

The Road to Helsinki

The Early Steps to the CSCE

A  DOCUMENT READER

SELECTED DOCUMENTS FROM THE
National Archives,
the Gerald R. Ford Library,
and the National Security Archive

For the International Conference

The Road to Helsinki
The Early Steps of the CSCE

29-30 September 2003
Florence, ITALY

Compiled for the
Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies
and the
Cold War International History Project

by
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CIMA
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Preface

We are pleased to present this document reader to the participants of the conference “**The Road to Helsinki: The Early Steps of the CSCE,**” to be held on 29-30 September 2003 in Florence and organized and sponsored by the **Machiavelli Center (CIMA)**, an inter-university center based on the cooperation among a group of Italian historians of international relations, the **Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’ Cold War International History Project (CWIHP)**, an international clearinghouse and network of Cold War researchers, and the **National Security Archive** a non-governmental research institute based at George Washington University, in cooperation with the **Parallel History Project**.

The conference is the second meeting organized by CIMA, CWIHP, PHP and their partners to explore the complex history of the Détente period. In September 2002, the scholarly conference “NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the Rise of Détente, 1965-1972”, held in Dobbiaco brought together about fifty scholars from Europe and the United States to discuss new evidence and findings. In preparation for the conference, CIMA and CWIHP compiled a two-volume document reader and a CD-Rom, “The Rise of Détente;” the reader featured a number of documents relating to the CSCE process.

This CWIHP-CIMA-Archive reader is a compilation of newly released documents on the lead-up to the 1975 Helsinki Conference. The documents are drawn from the U.S. National Archives and the Ford Library and capture some of the key moments and critical aspects of the CSCE process. We hope the documents contained in this reader will shed new light on contentious points, provide context and stimulate discussion at the Florence conference. Additional non-US documents will be made available to conference participants in later instalments prior to and at the conference, and CWIHP is planning to publish the entire collection as a CD Rom. CIMA, CWIHP and their partners intend to explore new evidence from other archives, particularly Eastern and Western European archives, more systematically in the coming years as new materials become available and publish them in a special issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*.

In compiling the reader, the editors received advice and support from a number of individuals. We would like to thank Oliver Bange, Bill Burr, Federica Caciagli, Marilena Gala, David Geyer, Eleonora Guasconi, Vojtech Mastny, Conor Savoy, Douglas Selvage for their contributions to the reader and related documents. Our special thanks go to our CIMA comrades-in-arms and the conference’s hosts and sponsors Massimiliano Guderzo, Ennio di Nolfo and Leopoldo Nuti (and their staff). Production of this reader would not have been possible without the generous support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies.

Hedi Giusto
Mircea Munteanu
Christian Ostermann



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Authority E012958

By MKNARA Date 7-8-03

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

April 4, 1969

NSC: COUNTRY +
BOX 709: FOLDER 1

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *K*

SUBJECT: Soviet Initiative for a European Security Conference

The Soviets and East Europeans are currently pushing, diplomatically and through propaganda, an "appeal" adopted by the Warsaw Pact countries in Budapest on March 17 which proposes an early conference on European security. Ambassador Dobrynin today delivered a copy to Elliott Richardson. (You will recall that Prime Minister Rumor raised the subject with you on April 1.)

The appeal has aroused interest in the West because it almost completely is devoid of the polemical attacks on the US and the Federal Republic which normally appear in Communist declarations of this sort. There are no really significant new substantive proposals on how to go about getting a European settlement in this document -- its main concrete proposition is that officials from interested European states should meet to arrange a conference and its agenda. Its main theme is that if the present status quo is recognized in Europe, especially by the Federal Republic, there could then be extensive east-west cooperation on economic and technical matters and military alliances could be abolished.

On the face of it, the appeal excludes the United States from participation in the proposed conference. But in the past when this criticism was levelled against their European security proposals, the Soviets have indicated that they are prepared to see a US role. They have maintained this line privately in the present instance, too.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

There has been speculation about the reasons why this appeal should have been issued at this time. The timing may be connected with the

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SECRET

impending NATO meeting: the Soviets may hope that the trend toward better cohesion in NATO after Czechoslovakia and as a result of your European visit can be halted or reversed by a conciliatory proposition from them. Beyond this tactical motivation, the Soviets may in fact be interested in restoring some of the east-west contacts, including economic ones, that were disrupted by their invasion of Czechoslovakia. Since the document makes a number of demands on the FRG -- including recognition of East Germany, the Oder-Neisse Line and the "special status" of West Berlin, as well as renunciation of nuclear weapons -- the Soviets may have wanted to lay the groundwork for renewed political contacts with Bonn. The obverse side of that coin is, as it always has been, an effort to isolate the Federal Republic by picturing it is the main obstacle to a European settlement if it fails to meet Communist demands.

Another motivation that may have played a role relates to Soviet efforts to consolidate the Warsaw Pact: this is the first major document in some time that all the East Europeans, including Romania, have been willing to sign.

OUR ATTITUDE

Although I do not believe that in and of itself this "appeal" does anything to advance the prospects of a European settlement, I believe we should not give it a negative response. Rather, we might use it in our effort to impress on the Soviets the need to talk concretely about the issues that exist between us.

What we have said about the inutility and, indeed, dangers of holding grandiose conferences at this stage should hold true in this case also; but we need not rule out eventual meetings, after the necessary spadework has been done to ensure that they get somewhere.

I do not believe that we should make an issue of our attendance at such meetings. Anyone who is serious about making progress on European problems knows that we must be a party; we should not make the Soviets think that they are doing us a favor if they agree to such an obvious fact of life.

I do believe that in the context of a constructive response we should make clear that

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BOX 709: FOLDER 1

NSC: COUNTRY +
BOX 709 FOLDER 1

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(1) in our view a real settlement in Europe is incompatible with gross intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, and

(2) cannot be based on discrimination against Germany, since this would undermine any settlement from the beginning.

All of this, of course, looks very far into the future. But I think it would be desirable for us to be in a positive if cautious posture on this range of issues. This, judging from discussions at NATO, is also the position of our allies in Europe.

SECRET



Authority EO 12958
DECLASSIFIED
DATE 7-9-03

NIXON MATERIALS
NSC: COUNTRY FILE
BOX 694 FOLDER 2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

PART II OF V

DATE: April 1, 1969
10:00 a.m.
The White House

SUBJECT: European Security Conference

PARTICIPANTS: His Excellency Mariano Rumor, Prime Minister of Italy
His Excellency Egidio Ortona, Ambassador of Italy

The President
Robert E. Osgood, National Security Council
Wells Stabler, Country Director, Italy-Austria-Switzerland
Major General Walters, Interpreter

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Prime Minister Rumor recalled that at the meeting at the Quirinale, Foreign Minister Nenni had spoken about a possible European Security Conference. Subsequent to that time, there had been the Budapest meeting of the various Communist Parties and the communique issued after that meeting had referred to a European Security Conference. The Italian Government was fully aware of the propagand value of the Budapest document and had no confidence in the Communist proposal. However, it was not desirable to leave this proposal to the Communists as a propaganda weapon. It should not be rejected out of hand, although any Security Conference would have to have two principal conditions. One was the presence of the United States from the very outset. The other condition would be that it would be more than a Security Conference. In this respect there could be a counter-proposal for a conference on East-West relations in general which would include such subjects as cultural exchanges, movement of persons, etc. The Prime Minister said that it would be useful for internal Italian purposes not to reject the Security Conference

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BY MARRA Date 7-9-03

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proposal. It would be desirable to discuss the idea within the framework of NATO. In reply to the President's query, the Prime Minister said that the proposal for a Security Conference had originated from the Warsaw Pact countries and the Communist Parties and had been with us for quite some time. It was not something which was imminent and the NATO countries would certainly not have to take any initiative. However, the Prime Minister repeated the thought that it should not be rejected out of hand and should be studied and examined within NATO.

The President agreed that there was nothing immediate in this matter and did not reject the idea that this general question might be discussed within NATO.

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 By ADA ARA Date 7-1-03
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

PART I OF II

DATE: April 4, 1969

Place: Under Secretary's Office,
2:30-3:30 p.m.

IT: European Security Conference

IPANTS: Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Under Secretary Richardson
Morton Abramowitz, Special Assistant, U
Adolph Dubs, Acting Country Director, EUR/SOV

TO:

NSC: PRESIDENT'S STAFF PUSKIN
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Ambassador Dobrynin said he was calling on the instructions of his Government to draw the attention of the U.S. Government to the Appeal on European Security issued by the Warsaw Pact countries at Budapest on March 17. The Warsaw Pact countries attach great importance to a conference on European security. They believe that the Appeal represents a serious attempt to facilitate security in Europe and cooperation among European States in the economic, technological and scientific fields. No conditions are being attached to the holding of such a conference. The Soviet Union and its allies are prepared to discuss any issues. The views of these countries about a security conference are spelled out in the Appeal. This is not a propaganda exercise but a serious approach to an important matter. It was visualized that a preparatory committee should meet to discuss the time, place and agenda for such a conference.

