Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding Zhou's Conversation with Bidault, June 18, 1954

Record No. 206-Y0050

Chairman [Mao], Comrade Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

At the noon of the 17th, I visited Bidault. He emphasized the purpose of his return to Geneva was to ask everyone not to adjourn the conference too early. He said that, since the conference has made some progress because of the constructive suggestions by Molotov and me, it should discuss the possibility of how to achieve some specific results. The conference should not be ended at this moment. I said that I agree with the French opinion to continue the conference because our stand is always to work with the conference to achieve a settlement. Since the British and American foreign ministers are now planning to leave the conference, we hope that the conference may reach certain, if not final, agreements before the foreign ministers' departures. Bidault said that Eden and Smith are willing not to leave Geneva until the next week. He also believed that during their absence their representatives should be at least at ambassadorial level, not only the experts, in order to continue their work. He hoped that the military representatives from each side should not ask unreasonable or unanswerable questions during their work of exchanging maps. Then, I repeated to Bidault what I had told Eden about Laos and Cambodia issue. I also added a few points especially for France:

The suggestions made by the Democratic Republic of Vietnaam are reasonable and proposed for reaching a glorious peace for both sides. To fulfill the reasonable requests by Laos and Cambodia need to meet the reasonable suggestions by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The problem could be solved much easier as long as France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the two major belligerent countries, agree on the issue. We are willing to see Laos and Cambodia become two of the Southeast Asian type countries while they become the member countries of the French Union. The cease-fire should take place on site in Cambodia, and both sides should reach a political solution through their negotiations there. In Laos, however, since the forces were relatively large, it may be acknowledged to use assembly areas to solve the problems. These areas are along the borders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and China. At the end, Bidault said that he won't allow anyone to disrupt the meetings in order to have the military negotiations to obtain a fruitful result.

Zhou Enlai
June 18, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN R.G. CASEY AND CHOU EN-LAI
GENEVA, 18th JUNE 1954.

I went to see Chou en-Lai at a pleasant villa about 8 miles north of Geneva. The meeting had been arranged by Trevelyan (British Chargé d'Affaires at Peking). I took John Rowland with me, as the conversation was likely to be largely about Indo-China.

I was very well received and the talk was quite an interesting one. He had a first-class young interpreter with him as well as the Director of the "American and Australian Division" of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. The talk started slowly for the first ten minutes, which meant that I had to do most of the talking. However, Chou warmed up and the discussion was quite a good one although, in the circumstances, it was not easy to get down to anything fundamental.

Chou has quite a good face, is about of middle height and with a good-looking eye. (I remembered how Chou was supposed to have "captivated" General George Marshall. I can understand this. He has quite a "reassuring" face.) He wore a sort of greenish-khaki suit or uniform, buttoned right up to the neck. He uses his hands a good deal in conversation. He made certain gestures from time to time, at each of which a Chinese servant in a smart white jacket appeared from nowhere with a tray of rather tart China tea, of which I felt myself obliged to drink many cups.

I started by saying that one of the good results of the conference had been the better relationship that had been established between his Government and the British Government. I said that I had heard a good deal about him (Chou) from Eden, and that I believed it was fortunate that they had established a relationship of considerable confidence. He said something to the effect that he had formed a good opinion of Eden. I built on this a bit and said that I had known Eden most of my life and that he was a model of integrity and honour, at which Chou bowed.
He deplored the lack of any useful result in the Korean discussions, and I said that it was traditionally difficult to get oil and water to mix. I said that I had hoped that it might have been possible to have got down to some modus vivendi that might at least have opened up some trade between North and South Korea, but the attitude disclosed in the earlier plenary meetings had crystallised the point of view of each side in a way that inhibited their getting together, even on the most modest lines. He said that the Korean talks had been followed by an outburst by Pyun (R.O.K. Foreign Minister) seeking to destroy the armistice. I confined myself to saying that a great many people deplored this.

I said that I believed that Eden had told Chou (Chou) that there was no doubt in his mind that China would be invited to be a party to any future discussions on Korea. I had heard that he (Chou) had had some doubts as to whether such an invitation would be given to China again. I said that, for my part, I felt sure that there was no doubt that China would be so invited. Chou bowed again.

We then got onto the Indo-China problem. I said that his (Chou's) initiative in respect of Laos and Cambodia was something to be welcomed and that I hoped that the proposal would survive the detailed discussion to which it would no doubt have to be submitted.

He said (as he had said to Eden before) that both sides wanted the integrity, autonomy and unity of Laos and Cambodia to be established and safeguarded. He (Chou) wanted each of these countries "to be like other South-East Asian countries".

However, he quickly went on to say that it must be firmly established that there should be no American bases, military or air, in Laos and Cambodia. I said that I did not think that this would be an impossible provision -
provided that it was mutual. He asked what I meant by mutual. I said that my country was not a party principal in these discussions and I had no mandate to speak for others, but that I would not be surprised if they were to insist on a similar provision in reverse - that there should be no Chinese bases or airfields created in the south of China in the general vicinity of the northern border of Laos and of Viet Nam. He boggled a bit at this and said that if any such bases were created they would be purely defensive - at which I smiled and said that this was where mutuality came in and that "defensive" and "offensive" had a different significance depending on who used them. He made a few strange noises at this but I think he got the point.

(By the way, in the course of interpretation of the above, the interpreter first of all interpreted Chou as having said 'no bases in South-East Asia', at which Chou corrected him and asked him to tell me that what he had said was "no bases in Laos and Cambodia". This had a little significance and also showed that Chou knows at least some English.)

I said that I had heard that he (Chou) had laid some stress on the existence of resistance movements ("free Laotian" and "free Cambodian") in these two countries. I said that I had had talks with the Foreign Ministers of Laos and Cambodia and they had both repeatedly assured me that "resistance movements" in their respective countries were, practically speaking, non-existent. I said that anyhow there was only one real way to clear up this point and that was by elections in these countries: again I said that I had no mandate to speak for either of them, but that I did not believe that they would have any reluctance to have elections in due course.

I asked if he had met the Foreign Ministers of Laos and Cambodia. He said that he had met them in the
9-power conference here, but not otherwise. I suggested to him that I thought it would be useful if he were to create an opportunity to meet them under the same private circumstances as I was meeting him.

Chou said that China had no aggressive or expansive intentions and that all she wanted to see was that the peoples of South-East Asia were free and independent and had democratic governments of their own choosing. I said that I believed that this was common ground between us, but that the implementing of this might take a little time. I said that, although unfortunately I had never been to China, I believed that the Chinese people had a proper appreciation of the healing property of time. He immediately took this up and said that there would have to be elections in Viet Nam quite soon. I said that the country was very much disturbed and that I believed that an appreciable time would have to go by before free elections could be held that would properly reflect the wishes of the people. He asked how long I meant. I said again that I had no authority to express other than my own view on this, but that I believed that at least 12 months must go by before elections could properly be held. He thought for a moment and then said that he agreed that some appreciable time must pass (I think this was the way he put it - at any rate it is the impression left on my mind).

He then said that of course there were two governments in Viet Nam, the government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and the government of Bao Dai. I leaned forward with raised eyebrows and said that I did not quite understand this. I asked if the first government that he had mentioned was what we called the Viet Minh and he smiled and said yes, it was.

Getting the conversation back to more general lines, I said that I felt it difficult to believe that he (Chou) thought that we (the democracies) had any
aggressive intent. I said that I had always believed that peaceful co-existence was quite possible between international communism and the democracies. Chou agreed and said that provided neither side had any aggressive intent (which, he emphasised, was certainly the case with China) such peaceful co-existence was a thing to aim at. I asked him if there was anything else that he thought that I could say that he thought might help him on the road towards believing what I knew to be the truth - that we, on our side, had no aggressive intent whatsoever. He contented himself by laughing a bit at this.

I said that I believed a great deal depended on a successful outcome of this conference on Indo-China. I said that we had a great deal more to lose than he had and that I believed that a generous and helpful attitude on his part would pay great dividends. He said that China had nothing to gain, but that he understood the importance of this conference.

I said that it was of course much too early to talk about "recognition" or the United Nations, as there were many hurdles to be overcome before it would be possible to talk of these things from a practical point of view. He made no direct comment on this, but said that China was being "denied her legitimate rights by being kept out of the United Nations". He also made some reference to Formosa that was not very clear and which I did not pursue.

He said that America was "ringing China round" with bases. I asked him if this was really meant to be a precise statement, to which he made no reply, except to say that wherever he looked he found evidence of intense American hostility. I admitted that there was a lack of confidence on each side, but that a successful outcome to this conference might improve this condition a good deal.

He said that the ideal relationship that China sought with all countries was the relationship that
existed between China and India.

As we had been talking for three quarters of an hour by this time, and as I had to go off to catch an aircraft, I said that unfortunately I would have to go, after thanking him for the time that he had given me.

I said that I thought that personal contacts like this were most useful. I said that for my part he (Chou) had been, up to now, merely a name in the newspapers, whereas now he was a personality and a man whom I had looked in the eye. He made some graceful remark. As a parting shot, I asked the interpreter to tell Chou that I thought he had a first-class interpreter, at which the boy did the nearest thing that a Chinese can do to blushing.
we do not want to discourage Mendes France initial report at what
may be policy of cooperation with US nor do we wish to do anything
to make more unhappy French feeling arising out of the Churchill-Eden
visit. On the other hand, we are in process rethinking our entire
position regarding Indochina in light developments at Geneva and
Paris. We need your contribution and hence the new position will be
reached until your return.

On balance we believe advisable you accept Mendes France invita-
tion although we would prefer you to take extra time which would
be involved in calling briefly on him rather than having him come to
airport to see you which carries a certain emergency and favorious
character which is inappropriate to our desire to make a calm fresh
start covering whole gamut of our problems with French including
EDC.

It seems that if you call on him you could better regulate time and
character of visit and explain it as a courtesy call—an explanation
which hardly fits into a hurried airport meeting.

If you do see Mendes France hope you will find it practicable
principally to gather his intentions without any explicit or implicit
commitment of our own.

As far as substance is concerned believe President's letter to Coty
gives guidance and that will be well to keep within 4 corners of
that letter.

DULLES

1 Under Secretary Bank replied in telegram Dulme 108, June 19, that he agreed
"completely with procedure you suggest (to Tel 215) re Mendes-France and
will keep plane departure flexible enough to act accordingly. We do not
mind within substance of President's letter." (806.1 GE/6-1954) The Depart-
ment of State replied in Tel 223, June 19, that "If Mendes-France still desires to see
despite absence Secretary approving his Cabinet and if Dilles concurs, we believe
it would still be appropriate for you to call in Paris on Mendes-France
en route home." (806.1 GE/6-1954)

Smith met for an hour and a quarter with Mendes-France on June 20
Quai d'Orsay in Paris. In telegram 4944 from Paris June 20, Ambassador Dillion
reported that the Under Secretary and the Premier discussed various matters
pertaining to Indochina and to the Geneva Conference, in particular negotia-
tions at Geneva between France and the Viet Minh. The Under Secretary
emphasized the importance of the French Delegation in Geneva keeping in touch with the U.S.
Delegation regarding any negotiations with the Viet Minh "so that we would not
be suddenly faced with a situation from which we would have to publicly dis-
associate ourselves." With reference to an agreement with the Viet Minh, Mendes
France indicated that he expected his government would have considerable difficulty with the Viet-
namese. He said the Vietnamese representatives would "place great weight on
any advice they might get from the United States and he hoped that the United
States would be able to help France by discreetly setting the Vietnamese
representatives to see that they would be wise to accept the French agreement with
the Viet Minh as the best agreement obtainable." Ambassador Dillion reported that
the Under Secretary did not commit himself in any way on this subject. (806.1 GE/6-
2054) For the full text of telegram 4944, see volume xiii.

* President Eisenhower's letter to President Coty, June 15, and the reply by
President Coty, June 20, are printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the

1 Message transmitted in two sections.
some respects it made no mention of Viet Minh withdrawal or of adequate supervision. So long as regular Viet Minh forces remained in Laos and Cambodia we could not help but view situation in very serious light. Molotov cited Pham Van Dong’s remarks regarding withdrawal Viet Minh “volunteers” and emphasized importance of beginning direct negotiations regarding Laos and Cambodia of type now taking place regarding Vietnam. I regretted that I was not at all convinced that Pham Van Dong really meant what he said. His statements sounded well enough, but his written proposal did not bear them out.

I said I wanted to make our position on Laos and Cambodia entirely clear. In addition to regular Viet Minh forces in these countries, which I enumerated, there were some dissident elements in Laos and a much smaller number in Cambodia. If regular Viet Minh forces were withdrawn, elections could be held, with guarantees that individuals would not be discriminated against as regards their electoral rights for having supported either side. Dissidents would be able to vote for any candidates they choose, Communists included. However, while Viet Minh forces remained in these countries, there could be no peace nor could free elections be held.

In private conversations with Mr. Eden and others, Communist delegates, in particular Chou En-lai, had taken an apparently reasonable view on Laos and Cambodia, but that here again, when we came to the point of trying to get open agreement on specific points we were unable to do so. I specifically mentioned Chou En-lai’s statements to Eden in which he said that China would have no objections to recognizing the Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia or to these states having forces and arms sufficient to maintain security, or their remaining in French Union 20 years as they were not used as military bases by the United States.² We could not disagree with any of this, although if we kept out the Chinese would have to keep out, and these small states would have to be allowed to join with their neighbors in whatever regional security arrangements would best protect their integrity without constituting a threat to any one else. Chou En-lai might be anxious about possibility of US bases in Laos and Cambodia. We wanted very much that these countries were not handed over to the Chinese. Molotov said that while he did not know what attitude Chinese might have on other questions in future, he could assure us that Chinese attitude on this particular question was not at all unreasonable, and that there was nothing in it which would give rise to conflicts. He added, however, that if we continued to take a one-sided view and insist on one-sided solutions, he must “in all frankness say that this would not succeed”. There were, he said, some differences of view

² Conversation reported in telegram Secto 468, June 17, p. 1170.
If French were encouraged to disregard actual situation and to ask for too much, he said, one could only expect conflict to continue. (He made it clear that he considered US as party likely to do the encouraging.) I replied that US was not one of principal to Indochinese dispute and did not cast deciding vote, to which Molotov remarked “maybe so, but you have veto, that word I hear you use so often” and went on to say that among other delegations present at conference there seemed to be real willingness to reach agreement. Agreement had in fact added very nearly been reached, although he hoped I would realize this was not information for publication. (This remark, obviously, referred to private French-Viet Minh military conversations which I have mentioned.) I said I must emphasize my government hold serious views on issue involved in Indochina situation, more serious perhaps, than did some of other governments represented at conference. I hoped he would give consideration to this, and assist in overcoming some of the deep-rooted suspicions of Asiatic participants which became apparent every time we tried to reconcile formal proposals.

Comment: Throughout conversation Molotov maintained friendly and mild tone evident in all informal conversations. He is completely sure of himself and of his position. What he had to say regarding Delta, Laos and Cambodia confirms Communist intentions to play at the cards they hold. His avoidance of endorsing Chou’s remarks to Eden concerning Laos and Cambodia indicated that simple withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from these countries was not acceptable and that some form of de facto partition was intended in Laos at least. His remarks seemed to indicate that Communists have eyes as much as half of country. This conversation, together with the inflexible position which Molotov took during his last conversation with me regarding the composition of a neutralization or supervisory commission for Indochina, as well as his speech on Tuesday, June 8 and all subsequent speeches on the Communist side, which took firm positions on points the Communists know to be unacceptable to Eden, Bidault and me, are highly significant. The recent emphasis by all three Communist spokesmen that France should carry on direct political and direct military negotiations with Viet Minh show their interest in having a convenient way of holding out for greater gains in their direct negotiations with the French as well as within the framework of the conference.

Molotov in effect told France in his June 8 speech that her position and that of the government she was supporting in Indochina was hopeless and that she had best face up to facts and capitulate in direct negotiations with the Viet Minh. His speech, of course, was in large part intended to assist in the destruction of the French Government for the implications that that would have on the European as well as on the Asiatic scene. Nevertheless, his harsh and even insulting language seemed to reflect the confident, nearly triumphant mood in which he has been lately. It would be misleading to ascribe the harder line which Molotov brought back with him from Moscow entirely to Soviet tactical considerations in regard to the French Government crisis. While the Soviets may think that the blocking of EDC through the destruction of the French Government would reduce future threats to them in Europe, the fact remains that the Indochina conflict potentially involves much more immediate threat of general war.

It is probable that initial Soviet tactics were to forestall US intervention in the Delta by some kind of a compromise formula involving Hanoi and Haiphong if it appeared that such intervention were imminent. The recent raising of the ante in the negotiations here by the Communist side probably reflects an estimate on their part that our intervention is improbable and that they are safe to go ahead there, keeping, of course, a sharp eye out for indications of change in our attitude.

While the Communist position on Laos and Cambodia remains more flexible than their position in regard to the Delta, they will get all they can in Laos now. In the whole area the determining factor for the Communists will continue to be their estimate of the likelihood of US or joint intervention and nothing short of a conviction on their part that this intervention will take place will keep them from going ahead with their plans for taking all of it eventually, through military conquest, French capitulation, or infiltration.

Realize much of above is repetitious, but it will serve as final summary.

SMITH

JUNE 19, 1954

1515.00/9-1954: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of Defense

SECRET


Army Message Gento 62. To Department of State and OSD for action, repeated information USARMA Paris, USARMA Saigon, USARMA London. For Hanoi from Sullivan Defense. Following is summary French-Viet Minh military talks with Viet Minh 17 June reported to Defense representative by member French delegation:

I. Both sides reached agreement on draft summary of discussions to date. No decision yet when or if summary will be presented to delegates.
Sixteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 19, 6:45 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State 1

CONFIDENTIAL

Geneva, June 20, 1954—2 a.m.


Chauvel recalled that it had been agreed yesterday that an attempt would be made, on basis Laotian, Cambodian (Secto 471) and Communist Chinese (Secto 468) proposals to present to conference a new text. He added that as result of exchanges of views between delegations, subject text was now available which he hoped had general agreement of all delegations and would permit military talks with respect to situation in Laos and Cambodia to begin without delay. Chauvel then read following text:

“With a view to facilitating simultaneous and rapid cessation of hostilities in Indochina, it is proposed that:

(a) The representatives of command of two sides shall meet immediately in Geneva or on spot;
(b) They shall study questions relating to cessation of hostilities and territories of Cambodia and Laos, beginning with question concerning withdrawal of all foreign armed forces, due regard being had to observations and proposals presented by various delegations at conference;
(c) They shall report as soon as possible to conference their conclusions and recommendations.”

Nolotov stated Chauvel proposal was not same as that submitted earlier to Soviet delegation in that in paragraph b after “foreign armed forces” Soviet text contains “and foreign military personnel.” Soviet delegation clearly under impression this had been agreed.

Chauvel admitted error due to fact text had been shipped around all day. Said he had no objection inclusion Molotov’s words which he thought covered by observations he made yesterday to general effect that any French troops or military personnel in Laos or Cambodia are there on basis agreements with sovereign governments concerned and that French rely on their judgment in matter.

1 A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/16) is in Conference files, loc 60 D 267, CF 272. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 6:45 p.m. and adjourned at 9 p.m. The minutes are also printed in Conference as “Minutes, pp. 820-827. The French proposal, Indochina Document IC/38, June 21, is in Conference files, loc 90 D 927, CF 272A.

* Dated June 15, p. 1196.
* Dated June 17, p. 1182.

1 Chou En-lai expressed agreement to French proposal with additional Molotov amendment.

Cambodian delegate then rehearsed his delegation. He accepted French proposal so far as purpose of military talks was concerned on understanding principal purpose withdrawal foreign troops from Cambodia. He agreed to location of talks. With regard to parties to talks, he said they should be Cambodia on one hand and Viet Minh on other. He described complete military independence of Cambodian Government. He said that he could not compromise on fact that parties to military talks would be Cambodia and Viet Minh, adding that if any delegations had idea of getting in other representatives, Cambodian delegate thinks it would be not useful to adopt present text. He referred again, in connection with Molotov amendment, to Cambodia’s need to bring in instructors and experts for young Cambodian Army and spoke of understanding attitude of Chou En-lai. He stated his delegation would be ready to negotiate on conditions for introduction this type military personnel.

Laotian delegate agreed with French text. Regarding simultaneous cease-fire, he expressed hope this could be achieved but that cessation hostilities in Laos as soon as possible would not thereby be prejudiced. He stated withdrawal of foreign troop from Laos would be decisive step toward durable peace. He recalled French Union’s presence in Laos so French troop in numbers and at places provided by treaty and also provision of French experts to train National Army in accordance with freely negotiated conventions. These arrangements are necessary for security of Laos.

US delegate made statement set forth in Secto 479.*

Eden stated that it should be clearly understood that any recommendations by military representatives would be brought before conference which would accept, reject or amend them as provided in paragraph (c) of French proposal.

Molotov confirmed understanding his amendment accepted. He said that obviously there were divergent views on many subjects but that purpose was to find something acceptable to all. He said that questions such as those of French officers serving in National Armies of Laos and Cambodia should be clarified in forthcoming military talks, not before. He reminded conference that Chou En-lai had submitted proposals covering matters not already covered by current French proposal on which discussion not completed. He stated Soviet belief that these matters upon which he did not enlarge would also be included in military talks.

* infra.
US delegate asked Molotov to be patient with him as only received French proposal ten minutes ago. He wished to know if Molotov differentiated between officers and non-commissioned of French forces and other foreign troops in Laos and Cambodia. He stated on this point he associated himself with views of Laos and Cambodia. He added that in view of Eden’s statement regarding reference of military recommendations to conference he would not oppose French proposal but wished all to take note of what he had said.

DRV delegate then spoke generally favorably of the Laotian statement although it calls for certain reservations. He said Cambodian remarks ignored certain realities, rejected certain essential points (not specified) of Chinese Communist resolution, appeared not inspired by spirit of conciliation and understanding and, through reservations reduced French proposal to something very unilateral and unrealistic. He said US delegate unilateral and unrealistic. He concluded approving French proposal with Soviet amendment and insisting upon wording of paragraph 6 thereof (as seemed to imply that military representatives could consider other questions relating to cessation of hostilities in Laos and Cambodia beyond withdrawal of foreign armed forces, etc.)

Chauvel pointed out his modest proposal did not pretend to settle all outstanding problems. He stated military representatives would not infringe upon sovereign authority of conference which remains supreme in settling diversities and making decisions on report of military representatives.

Eden stated that conference would note observations made as being included in those covered by paragraph 6 of French proposal as modified. He asked whether French proposal could now be considered accepted by conference as terms of reference for meeting of representatives of commands of both sides.

US delegate stated that he accepted French text as originally proposed, i.e., without Molotov amendment, and that he did not reject the amended text subject to reservations he had formulated.

After a brief recess, Eden submitted text of communiqué in which he included agreed text of French proposal, statement conference would continue in session and request that representatives of commands dealing with Laos and Cambodia submit interim or final report within 21 days. It was also agreed that next meeting be held June 22. (See sect 478 contains full text of communiqué as finally approved.) Eden said first task of conference next week would be to consider question of international supervision or control.

* Dated June 19, p. 1204.

Comment:
(1) US delegate questioned French, Laotian and Cambodian delegations regarding mechanism for establishing military contacts. They have no ideas.
(2) US delegate questioned Chauvel regarding fact French proposal does not specify that representatives of commands of two sides are Laos and Viet Minh and Cambodia and Viet Minh. Chauvel stated that he had oral agreement on this point from Soviet and Communist Chinese delegates who stated they had secured similar agreement from Viet Minh. We are worried about this point. We are convinced, however, that Cambodians and Laotians will refuse to meet with overt representatives of resistance movement.
(3) Chauvel’s tactics apparently aimed at keeping Mendes-France from coming to Geneva in order to talk to Dong and possibly Chou En-lai and others regarding unsettled problems. Agreement on military talks for Laos and Cambodia apparently regarded by Chauvel as a step forward which will make Mendes-France less anxious to hasten here.

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SMITH

1965/6/1954: Telegram
Sixteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 19, 6:45 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 19, 1954—midnight.

Secto 479. Paris priority 465, London 306, Tokyo 152, Saigon 184, Moscow 321, Department pass Defense; Tokyo pass CINCFE; Saigon pass Pinom Penh and Vientiane. Following is text Under Secretary’s statement 18th Indochina restricted session, Saturday, June 19:

"I refer to the last phrase of paragraph (6) of the French proposal to the effect that due regard is to be had ‘to the observations and proposals presented by the various delegations at the conference’ The position of my delegation on the question of Laos and Cambodia is perfectly clear, and has been repeatedly stated to this Conference. The problems of Laos and Cambodia, as has been so ably demonstrated by the representatives of these two countries, arise primarily in our view from an invasion of their territory by Viet Minh forces. It seems to us their problems can be simply resolved by the withdrawal from their territories of these Viet Minh forces. If military staff talks are to be held, it is clear that they should be held between the Cambodian and the Viet Minh commands in the case of Cambodia, and the Franco-Lao and Viet Minh commands in the case of Laos, and that they should be devoted primarily to the question of the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Cambodia and Laos."
The United States delegation has certain misgivings regarding the formula proposed as to whether it clearly provides for staff talks which will follow the principles which I have just stated. It has the gravest doubts regarding the Molotov amendment. I sincerely hope my associates realize what they are being asked to agree to. The small Cambodian and Laotian forces have a few French officers and non-commissioned officers. If they are deprived of these, their capacity for self defense is materially reduced. The United States delegation considers that in the same way as any other sovereign state, the States of Laos and Cambodia should be free to request and obtain technical assistance and advice, and certainly from the French Union of which they are members.

"I am not prepared to say, however, that the formula necessarily conflicts with these principles. I would assume that the military representatives will, in fact, produce recommendations which will provide for the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Laos and Cambodia. On this assumption and upon the understanding that these proposals are acceptable to all of the other delegations participating in this Conference, the United States will not oppose convening of the military representatives as originally proposed by France. My delegation, of course, reserves its right to decide for itself whether the solutions ultimately proposed by the military representatives are consistent with the positions which we have previously taken and which have been set forth by the delegates of Laos and Cambodia. These we support."

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JUNE 20, 1954

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath)

SECRET

Participants: Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State
Donald R. Heath, Ambassador to Cambodia and Vietnam
H. E. Tep Phann, Foreign Minister and Chief of Cambodian Delegation
H. E. Soa Sam, Former President of the National Assembly, Former Minister
H. E. Sam Sary, Former Minister

The Under Secretary made a good call on the Cambodian Foreign Minister this morning. He explained the purposes of his visit to Molotov's amendment to the French proposal whereby not only foreign armed forces would leave Cambodian and Laotian territory in the event of an armistice but all foreign military personnel as well. He said Cambodia usually desired to keep French military instructors and advisers to build up its army to defense strength but would like to get other foreign military advisers, particularly American instructors. Cambodia was aware of the remarkable record of the Americans in building up the South Korean army. The Under Secretary said it was a record of which we were proud. In a space of three years we had provided South Korean Government with 20 first-class divisions equipped in some cases perhaps even superior to the American division stationed in Korea.

The Under Secretary mentioned an unconfirmed report received this morning that India was preparing to recognize Laos and Cambodia,


We believe that the proposal concerning a comprehensive settlement raised by the VWP Central Committee has failed to hit the important points, and [they are] not prepared to make concessions on the Laos and Cambodia questions. This will make it difficult for the negotiation to continue, and this is not compatible with the international situation and will not serve our long-term interests. At present, the proposal from our side should take Vietnam as the emphasis, and should be prepared to make due concessions in Cambodia and Laos. Given the actual strength of the resistance government in Cambodia, it is impossible [for our side] to request division of zones in Cambodia, and it is only possible [for our side] to continue the negotiation by following the policy of on-site ceasefire, mutual consultation, supervision by countries of neutrality, and political settlement.

If we take the initiative to make concessions in Cambodia and Laos, we will be able to ask for more gains in Vietnam as compensations to us. Our position in Vietnam is relatively strong in various aspects, we will not only be able to keep our gains there, but also can work towards consolidating and expanding our influence.

The situation we are facing now is that if the concrete military solutions we are to introduce are reasonable, we will be able to strive for a quick deal with France, thus reaching an overall settlement. This will allow us to push the new government in France to resist America’s interference, and will also allow us to delay [Western powers’] rearmament in Europe. This is beneficial to both the East and the West, and this is the key question that we must make clear to the Vietnamese...

Although Mendès-France favors stopping the war in Indochina, he is not a genuine leftist politician, and his purpose is to use the slogan of peace to form a majority among various bourgeois parties. As he has to satisfy the requests from various aspects, his [attitude] is by no means stable. However, he is different from Bidaut in the sense that he has made it clear that his cabinet will survive only under the condition that the war stops in Indochina. Therefore, if we can reach an agreement on ceasefire with France, it will be beneficial to the whole situation. The emphasis of our strategy at this stage should be placed upon encouraging the (peace) initiatives by the French, and we should make the French not listen to the Americans completely, should make the British support stopping the war, and should quickly reach an armistice agreement [with them] as long as the conditions seem reasonable....
SECRET

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND WHITEHALL SECRET (CABINET)

DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden
No.802
June 19, 1954.

D.7.37 p.m. June 19, 1954.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.802 of June 19
Repeated for information to Washington Peking Saigon

I saw Chou En-lai this morning. He had got the latest French
draft terms of reference for the military groups to deal with
Laos and Cambodia. We agreed that an attempt should be made to
produce a formula acceptable to both sides before this afternoon's
meeting. He thought that the conference should recess and that a
time limit should be given to the groups discussing military
questions in the three states to report back to the conference which
would then reconvene at the top level. I agreed that this was
worth considering and asked what period he had in mind. He said
that this was a point which I might discuss with M. Mendès-France
tomorrow.

2. I said that we had the difficult question of supervision
to settle. He said that he felt that it would be much easier to
settle this when the military questions were solved and added that
we both had confidence in India, which would be chairman. I said
that I agreed that it probably would be easier to settle this
question at a later stage, but that there were difficulties in it
and I thought that meanwhile it would be advisable for a group to
be set up to discuss all the points involved. Chou En-lai agreed
and added that in any case this question could not be settled until
the French were here. He said that now there was a new French
Government which really wanted peace, which is presumably an
indication that the Communists think that they will find the new
Government easier to deal with than the old. I gave him no
encouragement in this.
SECRET

From Codel Geneva telegram No. 602 to Foreign Office

3. Chou En-lai said that the resistance movements in Laos and Cambodia were not Communist but nationalist and that he had learned something about Laos and Cambodia since he had come to Geneva, which he had not known before. He spoke about the necessity for regrouping the indigenous resistance forces on the borders of Laos and said that this would be connected with the political discussions. I impressed on him very seriously that the Viet Minh forces must not make new attacks in Laos and Cambodia during the period of discussion by the military groups and showed him a report of a new attack on the Mekong. I told him that new attacks by the Communists would have a very bad effect upon opinion in the United Kingdom and said that a number of people believed that we were being deluded by the Communists who were using the period of negotiations to improve their military position. He strongly denied that this was so. He said that he had no information about the incident in question. But he would certainly inquire. There would naturally be advances and retreats as long as the war continued, but he agreed that neither side should take any major military initiative during this period. He said that the French had made Dien Bien Phu into a major military action by dropping large numbers of parachute troops there. He added that military action in the war in Indo-China was a local matter. This may have been meant to disclaim that he could control the actions of the Viet Minh forces, but I think that the point had its effect. I urged him to speak to Pham Van Dong about this, emphasizing once again before I left that a renewal of hostilities now by Viet Minh forces in Laos and Cambodia could ruin all we were working for here.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington, Peking and Saigon as my telegrams Nos. 268, 134 and 78 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington, Peking and Saigon]

ADVANCE COPIES:
Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Private Secretary
Minister of State
Mr. W.D. Allen
Mr. Speaight
Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, June 20, 1954

Source: ZX, vol. 4, p. 509

(CCP) Guangxi Provincial Committee for conveying to Comrade Zhou Enlai:

Under the circumstances that the Geneva Conference has made progress and that an armistice agreement is possible to be reached in July, the operation activities of the Vietnamese People's Army should neither be expanded nor reduced, and it is proper for the activities to be maintained at their current level. A few days ago, Comrade Wei Guoqing telegraphed us to report that the Vietnamese command had made new deployments and was preparing to expand to a certain extent the size of military operations. We believe that (the opinion in) Wei’s telegram should be adopted and some additional troops can be deployed in the Red River delta area to threaten the French. However, no big operation should be carried out in July. When big operation should be carried out should be determined in accordance with the development of the Geneva Conference. Please discuss with Comrades Ho (Chiminh), Vo (Nguyen Giap) and Wei (Guoqing) to see whether or not the above opinions are proper.

CCP Central Committee
June 20

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not cite or quote without permission from CWIHP.
TOP SECRET

FROM PARIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND WHITEHALL SECRET (CABINET)

DISTRIBUTION

Sir G. Jebb
NO. 46
June 20, 1954.

D. 11.45 p.m. June 20, 1954.

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

I understand that you may wish to have a short telegraphic summary of the main features of your conversation at lunch today with M. Mendès-France, a full draft record of which follows by bag.

2. The main points of talk were as follows:

(a) Preliminary remarks

M. Mendès-France seemed well though tired. He was by no means optimistic about the possibility of carrying out his undertaking to the Assembly to achieve peace in Indo-China by July 20. In particular, the attitude of the Americans and of the Viet Nam Government presented great difficulties, some of which he had been unconscious of while in opposition. Nevertheless, so far as he could avoid it, he would do nothing to weaken the Western alliance which remained the basis of our common defence.

(b) Possible meeting with Chou En-lai

President of the Council explained that he had recently received a message from Chou En-lai suggesting that they should meet at Geneva. Unfortunately it was quite impossible for him to go to Geneva in the absence of the heads of the British, American and Soviet delegations. However, the military talks were unlikely to make very much progress until the French had made up their minds on the sort of arrangement which they could contemplate and this they could hardly do until the matter had been discussed with Chou En-lai. M. Mendès-France was therefore very keen on seeing the Chinese Foreign Minister and had thought of inviting him to come to Paris at once. He was however nervous about the reactions of the Americans to this suggestion which he would, of course, have to broach also with General Bedell Smith.

/He asked for
TOP SECRET

Paris telegram No. 431 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

He asked for your advice. You said you thought it essential that M. Mendès-France should see Chou En-lai. You thought, therefore, that M. Mendès-France might simply inform the Americans that he was going to see the Chinese Foreign Minister, whom in any case he would have been bound to have met if he had been able to go to Geneva. Your only doubt was whether Chou En-lai would feel able to come to the capital of a country which did not recognise China even if invited. After some discussion it was left to M. Mendès-France, if he decided on the meeting, would probably ask Chou En-lai to meet him somewhere halfway, for instance Chalon-sur-Saône or Dijon.

(c) Should M. Mendès-France also see a Viet Minh Representative?

M. Mendès-France said that this aspect of the matter was the most difficult of all. In principle, of course, there would be a great deal to be said for his talking matters over frankly with the Viet Minh representative but in practice if he saw him the position might become quite impossible for the French in the French occupied districts of Indo-China. He was particularly apprehensive of the effect of any too obvious concessions to Viet Minh on the morale of the French Union forces who were almost inextricably mixed up with Viet Namese. If latter were to desert in large quantities then the whole of the French Army in Indo-China might be gravely disorganised. He must also consider the fact that the new Viet Nam Prime Minister appointed by Bao Dai was a fanatical Catholic and not at all well-disposed towards the French. For these reasons he thought he would have to inform the Viet Minh representative that he much regretted that his absence from Geneva would render it possible to see him personally and that it would not unfortunately be understood if he suggested that the Viet Minh representative should come and see him in France.

(d) State of the Conference

You told M. Mendès-France that in view of the arrangement arrived at in Geneva contact with the adversary was now possible in all the three States concerned. In particularly...
TOP SECRET

Paris telegram No.434 to Foreign Office

arrangement as regards Laos and Cambodia was satisfactory. It had been significant that when talking recently of Laos, Chou En-lai had admitted the principle of unity. Above all you believed that, at any rate, Chou En-lai - who seemed to be the dominating figure as far as the Communists were concerned - really did want an agreement in Indo-China subject to only two conditions:

(i) that there should be no possibility of Laos and Cambodia being turned into "American bases", and

(ii) an arrangement being come to in Viet Nam which would admit of the predominance of the Viet Minh in at any rate the northern part of the territory and would not result in American troops occupying the southern portion of the country.

e. General

You gave M. Mendès-France the substance of your talk with Mr. Molotov recorded in Codal Geneva telegram No.607, in particular the warning to Mr. Molotov about the uselessness of trying to stiffen the Communist terms (see paragraph 4). M. Mendès-France was much gratified to hear of this and said that it would undoubtedly strengthen his position.

[Note by Communications Department: this telegram has been repeated to Washington].

ADVANCE COPIES
Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Private Secretary
Minister of State
Mr. Harrison
Head Western and Southern Department
Head South East Asia Department

B E B
the observations and proposals presented by the various delegations at the conference.

c) They shall report as soon as possible to the conference their conclusions and recommendations.

It was further stated that the conference would continue in session. The representatives of the commands dealing with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were asked to submit an interim final report to the conference within 21 days.

The next meeting of the conference will be held June 22.”

SMITH

JUNE 20, 1954

396.1 GR/6-2054

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath)

SECRET

GENEVA, June 20, 1954.

Participants: Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State
Donald R. Heath, Ambassador to Cambodia and Vietnam
H. E. Tep Phann, Foreign Minister and Chief of Cambodian Delegation
H. E. Son Sanh, Former President of the National Assembly, Former Minister
H. E. Sam Sary, Former Minister

The Under Secretary made a good-bye call on the Cambodian Foreign Minister this morning. Tep Phann explained the purposes of his reservation to Molotov’s amendment to the French proposal whereby not only foreign armed forces should leave Cambodian and Laotian territory in the event of an armistice but all foreign military personnel as well. He said Cambodia not only desired to keep French military instructors and advisers to build up its army to defense strength but would like to get other foreign military advisers, particularly American instructors. Cambodia was aware of the remarkable record of the Americans in building up the South Korean army. The Under Secretary said it was a record of which we were proud. In a space of three years we had provided South Korean Government with 20 first-class divisions equal and in some cases perhaps even superior to the American divisions stationed in Korea.

The Under Secretary mentioned an unconfirmed report received this morning that India was preparing to recognize Laos and Cambodia.

which he hoped would prove true. Tep Phann said they had talked with Krishna Menon when the latter was in Geneva and found him extremely uninformed about Cambodia and the development of its complete independence. He had no knowledge of India’s intention regarding recognition. He had also talked with Vice President Garcia of the Philippine Delegation but found him also uninformed on Cambodian and dubious of the reality of Cambodian independence. The Under Secretary said that he was shortly calling on Garcia and would urge that the Philippines accord recognition to Cambodia and the other associated states.

The Under Secretary then referred to a long talk he had had with Molotov two days ago. He had gathered from that talk that the Communists were inclined to accept Cambodian conditions and not ask for either temporary or permanent division of its territory. In case of Laos, however, the Under Secretary feared that the Communists were going to press for a sizeable slice of Laotian soil. He suggested that Cambodia should support Laos against such demands. The Cambodian Foreign Minister did not reply directly to this suggestion and pointed out there was some difference in the situation of Cambodia and Laos since the Cambodians exercised the high military command whereas the command in Laos was still in French hands. He went on to say that he was very skeptical of any results from the staff talks fearing that instead of the Vietnam command presenting itself for these talks the Vietminh would put forward representatives of the phony “free Cambodian” government. Tep Phann said that in this case the Cambodian government would refuse to start staff talks. The Under Secretary said he approved that stand but it would probably be impossible to keep the Vietminh command from adding a “free Cambodian” to the staff talks of the delegation on the pretext that he was a military officer.

The Under Secretary said that the more conciliatory attitude of the Communist delegations towards Cambodia’s proposals gave him some concern. Obviously the Communist tactic was to work toward a solution of the problem of Cambodia to prevent the country from making an appeal to the United Nations an eventuality which the Communists feared. Also the Communists feared to put forward too harsh terms to Cambodia and Laos because of the sympathy for these two countries entertained in India and in Burma. The Communists were not disposed to irritate India because although militarily weak, India enjoyed great moral stature and influence in Asia.

At the end of the interview Son Sanh put forward a request that the United States furnish a training mission and arms to build up the Cambodian defense force. The Under Secretary said he felt the United States would be disposed to consider such a request.
Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, concerning the meeting at Nanning, 23:00, 20 June 1954

Record number: 206-Y0050

Comrade (Zhou) Enlai:

Your telegram of 3:00, 20 June has been received.

(1) We approve that you leave Geneva for India by flight on the 23rd. The two telegrams (from you) to Ambassador Yuan (Zhongxian) have been conveyed to him.

(2) We approve that you and Comrade Ding, Truong Chinh, Vo Nguyen Giap, as well as Comrades Luo Guibo\(^{10}\) and Zhang Hanfu\(^{11}\), will hold meetings and discussions at Nanning. We have telegraphed the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party and Wei Guaqing\(^{12}\), so that they will be rushing to Nanning to wait for you there by the 28th.

(3) We will order the Military Commission to dispatch a special plane to wait (for you) in Guangzhou, and to conduct test flights between Guangzhou and Nanning in advance.

(4) The (CCP) Nanning Bureau Branch and Guangxi Provincial Committee will be posted of related development.

(5) We approve that our delegation (at Geneva) will be led by Comrade Li Kenong, who will remain (in Geneva) and will lead the negotiations on military affairs. Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang will go back to Moscow.

(6) On such related information as the date, time (of the flight), and the mark and type of the plane (for your trip), and the flight route from India to Guangzhou, please make an early report, so that we at home will complete due preparation in a timely manner.

The Central Committee
23:00, 20 June 1954

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\(^{10}\) Chief Chinese political advisor to Vietnam and first PRC ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

\(^{11}\) Vice Foreign Minister of PRC.

\(^{12}\) Chief Chinese military advisor to Vietnam.
Telegram, CCP Center to Wei Guoqing, Qiao Xiaoguang and Convey to the Vietnamese Workers Party Central Committee, Regarding the meeting between the Premier and Comrade Ding, June 20, 1954

Record number: 206-Y0050

Comrades Wei Guoqing and Qiao Xiaoguang and Convey to the Vietnamese Workers Party Central Committee:

After an agreement was reached at the Geneva Conference on 19 June, the foreign ministers from the main countries have left Geneva one after another. Comrade Molotov went back to Moscow on the same evening, and Eden and Smith left on the morning of the 20th. Comrade Zhou Enlai will return home around the 23rd. During the three weeks that the foreign ministers are absent, the conference will discuss the military issues related to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Therefore, our side must quickly decide upon a plan on division of zones. Comrade Zhou Enlai has consulted with and achieved the agreement of Comrades Molotov and Pham Van Dong, and he believes that it is necessary for him to meet with Comrades Ho Chi Minh, Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap, as well as Comrades Luo Guibo and Wei Guoqing, to discuss the situation related to the negotiation and the question of division of zones, so that a consensus will be reached and that progress will be made in negotiations at Geneva. We are of the opinion that this meeting is necessary, and we agree to Comrade Zhou Enlai’s opinions. Please ask Comrades Ho Chi Minh, Truong Chinh, and Vo Nguyen Gian, together with Comrade Wei Guoqing, to rush to Nanning, Guangxi, by 28 June to wait for Comrade Zhou Enlai. Please give the above with consideration and reply as soon as possible.

Central Committee
20 June 1950

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.

13 Member of Chinese Military Advisory Group to Vietnam.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Advisor to the United States Delegation (Bonsal)

SECRET

GENEVA, JUNE 21, 1954

Participants:
Mr. Tep Phan, Cambodian Foreign Minister
Mr. Sam Sary, Member of Cambodian Delegation
Mr. Son Sann, Member of Cambodian Delegation
Mr. Philip W. Bonsal, U.S. Delegation

Subject: Military Conversations between Cambodia and Vietminh

I called on the Cambodian Delegation this morning in place of Ambassador Heath who had had to leave for Paris.

Mr. Tep Phan told me that Mr. Chou En-lai had called him in yesterday and had expressed the wish of the Chinese Government to be helpful in getting the Cambodians into contact with the Vietminh for the purpose of proceeding with the military talks to which the conference agreed at its June 10 session. Mr. Tep Phan is awaiting instructions from his government regarding the personnel of the Cambodian representation, the point at which a meeting might take place and other details. It appears that Chou En-lai has invited the Cambodians to have dinner with him tonight. Mr. Tep Phan understands there is a possibility that some Vietminh representatives may also be there. He asked me for my advice as to whether he should go. I replied that this was a decision which he would of course wish to take himself. I said that personally it seemed to me that there must obviously be official contacts between the Vietminh and Cambodia but that it seemed asking a great deal, under the circumstances, to ask the Cambodians to mingle socially with the Vietminh who are active, unprovoked, invaders of Cambodia and killers of Cambodian people.

Mr. Tep Phan is worried about the future attitudes of the Communists with regard to his country. We agreed that the resolution accepted on June 19 was susceptible of two interpretations. It might be a general document which would permit the Communists to reassert various unacceptable points of view regarding the so-called resistance movements and their right to occupy certain areas in Cambodia. On the other hand, the terms were sufficiently general so that the other side could abandon their intentions regarding resistance movements without any further spelling out of this matter. If they do indeed intend to abandon that position it is obvious that it would be easier for them to do so without a specific admission of intent. We agreed that the position on this should very rapidly be clarified.

1208 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1952-1954, VOLUME XVI

Mr. Tep Phan told me that he expected to divide his time between Geneva and Paris. He said that he was most anxious to secure certain arms for the Cambodian army and that he was rather discouraged at the difficulties he had encountered. He said for instance that there was an order for 500 rifles to be supplied from the Saint Etienne factory which had been pending for six or seven months and which Mr. Tep Phan hopes to activate in the course of his next trip to France.

Mr. Tep Phan asked me about the possibility of getting arms from the US. I said that I was not up to date with regard to the details of such conversations as there have been on this matter. I said that I was aware of the fact that General O'Daniel and Mr. McClellan had been in Phnom Penh recently and had had some discussions with the Cambodian authorities. I said in this connection that if in fact the relatively favorable dispositions, which some people believe the Communists have now adopted with regard to Cambodia, are to find expression, it would seem advisable to make the path for such expression relatively smooth. I repeated that we should very shortly ascertain their real intentions.

Mr. Tep Phan agreed to keep the US Delegation closely informed of all developments.

SECRET

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

PRIORITY

GENEVA, JUNE 21, 1954—1 p.m.

Secto 488. Repeated information Paris 473, Saigon 189. Roux of French delegation has indicated to us that French thinking as to organization future work of conference involves delegating [delegation] to a committee of the conference a task of making recommendations regarding technical aspects of supervision and control of armistice. Reading informs us French delegation is preparing paper endeavoring to make distinction between technical aspects which would be province of committee and political aspects which conference would continue to work on.

I have stated to Reading and plan to inform Chauvel this afternoon that, although US delegation will give careful study to any suggestion made, it continues to be our view that certain fundamental matters of principle must be agreed to before profitable discussions at technical level can take place. These fundamental matters, in addition to the question of composition, include the authority, structure and...
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Sixteenth Restricted Session, June 21, 1954

Records No: 206-Y0050

(Top Secret)

Chairman Mao, Comrade Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

(1) The four delegations from our side came to our place for dinner on the evening of the 18th to say farewell to Comrade Nam II. On that evening, we discussed the two proposals presented by the delegations of Laos and Cambodia. We presumed that we could reach an agreement on the Laos and Cambodia issues at the meeting of the 19th with our counterparts. On the morning of the 19th, Eden came to see me (see the other telegram for details) after the French delegation brought us two draft proposals by our counterparts. Caccia went to see Gromyko, and Chauvel's assistant met with Wang Begnan. [The delegations] exchanged views separately. [We] put together points in common between the Chinese proposal and the two proposals of Laos and Cambodia, copied the Vietnamese Resolution on May 29th and made three principles. Through repeated discussion back and forth between both sides, [we] obtained agreement outside the conference first, and then held the meeting. We reached an agreement on three points at the sixteenth restricted session. See the communiqué for details.

(2) Three points of the agreement need to be explained:

- The word "and" in "the representatives of commands of two sides shall meet immediately in Geneva and on the spot" was changed to "or". This was proposed by the Cambodian delegation with the support of Americans (the process will be reported separately) to the Soviet Union. Molotov agreed with that. Cambodia does not want to negotiate here. They emphasize that [the parties to the negotiation] should be the Cambodian royal command on one hand, and the command of the Vietnamese on the other. They do not want to recognize France as chief representative. It therefore showed the contradictions between France and Cambodia. Now, [the] only solution is to enlarge the ongoing negotiations between the representatives of commands of both sides of Vietnam. It will require more days until the delegations of Laos and Cambodia show up and negotiate directly the issues of the Kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos.

- It was the Western countries that suggested jointly that ["We should first discuss the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces."]

- Our side added "and foreign military personnel" after "[armed forces"].

We meant the Vietnamese Volunteers. The Cambodian delegate stated that Cambodia needed the service of foreign military personnel. The Laotian delegation claimed that the French military personnel in Laos were dispatched there based on agreements between France and Laos.

(3) We originally thought that the meeting would need a recess. However, since France did not want the conference to be interrupted, "the conference will continue" was added to the communiqué. In fact the foreign ministers of major countries have already left. A special commission discussing detailed plans for international supervision could possibly be established after one or two more meetings.

(4) During the absence of the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, China, Britain and the United States, in order to push forward direct contact between France and Vietnam, I met with the Cambodian delegation on the 20th (see the other telegram for details), and I plan to invite the delegations of Laos and Cambodia to have dinner with Comrade Pham Van Dong on the 21st. [I will] introduce them to each other so that they can have more direct contacts in the future. Also, I told Chauvel that I was willing to meet with Mendes-France if he comes to Geneva in two days. Chauvel has not yet answered me. Even if Mendes-France will not come, I still plan to push Chauvel to contact the Vietnamese side directly. In order to influence France, I also met with two members of Parliament from the French Socialist Party. They both insist that [France] should establish diplomatic relations with China (see the other telegram for details.)

Zhou Enlai
June 21, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITE HALL DISTRIBUTION

Lord Reading
No. 836
June 22, 1954

D. 1. 23 p.m. June 22, 1954
R. 1. 30 p.m. June 22, 1954

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 836 of June 22
Repeated for Information to Paris Peking
Washington Saigon
and Savoy to Berne

My telegram No. 816 (not to all).

At a meeting of the 3 Powers this morning the Cambodian and
Laotian delegations reported on their contacts with Mr. Chou En-lai.

2. The Cambodians said that Chou En-lai had expressed his
readiness to arrange direct contacts with the Viet Minh military
representatives. The Cambodians had restated their general position
very frankly, and the Communists had shown no disposition to pursue
the argument about the "free Cambodians". Although there had
been a radio report to the effect that China was ready to recognise
Cambodia, this aspect was not mentioned.

3. The Laotian contacts were generally cordial. Chou En-lai
was sympathetic towards the Laotian desire to maintain an army for
internal security purposes, and again said that Laos could remain in the
French Union. The essential point was that there should be no United
States bases in Laos. The Laotian delegation derived the impression
that there would be no difficulties about arranging local contacts
with the Viet Minh, and that the forces of the latter would now be
gradually withdrawn.

Foreign Office please pass to Paris, Washington, Peking
and Saigon as my telegrams Nos. 197, 275, 142 and 51 respectively.

(Repeated to Paris, Washington, Peking and Saigon)

PPPP
Secto 405, repeated Paris 477, London 318, Moscow 141, Tokyo 141, Saigon 19 [101]. As indicated reference telegram Chou En-lai last night entertained Cambodian, Laotian and Viet Minh delegations at dinner. Accounts given us by Laotians and Cambodians indicate dinner was excellent with numerous toasts to peace and friendship followed by movies and by conversations.

Cambodians were favorably impressed at Dong's attitude toward Cambodia. He accepted principle of withdrawal of Viet Minh "volunteers." He said aspirations of minorities in resistance movements should, however, be taken into account. He expressed satisfaction at Cambodian intention of granting general amnesty following cessation of hostilities. He admitted great popularity of King Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia. He expressed satisfaction with agreements for transfers of power from France to Cambodia which Cambodians showed him and with which he apparently was familiar. He expressed understanding of Cambodian requirement for self-defense while claiming his main worry was possibility of American bases in Cambodia.

Conversation with Laotian delegates followed generally similar course. Chou En-lai evinced sympathy for interest in Laotian territorial integrity and independence. According to Ourof, "he almost promised us the protection of 600-million Chinese." Dong stated he accepted Franco-Laotian military agreements including continued existence of French Union bases on Laotian territory. He expressed concern at the possibility of American bases and of agreements between Laos and the US for defense. Dong accepted principle of withdrawal of Viet Minh volunteers and pointed to fact most of them had already departed and that operations were at low ebb (Laotian reports confirm this).

With regard to resistance movements in Laos, Dong's attitude was different from that followed with regard to Cambodia. He suggested meeting between Souvanna Phouma (Prime Minister) and his brother Prince Souvannouvong, the resistance leader. Dong said he would like to talk further with Laotian delegate on this subject. (Comment: it is quite evident that Dong regards Laotian resistance movement as more valuable asset than Cambodian resistance movement.)

According to our informants, there was no mention at this meeting of possible establishment of relations between Communist Chinese and Laos and Cambodia.

Comment: It seems clear that Viet Minh with Communist Chinese support will endeavor to secure at price of conciliatory friendly attitude they are adopting toward Laos and Cambodia involving with

dealment of Viet Minh and cessation of hostilities in these countries, a commitment or understanding which would in effect neutralize these two countries or at least prevent them from participating in South East Asian defense organization. Since participation depends not only on their willingness to participate but also on US willingness to make specific commitments for defense of Laos and Cambodia, US delegation would appreciate urgent instructions as to attitude we should advise Laotians and Cambodians to adopt. We are suggesting, of course, that they, while preserving their peaceful intentions and their complete sovereignty and independence make no commitments which would prejudice their ability to enter into collective security arrangements with other countries.

JOHNSON

396.1 GE/4-2254: Telegram

Seventeenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 22, 3 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 22, 1954—midnight.

Secto 504. Moscow 141 repeated information Paris 486, Saigon 189, London 318, Tokyo 158, Phnom Penh, Vietiane. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFFE. Seventeenth Indochina restricted session on Tuesday June 22, with Novikov (USSR) presiding. Chauvel opened by raising question international control for Cambodia and Laos. Referred to list of questions prepared for discussion (Secto 497) but decided withhold them pending implementation decision June 19 on military talks.

Denying Communist allegations that French believed international control should apply only Vietnam, Chauvel stated international supervision in Cambodia and Laos should apply to:

1. Evacuation of foreign troops;
2. Liberation prisoners of war and civil internees;
3. Protection of territorial integrity and concentration of remaining French troops (in Laos) to agreed bases;
4. Control over entry of arms necessary for national armies to assure defense.

Structure of international control would resemble that for Vietnam. Central commissions situated in country capitals and units in countryside and frontier areas with necessary material support and ability.

1 A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/17) is in Conference files, lot 63 CP 627, CP 279. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p.m. and adjourned at 7:20 p.m. The minutes are also printed in "Conferences de Genève," vol. 3, pp. 359-368. Message transmitted in two sections.

Dated June 21, p. 1211.
make investigations on request or on own initiative. Commissions could ask for creation joint commissions. Should be on spot to function from moment cessation hostilities.

Chauvel emphasized majority decision by commission. It would report to guarantors (conference powers) failure to obey decisions or anything threatening renewal hostilities.

Composition should be similar but not necessarily same as for Vietnam. Entire problem in practical aspects can be studied as whole for three states, but differences in function and structure should be noted. After certain fundamental issues agreed, French delegation would submit proposal for discussion. Raised question of turning over technical aspects for expert study, but conference should continue consideration special problems Cambodia and Laos.

Next China (Li Ko-neng) noted various views on international control, expressed belief since negotiation could resolve differences. He recalled various Communist statements this subject and particularly Molotov June 14 proposal (Secto 442 *), which he suggested as basis discussion. He supported proposal and amendment of June 16 (Secto 461 *) providing for five or three-power commission, including Indonesia, with India as chairman. Acknowledged special conditions Cambodia and Laos. Then emphasized that since two parties primarily responsible for successful cease-fire the joint commissions should be chiefly responsible for control. Hoped for rapid accomplishment of definition terms of reference and relations between joint and international commissions.

USDel followed with statement Secto 503.*

UK (Lord Reading) took floor to express hope and belief that Chinese were right, that differences could be settled, but noted several awkward problems. Although conciliatory and almost apologetic in words and manner, he then effectively attacked Molotov proposal. Referring frequently his agreement with USDel criticism, he pointed out ineffectiveness of subordination international commission to joint bodies. Frankly had to ask Soviet delegation for real reason behind this unworkable scheme.

Reading again supported Colombo powers and then turned to question majority or unanimous decisions by international commission. Said Molotov proposal would invite breakdown at critical moments while arguing whether any given incident required joint or unanimous decision.

He hoped drafters Soviet proposal would not object to amendments other delegations thought necessary. He ended with reference to Chou En-lai statement that decisions difficult without exact knowledge of what is to be supervised. Hoped therefore positions could be kept flexible pending submission reports by military representatives.

Dong (VM) spoke after recess and referred to study commission proposed by French delegate on subject of control. Dong proposed conference should adopt following principles to assist committee:

1. Correct interpretation of armistice texts with belligerent parties.
2. Joint commission should not be subordinate to "neutral armistice supervisory commission" (Dong reiterated familiar arguments that neutral commission should have no right to impose decisions on joint commission, that it is not possible to give neutral commission power of decision without providing it with coercive means to implement its decisions, and that differences should be referred to conference powers.)
3. Soviet proposal of June 14 re powers, functions and rules of procedure for a neutral commission should be used as basis for discussion and linked to question of composition neutral commission as suggested by Soviet delegate on June 16.

Cambodian delegate (Sam Sary) then took floor and stated that his delegate shared views expressed by Chauvel, but believed joint commission for Cambodia should be different from those for Vietnam and Laos although composition could be same and commissions could cooperate with each other. In referring to Communist Chinese suggestion that Soviet proposal be used as basis for discussion, Cambodian delegate said he did not reject everything in Soviet proposal although it applied only to Vietnam. He stated that since conference has recognized separate problem of Cambodia and Laos, conference should apply same approach to problem of control in Laos and Cambodia as distinguished from Vietnam. In concluding Cambodian delegate said the same remarks apply to the statement made earlier by Dong regarding question of composition of commission.

Vietnam delegate (Buu Kinh) referred to earlier expression views of his delegate June 9 on question of control, said line of reasoning guided by adherence to two principles: Impartiality and efficiency of control commission. These he reaffirmed while noting that the Soviet proposal lacked them. He then emphasized that role of joint commission should be limited to execution and implementation, and that one side cannot be both judge and party at interest, situation which would be inherent if joint commission were dominant over neutral commission. Concluded by saying that control body must be independent of both sides and that United Nations Organization best pos-
sible one to guarantee impartiality, efficiency and technical ability to carry out task.

Chauvel (France) then spoke extemporaneously noting that conference had before it "abundant crop of proposals", referred to valid questions posed today by US delegate and noted statement of UK delegate which, he said, conformed to his own views that difficulties arise from role of unanimity as his three years experience in United Nations Security Council testified. Referring to Cambodian intervention Chauvel said he saw no conflict between his and Cambodian views, stating that there was definite advantage in having central control commission for each country adding that he did not contemplate joint control system as in case of Vietnam, but rather liaison parties to supervise certain practical matters on a temporary basis (Chauvel remarks at this point were rather vague).

In course of further somewhat diffuse remarks Chauvel made following points: Some safeguards to insure carrying out of armistice terms necessary since unlikely two belligerent parties will work together following hostilities in spirit of complete cooperation; joint control commission should be charged with implementation of agreement as distinguished from role of mediation and control which must be provided by higher and neutral body when difficulties arise; speaking of relations between joint and neutral commissions question of which is subordinate not helpful since it is not necessary to set up tribunals but rather bodies suited for specific tasks they have to perform; conference should discuss what subjects would be suitable for each of these two commissions; i.e., in Vietnam question of regrouping of forces would be one for joint commission whereas control of entry of arm and equipment would be matter for neutral commission.

In concluding Chauvel suggested that conference set up committee of experts from each delegation to examine and compare various proposals on control; put forward to date, and advise conference of results of this examination. Committee would not necessarily exist for duration of conference but would report every 2 or 3 days concerning questions raised from one meeting to another.

Laotian delegate (Ouot Souvanavong [Souphanouvong]) then somewhat confusingly proposed that the two chairmen, following traditional procedure, meet to reach decision on French suggestion concerning committee of experts.

Lord Reading (UK) asked for the floor and stated that although he was willing to discuss anything with his co-chairman he felt that in the past such discussions pertained to procedural rather than substantive subjects, and expressed the view that there were too many differences of opinion to hope that two chairmen could reach solution. (None of delegates subsequently referred to Chauvel's suggestion.)

Novikov (USSR) speaking as Soviet delegate, contributed nothing new by touching on following points: Soviet, PR China and DRV Democrats consider United Nations unacceptable in control function; Colombo powers "truly neutral" but are not only neutral states in world; Soviet delegate has shown spirit of conciliation by proposing commission composed of 4 countries, then by suggesting chairman have decisive vote on number of questions, and then by proposing commission be reduced to 3 countries or raised to 5; if two sides in Indochina want to maintain peace it will be maintained, and no commission can thwarts resolve of one side to resume hostilities; decisions of neutral commission should not be imposed on joint commission; one has answered question how to make joint commission submit to decisions of neutral commission; US delegation has gone as far as to propose that international commission have organs on territories of both sides thereby infringing sovereignty "both Vietnam and DRV", and raising question US motives; one commission should be set up for all Indochina rather than one for each of three countries.

In concluding Novikov remarked that Kuznetsov (Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister) would arrive Geneva tomorrow, will study all proposals and may wish make statement.

Since no more speakers inscribed Novikov read usual communiqué asking delegates when next meeting should be set. After short round of discussion it was decided to set June 24 as date of next meeting with understanding that after consultation of co-chairmen meeting might be postponed.

JOHNSON

294.1 68/3254 : Telegram

Seventeenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 23, 3 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Gineva, June 22, 1954—10 p.m.

Secto 503. Repeated information Paris 48, Saigon 198, London 318, Tokyo 157, Moscow 148, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Department pass Defense; Tokyo pass CINCPE. Following is text my statement in 17th Indochina restricted session Tuesday, June 22:

Both the delegates of France and the People's Republic of China have spoken of the task now confronting this conference with respect to the question of international control. Mr. Chauvel has I believe given us a most useful analysis of the task we face in this regard.
As Mr. Li has noted, on June 14 Mr. Molotov made a rather extensive statement on the subject of International Joint Commission control over the provisions of an armistice agreement in the three states and submitted a proposal on this question. He later developed his ideas on that same day and on June 16. I would like to think of helpfulness to address myself to some of the questions raised by this proposal and its explanation, and to refer to some of the principles with which my delegation feels must be accepted with regard to each of the three states if this proposal is to be effective.

I regret I must first note the small degree of progress which seems to have been achieved. Mr. Molotov did accept that certain categories of decisions by the International Supervisory Body could be taken by majority vote. I regret that he stopped there and thereby placed such limits on the capacity of the Commission to take executive and rapid decisions. It unanimity were to be applied, and I quote from Mr. Molotov's proposal, so "questions connected with violation of provisions of the agreement or the arising of a threat of such violation which could lead to the re-opening of hostilities", it is obvious that on matters of the gravest importance the Commission could be paralyzed at the time when rapid and effective decisions were most needed.

However, this progress is slight when we consider the major questions which are still unresolved. I refer particularly to the questions of composition of the International Supervisory Commission, the authority of this Commission, and the relation of Joint Commissions to the International Commission.

The position of my delegation has been made clear several times on the question of composition of the International Commission. I can only reiterate that I consider either the United Nations as mentioned by several delegations or the Colombo powers as proposed by Mr. Eden as meeting the criterion of impartiality upon which this Commission must be founded. The views of the USIm are well known on the question of the inclusion of countries of the Communist bloc. These views are amply supported by the records, the neutral nations Supervisory Commission in Korea which there is no need for me to repeat at this time.

I turn to the question of the authority of the International Commission. The provisions of Mr. Molotov's proposal which are concerned with the functions and powers of the International Supervisory Commission, particularly when read in conjunction with the remainder of his proposal, would give us a Commission which the USIm feels not only lacked the real power of decision but which also lacked any substantive field in which to operate. I understand that the terms in the Russian language used by Mr. Molotov in describing the Commission is correctly translated into English as "observation" rather than "supervisory". Indeed, "observation" describes more accurately the functions proposed by Mr. Molotov for this Commission, and it is on this principle that we find our greatest divergence of view.

A further weakness in the functions assigned to the International Commission by the Soviet proposal is in the proposal's failure to spell out clearly that the Commission should have free access to the entire country in which it is operating and that this access should not be conditional upon an invitation by one or both of the opposing sides. This access should be facilitated, as M. Chauvel has pointed out, by providing the Commission with adequate means of transportation and communication as well as with sufficient personnel to carry out any missions which it considers appropriate to its functions.

The Soviet and other Communist delegations desire the acceptance of a powerless and unworkable body which would have no authority in relation to the two belligerent sides or to the Joint Commissions made up of representatives of these two sides. We, to the contrary, insist on a truly impartial International Commission in a position of authority over the parties to the armistice and over any Joint Commissions which it might be necessary to create.

I noted with interest Mr. Molotov's statement on June 14 that to insist on subordination of the Joint Commissions to the International Commission would mean that we do not want to re-establish peace in Indochina. I find that statement somewhat difficult to understand as it seems to me that the premise bears no relation to the conclusion. It is the belief of our delegation that the best means of maintaining a cessation of hostilities would be to give the necessary powers to the International Commission, including full authority over the Joint Commissions.

In summary, the United States delegation desires to see the creation of an impartial and effective International Supervisory Commission, endowed with real authority to supervise and control the provisions of the agreements with respect to each of the three states and provided with the personnel and material means which will permit it to carry out its mandate.

I have, Mr. Chairman, put forward this analysis in the hope that by pointing out what seems to our delegation the fundamental principles in this regard which still must be resolved, we can expedite the resolution of these problems.

JOHNSON

306.1 OR/9-2154: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET
PRIORITY
WASHINGTON, June 22, 1954—7:26 p.m.

Tosec 461. Proposal reported Sect 466 is consistent with working methods adopted by conference. As indicated in Sudan 211 we do not wish to participate in work of committees which may take decisions from which it might be awkward for us later to dissociate ourselves.

1 Drafted by Sturz of FRC.
2 Dated June 21, p. 1219.
3 Dated June 17, p. 1171.
SECRET
FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WITTEHALL SECRET (CABINET)

DISTRIBUTION

Lord Reading
No. 637
June 22, 1954.

D. 3.41 p.m. June 22, 1954.
R. 3.50 p.m. June 22, 1954.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 637 of June 22

Repeated for information to: Paris Saigon
Peking New Delhi.
Washington

Paris telegram No. 434 (not to all).

M. Chauvel called this morning to tell me the following:

(1) He confirmed that a meeting had been arranged for tomorrow at Berns at the French Embassy, between Chou En-lai and M. Mendès-France. This was in response to Chou En-lai's repeated requests to have an opportunity of seeing M. Mendès-France before leaving Europe. He was ready to defer his departure if there was any prospect of such a meeting taking place.

(2) M. Chauvel also informed me that Chou En-lai had told him that he was arranging to see Nehru in New Delhi on his way back to China.

(3) M. Chauvel had also had a friendly conversation with Mr. Pham Van Dong who showed himself able to speak perfect French. The meeting took place at Chou En-lai's villa by arrangement, and M. Chauvel was informed that the villa was at their disposal for future conversations if required. M. Chauvel had impressed on Mr. Pham Van Dong that the time available for conversations between them was short, but Mr. Pham Van Dong did not seem to see any particular difficulty in this, and indeed said that he thought that they could arrive at an agreement outside the Conference by private conversations between themselves within a period of ten days, and that a further period of five days would be sufficient for discussion within the Conference itself of any agreement reached. M. Chauvel had made it clear to Mr. Pham Van Dong that he would have to persuade /both
SECRET

Geneva telegram No. 837 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

both Viet Nam and the United States of the acceptability of any arrangement that might be arrived at in this way.

(4) M. Chauvel had made it clear that the Conference should continue to have sittings whilst these private talks were being conducted on a basis of two or three meetings a week, and Mr. Pham Van Dong said that he was in agreement.

(5) M. Chauvel told me that the Viet Namese Delegation were very upset as a result of the conversation which had taken place yesterday between the new Prime Minister and M. Moreau-France in Paris, and were even talking about packing up and leaving the Conference. But he would do his best to persuade them of the extreme folly in their own interests of taking any such course.

(6) Chou En-lai had given the impression that he was very much the father of Asia and that it was his task to arrange matters accordingly. He had also made it clear that in his opinion there were three States in Indo China, namely, Cambodia, Laos and Viet Minh and that Viet Nam counted for nothing. M. Chauvel based this conclusion upon the fact that Chou En-lai had made no effort to get into touch with the Viet Namese and made no reference to them in his conversation.

Foreign Office please pass Paris, Peking, Washington, Saigon and New Delhi as my telegrams Nos. 198, 113, 276, 52 and 116 respectively.

[Repeated to Paris, Peking, Washington, Saigon and copy sent to C.R.O. for repetition to New Delhi].

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

Sir I. Kirkpatrick.
Private Secretary.
Mr. W. B. Allen.
Mr. Speight.
Head of Far Eastern Department.
Head of South East Asia Dept.
Suggest you reiterate to Chauvel that we would not be prepared to accept membership in any "ad hoc" commissions which in our view should be composed only of principals.

DULLES

386.1 GR/6-2254: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 22, 1954—9 p.m.

Secto 501. Rptd information Paris 483, Saigon 196. Paris eyes only Ambassador, Saigon eyes only. Department limit distribution. Chauvel told me this afternoon that Chou En-lai-Mendes-France meeting had been arranged for tomorrow at Bern "under cover" courtesy visit by Mendes-France to Bern. However, announcement will probably be made this evening that he will also see Chou En-lai.

There was opportunity only to obtain brief account Chauvel's meeting with Dong today. Chauvel said that Dong stated agreement on Vietnam could be reached within ten days in "underground military talks", and Chouval added it would take another five days "to sell" the Vietnamese.1 I asked him what this portended as far as Hanoi-Haiphong perimeter was concerned and received vague answer to effect was making attempt to hold on to that area "for time being" on grounds of military necessity and that with passage of time lots of things could happen.

JOHNSON

1 In telegram Secto 506, June 23, the U.S. Delegation instructed the Department of State to "Correct second sentence paragraph Secto 501 to read as follows: 'Chauvel said that Dong stated agreement on Vietnam could be reached within ten days in "underground military talks" (which Chauvel expects to resume Thursday) and Dong expected it would take another five days "to sell" the Vietnamese.'" (386.1 GR/6-2254)

7510.00/6-2254: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, June 22, 1954—9 p.m.

Secto 502. Repeated information Paris 484, Saigon 197. Learning Heath was in Paris yesterday, the Vietnamese Defense Minister, Quat, asked to see him. Quat said there had been some "feelers" for him to remain in Ngo Dinh Diem's cabinet. Before making up his mind, he wanted to be certain of Ngo Dinh Diem's policy. He said that too many of Ngo Dinh Diem's supporters were neutralists of the Indian school; that neutralism was no answer to the Communist attempts to take over Vietnam.

Quat said he expected to see General Ely today. He was greatly alarmed over the French plan of drawing in their lines to encompass what they called the "useful delta" which meant a rather narrow parallelogram from Hanoi to Haiphong. When this idea had originally been broached the French said they would ask the Vietnamese National Army to defend the provinces to the west of the parallelogram, notably the two Catholic provinces of Phat Diem and Bui Chu. Quat had accepted this proposition provided the French would agree to give artillery and aviation support and group mobile in case of a large-scale Viet Minh attack. The French agreed. Now, however, the French said they could furnish neither artillery, aviation or group mobile and the Vietnamese Army having such support could not hope to withstand a determined Viet Minh attack. Quat said it was of the utmost importance that an attempt be made to hold these western and southern delta provinces since they were the source of manpower for the national army. He could not hope to build up the national army to the desired strength during 1954 without recruits from the north delta. With all due regard to the southern Vietnamese the best and most willing recruits were only to be found in the north.

Quat went on to say that while one must not underestimate the gravity of the military situation of the Franco-Vietnamese forces, one should not forget the Viet Minh were having their difficulties also and were desirous of peace in which they could consolidate their positions. He asserted that Viet Minh had had very great recruiting difficulties at the time they were increasing their attack on Dien Bien Phu and from the regions around Nam Dinh and Nam Dinh the Viet Minh had gotten only 15 and 20 percent of the recruits they had planned to conscript.

JOHNSON

JUNE 23, 1954

Editorial Note

At 8:30 a.m. on June 23, in Washington, Under Secretary Smith conducted a briefing on the Geneva Conference for the President and a bipartisan Congressional delegation of 13 Senators and 17 Representatives, including the Congressional leadership of both parties. He said the United States direction toward the Indochina phase of the Conference was different from that toward the Korean phase. The
Minutes, Zhou Enlai's Meeting with Chauvel, June 22 1954

Record No. 206-Y0067

Time: 11:45am-12:15pm, 22 June
Location: The Chinese Delegation's hotel
Chinese participants: Zhou Enlai, Li Kenong, Chen Jiakang*, and Dong Ningchuan (translator)
French participants: Jean Chauvel, Jacques Guillemin, and one translator

Chauvel: I visited Mr. Mendés-France in Paris yesterday. I have conveyed to him your willingness to meet him. He is very glad. However, since his new cabinet has just formed, he has a minister meeting this morning, and a cabinet meeting in the afternoon. Therefore, he will be able to arrive in Bern tomorrow. Right now, we have arranged his schedule as the following. He is visiting the officials of the Swiss government at 11:00am tomorrow morning. He is having a banquet at 12:30pm. He can meet you at 2:00pm at the French Embassy. We'd like to know if it is convenient for you.

The media and press have broadly publicized the news of this meeting. Some of them are distorted propaganda. We guess they are cooked by the Americans. I received many early phone calls this morning, asking my comments on the news. I told them that I didn't have much to say, and that they should ask Paris for comments directly. In order to avoid any rumor, we got to have a formal announcement. Mr. Mendés-France is planning to announce his meeting with you to his cabinet members at today's cabinet meeting. After the cabinet meeting, we will issue a news release. Its words may be like this: French Prime Minister will visit Sweden and meet the officials of the Swiss government. He will make a stop and meet Mr. Zhou Enlai, China's Premier and Foreign Minister. Are you happy with the news release?

Zhou Enlai: Thank you for Mr. Chauvel's effort. I know you have many difficulties so that I delayed my schedule for one day. The street news is obviously made by the Americans. They spread the news everywhere. For example, about my trip to India, India and our government have not yet release the news, they already found out in the airport.

Regarding your news release, I don't have any problem. It is all right to meet at 3:00pm.

Chauvel: It is the best if the Chinese and French governments can issue the news release at the same time.

Zhou Enlai: After you decide the releasing time, please ask Col. Guillermaz to inform Mr, Wang Bingnan.

Chauvel: Regarding the contents of tomorrow's meeting, even though Mr. Mendés-France does not have any particular topic, he will listen to everything you'd like to say. His mission is to quickly reach a peaceful solution over the Indochina's problem. By the deadline he has set up for himself, he has to report the result to the Parliament.

The problems we face now in the negotiations are the difficulties between France and its alliance. We think we will work out something with them. We are very glad to see that China and France can make common efforts together. After your departure, who is in charge here?

Zhou Enlai: Mr. Li Kenong, our vice minister of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, will stay in charge here. Also, Mr. Chen Jiakang. Head of the Asian Division [of the Foreign Affairs Ministry], will stay here. We hope that the French and Chinese delegations will maintain their contacts inside and outside the conference in order to make genuine progress through their efforts. I met the foreign ministers of Cambodia and Laos yesterday and the day before yesterday. I also invited the foreign ministers of Laos, Cambodia, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to dinner here last night. I have told them that our hope is to see the three countries establish a friendly relationship with France. After peace is resumed, they will develop better relations with France on the new foundation. Our goal is to support both sides to achieve a glorious cease-fire. We support and promote the conference, not derailing it.

Chauvel: This is exactly what we believe. We really appreciate your great efforts and personal contribution to the peace restoration in Indochina.

I think the main task for the next few weeks will be conducted in the military committees. However, we can't give the public an impression that the conference of the nine nations has gone. Thus, we feel that the conference should meet and show the media from all the countries that the nine nation conference is continuing. I talked to Mr. Pham Van Dong this morning about this. He said that we don't need to give this kind of optimistic impression. I think it may not be just an impression, this conference still has certain impact. If not much business, we can meet two or three times a week, and one hour each time.

The special meetings can report the result of their discussions to the conference.

Zhou Enlai: I think Mr. Chauvel has a good idea. But we need to discuss this with the Delegations of the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

It is better for the conference to have some business to work on. And each person doesn't need to talk a lot, that might intensify the atmosphere.

* Director of the Department of Asian Affairs of PRC Foreign Ministry
Chauvel: We will find some business for the conference to work on.

Zhou Enlai: It is important that the military staff meeting should have some achievement.

Chauvel: This is our common basis. I said to Mr. Pham Van Dong this morning that the discussion on the supervision and its membership does not have any foundation until the map [for regrouping] is drawn. It doesn’t matter for you and us if the conference continues or adjourns. But it means a lot to some other people. Thus, the conference must continue to meet.

We are planning to present two documents at today’s meeting. The first document is about establishing a special committee for the supervision issue. The Americans are not very happy to accept this document. They worry that the conference may not be able to take control after such a committee is established. The members of this committee can be decided later according to its tasks. The second document is drafted according to Mr. Zhou Enlai’s six-point suggestion. We intend to use it as the meeting agenda in order to make the conference progress. Mr. Pham Van Dong said that we should add the issue of local troop deployment to this document. Although Mr. Haie hasn’t given any specific replies, he doesn’t oppose it. We want to know now about China’s opinion. We can cooperate like we did last week.

(Chauvel presented an original copy of the two documents.)

Zhou Enlai: We will let you have our reply before the meeting and after our discussions.

Chauvel: Regarding the special committee suggested in the first document, we consider it the best if a delegation, such as the Chinese Delegation, can make a proposal for establishing a special committee of the supervision. Then, we will endorse it.

Zhou Enlai: We need to study the document.

Chauvel: We hope that the French and Chinese Delegations can maintain their active, careful, and secret cooperation during the next three weeks.

Zhou Enlai: This is for our own advantageous.

Translated for CWHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWHP.

Record No. 206-Y0050

Comrades Chairman, Shaoqi, and the Central Committee,

Eden came to visit me on the morning of the 19th, mainly to discuss the proposal on the issues of Laos and Cambodia, with a view to reaching an agreement on the same afternoon. In addition, he mentioned that the Viet Minh forces should not engage in large-scale hostilities while the negotiations were under way, and that if an agreement could be reached here, the hostilities should be ceased on the spot. (materials excised--editor) He said that he had recently heard the news that the Viet Minh forces had attacked a place on the Cambodian border. I said that we were in favor of an agreement as soon as possible so as to achieve the cessation of all hostilities, that the new French cabinet also wished for a ceasefire, and that we had not learned of any attack on Laos or Cambodia. I said to him, “You understand the nationalist movement sentiment in Southeast Asia,” the hostilities are mutual, and so the French must restrain their forces from large-scale campaigns. There was no major campaign to speak of in Dien Bien Phu, but French airborne troops turned it into a major one. I also told him that so long as reasonable demands were met in Vietnam, no unreasonable demands would be made on the issues of Laos and Cambodia. Eden then raised the issue of adjourning the conference. He said that the foreign ministers would return when the military representatives had prepared a report, and that they did not wish to resolve the issues of the jurisdiction and members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission before the conference was adjourned. I suggested that the foreign ministers return on a regular basis, so that a deadline could be imposed on the work of the military representatives of both sides. Eden agreed. In the end, Eden mentioned that what pleased him most was the improvement of Sino-British relations.

Zhou Enlai
June 22, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

Geneva, June 23, 1954—10 a.m.

Secto 505. Repeated information Paris 487, Saigon 200. Dac Khe, Deputy Chief of Vietnam delegation, told Heath that he saw both Ngo Dinh Diem and Bao Dai in Paris over the weekend. He had urged Ngo Dinh Diem to appoint a new chief of the delegation with least possible delay to which Diem agreed.

He found Bao Dai “very anxious” over the situation and the possibility of the loss of the northern Delta as a result of French-Viet Minh agreement. Dac Khe said he told His Majesty the only way to ensure that French not surrender north would be for Bao Dai to return forthwith to Vietnam and to take up residence in Hanoi. Bao Dai made no reply to this suggestion.

Dac Khe was extremely worried over the Chinese “concession” to Laos and Cambodia looking towards the “neutralization” of the two countries. Dac Khe said that China was a large cat which was suggesting that the two mice, Laos and Cambodia, be neutralized. But who would ensure the neutrality of the cat?

Dac Khe feared that an agreement acceptable to Laos and Cambodia would be reached shortly which would prevent those countries from carrying their case to the United Nations and this would greatly handicap chances of an eventual appeal of Vietnam to the UN.

Khe felt sure that Vietnam must eventually withdraw from conference. The question was when?

JOHNSON

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation.1

TOP SECRET

Washington, June 23, 1954—11:20 a.m.

Tosec 484. Limit distribution. Ref Secto 501.2 Chauvel’s evasiveness re “underground military talks” is contrary our understanding with him and Mendes-France that we were to be kept fully informed.

Suggest Johnson take earliest appropriate occasion remind Chauvel this understanding and to add that our continued presence at Geneva can be useful only to the degree that we are in fact kept fully informed.

Ambassador Dillon should make similar representations Mendes-France.

DULLES

1Drafted by Sturtevant FE/PSA. Sent to Paris as telegram 4756 and repeated to Saigon as telegram 2666.
2Dated June 22, p. 1222.

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

Geneva, June 23, 1954—7 p.m.

Secto 512. Reference Tosec 460: At yesterday’s restricted meeting Chauvel alluded to paper transmitted Secto 497,2 but stated he would withhold this “pending implementation June 19 decision on military talks”. Have no reason believe Chauvel attempting substitute this paper for June 19 conference decision. My understanding is Chauvel...
merely attempting draw up a form of agenda to provide framework for conference discussion while conferring some lip service to Chinese proposal. It does not seem to me his paper endeavors to register any conference agreement on topics mentioned as did Chinese Communist proposal June 16 which we will of course continue oppose. I see no objection going along with Chauvel on this, and would appreciate Department's approval.

Yesterday's meeting Chauvel also alluded to his proposal for "ad hoc" commissions' (Secto 496) but did not table any proposal (Reference Tosec 462'). However he did orally suggest the possibility of committee of nine, the sole purpose of which would be assemble "abundant crop of proposals" before conference on matters of control together with observations made by various delegations this subject and present sort of summary working documents, which would facilitate further discussions.

In view Chauvel absence at Bern today, have not been able discuss matter further with him, but Bonsal saw Roux this morning and reiterated our reluctance approve establishment of subcommittees in absence clear terms of reference reflecting agreement on principles achieved at conference itself. Bonsal suggested task Chauvel had in mind might better be performed by one delegation and presented as working document to conference. Roux would discuss with Chauvel having small group representatives of few principally interested delegations perform task. Roux stressed French thought is not create any formal permanent subcommittee, but rather assign group experts task which would be accomplished between regular meeting of conference by ad hoc experts, which would then be dissolved.

From my previous conversations with him, I believe Chauvel's motivation to be: (1) He has available junior staff member highly competent control matters who cannot directly participate regular restricted sessions but who could represent French delegation at lower level committee; (2) Chauvel himself is unfamiliar with large amount of material which various delegations have submitted and genuinely believes an agreed analysis presentation of material would be helpful; (3) Chauvel believes appointment ad hoc commission perform more or less specific task would give impression of activity and progress which not produced by repetitious discussions at restricted sessions.

I see little utility but no particular objection to such ad hoc committee if insisted upon by France. While as practical matter smaller group of "principally interested delegations" would probably be able to work more effectively, if we did not participate danger that elements of control which we consider important might be dropped in committee report. Therefore am inclined believe on balance preferable we participate if clearly understood committee job collating and recording only, and not decision-making.

Please instruct.*

I am not clear whether Chauvel will continue push for "committee of experts" on more substantive aspects control, but in view his anxiety get his junior staff expert work on this subject believe it likely he would do so. I strongly feel feel referral to committee in absence of agreement on essential principles very dangerous and will continue oppose.

JOHNSON

* The Department of State replied in telegram Tosec 476, June 24, p. 1238.

1515.00/6-2354: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, June 29, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 513. Repeated information Paris 590, Section 203, Phnom Penh 9. Following Heath's conversation with Cambodian Foreign Minister reported Secto 510. Heath received letter from Foreign Minister of which following is rough translation: *

"Following our talk this morning, I have the honor again to express to you the concern of my government for the present and future security of Cambodia, a concern which is justified by the insufficiency of means at its disposal up to this time to provide for that security. Although lacking necessary means to present the pressure of the common enemy, Cambodia is resolved to participate in any system for the defense of world freedom.

Thus Cambodia would be tempted to refuse the proposals of the People's Republic of China and the Viet Minh concerning prevention of the introduction of military personnel, or of arms, of the establishment of foreign bases, etc., and to devote itself to maintaining the principles for its complete sovereignty after the withdrawal of the invading troops. However, if Cambodia were not able to hope to receive assistance in personnel, armament, etc., in other words, if the conditions asked for the withdrawal of Viet Minh troops were in fact to be fulfilled, this refusal on our part to accept those conditions would lack an reasonable basis and would allow it to be believed that Cambodia does not wish the restoration of peace and does not even think of taking advantage of its refusal, if only during the transitory period, in order to organize itself internally and possibly to reshape its policy.

* Dated June 21, p. 1210.

* Dated June 22, p. 1221.
In these conditions, I ask Your Excellency kindly to re-examine the possibility of letting me know to what extent Cambodia might hope for future assistance from the United States for the defense of its security. This would permit me to define the position of my delegation at the time of forthcoming bilateral conversations with the Viet Minh.

As soon as I have precise assurance from the Government of the United States of America, my delegation will firmly defend its position, without fear of letting escape the chances of peace temporary or illusory though it might be, offered by the Communist delegations.”

JOHNSON

731G.00/6-2354 : Telegram
The United States Delegation to the Department of State
SECRET

GENEVA, June 23, 1954—9 p.m.

Secto 514. Repeated information Saigon 204, Paris 491, Vientiane 5.

Laotian delegation met with Pham Van Dong, Viet Minh delegate, alone this afternoon in garden of Chinese delegation’s villa.

Dong was very “amiable”. He seemed to agree that Viet Minh forces should be withdrawn and disposed to admit that French keep treaty military bases. He also admitted to continuation of French cadres and training missions but said French military personnel must be reduced to minimum figures which would be agreed upon in talks between representatives of the Franco-Vietnamese and Viet Minh commands scheduled to begin in Geneva about June 26. Dong asked very insistently whether there was any military pact with the United States. The Laotians answered negatively not considering the Military Assistance Agreement of 1950 (pentalateral) to fall in that category. Laotian delegate agreed to ask Laotian Premier, Souvanna Phouma, to meet with his half brother (Souphanouvong, leader of the Free Lao Movement) in the immediate future. Dong then suggested, without insistence, that Laotian Government might give some government jobs to members of the “Free Lao Movement” thus creating a government of “national union”. In the next elections, the latter could present their candidates for the Laotian Assembly. Then Dong mentioned vaguely that some sort of a “temporary arrangement” might be made for administration of those regions where the Free Lao Movement military forces were located. This suggestion worries the Laotian delegation.

After the talk with Dong, Ourot Souvannavong, Laotian Minister to Washington, had a talk with Tran Cong Tuong, member and translator on Viet Minh delegation. They had attended school together in Saigon. Tuong referred to the execution of a former fellow-schoolmate saying that the latter had been a non-Communist nationalist member of Viet Minh and no obstacle could stop the Communist domination of movement. Tuong also said that he was certain the Laotian Government would find that the Laotian Resistance Movement was much stronger and better implanted than was believed in Vientiane.

Ourot Souvannavong agreed to our suggestion that it would be well for the Laotian delegation to make no major commitments to the Viet Minh until they saw where the latter’s proposals were leading. He said he would keep the American delegation fully and promptly informed of developments.

JOHNSON

JUNE 24, 1954

731G.00/6-2454 : Telegram
The United States Delegation to the Department of State
SECRET

GENEVA, June 24, 1954—1 p.m.


Following account of Mendes-France-Chou En-lai interview yesterday at Bern was given Bonsal by Roux who was present. Chauvel who returned to Paris with Mendes-France, plans to furnish written summary to US and British Ambassadors Paris this morning.

Mendes-France had with him Chauvel, Roux, Col. Guillerm and an interpreter. Chou En-lai was accompanied by Li Ko Nung [Li Ke-nung] (Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs), by Director of European Affairs and two others plus an interpreter. Conversation cordial in tone. There was no mention at all time of Franco-Chinese relations or of recognition by France of Chinese Communist Government.

Chou En-lai carefully avoided giving impression he considered new French policy in making and he referred several times to earlier interviews with Bidaud.

Chou En-lai stated military aspects must be disposed of before other aspects can be taken up. A cessation of hostilities is primary goal. Chou En-lai hopes Ministers can return to Geneva as soon as possible to pass on recommendations of military representatives for all three countries.

With regard to Laos and Cambodia, although Chou En-lai stated there would have to be regrouping areas for national resistance forces, he said this could be handled by international commissions and that in any case governing thought should be that of reestablishing unity of Laos and Cambodia. If those countries truly support their present royal governments, that is their affair. A suitable place in national life must however be found for resistance elements.

Chou En-lai referred to dinner he had given for delegates of Laos, Cambodia and Viet Minh, stating that they had all spoken French.
Minutes, Zhou Enlai's Meeting with Mendès-France, June 23 1954

Record No. 206-Y0007

Time: 23 June 1954
Location: French Embassy, Borne
Chinese participants: Premier Zhou Enlai, Vice Minister Li Kenong, Feng Xian, Hua Xi, Zhang Wenjin, and Dong Yingcun (translator)
French participants: Pierre Mendès-France, Ambassador Chauvel, Luwin, Jacques Guillermaz, and one translator

Mendès-France: It is said that Mr. Premier postponed your trip to India for one day in order to come here. I really appreciate it.
Zhou Enlai: We are so glad to meet Mr. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister before my brief return to China.
Mendès-France: It is very good to quickly make this meeting happen. I am very glad about this. The reason is that I’d like to quickly solve all of the problems concerned to us. Mr. Premier knows under what kind of circumstances our new national government is established. The French National People's Assembly has decided on a date, and hopes that a settlement will be achieved before this date. This settlement of course must bring about peace.
Zhou Enlai: It is for this reason that the leaders of our two countries have this early meeting to exchange our opinions. I believe this helpful to make conference progress from now on.
Mendès-France: Mr. Premier has been attending all the meetings. I couldn’t participate in the conference before. But I had the information on your conversations with Mr. Bidault. I’d like to know more about Premier’s observation and opinion on what measures we should take in order to achieve peace in Indochina.
Zhou Enlai: In the past meetings, I have exchanged many opinions with Mr. Bidault and Mr. Chauvel. Nevertheless, I still like to talk to the new French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister now about our Chinese Delegation’s opinion on the conference.

The Chinese Delegation’s purpose of coming and attending this Geneva Conference is to resume and realize peace in Indochina. This is our goal, and we don’t ask for anything else. We oppose any enlargement or internationalization of the war. We oppose any use of threatening or provocative methods. They do not help negotiations. China, however, is not afraid of threatening, as Mr. Prime Minister knows. We need to employ conciliatory methods to help both sides to arrive at an agreement.

It is because of this common spirit, we’d like to address my opinions to Mr. Prime Minister.

To solve any problem in Indochina, the first thing is cease-fire. Military issues are always related to political issues. The military issue is discussed at present, and the political issue can be discussed later on. After an agreement is reached, the first thing is to stop the war. As Mr. Prime Minister said, the French Parliament has expressed this kind of desirability, because the people of France, Indochina, and the world all support this. The current situation in Indochina is that all the three countries involved in the war. They have a similar situation. All of the three countries need a cease-fire, and their people demand independence and national unification. The French Government has showed its willingness to recognize the independence of the three countries and their national unification. China is willing to see they will stay in the French Union. Our country who intends to establish a friendly and peaceful relationship with France.

The three countries, however, have different problems. Therefore, we should accept different ways in solving the problems in each country. Vietnam, for example, needs a general election for its national unification after the war, and then [the new national government] decides to the type of its political system. This will be determined by the Vietnamese people themselves. Regarding Laos and Cambodia, as long as the people in the two countries are still supportive to their current royal governments, our government will be very happy to see these two countries become part of the typical Southeast Asian countries, like India and Indonesia. I have expressed the same opinion to Mr. Bidault.

Of course, on the other hand, we don’t want to see that these three countries become the military bases of the United States, or that the United States builds up a military base with them. This is what we are against. If the United States establishes its military base there, we have to check it out, and we can’t just let it go without checking.

I talked to the foreign ministers of Laos and Cambodia a few days ago. They all assured me that they don’t warn any American military base in their countries. I said that’s good, and encouraged them to make friend with France, as long as France respects their independence.

I also heard that Mr. Pham Van Dong, representative of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, talked to them and expressed that Vietnam will respect the independence and sovereignty of Laos and Cambodia, and assure a non-aggression between them and Vietnam. It was very good when I heard they were talking like this.

Politically, the three countries face different situations. Currently, Vietnam has two governments. The military regrouping areas must be determined, but it doesn’t mean a [political] division. During a period of time after the cease-fire, a
free election will be held through negotiations between the two governments. This is their own domestic affair. We can show our support, even though we can’t intervene. Laos and Cambodia also need to achieve their unifications through elections. I think the Democratic Republic of Vietnam can agree on this point. The question is whether the two royal governments can recognize the resistant movements in their countries, and unite with the resistant governments in order to achieve their national unifications. The Bao Dai Government should approach the Democratic Republic of Vietnam through discussions and negotiations, instead of opposing it. Unfortunately, his political proposal exactly aims at opposition, hegemony, and inviting the United Nations to intervene. This is unacceptable.

Militarily, the military representatives from both sides are negotiating the issue of Vietnam. We all hope that a settlement will be reached sooner. Laos and Cambodia have two situations. The first is that they have local resistant forces; it is small in Cambodia, and large in Laos. In Cambodia, the royal government should talk directly to the resistant force for cease-fire, neutral nation supervision, and political solutions there. So as it should in Laos. In the meantime, the royal governments should also join France in the negotiations of both sides to determine the regrouping areas for the local forces. This will lead to their political unifications. The second situation is that all the foreign armed forces and military personnel should withdraw from these two countries. Vietnam had sent some volunteers over there. If it is still the case at the present, they may follow the resolution provided by the military staff meetings, requiring the withdrawal of all the foreign troops from the entire Indochina.

By now the representatives from both commands have reached an agreement in principle about the military meetings. They will meet and talk intensively in the next three weeks. Currently, the meetings of the belligerent states became the center of the conference. France and Vietnam are the most important parties from both sides. Our desirability is a direct contact of both sides and a signed settlement soon. All the nations at the conference, including China, are willing to make contribution to genuine progress, and firm to oppose any

These are the main points of my opinion.

Mendes-France: Premier’s points help me realize that Premier’s thinking of the issues is very clear. Of course, I can’t respond to every point, but some particular points should be discussed carefully. What made me glad is that our opinions are pretty close at the main points. I heard that the discussions on Laos and Cambodia have made some progress in the past several days. I also know that the progress was achieved mostly through the efforts of the delegation under the leadership of Premier Zhou. I believe that we don’t have any irresolvable problems between us over the issues of Lao and Cambodia.

As Premier mentioned, to cope with the domestic problems in Laos and Cambodia also needs international supervision. Certainly, a solution requires some work, but I don’t think it is too difficult to find out.

The problem in Vietnam is different. Premier just said that it is tougher. And then, its situation is not optimistic, because the war has been in that country so long. Moreover, as Premier said, the two governments have their own administrations and armies. The Vietnamese people are divided into two sides, and both sides have been fighting the war for many years. One of the points mentioned by Premier needs to be noticed that many problems can be solved through direct contact between both sides. If workable, we certainly welcome. In fact, however, it is difficult. Although it is difficult to contact and to obtain any result, we will make our vigorous effort to arrive at this goal. Nevertheless, we agree on this direction. Premier also said that the goal in this region is unification, and that the methods and procedure can be considered differently. Vietnam is divided into two parts, it is difficult to reach any agreement in a short period of time. It is impossible to complete its national unification as soon as the cease-fire becomes effective. The time issue was just mentioned because the war has been there so long that peace would not be staled immediately, and that procedure will not be that simple, for example, talking about an immediate election. In fact, if the Vietnamese people really want their unification, they have to cooperate and need certain procedure. Generally speaking, [our] goals are not much different in principle.

There is one more point as the last. I am glad Premier made such a suggestion: it is the best to go through two steps. This first is a cease-fire, and the second is a political settlement. I fully agree because of the same reasons Premier said. For a genuine progress, the first step is to concentrate our attention and energy on cease-fire issue, including the determination of regrouping areas. This is a practical solution, it should be reached fast. I’d like to ask Premier, if you agree that we have many points in common?

There is another important point. Premier raised a concern about establishing American military bases. I fully agree on this point. I want to make it clear that we don’t intend to establish any American base in that region. We don’t have such plan.

Zhou Enlai: I’d like to explain regarding your points:

You had a very good answer to my last point. France has no intention to establish any American base. This is very good not only for the three countries, but also good for China, France, and Southeast Asia. All of us hope for a peaceful coexistence, and building a common foundation for the future.

You also said that the military and political solutions in Laos and Cambodia needed international supervision. Our opinions are the same at this point.
The situation in Vietnam is different and difficult. But I think the military and political principles can be reached first. The problem-solving should deal with the troop regrouping and cease-fire issues first, and then turn to the political settlement. There should be two steps, not one step. The length of each step depends on the effort of both sides, and requires discussions between the two sides. France bears more responsibilities for them to get closer, not confront. If the two sides refuse to make contact or refuse to talk to each other, it will slow down the cease-fire. I believe that you have found that the Chinese delegation is pushing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to approach not only France, but also the Bao Dai Vietnam. France may find it difficult to ask the Bao Dai government to make contact with the others. Prime Minister knows where the difficulty comes from. That is the situation. Mr. Chauvel even knows better.

Of course, if we want to satisfy the reasonable requests made by Laos and Cambodia, we should meet the reasonable requests in Vietnam made by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Therefore, the military meetings between both sides may reach an agreement easier.

**Mendès-France**: I don’t have a whole package of opinion. We have some opinion on some of the issues. Let me repeat this, it is a good thing if we can help to put the two Vietnamese governments together. The French Government really wants to use its influence to facilitate their cooperation. It is, however, very difficult. We just talked about the long-time war, a long period of division, so that it is difficult for them to get together psychologically and politically. But they need to follow this guideline in order to achieve some settlements. It is better for them to set up some kind of foundation for implementing cease-fire and troop regrouping. As you know, the negotiations between their military experts are still going. Even though it seems having no major problem, the direction of their meetings is unclear. If we know what the foundation is and an agreement can be based on it, it would be much easier for us to push Vietnam. So far the French-Vietnamese meetings haven’t yet made any important progress. Mr. Pham Van Dung made contact with Mr. Chaurel yesterday. Currently, the focus of the conference is on the military issues, but there is no much progress. I am returning Paris tonight and will meet General Ely. I will for sure discuss this issue with him in order to further instruct our military representatives here and push the negotiations forward. And, if the Vietnamese government could do the same and give new instructions, it would be very good and easy to reach an agreement. Could Premier use your influence over the Vietnamese government to do this like us and help us on this? Until the military experts can make progress in their negotiations, reach an agreement, and build a foundation, the diplomacy will certainly work.

I have one more point to say. If we go with the Vietnamese government’s proposal on 25 May suggesting to have two main regrouping areas, only the military experts can provide us a foundation for diplomatic discussions.

**Zhou Enlai**: To avoid misunderstanding, I’d like to explain one thing. I said the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Bao Dai government should establish their “contact,” not “cooperation.” Since both sides have engaged in the war for many years, it is impossible to talk about any cooperation. Our expectation is that France could influence Bao Dai and make his government to contact the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in order to reduce difficulties and leave no room for any external disruption. The negotiations on the troop regrouping should now enter the phase of discussing specific matters. My opinion is the same as Mr. Prime Minister regarding this issue. The current discussions should get into the specific matters. We know that the military representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam also intends to achieve early and positive results.

I am very glad to hear that Mr. Mendès-France is going to meet General Ely, commander-in-chief of the French expeditionary forces in Indochina, after returning to Paris, and that General Ely will give specific instructions to the French military representatives at Geneva. The agreement on the main regrouping areas by both sides will lay the foundation for further diplomatic negotiations. I agree with Mr. Prime Minister at this point. Regarding the main regrouping areas, I’d like to know whether Mr. Prime Minister has any specific idea. If no decided point, don’t have to talk about this issue right now.

**Mendès-France**: To avoid any misunderstanding, I’d also like to make an explanation. When I said the “cooperation,” I meant using “cooperative” methods to solve the problems.

I agree with Premier Zhou Enlai’s point. We really hope that the military staff meetings can move into practical phase fast, and that the Vietnamese representatives will receive their new and clear instructions from their high command. The determination of the main regrouping areas can be used as the foundation for diplomatic negotiations. It seems that the main regrouping areas can be decided pretty soon. Regarding the particular idea on the main regrouping areas, I can’t make any suggestion right now, because I don’t know how the military staff negotiations go. They are planning to draw an across line from west to east. The line, however, proposed by the Vietnamese staff is over the south much more than the real situation. Our experts, who knew the field situation, have noticed all the points proposed by the Vietnamese on 25 May. I think it possible for them to provide a result for further diplomatic negotiations. Another evidence is that the negotiations on supervision currently is on its practical methods. We think that, if the objectives of supervision are known particularly, the problem of supervision could be solved easily. Thus, we should push the negotiations on the
regrouping forward and fast in order to advance the discussions on the supervisory issues.

Zhou Enlai: That's right. We should solve the problem of the regrouping areas first. I have noticed Mr. Prime Minister's stand on these issues. We believe that, after the military staff of both sides detail their discussions, the supervisory problem will be solved easily. I have exchanged my opinion on this issue with Mr. Eden. He agrees with my opinion.

Our current efforts should help [the military staff of] both sides to reach an agreement soon, achieving a result within three weeks. This result will bring both belligerent sides their glorious peace, and realize the desirability of the people of France, Vietnam, and the world. All the foreign minister can return to Geneva earlier.

Mendès-France: The three weeks should be the maximum time. During this period, as soon as the military representatives of both sides reach their agreement, they should inform their delegations. Therefore, there will be a few days for the foreign ministers to return to the conference.

Zhou Enlai: The sooner, the better. After my departure, Mr. Li Kenong, our vice minister of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, will be in charge here. I hope that Mr. Chauvel will continue the communication with Mr. Li Kenong. I am very glad to meet Mr. Prime Minister. I really appreciate you are willing to spend time in Bern.

Mendès-France: This is for our common task for peace.

Zhou Enlai: Mr. Mendès-France said at the Parliament that everything is for peace and friendship. We fully agree with this point.

Mendès-France: This is our first meeting. I hope we will have more contacts later on. I am really happy about this meeting. I'd like to express my appreciation here. Although I am very busy with many things since I have just organized my new cabinet, I really want to come here and meet you.

