the continuing deterioration of the military situation in the Delta will exert increasing pressure on the French to accept almost any face-saving cease-fire formula.

SMITH

1 Dated June 1, p. 964.
2 Dated June 1, p. 968.

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 3, 1954—3 p. m.


“Cambodian proposal for the settlement of the Cambodian problem:

1. A cessation of hostilities will be proclaimed in Cambodia, if possible simultaneously with a cessation of hostilities in Laos and Vietnam. In the event of an agreement on a simultaneous cessation of hostilities, the three plans relative to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam will be placed in force simultaneously.

2. All the regular and irregular Viet Minh forces will be as of the date of the cessation of hostilities evacuated outside the territory of Cambodia and regrouped in Vietnamese territory within the re-grouping zones assigned to the Viet Minh Command in accordance with the agreement between the French, Vietnamese and Viet Minh Command.

3. For this purpose, the Cambodian and Viet Minh Commands will meet on the spot in order to fix the details of the evacuation.

4. All of the armed elements which do not depend [f] either from the army or from police forces will be, as of the date of cessation of hostilities, disarmed and disbanded. Foreign elements, non-nationals, will go back to their countries of origin.

5. After agreement between the Cambodian and Viet Minh Commands, there will be carried out a release or an exchange of prisoners of war and civilian internees.

6. A system of control by the UN or a system of international control functioning under the auspices of the UN will be established to watch over the execution of the above-mentioned agreements. This system of international control must be organized and ready to function as of the date of the cessation of hostilities.”

SMITH

1 A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/11) is in Conference files, lot 60, D-677. C-878. The minutes indicate that the meeting continue at 3 p.m. and adjourned at 7 p.m. The minutes are also printed in Conference de Genève, pp. 181-195. This message was transmitted to the Department of State in three sections.
Second, since control of cessation of hostilities and all related agreements has technical character, he stated controls should be entrusted to states having sufficient stability and experience needed for task in question.

After summarizing views on neutrality and technical competence, Vietnamese delegate made proposal that control of execution of terms of Indochina agreement be handled through UN which meets conditions of neutrality. It is an organism of collective nature which already exists. It has no special sympathy for any state or group of states. It has on occasion synthesized policies of all member nations as in case of approval of declaration of rights of man in 1945. Although Communist states did not vote for this declaration, they did not vote against. He described two-thirds majority requirement in General Assembly as guarantee for all members. He also stressed technical competence of UN to which all main powers of world belong.

In closing, Vietnamese delegate cautioned against danger of neglecting UN where maintenance of peace involved. He stated that creation of ad hoc bodies endangers organization which aroused so much hope in world.

M. Bidault then spoke. He said Vietnamese proposal deserved careful consideration. He said undeniable UN founded by 50 countries in order advance rule of law and specific conditions necessary for maintenance of peace. He said UN had had successes, failures, and half successes. He recalled recent Colombo meeting where several Asian countries invited parties to Indochina conflict to have recourse to good offices and, eventually, to services of UN. The goodwill and impartiality of these Asian countries are beyond question. Therefore, Vietnamese proposal should be studied with great care.

Bidault stated that there are two aspects to be examined:

First, should conference ask UN to suggest composition of international commission or does conference prefer provide for this itself? Second, what will be final authority supervising work of international commission—will it be UN as proposed, or will there be some other organism to which international commission would report?

Bidault asked that conference reflect on these two questions and be prepared with replies in near future.

French delegate then turned to Viet Minh explanation of functions of control mechanism made at tenth restricted meeting yesterday, which he described as unsatisfactory and surprising to French delegation. French delegate, following Molotov's statement of May 14 (Secto 212 *) and CPR statement of May 27 (Secto 325 *) had believed there

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*Dated May 14, p. 785.

* Dated May 26, p. 945.
was agreement in principle regarding international control. Bidault quoted from Molotov's speech of May 14 (not from proposal) as follows:

"It would be possible to come to an agreement that supervision of implementation of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities should be entrusted to commissions composed of representatives of neutral countries."

Bidault recalled great satisfaction with which this agreement in principle had been received throughout world.

Bidault stated DRV proposal of yesterday very far from agreed concept. Dong proposes that control of armistice would rest solely on hands of joint commissions made up of representatives of two commands which would be termed an armistice commission and would alone be designated to fill this role. DRV gives to neutral commission merely secondary role including international aspects such as entry of materials and personnel from outside. Viet Minh representative assigns entire enforcement of agreement to parties to struggle. Bidault stated this absolutely unworkable.

Bidault pointed out also that Viet Minh proposal dealt with all Indochina while French delegate can conceive of joint commissions of belligerents only for Vietnam. Bidault stated he reserved right to return to problem of Cambodia and Laos on another day, which he hoped would be soon.

Bidault, continuing analysis of Viet Minh proposal, stated that such important matters as regrouping of forces would escape neutral commission entirely being confined to joint commission whose role would be limited to supervision of ports and, with Viet Minh permission, to land frontiers. But neutral commission entirely eliminated from control of essential clauses of cessation of hostilities agreement.

Bidault referred to experience with joint commissions made up of belligerents eight years ago as demonstrating inefficiency and serious danger involved in this type of arrangement. Bidault admitted utility of joint bodies made up of people having practical knowledge of country but stated such bodies cannot act as judges in disputes of which their members are parties. In case of a violation, it would be presumably impossible to get agreement of joint body even as to fact of violation and thus control would break down. Joint commissions would be useless in cases of violations and, added Bidault, "I am afraid this is the goal sought". Under Viet Minh proposal such important clauses as those referring to regrouping, transfer of troops, supervision of limits of zones, liberation of prisoners would escape from any real control. Result would be an interminable quarrel, without an arbiter, without an end, and without hope. French delegation warns conference against this result.

Following recess, General Smith recalled US preference for UN as supervisory authority and stated Vietnam had given convincing speech to this end. He recalled US view Czechoslovakia and Poland could not be considered for NNSC and suggested India, Pakistan, Sweden and Switzerland might well have been proposed by our side. However, suggested not appropriate halcyon names of countries in such a meeting. Therefore, if others agreed two chairmen arrange for discussion actual composition in more private manner. He also pointed fundamental importance resolving evident differences supervisory authority highlighted by Dong's and Bidault's presentations.

Chou started by saying that with respect to Eden's proposal for the formation of technical committee he agreed with Molotov that we should exchange views and determine first principles before tackling question technical committees. He wished to set forth CPR delegation views on principal controversial questions. Most disputed dealt with question joint committees. On May 27 he had said that in order to supervise armistice there should be two kinds of organizations; (1) joint committee as proposed by DRV which should be actual armistice commission made up of representatives of two belligerents; (2) neutral nation supervisory committee as proposed by Molotov on basis of Bidault proposal that this commission would be composed of neutral nations invited by the conference. Question of terms of reference could best be determined by using those of Korean armistice agreement. He stressed that these two kinds of organizations would be mutually related but neither was to be superior to the other and NNSC was by no means to be over the joint committees. Function of joint committees to supervise fulfillment by two parties of armistice provisions. Function of NNSC to supervise and inspect violations of armistice agreement. Such violations could take place inside or outside Indochina. He found example of competence of both parties to carry out armistice in their implementation of recent agreement for evacuation of seriously wounded of Dien Bien Phu although he suggested that measure of sincerity had not been equal on both sides. Disputes or violations of armistice agreement which two sides could not reconcile would be taken up by NNSC which would be established for that purpose. Its functions would be two-fold: (1) to supervise demilitarized areas separating two sides in Indochina; and (2) to supervise throughout Indochina and along common frontiers with other countries introduction whether on land, sea, or air of fresh troops, arms and ammunition. With respect to first function joint commissions would see to execution armistice agreement and NNSC would also

INDOCHINA
supervise. Thus within Indochina there would be two kinds of organizations working together. Along frontiers NNNSC would be directly responsible and this would be its more important function. Prohibition of introduction of fresh troops and material most essential to consolidation of peace in Indochina. CPR delegate cannot agree that NNNSC would have different function in different states. Cambodian delegate had said that clause re non-introduction not applicable to his country but this would mean that the US could establish military bases in Indochina and thus threaten peace. CPR delegation for this reason could never accept this suggestion.

CPR view was that NNNSC should be responsible to international guarantee of nine nations parties to conference. If NNNSC should find impossible to deal with certain incidents they would be reported to nine nations who should seek agreement for collective measures to deal with problem. He still felt that neutral nations should be as defined in Article 37 of Korean armistice agreement. Bidault's citation of Mao yesterday only proved that if ideological measure used there could be no neutrals. Only realistic approach was to define neutrals as those who had not participated in war. Vietnam delegation had proposed that UN supervise armistice. CPR must oppose. UN had nothing to do with Geneva conference and although some people were trying to drag UN into Indochina war for their own purpose only result could be new difficulties and obstacles in way of armistice in Indochina.

DRV delegate stressed necessity to agree on principles before proceeding to details. Problem of restoration of peace in Indochina war not difficult to achieve if two principal parties wanted it. In that case questions of control and implementation of cease-fire would present no difficulties. French and DRV had right and responsibility exercise such control. His delegation wanted peace and if it signed an agreement intended to implement it. Why renounce responsibility for benefit of international body, he asked and he denied any difference in views between his and Soviet delegation on subject of control as alleged by Bidault. He stressed that control should be exercised over all three states of Indochina without exception; otherwise if Vietnam only were controlled shipment of troops and equipment could be made to adjoining state. This would constitute threat to security and serious menace of aggression against peace. He strongly reconfirmed his opposition to any and all proposals tending to give UN authority for execution of armistice saying everyone knew who hid behind that organization and asking was it really organization of United Nations, was it impartial and neutral?

Then Cambodian delegate unsuccessfully sought recognition and Bidault suggested that further debate of this important subject be deferred to next meeting in order to avoid any temptation to polemics. This was agreed and Eden found no objection to his proposal that Indochina restricted meeting be held tomorrow, Friday, June 4, and that there be Korean plenary on Saturday, Monday restricted session probably on Korea, and Tuesday plenary session on Indochina.

Comment: Clear Communist concept supervision closely follows Korean pattern. Chou today appeared to give somewhat wider role to NNNSC than Dong's presentation yesterday by according it supervision of demilitarized areas along with joint commission and task of taking up disputes which two sides could not resolve. However difficult reconcile latter point with Chou's statement supporting Dong's position that NNNSC was not "over" joint committee. No sign whatever of any break in rigidity Communist position on composition.

SMITH

June 5.
June 7.
June 8.

110.11 DU/0-454 : Telegram
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, JUNE 3, 1954—4 P.M.

Dulles 146. For Murphy. Just before leaving here, Achilles gave me the following memorandum, which represents his personal thoughts on some of the matters we are dealing with. I thought it good enough to bring to your attention, and suggest you ask the Secretary to read it at his convenience.

"Memorandum"

It is essential to prevent the loss of Southeast Asia to communism. We are currently losing ground militarily and politically on the spot and there is danger of losing more politically here. On the other hand, every inch we lose makes it harder to keep from losing more. On the other, there is no sense in saying we will not yield another inch unless we damn well mean it. What we have got to find is a practical and realistic means of holding every inch we can.

We cannot stop the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia by either war or appeasement. We can do so only by deterring it. In Ernest Bevin's words (the genesis of the Atlantic Pact) : "What we need is such a mobilization of moral and material force as will inspire confidence and energy within and respect elsewhere." To deter, you have got to be willing to fight if necessary, but a US military victory in Indochina might cost us the rest of Southeast Asia psychologically. The difficulties in Asia, like the distances from home, are far greater than in Europe and the community of interest between possible part-

1 A copy of this memorandum, dated May 31, 1954, is located in Conference files, lot 60 P 687, CP 321.
ners far less. In detering something, the greater the force and determination available, the less is the likelihood of having to use it. The converse is equally true, and the present move in SE Asia is such that the risk of having to use it is great.

The narrow ledge between war and appeasement seems a little wider than it did a month ago, due primarily to the leasing of allied disunity. Despite American pressures toward war and British pressures toward appeasement, the enormity of the issues involved and the need of each for the other have tended to keep both on the path. Bidault has almost single-handedly kept the French Government from selling out and has secured approval for the sending of substantial reinforcements but he is not yet out of the woods.

The dilemma between war and appeasement is only one of several. A second is between the need to build a sound long-term defense in Southeast Asia and the need for immediate military action. A third is between wishful thinking that we might get by with use of US sea and air power and the painful reality that, once involved, we could not achieve victory or even a Korean type stalemate without at least as large a commitment of ground forces as we had in Korea. A fourth is between the need for solid Asian support and the present Asian attitude of antipathy toward the west and apathy toward communism. We could easily fumble into a disaster either way. While the right answer is hard to see, certain elements seem reasonably clear:

1. We must mean whatever we say, and the Russians must know we mean it.
2. If we decide to intervene directly we must be prepared militarily and psychologically to take on at least another Korean war and quite possibly World War 3.
3. If we decide to let part or all of Vietnam go we must seek a new line as far north and east as possible which we are prepared to hold militarily, politically, and economically, at the cost of war if necessary.
4. We cannot count on much help from France or anyone else.
5. Nothing we do to stop communism in Asia will succeed unless it has the wide support of Asian opinion, not just that of our friends out there. We have got to bring Asian opinion along as fast as we can. This cuts directly across (2) but not necessarily (3). It will take more patience and supplication than we usually show.
6. Any real barrier to communism in Asia is going to take time to build and we are going to lose some ground, whatever we do, before we get it built.
7. If we have to intervene militarily to save the immediate situation we should, while being prepared for the worst, make every effort to keep our intervention limited to a minimum and not get sucked into a major effort to drive the Chinese and Viet Minh back into China. That slope is just as slippery as the one of appeasement.
8. If there is any prospect of a settlement here that we could live with it is because of Russian respect for the A-bomb and fear of our intentions. While we must be careful to avoid bluffing, the current military talks may well help to increase their uncertainty.

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Memorandum by Chester L. Cooper and Joseph A. Tager of the United States Delegation to the Special Adviser (Heath)

SECRET

GENEVA, June 3, 1954.

Subject: National Intelligence Estimate on Laos and Cambodia

On June 1, the Intelligence Advisory Committee approved the attached National Intelligence Estimate of the effects of certain possible developments on the military security and political stability of Laos and Cambodia through the end of this year. The principal conclusions of this estimate are:

1. Communist political influence in Laos and Cambodia is probably minimal outside those areas firmly occupied by Viet Minh forces. Those forces, moreover, are not now an imminent threat to the local governments, because of the military support provided by the French.
2. Laos and Cambodia are vulnerable to Communist pressures, chiefly because of their military weaknesses. Additional sources of weakness are unpredictable leadership, the rivalry of cliques, and, in Cambodia, the existence of armed, non-Communist dissidence.
3. If, as a result of a negotiated agreement with the Communists covering all of Indochina, French and Viet Minh regular units were actually withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia (leaving Viet Minh irregular forces still operating in those countries), native forces could probably preserve for some time approximately the present degree of security and stability in Laos, provided French cadres and the present scale and nature of French material aid remained available to the native armies. However, such an agreement with the Communists would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to implement and police, and in these circumstances the native armies could probably not for long successfully resist the Viet Minh without increased outside support.
4. If Laos and Cambodia were partitioned, the will of the non-Communist remnants to maintain their independence would greatly decrease. Under such circumstances, probably nothing but military occupation of those countries by non-Communist forces would assure their continued freedom from Communist control.

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3 For a National Intelligence Estimate on Communist Capabilities in Indochina, June 1, see NES 10-3-54, in volume XIII.
Attachment

Effects of Certain Possible Developments on the Military Security and Political Stability of Laos and Cambodia Through 1954

I. Present Situation in Laos and Cambodia

A. Military Security

1. Viet Minh forces are operating in Laos and Cambodia, but do not currently present an imminent threat to the existence of the native governments. However, this is so only because the security of Laos and Cambodia is supported by French regular forces and extensive French assistance to native forces. (See page 7 for force strengths [peri, page 1028].)

Laos

2. Viet Minh regular troops in Laos are organic to regular Viet Minh divisions and are Vietnamese invaders, not Laotians. Viet Minh regional forces, scattered throughout Laos, are pre-dominantly Vietnamese, but include Laotians as well. These regional troops have effectively conducted guerrilla-type operations at company level and are considered equal in effectiveness to companies of the Laotian National Army. They could be easily organized into larger units, with a consequent increase in their capabilities. There are no known armed non-Communist dissident forces in Laos.

3. The defense of Laos has depended primarily on French Expeditionary Forces. For military reasons, the French may at any time reduce or increase the present strength of regular units in that country. If such strength is reduced substantially below 10,000, Laos would be seriously exposed to Viet Minh attack or subversion.

4. The Laotian National Army, numbering 14,600, is organized into six infantry battalions, seven light infantry battalions, and one parachute battalion. The combat effectiveness of the Army as a whole is only fair. It is inadequately trained and lacks experienced native officers and NCO’s. The Laotian National Guard is poorly trained and equipped.

5. The Laotian military establishment depends almost entirely on outside support. France (and, indirectly, the United States) furnishes all equipment and almost all the necessary funds. French train, advise, and tactically direct the Laotian forces. All French expeditionary and Laotian National Army troops in the country are under French operational command. Approximately 800 French officers and NCO’s serve in the Laotian National Army, and French officers occupy most field grade positions.

Cambodia

6. Two Viet Minh regular battalions, organic to a Viet Minh division, are now in northeast Cambodia. These troops are Vietnamese invaders who entered Cambodia in March 1954. In addition, small units of Viet Minh regulars, regional troops, and militia are scattered throughout Cambodia. The combat effectiveness of these regional and militia forces is generally only fair, but those east of the Mekong river will probably be raised to a high standard of organization and training before the end of 1954.

7. There are also in Cambodia several hundred armed non-Communist dissidents, who are followers of the Nationalist leader, Son Ngoc Thanh.

8. The Cambodian Royal Army, numbering 14,000, is organized into ten regular infantry, one parachute, and three light infantry battalions. Cambodian armed forces are heavily dependent on the French for finance, equipment, training, and advice, though less so than is the case in Laos. However, the Cambodian government exercises much greater command responsibilities than does the Laotian government. French officers and NCO’s, who formerly served in the Royal Army, are at present in the process of being withdrawn. The Cambodian King has full administrative control over all royal forces, and operational command west of the Mekong river.

9. The Cambodian Royal Army is reasonably well equipped and trained, but has a number of deficiencies, chief among which are a lack of adequate numbers of trained officers and NCO’s, a low standard of discipline and responsibility in the officer corps, and an almost paralytic defensive-mindedness. In time, the effectiveness of the Royal Army may be increased as a result of the efforts of General Khieu Tongtong, recently appointed by the King as Defense Minister, Chief of Staff, and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

B. Political Stability

10. The political situation in both Laos and Cambodia is uncertain, but at present is relatively quiet. In Cambodia, the royal institution is held in high regard by the people, who have traditionally accepted monarchical authority, and the King is personally popular. Moreover, Cambodia enjoys a high degree of cultural, ethnic, and religious homogeneity. In Laos, the population is largely apolitical. In neither country is there any appreciable economic or social unrest. In both countries, a tradition of governing elite subordinate to the throne attracts most educated Laotians and Cambodians to government service.

11. Communism has thus far made little progress in either Laos or Cambodia. The Viet Minh is unpopular in both countries because its
members are Vietnamese, who are heartily disliked by both the Laotians and the Cambodians. Communist-sponsored "free governments" and "independence forces" in Laos and Cambodia are viewed as parts of the Viet Minh and thus far have evoked little support in those countries. Communist political influence is believed to be minimal outside those areas firmly occupied by Viet Minh forces. The "nationalist" appeal of the Communists, which has been relatively successful in Vietnam, has been blunted in Laos by the general political inertness of the country, and in Cambodia by the vigorous nationalist efforts of the King.

12. The Cambodian government derives considerable domestic support from the fact that it is anti-French. The Laotian government, on the other hand, is outwardly pro-French, but this policy does not adversely affect the government's domestic strength.

13. However, both Laos and Cambodia are vulnerable to Communist pressures, chiefly because of their military weakness. Moreover, in times of crisis their political leadership is often unpredictable, especially in Cambodia. There has been a widespread tendency in both countries to regard the war against the Viet Minh as being "someone else's business". In addition, the Communists may be able at any time to take advantage of the fact that in Laos, and especially in Cambodia, there are rival cliques presently contending for political power.

Non-Communist Dissidence

14. A source of weakness in Cambodia is the existence of non-Communist dissidence. The principal dissident is Son Ngoc Thanh, who is believed to be essentially an independent nationalist. A premier of Cambodia under the Japanese during World War II, Thanh is believed to have a latent political following throughout the country, particularly among students, intellectual groups, and younger army officers who look in him the embodiment of Cambodian independence aspirations. Thanh's political influence has been sapped in recent months by the nationalist efforts of the King, but is still far greater than the small size of his present armed following would suggest. Cambodia's political stability would be greatly enhanced if he should rally to the government, but his future behavior cannot be predicted and it is conceivable that he might join forces with the Viet Minh. In addition to Thanh, there are a number of former dissident leaders who have rallied to the King, but who continue to enjoy warlord-like "autonomous" powers in certain regions of Cambodia. These people are essentially opportunists, whose future loyalty cannot be assured.

15. There are no significant non-Communist dissident groups in Laos. However, Prince Patsarath, now resident in Thailand, is a pre-

16. The future security and stability of Laos and Cambodia will almost certainly be determined by outside developments. The fate of these kingdoms will be largely fixed, not by their own efforts, but by a number of interacting factors, chiefly among which are probably: (a) the trend of developments in Vietnam; (b) the scale and nature of outside assistance given the governments of Laos and Cambodia, and (c) the nature and strength of Viet Minh military and political pressures against those countries.

Developments in Vietnam

17. Developments in Vietnam will have an immediate effect on Laos and Cambodia. A strong non-Communist position in Vietnam would tend to assure military security and political stability. However, if key areas of Vietnam fall to the Communists, pressure on Laos and Cambodia would be greatly increased. The military capabilities of these countries are so slight that they would almost certainly request outside aid to defend themselves. If such aid were not immediately supplied, Laos would be quickly overrun, or its government would seek accommodation with the Communists. Cambodians might hold out longer, but in the end it too would be forced to surrender or accommodate. If a negotiated settlement placed the Communists in a position which would enable them eventually, but not immediately, to dominate Vietnam, the immediate danger to Laos and Cambodia would be less and the Laotian and Cambodian governments could probably maintain control for some time.

French Withdrawal

18. If, as a result of a negotiated agreement with the Communists covering all of Indochina, French and Viet Minh regular units were actually withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia (leaving Viet Minh irregular forces still operating in those countries), native forces could probably preserve for some time approximately the present degree of security and stability in Cambodia and a certain minimum security and stability in Laos, provided French cadres and the present scale and nature of French material aid remained available to the native armies. However, such an agreement with the Communists would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to implement and police, and in these circumstances the native armies could probably not for long successfully resist the Viet Minh without increased outside support.
Outside Assistance

19. Under the adverse alternatives discussed in the two preceding paragraphs, outside support on a scale larger than the French could provide would be required to assure a satisfactory level of security and stability in those countries. If such additional support were not quickly forthcoming, the resistance of Laos and Cambodia to Communism would collapse.

20. If outside support took the form of a security system involving multinational guarantees for the security of Laos and Cambodia and could be implemented in time, that would probably permit Laos and Cambodia to maintain their security, despite rising pressures from the Communists in Vietnam and a probably growing degree of internal Communist unrest in both countries, we believe that the requirements of such a security system will be: (a) adequate MDA/P-type aid; (b) effective protective forces appropriately located in the area; and (c) assurance of assistance in the event of internal subversion as well as external attack. The success of the above measures, in the long run, would also require the maintenance and development of a political and psychological atmosphere which would motivate any indigenous peoples against Communism.

Partition

21. If Laos and Cambodia were partitioned, the will of the non-Communist remnants to maintain their independence would greatly decrease, and their ability to do so would be weakened because of the new establishment in those countries of strong and legalized Communist positions. Under such circumstances probably nothing but military occupation of those countries would assure their continued freedom from Communist control.

Force Strengths

**LAOS**

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<td>Lao Nat'l Forces</td>
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**CAMBODIA**

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JUNE 4, 1954

Memorandum from the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)

SECRET

GENEVA, June 4, 1954.

Subject: Meeting of the Six on Indochina this Morning.

1. The British and French representatives advanced the thought that Chou En-lai's address yesterday represented a slight concession from the Vietminh representatives' proposal, in that Chou En-lai recognized that the Neutral Commission could also take cognizance of violations of the armistice agreement although it would have no authority or superiority over the mixed commissions. This view was not shared by other Delegations. Ambassador Chauvel suggested, however, that perhaps Protov is having trouble coordinating his people.

2. This afternoon, both Eden and Bidault may seek clarifications of certain statements made by Chou En-lai and Dong yesterday with particular reference to discrepancies between them.

3. The Cambodians may make some brief statements rejecting Chou En-lai's proposal that the international mechanism control the nonintervention of troops and war material into Cambodia after the cessation of hostilities. However, the Cambodian Delegation has a fairly long speech almost prepared which it may deliver this afternoon or may wait for the plenary. (We should get the plenary organized as soon as possible.)

1 Drafted by Heath and Bonsal.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Tenth Restricted Session, June 3, 1954

Records No: 206-Y0050

(Top Secret)

Chairman Mao, Comrade Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

(1) Yesterday morning, the Soviet, [North] Korean and Chinese sides met and agreed that we should try to hold a plenary session on the Korean issue this week. [We will] let Nam II refute Pyun Yung Ta’s proposal and statements from the other delegations that supported Pyun. Although I will also speak to refute Pyun, I will emphasize the necessity and effectiveness of the neutral nations’ supervision of the all-Korean free elections. As I reported in a previous telegram, we are planning to let the Soviet side present the “draft agreement regarding basic principle of peaceful resolution of the Korean issue by the participating countries of the Geneva Conference.”

(2) Yesterday, at the tenth restricted session on the Indochina issue, Bidault presented a comprehensive plan regarding the issue of the neutral nations’ supervision. Its major points are as follows:

- The NNSC has five functions:
  (a) to supervise the regrouping of troops;
  (b) to supervise the movement of troops;
  (c) to investigate incidents that violate the armistice agreement in non-military zones;
  (d) to supervise the prevention of introduction of new troops and arms across the borders of Indochina. However, this point is still not clear;
  (e) to supervise the issue of the release of POWs and civilian internees.

- The NNSC should set up local commissions and ad hoc sub-commissions; the decisions of all levels of international commissions should be taken by a majority.

- The joint commission of both sides should function under the authority of the NNSC.

- Regarding the issue of the composition of the NNSC, Bidault disagreed with Gromyko’s proposal and said: “[i] communist countries cannot be neutral[.]” He also quoted from Chairman Mao’s On New Democracy that “neutral is simply a deceiving word.” However, he did not say that he agreed with those countries. Bidault especially emphasized that what he had said should only apply for Vietnam since the mission and organizational style of neutral nations’ supervision in Laos and Cambodia is different from that in Vietnam. Smith spoke and cited Switzerland and Sweden’s letter to the Military Armistice Commission on May 4th (the original letters were distributed after the meeting) to explain that the United Nations forces did not violate the armistice agreement. The Korean NNSC was unable to carry out their work was because of two communist members’ obstruction. He said that none of the communist countries could be considered neutral countries, nor could they take charge of supervision. Therefore, he opposed Poland’s and Czechoslovakia’s participation and was willing to accept India and Pakistan [as members of the NNSC]. I spoke immediately to refute Smith’s statement and cited Poland’s and Czechoslovakia’s letters dated April 15th, April 30th, May 8th and May 20th as proof (the original letters were distributed after the meeting). I expressed my support for Gromyko’s proposal and pointed out that we should not confuse the non-neutrality of political thoughts with neutral nations that have not participated in the [Indochina] war. Eden made a statement and insisted that we should use Biaidault’s plan as the basis for discussion. He suggested that we should set up a technical committee to discuss the issue of functions and structure of the NNSC. Eden also suggested that the NNSC should be composed of Asian nations and emphasized that the joint commission of both sides should be subject to the command of the NNSC. Molotov spoke to refute Smith’s statement: “[i]f Smith basically opposes communist countries joining the NNSC, it means that he does not want to settle the problem. This attitude hampers the settlement. Such an attitude denies all non-capitalist countries a role in the NNSC is close to the thoughts of the anti-communist league.” Molotov also cited documents signed jointly by four member countries of the Korean NNSC acknowledging that the United States violated the [armistice] agreement. However, [he] explained that the NNSC was still effective despite these weaknesses and that the four countries could reach an agreement. The four neutral countries that the Soviet Union proposed included two Asian countries and two European countries. Among those countries, two of them have diplomatic relations with France and the other two with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. They will be able to reflect the opinions of both sides.

(3) Our counterparts have not yet reached a consensus on the issue of the composition of the NNSC. They were unable to make any suggestions at the meeting. Through newspapers, it seems that France does not agree with Southeast Asian countries completely.

(4) I will report the situation at yesterday’s first formal meeting of the representatives of commanders of both sides in a different telegram.

Zhou Enlai
June 3, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Outside Assistance

19. Under the adverse alternatives discussed in the two preceding paragraphs, outside support on a scale larger than the French could provide would be required to assure a satisfactory level of security and stability in Laos and Cambodia. If such additional support were not quickly forthcoming, the resistance of Laos and Cambodia to Communist would collapse.

20. If outside support took the form of a security system involving multinational guarantees for the security of Laos and Cambodia and could be implemented in time, that would probably permit Laos and Cambodia to maintain their security, despite rising pressures from the Communists in Vietnam and a probable growing degree of internal Communist unrest in both countries: we believe that the requirements of such a security system will be: (a) adequate MDAP-type aid; (b) effective protective forces appropriately located in the area; and (c) assurance of assistance in the event of internal subversion as well as external attack. The success of the above measures, in the long run, would also require the maintenance and development of a political and psychological atmosphere which would motivate any indigenous peoples against Communism.

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<th>Regulars</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Viet Minh</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>8,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Expeditionary Corps</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3,000) (attached)</td>
<td>(Cambodian militia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodian Royal Forces</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Nat'l Guard)</td>
<td>4,000; semi-militia</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

JUNE 5, 1954

Memorandum from the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)

SECRET


Subject: Meeting of the Six on Indochina this Morning.

1. The British and French representatives advanced the thought that Chou En-lai’s address yesterday represented a slight concession from the Vietminh representatives’ proposal, in that Chou En-lai recognized that the Neutral Commission could take cognizance of violations of the armistice agreement although it would have no authority or superiority over the mixed commissions. This view was not shared by other Delegations. Ambassador Chauvel suggested, however, that perhaps Molotov is having trouble coordinating his people.

2. This afternoon, both Eden and Bidault may seek clarifications of certain statements made by Chou En-lai and Dong yesterday with particular reference to discrepancies between them.

3. The Cambodians may make some brief statements rejecting Chou En-lai’s proposal that the international mechanism control the introduction of troops and war material into Cambodia after the cessation of hostilities. However, the Cambodian Delegation has a fairly long speech almost prepared which it may deliver this afternoon or may wait for the plenary. (We should get the plenary organized as soon as possible.)

*Drafted by Heath and Bonsal.*
4. The meeting was given some interesting information regarding Krishna Menon's calls on the representatives of the Associated States (telegram being drafted). Menon, who only called on the Associated States Delegations after the Cambodian Delegate had expressed to the press his great surprise at the absence of such visits, showed great ignorance of the political situation of the three countries. He wants an international control of the introduction of troops and arms into all three countries and an immediate cease-fire. His idea of a court of last resort in the event of serious violations of the cessation of hostilities arrangements in Indochina would be the Four Great Powers who would presumably consult together and take appropriate measures; the alternative would be World War. Menon indicated that India was ready to participate in the enforcement of an armistice in Indochina. The Cambodian Ambassador added that his Delegation's enthusiasm for having India in the Control Commission had been "greatly tempered" by Menon's call. Menon suggested to the Laotian Delegation that they consent to Vietminh troops remaining in a small area in Laos. The Vietnamese Delegation said that the Foreign Minister had a two hour talk with Menon of which he did not have a full report but the Vietnamese Foreign Minister had taken Indian policy to date to task as favoring the Vietminh rather than the legitimate government of Vietnam. Vietnamese Delegation said that before accepting India in any capacity in Indochinese affairs, he would like to feel India was neutral and not merely neutralist.

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SMITH

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INDOCHINA

land but will support resolution which does not prohibit at a later stage, without further SC or GA action, the extension of this observation to Cambodia or Laos when those governments request it. It should not be difficult to find form of words to achieve this result. If the present subparagraph (a) of the draft resolution (Tose 229) carries too strong an implication to insure promised British support, perhaps it can be more generalized.

SMITH

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SECRET

Secto 374. Repeated information Saigon 149, Paris 384. Dad Khe told Heath yesterday that he had protested to French delegation that French Officers, who have now started talks in Geneva with representatives of Viet Minh command, are defeatists. Vietnamese Government has added Colon Ong Kim sitting in on these talks and Vietnamese delegation has added Tran Van Tuyn, both of whom have been instructed watch for any signs of "defeatist concessions" by their French colleagues.

SMITH

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CONFIDENTIAL

Secto 373. Repeated information Paris 387, London 242, Bangkok 16, USN 11. Reference Tose 384 and Secto 366. It seems to me that we must choose a careful path between resolution which would limit POC to Thailand and one which specifically provides for observation elsewhere in the area or directly implies that such observation will take place. As I said in Secto 366 Eden wants to avoid resolution specifically extending scope of POC beyond Thailand. (360.1 GE/6-354)

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1 Dated June 3, p. 1013.

2 In telegram Secto 366, June 3, not printed, the U.S. Delegation reported that "Eden today said UK felt Security Council consideration that appeal should not be pressed urgently and no resolution should be tabled which would have effect extending scope POC beyond Thailand." (360.1 GE/6-354)
referring to fact Viet Minh has foreign armament (including shells with Chinese characters) and after stressing pacific nature Cambodian Government and people, Cambodian delegate stated that when peace is restored Cambodia will need to import war materials and also foreign military technicians and instructors for legitimate purposes Cambodian organization for defense. He said international control over this legitimate activity would be dangerous intervention in Cambodian domestic concerns. He added, however, Cambodia would give commitment not permit introduction foreign troops into Cambodia and also to inform control commission re Cambodian importations of arms. He said international control in Cambodia over introduction arms and troops made as much sense as would similar control in Thailand and in China.

Cambodian delegate believes composition of international control commission for Cambodia should be different from that for Vietnam because of Cambodia's special situation. He reiterated proposal he had made on May 16 and 17 that selection of members international commission basis proposals by Geneva Conference and added that in case of Cambodia it should be Cambodia herself that would make proposal. Re composition, Eden referred to agreement that this should be pursued in private discussion. He repeated need for clarification re authority and status of the international committee. Thereafter, conference should take up structure and functions thereof. He stated Bidault's June 2 proposals would be most useful.

Eden said next question would be decision on authority to which international committee will be responsible. He expressed interest in CPR proposal that responsibility could be to Geneva Conference nations who have task of guaranteeing agreements. Eden suggested guaranteeing powers might see fit set up permanent control organism made up of members. This required further consideration.

Summarizing, he stated following questions:

1. What should be the function and responsibility of joint committees, of impartial international commission and of guarantor powers?

2. What should be the relations between these three bodies?

Molotov then spoke re composition of international commission. He referred to Soviet proposal (India, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Pakistan) and to objections on basis Communist ideology of Poland and Czechoslovakia. He stated these objections untenable. Capitalist countries on this basis could not be neutral either. He discussed organization of such bodies as UN, Security Council, ECOSOC and International Court of Justice. He stated charter of ICJ clearly calls for make up on basis differing juridical systems which reflect existing dominant political, economic systems.

Molotov rejected proposal to introduce UN into Indochina matter. He stated UN unfit if only because absence China whose people denied their legal right of membership. He also pointed out majority members Indochina phase Geneva Conference not UN members.

Re composition of international commission, Molotov stated there should be included countries having diplomatic and political relations with both of the parties to the dispute which means Poland and Czechoslovakia "or others" cannot be omitted.

On subject of relation between joint committees and international commission, Molotov stated relationship should be one of coordination, that they should work in agreement but not be subordinate one to the other. He referred to precedent in Korea where no such subordination exists in case of joint bodies representing belligerents. He described role of international commission as one of helping international body will not be able function satisfactorily if made up on same bilateral basis as joint committees. Membership of international commission must not reflect points of view of two sides but be truly impartial and endowed with necessary authority for task.
parties to carry out terms of their agreement. With reference to matter of appeal by NNSC in event unable settle disputes, Molotov referred to statement made by CPR in which Eden had expressed interest to effect that guarantor states mentioned in original French proposal would receive for consideration disputes which neither NNSC nor, in first instance, joint committees had been unable to settle. The guarantor states would then agree on necessary collective measures.

Molotov stated that NNSC must cover all three countries of Indochina. Otherwise there might occur in Laos and Cambodia a concentration of military personnel and arms or even establishment of foreign bases which would threaten permanence of cessation of hostilities in Indochina. He reminded conference that France and French troops have relations with all three states. He added that original French proposal spoke of international control for all three states, only difference being nature of responsibility in each.

Molotov denied there was any difference in the proposals of Soviet delegation and DRV in matter of NNSC. He expressed full Soviet endorsement of observations made by DRV and by CPR on this question.

Molotov also drew attention to second paragraph of Chinese proposal (Secto 326) providing that parties concerned should begin negotiations upon appropriate readjustments of their occupied zones and other related problems. He stated contacts have been established between commands in Geneva but noted that none had yet been established in field in spite of fact that conference "resolution" of May 31 clearly provides for special contacts. He expressed hope these would be established in near future. Molotov expressed agreement with suggestion made yesterday re private exchanges of views on international control commission problems.

After intermission, Bidault spoke at some length on need for effective impartial permanent control authority over armistice agreement which could take immediate action whenever necessary.4 Otherwise every agreement would be in danger. If no difficulties arose in implementation agreement, no need for such impartial arbiter. However, all agreed that violations likely and that disputes would arise mixed commission. Therefore, must be dispassionate and responsible control authority which would be removed from heated disputes and able move quickly. French could not abandon this concept.

Bidault continued he would speak of Laos and Cambodia later, and was concerning himself today only with situation Vietnam. He re-

5 Dated May 27, p. 947.
6 Reference to the communiqué agreed to during the Ninth Restricted Session on May 31; seetelegram Secto 328, May 31, p. 968.
7 French proposal on "Structure of Supervision in Viet-Nam" is infra.
(3) He agreed that Chou's basic principles might in long run be framework for agreement on condition that agreement be reached separately on three points, namely, (1) composition international commissions; (2) relationship between commission and mixed commissions; and (3) nature of obligations of guarantor states. Without this, Chou's basic principles remained skeleton without substance.

SMITH

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 243
Twelfth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 4, 3 p. m.: Proposal Made by the French Delegation.
MOST SECRET

[GENEVA,] June 4, 1954.

STRUCTURE OF SUPERVISION IN VIET-NAM

Supervision in Viet-nam shall be organized in the following manner:

1. An "International Supervisory Commission" shall be set up composed of representatives of neutral countries.

2. Joint commissions shall likewise be set up composed of representatives of the Commands.

3. The "International Supervisory Commission" shall be responsible for the execution, by the parties, of the clauses of the armistice agreements.

For this purpose, it shall establish a complete system of supervision, inspection and investigation, comprising a central commission, local commissions distributed over the whole of the territory, and ad hoc mobile commissions which can be utilized in any part of the country. These commissions shall carry out all necessary investigations both documentary and on the spot, either on their own account, or at the request of either of the parties, according to the decisions of the central commission. Any complaint shall be followed by an investigation.

Throughout the whole of the territory, the international commissions shall be given every facility by the civil and military authorities to enable them to carry through their mission.

The international commissions, at every level, shall take their decisions by a majority vote in accordance with a procedure to be determined.

4. The joint commissions shall take part in the execution of the armistice terms, particularly of those which imply regular contact between the parties or which require a thorough knowledge of local conditions.

INDOCHINA

The joint commissions shall act under the authority of the "International Supervisory Commission", which shall assign to them special duties taking account of the foregoing considerations. They shall report to the international commissions, in proper form to be established by the latter, on the performance of such duties.

Any difference of opinion arising within the joint commissions shall be submitted to the "International Supervisory Commission" which shall settle the dispute directly with the parties.