Ambassador Dobrynin said he knew that the question of U.S. participation would arise. This would be a matter for the European countries to consider and to decide. If all European states believe that U.S. participation is necessary or desirable, then the Soviet Union would have no objection. Dobrynin indicated that the Appeal was being delivered to various governments by the Hungarian Government since the Appeal originated

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Authority EO 12958
By RAO ARA Date 7-1-03

at the Budapest meeting. Soviet ambassadors were under instructions to present the Appeal to governments in Western Europe.

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Mr. Richardson commented that Ambassador Dobrynin had participated several questions. He noted that the Soviet Union realized that the conference would be held without any preconditions. He couldn't help but note that the Appeal had stated that fundamental, preconditions for Europe's security included such things as confirmation of existing European borders, recognition of the existence of the GDR, etc. Ambassador Dobrynin interjected that these were not preconditions that all countries could propose any questions which they thought relevant. Participants could also make any statements they wished. All questions raised could be considered by the preparatory group.

Mr. Richardson asked whether U.S. participation would take place only if there were unanimous agreement among European states. Ambassador Dobrynin replied that he did not know whether there would be voting or not on such issues. He had no authorization to speak for European governments. In any event, there would be no objection from the Soviet side to U.S. participation. Mr. Richardson asked about possible Canadian participation. Ambassador Dobrynin answered that he was not sure whether this would be a main concern of the participants or whether the Canadians themselves wished to take part in a security conference. At this point he could only say that he frankly didn't know whether Canada would be included or excluded from such a meeting.

Mr. Richardson asked whether the Soviet Union was prepared to consider arrangements for Europe other than those specified as prerequisites to European security in the Budapest Appeal. Specifically, would the Soviets consider arrangements regarding the FRG and the GDR other than those spelled out in the Appeal? Furthermore, would the Soviets be willing to consider such questions as access to Berlin? Dobrynin noted again that any questions could be raised and that the agenda would no doubt be broad-ranging. The main objectives would be to work toward the security and tranquility of Europe. The Soviet Union feels strongly that recognition of the present borders would be a stabilizing factor. Great importance is attached to this point. He added that at some point in the future, various issues could be discussed in large forums while other matters could be discussed in smaller groupings. Dobrynin suggested that the US and the USSR might even have some preliminary exchanges

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of views on issues that might be discussed. The Soviet Union recognizes that all objectives cannot be achieved overnight. Perhaps the first security conference might be just a beginning and a prelude to future meetings.

Mr. Richardson concluded by noting that the Appeal no doubt would be discussed at the forthcoming NATO Ministerial meeting and that the Appeal would also be discussed between our Western allies themselves. It was useful to have the Ambassador's views on questions that were raised.

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The Budapest "appeal" of March 17 contrasts sharply with its two predecessor documents in length, tone, and focus. In the last analysis, however, the substance may well prove to be much the same. The July 5, 1966 Bucharest Declaration was twice as long as the April 26, 1967, Karlovy Vary statement of European communist parties, which in turn was twice as long as the most recent document. What is spelled out in the others and omitted from the March appeal may or may not be revived later in other contexts; nonetheless, its absence from this document tends to focus the latter almost exclusively on the procedural aspects of one element of the earlier proposals, i.e., the idea of a European conference of some sort to discuss European problems. In this respect, the March appeal actually makes only one specific suggestion, that officials of all interested European states meet to fix procedures for convening an all-European conference and define its agenda. At both Bucharest and Karlovy Vary, a variety of substantive steps were mentioned but no such procedural proposals were advanced.

The Differences

Apart from this element, the most striking difference between the present appeal and the earlier documents is in the tone employed. Both the 1966 and 1967 texts proceeded from a polemical analysis of the world situation in which US imperialism was branded as the source of world tension and the FRG-US collusive alliance the major threat to security on the European continent. Anti-West German polemics in particular permeated both documents. The 1969 appeal makes no such reference at all to the US or the FRG. The threat to peace is now depicted merely as "those forces" which prefer new military programs to a settlement of disputes, or those who "refuse to draw the proper conclusions from World War II" and from the "destruction of German militarism and nazism." No other culprit (apart from "those forces") is mentioned.

The substantive demands made by the Warsaw Pact members at Budapest (their list of "fundamental requisites" for Europe's security) encompass the same preconditions cited in the two earlier statements but with two notable exceptions, i.e., the references to the Munich agreement and to the status of Berlin. All three documents insist it be understood from the start that (a) existing European frontiers are immutable, particularly the Oder-Neisse border and the frontier between the GDR and FRG; (b) "recognition of the existence" of two German states, the GDR and the FRG, is essential; and (c) the FRG must renounce its claim to represent all German people and to possess nuclear weapons in any form.

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Both at Bucharest and Karlovy Vary, the demand was made that the FRG must also renounce the Munich Agreement ab initio. This demand is completely absent from the Budapest appeal. (At Bucharest in 1966, a reference was also made to the immutability of the Czechoslovak-FRG border, but this had already been dropped at Karlovy Vary.)

The Berlin Peculiarity

The Bucharest 1966 declaration made no reference at all to Berlin; evidently at that point the USSR did not consider Berlin a proper subject for negotiations in a specifically European context. At Karlovy Vary, Berlin was mentioned but only as one aspect of a series of measures which the European "working class and the peace forces of the world" should undertake to promote peaceful relations in Europe. These measures included efforts toward normalization of relations between all states and the GDR, as well as between both German states themselves, and "between the GDR and West Berlin as a separate political entity."

The Budapest document in contrast places its reference to Berlin among the "fundamental preconditions for safeguarding European security." This latest document simply states that "West Berlin has a special status and does not belong to West Germany." (Interestingly enough, the version of the appeal carried by the Hungarian news agency states: "The FRG should declare that West Berlin has a special status, etc." and the East Germans are adhering to this formula, c.f. Foreign Minister Winzer's speech of March 31. In Pravda, however, the West Berlin passage is a separate sentence, distinct from the FRG declaration requirements.)

The time sequence of this difference in treatment of the Berlin question is of interest since it follows the change in Soviet tactics for dealing with the Berlin question after January 1968. Then Moscow for the first time turned to the FRG on Berlin matters and subsequently has been moving to separate out the German aspects of the Berlin status from the Four Power elements by dealing with either Bonn or the Allied capitals, depending on the issue. The Bucharest and Karlovy Vary documents appeared at a time when for Moscow Berlin issues were still reserved exclusively for Four Power consideration.

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Bucharest 1966 Specifics

Beyond these points, the Budapest appeal raises no substantive issues directly; it merely "reaffirms" in general terms the proposals and other measures embodied in the 1966 Bucharest declaration.

These earlier proposals, however, covered considerable ground. They included seven numbered categories:

- (1) Good neighborly relations among all European states, including establishment of normal relations with both German states on principles of independence, sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and renunciation of discrimination or pressure in any form against normal relations between states. (This of course is the 1969 Budapest "precondition" that the FRG must renounce its claim to represent all Germans, i.e., give up the Hallstein doctrine.)
- (2) Simultaneous liquidation of both NATO and the Warsaw Pacts, or barring that, liquidation of the military organizations of both alliances.
- (3) Partial measures toward military relaxation on the European continent such as liquidation of foreign bases, withdrawal of all forces stationed abroad to within their national frontiers, reduction of the numerical strength of the armed forces of both German states and the establishment of denuclearized zones.
- (4) The FRG must be denied access to nuclear weapons in any form and any form of participation in the control of such weapons.
- (5) Frontiers in Europe, including the Oder-Neisse and those between the two German states, are immutable.
- (6) Any German peace settlement will require recognition of the "fact of the existence of two German states" and their existing frontiers and the refusal of both German states to possess nuclear weapons.
- (7) Convocation of a general European conference at which agreement could be reached for a general European declaration on "cooperation for maintenance and strengthening European security." This declaration could be an undertaking for peaceful settlement of disputes, expansion of economic, scientific-technical and cultural relations, for exchange of information, and for consultations.

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Initiative Seriously Meant

When the Bucharest catalogue of proposals, measures or steps is compared to the recent Budapest appeal formulations, it is clear that the bulk of the former's contents are one way or another incorporated in the latter. Missing is only an explicit listing of the proposal for liquidating both alliances or the military structures and the various partial disarmament measures advanced earlier. However, the mere fact that the detailed Bucharest listing was not repeated does argue that the Warsaw Pact signatories view their latest appeal as a more realistic initiative. To that end, they were prepared to avoid mention of issues certain to arouse West European debate, controversy or opposition to the conference idea itself. Similarly the remarkable lack of polemics in the document also argues that the appeal is seriously meant to generate response.

