

—not to use force to resist the procedures for carrying the cease-fire into effect, although it deems them to be inconsistent with the will of the nation;

—to pursue the achievement of the aspirations of the Viet-Nam people with all the means conferred upon it by the national independence and sovereignty solemnly recognized by France.

396.1 GE/7-2154

*Proposal for Insertion in the Final Act, Submitted by the Delegation of the State of Vietnam*¹

GENEVA, 21 July 1954.

IC/53

The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the State of Viet-Nam to the effect that it undertakes:

To make and to support every effort for the restoration of peace in Viet-Nam;

Not to use force to oppose the agreed procedure for execution of the cease-fire, despite the objections and reservations it has expressed, in particular in its final statement.

¹ For text of the Vietnamese proposal, see *supra*.

V. POST-CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS: VIEWS ON THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS; STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES AND UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE SMITH; LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE GENEVA ARMISTICE AGREEMENT RESTRICTIONS; ARRANGEMENTS PERTAINING TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION (JULY 22-AUGUST 11)

396.1 GE/7-2254 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, July 22, 1954—2 p. m.
Secto 725. Repeated information London 32, USUN New York 1. Caccia, UK delegate, said he wished inform Department that Prince Wan had agreed with him early in July that, if an armistice agreement was reached in Geneva, Thai appeal would not be pressed for hearing at a special session of the assembly but would wait for the next regular session which convenes in September.

Caccia said UK agreed with this view and now that an agreement had been reached in Geneva, was advising Dixon in New York of UK view and asking he meet Ambassador Lodge and Hoppenot, French delegate, to discuss matter, and with their agreement, take matter up with Wan. It is further UK view that when next regular session of the assembly convenes that matter should then be reviewed in light of conditions as it would appear at that time. If Geneva settlement is working well, then Thai appeal should not be presented but held in further abeyance.

SMITH

396.1 GE/7-2254 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Gowen) to the Department of State

PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 22, 1954.
129. Mytel 127.¹ Under Secretary and party left for London 1530 hours Geneva time.

GOWEN

¹ Dated July 22, not printed.

passes. He held firm in negotiations on this line. Decision to drop to 17th parallel that of Mendes-France. Song Ben Hat River site of present line far less desirable from military point of view.

Three hundred day period for movement into regroupment zones more than adequate for orderly evacuation of delta. Deltiel seemed quite satisfied on this point, saying initial French position consciously high for bargaining purposes. However he expressed serious anxiety over difficulties of disengagement and separation of forces in delta during initial phase. French Union forces must withdraw lines to smaller perimeter at same time Viet Minh now within battle position pass through to outside. Meanwhile possibility further defection Vietnamese National forces is possible, and trouble with population under Viet Minh incitement also a danger.

Some forces withdrawn from delta will be disembarked at Tourane to reinforce demarcation line and northern part regroupment zone, and others at more southern ports.

In response to question whether he thought "Pathet Lao" forces who chose neither to withdraw with Viet Minh nor to be disarmed on the spot would create problem in provinces of Phang Saly and Sam Neua after movement there, Deltiel said he thought they could be handled once disassociated from Viet Minh and provided Viet Minh actually withdrew as required. On this point, as on all provisions agreements, he said, much depends on whether international commission can bring about compliance with terms.

GOWEN

751G.00/7-2354: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Gowen) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, July 23, 1954—3 p. m.

138. Repeated information Saigon 103. Chou En-lai gave dinner last night for all Indo-Chinese delegations. Tran Van Do had "previous engagement" but sent Ngo Dinh Luyen to represent him. Nong Kimmy refused to attend. Touloung, although present, expressed his great disgust with affair.

GOWEN

751G.00/7-2354: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Gowen) to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, July 23, 1954—5 p. m.

142. Repeated information Paris 134, Saigon 104. Tran Van Van called on Bonsal today. Although he represents himself as delegate of

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 261: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

GENEVA, July 22, 1954.

Secto 728. Repeated information Saigon 102. Tran Van Van, former Minister of National Economy and claiming to be Geneva observer of Vietnamese Front of National Safety (Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Binh Xuyen, and Catholics) left copies of prise de position with USDEL this morning.¹

Van supports position Vietnamese delegation at conference, but criticizes it for not walking out at last minute. He attacks French Colonialists and Viet Minh for collusion and sell-out to Vietnam, accusing former of wishing to hold on to richest part of country, states that the Front will take up the fight for independence and unity. Statement being pouched Department and Saigon.

JOHNSON

¹ Not printed.

751G.00/7-2354: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Gowen) to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, July 23, 1954—11 a. m.

135. For the Under Secretary and pass Defense. Following is substance remarks made by General Deltiel representative of CG French Union forces in military negotiations with Viet Minh to Dwan 22 July at airport prior departure of General Smith.

Deltiel said Mendes-France asked him to make known to General Smith Deltiel's view about armistice agreements from military point of view but crowded schedule had prevented his doing it personally. He asked his remarks be passed on General Smith.

Deltiel said signature Vietnam and Laos agreements "extremely painful" for him as military man since they represented a partial capitulation. He felt however that terms of agreements were very best that could have been obtained under circumstances. Task now remaining is to strengthen military position in retained Vietnam. This will be complicated by cooperative attitude Vietnam Government, divided loyalties of indigenous groups specifically Cao Daists and lack of dynamic Vietnam leadership ["like that of Syngman Rhee". Deltiel made especially bitter references to Bao Dai for staying away while country in crisis.

As for military demarcation line Deltiel said vicinity 18th parallel and Chalk Hills region only natural defensive position with narrow coastal strip on east and almost impenetrable mountains with few

Telegram, Zhong Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee, Regarding the final plenary session of the conference (excerpt), July 22, 1954

Record No.: 206-Y0051

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

The following is a brief report on the situation of the 21st.

(1) "The Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia" was not signed until noon time of the 21st, after much debate; and the time for troop withdrawal, with compromise, was finally set for three months.

(2) At 11:00 a.m. Eden came to my villa to say farewell. He said that Britain placed a lot of emphasis on the connections that had been established between China and Britain, and hoped that the two countries would maintain this relationship with confidence in the future. I said that the relationship between the two countries should develop further. He expressed gratitude to the help that I had rendered [to him] this time. I thanked him for the effort as chair of the conference.... I hoped that Britain should pay special attention to that the United States would not make trouble in Cambodia, and Eden said that he was confident that the United States would not establish military bases in Cambodia....

(3) At 1:00 p.m., I invited Mendes-France to a lunch for returning his favor. He said that the meetings with me this time had allowed the Geneva Conference to be successful, and also had opened the path for the development of French-Chinese relations. I also cheered for the development of Chinese-French relations on the new basis of friendship. Mendes-France asked me whether he should resign since the agreement on ceasefire was not signed in time. I said that the main things had done, and that this small matter would be counted as nothing. He said that both Molotov and I, same as their president, were of the opinion that he should not resign. He said with smile that when he reported to the parliament he would say that "Premier Zhou Enlai does not want me to resign."

(4) At 3:00 p.m. the closing session was held. Eden was the chair. Mendes-France's attitude was quite reconciliatory, and he mentioned President Ho Chi Minh in his final presentation. Toward the end of the session, Smith was trying to make trouble, but the atmosphere of the whole session was reconciliatory. Eden's attitude was to conclude the conference smoothly, so the closing session of the conference is quite harmonious.

(4) In the evening, the three delegations from the Soviet Union, Vietnam and China gathered to have a celebratory dinner at my place. Comrade Molotov already left for Moscow at midnight.

Zhou Enlai
1:00, July 22, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 261: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

Secto 728. Repeated information Saigon, GENEVA, July 22, 1954. Minister of National Economy and planning to be Geneva observer of Vietnamese Front of National Unity (Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Binh Xuyen, and Catholics) left Saigon for prise de position with USDeI this morning.¹

Van supports possible Vietnamese delegation at conference, but criticizes it for walking out at last minute. He attacks French Colonialists and Viet Minh for collusion and sell-out to Vietnam, accusing them of wishing to hold on to richest part of country, states that front will take up the fight for independence and unity. Statement being pouched Department and Saigon.

JOHNSON

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passes. He held firm in negotiations on this line. Decision to drop to 17th parallel that of Mendes-France. Song Ben Hat River site of present line far less desirable from military point of view.

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GOWEN

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CONFIDENTIAL

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GOWEN

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The Consul at Geneva (Gowen) to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, July 23, 1954—5 p. m.

142. Repeated information Paris 134, Saigon 104. Tran Van Van called on Bonsal today. Although he represents himself as delegate of

Cao Dai Pope and of Commander Binh Xuyen his closest connection appears to be Col. Trinh Minh The, former dissident Cao Daist. Van was also observer at Geneva Conference on behalf of National Salvation Front said to be composed of Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Binh Xuyen and Catholics.

Van is bitterly anti-French. He believes nothing politically constructive can be done in Vietnam in presence of French whom he credits with worst intentions. Nevertheless he recognizes early departure French Expeditionary Corps would leave a vacuum which Vietnam Army could not fill at present. He is most anxious for all forms of US aid.

Van states that although movements he represents are not all that might be desired, being in fact somewhat corrupt, still their armed forces are valid assets and should form basis of Maquis if needed. He is contemptuous of Catholic forces in south and of Leroy. He describes Tam and Huu as more French than the French.