5. The "International Supervisory Commission" shall be installed as soon as hostilities cease. It shall begin work immediately and define at once the spheres of action and the working conditions of the joint commissions. Measures consequent on the cessation of hostilities (regrouping, transfers of units, release of prisoners etc.) shall be carried out under its supervision with the assistance of the joint commissions.

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 4, 1954—10 a. m. [p. 11]

Secto 381. Repeated information Paris 388, London 246, Saigon 145, Tokyo 112. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Indochina restricted session Friday June 4, continued discussion international controls armistice agreement. There was no apparent progress toward meeting of minds.

On composition international commission, our side upheld thesis true neutrality or impartiality while Molotov stated essential commission contain countries having diplomatic, political relations each side and that countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia could not be rejected. General agreement this subject might be pursued in private conversations.

On relations between joint committees of belligerents and international control commission, Eden, Bidault and Smith reiterated strongly stand that international commission must have authority and full facilities and joint committees be definitely subordinate. Molotov equally firm that task of international commission one of coordination and assisting belligerents to implement armistice agreement.

Eden expressed interest in Chou En-lai's proposal that nine Geneva powers act as court of appeal in case international control commission unable settle disputes. Eden stated this worthy further study. Molotov

7 For the French proposal made at the Twelfth Restricted Session on "Structure of Supervision in Viet-Nam", see supra.
said nine guarantors might receive unresolved disputes from international commission and agree on collective measures.

Cambodian Del reiterated special nature Cambodian case and proposed special international control commission for Cambodia made up of three nations to be selected by conference from India, Pakistan, Burma, Philippines, Japan, Canada and Italy.

SMITH

398.1 GE/6-454 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1954—7:40 p.m.

Tosec 352. Department has received no reports tending confirm any information set forth in US press story dated June 2 and desires any comments which would help evaluate authenticity significance. Information in press item which is attributed to informed and authoritative sources is summarized below:

Molotov quick visit Moscow from Geneva was result conversation Menon with Molotov in which former conveyed India's stand that support of Viet Minh position on Laos and Cambodia jeopardize friendship USSR among independent nations Southeast Asia. USSR may modify its support of Viet Minh refusal withdraw from Laos, Cambodia. This could produce rift between USSR and Communist China. UK and India closely cooperating on this issue which Eden discussed with Chou at dinner June 1. Prime Minister Burma said to have influenced Nehru inform USSR dangers overly ambitious US policy in Southeast Asia. SEA governments reported satisfied sincerity Eden's efforts reach settlement Geneva and his awareness importance of sympathies people Laos, Cambodia with Buddhist peoples Burma and Ceylon. Molotov reportedly cooperative but Chou firmly insisting no possible treat Cambodia, Laos separately from Vietnam.

Dulles

1 Drafted by Day of FR/ESA. Repeated to New Delhi as telegram 1462, to London as telegram 35, and to Moscow as telegram 789.

2 The delegation reply is in telegram Dulles 154, June 5, infra.

110.11 DU/6-54 : Telegram

Smith-Menon Meeting, Geneva, June 4, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, June 5, 1954—3 p.m.

Dulles 154. Reference Tosec 352. Can best comment on Tosec 352 by giving you substance of conversation I had last night with Menon who asked to see me. Principal burden of his remarks, again was that in interest of reducing world tensions and to avoid complete failure of international conferences, we should not have a break here on Kores, but should announce a few points of agreement on principle and then agreement to disagree, et cetera.

He had just talked at length with Chou En-lai, and in response to my question, he said Chinese recognized special problems Laos and Cambodia, but could not agree to their special treatment. Possibly having been filled in on the substance of yesterday afternoon's debate, Menon gave as an example, that the Chinese could not agree to "neutral" supervision in Vietnam and no supervision, or different supervision in Laos and Cambodia. He repeated same arguments given by Molotov and Chou En-lai at yesterday's closed session. France and United States would build up military strength in Laos and Cambodia for aggression toward Vietnam, et cetera. (Of course, to us this is a subsidiary problem to that of the regroupment of Viet Minh forces outside Laos and Cambodia.)

There was no indication yesterday of a softening of the Communist position as previously described regarding Laos and Cambodia, and I intend to talk privately with Molotov on this matter when he comes to dinner Monday, and may be able thereafter to give a better estimate. My own impression has been that the Communist position hardened somewhat after Molotov returned.

SMITH

JUNE 5, 1954

394.1 GE/6-54 : Telegram

Smith-Bidault Meeting, Geneva, June 5, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 6, 1954—2 p.m.


1. Reference 1 paragraph 25: He foresaw no difficulties regarding request to other nations but wondered whether this problem might be

1 Dated May 11; see volume XIII.

2 Dated May 23; see 154.

3 Telegram 4286 to Paris, May 27, not printed, contained suggestions for meeting the French requirement that an agreement for joint action must allow France some flexibility in regard to the withdrawal of its forces from Indochina in the event of a substantial increase in the strength of the Vietnamese National Army. (TOK/6-5-2384)
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Ze'dong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Eleventh Restricted Session, June 4, 1954

Records No: 206-Y0059

Chairman Mao, Comrade Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

(1) Bao Dai's delegate said at yesterday's eleventh restricted session on the Indochina issue that only the United Nations could take charge of the task of supervising. Bidault spoke to support Bao Dai's delegate and said: 'The NSNC should be responsible to the United Nations'. In addition to repeating that the organization of the joint commission of both sides cannot apply to Laos and Cambodia, Bidault also emphasized that the joint commission should function under the authority of the NSNC so that the NSNC can serve as a judicial [organization]. However, since the members of the joint commission are parties concerned [in the war]; parties concerned cannot act as judges at the same time. Therefore, the joint commission can only function as a tool and cannot take major responsibilities for supervision. Smith stated the U.S. preference for the United Nations as supervisory authority. However, he said that he probably will not assert this. Smith said: 'Four countries, Switzerland, Sweden, India, and Pakistan are suitable to take charge of supervising, however, [China, the Soviet Union and Vietnam] must disagree'. He suggested that the two chairmen should discuss the issue of composition in private. I made statements not only resolutely opposing the United Nations supervision, but also pointing out that the relationship between the NSNC and the joint commission should be equal. The NSNC was by no means to be over the joint commission. Since the two belligerent sides are the main parties concerned, whether or not the armistice agreement can be carried out depends on both the sincerity of the joint commission of both sides should take major responsibility. The division of work between the two is: the function of the joint commission is to supervise the implementation of the provisions of the armistice agreement; meanwhile, the function of the NSNC is to supervise and inspect whether or not the two sides have violated the provisions of the armistice agreement. The NSNC's functions either inside or outside Indochina will be two-folded: one is to supervise demilitarized areas; the other is to supervise throughout Indochina and along common borders with other countries the prohibition of introduction of new troops, military personnel, and arms and ammunition whether on land, sea or air. Thus within Indochina there would be two kinds of organizations working together. However, the NSNC will be directly responsible for supervising along the borders. Regarding the issue of to whom the NSNC should report, I pointed out that I agreed with Bidault's original proposal to let the nine participants guarantee.

Chairman Eden agreed to discuss the issue of the composition of the NSNC in private. He stated that a restricted session on the Indochina issue will be held today and a plenary session on the Korean issue on the 5th. The 6th is [Saturday]. A restricted session on the Korean issue will be held on the 7th and a plenary session on the Indochina issue on the 8th.

(2) The Soviet, Vietnamese and Chinese sides are discussing issues concerning the functions of the members of the joint commission and the NSNC, the relationship between the two committees, and the international guarantee. We are also drafting detailed provisions now. I will report later after we have decided.

Zhou Enlai
June 4, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
said nine guarantors might receive unresolved disputes from international commission and agree on collective measures.

Cambodian Del reiterated special nature Cambodian case and proposed special international control commission for Cambodia made up of three nations to be selected by conference from India, Pakistan, Burma, Philippines, Japan, Canada and Italy.

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SMITH

361.3 G5/6-554: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Washington, July 11, 1954—7:40 p.m.

Tosec 352. Department has received no report pertaining confirm any information set forth in UP press story distributed London June 2 and desires any comments which would help evaluate authenticity significance. Information in press item which is attributed to informed and authoritative sources is summarized below:

Molotov quick visit Moscow for Geneva was result conversation Menon with Molotov in which former conveyed India's stand that support of Viet Minh position Laos and Cambodia would jeopardize friendship USSR and independent nations in Southeast Asia. USSR may modify its stand if Viet Minh refusal withdraw from Laos, Cambodia. This would produce rift between USSR and Communist China. UK and US closely cooperating on issue which Eden discussed with Chou at dinner June 1. Prime Minister Burma said to have influence on US inform USSR dangers overly ambitious USSR policy in Southeast Asia. SEA governments reported satisfied sincerity Eden's efforts reach settlement. Geneva and his awareness importance of peaceful people Laos, Cambodia with Buddhist peoples Burma and Ceylon. Molotov reportedly cooperative but Chou firmly insisted on possible treaty Cambodia, Laos separately from Vietnam.

DULLES

Drafted by Day of FEPSA. Repeated to New Delhi as telegram 1402, to Lodon as telegram 6574, and to Moscow as telegram 796. The delegation reply to telegram 154 June 5, infra.

110.11 DU/6-554: Telegram
Smith-Menon Meeting, Geneva, June 4, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, June 5, 1954—3 p.m.

Dulte 154. Reference Tosec 352. Can best comment on Tosec 359 by giving you substance of conversation I had last night with Menon.

Supra.

SMITH

JUNE 5, 1954

361.3 G5/6-554: Telegram
Smith-Bidault Meeting, Geneva, June 5, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 6, 1954—2 p.m.


1. Reference 1 paragraph 25: He foresaw no difficulties regarding request to other nations but wondered whether this problem might be

1 Dated May 11; see volume XXII

2 Dated May 26; see ibid.

3 Telegram 4295 to Paris, May 27, not printed, contained suggestions for meeting the French requirement that an agreement for joint action must allow France some flexibility in regard to the withdrawal of its forces from Indochina in the event of a substantial increase in the strength of the Vietnamese National Army.

(512.60/6-2254)
simplified, although he did not amplify. I feel sure French would like to be informed so soonest of progress negotiations with other interested nations.

2. Reference 1 paragraph 2c: Bidault feels Thailand resolution provisionally takes care this problem. He reminded me of difficulties which might arise regarding similar action on part of Laos and Cambodia. I pointed out that we able move fast in Korea because of POC on spot and stated most desirable establish counterpart in Thailand which at later date could extend activities to whole region. He was noncommittal.

3. Reference 2 paragraph 2: Bidault questioned advisability President unilaterally making formal pledge re fulfillment full independence and sovereignty. He believed isolated American guarantee ran risk of being interpreted as “vassalization” of Associated States by US; that guarantee should be directed toward territorial integrity, defense and security of Associated States rather than independence “as is usual in case of this kind” and that such a guarantee might be better within framework of any Southeast Asia organizations agreement.

4. Reference 2 paragraph 3c: Bidault suggested change word “after end of hostility” to “after reestablishment of peace and within period to be determined in agreement with Government.”

5. Reference 3 paragraph 2: He suggested paragraph read “throughout duration collective action present French effort will be maintained account being taken of France’s international obligations, requirements for metropolitan defense and its obligations toward countries in French Union and its protectorates.” Bidault stated that such language would be most helpful in EDC debates since many EDC enemies claim France could not maintain forces both metropolitan France and Asia. I pointed out that some conditions in new draft were inherent, such as requirements for national defense. Said I would report his proposal to Department.

6. Reference 1 paragraph 2: Bidault stated that French Government could only consider submission of request for assistance to Parliament upon completion of formalization Geneva conference, otherwise government would fall. I replied understood Laniel was prepared lay agreement before Parliament and Cabinet after decision taken honorable armistice not possible Geneva. I pointed out this parliamentary approval essential because of long-term basis our commitments and need to rely on fulfillment of conditions by any successor French Government.

I continued he and Laniel should judge timing and my government would not press French to take any action which might bring on government crisis.

SMITH

—— MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, BY THE SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION (HEATH) ——

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 6, 1954.

Participants: Frederic-Dupont, New French Minister for the Associated States.

DONALD R. HEATH, AMBASSADOR TO VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA.

At yesterday’s session Mr. Frederic-Dupont, appeared the day before to be French Minister for the Associated States, with whom I became acquainted during his visit with a French Parliamentary Commission to Indochina two years ago, said he would like to talk with me. I saw him this morning. He is leaving for Paris this afternoon, returning here Monday and will be at the Monday’s conference session whether it deals with Korea or Indochina.

He said that while he had been interested in Indochina affairs for some years he had had no time since his appointment to brief himself on his new job. He had seen General Thong only for three minutes and had come forthwith to Geneva. He started off by saying that he would speak with entire frankness although his ideas on the Indochina problem were not yet firm. He was a Frenchman but in these days of Communist menace he was not a Frenchman but a citizen of the free world. He believed that if the EDC had had some slight success in convincing his colleagues in the necessity of prompt French ratification of the PACT treaty. He was firmly of the belief that any attempt to get along with Communists on the basis of peaceful negotiations would be fatal failure unless such negotiations were backed up by force. Therefore should the world decide that continuance of French effort and sacrifices in Indochina was necessary he would go along repugnant though that course would be to present French government opinion.

On the other hand from long acquaintance with the Indochina situation he said that at Geneva or on the field of battle some decision might be taken, as it so often had in the past in Indochina, to transfer some small victory tomorrow without taking account of the possibility, that such decision might lead to a grave defeat at some future date.

It was conceivable, he said, that the Communists might back down and agree to French conditions as to the necessity of adequate neutral international control of an armistice, which would be a temporary victory for France but would be followed by Communist insistence

SUMMARY OF CONVERSATION TRANSMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT IN TELEGRAM, SECTO.

SMITH, June 5, (360.1 USZ/6-554)
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others: Regarding the Situation at the Twelfth Restricted Session, June 5, 1954

Records No: 206-Y0050

Chairman Mao, Comrade Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) Our counterparts did not refer to the issue of United Nations supervision at yesterday's twelfth restricted session because of our resolute opposition on the 3rd concerning the issue of the functions and authorities of the joint commission, of the NNSC and of the international guarantee [commission], and the issue of the relationship among these three bodies have already caught our counterparts' attention. Eden said yesterday that my proposal that the NNSC should be responsible to the Geneva Conference participants who have the task of guaranteeing the agreements is worthy of careful consideration. Eden also suggested that the participants should set up a permanent [supervisory] organization. Bidault stated that the French proposal has something in common with mine and hinted that he agreed with Eden on the establishment of a permanent organization. Bidault said that impartial arbiters are needed. He emphasized that the neutral organization must have the authority of supervision and a great number of staff. Bidault also reiterated his two original opinions: (1) the joint commission should be subordinate to the NNSC; the current proposal concerning supervision should only apply to Vietnam and the supervision of Laos and Cambodia needs to be decided separately. See attachment for Bidault's original proposal. Smith spoke next and did not oppose the conference participants joining in [the international] guarantee. However, he still emphasized that the NNSC should have superior authority over the joint commission. Regarding my proposal, Smith said: (2) it simply will be a framework for agreements, but this conference might reach. However, we must solve two problems first: (1) the impartial composition of the international supervisory commission; (2) the nature of the obligations of the countries who participate in guaranteeing the agreements.

Molotov spoke and agreed that the NNSC should be responsible to the Geneva participants who join in the international guarantee. He also pointed out that the agreement from both sides of belligerents has decisive meaning in solving the conflict. The joint commission can also play an important role. Therefore, it should not be subordinate to outside power. In addition, there is no such subordination existing [in case of the joint bodies representing the belligerents] in Korea. Molotov also refuted three points of [our counterparts'] arguments:

(1) If as [our counterparts] said, communist countries cannot be neutral and can only constitute one side [of the negotiations], then capitalist countries cannot be neutral, either. This argument violates the United Nations Charter since the U.N.'s Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the International Court of Justice are all composed of different countries of different political and economic systems.

The United Nations has nothing to do with this conference. China, a country of half a billion people, and the majority of the participants of this conference are not members of the United Nations. Therefore, the United Nations should not take charge of international supervision.

(2) The NNSC must cover not only Vietnam but also Laos and Cambodia.

(3) Eden went back to Britain last night. [The conference will] discuss the Korean issue today and next Monday. We will use these two, three days to revise our detailed proposal on the issues of the joint commission, the NNSC and the international guarantee. I will send another telegram to report again after the Soviet, Vietnamese and Chinese sides have made a decision.

Zhou Enlai
June 5, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
TOP SECRET

FROM: B.J.S.E., LONDON

TO: MINISTRY OF DEPLOY, LONDON

OPERATIONAL HANDLING

JH 2.

4th June 1954.

For Brownjohn from C.G.S.

1. This morning I had a private discussion with Radford and following is summary of the ground we covered.

2. South East Asia. Radford expressed the view that there were only two possibilities namely:

   a) Full scale intervention aimed at defeating the Viet Minh forces in the field and producing a military situation in which a stable and secure independent State of Vietnam might be built up. and

   b) A steadily deteriorating military situation resulting in the loss of the whole of Vietnam to the Communists.

He was advanced in his thinking to the extent of agreeing that (a) involves the serious risk of war with China but he claimed that China is very vulnerable and could be quickly and easily defeated, without serious risk of Russian intervention as long as Russian soil was not threatened. I pointed out that just as China could not stand by and see Viet Minh defeated I found it hard to believe that Russia could let China be defeated without going to her aid. It may be that Radford's views will advance again if he goes on thinking.

3. When I mentioned the third possibility based on partition Radford argued that loss of the Tonking Delta would be so damaging to French and Vietminh morale as to make it impossible to establish a stable state in southern Vietnam. That argument was advanced again this afternoon in conference by Valiay. It will certainly crop up again when we come to discuss the second of the six studies now being carried out by the staffs. Even the military point of view I believe it might be practicable if the French had faith in it and were prepared to produce the resources and effort required. It would help me to know whether the Foreign Office consider it a practicable solution from a Whitehall point of view as I dont want to argue a case for it on military grounds if it is hopeless politically.

4. After discussing South East Asia I mentioned the Minister of Supply's visit and its purpose and stressed the mutual advantages to be gained by putting research
and development on a much wider joint basis. He agreed but quickly turned to the Middle East and used the problem of
Arabian and Persian oil to illustrate the need for resolving the various problems in which British and American interests
are in conflict. I justified our attitude and referred to the valuable help the Americans could give us by bringing
Egypt to her senses.

5. Our discussion ended by中山 stressing the urgency
of our various politico-strategic problems due to the fact
that our present relative military superiority is being
steadily reduced. He said he would like to continue our
discussions and I propose to take any opportunity that
presents itself for doing so.

CIRCULATION

War Registry, Admiralty (For CPS).
C.I.G.S.
C.O.S.
Mr. J. D. Allen, F.O.
Mr. F. H. Dean, F.O.
Mr. G. S. McDonald, F.O.
Mr. J. G. "Ahourdin, F.O.
Major General V.H. Bishop, C.A.O.
Mr. Armitage-Smith,
D.C.O.A. "B".
would urge on Bao Dai the necessity of returning. He said he would write as a letter urging that General Smith talk with Bao Dai and persuade the latter to go back to his fatherland. He had very little hope of Bao Dai really doing anything very important, although he was extremely intelligent, a very charming and rather frank person but he had been spoiled. Frederic-Dupont saw no clear signs of other leadership in Vietnam. He would like to see a Syngman Rhee. He observed that there probably was latent leadership in Vietnam. If France continued its military and financial support of Vietnam and we continued ours, together we might be able to insist successfully that Bao Dai comport himself as the chief of a state in peril. At least we could make the try. Frederic-Dupont said he appreciated the talk and hoped it would be followed by others. He expects to see Ely and Salan over the weekend at Cognac. He remarked it had been definitely determined that Sihan should go as Ely's deputy but that Cognac would retain his command in the north. He asked our opinion of Cognac. I said we had a very high one. I forebore any comment on Salan.

398.1 GB/6-554 : Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

TOP SECRET NTOCT WASHINGTON, June 5, 1954-12:42 p.m.

Tedul 159. For Under Secretary from Secretary. Re Dulles 141. I am in general accord with the following considerations:

1. In view of dubious future role of Bao Dai as indicated your second paragraph, doubt should be made the recipient of any express or implied pledges from US.

2. Doubt that US should be so completely identified with France and Vietnam that our own independence of action and freedom to disassociate ourselves would seem to be impaired. I refer in this connection to last sentence of fifth paragraph about "coordination".

3. I have some concern that your proposed statements with reference to necessity Vietnam cooperation with French might be interpreted as asking Vietnam to take pressure off French for clarification of their independence and completion independence treaty.

4. We do not yet have any firm position as to what action we would take in relation to local authorities if French agreed to sell-out unacceptable to them. It would under these circumstances be most unlikely that we would openly intervene there, but we might want to encourage local resistance and help maintain some sort of a non-communist gov-

5. I hope you can use conversation to draw him out, particularly on the two points of:

a. what French can do to carry conviction in Indochina that the people are fighting for their own independence, and

b. how a more effective native government can be established.

Dulles

398.1 GB/6-554 : Telegram
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA, June 5, 1954-8 p.m.


Very shortly after he had expressed surprise to press that Menon visited Viet Minh delegation and not delegations of legal governments of Associated States, Cambodian delegate was approached by Menon and interview took place June 2. Menon showed complete ignorance political conditions and status Cambodian independence. He was interested in establishment international control of introduction further troops and munitions into all three countries of Indochina following cessation of hostilities. Cambodian delegate said this unacceptable in special case of Cambodia. As for guarantee of an Indochina agreement that may be concluded, Cambodian delegate states Menon appears to favor four great powers as court of last appeal to resolve difficulties. He states that if they unable reach agreement reactions to be taken in case of serious violations of agreement, alternative will be world war. Cambodian delegate indicated Menon favorable to Indian participation in control of armistice.

Laotian delegate reported Menon contemplating possibility Viet Minh troops might be permitted remain in frontier area of Laos. Laotian delegate stated this unacceptable.

Vietnamese delegate indicated Menon completely ignorant elementary facts re Vietnam and added view Menon position favors Communists. Vietnam delegate says Indians must prove they are neutral and not merely neutralists.
On the whole, Associated States enthusiasm for India and for Menon extremely moderate. They were startled and alarmed at his ignorance of facts of life with which they are confronted. 

JUNE 6, 1954

SECRET

THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

GENEVA, June 5, 1954—3 p.m.
[Received June 6, 1954.]

1. At four hour session Viet Minh referred to statement of Pham Van Dong at 25 May restricted session of delegations as basis upon which military talks should proceed, and suggested military representatives reach agreement thereon.
2. French representative took position that Viet Minh proposal not acceptable basis for discussion since it dealt with political and economic subjects and only incidentally strategic ones. French representative maintained discussion should deal with concrete proposals and not with principles of nature those in Dong's statement. Referred again to Laniel proposal of 5 March as concrete suggestion and basis for further discussion. Invited Viet Minh to table concrete proposal of their own.
3. Viet Minh representative said situation had changed since 5 March; said French had suffered many reverses and many casualties, condemned Laniel proposal as 'provocation', and said world opinion also condemned it. French representative responded that Viet Minh had also suffered heavily and that a battle lost is not a war lost as history of French nation testifies.
4. Viet Minh representative contended he could not discuss specific details without agreement on principles first.
5. Comment: No indications of progress in this meeting. French delegation contact expressed opinion that Viet Minh tactic of agreement on Dong principle would be dangerous since Communists could claim that French refusal to agree later to specific proposals allegedly in consonance with the principles demonstrated French bad faith. French still contend they will not fall into trap of beginning detailed talks in Indochina before agreement reached here on framework for talks in the field. French delegation contact noted that Viet Minh group consisted of only one military officer and is of opinion that Viet Minh may not be serious about reaching military agreements in Geneva, preferring that talks take place in field.

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 6, 1954.

GENERAL SMITH: I have been thinking over your letter to the Secretary on Indo-China. I most emphatically agree with your conclusion that it would take strong, direct and rapid action by the U.S. to reverse the adverse trend. Unless we take such action a result as you set forth is the best we can hope for.

The major factor is the defeatist and lack of will to fight among the Vietnamese who are now in the down slope. Our intervention on even a limited scale might reverse the trend. However, I feel that there is a better than even chance that our intervention would eventually result in full scale hostilities with at least Communist China. If a formula could be found that would give the Vietnamese the psychological lift of our intervention without our actually being required to intervene it would be ideal. However, I fear it is an impossible ideal.

The only other possibility of reversing the trend is for a Vietnamese to appear able and willing to sound a loud clarion call to turn his people around and start them up the slope. However, I see no such person at the present time or the probability of such a person appearing.

However, I do not agree that our intervention would have an "enormous adverse effect" on Asiatic public opinion because of direct association with militant colonialism. There would probably be some initial adverse reactions, but I believe they could be overcome by a clear declaration of our part of our policy with regard to Vietnamese independence. Adverse Asian reaction would rather arise from fear that we were precipitating World War III. If we succeed in winning in Indo-China without bringing on World War III our position in Asia would be enormously enhanced. However, if World War III did result, Asia would blame us and turn against us.

U. A. JOHNSON

1 For text of Under Secretary Smith's letter to Secretary Dulles, see telegram Dulles 157, June 7, p. 1064.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twelfth Restricted Session, June 5, 1954

Records No: 206-Y0050

Chairman Mao, Comrade Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) Our counterparts did not refer to the issue of United Nations supervision at yesterday’s twelfth restricted session because of our resolute opposition on the 3rd. What I referred to on the 3rd concerning the issue of the functions and authorities of the joint commission, of the NNSC and of the International Guarantee Commission, and the issue of the relationship among these three bodies have already caught our counterparts’ attention. Eden said yesterday that my proposal that the NNSC should be responsible to the Geneva Conference participants who have the task of guaranteeing the agreements is worthy of careful consideration. Eden also suggested that the participants should set up a permanent [supervisory] organization. Bidault stated that the French proposal has something in common with mine and hinted that he agreed with Eden on the establishment of a permanent organization. Bidault said that impartial arbitrators are needed. He emphasized that the neutral organization must have the authority of supervision and a great number of staff. Bidault also reiterated his two original opinions: the joint commission should be subordinate to the NNSC; the current proposal concerning supervision should only apply to Vietnam and the supervision of Laos and Cambodia needs to be decided separately. See attachment for Bidault’s original proposal. Smith spoke next and did not oppose the conference participants joining in the international guarantee. However, he still emphasized that the NNSC should have superior authority over the joint commission. Regarding my proposal, Smith said: If simply will be a framework for agreements that this conference might reach. However, we must solve two problems first:

- the impartial composition of the international supervisory commissions;
- the nature of the obligations of the countries who participate in guaranteeing the agreements.

Molotov spoke and agreed that the NNSC should be responsible to the Geneva participants who join in the international guarantee. He also pointed out that the agreement from both sides of belligerents has decisive meaning in solving the conflict. The joint commission can also play an important role. Therefore, it should not be subordinate to outside power. In addition, there is no such

subordination existing in case of the joint bodies representing the belligerents in Korea. Molotov also related three points of [our counterparts] arguments:

- If, as [our counterparts] said, communist countries cannot be neutral and can only constitute one side [of the negotiations], then capitalist countries cannot be neutral, either. This argument violates the United Nations Charter since the U.N.’s Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the International Court of Justice are all composed of different countries of different political and economic systems.

- The United Nations has nothing to do with this conference. China, a country of half a billion people, and the majority of the participants of this conference are not members of the United Nations. Therefore, the United Nations should not take charge of international supervision.

- The NNSC must cover not only Vietnam but also Laos and Cambodia.

(2) Molotov put some pressure on our counterparts at yesterday’s meeting since they delayed the establishment of contacts between the representatives of the two commands in the field, and expressed hope that these would be established in the near future.

(3) Eden went back to Britain last night. [The conference will] discuss the Korean issue today and next Monday. We will use these two, three days to revise our detailed proposal on the issues of the joint commission, the NNSC and the international guarantee. I will send another telegram to report again after the Soviet, Vietnamese and Chinese sides have made a decision.

Zhou Enlai
June 5, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Minutes, Wang Bingnan’s Meeting with Chauvel and Guillermaz, June 5 1954

Record No. 206-C0068

(Top Secret)

Time: 12:15pm-13:15pm, 5 June 1954
Location: Paul-Boncour’s Mansion
Chinese participants: Wang Bingnan and Dong Ningchuan (translator)
French participants: Jean Chauvel and Jacques Guillermaz

Chauvel: Thank you for coming here to exchange opinions. Now I’d like to discuss the current situation at the conference.

It is our opinion that the conference hasn’t made much progress in the past several days. The discussions went around and around at the same place. We are running out of time, and we should move faster for genuine progress toward a settlement.

Mr. Bidault said to Mr. Zhou Enlai there are currently two critical issues: (1) decision on troop regrouping areas, and (2) supervision. Regarding the regrouping issue, the military representatives from both sides have held three or four meetings. The Vietnamese commanders, however, only addressed the principles, but not specific issues. Therefore, their meetings arrived at no useful result. We are worried about this situation.

The Vietnamese Delegation insisted on holding the negotiations at local levels. When Molotov made this suggestion, the French Delegation agreed. We, however, think it unnecessary for the two delegations to discuss the same issue at the two different locations before any agreement on regrouping has been reached.

It was a problem between France and Vietnam. But, since there is a situation at the present, I’d like to raise the issue for the Chinese Delegation’s attention.

Regarding the issue of supervision, we have addressed much in principle, but have not yet reached an agreement on the membership of the supervisory organization. The French Delegation states that an objective neutral nation should not impartial to the nations on both sides. A neutral nation must be one that has no special relationship with any side. Its task is to closely supervise the implementation of the settlement and correct mistakes made by either side. India may be an example. India has relations with France, the Soviet Union, and China. It, however, has not yet recognized Vietnam, and its relationship with France is not very friendly. Mr. Menon met delegates from three member countries of the Associate States a few days ago. It shows that Mr. Menon knows little about these three countries, and he has even raised questions as to whether they have any constitution. France, however, still considers India a neutral nation and is willing to see India play an important role in the International Supervisory Commission. France is also willing to accept other nations from Asia and Africa as neutral nations. What is China’s opinion?

Wang Bingnan: In order to assist the conference in solving the problems smoothly, we agree to stay in touch and exchange our views on all the aspects.

Chauvel: This is exactly what I agree to.

Wang Bingnan: We have the similar concern on the slow progress of the conference. It should have useful results at a faster pace. But the development has been delayed, and still is now. The reason is that the conference has gone through unnecessary detours. This doesn’t help the conference, and instead it slows the settlement development.

Mr. Chauvel mentioned the problems of military meetings and supervision. We are fully aware of that the conference made detours on these two issues.

As far as I know, at the military staff talks, the French presented the Laniel Proposal, like a request for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s surrender. It shouldn’t be [tabled] at all. It is said that the proposal had been withdrawn. However, it delayed the talks. In our opinion, a rapid progress can be made through new, equal, and fact-based negotiations. The military staff contacts on the spot have not materialized by this moment. According to the past conference experience, military representatives should meet at Geneva and on the spots at the same time. The principles are discussed at Geneva while the details are discussed at the local levels. If you need to deal with the problems of badly wounded and sick prisoners, a direct talk should be held on the spot. The earlier a local contact takes place, the faster the problems will be solved. As a neutral state, we want to see an improved relationship between the two sides through the meetings, which may normalize the relationship between the French people and the Vietnamese people.

With regard supervision issue, someone brought up the United Nations. They want to complicate the issues, and do not really want to solve the problems. All of the parties have been debating the definition of a neutral nation. If we say a communist state is not a neutral nation, a capitalist nation can not be a neutral state, either. If so, there is no neutral nation at all in this world. When China fought against Japan in the past, the United States helped Japan with steel and iron to kill Chinese people. At that moment, the United States considered itself a neutral state. Therefore, the problem can’t be defined by ideological debates. We believe that a neutral nation is a non-belligerent nation in the war, and acceptable by both sides. Someone even nominated Japan. Such a proposal certainly does not help the conference.
Our suggestion is that the supervisory organization includes the following three committees: (1) a joint committee; (2) a supervisory committee of neutral nations; and (3) an international guarantee committee. Working together, the joint committee from the two sides should be responsible for an efficient implementation of a cease-fire. For example, both sides recently worked together to directly deal with the evacuation of seriously wounded soldiers from Dien Bien Phu. Even though some violations of the agreement occurred, all the problems were solved eventually. The task of the supervisory committee of neutral nations should be to domestically prevent a civil war from breaking out, and to internationally prevent foreign troops and war materials from being shipped into the country. Our opinion for total supervision includes air, land, and sea. Someone said that the supervisory agreement doesn’t apply to Laos and Cambodia. In our opinion, however, if it was true, the United States could establish its military bases over these countries. So their point is not very thoughtful. The task of the international guarantee committee [of the Geneva nine nations] should be to identify the unsolved problems that remained by the joint committee and neutral nation committee. The nine-nation committee should have further discussions on these problems submitted by the joint and neutral committees.

Mr. Bidault proposed some solutions toward supervision issue yesterday. We are now studying his proposal. We will deliver the Chinese Delegation’s response after our study.

I am in full accord with Mr. Chauvel’s suggestion on speeding up the conference progress. Nevertheless, I’d like to know Mr. Chauvel’s ideas about how to avoid interruptions and even backwardness of the conference, and how to practically and realistically push the conference forward.

Chauvel: I don’t have much time now. Hopefully, we can continue our conversations tomorrow and the next day. In short, I want to add several points. At the military meetings, the French staff presented the Lanel Proposal. Our purpose, however, was not to make the Vietnamese accept it, but to hope that the Vietnamese would tell us why they couldn’t accept it, and let them provide detailed critiques on our proposal. Although the two sides have been fighting the war for eight years, we have no understanding of each other. Therefore, a mutual understanding is desired at the present.

We believe that the most urgent problem at the present is the composition of the neutral nation supervisory commission. If this problem can be solved, other technical problems will be dealt with easily, and the conference will make much progress. During today’s conversation, I present the French opinion. At our next meeting, hopefully, Mr. Wang Bingnan can talk about China’s opinion on India and other countries. A conversation may take a detour in front of fifty people, but a face-to-face conversation between two persons should be much easier for problem-solving. At least, I believe so.

I must also emphasize my point on the local contact of military representatives. Although the past international agreements stated that principles were discussed at Geneva, and the details were discussed at local levels, they didn’t say these meetings would begin at the same time. We still believe that an agreement of the bottom-line principles has to be reached at Geneva, before any local talk can possibly start on the spot. Anyway, Paris has already notified Saigon, asking them to promptly send the French staff to contact the Vietnamese.

Wang Bingnan: In eight years, the war has hurt the feelings on both sides. A local contact may be the best way to heal the wounds and change the situation for the better.

Regarding the composition of the neutral nation commission, the Soviet Union has nominated four nations. We support the Soviet proposal. Mr. Chauvel, could you tell me about the French opinion on the other neutral nations besides India?

Chauvel: I mentioned India because it is a very typical sample of a neutral nation. Among other Asian nations, for example, are Pakistan, Burma, and Indonesia. None of them has a [diplomatic] relationship with Vietnam. Besides the nations in Asia, there are only Switzerland and Sweden in Europe. They may not be willing to accept the membership. Thus, it may be a compromising proposal to invite Asian nations only to implement the supervision. It will probably guarantee a balanced stand to cope with the problems. This is what Mr. Bidault has stated at the meeting. [We are] not looking for our allied nations, but inviting the [neutral] nations that could make their own independent judgments.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
On the whole, Associated States enthusiasm for India and for Menon extremely moderate. They were startled and alarmed at his ignorance of facts of life with which they are confronted.

JUNE 6, 1954

SMITH

394.1 G7/6-35/6: Telegram
The United States Delegation to the Department of Defense
SECRET
GEOGRAPHY, May 12, 1954—3 p.m.
[Received June 8, 1954.]

Army Message Gento 50. Action Defense; Military action USARMA-Paris, Saigon and Department State. From Defense representative Generals. For Hensel from Sullivan. Following is summary French-VN military talks with Viet Minh of May 4. June 24 reported to Defense representative by member French delegation:

1. At four hour session Viet Minh referred to statement of Pham Van Dong at 25 May restricted session of delegations as basis upon which military talks should proceed and suggested military representatives reach agreement thereon.

2. French representative took position that Dong proposal not acceptable basis for discussion since it dealt with political and economic subjects and only incidentally strategic ones. French representative maintained discussion should deal with concrete proposals and not with principles of nature that in Dong's statement. Referred again to Laniel proposal of 5 March as concrete suggestion and basis for further discussion. Invited Viet Minh to table concrete proposal of their discussion.

3. Viet Minh representative said situation had changed since 5 March; said French had suffered many reverses and many casualties, condemned Laniel proposal as "provocation", and said world opinion also condemned it. French representative responded that Viet Minh had also suffered heavily and that a battle lost was not a war lost as history of French edition testifies.

4. Viet Minh representative contended he could not discuss specific details without agreement on principles first.

5. Comment: No indications of progress in this meeting. French delegation contact expressed opinion that Viet Minh tactic of agreement on long principles would be dangerous since Communists could claim that French refusal to agree later to specific proposals allegedly in consonance with the principles demonstrated French bad faith. French still contend they will not fall into trap of beginning detailed talks in Indochina before agreement reached here on framework for talks in the field. French delegation member noted that Viet Minh group consisted of only one military officer and is of opinion that Viet Minh may not be serious about reaching military agreements in Geneva, preferring that talks take place in field.

CONFIDENTIAL
GEOGRAPHY, June 6, 1954

The Coordinator of the United States Delegation (Johnson) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)

TOP SECRET
GEOGRAPHY, June 6, 1954.

SMITH: I have been through your letter to the Secretary on Indo-China.

GEOGRAPHY: I most emphatically agree with your sentence that it would take strong, direct and rapid action by the U.S. to reverse the adverse trend. Unless we take such action as result such as you set forth is the best we can hope for.

The major factor is the defection and lack of will to fight among the Vietnamese who are now in the down slope. Our intervention on even a limited scale might reverse the trend. However, I feel that there is a better than even chance that our intervention would eventually result in full scale hostilities with at least Communist China. If a formula could be found that would give the Vietnamese the psychological lift of our intervention without our actually being required to intervene it would be ideal. However, I fear it is an impossible ideal.

The only other possibility of reversing the trend is for a Vietnamese to appear able and willing to sound a loud clear trumpet call to turn his people around and start them up the slope. However, I see no such person or the probability of such a person appearing.

However, I do not agree that our intervention would have an "enormous adverse effect" on Asiatic public opinion because of direct association with militant colonialism. There would probably be some initially adverse reactions, but I believe they could be overcome by a clear declaration on our part of our policy with regard to Vietnamese independence. Adverse Asian reaction would rather arise from fear that we were precipitating World War III. If we succeeded in winning in Indo-China without bringing on World War III our position in Asia would be enormously enhanced. However, if World War III did result, Asia would blame us and turn against us.

U. A. JOHNSON

1 For text of Under Secretary Smith's letter to Secretary Dulles, see telegram Dulles 157, June 7, p. 1064.
The Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 6, 1954.

My Dear General: In addition to your vast military experience and insight you have for years now successfully dealt at first hand and at high level with international affairs.

Since the attached confidential letter  represents your considered judgment of the present situation and its possible solution, you as the boss of this delegation must, of course, send it.

I would hope, however, that you will modify it to the extent of admitting a possible alternative, a possible if not too likely loophole, for a better way out of this mess.

That loophole consists of several big “ifs”—if military, congressional and public opinion can be rallied to the idea of American military intervention in Indochina, if we can persuade the Philippines and Thailand to at least token co-intervention, if Biafran ideas prevail and the French Assembly agrees to keep up the fight, if with or without Biafran we can install a Vietnamese regime of honesty and will (perhaps under Ngo Dinh Diem) and if EDC is ratified presenting Russia with a militarily United Western Europe with German divisions at its back-door, perhaps China might persuade herself or be persuaded by Russia not to intervene overtly in Indochina even if the battle turned against the Vietminh, which indeed it could.

Before embarking on intervention with its risk of bringing not only China but the entire Communist world into war we should offer a peaceful alternative to world opinion. That alternative would be: a massive genuinely neutral, preferably United Nations, international control commission—disposing of say, two divisions—with its elements stationed in the Vietminh as well as the Vietnam zones, able to move at will within them and along the Chinese frontier, able to enforce disarmament of all irregular troops, able to prevent entry of fresh troops and matériel and, in preparation of UN supervised elections, able to ensure that political parties, press and radio of both sides could campaign freely in the territories of the other. National elections might be held, say, within one year after hostilities—and terrorism—had ceased. We would run the risk that elections would go against the Vietnam Government. I don’t think that risk would ever develop because the Communists would not really accept such spelled-out control.