I have another practical question, that is, what we are going to tell the reporters. What do you think about this?

Zhou Enlai: Mr. Prime Minister can make a suggestion, please.

Mendès-France: I agree with a news release draft suggested by Mr. Chauvel: "We had a frank conversation on the issue of peace in Indochina, not a negotiation. This conversation may lead to our desirability that the Geneva Conference will achieve genuine progress." Seemingly, it can't be said too much beside this.

Zhou Enlai: It is good not saying too much.

Mendès-France: Hopefully, Mr. Li Kenong will contact Mr. Chauvel often later on.

Zhou Enlai: I have a wish. Within the next three weeks, if Mr. Mendès-France comes to Geneva or has other opportunities, I hope you can make a contact with Mr. Pham Van Dong, Head of the Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. We think it beneficial through such a direct contact.

Mendès-France: Mr. Chauvel already met Mr. Pham Van Dong yesterday. Mr. Chauvel told Mr. Pham Van Dong that I'd like to meet him. But it is unknown when and where the meeting can take place. It may depend on the progress of the conference. I agree that this kind of meeting is very important. I hope this meeting can come true.

Zhou Enlai: I will be happy to pass on Mr. Prime Minister's idea to Mr. Pham Van Dong. We hope that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and France can build a friendship on the foundation of peace.

Mendès-France: This is also our hope. Mr. Zhou Enlai is a senior and experienced Premier and Foreign Minister. I am a new and inexperienced Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. So there are too many things to be handled. But I will try my best to establish a friendly relationship between France and China, and between France and Vietnam.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation of the Meeting with [Phou] Sananikone, June 23, 1954

Records No: 206-Y0050

Chairman Mao, Comrade Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

[I] invited Foreign Minister Sananikone, head of the Laotian delegation, to come and meet with me on the 21st. Sananikone first stated that the Laotians came from the Tibetan plateau, and he had been to China himself. There are also a great number of overseas Chinese merchants in Laos. I said that the peoples of the East are all somehow related. Therefore, we should expect each other’s independence, sovereignty and unification even more. Sananikone said: “Laos is a small country and has a very small population. We need peace more than any other country. France has [military] bases in Laos based on military agreements between France and Laos. However, there are very few French troops here and the number of them can be supervised by the supervision commission. If the Vietminh troops are to be withdrawn, we will ask the French troops to withdraw. We do not have direct aid from the United States. The aid that the United States provides to the French Union is through France. We will not need such aid any more after peace is restored. We hope to establish diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with China after peace is restored. It is not difficult to solve the political problems of Laos. People of the liberation movement can vote and organize a reconciliation government. If the parliament agrees, we can revise the constitution and even establish a republic after the elections. [Prince] Souphanouvong is the brother of the current prime minister. He does not want to overthrow the king. He only wants to join the government. Problems can be solved if we can discuss them directly.” I told the Laotian delegation: “we are trying our best to facilitate the rapprochement among the three countries. [We] respect the independence of the three countries and oppose the United States establishing [military] bases in these countries. We believe that it is understandable that Laos presented its needs for maintaining armed forces for its own defense. We respect other countries’ safety and independence ["]. I told him that they do not have to worry about their boarders, and that we are willing to join the guarantee by nine countries. I emphasized that the current French government wants peace, and Vietnam and Laos want peace as well. No one can prevent the realization of peace if the parties concerned demand it. I also warned him to be on the alert so that the Americans can not sabotage [the peace]. The Laotian delegation hoped to first reach an agreement on the military issues in Laos. I said that we will come to a conclusion in these three weeks and will wait to make a final decision until after the foreign ministers come back. The Laotian delegate expressed his appreciation for introducing him to Pham Van Dong directly.

Zhou Enlai
June 23, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
The substance of the conversation between M. Mendès-France and Mr. Chou En-lai at Berne was as follows.

M. Mendès-France said that Mr. Chou En-lai would of course realise the conditions in which his Government had been constituted. He would like to know what Mr. Chou En-lai's advice was as to what should now happen.

Mr. Chou En-lai said that the only objective which the Chinese Delegation was seeking was the re-establishment of peace in Indo-China. They had no conditions to lay down. Therefore they were opposed to the extension and to the internationalisation of the conflict. On the other hand they could not be threatened. China did not take any notice of threats but they would continue trying to get the two parties together.

The essential thing now was to arrive at an armistice. Obviously the military and political aspects were closely allied, but for the moment the military aspect was the most important; political questions could follow. All three countries of Indo-China needed an armistice. All three wanted independence and unity. As for China, she was ready to agree to the three countries remaining in the French Union if they so desired. All this would make for the re-establishment of good relations between France and China.

In Vietnam the armistice would have to be followed by free elections which would be necessary to effect the unification of the country. In Laos and Cambodia, on the other hand, the present royal Government could be recognised if that was what the people desired. China agreed with M. Bidault that Laos and Cambodia should take their places as new countries in South-East Asia in the same way exactly as India or Indonesia had been established as new countries. But it was essential that they should not become
bases for American aggression. China could not be disinterested in their future. He had already seen the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Laos and Cambodia and it seemed to him that both of them wanted to avoid anything which would cause them to come under American influence. Mr. Chou En-lai had encouraged them in this attitude and had also told them that they should maintain friendly relations with France once the independence of their countries was recognised.

Chou En-lai had also seen Mr. Pham Van Dong, who was also ready to recognise the sovereignty, the independence, and the unity of Cambodia and Laos.

The political situation, however, was different in the three countries concerned. In Vietnam there were actually two Governments in existence and it was very difficult to find a frontier between the zones which recognised the authority of one or the other. The elections would take place after the armistice and, though the Chinese would not intervene, they might be able to help the two sides to come to an agreement. The Vietminh Government would ask for nothing better, but it would be necessary for the Government of Bao Dai to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. It looked as if this Government wanted to dominate the whole of Indo-China. Bao Dai even appeared to wish to provoke an intervention by the United Nations. China obviously could not agree to this.

Equally, in Cambodia and Laos unity would have to come about as a result of elections. Both felt it would be necessary for the royal Governments at least to recognise the existence of national movements of resistance. Their reunification would depend on this.

Admittedly in Cambodia the resistance movement was less important than it was in Laos. But the Cambodian Government should all the same open up direct negotiations with those...
...who represented that movement. The solution of the political problem would therefore partly depend on international control, and particularly on the responsibility of the United Nations in the event of the situation assuring the unification of the country. But the problem cannot be solved without mối...
remained were by no means insoluble. On the other hand, it was evident that as regards matters of internal policy much would have to be left to the International Body of Control. The actual principles on which this body would act remained to be determined.

It was a fact that the Vietnam problem was a different and a more delicate problem. In that country the struggle had lasted a long time. One idea of Mr. Chou En-lai's which he thought was particularly happy was that many problems could be resolved by confronting the representatives of the two Governments concerned. No-one would under-estimate the difficulties, but the objective would certainly be the same on both sides, namely how best to accomplish the unity of the whole territory concerned. He for his part had no objection to this principle but they would have to consider the timetable. Appeasement could not come about immediately after a long war. For instance, the French Government could not agree to such a summary procedure as immediate elections. Unity was certainly necessary in principle; and as regards that principle he could only repeat that there was no disagreement at all.

He had been glad to hear that Mr. Chou En-lai made a distinction between the two stages - the armistice and a definite settlement. Progress now depended on our concentrating on problems arising out of the armistice. In other words, hostilities must stop. That in its turn raised the question of regrouping and this should be the main object in the immediate future. He would like to know whether Mr. Chou En-lai was in agreement on the principle of the establishment of wide areas of regroupment.

There was one other point which was most important. Mr. Chou En-lai had spoken of the possible creation of American bases in Laos and Cambodia. Here M. Mendès-France could say straight out that he agreed entirely with Mr. Chou En-lai's view.

/There
There was no question of creating such bases and the French Government had not the slightest intention of allowing them to be established.

Mr. Chou En-lai thanked M. Mendès-France for the good reply which he had made on this last point. The peoples of the three countries concerned, of China and of France, and the whole of South-East Asia, were happy that France was not disposed to agree to the establishment of American bases. That could be the common basis for any future conversations.

He was also in agreement as to the necessity of an international control body for the solution of the military problem in Laos and Cambodia. In Vietnam the situation was different, and more difficult. It was important to reach agreement of principle on the military aspects of the problem. In practice that would mean finding regrouping areas and stopping hostilities. The study of political questions would follow. Therefore they were agreed in contemplating two stages, the length of which would depend on the events of the respective parties. There were certainly two Governments in Vietnam but France should help to bring them together and not to bring them apart. One of the obstacles to a conclusion of an armistice was that they did not speak to each other.

He thought that M. Mendès-France should recognise that the Chinese delegation were doing their best to urge the Vietminh Government to bring together not only the Vietminh Government and the French Government, but also the Vietminh Government and the Vietnam Government of Bao Dai. Admittedly that was more difficult. Where did this difficulty come from? M. Chauvel could tell M. Mendès-France if he did not know already.

If satisfaction was to be given to the reasonable desires of the Governments of Cambodge and Laos, so also should satisfaction be given to the reasonable desires of the Vietminh Governments. By this means it should be easy to arrive at an agreement.

/M. Mendès-France
M. Mendès-France replied that the French Government would do their best to get the two Governments in Vietnam together, but there would be great difficulties in the way. Much would depend on whether he could tell the Vietnam Government on what precise basis an agreement for the regrouping of troops and cease-fire would be accomplished. It would indeed be more easy to intervene with the Vietnam Government if the French Government knew what precise proposals would remain by the other side. Could Mr. Chou En-lai see to it that such proposals were made in the military talks which were taking place in Geneva?

Mr. Chou En-lai said that we must avoid all misunderstanding. There could be no question as yet of a rapprochement or cooperation between the two sides in Vietnam; all that could be possible at the moment was contacts. He hoped that France would encourage these contacts and that France would exercise her influence in order to get the two sides together without foreign intervention. As regards military discussions, these should become more concrete and he thought that the Vietminh delegation at any rate wanted to get quick results.

Finally, he was happy to know that after having seen General Bly M. Mendès-France would send instructions to the French military representatives. The Chinese Government would like the two parties to establish the main regrouping areas so as to provide a basis for diplomatic negotiations.

/M. Mendès-France
M. Mendès-France said that when he talked about co-operation he was clearly only thinking of co-operation in respect of immediate problems such as a cease-fire. That was the first stage which had to be overcome and it was essential if the military talks were going to make any progress for the Viet Minh delegation to have instructions which were just as precise as those of the French delegation. In particular the regroupment areas should be the basis of the military talks. Therefore it was essential to establish the main lines of these areas. For instance, a horizontal partition had been contemplated and it seemed that the representative of the Viet Minh thought that this horizontal line should be established far more to the south than was justified by the actual situation.

It would be easier to establish the control when agreement had been arrived at on the areas themselves.

Mr. Chou-en-Lai said that that was his opinion too and also that of Mr. Eden. When the areas had been fixed, all the rest would be much easier. At the moment what they wanted was a military agreement within 3 weeks, which would result in an honourable peace. When this agreement had been arrived at the Ministers for Foreign Affairs could come back to Geneva.

M. Mendès-France said that he thought that 3 weeks should be considered as a maximum period. After the military agreement had been arrived at he would have to have time to approach the other parties to the dispute.

Subsequently Mr. Chou-en-Lai said that he would like M. Mendès-France to have a meeting with the representative of the Viet Minh.

M. Mendès-France said in conclusion that M. Chauvel had the day before seen Mr. Pham Van Dongh, who had expressed the hope that he would meet with M. Mendès-France himself. He would have to think about this and if it took place, it would obviously be an important meeting.

GLADWYN JEBB.
In these conditions, I ask Your Excellency kindly to contemplate the possibility of letting me know to what extent Cambodia might hope for future assistance from the United States of America for the defense of its security. This would permit me to define the position of my delegation at the time of forthcoming bilateral conversations with the Viet Minh.

As soon as I have precise assurances from the Government of the United States of America, my delegation will firmly define its position without fear of letting escape the chances of peace, temporary or illusory though it may be, offered by the Communist negotiations.

JOHNSON

JUNE 24, 1954

SECRET


Laotian delegation met with Pham Van Dong, Viet Minh delegate, alone this afternoon in garden of Chinese delegation’s villa.

Dong was very “amicable”. He seems to agree that Viet Minh forces should be withdrawn and disposed of, that French must keep treaty with the United States, that no military bases be maintained, that French personnel must be reduced to a minimum figure which would be fixed by the talks. The Laotians answered negatively not considering the Military Assistance Agreement of 1950 (Pacific-Soviet) to fall in that category. Laotian delegate agreed to ask the Laotian Premier, Souvanna Phouma, to meet with his half brother, Phoumavong, leader of the Free Laos Movement, in the near future. Dong then suggested, without insistence, that the Laotian Government might give some government jobs to members of the “Free Laos Movement”. Thus creating a government of “neutral union” in the next elections, the latter could present their candidates for the Laotian Assembly. Then Dong mentioned vaguely that some sort of a “temporary arrangement” might be made for administration of those regions where the Free Laos Movement Military Forces were located. This suggestion worries the Laotian delegation.

After the talk with Dong, Ourou Soumavong, Laotian Minister to Washington, had a talk with Tran Cong Tuong, member and translator of Viet Minh delegation. They had attended school together in Saigon. Tuong referred to the execution of a former fellow-schoolmate, saying that he had been a non-Communist nationalist member of Viet Minh and no obstacle could stop the Communist domination of movement. Tuong also said that he was in Saigon the Laotian Government would find that the Laotian Resistance Movement was much stronger and better implanted than in Vientiane.

Ouro Soumavong agreed with suggestion that it would be well for the Laotian delegation to make no major commitments to the Viet Minh until they saw where his latter’s proposals were leading. He said he would keep the American delegation fully and promptly informed of developments.

JOHNSON

JUNE 24, 1954

SECRET


Following account of Mendes-France-Chou En-lai interview yesterday at Bern was given Bonsai by Roux who was present. Chauvel who returned to Paris with Mendes-France, plans to furnish written summary to US and British Ambassadors Paris this morning.

Mendes-France had with him Chauvel, Roux, Col. Guillermu and an interpreter. Chou En-lai was accompanied by Li Ko Nung [Li Ke-nung] (Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs), by Director of European Affairs and two others plus an interpreter. Conversation cordial in tone. There was no mention at any time of Franco-Chinese relations or of recognition by France of Chinese Communist Government. Chou En-lai carefully avoided giving impression he considered new French policy in making and he referred several times to earlier interviews with Bidault.

Chou En-lai stated military aspects must be disposed of before other aspects can be taken up. A cessation of hostilities is primary goal. Chou En-lai hopes Ministers can return to Geneva as soon as possible to pass on recommendations of military representatives for all three countries.

With regard to Laos and Cambodia, although Chou En-lai stated there would have to be regrouping areas for national resistance forces, he said this could be handled by international commissions and that in any case governing thought should be that of re-establishing unity of Laos and Cambodia. If those countries truly support their present royal governments, that is their affair. A suitable place in national life must however be found for resistance elements.

Chou En-lai referred to dinner he had given for delegates of Laos, Cambodia and Viet Minh, stating that they had all spoken French.
He spoke sympathetically of French Union. He added that there could be no American bases in Laos and Cambodia but was not violent on this point. There was no specific discussion of present French Union bases. Chou En-lai said that Chinese attitude on these matters would not be altered by threats to which Chinese would not yield. At same time he emphasized reasonable nature of Chinese position.

With regard to Vietnam, Chou En-lai stated that just as Laos and Cambodia had established contact with Viet Minh, there should be similar contacts between Vietnam and Viet Minh Government. He suggested that French authorities could persuade Vietnamese Government to engage in these contacts. He criticized Bao Dai's position on this subject as having been too intransigent.

Mendes-France then said that in order to be able to influence Vietnamese, French must know what Viet Minh have in mind in connection with military settlement. He said he was seeing General Ely June 24 and would see that French military delegates have precise instructions. Chou En-lai rejoined that he was glad to hear this and that he would try to see that Viet Minh also have instructions. He repeated that within period of three weeks provided by conference resolution, there must be progress which would permit Ministers to return to Geneva.

Chou En-lai made no reply to Mendes-France remarks that Viet Minh claims in military field seemed excessive.

With re to military regrouping of zones, there was no specific exchange of ideas. There was no mention of status of Tonkin, for example.

With re to problem of international control, Chou En-lai took position that this could not really be settled until after agreed military dispositions become apparent. It will then become clear just what the task of control will be.

Roux informed us that Mendes-France is seeing Ngo Dinh Diem this morning and will presumably report to him on conversations. French here are doing likewise with Laotian, Cambodian and Vietnamese delegates.

JOHNSON

396.1 GE/5-3451 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 24, 1954—2 p.m.

Secto 516. Repeated information of Paris 492, Saigon 206, Phnom Penh unnumbered. Re Secto 510, 513, June 23, Suggest Heath might be authorized orally to state to Cambodian Foreign Minister that the US is at present disposed to increase the deliveries of equipment for Cambodian regular forces which have been provided under terms of the Pentalateral Convention of 1950. It is also at present disposed to provide some military equipment for local defense units (auto defense). The kind and amount of military equipment to be provided would be discussed in the first instance by Cambodian defense authorities with the Chief of Military Assistance Advisory Group established under the authority of the Pentalateral Convention. Whether US military equipment would be furnished directly by US or at present through the French High Command in accordance with terms of the convention would be decided later. In this connection it has been the view of the MAAG that the development of the Cambodian defense forces to date has not provided a logistic branch sufficient to meet the requirements of American legislation and regulations or reception, transportation, maintenance and inspection of military equipment furnished.

It is noted that France has heretofore also provided both equipment and budgetary support for the Royal Khmer Army and is presumably prepared to continue such assistance. As regards military advisory, technical and training personnel it is noted France is also contributing such personnel and it is our understanding is prepared to continue to do so.

It is noted, however, that the Cambodian delegation, in the restricted session of the Geneva Conference on June 19, stated, "the Cambodian delegation would be ready, as proposed by the Chinese delegation, to engage in special negotiations on the question of the introduction of certain personnel into our territory"; and on June 4 it stated, "it might also be agreed, in connection with the control of the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces, that the relevant control authority would see to it that what is imported into Cambodia in the way of equipment, cadres, etc., would be elements strictly necessary for the Cambodian National Army for its own defense."

We note these statements with some concern as possibly indicating that the size, character and equipment and the members of foreign technical and training personnel for the Cambodian Armed Forces would be negotiated with member states of the Geneva Conference and determined by such negotiations.

In conclusion the Foreign Minister might be informed, in compliance with Tosec 465, June 23, that in the past we have been most favorably impressed with consistency and firmness of position maintained at conference, that withdrawal Viet Minh troops in Cambodia...
SECRET
FROM PARIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WHITEHALL SECRET
(CABINET) DISTRIBUTION

D. 1.52 p.m., June 24, 1954
Mr. Reilly
No. 440
June 24, 1954
R. 2.16 p.m., June 24, 1954

EMERGENCY
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 440 of June 24
Repeated for information to Washington, Codel Geneva, Peking, Saigon, New Delhi

Codel Geneva telegram No. 1613, repeated to Codel Geneva telegram
No. 837 to Foreign Office of June 22: Meeting Between M. Mendès-France
and Chou En-lai.

La Tournelle this morning read me extracts from account of interview
which is being telegraphed to the French Embassy for your information.
Following are main points,

1. Chou En-lai began with assurance that his Government's sole
aim was peace in Indo-China. They had no other ambition and imposed
no conditions. They would not yield to external or internal pressure
and they refused to be the object of threats or provocation. (La Tournelle
interpreted this last remark as an indirect reference to South East
Asia Defence Pact, which was not otherwise mentioned.)

2. Chou En-lai continued that it was essential to arrange an armistice
soon. Military and political aspects of problem were closely linked, but
military aspect should be tackled now and political aspect subsequently
(i.e., after armistice). His Government agreed that three countries of
Indo-China should remain in French Union and thought this would contribute
to friendly and peaceful relations between China and France.

3. Position differed in the three countries. People of Viet Nam must
work out a régime for themselves and should therefore have early elections
which would bring unity to their country. His Government could recognise
Royal Governments of Laos and Cambodia if their peoples wished to
retain them. He hoped that these two countries would take their place
among the new countries of South East Asia, like India and Indonesia. It
was, of course, essential that there should be no American bases in them.
He had encouraged their Foreign Ministers to maintain friendly relations
with France. M. Pham Van Dong was ready to recognize their
independence and sovereignty.

5. In Viet Nam the position was made much more difficult by existence
of two governments. Bao Dai must be more conciliatory. He wished to
secure United Nations intervention in order to establish his own domination
of all Indo-China. This the Chinese Government could not accept.

6. Chou En-lai made it clear that he expected that there would be
elections in Cambodia and Laos as well as in Viet Nam. Both Governments
must also recognize existence of resistance movements in their countries
and be ready to negotiate with them. He admitted, however, that
/movement
movement in Cambodia was less important than that in Laos. In Laos there must be military negotiations to establish "zones de désarmement". All foreign forces must be withdrawn from Cambodia and Laos. (La Tournelle did not understand this to mean that Cheu En-lai objected to presence of French forces in Laos under France-Lao agreement. Cheu En-lai did not refer to this point on this occasion but had previously at Geneva accepted the agreement). Most of the Viet Minh forces had already left Laos. Rest would go after armistice.

7. Concluding his opening statement Cheu En-lai said that for Viet Nam agreement had been reached in principle on the military plane. Direct negotiations between France and Viet Minh were, however, necessary in order to hasten full agreement.

8. M. Mendès-France expressed great interest in this statement. He thought that Cambodia and Laos presented no insurmountable difficulties but Viet Nam was much more difficult. Their first aim must be to secure the unity of Viet Nam. But after so long a war it was impossible in a short time to achieve the peaceful atmosphere necessary for elections. (La Tournelle commented that M. Mendès-France was strongly opposed to early elections which would certainly be won by Viet Minh). M. Mendès-France said that he had therefore been glad to note Cheu En-lai's distinction between armistice and the definitive political settlement. Immediate objective must be an armistice and regrouping of forces. He assured Cheu En-lai that there could be no question of American bases in Laos or Cambodia.

9. Cheu En-lai said that this assurance was very important in view of the need for international supervision of Laos and Cambodia. He agreed that in Viet Nam first step was to define regrouping zones in order to stop fighting. His Government were urging Viet Minh to get together with Bao Dai.

10. M. Mendès-France agreed that such direct negotiation was necessary. It would be easier to arrange if precise basis of an agreement on regrouping could be agreed. Contacts at Geneva had not so far been very fruitful. He added that he would send new instructions to French delegation after consulting General Pfla.

11. Cheu En-lai again confirmed that first objective was to agree on limits of regrouping zones and he referred to your insistence on this point. The rest should then be easy. Agreement must be reached within three weeks and he hoped it would ensure an honourable peace for both sides. Foreign ministers could then reassemble at Geneva. M. Mendès-France said that three weeks was the outside limit. Cheu En-lai asked M. Mendès-France to meet Pham Van Dong at Geneva or elsewhere. M. Mendès-France replied that M. Chauvel had already seen him. Whether he could meet him himself would depend on further course of negotiations, but he would like to do so.

12. Commenting briefly on discussion, La Tournelle said that he thought M. Mendès-France's general impression was favourable. Point which stood out was Cheu En-lai's fear of American bases in Laos and Cambodia. La Tournelle thought there was fair chance of Mendès-France winning his bet with French Foreign by obtaining armistice in next three weeks. Viet Minh had already agreed that French should keep a regrouping zone in Tengking which would include Hanoi so there was no immediate question of evacuation of the Delta. French were however still trying to extend their zone in Tengking to include
SECRET

Paris telegram No. 440 to Foreign Office

-3-

to include as much of the Delta as possible. Whether they could hope to keep any of Touki in eventual political settlement was another matter. Appointment of new Viet Namee Prime Minister would make surrender of all the Delta still more difficult since as a Catholic he drew much of his personal support from that area.

Foreign Office please repeat /Immediate/ Washington, Codel Geneva and Priorly/ Peking, Saigon, New Delhi as my telegrams Nos. 217, 102, 3, 39 and 1.

Copy sent to C.R.O. for repetition to New Delhi/.

ADVANCE COPY

Sir L. Kirkpatrick
Minister of State
Private Secretary
Mr. W. D. Allen
Mr. Spaight
Head of South East Asia
Department
Head of Far Eastern Department
Head of Western and Southern
Department

PPPP
is only problem regarding them which concerns the Geneva Conference and we feel we must warn the Cambodian delegation against making any commitments to Communist bloc which might compromise present defense or hinder participation in future defense arrangements.

JOHNSON

[Image 2x7066 to 610x7864]

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Day)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1954.

Subject: Geneva Conference

Participants: His Excellency Nong Kimny, Ambassador of Cambodia
Mr. Everett Drumright, FE
Mr. Henry B. Day, PSA

Nong Kimny had just returned by air from Geneva via Paris. He called to resume contact with the Department. He expressed appreciation of the support which the U.S. Delegation had given the Cambodian Delegation at Geneva.

Mr. Drumright exchanged current items of information with the Ambassador mentioning in particular the talks which Chou and Pham Van Dong had been having with the Lao and Cambodian delegations. These had taken place after Nong Kimny left Geneva. Mr. Drumright referred to the possibility that the Communists might agree to withdrawal of Viet Minh troops from Cambodia provided Cambodia agreed not to permit foreign bases on its soil or any foreign military personnel and to receive only very limited supplies of arms. Mr. Drumright informed the Ambassador that the Department had just received a message concerning a note from the Cambodian Foreign Minister to Mr. Ifeseth at Geneva which (a) pointed out that it would be unreasonable for Cambodia to refuse to accept conditions which the Communists asked if Cambodia could not expect to receive assistance in personnel and armament and therefore the conditions were in fact to be fulfilled and (b) asked to what extent Cambodia might hope for help from the U.S. in maintaining its security. The Ambassador said this note was fully consistent with the position Cambodia had taken from the beginning.

The Ambassador said that when he left Geneva at the end of the Korean phase he thought the Indochina phase would also come to a quick close. It was only then that the Communists adopted a more conciliatory tone and made overtures to Laos and Cambodia.

The Ambassador said he wished to make clear that his Government was determined to resist Communist encroachment but that Cambodia's resources were insufficient to enable it to withstand Communist pressures alone. His Government attaches great importance to action on regional defense and favors conclusion on agreement or pact as soon as possible. The second matter he wished to say was that his Government considered it important to learn the results of the Churchill-Eden visit. He had the impression that the UK Government desires to postpone action on regional defense and fears that the British may wish to postpone action indefinitely. The Cambodian Government would not mind postponement for two or three weeks if that is the duration of the life of the Geneva Conference but is strongly opposed to letting the matter die. The Ambassador recognized that the British might want some sort of Locarno-type pact. Whatever resulted it would be essential to have some sort of collective guarantee. With regard to action in the UN, the Ambassador said that the way had already been paved and that he was fully prepared to take further action in the UN.

The Ambassador referred to Menon's visit to Geneva. Menon's ideas seemed vague and cloudy. Until just before Menon had left Geneva he had called on all of the delegations at the conference except those of the countries principally concerned, namely, Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia. The Cambodian Delegation issued a communiqué pointing this out after which Menon announced that he would call on the delegations of the Associated States before leaving Geneva. Menon did call on Tep Phann, the Cambodian Foreign Minister, but nothing came of it. The possibility of recognition did not come up.

Nong Kimny expressed the belief that military talks between the Cambodian and Viet Minh Commissars should take place in Cambodia, that the Cambodians would not discuss anything with the so-called free Khmers. He understood that there were two representatives of this movement behind the scenes at Geneva. The Ambassador was surprised that Defense Minister Tioulong had planned to go to Geneva for military talks.

With regard to the plans of the King of Cambodia, the Ambassador thinks that the present time is not good for such a long trip as the King proposes. He himself was to have accompanied the King on the trip but persuaded his Government that it was more important to return to duty in Washington. The King has a definite commitment to visit Thailand but may give up for the present his plan to visit other countries.

1 For documentation on Prime Minister Churchill's visit, June 25-26, 1954, see volume XV.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Regarding the banquet with the Laotian and Cambodian delegations and Pham Van Dong, June 24, 1954

Record No.: 206-Y0050

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

On the evening of the 21st, I invited three representatives from Laos, four representatives from Cambodia, and Comrades Pham Van Dong, Hoang Van Hoan and Ta Quang Buu to a banquet. After I introduced them, the [guests of] the three countries began talking in French, and they exchanged the experience in the past and the whereabouts of [former] schoolmates. During the banquet, toasts were proposed to peace among the three countries and to the friendship among the four countries. We then freely discussed the conference and the situation in our respective countries. The Laotian and Cambodian delegates also thought that direct contact was conducive to the progress of the conference, and they agreed to contact each other directly in the future. After the meal, I invited them to watch the movie “The Butterfly Lovers.” In addition to praising the movie, they also said that the movie was of the taste of the East, which made them feel home-sick. At the session of the 22nd, the attitudes of the representatives of Laos and Cambodian changed significantly. On the 23rd and the 24th, Comrade Pham Van Dong met with the representatives of Laos and Cambodia at my place.

Zhou Enlai
June 24, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.

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15 Vice minister of defense of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, member of the DRV delegation, and head of the DRV military delegation.
Extract from protocol No. 6 of the meeting of the Soviet Union Communist Party
Central Committee Plenum

Meeting of 26 June 1954

Chairman comr. KHRUSHCHEV. Let's continue the work of the Plenum. The floor is given to comr. Molotov.
Following comr. Molotov's speech:
Chairman comr. KHRUSHCHEV. The CC Presidium had no intentions to propose some kind of a resolution regarding comr. Molotov's speech, since the Geneva conference has not been concluded.
There is a proposal to include comr. Molotov's speech in the record.
Any objections? (Voices - no). Comr. Molotov's speech is included in the record.

SECRETARY of CC
[attachment]

To comr. N.S. Khrushchev
Copy Top Secret
CC CPSU
I submit the draft of my speech to the CC CPSU Plenum on the results of the Geneva conference.

V. MOLOTOV
24 June 1954
No. 439/M
Sent to the members of CC CPSU Presidium

Verified: [signature]

P[filing] 12 copies to
180
ON THE RESULTS OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

The Geneva conference of foreign ministers was convened on the basis of the decision of the [Jan-Feb 1954] Berlin conference. This conference is devoted to two issues: the problem of Korea and the re-establishment of peace in Indo-China. The Geneva conference began on 26 April. The period to 19 June could be regarded as its first phase.

At the present time, the Geneva conference is continuing its work on the issue of Indo-China. During the foreign ministers' temporary absence, they are being represented by empowered representatives of the respective governments. It is presumed that the current phase of the Geneva conference will continue for perhaps another 3 weeks or slightly longer, after which the Geneva conference will be resumed with the participation of the foreign ministers themselves.

While the Berlin conference was primarily occupied with European issues, in particular the German question and the agreement with Austria, the Geneva conference is devoted to Asian issues. It is clearly clear that both the issue of Korea and the re-establishment of peace in Indo-China are among the most compelling problems facing Asia.

For the first time, the People's Republic of China has taken part in a major international conference. Its participation in the discussion of the compelling problems facing Asia is clearly understandable and necessary. Even the government of the United States of America had to recognize this, despite its hostile policy toward people's democratic China.

At the Geneva conference, the People's Republic of China has finally taken its rightful place as one of the five great powers. This is apparent even from the fact that only the great powers, including the People's Republic of China, participated in the discussion of both issues at the Geneva conference, while all the other countries participated in the discussion of only one of the issues under examination.

On this occasion China has stepped out into the international arena with a consistently democratic position and, moreover, with unprecedented authority. We speak of this with particular satisfaction, since the People's Republic of China is a great friend and ally of our country. We see in this a significant achievement and victory for the entire democratic camp, headed by the Soviet Union.

We regard the significance of the Geneva conference of foreign ministers as a step toward resolving the tensions in international relations. The Soviet government insisted and continues to insist that the importance of the Geneva conference, like the Berlin conference, will depend on whether its results help relax the tensions in international relations. In addition, we see in the settlement of international disputes the resolution to the question of relaxing tensions in the international situation in a manner which would correspond to the interests of all peoples and in the interests of strengthening universal peace.

The Geneva conference, like its Berlin counterpart, is perceived differently by the ruling circles in USA, who conduct their foreign policy "from the position of strength." They are interested not in settling unresolved international issues in the interests of strengthening peace and relaxing international tensions, but in implementing their aggressive aspirations. In this case, this pertains to Asian issues as well. In this regard, it does not hurt to recall how the question of convening the Geneva conference was discussed in Berlin.

In the opening proposal, proffered by [John Foster] Dulles at the Berlin conference, the possibility of the People's Republic of China participating in the discussion of the Indo-China question was accompanied by completely unacceptable preconditions. In Dulles's draft of 8 February [1954] the following wording was proposed: "As soon as the actions of the People's Republic of China at the political conference on Korea and Southeast Asia demonstrate its peaceful intentions, the representative of the four powers (USA, England, France, and USSR) will determine by way of mutual agreement the conditions for convening another conference, devoted to re-establishing peace in Indo-China."

Thus, in Dulles's proposal the possibility of the People's Republic of China participating in the discussion of the Indo-China question at the conference of foreign ministers was accompanied with two preconditions. PRC, as it were, had to "prove" beforehand its peaceful intentions both in the question of Korea and in Southeast Asia. These proposals were one of the manifestations of the "policy of strength," which was being conducted by the USA government. Obviously, these proposals of Dulles were rejected by the Soviet delegation at the Berlin conference. As a result, following numerous discussions, on 19 February the Berlin communiqué was published, which did not include preconditions on the part of the People's Republic of China's participation at the Geneva conference. Moreover, the Berlin communiqué essentially placed the People's Republic of China on an equal footing with the other four great powers at the Geneva conference.

The USA government was forced to agree to convene the Geneva conference by the fact that even they could not ignore the presence of strong feelings within broad democratic circles favoring for a relaxation of tension in international relations. This USA position at the same time corresponded with its desire to lend support to the French government of Laniel-Bidault, which was conducting an unconditional policy directed at the establishment of the "European Defense Community."

However, having agreed to participate in the Geneva conference, the USA government undertook a number of steps to exert pressure on the participants of the Geneva conference and, above all, on the government policies of England and France. About a month before the opening of the Geneva conference, the USA government launched a special campaign of slander against the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in connection with the situation in Southeast Asia, where the situation of the colonial countries had clearly deteriorated. This was yet another attempt to scare the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China with all kinds of threats and force the capitulation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

On 29 March, as a means of explaining the USA policy, Dulles gave a speech on the subject "Problems of the Far-East." In this speech he emphasized the important strategic and economic significance of Indo-China and portrayed the situation in such light as though "Moscow" and "Peking" are trying to take over Indo-China by way of Ho Chi Minh. With this, a several weeks-long campaign of increased slander was launched against USSR and the People's Republic of China with regard to the situation in Indo-China. During this speech Dulles declared: "Under the current circumstances, the important
of any manner of political system in Southeast Asia by communist Russia and its Chinese communist ally would create a serious threat to the entire free community. The USA believes that one must not passively agree to this eventually, and that it must be responded to with united action."

From this point, the USA government began to undertake various types of measures in order to try to establish a plan of "united action" by the colonial governments in Southeast Asia.

For this purpose, in early April, Dulles traveled to London and Paris with the intent of forcing the creation of a military bloc of aggressive governments in Southeast Asia. He announced that this trip to London and Paris represents a "peace mission on the basis of strength." It is impossible not to see in these steps by the USA government an attempt to present the Geneva conference with a fait accompli -- with a united front of colonial governments headed by the USA -- in order to obstruct the settlement of the Indo-China question on a basis acceptable to the people of Indo-China.

Even before the Geneva conference or during the time of this Conference, the USA government made attempts to establish, under the pretext of so-called "united action" in Southeast Asia, the so-called union of Southeast Asian countries with the participation of France and England. However, these attempts did not prove successful, as neither France nor England would agree to make a decision on this question without having first witnessed the results of the Geneva conference in Indo-China. The enactment of such a plan caused concern, especially in England, that this would lead to further escalation in the people's liberation struggle in the country of Indo-China, which could no longer be ignored by the government of France or, for that matter, the government of England, which also had a substantial stake in a peaceful settlement of the situation in Indo-China.

Finally, it is known that right on the eve of the Geneva conference, the official USA representatives attempted to reach an agreement with England in order to jointly intervene in the military actions in Indo-China and thus as particular these difficulties in Dien Bien Phu. But these attempts were also fruitless.

Given these facts, it is becoming clear that the USA government's agreement to participate in the Geneva conference was only a necessary concession to the French and English positions on this question. Its calculations with regard to Indo-China were by no means based on a desire to reach an agreement on Indo-China at the Geneva conference.

One cannot explain the coincidence of the fact that after the first few days of the Geneva conference, Secretary of State Dulles left Geneva, leaving his deputy in his place, with this the USA government undermined its attitude toward the Geneva conference, as well as the Geneva conference's lack of confidence in the USA government's "policy of strength," which exhibits the aggressive inclinations among certain USA circles and their negative attitude toward settling disputed issues on the basis of negotiations and international agreements. On the other hand, we have reason to assume that this step was not supported by England or France and therefore, as far as can be determined, remained an isolated act on the part of the USA.

This, then, was the situation at the opening of the Conference in Geneva.

Let me shift to the question of Korea, with which the Geneva conference began. In accordance with the armistice agreement in Korea, within three months of its signing, a political conference was to be convened for the purpose of resolving through negotiation issues pertaining to peaceful settlement of the entire question of Korea, including the question of the unification of North and South Korea into a single Korean state. However, the political conference on the question of Korea could not take place in light of the position taken by the USA representatives to hold preliminary negotiations in Panmunjom. In particular, they insisted that the USSR should be represented at this conference as one of the war parties, despite the whole absurdity of this position.

At the Berlin conference, a decision was adopted to examine the question of a peaceful settlement in Korea by representatives of USSR, USA, France, Great Britain, People's Republic of China, as well as other interested states at the Geneva conference. However, as demonstrated by the facts, this was not an expression of the USA and its satellite states' yearning for a settlement of the Korean question.

Even in Berlin, during separate meetings, Dulles had clearly stated that he sees no possibility to settle the Korean question at this time. He directly stated that he understands the position of USSR and PRC, which under these circumstances cannot allow in any influence on North Korea, while, on the other hand, he also stated that USA cannot allow any influence on South Korea. It was clear from these statements by Dulles that he is by no means troubled by the national interests of the Korean people, and that his primary objective in Korea was securing USA strategic and other interests in this region.

The discussion of the Korean question at the Geneva conference gave the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, as well as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the opportunity to launch a concrete program for the national unification of Korea. On the whole, the program of national unification of Korea proposed by the People's Democratic Republic of Korea consisted of the following:

First, it required holding all-Korean elections under the conditions of free self-expression by the entire Korean population. Furthermore, it stipulated that this question must be resolved by the Koreans themselves through an agreement between North and South Korea, for the purpose of which an appropriate all-Korean commission needed to be established with representatives from both parts of Korea. In addition, taking into account the three-year-long war in Korea and the resulting deterioration in relations between both parts of Korea, it was deemed advisable to hold all-Korean elections under international observation by an appropriate commission of neutral states.

Second, the PDKP proposed stipulated a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea over a specific time period. Moreover, this withdrawal of foreign troops must precede the all-Korean elections, as this is one of the most important conditions for ensuring the actual freedom of these elections.

Third, the PDKP proposals also stipulated that countries particularly interested in insuring peace in the Far East accept the responsibility of providing for further peaceful development of Korea. Such an agreement between the countries must preclude any attempts to violate the peace and begin a new war in Korea. To this end, our government declared the Soviet Union's and other countries' readiness to take part in fulfilling this objective and take upon themselves the responsibilities of ensuring a
peaceful development of Korea.

These fundamental points constitute the program for national reunification of Korea, advocated by the delegations of PDRK, PRC, and USSR. There can be no doubt that this program corresponds to the interests of the Korean people and, furthermore, the interests of strengthening peace in the Far East.

These proposals were rejected by the representatives of the countries participating in the agreement war in Korea under the flag of the United Nations Organization. This took place under obvious pressure from the USA.

The greatest objection was raised in the PDRK proposal to establish an all-Korean commission to prepare and conduct all-Korean elections for the National Assembly of Korea and to enact provisions directed at closing the economic and cultural gap between North and South Korea. In addition, the proposal to transfer the all-Korean commission to the authority to decide questions agreed upon by both sides was also called into question. However, to reject the necessity for such an agreement is to reject the very possibility of uniting North and South Korea on a democratic footing and to go instead in the direction of futile attempts to force the will of one side upon the other.

In opposition to this democratic program for the reunification of Korea, a proposal was put forward to hold all-Korean elections under the aegis of the United Nations Organization. However, this didn't even take into consideration that a three-year-long war has already been waged against the People's Democratic Republic of Korea under the flag of the United Nations Organization, and therefore the United Nations Organization can by no means assume the role of a disinterested organization. This proposal exhibits attempts to impose on North Korea the South Korean regime of Syngman Rhee, again, under the cover of the United Nations Organization flag, which emerged in the Korean conflict full dependence on the ruling circles in the United States of America.

In his speech on 28 April, Dulles said: "We do not need to devise a practical program for uniting Korea. It already exists. It was spelled out in the UN General Assembly resolution of 7 October 1957." In this declaration, Dulles directly referred to the illegal decision by the UN General Assembly, adopted during the height of the military assault against the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and intended to extend the South Korean regime of Syngman Rhee into North Korea.

Thus, yet another attempt was made at the Geneva conference to impose the South Korean semi-fascist regime upon North Korea, that is, an attempt was made to establish during the current peaceable conditions that which could not be accomplished through three years of war in Korea. Obviously, these attempts were decisively rejected at the Geneva conference by the People's Democratic Republic of Korea.

In accordance with the directives of the CC [Central Committee] of the Soviet delegates at the Geneva conference considered its responsibility not only to launch a program of national unification of Korea, but also to assist in further strengthening the peaceful nature of Korea's development. With these objectives in mind, the PDRK proposals to insure peaceful conditions in Korea were drafted and submitted for consideration at the Geneva conference on 15 June. On that same day, the USSR delegation submitted for consideration at the Geneva conference a short declaration on the Korean question. Since these two proposals did not receive the support of 16 other delegations, the delegation of the People's Republic of China, in accordance with the directives of our CC, submitted a proposal that the participating countries at the Geneva conference state their willingness to continue their efforts in the direction of reaching an agreement for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

This proposal was discussed during the concluding portion of the final Geneva conference meetings on the Korean question. The tenacious fight for the acceptance of this proposal, put up by the delegations of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, incurred some uncertainty among a number of the delegations of the opposing side. Readiness to accept this proposal was already expressed both by the Belgian representative (Paul Henri) Spaak, as well as by the current Conference chairman at the time, the English representative (Anthony) Eden, who even proposed to state that "it reflects the spirit of our Conference's work." However, even here objections were raised by the USA representative (Walter B. Smith), who announced at the last minute that he cannot accept this proposal. Thus, the direct interference of the USA delegation prevented the Conference from adopting a mutual statement on further action toward a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

What can one say of the results of the discussion of the Korean question at the Geneva conference?

This discussion demonstrated that the initiative to end negotiations on this question and the responsibility for refusing to accept any type of negotiated decisions lies squarely with the countries of the Anglo-American bloc. We must emphasize in front of international social opinion that the guilt for the collapse of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question at the Geneva conference is shared by these countries and, most of all, by the United States of America.

In addition, it is worth noting that the examination of the Korean issue during the Geneva conference to a great extent served to focus people's attention on solving the Korean problem. Our assignment is to ensure that the program for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, put forth by the countries of the democratic camp, permeates into the deepest minds of the Korean people and receives the greatest support possible from the people of other countries.

The struggle for a democratic resolution of the Korean question must not diminish. The Korean question awaits its resolution. The resolution of this question must be given the utmost support by the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and other countries of the democratic camp.

II

The discussion of the Indochina question has not yet been completed. One could even say that it is at this very moment that the discussion is entering the important stage. Thus, right now it is possible to speak only of the preliminary outcomes of the Geneva conference discussion of the Indochina question.

Indo-China is now in its eighth year of the national-liberation struggle against the French colonizers. The French government has already organized more than one
military campaign to destroy the national-liberation movement in all three countries of Indo-China: Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Beginning with last year, the so-called Navarre plan was being popularized in every possible way, with the aim of increasing military action by the French expeditionary force and creating a larger puppet government army. This military plan, created by General [Henri] Navarre, was given the approval not only by the French government, but also by the government of the USA, which during recent years has begun to interfere closely in military activities carried out in Indo-China.

However, the course of events in Indo-China is increasingly showing the futility of attempts at a military solution to the Indo-China problem. Indeed, right on the eve of the first day of the Geneva conference discussion of the Indo-China question, Dien Bien Phu fell to the hands of the forces of democratic Vietnam, which have been occupying it for the past few months. The defense of this city by French troops was given particularly high importance both by the governments of France and the USA.

One must also not forget that such an event as the fall of Dien Bien Phu in North Vietnam has given a new boost to the national-liberation movement in Vietnam, which, according to statements by several press organizations, has taken on a more mobile form in the liberation movement. In addition, the suggestion of the Vietminh policies in Vietnam evoked a deep reaction in other French colonies, such as North Africa. We were also informed in Geneva that in Algiers, for example, significant portions of the city population regarded the day of the fall of Dien Bien Phu as their own personal celebration, with numerous gatherings in the streets exchanging joyful greetings and congratulations.

In recent years, the national-liberation movement in Vietnam, as well as in Laos and Cambodia, has attained large proportions. The majority of Vietnamese territory no longer belongs under the control of the official government authority of Bao Dai. The democratic reforms, especially with regard to the redistribution of land to the peasants and the reduction of lease payments for land, carried out by the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam under the leadership of prime minister Ho Chi Minh, raised the authority of this government to such an extent that at the present time even the bourgeois officials of USA and France admit that if free elections were held in Vietnam, the majority of the votes would belong to Ho Chi Minh supporters.

The situation in another Indo-China country - Laos - also testifies to the significant growth in the national-liberation movement. Here, almost half of the country's territory is, for all practical purposes, no longer under the control of official authorities.

The national-liberation movement is also increasingly expanding in Cambodia, where there are also liberated regions and an active partisan struggle in various regions of the country. The Geneva conference was convened in a situation where the more aggressive imperialist circles in the USA have put their stakes on direct USA military interference in the war in Indo-China. The Soviet delegation was faced with the task of exposing these aggressive schemes of the ruling circles of USA. This is particularly important under the current conditions, since such interference on the part of the USA is leading to an expansion of the scale of military activities in Southeast Asia, with all of the ensuing dangerous consequences for peace.

One must not ignore the special situation which has now arisen in connection with the USA policy toward countries of Indo-China.

Everyone knows that the USA government is definitely unwilling to take into consideration the national movements in the countries of Indo-China and those organizations of this movement which have come forth from among the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. On the other hand, it is known that official representatives of the USA are consistently repeating statements regarding the inadequacy of such recognition of the independence of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, as it is provided for by their agreement with France. Such a situation can only be understood to mean that the ruling circles of the USA are trying to attain the greatest possible freedom of action for official government organs in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. This exhibits the aforementioned USA circles' endeavor to gain the possibility of placing these countries under direct dependence as the policy of the USA and its interests.

Such are the facts pertaining to the current military and political situation in the countries of Indo-China.

Up until recent times, the government of France did not want to take into consideration the growing national-liberation movement in Indo-China. However, the initiative of the French government at the Berlin conference, which manifested itself in a proposal to convene the Geneva conference for the purpose of discussing the issue of Indo-China, testified to the fact that the French government has been forced to acknowledge the serious consequences of the national-liberation movement in the countries of Indo-China. To this end, the Geneva conference was commissioned with the task of re-establishing peace in Indo-China.

Of the forces carrying on the national-liberation movement in Indo-China, the only one present at the Geneva conference itself is the delegation from democratic Vietnam. The majority of the Conference participants refused to acknowledge the importance of also entering into immediate negotiations with the leadership of the Laotian and Cambodian resistance. There are also attempts being made to explain the situation in Laos and Cambodia in a manner that rejects the existence of national-liberation movements in these countries, and instead advance the notion that this is nothing more than an outside interference by Vietnamese military forces in the internal affairs of these states. From this they draw the conclusion that, supposedly, the only task is to insure the recall of the Vietnamese military units from inside the territory of Laos and Cambodia, and then, as it were, the question of a continuing war in these states would be at an end. Such estimations, however, do not agree with the facts of the situation.

In this regard it is worth noting that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam delegation at the Geneva conference acknowledged that there had been in the past a certain number of Vietnamese volunteers participating in the national-liberation movements in Laos and Cambodia, but that these volunteers have already been recalled. They also conceded that if any still-present Vietnamese volunteers are discovered in these countries, then these remaining volunteers will also be recalled. One cannot fail to see in this the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's effort to do their utmost to re-establish peace in all of Indo-China.
It is well known that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam delegation at the Geneva conference proffered those proposals that, in its opinion, build a foundation for a settlement of the Indochina question and could secure the re-establishment of peace in Indo-China. Here are the more important of these:

1. France must guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Vietnam, as well as Cambodia and Laos. In addition, all foreign troops must be withdrawn from these countries’ territories.

2. Free general elections must be held in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, which must then be followed by the establishment of a single democratic government in each of these countries.

3. The government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, as well as the resistance governments of Laos and Cambodia, must express their readiness to address the question of joining the French Commonwealth according to principles of free will. They must also recognize the presence of French economic and cultural interests in these countries, which must also be exercised according to principles of equality and mutual interest.

4. The adoption of the aforementioned political measures must be preceded by cessation of all military activities in all of Indo-China and the completion of relevant agreements, which must provide for a complete cessation in the deployment of new military units, all kinds of weaponry and ammunition into Indo-China.

In addition, according to the Soviet delegation proposal, it was deemed advisable to form a commission of neutral countries to oversee each side’s fulfillment of the agreement to cease military activity.

In this way, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s proposals give an important basis for reaching an agreement with France. They provide the possibility of reaching an agreement on honorable conditions for both sides. On the basis of these proposals new and truly friendly relations could be established between the peoples of Indo-China and France.

What is the current situation in the negotiations on the question of Indo-China?

It should be first noted that negotiations on political questions essentially have not begun yet. In this regard, the Soviet delegation has been consistently pointing out the importance of examining the political questions in Indo-China, since the establishment of a stable and dependable peace cannot be secured without corresponding agreement on the essential political questions raised by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Up until the present time, everything has revolved around the question of the cessation of military activities. Obviously, none of the Geneva conference participants denied the importance and urgency of these negotiations.

In accordance with the directives of the CC of the CPSU, the Soviet delegation considered one of its most important objectives to begin direct negotiations between the representatives of France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, both in Geneva, as well as on location in Indo-China. Similar negotiations are also needed with respect to Laos and Cambodia.

The importance of such direct negotiations in Geneva was not immediately recognized by France. It was only on 2 June that direct negotiations between French military representatives and the military representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam commenced. And only on 19 June it was acknowledged that corresponding direct negotiations must also commence between the concerned parties with regard to Laos and Cambodia.

At the present time, it is still too early to talk about the prospects for these negotiations. However, the negotiations on questions regarding Vietnam, which commenced in the first days of June, have already made possible discussion of those concrete questions which can bring about agreements that are primarily of military importance. In addition, this would open up the possibility of reaching not only military, but also political agreements, which, in turn, could serve to establish a stable peace in Indo-China.

Of greater importance is the situation in Vietnam, which comprises 23 million people out of the entire 29 million inhabitants of Indo-China.

In recent days there has been much talk in the French, English, and American press of dividing Vietnam into two zones, where the military forces of democratic Vietnam would have to remain in the northern zone, and the military forces of the Bao Dai government would stay in the southern zone. Such a partition of the Vietnamese territory primarily corresponds to the principle, acknowledged by both sides, of establishing zones of military unit deployment of both sides and, in addition, would avert numerous occasions for mutual skirmishing by these military units, when they are deployed in many interesting regions. One must not, however, fail to take into account the negative repercussions of this partition of Vietnam into northern and southern zones, if one must postpone the fulfillment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s demands for such a settlement of the Vietnamese situation, which would provide for the ratification of immediate decisions both on political and military questions. Those political questions consist of, above all, the adoption of a decision which would provide for the earliest possible free elections in the entire Vietnam, and the creation of a single democratic government of Vietnam, carrying authority in the eyes of all the people of Vietnam.

As far as Laos and Cambodia are concerned, the decision of the Geneva conference on 19 June regarding direct negotiations between the concerned sides on questions pertaining to these countries, may hold significant importance. Obviously, for this purpose it is necessary that both sides, holding interests both toward Laos and Cambodia, must show a good faith effort toward reaching an agreement.

According to the 19 June decision adopted by the Geneva conference, all foreign armed forces and foreign military personnel must be withdrawn from the territories of Cambodia and Laos. This demand must be correspondingly carried out both by the French armed forces and the foreign volunteers currently in these countries’ territory.

In addition, there remains the still unresolved question of the composition and the functions of the international commission to monitor the enactment of the truce agreement. This question must also be subjected to a detailed examination in the near future.

For its part, the USSR delegation, supported by the delegations of PRC and DRV, proffered a proposal, regarding the composition of the international
monitoring commission, that takes into account previously voiced wishes of the other side. We agreed with the idea that such a commission must either be composed of five members, namely India (chair), Poland, Czechoslovakia, Pakistan, and Indonesia, or three members: India (chair), Poland, and Indonesia (or some other Asian country). This way the international monitoring commission would consist of primarily Asian countries, which should provide a suitable basis for an agreement on this question.

As far as the functions of the international mixed commission are concerned, it seems that there should not remain any serious disagreements among the conference participants. In any case, the Soviet delegation acted and continues to act on the basis of what they see as an undisputable position, namely, that the parties must not allow a decrease in the importance of the mixed commission with regard to fulfilling the true agreement, since the fulfillment of the conditions of this agreement will depend, above all, on the true readiness of each party to abide conscientiously by this agreement.

You are aware that during the course of the Geneva conference the French government had undergone significant changes. It would be risky right now to draw conclusions whether these changes in the French government will have a positive influence on the course of the Geneva conference. We know, however, that the new French government considers as one of its first priorities a quick resolution to the question of re-establishing peace in Indo-China. On the other hand, especially at the current time, aggressive circles in the USA are openly exerting pressure on their French allies to assure that no steps are taken by them which would promote a peaceful settlement of the Indo-China question.

Such is the condition of the current stage of negotiations for re-establishing peace in Indo-China.

X

X

What conclusions come to mind from what I have said concerning the Geneva conference?

1. First of all, one must note that the Geneva conference, like the Berlin conference of foreign ministers at the beginning of this year, demonstrated that direct negotiations between respective countries can play an important role in resolving pressing international issues. If negotiations on the Korean question did not result in an agreement and only limited themselves to clarifying each side's position, then, on the other hand, in the course of the Geneva conference it was realised that there are possibilities of re-establishing peace in Indo-China on favorable terms for both parties. This is served by the establishment of direct contact between the warring parties and the start of discussion on concrete points of the agreement for simultaneous cessation of military activity in all of Indo-China.

Even on the basis of these preliminary results one can positively assess the significance of the measures taken by our party and our government to reduce tensions in international relations and to strengthen peace.

2. The Geneva conference of foreign ministers has demonstrated yet again that the ruling circles of the USA are continuing their aggressive foreign policies and that this under the present circumstances is the main obstacle to settling a number of pressing international problems.

However, the Geneva conference has one important feature that sets it apart from the Berlin conference. Here, the divergence between the USA and other Western powers' positions, especially those of England and France, was openly demonstrated, and became visible proof of growing disagreements in the imperialist camp, as a result of which the USA at times found itself situated in opposition to most of the other conference participants.

3. An important aspect of the Geneva conference is that this is the first time that the People's Republic of China has participated at an important international conference on an equal footing with the other great powers - USSR, USA, England and France. PRC's participation in the examination of both issues - Korea and Indo-China - has special significance not only because the new democratic China has stepped into the international arena and taken its rightful place among the great powers, but also because the Geneva conference has visibly demonstrated that without the participation of the People's Republic of China, a discussion of a number of international problems, especially those concerning the situation in Asia, becomes altogether impossible.

The Geneva conference demonstrated the absurdity of the ruling USA circles' position to continue to obstruct the People's Republic of China from taking its rightful place at the United Nations Organization. The illogic of this position was once again demonstrated when USA representatives held talks with PRC representatives at the Geneva conference table, while, through its obstructionist policy, making it impossible to discuss corresponding issues with the PRC representatives at the United Nations Organization. One can hardly doubt the fact that the Geneva conference has conclusively demonstrated the untenability of the current USA policy toward the People's Republic of China.

4. Undoubtedly, the first positive results of the Geneva conference on the question of Indo-China have facilitated further relaxation of international tensions and, at the same time, created more favorable conditions for examining other pressing international problems. Already at the present stage of the Geneva conference, which enabled one to re-eval the possibility of re-establishing peace in Indo-China with consideration for both sides' interests, its influence was detectable among those social circles of a number of countries, particularly France, which voice their justifiable concern with regard to the creation of various types of aggressive groupings in Europe, and not only in Europe. This much is clear: if there are opportunities to agree on questions in Asia and settle these questions not on the basis of forming military blocs, but through agreements between respective countries, then there is no basis to believe that, given real desire on the part of interested countries, one could not reach such agreement with regard to resolving the pressing problems in Europe.

Thus, although the Geneva conference has not completed its work, the initial stage of this conference has already shown that there are possibilities of reaching certain positive results.

Guiding themselves by the directives of the party and the government, the
Soviet representatives will continue to steadfastly strive to ensure that the
Conference results are in accordance with the interests of strengthening the
international position of the USSR and the task of reinforcing peace and
international security.

[Source: Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSI), Moscow,
document located and provided by Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security
Archive); translation by Daniel Rows.]
SECRET
FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WHITEHALL SECRET
(CABINET) DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Makins
No. 175
June 24, 1964

D. 1.53 p.m. June 25, 1964

R. 7.25 p.m. June 25, 1964

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Paris telegram No. 164 of June 25
Repeated for Information to Foreign Office
Peking
Codel Geneva
Saigon
U. K. H. C. New Delhi

Year telegram No. 440 to Foreign Office: Meeting between
Mendes-France and Chou En-lai.

Following from Secretary of State:

2. I have received a similar account through French Ambassador
in London. Please thank the French Government for giving me this
full information.

3. I should also like you to take a suitable opportunity of
telling M. Mendes-France that, whilst most of this conversation was
very similar to these which I and others had with Chou En-lai recently
in Geneva, I detect some signs that he may be pulling up his price.
In particular, I note that he now claims that most of the Viet Minh
forces have been withdrawn from Laos, and that the main problem there, and in
Cambodia, is to reach internal settlements with the resistance movements.
This suggests that he may be attempting to evade the question of the
withdrawal of Viet Minh forces by seeking to disguise those forces as
"local resistance forces". This danger has, of course always existed,
and I am sure that M. Mendes-France will be on his guard against it.
I am sure, too, that he will agree that it is of cardinal importance to
insist upon the full withdrawal of all Viet Minh forces from the two States.

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Paris and routine
to Codel Geneva, Peking, Saigon and New Delhi as my telegrams Nos. 158,
20, 6 and 62 respectively.

'Repeated to Paris, Codel Geneva, Peking, Saigon'.

'Copy sent to C.R.O. for repetition to New Delhi'.

ADVANCE COPIES
Sir L. Kirkpatrick
Minister of State
Private Secretary
Mr. Speaight
Head of South East Asia Department
Head of Far Eastern Department
Resident Clerk

PPPP
(3) French position will be: (a) attempt obtain some surrucced neutralization of Bishoprics in north which will protect the anti-Communist population against the anti-communist population against the Viet Minh; (b) agree to give up Hanoi in exchange for complete Viet Minh evacuation of the south; (c) retain an enclave around Haiphong (French continue lay great stress on not permitting any Viet Minh enclave in north and necessity for exchanging something in north to achieve this).

In accordance with Toosey 478 (on which I will comment later today) made clear to Chauvel we will not participate work of committees in absence of agreement on principles. He expressed great disappointment, saying there would be no joint committee if we did not participate.

Chauvel promised set up orderly arrangement so we kept fully and currently informed secret talks through Bribisson or Cheysson and Colonel Dwan.

In response to my question as to whether French had done any work on draft agreement or control, he replied in negative and accepted my offer for Colonel Dwan make available to French experts our experience in Korea on this subject.

JOHNSON

1 Dated June 24, p. 1238.
2 See telegraph Secto 528, June 25, p. 1249.

3061 GE/6-2554: Telegram
Eighteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 25, 3 p. m.

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

GENERAL, June 25, 1954—9 p. M.


Cambodian delegate (San Sary) spoke first briefly and reiterated Cambodian position that control commission for Cambodia and Laos should be different from that for Vietnam even though its composition could be same. He stressed that his position was based on practical considerations since if there were but one commission for all of Indochina with its headquarters, for example, in Hanoi, contacts with its subcommittees would be difficult.

Chauvel (France) spoke next on the subject of relations between the joint and neutral commissions. Rather than speaking on whether joint commission should be subordinate to neutral commission, he thought it would be possible to consider these two bodies as operating side by side but in different fields, and that conference should try to decide upon what kinds of activity each should perform. He referred to Dong's (Viet Minh) statement that effective implementation of armistice agreement depended upon the two sides, this being the case, certain provisions of armistice would apply to each side separately, and certain other provisions, i.e., regrouping of forces, would require joint action. In its tasks the two sides must be helped by some control system, he said.

The task of the control body, he continued, should be to supervise implementation of agreement, either on its own initiative or on request of two sides, to make recommendation when differences occur regarding implementation, and thus to play mediatory role. Control body, he explained, should be link between implementation of armistice provisions and guarantee of agreement itself.

Chauvel then asked rhetorical question, would it be possible define different tasks for each commission? The control commission, he suggested, should act in cases of disagreement between two sides or violation armistice provisions by one side. He made analogy here with contract between two parties which often has arbitration clause, and when both parties sign they accept principles and consequences of arbitration.

Chauvel next referred to what some delegates referred to as compulsory character of decisions of neutral body. Some delegates, he said, contend implementation armistice agreement would depend goodwill both sides. Even if this were so, he said, there might be disagreements on interpretation. Here decision of neutral body would be necessary. French delegation does not believe it necessary for neutral body to have forces at its disposal. If one side refuses decisions of neutral body then this is case for guarantor powers.

Pursuing this point further, Chauvel said it would be useful to determine what kinds of situations would be decided by neutral body.

He thought in ordinary cases neutral body could make recommendations by a majority vote but that in serious cases, such as those threatening peace and security, then neutral commission could refer matter to guarantor powers. Such report could be made unanimously or with majority and minority reports. If one side refused to implement commission's recommendation, "one would not appeal to the police", but report of such refusal would be sent to guarantor powers. These re-
marks, Chauvel stressed, were just illustrative in effort to find areas within which joint and neutral commissions would function.

In conclusion, Chauvel stated that, since both commissions would have different tasks they should function in different locations, details of which could be specially examined. He referred to Cambodian delegate's idea that there should be separate commission for Cambodia and said that in his view there should be central body in each of three countries, but that tasks would apply to whole area, and that there might be a coordinating body.

Kuznetsov (USSR) then asked for the floor and referred to the large number of proposals on questions of functions and composition control commission emphasizing that the conference has expressed many points of view. He charged some delegates with being unwilling to help find common point of view, with putting obstacles in the way of a solution, and with distorting Soviet proposals. He referred to Soviet proposals as thoughtful, detailed, and helpful and wanted to make certain remarks in light of attacks on them made by other delegates.

Principle behind Soviet proposal, he said, was to facilitate establishment contact between both belligerent sides regarding all questions including supervision implementation of armistice. Soviet delegate, he contended, thinks both sides should be "full masters of their internal affairs", and that other states should not interfere in these affairs but should help two sides and render assistance only when necessary. This why Soviet proposal was not subordinate to international commission.

Some delegates, he continued, either misunderstood or distorted Soviet proposal and assumed Soviet delegate meant that two commissions should have same functions. By contrary, Soviet delegate believes commissions should work along parallel lines on basis cooperation, but should not perform same tasks. Conference should determine principles concerning what tasks would be performed by each commission.

Soviet proposals, he insisted, conformed to principle laid down by conference to effect that two sides be permitted to work out conditions of cessation hostilities.

Kuznetsov then cited the successful operation military armistice commission in Korea as proof that mixed commission not subordinate to neutral commission was practical, and accused US delegate of attempting to make Korean example look bad. The NNSC does not issue orders to MAC but cooperation exists and hostilities have been stopped for a year, he said.

He then referred to proposal of French delegate at last meeting that ad hoc commission be set up composed of experts to examine various proposals and prepare recommendations for conference. Soviet dele-

gate, he said, agrees with this in principle, and is ready to examine a program of work for this committee. However, he said, conference should think overall proposals and recommendations before and divide them according to their importance and according to those on which conference agrees and on which conference disagrees. If conference submitted all questions to subcommittee, he thought, this could be considered as constituting an unnecessary delay. Procedure other than that suggested by French delegate should, therefore, be considered.

Kuznetsov then made suggestion that heads of delegations meet in more restricted sessions with a few experts and interpreters, taking Soviet proposal on control as basis for discussion. He did not want to insist on immediate reply, but that this would be step forward to facilitate recommendations to Ministers "who should return to Geneva".

In concluding, Kuznetsov referred to today's statement by Chauvel, said it deserved attention, and asked Chauvel if he could have written texts. Chauvel nodded affirmatively.

After recess, Li Ke-nung spoke on armistice control system. He declared French proposal for comparing various proposals on this subject "was helpful". He supported, however, proposal by Kuznetsov for more restricted meeting to determine what work should be referred to committee of experts. Li also supported fully Kuznetsov's statements on control system.

Li then launched into discussion of various issues involved in control system taking as his text Molotov's proposals of June 14 and 16. He made following principal points:

1. Conference has in effect agreed with points 1 and 4 of Molotov's proposal of June 14, since all delegations agree that there should be two types of commissions—joint and international—that joint commission should be composed of equal representatives from two commands and that international commission should be composed of representatives of neutral powers. In latter connection, he referred to proposal that Colombo powers constitute international commission and agreed that these powers are neutral. He pointed out that three of five powers proposed for commission by Soviets were Colombo powers.

2. Concerning powers and functions of commissions, Li stated that Bidault statement of June 2 agreed in principle with point 5 of Molotov's proposal of June 14 concerning the functions of the neutral nations commission. Li noted Chauvel's statement of June 22 to effect that one commission need not be "subordinate" to other, that there should be division of functions, and that functions of two commissions should be spelled out. Li pointed out that Molotov's proposal of June 14 has many points of agreement in this respect with views expressed by Bidault.
3. Concerning voting on international commission, Li asserted Molotov's proposal of June 14 took into account views of some delegations that voting should be by majority vote. Li argued, however, that on issues vital to one side or other decision should not be one-sided but must be unanimous. He stated that points 7 and 8 of Molotov's proposal provided basis for agreement on voting.

4. Concerning international guarantees, Li stated all delegations agreed guarantees desirable and that conference powers should be guarantors. He claimed conference should be able to agree on Molotov's points 11 and 12. Proposal by chairman that next meeting be Tuesday June 29 accepted.

JOHNSON

394.1 GE/8-2554: Telegram

Eighteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 25, 3 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, June 25, 1954—8 p.m.

Secto 526. Repeated information Paris 503, Saigon 214. At recess today's restricted session, Chauvel expressed extreme disappointment over Kuznetsov's turn-down of Chauvel's proposal for small meetings of experts from certain delegations to study various proposals on armistice measures and controls and Chauvel's other suggestion that ad hoc committees be formed from time to time to study specific armistice problems. Chauvel disagreed with Kuznetsov's proposal that the 9 delegation chiefs meet to discuss control measures with fewer experts present than at recent sessions: A sort of a restricted session.

Chauvel thought at next session he would present a detailed paper on functions and powers of the control measures in answer to the Russian proposal of June 14 which is the only detailed paper on the subject to date.

JOHNSON

751G.00/6-2554: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1954—5:56 p.m.

Secto 479. Reference Secto 510 and 513. Preliminary oral reply should be made to Cambodian Foreign Minister along lines stated below. He may be informed that formal reply to his letter will be made promptly when Washington has had opportunity for full consideration.

1. We hope Cambodians will continue to press for withdrawal of Vietminh forces from Cambodia.
2. Our view is Cambodians should insist during negotiations that Cambodia is member of French Union and accordingly French military personnel are not to be considered foreign. Suggest they continue to reassert their right as sovereign government to employ anyone they wish.
3. We would be willing furnish military training mission if French did not do so.
4. We would be willing to furnish arms and equipment on request Cambodian Government.
5. You should also inform Cambodians that we are impressed and heartened by their clear understanding of the Communist motives and their rejection of them. Such steadfastness is the quality which must characterize any effective collective resistance to the further spread of Communist aggression. With reference to their queries about the SEA pact you should say that we are convinced of its utility in the present situation and are doing our best to bring it into being by obtaining the necessary support in the free world. We cannot yet say what precise form it would take, what facilities it would require, or what its scope would be, but we would hope that Cambodia would be a part of it.

You should also refer to Cambodian statements mentioned in Secto 516 and indicate that we would expect that no restrictions would be accepted which made it difficult or impossible for us to aid Cambodia in future.

We shall comment later on Secto 516, which should not enter into your discussion with Cambodians at this time, except as above noted.

DULLES

4 Dated June 24, p. 1234.

896.1 GE/8-2554: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1954—6:20 p.m.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Tosec 480. Tedul 221 and 222. Tosec 199. Basic instructions transmitted Tosec 138 were intended to provide guidance for fully operative USDel. As such they were approved by President and Congressional

1 Drafted by Sturm of FES/P & Gullion of S/P. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4819, to Saigon as telegram 2721, and to Phnom Penh as telegram 61.
2 Dated June 28, p. 1227.
3 Dated June 28, p. 1231.
4 Dated June 18, p. 1195.
5 For text of message see footnote 2, p. 1196.
6 Dated June 19, thid.
7 Dated May 12, p. 778.
SECRET
FROM GENEVA CONFERENCES UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION
TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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No. 852
D. 10.43 p.m. June 25, 1954.
June 25, 1954.

PRIORITY
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 852 of
June 25,
Repeated for information to Paris Washington Saigon.

Guard.

My telegram No. 646.

M. Chauvel informs me that he had a secret conversation with Pham Van Dong today.

2. Chauvel urged on Pham Van Dong that it would be undesirable for latter to meet M. Mendès-France at present. Any visit would result in publicity which would be likely to antagonise Viet Han delegates who were not being informed of these secret contacts. It was therefore essential that he and Pham Van Dong should continue to meet in secret and leave any meeting with Mendès-France till a much later stage.

3. M. Chauvel told Pham Van Dong that the French Government would not consent to any partition of Viet Nam if boundary demanded were too far south. French Government also could not contemplate complete abandonment of Haiphong and would require safeguards for bishoprics in Northern Annam. Pham Van Dong did not demur with regard to any of these points and admitted in principle special French interest in Haiphong.

4. Pham Van Dong's attitude also seemed encouraging with regard to problems of French military instructors in Cambodia and Laos and of two French military bases in Laos.

5. Chauvel while not unfailly optimistic hoped that this indicated a reasonable attitude in the consideration of these special issues.

/6. In giving
SECRET

Geneva Conference (U.K. Delegation) telegrams No. 859
to Foreign Office

- 2 -

6. In giving me this information Cheval stressed the importance he attached to complete secrecy about his meetings with Pham Van Dong. He also asked me to inform you that he had only informed United States delegate in general terms and had deliberately not given him the details which he had communicated to me.

Foreign Office pass Paris, Washington and Saigon as my telegrams 205, 261 and 87 respectively.

[Repeated to Paris, Washington and Saigon]
With UK represented by Ambassador (Lamb) and USSR in Deputy Foreign Minister (Kuznetsov), reduction our representatives below ambassador level together with Bonsal being restricted to role of observer will be interpreted by all as first step toward complete disassociation, and by French in particular as contrary to understanding as of June 19.

Therefore, seems to me that question is whether events since June 19 have been such cause us reconsider our acquiescence in continuation conference and thus withdraw to role observer.

In this connection from my conversation with Chauvel this morning (Secto 522), as well as previous conversations, I believe that he and Mendes-France estimate that we will in end acquiesce in type of "regrouping areas" in Vietnam which he has outlined today. If our considered decision is that we will not do so, should they later be told this now and told that in absence of any change of policy on our part we are immediately disassociating ourselves.

This would be said by Dillon directly to Mendes-France and by me to Chauvel.

I am unable to assess what effect this would be on French and believe Department may want to obtain Dillon's view on this. On one hand, it may stiffen France, which might attempt somewhat correct its policy when faced with break with USA. Other hand, in view of pledges he has made, Mendes-France might feel there would be no use even trying establish and, therefore, capitulate even further.

Insofar as Associated States are concerned, any disassociation would have to be carefully handled so as not leave them with any even temporary impression we are abandoning them to French policy with which they would have no choice but to acquiesce. Unless we are able immediately to assure them we are prepared enter into truly significant politico-military-economic relationships with them, I do not see how this can be done.

My own frank view is that while I appreciate but cannot assess other considerations, our continued participation on a critical and reserved basis would serve at this precise stage, to act as restraining influence upon French and bolstering influence upon Associated States and thereby assist in salvaging as much as possible from a most unhappy situation. If we, with or without our allies, are prepared to take immediate and concrete action to prevent an unacceptable settlement, I see much merit in immediate disassociation. If we are not, then I think we should do at least for time being, withdraw our influence from the conference unless we estimate withdrawal or threat thereof will in itself produce favorable change in French policy.

Alternatively, I could withdraw leaving Bonsal as US representa-

tive who would continue participate in meeting in middle position between observer role and disassociation. If observer role chosen, it must be made clear to both participants as there constantly arise situations in which silence can only be interpreted as assent.6

JOHNSON

JUNE 26, 1954

SECRET PRIORITY

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Geneva, June 26, 1954—1 p.m.

Secto 520. Repeated information Paris 508, London 323, Hong Kong 30, Moscow 148. Course past few days several knowledgeable American correspondents talked with Savage (press officer) re increasingly independent role taken by Chou En-lai during conference. Correspondents include such well-versed observers Communist affairs as Ed Stevens (Christian Science Monitor), Ed Korry (UP), and Joe Fromm (US News & World Report).

They cite evidence of Chinese Communist efforts to strike independent role as follows: Chou made first conciliatory gestures toward Laos and Cambodia, not Molotov; Chou acted as host recent Geneva dinner attended by Laotians, Cambodians and Viet Minh representatives during later stages conference, Chinese Communists appear taken over active leadership Viet Minh cause although several Viet Minh leaders spent considerable time Moscow on way Geneva; no Soviet representation seen at June 23 Mendes-France-Chou Bern parlé; finally current all-Asian discussion between Chou and Nehru.

Consensus these correspondents Chou been making obvious efforts forge own foreign policy in Far East and establish at Geneva strong international position for Communist China. They believe these efforts viewed with significant discomfort by Soviets.

I do not entirely share these views yet pass them on as of possible interest.

JOHNSON

396.1 6/6-2654 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

Geneva, June 26, 1954—1 p.m.

81. Preliminary oral reply conveyed today by Ambassador Heath to Cambodian Foreign Minister in accordance with Tosec 479. He expressed general satisfaction and agreement. With reference to longer term, he indicated Cambodian attitude regarding French Union would depend largely on French attitude. "If they continue to treat us like children, we will not stay in the Union."

Heath endeavored to make point that Cambodia as injured party insisting on withdrawal Viet Minh troops, should not put itself in position of making concessions to Viet Minh such as agreements regarding future Cambodian defense dispositions.

Ambassador Heath recalled that Cambodian delegation has unilaterally indicated its nonaggressive intentions, its determination to take appropriate steps, including foreign military personnel and material, to build up Cambodian national army to point required for self-defense and has indicated that it would be willing to report to International Commission regarding such measures. The evaluation of those measures in view of conditions for durable armistice would be province of International Commission.

Foreign Minister advised us that Cambodian mission for bilateral military conversations will depart Saigon June 27 and will consist of Tien Long, two regular Cambodian officers and Dap Chouen, Phan Chay and Chantanagei, latter three being leaders of former resistance bands who have rallied to Royal Government. Foreign Minister stated that he did not envisage presence of any French officer at conversations even in observer status although he recognized there would have to be some sort of liaison so that withdrawal of Viet Minh troops from Cambodia could be coordinated with whatever dispositions are made for the regrouping of Viet Minh troops in Vietnam.

JOHN

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Dated June 25, p. 1249.

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 26, 1954—5 p.m.

Secto 534. Department pass Saigon if desired; repeated information Paris 511. Following is Ambassador Heath’s account of his farewell call on Chauvel today:

"Chauvel asked me to say in Washington that from his own recent consultations with Mendes-France, he was certain that it was not the latter’s intention to evacuate Indochina but to make a viable settlement which France would support. While Dong had not definitely accepted the idea of the Hanoi-Phnom Penh enclaves and some sort of protective arrangement over the bishoprics of Phat Dieu and Bui Chu, he had expressed no hostility to the idea nor had he suggested any counter territorial concession for the Viet Minh in the south. With a foot-hold in the north and holding the south and part of the center, the Vietnamese would have the foundation on which to build a solid durable state with the possibility of regaining complete control of national territory from Viet Minh provided it developed the necessary political dynamism and capacity. The latter was the great question mark. Certainly the regime had so far failed to show energetic capacity and it was the general impression in Paris that Ngo Dinh Diem did not have the necessary qualities to unite his country. The latter’s speech on arrival in Saigon had not impressed the French Government.

"It would be the task of France cooperatively aided by the United States to try to build a solid state structure in the new Vietnam. Chauvel went on to say that he had not been favorably impressed by the Ministry of Associated States and did not think its personnel had the necessary drive and imagination to undertake successfully such a task. In any case it would be a mistake to send an ex-colonial official to Vietnam. La Chambre, the new Minister of Associated States, seemed to be a very good and intelligent chap but entirely new to the problem.

"Chauvel thought it was of the utmost importance that Ely be seconded immediately by an outstanding diplomatic counselor. He had urged on Mendes-France and hoped I would urge on La Chambre, if I saw him, the advantage of sending Georges-Picot. now at UN, at once to Indochina. The latter knew Indochina and was excellent at dealing with Asiatic peoples. Chauvel’s other candidate for the job, Baudet, former French Ambassador to Yugoslavia, was no longer available since Mendes-France had taken him to be his Director of Protocol. When I told Chauvel that I expected to see Bao Dai before leaving for Washington, he shrugged his shoulders over the political shortcomings of His Majesty but made no suggestions as to what might be said to the latter. He said he would appreciate, however, if I would pass on anything important Bao Dai said to me through Dillon in Paris.

"Chauvel said it was altogether possible in eight or ten days that, in their secret talks, the French would arrive at tentative agreement with the Viet Minh. He hoped that this agreement would be one that the United States might accept. It would be, however, difficult to sell to the Vietnamese who might unrealistically and irresponsibly oppose it. He had hoped that I would stay on at Geneva to help explain to the Associated States delegations, if a reasonable solution were found, that they should accept it and go on from there to build up their national strength. I made no comment on this or his other statements beyond observing that from my acquaintance the situation, the military position of France in Indochina was not as weak as was thought in many quarters.

"Chauvel said he regretted that the new government was opposed to DeJean coming to Geneva as advisor which Bidault had opposed, except possibly towards the end of the conference."

JOHN
Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaqiq, and the CCP Central Committee, and Convey to Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang, Concerning the content of a meeting between Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese delegations, 26 June 1954

Record Number:

(Top secret)

Chairman (Mao), Comrade (Liu Shaqiq), and the Central Committee, and convey to Zhou (Enlai), Zhang (Wentian), and Wang (Jiaxiang):

At 5:00 this afternoon, the Soviet, Vietnamese and Chinese delegations met to study the plan prepared by the Vietnamese side concerning division and adjustment of zones in Vietnam and Laos. Concerning Vietnam, the plan introduced by Comrade Pham Van Dong is that the enemy will withdraws from the northern plain and PingZhaoTian, and our troops in Quang Nam area will withdraw from the southern and central region. Our maximum (goal) is the line from Tuy Hoa, Jiaoyao [spelling needs to be checked], and Pleiku, along Route Nineteen, to the Vietnamese-Cambodian border (between the 13 and 14 parallels); the medium is for the 15th parallel, and the minimum is for the 16th parallel. At today’s meeting by the chief military negotiators from the two sides the French side already introduced the principles that its government would follow concerning dividing the line in Vietnam (that is, withdrawing completely from the north, dividing the line along the 18th parallel, and Haiphong only being used for the purpose of withdrawal); France’s military negotiator (Henry) Delteil will go back to Paris to get instruction today; and the two sides have agreed to discuss the situation in Vietnam next Monday (the 28th). Considering these three developments, the Vietnamese side should not delay putting forward the maximum plan. But in order for the negotiation to be carried out smoothly, it is necessary to combine introducing the political, military, and economic situations in the three countries of Indochina with the plans for settlement, and present them simultaneously, as this will more advantageous. Concerning Laos, the division of zones plan presented by Comrade Pham Van Dong focuses on pursing Sam Neua, Phong Sali, and such new liberation zone as MengKe and MengWei in upper Laos, and strive to expand the NanHuHe area (toward the west expand to Muong Souei, and toward the south to Nam Bac), and in the Sam Neua area expand to PanPan and TaTong and to be linked with the liberation zone of Central Laos. In Middle Laos, strive to maintain the liberation zone on Route 12 neighboring Vietnam, and toward the south expand to Route 9. In lower Laos, at the beginning raise the question of maintaining the liberation zone here, but only in the area concessions can be made. In order to maintain the integrity of the liberation zone in upper Laos, at the last stage concession also can be made on liberation zone in middle Laos. In the meantime, Pham [Van Dong] contends that in Laos in the question of division of zones should be solved in connection with the political questions there. In a coalition can be established, then it is not necessary for adjustment or withdraw to be conducted in various zones, and for special system to be maintained in the administration of our zones. Then Comrade Novikov of the Soviet Union points out that Pham says that he has no mature ideas; in the meantime, he has no clear ideas on the plan for division of zones. (It seems) as if he agrees to Premier Zhou’s opinion, that is, the bottom line is to adhere to maintaining a part of upper Laos neighboring Vietnam and China (the whole of Sam Neua, Phong Sali, and a small part of Luang Prabang); however, Pham also wants to expand the liberation zone in upper Laos in exchange for withdrawing from middle Laos. Therefore, it is difficult to discuss to make decisions, so he asks Pham to have further studies and then come up with concrete ideas, and three sides will have another discussion at 11:00 on the morning of next Monday. Before the military affairs conference gets down to discussing the zone division issues in Laos, the two sides should first examine and correct the maps reflecting the current status, and will then enter the discussions about a settlement. This way, (1) we will know more about the situation and thus put forward adjusted plans, and (2) we will get more time to wait for the decisions of the meetings in Nanning.

Li Kenong
26 June 1954
(dispatched on the 27th)

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
SECRET

A press report (in the New York Times of the 27th June) dated at Geneva, the 25th, and attributed to "Western sources" refers to a conflict of views and interests and consequent differences between the Vietnamese and Chou En-lai over the joint Vietnamese-Chinese proposals and lack of enthusiasm on the part of Pham Van Dong for the Chinese proposal about Laos and Cambodia.

It is also stated that the Vietnamese are "reluctant to reverse programmes of expansion into Laos and Cambodia" in the interest of a "regional Vietnamese imperialism within the orbit of Soviet-Chinese expansionism".

I do not suggest that this press report reflects the factual position at the present military talks at Geneva, or that there is any dragging of their feet by the Vietnamese in regard to the Chinese proposal as suggested; such less so I imply that the "Western sources" referred to are British or French.

In view of this report, whatever its source or purpose, I would like to set down for your information the history of the facts of this aspect of the present development, most of which I conveyed to you from time to time.

I. It will be recalled that the separation of the cease fire issue, in regard to Laos and Cambodia was originally a French or Western position, for what was then regarded by them as good reasons. There was conflict of views on this matter with the other side which was finally sought to be resolved by the cease fire resolution which you presented to the Conference.

II. The position in Laos and Cambodia, which at this stage was regarded by the west as merely one of the Vietminh withdrawing, and no further or other step being required became an acute issue, threatening a deadlock and a break-up of the negotiations.

III. This matter was specifically and strongly referred to by you in your statement before the Conference and in your talks with me you pointed out that no settlement was possible without some agreement about Laos and Cambodia and that these territories could not be left as invaded or probable victums of future invasion.
IV. I took this up in the first instance with Pham Van Dong and not with Chou En-lai at three successive interviews and obtained from him a statement of his position to meet the necessities of the case as I gathered from the talks with you. I did not however convey to him anything from you, as indeed I had no right to do.

V. Pham Van Dong's position to most of which he agreed without demur was -

(a) that the Vietminh did not want to conquer, expand into, or annex either of these territories;

(b) that the future of these territories was a matter for the peoples there alone, on the basis of free and fair elections after the ceasefire and in due course;

(c) that their position was that the Vietminh army was not deployed in these areas, and that it differed from the Western assertions about them;

(d) that as the settlement of the Indo-China problem was desired by the Vietminh and that the conflict in respect of the military position in Laos and Cambodia should be resolved he considered and would agree:

(i) that the question of the territories being clear of invading forces or of a situation of conflict could be settled by military talks between the two High Commands, to which they were agreeable and to which the French High Command would be agreeable. He repeatedly emphasised that the felt sure that it would be resolved by such talks;

(ii) that the Vietminh's only concern was that these states should be free and not become or be used as bases by any party;

(iii) That Vietminh would be prepared to enter into agreements of respect of integrity and non-aggression in regard to both of these territories, and into a tri-lateral agreement between them and also that the general Nine-Power guarantee should cover the integrity of these territories;

(iv) that as there were political movements opposed to the regions there as in the Vietnam and Vietminh held areas, the settlement should provide for no reprisals, no victimisation and the freedom of political life, subject to the condition that there should be no violence - all round.
Pham Van Dong pointed out that they had from the beginning referred to the "Free Governments" but had withdrawn their insistence about their representation as a measure of compromise and on the basis that the Vietminh delegation would mind the interests of the resistance groups.

VII. It was quite clear to me that the Vietminh wanted the Laos and Cambodia issues not to come in the way of a settlement or to impede the ceasefires talks and further that while they were not then willing to admit, in terms, that the Vietminh forces were deployed in those territories, they were agreeable in fact to withdrawing them. (This position has now been incorporated in the Chinese reference to outside or foreign forces.)

VIII. All this happened before I talked to Chou En-lai and I mentioned this development with satisfaction to you. The Laos and Cambodia position at this stage became amenable to treatment.

VIII. At this stage I also talked to the Laotians and the Cambodians:

(a) The Laotians were agreeable and quite satisfied and asked what step they should take to assist. I mentioned to them that they should talk to you. They agreed to all the terms and added that the political opposition had contested elections and been defeated and would be defeated again, but they would be included in the elections etc.

(b) The Cambodian was more forthcoming at first, but pointed out that he had publicly stated that his Government did not want his country to be made a base by the West or the other side, but to be independent, which he asserted they were even now. He agreed to the other items including free and fair elections.

IX. It was common ground with the three parties that the two present states and Royal governments would remain and their future was a matter for the countries and not to be brought up in the Conference settlements and not even to be an issue at the elections.

X. I spoke to Chou En-lai later and set out the difficulties about Laos and Cambodia. I mentioned that without this issue being resolved the Conference could not make progress and indeed might
suffer a setback. We covered the whole ground and he agreed to
think it over and consult the Vietminh, who, he said, were the party
most concerned. He, however, came out quite openly about the
independence of these states, non-aggression, integrity etc., and
also about agreements about non-aggression. In fact he had referred
to this aspect even much earlier.

XI. From the facts I have set out above it will be clear —

(a) that the proposals emerged at the talks with Pham Van
Dong in the first instance;

(b) although it came at the Conference from Chou En-lai
and the form of words was his as in the statement of the 15th or
16th of June, the agreements had been reached during the week-end,
as I conveyed to you at the time. It also formed part of my last two
talks with Molotov.

(a) There can be therefore no question of differences
between the Vietminh and Chou En-lai on this as the Vietminh was
the first to agree.

XII. The references to "liberation" group etc. is nothing new.
It cannot be a fresh demand for recognition of a Free Government but
of the resistance movements and its personnel, in the general settlement
about indigenous irregulars, no reprisals, political freedom etc.,
which would cover all three territories.

XIII. In Pandit Nehru's message to you of the 26th about his talks
with Chou En-lai there is a reference about slowing down of military
operations.

Arising from concern on this point which you mentioned
to me more than once (and you have also publicly stated), I took it up,
while I was there, first, with Pham Van Dong and then with Chou En-lai.

While neither would agree to a cessation of hostilities,
they both expressed themselves favourably about the desirability of
not stepping up military operations. I mentioned the question of
the Delta and Laos. Pham Van Dong allowed it to be inferred that there
was little activity by the "Free Force" in the Laos recently(1) and
that with regard to the north, Amai and the Delta, there was stepped-up
activity by the French. He referred to the bombing and to the position even in regard to the evacuation of the wounded which he said had been hindered by the bombing. Chou En-lai also allowed it to be inferred that once the talks made greater progress this matter would adjust itself. I gathered that their plan then was that this would be covered by the concentrations mutually agreed by the Commandos.

XIV. I was not in a position to expressly mention this to you as Pham Van Dong had said to me in so many words, that the military aspects were private and that they were mentioned to me only in confidence. Also it all seemed to turn on the bombing by the French so far as he was concerned. I believe, myself, that their attitude in this matter has improved since then and Chou En-lai has now said it to my Prime Minister. Therefore I am referring to this now.

XV. I have set all this down for your personal information and ready reference and to enable the situation to be seen in perspective.

I have referred here above to the two matters only: (a) Laos and Cambodia; (b) the slowing down of military activities. I have, however, mentioned to you the position reached in regard to other matters on which there were differences, the degree of narrowing that had come about, and also the fact that all three of them - the Chinese, Russians and Vietminh, had repeatedly said that some solution would be found.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd

The French Minister-Counsellor called this afternoon to inform me of recent developments at Geneva over Indochina. He said the Ambassador had intended to see Lord Reading but the latter was away. The communication had also been made to the Secretary of State in Washington by the French Ambassador so there was no need for us to pass it on to Washington. This is in fact the communication mentioned in Washington telegram No. 1500, which I had not seen when M. de Croy-Chapel called.

M. de Croy-Chapel explained that the military talks between the French and Vietminh had reached a point at which they could be carried no further until there had been some political discussions. M. Chauvel was accordingly seeing the Vietminh representative to sound out the basis of a possible political agreement. What the French had in mind was a sort of de facto partition which would leave a sufficiently viable non-Communist part of Vietnam, but would also maintain the de jure principle of the unity of Vietnam, on which both Vietnam and Vietminh were in agreement. For this and other purposes, it would be necessary to agree to some kind of non-Communist enclave in North Vietnam. What the French had in mind was Haiphong. Another French condition was that the two bishoprics in the Delta near Haiphong would be, as it were, neutralised, and so retain the sort of independent status they had preserved throughout the fighting. But the French realised that they might be asked to make equivalent concessions in regard to Southern Vietnam.

The French were by no means optimistic about the result of these discussions, which would be extremely difficult. They felt they could only succeed if there remained the menace of American, and indeed wider, military intervention should the Geneva conversations break down. It was therefore most important, in M. Mendès France's view, that anything said after the Washington meeting should avoid giving the Communists the impression there was no danger whatever of Western military intervention.

On the other side of the picture, it was, in M. Mendès France's view, equally important — and this was addressed to the Americans rather than to us — that no immediate threat should appear to issue from Washington. The Geneva Conference must be given every opportunity to succeed, provided it were equally clear that failure at Geneva would leave everyone free to take other decisions which might be extremely unpalatable to the Communists. One of the main elements of uncertainty was the attitude of the present Vietnam Government. They were by no means eager to acquiesce in the kind of solution M. Mendès France had in mind. But, without their acquiescence, there could be no agreed solution at all. The French feared that the Americans, who were perhaps not very anxious for a

/successful
successful outcome of the Geneva Conference, might encourage Vietnam to take an unduly rigid attitude. This would clearly be most unfortunate.

M. de Crouy-Chanel told me that a communication on the above lines had also been made to the U.S. Government, although the emphasis had been slightly varied, given the rather different approach of the Americans to this problem.

M. de Crouy-Chanel then told me that he had seen Sir G. Jebb's record of the interview between M. Mendès France and Chou En-lai. It corresponded with French records, except that there was what appeared to be a misprint in the eleventh paragraph from the end. The sentence which ended "... the length of which would depend upon the events of the respective parties." should read "... on the efforts of the respective parties." M. de Crouy-Chanel added that the record did not perhaps however bring out one aspect of the problem to which M. Mendès France attached great importance. His whole conversation with Chou En-lai had been concerned with what might be termed the present "armistice" period and was not intended to commit himself or any French Government to what would happen if the Geneva talks broke down. This was a point of particular importance to M. Mendès France's remarks about American

Copies to:

June 28, 1954

Lord Reading
Mr. Nutting
Mr. Dodds-Parker
Sir H. Caccia, on return
Mr. W.D. Allen, on return
Mr. Speaight
South East Asia Department
M. de la Chevalerie of the French Embassy told me today that his Government were slightly worried about the new Vietnamese Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem.

2. Apparently the French fear that if they reach an agreement directly with the Viet Minh there may be strong objections from the Vietnamese Prime Minister and his followers, who might then look to the United States to support them. If the United States also regarded the terms proposed for a settlement as unacceptable it would cause France considerable embarrassment if they did anything to foster Vietnamese discontent. M. de la Chevalerie appears to fear the effects of American influence on Ngo Dinh Diem.

3. I said that I thought this danger had already been brought to the notice of the Secretary of State by M. Mendès-France (see Foreign Office despatch to Paris No. 546 of June 23, paragraph 4(b)). I added that if an arrangement could be reached satisfactory to France, the Viet MINH, China and the United Kingdom I thought the United States at any rate would have little title to oppose it.

Copy to Mr. Ziegler
(U.S. Department)

W. J. M. Paterson
June 28, 1954
referring control commission rather than Communist terminology of "neutral".

Chauvel is currently considering informally setting up a trilateral conference of three (France, UK and USSR) at expert level to consider and compare current proposals before control as well as negotiate ad referendum on this subject. Chauvel said Lamb somewhat reticent on this proposal and Chauvel asking Paris to instruct French Embassy in London to urge on Foreign Office. Chauvel very concerned existing wide differences on control and is trying to push toward agreement on details at least to point of refining issues for quick decision by ministers when they reconvene to consider reports of military conversations.

Chauvel reports military talks with Viet Minh on Saturday were unsatisfactory. Viet Minh allegedly worried about change in French Government and wishes assurance Chauvel, Brebisson and others fully qualified to speak for new government. Chauvel says he has reported this to Paris and expects following cabinet meeting this afternoon, "it will be taken care of" but result, according to Chauvel is loss of two days in military talks. Further complicating factor is absence of authorized representatives of new Vietnamese Government.

Re recently opened military discussions between belligerents in field, Chauvel stated that until talks here have made further progress he unable to see what can be achieved in field other than establishment of contact and necessary facilities.

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The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1954—7 p. m.

4850. Re Deptel 4852 repeated Geneva Tosec 489 and Saigon 2746.

In concert with your U.K. colleague you should further instruct Department make parallel communication following reply to French aide-memoire set forth refelt. This reply has been cleared by Eden and we expect Churchill's concurrence tomorrow morning.

In drafting this reply below we had in mind that it should tend to stiffen French position so that they would not accept terms which we would be unwilling respect. (FYI U.K. sending a similar message. Jebb but is informing him that he may orally add that HMG would be willing if French Government desires to give diplomatic support to French Government in order secure an agreement on line set forth above joint instruction below. This we are unwilling to do as we informed British. End FYI.)

BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT. The U.S. Government/HMG have taken note of the French Government's communication. They appreciate being informed of this expression of the French Government's position in the current negotiations for an armistice agreement on Indo-China. The U.S. Government/HMG would be willing to respect an agreement which:

1. Preserves the integrity and independence of Laos and Cambodia and assures the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces therefrom;
2. Preserves at least the southern half of Vietnam, and if possible, the southern part of the country, within the current French position, and in this connection we would be unwilling to see the line of division of responsibility drawn further south than a line running generally west from Donghai;
3. Does not impose on Laos, Cambodia or retained Vietnam any restrictions materially impairing their capacity to maintain stable non-Communist regimes; and especially restrictions impairing their right to maintain adequate forces for internal security, to import arms and to employ foreign advisers;
4. Does not contain political provisions which would risk loss of the retained area to Communist control;
5. Does not exclude the possibility of the ultimate unification of Vietnam by peaceful means;
6. Provides for the peaceful and humane transfer, under international supervision, to those people desiring to be moved from one zone to another of Vietnam;
7. Provides effective machinery for international supervision of the agreement. END TEXT.

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1 Repeated to London as telegram 7147, to Saigon as telegram 2748, and to Geneva as telegram Tosec 490.
2 Supra.

DULLES

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1954—7:10 p. m.

4850. Following is translation aide-memoire delivered by Bonnet to Secretary and Eden June 26. Text coordinated US-UK reply contained next following message.

"The coming weeks will be of decisive importance insofar as Indo-China is concerned. Following his conversation with Mr. Chou En-lai, the head of the French Government has instructed M. Chauvel to approach M. Pham Van Dong with a view to carrying on with him direct negotiations to ascertain whether a basis can be found, in his opinion, for a territorial settlement in Vietnam or not."

1 Drafted by McBride of EUR/W. Repeated to London as telegram 7147, to Saigon as telegram 2748, and to Geneva as telegram Tosec 490.
"The objective of the French Government is to arrive at a regrouping which will assure the State of Vietnam a territory as solid as possible, and without the de facto division which will result being too cut up. That is the reason why the French Government will insist on maintaining Haiphong as long as possible and on obtaining the neutralization of the bishoprics of Bui Chu and Phat Dien.

"It is difficult to predict the result of this negotiation in which the French authorities must face two sorts of difficulties: on the one hand, it will be most difficult to obtain concessions from the Viet Minh in the north; and on the other hand the negotiations risk causing, if the agreement is concluded, dangerous reactions by the Vietnamese Government whose citizens are serving at the present time under the orders of the French command, comprising a major proportion thereof.

"The French Prime Minister feels that the allied American and British Governments should be as well informed as possible of these possibilities. M. Mendes-France wishes especially to call the attention of these two Governments to the following aspects of the situation:

"(1) If the Viet Minh appears disposed to negotiate, it is for a series of reasons among which figure without doubt the fear of a spreading of the conflict, a spreading which nothing at the present time would lead us to expect, but which the general world situation does not permit us to exclude. Although the fear of such an extension of the conflict may have a determining influence on the decisions of our adversaries, the French Government realizes that precise declarations on this subject are not possible at this time. But it considers it would be very useful if the final communiqué of the Anglo-American talks in Washington could state in some fashion or other that, if it is not possible to reach a reasonable settlement at the Geneva Conference, a serious aggravation of international relations would result.

"(2) The problem which is posed with regard to Vietnam is different. It is to be feared that any solution providing for an indefinite period a division of the country will cause a violent and unreasoning reaction on the part of the Vietnamese patriots. While this reaction may be in a large measure inevitable, every effort should nevertheless be made to canalize this reaction in a direction in conformity with the interests of Vietnam, France and their allies.

"To this end it appears highly desirable to the Prime Minister of France to obtain the assurance of the United States Government that nothing will be done by the latter which might even implicitly encourage such a reaction. Under present circumstances, such action could lead to no result but to ruin any hope of seeing Vietnam consolidate herself in such a fashion as to create in the face of the Viet Minh an authentically national and independent force. It is for this reason that the French Government strongly hopes it can count on the United States at the proper moment to intervene with the Vietnamese to counsel upon them wisdom and self-control and to dissuade them from refusing an agreement which, if it is reached, is dictated not by the spirit of abandoning them, but on the contrary by the desire to save in Indochina all that can possibly be saved, and to give the Vietnamese state, under peaceful conditions, opportunities which have not always been possible heretofore because of the war."
which, if it is reached, is dictated in no small part of abandoning them, but on the contrary be able to save in Indochina all that can possibly be saved of it by the Vietnamese state, under peaceful conditions, without any of the possibilities which have not always been possible heretofore, before the war."

DULLES
JUNE 29, 1954

360.1 GE/6-2954: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 29, 1954—noon.

Secto 540. Repeated information Paris 516, London 321, Saigon 223. Tosec 489 1 and 490. 2 USDel notes that numbered paragraph 3 in US-UK communication states that agreement must not impose on "re-tained Vietnam" restrictions on importation of arms. 3 It has been generally understood that conference that one of functions of International Control Commission would be prevention of importation of reinforcing troops and arms after cessation of hostilities and during period of international control. Only contemplated exception has been in case of Cambodia and Laos where modest importations for self-defense purposes have been envisaged. French delegation has made point at different times of need to supervise closely frontier between Vietnam and China in order to prevent strengthening Viet Minh forces. So far as "re-tained Vietnam" is concerned, it seems doubtful that French will be able to obtain any provisions for unrestricted arms importation which would not be equally applicable in case of Viet Minh area. Would appreciate clarification.

JOHNSON

1 Telegram Tosec 489 to Geneva sent as telegram 4552 to Paris, June 28, supra.
2 Telegram Tosec 490 to Geneva sent as telegram 4553 to Paris, June 28, p. 1236.
3 The Department of State in telegram Tosec 500, June 30, referring to telegram Secto 540, informed the U.S. Delegation that "Numbered paragraph three of US-UK communication is intended refer to maintenance of defenses adequate to preserve internal security in Associated States. We have in mind difficulty you mention re Vietminh area."
SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO SAIGON

Cypher/OTP

D. 5.50 p.m. June 29, 1954

SECRET

No. 375
June 29, 1954

Following is translation of text of aide mémoire contained in Washington telegram No. 1301 [of June 27] to Foreign Office.

Begins:

The coming weeks will be of decisive importance as regards Inde-China. Following his conversation with Mr. Chou En-lai, the head of the French Government has instructed M. Chauvel to approach M. Phan Van Dong in order to conduct direct negotiations with him on the basis of which it will be seen whether a territorial solution is possible in Vietnam or not. The object of the French Government is to obtain a regrouping which would assure the Vietnamese State as water-tight (étanche), a territory as possible, without the de facto division which would result therefore having too clear cut (tranché) a character. That is why the French Government will insist on keeping Haiphong as long as possible and on obtaining a neutralisation of the bishoprics of Bu Côn and of Phat Dieu. It is not easy to foresee the outcome of this negotiation in which the French authorities must face up to two kinds of difficulties: on the one hand they will have the greatest difficulty in obtaining any Viet Minh concessions in the North; on the other hand, if agreement is reached, they run the risk of dangerous reactions on the part of the Vietnamese Government whose subjects, (ressortissants) are, to a very considerable extent, at present serving under the orders of the French Command. The President of the French Council hopes that the allied American and British Governments will be brought au courant as soon as possible regarding these prospects. In particular M. Mendès France wishes to draw the attention of these two Governments to the following aspects of the situation:— (1) if the Viet Minh appears disposed to negotiate, it is for a number of reasons among which is no doubt the fear of an extension of the conflict, which is not foreshadowed by anything at the present moment but which, in view
SECRET

Foreign Office telegram No. 375 to Saigon

-2-

of the general world situation, cannot be excluded. While the fear of such an extension of the fighting may have a decisive influence on the decisions of our adversaries, the French Government realizes that precise declarations on this subject are not at the moment possible. But it considers that it would be very useful if the final communiqué of the Anglo-American conversations in Washington were to indicate in one way or another that if the Geneva conference does not allow a reasonable agreement to be reached, a serious deterioration of international relations would result. (2) The problem concerning Vietnam is different. It is indeed to be feared that any solution entailing division of the country for an indefinite period would cause a violent and irrational reaction on the part of Vietnamese patriots. If such a reaction is largely inevitable, it is none the less necessary that everything should be done to direct state channels consistent with the common interests of Vietnam, France, and her allies. To this end it appears highly desirable to the President of the French Council to obtain the assurance of the Government of the United States that nothing will be done for its part which might even implicitly encourage such a reaction. In the present state of affairs, such a reaction can lead to no other result than that of destroying all hope of seeing Vietnam consolidate herself in such a way as to create in the face of the Viet Minh an authentically national and independent force. That is why the French Government desires most earnestly to be able to count on the Government of the United States when the time comes to approach the Vietnamese, advising wisdom and self control and dissuading them from refusing an agreement which, if it eventuates, [corrupt group] not by spirit of desertion but on the contrary by the desire to save everything that can be saved in Indo-China and to give the Vietnamese State, in peace, the opportunities which up till now have not always been accorded by war.