Van describes Diem, Do and their associates as well meaning bourgeois devoid of the Nationalistic revolutionary fervor required by present situation. Van would like to proceed to US in order to propagate his ideas and inform American people about the situation in Vietnam. He will get in touch with Gibson Paris Embassy about his plans. Saigon's recommendations as to how he should be handled would be appreciated.

Before embarking upon his future activities Van will spend another week here followed by a month at Vichy taking the cure.

GOWEN

Editorial Note

At a news conference on July 23 the Secretary of State made the following statement:

"The Geneva negotiations reflected the military developments in Indochina. After nearly 8 years of war the forces of the French Union had lost control of nearly one-half of Viet-Nam, their hold on the balance was precarious, and the French people did not desire to prolong the war.

"These basic facts inevitably dominated the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference and led to settlements which, as President Eisenhower said, contain many features which we do not like [see editorial note, page 1503].

"Since this was so, and since the United States itself was neither a belligerent in Indochina nor subject to compulsions which applied to others, we did not become a party to the Conference results. We merely noted them and said that, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, we would not seek by force to overthrow the settlement. We went on to affirm our dedication to the principle of self-determination of

peoples and our hope that the agreements would permit Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam to be really sovereign and independent nations.

"The important thing from now on is not to mourn the past but to seize the future opportunity to prevent the loss in northern Viet-Nam from leading to the extension of communism throughout Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. In this effort all of the free nations concerned should profit by the lessons of the past.

"One lesson is that resistance to communism needs popular support, and this in turn means that the people should feel that they are defending their own national institutions. One of the good aspects of the Geneva Conference is that it advances the truly independent status of Cambodia, Laos, and southern Viet-Nam. Prime Minister Mendès-France said yesterday that instructions had been given to the French representatives in Viet-Nam to complete by July 30 precise projects for the transfers of authority which will give reality to the independence which France had promised. This independence is already a fact in Laos and Cambodia, and it was demonstrated at Geneva, notably by the Government of Cambodia. The evolution from colonialism to national independence is thus about to be completed in Indochina, and the free governments of this area should from now on be able to enlist the loyalty of their people to maintain their independence as against Communist colonialism.

"A second lesson which should be learned is that arrangements for collective defense need to be made in advance of aggression, not after it is under way. The United States for over a year advocated united action in the area, but this proved not to be practical under the conditions which existed. We believe, however, that now it will be practical to bring about collective arrangements to promote the security of the free peoples of Southeast Asia. Prompt steps will be taken in this direction. In this connection we should bear in mind that the problem is not merely one of deterring open armed aggression but of preventing Communist subversion which, taking advantage of economic dislocations and social injustice, might weaken and finally overthrow the non-Communist governments.

"If the free nations which have a stake in this area will now work together to avail of present opportunities in the light of past experience, then the loss of the present may lead to a gain for the future."

The Secretary's statement was released as Department of State press release 400, July 23, and is also printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, August 2, 1954, pages 163-164.

396.1 GB/7-2354

*Statement by the Under Secretary of State (Smith)*¹

WASHINGTON, July 23, 1954.

While the agreements reached at the Geneva Conference contain features which the United States does not like, I am nevertheless con-

¹ Smith made this statement upon arrival in Washington from the Geneva Conference.

vinced that the results are the best that could be expected in the circumstances.

The position of the United States was stated officially in the unilateral U.S. Declaration made at Geneva, and clearly outlined in the President's statement of July 21.² I am also convinced that the decision regarding our representation during the closing, critical hours at Geneva was wise and effective, both as to timing and tactics. Also, I might point out that, when we analyze and discuss the results of Geneva it will be well to remember that diplomacy is rarely able to gain at the conference table what cannot be gained or held on the battlefield.

² For text, see editorial note, p. 1503.

396.1 GB/7-2754

*Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Phleger) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 27, 1954.
Subject: Geneva Armistice Agreement Restrictions on Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam

This memorandum is designed to give an analysis² of the restrictions placed on Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in the Armistice Agreements and Declarations made at the recent Geneva Conference.³ This analysis is based on the instruments executed at the Conference, and must necessarily be regarded as tentative because much depends on the views which will be taken of those instruments by France and the Associated States, by other Conference members, and by the international commissions to be established under the Armistice Agreements. The memorandum will consider, in turn, a number of different respects in which restrictions are imposed, and under each heading will deal with the status of Cambodia, then of Laos, and then of Vietnam.

1. *Membership in collective security arrangement*

(a) Cambodia would be permitted to participate as a member of a Southeast Asia collective security arrangement. Article 7 of the Armistice Agreement with Cambodia provides, in part:

"In accordance with the Declaration made by the Delegation of Cambodia at 2400 hours on 20 July 1954 at the Geneva Conference of

¹ Drafted by Meeker of L/VUNA and approved by Phleger. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that the Secretary of State saw it. A copy of this memorandum in a slightly different form is filed in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 329.

² Meeker drafted a briefer analysis of the armistice agreement restrictions, dated July 22, and it is filed in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 329. A handwritten notation on the July 22 document indicates that the Secretary of State also saw this document.

³ For all of the armistice agreements and final declarations, see pp. 1506 ff.

Foreign Ministers: "The Royal Government of Cambodia will not join in any agreement with other States, if this agreement carries for Cambodia the obligation to enter into a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or with the principles of the Agreements on the cessation of hostilities, . . ."

Assuming that a Southeast Asia collective security arrangement would constitute a "military alliance" within the meaning of Article 7, such an arrangement would not be precluded by the provisions just quoted. A Southeast Asia collective security agreement would be "in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations". Similarly, such an arrangement would be compatible "with the principles of the Agreements on the cessation of hostilities". There is nothing in the Armistice Agreement with Cambodia which would make Cambodia's membership in the arrangement inconsistent, nor would it seem that such membership would be inconsistent with the "principles" of the Armistice Agreements relating to Laos and Vietnam; it is possible that the Conference text of Article 7 in the Cambodian Agreement contains a typographical error in giving "Agreements" as plural.

The international commission provided for in the Armistice Agreement with Cambodia—composed of Canada, India, and Poland—might be called upon to express its view whether a Southeast Asia collective security arrangement conformed to the principles of the United Nations and of the Indochina Armistice Agreements. Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Cambodian Agreement contain the following provisions:

"Article 19.

"When the Joint Commission is unable to reach agreement on the interpretation of a provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

"Article 20.

"The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by a majority vote, subject to the provisions of article 21. If the votes are equally divided, the Chairman's vote shall be decisive.

"The International Commission may make recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, in order to ensure more effective execution of the said Agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

"Article 21.

"On questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, and in particular,

(a) refusal by foreign armed forces to effect the movements provided for in the withdrawal plan,

(b) violation or threat of violation of the country's integrity by foreign armed forces,

the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous."

It is not clear whether the cases enumerated in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article 21 are exclusive, since they are introduced by the words "and in particular". In the Armistice Agreement with Vietnam, the expression "namely" is used instead of these words. It may or may not have been intended that the cases referred to in (a) and (b) would be exclusive for all three Armistice Agreements. In any event, it would seem that a recommendation of the international commission concerning Cambodian membership in a Southeast Asia collective security arrangement should be considered subject to majority voting rather than unanimity under Article 21 of the Armistice Agreement.

Consideration by the international commission of problems under the Armistice Agreement could only result in recommendations by the commission. The Parties to the Armistice Agreement have not bound themselves to accept any such recommendations. Article 22 of the Agreement provides, in part:

"If one of the Parties refuses to put a recommendation of the International Commission into effect, the Parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.

"If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in Article 21, it shall transmit a majority report and one or more minority reports to members of the Conference."

(b) Laos would be permitted to participate as a member of a Southeast Asia collective security arrangement. The Armistice Agreement with Laos contains no provision prohibiting such membership, and no provision comparable to Article 7 of the Cambodian Agreement. Laos, however, made a Declaration on July 21, 1954, containing the following statement:

"The Royal Government of Laos will never join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation for the Royal Government of Laos to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or with the principles of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities . . ."

Membership by Laos in a Southeast Asia collective security arrangement would not be inconsistent with this Declaration.

This Declaration is noted in paragraph 5 of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference. However, since the terms of the Declaration are not incorporated in the Armistice Agreement with Laos, it would seem that the international commission established under the Agree-

ment would not be called upon to express a view as to whether or not Laotian membership in a collective security arrangement was in conformity with the principles of the United Nations and of the Laotian Armistice Agreement.

(c) The zone of Vietnam south of the demarcation line would, apparently, be precluded from membership in a Southeast Asia collective security arrangement. Article 19 of the Armistice Agreement with Vietnam provides, in part:

"The two Parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy."

An argument might be made that the projected Southeast Asia collective security arrangement would not be a "military alliance" since it would be entirely defensive in character and would not commit the Parties to come to the assistance of any Party which became involved in an armed conflict regardless of the origin of that conflict. However, as a practical matter, such a narrow and now perhaps obsolete definition of the term "military alliance" would be difficult to sustain. It seems not unlikely that the Parties to the Armistice Agreement covering Vietnam understood the term as including a defensive treaty like the proposed Southeast Asia collective security arrangement.