If the foregoing seems to you too unlikely an alternative I nevertheless venture to suggest two changes in your letter:

1. I personally believe the Communists would accept a partition line further north than the Col du Quang which latter would give them a good 60 percent of the population and the territory. I believe they would accept northern Vietnam which would still give them Hanoi, the cultural capital, the hardest breed of Vietnamese and nearly one-half of the Vietnam’s population.

2. I personally would modify the phrase “the enormous adverse effect” partition would have on Asian opinion. I suggest that Formosa, Thailand, Philippines and even Burma would understand our intervention is not colonialist and that we might develop understanding in Ceylon, Pakistan and Turkey.

DRH

JUNE 7, 1954

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Advisor to the United States Delegation (Heath)  

SECRET

GENEVA, June 7, 1954.

Participants: M. Roland de Margerie, French Delegation
Donald R. Heath, US Delegation
Edward Page, US Delegation

In conversation this morning the following points were brought out by de Margerie:

1. While Biafran in the last session had taken a strong stand that the mixed commission must be subordinate to the authority of the international commission, de Margerie is not sure that he would maintain this line for the following reasons: If France desired, after a cease fire, to bring U.S. matériel or U.S. personnel into UN for training of troops a too precise supervisory structure might make this impossible. He had therefore recommended to Biafran that any final plan—he was under no illusions, that any armistice could be drawn which could not be evaded by the Communists—should be “short and vague”. He cited the incident of Abbe Moyes saying to Napoleon that “a constitution must be short and vague” only to be interrupted by the latter stating “yes I agree that a constitution must be short and obscure”. 

2. He thought Chou En-lai had made a slight concession in agreeing that the international commission would have authority over the demilitarized zones between or along the periphery of the regroupment areas. There would probably be at least five demilitarized zones which would give the international commission considerable authority.

1 Reference to letter from Under Secretary Smith to Secretary Dulles. For text of letter, see telegram Dulles 137, June 7, p. 1064.

2 Drafted by Heath and Page.
Minutes, Wang Bingnan's Meeting with Chauvel and Guillermaz, June 6, 1954

Record No. 206-C0068

(Top Secret)

Time: 5:30pm-6:40pm, 6 June 1954
Location: Mansion of the French Consul General to Geneva
Chinese participants: Wang Bingnan and Dong Ningchuan (translator)
French participants: Jean Chauvel and Jacques Guillermaz

Chauvel: Mr. Bidault just made a trip to the lake. Has Mr. Zhou Enlai gone for some outings?
Wang Bingnan: No, Foreign Minister Zhou has no time now for an outing.
Guillermaz: [You] should suggest Mr. Zhou Enlai going out.
Wang Bingnan: [He] could be interested in an outing only had the conference achieved some of its goals.
Chauvel: Mr. Bidault is planning a return to Paris for two or three days. Before his departure for Paris, he intends to meet Mr. Zhou Enlai one more time after the dinner on Monday. [We are] not sure if Mr. Zhou Enlai has time [for the meeting].
Wang Bingnan: Mr. Zhou Enlai is very glad to meet Mr. Bidault.

Chauvel: Wonderful. Let's say 9:00pm tomorrow [Monday]. We talked about the problems of the military staff meetings last time. It was said yesterday that their meetings have made some progress. Both sides have reached an agreement on tactical methods of regrouping their troops. Since both sides have further clarified their intentions, it should be easier for them to work out a solution.

I'd like to add a few more words now about the supervision issue. The Chinese side seems not fully understanding the French opinion [on the supervision]. We didn't mean that Laos and Cambodia don't need any supervision. Instead, our opinion is that these two countries have different situations, so that supervisory terms should be different accordingly. Our request is to talk about Vietnam first, and then Laos and Cambodia. We don't intend to facilitate any military base establishment in Laos and Cambodia, or to prepare a war in this region. Our fundamental goal is to solve the problems.

If my understanding is correct, Mr. Wang Bingnan proposed three types of committees for the supervisory machinery last time: international guarantee committee, neutral nation supervisory committee, and combined [both sides] committee. We think that an agreement based upon this proposal can be reached.

However, in order to make fast progress, the composition of the neutral nation commission should be discussed first. I expressed the French stand last time. I believe Mr. Wang Bingnan has thought about this issue. [I'd like to] now know about Mr. Wang Bingnan's opinion.

Wang Bingnan: [I am] glad to hear from Mr. Chauvel that the military staff meeting has made some progress.

Chauvel: Not much yet, only a little bit.
Wang Bingnan: This is a very positive sign, and it doesn’t matter how little a progress is or on which subject. In the spirit of avoiding any delay, we must make vigorous efforts to arrive at a further result.

Regarding the supervision of the Laos and Cambodia, we have stated that, as long as a principle [on their supervision] is agreed, the implementing methods may be different [from that or Vietnam] according to their specific conditions.

In the respect of the composition of the neutral nation commission, I have reported Mr. Chauvel's opinion to the head of our delegation. Currently, we are carefully studying Mr. Bidault's proposal, so that we can't answer this question. We are endorsing the four nations suggested by the Soviet Delegation.

Nevertheless, we believe that, as long as all sides do their studies objectively, the problems can be solved.

Talking about the entire Indochina's Conference and Korea's Conference, there are some difficulties. However, we should overcome the difficulties and strive for settlements. We'd like to draw the French attention to that, on one hand, the meeting makes its slow progress; on the other hand, it also has impediments. To settle the Korea problem is not impossible, and both sides have many common points. But someone stubbornly ask for conducting an election under UN supervision. This unnecessarily impedes the progress of the meeting. In their speeches yesterday, [North] Korea, China, and the Soviet Union Delegations all fully expressed a conciliatory spirit. But Mr. Smith didn't. Through the entire meeting, he did not only present no solid proposal, but also offered no help for any agreement at the meeting. It was just like his attitude at the Indochina meeting on the 29th, "no objection, but no acceptance." This continuing negative attitude against the meeting doesn't do any good to the conference. Our expectation is that the delegations should share their similar opinions first. Then, they can overcome obstacles and solve the different opinions in order to make the conference a full success.

Chauvel: We have noticed recently that Mr. Molotov, Mr. Zhou Enlai, and Mr. Eden all look for our common position as what we are doing. This is a good approach. The United States shows their most distrusted attitude toward the conference. Nevertheless, talking about the Indochina's issues, we have some alliances, such as the United States and the three [French] Union member nations.
We can only accept problem solutions accepted by our alliances. It is not easy to convince an allied country. Hopefully, Mr. Wang Bingnan can give your attention to it.

Wang Bingnan: In respect of solving the Indochina problems, France is one of the key players. Reinstalling peace is an advantage to France. Extension or internationalization of the war is a disadvantage to France. Hopefully, France can fully play its initiative role, and function as a powerful nation.

The Chinese Delegation does not have any selfish purpose in its efforts to strive for peace in Indochina. What we want to see is not a continuous bleeding France and Vietnam, but a normalization of French-Vietnamese relationship and a friendship between the two countries. What we want to see is not a reduced international status of France, but an increasing status of France in the world. We believe that France has the same goal of a successful conference.

Chauvel: I really appreciate it that Mr. Wang Bingnan has such a remarkable opinion toward France. In the past years, the Indochinese War was a problem for France and Vietnam. Now it has become an international problem. French requests an internationalized peace, not an internationalized war. Even though France has difficulties to make its alliance to accept a certain agreement, it is not impossible. We hope to eventually reach our common goal—peace—that is our common interests.

In regard of solving the Indochina problems, France recognizes China’s role among Asian countries. Therefore, we are glad to exchange our opinions with the Chinese Delegation on a regular basis for more help from China.

Regarding the neutral nation issue, France is not satisfied with merely signing an agreement on paper. It wants to see the supervisory organization really effective. Mr. Bidault did not enjoy criticizing the Soviet proposal. The Soviet proposal could only make the supervisory commission impotent. This is what all of us try to avoid. Mr. Bidault is going to meet Mr. Molotov tomorrow morning. They will talk about this issue. That the delegation heads can meet under a good condition is helpful for reaching an agreement at the conference. As long as the atmosphere changes for better, any distrust between the two sides will disappear.

Wang Bingnan: I have the same feeling.

Chauvel: Peace is like Pyrenees Mountain. Sometimes it looks dark, sometimes bright. As long as we have confidence, we will eventually see a bright Pyrenees Mountain.

Wang Bingnan: The Bai Mountain stands tall always without any change. Clouds and rain are only temporary conditions.

Chauvel: I don’t know if Mr. Bidault has any other issues in his mind besides the conference topics when he talks to Mr. Zhou Enlai. I am sure, however, he is willing to talk about every issue that Mr. Zhou Enlai is interested.

Wang Bingnan: Can you tell me the participants at the meeting?

Chauvel: It's just like the last meeting, Mr. Bidault, myself, and Mr. Guillermaz.

The two foreign ministers did not release the information on their last meeting to the media. It is desired to keep this way in order to exchange opinion frankly.

I met Swiss Foreign minister at Bern two days ago. He said that it was astonishing that some people could question the neutrality of Sweden. Sweden’s neutrality is not only a fact, but also recognized legally. Anyway, I explained to them, and it is over.

It is said that a general meeting will be held on Tuesday, isn't it?

Wang Bingnan: It's the plan, as far as I know.

Chauvel: Currently, the French Assembly continues their debates on the Indochina’s issue. Mr. Bidault is going to speak at Geneva on Tuesday, and at the French Parliament on Wednesday. He hopes for some good news that he can report to French Parliament.

Wang Bingnan: I hope that he can report some conference progress at the Assembly. This is also what French people have been waiting for.

Chauvel: This is our common hopes.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Thirteenth Plenary Session, June 6, 1954

Records No: 206- Y050

Chairman Mao, Comrade Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

At yesterday’s plenary session on the Korean issue, we took steps to make the meeting a restricted one in which we could solve the problem. In order to do this, we took the initiative in adopting a conciliatory attitude and seeking subjects on which agreement could be reached. The Korean, Chinese and Soviet delegations all spoke in the session. I have already sent back all three texts of the speeches. Nam II stated that the DPRK was not opposed to the phased and proportional withdrawal of foreign troops. He cited the examples of the United States and Switzerland in order to refuse his counterparts’ arguments concerning the organization of an all-Korean government based on the proportional representation of populations. I spoke to emphasize that we could find common ground on which to settle the Korean issue peacefully. At the meeting, Molotov submitted his draft concerning “basic principles and agreements on a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue.” Although I have already cabled the text of his draft, I need to add three more sentences to one of the sections. Specifically, “elections should be held within six months after the conclusion of this agreement. Elections should be conducted by secret ballot based on the laws of universal suffrage. Representation in the all-Korean legislature should be in proportion to the population of Korea as a whole.” Since three statements from our side all indicated that we tried to seek common ground, the Netherlands delegation said in their speech that they would examine Molotov’s proposals immediately after he spoke.

Smith and Pyun Yung Tai were afraid that our efforts to reach an agreement would have a positive influence on the conference. Pyun Yung Tai therefore made a special speech refuting Nam II’s arguments. Smith also spoke to attack my proposal for neutral nations’ supervision on elections in Korea. He emphasized that elections must be supervised by the United Nations. He even hinted at last that he would use public opinion to threaten us. I immediately made a brief statement saying that we could not agree to Smith’s explanation for the NNSC’s role in the Korean issue. I also reserved my right to reply to other parts of Smith’s statement to which we could not agree in the future.

(2) According to the media the 16 countries of the other party held a meeting yesterday in the morning. The United States intended to sabotage the negotiations on the Korean issue. However, other countries did not agree. Obviously, it is the United States that intentionally creates tension both inside and outside the conference. The Americans are trying to win support under the signalboard of the United Nations. They are afraid that our side will undermine the United Nations’ prestige, and that we will desperately oppose the exercise of veto over the issue of neutral nations. They are afraid that an organization of neutral nations on a footing of equality with both sides will be unfavorable to the United States.

(3) In order to expose America’s plot to sabotage [the conference], our side is preparing to provide further specific materials that affirm the achievements of the NNSC on the Korean issue and the effectiveness of the Four Nations’ Agreement. We will also provide materials to prove that the United States violated the armistice agreement and disrupted the NNSC. Concerning the propaganda issue, we plan to compare our conciliatory attitude and America’s disruptive one during the conference. It will show clearly that our side is trying its best to seek common ground. However, the United States is still insisting on United Nations supervision and is not willing to look for other channels beyond the United Nations to solve the problems.

Zhou Enlai
June 6, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chien Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
3. Bidault was now in favor of an Indochina plenary tomorrow if it would give him an opportunity to make a detailed statement on the French position prior to his statement in Parliament on Wednesday, which would be of a more general nature. Bidault’s line in Tuesday’s plenary would probably be to review the various practical conceptions, the French proposals and the fact they had been met by vague impractical and unacceptable proposals from the Communists.

4. Bidault would let General Smith know whether he thought it advisable for the General to speak tomorrow. De Margerie thought it possible that Bidault might desire the General to reiterate the U.S. position of the composition of the international commission.

*June 9.

Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsall) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)

SECRET

GENEVA, June 7, 1954.

Subject: Indochina

I called on Ambassador Chauvel at 12:30 today at the latter’s request.

Regarding the current military conversations, Chauvel said that absolutely no progress had been made. The Vietminh have insisted on trying to reach agreement regarding the general principles contained in their May 25 proposal whereas the French have wished to start from Laniel’s proposals of March 5. Late Saturday, the French suggested that a good way to begin might be to establish the present military positions of the opposing sides. The French plan this afternoon to present their situation and see if this elicits anything specific from the other side. They are not optimistic because of the generally delaying tactics of the other side including insistence on speaking Vietnamese, citing from Communist newspapers, etc., etc.

On the matter of controls, Bidault has had a talk with Chou En-lai and Chauvel himself has seen Wang Ping-nam three times. The CPR position is firmly to the effect that the control commission must have two members having relations with the Vietminh. The fact that France’s relations with India are less than cordial does not alter the Chinese Communists’ position that India is one of our side’s neutrals. Bidault is seeing Chou En-lai this evening and something may develop although so far the CPR position is one of firmly supporting the Soviet proposal on composition.

Bidault saw Molotov this morning with completely negative results. Chauvel described Molotov as having behaved like a “smiling log”. Molotov suggested that perhaps one reason the military discussions were not making greater progress was because “someone is expected” i.e., the Vietminh Delegation is not yet complete. Molotov insisted on the Soviet proposal regarding composition and particularly the inclusion of states having diplomatic relations with the Vietminh.

Krishna Menon saw Bidault for an hour and a half yesterday. He also insisted that the control commission should include someone having relations with the Vietminh.

It is the French impression that Molotov’s attitude since his return from Moscow has hardened to some extent. The French note that since Molotov’s return from Moscow he has had no direct contact with Eden. The French also regret that Eden has been away this weekend and therefore no contacts have been possible during these critical three days.

Bidault will be prepared to make a speech tomorrow generally summarizing the French proposals and the various arguments which have been advanced in the course of the restricted sessions. Bidault is according to Chauvel satisfied that the plenary here will precede the speech he will make to the Assembly and that thus he can use the speech he made here in reporting to the Assembly.

Ambassador Chauvel stated at both the beginning and the end of his conversation with me that the French are very much concerned and annoyed at the lack of any progress. They are in the dark as to the enemy’s military intentions, and are fully aware of the fact that between June 15 and June 20 General Giap will be ready to resume the offensive.

Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsall) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 7, 1954.

Subject: Implication of Probable Vietminh Offensive in Tonkin Delta

The following factors seem pertinent to an appraisal of the Indochina situation:

1. Present French military dispositions and intentions, even if successfully carried out, present the Vietminh with an opportunity in the...
offensive does begin, the following courses of action appear to be open to us:

(a) If we and the French were really and irrevocably determined on US intervention in order to prevent a Vietminh victory, we would simply, in view of the enemy's pursuit of his aggression, and in concert with the French take the necessary steps to withdraw from the Geneva Conference and we would submit the whole problem to our respective legislatures and to the UN and to our allies. It is quite obvious, however, that France is not in a position to take speedy effective action nor is it certain that the US could act speedily.

(b) Another possible course of action would be for the US, acting unilaterally following the resumption of the Vietminh offensive, to withdraw from the conference and to recover complete freedom of action. This might involve branding the Vietminh offensive as involving an overt Chinese Communist aggression. (You will recall that the Secretary early in April said that the Chinese were very close to such overt aggression.) We would then proceed as provided in NSC 5405 in the event of an overt Chinese aggression. This would be unsatisfactory because our military-political relations with the French would be uncoordinated, and because there is considerable doubt that our other allies would follow us.

(c) A third alternative would be for the US simply to withdraw from the conference and to dissociate itself from any deal which the French may be forced to make. Such a course would be extremely damaging to our prestige and would spell the end of the policy of collective security which we have endeavored to build. It would accelerate the turning over of Indochina to the Communists more than any other action we could take. We do not have a substitute partner in Indochina if the French bow out.

The consideration of these factors and of these alternatives leads me to pose the following questions: Is there anything which can be done within the current week (the critical date of June 15 is next Tuesday) to induce the enemy to abandon his apparent offensive intentions? Can it be made clear to Molotov and to Chou En-lai that if Giap intensifies his military action in the delta, we would be forced to withdraw from the Geneva Conference and to conciliate military measures to meet a changing military situation? Can we get the agreement of the French and British delegates?

Molotov and Chou En-lai would be informed perhaps by Eden acting for the French and ourselves that our readiness to negotiate for the restoration of peace in Indochina was predicated upon the situation as it existed when the conference opened. If that situation is to be changed we desire to recover full freedom of action to take necessary countermeasures. By means of this démarche, we would endeavor to impress in the most serious and convincing fashion upon Molotov and Chou En-

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Footnote: For NSC 5405, "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia," Jan. 10, 1954, see Volume XVI.
lai the extreme danger to world peace of a further offensive in the Tonkin Delta. At the same time, we could authorize Eden or whoever represents us to express a realistic understanding of the situation in Vietnam and a willingness to accept an agreement for the cessation of hostilities and for a transitional period leading to general elections throughout Vietnam which would give the Vietminh leaders an opportunity through peaceful means to contest control of the country with non-Communist leadership. We should of course stress the firmness of our position regarding Laos and Cambodia. Molotov should be made to feel that on the military actions of Giap over the next ten days, the whole issue of peace or war may depend.

The drawback to any approach to Molotov and Chou En-lai along the lines proposed above is of course the possibility that they might believe we were bluffing. This is a risk which we could have to take. We have to take it because, in the last analysis, we ourselves don't know whether we are bluffing or not, i.e., we can not be sure at this stage of the reaction of the American public to a further serious deterioration of the Franco-Vietnamese position in the Tonkin Delta followed by a Presidential appeal to Congress for the necessary authority to intervene militarily. Furthermore, we are uncertain regarding the reaction in France to further Vietminh military successes under either of the hypotheses set forth in numbered paragraphs 1 and 2 above. But the uncertainties in the situation should be made to work so far as possible to our advantage by being, from the enemy's point of view, as great as possible.

386.1 GB/8-754; Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

POP SECRET PRIORITY Geneva, June 7, 1954—2 p.m.

Dulles 157. Personal for Secretary.1

Dear Foster: If you have not done so, please read our Secot 389 reporting Heath's first conversation with Frederic-Dupont.2 As I told you privately, I have felt for some time that a solution somewhat like that visualized by DuPont is likely to be the best we will be able to get, and that we well may get something worse. The Viet Minh are obviously not in a hurry to settle military questions. Bidault said Saturday

1 For comments on the letter to the Secretary, see letters to Smith from Johnson and Heath, both dated June 6, pp. 1047 and 1048, respectively.

2 Telegram Secot 389, June 6, not printed, contained a summary of a conversation between Heath and Frederic-Dupont. (386.1 GB/8-554) For a memorandum of this conversation, June 5, see p. 1041.

that so far they had absolutely refused to discuss cease-fire details, and had confined themselves to political polemics and rather truculent references to their victories and their growing military strength. I am afraid there is truth in the latter.

I realize that a solution like that mentioned by DuPont would not please our soldiers and would not be popular generally at home, and I know how much importance Radford has attached to the delta, but I know also that China has been after the Red River valley and the delta for years, and it seems to me that they now intend to have it, or at least the greater part. The Communists probably estimate that if Hanoi is surrounded the French cannot supply the defenders by air and feed the population too, and that the occasional supply column they might drive through would not be enough. I believe also that the Chinese Communists have considered and are willing to risk the chance of what we might do in Indochina. They probably would welcome the introduction of some US ground forces there because of the opportunity this would give them directly to intervene for the ostensible purpose of repelling US aggression and because of the initially adverse effect our participation would have on Asiatic public opinion for many reasons well-known to you. I believe it already has involved in the minds of Australia and New Zealand some of the thoughts of "supporting colonialism" judging by the apprehensive reaction of their representatives here to our military talks in Paris.

I realize we cannot associate ourselves with or guarantee anything that bears the appearance or carries the name of partition, or of division of the country, and of course if such a solution is reached by the military committees it will not be called "partition." If a solution is not reached, and that rather promptly, I fear that a deteriorating situation in Indochina may provide it. Even now it would, I believe, require powerful, direct and rapid action by the United States to reverse the adverse trend. Laos and Cambodia can probably be saved, although in the former there will most likely be a rather large political and military "no man's land" in the north and along the frontier. My thought is that here we should in the matter of Indochina continue only to play the role of helpful friend as indicated in your Tedul 146, standing firm on the separate status of Laos and Cambodia but not opposing or obstructing any reasonable military compromise the French may be able to get, recognizing at the same time that it will be one that we don't like, and probably will not be able publicly to associate ourselves with. Signed Bedell.

SMITH

1 Dated June 1, p. 994.
In connection with review of intelligence survey, Gen. Valluy presented his own evaluation military situation Tonkin Delta as follows:

1. If Tonkin is lost, military line will not be reestablished anywhere.
2. Anyone can find on map a line with tactical characteristics which theoretically should permit reestablishment, such as the bottleneck or eighteenth parallel, but Valluy said he could affirm there would be no forces to man this line.
3. Valluy said he was not speaking of French lines in this connection but meant to indicate that there were no southern Vietnamese who could oppose northern Vietnamese.
4. Ho Chi Minh's objective is Tonkin, so he attained either by negotiation at Geneva or by assault on Hanoi.
5. Ho Chi Minh wishes to entangle us in negotiations by admitting, now, for first time, that there is a Communist northern state and a non-Communist southern state and saying that both might be incorporated in French Union.
6. What Ho Chi Minh seeks is Tonkin and its political capital Hanoi which he was driven in 1946. He wishes to obtain Tonkin either by negotiation (Valluy admitted a "wonderful military men" that Ho Chi Minh finds across negotiating table) or by military action. To prepare for such action, he is drawing up negotiations to gain time for his battle corps to be in position and ready, if action is called for.
7. In course of negotiations he is looking for a ceasefire (which is demanded by French public opinion) except at partition appears, as Ho Chi Minh wants to occupy all Tonkin. If conditions are too hard and talks are broken off he will strive to obtain Tonkin by force. In such a military action his chances of success are good.
8. It has been said at the Conference that if Tonkin is lost we will fight in south. However, Valluy will not fight nor will Vietnam. To man lines in south, communists will have to provide own men. Moreover, it will be an artificial line for defense of which Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand can do nothing.
9. Decision point at military conference is this: if other conferences do not undertake Valluy's battle for Tonkin, tomorrow they will fight without French, and Saigon and Bangkok. Valluy said he could affirm that if Tonkin is lost, no Vietnamese would fight against other Vietnamese, unless later (probably sooner) whole of Vietnam will become Communist.
10. Valluy said he did not mean to dramatize but to be realistic among soldiers. Truth cannot be disguised. Each of allies has share of responsibility and if battle for Tonkin is lost, allies will have to fight along actual main line of resistance much farther away.

Admiral C. Carney remarked that Gen. Valluy's appraisal was of interest and important to all conferees and suggested it might be put in writing and appended to intelligence survey as representing unilateral views of one representative. End Defense Dept summary.
SECRET

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION)

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OIT

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND WHITEHALL SECRET (CABINET) DISTRIBUTION

Lord Reading

No. 619

June 7, 1954

D: 5:08 p.m. June 7, 1954
R: 5:27 p.m. June 7, 1954

PRIORITY
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 619 of June 7.
Repeated for information to Washington
Paris
Saigon

Indo-China.

Allen saw Chauvel this morning in order to find out how the French delegation were progressing in their military talks with the Viet Minh and their direct discussions with the Chinese and Russians about international supervision. Chauvel said that very little progress had been made on either question and the French delegation were becoming increasingly disturbed by what seemed to them a growing tendency on the part of the Communists to spin out the talks and play for time.

2. On the military discussions Chauvel confirmed the information in my telegram No. 268 to Washington. He said that the Viet Minh representatives had refused to be drawn into either discussing the Laniel conditions or revealing their own proposals as to zones. They were insisting on trying to secure prior acceptance of the general principles enunciated by M. Phan Van Dong on May 25, (see paragraph 5 (ii) of my telegram No. 443). The French hoped, nevertheless, that it might seem possible to make a practical start by agreeing at least to trace on a map the military positions at present occupied by the two belligerent sides.

3. On the question of supervision M. Chauvel had had two talks with Wang Ping-yun, the Secretary-General of the Chinese delegation. The latter had begun by complaining that the French appeared to be trying to evade the establishment of international controls in Laos and Cambodia, adding that the Chinese delegation could only
could only interpret this as meaning that it was intended to establish American bases in these two countries. Chauvel reassured him on this, saying that the French delegation agreed that controls should be established in Laos and Cambodia, though their form would have to be different there from Viet Nam, and had no intention of allowing offensive bases to be established there. Chauvel then explained why the French delegation could not accept a system of controls which simply represented the differing views of the two sides, and said that, in their view, the only hope of producing a workable system lay in bringing in India, and other like-minded countries such as Burma, Ceylon and Pakistan, which, not entirely friendly towards France, were genuinely impartial. At a second meeting Tang Ping-man has said that he had spoken to Chou En-lai about this suggestion but that the Chinese delegation, while willing to bear it in mind, still maintained their support for the original Soviet proposal.

4. Thereafter M. Bidault had had a conversation with M. Molotov this morning. He had developed the same arguments with him but had found him, though amicable and relaxed, completely unresponsive. M. Molotov had simply repeated that he thought it most important that the control commission should contain representatives who had diplomatic relations with the Viet Minh.

5. In these somewhat discouraging circumstances the French delegation are preparing a speech for M. Bidault to make at tomorrow afternoon's plenary meeting. They will make it sound as positive and hopeful as possible, but will also make it clear that the blame for present delays lies with the Communists. According to Chauvel, M. Bidault at present intends to go to Paris on Tuesday night and may remain there on Wednesday and Thursday.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington, Paris and Saigon as my telegrams Nos. 208, 118 and 59 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington, Paris and Saigon]
In connection with review of intelligence survey, Gen Valley presented his own evaluation military situation Tonkin Delta as follows:

1. If Tonkin is lost, military line will not be reestablished anywhere.
2. Anyone can find on map a line with tactical characteristics which theoretically should permit reestablishment, such as Laos bottleneck or eighteenth parallel, but Valley said he could affirm there would be no forces to man this line.
3. Valley said he was not speaking of French forces in this connection but meant to indicate that there were no southern Vietnamese who could oppose northern Vietnamese.
4. Ho Chi Minh's objective is Tonkin, to be attained either by negotiation at Geneva or by assault on Hanoi.
5. Ho Chi Minh wishes to entangle us in negotiations by admitting now, for first time, that there is a Communist northern state and a non-Communist southern state and that both might be incorporated in French Union.
6. What Ho Chi Minh seeks is Tonkin and its political capital Hanoi from which he was driven in 1946. He wishes obtain Tonkin either by negotiation (Valley admitted "among military men" that Ho Chi Minh finds across negotiating table receptive French ears) or by military action. To prepare for such action, he is drawing out negotiations to gain time for his battle corps to be in position and ready, if action is called for.
7. In course of negotiating toward a ceasefire (which is demanded by French public opinion), concept of partition appears, as Ho Chi Minh wants occupy all Tonkin. If conditions are too hard and talks are broken off he will strive to obtain Tonkin by force. In such a military action chances of success are good.
8. It has been said at this Conference that if Tonkin is lost we will fight in south. However French will not fight nor will Vietnam. To man line in south, conferees will have to provide own men. Moreover it will be an artificial line for defense of which Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand can do nothing.
9. Decision point in military conference is this: if other conference do not underwrite today's battle for Tonkin, tomorrow they will fight without French in Saigon and Bangkok. Valley said he could affirm that if Tonkin were lost, no Vietnamese would fight against other Vietnamese, and sooner or later (probably sooner) whole of Vietnam will become Communist.
10. Valley said he did not mean to dramatize but only to be realistic among soldiers. Truth cannot be disguised. Each of allies has share of responsibility and if battle for Tonkin is lost, allies will have to fight along on actual main line of resistance much farther away.

Admiral Carney remarked that Gen Valley's appraisal was of interest and important to all conferees and suggested it might be put in writing and appended to intelligence survey as representing unilateral views of one representative. End Defense Dept summary.
Foregoing for your own info only. Valley was speaking in confidence and as an individual. Your comments requested.

Dulles

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1954—7:34 p.m.

Tosec 368. Secretary believes it is of overriding importance to push on with action on Thailand appeal, and to avoid getting bogged down in argumentation about geographical scope of sub-commission activities. Nevertheless, it seems clear UK and French will not agree to move along in SC until we have reached understanding on this question. Secto 368 and Secto 371 indicate language included Tosec 229 and in Thai speech to SC June 3 should meet Eden’s desire that resolution not specifically extend scope of POC beyond Thailand, while allowing actual observation to be extended later without further SC or GA action. However, French delegation in NY has firmly contended sub-committee must be restricted to Thailand alone while British were most concerned that there be no immediate request by Laos and Cambodia for observation.

Since we now desire quick action, suggest you meet with Eden, Prince Wan and Bidault to work out agreement which will permit delegations in NY to press matter in SC. Hope we could get their agreement next meeting of SC should be held preferably Friday and certainly not later than Monday or Tuesday, June 14 or 15. Possibly they would agree on text contained Tosec 229. If not, we would be interested to know what constructive suggestion they have. Soon as agreement on resolution reached we would want to have it introduced in SC, although we would hope next meeting could be scheduled even if text of resolution not yet firm. In this event next meeting would be limited to speech-making.

Foregoing discussed with Thai Ambassador here today. He most eager avoid delay in SC and feels strongly we should not give up our bargaining position by yielding on scope of UN observation at least at this time. He is notifying Prince Wan you may discuss matter with him.

Dulles

INDOCHINA

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Advisor to the United States Delegation (Page) 1

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 7, 1954.
Participants: Mr. Molotov, Mr. Kuznetsov, Mr. Troyanovsky, General Smith, Assistant Secretary Robertson, and Mr. Page.

After an exchange of amenities, General Smith inquired whether it might not be useful to explore possible compromise solutions to the question regarding the composition of the Indochinese Supervisory Commission. He stated categorically and in no uncertain terms that his government could not accept the Soviet proposal that the Commission be composed of India, Pakistan, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Our experience with the NNSC in Korea proved that such a composition was absolutely unworkable.

He did not wish to get into an argument over “neutrals” as compared with “impartial”—he was primarily interested in finding nations to serve on the Commission which would make it operate efficiently and which would not bog down its activities. He had suggested that a group of impartial nations in association with India and Pakistan could be formed. Such a solution was not so favorable to the West as one might think, as it is clear that India, one of the few Asian powers which could provide supervisory military personnel, is not on our side but, in international matters, seemed more often more on the Soviet side.

The Colombo powers were rather impartial nations with direct interest in Southeast Asian affairs. Another possibility might be to let the Vietminh and Vietnam each choose a member for the Commission and that three European members, neutral and impartial such as Norway, for example, be asked to serve on the Commission.

Mr. Molotov replied that although the Czech and Polish membership could be re-examined, he could not agree to any membership not on a 50-50 basis, that is 50% Communist and 50% non-Communist. Furthermore, at least two of the members of the Commission must have diplomatic relations with the Vietminh. He was absolutely adamant on this question. At one point he even sarcastically suggested that NATO be given armistice supervisory powers in Indochina. He maintained that one must take into consideration the will of the Vietnamese people, at least 50% of whom support Ho Chi Minh, that the French were too late in giving limited independence to Indochina and that this

1 Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulles, June 9. (7510.00/3-564)
should be taken into account. He then strongly attacked Bao Dai “now vacationing in Cannes” whom he said was supported by the United States. General Smith said that ¼ of the Vietnamese people supported Bao Dai, ¼ supported Ho Chi Minh and “¼” were on the fence. Molotov replied that even if this didn’t add up correctly it did not correspond to Soviet estimates. In any event he could not recede from the Soviet position that the composition of the Commission be on the 50–50 basis.

At about this time, Kuznetsov interjected that he had read reports that President Eisenhower had said that the US might intervene in Indochina with naval, air and marine forces. General Smith replied that such action was the last thing the US Government desired to take. Also, in designating areas for troop assembly, a hundred square miles of jungle was not worth making a crisis over that might involve serious results. The Vietminh were entitled to just consideration, but if their appetites were too great and if they overreached themselves a crisis could ensue which, he inferred, might well lead to US armed intervention. It was the duty of the US and the USSR to reduce friction in the area, not to increase it, and that was why he was now seeking a compromise solution of the question of the composition of the Supervisory Commission which was of the utmost importance. Unless a reasonable solution of this question were found there were grave risks inherent in the situation in Southeast Asia and Mr. Molotov realized the consequences of this.

Mr. Molotov seemed completely unimpressed. He merely remarked that perhaps the Vietminh deserve more than we were willing to give them, that perhaps they were entitled to more than 50% of the spoils of war—even up to 75% (General Smith strongly contested this claim.) In any event, he could not yield on the principle that the Commission be half Communist and half non-Communist.

Throughout the entire conversation Mr. Molotov was relaxed, yet absolutely unmoved, courteous, friendly, in excellent humor. (It was my [Page] opinion that he was even more relaxed than during the Berlin Conference.)

General Smith terminated the conversation by remarking that if agreement at Geneva could not be reached on such a matter as the composition of the Supervisory Commission, how could agreement be reached on anything. It would be questioned whether there was any real value in holding international conferences with the Soviet Bloc.

It was agreed that no comments whatsoever would be made to the press on this evening’s meeting.

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Brackets in the source text.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, concerning consultations among the Chinese, Soviet and Vietnamese delegations, June 7, 1954

Record No. 206-Y0050

(Top Secret)

Chairman [Mao], Comrade Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

(1) I hereby send you for your examination the twelve terms on the united committee (the committee on military armistice), the supervision committee by countries of neutrality, and the question of international guarantee that had been decided upon by the three sides of the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam yesterday (see the attached). It is planned that these terms will be raised by the delegation of the Soviet Union at the open session on the Indochina issue on the 8th. At the session of the 8th, I plan to make positive explanation of the six points concerning the basic principles in the military aspect that I put forward on Many 27, rebutting the mistaken points of the other side and, in particularly, criticizing the United States for its blocking the progress of the conference. Pham Van Dong in his presentation plans to highlight the stand of our side on the political issue.

(2) The telegram of the CCP Central Committee and the rely of the Vietnamese Workers Party have been conveyed to the Soviet Party Central Committee by Comrade Molotov yesterday. The three sides of the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and China exchange opinions on these two telegrams yesterday.

Zhou Enlai
June 7, 1954

Attachment (omitted)

*Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.*
Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, reply to Zhou Enlai's June 7, 1954 telegram, June 7, 1954

Record No. 206-Y0050

Comrade Zhou Enlai:

The telegram of June 7 has been received. We agree to the twelve terms on the untied committee, the committee of supervision by countries of neutrality, and the question of international guarantee.

Central Committee
June 7, 1954

*Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.*
should be taken into account. He then strongly attacked Bao Dai "now vacationing in Cannes" whom he said was supported by the United States. General Smith said that 1/3 of the Vietnamese people supported States. General Smith said that 1/3 of the Vietnamese people supported the United States. Molotov replied that even if this didn't add up correctly it did not contradict the Soviet estimates. In any event he could not rule out the possibility that the composition of the Commission on the 50-50 basis.

At about this time, Kuznetsov interjected that if he had read reports that President Eisenhower had said that the US might intervene in Indochina with naval, air and marine forces, General Smith replied that this was the last thing the US Government desired to take. That such action was the least thing the US Government would be willing to do, that such action was the least thing the US Government would be willing to do. The Vietminh were entitled to just consideration, but they were not entitled to more than 50% of the spoils of war—even up to 75%. (General Smith strongly contested this.) In any event, he could not yield on the principle that the Commission be half Communist and half non-Communist.

Throughout the entire conversation Mr. Molotov was relaxed, yet absolutely unavoidable, courteous, friendly, in excellent humor. (It was my [Page] opinion that he was even more relaxed than during the Berlin Conference.)

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1 Brackets in the source text.
Molotov insisted on earlier Soviet position regarding composition of control commission. He suggested possible delays in military conversations arose from fact Viet Minh delegation incomplete. French have impression Molotov's attitude since his return from Moscow June 1st has hardened. They noted that since his return he has had no direct contact with Eden. (Fuller account of conversation follows.)

5. Krishna Menon saw Bidault for one and one-half hours yesterday. He discussed generally on Soviet view regarding composition of control commission, i.e., inclusion of country or countries having diplomatic relations with Viet Minh.

6. Bidault plans to make speech generally reiterating French proposals and argument as set forth during restricted sessions. He plans leave Geneva after plenary tomorrow in order to take part in Assembly debate. He is pleased that he will have opportunity of speaking plenary here before commenting before Assembly on progress of conference.

* See telegram Secto 260, June 8, p. 1065.

SMITH

**SECRET**

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1954—noon.

Tosee 371. Following is Canberra's 280, June 6, 10 pm.


Prime Minister at American Embassy Sunday June 6 said he had just received cable from Spender clarifying Secretary's views respecting possible de facto partition. Cabinet discussions Friday fourth covered:

1. Australia does not underestimate seriousness events. Not dragging feet. Realizes importance making constructive suggestions.

2. Feels US has not defined precisely enough (a) political or (3) military objectives of intervention. Believes staff talks will supply better basis for appraisal. Asks whether we contemplate (a) intervening and hold Viet Minh from further advance which would involve long garrison task or (b) complete defeat Viet Minh which would require massive campaign land forces, (c) bombing Chinese bases and what Cabinet believes would be general war with China.

Australia reports indicate Viet Minh and Vietnamese dislike French and possibly any vote would go to Ho Chi Minh not French. Would be fatal for US merely to support French Power.

3. Since immediate intervention at this stage could not be UN it presents two acute problems for Australia: (a) would be committing Australia to military operations outside UN, (b) also outside British Commonwealth, because Cabinet believes neither UK nor Canada nor South Africa nor any other member British Commonwealth disposed participate in intervention except Australia and New Zealand.

4. Australia wants to aim at (a) putting block in way of Communist aggression in SEA and (b) reconciliation of UK and American policy, avoiding departure from unity.

Casey gathered impression UK, though thinking 'French have gone too far to be rescued', might have different view regarding defense of Thailand.

Therefore in effort to get UK and US views together, following should be considered: (a) Laos and Cambodia are different races from Vietnam. Viet Minh have no rights in Laos and Cambodia. Southern part of Vietnam contains export rice bowl and its protection of tremendous significance to British position in Malaya and to Japan as rice importer. Minds should be directed to having group of nations agree to give guarantee to territorial integrity Laos, Cambodia and Southern section of Vietnam for two reasons:

(a). Strategic importance in struggle against Communism.

(b). Guarantee of territorial integrity would not interfere with local self-government and might attract cooperation of India and Burma.

While disagreeing with Nehru, Prime Minister said no doubt of Nehru's importance in Asia. Nehru would violently challenge military intervention in Hanoi area as military colonialism and invasion. With Nehru's influence in Burma and Indonesia we might find we had hostile forces all round us, quite unlike situation in Korea.

Cabinet thinks Nehru should be asked to participate in territorial guarantee. Prime Minister personally pessimistic but says Casey does not despair of achieving that.

'Summing up' Prime Minister said:

1. Australia would regard military intervention in Hanoi area now as precipitate and likely to involve very large forces and over-all war with China with question also of Russian repercussions. Hence, if Australia understands 'American proposal' they think it requires more frank exchange before Australia would think the proposal right.