Secondly, the form of the "preconditions" cited and the fact that this time they include specific reference to West Berlin and use here a formulation quite different from the recent East European norm (and for that matter somewhat at odds with the formulation contained in the USSR-GDR Friendship Treaty) suggest that the Warsaw Pact initiative for a European conference is addressed first of all to the FRG. The communist preconditions for a conference obviously must be accepted by the West Germans first of all before it will be possible to speak of a European response to the appeal. The preconditions themselves are now presented in terms which the Warsaw Pact powers evidently believe can eventually be accepted by the Bonn government. (In this instance, the wording "special status for West Berlin" allows for the preservation of the FRG legal position with respect to Berlin without necessarily impairing the GDR's claims or the Soviet position on that subject.) Furthermore, omission of the heretofore traditional demand for ab initio renunciation of the Munich agreement implies both a Pact willingness to allow the Czechs and the FRG to resolve this issue their own way, if it is to be resolved, and a caution to the East Germans, who were foremost in insisting that this issue be maintained as a part of the Pact hard line against the FRG.

Focus on the FRG

Actually, the entire format of the Budapest appeal suggests a Pact agreement on new leeway in East-West European contact and cooperation which almost inevitably will mean expanded relationships between the individual Pact states and West Germany.

The almost inescapable focus on the German problem implicit in the entire complex points in turn to a revival of interest in some of those "steps" of the 1966 Bucharest declaration which were confirmed anew, although not specifically

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mentioned. The most pertinent one would seem to be the specific Bucharest proposal for a numerical reduction in the size of the armed forces of both German states. (It is conceivable that much of the GDR military activity of the past year and the announcement of an as yet undefined integration of GDR forces with those of the USSR may have been undertaken with this eventuality in mind.) The Bucharest declaration also specified that both German states will renounce nuclear weapons and proposed various denuclearized zones in Europe. All of these concepts are likely to be thrust into any European discussions which develop.

Regardless of the uses to which a European conference could be put, the call for such a conference itself seems designed to serve as a convenient excuse (or perhaps cover) for allowing a revival of East-West European intercourse, including bilateral East European-FRG relationships. Even if nothing concrete comes of the initiative per se, or if a meeting of European officials eventually does materialize and can agree on nothing more than a bland declaration, the very fact of a conference call seems to imply (a) that resumption of East European contacts or ties with Bonn has now been sanctioned by Moscow -- otherwise, even an atmosphere conducive to East-West talks is out of the question; and (b) once the web of East-West links is re-established it becomes increasingly difficult to disentangle it (at least without drastic action as in Czechoslovakia).

Ulbricht Unenthusiastic

This concern may well be behind Ulbricht's manifest lack of enthusiasm about Budapest; he has always been aware that once broad contacts got underway in Europe, their consequences could never be safely predicted. In any event, in his speech to the GDR National Front on March 22, he endorsed the conference appeal but pointedly noted all the pitfalls of dealings with Bonn or with the German Social Democrats. His presentation made it fairly obvious he was not enthusiastic about the new Budapest line and would be happy to see the initiative fail. A similar line was taken by the Polish press, at least initially, in spite of the fact that the Poles have told us they are engaged in updating their European security proposals.

US Role Ignored

All three communist documents on the European security theme couch their references to a European security conference in exclusively European terms. None of them specifically excludes US participation in such a gathering but rather studiously ignore the matter. The latest appeal is no exception, but like the others its formulations are elastic enough to allow such participation should the need arise. At the same time, avoidance of the issue suggests Moscow intends to try and play its European cards simultaneously and separately from its bilateral

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dealings with the US on broader security interests. The Soviets will probably seek to divert and/or exclude the US from their maneuverings stemming from the Budapest appeal by conducting those latter activities in bilateral or regional channels to which the US would not normally be party. The aim would always be to separate the US from its European allies and deal with each separately.

In this context, the Budapest document holds out the prospect of greater East-West European cooperation in technical and economic fields, particularly in such supra-national realms as waterways, health problems, transport, power generation. Development of East-West cooperative projects of this nature would be expected to generate an atmosphere conducive to political cooperation at some later date.

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By SM/NARA Date 7-8-03

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 31, 1969

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SECRET (EXDIS Enclosure)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: United States and Allied Approaches
to the Current Issues of European
Security

The problem of how the Alliance should respond to the appeal for a European Security Conference issued by the Warsaw Pact at Budapest last March will be the major item of business during the NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting in November and the Ministerial meeting in December.

We must hold the Allies together in fashioning a coherent, convincing and collective response to the Budapest appeal that will demonstrate to public opinion Western willingness to negotiate in a constructive spirit the real issues of European security.

We believe, moreover, that we should aim to enter into a process of negotiation with the Soviets from a solid tactical position. The Alliance should find it possible to make reasonable and attractive proposals that would permit us to deal confidently with the Soviets if they wish to negotiate. If the Soviets refuse to negotiate on this basis, there is good reason to hope that Moscow could be made to bear most of the public blame for the resulting impasse.

The Present European Security Equation

We do not believe that basic East-West differences

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-- such as the continuing division of Germany and the future of Berlin -- are subject to easy or early resolution, or that a European Security Conference is likely to accomplish much in the period immediately ahead. Successful negotiations on European security can only result from a lengthy process, not from a single climactic event.

We also know that the ultimate Soviet aim in putting this proposal in play with the West is to place a seal of legitimacy upon the division of Germany and Europe, while we would hope for the opposite result from any process of European security negotiations. Moreover, the mere convening of a European Security Conference with East German participation would, of itself, go far toward achieving this Soviet goal -- which means that West German views on the matter will merit particular attention.

Nonetheless, the fact remains that the Warsaw Pact's European Security Conference proposal has a certain resonance in Western European public opinion. Last April, as you will recall, several Allied governments urged that a direct and generally favorable response to the Warsaw Pact proposal be included in the communique of the Washington Ministerial meeting. Their ardor was dampened largely -- and at the last minute -- by a Tass release issued just before the meeting that attacked NATO in typical Cold War language. The communique of the Washington meeting thus avoided mention of a European Security Conference and went no further than a commitment "to explore with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe which concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful negotiation and an early resolution". The Ministers instructed the Council in Permanent Session to study the matter, and the result has been a full-dress substantive review by the Allies of the issues on which East-West discussions might be held. This List of Issues (a copy is enclosed)

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will be the main substantive underpinning for the November and December meetings of the Council at higher levels.

Since April, the Soviets and their Allies have given renewed signs of interest in a European Security Conference, and we have reports that the Warsaw Pact will meet to draw up a proposed "agenda" in the near future. The November and December NATO meetings thus will have to decide whether the Alliance should respond directly to this Warsaw Pact proposal, and if so, how.

In making the essentially tactical judgment about the appropriate US attitude toward the issue of a European Security Conference, we begin with the assessment that the majority of our Allies will wish to adopt a generally favorable posture toward such a conference.

In that likely event, it is also our belief that we should not take a negative stance and oppose, in principle, an Allied statement that, at the end of a long preparatory path, a European Security Conference could be convened, with United States and Canadian participation from the outset. Many West Europeans look upon European security negotiations as their equivalent to SALT - as the vehicle by which Western European governments can engage visibly in negotiations with the East on issues relating to their security. Thus Western European pressures for a European Security Conference may well grow as SALT gets underway, and it would hardly be appropriate for us to appear to stand in the way.

We also believe that the Alliance has no need to react in purely defensive fashion to the Warsaw Pact's European Security Conference gambit. Rather it should put forward in December substantive proposals that would meet Alliance interests if they could be negotiated with the East, that appeal to Western public opinion, and that -- where possible -- have divisive effects on the Warsaw Pact or put the Soviets on the defensive. The

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probability that some proposals are non-negotiable with the Soviets is thus not necessarily a bar to advancing them.

Issues for Possible Negotiation

The opinion amongst most NATO countries now is that an offer to negotiate balanced force reductions in Central Europe with the Eastern European countries should be one of the central elements in the Allied position. We share their view of the balanced force reductions approach because:

- The Alliance had publicly registered agreement in principle to balanced force reductions in June 1968 and again in April 1969.
- The preparatory studies are well-advanced and could be converted fairly soon into proposals for consideration as possible negotiating positions.
- Balanced force reductions proposal would be useful in the internal political debates of member countries, including the United States, as an argument against unilateral force reductions.
- It would appeal to a Western public opinion anxious for tangible signs of progress toward disarmament. In the likely event that the Soviets refuse to discuss this question seriously, we would presumably be better placed to maintain the position that unilateral force reductions would be self-defeating.

While the German question remains, of course, central to the problem of European security, we did not think it appropriate in the present political context for the United States to take the initiative on a matter of the most direct and immediate interest to the

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Federal Republic and concerning which German diplomacy has itself been very active in the last few years. The new German Government also will undoubtedly have an active Eastern policy and consult with us about it.

Hence, for the purposes of the present exercise, on Germany and Berlin, we would limit ourselves to an effort to build Allied support for the tripartite efforts to ease pressures on Berlin and for the Eastern policy initiatives which the Brandt government will be pursuing.