2. Other coverage by collective security arrangement

(a) If Cambodia were not itself a Party to a Southeast Asia collective security arrangement, Cambodia could, consistently with its Armistice Agreement, be protected by the undertakings of Parties to such an arrangement to defend Cambodia against attack. This follows *a fortiori* from the conclusion that Cambodia could be a member of a Southeast Asia collective security arrangement. There is nothing in the Cambodian Armistice Agreement to prohibit defensive treaty guaranties by other powers in favor of Cambodia. It seems clear that Cambodia could at any time request or consent to the protection afforded by such guaranties.

(b) Laos, similarly, could be protected by a collective security arrangement to which it was not a Party.

(c) While the two zones of Vietnam are precluded by Article 19 of the Vietnamese Agreement from adhering "to any military alliance", either zone, presumably, could be protected against attack by a defensive security treaty concluded among other powers. The Armistice Agreement covering Vietnam contains no provision prohibiting such protection of the two zones. Because of the provisions in Article 19 quoted above, it is problematical whether retained Vietnam could re-

quest or consent to the extension of SEATO protection prior to actual military attack. Its giving of consent or making a request in advance might be considered as a degree of participation which constituted *adherence to a military alliance*.

3. Bases

(a) Article 7 of the Armistice Agreement with Cambodia, in incorporating the Cambodian Declaration at the Geneva Conference, contains the following provision:

"The Royal Government of Cambodia will not join in any agreement with other States, if this agreement carries for Cambodia, as long as its security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian territory for the military forces of foreign powers".

Under this provision, the United States, in implementing the proposed Southeast Asia collective security arrangement, would not be able to have military bases in Cambodia in the absence of a threat to Cambodia's security. The international commission provided for in Article 11 of the Cambodian Agreement might be called upon to express its view as to whether such a threat existed. Probably a recommendation on this score by the international commission would be through majority vote.

It is not clear whether the reference to "foreign powers" in Article 7 includes France. Inferentially, from various indications scattered through the Indochina Armistice Agreements, the term "foreign" would not seem to apply to France. However, in connection with the matter of bases, this issue may be academic because of the provision (Article 4(1) (a)) for the withdrawal of French military forces from Cambodia and the implication that new French combatant units may not be introduced (except perhaps in the event of a threat to Cambodia's security within the meaning of Article 7). Article 4(1) (a) will be discussed below.

(b) The Laotian Declaration referred to in paragraph 5 of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference contains a provision on foreign military bases which has the same wording as the corresponding portion of Article 7 in the Armistice Agreement with Cambodia. This Declaration by Laos may not have the force of an international commitment, since it is cast as a statement of policy and is not incorporated in the Laotian Armistice Agreement.

Article 7 of the Laotian Agreement provides:

"Upon the entry into force of the present Agreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout the territory of Laos."

Article 8 limits France to the maintenance of two bases in Laos. The first paragraph of that Article reads:

"The High Command of the French forces shall maintain in the territory of Laos the personnel required for the maintenance of the two French military establishments, the first at Seno and the second in the Mekong valley, either in the province of Vientiane or downstream from Vientiane."

While Article 7 does not in terms prohibit the use of any existing Laotian bases by foreign forces such as United States forces, the restrictions placed by Article 6 of the Laotian Agreement on the introduction of military personnel into Laos may render this issue academic in the absence of a threat to Laotian security such as is mentioned in the Laotian Declaration. In the event of such a threat, perhaps both French and foreign military bases could be established on Laotian territory despite the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. The international commission might be called into play here since effectuation of the Laotian Declaration would involve departure from the Armistice terms.

(c) Article 19 of the Armistice Agreement covering Vietnam provides, in part:

"With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zone of either Party."

This provision would apparently preclude the United States from having a military base in retained Vietnam. It would not seem to preclude France from maintaining military bases in the zone south of the demarcation line. Article 18, however, provides:

"With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout Viet-Nam territory."

4. Local forces

There are no provisions in the Armistice Agreements covering Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam prohibiting or limiting the numbers or types of local armed forces which Cambodia, Laos, and retained Vietnam may keep or create.

5. French forces

(a) Paragraph (1) of Article 4 of the Armistice Agreement with Cambodia provides, in part:

"The withdrawal outside the territory of Cambodia shall apply to: (a) the armed forces and military combatant personnel of the French Union."

It might be inferred from this provision that, when the relatively small number of French forces now in Cambodia have been withdrawn, other such French personnel could not be introduced—except, presumably, to man bases which might be established under Article 7 in the event of a threat to Cambodia's security. In any event, it could be argued that Article 4(1)(a) means simply that *French fighting units* must be withdrawn during the withdrawal period; and that despatch of a French military advisory mission would not be prohibited by the Cambodian Agreement.

(b) The Armistice Agreement with Laos appears to place a numerical ceiling on the number of French military personnel who may be in Laos. Article 6 provides:

"With effect from the proclamation of the cease-fire the introduction into Laos of any reinforcements of troops or military personnel from outside Laotian territory is prohibited.

"Nevertheless, the French High Command may leave a specified number of French military personnel required for the training of the Laotian National Army in the territory of Laos; the strength of such personnel shall not exceed one thousand five hundred (1,500) officers and non-commissioned officers."

Article 8 provides:

"The High Command of the French forces shall maintain in the territory of Laos the personnel required for the maintenance of the two French military establishments, the first at Seno and the second in the Mekong valley, either in the province of Vientiane or downstream from Vientiane.

"The effectives maintained in these military establishments shall not exceed a total of three thousand five hundred (3,500) men."

It is possible that French forces over and above these 5,000 could be brought into Laos to man bases established in the event of a threat to Laotian security, if French forces were considered to be *foreign* forces for purposes of the Laotian Declaration provision relating to bases.

(c) Additional French military personnel may not be introduced into the Southern zone of Vietnam except through rotation as provided in the Armistice Agreement and through the French withdrawals from the Northern zone. Article 16 of the Vietnamese Armistice Agreement begins with the following general statement:

"With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited."

The Article then goes on to make provision for rotation.

(d) At the Geneva Conference France made the following Declaration, which is referred to in paragraph 10 of the Final Declaration of the Conference:

"The Government of the French Republic declares that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, at the request of the Governments concerned and within a period which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties, except in the cases where, by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time."

This statement of policy constitutes an additional element to be considered in assessing the position of France in regard to the stationing of troops in Indochina.

6. *Foreign forces*

(a) Article 7 of the Armistice Agreement with Cambodia incorporates the following provision contained in a Declaration by the Government of Cambodia:

"During the period which will elapse between the date of the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and that of the final settlement of political problems in this country, the Royal Government of Cambodia will not solicit foreign aid in war material, personnel or instructors except for the purpose of the effective defense of the territory."

The international commission might be called upon to express its view as to whether foreign aid in the form of a military advisory mission or other military personnel were "for the purpose of the effective defense of the territory". Presumably, if foreign military bases were established on Cambodian territory in the event of a threat to Cambodia's security (Article 7), such bases could be manned by foreign forces.

(b) Laos appears to be prohibited from the introduction of any additional military personnel from outside the country, except for specified numbers of French personnel. These restrictions are contained in Articles 6 and 8 of the Armistice Agreement with Laos, quoted above.

At the Geneva Conference Laos made a Declaration containing the following statement (referred to in paragraph 4 of the Final Declaration):

"During the period between the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and the final settlement of that country's political problems, the Royal Government of Laos will not request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors, except for the purpose of its effective territorial defense and to the extent defined by the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities."

Under the terms of this Declaration, the ability of Laos to secure foreign aid in the form of a military mission or other military personnel would seem to be limited to what is allowed by Articles 6 and 8 of the Laotian Armistice Agreement.

In an earlier paragraph of this same Declaration (noted in paragraph 5 of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference), Laos stated that it would "never join in an agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation for the Royal Government of Laos . . . , unless its security is threatened, . . . to establish bases on Laotian territory for military forces of foreign powers." By implication, this statement envisages the possibility of foreign forces being introduced into Laos, despite the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, in the event that Laotian security is threatened. The international commission might be called into play if foreign military forces were introduced into Laos to man bases established in the event of a threat to Laotian security, since such introduction would involve departure from the Armistice terms.

(c) Article 16 of the Vietnamese Armistice Agreement prohibits the introduction "of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel". This would apparently preclude the assignment of new United States Air Force technicians or military advisory group personnel, except in rotation for such technicians or personnel who were being replaced. It is understood that approximately 100 Air Force mechanics remain in Vietnam, and that the United States military advisory mission to the three Indochinese countries (now concentrated in Vietnam) comprises approximately 200 members of the U.S. armed forces.

7. *Armaments from abroad*

(a) Cambodia has agreed, in Article 7 of its Armistice Agreement, not to solicit foreign aid in war material, pending a final political settlement in Vietnam, "except for the purpose of the effective defense of the territory". Presumably, this provision covers receipt as well as solicitation. The international commission may have a role in determining what imports of armaments are "for the purpose of the effective defense of the territory".

(b) Laos has agreed as follows in Article 9 of its Armistice Agreement:

"Upon the entry into force of the present Agreement and in accordance with the declaration made at the Geneva Conference by the Royal Government of Laos on 20 July 1954, the introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and military equipment of all kinds is prohibited, with the exception of a specified quantity of armaments in categories specified as necessary for the defence of Laos."

There is no indication elsewhere in the Agreement how the quantity and categories referred to are to be specified. Presumably, this is to be done by agreement in the joint commission. If agreement is not reached there, the matter might then be referred to the international commission.