2. On other hand Australia thinks UK view may be much too restricted and if French left to themselves and completely evacuate Vietnam with result that Communists over-run down to southern extremities, this would expose Malaya to new form of attack. Cabinet also thinks UK underestimates significance of loss of export rice bowl area.

3. Australia therefore will say to Nehru and Eden: While should not risk hasty intervention and rapid evacuation, we must face up to threat. A line must be drawn and guaranteed. Perhaps
French, with material assistance from US can hold their own position in HaNoi area.¹

Prime Minister said if UK would join in any sort of territorial guarantee there would be no problem for Australia, but if it became question of entering war in which UK would be neutral, that, ‘would of course involve the end of the British Commonwealth’ and would be very difficult step, particularly for his administration which has consistently emphasized Commonwealth unity. He discounted necessity of such choice and said Casey ‘would have a good go at Nehru and Eden’.

Prime Minister said several Cabinet members had raised question of his going personally to Geneva and that Prime Minister had replied that he could not do that immediately without its appearing as complete disavowal of Casey who had done good job, but he told Cabinet members he will hold himself in readiness in case situation develops so that he could be of assistance in London, Washington or elsewhere. He contemplates leaving for New Zealand tomorrow for vacation two weeks if events permit that long.

Will cable Bangkok, New Delhi and Karachi Casey’s ETA those cities.

Signed Peaseless”.

DULLES

730900/8-854 | Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of Defense

SECRET

GENEVA, June 8, 1954—12:30 p.m.

Army Message Gento 52. From Defense representative for Hensel from Sullivan, information USARMA’s Paris, London and Saigon; repeated action Department State. Following is summary French-Vietnam military talks with Viet Minh 19th. June reported to Defense representative by member French delegation:

1. French representative proposed both sides reach agreement on areas in which each has military superiority as basis for proceeding to discuss grouping of forces. This and suggested each side specify areas in which it claims superiority, and that disputed areas be subject to negotiation. As initial gesture, French then described area of delta (apparently that conforming to present dispositional) as one over which it claims no military superiority of French Union forces. Invited Viet Minh similarly to specify areas of its own.

2. Viet Minh representative refused to accept area delimited by French representative stating Viet Minh held many localities within delta, and alleging in addition that dykes, population area with Viet Minh. French representative replied military representatives not concerned with dykes, population, only facts of military situation. Said Viet Minh should present areas it claimed in specific terms so talks could move forward.

INDOCHINA

Thailand with reference to their military position and steps which might be taken to strengthen it. Then Secretary Wilson, who was in Vienna a few days ago, had a series of talks, himself and military advisers, with the representatives of the Philippine General Staff.

The reports that are going on here in Washington with the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand are the same type of talks designed to gather together military information, to assess military possibilities so that if and when it is necessary to take political decisions there will be available at hand the military elements of the problem. I expect a further visit to the office of the Philippine Chief of Staff and possibly a visit from Thailand. We are trying to keep in as close touch as we can with the military position, as I say, because that has to be taken into account in reaching political decisions.

Asking about reports that the Administration might bring Congress to adopt some sort of resolution on the Indochina situation, Secretary Dulles replied:

“…there is no press plan for going to Congress for any authority in this matter. As is well known, the general scheme which the United States has had for this area and which I have already described here, would, if it was implemented, probably require congressional action, and that has so far not been a sufficiently general acceptance of the program to make it, as a matter of practical politics, a question of going to Congress.”

For the Secretary’s complete remarks on the Korean and Indochina use of the Geneva Conference, see the Department of State Bulletin, June 21, 1954, pages 947-949.

1 101/8-854 | Telegram

12th Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 8, 1954, 3:05 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 8, 1954—midnight

Gento 405. Repeated information Paris 496, London 280, Tokyo 118, Moscow 111, Phnom Penh, Vienvtiane, Department-pass Defense, Tokyo 401, and RINCFE. Fifth Indochina plenary session Tuesday June 8 with an opening presided over long well-balanced speech by Bidault drawing progress so far in effort define points of agreement and problems still at issue. Bidault pointed out result adoption French
proposal May 17 give priority military aspects cease-fire, progress of
conference was "not negligible." But desire French delegation take up
cases Laos and Cambodia first, because, simpler, frustrated by Com-
munist insistence "peace indivisible" and in order facilitate progress,
conference French had agreed to discuss Vietnam first. Bidault em-
phasized, however, that although some progress made discussions Viet-
am, cases of Laos and Cambodia still pending.

Bidault then took up six points which he said would bring out these
matters on which there was agreement and those on which divergent
views had been expressed:

1. Principle of cessation of hostilities. All delegates agreed this
principle which French delegation had proposed May 8. However, Com-
munists wanted simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina and
some delegates had expressed reservation on this.

2. Regroupment of regular units. After various proposals had been
made Eden text was adopted on May 26. France had observed at the
time that regrouping applied only to Vietnam and that principle of
unity of Vietnam could not be questioned. All delegates had agreed
principle unity of Vietnam. Concrete results Eden proposal man-
ifested in meeting at Geneva on June 2 by representatives High Com-
mans both sides and preparations going forward for on-the-spot
meetings in Indochina. French delegate hoped these military discus-
sions could proceed rapidly so that conference could examine con-
cern recommendations on map.

3. Irregular forces. Pointing out one-third Viet Minh forces in
category, Bidault stressed conference could not leave large para-
forces one party free; conference should study this problem when talk
on zones had progressed sufficiently. Bidault felt Dong statement
May 26 did not rule out possibility agreement this point.

4. Entry of troops and material into Vietnam after cessation
hostilities. Clauses in armistice agreement relating this subject
apply equally to both parties. Should also cover local war production
Without strict control of Vietnam's land and sea frontiers accord
supervision would be illusory and fraudulent. Agreement on this
principle seems possible.

5. Prisoners of war and civilian internees. There is unanimous
agreement on immediate liberation of POWs and civilian internees
following cessation of hostilities.

6. Controls and guarantee. Bidault stressed following aspects problem:

(a) Responsibilities International Neutral Control Com-
mission should extend to all clauses of armistice.

(b) Joint Commissions of two sides must be subordinated to
International Commission; questions on which Joint Commissions
cannot agree should be submitted to International Commis-
sion for decision by majority vote. Communist delegates insistence
that essential responsibility for certain aspects of armistice be
confined to Joint Commissions, which would not be subordinated
to International Commission, represents serious divergence in
views which must be surmounted.

(c) Composition of International Commission should be
determined by criteria of objectivity, impartiality and effectiveness,
any countries meeting these criteria satisfactory to French. An
International Commission composed four neutrals chosen reflect
equally views two sides would be impotent. Such content would
guarantee no one.

(d) There must be authority to which International Commis-
sion reports. This organ would in turn look to guarantors of armis-
tice, namely members Geneva conference. Bidault emphasized
guarantee must not be paralyzed by any veto.

Bidault summed up "appreciable results" of conference as follows:
(1) method of work chosen; (2) principle total cessation hostilities
accepted, simultaneously throughout Indochina if possible; (3) prin-
ciple regroupment zones Vietnam adopted and referred competent
persons for study; (4) principle of setting up International Control
Commission accepted.

Bidault cautioned however, that serious differences existed on es-
cential points which cannot be crossed without infringing essential
principles. He specified three subjects which had not yet been exam-
ned on which conclusions not yet reached: (1) Laos and Cambodia; (2)
regroupment zones; and (3) methods of control.

Next speaker was Pham Van Dong who said he would like to com-
pare various proposals made during conference. Claiming Vietnam
proposals realistic, fair, rational, he attacked proposals other dele-
gates as unilateral, incomplete, and negative. Describing Bidault's
proposals as completely military, Dong stressed interdependence politi-
cal and military problems, said even Bidault military proposals failed
deal with real situation Indochina and thus not likely lead to agree-
ment. Dong then attacked sarcastically proposals made by "Bao Dai dele-
gates," singling out particularly proposals on incorporation Viet Minh
forces into Vietnamese Army and elections under UN supervision for
government under aegis Bao Dai. He also attacked these as there
would be no control on introduction of arms into Cambodia and Laos.
Saying that "first result" of conference was acceptance resolution
maintaining to contacts by representatives of High Commands in
Geneva and Indochina, Dong accused French of offering nothing in
military meetings which could lead to agreement and of stalling start
on-the-spot talks in Indochina. Dong ridiculed recent initialing of
Vietnam independence treaty in Paris, saying it was simply fulfilling condition laid down by US for intervention in Indochina. Dong then made several proposals, suggested conference discuss in "realistic fashion" proposals tabled by Chou En-lai. Invited French delegate expedite on-the-spot contacts of military representatives in Indochina. Invited conference to embark immediately on discussion of political questions such as recognition of Vietnam, general elections, and relations Indochina with France, including association of Vietnam with French Union.

Third speaker was Tep Phan, Cambodian delegate, who again drew attention to fact that Cambodia was victim of Viet Minh aggression and reiterated Cambodian demand for complete evacuation Viet Minh Forces. He then made four-point proposal. (See Secto 367.4)

Turning to task of International Control Commission, Tep Phan said its tasks different in Cambodia than Vietnam and outlined its control functions in Cambodia as follows: (1) evacuation of Viet Minh regular and irregular forces; (2) disarming of all armed elements not in the army or police forces; (3) liberation and exchange of POWs and civilian internees; (4) external activities endangering peace and security of Cambodia.

- Phan emphasized his government could not accept any control over the entry of troops and war material into Cambodia, pointing out that unlike Vietnam there would be no armistice in Cambodia since the Viet Minh troops would be withdrawn. He assured Communist delegates Cambodian Army being trained for defense frontiers only and said his government prepared under certain conditions limit size of army in order not to pose threat to neighboring countries.

Cambodian delegate then discussed briefly questions composition International Control Commission, pointing out Korean experience demonstrated uselessness of Commission with composition suggested by Soviet delegate. He referred again to Cambodian proposal on composition of June 4 and suggested if no agreement could be reached Commission of neutral countries control of armistice should be trusted to UN.

Following recess, Molotov made long speech which included attack on US, France and Associated States. Beginning with comment on insincerity some participants this conference which supposed to be concerned with restoration peace in Indochina, he then claimed for scheming on Southeast Asia military pact with colonial powers pointed to military talks in Washington; accused US of ordering Thai UN appeal in order prepare for UN intervention which really US.

Molotov then stated that Indochina cease-fire must be enduring and therefore necessary take up political problems. Although priority military question agreed at beginning conference, it was now time to sum up and begin on political matters. He noted result of discussion of various proposals was some movement toward reconciliation, such as agreement simultaneous cease-fire, in spite some reservation, regroupment regular forces, and meeting of military representatives.

Also establish agreement in principle to Viet Minh proposal non-introduction foreign troops and arms after cease-fire. No doubt raised necessity joint Commissions or international supervision. Guarantee of settlement by conference powers suggested by France received favorably by Soviet delegate. In discussing guarantees, Molotov, did not mention "collective".

Molotov also marked areas disagreement such as function and composition International Supervisory Commission. and noted "crude attempts discredit NNSC in Korea". Maintained Communist position of more important role for joint committees which should be responsible for all on-the-spot measures to ensure cessation of hostilities.

Leading up to further comment on political questions, he praised national liberation movements in three states. Acknowledged differences in three such as three quarters of Vietnam in hands of movement while in Laos one-half of country not under control of "official agencies of the government". Cambodia "less" but developing. Ridiculed claims of Associated States to independence, pointing out no Asian power believes this true; that is why they have not recognized. Eight years of attempts to re-establish colonial regime has resulted in 100,000 French killed, wounded and cost of 2,000 billion francs and heavy defeats in spite US aid. War was not in national interest of France, but if French government wished to end it there was no possibility peace with honor on both sides.

Molotov disliked dwelling on military matters and said restoration peace required settlement two basic political questions: (1) relationships between France and Indochina states, and (2) internal political matters. Since Viet Minh had made generous offer, including readiness to examine French Union membership, and French had claimed willingness to recognize independence of three states, should not be too difficult to reach agreement.

Then returned to attack Associated States Government quoting from House Committee reports to prove Associated States lack independence. Commented Dien-Bien-Phu defended by foreigners who had nothing to do with France or Vietnam. Noted futile attempts to prove foreign elements with Viet Minh. Further proof lack of popular support for Bao Dai was failure to mobilization.
He devoted considerable comment to subject national elections in Vietnam and asked for French position. Ridiculous performance of Vietnamese in municipal elections and quoted western sources to effect Viet Minh would win if national elections held. Elections must be held in Vietnam under conditions freedom of activity for patriotic parties, groups and organs. However, elections should precede by withdrawal foreign troops, which requires military settlement at Geneva. He then enumerated three main political problems as: (1) establishing Franco-Indochina relations on basis equality and freedom; (2) free elections in all three states for democratic government; (3) on-the-spot contacts in Indochina for contribution to political as well as military settlement.

Molotov concluded with repetition of call for free elections after foreign troops withdrawal, direct contact in Indochina, and then proposed parallel consideration by conference of political and military matters by means alternate meetings.

Eden then made strongest and most forceful statement thus far made by UK in conference (Secto 404) during which he suggested Colombo powers for Supervisory Commission.

Bidault returned with vigorous but dignified reproof to tone and line of Communist speeches this session. Disappointed by insistence on political question, since cessation hostilities was obviously beginning of any solutions. He referred to speech on Korea by Soviet delegate in Security Council Malik in June 1951 and quoted him as follows:

"The Soviet peoples believe that the first measure should be to introduce discussions between belligerents for the purpose of bringing about a cease-fire and an armistice, involving the withdrawal of the forces behind an agreed line."

Said Viet Minh should not worry over lack of contacts Indochina since instructions had been given to French authorities to carry out. Hoped that these contacts Indochina and Geneva would cause delays. Said that answer to Dong's remark that some people wanted international war was that simplest means preventing this from to end war. Made special reference to Molotov's attacks and lack of urbanity usually found in this eminent and experienced diplomat, and regretted that one of conference chairmen had received partisan attack.

Dinh commented that truce on insults should be first order of business. Eden then called on US delegate.

Under Secretary offered forgo his statement in view late hour if other remaining inscribed delegates willing do same. Molotov said he would like speak one minute. Under Secretary refused yield to Molotov and then made statement Secto 403.

Molotov, obviously reacting to effective comments by Bidault, denied his speech insulting and said he was only recalling "certain bitter harsh facts".

Bidault replied facts must be respected but question is how facts are narrated.

Eden closed meeting by suggesting that remaining two inscribed speakers could speak at tomorrow's plenary. Meeting adjourned at 7:50.

Comment: Bidault last statement superb job of offsetting Molotov's obvious appeal to French opinion and turning tables on Communists by placing ones on them for failing achieve cease-fire because of intransigence and introduction extraneous issues as opposed reasonableness and conciliatory approach of French.

SMITH

Infra.

261.1 GE/8-854 : Telegram

Fifth Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 8, 3:00 p.m.

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

GENEVA, June 8, 1954.

Secto 403. Repeated information Paris 402, London 228, Saigon 151, Tokyo 116, Moscow, Vientiane, Phnom Penh unnumbered. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Following is text Undersecretary's statement at fifth Indochina plenary Tuesday, June 8: "At our previous meetings the United States delegation has stated from time to time in firm position with regard to the special nature of the problem existing in Laos and Cambodia. This position is as described this afternoon by M. Bidault as well as Mr. Eden and I will not enlarge on the subject except to say that the US associates itself with France and that the US delegation continues to maintain that peace would automatically be restored to Laos and Cambodia if the invading Viet Minh forces would withdraw.

Our object is to secure a real and lasting peace in Indochina. To do this we must be sure that there are adequate safeguards for any settlement which this conference may reach. My delegation has repeatedly, in our restricted session, stated the view that one essential element for
safeguarding a settlement is the creation of an International Supervisory Commission whose composition and terms of reference would permit it to function effectively.

The composition of an International Supervisory Commission is a question of such importance that I have suggested that its members be brought together at a conference. I still believe that we must move forward more rapidly if this point could be settled in private discussions. I think it will be helpful, however, to make clear the principle upon which we must proceed in arriving at the membership of an effective International Commission.

In one word that principle is impartiality. An impartial commission, as Mr. Eden pointed out, if endowed with adequate authority, can safeguard a settlement. A partial or divided commission will obstruct or prevent achievement of the real and lasting peace which must be our common objective. We must therefore search for impartial membership on a Supervisory Commission.

Mr. Molotov has suggested a four country commission to consist of India, Pakistan, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Two of these states—Poland and Czechoslovakia—are the same two Communist states that have exercised their power of veto to frustrate the effective operation of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea last Saturday, in our meeting on Korea, it was necessary for me to point out the unhappy experience which we have had [with?] this Korean commission. I described how the truly impartial members of this commission, Sweden and Switzerland, have been forced repeatedly to protest against the continued arbitrary refusals of the Communist countries to permit the carrying out of the obligations of the commission. My statements have been made a matter of public record in the Korean meeting. I will not repeat them here because the facts have been clearly demonstrated.

Mr. Molotov's proposal is that a Supervisory Commission should be established under arrangements exactly like those in Korea, where four Communist States, by exerting a veto over the activities of the commission have completely blocked effective performance of the obligations of the commission. This is obviously an unsatisfactory and unacceptable proposal. We must not repeat a mistake which has only served to obstruct the carrying out of an international agreement, but has also placed two truly impartial nations in the intolerable situation of being innocent parties to such obstruction.

Mr. Molotov did propose, however, that India and Pakistan should be requested to serve as two of the members of a Supervisory Comm
bodia we have to deal with formidable but entirely distinct problem of Viet Minh invasion. I cannot regard these aggressive acts, some of which have taken place since this conference was announced at Berlin, as acts of peace. Nor are they merely symptoms of internal troubles. Therefore, no one should be surprised that they cause deep concern far beyond confines of states concerned.

If foreign troops are withdrawn from these two countries, peoples of Laos and Cambodia can be left to work out their own destiny safeguarded by international supervision from interference from beyond their borders. In this connection I note that the representatives of Cambodia has told us today that Cambodia has no intention of allowing military bases to be established on her territory which might threaten peace of Indochina and Cambodia is willing, under appropriate conditions, to limit her own forces to those needed for defense of her territory.

Now I come to another crucial issue, international supervision. We are all agreed this must form an essential part of arrangements arrived at for the restoration of peace in Indochina. This all-important problem, which is common to all three states of Indochina is now central issue before conference.

It has, I think, been accepted that in Vietnam there shall be joint committees of two belligerents in addition to international supervision. These joint committees could probably render some useful service, provided that it was clearly understood that their functions were mainly technical and clearly subordinate to authority of an international supervisory commission.

After eight years of bitter fighting, even with the best will in the world, we must expect there will be differences between two sides comprising the joint committees. It's therefore essential to provide for an international supervisory commission endowed with power to resolve these differences and to insure the proper execution of all provisions of the agreement for cessation of hostilities.

Here I should like to make a suggestion, which is, I submit, practical. Over a month ago Prime Ministers of Ceylon, Burma, India, Indonesia and Pakistan met at Colombo and discussed among other things problems of Indochina. Communiqué they issued after their discussion has, I think been of real value to our deliberations here. I should like to suggest that Asian powers represented at Colombo Conference are admirably qualified to assume responsibilities of supervising whatever arrangements are reached by this conference. These five countries meet essential requirements of impartiality. They have recog-
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee (excerpt), June 8, 1954


On the question of zone adjustment in Vietnam, the “big adjustment” [plan] of dividing the north and the south into two big zones is more favorable to us. The small adjustment in the three war zones of the north, the central, and the south is not favorable to us (even under the circumstances that an agreement is reached on having a general election in Vietnam [it is not favorable to us], as the other side will surely block it, making it difficult to be carried out in a short time). Therefore, we should not initiate a [plan for] small adjustment unless we are forced to do so (for example, [under the circumstances that] an agreement cannot be reached on big adjustment because the enemy requests too much and our gain is too little, or the enemy will only consider small adjustment, and will not consider big adjustment). In order to pursue the big adjustment plan, the minimum request of our plan should not be set too high, and should be left with space for further maneuvering. The big adjustment plan proposed in the telegram of the VWP Central Committee on the 4th is same as the second option in the big adjustment plan in our telegram of May 30. If this plan cannot be achieved, it is acceptable for us if some additional concessions [on our part] are made on the basis of it, and we should not call this plan our final plan. Even though we may need to make some additional concessions, compared with the small adjustment plan, it is still more favorable to us. On the strategy of handling the negotiation, it is impossible for us not to enter discussion of specific questions, and this is also unfavorable to us. Our side will start working on checking and correcting the maps reflecting the current status, and we will then put forward the plan of division of zones, with the expectation that an agreement on the general principles of dividing zones and an agreement on ceasefire will be reached at an early time. Comrade Pham Van Dong has agreed to the above opinions. Please consult with the VWP Central Communist immediately.

Translating for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not cite or quote without permission from CWIHP.
Secret

Sir I. Kirkpatrick

The French Minister spoke to me to-day about Indo-China on what he insisted was a purely personal and unofficial basis. He said he knew I did not deal with Indo-China but that, perhaps, this would not prevent his remarks from being taken seriously, which he probably did not want. He did not mention the fact that his remarks were in no way official.

M. de Crouy-Chanal said that he was disturbed about the misunderstandings of each other's positions which seemed to be arising in the United Kingdom and in France. The French Embassy here were not fully informed of everything that passed in Geneva but they certainly had the impression that many French officials dealing with Indo-China were inclined to suspect British motives and intentions. He understood that M. Bidault was in close contact with the Secretary of State, but M. Bidault was not to blame because of the political situation in Paris.

These general suspicions seemed to confirm the minds of our critics in the idea that the British were playing a double game. In Geneva the Secretary of State had been very definite that the situation in Laos and Cambodia was quite different from that in Vietnam and that it was in the Western interest to maintain these two states intact outside the Communist sphere. On the other hand, reports reaching Paris from Indo-China itself and of discussions which Krishna Menon had had in Geneva with the Vietnamese representatives and others had left the impression that the regrouping of forces should perhaps also cover Laos and Cambodia, thus allowing Communist centres to be established in both these countries. In view of the close relations between the United Kingdom and India, anything which Krishna Menon said tended to be attributed to us or, alternatively, it was feared that we would, at a later stage, accept the Indian view rather than risk a disagreement with Indian and South Asian opinion generally.

I told M. de Crouy-Chanal that I could not of course speak to him authoritatively on this question and that I did not want to cross the wires, since we were in close touch with the French in Geneva and in Paris. I could however assure him at once that there was no question of any British double-game. We were perplexed, like everyone else, about the best course of action. Our perplexity had also been increased by the fact that neither the French nor the Americans had been very clear on the positive policies which they wished to pursue. It was however the Secretary of State who was conducting our policy in Geneva, with the full support of the Cabinet. He had taken, I thought, a very clear line on Laos and Cambodia. We really could not be responsible for what Krishna Menon or others might or might not be saying or for reports...
I June 1956

Seeking the Quai d’Orsay from Indo-China. It was, however, naturally that our people in Indo-China should be informing themselves on the general position in order to keep the Secretary of State informed at Geneva.

After some further conversation in which M. de Crouy-Chapal indicated clearly that the French themselves recognised weaknesses in their position in Vietnam and the necessity for some arrangement with Ho Chi Minh, I was asked whether it could indicate on what point British parliamentary and public opinion would feel that the West had gone as far as possible on concessions and that a stand must be made. I said that I thought it was quite impossible for anyone to answer this question. There was very natural and obvious reluctance here to contemplate starting a third world war, or even an American-Chinese war, as the result of developments in Tonkin were, I thought, many people who felt that in the circumstances partition of Vietnam might provide the only possible working solution, as it had in Korea and Germany, least for the time being. Opinion here would also be influenced by the behaviour of the Communists in the next few weeks. If it looked as though they had simply been negotiating to gain time in order to attack Hanoi, this would clearly affect the general opinion. But I concluded that it would be quite responsible on my part to try to answer his question when I doubted whether it would be possible to obtain an answer to similar questions in respect of France or America.

M. de Crouy-Chapel agreed that the American position was no means certain and that the forces against full American involvement in the Indo-Chinese war were certainly as strong as those in favour. As regards France, he said that the position should be clearer after this week’s debate. The governments would probably be bringing in measures to send a certain proportion of French conscripts to Indo-China. Sidault was, rightly or wrongly, hopeful that there would be quite a sizeable majority for a reasonably firm policy in Indo-China and for the measures which would give him a stronger bargaining hand at Geneva. M. Bidault felt that the Americans and the Chinese interest lay in getting all they could out of Geneva, including a strong position for Ho Chi Minh in Tonkin, and then crystallising their gains before American opinion had been too strongly aroused. This could give them a more solid basis from which to continue their long-term policy of driving the Europeans out of Asia and would avoid any head-on collision with the Indians and their South Asian States. The French themselves did not exclude partition of Vietnam – indeed, M. Bidault’s only formula was that there must be no capitulation. But it would ask a few weeks of delicate Oriental negotiating to bring the Vietnamese and Chinese to accept this, since neither could be responsible for proposing it. M. de Crouy-Chapal said that he thought “certainly prepared for the conference to continue for a long time and did not look at the situation /in terms
in terms of a probable crisis and a show-down within the next week or so. The Communists would play their hand too skilfully to permit this.

Before leaving, M. de Crouy-Chanel emphasised that he had been speaking on an entirely personal basis and in no sense officially. I said that my remarks were even more unofficial, since I had no responsibility whatever for Indo-China questions.

Copies to:
Mr. Speaight
South East Asia Department

June 8, 1954
and soundings indicate almost certainly New Zealand and probably Australia would not participate without UK. Our soundings indicate Thailand and Philippines would most likely come along.

Numbered paragraph 3. We agree undesirable President should make formal pledge unilaterally and refer you paragraph Deptel 4273, repeated Geneva Tosco 269, which stressed joint character any such pledge. President would necessarily deal with independence question in any request to Congress for authorization US forces for combat in Indochina.

Numbered paragraph 4. While we would agree substitution words “after re-establishment peace” for “after end of hostilities” we feel our phrasing for rest sentence definitely preferable to that proposed by Bidault. His text carries overtone France retaining right decide timing, first and then getting Vietnamese Government to agree after, which implies precisely type implication we consider unnecessary avoid if independence of Viet Nam to be crystal clear.

Numbered paragraph 5. We feel Bidault’s proposed text for paragraph 2 of Deptel 4286, repeated Geneva Tedul 123, conflicts with assurance sought by our text. While Bidault’s language might be helpful for EDO debate it provides loopholes for abuse interpretation, justifying later claims right withdrawal on other or other of count listed. When occasion offers suggest you point out to Bidault that we could not commit forces and US prestige in situation where there would be any question concerning premature French withdrawal their forces.

Numbered paragraph 7. After full agreement reached on all conditions and French Government has reached decision it wishes request US intervention, US must have opportunity at that time make its own decision whether prevailing circumstances warrant implementation of formal steps leading to US military participation. We cannot grant French an indefinite option on us without regard to intervening deterioration. Only after these decisions taken would we expect Laniel submit agreement and request for internationalization to Parliament for endorsement and ratification; also he must not prejudice our liberty of decision by approaching Parliament in such way we would appear morally committed intervene prior to our decision.

DULLES

* Dated May 26; for text, see volume xiii.
* Dated May 27, not printed, but see footnotes 3, p. 1039.
* Under Secretary Smith informed the Department of State in telegram Dulles, 166, June 16, that he would “be unable discuss referenced telegram (Tedul 132) with French until early next week since understand Bidault will probably return until then. Department may wish instruct Embassy Paris take questions with Bidault or De Margerie who with Bidault in Paris.” (3681 GSC 6-1039)

[Note: The text is a transcription and does not include the full context or all the details as indicated by the footnotes.]

INDOCHINA

JUNE 3, 1954

TSIG 00/8-254: Telegram
Smith-Eden Meeting, Geneva, June 3, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

NACI GENEVA, June 3, 1954—10 p.m.
Dulles 164. Eyes only Secretary. I had a long talk with Eden this morning. He said that we are clearly coming to end here on Indochina. Three major issues have emerged on which we cannot compromise and on which Communists show no intention of receding. These are (1) separate treatment of Laos and Cambodia, which are clearly victims of Viet Minh aggression; (2) status and powers of impartial international supervisory authority; and (3) composition of international supervisory authority.

He is convinced that we can get no further on these issues and that break within next few days. While he feels no useful negotiating purpose would be served, he is inclined to think that for public opinion it would be desirable that he privately see Molotov once more before a break in order to make clear to Molotov firmness our position and obtain Communist position. He is hopeful of forcing Molotov into public rejection Colombo powers for supervisory organization. This will have very beneficial effects in south and southeast Asia. I pointed out, and he agreed, that French situation is such that we would probably have to leave the French and Viet Minh military officers here talking about zones in Vietnam.

Immediately following break he feels Cambodia and Laos should put their cases to the UN entirely divorced from Thailand request. (I gathered that he was thinking of something more than just a POC.) He thinks it highly important that they move rapidly after the conference is wound up, but equally important until that time there be no hints or press leaks whatever that such action is contemplated. He feels that if properly handled and appeals are spontaneous on their part, with no implication of US-UK initiative or prodding, they will receive general Asian support. I pointed out, and he agreed, that France might oppose but we should go ahead anyway. In meanwhile he feels very strongly we must not now complicate matter by insisting on broadening Thailand appeal to Laos and Cambodia. He rightly points out that language in Security Council draft resolution is largely academic, as it will in any event be vetoed. Resolution can be written any way that appears desirable at the time matter comes before General Assembly. He said he would send instructions to Dixon
to try to work out with Lodge some language that would meet his point, while not necessarily precluding POC operations outside Thailand. I am sending separate telegram repeated to USUN replying to your Tosec 378 giving only latter part this paragraph.

Eden said he had not put in his ideas with regard to UN appeal by Cambodia and Laos, and therefore asked that the matter be treated with strictest secrecy.

Eden also said he was considering recommendation reduce strength of Commonwealth division in Korea by about half or one brigade in order to reinforce Malaya. If things eased up in Egypt, he was also hopeful that forces could be spared from there for Malaya. I told him that in view of more critical situation in southeast Asia and our ability within the armistice to train and equip ROK forces as replacements, I thought we would have no objection.

Clear that Eden now considers negotiations here have failed. Believe he is prepared to move ahead quickly in southeast Asia coalition which would guarantee Cambodia and most of Laos under umbrella of some US action with respect to those two countries. He expects active cooperation from Burma, and hopes for balevolent neutrality from India. He apparently does not feel much can be salvaged in Vietnam.

As you know, Bidault is not here and we will not know where French stand until Assembly debate completed, if then. If French continue negotiations, point will probably arrive shortly when deteriorating military situation will force them accept simple cease-fire in attempt temporarily salvage something. Therefore one question we may shortly face is what we and UK do if France insists on continuing negotiations somewhat longer. It is one thing to withdraw France negotiates an agreement with which we cannot publicly associate ourselves, and another to withdraw prior to that time.

Eden’s tactics recommend themselves very strongly to me.

Chauvel spoke to me after the above was dictated. In Bidault’s absence he and others have been considering recommending to Bidault that France and three Associated States together make appeal to UN. He had reports from Valley, part of which he read to me. He is obviously convinced that things will go badly in Delta. I made no comment except to suggest that Laos and Cambodia command a certain sympathy in Asia and Middle East which France plus Vietnam did not. I asked him categorically if France wanted to internationalize conditions we had tabled some time ago, saying neither you nor I knew where France stood. He replied that he did not know: that “Bidault still hoped to get something here.”

I would appreciate your thoughts and guidance. With respect Korea, Eden indicated he would probably speak next plenary (which we plan for Friday or Saturday). He would not be adverse to making this last session on Korea. However, not all of sixteen are yet prepared to do this. I do not know whether we will be able to get them lined up. If not, one more plenary may be necessary.

SMITH

* * *

266.1 GB/6-954 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 9, 1954—11 a.m.

Dulles 161. Repeated information Saigon 156, Paris 406, Eyes only Ambassadors. Re Tedul 171: My personal message to you (Dulles 157*) is a fair general commentary on General Valluy’s estimate of Southeast Asia situation, and I think it might be of some use to our Chiefs of Staff if you made it available to them together with the following specific comments on the numbered paragraphs of Valluy’s estimate:

1. I would modify his statement that if Tonkin is lost military line will not be reestablished anywhere to read “probably, will not be reestablished.” The unqualified “not”, and “anywhere” prejudices history and takes in too much territory.

2. I agree with two as a correct evaluation of the present situation, but to the concluding phrase “there would be no forces to man this line” I would add “unless other nations furnished them”.

3. Heath would agree that at present, there are “no southern Vietnamese who could oppose, northern Vietnamese”. I am unable to estimate.

4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. I agree thoroughly with this evaluation, except that we could, if we would, create ability of Thailand, Laos and Cambodia to assist.

9. Heath would agree with nine but would qualify statement that no Vietnamese would fight against other Vietnamese by saying that they would not fight effectively or long unless backed up by strong foreign forces. I am unable to estimate.

SMITH

* Dated June 7, p. 1068.
* Dated June 7, p. 1064.
5. I conveyed your feelings, as given in Tcedul 169, rather strongly to French, representing them as my own and that of Department, but of course the reply, at least by implication, is always to suggest considerations given in first paragraph of this message.

SMITH

561 GE/4-954: Telegram

Sixth Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 9, 3:05 p.m. - The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 9, 1954—midnight.

Secto 418. Repeated information Paris 410, Saigon 137, London 928, Tokyo 151, Moscow 113, Phnom Penh, Vietname. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCHE. Sixth Indochina Plenary Session, Wednesday, June 9, with Molotov presiding; Dinh (Vietnam) opened session with statement subdued in tone and ironic at Molotov's expense. He said he would not reply to Viet Minh's insults of their brethren but took issue with Molotov's false statement. He thanked Molotov for interest in independence of his country and referred well-known Soviet liberation of other small nations as evidence their action toward Eastern European countries since Yalta. He told Molotov that while Vietnam army has not yet had time to develop fully, soldiers fighting for their country should not be insulted. Dinh reminded conference of firm stand his delegation took which led to unanimous agreement by conference there should not be [be] partition of Vietnam and rejected Viet Minh proposals as in fact proposing partition which would give them power to perpetuate themselves in their areas.

Dinh came out strongly for international supervision of elections, as well as international supervision of implementation of armistice, which he said should be by UN. He rejected Soviet concept of Commission of India, Pakistan, Czechoslovakia, Poland pointing out that none of them had recognized Vietnam. UN would be impartial and neutral and most appropriate for armistice supervision. He recalled Soviet proposal December 24, 1948 for SC armistice commission in Indonesia. He also rejected Viet Minh concept that joint commission would be effective, citing Vietnam experience in 1946 to show joint commission never worked in practice.

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Phou Sauanhkone (Laos) followed with a résumé of his Government's position, stressing the difference between situation Laos, Cambodia on one hand and Vietnam on the other and repeated withdrawal of foreign invading forces would in fact result in cessation of hostilities. He said his Government's position is based on three points: (1) Laos is independent; (2) it has a democracy, united national government; and (3) there is no civil strife but only invasion of Viet Minh forces. He referred to tyranny and atrocities by invaders who pretend to champion liberty.

Turning to issues under discussion in relation to Vietnam, he said supervision must be effective and impartial which requires international neutral organ. Laos would prefer that it be UN which is most appropriate. An agreement cannot be reached on UN supervision as they are prepared to examine other possibilities, e.g., Asian countries such as Pakistan, Thailand, India, Ceylon and Philippines.

Following recess, Chou En-lai spoke, opening with statement that while some progress made this had been considerably short of expectation. He proceeded to summarize his delegation's views, starting with quotation of his May 27 6-point proposal (Secto 626 1), and elaborating on each point. He emphasized the following with reference numbers and paragraphs of proposal:

(1) Cease-fire must be simultaneous in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, even if procedurally at conference countries might be considered successively.

(2) Disposition of forces following cease-fire should apply to entire territory of Indochina, although since situation not entirely static, measures for settlement probably not same. He rejected idea that Communist forces in Cambodia and Laos should be evacuated, insisting they were local forces and therefore could not be removed from country. Chou En-lai also called for contacts between commanders in Indochina as well as in Geneva.

(3) It was essential to stop completely introduction of military personnel and material, which must include arms and personnel of United States. So far as supervision is concerned, Korean armistice agreement may be used for reference. Prohibition on such reinforcement must apply to all three Indochina states. As in Korean armistice agreement supervision should be divided between joint commission and neutral nations supervisory commission with terms of reference like case Korean armistice. Reference to composition of commission, he rejected argument that Communist states like Poland and Czechoslovakia cannot be neutral and said if Communist countries cannot be neutral either can capitalistic states, and it would be impossible to find un-neutral. Definition of neutrals he said should be that contained in Korean armistice agreement. If Communist states are barred from neutral nations' body, it will be impossible to reach agreement on composition.

* Dated May 27, p. 947.

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As to relationship between neutral nations supervisory commission and joint commission, neither should be subordinate to other, but both should have parallel and supplementary functions as in Korean armistice agreement.

Commission must operate by unanimity rule and not by majority. He rejected Smith criticism of NNSC into UN, saying it has been very effective, examining entry of over 2 million military personnel and over 7,000 US aircraft. Commission he said should not be prejudiced in favoring either side and must reflect views of both sides. He admitted there were disagreements in NNSC, but maintained this safeguarded Korean armistice agreement. If Poles and Czechoslovaks bar investigation of false US charges that PWs retained by Communists, Swiss and Swedish prevent investigation of US forcible retention and transfer to Taiwan of thousands of Chinese PWs. Indeed he said NNSC, which worked by majority, disregarded Polish and Czechoslovak views and has resulted in deadlock on forcible US retention of Communist PWs which still unresolved. NNSC on other hand has not taken action contrary to views of either parties and has therefore succeeded.

(4) Neutral nations supervisory commission should be responsible to countries providing international guarantees for peace in Indochina.

(5) UN supervision which has been proposed is unacceptable. Conference has nothing to do with UN and recent efforts to place Indochina question on UN agenda to step up intervention in Indochinese war makes it still less appropriate for UN to assume responsibility for supervising Indochinese armistice. Guarantees instead should be by participating states of conference who should agree to carry on consultation and adopt collective instead of individual measures in event of violation.

(6) View of experience re Dien Bien Phu personnel, agreement on exchange of PWs and interned civilians should present no problem.

After cease-fire throughout Indochina, PW question should be submitted for discussion in Geneva and in Indochina.

Chou En-lai concluded with attack on US efforts to extend war in Indochina, and prevent Geneva Conference from reaching agreement. He also attacked "war faction in France" which was seeking American intervention and enlarged aid and has adopted dilatory tactics at conference. Chou En-lai also charged us with intensifying activities to organize SEA bloc, thereby continuing to locate tensions in Far East and to threaten peace and security of Asia throughout the world. Recent treaties between French Government and Bao Dai running contrary to true independence for Vietnamese people also not conducive to early restoration of peace.

Finally, Chou En-lai said that military issues and political issues are interrelated and cannot be completely separated. On this point, he said Korean experience shows that these issues must be treated together since political conference pursuant to Article 6 proof Korean
armistice agreement never took place and Geneva Conference has produced no results so far and these political and military questions should be considered by conference along parallel lines and in rotation as suggested by Molotov. Meeting concluded with Smith statement contained in Secto 412. It was agreed to meet again in plenary Thursday, June 10.

Comment: Chou En-lai statement revealed no hint of concession and contained flat statements that it would be impossible to obtain agreement except on Communist terms, particularly re composition of neutral nations supervisory commission, its relation to mixed changes and unanimity provision in its operation. Believed it will harden UK and French positions.

Smith

*Intra.*

356.1 08/9224: Telegram

Sixth Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 9, 3:05 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

NIACOT

Secto 412. Repeated information Paris 403, London 262, Saigon 156, Tokyo 120, Moscow unnumbered. Department pass Defense Under Secretary’s statement at sixth Indochina plenary Wednesday, June 9: "Mr. Chairman, Fellow Delegates, as I listened yesterday to Mr. Molotov’s statement, and to that of Mr. Chou En-lai today, I felt a disappointment—shared, I am sure, by other delegations—at their unconstructive character. I had hoped for some definite response to our efforts toward compromise on basic issues. Since this has not been forthcoming and since we have had only a reiteration of accepted formulas which have been given us on a number of previous occasions, I feel that it is necessary now for me to comment on the charges reiterated on several occasions by Mr. Molotov and more insincerely, improperly repeated by Mr. Dong and Mr. Chou En-lai of aggressive designs and imperialistic intentions and deliberate deceptions and obstructions on the part of the US and of our friends and allies.