However, we feel balanced force reductions - a proposal long in play - is not enough by itself for us to propose in November and December as the American suggestion for the collective Allied response to the Warsaw Pact initiative.

Thus, we also believe that we should endorse a Joint Declaration on the Principles of European Security as a proposal of tactical utility. It could be advanced as a means of placing an additional restraint - however slight - upon the Soviet Union's use of force to discipline its Allies. It could be designed to remind Western public opinion of the past transgressions of the Soviet Union and to have divisive effects within the Warsaw Pact. The declaration should encompass such principles as non-intervention in internal affairs, including among members of an Alliance, abstention from the use or threat of force; respect for the independence and territorial integrity of states; and agreement to settle differences by peaceful means - all points now extant in the United Nations Charter but packaged in a declaration of applicability to the European area.

You may recall that the British advanced an East-West Code of Good Conduct proposal before the Czech crisis, but have left it dormant since. The French also have suggested East-West agreement on a Declaration of Non-Intervention that would be designed, implicitly

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at least, to inhibit a repetition of the Czech affair. Foreign Minister Schumann floated it in Moscow recently and -- not surprisingly -- found the Soviets reticent. We have reports that the Warsaw Pact may advance a Code of Good Conduct proposal of its own.

In summary, as we now see it, the total Western response in December to the Warsaw Pact initiative will comprise five main points:

1. Balanced force reductions -- a renewed and stronger signal of Allied willingness to negotiate.
2. Reference to a Joint Declaration of the Principles of European Security.
3. Berlin-Germany -- support for the tripartite probe and the Federal Republic of Germany's initiatives on inner-German relations.
4. Hortatory statements on enhanced East-West economic, technical and cultural exchanges, which some of the Allies - notably the Italians - will insist upon.
5. Statement of willingness to consider an eventual European Security Conference, provided it is properly prepared in advance and includes the United States and Canada from the outset.

State telegram number 181393 (enclosed) to USNATO, which was cleared by Dr. Kissinger, sets forth our preliminary guidance on the foregoing points.

We believe this cautious but positive approach is consonant with your policy toward Europe and plan to proceed along the above lines.


William P. Rogers

Enclosures:

1. State telegram 181393.
2. List of Issues.

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By **ARA** Date **7-1-03**

Department of State

7.
TELEGRAM

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1. POLISH AMBASSADOR MICHALOWSKI CALLED ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILLENBRAND NOVEMBER 17 TO DELIVER WARSAW PACT DOCUMENTS ON ESC ADOPTED AT PRAGUE. SAID POLES HAD PREPARED THIRD DOCUMENT AND SUBMITTED IT TO WP ALLIES AS SUGGESTIONS FOR ESC AGENDA ITEMS. NONE OF THESE DOCUMENTS HAD BEEN PUBLISHED. POLISH DOCUMENT WOULD INCLUDE POINTS AGREED IN PRAGUE BUT BE MORE

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TELEGRAM



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ETAILED. MICHALOWSKI GAVE FOLLOWING ORALLY AS OUTLINE OF PROPOSED POLISH PAPER:

- (A) RENUNCIATION OF USE OF FORCE.
- (B) RECOGNITION OF EXISTING FRONTIERS.
- (C) NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS.
- (D) OBLIGATION FOR SETTLEMENT OF ALL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS.
- (E) OBLIGATION TO CONFORM TO UN CHARTER.
- (F) RENUNCIATION OF ASSISTANCE TO ANY COUNTRY WHICH IS ENGAGED IN AGGRESSION IN SPITE OF ALLIANCES.
- (G) RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE.
- (H) AFTER SIGNATURE OF TREATY AND AFTER ASSURANCES OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED, A CONFERENCE COULD BE CALLED TO DISSOLVE ALLIANCES.
- (I) RESPECT FOR NEUTRALITY.
- (J) HOLDING OF DISCUSSIONS ON DISARMAMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF DISARMAMENT.
- (K) OBLIGATION FOR EFFORTS TOWARD REGIONAL DISARMAMENT, FIRST OF ALL, ATOMIC DISARMAMENT.
- (L) ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION.
- (M) POSSIBILITY FOR PERIODICAL CONFERENCES TO REVIEW AND ENLARGE TREATY IN FUTURE AS WELL AS TO ESTABLISH COMMITTEES TO DISCUSS FURTHER MEANS OF COOPERATION.

2. HILLENBRAND NOTED FORTHCOMING NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING AND SAID WP DOCUMENTS WOULD OF COURSE BE GIVEN CONSIDERATION. HE THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT GUIDELINES ISSUED FOLLOWING MEETING LAST APRIL WERE STILL VALID AND THAT COMMUNIQUE FROM DECEMBER MEETING WOULD PRESUMABLY BUILD ON THEM. IN OUR VIEW, WAY TO APPROACH THIS PROBLEM IS STILL TO TRY AND ISOLATE THOSE AREAS WHICH SEEM RIPE FOR DISCUSSION AND THEN TALK ABOUT THEM. EXAMPLES WERE SALT TALKS, FRG-SOVIET CONTACTS, AND SOVIET-WESTERN CONTACTS ON BERLIN. HE THOUGHT PRAGUE DOCUMENTS WERE THIN IN CONTENT AND HARDLY JUSTIFIED GRAND SECURITY MEETING WHICH WOULD CARRY WITH IT DANGERS OF ARRIVING AT SOME UNSTABLE, LOCARNO-LIKE SYSTEM IN WHICH POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF EUROPE WERE LEFT UNSOLVED. SAID PRAGUE DOCUMENTS ALSO LEFT OPEN QUESTION WHETHER US AND CANADA TO BE INCLUDED.

3. MICHALOWSKI SAID MEMBERSHIP SHOULD PRESENT NO PROBLEM AND IN POLISH VIEW, US AND CANADA SHOULD BE INCLUDED FROM START "WITH EQUAL RIGHTS." USG HAD NEVER SHOWN MUCH INTEREST AND "WE WILL

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By RAA ARA Date 7-1-03 *ent of State*

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NOT BEG YOU." AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT ABOUT US PARTICIPATION "WILL COME AS SOON AS YOU SHOW SOME INTEREST." HILLENBRAND SAID THERE DID NOT SEEM COMMON APPROACH BY ALL WP ALLIES ON THIS POINT AND ASKED WHETHER POLES SERIOUSLY THOUGHT CONFERENCE COULD BE CONVENED AS EARLY AS WITHIN NEXT SIX MONTHS. MICHALOWSKI SAID HE WAS AN OPTIMIST WHO THOUGHT THERE COULD BE SUFFICIENT PROGRESS ON SALT, FRG-SOVIET, BERLIN, AND POLISH GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS TO SHOW THAT BASIS FOR CONFERENCE DOES EXIST. HILLENBRAND SAID IT WOULD BE HARD TO BE SO OPTIMISTIC IN LIGHT OF HISTORY. HE ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY SIGNIFICANCE TO FACT THAT PRAGUE DOCUMENTS BEING DELIVERED ONLY NOW TO USG AND WHETHER DISTINCTION BEING DRAWN BETWEEN US AND OTHER PROSPECTIVE PARTICIPANTS WHO WERE GIVEN DOCUMENTS BY CZECHS. MICHALOWSKI SAID HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE DATED NOVEMBER 7 BUT HE HAD WAITED FOR RETURN OF HILLENBRAND TO WASHINGTON.

4. HILLENBRAND THEN SAID WE WOULD TAKE PRAGUE DOCUMENTS UNDER CONSIDERATION AS WELL AS POLISH POINTS AND NATO MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE WOULD BE AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT OF WESTERN POSITION. SEEMED TO HIM, HOWEVER, THAT ADDITIONAL POLISH POINTS SHOWED RECOGNITION OF INADEQUACY OF PRAGUE STATEMENTS. EXEMPT.
ROGERS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 195006

USNATO DELIVER ENGLEBERGER 0830 THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20

FYI AND NOFORN (EXCEPT AS NOTED IN PARA 4 BELOW)

SUBJ: SOVIET APPROACH ON EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

MEMORANDUM BELOW IS UNCLEARED AND SUBJECT TO REVISION UPON REVIEW

1. AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ASKED FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH SECRETARY ON NOVEMBER 18. THEY MET AT 9 A.M. ON NOVEMBER 19. DOBRYNIN THEN

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PROCEEDED TO SUMMARIZE LENGTHY "INFORMAL ORAL STATEMENT", TEXT OF WHICH HE LATER HANDED TO SECRETARY. FULL TEXT OF STATEMENT FOLLOWS:

QUOTE (1) SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROCEEDS FROM ASSUMPTION THAT POSSIBILITIES FOR HOLDING ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ARE NOW INCREASING. DURING TIME THAT PASSED SINCE BUCHAREST DECLARATION BY SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, AND ESPECIALLY SINCE BUDAPEST APPEAL, THE INTENTIONS OF COUNTRIES WHICH SPONSORED PROPOSALS FOR ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE HAVE BECOME MORE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. A NUMBER OF WRONG INTERPRETATIONS HAVE BEEN DROPPED WHICH DID NOT CORRESPOND TO REAL POSITION OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. DISCUSSION OF PROPOSAL FOR AN ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE HAS BECOME BUSINESSLIKE AND IS BEING FOCUSED ON ITS AGENDA, POSSIBLE RESULTS AND BODY OF PARTICIPANTS. THE WELL KNOWN INITIATIVE OF FINLAND PLAYED POSITIVE ROLE IN THIS RESPECT. THUS THE QUESTION OF PREPARATION AND CONVOCATION OF ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE WILL NOW ARISE ON A MORE PRACTICAL PLANE.

SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WHICH PROPOSED ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE HAVE CAREFULLY ANALYZED EXISTING POINTS OF VIEW, CONSIDERED THE OPINIONS EXPRESSED IN COURSE OF BILATERAL CONTACTS AND HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT POSITIONS OF INTERESTED STATES, IN PARTICULAR, THEY PAID DUE ATTENTION TO OPINIONS REGARDING THE NECESSITY OF THOROUGH PREPARATION FOR ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE, ITS POSSIBLE PARTICIPANTS AND DESIRABILITY TO SELECT FOR THE DISCUSSION AT THE ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE SUCH QUESTIONS WHICH WOULD ALLOW FOR A BROAD CONSENSUS IN THE PRESENT CONDITIONS IN EUROPE, AND REGARDING WHICH ALL POSSIBLE PARTICIPANTS IN THE ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE AS TO THEIR PRODUCTIVE CONSIDERATION AT THE CONFERENCE ITSELF.

HAVING TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT ALL ABOVE MENTIONED POINTS, COUNTRIES-SIGNATORIES TO BUDAPEST APPEAL FOUND IT USEFUL AND TIMELY TO COME OUT WITH NEW INITIATIVE TO DETAIL FURTHER STEPS FOR CONVENING ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE AND TO PROVIDE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS, WHICH AROSE IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION WITH VARIOUS COUNTRIES OF THE PROPOSAL TO CONVENE THE CONFERENCE.

(2) THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS CONVINCED THAT CONVENING OF ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE IN NEAR FUTURE WOULD SERVE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AS WELL AS INTERESTS

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OF ALL EUROPEAN AND NOT ONLY EUROPEAN STATES. IT STANDS TO REASON THAT PREPARATORY WORK MUST BE AIMED AT PRACTICAL FULFILLMENT OF PROPOSAL FOR CONVENING CONFERENCE INSTEAD OF BEING USED AS PRETEXT FOR ITS DELAY OR FOR RAISING VARIOUS PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS. IN OPINION OF COUNTRIES-PARTICIPANTS IN PRAGUE MEETING, THE ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE COULD TAKE PLACE IN FIRST HALF OF 1970.

AS FOR PLACE OF CONFERENCE, THE STATES-SIGNATORIES OF THE PRAGUE STATEMENT HOLD THE OPINION THAT IT COULD TAKE PLACE IN HELSINKI IN VIEW OF THE ROLE PLAYED BY GOVERNMENT OF FINLAND IN THIS MATTER.

(3) SOVIET GOVERNMENT FULLY SHARES VIEW OF STATES WHICH BELIEVE THAT ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE MUST END IN SUCCESS -- ALL THE MORE SO THAT IT WOULD BE THE FIRST MEETING OF ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN THE POST-WAR YEARS.

IN OUR OPINION, TWO ITEMS SUGGESTED BY PRAGUE STATEMENT FOR INCLUSION IN AGENDA OF AN ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE - INNER QUOTE ON THE ASSURANCE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND ON THE RENUNCIATION OF USE OF FORCE OR THREAT OF ITS USE IN MUTUAL RELATIONS AMONG STATES IN EUROPE END INNER QUOTE AND INNERQUOTE ON EXPANSION OF TRADE, ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TIES ON EQUAL TERMS AIMED AT DEVELOPING POLITICAL COOPERATION AMONG EUROPEAN STATES END INNER QUOTE - CAN BECOME SUBJECTS ON WHICH BROAD AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED, GIVEN SUFFICIENT GOOD WILL OF THE PARTIES. (COMMENT: DOBRYNIN HANDED THE SECRETARY THE TEXT OF THESE DRAFT DOCUMENTS.)

DISCUSSION OF FIRST QUESTION MENTIONED ABOVE COULD, IT IS BELIEVED, RESULT IN SIGNING OF FINAL DOCUMENT THAT WOULD PROCLAIM PRINCIPLE OF RENUNCIATION OF USE OF FORCE OR THREAT OF ITS USE IN MUTUAL RELATIONS AMONG STATES IN EUROPE. ADOPTION OF SUCH DOCUMENT WOULD ACUTALLY MEAN PROCLAMATION OF PRINCIPLE OF RENUNCIATION OF WAR IN EUROPE WHICH IS OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANE IN VIEW OF FACT THAT IT IS ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT THAT THE TWO MOST POWERFUL MILITARY-POLITICAL GROUPINGS CONFRONT EACH OTHER WITH THEIR MILITARY FORCES CONCENTRATED THERE IN IMMEDIATE PROXIMITY OF EACH OTHER. ESTABLISHMENT ON REGIONAL BASIS OF PRINCIPLE TO RENOUNCE USE OF FORCE OR THREAT OF ITS

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USE IS IN KEEPING WITH PROVISIONS OF UN CHARTER AND SERVES THEIR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT. BESIDES IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT NOT ALL OF STATES CONCERNED -- FUTURE PARTICIPANTS IN THE ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE -- ARE MEMBERS OF THE UN. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT ADOPTION OF DOCUMENT ON NON-USE OF FORCE BY ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE WOULD BY NO MEANS AFFECT COMMITMENTS ASSUMED BY STATES-PARTICIPANTS IN ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE THROUGH EXISTING MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS.

DISCUSSION OF SECOND QUESTION ON AGENDA WHICH COULD ALSO RESULT IN ADOPTION OF APPROPRIATE DOCUMENT, WOULD ALLOW MOVEMENT FORWARD TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS AMONG EUROPEAN STATES, PREPARE GROUND FOR CONSIDERATION OF CONCRETE QUESTIONS OF TRADE, ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION AMONG ALL EUROPEAN STATES AND FOR REMOVAL OF OBSTACLES IN THE MENTIONED FIELDS.

AN ACCORD ACHIEVED ON BOTH MENTIONED QUESTIONS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVEMENT OF GENERAL POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN EUROPE AND TO GROWTH OF TRUST, WOULD SECURE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND WOULD PAVE WAY FOR FUTURE CONSIDERATION OF OTHER PROBLEMS OF INTEREST TO EUROPEAN STATES, THE SOLUTION OF WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT OF BROAD COOPERATION AMONG ALL EUROPEAN STATES.

WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE CLEAR, THAT AT ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE, AS WE SEE IT, EVERY STATE-PARTICIPANT WILL BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO SET FORTH ITS VIEWPOINT ON QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SITUATION IN EUROPE AND MEANS OF STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT, AS WELL AS TO GIVE SUGGESTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEFUL COOPERATION AMONG EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. IN OTHER WORDS, WE HAVE IN MIND THAT THERE WILL TAKE PLACE A FREE DISCUSSION AT THE CONFERENCE, AND THAT DECISIONS WILL BE TAKEN ON THE TWO PROPOSED CONCRETE QUESTIONS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE. WE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THE IDEA THAT WORKING OUT AGREED DRAFTS OF THE POSSIBLE FINAL DOCUMENTS IN CONSULTATIONS EVEN BEFORE CONVOCATION OF AN ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE WOULD GUARANTEE THE SUCCESS OF CONFERENCE TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT.

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4) AS IT FOLLOWS FROM PRAGUE STATEMENT, THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY OTHER PROPOSALS AIMED AT PRACTICAL PREPARATION FOR AND ENSURING THE SUCCESS OF ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE.

SOMETIMES AN OPINION IS VOICED TO EFFECT THAT QUESTIONS ADVANCED BY SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE ALLEGEDLY NOT OF MAJOR SCALE AND THAT CARDINAL PROBLEMS SUCH AS GERMAN PROBLEM SHOULD BE INTRODUCED AT ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE. WE DO NOT AGREE WITH SUCH STATEMENTS AT ALL. SUGGESTIONS TO EFFECT THAT GERMAN PROBLEM OR OTHER PROBLEMS BE INCLUDED IN THE AGENDA - AND SUCH PROBLEMS ARE UNDERSTOOD BY THE WEST IN A SPECIFIC WAY WHICH IS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES - WOULD ONLY SERVE TO COMPLICATE IF NOT DOWN-RIGHT TORPEDO CONVOCAION OR, AT ANY RATE, FRUITFUL WORK OF THE CONFERENCE. ONE CANNOT BUT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION ALSO THAT AS FAR AS GERMAN PROBLEM GOES THERE IS SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF VICTORIOUS POWERS IN WORLD WAR II WHO SIGNED THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT. (n.b, France did not sign)

NOR DO WE AGREE WITH ATTEMPTS TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF WEST BERLIN SINCE THIS IS A SPECIAL QUESTION AND IT DOES NOT BELONG TO THE ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE.