Laos has also stated (in its Declaration noted in paragraph 4 of the Geneva Conference Final Declaration) that the Royal Government of Laos will not request foreign aid "except for the purpose of its effective territorial defense and to the extent defined by the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities". This provision indicates that it remains subordinate to the effect of Article 9 in the Armistice Agreement. However, if a foreign military base were established on Laotian territory as contemplated by paragraph 2 of the Laotian Declaration (mentioned in paragraph 5 of the Geneva Conference Final Declaration), the forces maintaining such a base would presumably be entitled to import arms and equipment for their use.

(c) Article 17 of the Armistice Agreement covering Vietnam begins with the following provision:

"With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordinance, jet engines and jet weapons and armored vehicles, is prohibited."

Subsequent paragraphs of this Article make provision for a piece-for-piece replacement of material destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cessation of hostilities.

8. *Locally produced armaments*

Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam are not limited as to the armaments they possess or produce within their territories. The Armistice Agreements covering these countries place no restrictions on economic aid which may be given to them. In fact, it would be possible under the Armistice Agreements to supply Cambodia, Laos and retained Vietnam with machinery and plants to manufacture all kinds of products including war materials.

9. *Traffic and commerce between the zones of Vietnam*

Traffic of persons and commerce of goods between the Northern and Southern zones of Vietnam is not precluded by the Geneva instruments. Paragraphs 6 and 8 of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference state that "the military demarcation line should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary", and "the provisions of the Agreements on the cessation of hostilities

intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely in which zone he will live." Article 13 (d) of the Vietnamese Armistice Agreement states:

"From the date of entry into force of the present Agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one Party who wish to go and live in the zone controlled by the other Party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district."

Articles 3 and 6 of the Agreement provide for control by the Joint Commission at the demarcation line and in its immediate area. Article 3 provides:

"When the provisional military demarcation line coincides with a waterway, the waters of such waterway shall be open to civil navigation by both parties wherever one bank is controlled by one party and the other bank by the other party. The Joint Commission shall establish rules of navigation for the stretch of waterway in question. The merchant shipping and other civilian craft of each party shall have unrestricted access to the land under its military control."

Article 6 provides:

"No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the provisional military demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission."

The Agreement contains no provisions restricting traffic by air or sea between the two zones.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 315

Documents Pertaining to the Arrangements for the International Control Commission, July 22-August 11, 1954¹

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSIONS IN INDOCHINA

1. Text of a Statement on Canadian Membership in the International Commissions for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia released at 5 E.D.T., July 28, 1954
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¹ For further documentation on the arrangements and activities of the International Control Commission, see volume XIII.

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5. Message from Mr. Nehru to Mr. Eden

6. Reply, dated July 22, of the Government of India to the Message from Mr. Eden and M. Molotov

(Attachment 1)

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT ON CANADIAN MEMBERSHIP IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS FOR VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA RELEASED AT 5 E.D.T., JULY 28, 1954.

The Canadian Government has today transmitted to Mr. Anthony Eden co-chairman, with Mr. Molotov, of the Geneva Conference on Indochina, its acceptance of the invitation forwarded by him on July 21 to designate representatives to form with India and Poland, the International Supervisory Commissions for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Officials are being sent to New Delhi this week to take part in preliminary organizational discussions, prior to the actual establishment of the Commissions in Indochina. The Canadian representatives on the Commission will be named shortly.

The Government has decided to accept this invitation only after detailed study of the cease-fire and Armistice Agreements which are to be supervised by the International Commissions, and with full knowledge and appreciation of the responsibilities and difficulties that will go with membership. There are no illusions about the magnitude and complexity of the task.

Canada is geographically remote from Indochina and her collective security responsibilities in Southeast Asia are limited to those that arise from membership in the United Nations. We know from experience, however, that just as local conflicts can become general war so conditions of security and stability in any part of the world serve the cause of peace everywhere. If, therefore, by participating in the work of these Indochinese Commissions, Canada can assist in establishing such security and stability in Southeast Asia we will be serving our own country as well as the cause of peace.

While it is a matter of regret to us that the settlement in Indochina and the supervision of that settlement are not directly under the aegis of the United Nations, the Government is satisfied that Canadian participation will be fully in harmony with our responsibilities as a member of the world organization.

Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, Concerning Policies and Measures in the Struggle against the United States and Jiang (Jieshi) after the Geneva Conference, July 27, 1954

Record number: 206-Y0054

Ambassador Zhang [Wentian] convey to Premier Zhou (top secret)

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:

The Central Committee recently discussed the situation related to the Geneva Conference, and it believes that after the armistices in Korea and Indochina, the United States is unwilling to accept its failure at the Geneva Conference, and will inevitably continue to carry out the policies of creating international tension for the purpose to further taking over more sphere of influence from Britain and France, expanding military bases for preparing for war, and remaining hostile to our Organization of Defense and rearming Japan, the United States surely will continue to use Taiwan to carry out pirate-style robberies of the ships from various countries to come to our country, and is likely to expand the sphere of blockade of our country to the areas off the Guangdong coast and to the Gulf of Tonkin area. Recently the United States and Jiang Jieshi have been discussing signing a US-Jiang treaty of defense, and the United States has repeatedly increased military aid to the Jiang bandits in Taiwan. All of this is worthy our main attention. According to public information, it seems as if the United States is still with some worries about signing a US-Jiang treaty of defense, and it seems as if they had not made the final decision. But if the United States and Jiang sign such a treaty, the relationship between us and the United States will be in tension for a long period, and it becomes more difficult [for the relationship] to turn around. Therefore, the central task of our struggle against the United States at present is to break up the US-Jiang treaty of defense and the Southeast Asian treaty of defense.

We believe that after the victorious conclusion of the war of liberation on our mainland and the victorious armistice of the Korean War, now we are still facing another war, that is, the war against the Jiang Jieshi bandit bloc in Taiwan. Now we are still facing a task, that is, the task of liberating Taiwan. After the end of the Korean War, we failed to highlight the task [the liberation of Taiwan] to the people in the whole country in a timely manner (we have been late for about six months). We failed to take necessary measures and make effective efforts in military affairs, on the diplomatic front, and also in our propaganda to serve this task. If we do not highlight this task now, and if we do not work for it [in the future], we are committing a serious political mistake. The introduction of the task is not just for the purpose of undermining the American-Jiang plot to sign a military treaty; rather, and more important, by highlighting the task we mean to raise the political consciousness and political alertness of the people of the whole

country, we mean to stir up our people's revolutionary enthusiasm, thus promoting our nation's socialist reconstruction. In addition, we can use this struggle to enhance our fulfilling of the task of national defense, and learn how to carry out maritime struggle.

Toward this issue the Central Committee has adopted the following measures:

- (1) In the political field, a propaganda campaign emphasizing that we must liberate Taiwan and exposing the Americans and Jiang (Jieshi) has already begun at home. Also we are prepared to issue an open statement about the Taiwan issue in the name of the foreign minister after your return to Beijing, which will be followed by a joint statement by the two representatives of various parties. Then, in accordance with the two statements broad, profound, and prolonged propaganda and education will be carried out among the people of the whole country. In addition, we are organizing broadcast specifically aimed at Taiwan.
- (2) In the military field, the Military Commission has already issued a special instruction for enhancing naval and air operations against the Jiang bandits in coastal areas. In the meantime, it is strictly regulated that the operation targets of our navy and air force should be restricted to Jiang Jieshi's military planes and vessels, and, toward American planes and warships, unless under the circumstance that they attack our troops, they are not permitted to take the initiative for attacks. The shooting down of a British transporter close to Yulin port on 23 July is a mistake that is completely possible to be avoided. Apart from taking diplomatic measures to manage this, we also should use this accident to carry out serious education among our troops.
- (3) Considering that our struggles against the American and Jiang (Jieshi) in the coastal area will be a matter of a very long period, and that our troops lack the capacity and experience for maritime struggles, it should become a long-range task to enhance the construction of my navy and air force. Our navy should follow a policy of first constructing boats and then constructing ships, and our air force should learn to carry out operations over the sea. In order to meet the needs of struggles with urgency at the present time, we plan to increase orders for naval and air force equipment from the Soviet Union in the next three years. The Military Commission has put forward an order of 500 million Rubbles. There exists no financial or budgetary difficulty for putting forward such an order. However, we should find more ways to get foreign aid. About this we will discuss and make decisions after you have come back home.

Please report the above policies and measures to the comrades of the Soviet Party central leadership, and ask for their opinions.

Apart from the above, the various aspects of domestic situation are good, except that the flooding disaster of this year is quite serious.

The Central Committee,
July 27, 1954

Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. Draft. Do not quote without permission from CWIHP.

intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely in which zone he will live. Article 13 (d) of the Vietnamese Armistice Agreement states:

"From the date of entry into force of the present Agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one Party who wish to go and live in the zone controlled by the other Party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district."

Articles 3 and 6 of the Agreement provide for control by the Joint Commission at the demarcation line and in its immediate area. Article 3 provides:

"When the provisional military demarcation line coincides with a waterway, the waters of such waterway shall be open to civil navigation by both parties. However one bank is controlled by one party and the other bank by the other party. The Joint Commission shall establish rules of navigation for the stretch of waterway in question. The merchant shipping and other civilian craft of each party shall have unrestricted access to the land under its military control."