Ends.

ATTRIBUTED TO:

with East Asia Department

-0-
but no concrete suggestions or discussion developed. He said Russians appear genuinely puzzled by attitude US and USDel here, stating they not know what US wanted. (Rogers said this was good thing.)
French gained impression while Soviet insisted on inclusion Poland or Czechoslovakia and India under 3-nation composition, would be willing substitute for Indonesia non-Asian country more "neutral" on France's side.

JOHNSON

Editorial Note

On June 29 President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill of the United Kingdom issued the following declaration on common principles of Anglo-American policy:

"As we terminate our conversations on subjects of mutual and world interest, we again declare that:

"(1) In intimate comradeship, we will continue our joint efforts to secure world peace based upon the principles of the Atlantic Charter, which we reaffirm.

"(2) We, together and individually, continue to hold out the hand of friendship to any and all nations, which we solemnly pledge and confirming deeds show themselves desirous of participating in a just and fair peace.

"(3) We uphold the principle of self-government and will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire and are capable of sustaining an independent existence. To welcome the processes of development, where still needed, that would toward that goal. As regards formerly sovereign states now in bondage, we will not be a party to any arrangement or treaty which would confirm or prolong their unwilling subordination. In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure they are conducted fairly.

"(4) We believe that the cause of world peace would be advanced by general and drastic reduction under effective safeguards of world armaments of all classes and kinds. It will be our persevering resolve to promote conditions in which the prodigious nuclear forces now in human hands can be used to enrich and not to destroy the kind.

"(5) We will continue our support of the United Nations and of existing international organizations that have been established in the spirit of the Charter for common protection and security. We urge the establishment and maintenance of such associations of divided nations as will be best, in their respective regions, to preserve the peace and the independence of the peoples living there. When desired by the peoples of the affected countries we are ready to render appropriate and feasible assistance to such associations.

The text of this declaration is printed in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents, volume I, page 1707, from which the above text is taken. For documentation on Prime Minister Churchill's visit to the United States, see volume VI.

396.1 GD/G-2954: Telegram

Nineteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 29, 1954, 3 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 29, 1954—midnight.


Qam [Pham] Van Dong (Viet Minh) opened with reference Soviet suggestion first meeting that after certain agreement on principles armistice control question could be referred to committee. Dong then, without contributing any new ideas, proceeding to comparison Soviet June 14 proposal and French (Chauvel) statement June 25 to show wide area agreement. He stated "object" of control was armistice agreement. Noted that military talks making progress but political questions barely started; although he did not pursue this question he seemed to indicate necessity embodying political terms in agreement.

Basing claims on French statements of June 2 and June 25 and Soviet June 14 proposal: Dong concluded no disagreement in principle on:

(1) Regroupment,
(2) Establishment demarcation lines,
(3) Establishment demilitarized zones,
(4) Liberation prisoners and civil internees, and
(5) Prohibition on introduction arms and troops after armistice.

Dong noted detail of Soviet proposal and stated it was good basis for discussion, although certain precisions and additions necessary. For

1 A set of minutes of this session (16 Restricted/19) are in Conference files, lot 60 D 827, CF 370. The minutes indicate that the session convened at 3 p.m. and adjourned at 5:45 p.m. The minutes are also printed in Conférence de Genève, pp. 347-355.
Dong finally stated belief conference now has basic factors with which to reach agreement in principle on control, and questions could now be referred to committee as proposed by Soviet delegate.

US delegate then made statement Secto 542.4

Chauvel followed with preliminary comment on Dong's statement. He asked for copy for more thorough study and noted several problems or deficiencies in Dong's speech:

1. To avoid confusion, term "control" should probably not be used with reference to the joint commission but rather terms such as "execution" and "implementation". "Control" is more relevant to international aspects of problem.

2. Dong's analysis omitted reference to mediation or arbitration by international control body. Even though that body may have only few occasions to act, it must have power to make compulsory recommendations.

3. Dong said that control machinery must respect national sovereignty. This is very well in normal peace time but we are dealing with abnormal situation.

Concerning Johnson's statement on Korean experience, Chauvel agreed conference must benefit by this and other experience, but observed all experiences not absolutely comparable. Chauvel then made somewhat cryptic remark about guarantees of settlement, saying this is complicated problem on which some data may still be lacking. He suggested this problem might well be reserved for return of heads of delegations.

In closing, Chauvel remarked French delegation now engaged on work on entire control question and welcomes suggestions from other delegates.

After recess, Cambodian delegate, Sam Sary, spoke briefly. He endorsed French proposal for establishment of committee of experts and agreed with Soviet recommendation that conference provide experts with a list of questions. He saw no need, however, for more restricted conference sessions to formulate such questions, as Soviets had proposed.

Cambodian delegate then made following points concerning supervision of armistice:

1. Each Indochinese state should have separate international control commission. He agreed with French suggestion that coordination between three commissions could be achieved by special body, but hoped that such body would act solely in liaison capacity and have no authority over country commissions. Liaison body could, he suggested, work through secretariats of three country commissions.

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4 These and following words in brackets supplied from the verbatim record of the Nineteenth Restricted Session.

4 Infra.
mission in Korea consists of four members, two of whom are not impartial, obviously is responsible for the state of deadlock of the commission there; but even if an odd number of nations were to compose the commission, such as five or three, the probability of deadlock, especially on important issues, would be no less great if one member could veto the decisions of the rest. The solution is not to suggest that the supervisory commission operate according to majority vote on some issues and by unanimity on others, since the "other issues" are obviously the important ones and those on which deadlock would be most harmful to the maintenance of peace.

A third lesson of the experience with control in Korea is that the two belligerent sides, represented in the military armistice commission, have not been able to work out their differences between themselves. I will not dwell here on why this has been so. Irrespective of why the military armistice commission in Korea has been unable to correct the situation of inadequate supervision, we must recognize that some provision must be made to resolve differences between the two parties when they occur. In Korea the neutral nations supervisory commission has not performed and cannot perform this function. The lesson we have learned is that both sides must invest in an impartial body the authority to render decisions when agreement between the sides cannot be reached. As Ambassador Chauvel so effectively pointed out last Friday, both sides can demonstrate their good faith in a real sense by accepting the mediator role of a truly impartial body.

As the US delegation has frequently stated, it believes that if the entirely reasonable proposal that the UN carry out this role is not accepted, the five countries of India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon should be acceptable to all parties genuinely interested in restoring and maintaining peace in Indochina.

JOHNSON
Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the Central Committee, “Briefing on the meeting by the Chinese, Soviet and Vietnamese delegations,” 29 June 1954

Record No: 206-00046-37 (1)

(top secret)

Chairman Mao!), Comrade Liu Shaoqi), and the Central Committee, Zhou Enlai), Zhang Wentian), and Wang Jiaxiang):

The Chinese, Soviet and Vietnamese delegations, following the usual practice, held a joint meeting at 11:00 am on June 29. The main points of the meeting are reported here as follows:

(1) Comrade Kuznetsov mentioned that he had a meeting yesterday afternoon with Chauvel, head of the French delegation. Chauvel said that the proposed solution put forward by the Vietnamese side at the meeting of the chief military representatives of the two sides on the 28th asked too much, which had made him quite uneasy. Chauvel further said that as this was the first meeting, it was natural that they (the Vietnamese) asked for a very high price, so as to get the right compensation. Kuznetsov said to him: you proposed the 18th parallel, and that would not work either; and he proposed that the French and the Vietnamese delegations should contact directly to get the problem solved. Chauvel again said that he did not understand why they [the Vietnamese] had put forward such a high request. He said that as a matter of fact, the central part of Vietnam was with a small population and not so large a value, why did they want to have it? Kuznetsov then asked: If it is of high value, why do you not mention it? Kuznetsov further said: I hope that you [the French and the Vietnamese] will have a talk about the whole situation of the three countries [of Indochina] within this week, so as to achieve a solution.

(2) According to Kuznetsov, a member of the French delegation released to Comrade Novikov: whether the question of members of the committee of supervision by countries of neutrality could be composed by India, Poland, and Canada. This way, [the committee would have] a member of North America, a member of Asia, and a member of Europe. The person who released the opinion said that this was only his personal opinion. It is reported that Chauvel has had discussions with British and American delegations about the question of the members [of the committee]. It is estimated that the introduction of the plan to include Canada is possibly the opinion of the United States, or possibly the shared opinion of Britain and the United States. It seems that France is not against this plan. After discussing [the plan] within our delegation, it seems that if we accept the plan of forming the committee of supervision by countries of neutrality composed of India, Poland, and Canada, it is not unfavorable to us. And we may use this opportunity to try to pull Canada [toward us]. The other side has not formally put forward the proposal. We hope that the Central Committee will study this and then instruct us [what to do], so that we will get prepared.

(3) At today’s meeting, Comrade Pham Van Dong once introduced the idea of focusing the discussion more on economic interests, and directing the discussion less toward the zone division issue. Kuznetsov did not say much about this issue, and he only said that they [the Soviets] would give further consideration to it. Our delegation then had an internal discussion, and we are of the opinion that at the present time the zone division issue remains a key issue concerning Vietnam and Laos, and to ask for too little will be disadvantageous, and to ask for too much will block the overall agreement. Therefore, we hope that the meeting at Nanning should make an early decision on this issue, and inform the Vietnamese delegation and us as early as possible, so that the negotiation process will be pushed forward.

Li Kenong,
29 June 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft: Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Mr. Krishna Menon called this morning in reply to a request for information about what had been agreed between ourselves and the Americans during the visit of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State. I said that my information was incomplete and that the Indian Government would be receiving an account from us either in Delhi or in Washington. Mr. Menon did not press me and went on to volunteer some information about Mr. Chou En-lai's talks with Mr. Nehru. He expressed this information in a series of general statements which can be summarised as follows:

1. We could rest assured that the Indians had in no way compromised us. On the contrary when Mr. Chou En-lai had volunteered that it was possible to talk with the British, the Indians had encouraged them along this line of thought. Mr. Menon thought that the process of liberalising Mr. Chou En-lai had been advanced by the Delhi visit.

2. We could feel assured that the Chinese would not make trouble for us in Malaysia.

3. The Indians felt confident that the Chinese would not play the game in Indo-China and would not step up military operations while the French-Viet-Minh negotiations were in progress.

4. There could be no question of the Viet Minh evacuating the delta. On the other hand the Communists would not press for the evacuation of Saigon.

5. The Chinese would not agree to a partition of Viet Nam. The future of the territory would have to be decided by elections.

All the above points, I think, cross in connexion with the Nehru-Chou En-lai talks. Mr. Menon then went on, speaking I think for himself, to express the hope that the Geneva discussions would be resumed soon at a higher level. In particular he hoped that the Secretary of State would return to Geneva.

Finally Mr. Menon said that he was very suspicious of the real motives behind the recent American expressions of anti-colonialism. He thought that the Americans might be creating an atmosphere which would enable them to send arms to Cambodia and Laos to help them liberate themselves from the French. If American arms were sent to Cambodia and Laos the Chinese would undoubtedly respond by giving more help to the Viet Minh.

(Signed) FIRBON DIAM

Mr. Cristianide
Mr. Beautelthon
June 30, 1954
From Paris to Foreign Office

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITHEALL SECRET (CABINET)
DISTRIBUTION

Sir G. Jebb
No. A61
June 30, 1954.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to U.K.H.C. Ottawa telegram No. 3 of June 30
Repeated for information to Foreign Office Washington
Code Geneva Saigon
Singapore

Following for Secretary of State,

Washington telegram No. 174 to me: Indo-China.

The American Ambassador and I agreed that I should deliver

to M. Mendès-France an aide-mémoire in the terms of Washington
telegram No. 1303 to Foreign Office, and that the Americans would
content themselves with subsequently handing an identical paper
to M. Parodi. Dillon confessed that he was rather embarrassed
by not being able to make the oral communication which I was
authorized to make, since he believed that the one thing that
French wanted was some American undertaking that they would, if
necessary, bring pressure to bear on the Viet Nam Government to
accept an arrangement on lines suggested between the French and
the Viet Minh. I accordingly saw M. Mendès-France at 11 a.m.
and handed him the document, subsequently making the oral
communication.

2. M. Mendès-France asked me in the first place to express
his great gratitude to you and the Prime Minister for the public
statement which he said had been exactly what he wanted. As
for the aide-mémoire, it seemed to him also to be entirely on
the right lines, but he would ask M. Parodi to give me in a day
or two's time the official reactions of the Quai d'Orsay after a
more profound study of the document. The only remark in connexion
with it that he would make at the moment was that he imagined
that the first sentence of paragraph 3 did not mean that the
United Kingdom and the United States Governments would consider


/that
SECRET

Paris telegram No. 461 to Foreign Office

-2-

that agreement between the French and the Viet Minh to hold supervised elections in Viet Nam would "materially impair" the capacity of the Free Viet Nam Government to "maintain a satisfactory non-Communist regime"? I said that I did not think myself that it could bear this construction.

3. After the line of latitude of Dong Hoi had been verified on the map, M. Mendès-France then said that the present state of the negotiations was that the French were insisting on the 18th parallel and the Viet Minh on the 15th. The French, however, had considerable reason to suppose that Communist insistence on the 13th parallel was a bluff, and that what the Viet Minh were really thinking of was the 16th parallel, which I rather think he referred to as the Potsdam line. Unfortunately, from the French point of view, the 16th parallel was not a good frontier to defend militarily if the war should ever be resumed. From the military point of view in fact the 18th parallel was far superior. He had, however, now told his experts to try to find some line between the 18th and the 13th parallels which would be defensible from the military point of view and they were at present engaged in this study.

4. As regards the elections, the position was that the Viet Minh were sticking out for holding them not later than six months after the conclusion of the armistice. The French had said they could not possibly agree to this and had proposed a formula which would result in their being held from 17 to 22 months after the end of hostilities. He did not think that they (the French) could or should agree to any period of less than about 15 months. Here again it was evident that some compromise would have to be reached if progress was to be made.

5. Generally speaking, M. Mendès-France said that he did not know whether the other side were simply trying to wear out the negotiations until the last possible minute (i.e., until July 19) in the hope of forcing him to make more concessions in the interval, or whether they had a serious negotiation in mind which would give a real prospect of arriving at agreement before July 20. In principle, of course, he would like to have it out
SECRET

Paris Telegram No. 461 to Foreign Office

-9-

with Mr. Pham Van Dong in some private talk at Geneva, but it was impossible for him to go to Geneva in the absence of at least one other leader of a Western delegation.

Foreign Office pass immediate to U.K.K.C. Ottawa priority to Washington, Codel Geneva, routine to Saigon and Singapore as my telegrams Nos. 3, 290, 107, 38 and 33 respectively.


ADVANCE COPIES

Private Secretary
Minister of State
Sir P. Roberts
Mr. Speaight
Head of South East Asia Department
Resident Clerk.

LLLLL/vvvvv
"go-between" role with Soviets which Chauvel thinks important. Massigli has discussed the matter with Reesing but had not received definite reply.

Chauvel said Offroy had been discussing control matters with Novikov but apparently no positive results yet reached.

French delegation being strengthened by LaTournelle who is arriving this afternoon.

JOHNSON

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 1, 1954—9 p.m.

Secto 550. Repeated information Paris 4, Saigon 2, Moscow 1. Paris eyes only Ambassador; Saigon eyes only McLintock; Moscow eyes only Ambassador. Department limit distribution. Following lunch today, Kuznetsov initiated discussion and set forth at length Soviet views regarding composition and authority international commission. (Novikov and Lavrov were also absent but took part in substantive conversation. Bongard, Getz and Yager accompanied me.) Conversation was completely friendly and frank in tone.

On composition, he expressed incomprehension at US opposition to such Communist powers as Poland and Czechoslovakia. He said commission must include powers acceptable to Viet Minh and made clear Soviets will continue insist on inclusion Communist element. He said Colombo powers did not meet this definition although Viet Minh willing to accept some of them. He particularly pushed Molotov's three-power proposal (India, Poland or Czechoslovakia and Indonesia), as some other Asiatic state), as a reasonable compromise.

I replied as forcefully as possible stressing firmness our position on composition and making clear that I was not only expressing views US Government but strong personal convictions based upon my intimate experience with Korean armistice. I pointed out that disregarding controversial question of ideology, evident close coordination between Chinese and North Koreans on one hand Poles and Czechs as other, the latter in no case ever finding even most minor flaw in Chinese and North Korean performance while Swedes and Swiss had not hesitated call their shots against UNC when they felt it justified. I pointed out conclusions on unworkability Korean system not only for US but of Swedes and Swiss. I also pointed out composition must not only be acceptable Viet Minh side and stressed reasonableness of Colombo powers, none of which could be characterized as partisans of France or expected act as such, none of which had recognized either Vietnam or Viet Minh and all of which were Asiatic states.

On subject role of international commission, Kuznetsov stated Chauvel had made considerable step forward in direction meeting Viet Minh requirements in that he had abandoned thesis joint commissions composed of belligerents should be "subordinate" to international commission. According to him, sticking point now is insistence that decisions of international commission should be mandatory so far as belligerents concerned.

Kuznetsov stated this unacceptable and proposed that international commission make "recommendations", either by unanimous or majority vote depending on cases, and that, if these unacceptable to either side, matter be referred to guarantors. I stressed impracticibility as would introduce delay and controversy precisely in cases where urgent clear-cut decisions and action vital if cessation hostilities to be preserved and revival of war to be avoided. I added, for purpose of debate, that since Kuznetsov had said French had made considerable step forward in narrowing gap on this point, it was now up to other side to take similar step. I expressed hope that good faith with which parties approach armistice would reduce controversy and violations to minimum but stressed importance that, as evidence such good faith, parties should beforehand agree to abide by decisions or, if Kuznetsov preferred the term, recommendations of international commission.

I also pointed impracticability attempting separate these issues upon which majority and unanimous votes would be required. No matter how carefully prior definition carried out commission would probably be tied up in hopeless procedural wrangle on which category any given case fell just at time decisions most urgently needed. Also stressed that category of cases for which Soviets envisaged unanimous decisions was just the category in which it would be most important commission be able act quickly without being blocked by requirement for unanimous decision. Important point was not perfection of decision from standpoint both sides but ability quickly reach decision when most needed. In reply, Kuznetsov said this would mean that views of only part of commission would be imposed on one side and this unacceptable. He said neither side should be subject to "commands" of commission.

I avoided discussion of role of guarantor states.

Kuznetsov alleged we had rejected Molotov's June 14 proposal without adequate analysis and study on purely political grounds. I denied this and said that our interest was solely in direction of assisting in finding practical and effective system international supervision.

I feel conversation should be of some helpfulness in additionally impressing Soviets with firmness our positions as well, I hope in some
small degree, with their logical basis. However, I am under no illusions as to effectiveness our logic in shaking their Communist convictions (and instructions). As was to be expected, on his part Kuznetsov showed no slightest sign of ability or willingness to shift from any present Soviet positions.

JOHNSTON

751G.00/8-3054 : Telegram

TOP SECRET

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1954—5:35 p.m.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

8. Re Embtel 5117.

1. Partition line taken from Five Power Conference report and Dong Hoï used as point of reference to avoid confusion between two systems, French and English, of parallels. Actual line thought of forms triangular promontory with apex at about 20th parallel (French system).

2. Implication paragraph on timing elections due to use of expression “final settlement and troop withdrawal” is that Mendes-France thinking of withdrawing entire French Expeditionary Corps from all of Viet Nam within next six months. “Withdrawal” on other hand, could mean deployment into agreed regroupment areas. Does Mendes seek agreement allowing reasonably in retained Viet Nam those Expeditionary Troops withdrawn from Tonkin and indefinite maintenance in retained Viet Nam of French forces now stationed there or are French prepared agree withdraw from all Viet Nam all French forces within matter of months? This requires full and urgent clarification.

3. Dillon with Mendes and Johnson with Chauvel should urgently seek such clarification.

DULLES

1 Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA.
2 Dated June 24, 1954.
3 Dated June 26, 1954.
4 In telegram Tosec 495, June 30, the Department of State informed Johnson that in light French aide-memoire (Tosec 499), Joint United States—United Kingdom reply thereto which was now approved, and decision set up United States—United Kingdom study group (Deptel 1154 to Geneva (not printed), approve your continuing as head USDel on present basis until further notice.” (Conference files, lot 80 D 627, CP 253)
5 Tosec 490 to Geneva sent as telegram 4833 to Paris, June 28, 1954.

DULLES

1751G.00/8-3054 : Telegram

39S.1 GE/7-254 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

GRENADA, July 1, 1954—1 p.m.

SECRET

Communist bloc efforts impose Indochina agreement from which we might feel obliged dissociate ourselves.

In particular, we desire you continue urge French delegation stand firm on question international control commission (UN or Colombo powers) and other conditions listed numbered paragraphs Tosec 490.

DULLES

1 Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA.
2 Dated June 24, 1954.
3 Dated June 26, 1954.
4 In telegram Tosec 495, June 30, the Department of State informed Johnson that in light French aide-memoire (Tosec 499), Joint United States—United Kingdom reply thereto which was now approved, and decision set up United States—United Kingdom study group (Deptel 1154 to Geneva (not printed), approve your continuing as head USDel on present basis until further notice.” (Conference files, lot 80 D 627, CP 253)
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5 Tosec 490 to Geneva sent as telegram 4833 to Paris, June 28, 1954.
United Kingdom Delegation to
the Geneva Conference,
Villa les Ormeaux,
Geneva.

July 1, 1954.

I had an interesting and very frank
discussion last night with Cheysson of the French
Delegation who is very close to M. Mendès-France
and who had recently seen him in Paris.

2. First he gave me in greater detail the
information about the military talks contained
in paragraph 3 of Paris telegram No. 5 to Ottawa
of June 30. He said that it was the Vietminh
military and their Vice-Minister of Defense (who
was not a Communist) who were proving the most
obdurate. It was noticeable that Pham Van Dong
himself was much more reasonable. It is interesting
that when the French had remarked to Wang Ping-nan
of the Chinese Delegation that some of the Vietminh
were being very difficult, the former had commented
that Dong alone had authority here to speak for the
Vietminh. Cheysson also told me that although the
Vietminh were being unyielding in the military
talks, they were nevertheless pressing for two or
even three meetings a day. Seeing that the fact
of these meetings is, remarkably enough, a well-
kept secret known only to the parties concerned,
the only conclusion the French can draw is that the
Chinese are pressing the Vietminh to get on with
the military talks. The French also mentioned
that on one occasion the Vietminh telephoned shortly
before one of these secret meetings to say that the
rendezvous chosen was too close to the French
border. The Russians for their part are now
treating the French Delegation with great cordiality
but have told them that in asking for the 16th
parallel they were demanding too much. The French
take this as another indication that the Communists
want to settle for the 16th parallel.

3. Cheysson also had some interesting, if
indiscreet, things to say about the French
Delegation. He said that it was Chevalier who
right from the beginning had urged upon Bidault

Sir Hubert Graves, K.C.M.G., M.C.,
Saigon.
the need to negotiate a settlement and who
was mainly responsible for the acceptance by
Bisoul in the last days of his office of a
policy indistinguishable from that of
Menes-France. The trouble was that
temperamentally Bisoul could not always bring
himself to put the policy across, particularly
whenever he strayed from his prepared text
or made extemporary interventions in the
Conference or in speaking outside to journalists
and others. On the other hand Reux, the
Director of Asian Affairs in the Quai d'Orsay,
had always tended to follow the old Bisoul
line of pre-Genova days. This had inevitably
caused a certain amount of confusion within
the delegation.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to
Faith in Paris and Joy in Washington, and to
Paterson in South East Asia Department,

(J.G. Tahourdin)
small degree, with their logical basis. However, I am under no illusions as to effectiveness of our logic in shaking their Communist convictions (and instructions). As was to be expected, on his part Kuznetsov showed no slighted sign of ability or willingness to shift from any present Soviet positions.

JOHNSON

7510.00/6-3054: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1954—5:35 p.m.

8. Re Embtel 5117.

1. Partition line taken from Five Power Conference report and Dong-Hoi used as point of reference to avoid confusion between two systems, French and English, of parallel actual line thought of forms triangular promontory with apex at about 20th parallel (French system).

2. Implication paragraph on timing actions due to use of expression “final settlement and troop withdrawal” is that Mendes-France thinking of withdrawing entire French Expeditionary Corps from all of Viet Nam within next six months “Withdrawal”, on other hand, could mean deployment into agreed regroupment areas. Does Mendes seek agreement allowing readiness in retained Viet Nam those Expeditionary Troops withdrawn from Tonkin and infinite maintenance in retained Viet Nam French forces now stationed there or are French prepared agreed to withdraw from all Viet Nam all French forces within matter of months? This requires full and urgent clarification.

3. Dillon with Mendes and Johnson with Chauvel should urgently seek such clarification.

DULLES

1 Drafted by Field of EUR/WE. Repeated to Saigon as telegram 15 and to Geneva as telegram 396.

2 In telegram 5117 from Paris, June 30, Ambassador Dillon reported on a discussion between British Ambassador to France Sir Gladwyn Jebb and French Ambassador to France Sir. (7510.00/6-3054)

4 In telegram 490, June 30, the Department of State informed Johnson that “in light French Ytte-né.-a.-a.-t.-i.-e. (Tosec 480), joint United States–United Kingdom report, which has now approved, and decision set up United States–United Kingdom study group (Dept. 1154 to Geneva [not printed]), approve your continuing to head US mission on present basis until further notice.” (Confidential files, lot 94, 02/7, 02/23)

7510.00/6-3054: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1954—5:35 p.m.

Tosec 507. Eyes only Johnson. Reference Tosec 478, 480, and 495.

In withdrawing basic instructions, and, in instructing you not take part in work of any ad hoc council, we did not mean to imply you should cease exert all possible influence on French to resist Blum bloc efforts impose Indochina agreement from which we feel obliged dissociate ourselves.

In particular, desire you continue urge French delegation stand firm on question international control commission (UN or Colombo powers) and other conditions listed numbered paragraphs Tosec 490.

DULLES

7510.00/6-3054: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, July 2, 1954—1 p.m.

Secto 552. Repeated information Paris 05, Saigon 03. Tran Van Do has called on US Delegation to state he is personal representative of Ngo Dinh Diem and is taking charge Vietnamese Delegation here. His status will be regularized when Diem forms his cabinet. Do is generally critical of previous Vietnamese political and military efforts and of French attitude toward those efforts. He is aware that before present Government can expect to enlist greater measure of outside support, it must prove that it has internal strength and support. He is also aware of extremely short time at Diem’s disposal. Do informed

1 The Embassy in Saigon reported in telegram 79, July 6, that “Tran Van Do has been named Foreign Minister new Vietnamese Government.” Embassy reported that Do’s “views on political scene in Vietnam have usually been interesting but always pessimistic. He has been fence sitter and regarded as intellectual and talker rather than doer.” Embassy said he was “believed to have been friend for considerable time of brother of President Diem, Ngo Dinh Luong, and to share his view.” (7510.02/7-654)
US that Vietminh here has refused any contact with Vietnamese Delegation (Do is known only to members US Delegation here as plausible fence-sitter; any information available to Paris and Saigon re his present status would be appreciated).

JOHN

JOHNSON

JOHNSON

G Chủ tịch: TELEGRAM

Twenty First Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, July 2, 3 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State 1

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, July 2, 1954—8 p.m.


Lamb observed that as result of last four meetings conference has clear idea of remaining tasks. Hoped today further progress would be made especially concerning relations between joint commission and international supervisory commission but need much goodwill in order reach satisfactory conclusion.

Chauvel (France) followed saying he too believed we are on path where agreement may be foreseen but he not yet ready offer more precise definitions or specific solutions. Most can be know said we seeking distinguish problems of joint aspect of control and neutral aspect of control. This broaches delicate problem of way decisions to be taken in important cases.

Chauvel stated he has in back of mind possible way to solve voting problem but not ready set it forth. Said would not make positive contribution to debate today.

Kuznetsov (USSR) then made following comment on control.

1. Relationship between joint and international commissions. Said on June 14, Soviets attempted define duties both commissions and relationship between them. Relation would not be that of subordination but each would carry on autonomously. Certain delegates have resisted this idea. French apparently do not insist upon subordination concept and other delegations also now appear not to do so. This testifies to certain rapprochement. We should then be able agree on draft on principle that two commissions work side by side.

2. Procedure for implementation of recommendations of international supervisory commission.

Some have expressed opinion armed forces will be needed to implement recommendations. We against this since would mean in effect occupation Vietnam, violation of sovereignty, and could restart war. Now apparently none of delegations proposes international commission have armed forces. No need stress binding nature of recommendations. Asked delegations, especially French, re-examine this question.

3. Decisions of the international supervisory commission.

French have proposed that supervisory commissions in addition to making recommendations, should make reports which if not unanimous could be made in form of majority and minority reports. Soviets proposed decisions be made not by majority vote but by agreement of all members. Seems French position remains same as before but desirable receive from French clarifications this point.

4. Composition of international supervisory commission.

Kuznetsov dwelled on June 29 US statement which he claimed attempted discredit NNSC and "reiterated outworn, long-since refuted arguments". Many documents distributed among delegations. If difficulties exist in NNSC that explained by fact US not only has not assisted commission but puts obstacles in way. Important thing is American command must stop obstructionist policy concerning NNSC. US considers as impartial only those countries which act as US desires.

In summary, Kuznetsov saw rapprochement concerning questions: (1) Inter-relationship of two commissions; (2) lack of need armed forces at disposal supervisory commission. On other hand, we are far apart on composition neutral supervisory commission and on method of resolving disagreements arising in commissions.

Chauvel then spoke again pointing out that Kuznetsov stated conference could today take "decision". We cannot take decisions as such. This is question of terminology. Cannot now say anything final on important question procedure of neutral control commission. We need to know what is to be controlled, need terms of reference and how body will act. Suppose neutral body would have to take decisions and would have to do something in case of disagreement. Could we not conceive this aspect from angle of law which is compulsory itself or if sides delegate to body powers of arbitration presume they will accept that arbitration. Goodwill is best guarantee for implementation of armistice.

1 A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/20) in Conference files/lot 60 D 627, CP 270. The minutes indicate that the session convened at 8 p.m. and adjourned at 5:40 p.m. The minutes are also printed in Conference de Genève, pp. 555-561.
agreement and must function with respect both bodies. Perfect machinery may become clogged. Question of what to do in case serious disagreement is not simple matter. At this point we do not seek specific formula so much as correct description on case. Not ready now make proposal but may be at next meeting.

During his intervention Chauvel, in obvious reference to Kuznetsov's attempt to indicate closeness of agreement between French and Soviet positions on relation of international and joint commissions, made statement to effect he could not necessarily be bound by impromptu remarks during course of debate.

After the recess, Lamb (UK) spoke briefly, and said that fact UK delegate had not intervened does not mean UK delegate subscribes to view that question of subordination in relation between mixed and international commissions is not a serious one. UK delegation reserves its position on this. What UK delegate wants, he said, is system that works best. UK delegate has not changed its view that international commission must have mandatory power in order to expedite decision. He concluded by saying UK delegation is studying various proposals and has not adopted any particular viewpoint.

Buu King (Kīnlā) (Vietnam) spoke next noting that after weeks on debate differences are still profound. His delegation, he said, considered principles of efficiency and impartiality fundamental to system of control. He then referred to comments of other delegates that control system should be compatible with principle of national independence, and pointed out that it is not same for country to accept limitation of its sovereignty for benefit of another state as it is to do so in interests of peace. He referred to cases in international law where sovereignty is limited in interests of peace, and cited 26 September 1953 Vishinsky speech in UNGA in which latter said international control should be applied to control of atomic energy.

Turning to subjects of composition and functions of neutral commission and its relation to joint commission, he asked if Soviet proposal would result in selection truly impartial countries. He subscribed to Eden's speech in Commons 21 June 1954 in which Eden said neutral commission composed of two Communist and two neutral would not work. He then asked whether neutral commission as proposed by Soviet delegation would be efficient and concluded that if unanimity rule were applied to important questions commission could be paralyzed by one state. As far as giving joint commission control responsibility, he said his delegation warned against this in light of sad memories of 1946. To assume mutual good faith is an illusion and a danger. After eight years of fighting difficult to imagine both sides will cease to dis-trust each other. Therefore, his delegation, he said, cannot accept parallel relation between commissions, and supports UK view on this point. In conclusion, he stated that only an international body can perform control function, and that a UN agency would be best.

There being no further speakers, session adjourned at 1740, and will resume on 6 July.

JOHNSON

396.1 GR/7-154 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1954—4:09 p.m.
Tosco 511. Reference Secto Secto 517, 544 and 549. Have you any further specific information re thinking by various delegations about possible resumption of conference at ministerial level?

DULLES

Drafted by Sturm of FRC3. Repeated to Paris as telegram 29, to London as telegram 37, and to Saigon as telegram 26.
* Dated June 24, p. 1228.
* Dated June 26, p. 1228.
* Dated July 2, p. 1228.
* The U.S. delegation's reply is contained in telegram 556, July 3, p. 1228.

751G.00/7-254 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1954—4:34 p.m.
39. ReDeptl 4852, June 28; Saigon 2746; Geneva 299. It seems to me that new Vietnamese Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem, who has reputation of uncompromising nationalist, is quite in the dark about developments critically affecting country he is trying to lead. We fear that if results of French negotiations with Communists are revealed to him as a fait accompli, the very reaction French wish to avoid will result.

You should therefore indicate concern to the French and ascertain their own intentions with respect to consulting him or minimizing his resentment and their views with respect to plans and prospects for maintaining order in South Vietnam.

DULLES

Drafted by Guillon of S/P and by Sturm of FE. Repeated to Saigon as telegram 31 and to Geneva as telegram 8.
* Dated June 28, p. 1227.
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

July 2, 1954.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Gladwyn,

The Counsellor of the French Embassy asked to see me this morning to talk about the Aide Mémoire about Indochina which you had delivered to M. Mendès France as a result of the discussions in Washington (your telegram No. 3 to Ottawa).

I had seen Lebel yesterday and given him some general background about the Washington meeting. But it was only this morning that he had received from Paris the text of your Aide Mémoire. He emphasized that he was not speaking on instructions but his personal feeling was clearly one of disappointment at what he described as the passive and reserved tone of the aide Mémoire. He suggested that the Americans might be expected to do no more than "respect" an agreement on Indochina but he thought the word came a little oddly from H.M.G. Moreover, your communication, while explaining what sort of agreement H.M.G. would respect, gave no indication either of what action might be expected of them were a different agreement or no agreement at all to be reached, or of what help they would be willing to give to assist the French Government to secure an agreement of the kind contemplated.

On the first of these points I explained to Lebel that the main problem was to bring the Americans along. It was something to have secured from them a definition of the agreement they would respect; we could not be expected to go further at the present stage and say what we would do if no such agreement could be reached. We hoped things would not come to that but if they did, it would probably be important for us to try to keep generally in line with the Americans.

As regards the second point, it emerged that the telegram which the French Embassy had received from Paris and which had also been repeated to Geneva, had made no mention at all of the supplementary oral communication which you had made to M. Mendès France explaining that H.M.G. would be willing to give diplomatic support to the French Government in order to secure an agreement on the lines indicated if the French Government wanted this. When I told Lebel about it he said that in his view this made all the difference. What had worried him was the implication that perhaps H.M.G. might now, as a result of the Washington visit, be withdrawing somewhat from the most helpful position which they had taken up at Geneva. I said that this was not so and that I knew the Secretary of State was still willing to give any help which the French Government thought he could usefully offer. The main purpose of our communication indeed, had been to strengthen the hand of M. Mendès France in his difficult negotiations. We still thought that provided the French side were played skillfully there was still a reasonable chance of getting an agreement on the lines indicated in our Aide Mémoire. We sincerely hoped that this would be achieved, not least because we now had an assurance that such an agreement would be respected by the United States Government.

/Sir Gladwyn Jebb, E.C.M.G., K.C.B.,
British Embassy,
Paris.
Label mentioned that he gathered the records of your conversation with M. Mendès France as well as Dillon's with Parodi had both been done by Parodi. Since Dillon did not of course make an oral communication similar to yours, although the two approaches were otherwise identical, it is just possible that your supplementary oral communication may somewhat have been missed. As I have said, there was no mention of it in the telegram which the French Embassy here received. Label said that he would make sure that Paris got the record straight. But you may also like to make sure that this is done at your end.

Yours ever,

[Signature]

W.D. Allen

P.S.
I am sending copies of this letter to Geneva and Washington.
Telegram, PRC Foreign Ministry to Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang, and Li Kenong, “The meeting between Premier Zhou and the leaders of the VWP will be relocated to Liuzhou,” 10:30, 2 July 1954

Vice Ministers Zhang and Wang, and Vice Minister Li:

The meeting with the Vietnamese comrades has been relocated to Liuzhou. Premier Zhou’s plane will take off this morning in Guangzhou, and will arrive in Liuzhou at 12:00. So this special report.

The Foreign Ministry
10:30, 2 July 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twentieth Restricted Session, July 3, 1954

Records No: 206-Y0051

Chairman Mao, Comrade Shaoqi and the Central Committee, also forwarding Zhou, Zhang and Wang:

At the twentieth restricted session on the Indochina issue on the 2nd, Kuznetsov spoke and summarized the discussion of these two weeks on the issue of supervision. Kuznetsov pointed out that the opinions of the Soviet proposal of June 4th and the French proposal of June 25th and 29th concerning the relationship between the NNSC and the joint commission became closer. In addition, other delegations now do not insist that the joint commission should work under the direction of the NNSC anymore. Opinions on definition of the functions and duties of the two commissions and the lack of need for armed forces for the NNSC became closer as well. Kuznetsov also suggested that we should make a draft resolution on the functions and duties of the two commissions that can be accepted by all the participants. However, there are serious differences on the issues of composition and the voting procedure concerning severe violation of the agreement that may cause the recommencement of hostilities. Regarding Chauvel’s previous proposal that the decision of the NNSC should have mandatory power over both sides, Kuznetsov asked Chauvel by what means we can guarantee the implementation of the mandatory power. After Kuznetsov spoke, Chauvel claimed that the conference can only reach an agreement on a certain document, but does not have the right to make a decision. Concerning the issue of the compulsory nature [of the recommendations] of the NNSC, Chauvel said that the NNSC should have the right to explain the agreement, and such explanation has legal mandatory power over both sides. Regarding the voting procedure on serious problems, Chauvel said that it was not a simple question, and he could only respond to it next time. The British delegate, Lamb, stated that Britain has not changed its original position. He said that although he had not made any statements at the two previous meetings, it does not mean that Britain agrees that the two commissions should not have subordinate relations. Bao Dai’s delegate repeated the same old story that communist countries cannot be neutral countries, and only the United Nations can guarantee effective [supervision]. The next meeting will be held on July 6.

Li Kenong
3:00, July 3, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
would consider this further. He is aware that French, British and
Soviet delegations are working on specific proposals (Secto 553).

Chauvel reports that he spoke most firmly to Dong regarding mili-
tary discussions. He said French have accepted Viet Minh proposal
that Viet Minh receive Tonkin area, including Capital, but that fur-
ther Viet Minh proposal for demarcation line is unacceptable. Chauvel
reiterated in strongest terms fact that French proposal for demarca-
tion line just north of Dong Hoi would be acceptable to conference
and would thus eliminate danger of extension of war. (Chauvel stated
to Bonsal that of course French would have to hold Haiphong and
adjacent zones for considerable period.)

Dong raised question of Viet Minh troops and sympathizers in area
south of Faifo. Chauvel stated he assumed regular troops would be
evacuated and others would return to their villages. He said that pre-
sumably there would be no objection to any persons desiring to do so
removing to Viet Minh controlled territory. (Bonsal expressed interest
and emphasized United States view this subject as set forth para-
graphs of aide-mémoire contained Department telegram 4853.)

Dong endeavored to raise question of eventual political settlement,
but Chauvel stated that in present discussions must be limited to mili-
tary matters and reaching of armistice. He stressed purpose of present
conversation is to make arrangements for removal from Tonkin of
300,000 Franco-Vietnamese troops. He said that French have no ag-
gressive military intentions, although obviously it is essential for
French to reinforce their position both by regrouping their forces in
delta and by measures agreed on in Paris in order to insure so far as
possible, security of their troops. (He told Bonsal he did not believe
either French or Viet Minh would take aggressive military action
under present circumstances.)

Alluding to political matters, Chauvel took occasion to point out to
Dong that elections have not yet been held in Communist China and
that Dong would probably agree on need for considerable period of
pacification and reconstruction before elections would be held. Dong
made no comment.

Chauvel read Bonsal passages from letter he had received from
Mendes-France indicating that French negotiators should avoid ap-
pearance of overeasiness to reach settlement. Deadline date of
July 20 which Mendes-France has set himself is not so pressing as to
induce French to accept Viet Minh proposal of thirteenth parallel.

1 Dated July 2, p. 1278.
2 Dated June 23, p. 1269.
3 French Premier Mendes-France made the announcement in the National As-
sembley on June 17; see the editorial note, p. 1126.
In view Department telegram 9,1 Bonsal drew Chauvel's attention to presence here of new Vietnamese representative Tran Van Do and to latter's interest in seeing Chauvel. (Chauvel apparently not fully informed by his subordinates on this score.)

JOHNSON

1 Department of State telegram 9 to Geneva, July 2, sent as telegram 39 to Paris, p. 1275.

364.1 GE/T-354 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, July 3, 12:35 p.m.

Secto 556. Repeated information Paris 9, London 8, 12. Tosec 511.1 Thinking here appears to be generally that a new representative comes up with substantive reports every 1 day period, Ministers will meet soon thereafter. Reports by Shortov will return about July 8 fairly wide-spread. Chauvel and Bonsal passage from letter he had received from Moscow to effect latter anticipated meeting in Geneva at middle or end of July 12 or later with final showdown about the duration of period Mendes-France has given himself to consultation.

Chauvel himself believes Ministers will have to take final decisions re demarcation points outstanding points of difference re control. He thus asks for immediate meeting of Ministers here before reaching of final decisions on agreement and notably before disposal of some of points contained in US-UK aide-mémoire.

Press has asked whether Secretary or Under Secretary planning return.

JOHNSON

1 Dated July 2, p. 1275.

2 On this question, see telegram 101 to London, July 7, p. 1294.

JULY 4, 1954

PSA files, lot 58 D 207. "Vietnam Correspondence.

Ambassador Donald R. Heath and Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal)

PERSONAL AND SECRET

PARIS, July 4, 1954.

Dear Phil.: It is good to hear your voice this morning. I had intended phoning you as soon as I had reached the Embassy, but you beat me to it.

INDOCHINA

As I indicated over the phone, I have little or nothing definite to report as a result of my brief Washington consultation. I am nevertheless glad I took the trip.

I was in Washington only a little over forty-eight hours. The man I saw was of course Henry Day, who was kindness itself, a man who is not intimately concerned with the Indochinese situation. He is one person in your outfit who is concerned and is very interested concerned is Paul Sturm, who sees the Secretary and Robert and his small committee at least once a day. Sturm is tired and now is baffled as everyone else at the Department at this precise juncture. I also saw Charlie Stelle and Ed Gullion. The latter made the statement, and I think it is correct, that all the people below the Secretary and Under Secretary are unanimous that we should intervene either make up our mind to intervene now with or without the London. The place and manner of intervention varies. Bob Bowie sent a memorandum to the Secretary on June 25 (written by Stelle) in which he remarked that in case of a settlement along the Dien Bien Phu line that we send in some troops in southern Viet Nam as well as train the Viet Nam Army.

My first talk was with Walter Bedell Smith who expressed his usual sentiments against the British activities to promote a settlement in Indo-China at any price and opposed to Eden's influence over B.2 Walter was rather despairing of the possibility of doing anything in the situation. I may say that I urged that you be put in charge of the delegation. The next day, there had an attack of ulcers and didn't return to the Department for a week.

I had a long talk with MacArthur but inconclusive. As I recall it, his conclusion was that the administration was going to be blamed for whatever happens here whether we disassociated ourselves or joined in to get the situation possible.

I also had a long talk with Bob Murphy and urged him as indeed I did on every visit that we use all the influence and pressure we could on Mendes-France to insist the French bargain for at least a foothold in the North Viet Na. Both he and the Secretary doubted that we could do any good to persuade Mendes-France to which my answer was that we could at least try. I also felt that the Communist Chinese wanted to be as badly as the French and would be disposed to force the Prime Minister to accept at least provisionally the Haiphong enclave. I said that the Secretary's conditional offer of American intervention on the lines of his Los Angeles speech must still remain.


Reference to "B" is presumably to Walter Bedell Smith.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and the CCP Central Committee, “a brief report on the meetings at Liuzhou,” 13:00, 3 July 1954

Record number: 206-00049-03 (1)

Chairman, Comrade (Liu) Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee, and convey to Ambassador Zhang and Minister Wang in Moscow, and Vice Minister Li in Geneva:

I arrived in Guangzhou on the morning of 30 June. Because of weather change and careless in eating I suffered from stomach disturb. I took a one-day rest in Guangzhou, and flew and arrived in Liuzhou at noon of 2 July. On the same day I met with Comrades Ding, Vo, Hoang, Luo, Wei, Chen Manyuan, and Xie Fang, and had a brief conversation with Comrade Ding. I have read the telegrams from the Central Committee via the Provincial Committee. Those telegrams that are conveyed to the friends are being read by them in turn.

This first meeting was held this morning, and Comrade Vo (Nguyen Giap) made a comprehensive presentation. The meeting will be continued in the afternoon, and Wei Guoqing will make a supplementary presentation. It is planned that at the meeting in the evening, I will report on the experience at the Geneva Conference and also on the current international situation. The important issues should wait to be solved (at the meeting of) the 4th. For the various issues that have been inquired by the telegrams from Geneva, probably I will reply this evening.

Zhou Enlai
13:00, 3 July 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twentieth Restricted Session, July 3, 1954

Records No: 206-Y0051

Chairman Mao, Comrade Shaoqi and the Central Committee, also forwarding Zhou, Zhang and Wang:

At the twentieth restricted session on the Indochina issue on the 2nd, Kuznetsov spoke and summarized the discussion of these two weeks on the issue of supervision. Kuznetsov pointed out that the opinions of the Soviet proposal of June 4th and the French proposal of June 25th and 29th concerning the relationship between the NNSC and the joint commission became closer. In addition, other delegations now do not insist that the joint commission should work under the direction of the NNSC anymore. Opinions on definition of the functions and duties of the two commissions and the lack of need for armed forces for the NNSC became closer as well. Kuznetsov also suggested that we should make a draft resolution on the functions and duties of the two commissions that can be accepted by all the participants. However, there are serious differences on the issues of composition and the voting procedure concerning severe violation of the agreement that may cause the recommencement of hostilities. Regarding Chauvel’s previous proposal that the decision of the NNSC should have mandatory power over both sides, Kuznetsov asked Chauvel by what means we can guarantee the implementation of the mandatory power. After Kuznetsov spoke, Chauvel claimed that the conference can only reach an agreement on a certain document, but does not have the right to make a decision. Concerning the issue of the compulsory nature [of the recommendations] of the NNSC, Chauvel said that the NNSC should have the right to explain the agreement, and such explanation has legal mandatory power over both sides. Regarding the voting procedure on serious problems, Chauvel said that it was not a simple question, and he could only respond to it next time. The British delegate, Lamb, stated that Britain has not changed its original position. He said that although he had not made any statements at the two previous meetings, it does not mean that Britain agrees that the two commissions should not have subordinate relations. Bao Dai’s delegate repeated the same old story that communist countries cannot be neutral countries, and only the United Nations can guarantee effective [supervision]. The next meeting will be held on July 6.

Li Kenong
3:00, July 3, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Main points, Zhou Enlai’s presentations at the Liuzhou Conference (excerpt), July 3-5, 1954


The Indochina issue has been internationalized, and this is a key feature of the current situation. In terms of the scope and degree of internationalization, the Indochina issue even has surpassed the Korea issue. In Korea, the enemy side of sixteen countries acted under the name of the United Nations, and China dispatched its volunteers. It was only a step away for the war to be changed into a world war. However, as both the Soviet Union and the United States wanted to localize the war, the war in Korea finally stopped, and a stalemate emerged between the two sides.

The question of the war in Indochina not only has involved the three [Indochina] countries, but also has influenced the entire Southeast Asia, and has influenced Europe and the whole world as well. This means that it will have impact on Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia, Pakistan, India, as well as on Australia, New Zealand, Ceylon, and the Philippines, and it will also have a big impact on France as France has colonies in Asia and Africa. It will also have an impact on Britain, as Britain has close connections with Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Malaya, Hong Kong, Australia and New Zealand, and is extremely sensitive to any situation change in Indochina, and will not simply let it happen without doing anything. Because the imperialists are afraid of China’s “expansion,” they absolutely will not allow Vietnam to achieve a great-scale victory. If we request too much at the Geneva conference and if peace is not achieved in Indochina, it is certain that the United States will intervene, providing Cambodia, Laos and the Bao Dai regime [with] weapons and ammunition, helping them train military personnel, and establishing military bases there. Therefore, we must isolate the United States and break up its plans, otherwise we will fall into the trap prepared by the U.S. imperialists. Consequently, even in a military sense we will not be able to seize [parts of] Vietnam.

There are seven crucial questions [that we are facing now]. (1) Does there exist contradictions between [peacefully settling] the Indochina issue and fulfilling the internationalist mission of the international communist movement? The answer is that there exists no such contradiction, otherwise it is not true internationalism. (2) Is it better to seize the entire Vietnam through a peaceful way, or through means of war? The answer is that from every perspective, it is now clear that it is impossible to seize the entire Vietnam merely by military means. (3) Can Laos and Cambodia be united [with us] through a peaceful way, or can they be united [with us] by means of war? The answer is that this should be done through a peaceful way, and the military way will only push them toward the United States. (4) Will we be able to separate France and the United States through a peaceful way or through means of war? (5) Will we be able to separate Britain and the United States through a peaceful way or through means of war? (6) Will we be able to divide the Bao Dai clique through a peaceful way or through means of war? (7) Will we be able to pursue cooperation with [other] Southeast Asian countries through a peaceful way or by means of war? The answers to all these questions are that peace is favorable to various aspects, and will make the United States isolated. If the proposals put forward by us are too demanding, and if we request too much, peace will not be reached in Indochina. The United States will surely intervene.

Korea is an example. The key of the Korea issue lay in the intervention of the United States. It was completely beyond our expectation that the [American] reinforcement would arrive so quickly... If there had not been the American intervention, the Korean People’s Army would have been able to drive Syngman Rhee’s [troops] into the ocean. Because of American intervention, we only achieved a draw at the end of the war, and were unable to win a victory.... Because of the reason, we now have only one main task, and that is to achieve peace.... If the war were to become internationalized, that would not be favorable to us, and we would lose the space of maneuvering as our rear and flanks would be exposed to [the enemy’s] threats. Therefore, to prevent American’s intervention is the central issue.

If we want to achieve peace, but the United States is determined to sabotage it, then what should we do? Of course we will have to fight continuously. The Vietnamese people want peace, and this will certainly influence the people in the whole Indochina, and will influence Southeast Asia. If Britain and France are also supportive of peace, then only the United States and Ngo Dinh Diem will remain against peace. Then the reasons and justice are in our hands. If the war continues, the world’s sympathy will be with us. The war will stop after fighting for another period, and at that time the United States will become even more isolated.

There are four basic conditions for an armistice: (1) Simultaneous ceasefire in all three Indochina countries; (2) Taking the 16th parallel as the demarcation line for the zones between the two sides (and if this does not work, then considering taking Route 9, which is close to the 17th parallel, as the demarcation line); (3) Forbidding transportation of weapons and ammunition into Indochina after the settlement; and (4) Removing all military bases from the three countries. The other side is not in a
position to oppose this. We have no need to establish military bases there. Cambodia and Laos are different from Vietnam. In Vietnam, it is the Vietnamese comrades who have struggled to achieve what they have achieved, and their influence has reached the whole of Vietnam. The goals in Cambodia and Laos should be freedom, democracy and independence. They should become "India-style Southeast Asian countries," which should be characterized as (1) they should not join any military alliance or allow the existence of foreign military bases; (2) they should be friendly to us, and (3) they should have some domestic democracy, which should mainly be reflected in that the political parties should have the freedom to have activities.

At present, the central task concerns the cadres, and the top cadres—namely members of the Politburo—in particular. It must be made clear among [VWP] Politburo members why it is necessary to achieve an armistice.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not cite or quote without permission from CWIHP.
As I indicated over the phone, I have little or nothing definite to report as a result of my brief Washington consultation. I am nevertheless glad I took the trip.

I was in Washington only a little over forty-eight hours. The first man I saw was of course Henry Dye, who was kindness itself, but who is not intimately concerned with the Indo-Chinese situation. The one person in your outfit who is concerned and is very intimately concerned is Paul Sturm, who sees the Secretary and Robertson and his small committee at least once a day. Sturm is tired and about as baffled as everyone else at the Department at this precise juncture. I also saw Charlie Steile and Ed Gullion. The latter made the statement, and I think it is correct, that all the people below the Secretary and Under Secretary are unanimous that we should intervene or rather make up our mind to intervene now with or without the French. The place and manner of intervention varies. Bob Bowie got off a memorandum to the Secretary on June 25 (written by Steile) in which he remarked that in case of a settlement along the Dong Ho Line that we send in some troops in southern Viet Nam as well as train the Viet Namese Army.

My first talk was with Walter Robertson who expressed his usual sentiments against the British attempts to promote a settlement in Indo-China at any price and referred to Eden’s influence over B. 2 Walter was rather despairing about the possibility of doing anything in the situation. I may say that I urged that you be put in charge of the delegation. The next day Walter had an attack of ulcers and didn’t return to the Department before I left.

I had a long talk with Douglas MacArthur but inconclusive. As I recall it, his conclusion was that the administration was going to be blamed for whatever happened there whether we disassociated ourselves or joined in to get the best solution possible.

I also had a long talk with Bob Murphy and urged him as indeed I did on everybody that we use all the influence and pressure we could on Mendes-France to insist the French bargain for at least a foothold in the Northern delta. Both he and the Secretary doubted that we could do anything to persuade Mendes-France to which my answer was that we could at least try. I also felt that the Communist Chinese wanted a ceasefire as badly as the French and would be disposed to force the Viet Minh to accept at least provisionally the Haiphong enclave. Bob said that the Secretary’s conditional offer of American intervention on the lines of his Los Angeles speech must still remain
open for a time because while the French have no intention of accepting it they would blame us if we withdrew it. When I saw the Secretary, he criticized the British for efforts to conclude peace at any price, referred to his offer of our intervention on terms which he said were thoroughly reasonable, expressed his disbelief that we were being kept really informed of the secret negotiations and expressed doubt that Mendes-France could be persuaded to adopt a strong line. I saw the President who said he had been thinking back whether there was anything that he might have done to have persuaded the French to internationalize the Indo-Chinese War. He said he had been endeavoring to persuade the French to do so since 1950. He wondered if he had talked to more people whether he might not have succeeded. He remarked that Bidault had been the one person who had seen the necessity of such action. Bidault had become converted to this idea at the Bermuda Conference.

I finally had a talk with Radford a short while before leaving Washington. Radford told me that one afternoon last spring the Government was almost decided to intervene with aviation to save Dien Bien Phu. Radford said he was convinced that throwing in our aviation would have saved Dien Bien Phu and our whole position in Southeast Asia would have been much stronger. His idea is that after intervening to save that fortress we could have withdrawn our aviation. He said unfortunately, however, the attitude of Washington toward our intervention was “conventional”.

All in all at least on the high levels the attitude was one of pessimism and not knowing what to do. Much sympathy was expressed to me over my task on my return to Saigon. There was no expression of hope or belief that I might do something. To all and sundry I said we will just do the best we can down there and we hope we can find someone or some group with whom we could build something solid. I insisted to everybody the necessity of keeping a foothold in the North remarking the French would have to keep Haiphong at least for a time in order to evacuate their forces.

Over the phone I indicated to [sic] my last talk with Bao Dai was “unsatisfactory”. That is the understatement of the week. He has no intention of going back there. I am sure that he is not a well man but that is no excuse for his cowardliness at this crucial moment in his country’s history. Nevertheless, I don’t think we should talk about his defection and eventual replacement now. We need to keep up at least a facade of Government until we find someone to take over.

Affectionate best to Margaret and yourself from us both,

[Signature]

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Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Dow) to the Head of the Delegation (Johnson)

TOP SECRET


Subject: Report of Five Power Military Conference, June 1954.1

Following is a summary of the conclusions of the Five Power Military Conference for your information:

The Present Situation

1. The retention of the Tonkin Delta is of the greatest importance to the defense of Southeast Asia as a whole. At the present time, the military situation in the Delta is critical. The Viet Minh are in a position to launch a strong offensive at any time from mid-June and by September will be able to undertake a fully coordinated offensive. Between now and September they will undoubtably exert heavy pressure and, if by then, no reinforcements have been received a severe Franco-Vietnamese reverse is probable. This may well lead to a serious defection of Vietnamese troops.

Forces Required to Stabilize the Situation in the Delta

2. The stabilization of the situation and establishment of a secure base in the Delta would require outside assistance on the order of three well trained and equipped divisions and about three hundred aircraft. Owing to the limited capacity of the airfields in Indochina these aircraft would have to be provided initially by a carrier task force, supported by appropriate naval units and from air forces based outside Indochina. Minesweepers may also be required.

3. The movement and concentration of these forces will take time and a decision to reinforce the Delta must be made immediately if adequate forces are to be ready to meet the large scale Viet Minh offensive expected in September 1954.

4. The Delta will remain vulnerable until the whole of Tonkin has been secured and the Viet Minh Regular Army in Indochina has been destroyed. There can be, therefore, no guarantee that further reinforcements will not be required later. The size will depend on a number of factors including the extent of the recovery of morale throughout Indochina, the growth in size and effectiveness of the Vietnamese forces; the extent to which French Union Forces, now necessarily dispersed on police duties throughout the country, can be concentrated; and the reaction of Communist China.

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1 For documentation on the five-power talks, see volume xii.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and the CCP Central Committee, “a brief report on the meetings at Liuzhou,” 18:00, 4 July 1954

Record number: 206-00049-03 (1)

Chairman, Comrade (Liu) Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee, and convey to Ambassador Zhang and Minister Wang in Moscow, and Vice Minister Li in Geneva:

On the morning of the 3rd, we listened to the report by Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap; and in the afternoon, we listened to the supplementary report by Comrade Wei Guoqing.

Yesterday evening and today I made a report on the experience at the Geneva conference, and I have raised some questions that are awaiting solutions. The report is composed of six parts:

(1) The current situation and our tasks;
(2) The question concerning peace and war;
(3) Peaceful settlement plans for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia;
(4) The question of negotiation—including policies, procedures, timing and supervision;
(5) The policies and tactics of the Vietnamese Workers Party in the future and the tendencies that are in need of attention;
(6) The question of arranging the work for the future.

About the above questions, (we) have had individual conversations, and have had preliminary exchanges of opinions (with the Vietnamese). Comrade Ding says that about plans of settlement, arrangement for military operations for the future, and arrangement on other work, the Vietnamese comrades and Comrades Wei (Guoqing) and Luo (Guibo) will work to make the preparation, and we should be able to reach decision after another day of meeting tomorrow. Regarding the various inquiries from Geneva, the responses should be made after tomorrow’s meeting. The date for returning to Beijing has been postponed for one day, and is changed to the 6th. So this special report.

Zhou Enlai
18:00, 4 July 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Transcript, Ho Chi Minh’s presentation at the Liuzhou Conference (excerpt), July 5, 1954

Source: Xiong, pp. 143-144

(1) Premier Zhou not only has participated in the struggle in Geneva, but also come here to make the important report. His presentation is very thorough, to which I am very grateful. In the past 30 years, since the establishment of the Communist Party of Indochina, we have always received support from the CCP Central Committee and also the personal help from Premier Zhou Enlai.

(2) The supplementary opinions of the other [Chinese] comrades are also very good, to which I agree completely.

(3) Now Vietnam is standing at the crossroads, either going to peace, or going to war. The main direction [of our strategy] should be the pursuit of peace, and we should also be prepared for [continuously] fighting a war. The complication of our work is that we have to prepare for both aspects in our strategy. For the ordinary people, and even for our cadres, this issue will appear extremely complicated. Our slogan in the past is “to carry the resistance through to the end,” and why now we want to pursue peace? Our cadres will ask “which is correct?” I agree that the primary issue is to persuade our cadres. There are many difficulties in this regard. But [to solve this problem] will first of all depend on the efforts by us the Vietnamese comrades. In addition, we will also depend on the help of the Chinese comrades.

(4) What the [Vietnamese] Workers’ Party Central Committee will need to do is how to persuade high-ranking cadres.... We do not have much time in this regard. Our problem is that we do not have enough cadres, but the work facing us is too much. In order to take over Hanoi and Haiphong we will need to have a large group of cadres. My main concern is that we do not have so many cadres, and, in comparison, I am not so concerned by other difficulties.

(5) Finally, I represent this conference to thank Chairman Mao and the CCP Central Committee.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft Do not cite or quote without permission from CWIHP.
open for a time because while the French have no intention of accepting it they would blame us if we withdrew it. When I saw the Secretary, he criticized the British for efforts to conclude peace at any price referred to his offer of our intervention on terms which he said was thoroughly reasonable, expressed his disbelief that we were being kept really informed of the secret negotiations and expressed doubts that Mende- France could be persuaded to adopt a strong line. He told the President who said that he had been thinking that there was anything that he might have done to persuade the French to internationalize the Indochina War. He said he had been endeavoring to persuade the French to do so since 1950. He wondered if he had talked to more people whether he might have succeeded. He remarked that Bidault had been the one person who had seen the necessity of such action. Bidault had become convinced to this idea at the Bermuda Conference.

I finally had a talk with Radford a short while before leaving Washington. Radford told me that one afternoon last spring the Government was almost decided to intervene with aviation to save Dien Bien Phu. Radford said he was convinced that throwing in our aviation would have saved Dien Bien Phu if in our whole position in Southeast Asia would have been much stronger. His idea is that after intervening to save that fortress we could have withdrawn our aviation. He said unfortunately, however, the attitude of Washington toward our intention was "not conventional."

All in all at least on the high levels the attitude was one of pessimism and not knowing what to do. Much sympathy was expressed to me over my task on my return to Saigon. There was no expression of hope or belief that I might do something. To all and sundry I said that we will just do the best we can down there. I wished I could find someone or some group with whom we could build something solid. I insisted to everybody the necessity of keeping a foothold in the North remarking the French would have to keep Haiphong at least for a time in order to evacuate their forces.

Over the same I indicated to [sic] my last talk with Bao Dai was "unsatisfactory." That is the understatement of the week. He has no interest of going back. I am sure that he is not a well man but there is no excuse for his cowardliness at this crucial moment in his country's history. Nevertheless, I don't think we should talk about his election and eventual replacement now. We need to keep up at least a facade of Government until we find someone to take over.

Affectionate best to Margaret and yourself from us both, Don

CONFERENCE FILE
lot 60 D 927, CR 308

Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Dow) to the Head of the Delegation (Johnson)

TOP SECRET


Following is a summary of the conclusions of the Five Power Military Conference for your information:

The Present Situation

1. The retention of the Tonkin Delta is of the greatest importance to the defense of Southeast Asia as a whole. At the present time, the military situation in the Delta is critical. The Viet Minh are in a position to launch a strong offensive at any time from mid-June and by September will be able to undertake a fully coordinated offensive. Between now and September they will undoubtedly exert heavy pressure and, if by then, no reinforcements have been received a severe Franco-Vietnamese reverse is probable. This may well lead to a serious defection of Vietnamese troops.

Forces Required to Stabilize the Situation in the Delta

2. The stabilization of the situation and establishment of a secure base in the Delta would require outside assistance on the order of three well-trained and equipped divisions and about three hundred aircraft. Owing to the limited capacity of the airfields in Indochina these aircraft would have to be provided initially by a carrier task force, supported by appropriate naval units and from air forces based outside Indochina. Minesweepers may also be required.

3. The movement and concentration of these forces will take time and a decision to reinforce the Delta must be made immediately if adequate forces are to be ready to meet the large scale Viet Minh offensive expected in September 1954.

4. The Delta will remain vulnerable until the whole of Tonkin has been secured and the Viet Minh Regular Army in Indochina has been destroyed. There can be, therefore, no guarantee that further reinforcements will not be required later. The size will depend on a number of factors including the extent of the recovery of morale throughout Indochina, the growth in size and effectiveness of the Vietnamese forces; the extent to which French Union Forces, now necessarily dispersed on police duties throughout the country, can be concentrated; and the reaction of Communist China.

For documentation on the five-power talks see volume xii.
5. The arrival of reinforcements from the Free Nations, other than France, would be an important factor in the restoration of Vietnamese confidence. In the opinion of the French General Staff the psychological impact of those reinforcements would be enhanced if they were drawn from the Western Powers.

Situation Should the Delta be Lost
6. Should the Delta fall to the Viet Minh, consideration must be given to the holding of a line of recovery further south. Due to the nature of the terrain and the forces which might be available to hold it such a position is not readily to be found. The line Thakhek-Dong Hoi offers the best possibilities although it is subject to a number of limitations. It would require a force of the order of four divisions with supporting air forces to hold it, together with the forces necessary to secure complete control of southern Indochina. Provision too, would have to be made for ensuring the security of the flank resting on the Thai border. The maintenance of this force would require development of the existing logistic facilities.

7. Under present conditions the French Union Forces in Southern Indochina are fully occupied with internal security duties and could make no contribution to the holding of this position. Therefore, unless adequate forces were extricated from the Delta, the success of this operation would depend on the timely arrival of the necessary reinforcements from outside Indochina.

War With China
8. The danger of Chinese Communist intervention will increase with the approach of Allied forces, other than Vietnamese forces, to the Chinese border. From the start provision must be made to meet such intervention.

9. Should war with China be precipitated by Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, air attack should be launched immediately aimed at military targets. In the selection of these targets political considerations cannot be ignored. To achieve a maximum and lasting effect nuclear as well as conventional weapons should be used from the outset. A blockade against China should also be established.

10. It is unlikely that the land forces immediately available would be sufficient to hold the Chinese advance but a recovery line in Indochina and defensive positions in Thailand and in Burma should be considered as a means of inflicting the maximum delay on the enemy and winning the support of those peoples. The lack of natural defensive positions and the inadequacy of forces likely to be available would limit what could be achieved.

11. The final stop-line should be a defensive position on the Kon, Isthmus, the essential communications being controlled by air and naval forces based on the Philippines, Malaya and Ceylon. Intermediate operations should not be allowed to prejudice the ability to hold this final position.

Global War
12. Any war with China involves some risk of war with Russia although no agreement was reached at this Conference as to whether the risk was probable or merely problematical. This is an important factor to be considered when deciding to commit forces to a war with China since such a commitment may not be allowed to destroy balance necessary for the implementation of allied global strategy.

13. In the event of Global War, the overall strategy of the Allies should be generally defensive in Southeast Asia utilizing the offensive capabilities of naval and air forces as practicable. Elsewhere in the Far East the possibilities for offensive action should be exploited.

Measures to improve Internal Security in Southeast Asia
14. The maintenance of internal security in Southeast Asia depends largely on our ability to enlist the determined support of the leaders and people of the free Southeast Asian countries in the fight against Communism. This is a political problem but if it can be solved there are certain military measures which can be taken to increase their stability and develop their strength.

15. From the military viewpoint, a vital factor in the maintenance of internal security is the existence of strong, reliable, well trained and well equipped forces including police. Therefore, the Allies should be prepared to aid in developing these forces and their ability to operate. Such action would contribute not only to internal security but also to the general defense of Southeast Asia. These measures should not be considered in isolation, but with political and economic factors, which, applied together, will contribute greatly to welfare and stability.

Military Problems of a Cease-fire in Indochina
16. Both the local situation in Indochina and previous experience of truces or armistices between free and Communist nations was taken into account. The conditions which would be the soundest and which would prevent a cease-fire in Indochina developing quickly into a more serious situation were set down only from the military point of view.

17. Any cease-fire agreement should provide for the retention by the French Union Forces of the Hanoi-Haiphong area, the communications between those two places and at least the area south of the line Thakhek-Dong Hoi.
18. There must be a guarantee by nations other than those directly involved that they will intervene if the agreement is broken and neutral observers with freedom of movement must be provided to detect and establish violations where they occur.

General Conclusions

19. Throughout the studies the Principal Military Representatives have been much impressed by the fact that the military measures required to enable resistance to further Communist aggression or infiltration in Southeast Asia to be effective call for firm solidarity between the Five Powers represented at this Conference. The Principal Military Representatives would also call special attention to the critical nature of the present situation in Tonkin and the urgency of decisions on the immediate problems that it presents.

JULY 6, 1954

7510.00/7-654 : Telegram
Johnson-Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, July 6, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

Geneva, July 6, 1954—7 p.m.

Secto 560. Repeated information Paris 19, Saigon 10. Limit distribution. Paris eyes only Ambassador. Saigon eyes only Ambassador. This morning Chauvel expressed to me serious concern re reports he had had from Bonnet of two statements by Secretary and one by Under Secretary to effect US not being adequately informed. He asserted with much emphasis that he had and would continue keep me fully and frankly informed. My own belief is that Chauvel has not deliberately withheld information.

Chauvel had seen Dong this morning. On question of demarcation lines, Dong again referred to status of populations sympathizing with Viet Minh who would be left south of demarcation line proposed by French. He said this question would be easier for him if he could get some general political assurances regarding eventual status these people. Chauvel said Dong indicated that with such assurances he might be able to accept Dong Hoi line.

In reply to Dong Chauvel stated that such assurances would have to be very general. They might refer to such matters as eventual unity, territorial integrity, democratic conditions, etc.

Chauvel told Dong that any attempt to go further into detail on political matters would result in prolonged discussion and delay in achieving the armistice which all desire.

Chauvel suggested to Dong that it might be advantageous to have the agreement on the armistice purely one between the commands of each side and not between governments. This would obviate immediate problem of securing consent of Vietnamese Government. Agreement would, of course, have to include certain questions not purely military. The agreement could then be submitted to the conference. Perhaps conference might then make a general statement of political principles which would be included in a final declaration by conference. Dong agreed with this general approach. He referred to his own statement of May 12 in which he had advocated that agreements regarding cessation of hostilities should be bilateral.

Chauvel stated that in his talk with Dong he referred to fact military conversations not moving well. He wondered whether it might not be possible to supplement them with some conversations between civilians on certain subjects not purely military. Dong agreed and Chauvel designated Offroy while Dong indicated that Tran Cong Tuong (Vice Minister of Justice in Viet Minh Cabinet and member Viet Minh delegation here—he was also in Fountainebleau Conference in 1946) would be his representative.

Chauvel told me French delegation is working on draft of paper on control system which will be submitted to British and Russian delegations and of which he will give us a copy as soon as completed. Although his position remains that parties should agree accept decisions or recommendations of international commission, he is somewhat skeptical on how system will work in practice on major questions. He stated that decisions could be by majority or unanimous vote, but that in case of majority decisions on major questions implementation would obviously be difficult. He pointed out that eventual recourse to guaranteeing powers, i.e., conference powers will obviously not work in event serious disagreement. He stated that it will be necessary in this case “for us to work out something among ourselves”.

Chauvel told us that he is leaving for Paris tomorrow to see Mendes-France in order to get his instructions. He indicated that Mendes-France has been in touch with London regarding future plans for conference. He has impression from Massigli that Reading or Caccia will be returning here shortly and that Eden is expected about 12th. (Lamb subsequently told me he has no information on Eden's plans and knows nothing about Reading or Caccia returning in advance of Eden).

Mendes-France himself may come here between 10th and 12th, probably not before Eden. The Chinese Communist representative apparently indicated to Chauvel that Chou En-lai's return is expected, but gave no details. Molotov is apparently still due about 8th, although Soviets have not directly said anything on this.
Armed Forces merely as source of manpower to be used piecemeal as required and has not permitted that army to operate as integrated fighting force (coordinated of course by Unified Command) has had disastrous effect on morale of Vietnamese forces.

(4) Dac Khe is critical of Bao Dai’s behavior and admits Bao Dai is physically and morally depressed. Nevertheless he holds that it would be major error to press for Bao Dai’s resignation at this time. Resignation would result in removal symbol of unity and tradition which is still valuable asset.

(5) Dac Khe expressed confidence inhabitants of recently evacuated provinces (he himself is native of Phu to though absent many years) and particularly Catholics would give Viet Minh much trouble. He believed guerrilla networks were in existence.

(6) Dac Khe anxious and perplexed regarding US attitude toward Vietnam. He hopes new government will justify continued US support. He believes US backing major asset and one which Communists truly respect and therefore one whose strength or weakness will have important bearing on terms of settlement if one is reached here or on possibility of continuing struggle if no settlement is reached.

369.1 GE/7-654 : Telegram

**The United States Delegation to the Department of State**

**SECRET**

Geneva, July 6, 1954—1 p.m.

Secto 559. Repeated information Paris 11, Saigon 8. Dac Khe, Minister of Democratization in Buu Loc Cabinet and member Vietnamese delegation here has expressed following views to Bonsul:

(1) Continued duration Geneva Conference is sapping will to fight and morale of Franco-Vietnamese forces. Prolongation of conference will be increasingly damaging.

(2) Mendes-France and other French leaders are not keeping Vietnamese informed of their plans and of their negotiations with Viet Minh. If presented with unacceptable terms for ending of conflict, Vietnamese will walk out of conference. (Dac Khe did not define terms he would consider unacceptable; he is aware of probability French will give up entire Tonkin delta.)

(3) Dac Khe is hopeful but not confident that Dien, for whom he has admiration and respect, will be able to rally Vietnamese people. However, he insists on essentiality of true independence, i.e., rapid conclusion of current negotiations and establishment without delay of truly autonomous Vietnamese Army. In common with many other Vietnamese, Dac Khe holds that while development Vietnamese National Army and related forces has been satisfactory from quantitative standpoint, fact French High Command has regarded Vietnamese...
missions will work side by side and that one will not be subordinate to other.

2. On functions and powers of two commissions, Soviet proposal of June 14 and French statement of June 25 are similar and should provide basis for agreed position.

3. It is not necessary in terms of reference of Neutral Commission to stress compulsory nature of Commission’s recommendations. If sides have good faith, they will pay serious attention to recommendations of Neutral Commission. Compulsory recommendations will not provide any additional protection for armistice, but merely lead to interference in internal affairs of states of Indochina.


5. On composition of Neutral Commission, constructive Soviet proposals can provide basis for agreement. Proposal that UN supervise armistice deliberately obstructs progress of conference.

6. On armistice supervision in Laos and Cambodia, Li argued since problems of peace in these countries are component parts of total Indochina problems, unified Neutral Commission should be established for all Indochina. Differing conditions in the three states of Indochina could be taken into account in administering armistice.

7. Statement by US delegate on June 28 distorted Korean armistice experience and demonstrated unconstructive attitude.

8. More restricted session, as proposed by Soviet delegate, to consider various proposals on armistice supervision and to refer to experts points agreed in principle should be adopted.

Chauvel spoke next. He stated French delegate is continuing work on comprehensive draft of control problem. He therefore preferred not to go into various issues involved but to wait until work finished.

He then turned to new subject and observed that point 3 in Chinese Communist’s proposal of June 16 had not yet been discussed. He asked Chinese Communist delegate what was meant by statement that “The question of the amount and the type of arms that may be introduced into Laos and Cambodia for requirements of self defense shall be the subject of separate negotiations.”

Sam Sary (Cambodia) followed with reminder that Cambodian delegate had several times restated opposition to Van in introduction arms and military personnel following cease-fire. Made points that after armistice Cambodia will not reduce its right and freedom to strengthen army for legitimate defense of kingdom; that if fear existed that arms would transit Cambodia for Viet Nam international control could be set upon Cambodia-Vietnam border; that it ridiculous to believe country of 5 million, even armed to teeth, could menace countries of several tens or hundreds of millions population. Repeated willingness Cambodia, under certain conditions, make commitment to receive arms and personnel would remain compatible with defense needs.

Sam Sary pointed out Chinese Communist proposal of June 16 recognized need for import of arms following armistice but failed to mention requirements foreign experts and instructors. He noted other Asian countries, independent longer than Cambodia, still required assistance its personnel in military establishments. Since Cambodia needed both arms and personnel two questions should not be separated.

If separate negotiations this subject, as proposed by Chinese Communists did take place, following principles should govern: Cambodian sovereignty must be recognized and Cambodia must be able organize defense without interference; insofar as security Cambodia not imperiled, Cambodia would give assurances defensive character its defense organization and would not menace neighbors.

Camboia ready participate in such negotiations but must know how organized, when, between what parties, and whether results to be incorporated in general armistice agreement or in separate convention. Ended by inviting views other delegates, particularly Chinese Communists.

Laotian delegate, Kam Phan Panya, endorsed statement of Cambodian delegate and drew attention to certain points particularly applicable to Laos. He stated that Laos has vast area along difficult borders and young army. As a result Laos has requested and received French assistance. Under Laotian-French agreements, French Union troops would be stationed in Laos even in peacetime for defensive purposes. Maintenance of these bases is for the time being essential to defense of Laos. Assistance of French officers and technicians necessary to raise Laotian army to proper level of defensive efficiency. Any lack in proportion between the size of the French training mission and task of such mission could easily be detected.

He pointed out that sparse population and geography were such that Laos could not be threat to neighbors. In closing, he stated technical military data on Laos, including relations with French, would be placed before military subcommittee.

Next restricted session scheduled for Friday, July 9.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Li Kenong (excerpt), July 6, 1954

Source: Xiong, p. 145

After meeting with Comrade Ho Chi Minh, I returned from Guangxi to Beijing today. The charge d'affair of the Soviet Union informed us yesterday that Comrade Molotov was scheduled to fly to Geneva on the 7th to meet with Mendes-Francis, and he hoped that I also rushed back to Geneva in an early date, so as to promote the development of the negotiation. After asking for instruction from the Central Committee, I will need to stay in Beijing for two to three days before leaving [for Geneva]. Therefore, I hope that you try to travel with Comrade Molotov on the 7th. If there is not sufficient time for this, then try to travel to Geneva on the 8th. For this matter please contact the Soviet side immediately, so that you may leave on the 7th or the 8th.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not cite or quote without permission from CWIHP.
SECRET
FROM PARIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITSELL SECRET (CABINET)

DISTRIBUTION

Sir G. Jebb
No. 177
July 7, 1954

D. 8.24 p.m. July 7, 1954
R. 8.35 p.m. July 7, 1954

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 177 of July 7
Repeated for information to: Washington
Codel Geneva

My telegram No. 173, Indo-China.

I asked for an interview with M. Mendes France and was received this evening.

2. As regards his movements he said that the sooner he now got to Geneva the better. Mr. Molotov had arrived there this afternoon and this might indicate a desire for a talk with the French Prime Minister. In principle M. Mendes France would like to talk to Molotov, but he was still rather reluctant to be at Geneva for any long period as the sole representative of the West. I understood him to say that Massigli had suggested that you might perhaps come over to Paris for lunch next Sunday and go on with him to Geneva. If this was the earliest you could manage he would gladly accept such an arrangement since he particularly wanted to talk to you. At the same time if you could possibly stop at Paris for Saturday night and go on to Geneva on Sunday morning this would be considerably more satisfactory. No doubt you will let me know your views as soon as possible.

3. I then asked what, if any, progress had been made in the committee? M. Mendes France said that since our last conversation there had been practically none. A hint had been thrown out that the Communists might accept the 14th rather than the 13th parallel, but that was all. M. Mendes France thought that there was likely to be no progress before the arrival of the Foreign Ministers at Geneva and that the Communist case was now to try to do a deal involving the partition line and the elections. The further to the north the partition line, the less delay they .......

[signature]

[Date: July 7, 1954]
SECRET

Paris telegram No. 177 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

delay they would expect in the holding of elections, or vice versa. He himself thought that the most important thing was to secure a long delay before elections were held: the exact location of the partition line, provided it was not further south than the 16th parallel, did not seem to him to be so important. On the other hand, the 18th parallel did remain the best from the strictly military point of view. Against this, if any settlement were to be guaranteed by other Powers, then it was the threat of general war which might prevent any violation of it and not the strength of any local military line.

A. M. Mendes France seemed in good form, but extremely tired. However terrible the negotiations at Geneva may be I expect they will seem a holiday after his recent experiences in Paris. On the whole he remains fairly optimistic. I think he badly needs your advice.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Codel Geneva as my telegrams Nos. 238 and 113 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington and Codel Geneva].

ADVANCE COPIES:
Sir H. Caccia
Private Secretary
Minister of State
Mr. W.D. Allen
Head of South East Asia Department
Resident Clerk
You might find it useful to have a short survey of the meetings of the Geneva Conference since I have been acting as joint Chairman.

2. Actually, as you probably expected, there has been little tangible progress. Chauvel has been the only active and constructive participant, and the French delegation have obviously been making an honest attempt to produce some form of the machinery of implementation of an armistice agreement which could be acceptable to both sides. On the other hand, true to form, the Soviet, Chinese, and Viet Minh delegates have been making the usual speeches talking glibly about the desire for peace and showing no indication of modifying their original attitudes, which are in fact the Soviet proposals. Pham Van Dong did perhaps on one occasion show some constructive effort, though even he in fact re-asserted his adherence to the Soviet desiderata.

3. All the Communist delegates have from time to time made their usual rude attacks on the Americans. In particular they have by abuse sought to counter the objections categorically stated by the American delegation regarding the obstacles encountered through the composition and mechanics of the neutral Supervisory Commission in Korea. The American delegate has with one exception sustained from active participation in the debates.

4. In my case I have likewise not contributed any discourse, for there seemed nothing that we could usefully add to your summing up of the United Kingdom attitude at the last meeting in which you participated on June 22. On Friday, July 6, however, Kuznetsov, in a typically unconstructive speech, was at pains to suggest that Chauvel in his various proposals had abandoned various points of difference, particularly regarding the mandatory powers of the International Supervisory Commission, and that this new position had been accepted by all the delegates present. It seemed to me as well not to let this statement pass without challenge lest later on he might suggest that having let this statement go unchallenged we had as it were accepted his statement. To avoid any risk of weakening our position by default I decided to make a short intervention in which I sought to avoid the possibility of any misunderstanding by stating that the British Delegation's attitude remained unchanged and I had not yet been convinced that powers of authoritative decision by the International Commission could be dispensed with. Chauvel, who had also said more or less the same thing to reserve the position of the French Delegation, agree that this was a wise precaution, and my American colleague thinks likewise.

The Marquess of Reading, C.B.E., M.C., T.D., Q.C.,
Minister of State,
Foreign Office.
5. Though no very visible progress has been achieved, on the whole the tone of these debates has been on a calm and unemotional level and one has the impression that the Communist side are stalling, presumably pending the return to the Conference of the Foreign Ministers. At the same time as I have already indicated they have shown no signs of modifying their attitude and are clearly seeking to exploit any apparent concessions on our side as a committal acceptance of their conditions.

6. The Soviet Delegation are evidently particularly eager to give an appearance of friendliness and have in turn entertained the French, American and my delegation staff to dinner. We dined with them last night in an outwardly very friendly atmosphere and no shop was talked until at the very end when Kuznetsov asked me what I thought were the most difficult points outstanding. Naturally I said the relationship of the International Commission to the Joint Commission and the composition of the former. We exchanged views in general terms along the now well-known lines regarding these points in a rather academic manner. I must say that Kuznetsov presented his case in a plausible though disingenuous manner and at that stage in the evening and in those jovial surroundings it would be very hard to produce a convincing refutation.

7. Cheuvel seems to be not unhopeful of some outcome of hisJacours both in trying to formulate a mutually acceptable draft for the constitution and operation of the two and international Committees and at the military talks for regrouping. His impression from his last interview, which took place yesterday morning, with the senior Viet Minh delegate, was that the latter might be prepared to agree to reasonable compromises on the regroupment and military territorial alignments provided some face-saving formula could be evolved. I do not feel so optimistic myself, but after all it is he that is in a position to form impressions from direct contact.

8. I am afraid all this is rather rambling and nebulous, but for that very reason it may serve as a genuine reflection of the atmosphere as it appears to me, at any rate. Evidently the main factor as always is what the Russians really want. If they genuinely want peace, they are surely in a position to ensure it, despite their occasional manifestations of personal independence. I believe the Chinese and Viet Minhese would still hesitate to disregard the overall directives from Moscow. In this connection you might like to see the enclosed record of the views of two prominent Swiss businessmen which has been forwarded by our Consul at Basle. Though evidently speculative, the views of these well-informed Swiss regarding the Russians, Geneva Conference, and France (and also incidentally Germany) are not without interest.

(L. H. Lamb)
French will give us opportunity see paper before presenting it to Soviets. In view paragraph 7 US-UK note to Geneva (Tosec 490) I would appreciate Department's instructions as to whether it desires I make further representations to Chou re this point, which is intimately tied up with policy US may adopt with regard to guaranteeing any agreement which may be reached.

JOHNSON

*Telegram Tosec 490 to Geneva sent as telegram 4853 to Paris, June 28, p. 1256.

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Day)

CONFIDENTIAL


Subject: Comments of Lao Minister on Return from Geneva Conference

Participants: The Honorable Ourot R. Souvannavong, Minister of Laos

PSA—Messrs. Day and Hoey

The Minister of Laos, who has been on the Lao Delegation at Geneva, said he had left Geneva on July 1. He said he might be called to Vientiane for consultations soon. The Lao Defense Minister took his place on the delegation.

He said that before he left Geneva military talks had begun between Lao and Viet Minh representatives at Geneva. Each side had held to its position and in the absence of any agreement there have been two postponements of further meetings. The Lao representative insisted that the only question for discussion was withdrawal of the Viet Minh from Laos. The Viet Minh side insisted on the principle of regroupment with a zone for Pathet Lao forces. No specific demarcation lines were discussed.

There have been some informal talks between the Lao Delegation and the Viet Minh Delegation aside from the military talks. His delegation first met Dong and two other Viet Minh delegates at the dinner which Chou gave for the Cambodian, Lao and Viet Minh. The atmosphere at this dinner was friendly with Chou assuming an extremely cordial attitude. Chou inquired whether there were any proposals for the US to establish military bases in Laos. He was informed that there were none but that Laos had treaty arrangements with France under which French troops were stationed in Laos for training and defense. Chou seemed to accept this as entirely agreeable. In direct conversations between the Lao and Viet Minh delegates, the Viet Minh urged that two or three representatives of Pathet Lao be included in the government to prepare for elections. The Lao pointed out that there would be elections next year in the normal course of events at which time any person wishing to be a candidate could present himself. At one time Chou wanted to help arrange a meeting between the dissident Prince Souphanouvong and his half-brother Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Prime Minister. Nothing came of this. The Lao Government has had no information for some time of any activity on the part of Souphanouvong or any so-called Pathet Lao forces.

Regarding the recent incident involving military trainees near Vientiane Ourot said that Prince Petsarath, who has been in exile in Thailand, had been given permission to re-enter Laos to visit his family. However, he actually came to recruit forces for Souphanouvong. He expected to move these from the Vientiane area to another part of Laos by way of Thailand. The plan failed.

Ourot said that he was with his Prime Minister when Menon called on him. He was impressed by Menon's lack of information regarding Laos.

Ourot said there was a Pathet Lao representative among the Communist delegates. One of the Lao Delegation recognized the individual. Ourot found three Viet Minh representatives who were former friends of his in student days. Ourot found them all well indoctrinated. One in particular made Ourot appreciate this by referring to Communism as an evincible force that would crush all obstacles. Ourot has the impression that the Communist delegates at Geneva all acted as victors. Their attitude of triumph was of course most noticeable after the battle of Dien Bien Phu.

Bonsal-Do Meeting, Geneva, July 7, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

Secto 371. Repeated information from Paris 20, Saigon 14. Bonsal and Dwan dined last night with Tran Van Do, new Vietnamese Foreign Minister, at latter's residence. Also present were Ngo Dinh Luyen (brother of Prime Minister) who is here on brief visit Nguyen Huu Chau, a family connection of Ngo Dinh Diem's, newly-arrived member of Vietnamese delegation here; Le Quang Trieu, Vietnamese Military Attaché, Washington, and Dac Khe, member of former Vietnamese Government.
Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twenty-first Restricted Session, July 7, 1954

Records No: 206-Y0051

Chairman Mao, Comrade Shaoqi, Comrade Enlai and the Central Committee:

I spoke first at the twenty-first restricted session on the Indochina issue on the 6th. I explained our position on the issue of the relationship between the joint commission and the NNSC, the issue of the compulsory nature of [the recommendations of] the NNSC, the issues of the voting procedure and the composition [of the NNSC], and the issue of the [armistice] supervision in Laos and Cambodia. I did not present anything new. I intentionally drew France over to our side and referred to Chauvel many times. For example, I noted that his statement deserves attention from the conference. [I also said that] the Soviet proposal of June 14 and the French proposal of June 25 could provide the basis for deciding the functions and authorities of the two commissions. Lastly, I once again expressed my support to Kuznetsov’s proposal of June 25. I also said that we can push the discussion on the issue of supervision one step forward if we could use the Soviet proposal of June 14 as the basis to discuss proposals from all delegations in the spirit of conciliation. Chauvel spoke next. He said that he had listened to my speech carefully and believed that my speech made a contribution to the conference. Chauvel raised the question of supervising the introduction of defensive weapons into Laos and Cambodia. He asked the Chinese delegation to explain point three in the Chinese proposal concerning the issues of Laos and Cambodia[:] “question regarding the amount and the type of arms that may be introduced into Laos and Cambodia for requirements of self-defense should be the subject of separate negotiations.” The Cambodian delegate stated his reason for opposing the prohibition of the introduction of military equipment and personnel [into Cambodia] and said that point three of the Chinese proposal failed to consider the issue of military personnel. He said that Cambodia needed military experts, and the limitation on the amount of imported arms and military personnel should not damage the effectiveness of ordinary defense. The Cambodian delegate also asked us questions such as how this negotiation will be organized and who will participate. The Laotian delegate also stated that Laos wants to organize its own defense after the withdrawal of foreign troops. However, French [Union] troops that are stationed in Laos cannot be reduced. Also, Laos needs French technicians. I did not respond to the French and Cambodian delegations’ request to clarify [point three of our proposal]. The meeting was in a relaxed mood. The next meeting will be held on the 9th.

Li Kenong
July 7, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
that two or three representatives of Pathet Lao be included in the government to prepare for elections. The Lao pointed out that there should be elections next year in the normal course of events at which time any person wishing to be a candidate could present himself. The Chinese wanted to help arrange a meeting between the present Prince Souphanouvong and his half-brother Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Prime Minister. Nothing came of this. The Lao government has had no information for some time of any activity on the part of Souphanouvong or any so-called Pathet Lao forces.

Regarding the recent incident involving military trainees near Vientiane Ouot said that Prince Petrovic, who has been in exile in Thailand, had been given permission to re-enter Laos to visit his family. However, he actually came to recruit forces for Souphanouvong. He expected to move these from the Vientiane area to another part of Laos by way of Thailand. This plan failed.

Ouot said that he was in touch with his Prime Minister when Menon called on him. He was impressed by Menon's lack of information regarding Laos.

Ouot said that he was a Pathet Lao representative among the Communist delegates. One of the Lao Delegation recognized the individual. Ouot found the Viet Minh representatives who were former friends of his in student days. Ouot found them all well indoctrinated. One in particular said Ouot appreciate this by referring to Communism as an irresistible force that would crush all obstacles. Ouot has the impression that the Communist delegates at Geneva all acted as victors. Their attitude of triumph was of course most noticeable after the battle of Dien Bien Phu.

3951 GE/7-54: Telegram
Bonsal-Do Meeting, Geneva, July 7, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET


Secto 571. Repeated information Paris 20, Saigon 14. Bonsal and Dwan dined last night with Tran Van Do, new Vietnamese Foreign Minister, at latter's invitation. Also present were Ngo Dinh Luyen (brother of Prime Minister) who is here on brief visit Nguyen Huu Chau, a family connection of Ngo Dinh Bien's, newly-arrived member of Vietnamese delegation here; Le Quang Trieu, Vietnamese Military Attaché, Washington, and Dac Khe, member of former Vietnamese Government.

Indochina

Vietnamese, with Ngo Dinh Luyen doing most of talking, made many bitter intemperate statements regarding French of which following fair sample:

1. French refused to allow Vietnamese to defend recently-evacuated areas of south delta and particularly bishopries. "If French don't want to fight any more themselves, they might as well make it possible for us to fight." (There was no attempt to hide analysis of capacities of Vietnamese forces which would have opposed Viet Minh in this area.) Marshal de Lattre's action in dissolving Catholic militia three years ago was severely criticized.

2. French failed to notify Vietnamese beforehand of their intentions in delta or to explore with Vietnamese possible alternative courses of action.

3. French have consistently failed and still fail to understand that creation of effective Vietnamese fighting force depends upon autonomy of that force under own leadership and its use as integrated whole rather than as mere manpower reserve for French High Command. Necessity for Unified Command recognized.

4. French are not keeping Vietnamese informed of current negotiations. Ngo Dinh Luyen has not seen Mendes-France for many days and interviews with Guy La Chambre have proved unilluminating.

5. There is reason to believe French plan to revive "Republic of Cochinchina" and thus to retain for themselves richest part of Vietnam leaving remainder to Communists [No]! evidence whatever was given on this score.

6. French still refuse official signature of treaties of independence and association and completion of negotiations on supplementary conventions (economic, cultural, military, et cetera).

In reply to all this, Bonsal could only suggest importance of establishing and maintaining closest contact between Vietnamese delegation here and other friendly delegations including particularly French delegation. He expressed skepticism regarding some of points made above. He pointed out that for eight years French and Vietnamese have been fighting Communists in Vietnam and that for past four years US material and moral support to both French and Vietnamese in this struggle has been substantial. He added expression of hope for future and belief that fact Vietnamese Government now being taken over by new men who had not previously been involved in struggle might produce important new political assets and revitalize forces fighting against Communist domination.

General effect of conversation was depressing. None of Vietnamese give impression of ability to exercise leadership or to conceive of or to carry out practical enterprises. Dac Khe suggestion regarding importance of maintaining covert relationships with friendly elements in Catholic bishopries and even of arranging to parachute arms and supplies to them was closest Vietnamese came to focusing on realities of present situation.
Luyen reported Bao Dai's state of health precarious.

Chau told us that in South Vietnam relations between Vietnamese and Viet Minh troops, at points where French are absent, are relatively good. Viet Minh do not tend to attack posts manned only by Vietnamese.

Dac Khe stated recent AP story attributed to Vietnamese sources here regarding military demarcation line at sixteenth parallel with enclaves for Franco-Vietnamese to north and for Viet Minh to south of line had in reality come from Viet Minh.

JULY 8, 1954

SECRET

Secto 574. Repeated information Paris 23, Saigon 15. Offroy called on Bonsal and me this morning. He described his talk with Bonsal Viet Minh delegate (see 6th paragraph Secto 560). He states his position on Viet Minh sympathizers south of Dong Ho line (paragraph 2, Secto 560). He states his position to be signed by the two commands could include provisions for free movement of population from one re-grouping area to the other, as well as arrangements for repatriation of prisoners, etc., this agreement should not include any specific reference to a date for the withdrawal of "foreign troops" from Vietnam and a date for elections. At most, French would agree that in first declaration of Geneva Conference some general statement respecting territorial integrity of Vietnam, provisions for eventual united and desirability of democratic processes. Tuong has not yet replied to this statement of position. I urged on Offroy importance invoking in cease-fire agreement arrangements for movement anti-Communist civilian population from evacuated zones so that responsibility for implementation would be clearly fixed and subject to supervision of international commission.

Offroy delivered us with copy of working paper prepared by French Del with regard to system of controls. He said besides ourselves copies were being given UK and USSR for their comments. Translation oftained Secto 575. Offroy reiterated views contained Secto 568.

We discussed with Offroy present state of Franco-Vietnamese relations and desirability, in our views, that French should take steps to establish close relations with new Vietnamese Del. Bonsal described in general terms his talk with Viet Minh yesterday (Secto 571). Offroy expressed some reluctance to view his inability answer questions re current French conversations with Viet Minh plus his rather pessimistic view of possibilities of having current Vietnamese Government officials take realistic and helpful view of situation. He suggested perhaps USDel should undertake this task. It is his view that if Vietnamese could be assured that part of Vietnam which will remain under their control after armistice agreement will receive whole-hearted support, in political, economic and military fields from France and US and other free world powers, their attitude might be improved. We noted that we did not believe it practical at this stage for USDel to be source of information re situation in which French have leadership and are playing major role. Offroy stated he would consider matter further. We hope we made some impression on him.

I raised with Offroy what French contemplated course of events with regard conference be on Saturday when report of military representatives is due to be made, but he had no views on subject. He said that when he returns, Chauvet might have some views and would communicate with me. He expects Mendes-France on Sunday. He asked whether we have heard if anyone would be coming from the US.

JOHNSON
Mr. Trevelyan
No. 453
July 8, 1954
D. 10.00 a.m. July 8, 1954
R. 11.52 a.m. July 8, 1954
IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 453 of July 8.
Repeated for information to: Washington Paris Moscow
Codel Geneva
Singapore Saigon

I saw Chou En-lai on July 8 and presented to him your letter about my appointment as Chargé d'Affaires. He said I would have heard that he had remained in Geneva for a few days in order to introduce the Laotians and Cambodians to the Viet Minh and to see M. Mendès-France. Since then he had paid his visits to India and Burma and had seen Ho chi Minh. He wished me to tell you that he had reached agreement with Ho chi Minh on the way in which the Indo-Chinese question could be settled, and that he thought that this would make it easier to get agreement at Geneva. I asked him whether there was any danger of fighting on a significant scale in Indo-China during this delicate period. He said that he did not think so, although as the country was large and communications very bad it was difficult to get orders through to some local commanders. He added that he intended to ask M. Mendès-France to stop French bombing, which he feared might otherwise stimulate a reaction from Viet Minh forces. He asked me particularly to mention this to you.

3. He is to leave Peking tomorrow and expects to arrive at Geneva on the 12th. He asked me to say that he hoped very much that you would be going back to Geneva and that he would be able to discuss matters with you there. He did not seem to have any particular information about recent progress in the military talks, though he said that they might well progress considerably in the last moment before the time limit was up.

He thought
CONFIDENTIAL

Peking telegram No. 453 to Foreign Office

-2-

He thought that it should not take very long now to settle matters at Geneva and hoped he would be able to return to Peking early in August.

4. I asked him when the Chinese Government were likely to appoint the Chargé d'Affaires in London. He said that he would have to select a really suitable person and could not do this until he next returned to Peking from Geneva. He explained that he was only in Peking for two days and had not even had time to touch his work as Prime Minister. He seemed pleased at reports of the visit of the Chinese trade experts to the United Kingdom, which he said was made possible by our negotiations at Geneva.

I had been asked beforehand to make the visit brief, as Chou En-lai was extremely busy during his brief stay here.

Foreign Office pass Washington, Paris, Moscow, Codel Geneva and Singapore as my telegrams Nos. 12, 2, 5, 16 and 52 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington, Paris, Moscow, Codel Geneva and Singapore].

DISTRIBUTED TO:
Par Eastern Department
South East Asia Department
Economic Relations Department

ADVANCE COPIES:
Sir H. Caccia
Private Secretary
Minister of State
Mr. W. D. Allen
Head of Far Eastern Department
Layen reported Bao Dai’s state of health poor.
Chau told us that in South Vietnam, conflict between Vietnamese and Viet Minh troops, at points where each are absent, are relatively good. Viet Minh do not tend to attack posts manned only by Vietnamese.

Dac Khe stated that an AP story attributed to Vietnamese sources here regarding new boundary demarcation line at sixteenth parallel with enclaves in Franco-Vietnamese to north and for Viet Minh to south of line, and in reality come from Viet Minh.

JOHNSTON JUNE 8, 1954

SUPPLEMENT TO TELEGRAM

Johnson-Offroy Meeting, Geneva, July 8, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 8, 1954—6 p.m.

Secto 574. Repeated information Paris 23, Saigon 15. Offroy called on Bonsal and me this morning. He described his talk with Tuong Viet Minh delegate (see 6th paragraph, Secto 560). With reference Dong’s position on Viet Minh sympathizers south of Dong Hoi line (paragraph 2, Secto 560) French position is that while cease-fire agreement to be signed by the two commands could include provisions for freedom of movement of populations from one regrouping area to the other, as well as arrangements for repatriation of prisoners, etc., this agreement should not include any specific reference to a date for the withdrawal of “foreign troops” from Vietnam or to a date for elections. At most, French would agree that in final declaration of Geneva Conference, some general statement be made re territorial integrity of Vietnam, provisions for eventual unity and desirability of democratic processes. Tuong has not yet replied to this statement of position. I urged on Offroy importance including in cease-fire agreement arrangements for movement anti-Communist civilian population from evacuated zones so that responsibility for implementation would be clearly fixed and subject to supervision of international commission.

Offroy furnished us with copy of working paper prepared by French Del with regard to system of controls. He said besides ourselves copies were only being given UK and USSR for their comments. Translation contained Secto 575. Offroy reiterated views contained Secto 568 re this matter, stated was only “working paper” and French did not consider it binding on them.

While fully understanding our views, he clearly contemplates that agreement with Communists on composition will only be reached if Soviet satellite included. He contemplates that the others would be one or more Asian “ neutrals” such as India and a Western country such as Canada or Belgium. He also is convinced that Communists will insist on “veto” on major questions. I expressed concern that French paper does not provide for majority decision in all cases, stating that if contrary to our views French contemplate acquiescing in inclusion Soviet satellite, majority principle is of even greater importance. In reply he stated that with strong possibility that an Asian “neutral” such as India would have decisive vote under majority rule in any Commission, he felt it of equal importance that Western Power on the Commission friendly to our side also be able to exercise a veto on major matters.

We discussed with Offroy present state of Franco-Vietnamese relations and desirability, in our view, that French should take steps to establish close relations with new Vietnamese Del. Bonsal described in general terms his talk with Vietnamese yesterday. Secto 571). Offroy expressed some reluctance in view his inability answer questions re current French conversations with Viet Minh plus his rather pessimistic view of possibility of having current Vietnamese Government officials take realistic and helpful view of situation. He suggested perhaps USDel should undertake this task. It is his view that if Vietnamese could be assured that part of Vietnam which will remain under their control after armistice agreement will receive wholehearted support in political, economic and military fields from France and US and other free world powers, their attitude might be improved. We replied that we did not believe it practical at this stage for USDel to be source of information re situation in which French have leadership and are playing major role. Offroy stated he would consider matter further. We hope we made some impression on him.

I raised with Offroy what French contemplated course of events with regard conference would be on Saturday when report of military representatives is due to be made, but he had no views on subject. He said that when he returns, Chauvel might have some views and would communicate with me. He expects Mendes-France on Sunday. He asked whether we have heard if anyone would be coming from the US.