(5) REFERRING TO QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN RAISED WITH ME BY U.S. OFFICIALS AS TO ATTITUDE OF SOVIET UNION TOWARD U.S. PARTICIPATION IN AN ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE, WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING CLARIFICATION.

ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE IS OF A REGIONAL NATURE, OPEN FOR PARTICIPATION BY ALL INTERESTED EUROPEAN STATES, INCLUDING, OF COURSE, THE GDR ON AN EQUAL "FOOTING" WITH THE FRG AND ON EQUAL "TERMS" WITH OTHER PARTICIPANTS. WITH THIS QUALIFICATION AS TO THE BODY OF PARTICIPANTS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THE UNITED STATES, IF THERE IS A WISH ON HER PART, CAN ALSO TAKE PART IN ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE, SINCE IT BEARS DEFINITE RESPONSIBILITY ENSUING FROM POTSDAM AND OTHER ALLIED AGREEMENTS IN FORCE FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN EUROPE. IN SETTING FORTH OUR POSITION AS TO AGENDA FOR THE CONFERENCE WE TOOK INTO ACCOUNT PREVIOUS CONTACTS WITH U.S. REPRESENTATIVES AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE VIEW EXPRESSED HERE TO THE EFFECT THAT ACUTE QUESTIONS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WITHIN THE RESPONSIBILITY

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OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE, BE CONSIDERED OUTSIDE OF THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE. THE ITEMS WE PROPOSE TO INCLUDE IN THE AGENDA ALSO CORRESPOND TO SUGGESTIONS BY THE AMERICAN SIDE THAT SUCH QUESTIONS BE TAKEN UP AT THE CONFERENCE WHICH COULD PRODUCTIVELY BE DISCUSSED AND ACTED UPON. WE EXPECT THAT FURTHER CONTACTS WILL ENABLE US TOGETHER AND FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE CAUSE (SIC) TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS RELATED TO PREPARATION AND HOLDING OF AN ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE.

16) WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS HOPE THAT US GOVERNMENT WILL GIVE ITS DUE ATTENTION TO PROPOSALS ADVANCED BY STATES WHICH SIGNED PRAGUE STATEMENT, AND TO CONSIDERATIONS OF USSR GOVERNMENT ON THIS SCORE, AND ON ITS PART WILL MAKE EFFORTS TOWARD PREPARATION OF CONVENING AND SUCCESSFUL HOLDING OF ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE. SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD APPRECIATE CONSIDERATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS WHICH US GOVERNMENT MAY THINK USEFUL TO EXPRESS IN THIS CONNECTION. END QUOTE.

requests reply

2. AFTER DOBRYNIN FINISHED HIS SUMMARY OF ORAL STATEMENT, THE SECRETARY ASKED HOW LONG THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD ENVISAGE DURATION OF PROPOSED ESC. AMBASSADOR REPLIED CONFERENCE NEED NOT BE LONG AT ALL IT AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED ON DRAFT DOCUMENTS BEFOREHAND THROUGH BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. OBVIOUSLY IF CONFERENCE WERE TO DISCUSS SUBSTANCE OF CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IT COULD LAST VERY LONG TIME. IT WOULD BE SOVIET HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON DRAFT DOCUMENTS PREPARED AT PRAGUE CONFERENCE BEFORE ESC CONVENES. THE USSR ASSUMED, DOBRYNIN SAID, THAT NATO COUNTRIES MIGHT HAVE TWO OR THREE OTHER ISSUES WHICH THEY WOULD LIKE TO RAISE AT ESC; THESE COULD ALSO BE DISCUSSED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AHEAD OF TIME.

3. DRAFT DOCUMENTS HANDED SECRETARY NOTED IN PARA (3) ABOVE ARE IDENTICAL WITH TEXTS TRANSMITTED IN LONDON'S 9176. (TEXT BEING REPEATED TO ADDRESSEES WHO DID NOT RECEIVE LONDON EMBTEL.)

4. FOR USNATO - AT NOVEMBER 20 POLADS DISCUSSION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN FOLLOW-UP TO PRAGUE DECLARATION, YOU MAY INFORM ALLIES OF DOBRYNIN CALL ON SECRETARY. YOU MAY ALSO MAKE ORAL SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL POINTS WHICH DOBRYNIN MADE.

GP-3. ROGERS

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SUBJECT: SECRETARY ROGERS' MEETING WIT PRESIDENT POMPIDOU:
 NATO MINISTERIAL AND ESC

POMPIDOU ASKED SECRETARY ROGERS HOW THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETINGS HAD PROGRESSED. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE MEETINGS WENT VERY WELL. THERE WERE NO SUBSTANTIAL DIFFICULTIES, THERE WERE DIFFERENCES OF NUANCE, BUT ON THE IMPORTANT MATTERS THERE WAS NO DISAGREEMENT. THE SECRETARY SAID HIS RELATIONSHIPS WITH SCHUMANN HAD BEEN EXCELLENT. AT THE CONFERENCE, THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES HAD BEEN VERY MUCH IN FAVOR OF THE PROPOSED EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE, BUT THE SECRETARY HIMSELF DID NOT THINK THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE SERIOUS IN PROPOSING THIS, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE THE RUSSIANS GAVE NO SIGN OF BEING WILLING TO DISCUSS SERIOUS ISSUES SUCH AS THE BALANCED REDUCTION OF FORCES. POMPIDOU RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT HE HOPED THAT THE SECRETARY REALIZED "I DO NOT FAVOR REDUCTION OF FORCES IN EUROPE". FEAR OF THE USSR MIGHT PRODUCE A RAPACKI-TYPE PLAN WHICH MIGHT RESULT IN THE NEUTRALIZATION OF EUROPE, AND HE, POMPIDOU, WAS OPPOSED TO ANY PLAN THAT WOULD NEUTRALIZE EUROPE AS A WHOLE.

THE SECRETARY RESPONDED TO THIS BY SAYING THAT FIRST OF ALL THE US HAD NO INTENTION OF REDUCING OUR FORCES IN EUROPE, THAT PREPARATION WAS GOING AHEAD IN THE US FOR THE 1971 BUDGET WHICH BEGINS JULY 1970, AND THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION OF HAVING A REDUCTION OF FORCES IN EUROPE IN THAT BUDGET. SECONDLY, THE SECRETARY HIMSELF AGREED THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT WANT A CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS THE REAL ISSUES SUCH AS REDUCTION OF FORCES IN EUROPE OR THE STATUS OF BERLIN OR GERMANY. THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT INTERESTED IN SECURITY AS SUCH, BUT IN TRADE AND IN PROPAGANDA. FOR THE US THE FORM OF ANY WESTERN DECLARATION, RESPONDING TO THE SOVIET ESC PROPOSAL WAS IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF THE IMPACT IT MIGHT HAVE IN ENCOURAGING PROPOSALS LIKE THOSE OF SENATOR MANSFIELD. THE FORM OF ANY SUCH DECLARATION SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO HELP US TO REINFORCE OUR COMMITMENT TO NATO.

POMPIDOU RESPONDED THAT THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE HAS AN INHERENT POPULARITY IN EUROPE BECAUSE IT PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE A DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. TODAY THE WORD "DIALOGUE" IS A MAGIC WORD. EVERYBODY WHO WANTS TO HAVE A DIALOGUE IS A GOOD GUY AND EVERYONE WHO DOESN'T IS A BAD GUY. THE SCANDINAVIANS AND GREAT BRITAIN WANT TO HAVE A DIALOGUE, BUT FRANCE

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HAD ALWAYS BEEN OPPOSED TO A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE, AS PROPOSED BY THE SOVIETS. THE FRENCH OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE AWAY FROM THE RUSSIANS ON THIS SUBJECT. THEREFORE THE FRENCH POSITION HAS BEEN TO DEMAND THAT THE SOVIET UNION ENGAGE IN PRELIMINARY AGREEMENTS IN ORDER TO STALL OFF OR POSTPONE THE BEGINNINGS OF SUCH A CONFERENCE. BUT IN POMPIDOU'S JUDGMENT THE OTHER COUNTRIES DO WANT SUCH A CONFERENCE AND WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO AVOID IT FOREVER.