These charges are part of a familiar pattern. I am quite sure that Mr. Molotov, and probably Mr. Chou En-lai, do not themselves actually believe that they will be taken seriously, except possibly in those countries where the instrumentalities of government are devoted to the suppression of the distribution of accurate and unbiased information.

I would assume, therefore, that Mr. Molotov was not actually speaking to us, but rather the regimented audience in Europe and Asia which accepts the Cominform line. I believe, therefore, that it is sufficient for me, in reply, to say that the record of my country during and since the second world war is well known to the whole free world. We are quite willing to have our present and our future intentions judged from this record and I am sure that the confidence of our associates will not be diminished, and that of less fortunate people, if they were permitted to examine the record, would be restored.

We sometimes overlook the fact that we know a great deal, also, about the record of the Soviet Union during this same period and, in judging the present and future intentions of the Communist states and in assessing the validity of their proposals, I suggest we can learn more from reviewing this record than from such statements as those which our Communist colleagues have permitted themselves to make. For example, when Mr. Molotov and Mr. Chou En-lai speak of the national liberation movements of the peoples of Asia, I am at once moved to recall what Mr. Molotov and the government he has so long represented have actually done to affect the national aspirations of various smaller nations.

I would therefore remind you all of the mutual assistance treaties which the Soviet Union made in 1939 with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. On October 31, 1939, Mr. Molotov, as reported in the Soviet press, said of these treaties that they in no way imply any interference on the part of the Soviet Union in the affairs of Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania... on the contrary all of these pacts of mutual assistance strictly stipulate the inviolability of the sovereignty of the signatory states and the principle of noninterference in each other’s affairs... we stand for the scrupulous and punctilious observance of the pacts on the basis of complete reciprocity, and we declare that all the nonsensical talk about the Sovietization of the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs.

The fate which overtook Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania very soon after this verbally admirable statement by our eminent colleague is well known to all of us.

Have any of my colleagues forgotten the pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany dated August 23, 1939. Probably at one time Mr. Molotov considered this pact a diplomatic achievement, but I’m sure he must later have shared with the rest of us the bitter conviction that it paved the way first for the Nazi victories of the early years of World War II and then for the Nazi assault on the Soviet Union which cost the grave, long-suffering and wholly admirable Russian people so many millions of lives and such wide-spread destruction.
I have examined this pact and particularly the secret annex thereto, which has since been revealed, and I remain deeply impressed by the following words from the second numbered paragraph of this annex to which Mr. Molotov appended his signature on August 23, 1939:

'The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and that such state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments. In any event, both governments will resolve this question by means of friendly agreement.'

No attempts to justify this international immorality on the ground of exigencies existing at the time can possibly be acceptable and read in the light of this paragraph, the history of Eastern Europe between 1939 when Poland was destroyed and 1945 when Czechoslovakia lost her proud place as a free nation becomes unmistakably clear. The national aspirations of small, weak countries are to be subject to what is called the 'interests' of large aggressive powers with designs of world domination. What took place in Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania and Czechoslovakia constitutes in each case a chapter in the Soviet record.

It now begins to appear that one of the next chapters in this record may reveal an intention to subordinate the national aspirations of the people of Indochina to what has been termed the 'interests of both parties' as they may be represented by the treaty relationship between the Soviet Union and Communist China.

I should like at this point to bring to your attention another interesting quotation which will be familiar to Mr. Chou En-lai: 'Truce is the military counterpart of the political tactic of coalition govt. It is the means to an end, not the ultimate objective.' In the words of our colleague, the Foreign Minister of Communist China, gave to the familiar military truce a meaning entirely new in the history of war. That meaning was spelled out in a war of aggression in Korea and the same concept hangs over the battlefields of Indochina and it will be understood that it is for this reason, among others, that the majority of us have insisted on definite understandings regarding some of the vital issues that we are considering in our effort to bring peace in Southeast Asia.

Our objective and our hope are peace and security. Mr. Molotov himself will recall that at our first formal conference in Moscow in 1946 I stated that the vital question in the mind of the entire free world was, 'how much further is the Soviet Union going to go?'

I said also at that time that if the aggressive expansionism which the Soviet Union had already demonstrated, were to continue, the free world, purely in self-defense, would if necessary draw closer together.

The repressive effect of Soviet armed might was not soon felt in South or Southeast Asia as it was in Eastern Europe. Consequently, therefore, we saw, since the end of the last war, the peoples of this area make giant strides in attaining independence and the control of their own destinies. Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines have taken their place in the family of free nations. These developments have been viewed with the greatest satisfaction by the people of my country.

Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam have more recently joined the other free South and Southeast Asian nations in the achievement of independence, and it is our sincere hope that they will attain peace and security based on a true respect for the national aspirations of their peoples. Those national aspirations should not be subordinated as has occurred in the case of the unfortunate nations mentioned at the beginning of this statement, to the interests of a large aggressive power or powers.

The Soviet Union today is the great Asian imperial power, holding vast colonial territories in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The solicitude I have heard expressed by Mr. Molotov of the peoples of Southeast Asia apparently does not extend toward the Armenians, the Kazakhs, Mongols, and I think it might be worth the while of all my colleagues to recall the circumstances under which the former small independent state of Tanauva disappeared completely from the map.

I might say also to Mr. Pham Van Dong that accusations against the use of aggressive intentions and imperialist designs come rather strangely from his lips when we recall that the troops of the Viet Minh have invaded the peaceful countries of Cambodia and Laos, and have spread death and destruction there.

But, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, I intensely dislike these charges and countercharges. I have, so far, refrained from replying myself because of the really serious and important business facing this conference.

Having now recorded my testimony with regard to the matter of imperialism, I should like to return to consideration of the specific proposals before us. At this moment we are still confronted with three important issues which have been debated at length at a number of meetings and without result. The first of these is, as I and others of my colleagues said yesterday afternoon, the special nature of the problem existing in Laos and Cambodia.

I believe that both Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault unanswerably demonstrated the necessity of separate treatment for those two countries.
where peace would automatically be restored by the withdrawal of the invading Viet Minh force.

The second issue is that of the powers of the international supervisory commission for Vietnam. This commission must, obviously have the authority and facilities to settle any problems or differences which cannot be adjusted by the joint commissions of the belligerents and, logically, therefore, its decisions must be binding on those joint commissions.

The third vital issue is the composition of the international supervisory commission. As I and others of us said before, a commission containing states unable to meet the test of impartiality, e.g., that is, a commission, the counterpart of that set up in Korea, on which Communist state members have been able by veto to prevent effective supervision, is obviously an unsatisfactory and an unacceptable proposal. Yesterday the representative of the UK proposed the Colombo powers. I welcomed that proposal. This afternoon the representative of Vietnam proposed the UN. That would be acceptable.

Both are reasonable proposals. The proposal of the Soviet Union from my point of view, and I think from that of the majority of my colleagues, is not reasonable.

I am obliged to state that the Soviet, the Chinese Communists, and the Viet Minh Delegations have, so far, shown no signs of willingness to resolve these issues on any reasonable basis which could be acceptable to this conference, or which would inspire and insure the return of peace to Indochina. I hope that I am wrong, but the negative results of our last meeting seem to support this conclusion.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.”

—SMITH

386.1 GB/6-954 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Geneva, June 9, 1954—5 p.m.

Sects 408. From Suydam for McCurty. There follow pertinent excerpts Under Secretary’s briefing of American press this morning (full text pouch mail): “The Secretary had quite a press conference (yesterday) and we have just gotten the pertinent points of it here. I presume that it has been or is being made available to you.

... (he said), among other things, that the attitude of the Communists at Geneva in stepping up the war in Indochina, as he put it, ‘gives the lie to their greatly professed love of peace.’

As an example of their professed efforts to diminish international tensions, I think it is worth while that you take another good close look at what Mr. Molotov said yesterday. It really represented him at his cleverest. He didn’t address himself to substance at all. It was very apparent, as soon as he had gotten into his speech, that his purpose was to undermine as much as possible the position of M. Bidault in the debates which were scheduled to start today. He took almost at French foreign policy and at French military policy, and he had a few words to say about M. Bidault’s philosophy. He was pretty brutal about the losses of Dien Bien Phu, and he enlarged in considerable detail on the cost of the war to France. Then he really cast all manner to the wind, and so did his colleagues, because they then began to refer to the Vietnamese Government, which as you recall has been officially recognized by a great many nations, as the Bao Dai Government and the representative of the Bao Dai Government—a clever buildup...

In my opinion, Mr. Molotov’s attitude has stiffened considerably since his return from Moscow. Whether the Moscow visit itself contributed to that, I do not know. A certain indication of a willingness to cooperate, and possibly play the part of the slightly left-of-center middleman—as between the two extreme positions which some people might say are represented by Communist China and the US—has vanished.

There is a great deal more evidence of rigidity and aggressiveness...

Our attitude in connection with the Indochina phase of the discussion has been what of a friendly collaborator; we do not attempt, and have not attempted, to assert any particular leadership, giving advice where we thought it was desirable and supporting reasonable suggestions as they were made...

The Communist position in demanding international—or, as they call it, ‘neutral’—supervision of the ceasefire in Indochina, the counter part of the so-called Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea, we have had to reject. We have also had to maintain and reaffirm and re-affirm our position with regard to the special character of the problems existing in Laos and Cambodia. Mr. Eden made a very strong statement on it yesterday himself, recording unmistakably the British policy, which is identical with our own. He proposed a counter-proposition that of Mr. Molotov, that impartial international supervision might be provided by the Colombo powers, reminding the conference that the prime ministers at Colombo had passed resolutions and issued a communiqué which had been of some help, and at least by implication had suggested a very great interest. I thought,
Telegram, Li Kenong to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regarding Chinese Delegation’s Meeting with Many French People Delegations, June 9, 1954

Record No. 206-C0090

Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
During 32 days from 6 May to 6 June, the liaison team of our delegation has hosted 236 delegations of French people, totaling 2,015 visitors.

(1) The French people delegations consisted of many social groups and various professionals. Some of them belonged to the French National Labors Federation and came as worker representatives from many regions (provinces, cities, and towns) and from different industries, factories, or shops. Some were local citizen representatives. Some belonged to the French Peace Movement Committee and came as local branch committee members. Some were local representatives of the French Women Union. There were also representatives of students, teachers, veterans, disabled veterans, city council members, farmers, journalists from and missionaries. The workers’ delegations had the largest number among the others, about 36.5 percent of the total; the citizen delegations as the second, 21.1 percent; the women delegations, 14.6 percent; and the Peace Movement Committee delegations, 14.2 percent. These four groups totaled 86.8 percent.

Most of the citizen representatives were the local organizers of the Peace Movement Committee, using the name of the local citizen delegation. They included the local political parties (mostly the Communist Party, Social Party, and Progressive Social Party) and many professionals. They had a very broad representation. Most of these delegations came from the cities like Paris, Marseille, Lyon, and their surrounding towns. Each delegation had more than ten representatives at the most, and two or three at the least.

(2) During the meetings, all the delegations usually first expressed their fully understanding and trust of China’s policy for peace, and then showed their appreciations of China’s efforts at the Geneva Conference. Some of them presented certain gifts (for example, candies and books on New China by the French Communist Party). Two of the delegations found the 1920 photos that the Chinese students celebrated the “Double Tens” at St. Etienne. They said the Premier [Zhou] was there. One of the delegations presented us the receipts of French donation and aid to China during the Anti-Japanese War. They said that the receipts had been buried underground during the Hitler’s occupation, and were retrieved after the war and kept well until now. Since many of them had been ignored by the French and American Delegations, they complained loudly and called Bidault an America’s running dog, not French. They also complained the French government’s corruption and the people’s suffering. They hope that we understand the French government and Bidault by no means represent the French people. They appreciate our reception and hospitality during their visits. They also asked us to pass on their respects to Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou. Some of them were touched with tears (mostly the workers and women who were harmed by the war). The journalists from Marseillaise Daily headlined their visit on their newspaper, emphasizing China’s sincerity for peace. During their visits, they also raised some questions. Mostly, they asked about the conference progress and requested that China make all its efforts to quickly stop the Indo-China war. They hoped to see an establishment of the Sino-French diplomatic relationship in the near future and an expansion of the economic and cultural exchanges between the two countries. Some asked for the information on the development of New China. A few visitors, however, asked if China had ever provided military aid to Vietnam; whether China would also intervene if the United States wanted to internationalize the Indo-China war; and if China had religious freedom, etc. Some stated that they knew the American and French governments made rumors that China aided Vietnam with war materials. But they still asked for further explanations since they did not have any strong evidence to convince the public. In meantime, we also hosted two North Africa’s worker delegations (ten people) who were visiting France. They were so excited about Chinese people’s achievement in their liberation. They complained about the suffering of the North African people under the French imperialist exploitation and expressed the North African people’s strong desire for an immediate independence.

(3) The French Communist Party works with the French Labor Union and the Peace Movement Committee, which initiated and organized the French people delegations’ visits. Their efforts will be continuing according to the on-going visits (an average about 70 to 80 visitors everyday). Their visits to certain extends promote the development of the peace movement in France, and enhance the mutual understanding and friendship between the Chinese and French peoples. The visitors expressed particularly their hatred toward America and their complaints about the French government. They trust peace-loving and democratic nations’ sincere efforts for peace. Therefore, [they] should have our attention.

(4) We have appointed certain persons in charge of these meetings. The reception room is decorated with Chinese carpet, palace lamps, traditional paintings, and other artistic displays. The Chinese wine, tea, and cigarettes are served and propaganda materials and other souvenirs are offered. By 6 June, 398 Chairman [Mao]’s buttons have been given (mostly to the workers), 300 pigeons
buttons, and 5,370 pictorial or literary materials (including the English publications of the 1953 National Game, People's China, New China's Children, New China's Women, China Reconstruction, Chinese Folk Arts, Chinese Literature, and New China in the Eyes of Children, and the Journal of China in French). There have been thirteen photo pictures taken, 600 feet of film made, and twelve news reports published. Usually, as soon as the visitors arrived, they were met with kindness and enthusiasm. All of their questions during the meetings were answered. The delegations received adequate information on New China according to their different backgrounds. So far there hasn't been any problem. Since the buttons and propaganda materials were not stocked enough before hand, they have to be shipped in again and again. Only one publication is in French (but only a few visitors speak English). In meantime, the other shortcomings include the lack of systematic reading materials on various aspects of New China, and not enough news coverage on these meetings. These need to be significantly improved.

Li Kenong
June 9, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
be withdrawn and later be formed into divisions. I realized their lack of higher officers. They would have to use French staff officers at this stage and, of course, the National Army would be under the French High Command. Dinh said Bao Dai had instructed Buu Lac to take this matter up with Pleven but Buu Lac had had to return to Saigon before doing so.

I went on to say as a general proposition that when military crises occurred, the Commander-in-Chief should be on the ground. As I understood it, Bao Dai was Commander-in-Chief of the National Army just as our President, by constitutional right, was CIC of American armed forces.

Dinh said he understood no final decision had been taken on General O'Daniel's plan for a training mission and program for the Vietnam National Army. I agreed that this decision had not been taken but suggested that Bao Dai should take that matter up. I said that the independence treaty with France had only been initialed but not formally signed by the latter placed Vietnam and ourselves in a difficult situation. We felt the treaty should be signed and that Bao Dai should insist on the advantage to France and Vietnam of having the convention signed without further delay.

I said that I would be glad to talk again with Bao Dai if the latter so desired, and Dinh said he would urge him to come to the Geneva area.

Dinh raised the question of possibility of an early cease-fire which might be accompanied by a prohibition on arrivals of fresh troops and matériel. Such a provision would prevent the sending of an American training mission and equipment which the Vietnamese Army would require. I replied that a cease-fire on such lines might present certain but not insuperable difficulties. If a cease-fire were agreed upon it might be somewhat on the lines of the Korean arrangement which provided for the gradual withdrawal of foreign troops but allowed for their replacement by newly formed native divisions which would be entitled to bring in the necessary equipment.

After our talk, Heath asked Dinh the reason for the delay in concluding the negotiations for the supplementary financial, economic and cultural accords in Paris. Dinh replied that there had been some "foot dragging" on both sides but the delay was mainly due to the inexperience of the Vietnamese negotiators. Dinh said that if he and Dac Khe were not tied down in Geneva they could return to Paris and he thought, conclude the supplementary agreements within a week.

Smith
Comments:

Eden's remarks to effect that in crossing Laotian and Cambodian borders Viet Minh forces had crossed frontier between Chinese and Indian cultures is of interest as possibly reflecting Nehru's views.

Communist speeches today probably intensify for effect on French political situation as well as strictly speaking purposes. Member French delegation interpreted them as attempt put French delegation in position of having to defend Laos (who is very unpopular with certain sections French population) publicly and thus leaving Communists free to charge that failure of conference to make progress is due to French Government's support of "rotten Bao Dai regime".


lead to deadlock. My reason for refusing to accept such a proposal is not ideological. It is simply that it wouldn't work.

As to the working of such a commission as we propose, it will clearly be the desire of the impartial powers, if they be chosen, to try to reach agreement among themselves on every issue that comes before them. But if they fail to do so, they must have the right to decide by a majority. There can be no power of veto. May I remind our critics on this point that to insist on unanimity is to declare that you have no confidence in impartiality. The international commission must, therefore, be truly impartial, and must have the power to decide by majority. We, for our part, are firmly convinced that the representation of India and Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia would form a just and impartial commission.

Now what of the relations of this international commission with the mixed committees representative of the 2 commands? There is no dispute that the latter could do useful work in Vietnam. On the other hand, it has been admitted that even with the best will in the world, the 2 sides cannot be expected after 8 years of war to agree on every point. The warning of the representative of the State of Vietnam about the experience of 1954 should not be forgotten by the conference.

No one, therefore, attempts to deny that there will be differences, and they may well be frequent. How are they to be resolved? This is surely where the international commission will have its part to play. No doubt it will always seek to reconcile these differences. But if it is not always successful, in the event of failure, the international commission must have the authority to decide. There is no other alternative.

The conference has a clear choice, and we should face it. Either we can set up a commission which is impartial so we can make it, and give it the necessary authority and the power to take its decisions by a majority if need be, each of us trusting in its good faith, or we can at each phase interpose a veto, as some delegations proposed. According to the latter, the veto might be used in the international commission itself. It could next be used in the international commission. It might even be used once again if in the last resort a question was referred to representatives of this conference. This issue of effective and impartial international supervision seems to me to be crucial. I am sorry to have to record that after the debate of the last 2 days we are in my judgment further apart than ever upon it.

I come now to the third of the main issues which I wish to discuss—the future of Laos and Cambodia. There is no dispute that it is our duty to examine measures to restore peace in Laos and Cambodia, as in Vietnam; there is dispute as to what those measures should be. Reference has been made here to the existence of resistance armies in Laos and Cambodia, and to the fact that there are 2 belligerent sides in all 3 states—Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. This does not accord with the information which we have from our representatives on the spot. I think it my duty to give this all good faith to the conference.

Laos was first invaded by regular Viet Minh forces in April 1953. These forces came from northern Vietnam. They advanced to within 12 miles of the capital before they were defeated and driven back to the frontier area in northeastern Laos, where they have since remained.
In December, 1953, a further invasion took place. Regular Viet Minh troops advanced from the Vietnam border into central Laos. Their advance was driven back. But there are still many Viet Minh troops in the border areas of Laos. These are regular battalions belonging to Viet Minh divisions with their headquarters in Vietnam. Some of them have heavy weapons, including artillery and anti-aircraft guns. These regular Viet Minh units cannot be described as resistance movements.

On April 17, the Laotian Government formally notified HMG and other friendly governments of the violation of their frontier by the Viet Minh. On December 25, the Laotian Prime Minister appealed to world opinion against renewed aggression by regular units of the Viet Minh corps de battle.

Cambodia was invaded in April 1954. This was on the eve of this conference, and several weeks after we had agreed in Berlin to meet here to discuss the restoration of peace in Indochina. Once again the invaders were regular Viet Minh troops who crossed the border from Vietnam. They did not come to fight the French. These foreign invaders have in fact merely terrorized and battered the people of Cambodia. They hold no centre of any importance. On April 23 of this year, a formal protest by the Cambodian Government against Viet Minh invasion was delivered to the Secretary General of the United Nations.

The Laotian and Cambodian delegates have already told us the history of the two resistance movements in their countries. No one denies that there have been such movements in the past. But with all exceptions, the former members of these movements have now rallied to the support of the legitimate governments of Laos and Cambodia. Armed resistance now derives overwhelmingly from the Viet Minh. It is only since this conference was announced that even Communist spokesmen have pretended anything else.

Viet Minh aggression is not the only factor that distinguishes the problems of Laos and Cambodia from those of Vietnam. In race, religion, language and culture, the peoples of these 2 countries are fundamentally different from those of Vietnam. The Viet Minh invaders not only crossed a political boundary, they crossed the frontier that divides the 2 great cultures of Asia—the Indian and the Chinese. The Viet Minh delegate attempted to excuse this action by saying that there were Vietnamese minorities in Laos and Cambodia. That is true, but it no more justifies Viet Minh invasion of Laos and Cambodia than it justifies Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia. It is also true that, in recent years, the 3 different peoples of Indochina were united under French rule. That is no reason why they should now be united against their wishes under the rule of the Viet Minh.

To sum up, I repeat that there are now 3 chapters to our work. Military talks between representatives of the 2 commands are proceeding. As I have said, we await a report upon these. In respect, however, to the arrangements for supervision, and the future of Laos and Cambodia, the divergencies are at present wide and deep. Unless we can narrow them now without further delay, we shall fail in our task. We have exhausted every expedient of procedure which we could devise to assist us in our work. We all know now what the differences are.

We have no choice but to resolve them or to admit our failure. For our part, the United Kingdom delegation is still willing to attempt to resolve them, here or in restricted session, or by any other method which our colleagues may prefer. But if the positions remain as they are today, then it is our clear duty to say so to the world, and to admit that we have failed.  

SMITH

105.15 DU/4-1954 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

SAN FRANCISCO, June 10, 1954—6 p.m.  

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

1. The following my comments on Under Secretary's Dulse 164 repeated as Number 2 from Department.

1. I agree that Geneva is getting us nowhere in Indochina except backwards. The pendency of negotiations leads to delaying vital decisions on our side while the Communists pursue actively and vigorously their program of action in Indochina. I have hoped that they too might have had a program of action while Geneva was going on, but this the British rejected. The sooner the British get into a mood where we can seriously talk with them about collective action the better off we shall be. I agree with the issue he names but I could not agree that they are necessarily the only public issues on which we would break. For example, I feel that there has been a general lack of good faith and a use of Geneva as a cover to promote Communist aggression.

2. I have no particular opinion about Eden seeing Molotov again. Also I am quite sure that this action in that respect will not be influenced by either your opinion or mine. I conclude that there is some advantage in getting a better understanding by India and Burma provided this is not at the expense of alienating Korea, Formosa, the Philippines and Thailland. I know that the British look upon the former as their particular friends and the latter as our friends. But apart from this difference, the latter group are willing and able to fight and that is an element which I fear is conspicuously lacking in the former group.

1 Dated June 9, p. 183. The Secretary's comments were repeated to Under Secretary Smith in Geneva as telegram Tedal 155, June 11. (751.3/9-1154)

In telegram Tedal 155, June 10, Acting Secretary of State Murphy informed Smith that he had "forwarded your Dulse 164 to the Secretary and he is thinking about it. I doubt that any substantive comments can be forthcoming before his return Saturday (June 12) when we will know outcome of French confidence vote, but we will of course send you comments as soon as we can." (751.G.00.8-554)
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding Zhou’s Conversation with Bidault, June 10, 1954

Record No. 206-Y0050

Chairman [Mao], Comrade Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

In the evening of the 7th, Bidault visited me and discussed mainly the issue of the neutral nation supervision. He stated that the nature of the Korean issue was different from that of the Indochinese issue so the precedent case of Korea did not apply to Indochina. He didn’t agree that Poland and Czechoslovak join the supervision of Indochina. Regarding the membership, he said that only India and Pakistan were neutral nations, and that a neutral nation should be identified and accepted by all sides. But he didn’t mention any specific nation for a probe. During our conversations, Bidault expressed his willingness for peace, and he also hinted us not to put on any military pressure. He said, “Don’t worsen the military situation to slow the progress. Military situation will cause negative political reactions. Do not continue the war while discussing the peace, and do not use the war to antagonize the public feeling of the other side.” On one hand, Bidault said that he hope to obtain a cease-fire under the condition that the historical relationship between France and the three countries, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, was considered. On the other hand, however, he said that he opposed to mix and discuss the military and political issues together. Bidault also tried to find out a better chance for an agreement if the Korean and Indochinese issues were discussed together or separately; and a possible result on the entire Asian issue if the discussions were conducted behind a close door. I told him that the two issues certainly had impact on each other. They all should be solved, not just one, and let the other unsolved, or even try to block any solution. Bidault said that he could avoid the impact of the development of the Indochinese issues on his government and media. He also said that, if necessary, he may have to mention his conversation with me in his speech that would be sent to the Assembly on Wednesday (the 9th). But he didn’t say it definitely that he would publicize this matter. He may want to use his contact with China to calm down the complaints in the Assembly, but he was afraid of upsetting America. Bidault also told me that he may have to talk aggressively and offensively at the public meeting on the 8th. He wanted to make a statement ahead that “This won’t be a problem for me to continue the communication with the Chinese Delegation thereafter.” During the conversation, Bidault emphasized that my opinion was very close to his. His conversations with me were more constructive than those with other people. I talked about the issues of neutral nation supervision, experience of the Korean neutral national supervisory commission, and veto right. I also emphasized that both sides should follow the conciliatory spirits and look for their common points.

[Text below is omitted.]

Zhou Enlai
June 10, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and others, Regarding the Seventh Plenary Session, June 11, 1954

Record No.: 206-Y0050

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Li] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

(1) At the open session on the Indochina issue on the 10th, Pham Van Dong put forward the five-point proposal (the whole text has been dispatched back). Molotov rebutted in his presentation the attacks by Smith on the Soviet Union, pointing out that the United States on the one hand had produced all kinds of excuses to block and delay the reaching of an agreement, and on the other had held discussions in Washington for intervening the war in Indochina. Finally he requested that all participants of the conference acknowledge the interest of firmly establishing sound and reliable peace in Indochina while resolving military issues, and he also requested that resolving the political issue should first of all be the question of guaranteeing the independence and freedom of the three countries in Indochina and restoring each country's unification under the condition of holding general election. In his presentation, Eden, apart from repeating the proposal by the five countries in Colombo opposing the veto power, especially emphasized that the Viet Minh's "aggression" of Laos and was just like the means that Hitler had used to invade Czechoslovakia. He further threatened that "unless we are able to reduce our differences without delay, our task will fail." The representative of Cambodia emphasized in his presentation that Cambodia was different in national culture, religion and many other aspects with Vietnam, and had already achieved independence, and that the main problem [for Cambodia] was the "aggression" by the Viet Minh.

(2) The open session on the Indochina issue has achieved no result after debates lasting for three days. How the conference will continue will depend on the discussions by the Soviet Union and Britain as the two chairs [of the conference] outside of the conference.

Zhou Enlai
June 11, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
withdrawal Vietminh forces, but apparently not much discussion on this point.

Respect composition and operation supervisory commission, Molotov said that he was not necessarily opposed to having majority decisions on some questions, but remained firm on 50–50 composition. He rejected Eden's suggestion of each side adding one to the five Colombo powers. Molotov suggested conference might begin examination categories of questions upon which majority vote and unanimous vote of supervisory organization would be required. Eden rejected pointing out impracticability and lack of real distinction between majority and unanimous vote with 50–50 composition. Eden said Molotov mentioned published reports India would refuse to serve with Pakistan. (Eden said to us with some bitterness this reflected Monn's activities.)

Molotov asked Eden for another Indochina plenary Monday suggesting might return to restricted sessions after that. Eden demurred, pointing out fatality of sessions under present conditions, but Molotov was insistant. I said if session held would plan to make statement. We discussed without conclusion having Laos and Cambodia at Monday's session 2 indicate that as they had been unable to obtain any results at conference, were bringing their case before UN.

Smith

Conference Blues, lot 60 D 427, CP 427: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegate

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1954—1 p. m.

To Secs 406. It seems clear from Canberra's 290 and Tosey 371, other messages from Peexee and talks here with officials that Australians are convinced of the need for developing collective arrangements for Southeast Asia area. With recent development in Eden's position, it should be easier for Australia and New Zealand to assist in carrying project forward and I am sure Casey's return to Geneva will give you opportunity to enlist his aid. I understand he plans return home via Washington and in your discretion tell him I am delighted he plans stop in Washington and will look forward to opportunity of good discussions with him. Suggest to him that he let me know his plans as soon as they are firm.

Dulles

1 Repeated to Canberra as telegram 246.
2 Dated June 8. p. 1692.
Mr. Eden
Cc. 671.
June 12, 1954.

D. 2.15 p.m. June 12, 1954.
R. 2.27 p.m. June 12, 1954.

TOP SECRET

From Geneva Conference (United Kingdom Delegation) to Foreign Office

Cypher/OTP

Foreign Office Secret and
Mitchell Secret (Cabinet)

Distribution

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 671 of June 12
Repeated for information to: Paris and Washington.

M. Bidault came to see me last night before his departure for Paris.

2. He said that there had been a secret meeting between the
head of the French Military Delegation and the head of the Viet
Minh Military Delegation without the knowledge of the Viet
Namese. The Viet Minh representative had said that if the French
abandoned the whole of Tengking, satisfactory arrangements could probably be
made in relation to the rest of Viet Nam.

3. M. Bidault said that his colleague, M. Frederic DuPont,
as in favour of closing with this offer at once. He, M. Bidault,
thought that some hard bargaining should be done. Although he did
not believe stories which were being put about, according to which
the Viet Minh in the last resort might be prepared to allow the
French to keep Hanoi and Haiphong, he thought that it might,
evertheless, still be possible to retain some French interests in
Tengking. The difficulty was that most of the Viet Namene Army
was from Tengking and that if the whole or most of it were
surrendered the Viet Namene army would disintegrate. Most of the
Catholic priests of Indo-China were also to be found in Tengking and
French honour was heavily involved. Perhaps it would be possible
to keep a few bishops.

4. M. Bidault said that when the French representative had
mentioned Laos and Cambodia, the Viet Minh representative had shown
no interest in discussing them and had declined to do so.

5. I told M. Bidault that if I were in his position I would
concentrate with the negotiations in the military committee. There
was
TOP SECRET

Cable Geneva telegram No. 671 to Foreign Office

was, of course, no need to give the Viet Minh everything they asked at once and the French representative would have to be tough. But time was not on the side of the French and the sooner these military negotiations could be concluded the better it would be. I thought that the other side might be anxious that they should succeed. It looked almost certain that the discussions being conducted by the full conference would lead nowhere. The only hope was in the military committee.

6. M. Bischult appeared to think my advice was sound. He emphasized the secrecy of the information which he had given me and said that he had communicated it to no other foreigner except General Bedell Smith.

7. See my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office please pass to Paris and Washington as my telegram No. 138 and 225 respectively.

[Repealed to Paris and Washington].
SECRET

GENEVA, June 12, 1954—4 p.m.

Dulles 175. Repeated information Paris 438. Gramyko told me yesterday that Commlists could not accept Colonbo Powers for Indo-chinese Supervisory Commission. He asked what was “minimum” US position. I reaffirmed that US could not accept “50-50” composition that Laos and Cambodian must be treated separately and that we would not associate ourselves with any form of capitulation on principle in Indochina.

SUMMARY

Editorial Note

On June 12, the government of Joseph Laniel was defeated in the National Assembly on the issue of Indochina by a vote of 306 to 222. The government resigned the following day. In despatch 3873 from Paris, June 30, the Embassy transmitted a detailed analysis of the debates leading to the fall of the Laniel government. (751G.007.3054)

On June 17, Pierre Mendès-France was elected Premier of France by the National Assembly. The vote was 419 to 47 with a large number of abstentions. In his statement of policy delivered prior to the vote, Mendès-France undertook to resign if he were unable to obtain a cease-fire in Indochina on reasonable terms by July 20.

Mendès-France formally took office on June 18. He also assumed the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs.

JUNE 19, 1954

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 622

Memorandum by Richard V. Hennes to the Head of the United States Delegation (Smith)

CONFIDENTIAL

[GENEVA,] June 18, 1954

GENERAL SMITH: The London Times article directly charged the Secretary with accusing Eden of going back on his agreement prior to the Geneva Conference. The fact that this article was one you in one copy, that another copy was then given me means delivering the text of the Secretary’s speech is a considerable degree of British concern. Although about one-third of the article referred to the Secretary’s reference to Stimson, which was the main point of Mr. Eden’s complaint, it seems likely that Eden’s real concern is at his being publicly charged with breaking faith.

The Stimson argument has been going on for years. Most reputable diplomatic historians in the US and UK have concluded that neither the US nor Great Britain was willing to stop the Japanese in Manchuria in 1931–1932. This conclusion is closer to the British position than to the one expressed by the Secretary. The latter has had some currency in journalistic circles in the US.

With regard to the section impugning Eden’s reliability, which was changed by the Secretary at your request, I would suggest that the British had intercepted somewhere along the line the original text and were positive of the meaning and therefore reacted to it rather than to the modified language. A comparison of the two versions is attached.

I suggest that you might tell Mr. Eden that we have a public opinion problem, that considerable segments of our population are firmly convinced that we were duped into two world wars by evil foreigners, and that collective security may be made more acceptable to these isolationist elements if it is presented with a made-in-America tag. By depicting the foreigner as an instant and, in particular, by twisting the lion’s tail,” we have a far better chance of bringing our isolationists along in a united action.

You might wish to refer to your personal knowledge of mid-Western sentiment if you use this rationalization.

RVH

Original Text

The British and French governments said that they were ready to take part with the other countries principally concerned in an examination of the possibilities of establishing a collective defense. But the British government subsequently concluded that any such examination should await the results of the Geneva Conference. The French also were still hesitant on “internationalization.”

Delivered Text

I went to Europe in this mission and it seemed that there was agreement on our proposal. But when we moved to translate that proposal into reality, some of the parties held back because they had concluded that any steps to create a united defense should await the results of the Geneva Conference.

Original Text

The morale of the French and national forces is strained under the prospect of mounting enemy power on their front and political vacillation at their rear.

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (U.K. DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden
No. 676
June 12, 1954

D. 6.31 p.m., June 12, 1954
R. 7.46 p.m., June 12, 1954

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 676 of June 12.
Repeated for Information to: Washington, Paris, Moscow, Saigon

I spent an hour with Mr. Molotov this morning discussing the conference's work on Indo-China. As usual he was friendly but there was little sign of any real change in his position. His general attitude was that it was now up to us to make the next move on the various questions in dispute.

2. I started by drawing the balance of our discussions. It was good that military talks had been started and, although progress was slow, I had heard no serious complaints. On the other hand, it was bad that we had still reached no agreement on the two main outstanding questions of the composition and powers of the supervisory commission and of Laos and Cambodia. On the composition of the supervisory commission, we had now put forward our counter proposal. On Laos and Cambodia, we had likewise stated our views. I should be glad to know what comments Mr. Molotov had to make.

3. Mr. Molotov first said that he still hoped it might be possible, if only in general terms, to discuss the political problems that would arise in all three states after the cessation of hostilities. Mr. Dulles was always proclaiming that the three states had not yet received an adequate measure of independence so it was clear we could not by-pass these political problems altogether. Perhaps the proposals for a political settlement put forward by the Viet Minh could not be accepted in their entirety, but it should be possible to reach agreement on some general principles. It was desirable, in fact, to state that free elections would be held in each of the three States. They should be held reasonably soon but it might not be necessary to specify a definite time-limit.

4. I recalled that the representative of Laos had recently indicated that after the withdrawal of Viet Minh troops, elections would be held in his country in which all sections of the population would be able to participate without discrimination. Provided it were made clear, therefore, that there would first be a withdrawal of foreign troops from Laos and Cambodia, I thought it might be possible to consider having some discussion of the political steps that might be taken in all three states after the cessation of hostilities.

5. On Laos and Cambodia,
5. On Laos and Cambodia, Mr. Molotov said he thought we should make no progress if both sides continued to insist on securing acceptance in advance of their own view of the situation. We thought that there were Viet Minh troops in two countries that should be withdrawn and the Viet Minh were not prepared to accept that view of the situation. In these circumstances, the only likely avenue of progress seemed to lie in direct military talks. The conference had already agreed that there should be a simultaneous cessation of hostilities in all three states. It might be possible for military representatives to find some concrete questions to discuss relating to the cessation of hostilities in Laos and Cambodia without raising in advance the contentious issue of withdrawal of Viet Minh troops.

6. I said that I did not see how the Laotians and Cambodians, for instance, could accept this without making plain their view that the staff talks were concerned with the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces. If that were done, the Viet Minh would presumably have to state that they disagreed. We should then be as far forward as I had given to the conference the information which I had received from our own representatives on the spot on the situation in the two states and we believed this information to be a true picture.

7. Mr. Maleev then returned to the question of supervision. He first asked whether we could take it that there was agreement on the question of mixed commissions. I replied that I thought the principle of mixed commissions was accepted for Viet Nam but that there was still a difference on the relationship between the mixed commission and the International commission. Mr. Maleev then asked whether there was agreement on the question of the guarantee, and particularly on the principle that the guarantees should understate collective action in the event of a violation. He thought the question of the guarantee important in order to prevent disputes and an intensification of tension between the guaranteeing Powers for the period of time that would be necessary after the conclusion of any agreement on Indo-China to ensure the pacification of the area. I replied that again I thought there was general agreement on the principle of a guarantee, but of course the application of this idea had not yet been worked out in any detail. On our side, importance was attached to ensuring that no one Power should be able to prevent the guarantee from being effective.

8. As regards the International commission, Mr. Maleev suggested two possible courses: either his proposal for a Four-Power commission might be accepted with provision for decisions by majority vote; or the question of composition of the commission could be reconsidered in conjunction with provision for decisions by majority vote on some questions and by unanimity on others. I said that I thought his first proposal, which would mean that decisions could only be taken by a vote of three to one, did not seem to me to help much. His second proposal might possibly be examined, though it seemed to me complicated and difficult to work out in practice. In reply to my question, Mr. Maleev confirmed that he did not regard my proposal for the Colombo Powers as acceptable since it was too one-sided. I said that I had considered whether one Communist and one non-Communist state might not be added to the five Colombo Powers, but that I thought this would make the commission too unwieldy. Mr. Maleev
SECRET

Geneva Conference (UKDEL) telegram No. 376 to Foreign Office

3-

agreed and said that, in addition, he still thought that the commission should reflect adequately the views of both sides. I asked whether this meant that he wanted two Communist representatives, i.e., both Poland and Czechoslovakia, on any commission. He said that he did. He then remarked that it had been suggested to him that India would not serve on the same commission with Pakistan. I replied that I hoped this would not prove to be a really serious cause of difficulty.

0. Mr. Molotov finally raised the question of further meetings and said that perhaps there might be a further plenary meeting next Monday, after which consideration should be given to the possibility of further restricted meetings. I said that I thought the arrangements for our future meetings must depend on whether any new approach could be found to any of the outstanding problems. It was agreed that we should each report to our friends upon our conversations and that I should let Mr. Molotov know when I was ready for a further talk.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington, Paris, Moscow and Saigon as my telegrams Nos. 227, 160, 63 and 65 respectively.

(Repealed to Washington, Paris, Moscow and Saigon.)
SECRET

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION) TO

FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WHITEHALL SECRET
(CABINET) DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden

No. 677
June 12, 1954

D: 7.00 p.m. June 12, 1954
R: 7.17 p.m. June 12, 1954

PRIORITY
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 677 of June 12
Repeated for information to: Washington
Paris.

My telegram No. 676. /D/07/610

I called on Bedell-Smith to tell him the result of my
talk with Molotov. I said that on the principal outstanding
questions in Indo-China the only new proposal which Molotov
had made was for military discussions between the staffs for
the preparation of a cessation of hostilities in Laos and
Cambodia. The suggestion that the terms of reference should
be left vague might be meant as a face saver; it could
equally be a time-waster, and I suspected the latter.