Article 6 provides:

"No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the provisional military demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission."

The Agreement contains no provisions restricting traffic by air or sea between the two zones.

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4. Text of the Canadian Government's reply to the Invitation to serve on the International Supervisory Commission for Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam

5. Message from Mr. Nehru to Mr. Eden

6. Reply, dated July 22, of the Government of India to the Message from Mr. Eden and M. Molotov

[Attachment 1]

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT ON CANADIAN MEMBERSHIP IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS FOR VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA RELEASED AT 5 E.D.T., JULY 28, 1954.

The Canadian Government has today transmitted to Mr. Anthony Eden co-chairman, with Mr. Molotov, of the Geneva Conference on Indochina, its acceptance of the invitation forwarded by him on July 21 to designate representatives to form with India and Poland, the International Supervisory Commissions for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Officials are being sent to New Delhi this week to take part in preliminary organizational discussions, prior to the actual establishment of the Commissions in Indochina. The Canadian representatives on the Commissions will be named shortly.

The Government has decided to accept this invitation only after detailed study of the Cease-fire and Armistice Agreements which are to be supervised by the International Commissions, and with full knowledge and appreciation of the responsibilities and difficulties that will go with membership. There are no illusions about the magnitude and complexity of the task.

Canada is geographically remote from Indochina and her collective security responsibilities in Southeast Asia are limited to those that arise from membership in the United Nations. We know from experience, however, that just as local conflicts can become general war so conditions of security and stability in any part of the world serve the cause of peace everywhere. If, therefore, by participating in the work of these Indochinese Commissions, Canada can assist in establishing such security and stability in Southeast Asia we will be serving our own country as well as the cause of peace.

While it is a matter of regret to us that the settlement in Indochina and the supervision of that settlement are not directly under the aegis of the United Nations, the Government is satisfied that Canadian participation will be fully in harmony with our responsibilities as a member of the world organization.

It should be emphasized that acceptance of membership on these Commissions does not mean that we have been called upon to guarantee or enforce the Indochina cease-fire. Nor does it involve any new military or collective security commitments for Canada.

The actual execution of the Cease-fire Agreements is the responsibility of the two sides directly concerned, functioning through joint commissions established by the Armistice Agreements. The International Commissions themselves have no enforcement obligation or responsibility. Their function will be solely supervisory, judicial and mediatory. Under Indian chairmanship, the Commissions will be responsible for supervising the proper execution of the provisions of the Agreements by the parties directly concerned; will assist these parties with the interpretation of those provisions; will be available to settle disputes; and in cases where disputes cannot be settled, will report the matter to the members of the Geneva Conference. India, Poland and Canada are also expected to assume responsibility at a later stage for supervising elections.

In carrying out their tasks the International Supervisory Commissions should be able to function more effectively than the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea which because of equal Communist and non-Communist representation, very often had effective action blocked, and which could report only to the two military commands.

The Indochina Commissions will each consist of three members—Indian, Polish and Canadian—and in most cases will be able to take decisions by majority vote. In those special and designated cases where unanimity is required by the Cease-fire Agreements but cannot be obtained, the Commissions will submit majority and minority reports to the Geneva Conference powers. It will then be the responsibility of those powers to deal with the matter.

In addition to providing representatives for each of the three Supervisory Commissions, India, Poland and Canada will supply a number of military officers for the fixed and mobile inspection teams which will supervise the execution of the Cease-fire Agreements in the field, under the direction of the Supervisory Commissioners.

A study of the information available has led us to the conclusion that the Commissions have a reasonable chance of operating effectively and of making a constructive contribution to the successful implementation of the Cease-fire Agreements, and hence to peace in Southeast Asia. If our expectations unfortunately prove ill-founded, and the Commissions are frustrated by obstruction, then of course no useful purpose would be served by continuing their existence.

The exchange of views which we have had with those powers with whom we are especially closely associated in efforts to maintain peace and strengthen security has confirmed our conviction that we ought to accept this onerous but honorable assignment.

Finally we have been conscious of the serious consequences which might follow if we were to decline the invitation, since this could delay and complicate the implementation of the Cease-fire Agreements with unhappy and possibly even serious results. We have no illusions that the task we are undertaking will be either easy or of short duration, but we take satisfaction from the fact that in performing it Canada will be playing a worthy and responsible part in an effort to strengthen peace.

[Attachment 2]

MESSAGE FROM MR. EDEN AND M. MOLOTOV TO GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND INDIA, DATED JULY 21

We have the honour to address you as co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China which concluded its work on July 20, 1954. The Conference took note of agreements ending hostilities in Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, and organising international control and the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements. In particular, it was agreed that an International Commission should be set up in each of the three countries for control and supervision of the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China. It was further proposed that these Commissions should be composed of an equal number of representatives of Canada, India and Poland, presided over by the representative of India.

2. On behalf of the Conference we accordingly have the honour to invite the Canadian/Indian Governments in consultation with the Governments of Canada/India/Poland, to designate representatives to form the International Supervisory Commissions for Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia as envisaged in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities and on supervision in those three countries.

3. It is hoped that the three International Supervisory Commissions can be established on the spot as soon as possible from the date on which the cease-fire comes into force.

4. The text of the final declaration adopted by the Conference and of all other agreements and declarations concerning the cessation of hostilities and the organisation of supervision in the three countries of Indo-China will be transmitted to you as soon as possible.

5. We have the honour to request an early reply, which we shall at once transmit to the members of the Conference.

[Attachment 3]

REPLY, DATED JULY 22, OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE MESSAGE FROM MR. EDEN AND M. MOLOTOV

The Government of India have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the communication forwarded by the United Kingdom High Commission conveying a message from Mr. Eden and M. Molotov as co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference. In this message it is stated that the Conference agreed that an International Commission should be set up in each of the three countries, namely, Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, for control and supervision of the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China. It was further proposed that these Commissions should be composed of an equal number of representatives of Canada, India and Poland, presided over by the representative of India. The Government of India are anxious to help, in every way possible to them, the cause of a peaceful settlement in Indo-China and are prepared to consider favourably assuming responsibilities as suggested, in regard to the control and supervision of the execution of the agreement arrived at Geneva. They would like to have, however, the texts of the agreements as well as of the declarations made in regard to the cessation of hostilities and the organisation of supervision, to enable them to find out the exact nature of the functions of the Supervisory Commissions and the responsibilities which the Government of India will have to undertake in regard to them. They will be grateful, therefore, if these texts are supplied to them at an early date, together with such other particulars as may be considered necessary.

[Attachment 4]

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT'S REPLY TO THE INVITATION TO SERVE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY COMMISSION FOR LAOS, CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM

I have the honour to acknowledge your message of July 21 which you and Mr. Molotov sent in your capacity as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, containing the invitation to the Canadian Government to designate, in consultation with the Governments of India and Poland, representatives to form the International Supervisory Commissions for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as envisaged in the Agreements on the cessation of hostilities, and on supervision in those three countries.

Conscious of the grave responsibilities which the task will impose,—but in the hope that it can be discharged in such a way as to contribute to the establishment of peace and security in Indo-China, the Cana-

dian Government accepts this invitation. The Canadian Government has been in touch with the Government of India concerning preliminary arrangements and intends to send representatives to New Delhi in the immediate future to consult with Indian and Polish officials on the setting up of the International Supervisory Commissions provided for in the Agreements drawn up by the Geneva Conference.

The Canadian Government would be grateful if you would transmit the text of this reply to the members of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, whose continuing interest and support will be required if the Commissions are effectively to carry out their functions and if the Agreements on the cessation of hostilities are to be successfully implemented.

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1954.

[Attachment 5]

INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY COMMISSIONS MESSAGE FROM MR. NEHRU TO MR. EDEN

The Government of India have the honour to inform the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China that at the invitation of the Government of India a preliminary conference of the three states constituting the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Indo-China was convened and met in New Delhi from the 1st of August to the 6th of August, 1954. A final communiqué² of the Conference which embodies the principal decisions arrived at and is being sent by air mail.

2. The Government of India are glad that the three Commissions will be installed and begin their work in Phnom Penh (Cambodia), Vientiane (Laos), and Hanoi (Vietnam) on the 11th of August, 1954.

3. The three Armistice Agreements and the issues arising therefrom were, as far as they are applicable to the work of the International Commissions, fully discussed. The Government of India are happy to state that the discussions were frank and cordial and the decisions were unanimous.

WASHINGTON, August 11th, 1954.

[Attachment 6]

REPLY, DATED JULY 22, OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE MESSAGE FROM MR. EDEN AND M. MOLOTOV

The Government of India have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the communication forwarded by the United Kingdom High Com-

² Not printed.

mission conveying a message from Mr. Eden and M. Molotov as co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference. In this message it is stated that the Conference agreed that an International Commission should be set up in each of the three countries, namely, Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, for control and supervision of the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China. It was further proposed that these Commissions should be composed of an equal number of representatives of Canada, India and Poland, presided over by the representative of India. The Government of India are anxious to help, in every way possible to them, the cause of a peaceful settlement in Indo-China and are prepared to consider favourably assuming responsibilities as suggested, in regard to the control and supervision of the execution of the agreement arrived at Geneva. They would like to have, however, the texts of the agreements as well as of the declarations made in regard to the cessation of hostilities and the organisation of supervision, to enable them to find out the exact nature of the functions of the Supervisory Commissions and the responsibilities which the Government of India will have to undertake in regard to them. They will be grateful, therefore, if these texts are supplied to them at an early date, together with such other particulars as may be considered necessary.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

A.I. MIKOYAN with Fidel CASTRO, [Cuban President] Oswaldo DORTICOS TORRADO, [Defense Minister] Raul CASTRO, Ernesto GUEVARA, Emilio ARAGONES and Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ

4 November 1962

A.I. MIKOYAN

I can give examples how our state and other countries voluntarily limit their actions while preserving their sovereign rights. For example, sovereignty of a host-country does not apply to the territory of foreign embassies. In this case we see a limitation of actions without limitation of sovereignty.