JOHNSTON

1 Supra.
2 July 11.
said that it seemed to me most improbable that the French would, so long as the Laotian Government desired to continue the relationship, go back on their treaty obligations to defend Laos. I added that I was without authority to give him any indication as to what our attitude would be in this most unlikely event. I pointed, however, to our general policy of support for Laos and for other free nations when threatened with aggression.

Mr. Phouialc stated that there is currently a point of difference between the French and the Laotian military representatives here. In considering the matter of separation of opposing native forces in Laos, the French view is that it might be desirable to concentrate all these forces in one area. On the other hand, Mr. Phouialc believes that it would be well to leave them in the half dozen provinces where they are since, if they are concentrated, they might become a dominating influence in a given province with the result that this province might be permanently lost to the central administration. On the other hand, according to Mr. Phouialc, if these forces are left dispersed as they are at present, they will be unable, after the departure of their Vietminh supporters, to exercise an important influence. Mr. Phouialc asked me for my view. In reply, I said that I could not express an opinion on the subject otherwise than to reiterate to him my confidence in his judgment on this and other matters.

7510.00/7-854: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY
London, July 8, 1954—4 p.m.

124. Eyes only Secretary. Re Deptel 101. I saw Eden this afternoon. He will answer your message soonest. Meanwhile he asked me to say he is going to Geneva Monday, and will meet Mendes-France. Mendes-France wished him to come over weekend but he is unable to do this. Eden will support French at Geneva in attempt to get most favorable possible settlement. He has no information or idea how matter may work out because Russians have not disclosed their hand and he is sure they will not do so until meetings take place in Geneva.

1 Dated July 7, p. 1294.
2 On July 8, Ambassador Makins transmitted to Secretary Dulles a message from Foreign Secretary Eden in which Eden indicated that he hoped "very much that you or Bedell will be able to return to Geneva early next week." The Foreign Secretary said that "one cannot yet be sure how things will work out because the Communists will certainly not show their hand until the last stages of the negotiations have been reached." (81199/7-854)
3 July 12.

I NDOCHINA

A WENDRICH

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY
Geneva, July 8, 1954—7 p.m.


1. The sides assume responsibility for the implementation of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities.
2. The control of this implementation is to be assured by an international commission.
3. In order to facilitate, in accordance with the conditions set forth below, the implementation of those clauses which imply joint action by the two sides, there is set up a joint commission in Vietnam.
4. The joint commission is to be composed of an equal number of representatives of the commanders of the two sides.
5. The heads of the delegations on the joint commission will have the rank of general.
6. The joint commission will create joint groups the number of which will be agreed between the sides. The joint groups are to be composed of an equal number of officers of the two sides. The stationing of these groups on the demarcation line between the regrouping zones is to be fixed by the sides, taking into account the authority of the joint commission.
7. The joint commission is to assure the following provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities:

(a) The cease-fire, which is to be simultaneous and general in Vietnam for the whole of the regular and irregular armed forces of the two sides.
(b) The regrouping of the armed forces of the two sides.
(c) Respect for the lines of demarcation between the regrouping zones and demilitarized sectors.

The commission is to help the sides in the implementation of the said clauses; it is to assure liaison between the sides for the preparation and for the placing in effect of plans for the application of these clauses; it is to endeavor to resolve the difficulties which may arise between the sides in the implementation of these clauses.

7. There is created an international commission charged with the control of the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam. It is to be composed of representatives of the following states: (Blank) it is to be presided over by the representative of (blank) it will have its headquarters at (blank).

8. The international commission is to create fixed and mobile inspection teams consisting of a number of officers designated by each of the states mentioned above.

The fixed teams are to be stationed at the following points: These points may be later modified at the request of the joint commission or at the request of one of the sides or at the request of the international commission itself by means of an agreement between the international commission and the command of the side concerned.

The action zones of the mobile teams will be the areas neighboring on the land and sea frontiers of Vietnam, the lines of demarcation between the regrouping zones, and the demilitarized zones. Within the limits of these zones, the teams will have the right of free movement and will receive from the local civil and military authorities all the facilities that may be needed to accomplish their missions (such as the furnishing of personnel, the making available of the necessary documents for control purposes, the summoning of witnesses necessary for investigations, the protection of the security and of the freedom of movement of the inspection teams, etc.). They will have at their disposal modern means of transport, observation, and communication which may be useful to them outside of the action zones defined above.

Mobile teams will be able, in agreement with the command of the side concerned, to engage in other movements within the framework of the missions entrusted to them by this agreement.

9. The international commission is charged with supervising the implementation by the sides of the provisions of the agreement. For this purpose, it is to carry out missions of control, observation, inspection, and investigation related to the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities and it must especially:

(a) Control the movement of the armed forces of the two sides carried out within the framework of the regrouping plan.
(b) Watch over the demarcation lines between the regrouping zones as well as the demilitarized zones.
(c) Control the operations involved in the freeing of prisoners of war and civilian internees.
(d) In the ports and airports as well as on all the frontiers of Vietnam, watch over the application of the clauses of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities having to do with the introduction into the country of armed forces of military personnel, and of all types of arms, munitions and war matériel.

10. The International Commission is to proceed through the inspection teams which have been mentioned above, and as rapidly as possible, either on its own initiative or at the request of the Joint Commission or at the request of one of the sides, to carry out investigations which may be necessary, on the basis of documents and on the ground.

11. The inspection teams are to transmit to the International Commission the results of their control, of their investigations, and of their observations; in addition, they are to make whatever special reports they may deem necessary or which the Commission may ask them for. In case of disagreement within the teams, the conclusions of each of the members are to be transmitted to the Commission.

12. If an inspection team has not been able to settle an incident or if it believes that there has been a serious violation or a threat of such a violation, the International Commission is to be informed; it is to study the reports and the conclusions of the inspection teams and to inform the sides regarding the measures which must be taken in order to settle the incident or to make the violation cease or do away with the threat of violation.

13. When the Joint Commission does not succeed in reaching an agreement regarding the interpretation of a provision or the evaluation of a fact, the International Commission arbitrates the disagreement. Its conclusions are to be sent directly to the sides and are to be communicated to the Joint Commission.

14. The recommendations and the arbitral decisions of the International Commission are to be adopted or rendered by a majority vote, subject to the provisions of Article 15 below. In case of a tie vote, the vote of the chairman is decisive. The International Commission may formulate recommendations regarding amendments and additions which it would be desirable to make to the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam in order to assure a more efficacious application of the said agreement. These recommendations are to be adopted by unanimous vote.

15. When questions are involved which relate to violations or to threats of violations which may result in a resumption of hostilities i.e.:

(a) The refusal by the armed forces of one side to proceed with the movements provided in the regrouping.
(b) The violation by the armed forces of one side of the regrouping zones or of the territorial waters or of the air space of the other side.
(c) Blank

The decisions of the International Commission must be adopted by unanimous vote. If unanimity is not achieved, the majority conclusions are to be communicated to the sides which must take them into consideration.
16. If one of the sides refuses to apply a recommendation or an arbitral decision of the International Commission, the latter informs the guarantors.

If the International Commission has not succeeded in reaching a unanimous conclusion in the cases provided for in Article 16, it will transmit to the guarantors a majority report and one or several minority reports.

The International Commission is to inform the guarantors of any obstacle which may arise to the carrying out of its activities.

17. The International Control Commission is to be on the spot from the moment of the cessation of hostilities in Indochina in order to be able to carry out the tasks provided in Article 9.

18. The International Control Commission in Vietnam is to act in close cooperation with the International Control Commissions in Cambodia and in Laos. An organism of coordination of the activities of the three Commissions is to be created through an agreement between them.

19. The International Control Commission for Vietnam may, after consulting with the International Control Commissions for Cambodia and Laos, formulate recommendations regarding the gradual reduction of its activities, taking into account developments in Vietnam. These recommendations are to be adopted by unanimity."

Comments USDel follow.\footnote{Comments on French paper contained in telegram Sect 577, July 9, p. 1311.}

JOHNSON

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UN.1 GE/7-854 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, July 8, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 576. Repeated information Paris 24, Saigon 16. Latournerle of French delegation today told Bonsal that he is informed that some weeks ago, Burmese Prime Minister\footnote{U N.} sent note to Nehru expressing grave concern at Chinese Communist activities on Burmese border and at Chinese Communist-supported Viet Minh invasions of Laos and Cambodia. Nehru passed this communication on to Chou En-lai at Geneva presumably through Menon with indication that Nehru shared Burmese concern.

According to Latournerle, Chou En-lai's anxiety to allay this concern for present through personal discussions New Delhi and Rangoon was a major reason his visit those capitals.

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INDOCHINA

1309

Latournerle believes on basis of above Communists will eventually accept for present firm positions of Laotian and Cambodian governments regarding withdrawal Viet Minh invaders and absence of "regrouping zones" for alleged Laotian and Cambodian resistance forces.

JOHNSON

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611.51/7-854 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France\footnote{Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to London as telegram 151 and to Geneva as telegram 522.}

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1954—7:24 p. m.

85. For Dillon, Aldrich and Johnson. I think it is probably true that if we had put together all of the bits of information given at various times and at various political and military levels at Paris, Geneva, Washington, Saigon and Hanoi, the result would have been a reasonably clear picture of French military intentions as now revealed. I have never harbored any thought of any willful concealment. Also I have always conceded that the French were clearly within their rights in making their own plans. I have repeatedly said at press conferences that we recognize that the French had the primary position in Indochina and that our role was that of a friendly observer who wanted to help if and when our help was wanted.

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I do feel that there is a certain lack of any intimacy which is perhaps due to the fact that we have not in the past worked closely with the personalities of the present Government who have been plunged into an immense and engrossing task. In this respect they have our sympathy and I hope that you will try to remove any impression of carping criticism on our part.

We are quite prepared to agree that France has been overextended in relation to Indochina and we are not quarrelling with present French policy designed to limit its commitments more nearly within the bounds of its strength.

Our present intentions to leave representation at Geneva at the present level of Ambassador Johnson is primarily because we do not want to be the cause of any avoidable embarrassment by what might be a spectacular disassociation of the United States from France. Whatever France may be determined to do, we accept as within its prerogatives. We only regret that we cannot agree to associate ourselves in advance with an end result which we cannot foresee. Equally, we do not want to be in a position of seeming to obstruct an end result which from the French national standpoint seems imperative to its parliament and people.

Since starting to dictate this, I have received through Bonnet a message from Mendes-France strongly urging that either Bedell Smith or I should come back. This apparently based on my today's press conference statement that neither of us had any present plans for returning.

I told Bonnet the substance of the preceding paragraphs to the effect that while we would be only too happy to contribute to a united front, we could not do so without knowing on what position that front was based. If there were a position which France was able to define and state that she would not accept anything else, then we would be able to judge whether or not that afforded the foundation for a united front. At the moment, it seems to me that there is less danger of doing irreparable injury to Franco-American relations if we avoid getting into a position at Geneva which might require a disassociation under spectacular conditions which would be deeply resented by the French as an effort on our part to block at the last minute a peace which they ardently desire.

We have not yet taken any irrevocable decision and even if no one from here comes over for the 12th, we would be standing by here under circumstances such that if developments at Geneva seem to indicate that our presence there would serve a really constructive purpose one or the other of us could get to Geneva overnight.

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INDOCHINA

Unless you perceive objection, I would like you to explain orally my position to Mendes-France, making clear that we are motivated by our estimate that in the end our presence at Geneva, even though initially it seemed an asset, might subsequently prove a liability to Franco-American relations.

Dulles

Code Room.—Please note

For London only

Please show Eden portion of this cable which follows first two paragraphs. Portion begins “We are quite prepared, etc.”

6 A letter of July 9 from British Ambassador Makins to the Secretary of State read: “I have now had a further telegram from Anthony Eden saying that he is glad that your decision that neither you nor Bedell Smith should go to Geneva for the present is not final.” Makins’ letter indicated that Eden felt it was important that in the difficult “concluding stages of the negotiations we should go out of our way to show an united front to the Communists, and he very much hopes that it will be possible for either you or Bedell Smith to go to Geneva soon.” (Presidential correspondence, lot 66 D 204)

JULY 5, 1954

296.1 GE/7-954 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET  PRIORITY

GVA, July 9, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 577. Department pass Defense; reprinted information Paris 26, Saigon 18. In commenting on working paper prepared by French delegation on control of cessation of hostilities in Vietnam (Secto 575 2), Department will wish to bear in mind general development of French thinking on this subject during past few weeks. Joint Commissions of belligerents are no longer envisaged as they were in original French proposals of June 2 and 4 as merely working instruments of International Commission. Importance of contemplated role of Joint Commissions has greatly increased. Concept of subordination has been totally abandoned although French continue to maintain obligatory nature of certain types of decisions and recommendations of International Commission. Any thought that International Commission would have physical means of acting as an enforcing agency has been abandoned. Soviet view of need for unanimous decisions on important questions has been accepted by French.

It should also be noted that until terms of agreement for cessation of hostilities are known, it is difficult to comment on significance of cer-

2 Dated July 8, p. 1806.
SECRET

Franco-Viet Minh Secret Talks

The Secretary of State has asked for notes on Geneva Conference telegram No. 44, Savang. 

This telegram describes the talks which have been taking place, without the knowledge of the Vietnamese, between the French and Viet Minh military representatives.

2. It will be recalled that at the outset of these talks the Viet Minh indicated that they would be prepared to leave all of Vietnam south of the Col des Huages, between Hue and Tourane (please see attached map) provided that the French abandoned the whole of Tonking. The Viet Minh have now put up their price considerably by claiming a partition line in the region of the 14th parallel.

3. There are two possible explanations of this:

(a) that the Viet Minh do not in fact desire settlement;

(b) that, as the French have asked for the 18th parallel, the Viet Minh have asked for the 14th in order by a process of bargaining and in view of the very short time available to M. Mendès-France, to secure a settlement on the approximate line of the 16th parallel.

4. The 16th parallel passes to the south of both Hue and Tourane and a division on this line would not only abandon to the Viet Minh the ancient imperial capital and the principal French base in central Vietnam but would also leave the French with no good defensible line to cover South Vietnam.

5. The military talks have not made much progress. A member of the French delegation has said that it is the Viet Minh military representatives who are proving the
most obdurate; and that it has been noticeable
that Pham Van Dong himself is much more reasonable.
It may be necessary for further political pressure
to be applied if any acceptable solution is to be
reached by July 10.
6. It appears from paragraph 6(c) of the attached
telegram that the French do not intend to retain a
perimeter in the Delta as a bargaining counter against
possible future Viet Minh claims in Cochin China.

Permanent Under Secretary's Department concur.

(W.J.M. Paterson)
July 8, 1954.

Sir H. Caunt
7/1954
SECRET
FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION)
TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

INDEXES:
FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WITTMANN SECRET
(CABINET) DISTRIBUTION

Str 1. Lamb
D. 2.20 p.m. July 9, 1964
No. 886
July 9, 1964
R. 2.37 p.m. July 9, 1964

PRIORITY
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 886 of July 9
Repeated for information to Paris Washington
Saigon Singapore

The French delegation say that the Viet Minh military continue
to ask for a wholly unacceptable partition line, namely the 14th
parallel, which they have been occupying. Meanwhile
both Pham Van Dong and the Chinese and Soviet Delegations adopt
a more reasonable attitude. This suggests either that there is a
disagreement between the Viet Minh military and the Communist
leadership, or that the Communists are retaining their extreme
demands in the hope of getting a better bargain when the time finally
comes for making concessions.

3. As regards procedure, the French now envisage a cease-fire
in two stages. First a disengagement of the opposing forces and
secondly their subsequent regrouping to form a partition line. The
first stage would be necessary to forestall trouble which might
otherwise arise from Viet Namese units as soon as the partition
arrangements became known.

3. The French appear to envisage that the fighting would cease
as soon as the Conference reached agreement on the main principles
governing the cease-fire agreement (details of which will have to be
worked out subsequently) and before the arrival in Indo-China of the
International Supervisory Commission.

4. French Delegation are working on one or more papers
elaborating these principles, either as a basis for detailed study and
possibly for eventual reference to the Conference.

Foreign Office please pass to Paris, Washington, Saigon and
Singapore as my telegrams Nos. 218, 261, 96 and 79 respectively.

[Repeated to Paris, Washington, Saigon and Singapore].

PPPP

[Signature]
outlook of leaders of new government on military problem now confronting Vietnam. Awareness of this outlook should be useful in future US contacts with Vietnamese officials on military subjects.

Outlook of Vietnamese representatives here appears to be based above all by their extreme bitterness toward French and by their intense desire for “real independence” of Vietnam. These factors, combined with high emotional content, appear to obscure their grasp of some of facts of military situation, and are likely to influence their judgment about what will be best military policy for Vietnam.

For example, Dac Khe, with apparent concurrence of his colleagues, flatly disagreed with French assertion that recent withdrawal French Union forces from southern part of delta was dictated by military necessity, and said French motives were political, looking toward extrication French Expeditionary Corps from delta and purchase of cease-fire at any price. Irrespective of whether or not withdrawal was dictated by military necessity as French claim, it is significant to note that Dac Khe and Ngo Dinh Luyen said their point borne out by fact Vietnamese Government pleaded with French to leave Vietnamese forces for defense southern delta under Vietnamese command even if French Expeditionary Corps were withdrawn; or alternatively to leave arms with people to permit them to defend area. French refused. From this Vietnamese concluded necessity of southern provinces not necessary, implying that since withdrawal of French forces and people to fight as existed was simply matter of leaving arms with them. Apparently not considered were factors such as capability of Vietnamese alone to resist attack, necessity for combat and logistic support provided by French, necessity for integrated defense plan, for all delta, and effect on whole defense position of weakness of one part.

Nguyen Huu Chan said with feeling that if French did not have resolve to carry on war they should not stand in way of Vietnamese doing so on their own with autonomous army under Vietnamese command. Although this reflects admirable spirit, it comes at somewhat belated stage when talk of going separate ways clearly unrealistic in light of present crisis faced by French Union forces even when operating in concert.

If above is fair sample of thinking of new government leaders, it reflects rather positive concept of military facts of life which, if not modified, is likely to make continued Vietnamese collaboration with French in carrying out common military efforts even more strained.

Above comments submitted for such use as they may be in contacts between US and Vietnamese officials on military subjects.

UNOCHINA 1315

3061GE/7-954: Telegram
Twenty-second Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, July 9,
3 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Geneva, July 9, 1954-10 p.m.

Respectfully:

Secto 580. Repeated information Paris 50, London 12, Saigon 31,
Tokyo 5, Moscow 6, Vientiane, Phnom Penh unnumbered. Tokyo pass
CINCPE. Department pass Defense. Twenty-second Indochina re-
stricted session Friday, July 9, Lamb (UK) presiding.


Li Kuo-nung (PRC) spoke next referring to comments of French,
Cambodian and Laos delegates 8 July on subject nonintroduction of
troops and arms into Laos and Cambodia after cessation hostilities.
Referring to question that above delegates raised concerning require-
ments for self-defense, Li said he would like to make three points in
response:

1. Problem of what was necessary for self-defense should be con-
idered separately, and quantity of military personnel, arms and
munition introduced should be limited to requirements of self-defense.
In this connection Li was pleased to note that Laos and Cambodian
delegates on 8 July reaffirmed their assurance that arms to be intro-
duced would be limited to requirements of self-defense.

2. Question of limitation on introduction military personnel and
arms should be discussed together with question of prohibition of
foreign bases. On this point Li noted 8 June statement of Cambodian
delegate that it would not allow foreign bases to be established in Cam-
bodia and concluded that neither Laos or Cambodia have views con-
tary to his on this question.

3. Referring to question of need for foreign experts and technicians
in Laos and Cambodia, Li said relation of these countries to French
Union required that this subject be studied and that it should be dis-
cussed along with question of withdrawal of foreign forces.

Referring to meetings between military representatives pursuant to
conference agreement on 19 June, Li said question of military arms and
equipment necessary for self-defense of Laos and Cambodia should
be discussed by representatives of two commands who, after reaching
certain measure of agreement, could submit recommendations to con-
ference. He expressed hope military representatives would proceed on
basis three above principles.

1 A set of minutes of this session (RC Restricted/292) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 027, CP 27B. The minutes indicate that the session convened at 3 p.m. and quorumed at 6:15 p.m. The minutes are also printed in Conference de Genève, pp. 268-273. The observations made by Pham Van Dong on the question of supervision, Indochina Document 10/41, July 10, are in Conference files, lot 60 D 027, CP 27DA. This message was transmitted to the Department of State in two
sections.

2 Intro.
Dong (Viet Minh) then took floor to speak on general question of control, noting that statements of Soviet, PRC, and French delegates at last session showed area of agreement on which conference could agree.

Dong said views of delegates quite close on following subjects:
1. All recognized need for two categories of control (joint and neutral commissions).
2. All agreed that relation between these organs should not be on basis of subordination but rather coordination.
3. All were or less agreed that since neutral commission would have no forces its decisions could not be imposed on the parties, and if one party protested, problem should be referred to guarantor powers.
4. All agreed decisions of neutral commission should be taken by unanimous vote on important questions such as renewal of hostilities and amendment of agreement, and that certain others could be taken by majority vote.
5. All agreed that organization of control should cover all of Indochina, although special situations in Laos and Cambodia would be taken into account.

On question of organization of control, Dong made following comments:
1. Regarding the objects of control, following military questions should be included: simultaneous and complete cease-fire; demarcation line between regroupment zones; separation of belligerent forces and transfer of belligerent troops to regroupment areas; withdrawal of foreign forces; prohibition of introduction of troops and military personnel; prohibition of foreign military bases, and exchange of POWs and civilian internees. All these, he said, are measures which should be implemented at same time as cease-fire.
2. Regarding the function of control body, Dong pointed out that implementation of agreement depended on action of two sides, that to be effective, control of implementation should be grounded on knowledge of prevailing conditions, and that supervision should be in the hands of those who are competent, that is, representatives of two sides in joint commission. Subjects enumerated in previous paragraph fall within competence of joint commission, except for prohibition of introduction of troops and military personnel and prohibition of foreign military bases. These latter two are within competence of neutral body. Distribution of tasks between two commissions can be determined by differing nature of roles. Joint commission implements, negotiates disputes, recommends to sides. In cases of disagreement, question is referred to neutral commission for advice and examination. Neutral commission supervises implementation of agreement, particularly concerning prohibition on introduction of troops and establishment of foreign bases; it makes inquiries, and recommends to sides. If one side contests ruling, issue goes to guarantor states. In short, joint commission supervises implementation of agreement and negotiates differences; neutral commission supervises and conciliates, while supreme arbiters are guarantor powers.

All above remarks concerning organization of control, Dong said, are valid for all of Indochina. Joint commissions should be set up in each of three states with one general neutral commission which would have sub-commissions in each state. Special conditions, particularly in Cambodia, should be taken into account, notably regarding withdrawal of foreign troops and non-introduction arms and military personnel from outside. Nevertheless basic principle of control for all three states of Indochina is not altered.

In concluding, Dong said considerable progress made by conference on question of supervision, and that "objects of control" being dealt with by military experts. He hoped military talks would soon reach satisfactory result and that committees could report in reasonable time.

Chauvel (France), speaking from notes, noted statements of Laotian and Cambodian delegates at last meeting in which they expressed concern over need for maintaining means of defense. He said French Government fully aware of this need, and recognized that if French troops have been in these two countries it was because national elements were not able to meet task. Real problem, he said, was necessity to give these states capability of exercising their sovereignty. In this connection he noted that ideas of US delegate expressed in Ambassador Johnson's opening statement coincided with concession French Government on this point.

Turning to statement of PRC delegate, Chauvel said he was not sure he agreed with PRC view that question of introduction arms and military personnel into Laos and Cambodia should be discussed by military experts since he felt this was not issue merely to be worked out by Laos and Cambodia with Viet Minh but was matter of interest all delegates in conference.

Chauvel then referred to Dong's statement, and warned conference against temptation, now that Ministers are about to meet, of reaching general agreements on various subjects when detailed issues are yet unresolved. It would be confusing, he said, to say we agreed in areas where in fact there is no agreement. He went on to note that Dong incorrectly said all delegations agreed that there should be single amnesties agreement for all Indochina. French delegation, he asserted, never said that. Rather it said just the contrary and he believed conference shared its view. On 19 June, he said, conference appeared to favor not one single commission but three to deal with problems in three states. Similarly a single text of an agreement cannot apply to all three countries. French delegation, he said, favors three agreements, one for each country.

Sam Sary (Cambodia) spoke next and said statement of PRC delegate concerning non-introduction arms into Laos and Cambodia not far
from his own lines of thinking, particularly remark on defensive goals such as arms should have. He went on to make following points:

1. Re foreign bases in Cambodia, statement of Cambodian delegate on 8 June that it did not intend to authorize foreign bases intended to apply only if Cambodia not threatened. However, if Cambodian security were imperiled, Cambodia intends, he said, to keep its legitimate right to defend itself by all means.

2. Re foreign instructors and technicians, he referred to present situation in which there are French instructors whom Cambodia continues to wish to avail itself of. However, he said, negotiation on this subject should properly be carried out in framework of conference, not with invader (meaning Viet Minh) who would be interested in limiting means of defense of its victim.

3. Re limitation on introduction arms and military personnel, principle of limitation, he said, applies only to quantity and should not be detrimental to sufficient defense of independence of country. Cambodia must be able to choose origin and quality of equipment and military personnel needed to maintain its sovereign independence.

In concluding, Sam Sary said his delegation fully shared reservations expressed by French delegate on question control in Laos and Cambodia.

Although no delegations indicated intention to speak further, and in spite of general feeling that meeting should adjourn, Kuznetsov suggested session take short break and resume to discuss question of next meeting in light of early arrival Foreign Ministers.

After break Kuznetsov expressed support of Soviet delegation for Chinese proposals re introduction of arms after cease-fire. Said as is known, in point order of conference decisions June 29, work of conference begins with question of withdrawal of foreign forces and military personnel. It is obvious this agreement meant provide cease-fire hostilities and thus provide that no foreign troops or foreign arms be admitted into the two countries. Taking into consideration peculiarities of situation in Laos and Cambodia, Chinese proposals provided for certain arms be admitted from outside but amount should be discussed separately. It will be difficult decide this question but Chinese suggestion deserves special mention. Majority delegates appear agree amount of arms should be limited to amount necessary for self-defense.

It also necessary provide that introduction arms not create situation menacing neighboring countries. Many participants this conference expressed this idea and not without foundation, for there are not a few examples where territory of sovereign states used to create great stores of armaments menacing neighbors. Countries allowing this in fact lose their sovereignty. We consider that anybody undertaking this discussion should proceed on principle that introduction of armament be limited to self-defense.

INDOCINA

During past three weeks delegates have tried hard reach rapprochement on question of control and supervision over cessation of hostilities. In particular, France has made no small effort in this respect. We have made step forward and have basis from which can move further. Important we not place artificial obstacles in way. We are now at stage where can pass from speech making to definition of certain formulas.

Lamb then stated co-chairman and he felt they could only very well fix date of next meeting since several delegations will be represented by Ministers.

Usual communiqué issued leaving date for next meeting open.

JOHNSON

396.1 GE/7-954 : Telegram

Twenty-second Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, July 9, 3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, July 9, 1954—9 p. m.

Seco 579. Repeated information Saigon 20, Paris 29, London 11, Tokyo 4, Moscow 5, Phnom Penh and Vientiane unnumbered. Department pass Defense. Tokyo for CINCFE. Following is text my statement at 23rd restricted Indochina session Friday, July 9:

"Mr. Chairman, in continuation of our discussion at the last meeting, I desire briefly to comment on the statements made at that meeting by the Dice of Cambodia and Laos on the important subject of the defense of their countries.

As the US and other Dels have stated on several occasions, the problem of restoring peace in Laos and Cambodia is solely one of ending a foreign invasion. It seems to the US delegate unthinkable that these sovereign states should be forced to divest themselves of their right of self-defense as the price of obtaining the withdrawal of foreign aggressive forces. I cannot seriously believe that anyone could regard Cambodia and Laos as potential threats to the peace and security of their neighbors. All possible doubt on this score has long since been removed by the declarations made before this conference.

The proposal made by Mr. Chou En-lai on June 16 appear to have paid at least some lip service to the right of Laos and Cambodia to import arms for their self-defense. However, as the Del of Cambodia pointed out at our last session, that proposal does not seem to have recognized the right of Laos and Cambodia to seek foreign technical assistance and to employ foreign military advisers whenever necessary to their defense. General Smith said on June 19, "The small Cambodian and Laotian forces have a few French officers and noncommissioned officers. If they are deprived of these, their capacity for self-defense is materially reduced. The USDel considers that in the same way as any other sovereign state, the states
of Laos and Cambodia should be free to request and to obtain technical assistance and advice.

The position of the Chinese Communist Del on the military facilities established in Laos under agreements between the governments of Laos and France also requires clarification. The purely defensive nature of these facilities has been made clear by the Dels of Laos and France. Moreover, since both Laos and France are members of the French Union, these facilities are clearly not "foreign" bases in the sense that term has been used by several Dels.

The Chinese Communist Del has proposed that separate negotiations be held on the question of the amount and type of arms that may be introduced into Laos and Cambodia for self-defense after the cessation of hostilities. At our last session, a number of questions were raised concerning this proposal. The Del of Cambodia, supported by the Del of Laos, also set forth certain principles which should be recognized if the proposed separate negotiations are in fact undertaken. These principles are entirely reasonable and indeed essential from the point of view of the future security of these small countries, which are now being forced to defend themselves against attacks originating outside their borders. As the head of the Cambodian Del made clear on an earlier occasion, the representatives of these two countries would be gravely dejected in their duty to their peoples were they to deliver them with hands and feet tied, defenseless to foreign aggressors. Indeed, after all the statements we have heard on the necessity for respecting national rights and sovereignty, I find it strange that we find ourselves in the position of discussing limitations on the most fundamental aspects of the sovereignty of these two countries.

I hope that the responses to the questions raised at our last meeting will lead to a concrete recognition of the sovereign rights and the defensive requirements of Laos and Cambodia.\(^{13}\)

JOHNSON

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 623

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bosan)

SECRET

Participants: Major Mathieu, Major Macfarlane, and Viet Minh

Philip W. Brown

Subject: Cessation of hostilities in Laos

I saw Major Mathieu briefly during the interval at today's restricted session. He expressed general optimism regarding the outlook for the military talks with the Viet Minh on the situation in Laos. From the military point of view, the problem would probably be solved by having once-and-for-all called Laotian resistants, once the Viet Minh invaders have withdrawn, integrated into the Royal Laotian army. In Major


d Mathieu's opinion, this can be done without great danger since there are only some 1,500 men involved.

From the political point of view, the problem is more complicated. The Laotian Government's position is that it is willing to grant complete amnesty to those who have borne arms against the government and to permit these people the full exercise of their political rights as Laotian citizens at the next elections. According to Major Mathieu, however, something more is required to meet the needs of the Viet Minh for some sort of face-saving device which will permit them to climb down from their former exaggerated position with regard to the Pathet Lao.

Major Mathieu stated that what is now being considered is the possibility of constituting a committee of whose members would be Ministers of the Laotian Government and others representatives of the Pathet Lao. The mission of this committee would be to study the political situation and to make recommendations for over-all pacification of the country. In view of the well-known Laotian temperament, Major Mathieu believes that such a committee would promote harmony in a framework of security for the present government.

I said that I was glad there was no question of a coalition government or of giving the Pathet Lao any authority in any area of Laos. I referred briefly to the well-known talent of Communists for infiltration and subversion. I said that off hand it seemed to me that if the committee which Major Mathieu discussed is to be constituted, it would be better if the representatives on the Laotian side could be well below the rank of Ministers. There would thus be avoided any appearance that the Laotian Government was treating the Pathet Lao movement as an equal. I said that perhaps the Laotian governmental side might be made up of some members of the Laotian National Assembly and that it should be understood that the function of the committee would be merely to make some recommendations which could be submitted to the Laotian Government for its consideration but which would have no binding character whatever. Major Mathieu said he thought well of this idea.

7510.00/7-454: Telegram

Johnson—Chaoul Meeting, Geneva, July 9, Afternoon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

Geneva, July 9, 1954—9 p.m.

I called on Chauvel following restricted meeting today. He has just returned from Paris. His impression is that Mendes-France position unchanged and that he does not intend make further concessions to secure agreement with Communists. Mendes-France anticipates active week of discussions followed possibly by last minute agreement on evening July 19. Mendes-France arrives here tomorrow afternoon. He will see Molotov tomorrow evening.

Chauvel dined last night with Communist Chinese Xi Ko-nung and Chang Wen-tien, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to USSR who has just returned here, were present. Atmosphere was "very cordial". Chauvel informed Chinese that military discussions with Viet Minh not going well and that latter had made both for Vietnam and for Laos unacceptable proposals wholly out of harmony with what Chauvel had understood Chou En-lai's position to be. Chinese expressed surprise but did not go into details of situation. He told Chauvel that Chou En-lai would probably return here early next week saying it takes three to four days to fly here from Peking depending on weather. Vice Minister stated Chou En-lai had had "very good meeting" with Ho Chi Minh and results "would be helpful to French". Vice Minister has spent last two weeks in Moscow and Chauvel believes Communist Chinese and Soviet positions regarding problem have been coordinated, with Chinese views on Asian problems being given major weight.

There was an "underground" meeting between French Colonel Brebisson and Viet Minh military representative yesterday. At this meeting Viet Minh made two proposals (1) A demarcation line about 40 kilometers north of Tuyhoa line and (2) "neutralization" of delta in order to permit total evacuation of French Expeditionary Corps in three months period. French representative stated both these proposals wholly unacceptable and not even worthy of discussion. He refused to set date for next meeting.

Chauvel saw Molotov this morning. Molotov expressed interest in being informed of progress of conference. Chauvel gave him general review touching particularly on question of demarcation line, attitude of extreme intransigence being adopted by Viet Minh in military talks and problem of international controls. Molotov expressed interest but claimed unfamiliarity with details. Chauvel suggested desirability of contact between French military representatives and members of Soviet delegation in order that Soviet delegation might be fully informed of difficulties being encountered and of attitudes adopted by Viet Minh. Later in day Soviet delegation got in touch with French delegation and these contacts will be set up. Molotov stated that he had seen Chauvel's working paper (Secto 575) and that while there were points requiring clarification and further study he thought it was a useful contribution.

Chauvel has impression both Russians and Chinese give Viet Minh fairly free hand to see how far they can go but that when they find Viet Minh demands have gone beyond limit which French can be expected to accept, they intervene. Chauvel made point to Molotov that any agreement reached must be acceptable not only to Franco-Vietnamese side and to Viet Minh but also to other conference members. He is hopeful that, as he says occurred previously, Chinese-Russian moderating influence now be brought to bear on Viet Minh. Chauvel expressed confidence that if he were negotiating only with Russians and Chinese, he could almost certainly achieve a settlement in line with provisions of US-UK aide-memoire.

Chauvel told me that he is having his staff prepare drafts of an armistice agreement and related documents so as to be ready in case ministers reach agreements on major matters. He stated that information we had furnished regarding Korean armistice was most useful to them and was much appreciated.

* * *

1 Dated July 8, p. 1305.

73150.00/7-1054: Telegram
The United States Delegation to the Department of State
TOP SECRET PRIORITY
GENEVA, July 10, 1954—1 p.m.

Secto 581. In keeping with Tosec 526, I assume that Department desires I maintain a generally passive attitude in conference meetings and in relations with other delegations, acting in role of "friendly observer who wants to help if and when our help is wanted".

US-UK note to France (Tosec 490) should provide sufficient guidance on US policy for most questions which will arise.

Real negotiating will take place at ministerial level outside of conference, and I will endeavor to maintain maximum keep Department promptly informed thereon.

It is not clear to what extent there may be conference meetings, but as it is likely that developments will be rapid during course of next week, probable that urgent questions will arise as to attitudes we will take as long as we participate when matters presented to conference.

1 Telegram Tosec 526 to Geneva was sent as telegram 85 to Paris, July 8, p. 1306.
2 Telegram Tosec 490 to Geneva was sent as telegram 4868 to Paris, June 28, p. 1256.
While any conference action which involves a commitment by the US would clearly require a reservation of US position pending instructions, uniformly to adopt such an attitude with respect other questions will be regarded by French and others as an obstructive and delaying tactic. I have in mind possibility of procedural and substantive issues on which Ministers here have reached agreement and where action might not be entirely to our liking but would not involve commitments by US. As example, something along lines French proposal on controls (Secto 575) might be presented for conference agreement as basis for drafting detailed agreement by committee experts. In such a situation I would not in conference oppose position taken by France but would merely state, where appropriate, US has some doubts on adequacy or clarity of document but will not obstruct action agreed upon by other participants in conference.

When consistent with the positions set forth in US-UK note to French (Tosec 490), I would propose briefly support in conference substantive positions taken by French or others on our side when it would appear appropriate and useful.

I would appreciate the Department's comments and instructions.

In event some one or all of Associated States take position of open opposition to France in conference session, possibly even to extent of walking out, I would appreciate Department's thinking regarding US attitude.

JOHNSON

Dated July 8, p. 1305.

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1954—5:42 p.m.

Tosec 529. Reference Secto 569. Amb Johnson should reiterate to Chauvel and Amb Dillon or Ambassador Johnson to Mendes our views on international control which are closely tied to attitude we shall adopt re any Geneva agreement.

In this connection it should be stressed our attitude will depend not only on adherence to seven points of US-UK note, but also on acceptance or non-acceptance of any agreement by Associated States (ref Dept 84 to Paris). For this reason it is indispensable that French face up to problem of advising Vietnamese of Geneva developments and prospects in order avoid dangerous reactions mentioned Deptel 84* to Paris.

Saigon's 85* indicates Ngo Dinh Diem is still uninformd re French intentions and has not accepted implications military situation. We are struck by his statement that "ceasefire must not lead to partition which could only lead to preparation for more deadly war", and his appeal that southern provinces of delta be restored.

Ambassador Dillon should again stress to Mendes (or in his absence to de Beaumont) acuteness this problem as it appears to us, and advise him that unless French themselves take initiative in preparing Diem for a Geneva agreement in line with US-UK seven points, we fear strongly adverse Vietnamese reactions may compromise possibility of establishing any line in Vietnam.

FYI For our part, we believe we must place our own relations with Diem on basis both more realistic and confidential if we are to play useful role in Vietnam at this time or in future. We would wish, of course, not to embarrass French thereby and would hope that their own consultations with Diem might have provided background against which review of our relations with Vietnam and statement of our policy in present circumstances would be appropriate. We believe such step would contribute and in fact be indispensable to purposes set forth in French Aide-Mémoire of June 26 (Deptel 4852 to Paris*). We propose Diem be given information based on our reply to Aide-Mémoire (Deptel 4853 to Paris*), although neither Aide-Mémoire nor our reply should be mentioned to him. End FYI.

French should be informed by Embassy Paris and British by Embassy London that we are conveying this information in general terms to Diem, primarily in effort relieve pressures which appear dangerous to us and prejudicial to establishment of any free world strength in Vietnam.

Ambassador Heath should see Diem soonest and convey to him oral message from Secretary in following sense:*

"As you assume your high office I want you to know that thoughts of American people, President Eisenhower and myself are with you and with your country in its difficult ordeal.

"Your wisdom, strength and record of devotion to cause of genuine independence are well known to us and we are confident that they will be put to service of Vietnam."

* Dated July 2, p. 1275.
* Not printed.
* Dated June 28, p. 1257.
* Dated June 28, p. 1256.
* Dated July 8, p. 1309.

* Ambassador Heath conveyed the Secretary's message to Diem on July 12. For Heath's report, see telegram 150, July 12, from Saigon, p. 1339.
"We know that struggle in Indochina is one for liberty against despotism and that you represent the spirit of resistance to a menace which threatens entire free world.

"US has, as you know, taken up arms against this Communist imperialism as one of the United Nations in Korea. We have also contributed our resources and those skills we possess in other threatened areas, not least in Vietnam. US remains prepared support countries everywhere seeking maintain their freedom against godless Communist menace.

"During past year as new plans of French Union High Command developed, we sought to assure ourselves that those plans offered prospect of military success and would accomplish and foster early completion of independence, and development of national armies, in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

"Unfortunately this program was not fulfilled and military situation in Vietnam deteriorated.

"Meanwhile US had acquiesced in suggestion of its associates in free world that fullest trial should be made at Geneva of resources of negotiation. Communists during this period in no wise abated their aggression in Vietnam. Other negotiations with Viet Minh and Chinese Communists, to which US is not a party, have also taken place.

"If as a result of such negotiations of military operations there should now result any cease-fire line tending to divide Vietnam, we would be unwilling to consider it as final. We would lend our best efforts to assist patriotic Vietnamese in building up strength in that part of Vietnam remaining outside Communist occupation. At the same time be recognized that the necessary conditions for intervention by our own forces in North Vietnam have not been realized and are unlikely to be in the future.

"As you know, President Eisenhower and I have recently concluded a series of conferences with British Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden. At these conferences we made clear our strong opposition to any settlement which might be made on terms leading to permanent division of your country. We and British agreed, and so informed French, that although temporary division of country might be required to effect regrouping of opposing military forces, we could not exclude prospect of ultimate peaceful reunification. In any such regrouping, we informed French, we felt strongly provision must be made for humane movements of populations.

"We believed French might be encouraged to resist possible agreements of more undesirable character if they were advised what kind of provisional agreement we and British might be prepared to respect, even though we were not prepared accept it as desirable or final. Accordingly we and British informed French we would respect an agreement which:

1. Preserves at least the southern half of Vietnam;
2. Does not impose on free Vietnam any restrictions materially impairing its capacity to maintain a stable non-Communist regime, and especially does not impose restrictions impairing its right to maintain adequate forces for internal security, to imports arms and to employ foreign advisers:

"3. Does not contain political provisions which would risk loss of the retained area to Communist control;
4. Does not exclude the possibility of the ultimate reunification of Vietnam by peaceful means;
5. Provides for peaceful and humane transfer, under international supervision, of those people desiring to be moved from one zone to another of Vietnam; and
6. Provides effective machinery for international supervision of the agreement.

"While we recognize that settlement along these lines imposes hardships on Vietnam, we fear that deteriorating military situation and separate negotiations in progress with Viet Minh and Chinese Communists could lead to something still worse. It is our hope that views we have expressed to French may bear fruit in form of stronger resolve on their part.

"Finally permit me say how much I sympathize with sufferings of Vietnam and its people. I am glad that one who had dedicated his life and prayers to its service is now at hand to give comfort and guidance."
regulate movement of mobile teams in its own area outside of action zones in reciprocal fashion. Re Article 9, he seemed to agree that some provision might be made for control of local arms and ammunition manufacturing plants.

Concerning two fundamental questions of binding authority of [garbled group] international commission (Article 12) and voting procedure (Article 15), Offroy said his original draft specifically stated that decisions of international commission would be binding on the sides but that this was modified so draft now makes decisions of international commission binding only implicitly. Here he cited wording Article 12. Reason for modification, he said, was that since this was particularly critical issue, Soviets might find it more difficult to accept if point were emphasized by being flatly stated. We pointed out that if Soviets were not prepared to accept this point it would be well to find it out before cease-fire, and emphasized strongly we felt this point should be positively stated. Concerning majority vote on minor subjects and unanimous vote on major ones, Offroy said French delegation believes Soviets will never accept principle of majority vote on all issues. Furthermore, French believe that veto provision will safeguard their interests as well as the event international commission is so composed as to be under some influence of French role in Indochina, is placed on commission of swinging balance. Furthermore as practical matter international commission itself cannot take any effective action to stop a serious violation of agreement if one side willfully intends to break it, and that various questions must in any case be dealt with by states willing to guarantee conditions after cessation of hostilities; regarding Article 14 Offroy said not intention of French draft that recommendations of international commission concerning amendments to agreement should be binding on sides, and seemed to agree that clarification of wording would be desirable. Re Article 16, Bonsal explained we reserved comment on this Article since question of guarantees still not sufficiently developed by conference.

In response to question about what French envisaged would be “demilitarized section” referred to in Article 6(C), Offroy said French initially had in mind Catholic bishops of Bui Chiu and Phat Diem in southern part of delta (from which forces of two sides would withdraw leaving police functions to Catholic militia) and zones separating troops of both sides along demarcation line and around one or more enclaves. Since withdrawals in delta, Offroy believes it is now less likely Viet Minh will accept demilitarization of bishoprics, but French will try get agreement on this.

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The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 10, 1954—7 p.m.

Secto 584. Repeated information Paris 33. Department limit distribution. Paris eyes only Ambassador. Chauvel today called in Bonsal to ask latest developments regarding United States representation at Conference next week. Bonsal replied that he was familiar with message regarding Secretary’s position transmitted yesterday by Joyce to Menes (Tose 526) 1 and with press accounts to effect that further representations had been made by Bonnet. Bonsal stated he had no information as to Secretary’s reaction to these further representations.

Chauvel then stated with great earnestness that he believed it would be “most dangerous” if United States delegation not headed by either Secretary or General Smith. He recalled that his whole effort over past three weeks in dealing with Viet Minh, Soviets and Communist Chinese had been predicated on possibility of attaining at least military settlement which would have international sanction. He said that chance of reasonable settlement along lines United States-United Kingdom aide-mémoire 2 depends entirely on judgment of Communists as to United States attitude. If Communists believe United States disassociating itself from negotiation, they will push their demands much further. Chauvel recalled that Molotov raised question of United States representation with Chauvel at their conversation yesterday and stated, when Chauvel indicated he had no information on subject, “we will have to go ahead anyhow”: Chauvel concluded with earnest reiteration of importance that either Secretary or Smith be here. He attaches greatest value even to “silent presence” of Secretary or Smith in order to achieve settlement short of loss entire area in fairly near future.

Chauvel reported that de Jean had found Bao Dai quite amenable to military settlement along lines Dong Ho demarcation line. Bao Dai most interested in possibility of French and United States military and economic assistance to reduced Vietnam which would result from military settlement.

Chauvel reported that Brebisson today briefed two Soviet officers regarding military negotiations with Viet Minh. This was in accordance with suggestion Chauvel had made to Molotov (Secto 578 3). Brebisson had impression Soviet officers wholly unfamiliar with situation. Chauvel hopeful that result will be helpful in sense of Soviet-Chinese Communist influence to restrain exaggerated Viet Minh demands.

JOHNSON

1Telegram Tose 526 to Geneva was sent as telegram 85 to Paris, July 8, p. 1309.
2For text, see telegram 4853 to Paris, June 28, p. 1266.
3Dated July 9, p. 1321.
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1954—10:25 p.m.

127. For Ambassador from Secretary. Limit distribution. Following is personal message from Secretary Dulles to Mendes-France which is to be delivered by Ambassador Dillon to Mendes-France in person as promptly as possible as instructed by separate cable. 2

Begin text: My dear Mr. President: President Eisenhower (who has been kept closely informed) and I have been greatly moved by your earnest request that I or General Bedell Smith should return next week to Geneva for what may be the conclusion of the Indochina phase of the Conference. I can assure you that our attitude in this respect is dictated by a desire to find the course which will best preserve the traditional friendship and cooperation of our countries and which will promote the goals of justice and human welfare and dignity to which our two nations have been traditionally dedicated. We also attach great value to preserving the unity of front of France, Great Britain and the United States which has during this postwar period so importantly served all three of us in our dealings with the Communists.

What now concerns us is that we are very doubtful as to whether there is a unified front in relation to Indochina, and we do not believe that the mere fact that the high representatives of the three nations physically reappear together at Geneva will serve as a substitute for a clear agreement on a joint position which includes agreement as to what will happen if that position is not accepted by the Communists. We fear that unless there is the reality of such a united front, the events at Geneva will expose differences under conditions which will only serve to accentuate them with consequent strain upon the relations between our two countries greater than if the US does not reappear at Geneva in the person of General Smith or myself.

Beginning early last April the US worked intensively with the French Government and with that of Great Britain in an effort to create a common position of strength. This did not prove possible. The reasons were understandable, and derived from fundamental causes which still sustain and influence the possibility of achieving at the present time a genuine “united front”.

During the talks of Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden with President Eisenhower and me, an effort was made to find a common position which might be acceptable to the two of us and, we hoped, to the French Government. This was expressed in the seven-point memorandum of which you are aware. I believe that this represented a constructive contribution. However, I do not yet feel that there is a united position in the sense that the three of us would be prepared to stand firmly on this as a minimum acceptable solution and to see the negotiations break off and the warfare resume if this position was not accepted by the Communist side. We doubt very much that the Communists will in fact accept this seven-point position unless they realize that the alternative is some common action upon which we have all agreed. So far, there is no such alternative.

Under these circumstances, we greatly fear that the seven points which constitute a minimum as far as the US is concerned will constitute merely an optimum solution so far as your Government and perhaps the UK are concerned, and that an armistice might be concluded on terms substantially less favorable than those we could respect.

We gather that there is already considerable French thinking in terms of the acceptability of departures from certain of the seven points. For example:

Allowing Communist forces to remain in Northern Laos; accepting a Vietnam line of military demarcation considerably south of Donghôl; neutralizing and demilitarizing Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam so as to impair their capacity to maintain stable, non-Communist regimes; accepting elections so early and so ill-prepared and ill-supervised as to risk the loss of the entire area to Communism; accepting international supervision by a body which cannot be effective because it includes a Communist state which has veto power.

These are but illustrations of a whittling-away process, each stroke of which may in itself seem unessential, but which cumulatively could produce a result quite different from that envisaged by the seven points. Also, of course, there is the danger that the same unacceptable result might come about through the Communist habit of using words in a double sense and destroying the significance of good principles with swiftly introducing implementations.

We do not for a moment question the right of the French Government to exercise its own judgment in all of these respects. Indeed, we recognize that the issues for France are so vital that the French Government has a duty to exercise its own judgment. I have from the beginning recognized the preponderant interest of your Government as representing the nation which has borne for so many years the burden of a cruel and costly war. However, my Government equally has the duty not to endorse a solution which would seem to us to impair seriously certain principles which the US believes must, as far as it is concerned, be kept unimpaired, if our own struggle against Communism is to be successfully pursued. At the same time, we do not wish to put ourselves in the position where we would seem to be passing moral judgment upon French action or disassociating ourselves from the settlement at a moment and under circumstances which might be unnecessarily dramatic.

It is also to be considered that if our conduct creates a certain uncertainty in the minds of the Communists, this might strengthen your hand more than our presence at Geneva in a form which would expose probably to the world, and certainly to the Communists themselves, differences which the Communists would exploit to the discomfiture of all three of us.

Under all these circumstances, it seems to us that the interests of both of our countries are best served by continuing for the time being

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1 Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to London as telegram 196 and to Geneva as telegram 21.

2 For a discussion between the Secretary of State and the President concerning this message to Mendes-France, see volume xiii.

3 Telegram 120 to Paris, July 10, infra.
the present type of US representation at Geneva. This consists of able and responsible persons who are in close contact with the President and me.

If circumstances should alter so that it appeared that our common interests would be better served if higher ranking officials became our representatives, then we would be alert to act accordingly.

It is because I am fully aware of the serious and solemn nature of the moment that I have gone into the matter at this considerable length. It is possible that by the first of the week, the Communist position will be sufficiently disclosed so that some of the answers to the foregoing queries can be foreseen. This might clarify in one sense or another the thinking of us all.

In this connection, let me emphasize that it is our ardent hope that circumstances might become such that consistently with the foregoing either General Bedell Smith or I can personally come to Geneva and stand beside you. End text.

DULLES

611.51/7-104: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 1

TOP SECRET NSC 1

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1954—10:35 p.m.

108. For Ambassador from Secretary. Limit distribution. In separate telegram I am sending you a message from me to Mendes-France, 2 which you should deliver to him in person at Geneva at the earliest possible moment. I think that in this connection you should not limit yourself merely to delivering the message, but that you should discuss the subject matter with him so as to be sure he gets the real flavor and import of what we are trying to explain. In this connection, please express the profound personal sympathy which the President and I have for the position of Mendes-France and our admiration for the courageous way in which he is tackling almost insurmountable problems. Also, emphasize that if we seem to differ from him as to whether Ambassador Johnson or General Smith or I am at Geneva, this is a difference of tactics which ought not to be exaggerated.

After having seen and delivered the message to Mendes-France as above, please then give a copy to Eden.

Because of your distinctive relationship to Mendes-France as Ambassador to France, we leave it to your discretion as to whether or not Johnson accompanies you. However, when you see Eden, you should have Johnson with you.

1 Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to Geneva as telegram 22 and to London as telegram 96.
2 Telegram 327 to Paris, July 10, supra.

END OF CHINA

JULY 11, 1954

Bolshoe Library, Hattori papers

Hayter Diary, Sunday, July 11, 1954

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

I dropped down to see the President at ten o'clock after church to see if there was anything further he wanted me to do. He had nothing in particular that he wanted me to do with reference to the closing of plans, but we did have an opportunity to talk about the international situation and the upcoming Geneva Conference. He informed me that he had been giving considerable thought to our discussion of several days ago and had reached the point in thinking matter where he thought it was necessary to have Foster Dulles fly to Paris to confer with Mendes-France and Eden on the entire situation. He told me at that time that Dulles would announce on Monday that he was leaving for Paris Monday evening 3 and that if Dulles did reach an agreement, we could support with the French and British, Dulles would also have Bedell Smith go back to Geneva. Now after all it is going to be a tough situation, but I think you are quite right in urging us to have a high level American representation at Geneva. Otherwise, the stories from

3 The log of the President's daily appointments for Monday, July 12, indicates that he held an off-the-record meeting with Secretary Dulles at 9:45 a.m. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower records, Daily Appointment) Thereafter Dulles called MacArthur in the White House instructing him to make arrangements through the United Nations Delegation at Geneva for the Secretary to meet with Premier Mendes-France in Paris on the evening of July 13. Mendes-France was not to be informed that Dulles would be going to Geneva. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file) MacArthur immediately called Ambassador Johnson at Geneva. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Korea-Geneva," 64) At 12:07 p.m. Dulles received a call from Johnson indicating that Mendes-France would be pleased to meet with Dulles in Paris the following evening. The Secretary so informed the President. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Telephone Conversations) For President Eisenhower's recollection of these events, see Mandates for Change, pp. 366-370. For the statement issued by Secretary Dulles prior to his departure for Paris on the evening of July 12, see the editorial note, p. 362.
Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twenty-second Restricted Session, July 10, 1954

Records No: 206-Y0061

Chairman Mao, Comrade Shaoqi and the Central Committee, also forwarding Zhou [Ensil] and Wang [Bingnan] in Moscow:

At the twenty-second restricted session on the Indochina issue on the 9th, the American and Cambodian delegations once again created difficulties on the issue of the introduction of defensive weapons into Laos and Cambodia. The American delegation made a statement and emphasized the sovereignty of Laos and Cambodia and their requirements for self-defense. He said that China's proposal regarding the introduction of defensive weapons into Laos and Cambodia had not recognized Laos and Cambodia's rights to seek foreign aid and employ foreign military advisors whenever it is necessary to develop their defensive position. He also required China to clarify its position on French military facilities established in Laos. I spoke and made three points in response:

(1) I emphasized that the prohibition on the introduction of military personnel, arms and ammunition is one of the most important conditions that guarantees the ceasefire. I pointed out that the delegations of Laos and Cambodia had already agreed to introduce weapons for self-defense only on July 6.

(2) I stated that the issue of the introduction of defensive weapons should be discussed based on the principles of prohibiting the establishment of foreign military bases. I also pointed out that the Cambodian delegation stated on June 8th that Cambodia had no intention of allowing foreign countries to establish bases within its territory.

(3) In consideration of the relationship between Laos, Cambodia, and the French Union, I said that we can discuss Laos' and Cambodia's needs for French (military) instructors and technicians. At last, I said that issues concerning the quantity and type of defensive weapons should also be included in discussions between the representatives of the two commands based on agreements.

Pham Van Dong made an overall statement on the issue of supervision. Chauvel spoke to support the American delegation. He disagreed with what I said about letting military representatives discuss issues concerning the quantity and type of defensive weapons. Regarding Pham's statement, Chauvel said that Pham mistakenly stated that we had agreed in areas where in fact there was no agreement.

He denied that he had agreed that there should be a single armistice agreement for all Indochina. He believed that not one single commission, but three commissions [dealing with problems in three countries] are necessary. Also, there should be three armistice agreements and three different organizations. The Cambodian delegation claimed that Cambodia has no intention of allowing foreign bases to be established in its territory only when it is not threatened. This means that [Cambodia] will allow the Americans to establish bases during a war. He also emphasized that Cambodia has the right to choose the origin and quality of military personnel and equipment meaning that only the quantity [of the equipment] could be limited, not the origin and type. That is there will be American personnel [in Cambodia] during peace time. Regarding Pham Van Dong's statement, the Cambodian delegate said that he shared the reservation expressed by Chauvel today, and emphasized that supervision could not be ineffective and the sovereignty of Cambodia should not be damaged. [V.V] Kuznetsov spoke to support my statement and pointed out that allowing foreign countries to build up military outposts in its own territory is, itself, a loss of sovereignty. Kuznetsov referred to the French delegation's effort to discuss the issue of supervision in the past three weeks and warned the participants that we should continue these efforts and should not create any problems on issues on which agreement is almost reached.

The next meeting will be attended by the foreign ministers, and the two chairmen will decide the date for the meeting.

Li Kenong
July 10, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and convey to Ho Chi Minh (excerpt),
July 11, 1954

Source: Xiong Huayan, Zhou Enlai chudeng shijie wuai, pp. 147-148; and Zhou nianpu, vol. 1,
pp. 396-397.

(1) In my meeting with the leaders of the Soviet Party, apart from introducing to them the
meetings between China and India, China and Burma, and China and Vietnam, we mainly
exchanged opinions on the Geneva conference. The opinions of the Soviet Party Central
Committee are as follows. At present, what should be introduced [by our side] are fair and
reasonable conditions that the French government is in a position to accept, so that the agreement
on restoring peace in Indochina will be quickly achieved. In order to pursue reaching an
armistice quickly, the conditions [introduced by our side] should be concise and clear, which will
help excluding the interference and sabotage of the United States, thus allowing the agreement
easier to be reached. If our conditions are complicated and loaded down with trivial details, the
discussion will be prolonged and less important issues and new problems will crop up
unexpectedly, which will delay the negotiations and cause the loss of opportunities, thus being
favorable to America’s sabotage effort. The bourgeoisie class in France is weak-willed, and it is
impossible for them to accept conditions that go beyond their capacity. Therefore, if the
conditions raised by our side are complicated and loaded down with trivial details, it will be
easier for the Americans to take the advantage. When the right timing is missed, the pro-
American and pro-war factions in France will rise again, and the Mendes-France cabinet will
inevitably collapse. This is unfavorable to the settlement of the Indochina issue.

I believe that the analyses and opinions of the Soviet Party Central Committee are
compatible with the opinions we have discussed in Liuzhou and in Beijing. On the questions of
dividing zones, on the handling of issues concerning Laos and Cambodia, and on defining the
duties and power of the supervision committee by countries of neutrality, and on the
commitments that the participants of the Geneva conference will make, we should follow this
policy-line, and should consider these questions from the angle of striving for quickly achieving
an agreement. Therefore after I arrive at Geneva, I will meet with Comrades Molotov and Pham
Van Dong, and will then make decisions on specific issues, so as to pursue reaching an
agreement quickly.

(2) According to the telegram from Geneva, it seems that until the 9th our side has not
proposed concession on the question of dividing zones. It is possible that Comrade Pham Van
Dong had been waiting for putting forward the proposal of concession until after discussing with
me at Geneva. Now, as judging from all angles, if we take the 16th parallel as the line, and plus
allowing the French side to temporarily use the port Da Nang, as well as the condition that Laos
will be allowed to use Route 9 for transportation, generally it is possible that an agreement could
be reached....

(3) Mendes-France already arrived at Geneva today, and he will be meeting with
Comrade Molotov tomorrow. Eden will be arriving at Geneva on the 12th. I will make effort to
leave for Geneva tomorrow. Since we still need to have discussions in advance, there is not much
time left.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not cite or quote without permission from CWIHP.
the present type of US representation at Geneva. This consists of able and responsible persons who are in close contact with the President and me.

If circumstances should alter so that it appeared that our common interests would be better served if higher ranking officials became our representatives, then we would be alert to act accordingly.

It is because I am fully aware of the serious and solemn nature of the moment that I have gone into the matter at this considerable length. It is possible that by the first of the week, the Communist position will be sufficiently disclosed so that some of the answers to the foregoing queries can be foreseen. This might clarify in one sense or another the thinking of us all.

In this connection, let me emphasize that it is my intention that circumstances might become such that consistent with the foregoing either General Bedell Smith or I can personally come to Geneva and stand beside you. End text.

DULLES

611.51/July 10, 1954: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the ambassador in France

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1954—10:33 p.m. 128. For Ambassador from Secretary. Limit distribution. In separate telegram I am sending you a message from me to Mendes-France, 1 which you should deliver to him in person in Geneva at the earliest possible moment. I think that in this connection you should not limit yourself merely to delivering the message, but that you should discuss the subject matter with him so as to be sure he gets the real flavor and import of what we are trying to explain. In this connection, please express the profound personal sympathy which the President and I have for the position of Mendes-France and our admiration for the courageous way in which he is tackling almost insurmountable problems. Also, emphasize that if we seem to differ from him as to whether Ambassador Johnson or General Smith or I am at Geneva, this is a difference of tactics which ought not to be exaggerated.

After having seen delivered the message to Mendes-France as above, please then give a copy to Eden.

Because of your distinctive relationship to Mendes-France as Ambassador to France, we leave it to your discretion as to whether or not Johnson accompanies you. However, when you see Eden, you should have Johnson with you.

END TEXT

DULLES

JULY 11, 1954

Eisenhower Library. Hagerty Papers

Hagerty Diary, Sunday, July 11, 1954

WASHINGTON, undated.

I dropped down to see the President at ten o'clock after church to see if there was anything further he wanted me to do. He had nothing in particular that he wanted me to do with reference to the change of plans, but we did have an opportunity to talk about the international situation and the upcoming Geneva Conference. He told me that he had been giving considerable thought to our discussion of several days ago and had reached the point in thinking it over where he thought it was necessary to have Foster Dulles fly to Paris to confer with Mendes-France and Eden on the entire situation. He told me at that time that Dulles would announce on Monday that he was leaving for Paris Monday evening 2 and that if Dulles did reach an agreement, we could support with the French and British, Dulles would also have Bedell Smith go back to Geneva. “All in all it is going to be a tough situation, but I think you are dead right in urging us to have a high level American representative at Geneva.”

1 The log of the President’s daily appointments for Monday, July 12, indicates that he held an off-the-record meeting with Secretary Dulles at 9:40 a.m. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower records, Daily Appointments) Thereafter, Dulles called MacArthur from the White House instructing him to make arrangements through the United States delegation at Geneva for the Secretary to meet with Premier Mendes-France in Paris on the evening of July 13. Mendes-France was not to be led to believe that Dulles would be going on to Geneva. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file) MacArthur immediately called Ambassador Johnson at Geneva. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, “Korea-Geneva 1954”) At 12:55 p.m. Dulles received a call from Johnson indicating that Mendes-France would be pleased to meet with Dulles in Paris the following evening. The Secretary so informed the President. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Telephone Conversations) For President Eisenhower’s recollection of these events, see Mandate for Change, pp. 369-370. For the statement issued by Secretary Dulles prior to his departure for Paris on the evening of July 12, see the editorial note, p. 3342.

2 Telegram 125 to Paris, July 10, supra.
experts with Cambodian Army be removed. Cambodians have replied that sovereign state has right to ask for and select origin of necessary advisers. Viet Minh continually seeking inject political questions which General Tioulong refuses to discuss.

2. Son Sann, who is leaving Geneva for Phnom Penh on July fourteenth, confirmed status military talks, and stated Cambodia had made all possible concessions to Viet Minh; it is now latter's move.

3. Son Sann raised question letter from Tep Phan (Seco 513*) asking US commitment for future assistance. Acknowledging preliminary oral reply to [of] Ambassador Heath (Seco 531*), and expressing appreciation that this a delicate subject, he stated Cambodian delegation would like written response. Department's views this matter requested.

4. Son Sann states Nong Kimmy rejoining delegation thirteenth or fourteenth.

JOHNSON

1 Dated June 23, p. 1231.
2 Dated June 26, p. 1231.

396.1 GE/7-1254: Telegram
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, July 12, 1954.

Secto 592. Repeated information Paris 41, Saigon 26. Although we have not yet had full briefing from French, we gather following items regarding Mendes-France activities today:

1. Mendes-France saw Dong yesterday and will see him again this afternoon. Yesterday's talk devoted to what Folin, Mendes-France's Chef de Cabinet, described as "exchange of charm" plus firm insistence by Mendes-France on Dong Hoi line. Although Dong attitude on this negative, he did not close door.

2. Mendes-France told me that Menon had called on him. He had discussed various possibilities regarding demarcation lines. Mendes-France had insisted on necessity of eighteenth parallel.

3. Mendes-France saw Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Van Do this afternoon.

USDe is giving dinner for Vietnamese delegation this evening and will report their reaction. I plan to discuss situation with Do along lines Secretary's message to Diem contained Tosec 520.1

JOHNSON

1 Dated July 10, p. 1321.
Minutes of the Meeting between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, 9:00 p.m.,
July 12, 1954

Chinese participants: Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Li Renqing, and Shi Zhe
Vietnamese participants: Pham Van Dong, Hoang Van Hoan, Phan Anh, and
Tran Cong Truong.

Meeting place: the villa of the Vietnamese delegation

Pham briefed on the major points of his talk with Mendes-France the previous night.

1. The issue of demarcation. The French side always insisted on 18th parallel north latitude as the line of demarcation. Our side attempted to propose 16th parallel, but the French side did not agree.

2. Political issue. Mendes-France agreed in principle to hold a general election to realize the unification of the north and the south, but did not set a deadline. The French side thought that an early and hasty military withdrawal would not work. It totally agreed with the principles of peace, independence, democracy and unity, and with the method of realizing the unification through a general election and organization of a national government.

3. French-Vietnamese relations issue. The French side agreed with Vietnamese efforts to improve French-Vietnamese relations, and thought that this could be explored further.

4. Laotian and Cambodian issues. Mendes-France thought that the key was Vietnam. Without a solution of the Vietnam issue, there would be no solution to the Laos and Cambodia issue. With an solution of the Vietnam issue, the Laos and Cambodia issue would be solved in several hours. It seemed that he had not been eager to talk about the Laotian and Cambodian issue.

Pham said that Mendes-France was smooth and experienced, leaving an impression of honesty and reliability.

Concerned with the security situation in the villa, Zhou asked Pham to go to his place to talk.

Pham said yes.

Hence all participants drove to the Huashan villa. Setting in a safe conference room, Zhou asked the assistant to bring tea and to prepare meal.

Zhou briefed on his trip to India and Burma, and then focused on views and policies on Indochina formed at the Liuzhou Conference.

Zhou said that at the conference, Vo Nguyen Giap had made a report on the military situation; Wei Guoqin had made some additional points; he had briefed on the Geneva Conference and the suggestions made by the Soviet, Chinese and Vietnamese delegations. After discussion, Comrade Ding (alias of Ho Chi Minh) made concluding remarks. Focusing on war, peace, and military withdrawal, the conference had reached a consensus.

Regarding war. As to whether war might be used to solve the whole Vietnam issue, all thought it to be difficult. Even if the US did not intervene, it would still take at least three years to take over the whole Vietnam. But the American intervention was inevitable. After the Korea War broke out, our side went from victory to victory, and finally approached Pusan. At that time, Mao suggested to Kim II-sung and Choe Yong-kon that American military intervention should receive serious consideration. Before long, the intervention came about, and the American approached the Yalu River. China sent one million volunteers only to push them back to the 38 parallel and to fight them into a stalemate.

Currently, the Vietnamese army had not come close to the situation in which Pusan had been approached. Comrade Ding estimated that America's restraint from escalating intervention would be temporary, and this situation might last until next November. The conclusion was that further fighting would not be beneficial.

Regarding peace. If the line of demarcation could be drawn near 16th parallel, the cease fire would be to our advantage. This would be conducive to the DRV, because the vast majority of its territory would be connected, a situation...
better than before. North Vietnam would boast of a population of 12 or 13 million, and South Vietnam only nine million. North Vietnam would control the capital, sea ports and developed economy. Politically their situations would be much better than those of East Germany and North Korea. The whole situation after the cease fire would be to our advantage. The DRV would possibly consolidate and develop itself, win over France, England, and Southeast Asian countries, enlist the support of Cambodia and Laos, drive a wedge into Bao Dai’s faction, isolate the US, weaken the warmongers, and consolidate and strengthen peace loving forces. Our international struggle should aim at forming a broad united front against American hawks. We should strengthen our fraternal countries on the one hand, attempt to win other countries over to our side instead of the American side on the other hand. France, especially its peace faction, would be the main object for us to win over. Since Mendes-France’s government comprised the French peace faction, we should try to win them over. Of course, it would be difficult to form a united front with France, a former enemy, and an adversary government headed by Bao Dai after seven or eight years of war. To form an anti-American united front would be as difficult as it had been for us to form an anti-Japanese united front. After the Long March led us to Yenan, Mao suggested that a united front with Chiang be formed. At that time the majority supported the idea, and the minority opposed it. The debate lasted for half a year. But in Sian Accident we finally set free Chiang Kai-shek.

Regarding military withdrawal. It would be very difficult to withdraw our own troops from the liberated areas. But to win a total victory, we sometimes had to sacrifice partial interest. Sometimes the long-term interests required the sacrifice of short-term interests. We had this kind of experiences. During the anti-Japanese war, the New Fourth Army, sandwiched by the Japanese and Nationalist armies in South Anhui province, was suggested by Mao to withdraw to the north of the Yangtze River. But Xiang Ying, who thought that the troop enjoyed good mass basis there, hesitated for several months, and put itself in a disadvantaged situation. When the incident occurred, the army suffered huge losses. After the Japanese surrender, we consciously withdrew our troops in south Jiangsu and Dongjiang to North Jiangsu and Shandong, leaving some cadres to mobilize masses. This decision saved our troops which were vulnerable to annihilation, consolidated our strength, and preserved some forces to mobilize the masses. All these was conducive to the subsequent liberation war. If our enemy had liked to exchange our military withdrawal with Beijing, Tianjin or Northeast China, we would have withdrawn more and even evacuate North Jiangsu totally.

After the meal, Zhou Enlai continued to talk about the following issues.

1. Military demarcation line. Zhou thought that if our side intended to keep small areas in the fifth district, the French side would propose to keep small areas in the Red River Delta. This would put us in a disadvantage. If we accepted 16th parallel without much ado, we could build a decent country. We would focus on building the country, observing the changing international situation. If we insisted on 16th parallel, the opposite side would turn down, refusing to give up Da-nang, Hue and No. 9 Road. Our side should prepare to make concession on the following three conditions.
   1. We would allow the opposite side to keep Da-nang for one more year.
   2. Allow them some rights to Hue.
   3. Allow them to use No. 9 Road as a communication line to Laos.

Our side could seek some concessions from the opposite side at the appropriate time of negotiations. For example, if we allowed the opposite side to keep Da-nang for one more year, we could demand the right to keep one area in south or the central district for one more year. The opposite side wanted to keep Hai-phong as a military transportation center for six or ten months, and wanted Peizh and Fayau parishes to receive preferential political treatment, and our side would make similar demand in central or southern district. If the opposite side demanded the safety of military withdrawal, our side would demand that they stop bombard our communication lines. Comrade Ho Chi Minh agreed to have No.
19 Road north of 16th parallel as the line of demarcation. I promised to provide equipment for expanding troops (infantry from six to ten divisions, artillery from two to four divisions, three more regiments of motorized troops, and a public security division protecting the capital). Ho had ordered the plan to be carried out.

2. Regarding political election. Comrade Ho Chi Minh thought that it would be better to set a deadline, specifying that a general election will be held within one or two years after the cease fire. A late deadline would be better than no fixed date. To avoid a stalemate, it would be OK to reach an agreement in principle, but to set a deadline later.

3. Regarding the demarcation between Vietnam and Laos and political issue. Comrade Ding thought that it would be better to ask Nanshan for several more counties. If impossible, we would demand two provinces. There were aristocracy in Laos and no political parties. If we organized a people's party, the aristocrats would be afraid, and this would create confrontation. Currently there were about 200 secret party members, and it would be better to organize them secretly as the core of political activities. In public we would rely on Comrade Souvann Phouma's name, status, and prestige, trying to get some members join the government and become governors. We should stabilize the situation and then gradually develop and form a coalition government. We would try to make Laos peacefully coexist with Vietnam and oppose American establishment of military bases.

4. Regarding Cambodia. The Central Committee of Vietcom agreed with three delegations' view that Vietnam might withdraw its troops from Northeast Cambodia, and that the local troops in the west and Southwest and South Vietnamese cadres who had volunteered to fight in Cambodia should withdraw partially, but not totally. We should make appropriate arrangements for those who would withdraw or stay.

Zhou Enlai said that the guidelines set by Liuzhou, Beijing and Moscow are as follows: taking initiative, being active, conducting prompt negotiations to solve the problem; simplifying the problem; avoiding complicating the negotiations; targeting at the French side; raising the conditions which should be considered acceptable to the opposite side. The Chinese Communist Party thought that the guaranteeing of the Indochina peace could be broadened, and that the members of the Colombo Conference might be invited, and that other Asian countries such as Thailand and the Philippines might be invited. Malines had agreed to these ideas in principle. These suggestions would be better raised by England and India, and then we would concur.

5. Suggesting Pham Van Dong to talk to Mendes-France to have 16th parallel as the line of demarcation. Zhou Enlai said that Molotov had agreed to Eden's suggestion that the Conference should not be convened temporarily, and that more activities outside the Conference be conducted. Zhou said that since Mendes-France and Eden would meet Dulles in Paris tomorrow afternoon (July 13th), it would be better for Comrade Pham to talk to Mendes-France before he departed.

Pham could offer some specific ideas on some important issues, making Mendes-France confident in his meeting with Dulles, preventing Dulles from disrupting the negotiation or from participating in the Geneva Conference. Zhou Enlai thought that the major issue was the line of demarcation. The Vietnamese should consider suggesting 16th parallel as the line. Since time was limited, delay would not be good. On other issues such as Laocon concentration areas, participants of international control commission, holding of a general election and realization of the Vietnamese unification, it would be better to provide specific ideas in Pham's talk with Mendes-France. Zhou Enlai cited the instances in which Mendes-France had kept his words and delivered his promises, to prove that it would be worth trying to win him over and to reach an agreement.

Pham Van Dong thanked Zhou Enlai's briefing and suggestions, and agreed readily that he would talk with Mendes-France tomorrow based on the spirit of the talk tonight.

Li Kenong said that I would spend several minutes reporting to the premier and other comrades about the Geneva Conference and the activities of Chinese delegation.

1. The Geneva Conference

On June 22, 25, 29, and July 2, 6, and 9, restricted sessions on the Indochina issue were held. The meetings mainly discussed participants, responsibilities of Neutral states' supervisory commission as well as its relations with joint commission; its internal voting procedure; whether its recommendations to both sides are compulsory; the inspection of cease fire in Laos and Cambodia; troops and weapons entry into Laos and Cambodia after the cease fire. The Chinese delegation made several speeches, supporting the Soviet delegation's 12 point suggestions (such as joint commission, the neutral state supervisory commission, and international guaranteeing) as well as the new suggestions made on June 16 regarding participants of neutral states' supervisory commission. We expressed our own view on troops and weapons entry into Laos and Cambodia, and got support from the Soviet and Vietnamese delegations. After these meetings, we reached consensus on some issues. For example, the French delegation deemed it unnecessary for the UN Commission to be affiliated with the neutral state's supervisory commission. We came closer to each other views on some issues; narrowed the gap on some issues; we still had differences on some issues. The US and Bao Dai still expressed opposition, attempting to block any agreement and receive the refutations from Chinese, Vietnamese and Soviet delegations. The most important thing is to demonstrate to the world that the Geneva Conference is still going on.

2. Regarding the negotiations between military representatives from both sides.

The Lao people's Liberation Army and the Vietnamese People's Army met with French and Laotian Kingdom's armies on June 24 and 25 at Geneva, and reached agreement on procedural issue. They are now talking about the agenda. It was said that the atmosphere was cordial.

On July 4, the representatives from the Headquarters of the Vietnamese People's Army headed by Major General Van Tien Dung and the representatives from the headquarter of the French Expeditionary forces headed by Colonel Laoluva started negotiation at Zhong Jia 30 km south of Thai Nguyen. They issued a joint communique, which said that "The delegations of the Headquarters of the Vietnamese People's Army and the delegation of the Headquarters of the French Federation army in Indochina began their military meetings at Zhong Jia at July 4, 1954. The meeting began at 8 a.m. DRV standard time and 9 a.m. Saigon standard time.

The opening session was amid cordial atmosphere. In their opening speeches, the heads of the two delegations expressed both peoples' desire to seek peace and their expectation that the military meetings will achieve satisfactory results.

On July 4, both delegations reached agreements on the tasks, responsibilities, agenda, working principles and methods.

The concrete issues to be discussed in the future meetings.

They held the second meeting in the afternoon that day. After discussions they reached the agreement on the task and contents of the meeting.

1. The military meeting will discuss all military issues raised at the Geneva Conference and make suggestions.

2. The military meeting will discuss and determine the measures to carrying out the agreement on military issues reached at the Geneva Conference.

3. The meeting will discuss the military problems caused by local specific circumstances.
As to agenda, both delegations have agreed to discuss the following issues:

1. The issues of POW within the context of Geneva agreement.
2. The realization of cease fire.
3. Adjustment of the re-assembly areas.
4. The issue of joint commission.
5. The issues raised by the Geneva military meeting and thought necessary to be raised by local military meeting.

On the afternoon of July 5, the third meeting was held, discussing the issue of handing over the sick and wounded POWs. They reached agreement on the principle and methods on the issue. The first group of POWs will be handed over at July 14, 1954.

On July 6, the meeting continued, discussing the issue of improving POW's living conditions. Both sides agreed to delegate a joint sub-committee to study the issue and report to the meeting.

On July 7, the meeting continued. The sub-committee on improving POW's living conditions started working in the morning of July 7, and finished the job in the afternoon on July 8. Both sides reached agreements on many fundamental points.

On July 10, both delegations held two secret meetings and one open meeting, reached four agreements on POWs: (1) Both sides will continue to hand over the sick and wounded POWs in batches, and will hand over the seriously sick and wounded POWs. (2) Both sides will provide the POW with the same food, clothing and shelter as their own soldiers receive. (3) Both sides promised to prohibit any measures which would cause POWs' physical damages and mental humiliations; to prohibit the use of POWs in military activities; to take bloods from POWs for their own blood supply. (4) Both sides will enjoy all facilities to provide POWs with medicine, created conditions in which POWs can write home within regulated hours, receive letters, gifts and packages from home; both sides will take measure to ensure the arrival of the first batch of mails at the camp for POWs before July 31, 1954. Both sides promised to fully carry out the agreement. In sum, the military meetings have made progress.

7. The diplomatic activity of the delegation.

During this period, we kept close contact with Pham Van Dong and others from Vietnamese delegation and Kuzminov and others from the Soviet delegation. We kept almost daily contact, either in meeting, or in separate conversation, to exchange information and to discuss policy.

Xiaowei was from the French delegation treated us to a meal once. Binhanh, Jiakang, and Hau Xiang attended. On the French side were Oferwa (French Ambassador to Thailand), Xiexoung (Secretary General of the delegation), Duerosai (Director of the Political Affairs of the French Foreign Ministry), Xiehaxi (advisers) and so on. During the time, Xiaowei and Xiehaxi mentioned that Xiaowei received a personal letter from Mendes-France, who said that he wished to solve the Indochina issue quickly but patiently. Xiaowei also said that they and the Vietnamese Federation are discussing the Hai-phang issue. In order to transport French and Vietnamese troops from the north to the south, they have to control Hai-phang for some time. Xiehaxi did most talking, and even told some inside stories, and expressed dissatisfaction with the US. He said that "without the solution of the Indochina issue, the Mendes-France government is unlikely to survive, and nobody knows what will happen to France. Some foreign forces are pressuring the French government to change policies, but Mendes-France, a man of strong will, would like to take responsibility to solve the Indochina issue. The measures he has taken are well known to you. If these measures do not work, foreign forces might overwhelm him. Inside France there are some forces which would like France to follow outside forces. All these forces have been using to pressure the French government to take a loyal Mendes-France does not like to take. If this happened, the Vietnamese war would last indefinitely, a situation the French people would not like to see. The European army will face the same danger, andarming of France will be inevitable. Now Mendes-France puts the
European army in the third place, and does not like to cave in to the foreign forces. The US knows this policy. But if Mendes-France government cannot last, it is questionable if the Englishman will sustain." He added that "Right now France is not a strong country. It cannot match the Soviet Union or the US, or even China in several years. But France is at the center of scale. It likes to remain at the center, which will be good for both Europe and Asia. But if Mendes-France was forced to resign, the balance would tip and the balance of power in the whole world political forces would change. If that is case, the outcome will be unbearable. As an Frenchman, I would hate to see this outcome."

Zhou Enlai cut in, Xiesong's words reflected the mentalities of the French people and the new French government, and suggested that Mendes-France would like to solve the Indochina issue. We should reach out for him and provide him with enough capital to counterbalance the US.

Li Keqiang continued: based on the principle of reciprocity and hard work, Comrade Wentian and I entertained the French delegation in the villa of our delegation on July 8. Xiaowei, Oferwa, Gilemasi, Xiesong and Li Jiarui (interpreter) attended. On our side, Bieman, Jiakang, and Yuan Xiang attended. During the discussion, we discussed that foreign military bases should not be built in Laos and Cambodia and large amount of weapons shall not be allowed in. Xiaowei agreed not to allow in large amounts of weapons to Laos and Cambodia, and the weapons preserved by Laos and Cambodia should be used to protect their own security, but not to pose threats to other countries. Xiaowei added that he was assured by the US many times that the US did not intend to build military bases in those two countries. We do not think that it would be difficult to formalize this promise. In addition, Xiaowei inquired many times when the premier would return to Geneva.

On July 8, Wentian and I met with Molotov, Kuznetsov and other Russians as well as

Pham Van Dong, discussing how to carry out the "July Fifth Directive" of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese labor party. At the meeting, Molotov asked me if I wanted to add anything to the document, and I said that the central committee of the CCP agreed with the Directive, and had no other ideas. Molotov had said that this time Moscow decided to ask me to return to Geneva as soon as possible, facilitating the progress of the meeting. The decision was taken with the American pressure on France and Mendes-France's promise in mind. Moscow decided to let Mendes-France and Eden know the decision in advance through their embassies. Molotov added that we should take initiative and be active to accelerate the progress of the meeting. The Vietnamese Directive had also emphasized this point in every aspect. Hence we should discuss every issue in turn according to the spirit of the instruction.

Regarding the military issue in Vietnam, Molotov said that it is necessary to discuss how to put forward our new plan. We can suggest that military meeting be convened on July 9, and in the meeting our side should prepare to ask if the French side is willing to narrow the gap between the two sides' positions. If they expressed their willingness to consider, then we should attempt to put forward our new plan.

Comrade Pham Van Dong said that the French delegation mentioned to concede some areas between the 14th and 15th parallels in exchange for Hai phang area. Both Comrade Molotov and Wentian thought that this option did not square with the instruction of the Vietnamese party central committee, or stood us in good stead. So the option should not be considered. We should do as the instructions of the Central Committees of Chinese party and Vietnamese party.

In discussing political issue, Molotov said that he was not sure about the suggestion that a meeting of foreign ministers be convened to discuss the date for Vietnamese election, and thought that it was premature to consider this problem right now. Comrade Wentian thought that it was necessary to discuss the issue that day.

In discussing the Laos issue, Molotov asked about the negotiation on this
matter. Comrade Pham Van Dong and I briefed him. He agreed with our suggestion. We had thought that although the Vietnam issue is the most important, the negotiation on the Laos issue should not slacken. We should take initiative to ask the French side's opinion about our opinion, and inquire if they have their own opinion. If they have, we would like to consider it. Molotov thought it was ok to take this method and that we should take initiative and should discuss for Laos issue after the solution of the Vietnam issue. The delay in negotiation on the Laos issue will affect the negotiation on the Vietnam issue. The separation of two issues would impede each other. In discussing the Cambodia issue, Molotov asked if we should accelerate the negotiation on Vietnam and how. After discussion, we concurred that we should speed up just like in the Vietnam issue.

Molotov also asked about the military commission's preparation of a report. He asked if it could be finish as scheduled and hoped for no delay.

When Molotov asked about the meeting the day after, Kuznetsov said that he had read Li Kenong's speech, and had no problem with it, and thought that it would be correct to answer the questions of Xiaowei and Lactia and Cambodian delegations in the short speech session.

At 3:00 p.m. of July 10, the Chinese, Soviets and Vietnamese talked again.

At first, Molotov briefed us on his talk with Xiaowei on July 9. He said that nothing new came out of this talk, and he had told me what they talked the day before yesterday. But Xiaowei emphasized that everything seemed to be all right during his talk with Comrade Pham. But when they shifted to the negotiation of military representatives, the demand became too much. For example, he wanted half of Laos. As to the Vietnam issue, Xiaowei said that these were no progress, and that should push for it since the demand is not unreasonable. In addition there was something interesting. Xiaowei suggested that the French military representative should inform the Soviet military representatives. I agreed. Today our military representative will meet with the French military representative.

From this talk, we can see that both sides did not see eye to eye on the Central Vietnam areas which is between the 13th and 18th parallels. He showed great interests in No. 9 road. He said that France does not have a stake in the central Vietnam, but Bao Dai does. He said that Da-nang matters, little to France.

Molotov said that tonight Mendes-France would come to have dinner with him. It would be difficult to expect something new out of it, but he would try to grasp Mendes-France's positions.

Xiaowei also asked when Comrade Zhou Enlai would return, and I told him either next Monday or Tuesday.

Comrade Pham said that he would meet with Mendes-France, and he would like to let us know the major issues he would raise during his talk with Mendes-France and asked us to make comments and suggestions.

1. Regarding the temporary line of demarcation, the current situation makes it necessary to add a adjective "temporary."
2. Military assembly, especially assembly area.
3. General election, date, and the date for political consultation of the government representatives of both sides.
4. The principle of the military withdrawal.
5. The relations with France: the temporary relations before unification and the relations after unification.
6. The cease fire.

Having heard these, Molotov said that all had only to do with the Vietnam issue.

Comrade Pham said yes. The Laos and Cambodia issues can be dealt with after a basic solution of the Vietnam issue. If we can reach agreement on the major Vietnam issue, I think that agreement on Laos and Cambodia would not be that difficult.

Molotov said that we should try to reach agreement on controversial issues. Comrade Pham Van Dong said that the most difficult issue was the military line of demarcation. I would justify the 14th and 15th parallel. The 16th parallel would
cost us. Molotov asked me about the proposal.

I said that I thought these sounds too general, and could not solve the problem. Did Comrade Pham plan to talk about a broad range of issues?

Comrade Pham said that he could talk more specifically, but it would not be convenient to be very specific.

Molotov said that if his understanding was right, Comrade Li Kenang had meant that the important thing was not what you told us but the issues you would raise to Mendes-France.

Pham Van Dong said that it would depend on the other side, on the suggestion of the present company, and the major issues solved by the talk between Molotov and Mendes-France.

Molotov said that he thought it would be the central areas.

Comrade Wentian said that in the first meeting, we should not expect to solve many issues, but should try to sound out on some controversial issues. We should try to make the atmosphere cordial, and find out the positions of the other side. Since the general principle and justification had been talked many times, we should not talk too much.

I added that Xiaowei raised the Laos issue and I was afraid that Mendes-France would do the same to Comrade Pham. So better prepare for it.

Molotov said that we can brightly mention Laos and Cambodia issues as the base of the future agreement in order to reach an agreement as soon as possible.

Comrade Wentian said that several points would be enough.

Molotov said that it was important to prepare for a talk with Mendes-France. As I mentioned above that the important thing is the central area, and that we should try to make the French side express their positions in a specific way.

Comrade Pham Van Dong said that he did not think that the French people know what they should do, and that we should put forward a proposal, and should take advantage of this opportunity.

Molotov said that the French newspaper had often reported recently that France would give up the delta, but keep Hai-phang.

I confirmed what Molotov said, but mentioned that Xiaowei said that those news was nonsense. What he said made us alert. If we overemphasized the internal difficulty of France, we would lower our guard.

Molotov then asked about the situation in Vietnam and Bao Dai's cabinet. Comrade Pham briefed. Molotov asked about the possibility that while we reached agreement with France, the pro-American cabinet member of Bao Dai Government opposed. Comrade Pham Van Dong said that it would be very possible. But their opposition would not be too serious, and it would depend on the extent of the US support.

From these two talks and other contacts, I felt that the Vietnamese delegation did not understand the "July 5th Directive" of its party's central committee totally. They had not made up their minds to give up the areas they controlled south of the 16th parallel in exchange for Red River delta controlled by the French side, and so did not make new suggestions. This resulted in the little progress of the negotiation.

Zhou Enlai asked Zhang Wentian if he wanted to add anything.

Zhang said that he totally agreed with Comrade Kenang's summary of the situation and views. He thought that the Vietnamese delegation delayed in making new proposals and in quickening the process of the meeting. On the one hand, they did not totally understand the "July 5th Directive"; on the other hand, some people overestimated their own strengths, especially the victory of Dien Bien Phu. They thought that the Vietnamese have won the decisive victory, and the French army would find it difficult to continue fighting, so they are reluctant to make appropriate concessions, and always wanted France to concede more. They harbor the hope of "Indochina Federation," and do not know well how to distinguish between people's revolution and national liberation struggle. The armed forces of the Vietnamese people are rather strong, and had the labor party as its leader, Ho
Chi Minh had rather high reputation. So it represents a better combination of people's revolution and national liberation. But in Laos and Cambodia, opposition forces are very weak. The oppositional government's influence are negligible, and the monarchical governments were still popular. People of these two countries wanted national independence and liberation, but not people's revolution. The conditions for revolution were not mature in these two countries. "Revolution cannot be exported." It would not work to rely on outside forces such as the Vietnamese forces to carry out people's revolution. The revolution would have to depend on the local people's willingness to make revolution themselves, and to chase away the French imperialism and overthrow the monarchies. So I suggested that the premier should work hard to persuade the Vietnamese delegation to quicken the speed of the negotiation.

Zhou Enlai said that having listened carefully Kenanga's report and Wenian's comment, he thought that our delegation had done a lot and made progress after he left Geneva. All they did was in accordance with the central committee's instruction and policies. All these showed that our delegation was capable and experienced. On behalf of the central committee he thanked all including the present company for their hard work.

Now, the major task of our delegation is to attempt to reach agreement on Indochina, the demand made by the Central Committee, Chairman Mao, the Chinese people and the people from all over the world. We should work hard and live up to expectation.

Then is it possible to accomplish this task? The answer is yes. The reasons are:

1. All the three parties of China, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union agreed to reaching an agreement on Indochina. The attitude of our party is unambiguous. I talked with Comrade Ho Chi Minh and made repeated careful studies. Comrade Ho Chi Minh and the central committee of Lao Dong party thought peace was conducive to Vietnam and therefore created a "July 5th Directive," and asked the Vietnamese delegation to implement. The central committee of the Soviet communist party also supported peace in Indochina, deeming it conducive to the socialist camp. Therefore it asked Comrade Molotov to return to Geneva ahead of schedule, hoping to motivate British and French foreign ministers to return to Geneva. When I stopped over at Moscow, I talked with comrade Molotov, who very much supported the opinion of the Chinese and Vietnamese parties as well as the efforts to achieve a peaceful solution, and who asked me to relay the message of the central committee of the Soviet party.

2. When the peace faction Mendez-France formed his cabinet, he promised to "resign without solving the Indochina issue in four weeks." So he tied the fate of the new cabinet to the peace in Indochina. Without peace his cabinet will collapse and he will lose his job as premier. So he was very active in facilitating the Geneva Conference to reach an agreement. I have talked with him for several hours, and felt that he was rather forthright, and would become a friend. I believed that under his term, the peace in Indochina can be realized.

3. England also wants peace in Indochina. British colonial influence was adjacent to Indochina. Britain fears the communist waves sweeping through its colonial system, and the negative impact of the US' large-scale involvement on its colonial interest, and the possible involvement in a war with China out of the escalation of Indochinese war. Moreover, India, Burma, and Indonesia and other South Asian countries were close to Britain, hoping for peace in Indochina and stability in South Asia. Eden was smart, rich in diplomatic experiences, and good at mediating. My impression from my dealing with him is that he wanted to promote peace in Indochina. Of course, he has two sides. For example, he helped the US in disrupting the conference on Korea, and when Belgium proposed to pass our final suggestion, he hesitated. He agreed to establish diplomatic relations at the level of charge d'affaires, but was unwilling to support our legitimate membership in the United Nations.

4. The US was rather isolated over Indochina issue, and Britain and France
are not willing to obey American's order out of self interest. Xiesong's words mentioned by Keng was an example. According to the reliable information, Dulles wrote to Mendes-France yesterday that "since the early April the US has sought close cooperation with the French and British governments, in order to take a joint and firm position. But it turns out to be impossible." The delegations from Lao and Cambodian Kingdoms was deceived into following the steps of American imperialists and French hawks. After our extensive contacts, they found themselves to be deceived. They are trying to break loose from the US and to move to our side. Right now only Bao Dai followed American steps.

Zhou continued, "Of course there are some unfavorable situations.

The important thing is the American disruption. From the very beginning of the Conference, the US did not agree to realize armistice in Indochina under the condition of recognizing the Ho Chi Mins government, did not like to see any results out of the new China's participation in the Geneva Conference, did not like to see the increasing international status of China. As one of the five powers, it wanted to adopt a global strategy of "containment of the communism," escalating the Indochina war, and incorporating the three countries in Indochina and Southeast Asian countries into its global strategy. Right now the US exerted great pressure on Mendes-France, attempting to prevent him from making concessions on Indochina issue. On July 13th, Dulles will go to Paris to meet with Mendes-France and Eden, with a view to obstructing and disrupting the Geneva Conference.

Zhou said that we should bare his intention, and talk with Mendes-France before this talk with Dulles, put forward new options, and provided Mendes-France with some capital to counterbalance the US. In a word, we should defeat American sabotage, and should not accept similar results to those of Korea.

All those present could not help but applaud.

2. Zhou continued, the French hawk Laniel and Bodault was very active. As opposition force, they attacked Mendes-France for his disruption of Franco-
Cambodia, and tried to encourage their neutrality, and to make them come closer to us. Right now it seems that Comrade Pham Van Dong were not ready yet, and so we should patiently persuade him. After all we are not the parties concerned. The decisions are up to them and France. What we can do is to promote them. Tonight I will have a long talk with him on behalf of the three central committees.

4. There are many differences between France and Vietnam, especially on the issue of the line of demarcation. France proposed the 18th parallel, the central committee of the Vietnamese party the 15th parallel, the Vietnamese delegation the 14th or 15th parallel. We should narrow the gap and make an agreement. Both sides should make concessions, and even big one. We should work on both sides.

So there are many problems and difficulties. But if we carry out the views and policies reached by the three parties, and work actively and cautiously, I think that the situations are very good. The numerous difficulties did not mean that there is no bright future. We can reach an agreement and realize peace in Indochina.
SECRET
FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND WHITEHALL SECRET (CABINET) DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden
No. 910
July 13, 1954.

D. 5.47 p.m. July 13, 1954.
R. 6.08 p.m. July 13, 1954.

FRENCH

PRIORITY SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 910 of July 13
Repeated for information to Washington Paris Peking

I went to see Chou En-lai this morning before leaving for Paris. I thanked him for the message he had sent me from Peking through Mr. Trevelyan and said I would be interested to hear more about Chou En-lai's journey and his meeting with Ho Chi-minh.

2. Chou said that he had discussed with Ho Chi-minh the situation in each of the three States of Indo-China and had reached a common understanding with him about the course to be followed to secure agreement here. As I would know, he had also had long talks with Mr. Nehru and L Nu whom he had found full of understanding regarding China's policy for peace in South East Asia. I commented that Nehru had sent me an account of their meetings.

3. As regards the negotiations here, Chou En-lai said that he had just seen M. Mendès-France and had found that on many matters the opposing viewpoints had moved nearer to one another. The main outstanding difference was the question of the demarcation line in Viet Nam. Here the gap was still wide, but provided both sides modified their positions agreement would be possible.

4. I asked about Laos and Cambodina, remarking that I had learned with surprise of the proposal put forward by the Viet Minh representatives for a Viet Minh regroupment area embracing nearly half the country. I hoped that Chou En-lai was still in favour of the independence and unity of Laos. Chou En-lai replied that he was and that Laos could be unified after elections. In the military talks there might well be requests for a little more or a little less. But agreement could be secured on the basis that
all foreign forces, including the French, should be removed. Agreement could also be reached on Cambodia provided there were further contacts. He had confirmed to Nehru and U Nu that China wanted Laos and Cambodia to be normal South East Asian countries, Nehru and U Nu had both agreed, though they had used the word "neutral". They were all agreed, too, that it was essential that no foreign bases should be established in these two States and that they should not join military alliances.

5. I said that I also agreed with this. If an agreement were reached it was important that other States such as the Colombo countries should associate themselves with it. We must all now work hard to get agreement here. M. Mendès-France who sincerely wanted a settlement, had not much time left.

6. Chou En-lai said that he hoped everybody really wanted an agreement. I said that I understood what he had in mind and that I believed they all did, including the United States Government with whom I had recently had discussions in Washington. Chou En-lai commented that it seemed to be only the United States Government that refused to give up the idea of forming military alliances. I replied that it was a fact that in the United States many people were suspicious that China might have ambitions, if not immediately then in the future, in South East Asia. Similarly I had no doubt that some people in China were suspicious that the United States might have such ambitions. I emphasised that I had spoken only of suspicions and I hoped that between these two opposing fears some way towards agreement might be found.

7. Chou En-lai said that he had concluded an agreement with India which was based upon policies of mutual respect. He had re-affirmed these policies to Mr. Nehru and to U Nu. As to what views were held in the United States, I, who had recently been in Washington, would be a better judge than he. But he had read with pleasure the references in my speech to the House of Commons on June 23 and in the Prime Minister's public statements in Washington to the idea of peaceful co-existence. He reminded me that President Eisenhower had since endorsed this idea. Chou En-lai said that time would show that my faith in peaceful co-existence was not misplaced.

/6. Before
SECRET

Codex Geneva telegram No. 210 to Foreign Office

-5-

8. Before leaving I explained that I was going to see
M. Aminot also before I flew to Paris. I had already
had one conversation with him and we had agreed that it would
be preferable to concentrate on private conversations rather than
to hold formal meetings of the conference for the next few days.
Chen En-lai said that he shared this view though some full meetings
would of course be needed later.

Foreign Office please pass Washington, Paris and Peking
as my telegrams Nos. 306, 227 and 156 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington, Paris and Peking]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Head of the United States Delegation (Johnson) 1

SECRET

Paris, July 13, 1954—8:30 p.m.

Participants:
The Secretary
Ambassador Dillon
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Phleger
Ambassador Johnson
Prime Minister Mendes-France
M. Latournelle
M. Parodi
M. de Folin

Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden
Sir Harold Caccia
Sir Gladwyn Jebb
Sir Anthony Rumbold

Following dinner Mendes-France explained to Eden and the Secretary present state of negotiations with respect to regroupment areas in Vietnam. He had a map showing the various proposals and counterproposals in detail and the areas occupied by the French and the Vietminh respectively. He said the original French proposal from which they had not deviated was for a line along a defensive ridge somewhat north of Donghôi in the vicinity of the 16th parallel (all parallels in accordance US system). He said this line was somewhat north of the Donghôi Thakhek line set forth in the seventh points of the US–UK memorandum. 2 He said the original Vietminh proposal was for somewhat “S” shaped line in the vicinity of the 13th parallel. They had then moved to a line in the vicinity of the 14th parallel.

Yesterday after they had heard the Secretary was meeting with Mendes-France and Eden in Paris, Dong had made a proposal to Mendes roughly along the 16th parallel, the line being just to the south of the French air and naval base at Tourane. Mendes accepted this relatively major shift in the Vietminh position as attributable to Vietminh knowledge of the Secretary’s meeting with himself and Eden. Mendes stated that French had flatly rejected this proposal and could never agree to Vietminh control of the naval and air base at Tourane, the important center of Hue and the vital road to Laos. He said that with respect to the road to Laos Molotov had suggested that the French could have the right of access to Laos along the road, apparently something along the lines of the corridor to Berlin. Mendes said that the road was narrow, mountainous, with many culverts and bridges and that French must have full control of the area both sides of the road, as Communist performance on any corridor arrangement could not be anticipated and stray individuals could blow bridges and culverts making the road unusable.

He indicated that the French would be prepared to drop their line some small distance south, possibly to the Donghôi Thakhek line or slightly south thereof.

The French map had an enclave drawn around the Haiphong area but there was no discussion of this.

With respect to Laos, Mendes-France stated that Communists now admitted to the existence of Vietmînh forces which would be withdrawn, but had insisted upon some temporary regroupment areas for the indigenous resistance forces pending their integration into Laoïtian forces. He said the Communists recognized the unity of Laos under its present government. He stated that the indigenous resistance forces were unimportant, totalling about 25 hundred men and that the Laoïtians were confident they could handle this problem. However, on the military level the Vietmînh had come forth with a regroupment proposal for a line running the entire length of Laos connecting up with their original (“S” shaped) 13th parallel line in Vietnam. He said that the French military experts had shown Vietmînh proposal to the Soviet military experts and the latter had characterized it as absurd. Mendes appeared to feel there was no serious problem with respect to Laos, except that of the two French bases which he said consisted of small air strips, some stores of ammunition garrisons totalling about 2000 French Union forces. He said the bases were entirely without military interest to the French and from the French standpoint they had no desire to maintain them. However, Laoïtians placed high value on them and had asked they be retained and he thought the Laoïtians would be able to work out something on this with the Vietminh.

Mendes said that Communists had recognized and seemed willing to agree to French military instructors and technical assistance to the armed forces of Laos and Cambodia as opposed to French garrisons being stationed there. He said the Communists were entirely unwilling to see any US military personnel stationed there in any capacity whatever and were extremely sensitive on the subject of US bases in those countries. The Secretary disclaimed any intention or desire for the US to establish military bases of any kind in those countries and stressed the importance of being able to assist those countries to maintain de-
quate defense forces and contribute to their economic development. In view of the traditional Communist charge that US bases were being established wherever we have had even an economic aid program, and the US legislative requirement that US personnel have some role in the administration of US economic aid, he expressed the fear that what the Communists were really attempting to do was to keep all US personnel, both civilian and military, out of these areas. He made it clear that the US would be willing to assist these countries but we were not willing or able to simply turn money over to them to spend as they saw fit.

Mendes-France and Eden both indicated that their understanding was that the Communists were opposing US military bases in the traditional sense of the term. The Secretary expressed the strong view that it was of vital importance not to agree to any terms which would inhibit the ability of Laos and Cambodia and retained Vietnam to obtain economic and military assistance from the free world.

There was no specific discussion of Cambodia. Mendes-France apparently did not take much interest in Cambodia. He said they had 99.5% full independence and they apparently wanted to stay in the French Union and that was all right with him.