2. Bedell-Smith said that he was strongly of the opinion that
it was merely intended to waste time. He then gave me the
gist of two telegrams which he had just received. The first
was a message from the United States Chargé d'Affaires
in Saigon giving an extremely gloomy account of the political
and military situation. It concluded that the French were
laying their plans to get out of Viet-Nam and that only the
presence of American ground forces could restore the position.

3. The second telegram was a plain spoken personal message
from the President. It advised Bedell-Smith to do everything
in his power to bring this conference to an end as rapidly as
possible. In the President's view, the Communists were only
spinning things out to suit their military purposes and the
time had now come to decide where the West intended to draw
the line in South-East Asia. He was convinced that the
Communists would carry on until such a line had been drawn and
the Communists warned "thus far and no further". In forging
this chain the missing link was the United Kingdom since Her
Majesty's Government could not be brought to decision while

/the........
SECRET

Geneva Conference (U.K. Delegation) to Foreign Office

the Geneva conference continued, it was imperative to bring the conference to a close without delay.

1. I said that it might be that it was a Communist rather than a Western advantage to continue the conference. But the French had an important interest in any decision.

5. We then agreed that I should see the French, Lao and Cambodian delegations in order to inform them of my talk with Molotov. I should then see Bedell-Smith to discuss tactics further.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 228 and 161 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington and Paris].

V V V V V
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, June 12, 1954 — 4 p. m.

Dulles 175. Repeated information Paris 423. Czynko told me yesterday Communists could not accept Colombo Powers for Indochinese Supervisory Commission. He asked what was "minimum" US position. I reaffirmed that US could not accept "50-50" composition, that Laos and Cambodia must be treated separately, and that we could not associate ourselves with any form of manipulation on principle in Indochina.

SMITH

Editorial Note

On June 12, the government of Joseph Laniel was defeated in the National Assembly on the issue of Indochina by a vote of 306 to 293. The government resigned the following day. In despatch 3373 from Paris, June 30, the Embassy transmitted a detailed analysis of the debates leading to the fall of the Laniel government. (T51G.06/6-3054)

On June 17, Pierre Mendès-France was elected Premier of France by the National Assembly. The vote was 419 to 47 with a large number of abstentions. In his statement of policy delivered prior to the vote, Mendès-France undertook to resign if he were unable to obtain a cease-fire in Indochina on reasonable terms by July 20.

Mendès-France formally took office on June 18. He also assumed the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs.

JUNE 12, 1954

Conference file, lot 60 D 627, CP II 22

Memorandum by Richard V. Hennes to the Head of the United States Delegation (Smith)

CONFIDENTIAL


General Smith: The London Times article directly charges the Secretary with accusing Mr. Eden of going back on his agreement prior to the Geneva Conference. The fact that this article was sent to you in one copy and that another copy was then given our messenger delivering the text of the Secretary’s speech, indicates a considerable degree of British concern. Although about one-third of the article is devoted to the Secretary’s reference to Stimson, which was the burden

1 Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State, 1929–1933.

of Mr. Eden’s complaint, it seems likely that Eden’s real concern is at his being publicly charged with breaking faith.

The Stimson argument has been going on for years. Most reputable diplomatic historians in the US and UK have concluded that neither the US nor Great Britain was willing to stop the Japanese in Manchuria in 1931–32. This conclusion is closer to the British position than that to the one expressed by the Secretary. The latter has had some currency in journalistic circles in the US.

With regard to the section impugning Eden’s reliability, which was changed by the Secretary at your request, I would guess that the British had intercepted somewhere along the line the original text and were positive of the meaning and therefore reacted to it rather than to the modified language. A comparison of the two versions is attached.

I suggest that you might tell Mr. Eden that we too have a public opinion problem, that considerable segments of our population are firmly convinced that we were duped into two world wars by evil foreigners, and that collective security may be made more acceptable to these isolationist elements if it is presented with a made-in-America tag. By depicting the foreigner as reluctant and, in particular, by “twisting the lion’s tail,” we have a far better chance of bringing our isolationists along in a united action.

You might wish to refer to your personal knowledge of mid-Western sentiment if you use this rationalization.

RVH

[Attachment]

Original Text

The British and French governments said that they were ready to take part with the other countries principally concerned in an examination of the possibilities of establishing a collective defense. But the British government subsequently concluded that any such examination should await the results of the Geneva conference. The French also were still hesitant on “internationalization”.

Delivered Text

I went to Europe in this mission and it seemed that there was agreement on our proposal. But when we moved to translate that proposal into reality, some of the parties held back because they had concluded that any steps to create a united defense should await the results of the Geneva conference.

Original Text

The morale of the French and national forces is strained under the impact of mounting enemy power on their front and political vacillation at their rear.
Delivered Text

The French and national forces feel the strain of mounting enemy power on their front and of political uncertainty at their rear.

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

Geneva, June 13, 1954—2 p.m.

Dulles [75]. During Eden's visit yesterday I read to him suitably expurgated extracts your Tocen 406,\footnote{1} emphasizing particularly the importance of collective action and the time already lost without serious talks. I said this represented the strong view of the President and myself, and that while I realized sensitive position of Britain re own public opinion India and Burma, etcetera, I was sure that in this matter we had been right from beginning. Eden repeated that Churchill "would not send troops to Vietnam". I said that if French could hold Hanoi-Haiphong area, or Haiphong and an enclave along coast, we should decide where to draw line on which we take our stand in South Vietnam and elsewhere in SEA. If the military talks in Washington were making any progress they should at least have the alternative ready for consideration and decision at the time of the PMs visit.

I then spoke of the political and psychological factors re withdrawal part of UK forces from Korea and critical nature of period after Geneva. Eden said there was nothing imminent on this and they intended to leave it for discussion in Washington.

New subject. I have just had long talk with Casey and conveyed message your Tocen 406.\footnote{2} He plans to return via Washington and will let you know. He is convinced of necessity of collective guarantees on Cambodia, Laos, and what can be saved of Vietnam. Also convinced that there must be, as he put it "teeth in those guarantees. He has expressed these views strongly to Nehru, saying that he hoped the same group Asiatic and European nations that gave the guarantees would provide the teeth, and that India and Pakistan would associate themselves with such a group. Nehru did not reject this, and had apparently discussed it later and at length with Piilai and Mrs. Pandit, who were present at dinner that evening; discussion continues. Casey felt that when he left, Nehru was favorable, but that influence of Menon, with whom he talked last night, would continue to be bad.

Sincerely,

\footnote{1}{Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Department of State, June 12, repeated to Geneva as Tocen 185, June 11, p. 1117.}
\footnote{2}{Dated June 12, p. 1125.}

\footnote{3}{Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Department of State, June 12, repeated to Geneva as Tocen 185, June 11, p. 1117.}
done about this since General Ely had indicated some weeks ago his acquiescence. Margeris said that unless we got our training personnel in soon a cease-fire arrangement would probably freeze the situation in such a way that it would be impossible for us to introduce additional personnel at a later date.

Margeris commented that we should consider the foregoing comments to be his own and not necessarily reflecting precisely the views of Bidault or how his chief would express them at this time.

As set forth in Embt 4790 June 9, in his speech before the National Assembly on Wednesday, Bidault nowhere mentioned the U.S. or its role in Indochina or at Geneva, and we got the impression from Margeris that Bidault's feeling toward the U.S. is becoming increasingly bitter, primarily for the reasons outlined in paragraph 1.

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*Not printed.*

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395.1 GB/8-1454: Telegram

Smith-Eden-Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, June 14, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NLC

Gr 173, June 14, 1954—10 a.m.


Eden reported he had informed Laotian and Cambodian delegations of Molotov's suggestion for military talks with those countries (Dulles 176) and that he had replied that he could not consider such talks unless it was clear that government would be about withdrawal of Viet Minh troops. Cambodians had no objections to a plenary or restricted session on Laos and Cambodia, provided it was clearly understood they would not raise issues.

Eden also reported that Laotians have asked his advice on whether their appeal to UN and Cambodians had indicated if they failed to get satisfaction at this conference they could take their case elsewhere. Eden said he considered it necessary give both delegations clear indication of his views. He proposed tell both of them that having failed to secure at Geneva withdrawal of Viet Minh forces, if they thought the right to appeal to UN on ground their territories had been invaded, they could count on UK approval and support. However, ground would need preparing here, possibly by asking for early meet

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*Dated June 18, p. 1194.*
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Fourteenth Plenary Session, June 13, 1954

Records No: 206-Y1050

(Top Secret)

Chairman Mao, Comrade Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

The delegations of six countries of the Western camp spoke at the open meeting on the Korean issue on the 11th. Six countries (France, with Britain and Canada taking the initiative among other five countries and New Zealand, Belgium and Thailand giving their support) stated unanimously that if the conference cannot reach any agreement on the Korean issue, it should be returned to the United Nations. Although Bidault was usually least interested in the Korean issue, he suddenly became active at this meeting in order to obtain more votes when the French Parliament decides on the motion of confidence on the 12th. He returned from Paris and intentionally showed the spirit of conciliation in proposing five ambiguous principles at the plenary session on the Korean issue. In his proposals, Bidault briefly mentioned that elections should be held throughout the territory of Korea, and also raised the issues of the withdrawal of foreign forces and international supervision. However, instead of emphasizing the necessity of the United Nations supervision, he simply said that “when once the unification has been carried out under legitimate conditions, the UN should be called upon to give their sanction (to this settlement thus reached)” From our side, both NAM and I spoke and expressed our complete support of Molotov’s five-point proposal presented on the 5th. We also proposed that the conference should adopt this proposal as the basis for further discussion. I not only fought back Smith’s threatening statement on the 5th that he would appeal to world opinion, but also focused on exposing his plot to disrupt the negotiations. I pointed out that since both sides had already achieved agreement on several points and agreement might be possible for some other points, there was no reason that the conference should not continue. The current situation is that the United States and South Korea want to sabotage the negotiations on the Korean issue, however, other countries who attended the sixteen countries’ meeting on the 4th did not agree. Since Molotov’s five-point proposal on the 5th was full of the spirit of conciliation, it made it difficult for our counterparts to reject it completely. Therefore, the United States cancelled the planned restricted session on the Korean issue on the 9th. At the same time, the US is attempting to mould public opinion and is preparing to end the negotiations at the right moment. At the plenary session on the 11th, the United

States therefore instigated the six countries to distort our arguments recklessly and to emphasize that the differences could not be resolved, and attempted to end the conference by proposing to return the Korean issue to the United Nations. However, though the six countries’ delegations’ statements, we perceived that there were still differences among them. Although all six countries defended the United Nations, five of them did not support Pyong Yung Tai’s sixteen-point proposal directly. Neither was their support of the United States enthusiastic. Bidault’s proposals were not quite in step with the other five countries’ statements. Neither did he raise the issue of the United Nations’ supervision. Bidault simply said that [the settlement of the Korean issue] should be reported to and obtain ratification from the United Nations. Therefore, it is still difficult for them to end the meetings on the Korean issue immediately. Our side plans to let NAM II propose our second original plan in next week’s meetings on the Korean issue.

Zhou Enlai
June 13, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
done about this since General Ely had indicated some hours ago his acquiescence. Margeris said that unless we get some firm personal in soon a cease-fire arrangement would probably freeze the situation in such a way that it would be impossible for us to introduce additional personnel at a later date.

Margeris commented that we should consider the foregoing comments to be his own and not necessarily reflecting precisely the views of Bidault or how his views would express them at this time.

As set forth in Document 4710 June 8, in his speech before the National Assembly on Wednesday, Bidault nowhere mentioned the U.S. or its role in Indochina or at Geneva, and we got the impression from Margeris that Bidault's feeling toward the U.S. is becoming increasingly bitter, primarily for the reasons outlined in paragraph 1.

Dillon

\*Not printed.

395.1 GE/6-1454: Telegram

Smith-Eden-Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, June 18, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

Grenata, June 14, 1954—10 a.m.


Eden reported he had informed Laotian and Cambodian delegations Molotov's suggestion for military talks with those countries (Duluth 175) and that both had replied could not consider agreeing such talks unless it was clear they would be about withdrawal of Viet Minh troops. Cambodia had no objections to a plenary or restricted session on Laos and Cambodia, provided it was clearly understood they would not modify their attitude.

Eden also reported that Laotians have asked his advice on whether they should appeal to UN and Cambodians had indicated if they failed to get satisfaction at this conference they could take their case elsewhere. Eden said he considered it necessary give both delegations clear indication his views. He proposed tell both of them that having failed secure at Geneva withdrawal of Viet Minh forces, if they thought it right take their case to UN on ground their territories had been invaded, they could count on UK approval and support. However, ground would need preparing here, possibly by asking for early meet-

\*Dated June 18, p. 1124.(1)

Eden indicated he was thinking in terms Laos and Cambodia bringing their case to UN as aggression, moving first to Security Council and then immediately to General Assembly under Part A Uniting for Peace Resolution, stating that "If we mean to draw a line, this is the way we might do it."

Eden also stressed view that if conference drags on and Viet Minh take advantage situation switch troops for major invasion of Laos and Cambodia, we would bear heavy responsibility if we had discouraged then from proceeding to UN. He also said he strongly felt we were losing by staying on any longer; the time had come to recess the conference while French-Viet Minh military talks continued. If anything developed from those talks which should be reported to conference, it could be reconvened.

Chauvel professed ignorance of Bidault's thinking, repeating French view on getting POC into Cambodia and Laos through Thai appeal. He made obscene statement to effect that in "underground military talks" with Viet Minh which are going on simultaneously with military staff talks, Viet Minh had said there was no chance getting anything in Vietnam if French position on Laos and Cambodia maintained. He said in these talks French had feeling that the Chinese were pushing Viet Minh move into Laos and Cambodia and that Viet Minh were not in control that situation. Stated he felt question Laos and Cambodia appeal to UN only one of timing and that effort should first be made get military talks going on satisfactory basis for Laos and Cambodia, and if this failed those two countries should go ahead with appeal to UN.

I said that I did not see why appeal by Laos and Cambodia under Part A Uniting for Peace Resolution should interfere with action on Thai appeal—they could both go along together. However Thai appeal should be pressed as both would take about same time. I raised question of what effect separate appeal by Laos would have on writing off Viet-

Man Eden and Chauvel both thought that there was basic difference between situation in Laos and Cambodia and that in Vietnam both with respect to actual conditions on the spot and with respect to conference, that appeal by Laos and Cambodia would not have harmful effects on Vietnam; that is, Laos and Cambodia were clearly victims external aggression and with respect to conference military talks were going on in Vietnam, whereas no basis for military talks on Laos and Cambodia had been found.
I fully agreed that things should be wound up here as quickly as possible so that we can get ahead on serious talks on collective action as only real means of improving situation. I said important decisions must be made, and this cannot be done while unprofitable debate is going on here. Only if the Communists believe we are going to do something is there likely to be improvement in present situation, and the sooner we get ahead on this, the better.

Eden said that if the Cambodian and Laotian delegations agreed, he would see Molotov Monday morning and suggest an early meeting on Laos and Cambodia, while warning Molotov that there is no change in the basic position on our side.

Eden said in deference to French views, he would not yet inform Laos and Cambodia they could count on UK approval and support, but would otherwise talk to them along lines set forth second paragraph this message.

During course conversation Chauvel said it was obvious that "official" military staff talks will not and cannot get anywhere; (in characteristic Chauvel fashion) he has hopes that the very secret "underground" military talks are going on simultaneously might get some place (Duluth 173*). He is anxious that at least official military talks continue to provide cover for secret talks. Chauvel said he was going to phone Bidault and urge he return to Geneva Monday.

[Here follows a paragraph which dealt with Korea; for text, see page 372.]

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* Dated June 12, p. 1126.

JUNE 14, 1954

294.1 GR/6-1454 : Telegram

Heath—Dac Khe-Bonial Meeting, Geneva, June 14, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

Geneva, June 14, 1954—8 p.m.

SEC 437. Repeated information Paris 430, Saigon 164. Dac Khe, Vietnam Minister of Democratization and Deputy Chief of Geneva delegation, talked to Ambassador Heath and Bonsal this morning.

In Dac Khe’s view, there was a course of action which could save Vietnam from complete takeover by the Communists. That would be for Bao Dai to return immediately to Vietnam to be with his troops and to back up a new government presided by Ngo Dinh Diem, in campaign of official austerity, honesty of pitiless severity against past and present governmental grafters. That was the first step. The next step must, in Dac Khe’s view, be a program of real agrarian reform and social betterment for the peasant 5/4ths of the population. The American economic aid program should be revised to serve exclusively needs of the agricultural population. A third step, which Dac Khe personally favored, was creation of a consultative assembly of limited legislative powers but inclusion the right to legislate on the budget.

A major reason that Viet Minh had made progress was general disbelief in the various Bao Dai governments to date. If elections were held at present, Viet Minh would win it. If really free supervised elections were held six months from now, neither the Viet Minh nor Bao Dai would gain a majority. But this situation could be changed substantially for the better in a matter of days or weeks. The new regime should arrest and send to Phouc Condor, the grafters, of which the government has already a list, preferably shooting the 4 or 5 most guilty.

There would be time successfully to initiate these reforms measures Dac Khe thought. In spite of French desire for a cease-fire, it would be almost impossible for the French to arrive at a negotiated cease-fire in the immediate future in view of Viet Minh intransigence and Vietnamese resistance to such a move.

Bao Dai’s stock had fallen in Vietnam since 1949, Dac Khe said, but so had Ho Chi Minh’s. Bao Dai had retained, however, a residual prestige which could be improved.

Dac Khe said that while Bao Dai lacked character, he, nevertheless, could be persuaded to undertake the decisive action necessary, but only the United States seconded by France could “persuade” Bao Dai to go into action.

There had to be plain talk of a firmness that neither France nor the United States had yet used with Bao Dai. It would be a most disagreeable interview for both sides because the past failings of Bao Dai and his governments would have to be frankly reviewed. Dac Khe suggested that Bao Dai would accept Heath’s criticism and recommendations because of his belief in the latter’s friendship.

Heath and Bonsal listened to all this without comment. When Dac Khe said, however, that Bao Dai would probably insist on assurance of American backing if he took the action requested, Heath remarked that some weeks ago when Bao Dai said he would insist on autonomy for Vietnam national army, Dac Khe had said to him that was a request to be made from the field of battle and not from Cannes or Paris. Heath asked why the same observation would not apply for a request for foreign backing; viz., if Bao Dai and his regime showed improved
performance and action on the ground, then would be the time to ask their friends for support. Dac Khe agreed.

Returning to Diem, Dac Khe said he would be an excellent man to lead off in exterminating corruption but would not be good in rallying the peasants. Diem was essentially a mandarin of the ideal type described by Confucius. Diem's criticism of Bao Dai's regimes was that there were too many mandarins of the bad type. Diem was an honest mystic of an age that had passed. Diem did not believe in agrarian reform except of an administrative mandarin type. He did not believe in a popular assembly. Both these measures, particularly the first, in Dac Khe's opinion, were absolutely necessary. The latter personally favored calling a special peasant congress to determine the character of an agrarian reform. A strong government could guide the deliberations of such a congress and not let it get out of hand as did the "national congress" of last October.

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SMITH

386.1 GE/6-1454: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET  PRIORITY

Geneva, June 14, 1954—9 a.m.

Dulles 180. Eyes only and personal for Secretary from Under Secretary. From his own statements and from other evidence Eden intends to pack up and depart Thursday at latest, taking most of his delegation with him. He will probably leave one or two officers as observers. Bidault will be here from time to time but will probably leave Chauvel in charge while military talks are going on. As indicated in my Dulles 170, French pin hopes on what Chauvel referred to as the "underground" conversations, which are presumably proceeding under cover of the military talks, and think that while these go on, Vietminh will not make all-out attack on Hanoi. I would think that Molotov will leave about the time Eden does, if we have by then brought things to a head, and I believe we also should depart about the last of this week, leaving a State officer, a military officer, and a stenographer, as observation and reporting group.

Think it is vital to get breaking off issues brought out and Foreign Ministers to go if we are to begin serious talks on collective action, particularly while Churchill is in US and also while Casey is here. I hope five power staff talks have produced some realistic, coordinated estimates which might form the basis of collective action discussions.

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1 Dated June 14, p. 1132.

If things go here as we hope, and if general timing is as indicated above, request your approval to proceed accordingly. 2

SMITH

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1 In a memorandum by the Secretary of State of a meeting with the President, June 14, Dulles wrote that he had "reported briefly on the Indochina situation and on conditions in Geneva, and I read to the President Dulles 180 reporting Smith's prospective return coincidentally with Eden's return. The President agreed on such return." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Meetings with the President)

2 In telegram 260, June 14, the Department informed the Under Secretary that "On assumption situation develops along lines in Dulles 180 we are giving thought to who should remain behind you leave Geneva. We agree your view that a State officer, military officer and stenographer be suitable and are thinking of Rossal." (386.1 GE/6-1454)

386.1 GE/6-1454: Telegram

Thirteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 14, 3 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL


Molotov reviewed proposals which have been made during past weeks re joint committee of belligerents and international supervisory commission in connection with implementation agreement on cessation of hostilities in Indochina. He recalled paragraph eight of DRV May 10 proposal and paragraph four of French proposal of May 8, as well as Soviet proposal May 14. Latter proposal included provision for a supervisory commission composed of neutral countries. On May 31, USSR proposed composition to include India, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Pakistan.

Molotov repeated already stated views on Communist side to effect joint commissions of belligerents should work parallel to and not be subordinate to international commission. He recalled Soviet discussion on this matter June 8. He stressed thesis that implementation of armistice agreements is primarily duty of two sides in war. He stated that if either side is determined not to carry out the agreement, no international commission could insure its being carried out.

1 A set of minutes of this session (10 Restricted/18) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 27A. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 6 a.m. and adjourned at 7:00 p.m. The minutes are also printed in Conference de Geneva, pp. 201-206. The proposal made by the Soviet Delegation, Indochina Document 10/30, June 14, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 27A.

2 A brief summary of the meeting was transmitted to the Department in telegram Secto 436, June 14. (386.1 GE/6-1454)
On matter of method by which international commission may reach decisions, Molotov for first time advanced that since international commission would be dealing with questions of varying importance, unanimity rule need not be applied to all matters. In certain cases a majority vote would be sufficient with chairman having deciding vote (at end of meeting Molotov stated India should be chairman).

Molotov then submitted detailed proposal transmitted separately via pouch (see Secto 442). Molotov concluded that Soviet delegation believes these proposals take into consideration remarks made by other delegations during discussion this subject and should therefore, facilitate agreement.

USDel (verbatim text transmitted in Secto 441), after referring to importance of two questions brought up by Molotov, namely, authority of international supervisory commission and composition thereof, turned to question of special situation in Laos and Cambodia. He stressed previously stated views regarding independence, constitutional character of these governments and fact that two countries victims of foreign invasion. He concluded with proposal that new restricted session be devoted to problem of restoring peace in Laos and Cambodia.

USDel expressed regret that Molotov continued insist on parallel nature of international supervisory commission and mixed commissions. He made point that submission by former belligerents on authority of truly impartial international agency would be an essential text of good faith of parties. He also stressed necessity for international commission to be able, in fact, to reach decisions. His again rejected Soviet proposal of India, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Pakistan. He repeated his general acceptance of either Colombo powers or UN selected commission.

French delegation (Chauvel) stated he unable make comparisons. Molotov's June 8 discussion with present proposal. He criticized recent Soviet proposal stating that distribution of functions between joint commission and international commission seemed to involve complication and overlapping. He referred to French June 4 proposal with particular emphasis on fact international commission to be complex, large-scale affair with ample facilities. He questioned whether Molotov's proposal met this point. He added that relationship between international commission and joint commissions as proposed by Molotov, i.e., parallel relationship, appeared to him unsatisfactory. He noted that in Molotov's proposal joint commissions not obliged to recognize or accept decisions of international commission but can.

* Dated June 14, p. 1149.
* Infr. 

Those decisions back to international commission. There is, of course, further reference to guarantor powers who would act as sort of super arbiters. This generally unsatisfactory since basis of true control should be body with real power. He referred to old French saying that Roland's mare was most beautiful horse in world, but unfortunately, was dead.

Chauvel then referred to composition of international commission. He characterized Molotov proposal as in effect providing that international commission would have equivalent composition to joint commission since members would represent parties. He said that it should be possible to find a commission made up of true neutrals. He added that Bidault had agreed to the UK proposal re the Colombo powers and French delegation maintains open mind re any proposal involving true impartiality.

Chauvel expressed himself as being puzzled at Molotov's proposal as to procedure in reaching decisions by the international commission. He said distinction between subjects which can be decided by majority and those to be decided by unanimity not clear. He suggested a list of subjects might be drawn up to make this issue more precise. He expressed fear that requirement of unanimity in provided in those cases which are most important and which therefore are very ones requiring most rapid decision.

Chauvel agreed fully with US delegations position re Laos and Cambodia. He said French Government also through its representatives and agents in those countries could endorse facts and conclusions advanced by Laotian and Cambodian delegations. He added that French delegation has not opposed international control in Laos and Cambodia but has merely said that since military situation there different from that in Vietnam, international control would be applied to different subject matter. Chauvel endorsed US delegation suggestion for early meeting on Laos and Cambodia.

Following recess Chou En-lai, after commenting on the artificial deadlock created by certain delegations made detailed statement in support of Molotov's proposal. He ended by referring to question of Khmer and Pathet-Lao and saying that his delegation was prepared to put forward views on this subject at future meetings.

Dong then stated that for his delegation joint commission was the disarmistive commission. He referred to previous comments which dated precedent of 1946 as proof in ability such mixed commission to function properly and asserted that state of mind of those who signed 1946 agreements well known to him since he had participated in Evian-Shell meeting. In interim, eight years had passed and many things had happened. Armies had gotten to know each other and at Geneva
conference Viet Minh had made proposals which were generally recognized as reasonable. This had had influence on members of French Expeditionary Corps and from those officers and men taken at Dien Bien Phu Viet Minh knew of their deep desire for peace. These were no longer the men of 1946, and as far as his side was concerned, their desire for peace was incontestable. The Viet Minh army and people would respond as a single man when the order was given for them to respect the armistice. All this lead to inevitable conclusion that one could trust the people who would compose joint commission. He was in complete accord with the Soviet proposal.

On subject of Khmer and Pathet-Lao he insisted that basic fact of situation was existence of liberation movement in each country. His delegation was ready to discuss problem on this basis.

He then recalled that on June 10, he had said that three fundamental issues divided the conference: (1) membership of supervisory commission; (2) its authority; and (3) fate of Laos and Cambodia. Despite Molotov's efforts today to deal with technical aspects of commission's function he nevertheless felt that principal differences remain unresolved. Military discussions now in progress were solid achievements and one must await results. He supported US suggestion that day be devoted to Laos and Cambodia but if no progress were made he doubted whether any good purpose served by conference continuing to debate unresolved questions. He suggested that conference might suspend its meetings until military committee could report on its work. He was not asking for an immediate reply from his colleagues but thought they might think it over.

Cambodian delegation pointed out Soviet proposal dealt only with Vietnam. Because of special position of Cambodia he was in full accord with US proposal that next session study Cambodian problem.

Molotov wished to make two supplementary observations relative today's proposal. He thought chairmanship of commission could be settled in usual way and that first named member of commission could be chairman and could have the deciding vote on questions where majority rule accepted. This formula would give India chairmanship.

Up to now so objections had been raised to this country. He reiterated that any subordination of joint commission to international supervisory commission would be incorrect since this would imply that joint commission should act on orders of international commission. Assumably such orders could only be enforced by force of arms which would mean that international military forces would have to be introduced into Indochina. Such introduction would be contrary to object of establishing peace in Indochina. Therefore he insisted that coordination meant not to want peace. Although he did not want

information on Laos and Cambodia provided by UK and US reflected sufficient objectivity and his delegation's views were well known he nevertheless had no objection to consideration of this subject at subsequent meeting but would hope such consideration would not preclude consideration of important questions discussed today.

Next restricted meeting Wednesday, June 16.

SMITH

3861 GEN/L 1542 / Telegram
Thirteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 14, 3 p.m.
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 14, 1954—midnight.

Secto 441. Repeated information Paris 438, Saigon 187, London 281, Tokyo 185, Moscow 123, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Following is verbatim text of General Smith's statement made in Indochina restricted session Monday 14 June:

"Mr. Molotov outlined very clearly some of the fundamental questions on which we have not been able to agree. I listened to him with great attention and will examine his proposals with care. I must say, however, that I heard nothing said which truly disposes of the fundamental issues before us. We are still in disagreement as we were before regarding the mandate of the international supervisory commission, regarding the relation between the proposed joint commissions and the international commission, and with regard to the composition of the international commission. We have already stated that agreement on these points is essential if our conference is to succeed.

I should like later to comment on the two most important issues raised by Mr. Molotov with regard to the international supervisory commission and the joint commissions. I should like at this time to remind my colleagues that there is a third question before us, the special situation in Laos and Cambodia.

On the question of Laos and Cambodia, it is my opinion that the statements at our meetings by the delegations of those countries have been clear, accurate and altogether in accordance with the facts. The information given by the delegate of the UK confirms that already available to the US delegation. I would like to point out that the US has been represented by diplomatic missions in Cambodia and Laos as well as in Vietnam since 1950. The US delegation at this conference includes several members who have been and still are assigned to these missions. Other members of this delegation have visited Cambodia and Laos one or more times during the past year or two. They have traveled widely in these two countries; they have talked to people in the cities and in the villages; they have seen with their own eyes the situation as it has developed and they are thoroughly familiar with the situation. American representatives were in these two countries during their last elections in 1951 and were deeply impressed by the
conduct of these elections and by the demonstration of the rapid development of effective democratic institutions in the short period since the constitutions of the two countries came into effect.

I must, therefore, reiterate a fact which has already been said here, that whatever armed opposition to the legal governments of Cambodia and Laos exists is provided by the military forces of the Viet Minh and the Communist political cadres under the protection of France. I accept as a fact that the Cambodian delegates at June 8 that the common denominator of the three wars in Indochina is the presence in each country of Viet Minh troops.

It should be apparent to all that the problems of Cambodia and Laos could be solved in a single day if the Viet Minh were willing to withdraw its invading regular and irregular troops. A political problem does not exist, as we know both from experience and from the statements of the delegates of Cambodia and Laos before this conference.

The delegation of Cambodia submitted a proposal to our meeting of June 8. This proposal is reasonable and logical in concept and also somewhat simple in execution.

The delegation of Laos submitted a proposal on May 10 which seemed to us to fit every requirement of the situation. In the opinion of the US delegation, these proposals could be rejected only by those having no interest in the restoration of peace to the two countries. It seems to me that if we have any hope that our conference may make any positive contribution to the restoration of peace in Indochina, we might devote our next restricted session to the problem of how to restore peace to Laos and Cambodia.

As to the next fundamental question clearly at issue between us, that of the authority of an international supervisory commission, it seems to us that there is very little to add to the clear and persuasive statements already made on this subject by Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault. As far as this delegate is concerned, these statements demonstrated to us that the international supervisory authority must have competence and power to settle any problems or differences which may arise on the joint commissions of the belligerent and that the decisions of the supervisory authority must be binding on the joint commissions. If, therefore, there is, with great regret, that I heard Mr. Molotov reject any possible cooperation or on parallel action of the two bodies.

There is, however, one important point that I think the Communist delegates should carefully consider. The Communist delegates have said that observance of an armistice depends upon the good faith of the belligerent parties; that cessation hostilities will not be permanent if the two contending parties are not prepared to cooperate in carrying out the agreement. This is a perfectly valid argument. Good faith on both sides is an essential element of a successful armistice. I see it. But reasonable men will recognize that the passage of eight years of bitter warfare does not easily or rapidly subside; that the best of will on both sides will be differences which will not, as has already been said, be readily adjusted, and that it is absolutely necessary that there be impartial authority with the power to arbitrate the differences which will arise. Good faith in entering into an armistice must, therefore, be expressed by willingness volun-

tarily to submit to the authority of an impartial international agency in the carrying out of an armistice. It is the willingness to submit questions to impartial authority, as well as the intent to stop shooting, which will demonstrate whether or not the contending parties have that good faith which the Communist delegates rightly say is an indispensable ingredient of a peaceful settlement.

The third vital matter on which we are in disagreement is that the composition of the international supervisory commission is closely related to the question of its necessary authority and most of us are convinced that the commission must have authority over the joint commissions and since its decisions must be binding on them, it is obvious that the commission must have both the capacity to arrive at decisions and the impartial character which will win for it the confidence of all the parties to the agreement including all the participants of this conference. If the commission is not divided that it cannot reach decisions, it will be important in settling differences. If the commission is not recognized as impartial its decisions will not be accepted by the parties to the agreement.

It seems essential to us, therefore, that the commission be an impartial one, and that it be so constituted that it can reach decisions. I regret that Mr. Molotov reaffirmed his previous proposal of a four-power commission of Poland, Czechoslovakia, India and Pakistan. This proposal does not seem to meet either of these two criteria for the simple reason as stated by Mr. Eden that it just would not work.

It did not seem to me, as I listened to Mr. Molotov, that he should expect the United States to differentiate between certain matters which could be settled through a majority vote with the chairman casting the deciding vote and other matters which would require unanimity for decision. I would do anything more than further to complicate an already complex problem.

I have said before that I welcomed the proposal of the UK for a commission composed of the Colombo powers. I have also stated that I believed the proposal of the representative of Vietnam that the duties of the commission be entrusted to the United Nations was also a reasonable suggestion. Either of these proposals would provide a commission which would be impartial and which had the capacity for making decisions. I should again like to point out to our Communist colleagues that the good faith which they have stated is important in carrying out an armistice should extend to providing reasonable prospects for success of such an armistice. An impartial and workable supervisory commission is a final essential element of such a successful settlement.”

SMITH

3561 G/65/1489: Telegram

Thirteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 14, 3 P.M.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL


Saigon, pass Phnom Penh and Vientiane. Following is text of Soviet proposal presented at Restricted Session on Indochina, Monday, June 14:

"1. Mixed Commission (Military Armistice Commission)

Composition
1. The Mixed Commission (Military Armistice Commission) shall consist of an equal number of representatives of the Commands of both sides. The senior members of the Mixed Commission shall hold the rank of General. The Mixed Commission shall create mixed inspection teams (the number to be agreed by both sides) with an equal number of members from both sides.

Functions and powers
2. It shall be the duty of the Mixed Commission to exercise control over the implementation of the terms of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, the principal of which shall be:

a. Control over the strict fulfillment of the plan for the establishment of zones and regrouping of the armed forces of the sides;

b. Control over ensuring a simultaneous, general and complete cease-fire;

c. Settlement by negotiations of all questions connected with violations of the terms of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities.

3. The Mixed Commission and the Neutral Nations Commission shall act in parallel and one Commission shall not be subordinate to the other. To ensure effective implementation of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities both Commissions shall act in conformity with the assignment of functions and in cooperation on the basis of the powers provided for in the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities.

II. Neutral Nations Observation Commission

Composition
4. The Neutral Nations Commission for the Observation (nabryvnoie) of Carrying out the Terms of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indochina shall be formed of the representatives of the following nations . . .

The term "neutral nations", as used here, shall refer to those states that have not participated in hostilities in Indochina.

The Commission shall consist of an equal number of representatives appointed by each of the above-mentioned neutral nations.

It shall create inspection teams composed of an equal number of officers appointed by the neutral nations.

Functions and powers
5. The task of the Neutral Nations Commission shall be to carry out surveillance (nabryvnoye), observation, inspection and investigation connected with the implementation of the terms of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities. The principal of these shall be:

a. Observation of the carrying out by both sides of the provisions establishing the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zones on the basis of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities;

b. Observation of the grouping of troops carried out in setting up the zones;

c. Observation of the repatriation by both sides of the prisoners-of-war and civilians;

d. Investigation and establishment of the facts of violations of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in the demilitarized zones at the request of the Mixed Commission or one of its sides as well as submitting proposals regarding their elimination.

e. Observation at specified naval or air ports and points on land of the cessation of introduction into Indochina from outside of new contingents of armed forces and military personnel, as well as of all types of armaments, ammunition and military equipment.

f. Recommendations concerning possible amendments and additions to the provisions of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities to provide the most effective carrying out of the Agreement.

The Neutral Nations Commission shall carry out its functions by means of the respective inspection teams stationed at the points specified in the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities.

General provisions
6. Neutral Nations Commission for the Observation of the Carrying out of the Terms of the Cessation of Hostilities shall adopt decisions by agreement among the members of the Commission. The Commission shall inform the Mixed Commission of its decisions and the Mixed Commission shall adopt in its connection appropriate measures. Any question back to the Neutral Nations Commission for re-examination. If an examination of this sort does not yield positive results the Neutral Nations Commission shall immediately inform the Mixed Commission and the States-guarantors of the fact.

In case differences of opinion arise in the Neutral Nations Commission during the consideration of one or another problem regarding the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, the Commission as a whole or its separate members shall pass on to the Mixed Commission as well as to the States-guarantors information pertaining to the problem under consideration including information concerning the attitudes of the State-members of the Commission.

If the sides in the Mixed Commission are unable to settle differences on subject under consideration the States-guarantors shall take appropriate measures to prevent violations of the agreement on the threat of such violation.

1. Be it resolved that the questions on which decisions can be taken if there exists no difference of opinion in the Commission shall be the following:

a. Questions connected with violation of provisions of the agreement or the arising of a threat of such violation which could lead to the reopening of hostilities (including violation of land
France at this critical moment that France has been deserted by US and UK and therefore has no choice but capitulation on Indochina to Communists at Geneva and possibly accommodation with the Soviets in Europe. Because of this, if the French want to keep the Conference at least nominally alive, we would go along with the idea of recess and the maintenance of the small observation group as you propose in Geneva. We trust that the developments at Geneva will have been such as to satisfy the British insistence that they did not want to discuss collective action until either Geneva was over or at least the results of Geneva were known. I would assume that the departure of Eden would be evidence that there was no adequate reason for further delaying collective talks on SEA defense.

2. Re paragraph 1 above we assume any recess would only relate to the Indochina phase of Conference and the Korean phase would be closed out as indicated last para Dulles 170 and Sect 432.

3. We believe that you should leave Geneva no later than Eden.

4. Assume that you will as soon as appropriate opportunity offers talk with Bishult as well as Eden about these matters.
Minutes, Meeting between Wang Bingnan and the French Delegation Member [Jean] Paul-Boncour (Summary), June 14, 1954

Records No: 206-C0068

(Top Secret)

Time: June 14, 1954, 7:30 p.m.
Place: Paul-Boncour’s office in the United Nations Building
Interpreter and Recorder: Dong Ningjuan

Paul-Boncour: today I would like to discuss two issues:
   (1) The Korean issue.

   As we have discussed previously, if the Korean issue is to be discussed in the United Nations, China will be invited. However, Mr. Wang said that China was only willing to enter the United Nations through the front door and therefore had no intention of taking this opportunity. Meanwhile, since the situation is newly changed, I would like to give some personal opinions:

   Regarding the issue of the All-Korean Commission, please pay attention to one paragraph in Bidault’s statement. Bidault pointed out that Molotov’s proposals must be revised under the guarantee of international organizations, the existing North and South Korean governments should get on well with each other so that they can have free elections. This proposal is not new. I proposed at the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea in 1948 that relations between North and South Korea must be improved. It should start with cultural and economic relations, and then gradually realize political unification. The United States at the time suggested that it should be discussed later. India also knew about this since I used to ask for the Indian delegation’s opinions.

   Fifteen days ago, Nehru also stated publicly that North Korea’s political system should not be forced on South Korea. Neither should South Korea’s political system be forced on North Korea. They must seek a way to coexist with each other peacefully. They should begin with cultural and economic issues, and solve their political problems thereafter.

   Not long ago we anticipated that the French government would face a crisis, therefore we asked Bidault to present this proposal so that the conference could note it for the record. This is France’s claim on the issue of peace in Korea. It was simply a personal proposal before, however, now the French government is using it for the first time as a proposal of its own. The United States is preparing to invite the other fifteen countries to join it to sabotage the conference on the issue of international supervision. If other countries decide to do so, France will agree with them.

   (2) [Paul] Ramadier wants to meet Mr. Zhou Enlai

   Former French Prime Minister Ramadier is a member of the Socialist Party. He is currently attending a conference of the International Labor Organization in Geneva and is also the chair of the conference. He is a good friend of my uncle Mr. [Joseph] Paul-Boncour (former Prime Minister from the Socialist Party), my wife and I are all very familiar with him. He will return to Paris after the conference and therefore wants to take this opportunity to meet Mr. Zhou Enlai. If Mr. Zhou Enlai agrees, I will arrange a lunch or dinner in a restaurant in the countryside so that two of them will be able to meet there. For the time of the meeting, we prefer next Sunday.