SECRETARY ROGERS RESPONDED THAT WE SEE IT AS YOU DO AND THAT IS WHY HIS SPEECH IN BRUSSELS EMPHASIZED THAT WHAT THE RUSSIANS WANTED HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH SECURITY. IT WAS TRUE, HOWEVER, THAT GERMANY HAS SUBSTANTIAL REASONS FOR WANTING THE CONFERENCE BECAUSE, FIRST OF ALL, GERMANY IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE UN. SECONDLY, GERMANY NEEDS TO INCREASE ITS CONTACTS WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND THEREBY CREATE A CLIMATE WHICH WOULD DIMINISH TENSIONS BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST. BECAUSE OF OUR INSISTANCE ON THE CONFERENCE BEING A REAL SECURITY CONFERENCE OR NO CONFERENCE AT ALL, THE SECRETARY HAD NOTED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOW CHANGED THE NAME OF THE CONFERENCE-THEY NO LONGER TALK ABOUT SECURITY. POMPIDOU RESPONDED THAT ONE GAINS NOTHING BY YIELDING TO THE SOVIET UNION. HE WAS GLAD THAT THE US AND FRANCE HAD A COMMON POSITION ON THE ESC PROPOSAL.

THE SECRETARY THEN ASKED POMPIDOU WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION IN THEIR TALKS WITH THE FRENCH HAD INDICATED ANY DESIRE TO TALK ABOUT BERLIN. POMPIDOU SHRUGGED HIS SHOULDERS AND HESITATED. HE DIDN'T APPEAR TO KNOW EXACTLY WHAT HE WANTED TO SAY. THEN HE SAID THAT HE HAS IMPRESSION THAT USSR REALIZED THEIR AGENDA FOR PROPOSED ESC IS TOO EMPTY. THE RUSSIANS WON'T TALK WITH FRANCE OR THE USA ABOUT SECURITY AND IN FACT THE RUSIANS WANT ONLY TO HAVE TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO GERMANY'S TO GET RECOGNITION FOR EAST GERMANY. POMPIDOU NOTED THAT OUR NEWSPAPERS AND THE LONDON PRESS REACTED FAVORABLY TO THE ESC IDEA. POMPIDOU CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT POLAND AND ROMANIA WANT THE CONFERENCE BECAUSE THEY HAVE TO GIVE THEIR PEOPLE SOME HOPE FOR THE FUTURE. A CONFERENCE OF THIS TYPE WOULD HELP THEM, THE POLES AND ROMANIANS, TO GAIN A LITTLE BIT OF FREEDOM FROM DOMINATION BY THE SOVIETS. THEY HAVE NO ILLUSIONS, POMPIDOU SAID, ABOUT THE EXTENT OF ANY FREEDOM THEY MIGHT HOPE TO OBTAIN, BUT EVEN THE POSSIBLILITY OF A CONFERENCE DOES GIVE THEM SOME HOPE. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THAT ACTUALLY WAS THE ONLY JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CONFERENCE.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

#5988

WASHINGTON

SECRET / NODISINFORMATION

January 8, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *HS*

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Diplomacy on European Security

Our dealings with the USSR on European issues, at least in recent years, are not strictly speaking analogous to our talks with them on the Middle East or arms control questions. On these latter matters we have had sustained negotiations either culminating in an agreed document (arms control) or revolving around such a document (Middle East). Since 1959, we have not really had this type of negotiation on European matters.

Rather there have been a series of long-range artillery duels via public declarations (usually, though not exclusively, issued by our respective alliance groupings), interspersed with occasional, random and disjointed bilateral conversations at various levels.

We have, by and large, been scrupulous in not making ourselves the Western negotiating agent on Europe; even if we had wanted it otherwise, it is not now likely that our allies would let us. If, on the other hand, we wanted to begin dealing with the Soviets on European questions, without the blessing of the allies, the effect on NATO would almost certainly be chaotic. In this connection, it is of interest that Gromyko has now come forward with the suggestion to Ambassador Beam that there should be bilateral US-Soviet talks on a European security conference. Dobrynin's strongly reiterated insistence on a direct US reply to the Soviet demarche of November 19 is undoubtedly also related to this.

Diplomacy in this area has also been complicated by numerous side-shows -- not unnaturally, since the interests of a great number of states, East and West, are involved. A review of US and Soviet exchanges therefore does not provide a complete picture -- although it does provide the essence. The present paper does not attempt to include the mass of exchanges, public and private, among individual European states, nor our own occasional exchanges, notably with the Poles and Romanians who, while supporting Soviet and Warsaw Pact positions, do so for reasons and with accents of their own.

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It should also be noted that some US-Soviet negotiations while ostensibly or mainly on matters other than regional European ones, have profound impact on Europe. This was true of the test ban negotiations in several different ways, profoundly true of the NPT negotiations and will be even more true of SALT. We have not tried in the present paper to analyze these interrelationships.

Finally, European security, broadly construed, includes economic and technical matters, in addition to political and military ones. While these have not recently figured in US-Soviet exchanges, they have done so at various times in the past and they remain very prominent in intra-European contacts on East-West issues. (Eastern Europe's relationship to the European Communities is a problem complex of increasing weight if and as the Communities develop and may in the middle run outweigh most if not all the other East-West issues in Europe.) In any case, we do not get into this entire area in the present paper.

Basically, despite the huge volume of documents and the smaller, though considerable volume of private talk, the fact is that European issues have not been ripe for concrete negotiation between ourselves and the Soviets. Even today, with the volume of private talk picking up, the issues have been largely procedural: do we or do we not have a conference; how should it be prepared, etc. (For the Soviets, admittedly, this has substantive interest since the mere convening of a conference is of advantage to them.)

The one real substantive subject, that of our and Soviet troops, has not been talked about seriously since Khrushchev and LBJ exchanged pen-pal letters in 1964 (NOTE: this is not generally known), when we rejected the idea of mutual cuts. While Dobrynin has now responded to Elliot Richardson's prodding by indicating that the Soviets would give serious consideration to a NATO proposal, it is far from clear that serious US-Soviet negotiations on this matter will (or should) be undertaken.

Other potential negotiating issues relate to Germany. You will recall that the President in his letter to Kosygin last April offered bilateral soundings on Berlin, and the Soviets have shown some interest. But we are probably well out of the bilateral channel on this one since (a) the subject hardly promises to be productive for us and (b) we should do nothing to undermine allied cohesion on this subject.

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In sum, when all is said and done, direct US-Soviet negotiations on Europe which would in any sense be directed at changing the status quo would at present be either (a) artificial and contrived, or (b) not in our interest, or (c) not in the Soviet interest. At the same time, while the status quo is not all that bad right now for us, at least when compared to other status quos, it is not desirable, or feasible, to seek US-Soviet negotiations which would sanctify it. Of all the Western powers we should be the last one to underwrite Moscow's free hand in Eastern Europe (especially since we are in process of developing a special relationship with Romania); and we certainly have no interest in negotiating the disruption of the Western alliance with Moscow.

This would not rule out conversations with the Soviets to see what if anything of substance they want to talk to us about on Europe; but we should do so with the utmost caution and take meticulous care that the Allies are kept informed.

This paper includes the following parts:

Part I -- A resume of the issues that have figured in US-Soviet exchanges, public and private (Tab I)

Part II -- A chronology of major statements by both sides (Tab II)

Part III -- A comprehensive selection of documents (Tab III)

*held in
Washington*

Attachments:

As described.

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January 8, 1970

PART I: EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES

BACKGROUND

As a major East-West issue the concept of a security system for Europe dates to the immediate post-Stalin negotiations: the Berlin Foreign Ministers' Conference, the Geneva Summit, and the follow-on foreign ministers' meeting. The Soviet aim was to block German rearmament and entry into NATO. A fundamental issue posed by various Soviet proposals was whether a security system of some kind should be super-imposed on a divided Germany or whether the two issues had to proceed in some relationship. The Soviets naturally took the former approach, while the West throughout the 1950s generally argued that any security system would have to be accompanied by tangible progress toward German unification. The culmination of the Western approach was the peace plan introduced at the Geneva foreign ministers' meeting on Berlin in 1959.

Following the rearmament of Germany and the creation of the Warsaw Pact, Soviet proposals gradually evolved more toward limiting Western armaments (especially nuclear) or troop levels, and linking the German issue by various schemes to confirm the separate existence of the GDR.

There has been, however, a remarkable consistency to the Soviet position. For example, the draft Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration of July 1958 and the Bucharest Declaration of July 1966 are almost identical in certain passages. The main difference over the years has been the increasingly sharper focus on specifically German issues and the de-emphasis on military provisions. This evolution has in part reflected the changes in the FRG's Ostpolitik, and consequent Soviet concern to retain control over the response to Bonn in Eastern Europe. Thus, beginning in 1966, Soviet security proposals have been heavily weighted in favor of political measures to consolidate the status quo.

This has been especially true since the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Since then the proposal to dismantle the two Alliance systems has been dropped and little attention paid to troop reductions. Indeed, the current Soviet position is to resist the idea of balanced force reductions, which of course was originated by the Soviets in the 1950s in response to the original Eden plan.