In response to the Secretary’s questions concerning the Communist position on political settlement, Mendes stated that Dong had first insisted on elections within six months after the cessation of hostilities and had also insisted that French troops must be evacuated before the holding of elections. Mendes-France stated that he had pointed out the inconsistency of this position and that Dong had now agreed that the question of the date for elections should be left for determination by the two governments in Vietnam. He said Dong was preparing a draft of some sort of general declaration in this regard. He said that the Communists were entirely willing to see Vietnam remain in the French Union and the Secretary pointed out that Communists would probably be very glad to see three Communist members in the French Union. Mendes replied that there was no danger of three, only of one, i.e. Vietnam and that he was well aware of this possibility and was considering handling it by some statement to the effect that the conditions for membership of a united Vietnam in the French Union would be determined by subsequent agreement.

There was a brief discussion about the International Control Commission for Indochina being discussed at Geneva. Mendes-France said he might eventually have to accept a Communist member on such a commission but he would not agree to the Communists having veto power.

Following presentation by Mendes, the Secretary went into a detailed, careful and reasoned exposition of his viewpoint on US representation at Geneva. He said that it was clear that the main Soviet Communist objective was Europe and that if they could disrupt allied unity with respect to Europe, preventing ratification of EDC and reconciliation between France and Germany, the major objective would be accomplished. For the USSR, the Far East was essentially a secondary objective, but they would exploit the situation in the Far East to the maximum so as to prevent allied unity, particularly so as to cause a split between the US and France. The US and France were united by deep ties of common interest and sentiment and he desired to do everything possible to maintain those ties and prevent disunity developing. His interest was in doing whatever was best to achieve this objective.

With respect to Geneva he was very concerned over the situation if there was high level representation there. There were two major possibilities:

1. The Communists would make proposals conditional upon US association and guarantee in such a form that they knew could not be accepted by the US. The Communists probably knew very well just how far the US was able to go. If, as would be necessary, the US refused to associate itself with and did not approve such guarantees, in the eyes of French public opinion US would be responsible for failure of France to achieve peace in Indochina. This would place an intolerable strain upon US-French relations.

2. On the other hand, the French might come to the point that they would say they did not feel they could resist making a poor settlement with the Communists unless the US would join with them in the fight on brief notice if they turned down the Communist terms. The US several months ago had stated the conditions under which it would join in action to defend Indochina on the basis of united action. Since then, the military situation had deteriorated very substantially, and the conditions under which we were then willing to join in collective action were no longer the same. If the French, as a condition for not making a bad agreement at Geneva, should ask us to give them a commitment to join with them in Indochina in a matter of days, this we would not be able to do. Neither the Secretary nor the President could make such a commitment. Whereas three months ago he was confident that Congressional approval for military action in Indochina could have been obtained under the conditions set forth to the French, he was not confident that this now could be done. If there were high level representation at Geneva, this problem would be much more acute, and therefore after long and careful thought and full discussion with the President, the conclusion had been reached that the long-term interests of US-French relations would be best served by neither the Secretary nor the Under Secretary returning to Geneva.
Mr. Eden expressed the view that the important thing was to get the best possible settlement, then make it clear that if the Communists broke it, everybody would be lined up against them. He hoped that not only the US, UK, and France would be able to take such a position together, but that it would be possible to obtain wide agreement thereon in South Asia. This would be a very important gain. The Secretary again expressed the view that if the Communists maneuver the situation so that it appears that the US is the only obstacle to a settlement, it would so strain relations between the allies that EDC would be killed and the Communists would accomplish their major objective in Europe. He did not want to expose himself to that risk. He said that he was prepared to say publicly and in writing that he was 100% behind the present French demands in Indochina, and wondered if this might help the French. Mendes-France again reiterated that the risks for the US are exactly the same whether high-level representation is present or not at Geneva and without the Secretary's presence the efficacy of US support of France is not the same.

Mendes-France then referred to the seven points, stating that he will do all he can to obtain a settlement within their framework, that if the Secretary were there he could help in this regard. If he is not there, he, Mendes-France, is satisfied the result would not be as good and his absence would weaken the French. The Secretary replied that the real question is what we do if Geneva fails. Perhaps the French negotiating position would be strengthened if it could portray to the Communists the US as the “wicked partner” in the background. Eden reacted very strongly to this, saying that he under no circumstances would be prepared to portray the US to the Communists as the “bogeyman”, the UK, US, and France are allies and he simply would not place himself in such a position. The Secretary suggested that this aspect might be implicit rather than explicit, to which Eden replied that Communists take advantage of every possible opportunity to try to get the British to say that the US is what is preventing peace, that the US is the only country that does not want peace. He absolutely refuses to be trapped into any such statement because he knows it is not true.

Mendes-France then stated that if France desired to obtain peace at any price, it would be much easier to do if the US were not there. However, this was most emphatically not the French position. France will do its best to get a settlement within the framework of the seven points, but if the US is not there at a high level, this will be much more difficult. There are definite limits beyond which France will not go. If there is no agreement by July 20, the war will continue, with intensification. The Communists well know that France will send reinforcements. The
danger of the enlargement of the war will be great. However, reinforcements cannot arrive there until September. Therefore, he is convinced that if there is no settlement by July 20 the Vietminh will immediately launch a big offensive. It will be impossible to hold Hanoi, Haiphong can be held only if there is naval and air support. There might be a question of whether the US could help if that situation arises. He wants to do all possible to obtain such a settlement by obtaining a cease-fire and obtaining it on the best possible terms. The best terms can be assured if the Secretary is there.

Mendes-France said that if there were big differences between the US and France, he could understand the US not being there, but this was not the case. The Secretary replied that the French might have to give in to very onerous Communist terms and he would fully understand that it might well be necessary for France to make peace terms which the US could not approve. He would not want to place himself in the position of having publicly to denounce the terms. He would not want France to say that it will stand on the seven points only if the US will fight as an alternative. Mendes-France replied that he would not ask this “for the time being” and said that if France does not stick to the substance of the seven points whether the Secretary is in Geneva or Washington, he would probably have to disavow the settlement, and he understood this fact. He was not prepared to say that on some points of detail the present French position might not compromise but he had no thought of compromise of any of the points on which, in the Secretary's letter to him of July 11th, the Secretary indicated he understood the French positions were shifting. He said with great earnestness that if a US Minister comes to Geneva and France signs something which the US feels it necessary to disavow, he would take the responsibility. He then solemnly stated in his official capacity “I ask you to come and help us.” The Secretary stated that he fully appreciated the weight of the Prime Minister’s request, he would defer his reply.

There was then some discussion of the type of statement the US could make with regard to any settlement at Geneva within the framework of the seven points, in which Mendes-France said that all France asked was that the US make a unilateral statement that it will take action if the Communists break any settlement that is reached. Mendes-France suggested something along the lines that the US would “view with grave concern any action from any country which will endanger the maintenance of peace in Indochina”. The Secretary said that a unilateral declaration something along these lines would present no problem.

*Text of this message was in telegram 127 to Paris, July 10, p. 1830.

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396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIAC

GENEVA, July 13, 1954—9 p.m.

Sec 597. Sent Paris 5097. Following is unofficial translation of draft declaration prepared by French delegation and circulated informally today and yesterday to other delegations for their comments and suggestions (Sec 598 1). Declaration would be issued by conference as part of its final proceedings.

"The conference takes note of the agreements which end the hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and which organize the international control of the implementation of the provisions of these agreements.

"The conference is happy to see peace reestablished in Cambodia and Laos, which countries having recovered their territorial integrity henceforth will be able to assume, without hindrance, in full independence and sovereignty, their role in the peaceful community of nations.

"The conference notes the statements made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos concerning their intention to proceed to free general elections with a secret ballot and to adopt measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community. The conference also notes of the statements of these governments by which they undertake to limit their armed forces strictly to the level required by the needs of the defense of their territory.

"The conference declares that the agreement concerning Vietnam has as its essential goal the settlement of military questions in order to put an end to hostilities but does not prejudice the solution of other problems related to the defensive restoration of peace in Vietnam.

"The conference declares that a settlement of these problems must be made on the basis of respect for the principles of independence of the unity and of the territorial integrity of Vietnam. This settlement will have to permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental liberties guaranteed by democratic institutions formed following free elections by secret ballot which will take place under international control, when, in the opinion of the competent representative authorities, the restoration of peace in the country has made sufficient progress and all the necessary conditions will be present in order to permit free expression of the national will. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities which are meant to ensure the protection of persons and of possessions will have to be applied in the most strict
manner and particularly to permit each person, in Vietnam, to decide freely the zone in which he wishes to live.

"In their relations with Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, each member of the Geneva conference undertakes to respect the independence, the unity, and the integrity of the states concerned, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

"The conference takes note of the statements by the Government of the French Republic on its resolve to conform to the decisions of the representative authorities in the three states concerning the presence of its troops in the territory of these states.

"The members of the conference agree to consult among themselves on any question which is submitted to them by the International Control Commissions in order to study the measures which might appear necessary to assure respect for the agreements on cessation of hostilities in Indochina."

BONSAI

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 13, 1954—10 p.m.

Secto 600. Repeated information Paris 49. French delegate today furnished me with draft of clause to be included in agreement on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam covering guarantees for individuals and communities against political reprisals, the right of choice for civilian populations and the protection of foreign property and persons. This draft has not yet been cleared by Foreign Office legal expert Gros but it has been shown to Viet Minh though text not supplied them. Viet Minh reaction was that some such clause might be included in agreement on cessation of hostilities but suggestion was made that there also be included a clause desired by the Viet Minh and providing for free exchange of goods between proposed regrouping zones. (According to French delegate, this clause would be of economic importance to Viet Minh.)

Unofficial translation follows:

"The two sides conscious of the need for sparing the populations concerned further trials, will each of them take the necessary measures so that, in the areas where the regroupings contemplated by this agreement will take place,

(A) There will be assured the protection and the safety of French and foreign nationals (ressortissants) residing in these areas as well as of Vietnamese who have collaborated with the other parties and in order that these different categories of citizens may be effectively guaranteed against any reprisals; any arbitrary political and administrative action and any discriminatory measures.

(B) That a right of choice be recognized, during a certain period, to all Vietnamese desiring to fix their domicile in another region of Vietnam and that their transfer there be freely assured.

(C) That all facilities be granted to Frenchmen and to foreigners desiring to break up their present establishment or temporarily to quit the region of Vietnam where they reside."

French delegate would welcome our comments on above working text.

BONSAI

396.1 GE/7-1354: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 13, 1954—10 p.m.

Secto 600. Repeated information Paris 49. Attention Ambassador Johnson. Offroy and Cheysson, French delegate, this evening gave me French working paper re international control in Laos and Cambodia to supplement paper recently furnished us on Vietnam (Secto 575 1) unofficial translation and comments will be furnished shortly.

Offroy also supplied us with outline of agreements for cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. These agreements are to be between military commands of Viet Minh on one hand in all three countries, and on other hand Franco-Vietnamese command, Cambodian command and Franco-Laotian command respectively. (There is apparently hope that this will make things easier for Vietnamese Government). The outline of the agreement for the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam may be translated as follows:

"First: the cease-fire:

Disengagement of Franco-Vietnamese and Viet Minh units and minor regroupings to follow the cease-fire.

This is to be signed as soon as completed, to be published at once, and to be placed in effect (under the control of the joint commission.)

Second: supplementary provisions:

A. Military provisions:

Definition of regrouping zones and of demilitarized sectors.

Regrouping of the armed forces of the two sides in accordance with a precise plan of transfers.

Nonreinforcing of the potential of the opposing forces liberation of prisoners and civilian internees.

Air and sea communications. (Circulation)

B. Political and administrative provisions:

Administration of the regrouping zones.

Conditions (modalities) of the transfer of zones.

1 Dated July 8, p. 1805.
Guarantee for individuals and communities against political reprisal.
Right of option for civilian populations
Movement of populations which wish to take refuge with the adverse side
Protection of property and persons
C. Provisions re the control of the agreements. (See working paper of July 7.)

Working paper of July 7 is that contained in Secto 575.

It will be noted that this outline apparently provides for cease-fire prior to availability on spot of international control mechanism. With regard to administration of territories to be transferred, Cheysson tells me French have accepted Viet Minh proposal of May 25 to effect that "a territory depending from one party, which is transferred to the other party following the plan of delimitation of zones, shall continue to be administered by the first party until the day when all of its troops which are to be transferred shall have left the territory in order to free the zone for the other party."

Outline for Cambodia and Laos is similar except that provisions are made for the evacuation of foreign troops rather than regrouping and for the movement of populations which desire to seek refuge in Vietnam. In the case of Laos, French Union forces are to withdraw to specified installations. In addition it is contemplated that the Laotian and Cambodian Governments will make declarations re importation of war material needed for self-defense purposes and re French instructors and technicians.

It is my understanding that neither of these outlines have as yet been distributed to other delegations, although I am not certain on this point.

USDel will make comments as soon as possible following further discussion with French Del. Meanwhile would welcome urgent comments from recipients this message.

BONSAI

JULY 14, 1954

SECRET

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

Secto 601. Repeated information from Paris 52, priority Saigon 31, Re Secto 599, repeated information from Paris 49, Saigon 80 regarding Viet Minh proposal that agreements on cessation of hostilities include clause providing for free exchange of goods between grouping zones, delegation agrees with French judgment that this clause would be of economic importance to Viet Minh. Also, delegation believes clause would probably work to political advantage of Viet Minh through facilitating Communist infiltration and subversion in non-Communist zones.

Request comments Saigon and France Department concerning attitude delegation should adopt toward Viet Minh proposal.

BONSAI

*The Department’s reply is contained in telegram Tosec 599, July 10, p. 1394. The Embassy at Saigon has contained in telegram 194 to the Department (repeated to Geneva as telegram 2546, July 12) that it concurred in the delegation’s estimate as expressed latter telegraph (secto 602). However, in a country such as this where corruption and subversion are almost of a professional standard, we believe that too much importance should not be attached to wording of the agreement since any event will be found by Viet Minh and interested persons on Vietnam in order to evade the engagement. (396.1 GE/T-1554) For additional comments on question, see telegram 218 from Saigon, July 17, p. 1323.

Conference, Int 50 D 627, CF 524

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Head of the United States Delegation (Johnson)

SECRET

JULY 14, 1954

Participants:
The Secretary
Ambassador Dillon
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Phleger
Mr. McCord
Ambassador Johnson
Mr. Eden
Sir Harold Caccia
Sir Gladwyn Jebb
Sir Anthony Rumbold

The meeting was informal, with at times discussions going on between the Secretary and Mendes-France, the Secretary and Eden, and all three.

The Secretary first discussed with Mendes-France a letter to be addressed to Mendes-France to the Secretary confirming the discussions and undertakings that had been reached. Mendes-France agreed

1 This meeting took place at the Quai d'Orsay from 11:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.
Minutes, Zhou Enlai's Meeting with Mendés-France (Excerpt), July 13, 1954

Record No. 206-Y0007

Time: 10:30 a.m.-11:45 a.m., July 13, 1954
Location: The residence of the Chinese delegation
Chinese participants: Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Li Kenong, Wang Bingnan, and Dang Ninhchuan (translator)
French participants: Pierre Mendés-France, Jean Chauvel, Jacques Guillermaz, and the translator

Mendés-France: Very happy to meet you again, and to work together for the final stage of the Geneva Conference. I do not know if Mr. Premier has brought us some good news.

Zhou Enlai: I met with the Indian prime minister, the Burmese prime minister, and also President Ho Chi Minh. I am satisfied with these meetings. We share common ideas and common goals, that is, to restore peace in Indochina. As I told Your Excellency Mr. Prime Minister in Berne, we hoped to see a fair and reasonable peace, a peace that was glorious to both sides.

After returning to Geneva, I exchanged opinions with our delegates, and I learned the efforts that the French delegation—and the efforts by Mr. Prime Minister in particular—have been made toward this direction. I am very happy about this. This makes it clear that Mr. Chauvel and Mr. Li Kenong, who have stayed here, have tried their best in the past three weeks. Although the progress is made slowly, it has played the role to promote the conference. Now we are all back here. I am willing to discuss the methods for resolving the problems in the future. The French side is restricted by the schedule. I hope to know the opinions of Mr. Prime Minister, so as to try our best to promote the realization of our common wish for restoring peace.

Mendés-France: When in Berne, I told Mr. Premier that we shared the same spirit. After I came to Geneva, I have respectively met with the heads of various delegations. Now there are many points commonly shared. However, on one main point, that is, the point of the demarcation line, the solution is yet to be achieved. I had two candid and lengthy conversations with Mr. Pham Van Dong. I told him that if an agreement could be reached on this issue, it would be easier for the other issues to be resolved. Now I am willing to listen to the opinion of Mr. Premier.

Zhou Enlai: Now there are quite many commonly shared points. We should be able to resolve the problem. You just mentioned the question of the demarcation line in Vietnam. I believe that if the two sides are to make further efforts and also make concessions, an agreement is easy to be reached. In appearance, the distance between the two sides is large. However, so long as the two sides approach each other, there should be ways to shorten the distance. I do not know if Mr. Mendés-France has any concrete opinions, and I would like to listen.

Mendés-France: It seems that Mr. Zhou Enlai already has learned our opinions. Now I would like to give a brief introduction. As you also have hoped, we already have conducted direct negotiation with the Viet Minh. Now the distance between the two sides remains big. I believe that the resolution does not just require the two sides to retreat a few kilometers and to find a line in the middle. If the Viet Minh is willing to make concessions on the issue of the demarcation line, we will make concessions in the political field. For example, we may issue a final political statement. Therefore, we believe that it is not necessary that the two sides should make the same concessions, and still a solution fitting the requests of both sides could be reached.

Originally the Viet Minh said that mainly they were interested in the north, which is an important region in terms of economy, politics, and population. We are willing to consider this proposal, and hope to receive reasonable compensations. However, in terms of geography, history, and logic, the line should be at Don Hui, close to the 18th parallel. This line is also compatible with the criteria that Mr. Pham Van Dong put forward in early May. At that time, Mr. Pham Van Dong asked for a demarcation line that was historical, traditional, and short. We believe that Don Hui should serve as a normal partition line. Further, France controls such an important city like Hue close to the partition line. Therefore it is appropriate for the temporary partition line to be drawn close to Don Hui.

It is true that the Viet Minh controls some areas in the south, and it is naturally difficult for them to give up these areas. However, our sacrifices in the Red River Delta area far surpass the interests that the Viet Minh will be giving up. So we believe that such requests are reasonable, which we hope that Mr. Pham Van Dong will accept. Our request is not for conducting bargaining, but for avoiding incidents in the future, and for being compatible with the hope of the nine countries participating in the conference.

Zhou Enlai: I know some of the explanations by Mr. Premier Minister, but there is another situation, which I hope that you should know. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam indeed has close connections with the people in central and southern Vietnam. And, in order for them to withdraw from these areas, it requires a lot of explanation. Although this withdrawal is only temporary, still it requires time. As far as territorial space is concerned, they will be withdrawing from a rather big area. I hope that you will learn this situation and understand the difficulty facing the Vietnamese side. Now, what needs to be resolved is the
question of ceasefire. Mr. Prime Minister said a moment ago that you would pay attention to the interests of the people in politics. This is good. We hope that France...will establish friendly and equal relations with Vietnam on new basis. I mentioned this point to Indian prime minister, Burmese prime minister and President Ho Chi Minh. We believe that on the question of peace no one should be excluded. This was already mentioned in the Chinese-Indian and Chinese-Burmese joint statements. I think that Mr. Prime Minister has already learned the true significance of the two statements.

Now we have encountered a deadlock on the partition line issue. This is not good. The two sides should make steps forward. One side makes one more step, and the other side will make one fewer step. The question can be resolved. If no progress is to be made, it is not beneficial to either France or Vietnam.

Mendès-France: Mr. Premier's opinions are same as ours. I know that in a political sense it is difficult to give up areas loyal to the Viet Minh for many years. I once told Mr. Pham Van Dong that if the difficulty were only this much, then we would be willing to change our original opinions, and to give a bag-size area in the south to be controlled by the Viet Minh. Of course we will put forward the same requests in the north. But Mr. Pham Van Dong still wants to have a zone that is intact. I believe that this is realistic, and that this is reasonable. I raise the question of setting up a bag-size area, and that means that I understand the opinions of Mr. Zhou Enlai. However, to establish two big concentration zones will avoid incidents. We also agree to this. That means that the two sides will have to make some painful concessions. Mr. Zhou Enlai said that the Viet Minh would withdraw from a larger area. I think that the comparison cannot be made only in terms of territorial space. As a matter of fact, such cities like Hanoi are much more important in terms of population, politics and economy than the areas from which the Viet Minh will be withdrawing. Take the population as an example, the people we will need to withdraw are 300,000, whereas the Viet Minh, only 30,000. This is more important a factor than territorial space. I am not stubbornly persisting in a negative attitude; I am hoping that the difficulties of the two sides can be truly resolved. We are prepared to demonstrate our sincerity for concessions in the political sphere.

Zhou Enlai: ... I am told that Mr. Prime Minister will meet Mr. Pham Van Dong again before leaving for Paris. I hope that you will give additional consideration to my opinions. The distance is not big. I believe that so long as we all make efforts, an agreement can be reached.

Mendès-France: I thank Mr. Zhou Enlai for the talk. I do not want to waste more of your time. Now I will raise two points as my conclusion: (1) I will go to Paris this afternoon, and Mr. Eder will also go. We will be meeting with Mr. Dulles. At present we do not know what final decisions the government of the United States will make. However, for the sake of consolidate the interests of peace, we believe that the agreement at the conference should be guaranteed by all participants of the conference. Yesterday I told Mr. Pham Van Dong that if I were in his position, I would rather give up two more parallels and get America's guaranty, but not gain two more parallels and lose America's guaranty. Our common interest is to obtain the agreement of the overwhelming majority. (2) I will go to Paris only for a short time, and I hope that the discussions at Geneva will continue. Now we have drafted a political statement, which Mr. Pham Van Dong has already studied and made comments. We have made some revisions in accordance with his comments. This document will be ready this evening. We will give Mr. Zhou Enlai a copy, and hope that he will study it as early as possible.

Zhou Enlai: Thank you for the notice and for sending us the document. The United States is trying everything possible to sabotage the conference. The foreign ministers of all countries have returned to Geneva, except for Dulles. We are not satisfied with this attitude. Dulles now has arrived in Paris, but he will not come to Geneva. We feel that this is quite strange. The Americans do not observe the agreements, but they claim that the others do not observe the agreements. In fact, the ones who are least willing to observe the agreements are the Americans.

Mendès-France: I do not quite agree to this point. Probably we have different opinions. But our efforts are for the purpose of making the opinions of all become closer. This is for the direct interest of enhancing peace.

Zhou Enlai: I agree to the last point. As a matter of fact, what I have said are also the opinions of French and American papers.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Minutes, Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Anthony Eden, July 13, 1954
Record No. 206-Y006

Time: 11:35 a.m. – 12:15 p.m., July 13, 1954
Location: Foreign Minister Zhou's Residence
Chinese Participants: Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Wang Bingman,19 Huang Xiang, Pu Shouchang (interpreter and note-taker)
British Participants: Anthony Eden, Harold Caccia, William D. Allen, Ford

Eden: I came to visit you this morning before I depart for Paris mainly to learn your understanding of the prospects after your talk with the French.

Zhou Enlai: After I had a talk with Mr. Mendes-France, I felt that we shared many common points on many issues, and our opinions were quite similar. Now the specific issue is the question of demarcation in Vietnam. I said to Mr. Mendes-France that France needed to advance further southward from the 18th parallel. So far as I know, the Vietnamese side is willing to make more concessions for the French move. I understand that Mr. Piem Van Dong is meeting with Mr. Mendes-France today. I hope that they will come close together with their opinions.

Eden: I hope so, too. Thank you for your message through Mr. Trevelyan. In that message you mentioned that you had met with Chairman Ho Chi Minh and that you had had a very good talk. Could you tell me more about this interesting talk?

Zhou Enlai: After I talked with you on the 16th of last month, I met with Mr. Mendes-France on the 23rd, and we discussed many things. Afterwards I visited India and Burma, and had talks with the prime ministers of the two countries. I discussed with Chairman Ho Chi Minh the issues covered in these talks. I exchanged with Chairman Ho Chi Minh our opinions on the issues of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and peace in Southeast Asia, and in the end we achieved a common understanding. I trust that Mr. Eden would be delighted to hear this.

Regarding the issue of peace in Indochina after my return this time, I believe that from the perspective of China, the Soviet Union and Vietnam, from the perspective of France, and from the perspective of the British royal government as well, a common solution could be found. Likewise, our wish and policies on restoring peace in Indochina have won support from India, Burma, and some countries in the Colombo Conference. Mr. Eden must have read the Sino-Indian and Sino-Burmese joint statements. I believe that these two statements would promote peace in Indochina. In these statements, we have also said that we would not reject the participation of any country in the effort for peace.

Eden: After Mr. Premier's visit to India, Mr. Nehru told me about your visit in a telegram. I believe your talk was useful. Everyone hopes for a resolution, and when I say this I include Washington. We very much hope that our arrangements will not only be supported by the participating countries like us, but also involve the Colombo Conference countries in some way.

Zhou Enlai: Yes, I did what I could in this regard during my visit to India and Burma this time. I am especially grateful to Prime Minister Nehru and Prime Minister U Nu for their enthusiastic support. It was a pity that I only had such a short time that I could not visit Indonesia.

Eden: You are truly a tireless traveler. On the issue of Laos and Cambodia, is everything going all right? The reason I am asking this question is that I have met with Mr. Molotov, and so far as I know, the Viet Minh has presented a map according to which they demanded big chunks of Laos' land.

Zhou Enlai: I believe that the question of Cambodia will be resolved after some further contact. As to the question of Laos, I have discussed it with both you and Mr. Mendes, and I believe that such a resolution could be achieved. As to the talks by the military representatives, it is possible for their demands to be a little more or a little less, but that is not non-negotiable. Prime Minister Nehru and Prime Minister U Nu both would like to see Laos and Cambodia become Southeast Asia-type countries ("Southeast Asia type" is my terminology; Prime Minister Nehru used the word "neutral," i.e., countries like India and Burma), therefore this is our common wish. We do not wish for Laos and Cambodia to become military bases for any foreign countries, nor do we wish for any country to participate in a military alliance that is hostile to the other.

Eden: These could all be agreed upon. Of course both countries must keep their unification.

Zhou Enlai: Not only their unification, but they also have to be free countries.

Eden: Neither country's land should be snatched away.

Zhou Enlai: We both agree that the determined stand in Laos are only temporary, and that unification must be achieved after the elections. Now that we only have a short time, everyone must make an effort, and we must not let anyone impede us.

Eden: We all hope that Mr. Mendes-France could succeed. Should he fail, it would be very bad for all of us. This would have great implications.

Zhou Enlai: But some people are hoping that he will fail.

Eden: I know what you mean, but my opinion is not exactly the same.

19 Director of the Administrative Office of the PRC Foreign Ministry, secretary general of the PRC delegation to the Geneva Conference.
Zhou Enlai: Mr. Eden should know a little more since you have been to Washington.

Eden: I found that there is much mutual suspicion. The United States thinks that China has ambitions in Southeast Asia, not for now but in the long run. I have found that you also think that the United States has ambitions in Southeast Asia, claiming that the U.S. is trying to establish military bases in Southeast Asia and so forth. It would be good to achieve an agreement amidst such mutual fear.

Zhou Enlai: We have issued joint statements with India and Burma, and we have expressed a willingness to issue the same statement with any Southeast Asian country and accept to be bound by such a statement. This proves that not only now do we have no ambitions, but even in the future we will have no such ambitions. However, the U.S. still would not relinquish its plans for military bases and alliances in Southeast Asia. On this issue, the United Kingdom should be able to make a fair judgment.

Eden: As I said just now, each side is suspicious of the other. Our American friends said that we had been deceived, but we are willing to take the risk.

Zhou Enlai: Time will prove everything. Both Mr. Eden’s report to the House of Commons on the 23rd of last month and Mr. Churchill’s statement in Washington referred to the peaceful coexistence among countries. We welcome this. This is conducive to easing international tension.

Eden: After we left Washington, the President of the U.S. also used the expression “peaceful coexistence.”

Zhou Enlai: This shows that Mr. Churchill had some influence on him.

Eden: Yes, we had a long talk with him. Let’s discuss these interesting questions after I return from Paris. Mr. Molotov and I agreed to a procedure where we would hold private talks without formal meetings, and I believe you must have known it.

Zhou Enlai: Yes, but we will have to hold a session at the end to conclude the conference.

Eden: Yes, if there is something to make public, of course a plenary session will have to be held. I must say goodbye now, for Mr. Molotov is going to see me soon.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Juan. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Minutes, Zhou Enlai’s Meeting with Chauvel, July 13, 1954

Record No. 206-Y0007

Time: 7:00pm, 13 July 1954
Location: Premier Zhou’s hotel suite
Chinese participants: Zhou Enlai, Li Kenong, Wang Bingnan, Chen Jiageng, and Dong Ningchuan (translator)
French participants: Jean Chauvel, Jacques Guillermaz, and one translator

Chauvel: I am now presenting the Honorable Premier a document. This document is drafted for the cease-fire agreement and some principles after the cease-fire. It also points out that the current solution is not for separate governments.

The fourth part of this document is about limiting the armed forces in Laos and Cambodia. The discussion of this issue is beyond the responsibilities of the military representatives of Laos, Cambodia, and the Vietnamese Government. It should belong to the nine-nation conference. Therefore, after this document is read at the conference, the representatives of Laos and Cambodia will be invited to make a statement. Their statement will be included in the document. It seems the best way to handle the situation.

Mr. Mendes-France also talked to Mr. Pham Van Dong about this issue. Mr. Pham Van Dong believes that this document should include the French Union and French cultural and economic relations with Vietnam. We think that these issues are about the French-Vietnamese relations, not about the conference nations. However, to restrain the armed forces in Laos and Cambodia are different issues. Thus, we would ask Mr. Pham Van Dong to re-consider this.

This is an unofficial document. Nevertheless, we have already handed it out to each delegation at the conference. We asked all the delegations to provide their additional suggestion or further corrections. So far we haven’t yet got everything back from the delegations. But we have collected some of them. Mr. Eden is very happy with this document. The Soviet Delegation shows its interest in the document. Mr. Pham Van Dong, however, responded that he agrees in principle, but he needs more time to read it carefully. Other member nations of the Union haven’t sent their feedbacks. The American Delegation hasn’t yet responded to it.

Zhou Enlai: I really appreciate Mr. Chauvel’s effort. As we return here, we saw this document. Even though it is a preliminary draft, it is a document for us to consider. We will study it in details and provide our response to the French Delegation as soon as possible.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Guarantee for individuals and communities against political reprisal
Right of option for civilian populations
Movement of populations which wish to take refuge with the adverse side
Protection of property and persons
C. Provisions re the control of the agreements. (See working paper of July 7.)

Working paper of July 7 is that contained in Seco 57.

It will be noted that this outline apparently provides for cease-fire prior to availability on spot of international control mechanism. With regard to administration of territories to be transferred, Cheysson tells me French have accepted Viet Minh proposal of May 25 to effect that "a territory depending from one party, which is transferred to the other party following the plan of delimitation of zones, shall continue to be administered by the first party until the day when all of its troops which are to be transferred shall have left the territory in order to free the zone for the other party."

Outline for Cambodia and Laos is similar except that provisions are made for the evacuation of foreign troops rather than regrouping and for the movement of populations within desire to seek refuge in Vietnam. In the case of Laos, French Union forces are to withdraw to specified installations. In addition, it is contemplated that the Laoistan and Cambodian Governments shall make declarations re the importation of war material needed for self-defense purposes and re French instructors and technicians.

It is my understanding that neither of these outlines have as yet been distributed to other delegations, although I am not certain on this point.

USDel will make comments as soon as possible following further discussion with French Del. Meanwhile would welcome urgent comments from recipients of this message.

BONSAL
JULY 14, 1954

SECRET PRIORITY

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET, PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 14, 1954—11 a.m.

Seco 601. Repeated information Paris 52, priority Saigon 31. Re Seco 600, repeated information Paris 49, Saigon 50 concerning Viet Minh proposal that agreement on cessation of hostilities include clause providing for free exchange of goods between regrouping forces, delegation agrees with French judgment that this clause would be of economic importance to Viet Minh. Also, delegation believes clause would probably work to political advantage of Viet Minh through facilitating Communist infiltration and subversion in non-Communist zones.

Request comments Saigon and guidelines Department concerning attitude delegation should adopt toward Viet Minh proposal.

BONSAL

*The Department's reply was transmitted in telegram Tepee 355, July 16, p. 1353. The Embassy at Saigon provided in telegram 104 to the Department (repeated to Geneva as telegram 201, July 15), that it concurred in the "delegation's estimate as expressed letter from Saigon [Seco 601]. However, in a country such as this where corruption and inefficiency are almost a professional standard, we believe that too much importance should not be attached to wording of the agreement since it is clear any event will be found by Viet Minh and interested persons on Vietnam's side to evade the engagement." (506.1 GE/7-1254) For additional comments on this question, see telegram 218 from Saigon, July 17, p. 1423.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 524

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Head of the United States Delegation (Johnson)

PARIS, July 14, 1954.

SECRET

Participants:
- The Secretary
- Ambassador Dillon
- Mr. MacArthur
- Mr. Phieger
- Mr. McCarrle
- Ambassador Johnson
- Mr. Eden
- Sir Harold Caccia
- Sir Gladwyn Jebb
- Sir Anthony Rumbold

The meeting was very informal, with at times discussions going on between the Secretary and Mendes-France, the Secretary and Eden, and all three.

The Secretary first discussed with Mendes-France a letter to be addressed by Mendes-France to the Secretary confirming the discussions and undertakings that had been reached. Mendes-France agreed

1 This meeting took place at the Quai d'Orsay from 11:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.
with the conclusion of a draft presented by the Secretary but indicated that he desired more fully to include the French position.\footnote{The U.S. draft has not been located; for the text of the letter from Mendes-France to Dulles, July 14, see p. 1363.}

There was also a discussion of a joint French-US position paper of which the Secretary showed Mendes-France a draft.\footnote{The U.S. draft has not been located; for the final approved text of the U.S.-France position paper, July 14, see p. 1363.} The discussion of this paper centered principally around respective positions with regard to bringing the matter of Indochina to the UN if there was no agreement at Geneva, and French intentions and policies concerning the independence of the Associated States. During this discussion the Secretary pointed out the dilemma with which France faced any US efforts to be of assistance. On the one hand, the French claimed that Indochina was an internal affair which could not be brought before the UN, and on the other hand, wanted assistance from the outside. The US could not be in the position of assisting a French colonial war in Indochina. Mendes-France replied that the Indochina affair was at the beginning a colonial war, but outside influences were more and more coming into the situation and it was no longer an entirely internal affair. However, with respect to bringing the matter to the UN, France had to consider the situation if trouble broke out in another French territory and the precedent that would be established if the matter of Indochina were brought to the UN.

With respect to the American draft of the position paper, to the effect that France reaffirms its intention to reaffirm genuine independence to the Associated States and would not forcibly prevent any of the States from withdrawing from the French Union, Mendes stated that France had many times expressed its intention with respect to the independence of the Associated States, and in addition there was no problem with respect to Laos and Cambodia with which treaties were completed and in effect.

With respect to forcibly preventing their withdrawal, he pointed out the constitution of the French Union did not make any positive provision for secession therefrom, and it was therefore beyond his constitutional power to make any such statement.

Mr. Eden stated that he thought the question of Vietnamese independence was very fundamental in the present situation and the Vietnamese had said to him that unless the question of their independence was resolved, there would be no hope of holding any part of retained Vietnam. The Secretary also expressed the view that there was no chance of holding Vietnam unless they were granted real independence. Mendes-France said the question is what is to be done if there is a cease-fire. Neither the separate authorities in the north nor in the south would have the right to speak in the name of all the country.

Only a future unified government would be able to do that. However, he fully recognized the importance of developing a strong nationalist government in the south of Vietnam even if in the beginning this gives rise to difficulties for France.

Mendes said he fully realized the urgency of doing something in this regard both in the civilian and military fields and that France must take political and psychological measures which will give the Vietnamese in the retained portion of Vietnam prestige and popularity and they would also need outside aid. It was extremely important that Vietnamese in this area be able to present themselves as representing a truly national movement.

It was decided that a working group would redraft the proposed letter and the joint position paper.

There was then discussion regarding whether General Smith's health would permit his presiding at Geneva.\footnote{July 20.} However, Mendes expressed the view that the important thing was not the exact date General Smith was able to arrive, but that they be able now to say that he was coming. The Secretary said that if General Smith was not able to come, it might be possible for him to return for a two or three-day period, but he explained that the situation in Congress with national and foreign aid and other legislation of importance to the area made it imperative that he be in Washington and also that he fully explain to Congressional leaders the results of the conversations held here.

Mendes said that the cease-fire act "has to be done by Tuesday";\footnote{Following this meeting, Secretary Dulles called President Eisenhower to inform him that agreements had been reached which would require Under Secretary Smith to return to Geneva. The President gave his approval. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)} That is when the date upon which the cease-fire was to go into effect must be published. After that the Conference can go on as long as it likes with regard to technical matters. If he deviates in any way from his determination that this be done by Tuesday, it will mean that the French will be involved in another Panmunjom. The Secretary pointed out that "technical matters" could be of very great importance.

The discussion was recessed until 3 p.m.\footnote{July 20.}

\footnote{See the editorial note, p. 1381.}

\footnote{7510.00/T-1454}

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, July 14, 1954.

During the course of the discussions at the Embassy this afternoon, Ambassador Johnson suggested to Secretary Dulles that he felt that
Mr. Mendes-France and Mr. Eden might not fully comprehend the position of the US with reference to "guaranteeing" a settlement which would turn over much of Vietnam to the Communists. Thereupon, Secretary Dulles drew Mr. Mendes-France and Mr. Eden aside with him and said he wished to make it crystal clear that the US could never join in any guarantee to the Communists of the fruits of their aggression. The US did accept it as a fact that certain people became the victims of Communist aggression, and it was not prepared to go to war to encourage others to go to war to rectify the situation. However, this was not the same as to say the US would become an ally of the Communists if there were a breach of the agreement by non-Communists.

It would be compatible with the foregoing that the US should make a unilateral declaration to the effect that in accordance with its obligations under the UN Charter, it would not resort to force to upset an agreement if it were arrived at, and it would seek to bring others to act correspondingly. Also the US could agree with others to react with force to Communist aggression in violation of the agreement. This, however, would have to be conditional upon Senate ratification of the treaty and/or Congressional approval of belligerency.

Mr. Mendes-France and Mr. Eden expressed their understanding of the US position. Mr. Eden stated that he hoped that the UK and others, including many South Asian countries, would be able to associate themselves with a declaration by the US against the use of force to overturn the Geneva agreements.

Ambassador Johnson and Mr. MacArthur were present during the above conversation.

[Annex]

PARIS TALKS, JULY 13-14, 1954

COMMUNIQUÉ

We have had intimate and frank discussions. These have resulted in a clear understanding of our respective positions in relation to Indochina.

The United States Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, explained fully the attitude of his Government toward the Indochinese phase of the Geneva Conference and the limitations which that government desired to observe as not itself having a primary responsibility in the Indochina war.

The French Premier and Foreign Minister, M. Pierre Mendes-France, expressed the view with which Mr. Anthony Eden, the Secre-

tary of State for Foreign Affairs for the United Kingdom, associated himself, that it would nevertheless serve the interests of France and of the Associated States, and of the peace and freedom of the area, if the United States, without departing from the principles which Mr. Dulles expressed, were once again to be represented at Geneva at the ministerial level.

Accordingly, President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles are requesting the United States Under Secretary of State, General Walter Bedell Smith, to return to Geneva at an early date.

721G.00/7-1454

France—United States Position Paper

CLASSIFIED

1. France and the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are recognized to be those which, on the non-Communist side, are primarily interested in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference.

The United States is interested primarily as a friendly nation which desires to assist, where desired, in arriving at a just settlement, but it will not seek, or be expected, to impose its views in any way upon those primarily interested.

2. The attached seven points constitute a result which France believes to be obtainable by negotiation at Geneva and which would be acceptable to France and, France believes, to the Associated States. The United States, while recognizing the right of those primarily interested to accept different terms, will itself be prepared to respect terms conforming to the attached. The United States will not be asked or expected by France to respect terms which in its opinion differ materially from the attached, and it may publicly disassociate itself from such differing terms.

3. If the settlement is one which the United States is prepared to "respect" its position will be expressed unilaterally or in association only with non-Communist states in terms which apply to the situation the principles of non-use of forces which are embodied in Article 2(4) and (6) of the Charter of the United Nations.

4. The United States is prepared to seek, with other interested nations, a collective defense association designed to preserve, against

4 This paper was approved by Secretary Dulles and Premier Mendès-France at Paris on July 14. The text was transmitted to Washington in telegram 170 from Paris, July 14. (751G.00/7-1454)
direct and indirect aggression, the integrity of the non-Communist areas of Southeast Asia following any settlement.

5. If there is no settlement, the United States and French governments will consult together on the measures to be taken. This will not preclude the United States, if it so desires, bringing the matter before the United Nations as involving a threat to peace as dealt with by Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

6. France reaffirms the principle of independence for the Associated States in equal and voluntary association as members of the French Union.

July 14, 1954.
Mendes-France

John Foster Dulles

Annex

Memorandum of Points Referred to in Paragraph 2 of the France-United States Position Paper

An agreement which:

1. preserves the integrity and independence of Laos and Cambodia and assures the withdrawal of Vietminh forces therefrom;

2. in connection with the line of military demarcation, preserves at least the southern half of Vietnam and if possible an enclave in the Delta; in this connection we would be unwilling to see the line of division of responsibility drawn further south than a line running generally west from Dong Hoi;

3. does not impose on Laos, Cambodia or retained Vietnam any restrictions materially impairing their capacity to maintain stable non-Communist regimes; and especially restrictions impairing their right to maintain adequate forces for internal security, to import arms and to employ foreign advisers;

4. does not contain political provisions which would risk loss of the retained area to Communist control;

5. does not exclude the possibility of the ultimate unification of the Vietnam by peaceful means;

6. provides for the peaceful and humane transfer, under international supervision, of those people desiring to be moved from one zone to another of Vietnam; and

7. provides effective machinery for international supervision of the agreement.

July 14, 1954.
John Foster Dulles
Mendes-France

INDOCHINA

Conference files, lot 60 D 827, CP 324

The French Prime Minister (Mendes-France) to the Secretary of State


Dear Mr. Secretary: Following our frank and friendly conversation of last evening, I believe I understand fully the position of the United States with regard to the negotiations at Geneva concerning Indochina.

If I interpret your views correctly, you recognize fully the primary right of France, the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, to decide the conditions for the settlement of a war in which they are the only belligerents on the Non-Communist side. You wish to aid us through your good offices in obtaining a just and honorable settlement which will take into account the needs of the interested peoples. However, you are not prepared to participate with the Communist countries in any settlement which might appear to retain for them the benefits of aggression or the domination of non-willing peoples. In any case, if a settlement should be arrived at between the parties holding the primary responsibility, you would agree to indicate that you would comply with the principles which are contained in Article 2 (4) and (6) of the United Nations Charter and you would consider any violation of the settlement by the Communist regimes as being of grave concern.

It being your belief that the continuation of the war would involve a serious risk of an extension of the conflict, both as concerns the combat areas and the belligerent countries, the question of the participation of the United States would be guided by the terms defined in the fourth paragraph of the letter addressed on July [June] 16, 1954, by President Eisenhower to President Coty.

You have indicated to me that you would fear, in the present state of negotiations, that the sending by the United States to Geneva of representatives chosen at a high level and bearing instructions from President Eisenhower to adhere to the principles noted above, could cause a situation capable of giving rise in France, under the most regrettable circumstances, to a feeling that our two countries are divided and that it might risk affecting seriously their good relations which are so important to the whole free world.

1 Unofficial translation of French text. Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 170 from Paris, July 14. (751G.00/7-1454)
2 For memorandums of conversation, July 15, see p. 1348.
3 The text of President Eisenhower's letter to French President Coty, June 16, is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, pp. 583-584. The text of the fourth paragraph of the President's letter is printed in volume xiv.
I have noted your hesitation to come to Geneva in the fear of having eventually to disassociate yourself from an agreement, or certain of its terms, which you might not be able to respect. This appears to me to be understandable, but in my opinion it does not respond to the situation. In effect, I have every reason to think that your absence would be precisely interpreted as demonstrating, before the fact, that you disapproved of the conference and of everything which might be accomplished. Not only would those who are against us find therein the confirmation of the ill will which they attribute to your government concerning the re-establishment of peace in Indochina; but many others would read in it a sure sign of a division of the western powers. Finally, the negotiations would thus be deprived of the element of balance indispensable to the seeking of a solution as recommended in the memorandum of June 30.4

I consider thus that such an absence would produce an effect diametrically opposed to the intentions which you have expressed and which I have cited above. In a situation as difficult as this only the unity of the western diplomatic front, supported by the immense potential which we have in common, can bring about the very military and strategic unity which we should seek eventually to establish in that part of the world.

It is in this spirit that the French Government envisages, aside from the assurances which the conference itself could furnish, the establishment of a collective guarantee by virtue of which the signatories would declare themselves prepared to intervene if, in Indochina, one of the three states was a victim of aggression.

I am fully conscious of the position of the government of the United States and I have noted with care the consequences which it might imply; but for the reasons which I have just enumerated, I have the profound conviction that the common interests of our two countries and of the three Associated States would be effectively defended only if you yourself, or the Under-Secretary should represent in person your government at Geneva.

If the situation should nevertheless evolve in a manner which would confirm your fears, I engage myself, on behalf of France, to make known publicly the conditions under which you have acceded to my request.

I do not wish to end this letter without telling you how much I have appreciated during the meeting, certainly fruitful for the future of Franco-American relations, the way in which you have been able to join firmness and sureness of your political views to a broad understanding of the positions of your friends.

1 Text transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 179 from Paris, July 14. (751G.007-1454) Copies of the Dulles-Mendès-France correspondence were provided to Foreign Secretary Eden who acknowledged receipt by letter of July 14 (Conference files, lot 40 D 627, CF 224).

2 Supra.

304.1 GE/7-1454 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY  GENEVA, J u ly 14, 1954—noon.

Secto 693. Repeated information prior to Paris 54. Limit distribution. Eyes only Dillon and Johnson. Chaysson of French delegation told me this morning that when Dong was given draft declaration (Secto 597 4) prepared by French delegate, his first reaction was to insist that the conference should also take note of the fact that Democratic Republic of Vietnam has stated its intention of examining the question of membership in the French Union and of engaging in discussions with the French with a view to resuming economic and cultural relations (Viet Minh May 10th proposals 5). French rejoined that this would hardly appear to be suitable question for inclusion in final declaration designed to record some measure of conference approval or acceptance of definite items. Chaysson added that if Dong

1 Dated July 18, p. 1255.

2 For the report of the Second Plenary Session on Indochina, May 10, see telegram Secto 192, May 10, p. 753.
TOP SECRET
FROM PARIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/TP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET (CABINET)

DISTRIBUTION

Sir G. Jubb
No. 188
July 14, 1951.

B. 2.19 a.m. July 11, 1951.

R. 2.21 a.m. July 14, 1951.

IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegrams No. 188 of

July 11
Repeated for information to: Washington
Codel Geneva.

I have just returned from a long discussion with
Mendès-France and Dulles. A detailed account will follow.
Meanwhile these are my impressions. Mendès-France made an
elegant appeal for United States help at Geneva. He pointed
out that whether Dulles was present or not, United States
Government were committed by Berlin decisions to their
representation at the Conference. If Dulles would come now
and help us we might be able to achieve the seven points laid
down at Washington as constituting a settlement the United
States could respect. United Kingdom and France together
were doing all they could to get just this and he asked in
friendship that the Americans should come and take their share.
I strongly supported him in all these arguments.

2. Dulles suggested that Americans might be more useful
as the "wicked partner" who was not present. I replied that
this was wholly unacceptable to us. I was not prepared to
argue that peace could be achieved in Indo-China, but for the
American attitude. This was to play the Communist game to
drive a wedge between us and would have disastrous consequences
in Europe. In the few hours I had been at Geneva my whole
argument had been in the contrary sense.

3. Mendès-France fought his corner brilliantly and I am
more than ever convinced that for the first time since we have
resumed office we have a Frenchman who knows what he wants and
will fight for it. After the meeting I tried to impress this
TOP SECRET

Paris telegram No. 188 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

upon Dulles who was, I think, shaken. In the end we agreed
to have a further discussion tomorrow at 11:30 a.m. I am
to see Dulles at 10 a.m. alone and will do all I can to persuade
him to come on to Geneva.

1. I am bound to admit that Dulles cut a sorry figure
tonight in his attempts to explain why the Americans would not
face the responsibilities of any Geneva decisions. He kept
trying to instigate that Mendès-France himself would abandon
the seven points agreed between us in Washington and that
internal American politics made it impossible for him to
underwrite any settlement. If this happened the damage to
France-American relations would be more serious than their
absence from Geneva. Dulles kept quoting Yalta. Mendès-France
explained bluntly that only Anglo-French diplomatic efforts
backed by Nehru had prevented an attack on Hanoi. If it took
place it must succeed in a matter of days, and the only hope
of averting it was a cease-fire.

5. I shall do my best to make the Americans understand
that if Mendès-France does not succeed at Geneva, the chances of
voting F.D.C. have probably vanished.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Washington and
Codel Geneva as my telegrams Nos. 244 and 118 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington and Codel Geneva].

ADVANCED COPIES TO:
Sir F. Roberts,
Minister of State,
Private Secretary,
Mr. Dean,
Head of South East Asia
Department,
Resident Clerk.
insists, some satisfactory language of a general character might be found to cover this point. "Of course we do not want them in the French Union."

BONSAI

306.1 GE/1-1454: Telegram.

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 14, 1954—noon.

Secto 604. Repeated information priority Paris 55. Limit distribution. Eyes only Dillon and Johnson. With reference Secto 598, Cheysson of French delegation today gave me somewhat more detailed account of yesterday's meetings between Mendes-France and Chou En-lai and between Mendes-France and Dong.

Although I am sure Mendes-France himself has already given Secretary this information, am transmitting Cheysson's account and his comments as of possible interest.

Yesterday morning Chou En-lai told Mendes-France that present difference of demarcation line must be settled and that it was up to both sides to make concessions with Viet Minh making the major concession. Mendes-France repeated that French position on Dong Ho line was firm.

Later Mendes-France received Dong and they had lengthy discussion of line. Finally Dong stated he was ready to go as far as 18th parallel (this runs just south of Tourane). Mendes-France stated this was unacceptable and that French position remained at or about the 18th parallel. Mendes-France stated that it was essential for Franco-Vietnamese to maintain positions at Tourane and Hue and also to maintain control of the road running from Quang Tri to Savannakhet in Laos. This latter objective would involve retention of considerable area north of road.

Dong rejoined that it would be possible to find a settlement giving Franco-Vietnamese side Tourane and making some special arrangements (neutralization?) for Hue and the road. Mendes-France refused to consider these ideas and reiterated position that line must be in Dong Ho area.

Cheysson is struck by fact that Dong made important although insufficient concession a week before probable end of conference and by the further fact that Communists, in making this concession, gave up the strong position they had hitherto adopted regarding the necessity for the Viet Minh to maintain and control the three provinces

south of Faito which they have ruled uninterruptedly since 1946. Cheysson believes further concessions may be expected from Communists.

BONSAI

306.1 GE/1-1454: Telegram.

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 14, 1954—2 p.m.

Secto 605. Repeated information Paris 56, Saigon 33, Pass Defense. Following is unofficial translation text of French delegation working paper on control in Cambodia and Laos similar to one on Vietnam reported in Secto 575:

1. Responsibility for implementation of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities is assumed by the sides.

2. An International Commission is charged with control of the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in (Cambodia) (Laos); it is composed of representatives of the following States: (blank). It is presided over by the representative of (blank). It has its headquarters at (blank).

3. The International Commission will create inspection teams, fixed and mobile, composed of an equal number of officers designated by each of the above States.

The fixed teams will be stationed at the following points: (blank); these points can later be modified by agreement between the Government of (Cambodia) (Laos) and the International Commission.

The action zones of the mobile teams will be the areas bordering on the land frontiers (and sea frontiers of Cambodia) (of Laos) within the limit of their zones of action they will have the right of free movement and will receive from the local civil and military authorities all the facilities they may need to accomplish their missions (furnishing of personnel, making available of the necessary documents for control purposes, the summoning of witnesses for investigations, protection of the security and of the freedom of movement of the inspection teams, etc.). They will have at their disposal modern means of transport, observation and communication which may be useful to them.

4. The International Commission is charged with supervising the implementation by the sides of the provisions of the agreement. For this purpose, it is to carry out missions of control, observation, in-

1 Dated July 18, p. 1846.

2 Dated July 8.

3 Dated July 8, p. 1306.
The recommendations of the International Commission are to be adopted by majority vote, subject to the provisions of Article 11. In case of a tie vote, that of the chairman is decisive.

The International Commission may formulate recommendations regarding amendments and additions which it would be desirable to make to the provisions of the agreement for the cessation of hostilities in (Cambodia) (Laos) in order to insure a more efficacious application of said agreement. These recommendations are to be adopted by unanimous vote.

When questions are involved which relate to violations or to threats of violations which may result in resumption of hostilities, i.e.:

- The refusal by foreign armed forces to proceed with the movements provided for in the withdrawal plan.
- The violation or threat of violation by foreign armed forces of the integrity of the country.

The decisions of the International Commission must be adopted by unanimous vote. If unanimity is not achieved, the majority conclusions are to be communicated to the sides which must take them into consideration.

If the International Commission has not succeeded in reaching unanimous conclusion in the cases provided for in Article 11, it will transmit to the guarantors a majority report and one or several minority reports.

The International Commission is to inform the guarantors of any obstacle which may arise to the carrying out of its activities.

The International Control Commission is to be on the spot from the moment of the cessation of hostilities in Indochina in order to be able to carry out the tasks provided for in Article 4.

The International Control Commission in (Cambodia) (Laos) is to act in close cooperation with the International Control Commissions in Vietnam and (Laos) (Cambodia). An organ of coordination of the activities of the three Commissions is to be created through an agreement between them.

The International Control Commission in (Cambodia) (Laos) may, after consulting with the International Control Commissions for Vietnam and for (Laos) (Cambodia), formulate recommendations regarding the gradual reduction of its activities, taking into account developments in (Cambodia) (Laos). These recommendations are to be adopted by unanimity.”

Bonnet
SECRET PRIORITY

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

Geneva, July 14, 1954—4 p.m.

Secto 606. Repeated information priority Paris 57, Secto 600, repeated information Paris 50. Unofficial translation follows of outlines of cease-fire agreements for Cambodia and Laos supplied yesterday by French delegation:

"Agreement concerning cease-fire in Cambodia.

First, cease-fire:

Disengagement of Cambodian and Viet Minh Armed Forces and minor regroupment following cease-fire.

This is to be signed as soon as completed, to be published at once, and to be put into effect (with cooperation of joint groups).

Second, supplementary provision:

A. Military provisions.

Plan for evacuation of foreign forces and liberation of prisoners and civilian internees.

B. Other provisions.

Guarantees for individuals and communities against reprisals and protection of property and persons.

Right of option for foreign civilian populations.

Movement of populations which wish to take refuge in Vietnam.

Third, provisions regarding control of agreements:

(See working paper of July 8)

Declaration of Annam Government:

(Same as declaration of Cambodian Government.)"

Working paper July 8 transmitted Secto 605.

Bonsal

SECRET PRIORITY

Geneva, July 14, 1954—5 p.m.

Secto 607. Repeated information priority Paris 58, Secto 34. Offroy, French delegate, states that Do has received strong telegram from Dien urgent that Hanoi, Haiphong and the Bases be retained for Vietnam in current negotiations regarding military groupings. In consequence, Offroy tells us Do is planning to issue rather strong public statement designed to give expression of serious divergences between France and Vietnam. Other states Do believes this approach would be good tactics although not entirely realistic. Offroy’s fears result may be to exacerbate anti-French sentiment in Vietnam and perhaps cause difficulties there although he recognizes possibility that appearance of serious differences between France and Vietnam may help negotiating position of the Viet Minh.

Bonsal

TOP SECRET

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

Geneva, July 14, 1954—8 p.m.

Secto 608. Repeated information Paris 59. Limit distribution. Eyes only Dillon. Offroy informs us that in course of conversation between members of French delegation and Wang Ping-nan, Secretary General of Chinese Communist Delegation, latter referred to discussions between Dong and Mendes-France re demarcation line (Secto 604). Wang Ping-nan stated that French should make some further con-
TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND WHITEHALL SECRET (CAMBRIDGE)

DISTRIBUTION

D. 5:15 p.m., July 14, 1954.
R. 5:21 p.m., July 14, 1954.

IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 492 of July 14.
Repeated for information to Washington, Codel Geneva.

Following from Secretary of State:

There was an interesting passage between Dulles and
Mendès-France about means for supporting Laos to maintain a
suitable non-Communist régime. Dulles said that if this aim
was to be achieved, the Government would need weapons and
economic aid. He assumed that these things could only come
from the United States and might entail a United States military
mission and teams of economic experts.

2. Mendès-France said that he did not think that the Viet
Minh would ever agree to a United States military mission. He
did not think that they would specifically exclude the possibility
of American weapons. Nor had there been any indication that
they would try to prevent American economic aid.

3. Dulles said that there might nevertheless be a diffi-
culty. United States legislation provided that aid would not be
granted in these fields without United States experts having the
means of ensuring that the aid was devoted to the means for which
it was granted.

4. I did not think it useful to intervene at this stage.
But it is quite clear that United States military aid in the terms
understood by Dulles would not be acceptable to the Viet Minh.

Foreign Office pass immediate to Washington and Codel
Geneva as my telegrams Nos. 248 and 222 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington and Codel Geneva]

ADVANCE COPIES:
Sir F. Roberts
Private Secretary
Minister of State
Mr. P. Dean
Mr. Head of South East Asia Department
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee (excerpt), July 14, 1954


During the three days after Mendes-France arrived in Geneva, he has been busy with various meetings. It seems that he hopes to reach an agreement by July 20. He intentionally insists on having the 18th parallel as the dividing line for zones of concentration before going back to Paris, hoping that our side will make concessions; he also uses this to bargain with Vietnam and the United States. In fact, France is willing to reach an agreement [on setting up the line] between the 18th and the 16th parallels. France has already submitted to our side a draft agreement on ceasefire in Vietnam that it had prepared (the draft agreements on ceasefire in Cambodia and Laos have not been completed yet), a political statement by the nine countries, and documents on the supervision issue in the three countries of Indochina. Our side is appointing a special group to study [these documents]. Molotov and Eden have agreed that the conference will not be resumed until the negotiation outside the conference has achieved results, and that the foreign ministers of various countries will continue the contact and discussion outside the conference, so as to pursue an agreement.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not cite or quote without permission from CWIHP.
B. Other provisions.
Guarantees for individuals and communities against reprisals.
Protection of property and persons.
Right of option of foreign civilian populations.
Movement of populations which wish to take refuge in Vietnam.
Third, provisions regarding control of agreements:
(See working paper July 8)
Declaration of Cambodian Government:
(Same as declaration of Cambodian Government.)

Bonsal

1 Dated July 13, p. 1357.
* Transmitted in telegram Secto 906. July 14, supra.

Bonsal
cession and implied that Viet Minh would be prepared to meet this with even greater concession. French representatives reiterated firm position re Dong Hoi line.

BONSAL

PES Files, Lot 58 D 207, "Vietnam Correspondence"

The Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal) to Ambassador Donald R. Heath

PERSONAL AND SECRET  

GENEVA, July 14, 1954.

DEAR DON: Many thanks for your good letter of July 4 which I received on July 13. In spite of the delay it was most useful and I am truly grateful to you for taking the time to write for I know how rushed you must have been.

You are certainly faced with a difficult task. Nevertheless on the basis of the past record I am sure you will get out of the situation all that can be gotten in the interest of the United States.

I noted your statement about the feeling in the Department regarding U.S. intervention. Whatever may be the merits of this course of action, those who favor it and I, it seems to me, in the somewhat sterile position of favoring something which is just not going to happen. My own belief is that the threat of American intervention has been and perhaps still is of some value to those who are negotiating for an end of this long war—a war which of course it would have been desirable to have won. But I have throughout been strongly of the opinion that actual intervention by U.S. forces against the Vietminh would not produce durable or desirable results. Therefore, when you refer to “all the people below the Secretary and Under Secretary” as being unanimous on this matter, please count me out.

There is some question as to whether the settlement which we finally reach will leave much scope for Mike O’Daniel and his activities. Certainly the pressure will be off and I suspect that the French attitude on the matter will stiffen although of course the Vietnamese will be anxious for our help.

I was also interested to note that in your talk with Bob Murphy you urged that we try for an enclave at Hanoi, whereas on your return to Saigon you seemed to feel that a Hanoi-Haiphong enclave must be sought. I hope that this change of view reflects your view that the military situation in the north is really better than it was when you talked with Bob Murphy. We will probably end up with a few months tenure of Haiphong but that is about all. On the other hand we may well get a solid area south of the 18th parallel. What can we then do?

1 ANS. p. 1280.

INDOCINA

Cheysson is most anxious that we should be thinking along lines of French and American economic and military support for “retained Vietnam”.

I think that under the circumstances we have been kept fairly well informed regarding Mendes-France’s negotiations. I also hope and believe that we have now reached a point where Diem in Saigon and Do in Geneva are also being taken into the confidence of the French. It seems to me furthermore that Mendes-France has taken a firm and resolute stand at least within the framework of our seven points and that to the extent that he can count on our support and on our association with the results he achieves, he will get the very best deal justified by the facts with which we are confronted.

I agree with what you say about Bao Dai and have been trying my best to follow this line in spite of my real feelings on the subject.

You are much missed on the Delegation here not only for your company but also because of the fact that we are kept pretty busy and would like to have someone to share the work with.

Margaret joins me in love to Louise and in very best to you both in the job which you have so brilliantly and wholeheartedly performed over the past four years. If all concerned had been as devoted and single-minded as the two of you our enterprise would not now be going through the wringer. But there will be something left from which to build.

Yours as ever,

PHILIP W. BONSAL

JULY 15, 1954

Editorial Note

Upon the return of the Secretary of State from Paris the Department of State released the following press release (884) on July 15:

“I return from consultations at Paris with the new French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, M. Pierre Mendes-France. These talks were also participated in by Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary.

“These talks have brought about a better understanding concerning Indochina much more complete than ever was heretofore existed. It enabled us to demonstrate anew the solidarity of the Western powers in the face of Communist hostility and intrigue.

“The United States has been concerned to find a way whereby it could help Burma, Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia find acceptable settlement without in any way prejudicing basic principles to which the United States must adhere if it is to be true to itself, and if the captive and endangered peoples of the world are to feel that the United States really believes in liberty.”
SECRET

FROM PARIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WHITEHALL SECRET
(CABINET) DISTRIBUTION

Sir G. Jebb
No. 496
July 14, 1954

D. 9.48 p.m. July 14, 1954
R. 10.10 p.m. July 14, 1954

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 496 of July 14
Repeated for information to Washington
Codel Geneva

My telegram No. 488: Indo-China.

Secretary of State called on Mr. Dulles at 10.30 this morning
and found that he had prepared a "position paper", purporting to set
out the attitude of the United States, French and British Governments,
together with a draft letter to himself from M. Mendès-France designed
to show that latter fully recognized the position taken up by the United
States. After some discussion the first document was redrafted so as
to bring the United States and France only into the picture and the
Secretary of State agreed in principle to say, in a separate letter, that
he approved, generally speaking, of the correspondence.

2. A conference followed in the Quai d'Orsay during the course of
which M. Mendès-France proposed several amendments to the United
States draft "position paper" and said that he would like to recast his own
reply so as to bring it more nearly into accordance with his own point
of view. Finally the documents were put into shape, signed and exchanged
after lunch at the American Embassy before the three statesmen left
Paris. The documents are contained in my five immediately
following telegrams.

3. Paragraph 5 of "position paper" as originally drafted by the
Americans came very near to involving us all in physical intervention in
Indo-China as a whole (including Viet Nam) if the war continued. Final
draft does, in fact, indicate that the United States at any rate will
probably bring the matter up in the United Nations. (French have still
to consider effect of appeal to United Nations on other French possessions.)
Terms of Secretary of State's letter (my fifth immediately following
telegram) make it clear however that we, for our part, should be
uncommitted on this particular point. In paragraph 6, Americans made
a strong effort to insert a phrase to the effect that France would not
"subsequently seek forcefully to prevent any of the three States from
withdrawing from the French Union should it so desire". M. Mendès-France
however, while saying that he personally would agree with such a
provision, succeeded in rejecting it on the grounds that it would be
unconstitutional.

4. The annex to the "position paper" (my second immediately
following telegram) which consists in fact of the seven points agreed
at Washington paragraph 2 was however slightly redrafted so as to
eliminate any suggestion of a permanent partition of Viet Nam.

/5.
SECRET

Paris telegram No. 495 to Foreign Office

5. M. Mandon-France's reply (my third immediately following telegram), as you will see, made it clear that the French would not only expect the Americans to make some declaration at Geneva that they would respect an "honourable" settlement, but also that they looked forward to a collective guarantee which would commit the signatories to some kind of intervention in Indo-China if Laos, Cambodia or "free Viet Nam" were victims of aggression. I rather think that Secretary of State feels that we should be obliged to take some action if a settlement in Indo-China was violated by the other side; and certainly the French would not have understood if we had refused to associate ourselves, even indirectly and to a limited degree, with such a statement.

6. A communiqué was drafted (see my sixth immediately following telegram). The second paragraph is perhaps a little bleak, but main point was announcement that Bedell Smith would be returning to Geneva "at an early date". You will also see that the Secretary of State "associated himself" with M. Mandon-France and this has, I think, given rise to considerable pleasure in French circles.

7. If I may be allowed to say so, I think the meeting was an unmitigated success. It is true that if only Bedell Smith had been allowed to go back to Geneva as arranged there would have been no need for it. But as things were, many dark American suspicions were undoubtedly removed and the French for their part got the support which may make all the difference to the negotiations. Finally the Secretary of State's already great popularity in France has risen to even greater heights. He was greeted in the streets with shouts of "merci".

Foreign Office please pass immediately to Codel Geneva and routine to Washington as my telegrams Nos. 124 and 280 respectively.

("Repeated to Codel Geneva and Washington")

ADVANCE COPIES

Sir F. Roberts
Minister of State
Private Secretary
Mr. Dean
Head of South East Asia Department
Resident Clerk

PPP
"I had the opportunity in Paris fully to explain the United States position in this respect to M. Mendès-France, whom I had known before but whom I had not met since he assumed his new office.

The conclusion was that we would have the Under Secretary of State, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, come to Geneva at an early date to renew his participation in the Indo-China phase of the Conference. But this is on the understanding, to which both the French and British Ministers expressly agreed, that renewed participation by the United States at the ministerial level will be without departing from the U.S. principles which we have described.

I believe that we have found a formula for constructive allied unity which will have a beneficial effect on the Geneva Conference. And it carries no danger that the United States will abandon its principles.

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT GENEVA, JULY 15, 1954—11 a.m.

Secto 617. Repeated information Paris 65, Saigon 38. At working level meeting today representatives of French, US and UK Dels called by French Del (Laloy) there was discussion of Soviet counterproposals to French draft declaration to be issued by conference. Soviet text is contained in Secto 615.1

Meeting opened with some discussion of original French text. Aside from some unimportant matters of drafting, there was general acceptance of French text except that USDel reserved position on final paragraph concerning agreement of members of conference to consult among themselves.

Turning to Soviet counterproposals, Laloy stated there were 3 main objections:

1. It applies political criteria for Vietnam also to Laos and Cambodia which do not have political problems,
2. It establishes date for elections, and
3. It introduces for all 3 countries prohibition on alliances and foreign bases.

Following are comments developed on specific numbered paragraphs of Soviet counterproposals:

1. It was agreed that instead of "approve" effort would be made to restore "takes note" from original French text. USDel firm on this point—French and British acquiesced.
2. This is new provision to which French do not object provided word "recognition" is replaced by "respect". French point is that independence has already been recognized.

French Del will ask explanation of clause added by Soviets to 6th paragraph of original French text.

4. There was objection to lumping together of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Evacuation of foreign troops is to take place in Laos and Cambodia at once subject to agreed reservations in case of French military personnel whereas in Vietnam position is that presence of French troops will be in accordance with decisions of representative authority.

5. In addition to lumping together of 3 countries, French hold that case of Vietnam will be covered in military agreement between commands and that there is no need for repetition in conference declaration. In case of Laos and Cambodia, these countries are making unilateral declarations which should be noted by conference in terms used by 2 countries.

6. This introduces new concepts of "military alliances" and "foreign bases". General subject matter to be covered in Laos and Cambodia by their unilateral declarations. In case of Vietnam, difficult to see how "foreign base" could be established in light of prohibition of introduction reinforcing troops and arms.

7. Again this provision joins together 3 countries and calls for political negotiations with Laos and Cambodia where there are no political problems.

8. British stated no fundamental objection to having international commission to supervise elections consisting representatives of same states supervising military aspect. French have already told Soviets they consider fixing of date for elections entirely unacceptable. They did not like concept of consultation between "northern and southern zones of Vietnam".

9. It appears unnecessary and perhaps dangerous to spell out freedom to be guaranteed in Laos and Cambodia. This is derogatory to established governments of these countries. Conference should limit itself to taking note of unilateral statements by Governments of Laos and Cambodia re dates of elections and should not attempt itself to fix dates.

10. This item should be in military agreement rather than in conference declaration. Final sentence appears ambiguous and should be eliminated.

11. No comment.

12. In this paragraph regarding consultation, Soviets have added word "collective". It was agreed that this should be omitted and US representative reiterated US reservation of position.

Laloy expressed view that conference guarantee would be of really effective importance since serious differences would have to be settled in some other manner.

Laloy will get Mendès-France's views on Soviet proposals and on working level comments this evening and will then prepare a further French draft based on original French draft incorporating whatever may be acceptable from Soviet draft. He will distribute this new draft as soon as possible to US and UK Dels.

* Dated July 15, p. 1584.
It was agreed that effort should be made so that Ministers could have before them urgently a text showing agreed and disagreed working level draft.

There was some inconclusive discussion of method of financing international supervisory commission. It was emphasized that adequate financing most important to proper functioning. Department's view this point would be appreciated.

JOHNSON

399.1 GE/7-1545 : Telegram
Johnson-Kimny Meeting, Geneva, July 16, Morning: United States Delegation to the Department of St.

SECRET

Geneva, July 16, 1954—8 p.m.

Secto 616. Repeated information Paris 64, Sanno 77, Phnom Penh 3. Nong Kimny called on me this morning. He described call yesterday by Chou En-lai, accompanied by two aides and interpreter and Cambodian Foreign Minister arranged at Chou's request. Chou stated his recent conversations with Nehru, U Nu and Ho Chi Minh permitted him to assert that all three want peace in Indochina and that this also is wish of all countries of South and Southeast Asia. Unanimous desire is that three Associated States be reunited and have cordial relationship with Colombo powers, such as Burma, India and Indonesia. Chou stated that India was willing to participate in International Control Commission. Chou recalled two declarations which had been issued on occasion of his visit to New Delhi and Rangoon, reiterating the five points contained in the Chinese-Indian Treaty regarding Tibet.

Chou then asked Cambodian Foreign Minister regarding prospects of Conference. Foreign Minister replied that in two meetings he had had with Dong had insisted on injecting political problem into military aspect and that if this continued, Foreign Minister is dubious as to prospects. He reported that Dong had asked that certain provincial officials, appointed by resistance movement be retained, and that resistance youth movements be preserved. These demands are contrary to Cambodian constitutional processes. Chou is reported to have, laughed at these claims, and to have stated that these are internal matters which Cambodian Government should handle unilaterally.

1 Telegram transmitted in two sections.

2 "Communique on Talks between Mr. Nehru and Mr. Chou En-lai, 28 June 1954" and the "Joint Statement by the Prime Ministers of China and Burma, Mr. Chou En-lai and U Nu, 29 June 1954" are printed in Documents on International Affairs, 1954, pp. 313-314. The Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet, signed on Apr. 29, 1954, is in 10 UNTS 229.

INDOCHINA

Chou then referred to the two documents he had received the day before (July 13) from French delegation, namely draft of Conference declaration (Secto 597), and working paper regarding content of Cambodia and Laos (Secto 605) with important draft declaration. Chou stated that in this document, France recognizes independence and sovereignty of Cambodia without discriminating against elements having cooperated with either party and contemplates the evacuation of all foreign forces. Also Chou interpreted document as meaning that there would be no military foreign bases in the three States of Indochina and that no military alliances would be permitted between the three States and other States. (Nong Kimny stated he was unable to find any basis for these assertions in French draft declaration; it is, however, included in Soviet draft just received.) Referring particularly to Cambodia, Chou stated his understanding intent was that countries would gain complete independence and that all elements belonging to resistance movement could return to national community. This would leave only military problem to resolution.

Cambodian Foreign Minister replied that after cessation of hostilities, all elements of the population who had formerly worked with Viet Minh would be able to return to national community without deprivation of constitutional civil rights. (In reply to my question, Nong Kimny stated amnesty was not designed to apply to crimes against persons and property.) Foreign Minister then asked Chou for his thinking regarding introduction of arms and military personnel in Cambodia after cessation of hostilities. Chou stated that this matter was to be subject in case both Cambodia and Laos to separate negotiations, but did not elaborate on this theme, taking refuge in statement that he had not studied French draft document which, however, he had received favorably as representing French desire to reach agreement. In reply to Foreign Minister's insistence on impossibility of accepting limitation on introduction of arms and military personnel into Cambodia, Chou replied that he would make further study of question and hoped Cambodian and Laotian representatives would submit their ideas. He expressed interest in knowing quantative foreign troops, military personnel and arms which Cambodian and Laotian Governments consider necessary for defense of their countries.

Cambodians reiterated point that arms limitation incompatible with sovereignty and pointed out that defense establishment in Laos and Cambodia would depend on armament of Cambodia's neighbors.

Dated July 13, p. 1555.

Dated July 14, p. 1556.
SECRET

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND WHITEHALL SECRET (CABINET) DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden
No. 930
July 15, 1954.

D. 3.15 p.m. July 15, 1954.
R. 2.35 p.m. July 15, 1954.

PRIORITY
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 930 of July 15.
Repeated for information to Paris and Washington

M. Mendes-France came to see me this morning in order to discuss the future work of the conference. I told him that when I had seen Molotov last night he had at first been suspicious about the American attitude, but had been somewhat reassured when I told him that we were all agreed on the importance of securing a cease-fire by July 20, and that we had not changed our positions in any respect so far as the negotiations were concerned. Molotov had agreed that private conversations should continue for at least another day before we decided whether a full meeting of the conference should be held.

2. M. Mendes-France said that he would prefer to avoid a full meeting until the private negotiations were further advanced and the final documents were more nearly ready for approval. He feared that if a premature meeting were held the Viet Namese might make unhelpful statements. They had been in touch with the Viet Minh, and there was a risk that they might allow themselves to be drawn into some damaging understanding, either about an early date for the elections or about the formation of a coalition Government before the elections. M. Mendes-France asked me to see the Viet Nam Foreign Minister and warn him of the dangers of such courses. I promised to do this. M. Mendes-France referred to the necessity for political and economic support for Southern Viet Nam after the armistice — (he thought France could provide the necessary assistance for Laos and Cambodia). I agreed that we must all consider what could be done in this respect.

3. As regards the other outstanding issues, I told M. Mendes-France that I thought he could obtain a division line in Viet Nam fairly near the 18th Parallel provided he made some slight advances on his present position. M. Mendes-France confirmed that he did not exclude this. On the position of the supervisory commission I said I was anxious that all five Colombo Powers should be included, and thought we might consider adding one Communist and one Western Power.

/M. Mendes-France
SECRET

Geneva Conference (U.K. Del.) telegram No. 380
to Foreign Office
- 2 -

M. Mendès-France agreed that the inclusion of one Communist did not matter seriously so long as provision was made for decisions to be taken normally by majority vote.

4. It was agreed that the French should concentrate today upon securing comments of other delegations upon the proposals they had circulated and that, in the light of those comments, a decision should be taken tomorrow about the setting up of a committee to isolate the outstanding problems for decision by Ministers. M. Mendès-France explained that for him the essential feature of any agreement reached here was that it must provide for the immediate and actual cessation of hostilities. The more additional points of substance which could be settled in such an agreement the better, but if necessary, other matters of detail could be left over for settlement by experts. It would be of great assistance to him if an agreement could be reached here on the 19th rather than the 20th. I undertook to urge the desirability of this on Molotov. He would then hope to leave Geneva immediately and would only come back if absolutely necessary.

Foreign Office please pass to Paris and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 332 and 315 respectively.

[Repealed to Paris and Washington].

EES
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Wei Guoqing (excerpt), July 15, 1954


At present, we are studying the principles on such questions as the ceasefire, troop withdrawal, and supervision presented by the French delegation. Please propose to the Vietnamese side that they should quickly work out a plan for the People’s Army to withdraw from the south, and promptly report the plan to the Vietnamese delegation.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not cite or quote without permission from CWIHP.
It was agreed that effort should be made so that the work could have
before them urgently a text showing agreement and disagreement working
level draft.

There was some increase in discussion of method of financing inter-
national supervisory commission. It was emphasized that adequate
financing was important to proper functioning. Department's view
this matter would be appreciated.

JOHNSON

366.1 EK/7-1954: Telegram
Johnson-Kimny Meeting, Geneva, July 15, Morning: The United
States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, July 15, 1954—8 p.m.

Secto 616. Repeated information Paris 64, Saigon 37, Phnom Penh 3.
Nong Kimny called on me this morning. He described call yesterday
by Chou En-lai, accompanied by two aides and interpreter and Cambodian
Foreign Minister arranged at Chou's request. Chou stated his
recent interviews with Nehru, U Nu and Ho Chi Minh permitted him
to assert that all three want peace in Indochina and that this also is
wish of all countries of South and Southeast Asia. Unanimous desire
is that three Associated States be united and have cordial relationship
with Colombo powers, such as Burma, India and Indonesia. Chou
stated that India was willing to participate in International Control
Commission. Chou recalled the two declarations which had been issued
on occasion of his visits to New Delhi and Rangoon, reiterating the
five points contained in the Chinese-Indian Treaty regarding Tibet.1

Chou then asked Cambodian Foreign Minister regarding prospects
of Conference. Foreign Minister replied that in two meetings he had
had with Dong, latter had insisted on injecting political problem into
military aspect and that if this continued, Foreign Minister is dubious
as to prospects. He reported that Dong had asked that certain provincial
officials appointed by resistance movement be retained, and that
resistance youth movements be preserved. These demands are contrary
to Cambodian constitutional processes. Chou is reported to have
laughed at these claims, and to have stated that these are internal
matters which Cambodian Government should handle unilaterally.

1 Telegram transmitted in two portions.
2 The "Communique on Talks between Mr. Nehru and Mr. Chou En-lai, 28 June
1954" and the "Joint Statement by the Prime Ministers of China and Burma,
Mr. Chou En-lai and U Nu, 29 June 1954" are printed in Documents on Inter-
national Affairs, 1954, pp. 315-316. The Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet, signed
on Apr. 29, 1954, is in UNTS 229.

INDOCHINA

Chou then referred to the two documents he had received the day
before (July 13) from French delegation, namely draft of Conference
declaration (Secto 597*), and working paper regarding controls in
Cambodia and Laos (Secto 605†) with important draft declaration.
Chou stated that in this document, France recognizes independence
and sovereignty of Cambodia without discriminating against elements
having cooperated with either party and contemplates the evacuation
of all foreign forces. Also Chou interpreted document as meaning that
there would be no military foreign bases in the three States of Indo-
china and that no military alliances would be permitted between the
three States and other States. (Nong Kimny stated he was unable to
find any basis for these assertions in French draft declaration; it is,
however, included in Soviet draft just received.) Referring particu-
larly to Cambodia, Chou stated his understanding intent was that
countries would gain complete independence and that all elements
belonging to resistance movement could return to national community.
This would leave only military problem for solution.

Cambodian Foreign Minister replied that after cessation of hostil-
ties, all elements of the population who had formerly worked with
Viet Minh would be able to return to national community without
depression of constitutional civic rights. (In reply to my question,
Nong Kimny stated amnesty was not designed to apply to crimes
against persons and property.) Foreign Minister then asked Chou for
his thinking regarding introduction of arms and military personnel in
Cambodia after cessation of hostilities. Chou stated that this matter
was to be subject in case of both Cambodia and Laos to separate nego-
tiations, but did not elaborate on this theme, taking refuge in state-
ment that he had not thoroughly studied French draft document
which, however, he had received favorably as representing French
desire to reach agreement. In reply to Foreign Minister's insistence on
impossibility of accepting limitation on introduction of arms and mili-
tary personnel into Cambodia, Chou replied that he would make
further study of question and hoped Cambodian and Laotian represen-
tatives would submit their ideas. He expressed interest in knowing
quantity of foreign troops, military personnel and arms which Cam-
bodian and Laotian Governments consider necessary for defense of
their countries.

Cambodians reiterated point that arms limitation incompatible with
sovereignty and pointed out that defense establishment in Laos and
Cambodia would depend on armament of Cambodia's neighbors.

1 Dated July 13, p. 1955.
2 Dated July 14, p. 1386.
Chou then referred to his June 10 proposal and stated belief that perhaps principles therein had been badly stated or badly understood. He referred particularly to paragraph 3 of that proposal which reads:

"3. After the cessation of hostilities, the introduction in Laos and Cambodia from outside of fresh troops and military personnel of ground, naval or air forces and of all types of arms and ammunition shall be prohibited.

"The question of the amount and the type of arms that may be introduced for the requirements of self-defense shall be the subject of separate negotiations."

Chou stated that he wished to make clear that the provisions regarding nonintroduction of arms and military personnel refers only to armistice period and not to permanent situation which will prevail after armistice has given way to definitive peace. Kong Kimny expressed view that this represents important development in Chinese thinking but added that Chou continues to link armistice in Cambodia with armistice in Laos and Vietnam and apparently contemplates that there will be one armistice for all three countries with simultaneous termination. Since Cambodians believe their problem extremely simple and recognize Vietnam problem extremely complex, it appears evident to them that if Chou's view prevails they may be bound by armistice terms long after peace could be definitively restored to their country.

Chou established differentiation between situation in Vietnam where neither party is to bring in arms and troops and that in Cambodia and Laos where limited introduction of arms and munition will be contemplated. Chou did not mention military personnel.

Later in day (July 14) Cambodians met with French. French told them they contemplate three basic documents in connection with cessation of hostilities:

1) Draft declaration copies of which have already been submitted to all delegations;
2) Three separate agreements on cessation of hostilities;
3) Unilateral statements by governments concerned including in case of Cambodia and Laos statement of intent regarding elections and regarding arms and equipment needed for self-defense.

Kong Kimny thought well of my suggestion to amend statement on elections by adding phrase "in accordance with constitutional processes" since Cambodians did not wish to assume obligation of holding special elections. (Normal elections scheduled in 1955.) Cambodians, also raised point with French that it would have been desirable instead of submitting draft declaration and draft control document to all delegations if agreements could not have been reached between six friendly delegations before handing these papers to Communists.

French replied that they recognized justice of observation but that from practical point of view it was necessary to discuss these papers simultaneously with both friendly and unfriendly elements if practical conclusions are to be reached within available time periods.

I took occasion in this connection to express the view that French position regarding general terms of settlement in Indochina was as firm and courageous as we could expect in view of realities of present situation. I stated Secretary had been much heartened by his talks with Mendes-France. I added that it seemed to me that Cambodian unilateral declaration envisaged in French draft need be no more than repetition of what Cambodians have already stated at conference regard to elections and to Cambodian defense plans.

JOHNSON

Editorial Note

At the 206th meeting of the National Security Council, July 15, in Washington, the Council devoted a substantial amount of time to a report by the Secretary of State on his talks in Paris with Premier Mendes-France and Foreign Secretary Eden and to the decision that Under Secretary Smith would return to the Geneva Conference as Head of the United States Delegation.

For a memorandum of discussion of this meeting, see volume XIII.

361 GE/7-1554: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation.

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 15, 1954—5:50 p. m.
Tosec 544. For Ambassador Johnson from Secretary. Please deliver following message from Secretary to Mendes-France.

"My dear Mr. President: Ambassador Johnson has just transmitted to me your kind message.3 I share your feeling that our meeting was well worthwhile. Certainly from my standpoint I feel a sense of respect and admiration for the forthright position which you have taken on the vital issues that confront us. Uncertainty is the worst plague and you have done much to dissipate it.

1 Drafted by the Secretary of State.
2 This reference to a "kind message" from Premier Mendes-France is apparently a reference to a handwritten paragraph at the end of Mendes-France's letter to Secretary Dulles of July 14, p. 1954. This paragraph was translated and then transmitted to Secretary Dulles on July 15 in telegram Secto 544, July 16. It read as follows: "I do not wish to end this letter without telling you how much I have appreciated during the meeting, certainly fruitful for the future of Franco-American relations, the way in which you have been able to join the firmness and the assurance of your political views to a broad understanding of the positions of your friends." (361 GE/7-1554)
I am glad to tell you that General Bedell Smith will be able to leave tomorrow and he plans to get away sometime tomorrow afternoon arriving in Geneva around Saturday noon.

Immediately upon my arrival in Washington a few hours ago I went from the airport to the White House and reported fully to the President, to General Bedell Smith and the other members of the National Security Council. The President was highly gratified with my report. General Bedell Smith will go to Geneva fully informed not only on the basis of documentation but on the basis of my personal report.

As you face fateful decisions at Geneva, you can feel that the many friends of France will be supporting you with their best wishes and with their prayers, and I am glad that we have found a way whereby, I hope without violation of our principles or serious risk of future misunderstanding, we can evidence at Geneva our moral and political support.

Mrs. Dulles asked me to thank you for the beautiful roses which you sent and which greeted her on her return.

With sincere good wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

Foster Dulles"

Dulles

3961 GE/7-1504 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of Defense

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, July 15, 1954—7 p. m.

Defense Message Gento 81. For Sullivan from Dwan. Following are principal provisions of French Delegation draft agreement on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, copy of which shown me today by member of French Delegation who promised to give US Delegation copy as soon as finalized:

Article I: Cease-fire.

This article provides for complete separation of opposing forces to be completed within 380 days from date of cease-fire and for division of final zones of regroupment along line in vicinity Porte d'Annam (18th parallel). Disengagement of forces to consist of initial separation and to proceed to final positioning of opposing forces.

Article II: Principles for Execution of Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities.

This article prescribes that the cease-fire, separation, and regroupment of forces will take place simultaneously for both sides. It includes details such as that forces both sides will be withdrawn from demilitarized zones; that civilians who desire may leave regroupment zones; that persons may cross demarcation line only with authorization of Joint Commission; that civil administration and relief is responsibility of commanders of zones concerned; that sides must remove mines and provide safe conditions for supervisory organs etc. It further makes distinction between regular and irregular forces, defining former as organized formations which on Viet Minh side include both regular and regional forces, and defines irregular forces as partisans.

Article III: Separation of Combatants.

This article provides for specific time for cease-fire and calls for execution of separation of forces as soon as possible thereafter. It provides for (but for moment leaves blank) number of days during which regroupment of forces into initial assembly areas must be completed and prescribes that Joint Commission is to fix local conditions therefor. It further provides for (but for moment leaves blank) number of days thereafter during which movement into primary regroupment zones must be completed and leaves to Joint Commission responsibility for fixing details for this movement. Following are primary regroupment zones designated for each side:

North Vietnam.

French Union Forces to be regrouped into following areas in three stages:

(1) Area delimited by present battle line in delta (details to be fixed by Joint Commission, both sides to agree to undertake no offensive action during fixing of detailed line);

(2) Enclave extending inland just beyond Hai duong;

(3) Enclave around Haiphong.

Central Vietnam.

Viet Minh Forces located between Col des Nuages (above Tourane) and Porte d'Annam to be evacuated north of Porte d'Annam; Viet Minh Forces located in quadrangle Col des Nuages, west to Laos border, south to junction borders of Annam, Cochinchina and Cambodia, east to Phan-Ri, to be regrouped in Quang-Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces, with five-kilometre demilitarized zone to be established around this regroupment area; Viet Minh Forces in Central Vietnam south of quadrangle described above to be regrouped in South Vietnam.

South Vietnam.

Viet Minh Forces east of Saigon River to be regrouped in Xuyen Moc and Ham-Tan Provinces. Viet Minh Forces west of Saigon River to be regrouped vicinity Long-My and in Ca Mau Peninsula.

Article IV: Withdrawals and Transfers.

This article describes simultaneous phased movements of opposing forces from regroupment areas. (1) When French Union Forces withdraw to Hai duong enclave, Viet Minh evacuate Long-My and Ca Mau regroupment areas in South Vietnam. (2) When French Union Forces withdraw to Haiphong enclave, Viet Minh evacuate Xuyen Moc, Ham-Tan regroupment area. When French Union Forces withdraw from Haiphong enclave, Viet Minh evacuate regroupment area in Cen-
diploam and other relations with the said states, at the time of the signature of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities, subject to recognition and respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the said states and to refrain from any interference in internal affairs.

4. The conference takes note of the agreement of the parties that all foreign troops and foreign military personnel will be withdrawn from the territories of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia within a time limit to be determined by agreement between the parties.

5. The conference takes note of the agreement, reached between the parties, that the transfer from abroad into Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, of new military units and military personnel, of all kinds of arms and ammunition will not be permitted and that the import of arms into Laos and Cambodia will be limited in relation to the established defense requirements of these countries.

6. The conference takes note of the agreement reached by the parties that after the cessation of hostilities, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia must not enter any military alliances whatsoever, and that the establishment of foreign bases on the territories of the said states must not be permitted.

7. The conference notes that the agreements regarding Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have as their goal the settlement of military questions in order to put an end to hostilities in Indochina. As far as political problems are concerned, these will be settled within the shortest possible time by means of direct negotiations between the interested parties in accordance with the provisions contained in the present declaration.

8. The conference declares that, in respect of Vietnam, the settlement of political problems effected on the basis of respect for the principles of the independence, unity and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free elections by secret ballot. These elections will be conducted under the control of an International Commission composed of representatives of the member states of the commission for control and supervision mentioned in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, when the agreed opinion, reached by consultation between the competent representative authorities of the northern and southern zones of Vietnam, is that the re-establishment of peace in the country shall have made sufficient progress and when all the conditions necessary for a free expression of the national will shall have been created, but not later than June 1955.

9. The conference takes note of the declaration by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their intention to hold general free elections by secret ballot, and to take all measures to enable all citizens to take their place in the national community. These elections should take place before June 1955. In order to conduct general free elections, the Governments of Cambodia and Laos must ensure individual rights and democratic freedoms for the whole population of these states, in particular, freedom of speech and press, freedom of meetings and organizations, freedom of residence and movement.

10. The competent representative authorities of the northern and southern zones of Vietnam as well as the authorities of Laos and Cam-

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The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, JULY 15, 1954—8 P. M.

Secto 615. Sent Paris 63, Saigon 35. Following is unofficial translation made by UK del of Soviet counterproposal to French draft declaration (Secto 597 1) to be issued by conference:

"1. The participants of the Geneva conference on the question of re-establishing peace in Indochina approve the bilateral agreements which put an end to hostilities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and which establish an international control and supervision over the implementation of the said decisions.

2. The conference takes note with satisfaction of the statement made by the French Government to the effect that, when settling all problems connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, it proceeds from the recognition of the complete sovereignty and independence, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

3. In its relations with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, each participant of the Geneva conference, regardless of its political, military.

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1 Dated July 13, p. 1555.
SECRET

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (U. K. DELEGATION) TO
FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET (CABINET)

DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden

No. 930 D. 10.30 p.m. July 15, 1954

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 930 of July 15.
Repeated for information to Washington Paris
Saigon, [Immediate]

The Head of the Laotian delegation called today and told me
that he had had a generally satisfactory conversation with
Chou En-lai, who had raised no difficulty about the territorial
integrity of the country nor about the withdrawal of Viet Minh
battalions.

2. The real problem for the Laotian Government was what to
do about the resistance forces. There were broadly two solutions.
They could be concentrated towards the Chinese border as
Chou En-lai had himself suggested. The danger of this method
was that the resistance group might then set up its own
administration in this area which would become semi-independent
and a centre of contamination. Alternatively, the resistance
forces could be dispersed throughout Laos in penny packets.
They would then depend on the Laotian army for maintenance, and
even if they were allowed to keep their arms, they would not
constitute any military danger.

3. If this solution were adopted, the political
personalities of the resistance movement could return to their
families and possibly even be re-instated in their posts in the
civilian administration from which a number had come.

4. I said that this was a problem which he doubt he
would discuss with the French. But for myself, I would be very
doubtful whether it was wise to leave the rebel forces with
their arms, even if they were distributed in penny packets about
the country. Further, it was one thing to allow the political
leaders to return to their families, but was it necessary, to
re-instate them in the administration?

/5. I should
SECRET

Geneva Conference (U.K. Del.) telegram No. 838 to Foreign Office.

- 2 -

5. I should be grateful for urgent comments from Her Majesty's Minister at Saigon on this problem.

6. The Head of the Laotian delegation also drew my attention to a report which he had received from his Government that the Viet Minh had recently intensified their recruiting campaign in Laos and had been widely distributing arms. I promised to bring this urgently to Molotov's attention, since this could undermine confidence at a critical moment in the work of the Conference. I have since done so and Molotov promised to look into it. Has Her Majesty's Minister at Saigon any information about this?

7. The Head of the Laotian delegation finally said that no solution had yet been found for the two bases to which the French were entitled under the France-Laotian Treaty. The Viet Minh had not objected to a French military mission, but had so far not given way about the two bases. There were only about three battalions of French troops concerned and he doubted whether, in the end, this would prove to be a sticking point.

8. I was somewhat disturbed by this conversation. The Laotians are the most likeable of the Associated States, but they also seem rather too simple for this world. I fear that they may fall to Communist wiles. I shall be grateful for any suggestions Her Majesty's Minister may have as to any further conditions I might propose to help them.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 318 and 23L and immediate to Saigon as my telegram No. 102.

(Repeated to Washington, Paris and Saigon)

ADVANCE COPIES
Sir P. Roberts
Minister of State
Private Secretary
Mr. Dean
Head of South East Asia Department

FFFF
Telegram, Zhong Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee, Regarding meeting with Tep Phan (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Head of the Cambodian delegation), July 15, 1954

Record No.: 206-Y0051

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

I paid a return visit to Cambodian Foreign Minister Tep Phan on the afternoon of the 14th. Besides reiterating our wish for Cambodia and Laos to become Southeast Asian-type states, I also apprised him of Chairman Ho’s approval of the five mutual non-aggression principles as laid out in the Sino-Indian communiqué. I told him that based on these principles, Chairman Ho was willing to establish friendly relations with the unified Cambodia and Laos. Tep Phan said that the Sino-Indian and the Sino-Burmese statements were in accordance with the wishes of the Cambodians. Tep Phan also mentioned that the military talks had had no progress, and that the constitution would not allow what Pham Van Dong had demanded, namely appointing members of the resistance movement to the position of county chiefs and recognizing the youth and women’s organizations. Regarding our suggestion of 16 June that no introduction of new foreign troops or armaments be allowed after the cessation of hostilities, Tep Phan misunderstood it as a permanent constraint on Cambodia’s armed forces, and therefore said that this stipulation would constitute a violation of the sovereign rights of Cambodia. I told him that this stipulation would only apply to the period of armistice and thus would not be permanent. After this explanation Tep Phan cleared his misunderstanding and expressed his gratitude. He said that this talk was very beneficial.

Zhou Enlai
July 15, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
RESOLUTION OF THE 6TH EXTENDED CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLenum
(July 15-18, 1954)


Based on the analyses of domestic and international situations, the Plenum concludes:

1) After military victories in the battlefields in the last Winter-Spring seasons, especially after the great victory in Dien Bien Phu, the domestic situation increasingly develops in our favor; the enemy is facing great difficulties, although they never cease trying to escape from this situation. After 9 years of resistance, the great victories we have gained in the military field, in land reform, as well as those related to financial, economic, cultural, educational matters, and building the Fatherland Front and the Party, etc. have marked up a big step forward in the cause of our armed forces and people. These victories have shifted the correlation of forces to our advantage, but they do not represent a radical change in terms of strategy.

We have achieved these great victories because our armed forces and people have forged a solid solidarity, overcome all the hardships, and fought valiantly. These are also due to the correct policy of resistance by President Ho, our Party and Government, as a result, the diplomatic struggle by our people over the last 8 or 9 years as well as the ongoing diplomatic struggle, which is just as nature, has enjoyed the heart-felt support by the Soviet Union, China, and other friendly countries, by French people and peace-loving peoples in the world.

But we need to recognize clearly that due to the prolonged war, our people have contributed a great deal of human and material resources. If the war prolongs, people will feel more tired, and we have to face greater difficulties.

2) While the peace and democratic movements in the world strongly develop, the warlike imperialist camp has faced with one defeat after another. They are at the same time having conflicting interests among each other. As a result, contradictions and divisions between the US and Britain, the US and France have been more and more.

Over the last 9 years, the French imperialists have been pursuing an unjust war with a view to re-establishing their rule in Vietnam, as well as in Khmer, and Lao states. But the more they fight, the more they suffer failures, and the more they have to rely on the US, thus becoming mercenaries for the US.

The war of aggression in Indochina has been strongly opposed by the French people and the world people. The 9-year fighting experiences in Indochina have divided the capital class into two factions: the war mongers and the pacifists, with the former wanting to rely on the US to continue the war, and the latter wanting to end the war by peace negotiations with us. The pacifist faction is now in power and conducting negotiations with us.

After the shameful defeat in Korea, the US imperialists have tried to urge the French colonialists to continue the war in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, thus getting rich from the war and alleviating the effects of the economic crisis that they are facing. After the Winter-Spring seasons, taking advantage of the French defeat, US imperialists hastily intervene into Indochina, being determined to implement the plan to prolong and expand the war in Indochina, so as to turn Indochina into their colony and military base. If the US imperialists directly intervene into the war in Indochina, then the correlation of force between the enemy and us will change not in our favor.

The US is the main obstacle to the restoration of peace in Indochina. They are intensely preparing for the establishment of an aggressive organization in Southeast Asia, using Indochina as the springboard to expand the war. They purposefully maintain tension in the world situation to fish in the troubled water, selling weapons and preparing for wars to threaten peace in the world. That is why the US is the main enemy of the peace-loving people in the world, and becoming the main and direct enemy of the Indochinese people.

3) In the new situation at home and abroad, the Plenum entirely agrees with the policy adopted by President Ho and Poliburo over the last period, namely to return to negotiations to restore peace in Indochina. The Plenum has decided on the guideline for the struggle in the new period: direct our efforts at the US imperialists and French war mongers, based on the victories that we have gained to strive for the realization of peace in Indochina, destroy the US scheme to expand and prolong the war in Indochina, consolidate peace, realize unification and fulfill the goal of peace, independence, and democracy in the whole country.

Our motto is: peace, unification, independence, and democracy. To fulfill this motto, we must consolidate the worker-peasant alliance, build the solidarity with other social strata, win over the leading patriotic, peace and democracy loving personalities, and form an expanded front to oppose the US imperialists, French war mongers, and their henchmen.

For the sake of peace, unification, independence, democracy our people and armed forces have heroically fought for the last 9 years and have achieved many victories. Nowadays, due to new situations, we have to adopt new policy guidelines and methods to achieve new objectives. This is an important change in the guidelines and methods, but the goal of our revolution remains the same.

The struggle carried on by us and by our camp in the Geneva Conference is going well with the possibility of reaching an agreement for truce. But many difficulties are ahead, especially when the US imperialists continue to sabotage the conference. When the truce is in place, the struggle to consolidate peace, to bring about unification, independence, and democracy in Vietnam will have to face many difficulties because of the US imperialists, French war mongers, and their henchmen.

4) The immediate tasks and duties for the whole party and people are as follows:
- Take advantage of peace, consolidate peace, and realize unification, independence, and democracy in the entirety of Vietnam
- Consolidate the armed forces, to build the strong people's army and make it responsive to demands of the new situation
- Continue to provide peasants with land, restore production, and lay conditions for national construction

The above-mentioned are the main immediate tasks for the whole party, armed forces, and people.

The war of resistance, the struggle for peace and its consolidation, for unification, independence, and democracy is a hard and complicated process. We must always be on guard before all the schemes and plots by the US imperialists, French war mongers, and their cliques. We must do our best to carry the struggle to the final victory, heighten the fighting spirit, and uphold the banner of peace, unification, independence, and democracy with a view to fulfilling the heavy but glorious tasks in the immediate period.

Let the whole party be unified in thoughts and deeds, forge a closer rank around and build a greater consensus with President Ho and the Central Committee, absolutely believe in President Ho and the Central Committee, be determined to overcome hardships, and make the utmost efforts so that at any time of war or peace we can be proactive and victorious.

Note: This document is only disseminated to the provincial level and kept by responsible cadres at this level.
REPORT BY PRESIDENT HO
AT THE 6TH EXPANDED CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM
July 15, 1954

The 6th Central Committee Plenum is expanded to invite a number of high-ranking officials to attend and discuss new situations and tasks.

On behalf of the Central Committee, I would like to convey my greetings to soldiers and cadres on all the battlefields, my encouragement to the people in the newly liberated areas, and my sympathy to the people still in the areas not yet liberated.

On behalf of the Central Committee, I would like to thank fraternal parties and peoples of friendly countries who have contributed to our resistance and restoration of peace, and thank the peace-loving people in the world who have supported us.

I would like to read a report before the Plenum on new situations and tasks.

I - NEW SITUATIONS

1. The world situation:

Because the Soviet Union, China, and other people's democracies have developed, consolidated, and made progress in all aspects, the peace and democratic movements in the world have grown stronger, because the Soviet diplomacy is correct and smart, the imperialists, first and foremost the US, have been forced to participate in the Berlin and Geneva conferences. The fact that the two conferences were convened alone represents a victory for our camp and a defeat for the imperialist camp.

The imperialist camp, headed by the US, is now full of increasingly grave contradictions. For example:

Contradictions between Britain and the US: the two countries have competing interests in the Mediterranean region, in the Middle East and Near East. The US is also drawing Pakistan, New Zealand, and Australia - former colonies of Britain - into its sphere of influence. In the Far East, policies adopted by the US and Britain with regard to China and Japan are contradictory, etc.

Contradictions between the US and France: on the surface, the US helps France, but the former is taking advantage of the latter's difficulties, forcing the latter to sign the Franco-German Treaty and the European Armed Forces Treaty. If France signs these Treaties, it would like putting itself in a noose in Indochina, it seems that the US and France have united, but in fact, the US wants to control the Vietnamese puppet government, to keep France aside. The US has put Ngo Dinh Diem - its useful benchmark - as the head of the puppet government.

The US policy related to the European Armed Forces Treaty has made the Western European countries as well as domestic politicos in these countries divide. The peoples of these countries oppose the pro-American governments; at the same time, a division has been detected between those capitalists who are pro-American and who are not. In Asia, the US wants to establish a Southeast Asian Defense Pact, using Asians to fight Asians. This policy is very reactionary, but the US has suffered many defeats. The US adopts the policy of using force, especially threatens other countries with nuclear and H-bombs. But the world peace movement against this policy, against nuclear and H-bombs grows stronger, even the Pope is against these bombs. As a result, the peace movement has attracted the majority of people, even capitalist classes in many countries, and the Pope as well.