Wang Bingnan: as far as we know, a session on the Korean issue will be held tomorrow. Now I would also like to express some personal opinions:
   (1) We have stated many times that this conference has nothing to do with the United Nations. Although this issue was discussed many times in the United Nations before, there was no result reached. Therefore, the Berlin Conference decided to hold the Geneva Conference.

   (2) Discussing the Korean issue at the United Nations is completely different from the issue of restoring China’s status at the UN. They should not be confused.

   We believe that the Geneva Conference should reach a conclusion on the Korean issue. Since the delegations have all agreed on some basic issues such as unification, free elections, and the phased withdrawal of foreign troops, it makes it easy to solve specific problems. We cannot understand why anybody would say that the conference will not succeed.

   We constantly insist at the Geneva Conference that we only want the conference to be successful, and we do not want it to fail. It is obvious that the Americans’ attitude is the opposite of ours. They want the conference to fail and do not want it to succeed. If the conference is to be sabotaged on the issue of supervision, our side does not have any responsibility for that. We hope to call the French delegation’s attention to it.

   If we share opinions on matters of principle, we should not have any problems dealing with specific issues. For example, if we have decided on the principle that we will hold the Geneva Conference, then there is no need to argue about whether the delegations should come here by plane, train or ship. We cannot say that you will not come to Geneva if you do not take the train. If anybody wants to sabotage the conference by using the issue of supervision, it means that they are intentionally preventing the conference from reaching any solutions.

Paul-Boncour: it sounds very reasonable from the point of view of the Chinese delegation and Chinese public opinion. However, China cannot prevent
the other sixteen countries from [considering these issues] from the perspective of the United Nations. To them, their statements are as well-founded as that of China. They have the rights to decide whether the Korean issue should be discussed in Geneva or in New York. Therefore, China’s attitude should be flexible.

I need to clarify one thing. Mr. Wang Bingnan just said that he wanted to get the French delegation’s attention. I am not speaking representing the French delegation and am simply giving some personal opinions as a good friend of China and the Secretary General of the sixteen countries.

Wang Bingnan: We believe that since related countries could not reach any solution at the Geneva Conference, and some countries are now talking about how the United Nations can actually solve the problems, isn’t it intentional sabotage?

How does Mr. Paul-Boncour think about the sessions, especially today’s session, on the Indochina issue?

Paul-Boncour: I haven’t yet had a chance to exchange opinions with the French delegation. However, my own opinion is that today’s session made important progress at the end. Mr. Molotov had already agreed to let India take the chair of the Commission of the United Nations. It thus denied Mr. Eden’s argument a few days ago. He said at the time that although the conference was still ongoing, it was already hopeless. Therefore, we should be prepared to end the conference. Of course the United States also wanted to sabotage the Indochina session. However, France is different. France wants the conference to succeed, not to fail.

We have problems translating Mr. Molotov’s detailed proposals. Our two translators have been working on them since three o’clock and still haven’t finished yet. Therefore, Mr. (Jean) Chauvel cannot make any clear statement simply depend on what he heard from the session. Nevertheless, Mr. Wang Bingnan should pay attention to one thing about which Smith is going to make a disappointed reply. He said that Molotov’s proposals did not contain anything new. However, Chauvel expressed that he was willing to consider them carefully. He did not want to easily put Molotov’s proposals aside before they are discussed.

Wang Bingnan: Although Mr. Paul-Boncour said that these were his personal opinions, I believe that they are similar to our own.

As far as I know, the military session also made great progress, and the atmosphere of the session was very good, too.

Mr. Molotov’s important proposals paved a new way for the conference. We welcome Mr. Chauvel’s attitude of careful consideration. The United States said that there was nothing new in the Soviet proposals. It shows that the Americans’ purpose is to let the conference fail. They obstruct the conference immediately every time it makes progress. France is an important party concerned. We hope that, as you said, France wants the conference to succeed. Then, we believe that the conference must reach a conclusion.

Paul-Boncour: Unfortunately, France does not have a government anymore. However, the French delegation and I all hope to be able to organize the technical committee, which will discuss the issue of supervision. This committee can discuss issues of the membership and authority of the NSC. After the discussion, it should submit its report to the conference like the session of the committee of military experts does. According to the French constitution, the president is the commander-in-chief of the three armed services. Although he has no authority to talk about political issues, he can take responsibility for the military issues of the armistice. The expert who is doing research on the issue of supervision in France is Colonel Guillermet.

Wang Bingnan: Do you think that the restricted sessions or the expert sessions should be continued?

Paul-Boncour: I still cannot answer you now, because we have to discuss Mr. Molotov’s proposals first.

Wang Bingnan: How long will it take to set up the new French government?

How many chances does [Pierre] Mendes-France have to form a cabinet?

Paul-Boncour: I think it is difficult to form a new cabinet. It will take longer. I hope that Mendes-France be successful, however, I think he will fail.

Currently, the French delegation is responsible to the president. The negotiation of the armistice issue is led by Chauvel, [Michel] de Brebisson and Guillermet and others.

Russia just joined the International Labor Organization. The meeting between Mr. Zhou Enlai and Mr. Raisi will be beneficial.

Wang Bingnan: I will answer you after I report to the head of our delegation.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jiao. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and the CCP Central Committee (excerpt), June 14, 1954


On the 13th, the three sides of China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam reached the consensus on that: (1) After the collapse of the Laniel Cabinet in France on the 12th, the French side is worrying that the situation of the French troops during the rainy season will become even more dangerous, and that the French cabinet is unable to dispatch more reinforcement to Indochina. It is unlikely that the United States will begin a major intervention at the moment, and Britain has been opposing to sending troops to participate in the war. Therefore, France is willing to continue the negotiation, and the French side generally is in favor of dividing zones in Vietnam. Under these circumstances, America's attempt to sabotage the conference will encounter difficulty. (2) In spite of the existence of all kinds of passive factors, our side will continuously adopt a positive attitude. Our will point out that the conference has reached an agreement on May 29, and that the military commands of the two sides have entered discussions on specific issues. This is only the preliminary achievements, and they should be expanded through the continuation of the negotiation, and it is mistaken to talk about the failure of the conference. It should be emphasized that the spirit of the positive attitude of our side has left the world with the impression that our side has consistently pursued and is still actively pursuing an agreement at an early time, and that our side is in favor of continuing the negotiation for reaching an agreement on the basis of the existing principles that have been mutually agreed to. We should try out best to make America's plot of sabotaging the conference encounter even greater difficulty. Even the conference indeed is sabotaged, it will become apparent that it is America, rather than our side, that should bear the responsibility.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not cite or quote without permission from CWIHP.
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

Geneva, June 15, 1954—10 p. m.


 Re composition: Molotov suggested possible addition Indonesia to four countries already proposed by Communists. He said Indonesia was Colombo power and had indicated interest in problem by sending representative Geneva to discuss matters with Soviet and other delegations. Eden said Burma better addition since it was limi- triphs country.

 Molotov agreed Burma interested party but said if limi- triphs country added someone might propose Thailand which was unacceptable. Eden had impression Molotov’s opposition to Burma not absolute.

 Re supervision: Molotov stressed importance mixed commission not subordinate to international commission. Did not see how this could work in practice unless international commission would bring in large army and he was opposed to that.

 Eden replied that there must be provision for resolving cases where mixed commission unable reach agreement. This could be done only by international commission on spot with authority to arbitrate, give rulings, and reach decisions by majority vote on all subjects with which authorized to deal.

 Molotov replied his latest proposal provided for majority vote on number questions and only reserved for unanimous decision questions tied lead to reopening of hostilities or related to amendments to the agreement. Eden asked how international commission would decide whether a question was one for decision by majority or unanimous vote. Molotov said only serious cases would require unanimity. He did not deny that difficulties would arise over determination of what constituted serious cases and finally suggested this question might be discussed further. Eden agreed and added it would be less difficult to settle questions re supervision if the military talks on Vietnam had reached conclusion and we knew what sort of military agreement was to be supervised. Molotov agreed it would be great advance if military agreement reached and that this might also facilitate discussion supervisory arrangements.

1 Dated June 14, p. 2148.
SECRET

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (U.K. DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
WHITSHALL SECRET (CABINET)

DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden
No. 726
June 15, 1954

D. 5.56 p.m. June 15, 1954
R. 6.15 p.m. June 15, 1954

PRIORITY
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 726 of June 15
Requested for information to Paris
Washington

My telegram No. 720: Indo-China.

Mr. Molotov asked me to see him this morning and said that
he wished to discuss the proposals which he had put forward
yesterday. He recognized that we did not find his proposals
for the composition of the supervisory commission acceptable.
How would we view the addition of Indonesia to the four countries
which he had proposed? Indonesia was a member of the Colombo
Group and had shown her interest in the problem by sending her
Ambassador in Paris to Geneva to discuss matters with the Soviet
and other delegations.

2. I said that I would like to consider this new suggestion
and talk it over with others concerned. But if another Colombo
Power was to be added, I should have thought that the claims of
Burma were stronger than those of Indonesia. She was a
limitrophe country, and if she had not sent a representative to
Geneva, I knew that she was keenly interested in developments
in Indo-China.

3. Mr. Molotov said that this was no doubt true, but if
a limitrophe country were added someone might suggest Siam. He
made it clear that that would scarcely be acceptable to him.
But I did not get the impression that his opposition to Burma
would be absolute.

4. Mr. Molotov then turned to his proposals for supervi-
sion. He said that, for them, it was a cardinal point that the
mixed committee of the two sides should not be subordinate,
and under the orders of the international commission. Indeed,
he did not see how, in practice, this could happen. That is

/unless if
SECRET

Geneva Conference (U.K. Del.) telegram No. 726 to Foreign Office

unless it was the intention that the international commission should bring in a large army, and he would certainly be against that.

5. I said that, in our view, it would be only right to provide for cases where the mixed committee of both sides had been unable to reach agreement. In that case, who should decide what was to be done? We thought that such a decision could only be taken by an international commission on the spot who, for the purpose, should have the authority to arbitrate and give rulings. Normally, they would no doubt try to proceed by way of conciliation, but if this failed, they should have authority to decide, and for this purpose we thought that they must be able to reach a decision by a majority vote on all those steps which, by agreement at the conference, they would be said to be able to deal with.

6. Mr. Molotov commented that, in his latest proposals, he had provided for a majority vote on a number of questions and had only reserved for unanimous decision questions which were liable to lead to the re-opening of hostilities or amendments to the agreement itself. I asked how he thought the international commission would decide whether any question was one which could be settled by majority vote or needed unanimity. He replied that his idea was that only "serious" cases would require unanimity. He did not deny that difficulties might arise over determining what was and what was not a "serious" case and finally suggested that this was the sort of question that might be discussed further.

7. I agreed and added that we might find it less difficult to settle these questions concerning the workings of the supervision if the military talks on Viet Nam had reached a conclusion and we knew what sort of military agreement would need to be supervised. For instance, might it be, as Mr. Molotov had at one stage hinted, a comparatively easy line such as in Korea? Or would we, in the event, be faced by a boundary as in Palestine or something else? Mr. Molotov agreed that it would be a great advance if a military agreement could be reached and that this might in turn ease the question of arrangements for supervision.

/8./
SECRET

Geneva Conference (U.K. Del.) telegram 725 to Foreign Office

-3-

3. In reply to my question, he said that his information was that there had been no military contacts yesterday and that the French colonel concerned had gone to Paris. He did not know when he would come back.

Foreign Office please pass to Paris and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 175 and 215 respectively.

[Repeated to Paris and Washington]

 bbbbb
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong. Regarding the Thirteenth Restricted Session, June 15, 1954

Record No.: 206-Y0050

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

On the morning of the 14th, Eden raised to Molotov the question of convening a secret meeting on the Indochina issue. Molotov agreed. On the afternoon [of the 14th] at the thirteenth restricted session, Molotov put forward a twelve-point proposal concerning the joint committee, the supervision committee by countries of neutrality, and the question of international guaranty. Because we have made concessions on the question of reaching agreement by consensus, there were changes for the seventh and eighth among original twelve points. I report once again the seventh and eighth points here. (See attachment no. 1.), and the other points remain the same. Smith made a bad response to Molotov's proposal in his presentation, claiming that there was nothing new in Molotov's proposal, and attempting to negate the proposal completely. He also requested that the next session be devoted specifically to the discussion of the Laos and Cambodia questions. Because Bidault had returned to Paris, so the presentation was made by French ambassador to Switzerland Chauvel. His attitude is quite subtle, saying that Molotov's proposal should be clarified, and he also supported to having the five Colombo countries as members of the supervision committee. Eden in his presentation intentionally demonstrated a passive attitude, saying that Molotov's proposal only resolved the technical aspect of the question, and was far from resolving the fundamental differences. Eden proposed that the conference be adjourned, waiting for being resumed after the result of the negotiation by military representatives. However, he only asked people to consider his idea, and did not present it as a formal proposal. Eden also echoed Smith to favor discussing the Cambodia and Laos questions at the next meeting. Molotov proposed again in his presentation that the committee of supervision by countries of neutrality be chaired by India, and exposed that the other side insisted upon having the joint committee work under the command of the international committee of supervision for the purpose of letting the military take control. Molotov agreed that the next session would discuss the Cambodia and Laos questions. I supported Molotov's proposal (the whole text is dispatched, see attachments no. 2.) After the session, the French delegation told us privately that they were interested in Molotov's proposal, and especially in having India as chair [of the committee]. They were also willing to put the question of supervision for discussion by the technical affairs committee composed of nine countries, and would report this to the plenary session, so that the conference will continue. We have agreed to this.

Zhou Enlai
June 15, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP
Minutes, Conversation between Zhang Wentian and (Harold) Caccia, June 15, 1954

Records No: 206-C0057

Time: June 15, 1954, 11:15 am to 11:30 am
Attendees on the Chinese side: Zhang Wentian, Huian Xiang, Pe Shouchang (interpreter)
Attendees on the British side: Caccia, Ford (interpreter)

Caccia: Yesterday Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov discussed the Laos and Cambodia issues. We assume that Mr. Molotov had already informed the Chinese side because the current arrangement is to let every chair inform his partner respectively. However, this time Mr. Eden is especially eager to let the Chinese and Soviet delegations know the British delegation’s position on the Laos and Cambodia issues so that [he could] remove all possibility that might cause suspicions.

Mr. Eden has already stated at the meeting that our basic position is that we insist that the Vietminh (Vietnamese Allied) troops should be withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia. Whether all the troops in these two countries are Vietminh troops or a part of them are is a controversial question. However, it is confirmed that there are Vietminh troops in these two countries. For us, the withdrawal of the Vietminh troops is a matter of principle. We have already made arrangements here so that we can reach an agreement on this issue and thus solve the Laos and Cambodia issues in Geneva. The Ambassador reads newspapers as we do, you must have already known that Cambodia had already made an appeal to the United Nations several weeks ago. And now Laos is also considering taking the same action. We believe that it is much better to reach the solution here.

I will repeat again that we believe that it is much better to reach the solution here. If we can reach an agreement on the withdrawal of the invading troops, we cannot imagine that any participating countries will use such an agreement to establish [military] bases in Laos and Cambodia. On the contrary, Mr. Eden said that if we could reach an agreement, this agreement will be ensured by all participants. Now I will get back to the instructions from Mr. Eden. We definitely cannot compromise on the withdrawal of all invading troops. Mr. Eden asked me to explain to the Ambassador, and also to inform the Prime Minister, that tomorrow’s meeting on the Laos and Cambodia issues might be a very important one. If we can solve the problem on which we cannot compromise, Mr. Eden hopes that we will thereafter be able to solve the Laos and Cambodia issues and to let all participants guarantee this solution.

The advantage of our current conference is that it is a place of discussion, and in fact the Chinese delegation has already been here. I think that the Ambassador must understand what I mean by this. We are glad to have the Chinese delegation here, and the Chinese delegation is already here. If the conference were held in another place, we would have had undesirable situation.

My mission is to clarify the above points. I hope that I have accomplished it.

Zhang Wentian: We understand Britain’s attitude. Mr. Eden has said that before the meeting. What Mr. Caccia said today is the same.

You understand China’s attitude as well. Foreign Minister Zhou stated it several times at the meetings.

I will report to Foreign Minister Zhou what Mr. Caccia said today.

At tomorrow’s meeting, the Chinese delegation will present its own proposal concerning the Laos and Cambodia issues. This proposal will take into account Mr. Caccia’s statement today.

Caccia: If Prime Minister Zhou wants to meet with Mr. Eden before tomorrow’s meeting Mr. Eden will completely agree with that.

Zhang Wentian: I will also report to Foreign Minister Zhou about this.

Caccia: Please excuse me. I have to leave in a hurry because I need to accompany Mr. Eden to visit Mr. Molotov. Also, I borrowed Mr. Eden’s car when I came.

Zhang Wentian: We don’t need to be too polite with one another. We welcome your visit.

Translated for CWHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWHP.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Fifteenth Plenary Session, June 17, 1954

Records No: 206-Y0050

Chairman Mao, Comrade Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) The Soviet, Korean, and Chinese delegations discussed our strategies toward the Korean issue on the evening of the 14th. We assume that our counterparts will not accept the five-point proposal that Molotov presented on June 6th since they have already spread rumors outside the conference that the conference will be ended at the plenary session of the 15th. It will be difficult to present easily our side's second original plan (regarding the consolidation of peace in Korea) as well as the supplementary proposals that we originally planned to use at last steps. We must try to play every card we have at the last session. Even if we cannot prevent the conference from being sabotaged, we can at least drive our counterparts into an unfavorable position. The more modest our proposals are, the more passive our counterparts will be. It will also make it more difficult and more unreasonable of them to sabotage the conference. In addition, it will force our counterparts to take greater responsibility for ending the conference. Therefore, we have decided that at the plenary session on the 15th, our side should: let Nam II present proposals on the guarantee of peace in Korea; let me speak to support Nam II's proposals and recommend that the conference go into a restricted session of seven countries [China, USSR, UK, US, France, DPRK, and ROK]; and let Molotov submit a [draft] declaration to guarantee that no action will be taken to threaten peace in Korea. We assume that our counterparts will accept none of these proposals. Therefore, at last, I will make a minimum proposal. Specifically, I will express our common desire for the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue and propose to discuss the issues of time and place for the reopening of the negotiations. We presume that our counterparts will not even accept this minimum proposal since the United States' policy is basically not to reach any agreement.

(2) At the fifteenth plenary session on the Korean issue on the 15th, Chairman Eden intentionally let our three delegations speak first. Nam II made a six-point proposal on the guarantee of peace in Korea. I spoke to support Nam II's proposals and suggested that the conference go into a restricted session of seven countries. Molotov proposed that the nineteen countries should publish a joint declaration ensuring that no action will be taken to threaten peace in Korea. It seems that Molotov's proposal for a joint declaration was beyond our counterparts' expectations. Thus, Eden immediately called for a short recess after our three delegations finished our speeches. The sixteen countries held an extraordinary meeting [during the recess] and requested an extension of the interim period. Although our counterparts did not reach a complete internal agreement at the time, the United States had already decided to sabotage the conference. Following the recess, our counterparts opposed discussing our side's proposals, and the Thai delegation presented the 16-nation joint declaration. They then declared the end of the conference. Molotov then made an overall statement on the Korean issue and pointed out that our counterparts should take the responsibility for sabotaging the conference. I spoke next and expressed my great regret that the 16-nation declaration announced its determination to end the conference. I then presented our minimum proposal. Specifically, that the nineteen countries should issue a joint statement indicating a common desire to achieve the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue on the basis of establishing a unified, independent, and democratic country of Korea. I pointed out that if they rejected this proposal, their rejection of negotiations could only have an unfavorable effect on future international conferences. This minimum proposal obviously tore our counterparts into confusion. After debating back and forth among themselves, the Belgian delegate stated that he was not opposed to the spirit of my proposal and was ready to accept it. Eden agreed with the Belgian delegate's statement and asked the delegations if he could conclude that the conference had already accepted China's proposal. Nobody was responding at the time. Smith was panic-stricken and immediately took the floor himself with a statement against us. Eden then reversed himself and said that the conference had no procedure for voting. He pointed out that the conference would not be able to reach agreement on any of the proposals, and it was only possible to note the proposals as part of the record of the conference. I immediately praised the Belgian delegate's spirit of conciliation and said that it was also worth noting that Chairman Eden asked the delegations to consent to China's last proposal. At the same time, I criticized the opposition and obstruction of the US delegation and pointed out how the US delegation had been preventing the Geneva Conference from being able to arrive at even a minimum agreement. At the end, Eden declared that the conference would note all proposals and statements as part of the record and that the meeting was adjourned. In sum, the Soviet, Korean, and Chinese delegations' repeated efforts disrupted our counterparts' arrangement and completely exposed America's decision to sabotage the conference for the world.

(3) At this point, the conference on the Korean issue ended. We are considering whether or not the Soviet Union, the DPRK, and China, the three countries of our side, should issue a joint statement or issue statements separately after we return to our countries summarizing the discussions on the Korean issue at the Geneva Conference and explaining them to the whole world.

Zhou Enlai
June 17, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Summary. Zhou Enlai’s presentation at a meeting of the Chinese, Soviet, and Vietnamese delegations, June 15, 1954


Under the current circumstances, our side should make some concession on the Laos and Cambodia questions in accordance with our established policies, so that the conference will continue, and that the ways through which agreements can be achieved will be identified. The key issue in the negotiation now is whether to acknowledge that there are Vietnamese troops in the two countries. Therefore, it is appropriate [for our side] to use the concession of acknowledging the existence of Vietnamese troops in Laos and Cambodia to exchange for compensation on the issue of dividing zones in Vietnam.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not cite or quote without permission from CWIHP.
TOP SECRET
FROM SAIGON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND WHITEHALL
SECRET (CABINET) DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Graves
No. 221
June 16, 1954

D. 6.55 a.m. June 16, 1954
R. 8.28 a.m. June 16, 1954

IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 221 of June 16,
Repeated for information to Codel Geneva
and Saving to Paris
Washington

Your telegram No. 326: Viet Nam Army.

It is correct to say the Viet Nam army is recruited
and organized largely on a territorial basis. The best
military material, and also the largest part of it, however
does from Tong King where most of it is now serving. The
abandonment of Tong King to the Viet Minh would therefore
deal the Viet Nam army a heavy blow, and would almost
certainly precipitate its disintegration.

2. Troops recruited from central and southern Viet Nam
are of lower quality. Armed forces in the south consist
largely of private armies of so-called Viet Minh (grps. undecl.)
and are in reality high grade (grps. undecl.) in fact.

3. M. Sidault's remarks are not very wide of the mark.
It would be unwise to place much reliance on the present
Viet Nam army.

Foreign Office pass Immediate to Codel Geneva as my
telegram No. 39 and Saving to Paris and Washington as my
telegrams Nos. 56 and 54.

[Repeated to Codel Geneva and Saving to Paris and
Washington].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Minister of State

Mr. Speight
Head of South East Asia
In answer Eden's question, Molotov said no military contacts made yesterday since French colonel in Paris.

Molotov told Eden he would "suggest nothing" tomorrow re Laos and Cambodia. Eden got word from these today that UK absolutely firm on Laos and Cambodia.

New subject: Chinese wishes establish nine-nation group to work on technical problems; in order avoid appearance French being left alone to deal with Viet Minh. Chinese made similar suggestion to French Deputy Secretary-General this morning.

SMITH

JUNE 16, 1954

360.1 GE/6-1954; Telegram

Smith-Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, June 16, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET          PRIORITY        GENEVA, June 16, 1954—6 p.m.

Dulles 187. Repeated information Paris 443. Paris eyes only Ambassador. Reference Tedul 198 repeated information Paris 4850 Saigon 2600.1 Chauvel informed me this morning that in Franco-Viet Minh "underground military talks" (conducted by Colonel de Bressois on French side) Viet Minh had demanded all of Tonkin and entire delta area including Hanoi (to become Headquarters Viet Minh Army) and Haiphong be turned over to Viet Minh. French without agreeing had implied that if anything like this settlement were made, French would demand free hand in south, indicating area south of line starting approximately 18 parallel on Laoising border and running southeast approximately to Bidon (this line marked somewhat indefinitely on map in Chauvel's office). French had also indicated necessity for enclave and port in delta area, implying temporary tenure for troop withdrawal. Chauvel indicated Ely felt he could not defend delta area and better have French forces therein by negotiations than lose them in battle. French raised question evacuation their troops, French citizens, and Vietnam Catholics from Tonkin area but had received no reply from Viet Minh. Chauvel also stated French had made clear that Laos and Cambodia were not involved in this proposed settlement. No mention was made regrouping Viet Minh forces south this line. Last conversation three days ago and nothing has developed since. Chauvel continued that Vietnamese had no knowledge this proposal and if acceptable to French it would be most difficult to sell it to them, which might be necessary within next few days. He implied that Ambassador Heath might be of real service this connection.

I informed Chauvel of Zhukov-Kingsbury Smith conversation (Secto 423 repeated Paris 418*) emphasizing advisability French retaining foothold in north preferably Haiphong-Hanoi area, but at least Haiphong. This, with possibly, small compensating enclave for Viet Minh south of line, would avoid appearance of outright partition. Chauvel was somewhat dubious whether this would be possible but thought that maybe foothold on delta coast at Hon Gay, where there are important French coal interests, might be retained. I told Chauvel that we did not wish be suddenly placed in position where these secret negotiations might have result of our being abruptly confronted with agreement or proposed settlement which we would not feel able accept and from which we might have to disassociate ourselves, and stressed need our being informed on continuing basis of conversations. Suggested Colonel Dwan be liaison officer in respect. Chauvel agreed entirely.

SMITH

* For a memorandum of conversation of this discussion, see p. 1109. Summary of conversation transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 423 June 11. (360.1 GE/6-1154)

Conference File, lot 60 D 627, CP 285

Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)

SECRET

GENEVA, June 16, 1954.

Subject: Meeting of the Six this morning.

1. Bidault is returning to Geneva this afternoon at about 5:00 and remaining through tomorrow morning. He will not be present at this afternoon's session. He will, however, wish to see Mr. Molotov and the heads of the five friendly delegations.

2. Chauvel stated French most anxious to avoid giving the impression that the windup of the Korean phase is a precedent for a similar windup of the Indochina phase. He recognized, however, that the heads of some of the delegations might have to return home. After referring to recent discussions regarding the control problem and particularly to Eden's proposal of June 2nd regarding reference of the French proposal of that date to a technical committee and after referring to Molotov's proposal of June 14, Chauvel said that perhaps the time had come to refer this whole matter to a committee made up

1 Dated June 14, p. 1148.
of representatives of the nine delegations who would study it. Chauvel tabled a paper on this subject (translation attached). Chauvel said that he was thinking of presenting this paper this afternoon. The Cambodian delegation took a strong position against the introduction of any proposal that would tend to relate to the particular case of Laos and Cambodia. He furthermore criticized Chauvel's proposal as putting Laos and Cambodia in the same class as Vietnam. I stated that I would have to refer the matter back to the head of my delegation but that it seemed to me there was considerable question as to timing and that we were perhaps not ready for a committee at this stage. The Vietnamese delegate also stated that he thought Chauvel's proposal would be premature. He added that reference should be made in the terms of reference of the proposed committee to the "authority" from which the control organ would depend (i.e., the guarantors). Later Offroy made it very clear that what the French wished to avoid was any departure from the conference of the leading figures without leaving representatives of the nine delegations apparently engaged in useful work. Offroy referred to the Eden proposal of a recess pending a report from the military conversations said that the French wished to avoid any complete recess.)

3. With regard to the specific matter of Laos and Cambodia which is to be discussed this afternoon, it was agreed that the Cambodians and Laotians in that order would present their cases. The Cambodians have already made a specific proposal (June 8), the Laotians will make a similar one this afternoon. The French do not plan to make their statement in support of the Laotians and Cambodians until after hearing from the Communists. (The British representative indicated that Molotov had told Eden that the Soviets would have some suggestions to make.) I indicated that we would speak but I did not state at what point. (Chauvel at one point suggested the possibility of military talks on Laos and Cambodia but did not develop his thinking.)

4. It was suggested that it would be good tactics to avoid strong statements on our side until after we had heard from the Communists.

5. The Cambodians will again stress their willingness to make commitments regarding the nonintroduction of foreign troops into Cambodia and the restriction of the Cambodian military establishment, what is required for Cambodian defense.

6. Ambassador Offroy told me that he saw no objection to the mention in your remarks of specific Viet Minh units which have invaded Laos and Cambodia.

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1 Not attached to the source text.
The Laotian delegate took generally similar line. He stressed national unity of Laotian people, democratic conditions and complete independence. He referred to presence of Viet Minh invaders known to all objective observers. He submitted a six-point proposal involving (1) evacuation of Viet Minh regular and irregular troops; (2) concentration of French Union troops at bases established in Franco-Lao agreements; (3) disarmament of remaining irregular troops with departure of Vietnamese citizens and granting of all civic rights to Laotians; (4) freeing of prisoners of war and civil internees; (5) system of international control to be applied also to supervising the frontiers; and (6) a meeting of representatives of the military commands at Geneva, these representatives to create, if they so desire, special military committees to coordinate troop movements on the spot. (Text transmitted in Sect 457.)

Chou En-lai then referred to his proposal of May 27 (Secto 396*1) and to agreement of May 31 based on Eden proposal (Secto 347*2). He recalled that he had stated on several occasions that conditions not same in each of three countries of Indochina; there are differences between all three although they cannot be disassociated in clear-cut manner. He then expressed following views:

First, in accordance with May 29 agreement, there must be early and simultaneous cessation of hostilities throughout Indochina. Examination of situation in Laos and Cambodia must necessarily proceed on this principle.

Second, [garbled group] in the agreement of May 29, representatives of the two commands should now examine the situation in Laos and Cambodia so far as the dispose of forces at the time of the cessation of hostilities is concerned.3 Chou En-lai pointed out that the representatives of the two commands have been meeting with regard to Vietnam since June 2 and that they should now study both in Geneva and on the spot the disposition of forces in Laos and Cambodia. This study must take into account (a) that opposing native forces in Laos and Cambodia include the armies under resistance governments in the two countries, and (b) that all foreign forces must be withdrawn in accordance with the DRV proposal of May 10.

Third, from date of cessation of hostilities there must be prevention of introduction into Indochina from outside of all kinds of military personnel and material. This principle must apply to Laos and Cambodia also. Chou En-lai stated he had noted with understanding Cambodian's statement of June 8 recalling Cambodian requirements of arms for defense. This would apply also to Laos. This question requires further consideration. At same time Chou En-lai made clear that if peace is to be restored in Indochina, no foreign country must be permitted to establish bases in the territory of any of the three countries of Indochina after the armistice.

Fourth, the principle of international supervision applicable to Laos and Cambodia seems to be generally accepted. However, special conditions there are to be taken into account in applying international supervision.

Fifth, there seems to be no problem involved in the release and exchange of prisoners of war and civil internees.

Sixth, there should be no persecution of persons having collaborated with either party during the war.

Chou En-lai then submitted proposal transmitted as Secto 458.4 DRV delegate then spoke at some length on necessity recognizing importance national liberation movements Laos and Cambodia; he maintained movements, based on past history and glories these countries, had been active for many years subsequent to French conquest and colonization. Even after France had entrenched itself in Indochina people continued fight for independence. After defeat Japanese occupation Viet Minh, Khmer, and Pathet-Lao Republic formed. French tried to break down these resistance movements' with arms and then endeavored entice them with pseudo-independence and democratic reforms. Alim US interventionists was to take over from French colonialists. DRV representatives respected and saluted these liberation movements and wished to do everything possible to help them. He refuted "endemium" assertions that there were external influences (Viet Minh) in Laos and Cambodia. When imperialism and colonialism exists resistance comes from within and could not be imposed artificially from without. He then added that he supported Chinese resolution and expressed hope that negotiations in Geneva and on spot would take place.

DRV delegate then referred to his May 10 proposals and said question restoring peace Vietnam necessitated discussion political and military issues. Military discussions have shown some progress here at Geneva and time had come to take up political matters. For this reason, he submitted proposal transmitted as Secto 459.4

French delegate (Chauvel) expressed pleasure that DRV delegate had not objected to Chinese proposals. He would later comment on DRV proposals but wished now limit his remarks to Laos and Cambodia. Communists appeared concerned re bases these countries. Proposals made by Laotian and Cambodian delegates should give assur-
ances on this score. When Viet Minh troops withdrawn no foreign troops would remain Laos and Cambodia. The Cambodians had said that if there were no danger of aggression there would be no appeal for foreign troops. What more guarantees do Communists desire? Re Laos, France had agreement with military commitments. When Viet Minh troops withdrawn French troops would be reduced to very minimum needed to maintain security and would be subject international control. France ready accept these controls. If proposals Laos and Cambodia accepted adequate guarantees would exist in military fields.

Re statements made by Communist side concerning resistance movement, French delegate felt that Laos and Cambodia statement had given satisfactory answer. If hostilities cease, free elections would be held these countries with neutral commission to supervise them. Khmer and Pathet-Lao people would have same civic rights and could take their place in society. French delegate associated acceptance Laos and Cambodia proposals which he believed would bring peace and security to area. He continued that he had listened with care and read with interest Chinese proposal which contained many useful elements. He would comment on them at later date. He surprised to hear today DRV proposal, it being his understanding that subject Laos and Cambodia would be discussed meeting. He felt tabling this proposal was endeavor to mix up everything. He was not critical of proposal itself but wished to take things up in methodical order.

US delegate, though inscribed to speak, stated thought it better to limit remarks to few words in view late hour. He said he listened with interest to Chinese statement which seemed to him restrained and reasonable. He could not say same thing regarding DRV statement which was not reasonable or restrained. He proposed that conference return to subject Laos and Cambodia. In closing, he remarked that at first glance there appeared to be certain points in Chinese proposal which might be agreed to and others which seemed to him similar to points proposed by Laotian and Cambodian delegates.

Soviet delegate pointed out that conference in considering restoration peace in Indochina gave immediate attention cease-fire Vietnam which was main theater operations. However, entire area had many similar characteristics and he could not agree that situation Vietnam different from Laos and Cambodia although latter two had certain peculiarities which must be taken into account. All three states struggling for freedom and independence. He believed re-establishment peace all three Associated States could not but be related to desire those people for peace, liberty, and freedom. In examining question restoration peace Laos and Cambodia certain difficulties had arisen. Conference had heard representatives from only one of the belligerents and had not heard from the resistance movements. Soviet delegate considered Cambodian proposal of June 8 as one-sided and cited paragraph two as example. Same thing could be said of today's Laotian proposal. He believed Chinese proposal covered all main questions and took into account desires of representatives Laos and Cambodia. It might form basis for decision this conference. DRV proposals took into account measures, if not taken, would mean no cease-fire Laos and Cambodia. If accepted cease-fire could be agreed upon. He therefore supported DRV proposal.

Soviet delegate then referred to his proposal June 14 regarding composition, arrangements neutral commission and mixed commissions. He continued that he would like to meet desires other delegates and therefore suggested that international neutral commission be composed of five, not four members, and that Indonesia, for example, be added. India would have chairmanship and other members would be Poland, Czechoslovakia, Pakistan. Another variant might be a more restricted international commission composed of India (chairmanship), Poland, and Indonesia or "some other Asiatic power". He thought agreement might be reached on one these proposals. He again endorsed his June 14 proposal adding Soviet delegate considered entirely unacceptable suggestion that mixed commission be subordinate to international commission.

Vietnam delegate stated he felt Laos and Cambodia proposals most reasonable on which he would speak at later date. He noted conference had agreed deal first with military questions Vietnam and he felt that much confusion would be caused by discussing military and political questions at same time. More reasonable complete military talks then enter political field. He still supported his May 13 proposals and when political discussions were initiated he would make his views known thereon. He maintained DRV statements regarding independence Vietnam had no basis whatsoever and pointed out he had communicated to conference treaties of independence recently initiated Paris. He again maintained that elections Vietnam should be under supervision United Nations.

UK delegate started to close meeting stating discussion had been important and many proposals tabled. He suggested that this might be studied carefully and views exchanged. French delegate interjected with statement he wished to submit still another proposal on procedures re controls (see Sects 406). UK closed meeting with suggestion that all proposals be studied carefully and delegates meet Friday, June 18, to discuss them.

Smith

* Dated June 17, p. 1104.
Fourteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 16, 3 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 16, 1954—midnight.

Secto 457. Repeated information Paris 444, Saigon 170, London 292, Tokyo 143, Moscow 128, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Following is text of Laotian proposal presented at restricted session on Indochina Wednesday, June 16:

"1. On the date of the cessation of hostilities, the regular and irregular Viet Minh troops will be withdrawn from Laotian territories.

2. The French Union forces will return to the bases specifically provided in the agreements existing between the Kingdom of Laos and the French Republic. Those forces which are not considered by Laos as necessary for its security will leave country.

3. Remaining irregular elements will be disarmed. The Vietnamese components thereof will return to Vietnamese territory.

4. The Laotian nationals, after having presented themselves to the regular Laotian authorities, will recover without reservations the rights enjoyed by all Laotian citizens and particularly the right to be voters and candidates to the National Assembly. They will enjoy the legislative provisions already applied to the members of the former Lao Issari movement which contemplate particularly their right to join or to be reincorporated into the civil service or into the national army.

5. The two parties will proceed to the total liberation of prisoners of war and civil internes.

6. An international control will be established to supervise the execution of the different points of the above agreement and especially of the troop movements contemplated in Articles 1 and 2. It will also be applied to the supervision of the integrity of the frontiers.

7. Representatives of the military commands will meet at once in Geneva in order to study the conditions of execution of points one and two. They will be able to propose the creation of ad hoc military committees whose purpose will be to coordinate on-the-spot troop movements in any given region. They will as soon as possible submit the result of their labors to the conference."

SMITH

Fourteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 16, 3 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 17, 1954—1 a.m.

Secto 459. Repeated information Paris 445, London 293, Tokyo 143, Saigon 171, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered, Moscow 129. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Following is text of proposal submitted by Pham Van Dong at restricted Indochina meeting Wednesday, June 16:

"The participants of the Geneva Conference are agreed on the following:

1. In the interests of establishing a stable peace in Indochina political questions must be settled on a basis of respect for the principle of complete and real sovereignty and national independence of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

2. In order to restore the unity of Vietnam and to create a single government in Vietnam there must be carried out in the shortest possible time after the cessation of hostilities free general elections by secret ballot throughout the territory of Vietnam."
In order to create appropriate conditions which will assure the organization of the above-mentioned elections, the following must be recognized as necessary:

a. Withdrawal from the territory of Vietnam of all foreign troops before the organization of the elections;
b. The international supervision of the organization of the free general elections in Vietnam by the international supervisory commission composed of . . .

3. An undertaking by the belligerent parties not to prosecute the persons who collaborated with the opposing party during the war.
4. Establishment of economic and cultural relations between France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on a basis of equality and of mutual interests.
5. Undertaking by each of the three states of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to respect the independence, the unity and internal regime of the other states.
6. Other political questions concerning Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia must be settled at a later time in the interests of consolidating peace and the guarantee of democratic rights and national interests of the peoples of Indochina."

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SMITH

3561 GC/4-1754 : Telegram
Fourteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 16, 3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 17, 1954—1 a.m.

Secto 460. Repeated information Paris 447, London 286, Tokyo 144, Saigon 173, Moscow 151, Phnom Penh, Vientiane,unnamed, Tokyo for CINCPE. Department pass Defense. Following is translation of proposal French delegate mentioned at restricted Indochina meeting, Wednesday, June 16, and which will be distributed to 9 delegations by June 17 for discussion, June 18.

"A committee, composed of representatives of the 9 delegations of the conference, will gather as soon as possible in order to study: on the base of the proposals which have been made by the various delegates, the technical conditions (modalities) of the control over agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, in Cambodia and in Laos.

The committee will submit its recommendations to the conference as soon as possible—and in case of differences the points of divergence on the various aspects of the problem for each of the three countries. It will study particularly questions relative to the structure, organization and the competence of the control commissions."
Mr. Eden
No. 761
June 16, 1954

D. 11.06 p.m. June 16, 1954
R. 11.30 p.m. June 16, 1954

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 761 of June 16
Repeated for Information to
Washington
Paris
Beijing
Salon
Moscow
Singapore

My telegram No. 747 (not to all).