Another example. An agreement to create an international verification commission was achieved in Geneva [in 1954] during the discussion of the Indochina issue. The proposal was made by representatives of the Soviet Union, China, and other countries. The proposal was also supported by the leader of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam comrade Ho Chi Minh, who was directly concerned. Currently both Ho Chi Minh and the king of Cambodia ask to preserve that international verification commission. In this case there is no question of limiting the sovereign rights neither of Vietnam nor Cambodia.

Source: CWIHP Working Paper 22, "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," May 1998

**Cuban Record of Conversation, Mikoyan and Cuban Leadership,
Havana, 4 November 1962
MEETING OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CRI WITH MIKOYAN AT THE NATIONAL
PALACE,**

A.I. MIKOYAN

Cuba is in the hands of the Cubans. But because we were the owners of those weapons... (paragraph missing). [notation in original-ed.] We thought that you, after the consultations, you would accept the inspection. But we never thought of deciding anything for you. Why did we think that we could accept a verification of the dismantling by neutrals, without infringement of the Cuban sovereignty? It was understood that no State would accept an infringement of your sovereignty. In very particular cases, a State can... [ellipsis in document--ed.] its acts, by agreement and not due to pressures from abroad - the territory of the Embassy within a sovereign State for example. When discussing the problem of Indochina and Vietnam in Geneva [in 1954], an agreement was reached to create an International Control Commission.

Source: CWIHP Working Paper 22, "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," May 1998

MAO ZEDONG AND PHAM VAN DONG³, HOANG VAN HOAN²
Beijing, 5 October 1964, 7:50 (p.m.?)

Mao Zedong:

According to Comrade Le Duan³, you had the plan to dispatch a division [to the South]. Probably you have not dispatched that division yet⁴. When should you dispatch it, the timing is important. Whether or not the United States will attack the North, it has not yet made the decision. Now, if [the U.S.] is not even in a position to resolve the problem in South Vietnam, if it attacks the North, [it may need to] fight for one hundred years, and its legs will be trapped there. Therefore, it needs to consider carefully. The Americans have made all kinds of scary statements. They claim that they will run after [you], and will chase into your country, and that they will attack our air force. In my opinion, the meaning of these words is that they do not want us to fight a big war, and that [they do not want] our air force to attack their warships. If [we] do not attack their warships, they will not run after you. Isn't this what they mean? The Americans have something to hide.

Pham Van Dong: This is also our thinking. The United States is facing many difficulties, and it is not easy for it to expand the war. Therefore, our consideration is that we should try to restrict the war in South Vietnam to the sphere of special war, and should try to defeat the enemy within the sphere of special war. We should try our best not to let the U.S. imperialists turn the war in South Vietnam into a limited war, and try our best not to let the war be expanded to North Vietnam. We must adopt a very skillful strategy, and should not provoke it [the U.S.]. Our Politburo has made a decision on this matter, and today I am reporting it to Chairman Mao. We believe that this is workable.

Mao Zedong: Yes.

Pham Van Dong: If the United States dares to start a limited war, we will fight it, and will win it.

Mao Zedong: Yes, you can win it⁵. The South Vietnamese [puppet regime] has several hundred thousand troops. You can fight against them, you can eliminate half of them, and you can eliminate all of them. To fulfill these tasks is more than possible. It is impossible for the United States to send many troops to South Vietnam. The Americans altogether have 18 army divisions. They have to keep half of these divisions, i.e., nine of them, at home, and can send abroad the other nine divisions. Among these divisions, half are in Europe, and half are in the Asian-Pacific region. And they have stationed more divisions in Asia [than elsewhere in the region], namely, three divisions. One [is] in South Korea, one in Hawaii, and the third one in [original not clear]. They also placed fewer than one division of marine corps in Okinawa in Japan. Now all American troops in South Vietnam belong to the navy, and they are units under the navy system. As far as the American navy is concerned, they have put more ships in the Western Pacific than in Europe. In the Mediterranean, there is the Sixth Fleet; here [in the Pacific] is the Seventh Fleet. They have deployed four aircraft carriers near you, but they have been scared away by you.

....

Mao Zedong: If the Americans dare to take the risk to bring the war to the North, how should the invasion be dealt with? I have discussed this issue with Comrade Le Duan. [First], of course, it is necessary to construct defensive works along the coast. The best

way is to construct defensive works like the ones [we had constructed] during the Korean War, so that you may prevent the enemy from entering the inner land. Second, however, if the Americans are determined to invade the inner land, you may allow them to do so. You should pay attention to your strategy. You must not engage your main force in a head-to-head confrontation with them, and must well maintain your main force. My opinion is that so long as the green mountain is there, how can you ever lack firewood?

Pham Van Dong: Comrade Le Duan has reported Chairman Mao's opinions to our Central Committee. We have conducted an overall review of the situations in the South and the North, and our opinion is the same as that of Chairman Mao's. In South Vietnam, we should actively fight [the enemy], and in North Vietnam, we should be prepared [for the enemy to escalate the war]. But we should also be cautious.

Mao Zedong: Our opinions are identical. Some other people say that we are belligerent. As a matter of fact, we are cautious. But it is not totally without ground to say [that we are belligerent].

....

Mao Zedong: The more thoroughly you defeat them, the more comfortable they feel. For example, you beat the French, and they became willing to negotiate with you. The Algerians defeated the French badly, and France became willing to come to peace with Algeria. It has been proven that the more badly you beat them, the more comfortable they feel.

....

Mao Zedong: Is it true that you are invited to attend the [UN] Security Council meetings?

Zhou Enlai: This is still a secret. The invitation was made through U Thant⁶.

Mao Zedong: And U Thant made it through whom?

Zhou Enlai: The Soviets.

Mao Zedong: So the Soviet Union is the middleman.

Pham Van Dong: According to the Soviet ambassador to Vietnam, they met with U Thant on the one hand, and with [U.S. Secretary of State Dean] Rusk on the other.

Mao Zedong: It is not completely a bad thing to negotiate. You have already earned the qualification to negotiate. It is another matter whether or not the negotiation will succeed. We have also earned our qualification to negotiate [with the Americans]. We are now negotiating with the Americans on the Taiwan issue, and the Sino-American ambassadorial talks are now under way in Warsaw. The talks have lasted for more than nine years.

Zhou Enlai: More than 120 meetings have been held.

Mao Zedong: The talks will continue. One time, during a meeting at Geneva, they did not want to continue the talks. They withdrew their representatives, leaving there only one person in charge of communication and liaison matters. We gave them a blow by

sending them a letter, setting up a deadline for them to send back their representative. They did return to the talks later, but they did not meet the deadline we set for them: they were a few days late. They said that it was an ultimatum by us. At that time, some among ourselves believed that we should not set the deadline for them, nor should we make the harsh statement, and that by doing so it became an ultimatum. But we did, and the Americans did [return to the talks].

Source: CWIHP Working Paper 22, "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," May 1998

ZHOU ENLAI AND ALGERIAN PRESIDENT BEN BELLA¹
Algiers, 30 March 1965

Zhou Enlai: The Vietnam question resulted completely from the trouble made by the Americans. Originally, according to the Geneva agreement of 1954, France withdrew from Vietnam, and two years later, south and north Vietnam should unite peacefully. But the American invasion hindered the realization of the peaceful unification of the north and the south. At present, the United States intends to scare Vietnam by expanding the war, hoping that Vietnam will yield to American bombardment, agreeing to negotiate. The United States also intends to scare China, forcing us to accept peace negotiations. Further, the United States is pursuing peace negotiation through the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and other countries. "Unconditional cease-fire"—this is nothing but requesting that the people in South Vietnam should stop armed struggle, that North Vietnam should stop supporting the struggle in South Vietnam, and that the puppet troops in South Vietnam would be given some breathing space, so that the United States would be able to strengthen its military presence in South Vietnam. An unconditional ceasefire in South Vietnam? No way. This would mean that South Vietnam would once again be enslaved, continuing to be ruled by the puppet regime. The activities for an unconditional ceasefire are conducted by all kinds of people, including the activities by the British. Some are directly, and some are indirectly, instructed by the United States [to do so]. But there are also some good-intentioned people who believe that the problems can be solved through peace negotiations. But all these activities are unfavorable to the liberation of the people in South Vietnam, if viewed objectively.