In the Geneva Conference and in the aftermath of our victory in Dien Bien Phu, the US put forward a "joint statement" among the US, France, and Britain as well as some other countries to threaten China, blaming China of intervening in the Indochina war. But the US failed in this scheme because Britain protested, and other countries did not follow the US. The US then proposed "joint action" to rescue France in Dien Bien Phu, but Britain and other countries did not agree; the US again failed in its attempt. The US spared no effort to sabotage the Geneva Conference, i.e., sabotage peace. The US Secretary of State sat in the negotiations then quitted. But other delegates continued the negotiations as usual, and brought about some results for the Geneva Conference.

Having failed, but the US does not give up. It is trying to form the Southeast Asian Defense Pact. The US defeat is the victory of our camp. The US is the main enemy of the world peace; we have to concentrate our force to oppose the US.

2. Domestic situation:

The peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos are united; the struggles by the three countries' peoples are increasingly developing. Our guerrilla units in the South, North, and Central region have not only maintained but developed their forces. Our regular armed forces continue to achieve victories in the Border campaign, the Hôa bunh and North West campaigns, etc. The previous victories, together with the Dien Bien Phu victory have changed the situation in a significant way. We have destroyed the Navarns plan, overthrew the Laniel-Bidault government; the areas occupied by French armed forces have been narrowed.

We gained victories because the policies adopted by the party, the government are correct, because our troops and people are heroic, because people of the friendly countries and people in the world support us. Our victories are common victories of the peace and democracy movement in the world.

Apart from military victories, we have also gained initial victories in the anti-feudal front. Military victories exert a strong influence on the mobilization of the people to carry out the land reforms. Victories in the anti-feudal front, on its part, exert influence on the anti-imperialist front.

Our victories have made our people and people in the world happy, consolidated diplomatic stance in Geneva; these victories of ours have forced the enemy to talk with us. If we recall the conditions put forward by Bollaert in 1947, we will see that the French position changed to a great extent. So since the start of our war of resistance, our posture is increasingly strong, that of the enemy is increasingly weak. But we should pay attention to this: the positions of strength and weakness are relative, not absolute. We should not be wishful. Our victories have put the US on alert. After the Dien Bien Phu campaign, the US schemes and plans have changed, now aiming at prolonging the war in Indochina, internationalizing the war in Indochina, sabotaging the Geneva Conference, getting rid of France to control Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, turning the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos into slaves of the US, and causing more tensions in the world.

As a result, the US is not only the enemy of people in the world, but also turning into the main and direct enemy of the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

Because of the above-mentioned changes in the world and domestic situations, the Geneva Conference was materialized. As the Geneva Conference has shown, contradictions among the imperialists are becoming increasingly obvious; this is ambiguous, and the US sabotages the Conference. By now, the US has been more and more isolated. Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union are very much united. Because of the contradictions among the imperialists, and because of our efforts and efforts by our camp, we have achieved some relatively important agreements. At present, the French government is under the control of the pacifist faction, so ending the war in Indochina is more likely.

When the Conference adjourns, heads of delegations returned home, leaving the job to their deputies. On this occasion, the PRC prime minister, comrade Zhou Enlai flew from Geneva to visit India and Burma. Comrade Zhou, together with Indian and Burmese Prime Ministers put forward the statement of peace. The 5 principles in this statement are short, but very clear and correct. The people in the world, especially in Asia welcome these principles, which help to defeat the US scheme to sabotage the solidarity among Asian peoples. These 5 principles include:

1. Mutual respect to territorial integrity and sovereignty
2. Non-aggression
3. Non-interference in each other's internal affairs
4. Equal and mutual benefit
5. Peaceful coexistence
II. NEW TASKS

The new situations have required new tasks, guidelines, and policies. Over the 9 years of resistance, our party and government have led the people and armed forces to overcome difficulties, valiantly fight, and gain glorious victories. Our forces have made progress in all fields. Due to correct policies adopted by the party and government, good results have been gained. Nowadays, the situations are new, our tasks are new, policies and mottos have to change in order to suit new situations. Up to now, we have had to concentrate our forces to oppose the French aggression. Now France is talking with us, the US is turning into the main and direct enemy, the focus of our policy should be narrowed down toward the US. From now on to the time when peace is restored, we must continue to fight against France. But our and the world's spearhead is at the US. The US policy is to expand and internationalize the war in Indochina. Our policy is to take advantage of peace to cope with the policy of war by the US. For the last 9 years, the objectives of our party's political program has been made clear: complete independence for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; non-recognition of the French Union; wiping out French troops from Indochina; abolishment of puppet troops and governments; confiscation of assets held by imperialists and their puppets; initiation of tax-reduction programs with a view to subsequently conducting the land reforms; realization of democracy nation-wide, and resistance to the final victory. The political program has gained many victories. The political program is correct.

In the new situation, we cannot follow the old program. Before, our motto was "resistance to the final victory." Now, because of new situations, we should uphold new motto: "peace, unification, independence, and democracy." In order to oppose the US direct intervention to prolong and expand the war in Indochina, we should realize that in the context of peace, our policy must change. When we confiscated French imperialists' assets, now when the two sides engage in negotiations, we can uphold the principle of equality, mutual benefit so that French economic and cultural interests can be retained in Indochina. When we talk, appropriate compromise must be made. Before we said: [we have so] wipe out and annihilate all the French troops. Now that talks have been held, and France has agreed to a scheduled withdrawal of troops. Before we did not recognize the French union, now we accept to discuss the participation to it on an equal and voluntary basis. Before, we advocated the annihilation of the puppet troops and governments for national unification. Now we adopt a policy of tolerance, resorting to national elections to realize national unification.

If we want peace, we must end the war; if we want to end the war, we must have an armistice; if we want to have an armistice, we have to delimit, that is the enemy's troops must be temporarily re-grouped in an area, so must our troops. We must ensure a large area to enjoy sufficient conditions for construction, consolidation, and development of our forces to influence other areas so as to realize unification. Demarcation does not mean separation/division. This is a temporary thing in the process of unification. When it takes place, the enemy will temporarily occupy some liberated areas. The people in these areas will be confused, some will be pessimistic and disappointed, thus being vulnerable to be exploited by the enemy. We have to make it clear to our people: in the interest of the whole country, for the sake of long-term interest, [they must] accept this, because it is a glorious thing and the whole country is grateful for that. We must not let people have pessimistic and negative thinking; instead encourage the people to continue the struggle for the withdrawal of French troops to ensure our independence.

Demarcation to reach peace, election to reach unification is our policy guideline. We conduct the resistance for independence, unification, democracy, and peace. Peace itself serves the goals of unification, independence, and democracy. The new situation requires new policy to gain new victory.

Regardless of war or peace, we must be proactive, must foresee things, and be prepared. To struggle for peace is not an easy thing; it is a long, hard, and complicated struggle with both favorable and difficult conditions. Favorable conditions include: friendly countries support us; people in the world also support us, our people are enthusiastic and confident in our party and government. [If] our party and government have skillful leadership and our people are sure to unit in peaceful time as we did in the war of resistance. Difficult conditions include: the US is sparing no effort to destroy restoration of peace in Indochina, the pacific faction in France has not got rid of the US influence.

The nature of the new situations represents not only difficulty but also complexity. For example, we adopt different policies for newly liberated areas and the free areas; we must also adopt different policies for the areas under our control and for the areas occupied by the enemy; before, we have operated in the rural areas, now we have to adopt policies for urban areas. The policies with regard to France for now must be different as compared with before; the same applies to the pro-American and pro-French puppets. Before, we only have domestic policy and diplomacy with our friendly countries; now we conduct diplomacy with other countries as well, etc.

We have so differentiate immediate and long-term futures, as well as overall and particular interests. The situations are now at the time of major changes with numerous difficulties and complexities. If we are not prepared and fail to lead, the thoughts will be confused, the deeds will also be confused.

The wrong thoughts can include:

Leftist deviation: some see that we have gained victories and want to continue fighting, till the final victory. They see only areas and fail to see the whole forest; they see France withdrawing troops but fail to see its scheme; they see France but fail to recognize the US, and they favor fighting and underestimate diplomacy. They do not know that we conduct the struggle in the battlefield, and we also conduct the struggle in the international conference, both for the common goal. So, they will expect the police, considering them as rightist deviation, excessive compromises. Instead, they will put forward too high conditions, which the enemy cannot accept. They want quick fix for everything, failing to understand that the struggle for peace is hard and complicated. Leftist deviation will lead to being isolation, dissociation with our people and people in the world, and subsequent failures.

Rightist deviation: those people of this tendency will have pessimistic and negative thoughts: they will compromise without any principle, they do not believe in the strength of the people, discourage the people's fighting spirit. They forget how to endure hardship, only wanting to lead a quiet and easy life.

Both leftist and rightist deviations are wrong and will be exploited by the enemy, therefore, they are harmful to us and beneficial to the enemy.

THE DUTIES AND TASKS

The new situations define the three new duties include

1) To take advantage of peace, to realize unification, to complete national independence and democracy nation-wide
2) To reinforce the people's army, to build it strong and fitted for the requirements of the new situations
3) To continue providing peasants with land, to tirelessly restore production, and to make preparations for national construction.

These three duties then define 10 tasks as follows:
1) To unify the thoughts among the whole party and people on the new situations and duties
2) To consolidate the leadership in diplomatic struggle
3) To strengthen the forces of the people's army
4) To take control of the newly liberated areas, especially the urban areas
5) To change approaches in conducting our work in the occupied areas
6) To continue consolidating the free areas
7) To mobilize the people in the implementation of the land reform
8) To strengthen the economic and financial work for the preparations of conditions for national construction
9) To assist Pathet Laos and Khmer
10) To continue re-education in the party, especially in the newly liberated areas.

The Central Committee directs these 10 tasks. Each locality and branch will have specific tasks among these 10, i.e. it is not necessary that 10 tasks will be carried out everywhere.

Among these 10 tasks, the work of leading people in thought is the most important. We have to make sure that new situations are aware of and new tasks understood so as to unify thoughts, which can ensure the unity of action. If we can ensure the unity of thoughts and deeds in the party and among the population, then the tasks can be carried out successfully, however they are difficult and complicated.

At present, as and when the US is the main enemy of people in the world and becoming the main and direct enemy of the Indochinese people, all the things we do should aim at the US. Anyone and any country that is not pro-American can be mobilized (even temporarily) in the unified front. Our unchanged objective is peace, unification, independence, and democracy. Our principle is solid, but the tactics are flexible. All the work must be coordinated and closely linked to each other; all the organs must be coordinated closely. All the work must also be suitable to specific time and place contexts.

Under the leadership of the party and government, with the unity of and efforts by all the carders and people, and with the sympathy of people in the fraternal countries and peace-loving people in the world, we are certain to be successful in carrying out the 3 duties and 10 tasks mentioned above.
TO FULLFIL THE IMMEDIATE TASKS
REPORT BY COMRADE TRUONG CHINH
AT THE 6TH EXPANDED CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM
July 15 - 18, 1954

Comrades,

The report on "New Situations and New Tasks" by President Ho has clearly analyzed the present situations and laid out the immediate tasks for us. This report shows us the way to peace, unification, independence, and democracy, and is the guiding torch for us in the present period.

Subsequently, I would like to add some opinions on the analyses of the new situations and tasks, and at the same time introduce some guidelines for us in the fulfillment of these new tasks.

According to the report by President Ho, we realize that domestic and international situations bear the following characteristics:

1. The more we fight, the stronger we grow, the more the enemies fight, the weaker they become. After the Dien Bien Phu campaign, the correlation of force has changed to our favor, but not in a radical way. In certain battlefields and to some extent, our posture is stronger than that of the enemy, but on the national scale, our strength is approximately equal to that of the enemy.

2. Because of the war in Indochina, the rank and file of the ruling circles in France have been divided substantially: the warmongers rely on the US to continue the war, the pacifists want to end the war through peace negotiations with our government. The pacifist camp has come to power in France, but the warmongers still influence the French policies and get the support from the most reactionary comprador bourgeoisie and feudal classes in Indochina.

3. After the armistice in Korea, the US imperialists began to intervene in the war in Indochina, taking advantage of the war to make money and alleviate the economic crisis in the US. In the recent Winter-Spring campaign, the US understood that France was defeated, therefore it blatantly intervened in the war in Indochina, with US warplanes directly taking part in the killings of Indochinese peoples. They tried all means to implement the plan of expanding and prolonging the war in Indochina with a view to turning Indochina into their colony and strategic military base, causing many difficulties for the Indochinese peoples and tensions in the situations in Southeast Asia and the world.

The war in Indochina has in fact become the war of the US and the French expeditionary forces are now mercenaries of the US.

The Ngo Dinh Diem puppet government is the henchmen of the US imperialists and French warmongers.

4. After the armistice in Korea, the force of world peace is stronger. Hundreds of millions of people are asking themselves: if peace is restored in Korea, then why not in Indochina? They subsequently try to end the war through negotiations. The Berlin and Geneva Conferences are the responses to the ardent aspirations of peace loving people in the world.

Just now, hundreds of millions of people warmly welcome the Soviet Union's position that any dispute between countries in the world can be solved through peace negotiations and they try to make negotiations possible.

In short, from the situations, we clearly see that:

a) There are two opposing policies in the world: the one of peace initiated by the Soviet Union, and the one of war supported by the US. Our people follow the one of peace, trying hard to contribute to its implementation.

b) There are two possibilities in the development of situation in Indochina: the one of war being expanded and prolonged, and the one of peace being restored in Indochina by peaceful means. Our people are trying to make the latter possible.

If peace is restored, it will be beneficial to the people in Indochina and in the world because we will destroy the scheme of war expansion and prolongevity by the US and reduce tensions in the situation in Southeast Asia and in the world.

Before, we correctly adopted the policy of prolonged resistance and self-reliance. Now, because of changes in the situation, we adopt the policy of taking advantage of peace, at the same time continue to prepare for war if necessary.

c) Right now, the US is the number-one enemy of peace loving people in the world, at the same time, it is becoming the main and direct enemy of the Indochinese people.

The main enemy of ours now is the US imperialists with their henchmen being French warmongers and pro-American puppets. We have to consider them as the focus of our struggle, isolate them so as to defeat them.

We have to exploit the division in the ruling circles in France, struggling against the warmongers and winning over the pacifists.

We have to exploit the division between and among Britain, France, and the US, struggling against the US and winning over France and Britain.

We have to exploit the division among the puppets, struggling against the pro-Americans and henchmen of French warmongers and winning over pacifists in the Mendes France government.

We agree with the establishment of a united front against the US in Southeast Asia and in the world.

We should establish a united national and democratic front to oppose the US interventionists, French warmongers, and their henchmen.

On the basis of the victories that we have gained, we must struggle to restore peace, while try to realize unification and complete independence and democracy in our country.

Our main motto is peace, unification, independence, and democracy.

President Ho has laid before us three new duties and ten immediate tasks, which are:

1) To take advantage of and to consolidate peace, to realize unification, to complete national independence and democracy nation-wide
2) To reinforce the people's army, to build it strong and fitted for the requirements of the new situations
3) To continue providing peasants with land, to tirelessly restore production, and to make preparations for national construction.

We should struggle for the realization of cease of fire and armistice on the entirety of Indochina. Yet, cease fire and armistice notwithstanding, as long as foreign troops have not been withdrawn from Indochina, peace is not consolidated. Moreover, although foreign troops are withdrawn from Indochina, as long as there are imperialists in the world, peace is not ensured. Therefore, [we] must reinforce our troops all the time, consolidate national defense, and present the US interventionists and French warmongers from using their henchmen to destroy the armistice treaties or directly provoking war. That is why to consolidate the armed forces is the strongest insurance for the right to live in peace of the Vietnamese people. At the same time, [we] must continue the political struggle and try our best to construct our country so as to realize unification, complete the cause of independence, democracy in the whole of our country, and fulfill the task of making the people's national and democratic revolution in Vietnam.

In order to consolidate our forces in military, political, economic aspects, we should intensify the land reform with a view to totally freeing the peasantry from the feudal yoke, mobilizing the great force of the peasantry, strengthening the alliance of the peasants and workers, creating conditions for boosting production, industrialization of the country and modernization of the armed forces.
The three duties mentioned above are closely linked with and mutually supportive to each other. Struggling for peace, land reform, and military struggle are the three aspects of our people’s patriotic struggle at present.

In order to fulfill these three duties, we must implement 10 following immediate tasks, namely:

1) To unify the thoughts among the whole party and people on the new situations and duties
2) To consolidate the leadership in diplomatic struggle
3) To strengthen the forces of the people’s army
4) To take control of the newly liberated areas, especially the urban areas
5) To change approaches in conducting our work in the occupied areas
6) To continue consolidating the free areas
7) To mobilize the people in the implementation of the land reform
8) To strengthen the economic and financial work for the preparations of conditions for national construction
9) To assist Pathet Laos and Khmer
10) To continue re-education in the party, especially in the newly liberated areas.

I will hereafter go into details of these tasks, based on the two possibilities in the development of situations in Indochina. Peace can be restored or war can be expanded and prolonged.

I. TO UNIFY THE THOUGHTS AMONG THE WHOLE PARTY AND PEOPLE ON THE NEW SITUATIONS AND DUTIES

The report by President Ho has made it clear about the new situations and tasks, the guidelines and policies for us in the immediate future. The entirety of our party, people, and armed forces must form a unity of thought, and work together in order to try to fulfill these tasks.

First of all, we must have correct assessments of our victories, the changes for restoration of peace in Indochina and new difficulties posed by the new situations. We should not underestimate the US and French schemes to expand and prolong the war in Indochina, sabotage peace negotiations, and cause tensions in the situations in Asia and in the world.

The entirety of our party, armed forces, and people must also form a unity in the understanding of the present guidelines and policy put forward by the Central Committee so as to strengthen the confidence in the party’s and government’s policy aimed at restoring peace in Indochina. This unity, if implemented, will create conditions, more favorable for fulfilling the unfinished tasks; and at the same time contributing to the course of peace and democracy in the world.

In the new situations at home and abroad, our Party adopt a policy aimed at concentrating our resource to oppose the main enemies, i.e. US imperialists and French warmongers, defeat their schemes to expand and prolong the war in Indochina, exploit their internal contradictions, and win over the forces supportive and sympathetic to our patriotic struggle. Therefore, we adopt a policy of peace, using peaceful means to develop our forces in all aspects and advance toward the goals of national unification, independence, and democracy. Yet, we must be prepared for intensifying the war of resistance if negotiations fail.

If we, through peace negotiations, achieve an armistice in Indochina with fair and reasonable conditions, which consolidate achievements that have been gained and lay the basis for the advancement toward the realization of national unification, complete independence and democracy in our country, this will be a very big victory for us and the movement for peace and democracy in the world. The entirety of our party, armed forces, and people must recognize this big victory in order to be more enthusiastic in fulfilling the immediate tasks.

In the context of new situations and changes in our policies, it is likely that many comrades fail to see the complexity in the situation, overestimating our strength, underestimating schemes of the US imperialists and French warmongers, insisting that we must fight to the final victory and wipe out all the aggressors from our country in a short period of time. They therefore do not agree with the peace negotiations option for solving the Indochina problem or if they do, they still want to realize at once the things that we have not gained on the battlefield and oppose the armistice with fair and reasonable conditions. Some other comrades only see the possibility for restoring peace in Indochina without recognizing the possibility of war being expanded and prolonged; they therefore fail to see that the armistice, which is agreed upon, may not lead to long-lasting peace, and as a result become worried, less watchful, and fail to try to strengthen the armed forces, intensify the land reform, consolidate the rear, boost production, increase the resources, and heighten the fighting spirit of the whole armed forces and people.

It is also likely that there are other comrades who are weak-willed, afraid of hardships, frightened by the threat of US intervention, against which they think we would fail, and as a result want peace at any price. They should remember that we adopt peace negotiations on the basis that the enemy must recognize our country’s independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. In order to achieve results in negotiations, we have to compromise, but compromises are measured and made within principles; for their parts, the enemies must also compromise. If the opposing sides insist to deny our victories and want to impose unreasonable conditions, we then on the one hand will uphold the banner of peace, and on the other hand must continue the war to reach our final objectives, regardless of any hardship and sacrifice.

Because of the special situation in the Indochina battlefield, in order to reach an armistice, we have to temporarily regroup troops of the two sides. If we do not do this, there is no way to materialize the cease-fire given troops of the two sides are interposed. Some comrades who do not understand the necessity, or have been influenced by the enemy’s propaganda, consider demarcation as an act of “territorial division,” and become pessimistic as a result. They fail to understand that temporary demarcation in specific areas is to ensure the armistice as a necessary step for national elections for national unification. The demarcation must be carried out in tandem with the explanation to cadres and people in the temporarily occupied areas so as to help them understand the new situation, its interests, aware of the long-term and common interests of the people, and more confident in President Ho, the party and government, and eager to carry out the new and glorious tasks.

Once the armistice is in place, it is likely that some comrades think that peace is consolidated, the revolution is successful, then want to rest, become hedonistic, give up the fighting spirit, lack vigilance and have no plan to respond to the enemy’s new plot. One thing that we must recognize is the agreement and reluctance to solve political issues. They do not know that we have only made one step in the long road toward national liberation and people’s democracy and we have to continue the long and hard struggle for unification, independence, and democracy. Our tasks are still very heavy.

If we fail to notice new situation and new policy changes, it is very difficult to avoid the wrong thoughts, especially the majority of our cadres still have low level of political theory and awareness. Right now, the main wrong thought is leftist deviation; yet later on, when peace is restored, the main wrong thought will be rightist deviation. These wrong thoughts will weaken the fighting capacity of the party and negatively influence our armed forces and people, and serve as the fertile ground for the enemy’s counter-propaganda. They will turn their defeats into their victories, our victories into defeats. Especially, the US will distort the situation so as to make our cadres and people confused. For example, they will portray demarcation as territorial division, [diplomatic] gains as sacrifices the Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Lao people have to render in the interest of our camp and the world peace movement, etc so to win over those misreading the situation and lacking vigilance.

For the cadres and people in the temporarily occupied areas, it is necessary to overcome thoughts of pessimism and disappointment of those who first do not believe in the new policy, comply the order from higher levels, then give up struggling, thus being an easy target for the enemy to win them over its side.

Therefore, in order to fulfill the new, heavy, and complicated tasks, we must do the propaganda work, explaining to the whole party the new situations and tasks so as to forge a unity of thoughts and deeds within the whole party, consolidate the belief of the whole party, armed forces,
and people in the great victory of our nation and other nations in the world, and try our best for the revolutionary cause.

The work of propaganda and explanation of the situations and tasks at present is important and definitive to our victories in the coming period. Therefore, the main contents of the work with regard to our cadres and people are propaganda and explanation of the new situations and tasks. [We] must organize groups to study thoroughly the report by President Ho read in the Plenum. Awareness of new guideline and policy as well as the sense of discipline will be heightened, the leftist and Rightist deviations will be corrected through this learning activities; as a result, the fighting spirit and the unity within our party will be consolidated. At the present, the leftist deviation is the main target, but we have to keep in mind the rightist deviation. Once the Rightist deviation is in place and peace is restored in Indochina, to oppose the rightist deviation will be the main target, with the leftist deviation being kept in mind.

The Nham Dan should be published daily and the Central Committee must closer direct it so as to help it fulfill the task of uniting our thoughts and becoming a sharp weapon in the complicated political struggle ahead of us.

With regard to the method of propaganda, it is necessary to do the following:

a) To convene conferences for high-ranking cadres to inform them of the situations, clear their thinking and unite their thoughts and deeds.

b) After the armistice agreements are signed, to organize meetings or people representatives' conferences in which responsible cadres directly report outcomes of the Geneva conference and the meaning of our victory in the restoration of peace in Indochina so as to encourage and educate the mass (We will provide outlines for the propaganda work in separate documents.)

2. TO CONSOLIDATE THE LEADERSHIP IN THE DIPLOMATIC STRUGGLE

We are conducting the diplomatic struggle on two fronts: in Geneva and at home. We have gained great victory in Dien Bien Phu and other battlefields nation-wide; our position is one of justice, our proposals are reasonable and realistic; we and our friendly countries (i.e. the Soviet Union, China) are sincere about peace and try all means to bring about good outcomes for the negotiations; the French people and peace-loving people in the world are resolutely struggle for the end of the war in Indochina. Because of these reasons, although the US imperialists, French warmongers, and Vietnamese, Cambodian, Lao puppets are trying very hard to sabotage, so far, the Geneva conference has reached certain outcomes and the on-spot conference on military issues has been convened in Trung Gia. Numerous difficulties, however, remain. The US imperialists and French warmongers and their cliques are stepping up her sabotages and they will continue to do so.

At present, the opposing sides are still very much ambitious about demarcation in Vietnam. They refuse to talk about political issues, link them with military issues, recognize the Khmer and Lao resistance governments, and purposely complicate matters related to the composition of a neutral control committee, etc. The US imperialists are exerting pressures on the Mendes France government. They are instructing the Bao Dai - Ngo Dinh Diem cliques to sabotage the negotiations and preparing to sabotage the implementation of the armistice agreement if it is reached.

Therefore, the chance for restoring peace in Indochina is likely, but obstacles to negotiations also exist. We should not be wishful and self-complacent with what have been achieved; to the contrary, we must always be watchful and full of efforts.

In order for the Geneva as well as Trung Gia conferences to succeed, it is necessary to consolidate our party leadership in the diplomatic struggle.

First of all, the whole party and all the diplomats must understand how does the restoration of peace in Indochina benefit us and world peace so that all will be energetic, enthusiastic, and confident in the guidelines and policies adopted by President Ho, party and government. We must in a short period of time reach and sign an armistice agreement with the Mendes France government. [We should not] miss a good opportunity. [We should not] let the US imperialists and French warmongers to take advantage of the prolonged Geneva conference to cause thoughts of pessimism, disappointment and to sabotage the negotiations. At the same time, we must overcome the thought of compromise, wanting to reach a quick armistice agreement simply for the sake of ending the negotiations.

[We] must avoid leftist deviation, which puts too high objectives for the diplomatic struggle, thus driving the negotiations into deadlock. Yet, at the same time, [we] must oppose rightist deviation, which allows excessive compromises and as a result, the people will be disappointed and the enemy will ask for more.

The main principles to be adhered to in our diplomatic struggle are as follows:

1) To combine a high sense of principle with a reasonable flexibility
2) To consider options on the basis of the correlations of force between us and the enemy
3) To place the problem of Indochina in the context of preserving peace and democracy in the world so as to reach appropriate solution.

To support the diplomatic struggle for early victory, [we] must invigorate people in the whole country to step up all the work to form a strong rear for our diplomatic struggle. It is necessary to select and train a number of cadres to reinforce the government's work of diplomacy, not only for the immediate diplomatic tasks ahead, but also for the complicated diplomatic activities in the future. These cadres first of all must be politically reliable, and equally knowledgeable. They must be well trained before taking their duties.

Finally, as being in charge of leading the peace negotiations, the Central Committee should have a professional staff that keeps a close watch on the negotiations, study the problems, and suggest timely solutions.

Comrades,

The guidelines and policies proposed by President Ho and the Central Committee are correct. We must absolutely believe and enthusiastically implement them.

The signing of an armistice agreement and the restoration of peace will be a great victory for the world peace movement and us.

However, difficulties are abundant, for the US interventionists, French warmongers, and their cliques are very much sabotaging the peace. The capitalist pacifists in France will still be obstructive. We must always be watchful and determined to defeat the schemes and prevent pacifists in France from breaking the promises.

Difficulties are many, but peace will bring about new favorable conditions, because:

We will gain time for strengthening our forces, improving the people's livelihood, rehabilitating the economy; thus laying conditions for national unification and winning new victories.

The restoration of peace in Indochina will encourage peace-loving people in the world. It will contribute to the formation and expansion of an anti-US front that will unite Southeast Asian people, including Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Lao peoples to oppose the US imperialists, French warmongers and their puppets and hunting dogs.

The restoration in Indochina will heighten the prestige and credibility of President Ho, the party and government, and consolidate the leading role of the working class.

These will be the conditions guaranteeing our subsequent victories.

Yet, President Ho said: "Like the military struggle, the diplomatic struggle must be long and hard before we gain complete victory." The new situations and tasks require all of us to adhere to the hardship-enduring lifestyle, devote all of our body and soul to follow our party's line, render all our efforts to serve the people, be watchful and cautious, avoid being arrogant and hot-tempered, close our rank under the banner of President Ho, and ceaselessly strive for the party's revolutionary cause.
The whole party must unite as a monolith in order to be able to unite the working class and the people at large so as to oppose the enemies from within and without and successfully carry out the immediate tasks.

Under the farsighted leadership of President Ho, we will surely gain and consolidate peace, realize national unification, independence and democracy nation-wide, and reach the goal the national-democratic revolution in our country.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Wei Guoqing (excerpt), July 15, 1954


At present, we are studying the principles on such questions as the ceasefire, troop withdrawal, and supervision presented by the French delegation. Please propose to the Vietnamese side that they should quickly work out a plan for the People's Army to withdraw from the south, and promptly report the plan to the Vietnamese delegation.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
regarding status of discussions on international controls of agreements for cessation of hostilities in Vietnam (Secto 575 1) and in Cambodia and Laos (Secto 605 2). He stated following four major questions remained pending with Communists:

1. Composition: Communists insist on inclusion of Communist member. Further discussions will have to take place at ministerial level following General Smith’s arrival.

2. Freedom of action of international inspection teams: Soviets contend that complete freedom of action for these teams would infringe on sovereignty of states concerned.

3. Rules of procedure and mandatory character of decisions of International Commission; Soviets continue to insist on unanimity rule in event of major violations and on recommendatory rather than mandatory character of Commission’s decisions and recommendations.

4. Organization: Soviets want one plenary commission with subcommisions for Laos and Cambodia. Our side concedes of three commissions with similar composition plus coordinating mechanism.

Offroy envisages meeting at early date of friendly delegations to express views on draft texts already submitted by French. This would be followed very shortly by discussion with other side on restricted basis. Offroy envisages no more than three or four powers taking part in this discussion aimed at securing definition of agreed and disagreed items.

To date, French have distributed papers on controls (Sectos 575 and 605) to all nine delegations; draft declaration for conference (Secto 597 3) also to all nine (Soviet counterproposals contained Secto 615 4 has been distributed to all delegations); administrative human rights provision of cessation of hostilities agreements to six friendly delegations and draft military clauses of these agreements distributed probably only to US.

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JOHNSON

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JULY 16, 1954

Conference Sls, lot 69 D 627, CP 301

Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal) to the Head of the Delegation (Johnson)

[GENEVA,] July 16, 1954.

Re: Message from Dennis Allen

Dennis Allen telephoned at 1:35 a.m. to say that he had just had a call from la Tournelle who stated that at last night’s Mendes-

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1 Dated July 8, p. 1305.
2 Dated July 14, p. 1350.
3 Dated July 15, p. 1355.
4 Dated July 16, p. 1354.

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INDOCHINA

France-Molotov dinner 1 it was suggested that a meeting might be held this afternoon between the two Chairmen (Eden and Molotov) and the French to review the documents which have so far been produced and to see where the Conference stands.

Eden has asked Allen to let you know of this suggestion and to find out your views. Eden believes that the meeting in practice might be useful. If the question of U.S. participation in such a meeting is raised, Allen believes that the Russians would probably insist on the presence of the Chinese communists and we would thus have a five-power gathering.

I told Allen that we would let him have your views as soon as possible.

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1 See telegram Secto 629, July 16, p. 1394.
2 Handwritten notation on the source text indicated that Ambassador Johnson had “no objection” to holding the meeting between the two Chairmen and the French and that Johnson agreed with Dennis Allen’s belief that the Russians would probably insist on a Chinese Communist presence which would mean a five-power gathering. An additional handwritten notation indicates that Allen was advised of the Ambassador’s notations.

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Conference Sls, lot 69 D 627, CP 301

The Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State (Smith) 1

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1954.

MY DEAR GENERAL SMITH: The following basic instructions, 2 which have been approved by the President, will guide you as head of the United States Delegation in your participation in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference for which you are leaving today.

1. I append hereto as Annex A a Six Point France-United States Position Paper, dated July 14, 1954. 3 Attached hereto is a Seven Point Memorandum setting out the terms which the French Government states it believes are obtainable at Geneva by negotiation, and which would be acceptable to France, and France believes, to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. 4

2. The United States recognizes that these four nations have a direct and primary interest as belligerents which entitles them to negotiate a settlement without any coercion or pressure from the United States. As stated in the Position Paper, the United States will not seek “to

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1 A copy of this letter is also filed in 360.1 G 6/T-1954.
2 Under Secretary Smith’s original instructions were contained in telegram Tose 138, May 22, p. 775.
3 Under Secretary Smith departed for Geneva on the afternoon of July 10.
4 Ann, p. 1358.
5 Attached to the position paper, p. 1364.
impose its views in any way upon those primarily interested," i.e., France and Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

3. Therefore, your role at the Conference will be that of the representative of a nation friendly to the non-Communist states primarily interested, which desires to assist, where desired, in arriving at a just settlement. You will not, however, go beyond this role.

4. If there is a cease-fire, armistice or political settlement which conforms substantially to the Seven Points referred to in the annexed Position Paper, and which is agreed to by the states primarily interested, you are authorized to make a declaration of the attitude of the United States in the form of the annexed declaration, marked Annex B. This will be a unilateral declaration, unless certain of the non-Communist states desire to associate themselves with it, in which case this is acceptable. The United States will not, however, become co-signatory with the Communists in any declaration.

5. You will note that the Position Paper states that if the terms of settlement differ materially from those set out in the Seven Points, the United States will not be asked or expected by France to respect those terms and "it may publicly disassociate itself from such differing terms."

6. In the event that you are in doubt as to whether the settlement conforms substantially to, or differs materially from, the Seven Points referred to in the Position Paper, you will seek instructions before either refusing to make the declaration contemplated by the above paragraph numbered 4 or publicly disassociating the United States as contemplated by the above paragraph numbered 5. Of course, before taking any important action which could have serious repercussions upon our international relations, you will naturally communicate with me.

7. You will avoid participation in the negotiations in any way which would imply, or give the Communists a plausible case for contending, that the United States was so responsible for the result that it is in honor bound to guarantee that result to the Communists. We apprehend that the Communists might offer to make certain concessions if the United States would then guarantee the settlement so far as they were concerned. You should, so far as possible, avoid getting yourself into a position which would lend itself to such a Communist maneuver. Accordingly, the non-Communist belligerents, rather than the United States, should be the active negotiators, and such ideas as we have should be put forward to the French or Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, as may be appropriate, and through them to the Conference if they find it desirable to adopt such ideas as their own.

8. Also, since the United States is not prepared at the present time to give any commitment that it will intervene in the war if the Geneva Conference fails—the United States position in this respect is set out in President Eisenhower's letter of June 16, 1954, to President Coty 4—you should avoid as far as possible exerting any pressures or giving advice to the French of such a character that, if there is no cease-fire, the French can plausibly contend that it is because of our advice to, or pressure upon, them, and that therefore we are morally obligated to intervene at once in a military way.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

Annex B

The Government of the United States being resolved to devote its efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations

Takes note of the Agreements concluded at Geneva on _______ (date) _______ between the _______ military commands

Declares with regard to aforesaid Agreements that

(i) it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with Art. 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain from their international relations from the threat or use of force; and

(ii) it will seek that other states which are not members of the United Nations shall similarly refrain from the use of force, in accordance with the Art. 2(6) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with insuring that states which are not members of the United Nations shall act in accordance with the principles of the Charter so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security; 8

and

(iii) it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of these agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

4 The text of President Eisenhower's letter to French President Coty, June 16, is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, pp. 353-354. The pertinent portion of the letter, the fourth paragraph, is printed in volume xxii.

8 The copy of this draft in the Dulles papers at the Eisenhower Library bears the handwritten initials of President Eisenhower indicating approval.

The following marginal notation appeared opposite paragraph (iii): "Deletion recommended by Secretary. Tosee 560." Telegram Tosee 560, July 17, read as follows: "Upon reflection and in view of reactions here, believe that Subparagraph 2 of US Declaration Annex B should, if at all possible, be eliminated as subject to misconstruction. Suggest you inform Phleger." (3961 BR/T-1754)
Secret
From: Saig M
To: Foreign Office

Cypher/OTP

Foreign Office Secret and
Whitehall Secret
(Cabinet) distribution

Sir H. Graves
No. 291
July 16, 1954

D. 11.23 a.m. July 16, 1954
R. 1.19 p.m. July 16, 1954

Immediate Secret

Addressed to Cabel Geneva Telegram No. 73 of July 16.
Repeated for information to: Foreign Office
and saying to: Washington

Your telegram No. 938 to Foreign Office.

I have the following observations.

(a) Resistance forces.

From the facts, Laotian delegation appear to consider dispersal
feasible. I assume these forces are relatively small numbers of
genuine Laotians now under Viet Mink command. If so, disarmament
should be practicable, and it is in my view, imperative. It is more
important because of the possibility that numerous Viet Minh would
try to pass for Laotians. (Please see my telegram No. 16
paragraph 6).

2. The proposal for concentration towards the Chinese
frontier sounds like Cheu En-la’s own idea uninfluenced by the
Viet Minh, who would have been more likely to think of asking for
East Hauaphan. It suggests an increase in [gp unico f Chinese]
as opposed to Viet Minh interest in the future of Laos, and deserves
watching on that account. It is a thoroughly undesirable proposition.

3. The notion of re-instating political personalities in the
administration is, I fear, characteristically amiable and
ingenious, and ought to be discouraged. The trouble near
Vientiane recently was attributable in no small measure to clandestine
activity of the former Issara who had been re-instated (though in
relatively humble capacities).
SECRET

Saigon telegram No. 297 to Foreign Office

-2-

(b) Viet Minh arms distribution.

1. I have no new information about this. It was stated last month that 21 cases of United States arms (intended for the Siamese army) had been stolen from a depot near Geben on May 26, and that 16 of these arrived opposite Vientiane on June 2. The Lastian Government had laid hands on two of them, but some others were known to have been spirited over the river and into the jungle north-east of the capital. This, though a relatively small operation, may perhaps have formed the basis of reports mentioned by the head of Lastian delegation.

5. It is difficult to suggest further conditions to safeguard the Lastians. But they ought certainly to be encouraged to attach importance to the maintenance of the French Treaty bases which are essential to any organized defence of the country. Anything that could be done along these lines, and to fester their suspicion of Communist motives, would be useful.

Foreign Office pass Immediate to Codel Geneva as my telegram No. 73 and Saving to Washington and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 80 and 85.

[Repeated to Codel Geneva and Saving to Washington and Paris].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary
Sir F. Roberts
Minister of State
Mr. Dean
Head South East Asia Department
form part of the agreement reached.

Chou En-lai said that it had always been his view that Laos and Cambodia, while retaining armed forces for their own defence, should be in a neutral position and should allow no foreign bases on their territory and conclude no military alliances with other countries. He had explained his position to the Secretary of State in this respect on their conversation of June 16. He still adhered to that position and during the last three weeks, in the course of his visit to Mr. Nehru, U Nu and Ho Chi-minh, he had worked very hard and with some success, to lay the foundations for a settlement on this basis. But if Laos and Cambodia were now to be included in a military alliance for South East Asia, then the situation would be entirely different.

The Secretary of State said that he could speak only for himself but that so far as he was concerned he knew of no intention that any of the Associated States of Indo-China should be members of the proposed South East Asia pact. But it was of course essential that the Vietminh forces should be withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia and that these two countries should be left to lead their own lives in peace. They must retain their full sovereignty subject only to such limitations as they might agree to in the context of the present negotiations.

The Secretary of State said he would be seeing Mr. Beddell Smith later in the day and would inform him of the preoccupations which Chou En-lai had expressed. The Secretary of State would then discuss the matter with Chou En-lai again.

Chou En-lai then said there was a second aspect of the matter on which he sought clarification. He had noted with pleasure the Secretary of State's reference to a Far Eastern "Locarno" in his speech in the House of Commons on June 23. He had interpreted this as meaning that the United Kingdom
supported measures designed to further collective peace in South East Asia. He had found that Mr. Nehru, U Nu and Ho Chi-minh put the same interpretation on the speech and welcomed it. They had been thinking of an arrangement in which all could join, including the United States too. But he failed to see how the Anglo-American-French plan for a South East Asian Treaty which excluded some countries could be consistent with the desire to spread peace. It could only bring about division and mutual apprehension. The fact that the plan was under American leadership was ominous.

The Secretary of State said that there were two lines of policy at the present time. The first one was to achieve a settlement on Indo-China. If a settlement was reached that all could accept, he expected that the countries participating in the conference including the United States, would make declarations of their willingness to respect and uphold the settlement. It was desirable that the Colombo countries should also make such declarations and he felt confident that they would be willing to do so. This would create in effect a "Locarno" system for Indo-China, though that name should be avoided. The States of Indo-China might be a protective pad having advantages to both sides. The second line of policy was for some countries to have their defensive alliance and he mentioned the United States, Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand, with the addition of others. This would be like the alliance between the Soviet Union and China. The idea had been under consideration for several years and he himself had long advocated it. There was already the ANZUS Pact, and the new treaty would include Australia and New Zealand and be a Treaty for South East Asia and the Western Pacific. It would be on the lines of N.A.T.O. As yet the subject was still under study.
study; no invitations had been issued to join and no terms had been drafted. But the Secretary of State confirmed to Chou En-lai that he intended to proceed on these lines and he assured him that the treaty would be defensive only and that in his opinion the United States had no aggressive intentions. The Secretary of State said that we should try to secure a good agreement for Indo-China; the creation of the South East Asia Treaty need not then cause anxiety.

Chou En-lai replied that the Sino-Soviet Treaty was directed against the revival of Japanese militarism; so was the ANZUS Treaty and for that reason he had never objected to it. The Sino-Soviet Treaty had nothing to do with South East Asia. There the situation was different. It was an area which presented special opportunities for the strengthening of peace on a collective basis and he agreed that Indo-China could become a protective pad. But an organisation on the lines of N.A.T.O. in South East Asia would increase division, apprehension and mutual suspicion, just at a time when we were trying to build an area of peace and expand it. It would split Asia as N.A.T.O. had split Europe. He was sure that the Secretary of State would realise that it would be opposed by certain countries in South and South East Asia. China would be firmly opposed to it. He himself had envisaged that not only the Geneva countries but also the Colombo countries and even others would join in a collective peace arrangement, and that there should be no mutually exclusive arrangements. He did not see how the Defence Treaty could be reconciled with the proposed Indo-China settlement.

The Secretary of State said that he saw no reason why the situation envisaged by Chou En-lai should arise. He would deplore a split in South East Asia. But a split was avoidable. He thought that the two lines of policy he had mentioned were reconcilable and complementary. The better the settlement reached
at Geneva, the less reason would there be to fear the plans for South East Asia defence.

Chou En-lai suggested that one might also argue that the more the plans for a South East Asia Treaty were pressed forward the less were the chances of securing a good settlement at Geneva.
Minutes, Conversation between Zhang Wentian and Harold Caccia, July 18, 1954

Record No. 206-C0057

Time: 12:00 p.m. – 12:30 p.m. July 18, 1954
Location: Villa of the Chinese Delegation
Chinese Participants: Zhang Wentian, Huan Xiang, Zhang Wenjin (interpreter)
British Participants: Harold Caccia, Ford

Caccia said that Eden had dispatched him because the day before Premier Zhou had mentioned certain issues regarding the Southeast Asian pact. Eden had contacted his friends and allies, and it could be said now that if the two sides could reach an agreement here, then the inclusion of the three Indo-Chinese states in the Southeast Asian pact absolutely would not be mentioned. The British side believed that in the resolution to be reached, these states would be neutralized so that they would not form any alliance with any side.

Ambassador Zhang then asked the question of foreign military bases. Caccia said that it was a different issue. But it was understood that such questions as bases, armed forces and military equipment would all be mentioned in the draft. So far as he knew, the agreement would include the following four issues: military alliances, military bases, entrance of foreign personnel from outside the country, and foreign arms and munitions. These decisions should apply to both sides. Ambassador Zhang said that Premier Zhou had stated repeatedly that the binding force is equal to both sides: China would not form an alliance with Vietnam, and the three Indo-Chinese states should not enter into any alliance with other countries.

Caccia then said that he had two questions Eden had instructed him to raise:
First was the question of Laos. Eden had heard the day before that during the French-Laos and Vietnam military talks, Vietnam had demanded that half of Laos be marked as the regroupment area. Eden asked China to look into the matter. Laos would soon come up with a counter-proposal detailing a series of regroupment areas, and everyone would recognize it as a sincere and good proposal. The United Kingdom hoped that everyone would deem this as a satisfactory solution. Caccia added that both Premier Zhou and Ambassador Zhang were aware that countries like India and Burma regarded the Laos question as a touchstone for testing whether we were serious about our work.

Ambassador Zhang said, we have not seen the proposal by Laos. As to our attitude towards the question of Laos, Premier Zhou has said that a regroupment area in northeastern Laos should be marked out, that it should be provisional, and that it would be reunified with Laos once the question of the resistance forces is solved in the future. As to the demand by the Vietnamese military representative, it was based on the status quo. They have not formally proposed a final regroupment area. Premier Zhou's opinion has not changed. The French delegation has proposed a series of smaller areas, which are quite scattered. We are not very supportive of this proposal. We are in favor of a single assembly area in the northeast.

Caccia said, a meeting is going to be held this afternoon, and many questions have yet to be solved. Time is short, too. Take two examples: acting on Premier Zhou's advice, Mendes-France went to visit Pham Van Dong and discussed the questions of demarcation and the membership of the supervisory commission. Regrettably no agreement was reached. Eden hopes that at the meeting this afternoon, the participants' attitudes will not be too stiff and polarized, which will make it even harder to solve many of the questions. Hopefully after this afternoon's meeting, everyone will come closer rather than walk farther away from each other. Mr. Ambassador certain knows that if a delegation is attacked, its friends will come out to protect it, and so it is the case with the other side. As a result, opposition groups will be formed. The Chinese delegation can rest reassured that the British delegation will never do anything to heat up the temperature, and it hopes that the Chinese delegation will adopt the same attitude.

Ambassador Zhang said, the Chinese delegation also hopes to see everyone come closer rather than standing divided, but both sides must be willing to come closer. For example, the reason why the demarcation question has dragged on is that although the Vietnamese side has conceded to the 10th parallel, the French side still insists on the 18th parallel. If France could adjust its attitude, things would be much easier.

Caccia said, France feels that its concessions in the north could not be compensated by the Vietnamese concession from the 13th parallel to the 16th parallel.

Ambassador Zhang said, this is the opinion from the French perspective. In Vietnam's view, they have made much greater concessions, giving away their traditionally controlled zones. Both sides say that they have made enough concessions, and the question now is how to solve the problem.
Caccia said, France's basic attitude is that in no circumstances should Route 9 leading to Laos be controlled by Vietnam completely and unrestrictedly. Fortunately this route does not fall on the 18th parallel, otherwise we would all have to buy our return tickets home.

Ambassador Zhang said, there is also the question of the Neutral National Supervisory Commission. This question has been under discussion for a long time, and the other side has not explicitly stated its attitude,

Caccia said, at the talk between the British, French and Soviet Foreign Ministers yesterday, Eden has said that he was personally prepared to agree to have seven member states: one communist state, one non-communist state, and five Colombo states. Despite the rather large number of states, some of them could not supply many people. He emphasized that their side had made concessions concerning two principle issues: 1. agreeing to have a communist state as a member, and 2. agreeing to require a unanimous vote on certain issues in the voting procedure. He heard that the other side might accept this new proposal, and Molotov said he would discuss it with Pham Van Dong. Due to late time, it has not been discussed yet. Eden also mentioned a point that would have impact on both sides, which was that choosing yet another state from the Colombo states would be difficult and unfavorable to both sides, or at least the UK thought so.

Ambassador Zhang said, we have chosen two states. Moreover, the fewer the states, the easier it is for our work.

Caccia said, these states, particularly Sri Lanka, supplied many people.

Ambassador Zhang asked what to do with the specific date for elections. If a deadline is not set, it would be hard to explain to the Vietnamese people. With a specific date, the Vietnamese people could feel hopeful.

Caccia said, we all have to be realistic, and it is better not to promise something that one cannot reasonably accomplish. In fact, even without wars, countries such as India took two to three years to hold elections. He admitted that a specific date would be encouraging. He said, another solution would be to set no definite date but stipulate that "after the armed forces are assembled, a meeting shall be held by the elections commission, a neutral nations commission, or a certain institution to determine the date for elections." Every country has its own experience regarding elections. For example, China has its own experience, France has post-World War II experience, and the UK has experience in the elections in India and Burma.

Ambassador Zhang said, our proposal for a definite date is not merely based on China's experience, but we have also sampled experience from various sides. Once a date is set, there is a goal, and the Vietnamese could see that the reunification of Vietnam is being brought about. Without a definite date, the Vietnamese would have no idea when the elections are postponed to, and when they cannot see good prospects, the people will begin to doubt.

Caccia asked Ambassador Zhang whether he felt that between the two proposed solutions, the former was better, even if the date for elections was far away, for a realistic time had to be found.

Ambassador Zhang said, a definite date has to be set. If we refer to everyone's experience, we can always find a realistic time. Time, after all, cannot be unrealistic.

In the end, Ambassador Zhang said that he would brief Premier Zhou on the talk. Caccia asked the Ambassador to also convey the opinions on elections to Premier Zhou, and hoped that the meeting in the afternoon would not be too heated up.

Translated for CWHIP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWHIP.
Telegram, Zhong Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee, Regarding meeting with Tep Phan, July 18, 1954

Record No.: 206-Y0051

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

On the 17th Cambodian Foreign Minister Tep Phan came to see me with the documents pertaining to the introduction of foreign armaments into Cambodia and the election [in Cambodia]. I focused on two points in my talk with him.

1. To the principle that foreign military bases should not be established in Cambodia, and that Cambodia should not participate in foreign military alliances, Mendes-France, Eden, Nehru, U Nu, and President Ho Chi Minh all expressed their agreement. However, after the Paris conference, it was reported that the United States wanted to absorb the three countries of Indochina into its alliance system in Southeast Asia, which had worried us. Tep Phan said that if they felt that the security of their country was facing threats, perhaps they would consider making an alliance with other countries. He also expressed that they wanted the help of the United States for training their personnel.

2. I said that the resistance force of Cambodia should be incorporated into the forces of the Kingdom, and should not be purged or discriminated against, and that the government of the Kingdom should unite with them, and should help find outlets for them, otherwise the war would not stop. Tep Phan said that because of the budgetary limits of the state the resistance force could not be absorbed, and that there should be ways for the civil personnel [of the resistance force] to join the government within the sphere of the constitution. Tep Phan said that to guarantee absorbing all of them was a question concerning Cambodia's sovereignty, therefore, Cambodia was only willing to issue a unilateral statement, rather than to follow the form of [entering] an international agreement.

Zhou Enlai
July 18, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Minutes, Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Sananikone (Summary), July 18, 1954

Records No: 206-Y0008

Time: July 18, 12:30 am to 12:45 pm
Place: Prime Minister Zhou Enlai's residence
Attendees on the Chinese side: Zhou Enlai, Li Kenong, Dong Ninguo, (interpreter)
Attendees on the Laotian side: Sananikone (Foreign Minister), ? (Secretary of Defense), Thao Lynam (Director of General Office of the Foreign Ministry).

Sananikone: In our last meeting, the Prime Minister said that you were willing to help us solve problems, therefore I came to ask for your help today. We met with Mr. Pham Van Dong yesterday and the day before yesterday. We believe that there is no problem concerning the military issue we cannot overcome. There are differences on political issue. Mr. Pham Van Dong said that first we must seriously recognize the existence of the resistance movement. Then we can delimit concentration areas and establish independent administrative organization. This is not different from dividing our territory, and it is in fact the division of the country. It is difficult for us to accept it. Our secretary of defense also attended the meeting. Now I would like to ask him to convey our opinions to the Prime Minister.

? : Mr. Sananikone said before that Laos is a small country and wants to have a peaceful and friendly existence. Regarding the issue of restoring peace, we are willing to try our best to make the biggest compromise. We admit that there is a resistance movement. However, we have to point out that the resistance movement does not have a lot of influence and only has two to three thousand people. In addition, the existence of the resistance movement is based on support from the Vietnamese. Mr. Pham Van Dong suggested that the king should appoint some administrative officials based on suggestions from the resistance movement. This is not suitable to our constitution. We agreed to delimit some concentration areas and to establish several joint committees and a central committee in these areas.

During the time when we wait for elections, joint committees can function as a united government. We are willing to consider all suggestions. However, we cannot accept the plan to divide the country. We will be truly appreciative if the Prime Minister could consider our situation.

Sananikone: Right now what we need to achieve is the conciliation of all the Laotian people. It is not a [true] conciliation if we cannot live together, and we have to be separated in two different regions after the armistice. Therefore, the disadvantage of the concentration areas is bigger than the advantage. I used to ask Mr. Pham Van Dong that why they argued that we should divide [the country] like this. We all need to conduct propaganda activities throughout the country freely during the elections. If we delimit concentration areas, it will be impossible to conduct such activities. Also, they can keep cadres and weapons. They should be able to accept our plan.

Mr. Souphanouvong has many strengths, and we all know that well. He graduated from Paris Industrial University. There are very few talented people like him in Laos. We believe that after the elections, he will surely get the most honorable position in the government. He can even be our prime minister.

Zhou Enlai: Thank you both for informing me of these situations. I would also like to give some of my opinions.

The Laotian issue can be divided into two parts to discuss: the internal one and the external one. We worked hard in June to suggest that the Vietnamese, Volunteers forces and French Union forces should be withdrawn from Laos. We can then begin preparation after the above principles are decided. It is a good thing to confirm these principles in the armistice agreement on Laos. I said in my statements on June 16th and 19th, and also in my conversation with the Foreign Minister on the 21st, that we hope that Laos will not allow foreign countries to establish military bases in its territory or to form military alliance with foreign countries. We hope to see Laos become a peaceful, independent, unified, and friendly country with all others. (Omission—editor) We are neighbors. We are happy to see such a situation. It will also make us feel relieved. We believe that these points should be written into the draft agreement presented by the French delegation. However, France did not agree. This is not right. The Foreign Minister also said before that Laos would not allow foreign countries to establish military bases and would not join any foreign military group. Our common desire like this still should be achieved. Then the armistice agreement can (eventually) be reached.

Regarding the internal issue, the resistance forces of Laos should recognize the royal united government; and the royal government should recognize the resistance forces. The number of [the troops] is not an important issue. You said that there are two or three thousands of them. We think that there are more than that. It is important to contact them and then decide concentration areas. We have already read the eleven points presented in the draft of the Laotian armistice agreement. The concentration areas are scattered in upper, central and lower Laos, and it is too spread out. It might because you think that the concentration areas proposed by Vietnam are too large. [However, such] a distribution of [concentration areas] will make all parties anxious and may even cause local conflict. Therefore, we believe that big areas are better than small ones. I have already discussed this with the Foreign Minister, Mr. Mendes-France and Mr. Eccle. [You] should delimit a concentration area in Northeast Laos and establish a joint...
committee to deal with mutual and local relations. After the elections, the resistance movement [should] be able to join the royal government. This is a good way to handle it.

As far as I know, no one has ever considered Laos as Vietnam. The delineation of concentration areas is simply a temporary idea. Laos only has one royal government. This is not the division of the country. After the withdrawal of all foreign forces, Laos can therefore become a peaceful, independent and unified country. Pots around [Laos] will still be supervised in the future. Therefore, Laos's security can be guaranteed. During the armistice period, defensive weapons that Laos needs to introduce can be decided through negotiations. The Foreign Minister said on June 16 that [members of] the Resistance will be able to enjoy all civil rights and will be accepted to work [for the government]. This is very good. Resistance forces mostly have fought the French troops. Now we need to help them and unite them. It will be great if the royal government and Mr. Souphanouvong can meet in Laos and deal with these issues. You should start uniting them not only after the elections but also before the elections. Since Laos is a small country, it should try even harder to unite all forces within the country. I think that Mr. Pham Van Dong also shares the same thoughts.

Sananikone: I appreciate the Prime Minister's invaluable advice. It is a good basis for us to carefully consider [those issues]. We have discussed with Mr. Pham Van Dong the meeting between our prime minister and his brother. [We believe this] if the military conference here does not make any progress it will not be effective, even if they meet in Laos. However, if the Prime Minister believes that it is the right time for the brothers to meet, we are willing to help. In sum, our prime minister is very willing to talk with his brother directly.

Zhou Enlai: It is best [if they] can discuss internal issues directly. Mr. Pham Van Dong is simply the representative of the Lao resistance movement and cannot discuss the details. Therefore, the sooner the better it is that they meet locally. You are family, there will not be any problems you cannot solve. Isn't it great to have all forces of the country unified under the royal government and have all the people of the country support the government in the future?

Sananikone: Regarding the issue of military bases, as we discussed last time, the Laotian-French agreement allowed France to keep two bases in Laos. Mr. Bidault stated at the conference that if Laos requests that France withdraw its troops from Laos, France is willing to do so after the withdrawal of the Vietminh troops. Therefore, if we ask French troops to withdraw, they will not refuse. However, we want to ask France to withdraw the majority of its troops and keep a few personnel to fulfill security needs. If the Prime Minister thinks that [we] should not allow the French Union troops to stay in Laos, and France is also willing to withdraw troops, then France should express its opinions at the conference. We are willing to accept that. We will follow the agreement. However, if France wants to abandon it, we will not oppose it, either.

Zhou Enlai: What kind of agreement is the Laotian-French agreement?

Sananikone: It is the agreement we signed in October 1953. Laos joined the French Union based on this agreement. If Laos is invaded, France is to provide protection. However, if the armistice agreement can be guaranteed by all participants of the conference, even by the participants of the Colombo Conference, then we will not necessarily need a guarantee from France. We think that France does not have many interests in keeping a great number of troops in Laos after the armistice since France is having economic difficulties.

I would like to ask another question. If we accept the principle of delimiting concentration areas, what areas does the Prime Minister think they should be? I hope that the Prime Minister can briefly talk to us about that so that we can consider [this issue better].

Zhou Enlai: The details should be negotiated by the Laotian military commission. I said on June 21 that concentration areas could be delimited in two provinces in Northeast Laos and should not be scattered in eleven places in upper, central and lower Laos. If so, central and lower Laos can be stabilized. [You] should not [keep] too many troops there. They can be merged into the royal army or policy forces. Some of them can also be demobilized. This is only a tentative idea. What I said in June is still effective now. Some of the problems can be solved here, the others should be discussed in Laos. Regarding the issues of military bases and military alliance, we most oppose American bases and military alliance with the United States. I think you all know this.

Sananikone: The Laotian government has never been formally informed about these issues. We simply learned from newspapers that the United States is planning to establish a Southeast Asia defense alliance, which will include the three countries of Indochina. However, we do not have such a thought. I have said so to many journalists.

Zhou Enlai: If the conference can reach an agreement, then we all should join together to guarantee that there will be no instance of conflict inside Laos and Cambodia. We hope that Laos and Cambodia become peaceful neutral areas and do not join any international military groups. Otherwise, the restoration of peace will become meaningless. (Omission- editor)

Sananikone: If all countries join together to sign [the agreement], Laos will therefore have a guarantee and should not join any military groups.

Zhou Enlai: Perhaps you will think that China is a big country and should be anxious [about us]. However, after the peace agreement has been reached, the Kingdom of Laos will be a unified country through elections. We are willing to establish a friendly relationship with Laos. The Five Principles [of Peaceful]
Coexistence we referred to before can also apply to the relationship between us. We are also willing to make the same statement and will keep our promise. We do not want to threaten anyone, we do not want to be threatened by anyone, either.

Sananikone: Thank you very much for this very interesting conversation. We will go back and consider carefully the points to which the Prime Minister referred. We will be back after we have reached some conclusions. We know that the Prime Minister is very busy, and we have already taken up too much of his time, please excuse us.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
agreement, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, namely:

(a) Refusal by the armed forces of one party to escort the movements provided for in the regroupment plan;
(b) Violation by the armed forces of one of the parties of the regroupment zones, territorial waters, or airspace of the other party;

The decisions of the international commission must be unanimous.

16. If one of the parties refuses to put into effect a recommendation passed by the international commission, the commission shall consider the conditions under which the parties address themselves to the guarantors. If the international commission does not reach an opinion within 30 days or if the decision provided for in Article 15, it will submit a majority report and one or more minority reports to the guarantors. The international commission will address itself to the guarantors in all cases where its activity is being hindered.

17. The international control commission will be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indochina in order that it should be able to fulfill the tasks provided for in Article 9.

18. The international commission for control and supervision in Vietnam will act in close connection with the international control commissions in Cambodia and Laos. A body for coordinating the activities of these commissions will be set up by agreement among them, in the form of a coordination international commission for control and supervision in Indochina.

19. The coordination international commission for control and supervision in Indochina will adopt decisions concerning a progressive decrease in the activities of the international commissions for control and supervision in Laos and Cambodia, taking into account the evolution in Vietnam. These decisions will be adopted unanimously.

SMITH

JULY 19, 1954

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 306

Memorandum by the Advisor to the United States Delegation (Divan)

CONFIDENTIAL

[GENEVA, JULY 19, 1954.]

COMMENTS ON VIETMINH DRAFT ARMISTICE AGREEMENT FOR VIETNAM

1. Vietminh draft is based on French draft, follows its organization, and in many cases borrows whole paragraphs.

2. It establishes a single military demarcation line but does not say where.

3. It requires transfer of all forces of both sides to their respective sides of the line within 180 days. (French draft provides for 300 days.)

INDOCHINA

4. It omits any reference to intermediate regroupment zones as French draft covers so completely, and calls instead for withdrawal in two stages—air and naval forces and two-thirds of the ground forces during first three months, balance in last three months. Draft leaves up to the representatives of the two commands on the spot to work out further details.

5. It provides that turnover of civil authority between each side begins at the outset of the withdrawal and transfer of troops, specifically requiring that such transfer of control to the Viet Minh be completed within 60 days and of Hanoi within 180 days.

6. It permits transfer of civilians from one zone to the other.

7. It prohibits introduction into Vietnam of reinforcing military personnel (although permitting individual and small unit rotation), except during 180 days period of evacuation.

8. It prohibits introduction of reinforcing arms and ammunition (but permits piece for piece replacement only during period between completion of transfer of forces and withdrawal of foreign forces).

9. Neutral control commission to observe and inspect reliefs and replacements at specific ports of entry.

10. It prohibits creation of new military bases and reinforcement of existing bases, and reestablishment of old bases.

Draft is exceedingly vague on details and phasing of regroupment of forces, leaving details to two commanders to work out. It appears constructed so as to permit the spirit of the agreement to be violated through implication of the letter.

It calls for transfer of forces in a time period less than that French say is needed to evacuate Delta in orderly fashion.

[Attachment]

SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS OF VIETMINH DRAFT ARMISTICE PROPOSAL FOR VIETNAM

Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zones

1. Provides for provisional military demarcation line and 10-kilometer demilitarized zone.

2. Location of line to be indicated on attached map.

3. Forces of both sides to be regrouped on either side of the line within 180 days after armistice comes into effect.

Principles for Implementation of Armistice Agreement

1. Establishes principle of simultaneous ceasefire throughout all Indochina as of (blank) hour and date.

* Not printed.
shall be made for the "peaceful humane transfer, under international supervision, of those people desiring to be moved from one zone to another of Vietnam." Numbered paragraph (b) was not in our view adequately spell out this provision, and paragraphs (a) and (c) lay too much stress on rights of French and foreign nationals.

DULLES

396.1 GE/7-1554: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1954—6:37 p.m.

Tosec 553. For Under Secretary from Secretary. There is rising concern which found utterance at my hearing today with Foreign Relations Committee that vast amounts of war matériel from US will fall into hostile hands. I hope that you will have the opportunity to emphasize to French importance of cease-fire terms which will permit safeguarding or at least destroying this matériel.

Hearing as a whole went well and there was no expressed criticism of your return to Geneva.

DULLES

1 Drafted by the Secretary of State.

396.1 GE/7-1554: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 16, 1954—7 p.m.

Secto 626. Repeated information Paris 73, Saigon 44. Saw Chauvel this afternoon. He told me that Mendes-France and Molotov had dinner last night, and Soviets had launched into substantive discussion even before cocktails were served and continued throughout dinner, and Mendes-France and Molotov had discussion following dinner with only interpreters present which lasted more than 3 hours until almost 1 a.m. Discussion covered whole range of outstanding questions at least once; according to Chauvel some of them "twenty times." Chauvel said Mendes had stuck firmly to French positions and with very minor exceptions of elections mentioned below, Molotov had, while being very pleasant, not budged an inch. On elections Molotov finally made suggestion that conference agree on date by which two governments of Vietnam would have decided date for elections. Mendes rejected this. Chauvel's assessment was that Communists expected to find Mendes "soft", are somewhat confused at his firmness, and are still testing him.1

There have been no other major developments. I called Chauvel's particular attention to paragraph 3 of position paper on Indochina agreed at Paris and noted that French were still using term "guarantees powers" in draft armistice, and asked how he perceived the situation in this regard. He said that he conceived guarantee to be more than that embodied in French draft of conference declaration (Seeto 597'). I pointed out that position paper made it clear that US will express its position unilaterally or in association only with non-Communist states, and was not quite sure how French concept of conference declaration fitted therewith. I said I had particularly instructed Bonsal reserve our position on last paragraph of French draft providing for consultation among conference powers on reports of violations by supervisory commission. Although I had no instructions on subject, I did not believe US would be willing assume continuing obligation consult with all conference powers including Communist China and Viet Minh. Chauvel said that in light of paragraph 3 of position paper, French draft provided only for conference "noting" armistice agreement.

Chauvel said French were concerned over reports continued contacts between Tran Van Do and Dong. They did not know exactly what was happening, they know very little about Do, but they had impression he was unsophisticated and might be "taken into camp" by Dong. They felt after zones between denoted and two governments each clearly responsible for own territories, such contacts would probably be desirable and necessary, but in present situation might be dangerous and could even result in surprise move bringing about something in nature of coalition government. Chauvel said De Jean was going to see Bao Dai to determine what Bao Dai knew about the matter and whether he had approved.

In reply to my question on what French conceived to be major outstanding issues, Chauvel listed: (1) military demarcation line in Vietnam, (2) regrouping in Vietnam, particularly in delta area, where Chauvel said Viet Minh would be required to move out two divisions from areas that they now occupied so as permit separation from French-Vietnamese forces. In Laos he said major question was reten-

1 With respect to this meeting the U.S. Delegation reported to the Department of State in telegram Secto 621, July 16, as follows: "Latournelle today told us that in course of dinner meeting with Molotov last night, Mendes-France gave complete statement of French positions on Indochina settlement. Molotov listened attentively and courteously but gave no indication of any yielding from previously assumed Communist positions. According to Latournelle, Molotov behaved like a "feather bed." (396.1 GE/7-1554)

2 Dated July 13, p. 1535.
tion small number French troops there (consideration was being given to “changing their flag” from French to Laos), and also political questions in Laos. He said there were no major issues on Cambodia.

Chaurel also mentioned international control and asked whether I had any new instructions on subject. I said I had not and subject had not been discussed at Paris in any detail.

UK informed me today that meeting was proposed this afternoon between Mendes, Eden and Molotov to go over present stage of work of conference and make catalogue of work to be done. They asked whether I wished to be present, pointing out if US were present Soviets would probably insist on presence of Chinese, thus turning meeting into “five-power affair”. I replied that I had no objection to their going ahead on three-power basis.  

JOHNSON

2 See telegram Secto 632, July 17, p. 1408.

396.1 GE/T-1654 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

TOP SECRET
WASHINGTON, July 16, 1954—7:38 p.m.

Toese 555, Secto 597. US position is still that it will not negotiate and sign with Communist bloc any multilateral declaration on Geneva conference or on any agreement issuing therefrom.

With respect French draft we note with concern political content particularly commitment to hold elections in Vietnam at time to be chosen by “competent representative authorities”.

Final paragraph draft appears contemplate perpetuation of conference through imposing on participant states obligation to act as referee on matters submitted by International Control Commissions. This seems be off-hand manner of changing such states with obligation to “guarantee” Geneva settlement which US not prepared accept.

Following comments apply to numbered paragraphs Soviet counter-proposal Secto 615  and Working Group comments Secto 617:

1) Agree with USDel comment.

2) Agree with Working Group amendment. Soviet recognition of territorial integrity of Vietnam indicates they have no doubt as to who would win any elections held as early as June 1955.

3) It would be interesting know exactly what this paragraph signifies to Soviets. Is this paragraph and its French counterpart intened to include formal diplomatic recognition all around? How are Vietnam and the Vietminh regimes to be accommodated within this formula?

4) Who are the “parties”: military commands? In the Working Group comment on this paragraph what is meant by “representative authority”?

5) Again who are the “parties”? Will Russians openly acknowledge that paragraph applies to Vietminh also?

6) This paragraph is of great interest to US because of prospective Southeast Asia security pact. In its present form it is accordingly wholly unacceptable to us. Do Russians mean it to be applicable to Vietminh also?

7) What is meant by second sentence? Who are “the interested parties”?

8) Agree with French comment. We note that under this proposal elections would have taken place before expiration 380 days French propose as period for separating opposing forces (Gento 81).  

9) We consider this paragraph irrelevant and objectionable.

10) As received this paragraph says authorities must not “permit” individual or collective collaboration. We assume this should read “punish” and agree with French comment.

11) Would implementation of this paragraph on movement of persons be left to chance?

12) Department’s comment on similar French proposal applies. Laloy’s remark on this subject is not clear.

It strikes us that Soviets in this draft have done masterly job of masking existence of Vietminh.

We agree with Laloy’s three numbered objections stated at beginning of message.

Question of financing will be taken under advisement.

DULLES

* Dated July 15, p. 1382.

394.1 GE/T-1654 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET
WASHINGTON, July 16, 1954—8:14 p.m.

Toese 557. Secto 618. US-UK seven points given Prime Minister Diem in Secretary’s message  were edited to eliminate references to Laos and Cambodia and states of general terms territorial conditions as they affect Vietnam. Mention of enclave in northern delta purposely eliminated since condition was softened by phrase “if possible” and  

* Drafted by Sturm of FE/P&G and Guillot of S/P. Repeated to Saigon as telegram 210 and to Paris as telegram 215.

* Dated July 16, p. 1382.

* For text, see telegram 4663 to Paris, June 28, p. 1256.

* For text, see telegram Toese 559, July 10, p. 1224.
outside of Cambodia a large number of people of Cambodian racial origin. For this reason Cambodia makes a general reservation.

Vietnamese representative (Chau) emphasized need for leaving imprecise duration of pre-electoral period in Vietnam.

UK (Aller) and US (Bonsal) expressed view new text represented considerable progress. US position on not participating in consultation with other conference members regarding questions transmitted to them by international control commission was reiterated.

After meeting, Bonsal endeavors to make clear to Cambodian delegates that it would not be possible practically to guarantee Cambodian security through any mechanism composed of conference members and subject to Community veto. He stated that Cambodian security would have to be insured through other means which he was confident US and other interested countries looked forward to discussing with Cambodian Government once satisfactory cessation of hostilities achieved. Such caution to be satisfactory must not bind hands of Cambodian Government or prevent it from cooperating with other non-Communist states in defense matters.

JOHNSON

396.1 GE/7-1564: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET  PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 10, 1954—11 p.m.

Secto 628. Repeated information Paris 74, Saigon 46. Following is unofficial translation of French redraft of proposed conference declaration prepared following discussion of Soviet draft Secto 615 and Secto 617: 1

"1. The conference takes note of the agreements which terminate hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam and which organize international control and supervision of the implementation of the provisions of these agreements.

2. The conference is pleased to see peace re-established in Cambodia and Laos, which countries, following the placing in effect of the provisions contemplated in this declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities, will be able thereafter to take up, without obstacle, in full independence and sovereignty, their role in the peaceful community of nations.

3. The conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos with reference to their intent of adoption measures which will permit all citizens to take their place in the national community and, especially, re their intentions to proceed to general elections with secret ballot which will take place in accordance with the constitution of each of these countries, with respect for fundamental liberties. 2

4. The conference also takes note of the declarations of these governments according to which, (text to be drafted on the basis of the declarations of the Governments of Laos and of Cambodia re their defense needs).

5. The conference notes that the agreement concerning Vietnam has as its essential goal the settlement of military questions in order to put an end to hostilities, but does not prejudge the solution of other problems related to the definitive restoration of peace in Vietnam. It expresses the conviction that, following the placing in effect of the provisions contemplated in this declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, Vietnam will be able to take up without obstacle, in full independence and sovereignty its role in the peaceful community of nations.

6. The conference declares that the settlement of political problems in Vietnam must be carried out on the basis of respect for the principles of the independence, the unity, and the territorial integrity of Vietnam. This agreement must permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental liberties guaranteed by democratic institutions formed following free elections by secret ballot which will take place under the control of an international commission, composed of representatives of the states' members of the International Control Commission set up by the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, when, in the opinion of the competent representative authorities in each zone, the restoration of peace in the country has made sufficient progress and all the necessary conditions are present in order to permit the free expression of the national will.

7. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities meant to assure the protection of persons and property must be applied in the strictest fashion and particularly must permit everyone in Vietnam to decide freely as to the zone where he wishes to live.

8. The conference notes the declaration of the Government of the French Republic according to which that government is prepared to withdraw its troops from the territories of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam at the request of the governments concerned.

9. The conference notes the declarations of the French Government according to which the settlement of all the problems related

* In telegram Secto 620, July 17, the U.S. Delegation transmitted to the Department of State a new redraft paragraph 3 that the delegation had received from the French. The text of paragraph 3 now read as follows:

"The conference notes the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos with reference to their intent of adopting measures which will permit all citizens to take their place in the national community, especially by participating in the next general elections which, in accordance with the constitution of each of these countries, will take place with secret ballot, and with respect for fundamental liberties." (396.1 GE/7-1564)

1 Dated July 15, p. 1384.
2 Dated July 15, p. 1376.
to the restoration and to the strengthening of peace in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam is based upon respect for the independence, the sovereignty, the unity and the territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

In its relations with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, each of the members of the Geneva conference (without prejudice to its political, military, diplomatic or other relations with the states concerned at the time of the signature of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities) undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the said states and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

10. The members of the conference agree to consult together on any question which may be transmitted to them by the International Control Commissions, in order to study the measures which may appear necessary to assure observance of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Indochina."

Immediately following telegram describes discussion of this draft at working level meeting today attended by France, US, UK and three Associated States.4

JOHNSON

4 Telegram Secto 627, July 10, supra.

JULY 17, 1954

SECRET

Laloy of the French Delegation tells me that there will be a meeting this afternoon between the French Delegation (Latournelle, Gros, Laloy and Cheysson) and the Viet Minh Delegation in order to go over both the draft military statements and the draft declaration. The idea is to see whether questions to be settled by Ministers can be separated from those which can be considered purely technical.

In reply to my question, Laloy told me that the Vietnam Delegation will not be represented at this meeting. While the Vietnam Delegation has participated in the military conversations, it is Laloy’s view that these are at a higher level and that there is no reason for Vietnam’s participation. (I think this is a mistake.)

1 On a copy of this document in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, OF 306, the words "these are" have been stricken and the following words inserted: "today’s meeting is ".

SECRET

Washington, July 17, 1954—2:17 p.m.

Tosec 555. We agree French redraft of proposed conference declaration transmitted Secto 628 marks some advance, subject to comments made Tosec 555.

We are however still perturbed by numbered paragraph six which says elections are to be held in Vietnam when “in opinion of competent representative authorities in each Zone” such action is feasible. Assuming “competent representative authorities” to mean governments of respective zones, we foresee almost certain disagreement between them with result that elections in Vietminh zone might take place few months hence while being delayed much longer in non-Communist zone. We fear any disagreement between zones on issue would tend to be resolved in favor Vietminh with corresponding prejudice to interests of free world. How does working group propose such situation should be dealt with?

With reference to numbered paragraph 8, would proposed French declaration state or imply French troops would be withdrawn only “at request of governments concerned” and not before or otherwise?

We agree with Bonsal’s反射s to Cambodian delegates, but we do not wish them to be left with impression US will be willing discuss question of Cambodian security only if and when satisfactory cease-fire is achieved throughout Indochina.

DULLES

[Geneva,] July 17, 1954

SECRET

Subject: Final Conference Declaration

Paragraph 10 of the current French draft declaration1 for issuance by the conference reads as follows:

"The members of the Conference agree to consult together on any question which may be transmitted to them by the international for full text, see telegram Secto 628, July 10, p. 1000.
RECORD OF A CONVERSATION
WITH CHOU EN-LAI AND PHAM VAN DONG
16 July 1954

Molotov says that he would like to inform Cdes. Chou En-Lai and Pham Van Dong about the substance of his conversations with Eden and Mendes-France which were held on 15 July.

1. Regarding the conversation with Eden.

Molotov: In a conversation with me Eden said that he had not managed to carefully study the French draft of the declaration on Indochina which we (the Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese delegations) had changed but would like to make some preliminary comments. Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are placed together in the text of the declaration. But, in Eden’s opinion, they ought to be separated and spoken of separately, inasmuch as the conditions in these countries are different. Eden was told in reply that differences really exist, but there is also much in common.

Eden stressed that, in his opinion, it is very hard to set a deadline for holding elections.

He expressed a desire to exclude military issues from the declaration and move them to the armistice agreement.

Eden further said that the representatives of Laos had complained to him that a strong movement of people and weapons into Lao territory was being observed recently and that this was causing them concern.

I replied to Eden that I was hearing this for the first time.

Chou En-Lai and Pham Van Dong say that the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of defense of Laos said nothing about this in a conversation with them.

Molotov: I told Eden that we had still not received the French text of the draft agreement about a cessation of military operations, and that the French are sending us the draft of this document in parts. Eden said that there had been some delay with this matter and that the preparation of documents now needed to be speeded up.

2. Regarding the conversation with Mendes-France.

Molotov briefly describes the substance of the conversation with Mendes-France, the main issue being elections in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the line of demarcation, and the periods for the evacuation of foreign troops.

Molotov says that as a result of the conversation with Mendes-France he had formed the impression that the French might agree to establish lines of demarcation only somewhere north of the 16th parallel.

Molotov reports the following about Mendes-France’s proposal about holding a conference of the three representatives (Eden, Mendes-France, and Molotov) and how he reacted to this proposal by Mendes-France.

Molotov asks Chou En-Lai’s and Pham Van Dong’s opinions about this issue.

Chou En-Lai says that he shares the position taken by Molotov; moreover, he thinks it advisable to agree with Mendes-France’s proposal to hold a conference of the representatives of the USSR, France, and Britain. Chou En-Lai added that it would be undesirable for us to participate in the conferences of [UN] representatives and therefore it seems inadvisable to insist on the participation of PRC representatives.

[Translator’s note: due to a reproduction error, the word/abbreviation in brackets above was partly off the page]

Pham Van Dong expresses agreement with the opinion stated by Chou En-Lai.

Molotov talks about the objections of Eden and Mendes-France against holding elections before June 1955 and asked Chou En-Lai and Pham Van Dong whether we ought to insist on our previous position on this issue or whether it would be advisable to submit new proposals in the course of the discussion. For example, to propose that elections be held in 1955 or to recommend that this formula be adopted; suggest to both sides that the issue of the timing of elections in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia be resolved no later than June 1955.

Chou En-Lai states that regarding the issue of the deadlines for holding elections it would be advisable to take the following position: insist that the Conference establish a deadline for holding elections no later than June 1955. If this proposal is rejected, then submit a new proposal - instruct that elections should be held in 1955. If this proposal, too, is not
accepted as a last position [we] ought to insist on a decision being made which provides that both parties should decide the issue of establishing the time for holding elections no later than June 1955 by agreement between themselves.

Pham Van Dong says that he agrees with the ideas expressed by Chou En-Lai.

Chou En-Lai stresses that the issue about the deadlines for holding elections was discussed by him in detail in a meeting with Ho Chi Minh and that Ho Chi Minh agreed in principle that at least the third alternative solution about the timing of elections mentioned by Chou En-Lai might be offered.

Molotov then asks what issues that Pham Van Dong intends to discuss during today's meeting with Mendes-France.

Pham Van Dong says that he intends to touch on the main issues affecting Indochina, namely the issues of the elections and the line of demarcation. Pham Van Dong added that he would insist on establishing specific deadlines for holding elections in accordance with the opinions exchanged between us and also on placing the line of demarcation along the 16th parallel.

Chou En-Lai says that we will probably succeed in reaching an agreement regarding the issues mentioned above in the near future, but one very important issue remains which ought not be lost sight of. This is the issue of the creation by the Americans of a military bloc in Southeast Asia. Chou En-Lai stressed that there are grounds to suspect that the US, Britain, and France have reached some sort of agreement in principle among themselves on this issue. If the Americans manage to draw Bao Dai's Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia into a military bloc, then the agreement we are drafting about a prohibition on creating foreign military bases on the territory of the countries mentioned will lose the importance which we are attaching to it. Chou En-Lai added that in a conversation in India with Nehru and in a conversation in Geneva with Eden, he stressed that foreign military bases must not be created on the territory of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and that Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia must not be drawn into any military alliances or blocs. Chou En-Lai asks whether Cde. Pham Van Dong ought not touch on this issue in the conversation with Mendes-France and express our position.

Molotov expresses his agreement with the opinion of Chou En-Lai and says that in conversations with Mendes-France and Eden we ought to point out the reports that exist in the press about attempts being made to create military blocs in Southeast Asia and declare that we are against such blocs. Molotov asks whether any documents needed to be tied to this.

Chou En-Lai says that the representatives of the Western powers would hardly agree to sign a particular document about this.

Molotov says that the issue of military blocs in Southeast Asia ought to be touched on during the discussion at the Geneva Conference of the text of the declaration being prepared on the issue of Indochina.

Chou En-Lai and Pham Van Dong express agreement.

Chou En-Lai says that according to information available to him Britain is working actively to create an alliance of countries in Southeast Asia which would be connected to one another by a system of treaties like Locomo. The US is trying to counter the British plan with their own plan. They are counting on a base of the group of the five powers who are taking part in a conference in Singapore, the creation of a military bloc under their aegis, including Thailand, Pakistan, Bao Dai's Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia besides those five countries. Chou En-Lai said that we must oppose the creation of military blocs in Asia, using the differences which exist between the US and Britain to do this.

Molotov and Pham Van Dong expressed their agreement with the opinion of Chou En-Lai.

Molotov asks whether during negotiations on the issue of the time to perform a regrouping of forces they ought not say that the transport of French troops from North Vietnam might be accomplished not only by sea but also via railroads and highways. He stressed that this might be used as an argument in order to insist on a reduction of the time for the regrouping proposed by the French delegation (360 days).

Chou En-Lai and Pham Van Dong say that the transport of the enemy troops from North Vietnam to the south does not seem possible in view of a whole series of circumstances (the lack of suitable roads, difficulties associated with supplying the troops with food, etc.)
Chou En-Lai then says that in a conversation with Cde. Molotov
Mendés France might touch on the issue of the period of withdrawal of
French troops from the southern regions of Vietnam. Accordingly, Chou
En-Lai would like to direct Cde. Molotov's attention to the fact that France
is counting on keeping its troops in the south of Vietnam a little longer.
Chou En-Lai said that such a delay is to our advantage inasmuch as the
presence of the French in Vietnam might serve as an obstacle to the
establishment of a military-political understanding between the Americans
and the Bao Dai administration. Chou En-Lai added that, of course, the
French troops ought to be withdrawn from Southern Vietnam before the
general elections are held there.

The conversation lasted 3 hours and 30 minutes.

Recorded by A. Ledovsky [signature]

[handwritten on the back of the last page: AVP RF Fond 06, Opis 13a,
papka 25, pp. 100-105]

FROM THE JOURNAL  Top Secret. Copy [text off the reproduced page]
OF V. M. MOLOTOV
to the restoration and to the strengthening of peace in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam is based upon respect for the independence, the sovereignty, the unity and the territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

In its relations with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, each of the members of the Geneva conference (without prejudice to its political, military, diplomatic or other relations with the states concerned at the time of the signature of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities) undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the said states, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

10. The members of the conference agree to consult together on any question which may be transmitted to them by the International Control Commission in order to study the measures which may appear necessary to ensure the observance of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Indochina.

Immediately following telegram describes discussion of this draft at working level meeting today attended by France, US, UK and three Associated States.*

*Telegram Secto 627, July 16, supra.

JOHNSON

JULY 17, 1954

75IG.00/7-1754

Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)

SECRET


Laloy of the French Delegation tells me that there will be a meeting this afternoon between the French Delegation (Latourneille, Gros, Laloy and Cheysson) and the Viet Minh Delegation in order to go over both the draft military agreements and the draft declaration. The idea is to see whether questions to be settled by Ministers can be separated from those which can be considered purely technical.

In reply to my question, Laloy told me that the Vietnam Delegation will not be represented at this meeting. While the Vietnam Delegation has participated in the military conversations, it is Laloy's view that these are at a higher level and that there is no reason for Vietnamese participation. (I think this is a mistake.)

* On a copy of this document in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 306, the words "these are" have been stricken and the following words inserted: "today's meeting is".

1 Drafted by Scumph of E/O/P/SA. Repeated to Paris as telegram 222 and to Saigon as telegram 217.
2 Dated July 16, p. 13.
3 Dated July 16, p. 17.

75IG.00/7-1754

Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal) to the Deputy United States Representative and Coordinator of the Delegation (Johnson)

SECRET


Subject: Final Conference Declaration

Paragraph 10 of the current French draft declaration for issuance by the Conference reads as follows:

10. The members of the Conference agree to consult together on any question which may be transmitted to them by the international

*For full text, see telegram Secto 628, July 16, p. 1400.
SECRET

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (U.K. DELEGATION) TO
FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTT

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WHITEHALL SECRET
(CABINET) DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden

No. 956
July 17, 1954

D. 1.00 p.m. July 17, 1954
R. 8.16 p.m. July 17, 1954

PRIORITY
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 956 of July 17.
Repeated for information to: Washington Paris
Ottawa Canberra
Wellington New Delhi
Rangoon Karachi

Chou En-lai called this morning at his request. I opened the
conversation by referring to my discussion with Molotov and
Mendès-France last night about the main issues upon which the
conference would have to reach a decision. Chou En-lai said at
once that given goodwill on both sides these could be settled, but
that it was not about these issues that he had come to speak to me.
He wished to ask me whether the meeting in Paris must be
interpreted as meaning that our plans for a South-East Asia
alliance were being pushed forward. In particular he wished to
know whether it was our intention and the American intention, that
the three Associated States of Indo-China should form part of such
an alliance. If so, the outlook for a peaceful settlement would
not be good. He feared that the Americans wished to sabotage the
work of the conference.

2. I said that there had been no new development about the
proposed South-East Asia defensive alliance, which I had myself
advocated for several years. I had already explained in the
House of Commons and elsewhere, the difference between a
Locarno-type arrangement to under-write the result of this
conference, and a South-East Asia alliance which would be the
counterpart of the Soviet-Chinese alliance. The South-East Asia
alliance was not a new project but its membership and terms had
still not been fixed. It was nothing to be alarmed about since
it would be purely defensive as was N.A.T.O.

/It would
SECRET

Geneva Conference (U. K. Delegation) telegram No. 956 to Foreign Office

-2- It would be a counterpart to the Chinese-Soviet Alliance. So far as I knew it was not the intention that the three Associated States should be members. The Americans had made it clear that they had no desire to create bases in those states. The proposed alliance would moreover not be limited to South-East Asia but would extend to the Western Pacific. The Anzus Pact already existed, and the Chinese had not complained about it.

3. Chou En-lai said that there was no parallel with the Soviet-Chinese Alliance or with the Anzus Pact. Both these pacts were directed against the revival of Japanese militarism. They had nothing to do with South-East Asia. China's policy in regard to South-East Asia was quite simple. They approved of a Locarno-type arrangement which as many states as possible would join, so that a large area of peaceful co-existence in Asia should be created. But the proposed South-East Asia Alliance would split the area just as N.A.T.O. had split Europe, and would make peaceful co-existence very difficult. He had discussed all these matters with Nehru and U Nu, and they both shared his views. As regards the three Associated States in particular they should be independent, sovereign and neutral.

4. I said that I would be talking to General Bedell Smith later today, and would explain to him Chou En-lai's preoccupations about the neutral status of the three Associated States. Meanwhile, I must repeat that there was nothing to be alarmed about in the proposed South-East Asia defence alliance. It would not be in any way incompatible with an agreement on Indo-China resulting from the present conference, with which the United States and, I hoped, Asian countries would associated themselves. The greater success there was at the conference, the less need there was to fear that such a pact would split South-East Asia. Chou En-lai replied that the smaller was the apparent danger of South East Asia being split, the better the conference was likely to succeed.

/Foreign Office
SECRET

Geneva Conference (U.K. Delegation) telegram No. 956

to Foreign Office

Foreign Office please pass to Washington, Paris, Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, New Delhi, Rangoon and Karachi as my telegrams Nos. 325, 220, 23, 26, 26, 26, 71, 76 and 104 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington, Paris and Rangoon]

[Copy sent to C.R.O. for repetition to Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, New Delhi and Karachi]
to the restoration and to the strengthening of peace in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam is based upon respect for the independence, sovereignty, the unity and the territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

In its relations with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, each of the states concerned (without prejudice to its political, military, diplomatic or other relations with the states concerned at the time of the signature of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities) undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the said states and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

10. The members of the conference agree to consult together on any question which may be transmitted to them by the International Control Commissions, in order to study the measures which may appear necessary to insure observance of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Indochina.

Immediately following telegram describes discussion of this draft at working level meeting today attended by France, US, UK and three Associated States.

JOHNSON

*Telegram Secto 627, July 16, 1954.

JULY 17, 1954

Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)

SECRET

[GENEVA], July 17, 1954.

Laloy of the French Delegation tells me that there will be a meeting this afternoon between the French Delegation (Latourelle, Gros, Laloy and Leysen) and the Viet Minh Delegation in order to go over both the draft agreements and the draft declaration. The idea is to see whether questions to be settled by Ministers can be separated from those which can be considered purely technical.

In reply to my question, Laloy told me that the Vietnamese delegation will not be represented at this meeting. While the Vietnamese Delegation is participating in the military conversations, it is Laloy’s view that these are at a higher level and that there is no reason for Vietnamese participation. (I think this is a mistake.)

1 On a copy of this document in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 306, the words “these are” have been stricken and the following words inserted: “today’s meeting is”.

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1954—1:07 p.m.

SECRET

Tosec 558. We agree French redraft of proposed conference declaration transmitted Secto 628 2 marks some advance, subject to comments made Tosec 555.2

We are however still perturbed by numbered paragraph six which says elections are to be held in Vietnam when “in opinion of competent representative authorities in each zone” such action is feasible. Assuming “competent representative authorities” to mean governments of respective zones, we foresee almost certain disagreement between them with result that elections in Vietminh zone might take place few months hence while being delayed much longer time in non-Communist zone. We fear any disagreement between zones on this issue would tend be resolved in favor Vietminh with corresponding prejudice to interests of free world. How does working group propose such situation should be dealt with?

With reference to numbered paragraph 8, would proposed French declaration state or imply French troops would be withdrawn only “at request of governments concerned” and not before or otherwise?

We agree with Bonsal’s remarks to Cambodian delegates, but we do not wish them to be left with impression US will be willing discuss question of Cambodian security only if and when satisfactory cease-fire is achieved throughout Indochina.

DULLES

1 Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA. Repeated to Paris as telegram 222 and to Saigon as telegram 217.
2 Dated July 16, p. 1400.
3 Dated July 16, p. 1389.

Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal) to the Deputy United States Representative and Coordinator of the Delegation (Johnson)

SECRET

[GENEVA], July 17, 1954.

Subject: Final Conference Declaration

Paragraph 10 of the current French draft declaration 1 for issuance by the Conference reads as follows:

"10. The members of the Conference agree to consult together on any question which may be transmitted to them by the international

1 For full text, see telegram Secto 628, July 16, p. 1400.
control commissions, in order to study the measures which may appear necessary to insure observance of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Indochina."

We have consistently taken the position that we would not consult with the Communist powers regarding matters related to Indochina after the close of the present Conference. Therefore we should either suggest that this paragraph be omitted or that it merely provide that the international commission will report to the Geneva Conference powers on such matters related to the implementation of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities as the international commission has not been able to handle.

The following wording might be appropriate in the event the latter alternative is accepted:

"10. The International Control Commission (or Commissions) will inform the members of the Conference regarding the progress of its (their) work and particularly regarding questions which appear to involve a threat to the successful implementation of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities. In the event that unanimity is not achieved in the preparation of such reports, any member or members of the Commission may communicate directly with the members of the Geneva Conference."

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396.1 GE/7-1954: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

Geneva, July 17, 1954—3 p.m.

Secto 682. Repeated information Paris 76, Saigon 48. Caccia gave Johnson brief account of Mendes-France, Eden, Molotov meeting last night. More complete account will be received and transmitted later today.1 The three met for approximately three hours, from 6 until 9 p.m.

It was agreed the following eight documents are working papers before some or all conference members: French draft cease-fire agreement on Vietnam, French draft cease-fire agreement on Laos, French draft cease-fire agreement on Cambodia, Viet Minh draft cease-fire agreement on Vietnam (not yet received by US delegation), French draft control organization for Vietnam, French draft control organization for Laos and Cambodia, declaration by Cambodia on military and political matters and similar declaration by Laos (neither country has yet presented drafts), and French-Russian drafts and counter-drafts on final declaration of conference.

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1 Telegram Secto 682, July 17, p. 1408.

Indochina

Discussion then turned to substantive issues, with Mendes listing: (1) line in Vietnam, (2) elections in Vietnam, (3) international control organization as major issues requiring ministerial decision. Molotov added (1) time required for completion regrouping; that is, French proposal for 280 days vs. Communist proposal for maximum for six months; (2) prevention of entry of arms, ammunition and foreign forces to all three states; (3) foreign bases in all three states; (4) nonentry of three states into military alliances. Eden added regroupment in Laos.

There was vigorous but inconclusive discussion on three French points, neither side moving from previously stated positions.

The Laotian delegation informs us that they had talk with Viet Minh this morning with completely negative results. The Viet Minh demand about half the country for regroupment zone for Pathet Lao and at same time that there be formed for entire country government of national unification in which Pathet Lao would be represented. These demands were rejected by Laotian delegation.

LaTourrette calls us that at Mendes-France dinner for Molotov July 15, Molotov on two occasions referred to US as "war-like power". Mendes-France denied this stating that he would not have gone to Paris to see Secretary unless he was convinced sincerity US desire for restoration of peace in Indochina on terms which Mendes-France believes acceptable and honorable.

SMITH

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*This meeting was reported in telegram Secto 626, July 16, p. 3304.

396.1 GE/7-1954: Telegram

Smith-Eden-Mendes-France Meeting, Geneva, July 17, Afternoon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

Geneva, July 18, 1954—11 a.m.

Secto 688. From the Under Secretary. Limit distribution. I met with Eden and Mendes-France at the latter's residence yesterday afternoon. Previous to Eden's arrival I had a few minutes with Mendes-France alone and gave him full background regarding my role here and regarding impossibility that US should sign any conference document with Communist powers. I read him extracts from my letter of instructions. I made clear that these applied also to current French draft of declaration to be issued by conference. I also emphasized extreme importance of evacuating military equipment in order that it should not fall into Communist hands. I said that if there were any difficulties of local evacuation from advanced posts, heavy
Minutes, Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Anthony Eden (Excerpts), July 17, 1954

Record No. 206-Y0006

Time: 11:30 a.m. – 12:40 p.m. July 17, 1954
Location: Eden’s residence
Chinese Participants: Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Li Kenong, Huan Xiang, Pu Shouchang (interpreter and note-taker)
British Participants: Anthony Eden, William D. Allen, Anthony Rumbold, Ford (interpreter)

Eden: Last night we had a talk, and I think you have learned the contents of the talk. It seems that the biggest questions are those of demarcation and the date of the elections. Other questions can all be resolved.

Zhou Enlai: Yes, Mr. Molotov has notified me. The three of you had a long talk on these two questions, and I believe a solution could be found in the end. Therefore, I would like to discuss another question with you today. It is the question of the Southeast Asian defense pact. Since the Paris talks, there has been much information from various sources, as well as a lot of publicity. Does the United States intend to sabotage the reaching of an agreement on restoring peace in Indochina with this question? Rumor has it that the three Indochinese states will be included in this pact. If this were to be so, then peace would have no meaning other than to prepare for new hostilities. So I would like to ask Your Excellency directly, for I could obtain first-hand information from Your Excellency.

Eden: There has been no sudden change regarding this question. As I have said in the Parliament, two issues are involved here.

Firstly, to be honest with you, the U.S. might not like any agreement that could be possibly reached here. But we are hoping that they will at least like it so much that they will issue a statement. This is what we are trying our best to urge them to do. Then every one of us will likewise issue a statement to support the agreement. Your Excellency mentioned that you would like the Colombo Conference countries to be involved, and perhaps they can issue a statement, too. Thus the arrangements made here could be reinforced.

Secondly, our Southeast Asia pact with the U.S.: this is a defensive arrangement. A research group is evaluating it in Washington. This is an arrangement that is symmetrical to the Sino-Soviet Alliance, and it is defensive just like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with duties exactly like those in NATO.

As to the other point you asked about, I can only give you a personal answer. So far as I understand, there has been no proposal for the three Indochinese states to join in the Southeast Asian pact, but as sovereign states they are free. They can issue statements for the conference to notice.

Many things will depend on how we solve questions here. If an arrangement could be made that is acceptable to all of us, then the atmosphere will be improved and confidence increased. I hope that Laos and Cambodia could become a “buffer” for both of us. So I hope that Your Excellency could help us obtain a guarantee that Laos and Cambodia will be independent. This way, confidence will grow.

[materials excised] It is precisely for this reason that I am delighted to hear the Premier say that the introduction of arms should be allowed into Laos and Cambodia for self-defense. This illustrates that the two countries can be independent. This has been greatly influential.

I can say with much confidence that the U.S. has no intention to establish military bases in either of the countries.

Zhou Enlai: Thank you, Mr. Eden, for your explanations. In order for an agreement to be reached on the issue of restoring peace in Indochina, this question needed to be clarified in the important stage. All efforts must come from both sides.

First of all, regarding Laos and Cambodia, our attitude has not changed since I talk with Mr. Eden on June 16th, and we will keep our promise. During the three weeks while I was away from here, my activities also highlighted this point and proved that I am making an effort for this.

We have had Mr. Eden’s repeated assurance; as Mr. Eden just said, it would benefit both sides for Laos and Cambodia to become a peace zone. In order for these two countries to become a peace zone, they must be made peaceful, independent, and friendly to all countries. The two countries must not have any foreign military bases, must not establish military alliances with other countries, and they should have guarantees from both sides, or even from various sides. If the circumstances remain unchanged as Mr. Eden and Mr. Mendès-France have promised and as Prime Minister Nehru, Prime Minister U Nu and Chairman Ho Chi Minh have witnessed, then our attitude will not change. Thus, peace in Indochina will have a basis. This is the first situation.

Another situation would be that the U.S. includes the three Indochinese states in the so-called Southeast Asian defense pact, and the United Kingdom, France, and the three Associated States have agreed to the U.S.’s requests or have made promises. In such a situation, circumstances would be different. Peace would have no other meaning than to diminish the battlefield of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for American purposes, and to prepare for new hostilities. In that case we would have to be concerned, for it would be different from our talk of June 16th.

Eden: If I remember correctly, the Americans themselves have said in past meetings that they had no intention to establish military bases in Laos and Cambodia. If you do not object, I will raise your concerns to General Smith when I see him this afternoon.

Zhou Enlai: Thank you. I would like to ask Foreign Secretary Eden to clarify whether the U.S. is already engaged in activities to include the three Indochinese states in the so-called Southeast Asia defense pact. This in principle is the same as the question of military bases.
When we discussed the questions of Laos and Cambodia on July 13th, I said that Laos and Cambodia must not have any foreign military bases and that the two countries must not enter into military alliances with foreign countries. Mr. Eden agreed with me at the time.

Eden: As I said just now, the Americans have told me that they had no intention to establish military bases in Laos and Cambodia. Of course, if the Viet Minh wants to take over Laos and Cambodia before or after an agreement could be reached, they we and the U.S. will express our concern.

I have said just now that I will confirm with General Smith to get further clarification.

Zhou Enlai: This brings us to the second question. Regarding the so-called Southeast Asian defense pact, Mr. Eden presented an argument just now that because there is an alliance between China and the Soviet Union, the U.K., the U.S. and France had to have a defense pact. But the Sino-Soviet Alliance is concerned with the revival of Japanese militarism and not with Southeast Asia. The problem in Southeast Asia is of a different character. Precisely for this reason Prime Minister Nehru and I are trying to create a peaceful region and expand it. When I was in India, both Prime Minister Nehru and I thought highly of the Southeast Asian Pact of Locarno proposed by Mr. Eden. I do not know if our interpretation is correct, but we thought that your proposal meant putting all the Southeast Asian states together to form a collective peace pact. Such a pact would not exclude anyone; if the U.S. wanted to join in, it would not be rejected. Thus regional peace could be guaranteed, and it would include not only the two sides in hostility, but also third-party states. This way we can experiment with peaceful co-existence in Southeast Asia. If Mr. Eden thinks along similar lines with Prime Minister Nehru, Prime Minister U Nu, Chairman Ho Chi Minh and me, then an opposing alliance should not be established in Southeast Asia, for it would undermine the idea of collective peace as well as the idea of the Pact of Locarno proposed by Mr. Eden. We would like to know how far Mr. Eden has gone with that effort. Of course, the U.S. opposes it, as we have read in the newspapers. But for peace in Indochina, we should try to persuade the U.S.

Eden: I have found some trouble. I used the word "Locarno," not knowing that the U.S. did not like it. I still do not know why they don't like it. They say that it belongs with things like Munich, but in fact it is not so. Mr. Churchill and I myself have always been in favor of such an idea.

This could be connected to the first part of our discussion just now. If an agreement could be reached here, and if every one issues a statement announcing their support for the agreement and opposing any sabotage of the agreement, then it would be a Locarno-style arrangement. Perhaps we should use the term "Locarno." I agree with you that not only the participating countries in the Geneva Conference, but also the Colombo Conference countries should be involved in this arrangement.

I do not see how such an arrangement would be incompatible with a NATO-style Southeast Asian pact. The Southeast Asian pact is concerned with a possible situation. An important issue at the Paris talks was to ask the Americans to come here. We hope that as a result of coming here, they will feel delighted and issue a statement to honor the agreement reached here, agree not to undermine the agreement, and to oppose anyone else’s sabotaging the agreement. Every one of us should do the same.

Zhou Enlai: If an agreement could be reached on restoring peace in Indochina, and it could have the support of not only all the participating states at the conference but also of the Colombo Conference countries or even more countries, then it would be the result of an effort for collective peace. It would also affirm the idea of a Pact of Locarno as proposed by Mr. Eden. Although the U.S. opposes this term, in essence it is so.

Given this, if an opposing alliance is formed, it would create an unstable situation. We could promote solidarity in Southeast Asia and bring about regional peace, but if an opposing alliance is established, it would only split the scene. In this regard, due to more interactions with the Associated States, Mr. Eden must know that some of these states support it but others oppose it, or at least it is so among the Colombo Conference countries. In consequence, as soon as some positive results are achieved, they would be undermined in some negative ways. This would generate fear, suspicion, opposition, disharmony, and disquiet. When I was in Delhi, I discussed this issue with Prime Minister Nehru from various perspectives, and we both believed that it would not be beneficial. At that time we thought that Mr. Eden was trying to counter a Southeast Asian defense pact with Locarno. If the two were to exist at the same time, it would be unthinkable.

Eden: It is not as bad as that. The idea of a Southeast Asian pact is an old one, it was proposed a few years ago. It is purely defensive in nature, just like NATO. As I have explained in the parliament, two things are involved here: firstly, everyone has to join in to support the agreement reached; secondly, our own defense arrangement. It should not cause concern, for just like NATO, it is defensive in nature. I do not know how many states will join in, and nothing has been drafted yet, but it does not threaten anyone, just like NATO is defensive.