I had an important discussion with Chou En-lai this morning at his request. We discussed first yesterday's meeting on Korea. I explained that in the view of Her Majesty's Government it was inconceivable that there could be negotiations on Korea without the Chinese being present, although it was of course open to the United Nations to discuss the question at any time. I said that Bedell-Smith had explained to me that he had been unable to accept Chou En-lai's proposal without the approval of the United States Government, particularly as it had the effect of maintaining the machinery of the present conference in being for future negotiations on Korea. Chou En-lai said that he considered that Her Majesty's Government were making genuine efforts at conciliation. The United States, however, had always intended that the conference should fail and were doing their best to bring this about. There had been no real attempt at conciliation on Korea by the great Western Powers to match the conciliatory spirit which the other side had brought. He was very disappointed at the result, and if there should be a similar result from the conference on Indo-China, the door to conciliation would be completely shut. I said that it was desirable that the conference on Indo-China should not have a similar result.

2. It was clear that Chou En-lai had asked for the meeting to talk about Laos and Cambodia. He spoke in a most serious manner. He said that they recognized that there was a different situation in Laos and Cambodia, although there really were resistance movements there. They wanted the two countries to have a free and independent life like India, Burma and Indonesia. He knew that the Viet Minh were prepared to respect their sovereignty, independence and unity. The Chinese could not admit that there could be American bases in these two countries and would have to take notice if such bases were established there. Provided there were to be no foreign bases, they would be prepared to recognize the Royal Governments after those Governments had made internal settlements with the resistance movements. It would be an advantage both to China and the Western nations if they were to be members of the French Union. The situation in each country was different. In Cambodia there were only small resistance forces, and all that was necessary was a political settlement which could be easily obtained. In Laos there were larger resistance forces and it would be necessary
SECRET

Geneva Conference, (U. K. Del.) telegram No. 761 to Foreign Office

-2-

to establish regrouping areas, especially on the border of Viet Minh and Chinese territory. The task of the conference in regard to these two countries could be divided into two parts: the removal of foreign forces and the measures to deal with the domestic resistance forces. The military staffs should get down to work and report on what was necessary in each country.

3. I said that we too wanted Laos and Cambodia to be free countries with no foreign bases, neither Viet Minh nor other. I could assure him of my conviction that the United States had no desire for any bases in those countries. Our aims were not different from the Chinese aims as he had described them. There were two complications in the withdrawal of foreign forces. It would be difficult for the Viet Minh to agree to the withdrawal of their forces if they did not admit that they had any in the territories in question. Further, the French were entitled to maintain troops in a few points in Laos under their treaty, though it should be possible to confine their troops to these points. It would be necessary for the conference to give the military staffs a directive regarding the withdrawal of foreign forces if they were to make a useful report to the conference. It would probably be easier now to make progress by discussions outside the conference rather than by speeches in its plenary meetings. It might be of advantage therefore if Chou En-lai could speak to the French on the same lines as he had spoken to me.

4. Chou En-lai accepted the proposal that he should talk to the French and said that he thought that there would be no difficulty in getting an agreement from the Viet Minh to the withdrawal of their troops from Laos and Cambodia as part of the withdrawal of all foreign forces. I received a strong impression that Chou En-lai wanted a settlement in Indo-China and was anxious that this part of the conference should not break down. We cannot tell, however, how far reaching his control over Viet Minh may be.

(See also my immediately following telegram not to all posts.)

Foreign Office please pass to Washington, Paris, Moscow, Saigon, Peking and Singapore as my telegrams Nos. 263, 179, 71, 68, 119 and 62 respectively.

[Repealed to Washington, Paris, Moscow, Saigon, Peking and Singapore]

ADVANCE COPIES

Sir J. Kirkpatrick
Minister of State
Private Secretary
Mr. Speight
Head of South East Asia Department
Head of Far Eastern Department

PPP
The United States Delegation to the Department of Defense

GENEVA, June 16, 1954.

Army Message Gento 58, Action Defense, Information USARMA Paris, USARMA Saigon, USARMA London, State Department. From Defense representative for Hensel from Sullivan. Following is summary French-Vietnamese military talks with Viet Minh 14 June reported to Defense representative by member French delegation:

1. Maps exchanged 11 June by both sides (see Gento 58) compared and found to be widely divergent regarding areas over which each claims military superiority. Substantially Viet Minh position is that French hold only population centers. (Maps being reproduced by French delegation, copies promised US delegation when available.) No discussion thus far of possible regroupment areas.

2. Principal topic of discussion was preparation of paper setting forth summary of results of all meetings to date. Viet Minh representative tabled his version which French representative found unacceptable. Chief point of disagreement was Viet Minh assertion that French had put forward Laniel proposal of 8 March 1 on talks or leave it basis, and that Viet Minh had rejected it. French representative stated his reference to Laniel proposal intended merely as starting point for military discussions, that he expressed willingness to modify it, and that therefore, it was not subject to acceptance or rejection. Another point of disagreement in Viet Minh draft was statement of French position regarding Dong proposals of 25 May, advanced by Viet Minh representative at 4 June meeting. French representative found Viet Minh expression of reasons for French disagreement with Dong proposals inaccurate. French representative is redrafting paper and will present his version to Viet Minh 15 June. Presumably next meeting will be devoted to further discussion of maps and draft summary of progress to date.

Comment:

(a) French delegation contact, in response to direct question, stated there were no military talks with Viet Minh going on in Geneva other than those herein reported;

(b) Further informed Defense representatives that instructions were issued to General Edy to have a liaison officer at Dinh Cau 14 June during POW exchange available to make contact with Viet Minh liaison officer and discuss time and place for meeting of representatives and military commanders in field. Viet Minh were informed in advance. French delegation has no information yet whether contact was made.

1 Not printed.
2 For outline of the Laniel proposal, see telegram 8240 from Paris, Mar. 6, p. 3.
My dear Lane,

On the assumption that a White Paper will be published after the end of the Geneva Conference, I have been considering whether it might be possible to use this as a means of presenting R.W.G.'s case on the two controversies, which have been so widely discussed in the American press, over (a) the interpretation of the London communiqué of April 13, and (b) the response to the French appeal on the use of the Geneva Conference for an air strike at Dien Bien Phu. Several people, including "Scotty" Reston, have suggested to me and to members of my staff that, unless something is done to present the British case on these matters, there is a serious risk that another legend will grow up in this country like the legend about policy towards Japan in 1931/32 to which Dulles so misleadingly gave a new lease of life in his speech in Los Angeles on June 11.

I have a good deal of sympathy with this idea, and I hope that a White Paper is to be produced the possibility of documenting our attitude to these two controversies will be borne in mind. But I confess that I find it difficult, on the basis of the materials available to me here, to recommend precisely what papers it might be useful to include. The language of the communiqué of April 13, unless explained by other documents, could too easily be interpreted as supporting the American contention that we were committed to an immediate examination of the possibility of establishing a collective system of defence in South East Asia and the Western Pacific. The relevant extract from our own record of the conversations between the Secretary of State and Dulles (Foreign Office telegram No. 1659 of April 19), is not an agreed text, and I suppose the Americans might counter it by saying that, while they recognised that the membership of the proposed security system was to be a matter for further discussion, they had also understood that, in the words apparently used by Marshall to Eden (Wellington telegram No. 11 of April 19 to Commonwealth Relations Office), "it was agreed in London and Paris to set up a working party".

As for the French appeal of April 21, the policy of R.W.G. was and is perfectly clear. What is in doubt is the policy of the U.S. Government at that time - see for example Peat's negative answer to Bidault in Paris (Paris telegram No. 274 of April 25) and the simultaneous report of Bedell Smith's statement to Bennett in Washington that it was still possible to get a quick decision by Congress in favour of action in Indo-China (Foreign Office telegram to Paris No. 924 of April 25). The publication of British documents is therefore not likely to contribute much enlightenment either to public opinion now or to historians in the future on this particular issue.

In short, I agree that there would be advantage in re-stating our record in an authoritative way. But I do not wish to exaggerate the importance of this, since it is American rather than British policy that calls for clarification. And I should deplore any publication which resulted in a fresh outburst of recriminations.

Yours,

R. Dulles

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.
SECRET

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (UDDF) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET (Cabinet)

DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden
No. 769
June 17, 1954
D. 6.12 p.m. June 17, 1954
R. 7.00 p.m. June 17, 1954

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 769 of June 17
Repeated for information to Washington Moscow
I Paris Saigon

My telegram No. 763: Indo-China. 7/107/45

Bidault came to see me before lunch today in order to give
Bedell Smith and me an account of conversations he had had wit
Molotov and Chou En-lai in the course of the morning.

2. Both Molotov and Chou En-lai had expressed concern
about the way in which the Korean part of the conference had
ended, and lest the Indo-China discussions might end in the same
way. Neither had given any indication of their own personal
plans but both had expressed the hope that Bedell Smith and I
would stay in order that further progress might be made. Molotov
had been friendly and had not demurred when Bidault had suggest
that after the departure of the Foreign Ministers the conference
might continue for a while in the hands of deputies.

3. Chou En-lai had given Bidault a full account of his views about Laos and Cambodia, which appears to be the same as that which he gave me (my telegram No. 754) 7/107/45

4. Bidault had formed from these two conversations the strong impression that Molotov and Chou En-lai were anxious to reach an agreement. Partly on the strength of this impression and partly for French internal political reasons Bidault urged that Bedell Smith and I should stay on here for a few more days

5. After Bidault had left to catch his aircraft back to Paris for the afternoon’s debate, Chauvel stayed behind to discuss plans further with Bedell Smith and myself. He said that was confirmed that the French now had an opportunity of making progress in direct talks outside the conference. He and his /staff would
staff would follow up M. Bidault's meetings in further discussions with the Chinese delegation. He would also discuss the situation further with the Cambodian and Laotian delegations. His aim would be to try to bring about a reconciliation between the proposals tabled at yesterday's meeting by the Chinese and by the Cambodians and Laotians in the hope that an agreed draft might be produced for approval at tomorrow's meeting. This draft if one could be worked out, would provide the basis for two further sets of military staff talks on Cambodia and on Laos, which would be supplementary to those already in progress on Viet Nam. In addition Chauvel would table at tomorrow's meeting his proposal for the setting up of a technical committee to work out the arrangements for supervision in each of the three states if agreement could be reached to set all this work in motion, it a point which would have been reached at which the departure of the Ministers could perfectly well be justified. The conference could then continue in the hands of deputies and the Foreign Ministers could if necessary return in a few weeks' time to consider and approve their recommendations.

5. Bedell Smith said that he could not leave before I did for fear it should be said that the United States were taking the initiative in breaking off the discussions. He at present intended to leave on Saturday. He could not delay much longer since it was essential for him to reach Washington a day or two before the arrival of the Prime Minister and myself. There would be certain indispensable preparatory work to be done with members of Congress and others who were inclined to be critical.

7. In the circumstances I have decided that I must stay here at least until after tomorrow afternoon's meeting, which promises to be an important one. I shall see after that whether it is possible for me to leave on Saturday.

Foreign Office please pass Washington, Paris, Moscow and Saigon as my telegrams Nos. 258, 183, 74 and 72 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington, Paris, Moscow and Saigon]

ADVANCE COPIES

Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Private Secretary
Minister of State

Mr. Speaight
Head South East Asia
Department

66666
Resident Clerk
SECRET

FROM GENOA CONFERENCE (U.K. DEL.) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Gypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET (CABINET)

DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden
No. 774
June 17, 1954.

D. 7:35 p.m. June 17, 1954.
R. 7:49 p.m. June 17, 1954.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 774 of June 17.
Repeated for information to Washington
Paris
Moscow

My telegram No. 769.

When Molotov called this afternoon he began by asking whether I thought that progress could be made on Laos and Cambodia on the basis of the proposals which the Chinese delegation had made yesterday. I said that Bidault had the impression from these proposals and from his talk with Chou En-lai this morning that an agreement might be possible.

2. The French Delegation were working on a paper which would combine the Chinese proposals with those put forward by the Lao delegation yesterday and hoped to have further discussions with the Chinese delegation this afternoon. Their object would be to try to negotiate an agreed paper to put before the conference at its restricted session tomorrow.

3. Molotov said that there were points of agreement in the two papers, but he noticed that the Lao proposals would perpetuate the French bases in Laos. If foreign forces were to be withdrawn, this should apply to the French as well as to the Viet Minh. I reminded Molotov that the French had treaty rights to station forces in two places in Laos, but from the discussion it was clear that this is going to be a difficult question.

4. Molotov then turned to the question of composition of the supervisory commission. He said that if we did not like Indonesia, he would be ready to accept a commission composed of India, Burma and Poland. I replied that this would create
SECRET

Geneva Conference (U.K. Del.) telegram No. 774 to Foreign Office

obvious difficulties and that it seemed invidious for either of us to differentiate between the Colombo Powers. I asked whether he would be ready to consider taking the Five Colombo Powers and adding one from each side, for instance Poland and Switzerland. Molotov commented that this arrangement might be unwieldy and that it was surely enough for the Colombo Powers if, between them, they were to provide two-thirds of the supervisory commission. It was agreed that we should consider this question further.

5. He then discussed how the work of the conference should be handled. Molotov said that he did not want to stay here very much longer and I told him that I too wanted to get away. My hope was that we should be able to set up military committees, with agreed terms of reference, for contacts between the staffs on Laos and Cambodia as we already had done for Viet Nam. It might also be of advantage to set up a technical committee to consider various proposals that had been made for the way in which supervision would work. If this could be done, the heads of delegations might go and return when the various committees were ready to report results to the conference. In the meantime, the delegations might be in charge of deputies.

6. Molotov agreed that this might be the best way of proceeding. He showed that he attached importance to the settlement of the problem of the composition of the supervisory commission before heads of delegations left.

7. His last words were that we should make a determined effort in the next two or three days to settle these main outstanding questions of principle. If so the conference would have made real progress.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington, Paris and Moscow as my telegrams Nos. 260, 185 and 75 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington, Paris and Moscow].

ADVANCE COPIES
Private Secretary
Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Minister of State
Mr. Speaight
Head of South East Asia Department
Resident Clerk

FF FF
The United States Delegation to the Department of Defense

SECRET


1. Maps exchanged 11 June by both sides (see Gento 87) compared and found to be widely divergent regarding areas over which each claims military superiority. Substantially Viet Minh position is that French hold only population centers. (Map being reproduced by French delegation, copies promised US delegation when available.) No discussion thus far of possible regroupment areas.

2. Principal topic of discussion was preparation of paper setting forth summary of results of all meetings to date. Viet Minh representative tabled his version which French representative found unacceptable. Chief point of disagreement was Viet Minh assertion that French had put forward Laniel proposal of 5 March on take it or leave it basis, and that Viet Minh had rejected it. French representative stated his reference to Laniel proposal intended merely as starting point for military discussions that he expressed willingness to modify it and, therefore, it was not subject to acceptance or rejection. Another point of disagreement in Viet Minh draft was statement of French position regarding Dong proposals of 25 May, advanced by Viet Minh representative at 4 June meeting. French representative found Viet Minh expression of reasons for French disagreement with Dong proposals inadequate. French representative is redrafting paper and will present revised version to Viet Minh 15 June. Presumably next meeting will be devoted to further discussion of maps and summary of progress to date.

Comment:

(a) French delegation contact, in response to direct question, flatly stated there were no military talks with Viet Minh going on in Geneva other than those herein reported;

(b) Further informed Defense representatives that instructions were issued to General Ely to have a liaison officer at Dinh Cu 14 June during POW exchange available to make contact with Viet Minh liaison officer and discuss time and place for meeting of representatives military commanders in field. Viet Minh were informed in advance French delegation has no information yet whether contact was made.

1 Not printed.

For outline of the Laniel proposal, see telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, p. 405.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Fifteenth Plenary Session, June 17, 1954

Records No: 206-Y0050

Chairman Mao, Comrade Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) The Soviet, Korean and Chinese delegations discussed our strategies toward the Korean issue on the evening of the 14th. We assume that our counterparts will not accept the five-point proposal that Molotov presented on June 5th since they have already spread rumors outside the conference that the conference will be ended at the plenary session of the 15th. It will be difficult to present easily our side’s second original plan (regarding the consolidation of peace in Korea) as well as the supplementary proposals that we originally planned to use as last steps. We must try to play every card we have at the last session. Even if we cannot prevent the conference from being sabotaged, we can at least drive our counterparts into an unfavorable position. The more modest our proposals are, the more passive our counterparts will be. It will also make it more difficult and more unreasonable of them to sabotage the conference. In addition, it will force our counterparts to take greater responsibility for ending the conference. Therefore, we have decided that at the plenary session on the 15th, our side should: let Nam Il present proposals on the guarantee of peace in Korea, let me speak to support Nam Il’s proposals and recommend that the conference should go into a restricted session of seven countries (China, USSR, UK, US, France, DPRK, and ROK) and let Molotov submit a [draft] declaration to guarantee that no action will be taken to threaten peace in Korea. We assume that our counterparts will accept none of these proposals. Therefore, at last, I will make a minimum proposal. Specifically, I will express our common desire for the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue and propose to discuss the issues of time and place for the reopening of the negotiations. We presume that our counterparts will not even accept this minimum proposal since the United States’ policy is basically not to reach any agreement.

(2) At the fifteenth plenary session on the Korean issue on the 15th, Chairman Eden intentionally let our three delegations speak first. Nam Il made a six-point proposal on the guarantee of peace in Korea. I spoke to support Nam Il’s proposals and suggested that the conference go into a restricted session of seven countries. Molotov proposed that the nineteen countries should publish a joint declaration assuring that no action will be taken to threaten peace in Korea. It seems that Molotov’s proposal for a joint declaration was beyond our counterparts’ expectations. Thus, Eden immediately called for a short recess after our three delegations finished our speeches. The sixteen countries held an extraordinary meeting during the recess and requested an extension of the recess. Although our counterparts did not reach a complete internal agreement at the time, the United States had already decided to sabotage the conference. Following the recess, our counterparts opposed discussing our side’s proposals, and the Thai delegation presented the 16-nation joint declaration. They then declared the end of the conference. Molotov then made an overall statement on the Korean issue and pointed out that our counterparts should take the responsibility for sabotaging the conference. I spoke next and expressed my great regret that the 16-nation declaration announced its determination to end the conference. I then presented our minimum proposal. Specifically, that the nineteen countries should issue a joint statement indicating a common desire to achieve the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue on the basis of establishing a unified, independent, and democratic country of Korea. I pointed out that if they rejected this proposal, their rejection of negotiations could only have an unfavorable effect on future international conferences. This minimum proposal obviously threw our counterparts into confusion. After debasing back and forth (among themselves), the Belgian delegate stated that he was not opposed to the spirit of my proposal and was ready to accept it. Eden agreed with the Belgian delegate’s statement and asked the delegations if he could conclude that the conference had already accepted China’s proposal. Nobody was responding at the time. Smith was panicked and immediately took the floor himself with a statement against us. Eden then reversed himself and said that the conference had no procedure for voting. He pointed out that the conference would not be able to reach an agreement on any of the proposals, and it was only possible to note the proposals as part of the record of the conference. I immediately praised the Belgian delegate’s spirit of conciliation and said that it was also worth noting that Chairman Eden asked the delegations to consent to China’s last proposal. At the same time, I criticized the opposition and obstruction of the US delegation and pointed out how the US delegation had been preventing the Geneva Conference from being able to arrive at even a minimum agreement. At the end, Eden declared that the conference would note all proposals and statements as part of the record and that the meeting was adjourned. In sum, the Soviet, Korean and Chinese delegations’ repeated efforts disrupted our counterparts’ arrangement and completely exposed America’s decision to sabotage the conference.

(3) At this point, the sessions on the Korean issue ended. We are considering whether or not the Soviet Union, the DPRK, and China, the three countries of our side, should issue a joint statement or issue statements separately after we return to our countries summarizing the discussions on the Korean issue at the Geneva Conference and explaining them to the whole world.

Zhou Enlai
June 17, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
of Haiphong" which in any event must remain under their control for a considerable period for purely military reasons to effect evacuation of French Union Forces from the north. However, if, as appeared likely, choice was giving Viet Minh an enclave in south in exchange for French enclave in Haiphong, they thought it preferable to give up Haiphong. He said no French parliament would approve conditions which the US had laid down for its intervention, and French had no choice but made the best deal they could, obtaining as strong position as possible in south. Chauvel understood fully; he would probably not be able to publicly associate ourselves with such a solution, but he hoped that when it came time to put it to the Vietnamese the US would consider it possible very discreetly. He let the Vietnamese know that we considered it best that could be obtained under the circumstances and our public disassociation would not operate so as to encourage Vietnamese opposition. Johnson replied he did not see how it would be possible for us to do this, and in any event he would, of course have to see what the solution was. Chauvel said that such a solution as partition should come as no surprise to the Vietnamese as Buu Loc had sometime ago indicated to DeJean there had been conversations between Vietnamese and Viet Minh in which Viet Minh had made it clear that only two alternatives were coalition government or partition. Chauvel said Ngo Dinh and Diem are very unrealistic, unreasonable, and would probably prove to be "difficult".

Chauvel said the line French had in mind had been made available to US defense representatives at some five-power talks, but was vague about time and place. He referred to it as "line of the chalk cliffs," which he said was defense position running from the sea across Vietnam and Laos to the Mekong. Understand this is a line roughly 19 parallel running from vicinity of Dong Hoi to Thatkhet. Replying to query, Chauvel said French Union Forces removed from the north would be deployed along that line.

Chauvel said all indications were Mendes-France would succeed in forming government next day or two and would probably himself assume Foreign Minister post. Said he had been in touch with Mendes-France and had sent emissary to Paris this morning to brief him on situation in Geneva. Chauvel said was anxious to show complete continuity of French effort here in Geneva and hoped there could be another restricted meeting tomorrow. Chauvel said, "Under-ground military talks" last night had been completely unproductive, Viet Minh obviously taking strong line in view of French Government situation.

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751G.00/6-1754: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation.²

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 18, 1954—1:04 p.m.

Tedul 217. Dulles 193.² It has for a long time been our basic policy to see the UN more actively concern itself with the situation in Indochina as a whole and also in relation to Thailand. It seems that if Laos and Cambodia act alone, particularly under Chapter VII this might be construed as a writing off of Vietnam and care would be required in this connection. We note, however, that 157 from Phnom Penh.² indicates intention only to seek peace observation commission not Chapter VII action.

In view of the critical nature of the situation we are not disposed to attempt to use pressure to prevent what any one of these governments thinks may be necessary to its own survival. This would be to assume excessive responsibility. We can, however, exert care lest the action of one should unfortunately injure the other.

DULLES

¹Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to USUN as telegram 653, to Bangkok as telegram 2299, to Saigon as telegram 2049, to Phnom Penh (from Saigon) as telegram 78, to London as telegram 6686, and to Paris as telegram 6683.

²Dated June 17, p. 1173.

³June 17, not printed; the message contained a report on a Cambodian request for a peace observation commission. (751G.00/6-1754)

396.1 GB/6-1554: Telegram

Fifteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 18, 3 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 18, 1954—midnight.


In General Smith's absence, Robertson made statement (Seco 470) sustaining proposals made June 8 by Cambodian delegate (Seco 367¹) and June 16 by Laotion delegate (Seco 457²). He

¹A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/15) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p.m. and adjourned at 7:30 p.m. The minutes are also printed in Conférence de Genève, pp. 311-322. The speech by Top Phan, Indochina Document 1C/37, June 18, and the proposal by Cambodia and Laos, Indochina Documents 1C/38 and 1C/38, respectively, June 18, are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 276A.

²Intra.

³Dated June 8, p. 1014.

⁴Dated June 16, p. 1182.
stated Chinese Communists proposal (Secto 458 a) seemed to make provision for local Communists to remain in Laos and Cambodia and was lacking in precision and definiteness. He stated US delegate therefore unable accept Chinese Communist proposal. He spoke of large number positively identified Viet Minh units in Laos and Cambodia.

Cambodia delegate then commented on Chou En-lai's June 16 proposal. He said he was not opposed to simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina if it could be rapidly reached. Otherwise cease-fire in Cambodia might precede other cease-fire since it can be accomplished by withdrawal of all regular and irregular foreign forces. Cambodian delegate reiterated commitment that after such withdrawal, Cambodia would admit no more foreign troops. He stressed, however, Cambodia cannot accept re-grouping zones for existing foreign troops i.e. Viet Minh in Cambodia.

With regard to negotiations by the representatives of belligerents, Cambodian delegate said purpose, location and participants must be settled. As to purpose, he said military representatives must deal primarily with elimination of foreign forces including period of time, facilities to be given Viet Minh command to fulfill commitments and road and river routes to be used. Military representatives must have precise terms of reference.

With regard participants, Cambodian delegate said there would be representatives of Royal Cambodian Command on one hand and Viet Minh Command on the other.

As to location, Cambodian delegate recalled Viet Minh proposal that discussions for Vietnam be on spot and said this would be appropriate in case of Cambodia. He pointed out extremely fluid military situation in Cambodia with highly mobile Viet Minh invaders. He therefore did not consider meeting of military representatives in Geneva practical or useful. He reiterated paragraphs 2 (a) and (b) and 3 of Cambodian proposal of June 8 (Secto 367) as spelling out terms of reference of military representatives.

Turning to paragraph 3 of Chinese Communist proposal re new introduction from abroad of new troops and military personnel, Cambodian delegate expressed appreciation. Chou En-lai's understanding that new country requires to organize its defense structure. He said however, in addition to arms and munitions, new army needs experts and instructors.

With regard to 4th paragraph of Chinese Communists proposal on international control Cambodian delegate indicated acceptance of such control either by true neutrals or by UN, stating that it must be on spot and ready to function at time of cessation hostilities in order

control (1) withdrawal of foreign forces, (2) freeing of prisoners of war and civilian internees, and (3) any external activity capable of troubling peace and security of Cambodia. Cambodian delegate expressed view there would be no difficulty with 5th and 6th paragraph of Chou's proposal dealing with liberation and exchange of prisoners of war and civilian internees and with non-persecution of persons having collaborated with opposing party.

Cambodian delegate took strong issue with Viet Minh statement supporting so-called resistance government. He added Chou En-lai's proposal not far off some points from Cambodian position and expressed satisfaction at spirit of conciliation shown by Chinese.

Cambodian delegate then submitted specific proposal (Secto 471 a) covering meeting of military representatives to achieve purposes outlined above.

Chou En-lai then spoke. He stated Mr. Robertson's statement was obviously different from General Smith's statement other day. He expressed understanding of duty Robertson has to perform i.e. the creation of controversy and of instigating controversy. For himself, he would put emphasis on conciliation and attempt to reach agreement in principle. He added, however, that as Robertson well knew, if Robertson insisted on challenging him, he would meet challenge and there would be endless discussion in this conference "we are not strangers to each other".

Chou En-lai then took up situation in Laos and Cambodia stating that in both countries there were resistance forces led by resistance governments and that there were also foreign troops some of which have been withdrawn. Agreement should be reached for complete withdrawal of foreign troops in Laos and Cambodia as well as in Vietnam.

Chou En-lai reiterated need for meeting of military representatives. Re international supervision he said that UN cannot be considered. He added international control should extend to Laos and Cambodia taking into account special conditions there. He urged early effort both within and without conference to agree on composition of neutral committee, stating that after agreement on composition decision can be reached on other points re control. He expressed himself favorably re French proposal for a committee of nine delegates to discuss this point (Secto 460 a). He considered this proposal an alternative to discussion within the conference itself.

Chou En-lai reiterated stand be simultaneity of cessation of hostilities.

\* Dated June 17, p. 1162.
\* Dated June 17, p. 1164.
Chou En-lai then turned DRV proposal of June 16 re political considerations (Secto 459*) and expressed full support. He stated true peace can be consolidated only when political problems are solved. He proposed that conference set date for discussion of political problems on basis DRV 6-point proposal June 16.

Laos delegate then stated Chinese Communist proposal of June 16 seemed to him to present acceptable basis for development discussion. He recalled his reservations on simultaneity of cessation hostilities but he said none of Chinese Communists points presented insuperable problem but that some required precision.

Laos delegate then made proposal (Secto 459) for meeting of representatives of the two commands in Geneva and on spot to study withdrawal of Viet Minh troops from Laos and of French Union troops to peace time bases in Laos. The representatives are to submit recommendations to conference as soon as possible. Meanwhile conference can continue to examine other problems relating to peace in Laos and especially to international control.

After the recess Mr. Robertson asked for the floor and made the following statement:

"I categorically reject Mr. Chou En-lai's insinuations. There is nothing contradictory in the statement I have just made with the position taken by General Smith at our last meeting. General Smith stated that Mr. Chou En-lai's proposal deserved our respectful attention. The US delegation has carefully considered the proposal and I have stated the conclusions reached. We have listened with careful attention to the statements made by the Cambodian and Laotian delegates. They pointed out, as I did, the lack of precision and definiteness in some aspects of the Chinese proposal and its failure to provide for the withdrawal of the Viet Minh forces. For these reasons the US delegation believes that the Laotian and Cambodian proposals provide a more desirable basis for negotiation".

Pham Van Dong (Viet Minh) spoke next and supported Chinese proposal of 16 June (Secto 458) which, he said, should be used as basis for further debate and which springs from principles presented in Chinese proposal of 27 May (Secto 326*). His delegation, he said, supports these principles and Chinese proposal concerning Laos and Cambodia.

He then made following remarks:

1. Principle of simultaneous cease-fire in three states should be accepted.
2. Disposition of forces of both sides after cease-fire should pertain to local forces including forces of resistance movements in Laos and Cambodia which, he said, exist in fact.

*2. With respect to withdrawal of foreign forces he said there have been Viet Minh volunteers in Laos and Cambodia and that these have been withdrawn but that if today there are such forces they will be withdrawn.
3. No foreign country should establish military bases in Indochina.
4. Representatives of military commands should engage in negotiations in Geneva and on the spot re cease-fire in Laos and Cambodia.

Dong then devoted some time to discussion of resistance movements in Laos and Cambodia, stressed that they were organized in companies and battalions, and that the existence of these forces must be recognized by all parties. He attacked Laotian and Cambodian delegations for denying existence of such forces and hoped these delegates would yield to reason. Concluded by charging that information about Viet Minh units mentioned by Robertson in opening statement was as fallacious as allegation that Chinese units participated in battle of Dien Bien Phu which, he said, has been denied by French High Command.

Chauvel (France) spoke next and referred to Chinese statement and proposal 16 June as reasonable and moderate, and as containing elements which could be acceptable although terminology appeared subject differing interpretation. He then commented on following points of Chinese proposal (Secto 458):

1. Re paragraph 3: Clarification necessary since, while text does not prohibit certain categories of armament necessary to defense, its purpose appears to be otherwise.
2. Re paragraph 4: While French delegate agrees international control should be applied to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, it is not clear whether one or three commissions intended.
3. Re paragraph 2: This main difficulty Chinese proposal believe all agree negotiation between representatives commands of belligerent parties necessary, but who are those commands? This not clear since in statement introducing proposal Chou En-lai drew distinction in speaking of disposition of forces between local troops and foreign troops.

Chauvel remarked that Chinese text offers prospect for making progress and added parenthetically, in obvious reference to French delegate, conference should resolve these questions since composition some delegates might soon be changed.

Taking up question withdrawal foreign forces Chauvel emphasized need for clear definition identity of belligerent commands. For example, in Cambodia since no French forces are there, who would establish contact in the field. Suggested Command of Royal Cambodian Forces would have to discuss problem with Viet Minh since latter would be command that had to receive troops withdrawn. Similarly in Laos there is French-Laotian command and on other hand
would conduct such military talks but that this would not be difficult to settle.

Eden spoke last briefly in support of Chauvel’s suggestion that all delegates consider three texts (Chinese, Laos, and Cambodian), in effort to reconcile them between now and next meeting as practical basis to go on.

Molotov stated he saw no objection to this suggestion since it appeared to be reformulation of French delegate’s proposal. Molotov then adjourned meeting to be reconvened 19 June.

SMITH

366: GE/6-1954: Telegram
Fifteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 18, 3 p. m.
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 18, 1954—midnight.


"Proposals on how to settle the problems of Cambodia and Laos have been put forward by the representatives of Cambodia and Laos on June 8 and June 16, and by the Chinese Communist delegation on June 16. The US delegation has given these proposals careful consideration.

The proposals of the Cambodian and Laotian delegations are clear, simple and forthright. They both provide for what is obviously the essential element of a just settlement—the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from the two countries.

The Chinese Communist proposal, on the other hand, is not clear on the question of the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Laos and Cambodia and further seems to contemplate that local Communist forces not in those countries, but that some provision should be made for them in any settlement. For these and for the reason that other provisions lack precision and definiteness, we are unable to accept the Chinese Communist proposal.

I do not believe that we will ever find a more appropriate time for good faith to be manifested than during our talks this afternoon. The head of the Viet Minh delegation, as well as the leader of the Soviet delegation, has expressed his confidence that this good faith exists. If we are to accept these protestations, if we wish the world to give any credence to these assertions, we must have a concrete demonstration before we can make progress toward an agreement in which that element plays a part. I can think of no better demonstration than for the Viet Minh to admit the presence of its regular and irregular milit-
2. Of studying the methods of liberation or exchange of prisoners of war and civil internees.

2. To submit, in the shortest possible time, their recommendations to the decision of the conference.

B. Laotian

"Toward a cessation of hostilities in Laos:

1. The representatives of the two commands will meet as soon as possible at Vientiane and contacts will be established immediately on the spot.

2. The representatives of the two commands will study the problems relative to the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Laotian territory and of those of the French Union to their peace-time bases.

3. They will submit their recommendations to the conference as soon as possible."

Conference files, lot 68 D 697, CP 320: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET NIAC

GENEVA, June 18, 1954—6 p. m.

Dulles 197. Eyes only Secretary from Under Secretary, Ambassador Dillon has telephoned suggesting that on my return I touch down at Paris and see Mendes-France at airport on condition that he is /invested, which Dillon expects today or tomorrow.¹ Dillon says that Mendes-France urgently desires to see me. Because of French reaction to Churchill visit² and for other reasons he will do this, unless I hear from you to contrary.³ Plan to leave here Sunday afternoon.

SMITH

¹ Memoranda from Johnson to Smith, June 16 and 17, concerning Ambassador Dillon's call and a possible meeting between Under Secretary Smith and Premier Mendes-France are in Conference file, lot 68 D 697, CP 320.

² For documentation on Prime Minister Churchill's visit to Washington, June 22-23, see volume VI.

³ The Department's reply was contained in telegram Tnul 18, June 18, infra.

Tnul 18 SM/6-1954: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

TOP SECRET NIAC

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1954—4:42 p. m.

Tnul 18. Eyes only for Under Secretary and Ambassador from Secretary. Ur Dulles 197.¹ This poses difficult problem. On one hand

¹ Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4671. Supra.
Minutes, Meeting between Zhou Enlai and the Australian Minister for External Affairs [Richard] Casey (Summary), June 18, 1954

Records No: 206- Y0009

Time: June 18, 1954, 12:00 p.m. to 12:45 p.m.

Attendees on the Chinese side: Zhou Enlai, Ke Bainian, Pu Shouchang (interpreter)

Attendees on the Australian side: Casey, Lauren [?] (staff of the Australian legation at Saigon)

1. Regarding the Korean issue
   Casey first assured us that he had never thought about excluding China in the future from the discussions on the Korean issue. He then said that the Korean issue is currently a mess. It therefore proved that it is difficult for such a big conference as this one to solve the problem. He said that he originally thought that even if North and South Korea could not be unified shortly, at least some temporary measures could be taken. For example, [measures on the issues of] trade and communication and so on between the North and the South. However, now the North and the South are like oil and water and do not mix.

   Foreign Minister Zhou said, we also hope that the North and South will not continue fighting each other. Instead, we want them to get closer. However, as Mr. Casey knows, South Korea's attitude is very unreasonable on these issues. After the sixteen countries published the joint declaration, the South Korean delegation immediately made a statement saying that it would no longer be restrained by the Korean War Armistice Agreement. This statement not only embarrassed the other members of the sixteen countries but even Mr. Smith.

   Casey said that it was right, and they were very angry about that, too.

2. Regarding the issues of the recognition of China and the United Nations
   Casey said that currently there were still various difficulties to be overcome. Therefore, it was still too early to discuss the issues of recognition and the United Nations. He said that he believes that Foreign Minister Zhou understands political issues and other issues in the world.

   Foreign Minister Zhou said: "[It does not matter. However, Mr. Casey should know that we have complaints about these issues."

   Casey asked, "[what did you mean by 'complaint']?"

   Foreign Minister Zhou said that China was deprived of the authority and status to which it was entitled at the United Nations.

   Casey said that nevertheless, the improvement of Sino-British relations achieved this time was very profitable. "[If we] take a little bit longer, and use time to 'heal', [I believe that the situation will get better." He said, he understands that the Chinese people know about "the time cure."

   Foreign Minister Zhou said that the improvement of Sino-British relations was an achievement. "[I believe that it can also help to deepen the understanding of the countries of the British Commonwealth toward China through the improvement of Sino-British relations. Mr. Casey just said that the Chinese people know about the 'time cure,' it means that Mr. Casey has some understanding of the Chinese people."

   Casey said that he believes that the improvement of Sino-British relations will deepen the understanding of the countries of the British Commonwealth toward China as well.

3. The Indochina issue
   Casey said that as far as he knows the discussion on the Indochina issue made progress because of Foreign Minister Zhou's proposals.

   Foreign Minister Zhou briefly repeated to Casey what he had discussed with Eden. For example, [we] hope that Laos and Cambodia become countries of the Southeast Asian type; the two [different] situations of Laos and Cambodia should be recognized; although [Laos and Cambodia] should keep their own defense forces, foreign troops must be withdrawn; and no foreign countries should establish military bases in Laos and Cambodia, and so on.

   Casey asked whether holding elections in Laos and Cambodia would be the best way to test the size of the local defense forces. Since a war is ongoing in the region, and the situation is confusing, the elections should therefore probably be held a while after the armistice. He then asked, "[what do you think about holding an election within twelve months after the armistice?]"

   Foreign Minister Zhou said that elections should eventually be held in the three countries of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Although the elections would probably need to be held a while after the armistice, we hope that the shorter this period of time is the better. However, the current problem is to end the war.

   Casey asked whether Foreign Minister Zhou had met with the two foreign ministers of Laos and Cambodia. They would be glad to know about what Foreign Minister Zhou had discussed with Eden.

   Foreign Minister Zhou said that he had not yet had a chance to talk with the foreign ministers of Laos and Cambodia.

4. Issue of the military bases.
   Casey said that if a certain arrangement could be made in Indochina, Australia would definitely respect and not sabotage it. He also said that Foreign Minister Zhou did not have to be afraid of anything. They [the Western countries?], including Australia, will not conduct an invasion. He said he believed that
"international communism" can peacefully coexist with "international democratic countries."

Foreign Minister Zhou said: ""China is willing to coexist peacefully with all the countries of Southeast Asia and the western Pacific Ocean. It certainly includes Australia and New Zealand. This is China's policy toward India. However, China also applies this policy to all other countries. These are not empty words. It is the policy that we have been following for the last five years. The People's Republic of China will not conduct an invasion, nor should Mr. Casey have any doubts on it."

Casey said that he was glad to hear that. He also said that he believed that it will not be difficult for both sides to reach an agreement as long as China does not establish military bases.

Foreign Minister Zhou asked: ""Did you mean that if China establishes military bases in Indochina? How could China go to Indochina and establish military bases there? We believe that no foreign countries should establish military bases in Indochina."

Casey said that what he just meant was that China should not establish military bases inside the Chinese territory near Indochina. Then he said, they [the Western nations?], including Australia, establish military bases for the purpose of defense, not aggression. However, it was probably difficult for Foreign Minister Zhou to accept this explanation.

Foreign Minister Zhou said, ""It will be difficult for us to imagine that Australia would go to and establish military bases everywhere alone if the United States had not established military bases in western Pacific Ocean and all over Asia. We believe that only the military bases established in our own countries can be called defensive ones. Military bases established in other countries' territories are for aggressive reasons. This is our definition."

Casey said, ""You should not think that the United States is that bad."

Foreign Minister Zhou said, ""It is the United States that has been taking a hostile attitude towards us in the past five years."

Foreign Minister Zhou continued, ""Although Mr. Casey and I can discuss all other issues, we have different understandings of the United States. However, this will not affect relations between China and Australia."

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