[Notes:

1. Ahmed Ben Bella, 1919-, President of Algeria from its independence in 1962 until he was deposed on 19 June 1965. "]

Source: CWIHP Working Paper 22, "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," May 1998

Discussion between Mao Zedong and Hoang Van Hoan¹

Mao Zedong advises Hoang Van Hoan to escalate without hesitation, as the war has already begun to do so, July 16 1965

Mao Zedong: ...We all believed in the Geneva Accords but the enemy did not respect them. After you regrouped your troops, they started killing people. They kill people in the South in order to teach them a lesson. At first, our motto was mainly for the political struggle and the military struggle was secondary. Later, the political and military struggles became equal. And then the military struggle will be the main [part], the political struggle will be supportive to the military one. So, we are also escalating step by step.

At first, we destroy a platoon, and then a company. Then we annihilate a battalion, and a regiment or two. That way, we can destroy from 4 to 5 battalions [in] each campaign. We should escalate and we should know how to escalate step by step.

[Notes:

1. Hoang Van Hoan headed a DRV National Assembly delegation to China.]

Source: CWIHP Working Paper 22, "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," May 1998

Chinese Foreign Ministry Circular, "Talks Between the Ghanaian Mission and the DRV, August 03, 1965

The Ghanaian mission has concluded its visit to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) on July 30. The mission has failed in its effort on behalf of the Anglo-American "peace talk" plot to lobby the DRV.

1. The following is a description of the Ghanaian-Vietnamese talks as provided by the DRV:

The Ghanaian mission stated that Ghana supported the Four-Point Proposal of the DRV[2] and the Five-Point Formula of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF)[3] and was interested in the NLF's proposal to establish a National Coalition Government and implement peace and neutrality. The purpose of Nkrumah's participation in the British Commonwealth "peace mission" was to serve the interests of the Vietnamese people. The condition for his participation was the recognition of the NLF as the representative of South Vietnam. Ghana was no longer associated with this mission now. At present, the American position was not much different from the positions of South and North Vietnam. The United States was willing to implement the Geneva Accords and withdraw its forces from South Vietnam. The United States believed that the unification of Vietnam should be decided by the Vietnamese people themselves. Where the United States differed from North Vietnam and the NLF was just the demand on neutralization of entire Vietnam. The current moment was the best time to begin peace talks. Ghana suggested that Afro-Asian countries serve as mediators to promote peace talks. It was the hope of Afro-Asian countries to restore peace in Vietnam. The DRV must unite with Afro-Asian countries in order to realize its goals. Disunity meant weakness.

.....

The proposal made by the Ghanaian mission to the Vietnamese represents the old plot of unconditional peace negotiations advanced several times in the past by the imperialists, revisionists, and reactionaries. The idea that "Afro-Asian countries served as mediators" is designed in reality to bypass the Geneva Accords to get the United States and the DRV into direct talks while countries like Ghana help the United States by pressuring the DRV. Before the visit of the Ghanaian mission to Hanoi, we had notified the DRV of our position on the attempts of Nkrumah and the mission to visit China. After this contact, the DRV concluded that a large gap existed between the DRV and Ghana and that the DRV would not benefit from the visit. Therefore, the DRV rejected the Ghanaian proposal and postponed the visit of Nkrumah to the DRV. [...]

The NLF's Five-Point Formula was set forth on March 22, 1965. Among other things, it called for implementation of the Geneva Accords, withdrawal of U.S. troops, and the unification of the two Vietnams. For the text of the NLF's March 22, 1965, proclamation, with annotations indicating how the DRV moderated the tone of the original statement broadcast over Liberation Radio, see Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall, eds., *The Viet-Nam Reader*, rev. ed., (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 232-252. See also Herring, ed., *The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War*, p. 832.

Source: CWIHP Working Paper 22, "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," May 1998

Malraux's visit to China, August 12, 1965

Between July 19 and August 6 (1965), French Minister of State (Andre) Malraux visited China as special envoy of de Gaulle. At first, the French government indicated that Malraux would come to China as a private visitor. It did so for three reasons: to protect France's prestige as a "big power" and not to appear that it needed our help; to prevent the prospect that we would reject Malraux's visit because he served as a peace broker on Vietnam; and not to irritate the United States. After Malraux's arrival in China, the French government worried that our leaders would not receive him. As a result, it stressed that de Gaulle wanted to conduct talks with our leaders and that Malraux was making an official visit. But in public statements the French government still insisted that Malraux was making a private trip. We expressed our dissatisfaction with the unclear identity of Malraux and the trick played by the French government. Later, the French government delivered a letter of introduction from de Gaulle to Chairman Liu (Shaoqi), authorizing Malraux to "thoroughly exchange views" with China on "significant issues concerning both China and France as well as the future of the world." It also expressed apologies to us. To exploit Franco-American contradictions and to woo de Gaulle, Chairman Mao, Chairman Liu, Premier Zhou, and Deputy Premier Chen (Yi) all received Malraux and discussed with him the following issues:

(1) Vietnam and Indochina

The Vietnam question was a primary issue that Malraux wanted to discuss. Rather than raising the issue directly, he chose to sound us out indirectly. Deputy Premier Chen asked Malraux whether he carried any specific proposals on Vietnam from de Gaulle, he replied no, saying that France would not initiate any proposal without obtaining China's agreement. During his meeting with Premier (Zhou), Malraux indirectly advanced the "Indochina neutralization" plan: to divide Vietnam along the Truong Son Ra mountain. The area east of the mountain, including Saigon, would belong to the DRV or the NLF; the area west of the mountain as well as Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand would be "neutralized." Malraux also asked whether it was possible to open negotiations when the United States "promised" to withdraw troops. Premier immediately repudiated Malraux's plan, pointing out that the boundaries in Indochina had long been established and that what needed to be discussed at the moment was the respect for the independence and neutrality of Cambodia and Laos on the basis of the Geneva Accords. Premier also explained our position on Vietnam and expressed our firm support for the anti-American patriotic struggle of the Vietnamese people. He contended that the United States, rather than seeking to preserve its prestige and disengage, desired to stay in Vietnam.

(2) Opposing American-Soviet Hegemony (not translated).

(3) Reform of the United Nations (not translated).

(4) Sino-French Relations (not translated).

(5) Chinese Domestic Issues (not translated).

August 12, 1965.

Source: CWIHP Working Paper 22, "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," May 1998

Mao's Conversation with the Party and Government Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 110, October 20, 1965

You are fighting an excellent war. Both the South and the North are fighting well. The people of the whole world, including those who have already awakened and those who have not awakened, are supporting you. The current world is not a peaceful one. It is not you Vietnamese who are invading the United States, neither are the Chinese who are waging an aggressive war against the United States.

Not long ago the Japanese Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun published several reports filed by Japanese correspondents from South Vietnam. U.S. newspapers described these reports as unfair, thus provoking a debate. I am not referring to the Japanese Communist newspaper, Akahata. I am talking about Japanese bourgeois newspapers. This shows that the direction of the media is not favorable to the United States. Recently the demonstration by the American people against the American government's Vietnam policy has developed. At the moment it is primarily American intellectuals who are making trouble.

But all this are external conditions. In fact what will solve the problem is the war you are fighting. Of course you can conduct negotiations. In the past you held negotiations in Geneva. But the American did not honor their promise after the negotiations. We have had negotiations with both Chiang Kai-shek and the United States. Rusk said that the United States has had most negotiations with China. But we stick to one point: the United States must withdraw from Taiwan, and after that all other problems can be easily resolved. The United States does not accept this point. China and the United States have been negotiating for ten years and we are still repeating the same old words. We will not give up that point. The United States once wanted to exchange press delegations with us. They argued that when we began with minor issues, we could better settle major problems later. We contended that only by starting from major issues could minor problems be easily resolved.

You withdrew your armed forces from the South in accordance with the Geneva Accords. As a result, the enemy began to kill people in the South, and you revived armed struggle. At first you adopted political struggle as a priority supplemented by armed struggle. We supported you. In the second stage when you were carrying out political and armed struggles simultaneously, we again supported you. In the third stage when you are pursuing armed struggle as a priority supplemented by political struggle, we still support you. In my view, the enemy is gradually escalating the war; so are you. In the next two and three years you may encounter difficulties. But it is hard to say, and it may not be so. We need to take this possibility into consideration. So long as you have made all kinds of preparations, even if the most difficult situation emerges, you will not find it too far from your initial considerations. Isn't this a good argument? Therefore there are two essential points: the first is to strive for the most favorable situation, and the second to prepare for the worst.

Source: CWIHP Working Paper 22, "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," May 1998

Discussion between Chen Yi and Le Duc Tho, October 17, 1968

Chen Yi criticizes Vietnam on past concessions to the US, which undermine China and the NLF; Chen Yi also criticizes Vietnam's acceptance of Soviet proposals to negotiate.

Chen Yi: (4) In our opinion, in a very short time, you have accepted the compromising and capitulationist proposals put forward by the Soviet revisionists. So, between our two parties and the two governments of Vietnam and China, there is nothing more to talk about. Nevertheless, as President Ho has said, our relationship is one of both comrades and brothers; we will therefore consider the changes of the situation in November and will have more comments.

Le Duc Tho: On this matter, we will wait and see. And the reality will give us the answer. We have gained experience over the past 15 years. Let reality justify.

Chen Yi: We signed the Geneva accords in 1954 when the US did not agree to do so. We withdrew our armed forces from the South to the North, thus letting the people in the South be killed. We at that time made a mistake in which we [Chinese] shared a part.

Le Duc Tho: Because we listened to your advice.³

Chen Yi: You just mentioned that in the Geneva Conference, you made a mistake because you followed our advice. But this time, you will make another mistake if you do not take our words into account.