I want to add that it is not just about Southeast Asia; it includes the western Pacific, for Australia and New Zealand are included. Australia and New Zealand had had prior arrangements in the ANZUS Pact. If it is to be expanded, it will not be a bad thing, but a good thing. You will agree that Australia and New Zealand will not attack others. We are confident that the U.S. will not attack others, either.

Zhou Enlai: The ANZUS pact is directed against the possible resurgence of Japanese militarism, just as the Sino-Soviet Alliance, and therefore it is somewhat grounded. This is because all these countries face the menace of Japanese militarism. But the problem in Southeast Asia is of a different character.

NATO has created confrontation in Europe, and people are looking for ways to repair the damage. NATO has made it difficult to achieve peaceful co-existence. Now the possibility exists in Southeast Asia, but some people want to create disharmony. We not only disdain it but also oppose it. Prime Minister Nehru, Prime Minister U Nu and Chairman Ho Chi Minh all have similar feelings. We are all very pleased by the British effort here, for it brings close together the Southeast Asian countries, and therefore we welcome it. We also welcome the improvement in Sino-British relations. But the creation of disharmony separates us. It brings trouble, and it is not beneficial to future development. Undoubtedly
the people in Southeast Asia oppose it just like we do, for it will generate fear and suspicion.

Eden: The idea of this pact has no new content. Six years ago I myself urged for NATO. When Mr. Dulles visited London this April, we openly expressed our support for this idea. Therefore there have been no sudden or bad changes. The better our relations here, the less reason there is for making defensive arrangements elsewhere. I am above all opposed to the creation of disunity.

Zhou Enlai: I agree with what your last sentence. Hardly had we promoted peace here when someone is trying again to create disunity. Our attitude towards the Paris talks is this: if they create disunity, then we oppose them; if they invite Smith to come back, then we welcome them. If they bring about disunity in Southeast Asia, then we oppose them. We are in favor of peace and against disunity. This is our attitude.

Eden: The Southeast Asian pact is not a new idea, and it was not invented at the Paris talks but has been around for some time. I have just said that the better we do things here, the less we need to consider defensive arrangements.

Zhou Enlai: You can say that sentence in reverse: if someone tries to create disunity, it would bring trouble to achieving peace.

Eden: In any event, relations between our countries are good. Please do not worry about this.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Minutes, Zhou Enlai’s Meeting with Mendés-France (Excerpt), July 17, 1954

Record No. 206-Y0007

Time: Beginning at 4:45pm, 17 July 1954
Location: Mendés-France’s Mansion
Chinese participants: Zhou Enlai, Li Kenong, Wang Bingman, and Dong Ningchuan (translator)
French participants: Pierre Mendés-France, Jean Chauvel, Jacques Guilleminaz, and one translator

Zhou Enlai: Our opinions are gradually getting closer now. We don’t have much time, and we should reach some solutions fast. At the present, the two issues that have had the most debates over are how to draw the line and when to hold the election. I talked to Mr. Prime Minister during the last two meetings that we wanted to push the conference forward for a settlement. (Omitted—editor) Now there are two problems remained. The three-person talks tonight and the meeting between Mr. Prime Minister and Mr. Pham Van Dong should find some solutions. However, I’d like now to discuss another problem, that is, the so-called the defense organization of Southeast Asia.

After the Paris meeting, there is some recent propaganda that the United States intends to organize a Southeast Asian group, and that it also push the three countries in Indochina to participate in the organization. That is much different from what Mr. Mendés-France, Mr. Eden, and I have been talking about. This problem causes our concerns. Our desirability is that a restoration of peace will be realized in Indochina, and that Laos and Cambodia will become peaceful, independent, friendly, and neutral countries. If they join America’s alliance and establish American bases, then the restoration of peace becomes meaningless. It will increase America’s influence, and decrease the influence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This is not beneficial for the Indochina’s people and French people. According to our conversations in the past meetings, I think it shouldn’t happen like this. But there are so many rumors out there, as if Paris has some kind of promise. Thus, I’d like to talk to Mr. Prime Minister directly and frankly.

Mendés-France: I appreciate Mr. Premier recalls our conversations in the past meetings, and intends to maintain a consistent stand. I also want to maintain my previous stand.

After our two meetings, as Mr. Premier knows, we have some situations. Our deadline—I should say my deadline—is now coming soon.1 But we still face many difficulties.

Zhou Enlai: I can’t talk about this issue in details. It should be dealt with directly by Mr. Pham Van Dong and Mr. Prime Minister. Mr. Prime Minister had said that the current problems are not only to draw the line, but also including the political problems. I have told this to Mr. Pham Van Dong and Mr. Molotov. I guess that it may be easier to solve the two problems if we can connect them together. Tonight meeting may bring us some results.

Mendés-France: I can now respond to Mr. Premier’s concerns about the alliance of Southeast Asia. I think it unnecessary for Mr. Premier to worry about this. The Paris meeting did not consider any kind of alliance of Southeast Asia to include the three countries of Indochina. As far as I know, the United States does not have any attempt to establish any military base in Indochina. Therefore, we don’t need to worry about any change to our previous position in the past meetings. Certainly, if the war can’t be stopped, there will be different stories. If the cease-fire becomes a reality, some country may come up with its own, separate statement to strengthen its original positions. Nevertheless, I want to make sure with Mr. Premier that we do not consider any alliance of Southeast Asia to include the three countries of Indochina. Please trust me, this is my word without any reservation.

Zhou Enlai: Thank you for your explanations. What we hope to see is the expansion of a peaceful region. If the United States fixes an alliance of Southeast Asia, including the three countries of Indochina, then, all of our efforts to push these compromises will become fruitless. That is why I want to mention my concerns.

Mendés-France: The best way to consolidate future peace is to solve the current problems reasonably. If Laos can be an example, we hope that Laos can join the French Union, and that it won’t sign any military pact with other countries. Following the regulations under the French-Laos agreements, no foreign military base is established there. But Laos’ problems remain unsolved. The Vietnamese Government proposed some unrealistic requests. They suggested their regrouping area from north to south nearly 1,000 kilometers. It is difficult to accept. I hope Mr. Premier can give Mr. Pham Van Dong some advice as you did in many occasions and ask him to make more realistic considerations.

Zhou Enlai: It is proper to discuss the Laos problems with Vietnam’s problems such as drawing the line and election. We have read the draft of the second political statement of the French Delegation. We think it should include these issues such as no establishment of foreign military base and no military alliance with foreign countries. I have mentioned this in my speeches on 16 and 19 June. Otherwise, there won’t be any guarantee.
It is said that the French military representatives have drafted a cease-fire proposal for Laos. It requests that, after the foreign troops withdraw, the local resistant forces should regroup at certain points. Vietnam, however, asks for some determined areas for the regrouping of the resistant forces, instead of regrouping at the points. I think that the military staff through their negotiations can solve this problem. Moreover, this also relates to the problem of the line drawing in Vietnam. My hope is that Mr. Mendes-France can directly talk to Mr. Pham Van Dong again. The three-person meeting tonight may also discuss this problem.

Mendes-France: I have asked the staff of the French Delegation to contact the staff of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Hopefully, there will be some progress. Of course, the meeting with the two presidents tonight is also very important for me.

Mr. Chauvel said a little while ago that the French Delegation staff had suggested to the staff of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Delegation working together and drafting a political statement based on the common ground. However, this task right now suspends somehow. Hopefully, Mr. Pham Van Dong can give a push to this task.

Zhou Enlai: Besides the political issues, the discussions of the cease-fire should also find out some of the main common points that may produce an agreement. Otherwise, the whole package of the truce agreement as a booklet can’t be put together overnight.

Mendes-France: I fully agree with such an idea.

Zhou Enlai: Today is the 17th. It will be a success only if some agreements can be achieved on the major issues within the next two days.

Mendes-France: I am very glad to hear this word. I fully agree.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Minutes, Zhou Enlai's Conversation with Mendès-France (Excerpt), July 17, 1954

Record No. 206-Y0007

Time: From 4:45pm 17 July 1954
Location: Mendès-France’s Mansion
Chinese participants: Zhou Enlai, Li Kenong, Wang Bingnan, and Dong Ningeian (translator)
French participants: Pierre Mendès-France, Jean Chauvel, Jacques Guillermaz, and one translator

Zhou Enlai: Our opinions are now getting closer and closer. We don't have much time.

Mendès-France: It is said that Mr. Premier postponed your trip to India for one day in order to come here. I really appreciate it.

Zhou Enlai: We are so glad to meet Mr. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister before my brief return to China.

Mendès-France: It is very good to quickly make this meeting happen. I am very glad about this. The reason is that I'd like to quickly solve all of the problems concerned us. Mr. Premier know under what kind of circumstance our new national government is established. The French National People's Assembly has decided on a date, and hopes that a settlement will be achieved before this date. This settlement of course must bring about peace.

Zhou Enlai: It is for this reason that the leaders of our two countries have this early meeting to exchange our opinions. I believe this helpful to make conference progress from now on.

Mendès-France: Mr. Premier has been attending all the meetings. I couldn't participate in the conference before. But I had the information on your conversations with Mr. Bidault. I'd like to know more about Premier's observation and opinion on what measures we should take in order to achieve peace in Indochina.

Zhou Enlai: In the past meetings, I have exchanged many opinions with Mr. Bidault and Mr. Chauvel. Nevertheless, I'd still like to talk to the new French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister now about our Chinese Delegation's opinion on the conference.

The Chinese Delegation's purpose of coming and attending this Geneva Conference is to resume and realize peace in Indochina. This is our goal, and we don't ask for anything else. We oppose any enlargement or internationalization of the war. We oppose any use of threatening or provocative methods. They do not help negotiations. China, however, is not afraid of threatening, as Mr. Prime Minister knows. We need to employ conciliatory methods to help both sides to arrive at an agreement.

It is because of this common spirit, we'd like to address my opinions to Mr. Prime Minister.

To solve any problem in Indochina, the first thing is cease-fire. Military issues are always related to political issues. The military issue is discussed at the present, and the political issue can be discussed later on. After an agreement is reached, the first thing is to stop the war. As Mr. Prime Minister said, the French Parliament has expressed this kind of desirability, because the people of France, Indochina, and the world all support this. The current situation in Indochina is that all the three countries involved in the war. They have a similar situation. All of the three countries need a cease-fire, and their people demand independence and national unification. The French Government has showed its willingness to recognize the independence of the three countries and their national unification. China is willing to see they will stay in the French Union. Our country also intends to establish a friendly and peaceful relationship with France.

The three countries, however, have different problems. Therefore, we should accept different ways in solving the problems in each country. Vietnam, for example, needs a general election for its national unification after the war, and then the new national government decides on the type of its political system. This will be determined by the Vietnamese people themselves. Regarding Laos and Cambodia, as long as the people in the two countries are still supportive to their current royal governments, our government will be very happy to see these two countries become part of the typical Southeast Asian countries, like India and Indonesia. I have expressed the same opinion to Mr. Bidault.

Of course, on the other hand, we don't want to see that these three countries become the military bases of the United States, or that the United States builds up a military pact with them. This is what we are against. If the United States establishes its military base there, we have to check it out, and we can't just let it go without checking.

I talked to the foreign ministers of Laos and Cambodia a few days ago. They all assured me that they don't want any American military base in their countries. I said that's good, and encouraged them to make friend with France, as long as France respects their independence.

I also heard that Mr. Pham Van Dong, representative of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, talked to them and expressed that Vietnam will respect the independence and sovereignty of Laos and Cambodia, and assure a non-aggression between them and Vietnam. It was very good when I heard they were talking like this.
Politically, the three countries face different situations. Currently, Vietnam has two governments. The military regrouping areas must be determined, but it doesn't mean a [political] division. During a period of time after the cease-fire, a free election will be held through negotiations between the two governments. This is their own domestic affairs. We can show our support, even though we can't intervene. Laos and Cambodia also need to achieve their unifications through elections. I think the Democratic Republic of Vietnam can agree on this point.

The question is whether the two royal governments can recognize the resistant movements in their countries, and unite with the resistant governments in order to achieve their national unifications. The Bao Dai Government shouldnd approach the Democratic Republic of Vietnam through discussions and negotiations, instead of opposing it. Unfortunately, his political proposal exactly aims at opposition, hegemony, and invading the United Nations to intervene. This is unacceptable.

Militarily, the military representatives from both sides are negotiating the issue of Vietnam. We all hope that a settlement will be reached sooner. Laos and Cambodia have two situations. The first is that they have local resistant forces; it is small in Cambodia, and large in Laos. In Cambodia, the royal government should talk directly to the resistant force for cease-fire, neutral nation supervision, and political solutions there. So as it should in Laos. In the meantime, the royal governments should also join France in the negotiations of both sides to determine the regrouping areas for the local forces. This will lead to their political unifications. The second situation is that all the foreign armed forces and military personnel should withdraw from these two countries. Vietnam had sent some volunteers over there. If it is still the case at the present, they may follow the resolution provided by the military staff meetings, requiring the withdrawal of all the foreign troops from the entire Indochina.

By now the representatives from both commands have reached an agreement in principle about the military meetings. They will meet and talk intensively in the next three weeks. Currently, the meetings of the belligerent states became the center of the conference. France and Vietnam are the most important parties from both sides. Our desirability is a direct contact of both sides and a signed settlement soon. All the nations at the conference, including China, are willing to make contribution to genuine progress, and firm to oppose any

These are the main points of my opinion.

Mendès-France: Premier's points help me realize that Premier's thinking of the issues is very clear. Of course, I can't respond to every point, but some particular points should be discussed carefully. What made me glad is that our opinions are pretty close at the main points. I heard that the discussions on Laos and Cambodia have made some progress in the past several days. I also know that the progress was achieved mostly through the efforts by the delegation under the leadership of Premier Zhou. I believe that we don’t have any unsolvable problems between us over the issues of Laos and Cambodia.

As Premier mentioned, to cope with the domestic problems in Laos and Cambodia also needs international supervision. Certainly, a solution requires some work, but I don’t think it is too difficult to find out.

The problem in Vietnam is different. Premier just said that it is tougher. And then, its situation is not optimistic, because the war has been in that country so long. Moreover, as Premier said, the two governments there have their own administrations and armies. The Vietnamese people are divided into two sides, and both sides have been fighting the war for many years. One of the points mentioned by Premier needs to be noticed that many problems can be solved through direct contact between both sides. If workable, we certainly welcome. In fact, however, it is difficult. Although it is difficult to contact and to obtain any result, we will make our vigorous effort to arrive at this goal. Nevertheless, we agree on this direction. Premier also said that the goal in this region is unification, and the methods and procedure can be considered differently. Vietnam is divided into two parts, it is difficult to reach any agreement in a short period of time. It is impossible to complete its national unification as soon as the cease-fire becomes effective. The time issue was just mentioned because the war has been there so long that peace would not be stalled immediately, and that procedure will not be that simple, for example, talking about an immediate election. In fact, if the Vietnamese people really want their unification, they have to cooperate and need certain procedure. Generally speaking, our goals are not much different in principle.

There is one more point as the last. I am glad Premier made such a suggestion: it is the best to go through two steps. This first is a cease-fire, and the second is a political settlement. I fully agree because of the same reasons Premier said. For a genuine progress, the first step is to concentrate our attention and energy on cease-fire issue, including the determination of regrouping areas. This is a practical solution, it should be reached fast. I'd like to ask Premier, if you agree that we have many points in common?

There is another important point. Premier raised a concern about establishing American military bases. I fully agree on this point. I want to make it clear that we don't intend to establish any American base in that region. We don't have such plan.

Zhou Enlai: I'd like to explain regarding your points:

You had a very good answer to my last point. France has no intention to establish any American base. This is very good not only for the three countries, but also for China, France, and Southeast Asia. All of us hope for a peaceful co-existence, and building a common foundation for the future.
You also said that the military and political solutions in Laos and Cambodia needed international supervision. Our opinions are the same at this point.

The situation in Vietnam is different and difficult. But I think the military and political principles can be reached first. The problem-solving should deal with the troop regrouping and cease-fire issues first, and then turn to the political settlement. It should be two steps, not one step. The length of each step depends on the effort of both sides, and requires discussions between the two sides. France bears more responsibilities for them to get closer, not confront. If the two sides refuse to make contact or refuse to talk to each other, it will slow down the cease-fire. I believe that you have found that the Chinese Delegation is pushing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to approach not only France, but also the Bao Dai Vietnam. France may find it difficult to ask the Bao Dai government to make contact with the others. Prime Minister knows where the difficulty comes from. That is the situation. Mr. Chauvel even knows better.

Of course, if we want to satisfy the reasonable requests made by Laos and Cambodia, we should meet the reasonable requests in Vietnam made by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Therefore, the military meetings between both sides may reach an agreement easier.

Mendes-France: I don't have a whole package of opinion. We have same opinion on some of the issues. Let me repeat this, it is a good thing if we can help to put the two Vietnamese governments together. The French Government really wants to use its influence to facilitate their cooperation. It is, however, very difficult. We just talked about the long-time war, a long period of division, so that it is difficult for them to get together psychologically and politically. But [they] need to follow this guideline in order to achieve some settlements. It is better for them to set up some kind of foundation for implementing cease-fire and troop regrouping. As you know, the negotiations between their military experts are still going. Even though it seems having no major problem, the direction of their meetings is unclear. If we know what the foundation is and an agreement can be based on it, it would be much easier for us to push Vietnam. So far the French-Vietnamese meetings haven't yet made any important progress. Mr. Pham Van Dong made contact with Mr. Chauvel yesterday. Currently, the focus of the conference is on the military issues, but there is no much progress. I am returning Paris tonight and will meet General Ely. I will for sure discuss this issue with him in order to further instruct our military representatives here and push the negotiations forward. And, if the Vietnamese government could do the same and give new instructions, it would be very good and easy to reach an agreement.

Could Premier use your influence over the Vietnamese government to do this like us and help us on this? Until the military experts can make progress in their negotiations, reach an agreement, and build a foundation, the diplomacy will certainly work.

I have some more point to say. If we go with the Vietnamese government's proposal on 25 May suggesting to have two main regrouping areas, only the military experts can provide us a foundation for diplomatic discussions.

Zhou Enlai: To avoid misunderstanding, I'd like to explain one thing. I said the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Bao Dai government should establish their "contact," not "cooperation." Since both sides have engaged in the war for many years, it is impossible to talk about any cooperation. Our expectation is that France could influence Bao Dai and make his government to contact the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in order to reduce difficulties and leave no room for any external disruption. The negotiations on the troop regrouping should now enter the phase of discussing specific matters. My opinion is the same as Mr. Prime Minister regarding this issue. The current discussions should get into the specific matters. We know that the military representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam also intends to achieve early and positive results.

I am very glad to hear that Mr. Mendes-France is going to meet General Ely, commander-in-chief of the French expeditionary forces in Indochina, after returning to Paris, and that General Ely will give specific instructions to the French military representatives at Geneva. The agreement on the main regrouping areas by both sides will lay the foundation for further diplomatic negotiations. I agree with Mr. Prime Minister at this point. Regarding the main regrouping areas, [I'd like to know] whether Mr. Prime Minister has any specific idea. If no decided point, don't have to talk about this issue right now.

Mendes-France: To avoid any misunderstanding, I'd also like to make an explanation. When I said the "cooperation," I meant using "cooperative" methods to solve the problems.

I agree with Premier Zhou Enlai's point. We really hope that the military staff meetings can move into practical phase fast, and that the Vietnamese representatives will receive their new and clear instructions from their high command. The determination of the main regrouping areas can be decided pretty soon. Regarding the particular idea on the main regrouping areas, I can't make any suggestion right now, because I don't know how the military staff negotiations go. They are planning to draw an access line from west to east. The line, however, proposed by the Vietnamese staff is over the south much more than the real situation. Our experts, who knew the field situation, have noticed all the points proposed by the Vietnamese on 25 May. I think it possible for them to provide a result for further diplomatic negotiations. Another evidence is that the negotiations on supervision currently is on its practical methods. We
think that, if the objectives of supervision are known particularly, the problem of supervision would be solved easily. Thus, we should push the negotiations on the regrouping forward and fast in order to advance the discussions on the supervisory issues.

Zhou Enlai: That's right. We should solve the problem of the regrouping areas first. I have noticed Mr. Prime Minister's stand on these issues. We believe that, after the military staff of both sides detail their discussions, the supervisory problem will be solved easily. I have exchanged my opinion on this issue with Mr. Eden. He agrees with my opinion.

Our current efforts should help both sides to reach an agreement soon, achieving a result within three weeks. This result will bring both belligerent sides their glorious peace, and realize the desirability of the people of France, Vietnam, and the world. All the foreign ministers can return to Geneva earlier.

Mendès-France: The three weeks should be the maximum time. During this period, as soon as the military representatives of both sides reach their agreement, they should inform their delegations. Thereby, there will be a few days for the foreign ministers to return to the conference.

Zhou Enlai: The sooner, the better. After my departure, Mr. Li Kenong, our vice minister of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, will be in charge here. I hope that Mr. Chauvel will continue the communication with Mr. Li Kenong.

I am very glad to meet Mr. Prime Minister. I really appreciate you are willing to spend time in Bern.

Mendès-France: This is for our common task for peace.

Zhou Enlai: Mr. Mendès-France said at the Parliament that everything is for peace and friendship. We fully agree with this point.

Mendès-France: This is our first meeting. I hope we will have more contacts later on. I am really happy about this meeting. I’d like to express my appreciation here. Although I am very busy with many things since I have just organized my new cabinet, I really want to come here and meet you.

I have another practical question, that is, what we are going to tell the reporters. What do you think about this?

Zhou Enlai: Mr. Prime Minister can make a suggestion, please.

Mendès-France: I agree with a news release draft suggested by Mr. Chauvel: "We had a frank conversation on the issue of peace in Indochina, not a negotiation. This conversation may lead to our desirability that the Geneva Conference will achieve genuine progress." Seemingly, it can't be said too much beside this.

Zhou Enlai: It is good not saying too much.

Mendès-France: Hopefully, Mr. Li Kenong will contact Mr. Chauvel often later on.

Zhou Enlai: I have a wish. Within the next three weeks, if Mr. Mendès-France comes to Geneva or has other opportunities, I hope you can make a contact with Mr. Pham Van Dong, Head of the Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. We think it beneficial through such a direct contact.

Mendès-France: Mr. Chauvel already met Mr. Pham Van Dong yesterday. Mr. Chauvel told Mr. Pham Van Dong that I'd like to meet him. But it is unknown when and where the meeting can take place. It may depend on the progress of the conference. I agree that this kind of the meeting is very important. I hope this meeting can come true.

Zhou Enlai: I will be happy to pass on Mr. Prime Minister’s idea to Mr. Pham Van Dong. We hope that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and France can build a friendship on the foundation of peace.

Mendès-France: This is also our hope. Mr. Zhou Enlai is a senior and experienced Premier and Foreign Minister. I am a new and inexperienced Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. So there are too many things to be handled. But I will try my best to establish a friendly relationship between France and China, and between France and Vietnam.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permision from CWIHP.
equipment should rather be destroyed on spot than abandoned to
enemy. He said instructions to this effect already issued, and all equip-
ment would be needed in south. However he would send urgent message
emphasizing this. He understood my own role here and was grateful
for your personal message, which I had made a little florid.

When Eden arrived, the three of us began with extensive discus-
sion of status of international control. Minor issue of number of com-
missions (one or three) and coordinating mechanism for three com-
misions appears on way to solution with Viet Minh acceptance of three
commission principles.

So far as voting is concerned, it appeared to us that we would
have to accept majority voting on minor or reserve questions and
unanimity for major matters. We speculated as possibility of secur-
ing acceptance of majority vote to determine which are minor and which
major matters. There was general agreement that built-in veto, in
view probable composition of commission, see below) might work
more to our advantage if solid “neutral” on our side was included
in commission.

Chauvel stated that two French were arguing papers on controls (Sectos
575, and 605) had been circulated to other members of conference
but that no counter-proposals had been received from Communists.
Molotov had indicated to Eden that he saw no particular problem with
French papers on this subject. Those papers, however, do not cover
matter of composition.

On composition we agreed that Communists would not drop demand
that at least one Communist be included. We tentatively there-
fore agreed that best position might be Colombo powers plus one
Communist power plus one Western neutral (Belgium or Canada were
mentioned, although it was recognized Canada would probably be
unacceptable because of Commonwealth ties).

On question of freedom of movement for international commission it
was general view that commission would not in fact receive necessary
facilities for thorough timely inspections throughout Viet Minh zones
and that therefore to insist on theoretical freedom of movement would
probably be of other side more than ourselves.

I then made clear that US could not agree any proposal requiring all
conference members consult on reports supervisory commissions. I
added that we did not wish in anyway to perpetuate conference. I
suggested, however, we would have no objection if, in armistice docu-
ment rather than in conference declaration, statement were made that

2 Dated July 8, p. 1903.
3 Dated July 14, p. 1903.

the international commission would report on its work as particu-
larly on difficulties encountered to members of conference. Mendes-
France and Chauvel both stated they feared this would result in a
control commission having no “top” although they recognize futility
of a guarantee system in which Communist participate. Chauvel
pursued subject of trying to get something into conference declara-
tion on this subject of which all members should “take note” and which
would bind none to consultations.

Turning to subject of demarcation line Eden expressed hunch that
final settlement would be near eighteenth parallel. He wondered
whether it might not be possible to trade some nonessential area be-
tween seventeenth and eighteenth parallels for position on elections
which we could all accept. French have three successive positions on
lines between seventeenth and eighteenth parallels which they intend
present as necessary in negotiations. Mendes-France stated that our
interests required delay of at least two years before elections. Soviet
thinking on election date seems to be by time in 1955. Mendes-France
stated that on this point therefore French and Soviets are only about
six months apart, since French could accept date mid-1956.

SMITH

394.1 GH/T-1754

Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation
(Bonsal) to the Deputy United States Representative and Coordi-
nator of the Delegation (Johnson)

SECRET

GENEVA, July 17, 1954.

De Latournelle telephoned me at 5:20 this afternoon to say that
he and Gros and Cheysson would like to call on me to discuss the
proposed French draft declaration to be issued by the Conference. It
was suggested that Mr. Phleger might also be present at this meeting.

After consulting with you, I telephoned de Latournelle at 5:55 and
stated that in view of the conversation which General Smith had had
with M. Mendes-France this afternoon and in view also of the third
point of the joint French-US position paper prepared in Paris on
July 15, there did not seem to be any useful purpose served by further
US working level participation in the discussion of this declaration.
I suggested that if there was anything unclear in the situation it should
probably be discussed directly by General Smith and M. Mendes-
France.

De Latournelle stated that he would report our conversation to
Mendes-France.
SECRET

FROM: GENEVA CONFERENCE (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WHITEHALL SECRET
(CABINET) DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden
No. 952
July 17, 1964.

D. 3. 5 p.m., July 17, 1964.

RE: 3. 30 p.m., July 17, 1964.

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 952 of July 17
Repeated for Information to Washington Paris Saigon
Ottawa Canberra
Wellington New Delhi
Karachi

My immediately preceding telegram.

Tripartite Meeting July 15.

Elections in Viet Nam.

Mr. Molotov said that the date should be fixed by the conference.
This was important in order to set at rest doubts which might be
aroused in Viet Nam by the military division of the country. Perhaps
a rather more flexible formula could be found than the firm date of
June 1965 suggested by the Soviet Delegation.

2. M. Mendès-France said that after a cease-fire various events
were bound to take place, the duration of which it was impossible
to foresee. The forces had to be regrouped, persons had to be
transferred from one zone to another, new local administrative
authorities had to be established, electoral lists had to be drawn up and
political parties had to be created and allowed time to conduct their
campaigns. If difficulties and disappointments were to be avoided,
any precise date fixed must be a distant one. It was, therefore, probably
better to avoid at this stage any too rigid solution. There might be
various possible ways of making the arrangements flexible. The date
for elections might be fixed after regrouping had been completed, or a
distant date might be fixed now and the international control commission
be given authority to advance it if possible; or an early date might be
fixed now and the control commission authorized to defer it if necessary.

3. Mr. Molotov repeated his view that it was important to fix a firm
date in order to avoid unfavourable interpretations in Viet Nam. If
June 1965 was not acceptable it might be possible to say that elections
would be held during 1965, the precise date to be fixed by agreement
between the two parts of Viet Nam.

/4/ M. Mendés-
4. M. Mendes-France still thought it would be important to fix a time limit as early as the end of 1955. The French thought that 380 days would be required for regrouping alone; even after that many months of preparation would be required to complete the arrangements for elections. In any case, time must be allowed for wartime passions to cool before the country was subjected to election propaganda. In France, after the liberation in August and September 1944, it had taken 14 months in far easier conditions before elections could be held in October 1945.

5. I referred to the example of the Sudan, a country where there had been no war and which was not divided but which like Indo-China had little experience of elections. There it had taken 18 months to organize elections. In my opinion the best solution for Viet Nam would be for the two parts of the country to meet to fix a date for elections after the regrouping of forces had been completed.

6. M. Mendes-France agreed that this might be considered but Mr. Molotov urged that to leave the matter vague would create an unwelcome impression in Viet Nam. He asked that his idea for elections during 1955 should also be considered.

**Demarcation line**

7. Mr. Molotov said that he had tried to convince M. Mendhes-France that in moving from the 18th to the 16th parallel the Viet Minh had made a substantial concession which called for an appropriate response from the French Delegation in the interest of compromise.

8. M. Mendes-France said that he had equally tried to convince Mr. Molotov of the merits of the 16th parallel. He could not agree that the Viet Minh offer of the 16th parallel constituted a concession. He meant that the Viet Minh would be giving up a zone which they controlled between the 16th and 14th parallels, but would be receiving in return the area more important area of the Tonking Delta. M. Pham van Dong had admitted that if the line were drawn on the 16th parallel, then such special arrangements would be required in the area to the north of it and in respect of the port of Haine, the capital town of Hue and Route No. 9 into Laos. The necessity for such special arrangements showed how unnatural and inconvenient such a demarcation line was. One was bound to ask in particular why the Viet Minh wanted Route No. 9, which passed only Laos and of which the Viet Minh could have no legitimate need whatsoever.

9. Mr. Molotov argued that the 16th parallel had been the demarcation line in 1945 and that it was being proposed now as a purely provisional measure for a short period pending the unification of the country. Any temporary inconvenience caused could therefore readily be overcome by special arrangements. He was sure that the Viet Minh had no ulterior motives in respect of route No. 9. In any case, his information was that / Viet Minh
SECRET

Geneva Conference (U.K. Del.) telegram No. 962 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

Viet Minh influence extended over the greater part of the zone between the 16th and 18th parallels.

10. M. Mendès-France said that there might have been a few incidents caused by Viet Minh infiltration in the mountain areas of this zone, but that the populated coastal areas of the zone had always been under French influence. The Viet Minh would be getting a favourable bargain in exchanging the area between the 14th and 16th parallels (where they had some 30,000 men) for the Tonking Delta (where there were 300,000 French Union troops). There was no chance of persuading the French Government to agree to a line which excluded either Route 8 or Route No. 9.

11. I said that M. Mendès-France had stated a very strong case, which I supported. He had always been under French influence and Route 8 was vital to Laos, if that country were to be given a chance to lead its own life in accordance with the intentions of the conference.

12. Mr. Molotov then suggested discussion of the question of control arrangements. The Soviet Delegation had presented two alternative proposals for composition of the control commission.

13. M. Mendès-France suggested that it might be better to leave over the question of supervision for later discussion. The two questions of elections and demarcation line in Viet Nam had been discussed together and might be linked in the sense that conceivably one party might yield on one question, and another party on the other. It would perhaps be better to reflect upon the position now reached.

Foreign Office please pass Washington, Paris, Saigon, Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, New Delhi and Karachi as my telegrams Nos. 364, 239, 105, 28, 26, 95, 150 and 103 respectively.

(Repeated to Washington, Paris, Saigon and Copies sent to C.R. C. for repetition to Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, New Delhi and Karachi.)
Pham Van Dong says that, in his opinion, they need to exchange opinions about how we ought to act in order to achieve an agreement which is acceptable to us about a demarcation line, about elections, and a series of other issues - about regrouping zones, about the composition of the observers' commission, etc. (Translator's note: apparently this is what later became known as the "International Commission for Supervision and Control").

Chou En-Lai proposes initially exchanging opinions about the main fundamental questions of our positions and then discussing the text of the documents which have been prepared.

Molotov agrees and names the main documents and the main questions which need to be discussed - the demarcation line, the times of the elections, the composition and functions of the observers' commission, the deadline for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Indochina, the withdrawal of tank and other weapons and military personnel in and out of Indochina, the prohibition of the creation of foreign military bases on the territory of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and a military bloc in Southeast Asia. Molotov further says that at a closed meeting on 18 July Mendes-France hinted that political representatives ought to discuss the main questions about which both sides might make mutual concessions.

Molotov raises the first of the aforementioned seven questions for discussion (the demarcation line) and asks Chou En-Lai and Pham Van Dong to give their ideas.

Chou En-Lai says that in a conversation with Wang Bing-Nan, the general secretary of the PRC delegation, Colonel Guillermaz, the representative of the French delegation, told the former that the French delegation could not agree for Road No. 9 to be jointly used and let it be known that the French would insist on the demarcation line passing north of this road. Guillermaz also said that the French delegation would insist on setting a later date for holding elections in Indochina and gave a period of two years.

Molotov says that at what final position we can stop on the issue of the demarcation line.

Pham Van Dong says that the DRV might concede Road No. 9 to France and agree to place the demarcation line somewhat north of this road. He adds that French concessions need to be demanded in the regions of Touanne (Translator's note: now called Da Nang) and Hue.
Pham Van Dong says that Mendes-France hinted earlier about the possibility of such concessions.

**Molotov** asks what concessions does the DRV intend to demand of the French in Tourane and Hue.

Pham Van Dong replies that he had in mind a demand that France not create a naval base in Tourane. Pham Van Dong says that he does not yet have any specific ideas as regards Hue and has to think about it. Pham Van Dong then says that it is necessary to demand that the French agree to set a specific time to hold elections in Indochina for the [above] concession about the issue of the demarcation line. He adds that this deadline might be somewhat extended but that it ought to be mentioned in order that the DRV government have an opportunity to organize certain explanatory work among the population.

Chou En-Lai states that Pham Van Dong's proposal concerning the final position about the issue of the demarcation line agrees with the instructions that our delegations has and it can be agreed to. About the question of Tourane Chou En-Lai says that in a conversation with him Mendes-France hinted at the possibility of French concessions.

Chou En-Lai asks Molotov whether based on his talks with Mendes-France and Eden we can count on being able to achieve anything about the issue of elections.

Molotov says that Mendes-France and Eden talked about the issue of elections and stresses that it is necessary to get a definite timeframe established during which elections are to be held. As regards an exact date for holding the elections then it could be suggested that it be set locally [na mieste] by agreement between the competent authorities of the two countries.

Chou En-Lai and Pham Van Dong agree with Molotov's suggestion.

Molotov says that if we ought to be prepared to agree to the establishment of the demarcation line north of Road No 9, then this line needs to be determined.

Pham Van Dong says that he will give instructions to his military experts to study this issue and to prepare an appropriate map indicating this line on it.

Molotov raises the issue of a military bloc in Southeast Asia for discussion and asks Chou En-Lai's and Pham Van Dong's opinions about what our side ought to initiate.

Chou En-Lai suggests getting the representatives of Laos and Cambodia to say specifically in their speeches that they will not permit the creation of foreign bases on the territory of Laos and Cambodia and that Laos and Cambodia will not join any military alliances or blocs.

Molotov says that he thinks it advisable to include a commitment by Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in the text of the declaration not to create foreign military bases on their territory and not to join military alliances.

Chou En-Lai and Pham Van Dong agree.

Molotov raises the issue of the international observers' commission for discussion.

Chou En-Lai says that in a conversation with Eden on 16 July the latter informed him that the French are inclined to form an observation commission composed of representatives of India, Canada, and Poland. [Indian Permanent Representative to the United Nations V. Krishna Menon spoke approvingly about this alternative and expressed satisfaction that it did not envisage the participation of Pakistan. Chou En-Lai further says that he touched on this French alternative in a conversation with Eden. The latter expressed his agreement with this observation commission membership, but in doing declared that Britain could not submit such a proposal on its own initiative since this would provoke Pakistani displeasure against them.]

Molotov says that it is advisable to hold to the position to which our three delegations agreed earlier about the issue of the composition of the international observation commission.

Chou En-Lai and Pham Van Dong agree.

Chou En-Lai suggests agreeing about the commission's area of activity. He says that the French delegation has introduced a proposal that the international commission conduct observation along the borders (including land and sea), but not at individual points as the Chinese and Vietnamese side have proposed. Chou En-Lai thinks that it would be more to the advantage to the DRV and PRC to establish monitoring along all borders, which would permit more careful observation to ensure that the
Americans or the French are not moving troops or weapons onto the territory of Vietnam.

Molotov proposes holding to this tactic on this issue: if the French insist on their proposals then agree with them and thus make a seeming concession.

Pham Van Dong and Chou En-Lai agree.

Molotov raises the issue of the establishment of re-grouping zones in Laos and Cambodia for discussion.

Chou En-Lai and Pham Van Dong propose agreeing to the establishment of a re-grouping zone in the northeast part of Laos as a final position.

Molotov asks who on our side will sign the agreement about Laos and Cambodia.

Chou En-Lai and Pham Van Dong think it possible to authorize two representatives for this: a representative of the People’s Army of Vietnam and a representative of the resistance forces. They add that this issue needs to be studied further.

Chou En-Lai raises the issue of the deadline for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Indochina. He says that it is possible to agree to the establishment of a period of 240 days (instead of 380 days, as the French are proposing).

Pham Van Dong agrees.

Molotov recommends establishing separate deadlines for the withdrawal of troops and for the withdrawal of weapons and adds that the deadline for the withdrawal of weapons might be made longer than that for the withdrawal of troops.

Chou En-Lai and Pham Van Dong agree.

Molotov raises the issue of the draft declaration for discussion.

Chou En-Lai and Pham Van Dong agree with Molotov’s suggestion of taking the French draft as a basis and making the necessary changes to it.

Then Molotov, Chou En-Lai, and Pham Van Dong exchange opinions about all the points of the text of the declaration and make changes.

The conversation lasted one hour.

Recorded: by A. Ledovsky [signature]

[handwritten on the back of the last page: AVP RF Fond 06, Opis’ 13a, paps 25, pp. 106-112]

Distributes to CC Presidium members

25. VII [illegible signature]

FROM THE JOURNAL
OF V.M. MOLOTOV
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

G barr, July 17, 1954—7 p.m.

Secto 652. Repeated information Paris 79, Saigon 50. Following account of Mendes-France-Eden-Molotov meeting last night is based on report of this meeting to Foreign Office made available to Johnson by Caccia. This telegram expands upon and supersedes preliminary account transmitted in first three paragraphs Secto 650 (repeated information Paris 79, Saigon 48).

At Eden's suggestion, French enumerated documents before conference:

(a) Armistice agreements to be signed by local commanders-in-chief. French have prepared drafts for Vietnam and Laos and Cambodians draft for Cambodia. Viet Minh delegation preparing counter draft for Vietnam.

(b) Control arrangements. French have circulated papers for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

(c) Political arrangements. After having seen military documents, certain delegations might make unilateral statements. For example, Laos and Cambodia are preparing statements on their willingness to limit their armed forces. Conference as whole would then agree upon common statement taking note of military agreements and unilateral declarations. French have circulated draft of such statement. Soviets have prepared counter draft and French second retract.

French explained that if conference did not have time to agree on all details of armistice, it might approve only parts providing for cessation of hostilities and first stage of regrouping. Remaining aspects of agreements could be covered by statement of general principles for guidance of experts who would work out details after conference had dispersed.

It was agreed that British, French, and Soviet experts would meet July 17 to consider various drafts.

At Eden's suggestion, Mendes-France summarised main outstanding problems as (a) demarcation line for Vietnam, (b) elections, and (c) control arrangements. Concerning demarcation line, he said French had proposed line near 18th parallel whereas Viet Minh proposed 16th parallel. On elections in Vietnam, he said question was whether to fix firm date now (Soviets had proposed June 1955) or whether, as French proposed, to settle now only manner in which date would be set. Elections in Laos and Cambodia already provided for in constitutions for August and September 1955, respectively. On control, he said main questions were: Whether there should be one commission or three, composition, voting, execution of commissions' recommendations, and freedom of movement for inspection teams.

Molotov added to outstanding issues: (d) time required for regrouping (French have proposed 380 days and Soviets 6 months); and (e) prevention of importation of new arms and military personnel subject to certain exceptions for Laos and Cambodia, prohibition of foreign military bases, and prohibition of military alliances by three states.

Eden added (f) question of regroupment areas for resistance forces in Laos.

Discussion then turned to substantive issues:

(a) Elections in Vietnam. Molotov said conference should fix date for elections. He conceded more flexible formula might be found than firm date of June 1955 previously proposed by Soviets and suggested agreement merely that elections be held during 1955 with precise date to be fixed by Vietnamese and Viet Minh authorities.

Mendes-France argued that it would be imprudent to fix date as early as the end of 1955. He suggested two ways of providing necessary flexibility in arrangements: Date for elections might be fixed after completion of regrouping; or exact date might be fixed now and international control commission be given authority to advance date if necessary.

Eden supported Mendes-France on need for flexibility and suggested that two parts of Vietnam fix date after completion of regrouping. Mendes-France agreed to consider this suggestion, but Molotov continued to urge elections during 1955.

(b) Demarcation line. Molotov argued that in moving from 18th to 16th parallel, Viet Minh had made substantial concession which called for proper response from French. Mendes-France disagreed, arguing that Viet Minh would be giving up much less in Annam than they would be getting in Tonkin. He said that Pham Van Dong had admitted that line on 16th parallel would require special arrangements for Tourane, Hue, on route No. 9 leading into Laos. Mendes-France stated that necessity for such special arrangements showed how unnatural demarcation line at 16th parallel would be. He said that there was no chance of persuading French Government to accept line which excluded either Hue or route No. 9. Eden supported Mendes-France.

Molotov suggested that discussion move to question of control arrangements. Mendes-France replied might be better to postpone such discussion. He observed that questions of elections and demarcation line had been discussed together and might be linked in sense that conceivably one party might yield on one question and another party on other.

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1 Dated July 17, p. 1404.
The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET
Washington, July 17, 1954—7:37 p.m.

Tosec 562. 1. Final report US–UK study group on SEA defense being cabled.2 Rob Scott requests you make copies available Eden to which we fully agree.

2. Scott asking UK govt to concentrate on two immediate questions:
   a. US position that working group of representatives US, UK, France, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand should be formed immediately to prepare recommendations on terms of collective security treaty.
   b. US position that declaration of intent should be issued quickly whether or not there is a settlement at Geneva.

3. We hope Eden will not continue emphasize efforts toward persuading Colombo Powers at expense moving ahead rapidly on collective defense arrangement.

4. We will, of course, continue our consultations with Australia, New Zealand, Philippines and Thailand.

5. FYI study group agree copies report should not be given other countries but there was informal understanding Australia, New Zealand and Canada could receive copies, which is being followed up here.

DULLES

1 Drafted by Galloway of C.

Conference files, lot 68 D 627, CP 254 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET
Washington, July 17, 1954—8 p.m.

Tosec 563.

[REPORT OF THE JOINT U.S.–U.K. STUDY GROUP ON SOUTHEAST ASIA]

ITEM I

Terms of Reference:

“Assuming France–Associated States and Vietminh reach agreements on Indo-China, which the US and UK are willing to respect—

(a) The precise terms on which the UK and US might be willing to be associated with such agreements; and

(b) The basis on which the free Asian and other interested non-Communist states might be brought into association with the agreements.”

1. There was discussion of the methods of association with such agreements. The UK members preferred a multilateral declaration to be signed by all the countries taking part in the Indo-China phase of the Geneva conference and as many other interested South and Southeast Asian states as possible. The US members stated that provided the agreements met US specifications, the US, at the conclusion of the Geneva conference, would be prepared to make a unilateral statement of US policy to the effect that the US would respect the agreements in the sense of applying thereto the non-force principles of Article 2 (4) and (6) of the UN Charter. The US would gladly welcome non-Communist co-signers. The US members were not prepared to envisage negotiating the terms of such a unilateral statement of US policy either directly with the Communists at Geneva or indirectly through discussion of the terms with the Indians or other countries.

2. The US members defined an agreement which the US could respect rs being one which (a) in its view substantially fulfilled the seven points communicated to the French by the UK and US1 and subsequently accepted by France (July 14, 1954) ; and (b) the Associated States accepted.

3. The UK members pointed out that the UK would wish to make a declaration in a form which as many as possible of other interested states might feel able to use. Some of these countries might not be members of the UN, or not represented there. The UK might therefore wish to avoid too many detailed references to provisions of the Charter, and refer only to the general principles of the UN, in order to secure as wide agreement as possible on the substance and terms of a declaration in respect of an Indo-China settlement.

4. On the assumption that agreements are reached on Indo-China which the US and UK members are willing to respect, the UK members stated that the free Asian and other non-Communist states should be encouraged to bring themselves into association with the agreements on the same basis as the US and the UK. The UK members considered that the first step in securing the support of these powers for a collective defense system would be to induce them to associate themselves with an Indo-China settlement. This would not only help to make that settlement durable and effective, it would also be valuable in the event of violation and in the event of an appeal to the UN.

1 The seven points were contained in telegram 4933 to Paris, June 28, p. 1250.

2 The French acceptance was contained in the U.S.–France Position Paper, July 14, 1954, p. 1363.
5. The US members agreed that it would be valuable to have free Asian and other interested non-Communist states associate themselves with whatever declarations the US and the UK might make. The US members stated, however, that the value was not so great that the US would be disposed to exert political pressure on other non-Communist countries to associate themselves with the declaration which the US might make.

6. Agreed recommendations on Item I.

The Study Group agreed that provided agreements are reached which the two governments can respect:

a. The US and UK should each issue a declaration of policy in respect of the agreements.
b. The terms of the US and UK declarations should be as similar as possible.
c. These declarations should conform to the purposes and principles of the UN and should contain a statement that the issuing government would not use force to disturb the agreements.
d. It would be desirable for as many interested non-Communist countries as possible to issue similar or identical declarations.

ITEM II

Terms of Reference:

"Assuming an Indo-Chinese agreement, the terms of a collective security pact regarding Southeast and possibly South Asia, designed—

a. To deter and if necessary to combat Communist aggression by making it clear that it would be met by prompt and united action and would involve grave consequences;
b. To provide machinery for effective cooperation in defense of the area against aggression and for assisting the lawful governments to resist Communist infiltration and subversion;
c. To commit the members to take, in accordance with their constitutional processes, such action as is deemed necessary, including the use of armed force, in the event of Communist aggression covered by the pact;
d. To protect Laos, Cambodia, and that part of Vietnam remaining free after any agreement, whether or not they are free to participate under the terms of the agreement."

7. [a.] The Study Group agreed that drafting a collective security treaty should be a matter for negotiation between all the founder members.

b. The US members submitted an informal draft text of a collective security treaty for Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, as an indication of US thinking.

(Annex A 1). The US members stated that they had also made this draft available to certain of the other potential founding members of a collective security arrangement.

c. The UK members made some preliminary comments on the American draft. The UK comments are given in Annex B.4 The UK members considered that it was premature to submit a text until clear agreement had been reached between the two governments on the nature and purposes of the proposed treaty, and on the timing and negotiations with other powers. They were therefore unable to associate themselves with the US members in submitting a text at this stage.

8. Main features of a collective security treaty.

The Study Group agreed on the main features of the proposed treaty. These features are indicated in the following recommendations, which, however, do not attempt to use language suitable for inclusion in the treaty.

a. Purpose. The purpose of the treaty is to block the expansion of Communist influence in the general area of South and Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. The group recognized that this might take several forms: overt aggression; infiltration and subversion coupled with Communist assistance to armed rebellions or Communist interference in civil wars; or Communist infiltration and subversion without resort to violence. The group agreed that provision should be made in the treaty against all these contingencies.

b. Membership.

(1) The initial membership of the collective security treaty should include UK, US, Australia, New Zealand, France, Thailand and the Philippines and other Southeast Asian states (Burma and Indonesia) if they are willing. The initial membership could also include other states which, on the basis of informal consultations, indicated their desire to participate.4

(2) Cambodia, Laos, and non-Communist Vietnam should be participants if the arrangements at Geneva should permit this.

(3) After entry into force of the treaty, invitations to other states to accede to the treaty, or to associate themselves with it, could be issued upon unanimous agreement of the parties to the treaty.

c. Nature of the commitment.

Each party should agree:

(1) To assist the lawful governments to maintain and develop their capacity to resist armed attack and Communist infiltration and subversion, through help in the military, police, intelligence, information, economic, technical, and other relevant fields.

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1 Annex A, a draft treaty text dated July 9, is printed in Volume XII.
2 Annex B is printed ibid.
3 For clarification of paragraph 8[a](1), see telegram Tosec 586, July 18, p. 1431.
2. To consult together in order to agree on the measures which should be taken whenever in the opinion of one of the parties the territorial integrity, political independence or security of one of the parties, or the peace of the area, is endangered.

3. In the event of overt Communist aggression in the area of the treaty, to take in accordance with its constitutional processes such action as it deems necessary including the use of armed force.  

a. Geographical scope of the commitment.

1. The commitment in paragraph c(3) above should cover:

(a) Local territory of parties to the treaty in the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southwestern Pacific;

(b) Laos and Cambodia and non-Communist Vietnam whether or not they are parties to the treaty;

2. Provision should be made to allow countries not participating in the treaty to be covered, by agreement, by the commitment in paragraph c(3) above.

3. The treaty should permit later enlargement of its geographical scope.

a. Organization.

The treaty should contain no more than a simple and generalized description of a council; precise organization should be left to discussion with other participating countries and to development by the council. Among the subjects the council should consider would be:

1. Establishment of such permanent machinery as might be needed;

2. Interim arrangements pending the completion of (1) above;

3. Arrangements for the association of countries not parties to the treaty with work of the organization.

f. Duration.

The treaty should be of indefinite duration with the provision that any party may cease to be a party one year after notice of denunciation.

9. Considerations affecting timing.

a. The group agreed that any agreements reached at Geneva would register a considerable gain for the Communist bloc in Southeast Asia. In the wake of such agreements there would be left an unstable situation in those areas of Indochina remaining free. At the same time these agreements would increase the tendency of the other non-Communist states in the area to accommodate themselves to the prospect of further Communist encroachment. These considerations underlined the necessity for urgent conclusion of collective security arrangements. The group also recognized the importance of securing the backing of the Colombo powers in halting the expansion of Communist influence.

* For clarification of paragraph b.c.(3), see telegram 5966, July 10, p. 1431.

The attitude of these powers toward the collective security arrangement would be important. It would be desirable that these powers should at least acquiesce in the establishment of such an arrangement.

b. The UK members believed that strong efforts to secure the participation of the Colombo powers in the collective security arrangement or at least their acquiescence in its formation should be made prior to the negotiation of the treaty. In the long run the general aim of blocking Communist expansion in the area will be governed by the support that can be obtained from the peoples and governmens of the area. The UK, therefore, considered that immediate negotiations of a collective security arrangement prior to consultation with the Colombo powers would prejudice the eventual attitude of the latter thus endangering the ultimate object of the treaty.

c. The US members believed that explorations with the Colombo powers should not delay the formation of a security arrangement for the area. The US members recognized the possibility that speedy establishment by other countries of a collective security arrangement might engender temporary opposition on the part of some of the Colombo powers; they believed, however, that in the long run the immediate creation of a strong defense against Communist expansion in Southeast Asia would lead to eventual cooperation by South Asian countries. The US members believed that the political emergency created by a Communist victory at Geneva should be met by immediate action to serve notice that Communist expansion in Asia had reached its limit. The US members believed that delay in the formation of a collective security agreement would probably result in a deterioration in the area of South and Southeast Asia which in the end could well render impossible the conclusion of any effective security arrangement, additional to the US security arrangements with others in the area. The US members believed, therefore, that the collective security arrangement should be negotiated forthwith, with those nations now ready to proceed in the establishment of an effective collective defense system in the general area of the South and Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

10. Declaration of intention.

a. The US members considered that even if there were agreements at Geneva, the urgency of the situation was such, and the probable length of time before a treaty could be signed and ratified was such, that it would be important to have the founding countries issue a statement of intent to conclude a treaty, and immediately to establish ad hoc machinery pending the ratification of such a treaty. The US submitted a draft declaration (Annex C) as an indication of US thinking.

Annex C is printed in volume xii.
The US members stated that copies of this draft had been made available to other potential signatories of such a declaration.

b. The UK members doubted whether it would be necessary, in the event of a settlement in Indo-China, to issue a declaration of intent, but did not exclude this possibility.

**ITEM III**

Terms of Reference:

"Assuming no agreement on Indo-China—

a. The form of collective defense pact for the purposes outlined in paragraph 2, which would be suitable to the situations;

b. The action to be taken in respect of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam."

11. The group agreed that the main features of a collective security treaty which would be suitable in the event of no agreement on Indo-China should be similar to those proposed by the group in the event of a settlement.

12. Timing.

The group agreed that in the event of a failure of the negotiations at Geneva the establishment of a collective security treaty would become more urgent.

a. The UK members considered that a strenuous effort should be made to enlist the support of the Colombo powers and that this consideration should be kept in mind in deciding how to proceed with the negotiation of the treaty.

b. The US members believed that the situation would require negotiation of a treaty with the utmost dispatch by those nations ready to participate in such a treaty.


The group agreed that in the event of failure of the negotiations at Geneva:

a. It would be desirable that each of the 2 governments should issue a declaration of intent to conclude with other interested countries a collective security treaty.

b. It would be desirable that as many other potential members of the treaty as possible should issue similar declarations, and that they should be consulted urgently to this end.

The US members believed that the issue of a declaration would, in the event under consideration, be not only desirable but imperative and that the declaration should provide for the immediate formation of ad hoc machinery by the potential founding members of a security treaty.

**ITEM IV**

Terms of Reference:

"The procedure for bringing other interested nations promptly into these negotiations."

15. The group noted that consultations have already been undertaken with representatives of Australia, and the Colombo powers.

16. The group recommended that the problem of further consultations concerning a declaration in respect of an Indo-China settlement should be dealt with by the representatives of the two governments at the Geneva conference. (The respective views of the UK and US members are covered under Item I of this report).

17. a. As regards consultation with other powers on the projected Collective Security treaty, the US members believed that a working group with representatives of the UK, US, Australia, New Zealand, France, Thailand, and the Philippines should be established in Washington immediately to prepare agreed recommendations on the terms of a Collective Security pact regarding Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, and to prepare agreed recommendations on the terms of a declaration of intent. Consultations should be undertaken with the Cambodians, Laotians and Vietnamese as appropriate.

b. The United Kingdom members believed that such a working group should not be set up until the views of the two governments on this report were known and that in any case the establishment of the group should be preceded by individual soundings of the views of all potential participants in the treaty. Meanwhile consultation with other powers should be in general terms on an individual and not collective basis.
Viest Minh fighters themselves, and in full accord with the Chief and the Government of the State of Vietnam, the Vietnamese delegation asks not only a cease-fire but the disarmament of all the belligerent forces in Vietnam.

The Vietnamese delegation asks that the entire territory of Vietnam be placed provisionally under the control of the United Nations pending the complete re-establishment of security, of order and of peace in their minds and in their hearts which will permit the Vietnamese people to decide their destiny by free elections.

His Majesty Bao Dai, Chief of State of Vietnam, thus shows once more that he places the independence and the unity of his country above any other consideration, and that the National Government of Vietnam would prefer this provisional control by the United Nations over a truly unified and independent Vietnam to its maintenance in power in a country dismembered and condemned to slavery.

The Vietnamese delegation reserves its right to develop its proposal at a later time.”

SMITH

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 17, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 634. Repeated information of an attack made by the French delegation for our comments. They pointed out language second paragraph taken from USSR-Norwegian treaty, and fourth paragraph from UN charter. Unofficial translation follows:

“The Government of Laos wishes to establish relations with all its neighbors on foundations of mutual respect, non-interference, and non-aggression. It considers that the defense of its territory is best assured by its association in the French Union.

The Government of Laos is resolved never to take part in a policy of aggressive goals and will never permit Laotian territory to be used in the service of such a policy.

The Laotian Government will never take part in any agreement with other states if this agreement carries with it for Laos the obligation of establishing bases for the military forces of foreign powers on Laotian territory, as long as Laos is not attacked or exposed to the threat of an attack.

The Government of Laos is resolved to settle its international differences by peaceful means, in such a manner that peace and international security, as well as justice, will not be endangered.

The Government of Laos will refrain from recourse to threats or the employment of force either against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any state or in any other manner.”

SMITH
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET  GENEVA, July 17, 1954—9 p.m.

Secto 635. Repeated information Paris 88, Saigon 53, Phnom Penh 4. Nong Kimny tells us Cambodian Foreign Minister this morning called on Chou En-lai, returning latter’s call described Secto 616. 1 He found Chou less conciliatory than on occasion previous conversation. Chou urged that Cambodian government take to incorporate resistance elements into Cambodian army, police or civil service. He also spoke with great seriousness and emphasis regarding proposed Southeast Asian pact. He said that if Cambodia were to join such a pact or to permit foreign bases on her territory or to accept American military instructors, the consequences would be very serious and would aggravate the situation with unfortunate consequences for Cambodian independence and territorial integrity. He said that it would be all right for the Cambodians to have French or even British instructors. He made clear that his remarks regarding the Southeast Asian pact, foreign bases and American instructors apply to all three states of Indochina.

According to Nong Kimny, Cambodian Foreign Minister reiterated Cambodian position that Cambodia must retain her freedom of action to insure her own defense.

SMITH

1 Dated July 15, p. 1278.

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET  GENEVA, July 17, 1954—9 p.m.

Secto 636. Repeated information Paris 88. Eden today gave Mendes-France and me following account his talks with Chou En-lai this morning. Chou was most anxious about reports reaching him re recent Paris talks and particularly re US plan to create Southeast Asia pact including Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Chou reiterated his position to effect that he was prepared to join in a guarantee of the freedom and independence of all three Indochinese states but that if these states were to become members of Southeast Asian pact, everything would be changed.

Eden told us that he replied that he knew of no proposal for the Indochinese states to join a Southeast Asian pact but that he would confirm this with General Smith. He told Chou that of course we are interested in the defense organization of Southeast Asia and he pointed to current Soviet-Communist-Chinese pact as indicating right of nations to join for self-defense. Chou rejoined that this pact was concerned only with Japan, adding that he does not mind ANZUS which also is directed against Japan. He spoke at length on danger of foreign bases in Indochina. Eden told us he said this was nonsense.

I stated to Eden and Mendes-France that it seemed to me that question of whether or not Indochinese states are to be members of Southeast Asian defense pact depends on the outcome of current conference. I added that if we failed here we would have to go ahead and face a different and serious situation.

Later at Eden’s villa, I urged upon him the great importance of our being prepared without delay, regardless of how conference comes out, to issue statement of intent to form Southeast Asian defense organization. I said that I hoped that US, UK, Australia, New Zealand, possibly France as well as the Philippines and Thailand could be members initially. Eden stated that he would give serious thought to this matter but added that of course he would have to advise Commonwealth members in South Asia before any action was taken. He promised a reply on this subject before long.

Turning to general situation here, Eden and I agreed that Communist position, and particularly Molotov’s has hardened very considerably in last three or four days. It is evident that Mendes-France has been a great disappointment to the Communists both as regards the relatively firm position he has taken on Indochina and his attitude toward EDC. They may therefore wish to force him out of the government by making settlement here impossible.

SMITH

1 Dated July 17, p. 1404.
that French draft armistice agreement on Vietnam dealt with this subject and that proposed French conference declaration covered matter insofar as Laos and Cambodia concerned. Molotov said he would study matter further. Molotov then said he could not find anything with respect to foreign military bases and non-entry of these countries into military alliances. Mendes referred to proposed unilateral declarations by Laos and Cambodia and note to be taken thereof in conference declaration, to which Molotov replied that this was fine, but Russian counter-draft had proposed each power in conference undertake obligation in this regard and French proposal was "not quite the same thing".

There was then discussion of time required for regrouping, in which Mendes pointed out this was military problem; French military estimated 305 days would be required under ideal conditions and that 216 months had been added for "acts of God" and as a margin of error. He said there was not only question of military personnel and matériel, but also of civilian population. Molotov appeared to be somewhat surprised at the mention of civilian population and suggested that perhaps that could be handled in some other way. After fairly extensive discussion, it was agreed French and Viet Minh military experts would discuss matter further, Molotov agreeing to urge Viet Minh military meet with French who for some time have been unable to make contact on military level.

Mendes then turned discussion to supervision, during course of which Molotov said the French proposal for three separate commissions for each of Associated States acceptable if there was coordinating committee. During course of this discussion, Eden supported Colombo power group and finally suggested that if not acceptable, non-Communist state and one other state be added to Colombo group, pointing out French have conceded issue of unanimity and this would meet Communist point having at least one Communist state. Molotov replied by referring to his previous three-nation proposal, saying he had no other proposal to make and would inform Viet Minh of British suggestion.

On voting, Mendes referred to French paper and Molotov stated, subject to certain drafting amendments, positions not far apart. It was agreed French and Viet Minh civilian experts would meet to discuss drafting changes. Freedom of movement for commission was also raised by Mendes, to which Cuccia understood Molotov to reply that this was no problem. However, status of this apparently left vague.

Ministers then asked for report from experts (Tahourdin, Levisschen and Laloy were meeting in separate room on last French draft of conference declaration). However, it appeared that no progress had been made, Soviets, while accepting last French re-draft

as basis for discussion (Secto 628) attempting to re-introduce all items dropped from Soviet counterproposal (Secto 615).

Molotov then suggested a conference meeting be held tomorrow and long discussion ensued with Mendes and Eden attempting prevent meeting and making counter-suggestions of short meeting starting at 5:00 instead of 3:00, etc., but Molotov remained adamant on full meeting. During course of discussion, Molotov indicated Chinese and Viet Minh feel they have perhaps been left out of negotiations a little and have something to say. There was also vague reference by him to General Smith's return and desirability he be "brought back into picture". Matter was left with Molotov to consult with Chinese and Viet Minh on meeting at later hour than 3:00, and UK and France suggested meeting be very restricted with only 2 or 3 present from each delegation. Apparently, Eden and Mendes feel meeting cannot be refused if Communists continue to insist.

Caccia reported that on entering meeting with Molotov, Mendes had requested Eden not to raise question of line and elections, as in talk with Chou which Mendes had just had it appeared some resolution can be found these problems. However, neither Eden nor Caccia had opportunity obtain more full account from Mendes.

French had told Caccia they are immediately replying to Vietnamese note (Secto 633) denying Vietnamese have not been kept fully informed.

SMITH

Dated July 16, p. 1400.
Dated July 15, p. 1384.
Dated July 17, p. 1410.

218. Repeated information Paris 85, Geneva 46. Reference: Secto 601, repeated Paris 52, Saigon 21, July 14. 1 Free exchange of goods between regrouping zones would certainly be of importance to Viet Minh. Practically all of surplus economic areas will be in free zone. Even if Viet Minh get control of coal mines and cement mill north Vietnam, in addition to cotton mills, Viet Minh would still have trouble making their zone self-sustaining due to problems of supply of machinery and raw materials and transportation and marketing difficulties. All of surplus rice and rubber areas would be in free zone.

1 Anon, p. 1358.
Most of mineral resources would be in Viet Minh zone, but are relatively undeveloped. Viet Minh zone would be deficient in rice.

In summary, after certain amount of reconstruction free zone could be made self-sustaining over longer period of time and with more difficulty.

Free exchange of goods between zones would enormously complicate problem of giving US economic aid to free Vietnam. Free exchange would in effect mean giving economic aid Viet Minh as pointed out in our telegram 194, sent Geneva 28, Paris 74. Difficulties preventing smuggling between zones which goes on even under war conditions, would be increased under armistice. However, this should not prevent free world from attempting to put economic pressure on Viet Minh and Communist China.

USOM concurs.

HEATH

JULY 18, 1954

SECRET

Secto 648. Repeated information Paris 90, Saigon 91. There was working level meeting of friendly delegations this morning in order to consider questions related to conference and went session this afternoon. Phleger and Bunson attended a USDel. The French chairman (Roux) said he understood Molotov’s main purpose in calling meeting was to study proposed declaration. Text of declaration with agreed and unagreed portions resulting from meeting between UK, USSR and French working level representatives yesterday evening was taken up. Text portions covered in Secto 647.1

Vietnamese Representative Ngo Dinh Luyen (brother of Prime Minister) stated his delegation not in position to express views on declaration which referred to agreement on cessation of hostilities with terms of which Vietnamese Government unfamiliar since it had not participated in negotiation of agreement.

USDel reiterated US reservation on paragraph dealing with consultation and stated full position of USDel with regard to declaration and to guarantees of results of conference would be made known by chief of USDel.

1 Dated July 18, p. 1498.

INDOCHINA

It was agreed that in paragraph of proposed declaration sentence would be added to effect “line of demarcation provided in agreement on cessation of hostilities must in no way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary”.

There was also some discussion of proposed unilateral declaration to be made by Laotian and Cambodian delegations. Laotian text is contained in Secto 634.2 Laotian del reserved comment. Cambodian del to whom similar draft had just been submitted stated that his government had previously envisaged unilateral declaration on three subjects:

(1) Absence of reprisals against resistance movements;
(2) Intention to hold elections in accordance with Cambodian constitution; and
(3) Military intentions and limitations. He said that he would prefer to have statement on elections included in unilateral declaration rather than in conference declaration. He wished to avoid impression that holding of elections was something which had been imposed on Cambodia by Communist in course of partition settlement.

Reverting to conference declaration, Cambodian representative (Sam Sary) also stated that his government would have to make reservation regarding articles 6 and 9 in which respect for territorial integrity is mentioned since his government did not wish to disbar itself from negotiations with Vietnamese government regarding boundary between Vietnam and Cambodian boundary which Cambodia does not recognize since it was established by unilateral action of French President.

SMITH

Secto 650. Repeated information Paris 91, Saigon 60, Phnom Penh 5. Cambodian Foreign Minister and Cambodian Ambassador to Washington called on me this morning for discussion of conference prospects he agreed as to strength and justice of Cambodian position and as to probability Cambodia would come out of conference with assurance Viet Minh invaders would be withdrawn.

The problems of Cambodian defense in future, I stated that if Cambodians could create conditions under which they would be able to
Most of mineral resources would be in Viet Minh zone, but are relatively undeveloped. Viet Minh zone would be deficient in rice.

In summary, after certain amount of reconstruction free zones would be made self-sustaining over longer period of time and with more difficulty.

Free exchange of goods between zones would enormously complicate the problem of giving US economic aid to free Vietnam. Free exchange would in effect mean giving economic aid Viet Minh as pointed out in our telegram 194, sent Geneva 38, Paris 74, difficulties preventing smuggling between zones, which goes on even under war conditions, would be increased under armistice. However, this should not prevent world from putting economic pressure on Viet Minh and Communist China.

USOM concurs.

HEATH

* Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1359.

JULY 17, 1954

3601 GE/7-1954: Telegram

Working Level Meeting of Six Delegations, Geneva, July 18, Morning:
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

Geneva, July 18, 1954—10 p.m.

Secto 648. Repeated information Paris 90, Saigon 59. There was working level meeting of friendly delegations this morning in order to consider questions related to conference restricted session this afternoon. Phegley and Bonsal attended for USDel. The French chairman (Bourse) said he understood Molotov's main purpose in calling meeting was to study proposed declaration. Text of declaration with agreed and unagreed portions resulting from meeting between UK, USSR and French working level representatives yesterday evening was taken up. These portions covered in Secto 647.

Vietnamese representative Ngo Dinh Luyen (brother of Prime Minister) stated his delegation not in position to express views on declaration which referred to agreement on cessation of hostilities with terms of which Vietnamese Government unfamiliar since it had not participated in negotiation of agreement.

USDel reiterated US reservation on paragraph dealing with consultations and stated that full position of USDel with regard to declaration and to guarantees of results of conference would be made known by chief of USDel.

1 Dated July 18, p. 1498.

INDOCHINA

It was agreed that in paragraph of proposed declaration sentence would be added to effect “line of demarcation provided in agreement on cessation of hostilities must be in the way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary”.

There was also some discussion of proposed unilateral declaration to be made by Laotian and Cambodian delegations. Laotian text is contained in Secto 634. Laotian del reserved comment. Cambodian del to whom similar draft had just been submitted stated that his government had previously envisaged unilateral declaration on three subjects:

(1) Absence of reprisals against resistance movements;
(2) Intention to hold elections in accordance with Cambodian constitution;
(3) Military intentions and limitations. He said that he would prefer to have statement on elections included in unilateral declaration rather than in conference declaration. He wished to avoid impression that holding of elections was something which had been imposed on Cambodia by Communists in course of reaching settlement.

Reverting to conference declaration Cambodian representative (Sam Sary) also stated that his government would have to make reservation regarding articles 8 and 9 in which respect for territorial integrity is mentioned since his government did not wish to disbar itself from negotiation with Vietnamese Government regarding boundary between Vietnam and Cambodia, boundary which Cambodia does not recognize since it was established by unilateral action of French President.

* Dated July 17, p. 1419.

3601 GE/7-1954: Telegram

Smith-Kimmy Meeting, Geneva, July 18, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Geneva, July 18, 1954—11 p.m.

Secto 650. Repeated information Paris 91, Saigon 60, Phnom Penh 5. Cambodian Foreign Minister and Cambodian Ambassador to Washington called on me this morning for discussion of conference prospects. We agreed as to strength and justice of Cambodian position and as to probability Cambodia would come out of conference with assurances Viet Minh invaders would be withdrawn.

Re problems of Cambodia’s defense in future, I stated that if Cambodians could create conditions under which they would be able to
import arms and continue to employ French military instructors and technicians, it seemed to me that Cambodia might then, if necessary to secure agreement at conference, make declaration to effect Cambodia does not intend foreign bases on her territory and does not intend to enter military alliances under present circumstances. I stated in this connection that US and other like-minded countries intend to go ahead rapidly and effectively with creation of Southeast Asia pact. If Cambodia could join this pact, so much the better. But if Cambodia were for any reason unable to have a formal relation with the pact, I assured the Cambodian Foreign Minister that, in our view, any aggression overt or covert against Cambodian territory would bring pact into operation even though Cambodia not a member.

I took position that French Union membership afforded Cambodia adequate desirable means of securing through France necessary arms some of which would be American as well as necessary instructors and technicians some of which might well be American trained.

Nong Kimmy took careful notes on conversation. Foreign Minister limited himself to statement that Cambodia relies heavily on US for eventual protection against aggression and that Cambodia desires to emerge from current conference with maximum freedom of action re measures Cambodia may take to assure defense.

Smith—Do—Chuong Meeting, Geneva, July 18, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

Geneva, July 18, 1954—11 p.m.

Secto 632. Repeated information Paris 83, Saigon 62. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Van Do and Tran Van Chuong called on me this morning. Burden of conversation for Vietnamese was carried by Chuong. Latter referred to meeting with Secretary in Paris and memorandum which he presented at that time.

I expressed our sympathy for present difficulties Vietnam, but emphasized that any division of country was forced by harsh military necessity and that US could only consider such arrangement to be of temporary nature. I said US would not guarantee or recognize a partition and would not associate itself with statement accepting partition as such. However, US would not use force to upset an armistice agreement. I reiterated that no more could be gained at conference table than on battlefield.

In discussion of post-armistice need for Vietnam to maintain and strengthen army, Chuong brought up need for continuing US aid. I said, in view probable Communist insistence on foreign arms or instructors, it would appear necessary emphasize non-French character of French Union assistance. Chuong objected to US aid being channeled through French, to which I replied that aid could go through French directly to Vietnamese Army. I recalled that I had told Bao Dai to insist to French that Vietnam be permitted reorganize and form autonomous army, but he had not done this.

Chuong noted that Ngo Dinh Diem's request to General Ely for arms for Catholic militia in bishoprics for self defense had been met by French military withdrawal from those provinces. I replied that as military man I understood necessity of French decision in face of Viet Minh strength. It was too bad that better organized autonomous Vietnamese Army had not previously been created; this fault of neither Vietnam nor US, but it was too late to accomplish this in north.

Chuong asked US reaction to situation brought out in his note to effect that Vietnam, after accepting principle military regrouping zones, now being faced with partition. I repeated US does not accept partition, only temporary division through armistice agreement. To Chuong's question about need for military and political build-up of south during division period, I replied it was imperative if there to be any hope for success in eventual elections. Previous to elections south should be cleaned of Viet Minh and strengthened, while during this same period population of north would have had taste of living under Communist rule. After two years, there was hope that elections would turn out favorably.

Chuong asked if Vietnam could count on US aid; I countered by asking if Vietnam would remain in French Union, to which Chuong replied that necessary conditions were full independence and right to leave if they wished. I again made point that Communist insistence on no foreign military assistance might require such aid to go through medium of French Union.

Chuong then went through customary exercise of blaming presence of French for strength of Communists. He said Vietnam would use this conference to gain real independence from France.

When I asked if this might not mean departure French troops, he said that was wish of Vietnamese Government; without French, they could successfully appeal to Nationalists and fight Communists. I replied that in such circumstances Communists would walk through the country.

I ended by noting that US would not obstruct conference by insisting on US right to give direct military assistance and training, and that...
US certainly not prepared to fight for this principle if Vietnamese refused French channel.

SMITH

TOP SECRET NIACFT

GENEVA, JULY 18, 1954—1 P. M. 1

Secto 639. For the Secretary from the Under Secretary. Following dispatch given us in advance by Topping of Associated Press apparently represents official Chinese Communist position and was given Topping in order that we would become aware of it. 2 It begins:

"The Communist bloc has demanded that the United States guarantee the partition peace plan for Indochina and join in an agreement to neutralize the whole country, a responsible Chinese Communist informant said today.

The informant, who reflects the views of Red China Premier Chou En-lai, said the Communists are hopeful of a cease-fire agreement by next Tuesday's deadline if the Western powers agree to bar all foreign military bases from Indochina and keep the three member states out of any military bloc."

The informant said the Communists are pressing for the stamp of American approval on the armistice agreement—already okayed in principle by Britain and France—which would divide Vietnam between Communist leader Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh and Bao Dai's pro-Western regime.

"We believe that the US as a member of the conference should and is obligated to subscribe to and guarantee any settlement. Morally there is no reason for the US to avoid this obligation."

But the informant did not rule out the chance of an Indochina cease-fire even if the US refuses to okay the armistice agreement.

The Eisenhower administration has told France and Britain that they cannot go ahead with their plan for an Indochina settlement based on partition of Vietnam. But Washington has made it clear that it is not ready to associate itself formally with the plan which would sanction putting millions of Vietnamese under Red rule.

The Communist informant said the 'crucial issue' now in the Geneva peace negotiations revolves around whether the Western powers will agree effectively to neutralize Indochina.

"Refusal to join in such a guarantee," the informant said, 'could seriously deter a final settlement. On other important points in the negotiations we are in agreement or close to it. We are hopeful and we believe that there is time to reach a settlement by July 20."

1 Because of the time difference between Geneva and Washington, telegram Secto 638 was received at 9:58 a.m., Washington time, and the reply to Geneva, Secto 637, was sent at 12:26 p.m., Washington time.

2 For background on Topping's talk with the Chinese, see telegram Secto 661, July 19, p. 1448.

SMITH

TOP SECRET NIACFT

WASHINGTON, JULY 18, 1954—12:26 P. M.

Toses 565. From Secretary of Under Secretary. Does Secto 637 fourth paragraph mean that Eden has given away position which...
SECRET

3 M GENEVA CONFERENCE (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

phcr/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITESTALL SECRET (CABINET) DISTRIBUTION

D. 2.18 p.m. July 18, 1954.
R. 3.00 p.m. July 18, 1954.

TORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 960 of July 18

posted for information to: - Paris U.K.H. Ch. Ottawa

Washington

Canberra

Saigon

Wellington

New Delhi

Karachi

M. Mendès-France came to see me this morning in order to tell of his talks yesterday with Chou En-lai and Phan Van Dong. He had repeated to him most of what we had said in the telegram No. 956 to Foreign Office) about our plans for a South-East Asia Defence Agreement, and especially his fears that the newly independent States of Indo-China might be included in it.

Mendès-France had the impression that he was now somewhat reassured on this latter point.

2. They had also discussed the line of demarcation in the Tonkin area where there is a need to ensure Laos free communication along route No. 9. Mendès-France had indicated that he would be able to agree to a line south of the 18th parallel, provided this road were safeguarded. Chou En-lai advised him to talk to Phan Van Dong. However the meeting with Pham Van Dong had been completely unproductive. Pham Van Dong had shown no sign of budging from the 16th parallel

had also said that my proposal on composition of the Supervisory Mission (five Colombo Powers plus one Communist and one other) was quite unacceptable; he regarded most of the Colombo Powers as suspect because they were members of the Commonwealth. This seems comforting.


[Repeated to Paris, Washington, Saigon, and copies sent to C.R.O. for transmission to Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, New Delhi and Karachi].

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Mendes-France took in Paris, namely that he was willing to have Communist state on Control Commission without veto, or unanimity if no Communist state a member, but he would not take with a Communist state and unanimity rule.

Your Secto 639 received. It may be useful for your bear in mind that Executive has no Constitutional power to give any guarantee. This can only be done by treaty, ratification of which would surely be rejected. Executive can only reaffirm in relation to Indochina its general undertakings expressed in UN Charter.

Am fearful Eden will try to push Mendes-France into agreement for three or seven Points which will confront us with dilemma of either agreeing to "respect" it or repudiation which might involve our responsibility for breakup. This precisely result which I apprehended and fully discussed with Mendes-France at Paris and I must count on him to strive to protect our countries against consequences of this Communist manoeuvre which Eden might unwittingly abet.

DULLES

396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

Geneva, July 18, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 640. Repeated information Paris 86, Saigon 35, Tosec 550, repeated Paris 204, Saigon 204. US Delegation will remain alert to various points raised in reference telegram concerning economic relations between Communist and non-Communist zones Vietnam. US Delegation, however, will detail economic arrangements will be incorporated in agreements for cessation of hostilities and assume that these arrangements will be subject of later negotiation between authorities of two zones which time US representatives in Saigon and perhaps also in Paris will have an opportunity of making our detailed views known.

Regarding final paragraph of reference telegram on subject humane transfer of populations, US Delegation assumes these comments made prior to receipt of Secto 622 which gives latest French draft on this general subject.

SMITH

1  Dated July 16, p. 1393.

2  Dated July 16, p. 1392.

396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

Washington, July 18, 1954—1:11 p. m.

Tosec 566. At conclusion final study-group meeting UK showed us memorandum representing their understanding situation re membership countries as follows:

"For UK Record

It was understood that the wording of Para 656(1) covered the possibility of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon becoming initial members. The US Representative said that they would not in practice interpret it to cover the inclusion of Formosa, Korea, or Japan as initial members. He indicated that the US Government had no intention of opening informal consultations with Formosa, Korea, or Japan in order to bring them in as initial members. But would, however, preclude their eventual participation under the provisions of the treaty governing the accession of additional parties."

With respect to area to be covered by pact we made following notation which we gave the British:

"The US Representative made clear to the UK Representatives that in the US view, commitments under Para 8c(3) did not apply to Hong Kong."

DULLES

1  Drafted by Tyler of EUR/WE and Duvall of OC/T. Repeated to Saigon as telegram 220, to London as telegram 367, and to Paris as telegram 226.

2  For the text of the report of the U.S.—U.K. Study Group on Southeast Asia, see telegram Tosec 563, July 17, p. 1410.

396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

Twenty-third Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, July 18, 4 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Priority

Geneva, July 18, 1954—71 p. m.

Secto 654. Repeated information Paris 94, London 19, Saigon 63, Tokyo 6, Moscow 7. Department status Defense; Tokyo pass CINCE/G; Saigon pass Vientiane and Phnom Penh. Twenty-third Indochina restricted session Sunday, July 18, Molotov presiding. This session called at urgent request Soviets; French and British had requested that participants be confined to chiefs of del plus one adviser. This latter relaxed to permit two advisers.

1  A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/23) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 279. The minutes indicate that the session convened at 4:45 P.M. and adjourned at 4:15 P.M. The minutes are also printed in Conférence de Genève, pp. 376-377. This message was transmitted in two sections.
Molotov spoke first, noting that last meeting of Foreign Ministers held on June 4, just one month ago. He believed that today’s session provided good opportunity to gauge importance of period which had passed since last meeting and work performed by deputies. He believed that results achieved through private meetings and discussions had been not inconsiderable. Of course, not all of the questions had been resolved nor everything done which had to be done, but one should recognize the value of what had been achieved.

Molotov said first of all he wished to note that as far as the most complicated problem was concerned, that of peace in Indochina, a basis for re-establishment of peace had been achieved as a result of private negotiations which had opened possibility of an agreement on that question. He believed that all participants would attach appropriate significance to this accomplishment. He felt it was also important to recognize the work done with reference to establishment of peace in Laos and Cambodia. In this connection, it is perhaps true that everything had not been done that could be done, but it appeared conference was on the way to agreement concerning Laos and Cambodia.

Molotov said that all this shows recent private talks have had success and he expressed belief that such success would continue.

Describing situation as it appeared to him, Molotov noted that drafts for agreements on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and Laos had been presented to conference. Two drafts would be available today. The same was also true for Cambodia. He hoped parties concerned would display goodwill necessary to agree on unresolved points in these drafts.

Molotov noted also [there] were two drafts of Geneva conference declaration dealing with important political matters.

Two drafts have also been presented concerning the question of international control pertaining to implementation of the agreements. Question of control commission has long been discussed and Molotov felt that final agreement on this subject would not require great deal of time.

Molotov concluded by saying that he had made these observations in order to give general picture of the conference at present and that his remarks were naturally not complete. He believed that today’s meeting could make progress on the questions under discussion and would contribute to solution of problems facing conference.

After long pause Tran Van Do (Vietnam) spoke next, saying he had learned this morning that today’s meeting was to review final declaration of Geneva conference. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, he wished to state firmly that Vietnam delegation could not associate itself with any discussion of this declaration. Vietnam position based on following points:

1. Vietnam does not agree to conditions advanced for cessation of hostilities.
2. Vietnam delegation has not as yet advanced proposals on behalf of Vietnam Government for solution of problem based on principles of peace, independence and unity.

With regard point number one, Do referred to French draft of July 16 of conference declaration (Secto 626 repeated Paris 74, Saigon 48 4). This draft spoke of division of Vietnam into zones. For example, article 6 said settlement must permit Vietnamese people enjoy fundamental liberties guaranteed by democratic institutions formed following free elections supervised by international commission. Elections would take place when in opinion of competent representative authorities in each zone, restoration of peace in country has made sufficient progress, etcetera. Article 7 speaks of a settlement which would give Vietnamese people right to decide freely as to zone, etcetera roughly desired.

Vietnamese representative next referred to Soviet draft of July 15 (Secto 615, repeated Paris 63, Saigon 84 4). Article 8 of Soviet draft speaks of “consultation between competent representatives of northern and southern zones of Vietnam’. Article 10 states that representative authorities in northern and southern zones of Vietnam, as well as authorities of Laos and Cambodia, will not permit persecution of persons who have collaborated with other side.

In view Vietnamese delegation, this indicates that Vietnam will be divided into north and south zones. Everyone is talking of the division of Vietnam and mention is even made of parliaments at which division will be accomplished. Delegation of Vietnam can only protest the idea of partition. Based on point number one cited earlier in statement of Vietnamese representative, Vietnamese delegation flatly rejects both drafts submitted to conference.

Vietnamese representative then stated that Vietnamese delegation has not had opportunity, on behalf of new Vietnamese Government, to express own views. It reserves its right to submit a draft declaration and to elaborate on it at a plenary meeting in near future. Vietnamese delegation therefore requests a plenary meeting for this purpose.

Do noted further that there was no mention of State of Vietnam in either French or Soviet drafts. Vietnamese delegation cannot accept

*4Dated July 16, p. 1400.
*5Dated July 16, p. 1254.
declaration or agreement where Vietnam, which invited to conference as existing state, not even mentioned.

After pause following Molotov's request for other speakers, General [Smith] made following statement:

"If no one else desires to speak, I think it would be helpful if I made clear position of US in these last critical days of conference. I do this because I have recently seen the advance drafts submitted to the conference and have had a chance to review them.

"The position of the United States with respect to this conference has consistently been that it is willing to assist, where desired, in arriving at a just and honorable settlement which will contribute to the establishment and maintenance of peace in the area. The United States is not a belligerent in this conflict and it has not and will not seek to impose its views in any way upon the belligerents, who are the parties primarily interested.

"If the agreements arrived at here are of a character which my government is able to respect, the United States is prepared to declare unilaterally that, in accordance with its obligations under the United Nations Charter, and particularly Article II (4), it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, and would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern."

Since no other representatives requested floor following General Smith's statement, Molotov suggested intermission. After intermission had lasted for 45 minutes, it was informally agreed that meeting should be adjourned without returning to conference room. No communiqué issued.

Comment: Today's restricted session strongest performance to date. Apparent Molotov had not set stage even with Communist colleagues for any particularly important announcement despite its insistence that meeting be called. Molotov said to Mendes-France just before meeting that he thought would be well underline progress made and to show how close conference was to reaching agreement.

During recess, Chou En-lai said he had no desire make any statement. He seemed as much in dark as everyone else as to why Soviets had called meeting.

361. 327/1954: Telegram.
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

SECRET

Geneva, July 18, 1954—6 p.m.

Secto 644. Limit distribution. Eden has just given us following draft message to Colombo powers, Australia and New Zealand (re

Tose 562) which he is today transmitting to capitals concerned for delivery as soon as London approval received. He expects this will be forthcoming tomorrow. I told Eden I thought we would want to make similar communication to Philippines and Thailand, that it would be somewhat different because they had already agreed in principle to this move, but that we should synchronize our approaches. He undertook to have London inform Washington directly of UK Government approval.

Further comment follows in separate message.*

Language in brackets [parentheses] is original UK text, which Eden agreed to amend at my suggestion.

Begin text:

Draft message to Colombo powers, Australia and New Zealand.

"We are now in the critical concluding phase of the Geneva conference. We are all working very hard for an agreement, to which I attach the greatest possible importance. I still hope one may be reached.

"If it is, I trust that we may count upon all of the Colombo powers as well as upon other countries, to endorse it and to associate themselves with it in some way. This would very greatly strengthen peace in Asia. I shall communicate with you again as soon as possible about this once we have got agreement.

"The chances of agreement are still in my opinion no better than even. In these circumstances we are bound in prudence to consider the action to be taken in the interests of peace if we fail. A very grave situation would at once arise and it would be of crucial importance that common action on the widest possible basis should be taken urgently in order to stabilize it.

"In my view the best action would be an early announcement that countries of the Commonwealth and of South and Southeast Asia, together with the United States and France had all agreed to work together to ensure their common defense.

"As you know, we have long been in favor of creating a broadly based defensive organization for Southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific. Such a system is needed whether or not agreement is reached here. But if agreement is not reached then the need will become far more urgent and joint planning should begin at once.

"HMG have accordingly decided in that event to join with the United States Government, and with such other interested governments as are willing to take part, in making an early declaration of their intention to establish such an organization (begin such joint discussion). They greatly hope that the government of - will also be ready to make such a statement. You will see that no place is mentioned and we would like your views upon this. A draft showing the

* Dated July 17, p. 1430.
* Telegram Secto 649, July 18, p. 1439.
* The original text of the message from Foreign Secretary Eden to the governments of the five Colombo Powers, Australia, and New Zealand, July 15, is filed in 7510.00/7-1254."
form such a statement might take is contained in my immediately following telegram.

"We shall be glad to have your very early views on this proposal. A similar invitation is being addressed to the governments of ______.

"Draft declaration"

"The government of ______ desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in Southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific and convinced that the situation calls for them to be prepared for the exercise in this area of the inherent right of collective self-defense, recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, have decided to set up immediately in ______ an interim council or committee (working committees) to prepare early recommendations for the conclusion (on the question) of a collective defense agreement for Southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific."

End text.\(^5\)

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\(5\) Annex B to Foreign Secretary Eden's draft. Titled "Draft Declaration of Intention on Collective Defense."

\(^6\) Annex A to the draft was as follows: "Possible points for inclusion in a Declaration of Support for an agreement on Indo-China. 1. Note (or approve or welcome or support) Geneva settlement. 2. Desire to contribute to consolidation of peace in the area. 3. Undertake to treat violation of Indo-China settlement as a threat to internationals' peace and security. 4. Resolve to apply principles of United Nations in support of the settlement (e.g. Article 7(4) of Charter)." (751G.007/1536)

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3061 G7/7-1954: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation\(^1\)

CONFIDENTIAL  PRIORITY  WASHINGTON, July 18, 1954—7:16 p. m.

To Secy. From Secretary for Undersecretary. President asking principal radio and television networks to reserve time for Wednesday night\(^2\) which President will use if Geneva Conference fails so that he can explain gravity of resulting situation.\(^3\) You may in your discretion inform your French colleague.

DULLES

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\(^1\) Drafted by the Secretary of State and Browne of O/T.

\(^2\) July 21.

\(^3\) For background information on the President's decision to ask for principal radio and television networks to reserve time for Wednesday night, see memorandum of a conversation with the President by the Secretary of State, July 19, in volume xiii.

In the memorandum the Secretary wrote as follows: "After leaving the President [on July 18] I despatched a cable [Toosey 568] informing him of the President's intentions and authorizing him to inform Mende-Des-France as he did [see telegram Seco 565, July 19, p. 1461]. Subsequently on Monday morning [July 20] I telephoned to General Smith to alert him of the view that matters were going better from the standpoint of prospective settlement and that what had already been done was sufficient. I informed the President and he concurred." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, meeting with the President)

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3061 G7/7-1954: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State\(^1\)

SECRET  PRIORITY  GENEVA, July 18, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 567. Repeated information Paris 97, Saigon 66. Department pass Defense. Following is translation (done by British) of text writing paper on control in Vietnam prepared by Soviet delegation. Paper dated July 9 although only received today. Soviet paper follows closely French paper July 7 (Secto 575, repeated Paris 25, Saigon 17\(^2\)). Most important changes from French text appear in paragraph three of numbered paragraph eight, numbered paragraph nine (d), numbered paragraphs 15 and 18.

1. The responsibility for implementing the consequence of hostilities is placed on the parties.\(^3\)

\(^1\) Message transmitted in two sections.

\(^2\) Dated July 5, p. 1506.
"2. Control and supervision over this implementation is ensured by the international commission.

"3. In order to facilitate, under conditions shown below, the implementation of provisions concerning joint actions by the two parties, a joint commission will be set up in Vietnam.

"4. The joint commission is composed of an equal number of representatives of the commands of the two parties.

"5. The presidents of the delegations of the joint commission will hold the rank of general. The joint commission will set up joint groups, the number of which will be determined by mutual agreement between the parties. The joint groups will be composed of an equal number of officers from both parties. Their activity on the demarcation lines between the zones of regroupment will be determined by the parties whilst taking into account the powers of the joint commission.

"6. The joint commission will ensure the implementation of the following provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities:

a. A simultaneous and general cease-fire in Vietnam for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.

b. A regroupment of the armed forces of the two parties.

c. Observation of the demarcation lines between the zones of regroupment and the demilitarized sectors.

It will help the parties to implement the said provisions, will ensure liaison between them for the purpose of working out and putting into effect of plans for the application of these provisions, and it will endeavor to solve controversial questions which may arise between the parties during the implementation of these provisions.

"7. An international commission will be set up for control and supervision over the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Indochina. It will be composed of an equal number of representatives of the following states: (blank)

It will be read by the chairman (blank)

Its location will be (blank)

"8. The international commission will set up permanent and mobile inspection brigades, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-noted states. The permanent brigades will be located at the following points (blank). These points of location may, at a later date, be altered at the request of the joint commission, or of one of the parties, or of the international commission itself by agreement between the international commission and the command of the party concerned.

The field of action of the mobile brigades will be the demilitarized zones. Within the limits of these zones they will have the right to move freely and to receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may be in need of for the fulfillment of their tasks (supply of personnel, placing at their disposal documents necessary for control, summoning witnesses necessary for investigation, ensuring the security and freedom of movement of the inspection brigades, etc...) they will have at their disposal the necessary modern means of transport, supervision and communication. Outside the zones and points of activity shown above, the mobile brigades may, by agreement with the command of the party concerned, make trips within the limits of the tasks given them by the present agreement.

"9. The task of supervising the implementation by the parties of the provisions of the agreement will be placed on the international commission. For this purpose it will fulfill the tasks of control, supervision, inspection and investigation connected with the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, namely, it must,

a) Control the movement of the armed forces of the two parties, effected within the framework of the regroupment plan.

b) Supervise the demarcation lines between the zones of regroupment, and also the demilitarized zones.

c) Control the operations of releasing prisoners of war and civilian internees.

d) To watch over the implementation of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, concerning the ban on the introduction into the country from abroad, of armed forces, military personnel and of all kinds of arms, ammunition, military equipment, in the zones and points shown in Article 8.

"10. The international commission shall, through the medium of the mobile brigades mentioned above, and as soon as possible, either at its own initiative, or at the request of the joint commission, or of one of the parties, have recourse to necessary investigations by documents on the spot.

"11. The inspection brigades will submit to the international committee the results of their control, their investigation and their observations, and therefore they will draw up special reports which they may consider necessary or which may be requested from them by the commission. In the case of a disagreement between the brigades, the conclusions of each member will be submitted to the commission.

"12. If any one inspection brigade is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or a threat of a serious violation the international commission will be informed; the latter will study the reports and the conclusions of the inspection brigades and will inform the parties of the measures which should be taken for the settlement of the incidents, ending of the violations or doing away with the threat of violation.

"13. When the joint commission is unable to reach an agreement on the interpretation to be given to some provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the international commission will study the controversial question. Its conclusions will be sent directly to the parties and will be notified to the joint commission.

"14. Recommendations will be adopted or passed by the international commission by majority vote, reservation being made for the provisions contained in Article 15. If there is a split of votes the chairman's vote will be decisive.

The international commission may pass recommendations concerning amendments and additions which it may be necessary to make to the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, in order to ensure a more effective implementation of that agreement. These recommendations will be adopted unanimously.

"15. When dealing with questions concerning violations of the
agreement, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, namely:

(a) Refusal by the armed forces of one party to effect the movements provided for in the regroupment plan;

(b) Violation by the armed forces of one of the parties of the regroupment zones, territorial waters, or air space of the other party;

The decisions of the international commission must be unanimous.

16. If one of the parties refuses to put into effect a recommendation passed by the international commission, the commission or one of the parties address themselves to the guarantors. If the international commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in Article 15, it will submit a majority report and one or more minority reports to the guarantors. The international commission will address itself to the guarantors in all cases where its activity is being hindered.

17. The international control commission will be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indochina in order that it should be able to fulfill the tasks provided for in Article 9.

18. The international commission for control and supervision in Vietnam will act in close connection with the international control commissions in Cambodia and Laos. A body for coordinating the activities of the three commissions will be set up by agreement among them, in the form of a coordination international commission for control and supervision in Indochina.

19. The coordination international commission for control and supervision in Indochina will adopt decisions concerning a progressive decrease in the activities of the international commissions for control and supervision in Laos and Cambodia, taking into account the evolution in Vietnam. These decisions will be adopted unanimously.

SMYTH

JULY 19, 1954

Conference files, lot 20 D 827, CP 206

Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegate (Dean)
CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, July 19, 1954

COMMENTS ON VIETMINH DRAFT ARMISTICE AGREEMENT FOR VIETNAM

1. Vietminh draft is based on French draft, follows its organization, and in many cases mirrors whole paragraphs.

2. It establishes a single military demarcation line but does not say where.

3. Requires transfer of all forces of both sides to their respective sides of the line within 180 days. (French draft provides for 380 days.)

4. It omits any reference to intermediate regroupment zones as French draft covers so completely, and calls instead for withdrawal in two stages—air and naval forces and two-thirds of the ground forces during first three months, balance in last three months. Draft leaves up to the representatives of the two commands on the spot to work out further details.

5. It provides that turnover of civil authority between each side begins at the outset of the withdrawal and transfer of troops, specifically requiring that such transfer of civil administration of Hanoi be completed within 60 days and of Haiphong within 90 days.

6. It permits transfer of civilians from one zone to the other.

7. It prohibits introduction into Vietnam of reinforcing military personnel (although permitting individual and small unit rotation), except during 180 day period of evacuation.

8. It prohibits introduction of reinforcing arms and ammunition (but permits piece for piece replacement only during period between completion of transfer of forces and withdrawal of foreign forces).

9. Neutral control commission to observe and inspect reliefs and replacements at specific ports of entry.

10. It prohibits creation of new military bases and reinforcement of existing bases, and reestablishment of old bases.

Draft is exceedingly vague on details and phasing of regroupment of forces, leaving details to two commanders to work out. It appears constructed so as to permit the spirit of the agreement to be violated through imprecision of the letter.

It calls for transfer of forces in a time period less than that French say is needed to evacuate Laos in orderly fashion.

[Attachment]

SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS OF VIETMINH DRAFT ARMISTICE PROPOSAL FOR VIETNAM

Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zones

1. Provides for provisional military demarcation line and 10-kilometer demilitarized zone.

2. Location of line to be indicated on attached map.

3. Forces of both sides to be regrouped on either side of the line within 180 days after armistice comes into effect.

Principles for Implementation of Armistice Agreement

Estabishes principle of simultaneous ceasefire throughout all Indochina as of (blank) hour and date.

1 The handwritten initials of U. Alexis Johnson appear on the source text.

2 Summary of the Viet Minh draft agreement is attached; it was transmitted to the Departments of Defense and State in telegram Gento 84, July 16. (Conference files, lot 20 D 827, CP 207)

* Not printed.
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (U.K. DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/UTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND WHITEHALL
SECRET (CABINET) DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden

No. 966

July 18, 1954

Dr. 11.06 p.m. July 18, 1954

R: 11.13 p.m. July 18, 1954

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 966 of July 18.
Repeated for information to Washington, Rangoon,
Paris Ottawa
Colombo Bangkok
Delhi Saigon
Karachi Wellington
Djakarta Canberra

Chou En-lai said to me this afternoon that it was time
that agreement was reached on the question of the composition
of the International Supervisory Commission. He accordingly
proposed that this should consist of India, Canada and Poland.
Kolotov afterwards told me that he agreed.

2. The Americans and French are prepared to accept this
proposal, though latter might prefer Belgium to Canada.

3. I regret having failed to secure agreement to nomination
of the Colombo Powers but I do not think we can stand out any
more on this issue. Unless I hear otherwise, I assume that
there will be no objection to my accepting present proposal
for Canada or Belgium as third power. I should of course
prefer Canada. My immediately following telegram contains
a personal message which, if agreed, might be transmitted to
Prime Ministers concerned when matter is finally concluded.

4. You will no doubt arrange with C.A.O. for suitable
warning communication to Canadian Government, though choice
is not yet finally made.

/Foreign Office
United Kingdom Delegation

Villa les Ormeaux,

Geneva.

July 18, 1954.

Dear Willie,

I enclose for the records a fuller account of yesterday's conversation between the Secretary of State and Chou En-lai than was contained in our telegram No. 956 of July 17. You will no doubt consider whether in addition to including this fuller record in any print volume on the Conference, copies should be sent at once to Peking and other posts.

Chou En-lai brought with him Vice-Minister Li Ze-ming, Ambassador Chang Wen-tin and Huan Heliang as well as interpreter Fu. It was clear that he regarded it as a rather important and solemn occasion.

Yours ever,

W.D. Allen

W.J.M. Paterson, Esq.,
South East Asia Department,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.
The Secretary of State opened the conversation by saying that Chou En-lai would no doubt learn from M. Molotov of their conversation the night before with M. Mendès France. The two most important and difficult outstanding questions seemed to be the position of the demarcation line and the date of the elections in Vietnam. There were many other outstanding problems but these could probably be settled more easily.

Chou En-lai said that he had been informed about the meeting and he agreed that given goodwill on both sides the outstanding problems could probably be settled. But it was not about that he wished to speak.

He was increasingly concerned about the reports which were circulating to the effect that plans were being made to create a South East Asia pact. These reports had become even more frequent since the meeting in Paris with Mr. Dulles. He would be grateful for anything the Secretary of State could tell him about this. In particular he wished to know whether it was intended that the Associated States of Indo-China should form part of such an alliance. If so the outlook for a peaceful settlement would not be good. He feared that the Americans wished to sabotage the work of the Conference.

The Secretary of State recalled that he had more than once expressed the view that there should be no foreign bases in Laos and Cambodia and that the import of arms should be limited to what the Governments of those countries thought necessary for their defence. That remained his opinion and if his recollection was correct the Americans had expressed similar views in the course of the Conference. It was his hope that if agreement were reached, declarations to this effect might be made by Laos and Cambodia which could then be noted in the final declaration of the Conference and thus
2. Requires conference to establish a schedule for the meeting in Indochina of representatives of the two opposing commands who will handle operations connected with the cessation of hostilities.

3. Pending general elections for unification of Vietnam, civil administration in each regroupment zone to be conducted by the side regrouping therein. (Comment: question of elections not mentioned in French draft.)

4. Transfer of civil administration from one party to the other to begin at the outset of the withdrawals and to be completed when the withdrawal is completed. Specifically, transfer of civil administration of Hanoi to Vietminh must be completed within at least 60 days from date armistice comes into effect; that for Haiphong within 180 days. (Comment: French draft provides that civil administration remain in hands of one side until all its forces are withdrawn from zone concerned.)

5. Prohibits reprisals against persons and organizations having collaborated with other side during hostilities and guarantee of their democratic liberties.

6. Between time armistice enters into effect and completion of transfers of troops, civilians desiring to move from the zone of one side to the zone of the other will be authorized and assisted to do so by the authorities of zone in which they are now living.

7. Withdrawals of forces and equipment to be made by sector or province in the following order: all combat aircraft, naval units, and two-thirds of the ground forces to be evacuated in the first three months; the balance of forces and supplies to be totally evacuated in the last three months.

8. The Joint Commission and the neutral control commission to observe measures guaranteeing security of the forces during withdrawals and transfers.

9. A meeting of the representatives of the two high commands in Indochina will determine specific conditions for withdrawals and transfers according to the above principles.


1. All reinforcing troops and additional military personnel prohibited from entering Vietnam after the ceasefire.

2. Arrival of individual military personnel into Vietnam for temporary duty and return to Vietnam of individual military personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Vietnam to be authorized under the following conditions: relief of units and personnel not authorized during evacuation period of 180 days; term "relief" means replacement of units or personnel by other units of the same echelon or of other personnel arriving in Vietnam for military service there; relief units not to be larger than battalion size or equivalent naval and air units; relief to be man for man and no more than 1000 men to be admitted within any one month; units and personnel to enter and leave Vietnam only at points set forth below; neutral control commission, through its inspection teams, to observe and inspect reliefs at locations mentioned above.

3. Introduction of reinforcing armaments and ammunition and other war materials into Vietnam is prohibited, such as combat aircraft, naval units, artillery, recoilless weapons, armored vehicles, etc.; piece for piece replacement permitted between completion of transfer of forces to withdrawal of all foreign forces; neutral control commission, through its inspection teams, to observe and inspect these replacements.

4. From proclamation of ceasefire, creation of new military bases (naval and air) and construction work on existing military bases and restoration of bases will be prohibited.

5. Points of entry and exit for relief personnel and equipment (to be defined later).

POW and Civilian Internees

1. Vietnamese nationals, French and other nationalities, to be liberated within period of (blank) days from effective date of armistice.