Source: CWIHP Working Paper 22, "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," May 1998

Discussion between Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong, November 17, 1968

Mao Zedong: After some years of struggling against them, you should consider not only your difficulties but also your enemy's. You have been fighting for more than a dozen of years. 23 years have passed since the Japanese surrender in 1945 but your country is still existing. You have fought the Japanese, French, and now you are fighting the Americans. But Vietnam still exists like other countries, and more than that, it has developed to a greater extent.

Pham Van Dong: That is true.

Mao Zedong: Why was the Geneva Conference convened? ([he] asks Comrade Zhou Enlai). In the past, I did say that we had made a mistake when we went to the Geneva conference in 1954. At that time, President Ho Chi Minh wasn't totally satisfied. It was difficult for President Ho to give up the South, and now, when I think twice, I see that he was right. The mood of the people in the South at that time was rising high. Why did we have the Geneva conference? Perhaps, France wanted it.

Zhou Enlai: It was proposed by the Soviet Union. Khrushchev at that time was in power. And in January 1954, the Soviets wanted to solve the problem.

Mao Zedong: Now, I cannot remember the whole story. But I see that it would be better if the conference could have been delayed for one year, so the troops from the North could come down [to the South] and defeat [the enemy].

Pham Van Dong: At that time, we were fighting in the whole country, having no division between the North and the South.

Source: CWIHP Working Paper 22, "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," May 1998

Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, March 21, 1970

Zhou Enlai advises to support Prince Sihanouk over Lon Nol.

The fighting capability of the Sihanouk faction cannot match yours. So if Sihanouk agrees to establish a united front, Cambodian forces can be stronger. But France advises him not to with the reason that if he allows the Vietnamese to enter Cambodia, they will not leave. France, at the same time, thinks that Sihanouk does not entirely listen to France, so France wants to replace Sihanouk by Lon Nol. Yet, Sihanouk is tilting to the Soviet Union and China, thus reducing French influence. For his part, Lon Nol does not want to displease China and the Soviet Union. On March 18, after the coup, Lon Nol did not attack your forces in the border areas and he did not press us to solve this problem. On March 18, they destroyed houses of Chinese and Vietnamese living in Svay Rieng province. On the 19th, however, they stopped these acts. And on the 20th, they issued a special order not to damage the Chinese and Soviet embassies in Phnom Penh. Lon Nol is also afraid that the Khmer people will rise up against him and at the same time, afraid that if he attacks [forces in South] Vietnam, North Vietnam will fight back. China will support North Vietnam. In that way, the war will broaden. War has broken out in Laos. A similar situation can occur in Cambodia.

Thus the situation in Indochina will return to the one before the Geneva Conference of 1954. I am sure that you still remember what comrade Mao told President Ho: "Indochina is united as a bloc. This situation was created by the French." If the situation develops that way—which is what the US actions will lead to—Indochina will become a united battlefield.

I do not know whether the forces of Um Savuth² have reached Rattanakiri, and have they contacted Vietnamese forces?

Source: CWIHP Working Paper 22, "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," May 1998

Discussion between Mao Zedong and Le Duan, May 11 1970

Mao Zedong advises Le Duan not to fear the United States.

Mao Zedong: You can [land at our airports]. We do not fear. If the American air force comes to attack the "shelters" of Vietnamese air force, let them come.

Le Duan: Although we issued such instructions, still we needed to rely on your support. At that time, you dispatched several divisions to Vietnam, also engaged in fighting American planes.

Mao Zedong: That is true. The Americans are afraid of being beaten, and they have no guts. You may negotiate [with the Americans]. I am not saying that you cannot negotiate, but your main energy should be put on fighting. Who sabotaged the two Geneva conferences? Both you and us truthfully abided by [the resolutions of the conferences]. But they did not. It is better that they did not.

Source: CWIHP Working Paper 22, "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," May 1998

Discussion between Le Duc Tho and Ieng Sary, September 07 1971

Le Duc Tho offers advice to Ieng Sary about the current conflict between China and the Soviet Union.

Le Duc Tho: We will always remember the experience in 1954. Comrade Zhou Enlai admitted his mistakes in the Geneva Conference of 1954. Two or three years ago, comrade Mao also did so. In 1954, because both the Soviet Union and China exerted pressure, the outcome became what it became. We have proposed that the Chinese comrades admit their mistakes and now I am telling you, the Cambodian comrades, about this problem of history.

We should be independent in thoughts, promote international solidarity and solidarity with the Soviet Union and with China. We have to fight a big imperialist country. If we take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the situation will become more complicated. At present, China considers that it has two enemies, namely the Soviet Union and the US. It therefore will not be beneficial if we take sides.

[Notes:

1. Ieng Sary (1930-), Pol Pot's closest collaborator in the Cambodian Communist Party Politburo. He moved to Beijing in 1971, where he established the authority of the Khmer Rouge over Sihanouk's government in exile. He was responsible for foreign affairs in the government of Democratic Kampuchea after 1975. Defected to the Hun Sen-Ranaridh government in 1996.]

Source: CWIHP Working Paper 22, "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," May 1998

Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Le Duc Tho July 12 1972

Zhou Enlai advises Le Duc Tho on negotiations with the US, particularly the issue of Nguyen Van Thieu.

Zhou Enlai: We are asking the US to remove Thieu. However, if we hint that Thieu can be accepted, the US will be surprised because they do not expect that. Of course, Thieu cannot be a representative of a government. But in negotiations, surprise is necessary.

In the pro-American force, Thieu is a chieftain. He is the one that sells out his country. Yet, he plays a decisive role in his party. We, therefore, cannot solve anything if we only talk with other figures in his party rather than him. Of course how to solve this problem is your job. However, as comrades, we would like to refer to our experience: In the civil war, no result would be gained if we insisted on talking with Jiang's ministers but not with Jiang himself. In the Korean War, we talked with Eisenhower. At the Geneva Conference, because [French Prime Minister Georges] Bidault was stubborn, siding with the US, talks did not continue. When [Bidault's successor as Prime Minister in 1954, Pierre] Mendes-France came to power and was interested in negotiations, the problem was solved. That means we have to talk with the chieftains. Again, our talks with the US did not proceed until the visit by Nixon to China. [North Korean Prime Minister] Comrade Kim Il Sung is also trying to talk directly with [South Korean President] Park Chung Hee. We do the same in our relations with Japan. These are historical facts. The CCP Politburo has discussed this matter, but it is up to you to decide.

Source: CWIHP Working Paper 22, "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," May 1998

Comrade B on the Plot of the Reactionary Chinese Clique Against Vietnam, 1979

Speech by Comrade B (Le Duan) regarding the plot of reactionary Chinese clique against Vietnam. Published in CWIHP Bulletin Nos 12/13.

COMRADE B ON THE PLOT OF THE REACTIONARY CHINESE CLIQUE AGAINST VIETNAM

Generally speaking, after we had defeated the Americans, there was no imperialist that would dare to fight us again. The only persons who thought they could still fight us and dared to fight us were Chinese reactionaries. But the Chinese people did not want it like that at all. I do not know how much longer some of these Chinese reactionaries will continue to exist. However, as long as they do, then they will strike us as they have just recently done [meaning in early 1979]. If war comes from the north, then the [northern central] provinces of Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Thanh Hoa will become the bases for the entire country. They are unparalleled as the most efficient, the best and the strongest bases. For if the Deltas [in the north] continued as an uninterrupted stretch, then the situation would be very complicated. Not at all a simple matter. If it had not been for the Vietnamese, there would not have been anyone to fight the USA, because at the time the Vietnamese were fighting the USA, the rest of the world was afraid of the USA... Although the Chinese helped [North] Korea, it was only with the aim of protecting their own northern flank. After the fighting had finished [in Korea] and when the pressure was on Vietnam, he [this appears to be a reference to Zhou Enlai as the text soon seems to suggest] said that if the Vietnamese continued to fight they would have to fend for themselves. He would not help any longer and pressured us to stop fighting.

When we had signed the Geneva Accords, it was precisely Zhou Enlai who divided our country into two [parts]. After our country had been divided into northern and southern zones in this way, he once again pressured us into not doing anything in regard to southern Vietnam. They forbade us from rising up [against the US-backed Republic of Vietnam]. [But] they, [the Chinese,] could do nothing to deter us.

When we were in the south and had made preparations to wage guerrilla warfare immediately after the signing of the Geneva Accords, Mao Zedong told our Party Congress that we had to force the Lao to transfer immediately their two liberated provinces to [the] Vientiane government. Otherwise the Americans would destroy them, a very dangerous situation [in the Chinese view]! Vietnam had to work at once with the Americans [concerning this matter]. Mao forced us in this way and we had to do it.[...]

Upon reaching the south, I immediately cabled Bac Ho to ask to remain [in the south] and not to return to the north, so that I could fight for another ten years or more. [To Zhou Enlai]: "Comrade, you caused me hardship such as this [meaning Zhou's role in the division of Vietnam at Geneva in 1954]. Did you know that, comrade?"

Zhou Enlai said: "I apologize before you, comrade. I was wrong. I was wrong about that [meaning the division of Vietnam at Geneva]." After Nixon had already gone to China, he [Zhou Enlai] once again came to Vietnam in order to ask me about a number of problems concerning the fighting in southern Vietnam.

Source: CWIHP Bulletin 12/13