2. Term "civilians internees" to include those arrested and detained for having contributed to armed or political struggle between the sides.

Additional Provisions

1. Commanders of both sides to accord protection and assistance to Joint Commission and the neutral nations control commission.

2. Expenses of the commissions to be shared, etc.
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION)

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/Typ.

FOREIGN OFFICE AND

WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden

No. 977

July 19, 1954.

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to: Foreign Office telegram No. 977 of July 19.


Saigon, Ottawa.

Canberra, Wellington.

Karachi, Delhi.

The head of the Laotian delegation called this morning to
tell me of an interview with Chou En-lai.

2. On the question of the French bases in Laos, the
Laotians had explained that their retention was in Laotian
interests. Chou En-lai had argued that in the event of trouble
they would afford a pretext for United States intervention and
this constituted a threat to China.

3. As regards the Laotian dissident irregular forces,
Chou En-lai said that these should be regrouped in the north-
est of Laos and administered, until elections to be held in
1955, by a regional joint commission composed of Communists
and representatives of the Laotian Government. In addition,
a similar commission would be established at the capital with
authority over the regional commission. The Laotians had replied
that this proposal would be examined but that they could not
recognize the existence of the "Pathet Lao" movement.

4. The Laotian delegation said that they were concerned
over the influence of the Laotian dissident elements - estimated
by the French command at 2,000 but by the Viet Minh at 6,000 -
when the time came for elections. The French proposal for
their concentration in separate areas was acceptable. It was,
however, essential that the French bases should remain, even
if, in the interests of securing an agreement, they would have
to be reduced in size.

Foreign Office please.....
feel, and Eden and I agree, that with such composition built-in veto will work to our advantage. This setup-costs French or anybody else could get, and I feel it is within spirit of point 7. 1

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1 Point 7 of the U.S.-F. Communication to the French, contained in telegram 4983 to Paris, June 30, 1954, read: "7. Provides effective machinery for international supervision of the agreement."

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The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—7 p.m.

Secto 69. Repeated information Paris 102, Saigon 71. French delegate has given us copy of draft of unilateral declaration of Governments of Laos and Cambodia which these governments have accepted. Draft also given Viet Minh and Chinese Communists but their reaction not yet received. Unofficial translation follows:

"The Government of (Laos, Cambodia) is resolved never to take part in an aggressive policy and never to permit the territory of (Laos, Cambodia) to be used in the service of such a policy.

"The Government of (Laos, Cambodia) will never join in any agreement with other states if this agreement carried with it for (Laos, Cambodia) the obligation of establishing bases for military forces of foreign powers on the territory of (Laos, Cambodia) as long as (Laos, Cambodia) is not attacked or exposed to threat of attack.

"The Government of (Laos, Cambodia) is resolved to settle its international differences by peaceful means in such a manner that peace and international security as well as justice will not be endangered. During the period between the date of cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and that of definitive settlement of the political problems in that country, the Government of (Laos, Cambodia) will not solicit foreign aid in matériel or personnel or instructors other than within the limits defined above and in the framework of a strictly defensive policy which it intends to apply in the future as it has always done in the past."

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366.1 GE/7—1954 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—7 p.m.


Verbatim text:


Working document concerning the joint and the international commissions in Cambodia and Laos.

1. Responsibility for the execution of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities is placed on the parties.

2. An international commission shall be entrusted with control and supervision over the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in (Laos Cambodia). It shall be composed of representatives of the following states:

It shall be presided over by the representative of

Its location shall be

3. The international commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned states. The fixed teams shall be located at the following points:

These points of location may, at a later date, be altered by agreement between the government of (Laos Cambodia) and the international commission. Beyond the points shown above mobile teams may, by agreement with the command of the party concerned, carry out movements within the limits of the tasks given them by the present agreement. They shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfillment of their tasks (provision of personnel, placing at their disposal documents needed for supervision, summoning witnesses necessary for the holding of inquiries, ensuring the security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams, etc.). They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, supervision and communication as they may require.

4. The international commission shall be responsible for supervising the proper execution by the parties of the provisions of the agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfill the tasks of control, supervision, inspection and investigation connected with the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, namely it shall:

(a) Control the withdrawal of foreign armed forces in accordance with the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities.

(b) Control the operations of releasing prisoners of war and civilian internees.

(c) Supervise at the points mentioned in Article 3, the implementation of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, concerning the ban on the introduction into (Laos Cambodia) from abroad, of armed forces, military personnel and of all kinds of arms, munitions, and war material.

5. A joint committee and joint teams shall be set up in order to facilitate the implementation of the provisions concerning the withdrawal of foreign armed forces and foreign military personnel. The
12. If one of the parties refuses to put into effect any recommendation of the international commission, the commission, or one of the parties, may address themselves to the guarantors. The international commission may address itself to the guarantors in all cases where its activity is being hindered. The guarantors shall make available their instruments of power to the international commission for the purpose of conducting its activities. If necessary, the international commission shall adopt decisions concerning a procedure for conducting its activities in the absence of a guarantor.

13. The international commission shall act in close cooperation with the United Nations in order to ensure that the decisions of the international commission are implemented.

14. The international commission shall be vested with the power to adopt decisions concerning the coordination of the activities of the commission and the United Nations, taking into account the evolution in Vietnam. These decisions shall be adopted unanimously.

Source:
Washington, July 19, 1954

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

X:xt

Y:xt

Z:xt

Washington, July 19, 1954-7: 45 P. M.

Mr. Secretary:

As requested 609, you may expand proposed unilateral amendment so to take note of paragraphs 2 of 8 of the proposed U.S. Declaration. The following is the assumption that the U.S. Declaration in its final form does not specifically differ from Sec. 609. As to non-participatory delegations, there is no objection to including first paragraph of effect of U.S. Declaration as proposed, paragraph second portion of paragraph 9 as this seems to imply a multilateral agreement.

The undersigned, the Secretary of State, has received the following instructions with understanding that the U.S. Declaration will be adopted as proposed.

The following, is the assumption that the U.S. Declaration in its final form does not specifically differ from Sec. 609. As to non-participatory delegations, there is no objection to including first paragraph of effect of U.S. Declaration as proposed, paragraph second portion of paragraph 9 as this seems to imply a multilateral agreement.

The undersigned, the Secretary of State, has received the following instructions with understanding that the U.S. Declaration will be adopted as proposed.
lateral engagement with Communists which would be inconsistent with our basic approach and which subsequently might enable Communist China to charge us with alleged violations of agreement to which it might claim both governments became parties.

While we don't want to take responsibility of imposing our views on the French, I feel particularly concerned about provisions of paragraph 6 which gives the Control Commission, constituted as per Seco 668, authority also to control the general elections. The ink is hardly dry on the Declaration of President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill of June 29 to the effect that "in the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the UN to insure that they are conducted fairly." It is rather humiliating to see that Declaration now so quickly gone down the drain with our apparent acquiescence.

With reference to 668 believe something like this is acceptable if obtainable. Believe that this would not necessitate these states dealing only with or through France as suggested your 650 and 652. We hope that this possibility of direct assistance for genuinely defensive and internal security purposes and not involving any US bases can be preserved as it may very well be that as a result of surrender in Tonkin Delta French will become so highly unpopular that their effort to maintain authority in other areas would in fact lead to these other areas surely falling under Communist domination.

4. The conference also takes note of the declarations of the governments according to which (text to be drafted on the basis of the declarations of the Governments of Laos and of Cambodia regarding their defense needs). (See Seco 668 for current draft.)

5. The conference notes that the agreement concerning Vietnam has as its essential goal the settlement of military questions in order to put an end to hostilities and that the military demarcation line does not constitute a definitive territorial or political boundary. It expresses the conviction that the placing in effect of the provisions contemplated in this declaration and the agreement on the cessation of hostilities has created the necessary premises for realizing in the near future a political settlement in Vietnam.

6. The conference declares that the settlement of political problems in Vietnam must be effected on the basis of respect for the principles of the independence of the unity, and the territorial integrity of Vietnam. This settlement will involve free general elections, with secret ballot, which will take place in the course of the year 1956, under the control of an international commission composed of the representatives of the states members of the international commission. It is being required that all conditions must be present to assure the respect of fundamental liberties and of free expression of the national will.

7. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities meant to assure the protection of persons and property must be applied in the strictest fashion and particularly must permit everyone in Vietnam to decide freely as to the zone in which he wishes to live.

8. The conference notes the declaration of the Government of the French Republic according to which that government is prepared to withdraw its troops from the territories of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in agreement with the governments concerned.

9. The conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government according to which the settlement of all the problems related to the restoration and to the strengthening of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam will be based upon respect for the independence, the sovereignty, the unity and the territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

In its relations with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the said states and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

Pendence and sovereignty, their role in the peaceful community of nations. (Note: French will accept wording here to general effect peace will also be restored in Vietnam following but not preceding placing in effect of provisions of declaration.)

3. The conference notes that the agreement concerning Vietnam has as its essential goal the settlement of military questions in order to put an end to hostilities and that the military demarcation line does not constitute a definitive territorial or political boundary. It expresses the conviction that the placing in effect of the provisions contemplated in this declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities has created the necessary premises for realizing in the near future a political settlement in Vietnam.

6. The conference declares that the settlement of political problems in Vietnam must be effected on the basis of respect for the principles of the independence of the unity, and the territorial integrity of Vietnam. This settlement will involve free general elections, with secret ballot, which will take place in the course of the year 1956, under the control of an international commission composed of the representatives of the states members of the international control commission. It is being required that all conditions must be present to assure the respect of fundamental liberties and of free expression of the national will.

7. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities meant to assure the protection of persons and property must be applied in the strictest fashion and particularly must permit everyone in Vietnam to decide freely as to the zone where he wishes to live.

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In its relations with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the said states and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

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NOTE: French will accept wording here to general effect peace will also be restored in Vietnam following but not preceding placing in effect of provisions of declaration.)

3. The conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos with reference to their intent of adopting measures which will permit all citizens to take their place in the national community, especially by participating in the next general elections which, in accordance with the constitutions of each of these countries, will take place in September 1955 for Cambodia and in August 1955 for Laos with secret ballot and with respect for fundamental liberties.

4. The conference also takes note of the declarations of these governments according to which (text to be drafted on the basis of the declarations of the Governments of Laos and Cambodia declaring their defense needs). (See Seco 668 for current draft.)

5. The conference notes that the agreement concerning Vietnam has as its essential goal the settlement of military questions in order to put an end to hostilities and that the military demarcation line does not constitute a definitive territorial or political boundary. It expresses the conviction that the placing in effect of the provisions contemplated in this declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities has created the necessary premises for realizing in the near future a political settlement in Vietnam.

6. The conference declares that the settlement of political problems in Vietnam must be effected on the basis of respect for the principles of the independence of the unity, and the territorial integrity of Vietnam. This settlement will involve free general elections, with secret ballot, which will take place in the course of the year 1956, under the control of an international commission composed of the representatives of the states members of the international control commission. It is being required that all conditions must be present to assure the respect of fundamental liberties and of free expression of the national will.

7. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities meant to assure the protection of persons and property must be applied in the strictest fashion and particularly must permit everyone in Vietnam to decide freely as to the zone where he wishes to live.

8. The conference notes the declaration of the Government of the French Republic according to which that government is prepared to withdraw its troops from the territories of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in agreement with the governments concerned.

9. The conference notes the declaration of the French Government according to which the settlement of all the problems related to the restoration and to the strengthening of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam will be based upon respect for the independence, the sovereignty, the unity and the territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
10. The members of the conference agree to consult together on any question which may be transmitted to them by the international control commissions, in order to study the measures (USSR: Collective) (French-UK: . . . or individual) which might appear necessary to insure observance of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Indochina.”

Note: In addition French would agree to following desired by Soviets. “The competent representative authorities of the northern and southern zones of Vietnam as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia must not permit individual or collective persecution of persons, or members of their families, who had collaborated in any way with one or the other side during the war”. (This omits last sentence of Article 10 of Soviet draft transmitted in Secto 615.)

* * *

**Note**

1 Dated July 16, p. 1400.
2 Dated July 15, p. 1483.
3 Dated July 18, p. 1493.

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**Secto 671. Repeated information Paris 105, Saigon 74. French Delegation has told us that they intend to maintain position re text of final conference declaration set forth in Secto 628 with following possible changes (see also Secto 647 in which current Soviet positions are set forth). References are to be numbered paragraphs of French text transmitted Secto 628.**

2. French anticipate no difficulty in satisfactory wording here which will give away nothing of previously assumed position.

3. French will insist on maintaining reference to “constitution of each of these countries” and that elections be fixed in August or September 1955 and will reject Soviet proposal of elections within one year.

4. French will endeavor to secure Communist agreement to text of declaration made by Governments of Laos and Cambodia and which Laotian and Cambodian delegations have already accepted. This article will then refer to those declarations. French will not accept Soviet proposal cited Secto 647.

5. French will insist on inclusion of language to the effect that military line of demarcation does not constitute definitive territorial or political boundary.

6. French plan to propose following alternative wording for this article: “The conference declares that the settlement of political problems in Vietnam must be effectuated on the basis of respect for the principles of the independence of the unity, and the territorial integrity of Vietnam. This settlement will involve free general elections, with secret ballot, which will take place in the course of the year 1956, under the control of an international commission composed of the representatives of the states members of the international commission, it being requisite that all conditions must be present to assure the respect of fundamental liberties and of free expression of the national will”.

7. The French Government will insist upon maintenance of French drafting on this point, i.e., that French troops will be withdrawn from the territories of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam only in agreement with the governments concerned.

With regard to additional paragraph which Soviet Delegation desires to have included and which is the same as paragraph 10 of the Soviet proposal transmitted in Secto 615, French will accept first sentence reading: “The competent representative authorities of the northern and southern zones of Vietnam as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia must not permit individual or collective persecu-
tion of persons, or members of their families, who had collaborated in any way with one or the other side during the war. But will reject second sentence: "These persons and the members of their families should be afforded individual freedom and freedom of political activity and right to elect and be elected."

**Smith**

3961 GR/7-1954: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET  

**Geneva, July 19, 1954—9 p.m.**

Secto 673. Repeated information Paris 106, Saigon 75. Vietnamese Del handed us late this afternoon their new proposal. It is elaboration of idea in note to French (Secto 633) and conference was advised of its preparation in yesterday's restricted session. Unofficial translation follows:

"French, Soviet, and Viet Minh drafts all admit the principles of a partition of Vietnam in two zones, all of North Vietnam being abandoned to the Viet Minh.

Although this partition is only provisional in theory, it would not fail to produce in Vietnam the same effects as in Germany, Austria, and Korea.

It would not bring the peace which is sought for, deeply wounding the national sentiment of the Vietnamese people, it would provoke trouble throughout the country, trouble which would not fail to threaten a peace so dearly acquired.

Before discussing the conditions of a de facto partition with disastrous consequences for the people of Vietnam and for the peace of the world, the Del of the state of Vietnam renounces its proposal for a cease-fire without a demarcation line, without partition, even provisionally.

The Vietnamese Del therefore proposes:

1. A cease-fire on present positions.
2. Regroupment of troops in two zones which would be as small as possible.
3. Disarmament of irregular troops.
4. After a period to be fixed, disarmament of Viet Minh troops and simultaneous withdrawal of foreign troops.
5. Control by the United Nations:
   A. Of the cease-fire
   B. Of the regroupment
   C. Of the disarmament and the withdrawal
   D. Of the administration of the entire country
   E. Of the general elections, when the United Nations believes that order and security will have been everywhere truly restored.

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1 Dated July 17, p. 1418.

**Smith**

3961 GR/7-1954: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET  

**Geneva, July 19, 1954—9 p.m.**

Secto 674. Limit distribution. Re Secto 660. Eden and I have discussed program of action to be taken in event of acceptable settlement. We have agreed to submit the following formula to London and Washington:

"Action in re to Southeast Asia pact in the event of acceptable agreement on Indochina at Geneva on or about July 80."

1. Every effort should be made to persuade countries of Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific to associate themselves in some way with the Geneva agreement, in accordance with the suggestion made to them on July 19.

2. Whether or not such declarations of association are made by all the countries concerned, invitations should be addressed not later than August 7 to the Governments of France, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines and Siam, to appoint representatives to meet with representatives of the Governments of the US and UK in (blank) not later than September 7 in order to prepare recommendations on the conclusion of a collective defense agreement for Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

3. The invitations to the five commonwealth countries, Burma, and Indonesia would be sent by the UK Government, to the Philippines and Siam by the US Government, and to France jointly by the two governments."

**Smith**
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—9 p.m.

Secto 675. Repeated information Paris 107, Saigon 76. At Mendes-France-Eden meeting with Chou this afternoon, Chou very considerably modified demands with regard to Laos set forth Secto 663. He agreed to retention of French bases in Laos, provided French turn base at Xieng Khouang over to Laotians and establish substitute base in southern part of Laos. French state this entirely agreeable to them, as they have some time have considered moving base elsewhere.

Chou also dropped his demand for any joint administration. He proposed regrouping points for Pathet Lao forces to be established in northeast provinces. French more optimistic over possibility agreement on Laos.

SMITH

1 Dated July 19, p. 1469.

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET NACFT

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—11 p.m.

Secto 676. Repeated information Moscow 8, For the Secretary from the Under Secretary. As I mentioned on the telephone today, Mendes-France told me that during his first dinner with him, Molotov had made two very brief references to Europe, simply saying that it was necessary to “strengthen peace in Europe too”, and when Indochina settlement was complete might be possible to exploit the atmosphere that would exist for “bringing peace in Europe”.

Mendes said that he had replied when the Indochina affair was settled he would be pleased to hear what Molotov had to say and report to his government. However, he was not prepared to discuss Europe now, as he was concentrating on the Indochina problem, and he was young and uninformed on many aspects of the European problems, and was therefore in no position to discuss them. Mendes said that although he had expected there would be effort to link Indochina with Europe, since that Molotov had never mentioned Europe and subject had not come up in any way during negotiations here.

However, yesterday during private luncheon between Joxe (French Ambassador to Moscow) and Vinogradov (Soviet Ambassador in Paris), latter had said that before leaving Geneva Molotov would be glad to have a good talk with Mendes concerning European affairs.

SMITH

1 Dated July 19, p. 1469.

2 For Soviet amendments to this draft, see memorandum from Bonal to Johnson, July 20, p. 1468.
SECRET

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (U.K. DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND WHITEHALL SECRET (CABINET) DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden

D: 11.51 p.m. July 19, 1954

No. 98A

R: 12.01 a.m. July 20, 1954

July 19, 1954

IMMEDIATE SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 98A of July 19.

Repeated for information to Washington

Paris

Following for Prime Minister from Secretary of State.

Indo-China.

The French Prime Minister told me this evening that he had had two hours' discussion with Bedell Smith this afternoon about the form in which the United States might be ready to associate themselves with any settlement. Bedell Smith had made it plain that if the United States could respect such a settlement, they could not sign any agreed declaration, nor could they even take note of a clause (let alone agree) which might provide for consultation between the members of the conference in the event of there being some disagreement later over the execution of the terms of any eventual agreement.

2. The most that the United States might be prepared to do would be to make a unilateral declaration taking note of what had been decided and undertaking not to disturb it.

3. Since Dulles was at least as much responsible as we for the calling of the Geneva Conference and the present terms of reference, I find this attitude unreasonable and we may tomorrow be faced with difficult procedural decisions. We shall naturally try to overcome these without there appearing to be any difference in the Western camp. But I am clear that if the alternative is, on the one hand, no agreement because of such procedural difficulties and the continuation of the war in Indo-China with all that that will bring with it, and on
SECRET

cable Geneva telegram No. 961 to Foreign Office

-2-

the other hand an agreement for the cessation of hostilities with some procedural difference between the United States position and our own, we must plump for the latter.

4. We only have until mid-night tomorrow, July 20, and I may have to act on these lines without the opportunity of consulting you further. It would be helpful to me to know that I can count on the full support of Her Majesty's Government.

5. I start tomorrow early with an attempt to convince Molotov that no signatures are called for. The above is the event that I may fail.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 330 and 253.

[Repeated to Washington and Paris]

add

ADVANCE NOTICES TO
Sir F. Roberts
Private Secretary
Minister of State
Mr. Dean
Head South East Asia Department
Resident Clerk
Minutes, Conversation between Zhou Enlai, Pierre Mendes-France, and Anthony Eden, July 19, 1954

Record No. 206-Y0907

Time: 12:45-13:30 July 19, 1954
Location: Premier Zhou’s Residence
Chinese Participants: Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Li Kenong, Wang Bingnan, Chen Yi, Huang Xian, Pu Shouchang (interpreter), Dong Ningchuan (interpreter)
French Participants: Pierre Mendes France, Jean Chauvel
British Participants: Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan, Ford

Mendes-France: Now the conference has entered into the concluding stage, but the question of Laos has not seen much development. I wish to discuss this question with Your Excellency the Premier.

The question of Laos has two sides: on the one hand is restoring peace and the problems after peace is restored, and on the other is the question of the French troops in Laos. French troops are stationed there at the request of the Laotian government, and the number of troops is not large at around 3,000. This is a measure to help Laos, and cannot be regarded as a danger. I have also discussed it with Mr. Pham Van Dong, and it is not necessary to worry about it. Laos has a border of about 3,000 kilometers, and it needs an army that can maintain order and safeguard security. Therefore, the help from the French troops is necessary. Would Your Excellency the Premier agree? I tried to repeat that the French troops are not aggressive and will not threaten anyone.

Zhou Enlai: The question of the French troops stationed in Laos within a given time, at certain location, and in a certain number could be considered in connection with other questions. I wonder if the question of reorganizing the Laotian resistance force in concentration areas has been solved. French troops should mostly be stationed along the Mekong River, and Xien Khouang would be too close to the Vietnamese border.

Mendes-France: We have two bases along the Mekong River, and this should be no problem. As to the base in the Plain of Jars, we can try to find another way out. We agree to a limit on the number of French troops in Laos, but in terms of duration, I hope we could reconsider it, for Laos needs to take some time to establish its armed forces for self-defense.

The regrouping of the resistance force in Laos is a subtle question of policy. But it should not be a big problem, since the number of the resistance troops is not big: in the beginning there were only 2,000, later the number grew to 2,500, and now it is said to be 4,000, which is perhaps not very true. But after all the number is small and the question could be solved. We also agree to remove the danger that these troops will be allowed to participate in state affairs and will not be retaliated upon. Their civil servants can get jobs in administrative institutions, and soldiers can be incorporated into the national army. They can be entitled to the right to vote, to be elected, and all the other civic rights. However, we do not understand why such military troops should be entitled to special political rights and control a special administrative region, albeit part of a region. It is inappropriate when the majority does not have such political privileges while the minority does. We are willing to consider all specific suggestions in a conciliatory spirit, but it is not a good idea to partition Laos and delimit discriminatory political regions.

Zhou Enlai: The opinions that Your Excellency the Prime Minister has just stated are quite similar to mine. I discussed solutions with the Laotian Foreign Minister and Defense Minister yesterday. We believe that a distinction should be made between two questions: one is the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the other is the jigsaw grouping of local forces. These forces should be regrouped in one area, rather than at eleven points. The regroupment of the resistance force should be protected, and after the elections, they can either join the national armed forces, the police force, or be demobilized out of their own will. Thus, the situation can be improved. After the withdrawal of foreign troops, the international supervision at the ports around the country will serve as a guarantee. A further distinction should be made between two questions. The resistance force is a military organization, and can be protected after regroupment and political work. When reunification is achieved through elections, they can be placed well. As to the question to local administration, it is a matter of internal affairs and thus the Royal Government and the representatives of the resistance force should meet on the spot to look for a solution. The resistance force stood in opposition to the government during the war, but now that they recognize the Royal Government, the Royal Government should unite with them. Mr. Mendes-France has also said that they should be granted various rights, given jobs, and placed well.

The central question now is to make the regrouping areas the areas where the resistance force stayed a long time. This would be conducive to solving the problem. I say candidly that we are willing to consider the French plan to retain some troops in Laos within a time and at certain locations so as to train and strengthen Laos self-defense forces. We hope to see Laos become a peaceful, independent, free and friendly country, and capable of defending itself. We believe
that Mr. Mendes-France should also consider delimiting a fairly large regrouping area. Later, reunification could be realized through supervised elections, and the resistance force should be taken good care of. This would be promoting reunification from another side. After the withdrawal of the Vietnamese Volunteer Forces, the resistance force should have protection.

We can promote reunification from two sides. We are willing to have Laos become a buffer zone as described by Mr. Eden. I am delighted that Mr. Eden is also here, so that we can discuss ways to reach our common goals. We should all urge upon the Royal Government to assume responsibilities. When everything is done through the Royal Government, it could be normalized.

Mendes-France: As Your Excellency the Premier has said, our opinions are no longer far apart. The question of French troops in Laos should be easy to solve. The retention of French troops in Laos should not cause anyone to worry; the Vietnamese People’s Army should be withdrawn; the resistance force should be well taken care of. Specific solutions to these questions should not be too difficult to find. The reason why I proposed eleven regroupment points is that we believe it to be a fairly appropriate solution. If you think there should be fewer points, it can be done easily, but it would complicate the problem to move all the people in the south to the north. Since the resistance force is all over the country, shouldn’t we also consider regrouping points in the south? Most of the people there are accustomed to local life, and the question should be solved there. The other part of the people can be transferred north. As to regroupment in the north, the question is relatively easy. We suggest that we protect the resistance force as best we can, and grant them all civic rights, but no special political rights.

Laos is a weak country; we all agree that it could be totally independent. What needs to be avoided now is that we should not give Laos and other countries an impression that just as a country is acquiring independence, people begin to consider partitioning it and marking out administrative regions with special positions. The real independence of Laos should be guaranteed, and it should not be threatened either from within or from without, otherwise it would have a negative influence on Asia and on other areas. I hope Your Excellency the Premier would pay attention to this.

Zhou Enlai: I said in a talk with Mr. Mendes-France and Mr. Eden in June that there should be a regroupment area for the resistance force in Laos. But this is different from the situation in Vietnam. In Vietnam, there are two regroupment areas and two governments, within a specific period they control their respective areas. But the regroupment areas in Vietnam are only a provisional solution, and it does not harm reunification. The proposed eleven regroupment points in Laos will not bring about stability; rather, they might cause local conflicts. The retention of French troops in Laos is to help Laos establish a force for self-defense, reunification, and independence. We will not call this French aggression, but French troops are foreign forces. The resistance force is a local force and should be concentrated rather than scattered at eleven points. They should have protection, and after regroupment gradually participate in state affairs under international supervision. Laos is not like Vietnam, and the Royal Government should be responsible for solving their problems and reassuring them.

It is possible that some people in the south do not want to move to the north. This is a political issue, and can be solved through negotiations by the representatives of the resistance force and the Royal Government. Administrative questions should be separated from military questions. What I said in June was based on realistic concerns, and what I say now is the same, without any additions or reductions. On the contrary, we are willing to consider the retention of French troops in Laos. This is a new point.

Mendes-France: Now that our opinions are no longer far apart, I suggest that the discussion be continued by experts.

Eden: I hope so, too. From what we have heard, agreements have been reached on some points here. As we understand, Mr. Zhou Enlai is not opposed to the idea of a regrouping area in the south, but to the idea of eleven scattered points. I think this question can be handed to experts to be discussed along with the question of French troops in Laos.

Zhou Enlai: What I proposed in June and what I have always stated is the establishment of a regrouping area in the northeast, and not eleven scattered points. Otherwise unrest would result, and the cease-fire would not be stable. This regrouping area is only provisional, and after reunification through elections, the resistance force could become part of the Royal armed forces of part of the local police force, or simply be demobilized. This would be promoting reunification and not disunity.

Mendes-France: Regarding the question of the number and location of the regrouping areas, I think the main regrouping area can be established in the northeast. Perhaps regrouping points could still be established in the south, but as to the question of specific borders, it can be solved on the spot. After regroupment, representatives of the resistance force can get in touch with the local authorities to solve all the problems after regroupment.
Zhou Enlai: I agree with Your Excellency the Prime Minister. The questions shall be studied by experts.

Maître France: The experts can meet this afternoon.

Eden: If we are through with the Laos question, I would like to propose another thing. Caccia and Ambassador Zhang had a very productive talk. I suggest that they talk again.

Zhou Enlai: Good. Mr. Caccia, why don't you stay for lunch so you can have a talk.

Translated for CWHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWHP.
Minutes, Conversation between Zhang Wentian and Harold Caccia, July 19, 1954

Record No. 206-C0057

Time: 1:30 pm – 2:10 pm, July 19, 1954
Location: Premier Zhou’s Residence
Chinese Attendees: Hua Xiang, Pu Shouchang (interpreter and note-taker)
British Attendees: Ford (interpreter)

1. Question of Demarcation Line in Vietnam

Caccia said that he had reported to Eden what Ambassador Zhang said the day before. Eden had conveyed the message to Mendes-France. The French side thinks that France has made considerable concessions in northern Vietnam, but the French side feels that “fortunately Route 9 does not fall on the 18th parallel.”

Ambassador Zhang asked, where does Eden think the demarcation line is south of the 18th parallel that is acceptable to the French side?

Caccia answered that there were two major considerations on this issue:

First is Route Nine, and second there should be sufficient space north of Route 9 to make those who use and maintain Route 9 feel safe.

Caccia said, there are two rivers between Route 9 and the 18th parallel, one of which enters the ocean at Dong Ha and the other at an unspecified location. These two rivers could both provide some protection for Route 9. Perhaps one of the two rivers can be chosen.

Ambassador Zhang asked, does Eden mean that as long as Route 9 is safe, it would be acceptable to the French side?

Caccia said, yes, but the demarcation line should not be a preposterous line. Some topographical details must be taken into consideration, and thus a river is recommended.

Ambassador Zhang asked, does the French side insist on Route 9?

Caccia answered, absolutely so. If this could not be negotiated, we could only buy our tickets home.

Ambassador Zhang said that he would report Eden’s opinions to the Premier.

2. Question of Date of Elections

Caccia said that he had reported to Eden the two solutions proposed by Ambassador Zhang the day before. He had also told Eden that the Chinese side was in favor of determining a date right now. He then said that based on the experience of Burma and India, it would take two to three years, and so it seems that the Soviets had promised an impossible task in their draft by proposing that the elections be held by the end of 1955. Lastly he said that the elections perhaps could be held in 1956, or by the end of 1956, or as early as possible in 1956.

3. Question of Military Alliances

Caccia said that some British newspapers had run inaccurate reports of the Caccia-Zhang talk the day before, and so he would like to repeat what he had said. If an agreement could be reached here that was acceptable to all, and if the agreement stipulates the non-entry of the three Indochinese states into any military alliances, then the British side believes that the three states will not be invited to joint any military alliances, and the United Kingdom will by no means do that. At the same time the UK believes that the Chinese side had the same attitude. Caccia went on to say that in saying so he represented not only the UK, but also the countries in the Commonwealth. As to the United States, American representatives had stated their attitude clearly the previous afternoon, and this further proved what Caccia had said the previous morning.

Ambassador Zhang said, we have the same understanding of what we discussed yesterday morning.

Caccia said that as he understood, Laos and Cambodia would issue their separate declarations to say that they would not enter into any military alliances.

Ambassador Zhang asked, in what way will the two sides in Vietnam express this point?

Caccia answered that this point could be included in the armistice agreement. He promised to check the armistice agreement to see whether this point is already included.

Transcribed for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Minutes, Conversation between Zhang Wentian and Harold Caccia,
Second Meeting of July 19, July 19, 1954

Record No 206-C0057

Time: 5:45 pm – 6:00 pm, July 19, 1954
Location: Headquarters of the British Delegation
Chinese Attendees: Huan Xiang, Pu Shouchang (interpreter)
British Attendees: Ford

Ambassador Zhang said, the information that Mr. Caccia requested this afternoon will be provided now, and please convey it to Foreign Secretary Eden.

Ambassador Zhang said, the first point is concerning the demarcation line. Now the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has made a further concession, i.e., accommodating the topographical details, the demarcation line is to be set ten kilometers north of Route 9. If the other side still refuses to accept this, we could only buy our tickets home. According to this proposal, the security of Route 9 is no longer a problem.

Caccia said, I am afraid that a ten-kilometer area might be too narrow.

Ambassador Zhang said, a five-kilometer demilitarized zone on each side of the demarcation line will be established.

Caccia said that he could not accept this proposal on behalf of the French side. He said that this matter needed to be discussed further by Mendes-France and Pham Van Dong, and that he believed that the French side might want a few more kilometers.

Ambassador Zhang said, the second point is the date for elections. The DRV has also made a further concession to hold general elections two years after the signing of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. The precise date and the actual method of the elections will be negotiated by qualified and representative authorities from the north and south regions of Vietnam, and a decision is to be made no later than June 1955.

Caccia made no comment on this point, and only said that it would be discussed by Mendes-France and Pham Van Dong.

Ambassador Zhang said, the third point is concerning the membership of the international supervisory commission. The international supervisory commission is to be composed of representatives from the following three countries: India, Poland, and Canada, chaired by the Indian representative. This has been accepted by Mr. Eden and Mr. Mendes-France, and we can confirm it now.

Caccia said that the UK accepted this, and France had said that it would accept it. The United States had not stated an attitude, but hopefully would accept it, too. For the sake of certainty, Caccia said that he would try to learn the American attitude and telephone the Chinese side about it.

Ambassador Zhang said, the fourth point is concerning the timing of the withdrawal and transfer of troops by both sides. The regrouping of the armed forces within Vietnam is to be completed with 245 days.

Caccia said, when this question was first raised, it was divided into two parts. The first part is based upon the material conditions for the withdrawal of troops, such as the railway and ports. Based on calculations of the transportation capacity per day, France proposed 285 days, and later after some reconsideration proposed 200 days. The second part takes into account estimates of inclement weather, and France proposed two and a half months in addition. The present proposal of 245 days means that Mendes-France will have to hope for the best of luck, and Mendes-France might feel dismayed by this.

Ambassador Zhang said, according to our calculations, six months would be enough. The present proposal of 245 days has taken into consideration bad luck. Generally speaking, Mr. Mendes-France has had good luck, and only a few days of bad luck.

Caccia said that this question needed to be discussed by Mendes-France and Pham Van Dong.

Ambassador Zhang said, the fifth point is concerning the guarantee by all the participating countries at the Geneva Conference to negotiate adopting collective measures when the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission presents a problem of a breach of the agreement. This is the last article of the political declaration. The French draft used the expression “individual and collective measures,” but we think it would be better if we adopt collective measures.

Caccia said that he had not seen the final draft yet, and that he could only say that he had noted our opinion. He said, U.S. representatives said yesterday that if an agreement was reached here, they were willing to honor it. They would issue an individual statement to promise that they would not sabotage this agreement. If someone else had the intention to sabotage it, they would consider it a grave matter. These remarks by the U.S. representatives indicated that they did not want to be bound on the issue of collective measures. Caccia then added, U.S. representatives said yesterday that they would act in accordance with the second and fourth articles of the United Nations Charter, and that any actions taken in accordance with the UN Charter could be said to be collective in some degree. Caccia said that the question of collective measures therefore might encounter some difficulty.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twenty-third Restricted Session, July 19, 1954

Records No: 206-Y0051

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

1. Eden sent Caccia to come and meet with Ambassador Zheng on the morning of the 18th. Caccia first said that he wanted to clarify one thing: if the Geneva Conference can reach an armistice agreement acceptable to all the participants, the establishment of foreign military bases in the three countries of Indochina and the participation of the three countries in the Southeast Asia defense alliance will not happen. These two issues and the issue of the prohibition of the introduction of new weapons across the border will be confirmed in either the armistice agreement or the statement by Laos and Cambodia. Caccia also said that he hoped that the atmosphere of the meeting in the afternoon would not be too tense, and we should not attack a certain delegate (meaning Smith) to create tension since it is harmful to the progress of the meeting. Caccia also guaranteed that the British delegation will not create tension.

2. At the same time, Eden also met with Comrade Molotov and gave the same opinions. Comrade Molotov therefore went to comfort Mendes-France before the meeting in the afternoon, and told him that we are willing to support his [plan to establish a ceasefire on the 20th. The tone of the statement of our side at the meeting will be mild, too. Since our counterparts have changed and relatively softened their attitude under our pressure, we accordingly changed the tone of the text of our statement to make it milder.

3. Comrade Molotov was chairing the meeting in the afternoon. His tone was mild when he made the opening speech. He summarized the results that had been achieved through previous meetings and expressed his belief that such success will continue. He hoped that the parties concerned will display sincerity to agree on unresolved points in the agreement. At last, Molotov said that he "believes that today's session will help to drive forward the solution of problems." Bao Dai's foreign minister Tran Van Do first spoke to oppose the division of Vietnam. He protested it and refused to accept the draft declarations of both the Soviet Union and France since they all referred to the division of Vietnam into two zones. Smith spoke after that and made clear the position of the U.S. in these critical days of the conference. Smith said: "the attitude of the United States toward the Geneva Conference has consistently been that it is willing to assist in arriving at an honorable settlement. Such a settlement will contribute to the maintenance of peace in the area. The United States is not a belligerent in this conflict and is also not willing to impose its will upon others. However, we have been very interested in this conference. If the agreement concluded here can be accepted by the American government, the American government will declare unilaterally that, in accordance with its obligations under the United Nations Charter Article II (4), it will refrain from the threat or the use of violence to disturb this agreement."

4. An intermission followed after Smith's speech. All the delegations became lively in the bar and energetically carried out diplomatic activities. Smith came to talk to me, and said to me: "I hope that our two countries can move to a better mutual understanding." Smith said [Walter S.] Robertson is sick and stays in the United States. He asked Smith to send his regards to me. Robertson also hopes that this conference can reach a good solution, and the relations between our two countries will be gradually improved. Eden asked me if my speech was long, and I said no. Eden said that currently there are not many unresolved problems left except the issues of division, election dates and Laos. I said that there is also the issue of the composition of the NSNC. I asked him if he had already known about the French proposal. He said that he agreed to have India as chair plus Poland and Canada [as members of the NSNC]. I agreed with that, too. Eden told Mendes-France that I agreed. Mendes-France said that was good, but he still wanted to keep it secret because he needed to deal with others. The issue of composition was thus solved. Mendes-France told me that what he worried about was the issue of Laos. I told him that I had already given my detailed opinions to the foreign minister of Laos. He said that was good. Also, Boa Dai's Foreign Minister, Tran Van Do, talked with me through the introduction of the French delegation. The foreign minister of Cambodia asked my opinions on Cambodia's draft unilateral declaration that he presented.

5. The atmosphere of the meeting and the intermission was very relaxed, and everyone was polite. Eden then made the suggestion to Molotov that Britain and France all believe that the meeting does not need to be continued. Comrade Molotov agreed that the meeting should be adjourned after he discussed it with us. The two chairmen also decided to announce the same communiqué as usual, and the then the meeting was adjourned. Neither Comrade Pham Van Dong nor I used the text of the statements we prepared. The meeting began tensely but ended in a relaxed mood. We do not necessarily need to put any pressure on the conference since the United States made their position clear. Britain and France began showing a true spirit of conciliation, and the issue of composition has been solved. We will try to curb off [our counterparts] on other issues in these two days. If our counterparts are willing to keep making compromises, we believe that we can reach the agreement on the 20th.

Zhou Enlai
July 19, 1954

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individual declarations associating them in some way with a general settlement and containing suggested points, but in their own language. These points had been advanced as "the kind of points that might be included in anything that were said." In agreement with us, no indication was given that points taken from US draft declaration. It was Eden's thought that each country would produce its own form of language and these would probably differ considerably. Most Colombo powers would presumably wish to avoid using term "aggression" in this context.

Re Annex B, Eden said he thought phrase "establishment of a collective defense" was better than his original and agreed to advance and support it, if and when this proposed document discussed with powers concerned. It agreed it was better not to make special démarche for this purpose but to await recipients initial reactions.

__SMITH__

__Note:__

- For text of Annex B. see telegram Secto 644, July 15, p. 1434.

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**SECRET**

**NIACT**

**GENEVA, JULY 20, 1954—5 P.M.**

Secto 684. Regarding Secto 667. Following is French draft text of conference declaration as furnished by Ambassador Chauvel at 12:45 today and is under discussion at Eden, Mendes, Molotov meeting this afternoon. Hold this text to provide basis for telephone call to Secretary when report is received of changes resulting from that meeting.

1. The conference takes note of the agreements which terminate hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam and which organize international control and supervision of the implementation of the provisions of these agreements.

2. The conference congratulates itself on the termination of hostilities in all three countries and expresses the conviction that the placing in effect of the provisions contemplated in this declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to assume hereafter their role in the peaceful community of nations in full independence and sovereignty.

3. The conference takes note of the declarations made by the governments of Cambodia and Laos with reference to their intention of adopting measures which will permit all citizens to take their place in the national community, especially by participating in the next general elections which, in accordance with the constitutions of each of these countries, will take place in the course of the year 1955 with secret ballot and with respect for fundamental liberties.

4. The conference takes note of the articles in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam prohibiting the entering into Vietnam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all arms and munitions. It also takes note of the declarations made by the governments of Cambodia and Laos concerning their determination not to request foreign aid and materials, personnel or instructors except in the interest of the defense of their territory and within the limits fixed by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities.

5. The conference takes note of the articles in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam according to which no military base depending on a foreign state can be established in the regrouping zones of the two sides, it being the duty of the latter to see to it that the zones attributed to them do not become a part of any military alliance and are not used for the remuneration of hostilities in or the service of an aggressive policy. It also takes note of the declarations of the governments of Laos and Cambodia in accordance with which these governments will not join in any agreement with other states if this agreement involves the obligation to participate in a military alliance which is not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or with the principles of the agreements on cessation of hostilities in Indochina or to establish bases for the military forces or foreign powers on Laotian or Cambodian territory.

6. The conference notes that the agreements concerning Vietnam has as its essential goal the settlement of military questions in order to put an end to hostilities and that the military demarcation lines cannot in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. It expresses the conviction that the placing in effect of the provisions contemplated in this declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary premises for realizing in the near future a political settlement in Vietnam.

7. The conference declares that, so far as Vietnam is concerned, the settlement of the political problems, to be effected on the basis of respect for the principles of the independence, of the unity and of the territorial integrity, must permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental and democratic institutions guaranteed by democratic institutions formerly as a result of free general elections with secret ballot. In order that the restoration of peace may have made sufficient progress and that all the conditions be present which are necessary to permit the free expression of the national will, the general elections will take place on July 20, 1956, under the control of an international commission composed of representatives of the states which are members of the commission for control and observation contemplated in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations on this subject may take place between the competent representative authorities of the two zones beginning July 20, 1955.

8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities meant to ensure the protection of persons and property must be applied in the strictest fashion and particularly must permit everyone in Vietnam to decide freely as to the zone where he wishes to live.
8. The conference takes note of the agreement which has been made to take note (constater) of the fact that, in accordance with the declaration of the Government of the French Republic, the latter will withdraw its troops from the territories of Cambodia, of Laos and of Vietnam at the request of the governments concerned and within the periods which will be fixed in agreement with those governments, except for those cases where, in accordance with provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities, a certain quantity of French troops may be left in agreed points and for agreed periods.

9. The conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government according to which, for the settlement of all the problems related to the restoration and strengthening of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam the French Government will base itself upon respect for the independence and the sovereignty, the unity and territorial integrity of the governments of Cambodia, of Laos and of Vietnam.

In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, [each] of the members of the Geneva conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty and the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the said states and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

10. The members of the conference agree to consult together on any question which may be transmitted to them by the International Control Commissions, in order to study the measures (USSR: Collective) or individual) which might appear necessary to insure observance of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Indochina.

Note—following additional sentence agreed but precise place it will be inserted in body declaration not known:

"The competent representative authorities of the northern and southern zones of Vietnam as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia must not permit individual or collective persecution of persons or members of their families, who had collaborated in any way with one or the other side during the war."

396.1 GE/7-2054 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET NIAC

GENEVA, July 20, 1954—5 p.m.

Secto 685. Repeated information Paris 113, Saigon 82. State pass Defense. Following is unofficial translation of "draft declaration of the Cambodian delegation on the final act" which will apparently be added to list of conference documents transmitted Secto 682 repeated information Paris 113 Saigon 81.4

"Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the final act stipulate respect for the territorial integrity of Vietnam. The delegation of Cambodia asks the conference to consider that this clause does not imply the abandonment of the rights and legitimate interests which Cambodia might wish to assert with respect to certain regions of South Vietnam, and subject to which Cambodia has formulated specific reservations, particularly at the time of the signature of the Franco-Soviet Treaty of 8 November 1949 on the relations between Cambodia and FR, and at the time of the vote on the FR law joining Communist China to Vietnam.

Faithful to the ideal of peace and to the international principle of non-intervention, Cambodia does not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of the State of Vietnam and associates itself completely with the principle of respect for its integrity, subject to a reservation concerning the adjustment and regularization of the delimitation of the frontiers between that state and Cambodia, frontiers until now fixed by unilateral act of France.

In support of this declaration, the Delegation of Cambodia is addressing to all members of the conference a memorandum on the Cambodian territories of South Vietnam. 9

10 July 1954"

SMITH

396.1 GE/7-2054 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET NIAC

GENEVA, July 20, 1954—6 p.m.

Secto 686. Repeated information priority Saigon 113, Paris 83. Following is unofficial translation of text of note received from Vietnamese delegation this afternoon:

"In case of rejection of the proposal for a cease-fire without partition, and in order not to slow down the search for another peaceful solution, the delegation of the State of Vietnam solemnly draws the attention of the other delegations to the following points:

"The armistice agreement, considered as an act of a purely military nature, affecting only the French High Command and the Viet Minh High Command, and only being signed by the two commanders-in-chief and by their representatives, will lead nevertheless to consequences which compromise the future of the State of Vietnam from other points of view.

"In effect, it leads to the abandonment of territory, of populations, of civilian public services.

"The delegation of powers that the French High Command holds from the Chief of State of Vietnam, insofar as Vietnamese troops are"
SECRET NIACI GENEVA, July 20, 1954—10 P.M.

Secto 695. Following are texts of two declarations to be issued by Government of Cambodia. These texts have been agreed between French and Viet Minh and are currently being discussed with Cambodians:

The first declaration reads:

"Declaration of Royal Government of Cambodia

(Reference: Article 8 of the final declaration)

The Royal Government of Cambodia:

Anxious to assure the harmony and unanimity of the populations of the Kingdom, declares it is resolved to take the necessary measures in order to integrate all citizens without any discrimination in the national community and to guarantee to them the enjoyment of the rights and liberties provided for in the constitution of the Kingdom.

Makes clear that all Cambodian citizens will be able to participate freely as voters and as candidates in general elections with secret ballot."

The second declaration reads:

"Declaration to be made by Cambodian Government

(Reference: Articles 4 and 5 of the final declaration)

The Royal Government of Cambodia is resolved never to take part in an aggressive policy and will never permit the territory of Cambodia to be used in the service of such a policy.

The Royal Government of Cambodia will never join in any agreement with other states, if this agreement involves for the Royal Government of Cambodia the obligation to enter into a military alliance which is not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities or to establish bases for the military forces of foreign powers on Cambodian territory.

The Royal Government of Cambodia is resolved to settle its international differences by peaceful means in such a way that peace and international security as well as justice will not be endangered.

During the period between the date of cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and that of the definitive settlement of the political problems in that country, the Royal Government of Cambodia will not request foreign assistance in material, in personnel or in instructors other than in the interest of the defense of the country and within the limits fixed in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities."

SMITH

1 Both dated July 20, pp. 1474 and 1460, respectively.

July 21, 1954

SECRET NIACI GENEVA, July 21, 1954—11 A.M.

Secto 696. Re Sectos 684 and 690. Following has been submitted by del of state of Vietnam for insertion between Article 11 and present Article 12 of declaration:

"The conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the state of Vietnam undertaking:

1. To make and support every effort to re-establish a real and lasting peace in Vietnam;

2. Not to use force to resist the procedures for carrying the cease-fire into effect, although it deems them to be inconsistent with the will of the nation;

3. To pursue the achievement of the aspirations of the Vietnam people with all the means conferred upon it by the national independence and sovereignty solemnly recognized by France."

SMITH

July 21, 1954
Minutes: Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Top Phan (Summary), July 20, 1954

Zhou Enlai: We have almost finished our working documents except for the Nakhon Ratchasima Military delegation. We will work harder on them and ensure the Cambodian delegation at the Geneva Conference. San San (personal representative of the King of Cambodia) will have a meeting today. I have already read two documents concerning Cambodia one of which is on the Present Plan of the Two-Tone Agreement. We will send it to San San. We have already discussed the differences between the Nakhon Ratchasima Military delegation and the Cambodian delegation.

Top Phan: We have not yet read the document of July 19th. We received a new proposal from the Vietnamese Side on some military issues. Our opinions still have some differences regarding political issues and some military issues as well.

Zhou Enlai: We also have something in common. We can discuss the differences.

Top Phan: Regarding the military issues, we should distinguish from foreign military issues. We believe that this issue should be handled by both sides since they are military issues. Zhou Enlai: We accept the provisions of the joint statement claiming that there should be no foreign armed forces in Cambodia. We also accept the provisions for the introduction of a certain number of weapons and ammunition for our own security reasons. Our troops are in the process of being consolidated. This is for the protection of our own country’s security. Zhou Enlai: The areas are too spread out. There are some difficulties for them to withdraw. Our six months is still long. There is another suggestion that we can continue the national union without the general election until the realization of the national union of Cambodia.

Top Phan: It is unreasonable for us to keep all the armed elements gathered in local areas. We hope that all people in Cambodia can join the national community. It does not matter whether they originally grew up in Cambodia or not. According to our constitution, services were not to participate in general elections.

Zhou Enlai: Why is that?

Top Phan: According to our constitution, people on active service do not have the right to participate in elections or to be elected, either.

Zhou Enlai: Don’t we have one officer in Cambodia?

Top Phan: Yes, we do have one. France and many European countries all have this system.

Zhou Enlai: American servicemen can participate in elections.
Tiouloung: French police officers can participate in elections. In our country, servicepersons can not participate in elections; monks do not participate in elections, either.
Tep Phan: There are about 60,000 monks in our country. None of them participate in elections.
Zhou Enlai: Why?
Tep Phan: Because they renounce the world, and stand aloof from worldly affairs. They are not interested in politics. The monks I am talking about are people who wear the yellow kasaya robe. In our country everyone is Buddhist.
Tiouloung: There is another issue. Some people also ask us to declare that we will not establish military bases in our own territory.
Tep Phan: Our country is an independent country. We need to have our own military bases and airports for defensive reasons.
Zhou Enlai: This is ridiculous. Of course you should not make strict rules like these.
Tep Phan: It is completely for self-defense. Every Laotian believes in the independence of our country. We should have the right to build our own bases and airports in our own territory.
Zhou Enlai: You surely can build your own airports.
Tiouloung: In addition, the Vietnamese proposal suggested that we should withdraw our troops two kilometers from each side of the road along which they are to withdraw their troops. We cannot accept that, either, since the width of two kilometers extends to places we live. However, our side agreed to guarantee their security when the Vietnamese withdraw their troops. We are also getting ready to provide them with all conveniences [on transportation]. We will provide the means of transportation such as trains, trucks and ships on the railway, on the road and on the sea. We are willing to do so. The above are the differences concerning military issues I would like to point out.
Sam Sary: There is another difference regarding the type and amount of the imported military personnel and weapons to Cambodia. [Although they said to] discuss it separately, it is not clear enough to us. With whom on earth should we discuss this? When should we discuss it? And where should we discuss it? I was wondering if we can present the issue in the unilateral statement of the Cambodian delegation about whether we are allowed to introduce a certain number of weapons and military personnel for the requirements of territorial defense. (Omission- editor)
Tiouloung: [Mr. Prime Minister.] Our opinions on general and even practical issues can be quite close to [yours] when we discuss them with you. However, they are different [when we talk with] the [Vietnamese] side.

It is also worth studying the way we express ourselves. [For example,] what issues we need to raise in the joint statement for the conference, and what issues we can raise in the unilateral statement of our delegation.

It is stipulated in Chapter 3 Article 5 of the draft armistice agreement of Cambodia: after the restoration of peace in Cambodia, the original non-Cambodian elements can be accepted to the Royal Army or local police forces or can be demobilized based on their own free will. After they are demobilized and become civilians, they can be employed by all administrative or other organizations of the Royal Government of Cambodia.

Zhou Enlai: I appreciate it that you raised all these differences in details.
Tiouloung: We fully intend to make more efforts to help reach the agreement. We hope that we can revise the documents. Also, we believe that it is necessary to let our counterparts understand that the agreement should be reached on a footing of equality.
I would also like to discuss the suggestion that we should gather these elements together and not to disarm them temporarily. However, if they do not enter the military academy, they cannot obtain military ranking. They will be trained at the military academy and should pass their exams. Other servicepersons will oppose them if these people attain military positions without military training and passing exams.
Tep Phan: We would like to have the Prime Minister's opinions on the issues we presented.
Zhou Enlai: I appreciate the differences you presented. We all hope that we can reach an agreement at today's meeting. We do not have much time left, so let's make some efforts together. I deeply regret that agreements on all other issues have already been reached except the issue of Cambodia.
What we have to do now is to work to resolve our differences. We believe that we can settle the differences. I have already said many times that the basic principles concerning restoration of peace in Cambodia are independence, no foreign intervention, unification and the integrity of sovereignty. We said on June 16 that we had been insisting on and giving support to such an argument. [We hope that we can] reach a reasonable solution that will not interfere with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cambodia and will take care of both internal and external [issues].

The Vietnamese People's Volunteer forces (Omission- editor) will definitely withdraw. Regarding the issues of the period of withdrawal and of passing through the withdrawal route, if you think the period is too long, we can ask them to cut it short. [However,] one month is too short. Sooner or later they will withdraw.
Regarding the security issue of the withdrawal, the issues of the joint commission and international supervision and the issue of the means of
transportation, [we believe that] all these issues can be solved since you have already said that you are willing to cooperate. Regarding internal issues, you should categorize all the soldiers in Cambodia taking their wishes into consideration. Some of them originally lived there and do not want to leave. Some of them are from Cochin China. However, [you] should not discriminate against them. If some of them hope to stay in Cambodia, you surely cannot expel them. However, they should obey the Kingdom's laws.

Touloung: Do you mean those elements who joined the resistance movement? People who enter Cambodia from Cochin China need passes. We inspect all persons who enter Cambodia from foreign countries. [Only after we check] whether they are honest and act dutifully, will we allow them to enter. We have already informed the Vietnamese side about this.

Tep Phan: They surely can choose to leave or stay in Cambodia of their own free will. However, we have to check whether or not they are honest. Only people who act dutifully can stay in our country. We cannot let those dishonest people, even bandits, stay in our country. We must take the necessary measures since we are worried about our national security. Mr. Prime Minister, can we make decisions for our internal affairs?

Zhou Enlai: You surely have the right to deal with the internal affairs. However, you should not expel them and create tension. The Royal Government should not persecute those who want to stay in Cambodia and are willing to obey the laws. [The Royal Government] should not discriminate against those who used to cooperate with the other side, either.

Tep Phan: We have our own constitution and laws. Our constitution is democratic.

Zhou Enlai: Regarding the armed forces of Cambodia, [you] can first gather them on the spot, and then settle the problems with peaceful and political solutions. Try your best to accept them into military and administrative services. As you just said they can enter the military academy or have other choices based on their own will. Regarding political issues, [you] should pay attention to three points:
1. Do not persecute people who used to cooperate with the other side.
2. Arrange suitable jobs for them.
3. Since they still have some political organizations, parties and other groups, you should recognize their legal positions based on the constitution. You can meet and negotiate with the leaders of local political organizations.

Tep Phan: We have always gotten in touch with them until now.

Zhou Enlai: It is possible. As long as you open the door, you can reach an agreement. Regarding general problems of military issues, [you] should not introduce new troops and weapons from aboard, establish foreign military bases or join military alliance. The necessary type and amount of weapons that decided for defensive reason of Cambodia is not included in this limitation.

Tep Phan: The word "self-defense" can be described by two words in French. One is AUTO-DEFENSE, the other is DEFENSE A L'INTERIEUR DU PAYS (domestic defense). We prefer the second one since the first, "self-defense", can also be translated as local defense.

Zhou Enlai: I can agree with this.

Touloung: Mr. Pham Van Dong also used the word self-defense. Regarding the prohibition of the introduction of weapons, we also cannot agree with their explanation. They even included shotguns. Meanwhile, we need to add "when Cambodia is not invaded by foreign countries or threatened by foreign invasion" to the provision [that Cambodia] "should not establish foreign military bases and join military alliances."

Zhou Enlai: We can consider that.

Tep Phan: Our country is an independent country. Don't we have the right to sign agreements with foreign countries?

Zhou Enlai: Of course you do if you sign a trade agreement.

Tep Phan: What if we sign a military agreement with China?

Zhou Enlai: China has never signed any agreement of military alliance with any country. Regarding French military personnel who are training the troops [of Cambodia]...

Touloung: (Interrupt) France or foreign countries?

Tep Phan: It's not limited to France. Regarding France, we...

Touloung: (Interrupt) We have the experience of being ruled by France for several decades. We will not be interested in French "aid" anymore.

Zhou Enlai: You should not be pro-America, either.

Tep Phan: We won't. Even Mr. Smith said that the United States has no intention of providing aid.

Zhou Enlai: Smith can say like that. However, there are still people like [Arthur W.] Radford and Nixon in the American government.

Sam Sary: We can still establish technical collaboration with countries like India and China.

Tep Phan: However, we are cautious about France.

Touloung: We are cautious about the cooperation of French experts and technicians, too.

Zhou Enlai: France has somehow changed its attitude recently.

Tep Phan: We still have to reconsider joining the French Union. Last time when we discussed drafting documents with the French delegation, we asked them not to add the point regarding joining the French Union to the documents.
Tioulong: Personally, I have already met with the Prime Minister three times. However, I have never met Mendes-France.

Tep Phan: We are not interested in joining the French Union [since] we do not want to be ruled by them anymore. France is no better than the Vietnamese.

Zhou Enlai: However, being pro-America is even worse. China has its experience [of dealing with the U.S.] Sino-American relations have a long history. The United States was a newcomer. America's attitude was relatively moderate at first. However, it changed after the United States excluded British influence [from China] after World War Two.

Tep Phan: I understand that.

Zhou Enlai: It is good that you understand it. The time for the meeting is approaching. I hope that you can reach an agreement with the Vietnamese delegation regarding these issues at the meeting in the afternoon. We will also push the Vietnamese side forward so that the meeting can be successful.

Tep Phan: Thank you very much for your help. (Omission editor)

Zhou Enlai: I am sure that Vietnam does not have such an intention. Chairman Ho Chi Minh firmly clarified the position of Vietnam when I met with him on the Guangxi border this time. He promised that Vietnam would not invade any country because a country is destined to fail. I am telling you the truth since we are all relatives.

Tep Phan: Yes. We need to protect our independence because we want to survive. Our situation is very difficult since our neighbors, such as Thailand and Vietnam, are all big countries. Since our country is a small country, we have no intention of attacking others and only hope that we can survive. In addition, the religion in which we believe does not allow us to attack others.

Zhou Enlai: Your situation is relatively good. The conference will publish a joint statement to guarantee [the armistice], and you have the support of the participants of the Colombo Conference. It is much better than [the situation of] Korea.

Tioulong: I understand this. Cambodia will be a new country after peace is restored. As in China, all the people [of Cambodia] need to make efforts to build up our country. The Chinese and Cambodian people also have a blood relationship. For example, I myself have Chinese blood. My grandfather is Chinese. You can tell that from my name. My [last] name is Tioulong.

Zhou Enlai: Very good.

Tioulong: Our peasants cultivate and merchants do business. We all hope to live in peace. It will make our economy develop. We are currently opening up wasteland for development.

Zhou Enlai: We all want peace. The Chinese people are also conducting peaceful development.

Tep Phan: The help we get from you can speed up the achievement of the agreement, and will therefore help us obtain peace and independence. We will need China's help on all different levels in the future.

Zhou Enlai: Yes. We also welcome you to come to visit China in the future if you have the chance.

Tep Phan: We would love to. Thank you.

Zhou Enlai: We will even have diplomatic relations in the future.

Tep Phan: Yes. (Standing at the door and leaving.)

Tep Phan: We appreciate the Prime Minister's help. We hope that Cambodia will become an independent and free country and will peacefully coexist with all its neighbors after the peace is restored.

Zhou Enlai: I also hope that the friendship between the peoples of our two countries will be improved.

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding Zhou’s Meetings with Mendes-France and Eden; and Discussions Outside the Conference, July 20, 1954

Record No. 206-Y0051

Chairman [Mao], Comrade Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

1. Mendes-France and Eden visited me in the afternoon of the 19th and focused their talks on the problems of Laos. Mendes-France said that the French troops, about 3,000 men, stationed in Laos for security reasons, are not threatening anyone. He agreed on the number limit of French troops there, but didn’t agree on a time limit. I said that the question of how long, which area, and how many French troops should remain stationed in Laos can be discussed with other related issues. Regarding the regrouping of the Laos resistance forces, he said that the resistance forces had only 2,000 men, not enough to control a special administrative region. I told him that the resistance troops should regroup in one area, not spread to eleven points (the French proposal suggested eleven points). In respect of their local administration, it is their own domestic affairs that should be discussed through the local contacts between royal government and resistance force representatives. Mendes-France said that the regrouping points could be reduced, but it would become complicated if all the troops have to move from the south to the north for regrouping since the resistant forces were all over the country. It may be considered to determine certain regrouping points in the south, since the most people there used to the way of their local life, so that it should be solved locally. I said that the eleven points for regrouping in Laos would bring peace and stability, and could cause some local conflicts. The resistant forces are local troops that should group together, not disperse to the eleven points. They should be protected. After their assembly, they will gradually participate in the life of the state under the international supervision. Laos is different from Vietnam. Its royal government will be responsible for the armed forces so that they won’t worry. If someone doesn’t want to go to the north, the resistance movement and royal government can send their representatives to meet and discuss this matter. Then, Eden asked me whether I oppose one regrouping area in the south. I didn’t answer him. At the last, Mendes-France said that our opinions are not too far apart and let the experts continue their discussions. He also agreed that the main regrouping areas will be in the northwest, and said that these may be still a regrouping area in the south. The specific limits of the area can be determined on spot. After the regrouping, the commanding officers of the resistant troops can establish contact with the local governments in order to cope with all the issues after regrouping.

2. After my meeting with Mendes-France and Eden, Eden’s assistant, Karsia, who came with Eden, stayed and talked to Ambassador Zhang about the problem of drawing the line. Karsia said that France definitely wanted to have Route 9. “If this is not negotiable, we all have to buy our train tickets and go home.” He also demanded to have enough area north of Route 9 in order to secure the [French troops’] safety. He suggested that the two rivers between Route 9 and the 18th Parallel could be chosen as the line. Regarding the election date, he proposed a date during the year of 1956. Talking about the military alliance, Karsia described the position of Great Britain and British Union as the following: If an agreement accepted by all the delegations is reached here and the agreement regulates that the three Indo-China countries cannot participate in any military pact, Britain thereby believes that the three countries are not supposed to be invited [to the Southeast Asian military pact]. And Britain itself won’t do it. He said that Laos and Cambodia would make their announcements respectively to state that they will not join any military alliance.

3. The Delegations of the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam have discussed the final proposal this afternoon, and have presented it to Britain. The main points of the proposal have been telegraphed [to Beijing] yesterday.

4. I met Menon this evening. I told him about the proposal that had been presented to Britain. He said that France hopes to draw the line in the area nearby a river. Regarding the election date, Menon suggested not having a scheduled election date, but scheduling the date for forming the election committee. I firmly opposed his suggestion and said, there is an agreement that the election will be under international supervision. If an election committee is formed, it needs to have both sides plus another country. This may cause foreign intervention of domestic affairs. Both sides in Vietnam won’t accept this kind of suggestion. And China does not agree either.

5. Comrade Pham Van Dong met Mendes-France again during the night. Mendes-France proposed to draw the line along the provincial border between Hoangpeng and Hoangghi, that is, the 17th Parallel. Pham did not respond. Mendes-France agreed to set up the troop withdrawal deadline within 245 days. But he asked for two more months as a psychological preparation period. He agreed with our proposing the election date, that is, two years. The first year is for discussions and negotiations. Mendes-France disagreed the gradual withdrawal. Regarding the protection of French economy and business in Vietnam, he presented a new proposal asking for much more than that of the previous proposal. In short, the only solution so far is the election date.

Zhou Enlai
12:00, July 20, 1954

Translated for CWHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWHP.
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET NKC ACT
Grenada, July 20, 1954—11 p.m.

Secto 685. Following are texts of two declarations to be submitted by the Government of Cambodia. These texts have been agreed between French and Viet Minh and are currently being discussed with Cambodians:

The first declaration reads:

"Declaration of Royal Government of Cambodia

(Reference: Article 3 of the final declaration)

The Royal Government of Cambodia:

Anxious to assure the harmony and unity of the populations of the Kingdom, declares it is resolved to take the necessary measures in order to integrate all citizens without any discrimination in the national community and to guarantee to every citizen the enjoyment of the rights and liberties provided for in the Constitution of the Kingdom. Makes clear that all Cambodian citizens will be able to participate freely as voters and as candidates in general elections with secret ballot."

The second declaration reads:

"Declaration to be made by Cambodian Government

(Reference: Articles 4 and 5 of the final declaration)

The Royal Government of Cambodia is resolved never to take part in an aggressive policy and will never permit the territory of Cambodia to be used in the service of such a policy.

The Royal Government of Cambodia will never join in any agreement with other states without the agreement of the Royal Government of Cambodia.

The Royal Government of Cambodia will not permit Cambodia to enter into a military alliance which is not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, to establish bases for the military forces of foreign powers on Cambodian territory.

The Royal Government of Cambodia is resolved to settle its international differences by peaceful means in such a way that peace and international security are preserved.

During the period between the date of cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and that of the definitive settlement of the political problems in the country, the Royal Government of Cambodia will not request foreign assistance in material, in personnel or in instructors other than in the interest of the defense of the country and within the limits fixed in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities."
tion that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam henceforth to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.

3. The conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community in particular by participating in the next general elections, which, in conformity with the constitution of each of these countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms.

4. The conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam prohibiting the introduction into Vietnam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. The conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in material, in personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of their territorial defense and to the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities.

5. The conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam to the effect that no military base at the disposition of a foreign state may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other states if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Indochina or the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign powers.

6. The conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Vietnam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Vietnam.

7. The conference declares that, so far as Vietnam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order that the restoration of peace may have made sufficient progress and that there may be present all the necessary conditions to permit the free expression of the national will, general elections will take place in July 1956, under the control of an international commission composed of representatives of the states which are members of the international commission for supervision and control provided for in the accord on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will take place on this subject between competent representative authorities of the two zones after July 20, 1955.

8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Vietnam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.

9. The competent representative authorities of the northern and southern zones of Vietnam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such person's families.

10. The conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, at the request of the governments concerned and within a period which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except in the cases, where by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.

11. The conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems connected with the reestablishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, the French Government will proceed from the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, each member of the Geneva conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned States, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

13. The members of the conference agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission, in order to study such measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam are respected. 

SMITH

751G.00/7-2154: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

NACT

GENEVA, July 21, 1954.

Sec. 699. Armistice agreements Vietnam and Laos to be signed at 3:30 a.m. Geneva time.

1 For the Armistice Agreements for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, Indochina Documents, pp. 1505, 1521, and 1531, respectively. The Indochina Documents indicate that the agreements for Vietnam and Laos were signed at 2400 hours (midnight) July 20, and that the agreement for Cambodia was signed on July 20 (no specific time given).
US delegation releasing following statement at that time:

Statement by the United States representative

"The United States delegation is very pleased with the important progress that has been made tonight toward ending the bloodshed in Indochina. As soon as we have had an opportunity to examine the final texts of the agreements reached by the belligerents, the United States delegation will express its views with regard to them. Meanwhile, we share the fervent hopes of millions throughout the world that an important step has been taken toward a lasting peace in Southeast Asia, which will establish the right of the peoples of that area to determine their own future."  

SMITH

751G.00/7-2154 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

NIAC

GENEVA, July 21, 1954.

Secto 705. For immediate action of Secretary. Following is revised text of declaration by Royal Government of Cambodia (reference: Articles 4 and 5 of final declaration) which has been agreed to by all parties:

"The Royal Government of Cambodia is resolved never to take part in any aggressive policy and never to permit the territory of Cambodia to be utilized in the service of such a policy.

The Royal Government of Cambodia will not join in any agreement with other states, if this agreement carries for Cambodia the obligation to enter into a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or with the principles of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities, or, as long as its security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian territory for the military forces of foreign powers.

The Royal Government of Cambodia is resolved to settle its international disputes by peaceful means, in such a manner as not to endanger peace, international security and justice.

During the period which will elapse between the date of the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and that of the final settlement of political problems in this country, The Royal Government of Cambodia will not solicit foreign aid in war material, personnel or instructors except for the purpose of the effective defense of the territory."

SMITH

1 Final text, Indochina Document IC/46 Rev. 2, July 21, p. 1544.

of free nations, we are requesting the agreement of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to our appointment of Chiefs of Diplomatic Mission, to be resident in Phnom Penh and Vientiane. We already have a Chief of Mission at Saigon, the capital of Viet-Nam, who will of course be maintained."

It will be assumed in making this statement that the contacts have by that time been made and that the Foreign Ministers of Cambodia and Laos are agreeable.

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**Editorial Note**

At 7 a.m. on July 21 the Secretary of State received a telephone call from Under Secretary Smith summarized as follows:

"S. [Smith] said one of the Foreign Ministers there will make a statement that a cease-fire has been arranged. The protest against negotiations will be done in the political field. It is the best obtainable by negotiation. They discussed some of the terms, but they will probably come in by cable, and I won't set down what may be inaccuracies unless someone wants them. There are practically no restrictions on Cambodia's maintaining an adequate security arrangement. These international control or supervision of the transfer of some of the people. Re what the Sec. was worried about, the French assured S. it will be given priority—even over personnel. They discussed S.'s statement, and the Sec. suggested putting in something re salt determination as independent and sovereign states. S. agreed and referred the Sec. to the statement made last night. The prohibition of arms and alliances is not forever. They agreed S. would make his declaration. It would be extremely bad if we did not when Mendes has done all he has. S. said today they are going to demonstrate Western solidarity by dining and meeting together. This would be done preparatory to Mendes' talking with Molotov. S. and the Sec. have their fingers crossed on this. S. assured the Sec. there were no under-the-table deals. S. said he thought his declaration would have been made by the time the Pres. has his press conference. S. read his statement." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Telephone conversations)

For the text of President Eisenhower's statement made at his press conference on July 21, see editorial note, page 1503.

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**Memorandum by Richard V. Hennes to the Head of the United States Delegation (Smith)**


General Smith: The Secretary is recommending to the President that he give the following statement at his press conference. He will proceed with this unless you advise to the contrary:

"As evidence of our resolve to assist Cambodia and Laos to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community

1 Smith's handwritten initials appear on the source text.
2 Reference to the memorandum of points attached to the U.S.-French Position Paper, July 14, p. 1388. This memorandum was also attached to the Secretary's instructions to Under Secretary Smith, July 18, p. 1388.
Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Reinhardt) to the Deputy United States Representative and Coordinator of the Delegation (Johnson) 1

CONFIDENTIAL


Subj: Possible Communist Attack Against U.S. Position at Final Plenary Session

We have heard rumors to the effect that, at the final plenary session this afternoon, Molotov or Chou may take the opportunity to denounce the United States' position of non-association with the Indo-Chinese settlement. According to these rumors, the Communists might use the occasion for a full-scale attack against United States policy.

If the Communists engage in polemics against us at the plenary, it would probably be with the aim of eliciting a counter-attack from our side, which could then be used by their propaganda in an attempt to demonstrate that we were opposed to a peaceful settlement in Southeast Asia.

On balance, however, we believe it is unlikely that the Communists will choose to upset the picture of "sweetness and light" which they will wish to achieve at the final plenary by launching a violent attack against the United States.

We have considered what response should be made by the United States if such an attack materializes. In our view, it would be best to refrain from responding in kind to a Communist denunciation and to re-state, in restrained and dignified fashion, our position of non-association based on the fact that the United States is not a belligerent.

Drafted by Stoessel of the delegation.

Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonesa) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)

SECRET


The Vietnamese Foreign Minister [Do] has just told me that he will be present at the plenary session this afternoon. He will state that his government is glad that a cease fire has been arranged. He will protest at the manner in which the negotiations have been conducted and at the fact that his government has not been kept informed. He will state that his government does not plan to use force in order to overthrow the cease fire but that it reserves its freedom of action in the political field.

Drafted by MacArthur.

1 Dated July 19, p. 146.

2 Dated July 20, p. 1470.
RECEPTION OF MENDES-FRANCE, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FRENCH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

21 July 1954 at 1120

Mendes-France says that now all issues connected with the restoration of peace in Indochina have already been settled in spite of the difficulties from some of the associated countries.

Molotov agrees with this and then adds that there are a number of other important problems which require solutions, for example, the German question, which is directly tied to the problem of security in Europe. As everyone knows, the Soviet government has submitted a proposal about ensuring collective security in Europe; this question was discussed at the Berlin Conference and has not been removed from the order of business. The rapprochement of the points of view of the Soviet Union and France on this problem should have great importance for ensuring security in Europe.

Mendes-France says that he is still not familiar with the German question and the question of European security in detail. As far as he knows, the proposal of the Soviet Union about organizing collective security in Europe has not encountered a favorable attitude from the three other countries. Therefore it would be inadvisable to advance the same formula right now. Some other ideas ought to be examined. In addition, there are such difficulties as the time factor. At the present time the treaty about a European defense community has been ratified by a number of countries. Strong outside pressure has been exerted on France toward these same ends. In connection with the delay in a response from France, the US, and Britain, other countries have begun to study other forms of restoring the sovereignty of West Germany. The French government cannot delay further on this issue and ought to give a reply. The French Parliament will take up the discussion of this problem in the near future. French public opinion is divided right now: part favors a European defense community, seeing an advantage in it in that it provides an opportunity to limit the arming of Germany and avoiding the creation of an autonomous German army. Another part sharply opposes such a plan.

Molotov says that France and the USSR are especially interested in the German issue being solved in the interest of peace. Other neighbors of Germany are also interested in this such as, for example, Belgium, Poland, and also other European countries.

It needs to be kept in mind, Molotov says, that the solution with regard to West Germany offered by the US and Britain is not just unacceptable to the USSR. It might create serious difficulties in Europe. The division of Germany would bring a strengthening of the aggressive forces in West Germany, which runs counter to the interests of the French and Soviet peoples. From the point of view of the Soviet Union, as long as Germany is not reunified on democratic and peaceloving principles, its arming would not only be inadvisable, but also risky. Until Germany is reunified as a peaceloving and democratic country both parts of Germany must not be armed. They should develop cooperation in the economic and political areas. At the same time conditions need to be prepared for the reunification of Germany so that Germany is not an aggressive country and does not carry with it the threat of war.

The plan of the Soviet Government pursues these goals. It is possible that our proposal is not completely satisfactory but we do not see any other proposals to solve the German question in the same peaceloving terms. The path to the creation of a European defense community is not the path of a rapprochement between France and the Soviet Union and not a path along which France will be able to find the assurance of its interests. The discussion of the German issue and of those proposals which were advanced by the USSR at the Berlin Conference and then supplemented with consideration of the comments and changes which were expressed needs to be continued.

Molotov suggested that Mendes-France state the intention of the French government with regard to the ways to assure collective security in Europe described in the Soviet government's draft, even in general terms. America, he said, is far from Germany and possibly it is ready to pursue a riskier policy. France and the Soviet Union are interested in a more cautious policy on the question of the rearmament of Germany. Many Frenchmen understand this and the alarm at the prospect of the arming and remilitarization of West Germany is even more noticeable in the country than in Parliament.

If France follows the US as Britain has, then it will be hard to change [its] position when Germany is rearmmed again, when it is remilitarized.

Experience shows that France might also pursue a more independent policy on the German question, pursue a policy ensuring peace, and [a policy] which is more in accord with the interests of the people of Europe. Molotov points out that the rapprochement of the positions of France and the USSR on the German question might prevent
the rearmament of Germany, which in this case is the main task. The Soviet government has pointed out the path, as far as it is concerned. If there are other ways, it is ready to hear the opinion of the French government.

Mendes-France says that he is also confident that France and the Soviet Union are the most concerned about a solution of the German problem. But the problem now is not the same as it was in 1950. France is not free in its actions right now as it was then. One cannot fail to consider that during these years preparations have been made, international talks [held] in which France participated, then an agreement was signed, and France now should make a final decision. It would be wrong to put this off further. The European defense community is unacceptable to the Soviet Union but there is no other alternative visible. The present situation cannot continue for long. Germany is waiting for a normal legal and political system to be offered to her.

The US and Britain do not conceal that they want to rearm Germany. French public opinion realizes this danger. The Americans and the British in London view the question about the possibility of offering sovereignty to West Germany in the same way as the Soviet Union has offered sovereignty to East Germany. The possibility of the rearmament of Germany is hidden behind this. Such a rearmament might be done unilaterally or in an organized framework restricting it. It is this very solution that the US, Britain, and the Western European countries are proposing.

The French government has nothing in place of such a proposal which might serve as a basis for discussion. It will have to deal with the German question in 10 days. Efforts are being made in France to reconcile the different points of view right now. I should warn you, says Mendes-France, that Molotov will probably not like the results of this reconciliation. Mendes-France suggests that the Soviet Union advance a new constructive proposal which would give the Western powers grounds for optimism. For example, the issue of disarmament, which has been discussed for a long time now but has moved forward very little could be such an issue. Such a proposal by the USSR would make talks about disarmament easier and would bring hope to the peoples. This might be a unilateral decision which would demonstrate to public opinion what serious efforts the USSR is making on this issue. Such a step might provoke actions by the Western powers in response and, on the other hand, this would also lead to a solution of the German question in the interest of peace.

Molotov says that the question before France right now is what direction it ought to choose to solve the German issue. Without taking on himself the task of giving advice to the French government, he directs Mendes-France’s attention to those aspects of the German question which very closely affect the interests of France and the Soviet Union. France can have no doubt that the policy of the Soviet Union on the German question is a policy of peace. No one has so firmly and consistently defended nor does defend the interest of peace in Europe as the Soviet Union. But not only the USSR is interested in this but France, too. France now has to take a step which it should regard in the most serious fashion and weigh whether this step will lead to a strengthening of peace or preparations for a new war in Europe. A reference to 1950 and succeeding years is not enough. This argument cannot predetermine the conclusions which France ought to draw. In the past, says Molotov, French leaders have declared that the Western powers have their own plan in the form of a European defense community but the Soviet Union is not posing any alternative to it. Such an alternative has been given right now. It is the plan for assuring collective security in Europe proposed by the USSR. The Soviet government has carefully regarded all the comments and changes expressed with regard to this plan. It is now ready to hear other comments about this plan and also to discuss new proposals.

The Soviet government thinks that the issue of collective security in Europe affects a large number of European countries, many of which are not connected with the European defense community, but [which are] directly interested in a solution of the German question and in strengthening peace in Europe.

In other words, says Molotov, the question is: after the period which began in 1950 France ought to take the following step. This step can tie France to West Germany where aggressive elements predominate and where by all indications their role will continue to increase. France should now weigh the developing situation when the question is whether to take a step along a path of strengthening peace or along a path of preparing for a new war in which France ends up with West Germany but against the Soviet Union and a number of other European countries. No outside forces can prompt France to go with West Germany against other European countries, including against such [countries] as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and others.

As regards disarmament, says Molotov, the Soviet Union favors a specific solution to the problems of a reduction of armaments, not to
mention the desire to solve controversial issues through negotiations which is the basis of our peaceful policy. There is a Soviet proposal about the reduction of the armaments of the great powers by one third, which would be a serious step toward a general reduction of armaments. In December 1953, in response to the well-known proposal by Eisenhower, the Soviet Union proposed that all the great powers announce a renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. This was an important step on the road toward a prohibition of nuclear weapons. However, thus far it has not received support. Of course, these issues are more complex, for not only European countries are interested in them, but also the US, which at one time proposed its own Baruch plan, which was neither acceptable at the time nor now and in general has no prospects. But the active desire of France for peace ought to play a great role in European affairs. This means that much depends on France’s future steps on the German problem. Such steps will either promote the strengthening of peace and resist the plans to rearm Germany or they can promote a worsening of the situation in Europe and an aggravation of the relations between the two camps in Europe.

Mendes-France says that France is in a difficult position. It is, of course, independent in deciding questions, but a real situation exists with which it is forced to consider when making decisions. On the German question it must consider the positions of America and Britain, ties with whom are needed for the security of France. The latest proposal of the Soviet Union about ensuring collective security in Europe did not receive approval even in principle. Therefore it cannot be used now as a basis and it will be necessary to go other routes. The very fact of France’s delay in solving the German issue entails undesirable consequences. America and Britain have decided to rearm Germany in any event. Many Frenchmen are thinking about this issue right now, about whether the German problem will be decided without France and whether in such an event that it might be better to adopt a decision which would restrict the rearmament of Germany in some organized framework.

Returning to the issue of disarmament, Mendes-France says that this decision has little practical interest but it would meet with a great political and psychological response in French public opinion. Plans for gradual disarmament do not have the effect that bolder and more original proposals might produce. He requests the proposal about collective security in Europe be reexamined and hints that if the Soviet government took the initiative upon itself on the issue of general disarmament it would produce a greater impression on public opinion than a proposal for proportional disarmament. Mendes-France points out at the same time that there is also a French proposal on the issue of disarmament which deserves attention.

Molotov points out a situation has been created now where France should display its will and decide on its new step in foreign policy. Ways to strengthen peace are opening favorable vistas for the development of political and economic relations between all countries interested in strengthening peace in Europe, in particular in a suitable solution of the German question. The position of France is difficult. But the main thing now is that the steps which will be undertaken in the near future do not conflict with the interests of peace. We think, he says, that the Soviet proposals are in accordance with the interests of peace in Europe.

Mendes-France repeats that he is a supporter of taking firm and energetic measures which would actually promote the strengthening of peace.

Molotov asks whether Mendes-France foresees any changes in the relations between France and the People’s Republic of China.

Mendes-France expresses the hope that relations between France and the PRC will improve and that in any event he is doing everything in his power. He hopes that France normalizes its relations with China. In any event France is trying to do this, for current relations are not in accord with the actual state of affairs.

Mendes-France thanks Molotov for the efforts undertaken during the Geneva Conference.

Molotov replies that Mendes-France personally played an especially important role in achieving the successes of the Geneva Conference.

The conversation lasted about two hours. Ghe. Vinogradov (the Soviet ambassador to France) was present during the conversation.

Recorded by Kazansky
Authenticated [by] [signature illegible]

Distributed to comrades: Bulganin
Voroshilov
Kaganovich
Malenkov
Mikoyan
Molotov
Pervukhin
Saburov
Khrushchev
536/М

18 copies sent. If [Translator's note: This is probably a reference to a sheet size]
356
[handwritten on the back of the last page: AVP RF Fond 06, Opis' 13a, pапka 25, pp. 121-130]
Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (A. E. Feuchtwanger) to the Deputy United States Representative and Coordinator of the Delegation (Johnson) 1

CONFIDENTIAL


Subj: Possible Communist Attack Against UN Position at Final Plenary Session

We have heard rumors to the effect that, at the final plenary session this afternoon, Molotov or Chou may take the opportunity to denounce the United States position of non-association with the Indo-Chinese settlement. According to these rumors, the communists might use the occasion for a full-scale attack against United States policy.

If the communists engage in polemics against us at the plenary, it probably will be with the aim of eliciting a counter-attack from our side, which could then be used by their propaganda in an attempt to demonstrate that we were opposed to a peaceful settlement in Southeast Asia.

On balance, however, we believe it is unlikely that the communists will choose to upset the peace of "sweetness and light" which they will wish to achieve at the first plenary by launching a violent attack against the United States.

We have considered what response should be made by the United States if such an attack occurs. In our view, it would be best to refrain from responding in kind as a Communist denunciation and to restate, in restrained and dignified fashion, our position of non-association based on the fact that the United States is not a belligerent.

1 Drafted by Stroesser and Johnson.

Conference files, folders 527, CF 306

Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (A. E. Feuchtwanger) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)

SECRET


The Vietnamese Foreign Minister [Do] has just told me that he will be present at the plenary session this afternoon. He will state that his government is glad that a cease fire has been arranged. He will protest the manner in which the negotiations have been conducted and the fact that his government has not been kept informed. He will state that his government does not plan to use force in order to overthrow the cease fire but that it reserves its freedom of action in the political field.

INdochina

385.1 G1/7-1044 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation 1

SECRET

Washington, July 21, 1954—12:15 p.m.

Toseo 587. For Under Secretary from Secretary.

1. Re Eden's formula for moving ahead on collective defense in SEA (Secto 674 2 as amended by Toseo 579 3) we have assumed that Eden would not extend formal invitations to any of Colombo Powers unless such powers had previously indicated informally that they would accept invitation. Is this assumption correct? In our view it would be counter-productive to send a formal invitation and to have such invitation formally rejected. Furthermore, it would greatly complicate our ability to deal with fact that neither ROK nor Formosa will be invited.

2. Also we had not envisaged that US-UK invitations would be made public but rather that after invitations are extended, those governments accepting would make simultaneous and identical announcements in capitals in the form of a declaration of agreement to appoint troops to meet together to prepare recommendations on establishment of SEA collective defense. This would make clear their common purpose and fact that their decision was on basis of common initiative and agreement and not something that US and UK had pushed others into.

3. Now that Geneva Conference has produced agreements, assume Eden will proceed immediately with further consultation Colombo Powers to determine their attitude toward establishment collective defense SEA. As he knows, Philippines and Thailand are ready to proceed. We will confer with British Embassy here immediately to initiate necessary further consultation with French.

4. Hope consultations with Colombo Powers will produce early indication attitudes those powers so that if they are willing to participate, invitations can be extended and announcements made (paragraph two above) as far as possible in advance August 7 deadline. In our view, timing is still the important element particularly in view of the fact that public reaction to Geneva Conference is as we expected portraying Indochina agreement as great victory for Communists.

5. Please discuss above with Eden.

DULLES

1 Drafted by MacArthur.

2 Dated July 19, p. 1465.

3 Dated July 20, p. 1470.
Last sentence of paragraph 5 should read as follows: "The conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other states if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign powers."

No other deletions or additions. Please note, however, that due to translation differences secretariat documents as issued will differ in wording and use of phrasing although not in substance from US delegation translations contained in, for example, Sectos 692, 693, 694 and 695.

Further, last two sentences of paragraph 7 should read as follows: "In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtained for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the member states of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 April 1955 onwards."

The conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of the effective defense of their territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos."
he has demonstrated a capacity to take decisions and carry them out. You may tell him that I hope he feels that our presence through General Smith at the Geneva Conference was helpful to his cause, and that so far as I am concerned, I greatly value the opportunity we had at Paris for an exchange of views, and believe that exchange will be helpful for the future.  

DULLES

1 In telegram 994 from Paris, July 27. Ambassador Dillon replied that he had passed the Secretary’s message to Mendès-France the day before. With respect to the presence of Under Secretary Smith at the Geneva Conference Ambassador Dillon reported that Mendès-France “felt the return of Bedell Smith to Geneva had been an event of the greatest importance and that he thought it was probably impossible for us to realize how important Bedell Smith’s presence had been to achieving a successful result at Geneva.” (7510.00/7-2754) For the remainder of Ambassador Dillon’s reply, see volume XIII.

394.1 GE/7-2154

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Head of the United States Delegation (Smith)

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, July 21, 1954.


Participants: Mr. V. M. Molotov, Minister for Foreign Affairs, USSR
Mr. V. V. Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, USSR
Mr. O. A. Troyanovsky, Interpreter
U-General Smith
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson

I called on Molotov at his villa shortly before the plenary meeting this afternoon and told him I wished to inform him of exactly what the United States was going to say at the meeting this afternoon.

Troyanovsky interpreted to Mr. Molotov the full text of the U.S. Declaration. I said that this declaration should be satisfactory, and pointed out that the last paragraph of the declaration with respect to the renewal of aggression was stronger than that in the proposed Conference declaration.

Mr. Molotov pointedly referred to the fact that the U.S. would not be associated with the other members of the Conference and was taking a unilateral position. He said it was unfortunate that the U.S. was disassociating itself from all the others. I replied that some of the others were not recognized by the U.S. and that the Conference agreements contained some things we disliked very much. However, I said, the United States had consistently tried to be helpful, particularly in

discussions with the Cambodian representatives the previous night. This drew a quizzical expression from Molotov. (Both the Chinese and the Russians believe we tried to induce the Cambodians to hold out.)

Without mentioning it by name, Molotov referred to SEATO as a renewed threat. I replied that it would not be a threat to anyone, but would be purely defensive. In response to his question I said that it was not now contemplated that the Associate States be invited or pressed to join SEATO.

WBS

Eighth Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, July 21, 8:10 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET


Eden announced that before opening formal proceedings he wished to call on representative state of Vietnam. Tran Van Do stated his delegation tabled proposal for armistice without partition, involving disarmament all forces, limited regroupment zones, temporary UN administration of country, and final settlement through free elections. He protested rejection this proposal without examination. He requested conference accept at least demilitarization and neutralization of Catholic bishoprics in south Tonkin delta. He protested fact that armistice for Vietnam had been negotiated by French command, although authority of that command over Vietnamese troops had been delegated from Chief of State of Vietnam. He also protested abandonment of territory still under Vietnamese control and stated that as result Vietnam was deprived of sovereign right to organize its defense without reliance on foreign troops. Finally, he protested inclusion of date for elections in armistice agreement since such provision obviously political in nature. He reserved Vietnam’s right to full freedom of action to safeguard unity, independence and territorial integrity.

1 A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/8) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, OF 277. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 8:10 p.m. (after 10 minutes for press photographs) and adjourned at 9:30 p.m. The minutes are also printed in Conférence de Genève, pp. 378-392. Extracts of the minutes are printed in Cud. 9239, op. 5-9. This message was transmitted in two sections.
Mendes-France responded to Do's statement. He said French delegation did not wish to return to points raised by Vietnamese delegation, but believed French command had acted within its mandate. His further stated French Government has always shared concern of Vietnamese delegation for Catholic bishoprics and expressed hope that recent declaration by Ho Chi Minh concerning Viet Minh intention respect freedom of conscience will be observed.

Eden remarked conference will wish to take note of statements of Vietnam and France.

Eden then proceeded to list agreed documents which were before conference (Secto 692 4). He stated agreements on cessation of hostilities were not to be made public pending agreement between parties. He explained agreements should not be published until all cease-fires had been effected.

After completing list of documents Eden requested each delegation declare its position on final conference declaration. Responses varied:

- France—approved terms of declaration.
- Laos—had no observations to make.
- Democratic Republic of Vietnam—nodded agreement.
- Chinese Communists—agreed.
- USSR—agreed.
- Cambodia—protested Eden's failure to list Cambodian declaration reservations concerning Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier (transmitted Secto 685 4) and read text.

(Eden explained that he had only at that instant received Cambodian declaration and expressed opinion that past controversies between Cambodia and Vietnam were not part of task of conference. Dong agreed with Eden and registered “most express reservation” concerning Cambodian statement. Eden declared conference could take note of statements of Cambodia and Democratic Republic of Vietnam.)

- Vietnam—asked following language be inserted after Article 2 of final conference declaration: "Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the State of Vietnam undertaking...

1To make and support every effort to re-establish a real and united peace in Vietnam; not to use force to resist the procedures for bringing the cease-fire into effect, in spite of the objections and reservations...

that the state of Vietnam has expressed, especially in its final statement."

Eden responded final declaration already drafted and proposed conference take note of Vietnamese statement.

Eden then stated two more pieces of business to be settled:

1 He suggested that two chairmen send telegrams to governments of India, Poland and Canada, asking them to undertake the armistice supervisory duties proposed by conference. No objection.
2 He suggested chairmen prepare proposal on allocation of costs on International Commission. Again no objection.

At this point, session appeared to be at point of adjournment. Eden made brief statement concerning conference achievements and expressed his appreciation for cooperation all delegations, hospitality of Swiss Government, and assistance of United Nations. US delegate thanked chairmen for their performance. Molotov replied to US delegate, stressing outstanding role of Eden in conference.

Vietnamese delegate again asked conference include his insertion in final declaration. Eden again replied final declaration could not be amended, but conference could note Vietnamese statement.

Eden then started to declare session closed, but Molotov triggered series of concluding statements by asking to speak, explaining he had believed such statements were to be made.

Molotov's speech consisted largely of standard Communist themes. Only points of interest were:

1 Reference to unsolved problem of Korean re-unification;
2 Cryptic reference to position taken by US on final declaration “fact which we know”;
3 Assertion that artificial obstacles to international role Communist China created by aggressive circles now being swept away.

Pham Van Dong followed with equally platitudeous and somewhat emotional pronouncements on accomplishments of conference. He made special reference to DRV policy of freedom of worship in Bui Chu and Phat Dien. He emphasized DRV desire for cultural and economic links with France and ended with appeal to Vietnamese of south, stating “victory is ours; independence is in our hands”.

Chou En-lai followed with statement similar in tone to those of Dong and Molotov and containing no points of particular interest. Laos and Cambodia then delivered brief statements on accomplishments of conference. Mendes-France gave final statement, in which he emphasized that success of conference was due to spirit of compromise and that same spirit would be needed in carrying out agreements.

Smith
With respect to the statement made by the representative of the State of Vietnam, the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing in its declaration just made is intended to or does indicate any departure from this traditional position.

We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam to play their part in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples of that area to determine their own future. [Signature]

SMITH

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY GENEVA, July 21, 1954—11 p.m.
Touss 15. For Bording/Phillips. Geneva Guide Final. But for Molotov's sudden awakening at 4:10 this afternoon, conference chairman Eden might have closed the Geneva Conference without a final round Communist harangue. Matter of fact, plenary session was actually closed in Eden's words when Soviet Foreign Minister suddenly asked whether closing statements were in order. Probably weren't but he started off anyway.

Naturally, he set the theme for his two Asian colleagues, striking chords of "peaceful co-existence", "relaxation of tensions", and the "success" achieved at Geneva by the "forces of peace". Molotov's tone considered moderate, especially towards US, but this did not last long. Pham Van Dong picked up the theme but not the tone, and once having touched in his own words on the "Communist success" (and thus the conference success, of course) at Geneva, he launched into the type of aggressive attack that has come to be expected of him. Certainly it was in bad taste under the circumstances.

Aside from these three speeches, final session of conference, as you know from news file, devoted largely to presentation of final declaration plus special statements from almost everyone of Allied delegations. Some of these made for home consumption, especially when they reflected note of protest, demand or reservation. This does not, of course, apply to US declaration, principles of which are well-known and can be dealt with accordingly. Certainly Smith's forthright statement can be considered a sound and positive, rather than negative, approach to problems of guaranteeing peace and security in Southeast Asia, and protecting fundamental rights of man in which free
world believes. US declaration was actually much stronger and had much more substance for non-Communist states than conference declaration by other members. Our statement was the only one which really carried the weight of a guarantee against further aggression. This should be a recurring point in our commentary on the whole conference.

Treatment: Of other separate declarations, only one with which we need deal especially, aside from noting (as did the conference, in most cases), is short Vietnam resolution prepared for insertion into the final declaration. Not accepted as an insertion, but since it states worthy pledge on behalf of Vietnam to bend all efforts to re-establish real peace in that country, and to refrain from using force to oppose any implementation of cease-fire agreements, US supports it. Because of the language, it requires careful handling, with emphasis on the pledge, and not on irony of its phraseology. US considers this a statement of valid intent to achieve true and lasting peace, and we wish the Vietnam[ese] well.

Communist wind-ups were notable, and even vulnerable, for at least one specific strain which ran through them all. At every turn they combined the “forces of peace”: Viet Minh, Communist China and the Soviet Union, with France. In their lexicon, France is on their side, because it helped to make peace and peace is their private property. Not only weakness of this argument but the affinity of it should be obvious. We suspect French themselves will rebut this premise, and we should pick up everything in next few days, probably from Mendes in Paris, which helps knock down that inadmissible although not new by any means, Communist reasoning.

Notable also was Asian Communist appeals, either in Dong’s language or in Chou’s more moderate approach, for what would amount to an Asian security pact. Their principal objective is just such a pact as Molotov has proposed for Europe, with US isolated. We have our answer to that, which presumably is being worked into our output as situation permits.

Also note heavy reliance on cultural and economic cooperation theme, to which our national strategy for this area might have some other than straight military answers. It has been obvious throughout conference that Chou is most concerned over US activities in Asia, so the more active we are, on all fronts, and especially in the next two years where elections will be held, the more anxious we can make him. Our statement is part of the strategy referred to; it stands out of the welter of language in Geneva today as a real, valid, and applicable principle, and should be treated as such.

Smith

Indochina

Editorial Note

At his news conference on July 31, President Eisenhower made the following statement:

"I am glad, of course, that agreement has been reached at Geneva to stop the bloodshed in Indochina.

"The United States has not been a belligerent in the war. The primary responsibility for the settlement in Indochina rested with those nations which participated in the fighting. Our role at Geneva has been at all times to try to be helpful where desired and to aid France and Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam to obtain a just and honorable settlement which will take into account the needs of the interested people. Accordingly, the United States has not itself been party to or bound by the decisions taken by the Conference, but it is our hope that it will lead to the establishment of peace consistent with the rights and the needs of the countries concerned. The agreement contains features which we do not like, but a great deal depends on how they work in practice.

"The United States is issuing at Geneva a statement to the effect that it is not prepared to join in the Conference declaration, but, as loyal members of the United Nations, we also say that, in compliance with the obligations and principles contained in article 5 of the United Nations Charter, the United States will not use force to disturb the settlement. We also say that any renewal of Communist aggression would be viewed by us as a matter of grave concern.

"As evidence of our resolve to assist Cambodia and Laos to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of free nations, we are requesting the agreement of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to our appointment of an Ambassador or Minister to be resident at their respective capitals (Phnom Penh and Vientiane). We already have a Chief of Mission at Saigon, the capital of Viet-Nam, and this Embassy will, of course, be maintained.

"The United States is actively pursuing discussions with other free nations with a view to the rapid organization of a collective defense in Southeast Asia in order to prevent further direct or indirect Communist aggression in that general area."

The text of this statement is also printed in the Department of State Bulletin, August 2, 1954, page 163, and in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, page 642.

751G.06/7-2154: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1954—7:45 p.m.

Tose 897. For Phleger from Cowles. Secretary has asked for our legal opinion as to what extent Geneva agreement may impose inhibi-

1 Drafted by O'Connor of S.
tions and restrictions on the Associated States. He has asked particularly how we can (a) protect Laos, Cambodia and retained Vietnam through SEATO against external aggression and assist them to prevent internal subversion and (b) bring them into some form of military or economic association with SEATO.

Secretary thinks that what we can do in these respects will depend to a considerable extent on the legal interpretations which France, UK and Associated States place on the agreements reached at Geneva, in light of their discussions and negotiations of these agreements. I would very much like to have your comments on these points either by cable or in person if you plan to be back by end of week.  

DULLES

\footnote{The reply to the Secretary's request was contained in two memoranda—one, dated July 23, prepared by Meeker of L/UNA; the other, dated July 27, also prepared by Meeker, was sent by Fulger of L to the Secretary of State. The memorandum of July 22, which contains a handwritten note on the source text that the Secretary of State saw it, is filed in Conference files. R/30 D 697, CP 299. For the memorandum from Fulger to the Secretary, which also contains a handwritten note on the source text that the Secretary saw it, see p. 1852.}

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, July 21, 1954—8 P.M.

Secto 718. Repeated information Paris 128, Saigon 97. Offroy of French del tells us that following conclusion of conference today he is pursuing negotiations with Viet Minh del regarding protection of French economic interests in North Vietnam and regarding conditions under which Frenchmen will be allowed to continue to reside there. According to Offroy French do not propose for present to have any sort of official representation in North Vietnam after evacuation French Expeditionary Corps and have rejected Viet Minh proposal for Viet Minh representation in Paris.

SMITH

IV. INDOCHINA DOCUMENTS PREPARED BY THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE: ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS FOR VIETNAM, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA; THE FINAL DECLARATION ON INDOCHINA: DECLARATIONS BY CAMBODIA, LAOS, AND FRANCE; PROPOSED AMENDMENT BY VIETNAM TO THE FINAL DECLARATION (JULY 20-JULY 23)

386.1 GE/1-2154

Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, 20 JULY 1954.

IC/49 Rev. 2

CHAPTER I

PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

Article 1

A provisional military demarcation line shall be fixed, on either side of which the forces of the two parties shall be regrouped after their withdrawal, the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam to the north of the line and the forces of the French Union to the south.

The provisional military demarcation line is fixed as shown on the map attached (see Map No. 13). It is also agreed that a demilitarized zone shall be established on either side of the demarcation line, to a width of not more than 5 kms. from it, to act as a buffer zone and avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities.

Article 2

The period within which the movement of all the forces of either party into its regrouping zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall be completed shall not exceed three hundred (300) days from the date of the present Agreement's entry into force.

Article 3

When the provisional military demarcation line coincides with a waterway, the waters of such waterway shall be open to civil navigation.

\footnote{The following printed notation appeared on the source text: "The two parties..."}
Call by the Secretary of State on Chou En-lai
July 21, 1950

The Secretary of State, speaking both as one of the
co-chairmen and as United Kingdom representative thanked
Chou En-lai for the assistance he had given at Geneva. He
expressed the hope that the agreement would further peace in Asia.
Chou En-lai paid tribute to the efforts made by Mr. Eden, without
which, he said, no agreement could have been reached.

Chou En-lai referred to the last minute difficulties over
Cambodia. As he was speaking a message was handed to him from
which it appeared that the Cambodian armistice terms had even yet
not been signed as the Cambodian representatives refused to accept
any obligation in regard to the expenses of the international
commission in Cambodia. Chou En-lai went on to say that he foresaw
trouble in the future about Cambodia, and one of the points at
issue would probably be the Cambodian claims for ports on the
ground that their territory had no outlets. Chou En-lai said they
even asserted that they had no outlet through Siam. He said that
he for his part would see to the integrity of Laos, but he wished
Mr. Eden to bend his efforts to see that Cambodia would be like
Laos, and that there would be no foreign bases there. He hinted
at his fear that the United States would intervene in Cambodia.
The Secretary of State said that he firmly believed that the United
States did not seek to establish a base in Cambodia, and he himself
would do what he could to help. He told Chou-En-lai in confidence
that General Bedell Smith had recommended the Cambodian representa-
tive on July 20 not to make difficulties at the last minute.
Chou En-lai said the trouble was that there was division within the
United States government. Mr. Eden replied that the next few
months would be difficult ones for the United States because of
the impending elections, which it would be well to appreciate.

Chou En-lai contrasted the French delegation's difficulties
with Cambodia and the contacts which had been established between
the French and the Vietminh delegations in the last few days:
he remarked humorously that this was one of the changes
brought about at Geneva.

Mr. Eden referred to the improvement in relations between
the United Kingdom and China and said that if Chou En-lai
wished to communicate with him after Geneva he hoped that he
would do so through Mr. Trevelyan. Chou En-lai agreed and
said that on his return to Peking he would appoint a Chargé
d'Affaires to London whom he hoped Mr. Eden would receive.
He said that relations should continue to become closer in the
future. He recalled that he had seen the British High
Commissioner in Delhi and the Ambassador in Rangoon when passing
through and had been met by a British representative at Hong Kong.
He thanked Mr. Eden for these attentions and said they showed
the improvement in relations.