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The locus of negotiations has shifted several times. In the 1950s the European issues were discussed primarily in the four-power context, at foreign ministers' meetings, or in bilateral exchanges between the United States and the USSR. In the early 1960s the main forum was the Geneva Disarmament Conference, where military security systems or partial measures were advanced by the Soviets, though the US rejected the introduction of European security per se.

After the fall of Khrushchev the specific proposals of a European conference was revived at the 23rd Soviet Party Congress in March 1966 and followed up in larger Communist multilateral meetings. A Warsaw Pact meeting in Bucharest in July 1966 established what still remains the basic catalogue. It was reconfirmed with some modifications at a meeting of European Communist Parties at Karlovy Vary in April 1967. After the interruption of Czechoslovakia, the Soviets returned to the European security question at a Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest (March 1969) which reconfirmed the Bucharest position. Most recently a Warsaw Pact meeting at Prague in October 1969 pared down the position to two specific proposals for renunciation of force and economic cooperation.

Since the US has not formally been included as a prospective participant in a European conference, there have been very few high level discussions on the issues. The US position has generally been incorporated in the NATO responses. The main ones have been the Harmel Report of 1967, the more specific proposals of the Reykjavik meeting in June 1968, and the current positions of last April and December.

MAIN ISSUES

I. GERMANY AND RELATED QUESTIONS

Borders

The Soviets in all three recent declarations have insisted that recognition of existing frontiers as "immutable" is a basic demand; they have always spelled out the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and the border between East and West Germany.

The US has maintained for years that frontier questions must await a final German peace settlement though we have made it clear that we would support the Oder-Neisse line.

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The Germans have taken a roughly similar position. It appears, however, that Brandt is prepared to accept the Oder-Neisse line via the route of renunciation of the use of force to change any of Germany's borders. In the most recent exchange, the Soviets have proposed that Bonn renounce any means of revising frontiers.

The Poles have always insisted on the acceptance of this border; the Gomulka position of May 1969 hinted that formal legal recognition might be negotiable, but at the same time he proposed a treaty between Bonn and Warsaw similar to the Goerlitz Treaty between the GDR and Poland.

GDR Recognition

The consistent Soviet proposal has been for recognition of the existence of two German states and the renunciation by Bonn of any claim to represent all of Germany; the hard version of this stand is the Ulbricht demand that relations be established through an internationally valid treaty; the soft version is that relations be based on equality.

The older position taken by Bonn was that legal recognition was impossible; now this is being softened somewhat, under the rubric of an inner-German modus vivendi.

The NATO Declaration in December 1969 acknowledged that "the proposals of the Federal Republic for a modus vivendi between the two parts of Germany and for bilateral exchange of declaration on the non-use of force, if they receive a positive response, could substantially facilitate cooperation between East and West on other problems."

West Berlin

While Berlin was not mentioned in the Bucharest Declaration of 1966, it was added in 1967 and in 1969. The position is that West Germany must renounce any claims to West Berlin, which the Soviets define as an independent political entity. In 1967, the Soviets called for normalization of relations between West Berlin and the GDR. In 1969 (Budapest) it was merely described as a separate political entity.

Currently, the Soviets claim that the question of Berlin should not be introduced at a European conference, or any other German issues per se. Dobrynin claimed to Rogers that this would torpedo the conference.

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Since mid-1959, we have generally treated Berlin separately and as an issue on which progress should be made as a step toward European security. The current position is that the four-power discussion on improving the situation in Berlin will provide a test of Soviet willingness to demonstrate progress on concrete issues.

The issue is somewhat confused by Bonn's willingness to reduce its activities in West Berlin in return for improvement in the city's situation -- mainly contacts with the outside including the GDR.

The Soviets hinted in their most recent demarche to Bonn in January 1970 that West German activities should be reduced first, if the four-power talks are to succeed.

Munich Agreement

The Soviet position has been that the agreement was invalid from its inception and West Germany must acknowledge it as such.

The Germans have declared they regard it as invalid, but not from its beginning; they propose to discuss this with the Czechs.

As non-signatory to Munich, we have no legal position; the British and French, however, have not accepted the Soviet interpretation.

German Access to Nuclear Weapons

The age-old Soviet position is that Bonn must be prohibited from possession or access to nuclear weapons in any form.

Our position has been that the London-Paris agreements effectively accomplish this; moreover, the non-proliferation treaty reinforces the prohibitions on Germany.

In 1967 the Soviets acknowledged that German ratification of the NPT might remove this issue, but in current exchanges still raise the question of access to nuclear weapons.

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II. POLITICAL AGREEMENTS

Dissolution of the NATO and Warsaw Pacts

Prior to Czechoslovakia, the Soviets consistently included this in a list of proposals; a variant was that if the Alliances continue, the military organizations be disbanded.

The West has generally responded that NATO is defensive, etc.

Renunciation of Use of Force

Using almost identical language the Soviets have proposed multilateral treaties renouncing the use or threat of force; sometimes combining it with a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. These formulations go back to 1955.

The Soviet Warsaw Pact countries have circulated a formal proposal in the form of a draft treaty adopted at Prague at the Warsaw Pact meeting of October 31, 1969, with the following operative provision:

"[The parties] solemnly declare on behalf of their states and nations that in their mutual relations they shall renounce the use of force or the threat of its use; that in settlement of any dispute and disagreement among them exclusively peaceful means shall be used.

Declare that they shall recognize and unconditionally respect the territorial integrity of all European States within their existing borders.

In no case shall this apply to the obligations that the states-participants of the all-European conference had undertaken in virtue of valid bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements."

With the advent of the Grand Coalition, Bonn has found this concept of renunciation of force a device to circumvent border and recognition questions; bilateral negotiations began in 1966 and continued to the eve of the Czech invasion; they resumed more or less in 1969 and began formally on December 8 in Moscow; the contest thus far seems to be a repetition of the previous exchanges; the Soviets seeking to confirm

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that similar treaties will be negotiated with all other socialist countries including the GDR, and using the renunciation clause to confirm European frontiers; the Soviets are also refusing to give up their interpretation of Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, which they interpret as confirming certain residual post-war rights of intervention in Germany. (An outstanding aspect of non-use of force is how the Western Powers could reply to non-forcible harassment or challenge in Berlin.)

III. PARTIAL ARMS CONTROL DISARMAMENT

The Soviet catalogue in recent years has included with general consistency the following:

- liquidation of foreign military bases
- withdrawal of foreign troops to within national frontiers
- reductions of an agreed number and according to agreed schedule of armed forces of two German states
- creation of de-nuclearized zones (Central Europe, Balkans, Mediterranean, Northern Europe)
- pledges not to use nuclear weapons against such zones
- cessation of flight of nuclear-armed aircraft over European states
- prohibition of entry of nuclear submarines in European ports
- zones of frozen or thinned-out armaments

While many of these proposals have also been ventilated in Disarmament Conferences, they have also been included as European security measures. Some of them have faded from prominence. The Budapest (1969) declaration, though confirming the Bucharest statement of 1966, which included all of the measures listed above, did not repeat the litany.

The general Western response, in the current phase, has been to develop a counter-list of partial measures many of which were originally proposed by the USSR and then abandoned.

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NSC: PRESIDENT'S TRIP PLANS
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-- Observers at maneuvers; proposed by the USSR in 1965, discussed in NATO and rejected as impractical mainly because of German recognition problems; now revived on the NATO list, and mentioned in the NATO Declaration on European Security (December 5).

-- Observation posts; one of the oldest schemes introduced in May 1955 by the Soviets; US tabled a plan in 1962 and the UK in 1964, but the Soviets refused to consider it in isolation.

-- Elimination of restrictions on movement of Military Liaison Missions in Germany; considered in current NATO studies, but not formally broached to the USSR.

-- Advance notification of military maneuvers.

-- Prohibition of maneuvers on borders; introduced by US in ENDC in 1962.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

In the 1950s the Soviets proposed a one-third cut in occupation troops in Germany to be followed by further cutbacks; again in 1961 the Soviets proposed a one-third cutback or other acceptable proportions with the necessary control. In 1963 Khrushchey claimed that a cut could be carried out without disturbing the balance of forces; he later suggested a policy of mutual example in making cuts. (There was a K-LBJ pen-pal exchange in early 1964 on this subject in which we took a negative position.)

In 1966 President Johnson said that if "changing circumstances should lead to a gradual and balanced revision in force levels on both sides, the revision could help gradually to shape a new political environment."

In June 1967 the NATO Ministerial Meeting decided that if conditions permitted, "a balanced reduction of forces between East and West could be a significant step toward security in Europe."

In early 1968 the US proposed to the NATO disarmament experts and NAC agreed to study balanced force reductions by constructing and analyzing models. The NATO Military Authorities subsequently commented that

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the six models actually prepared were unfeasible and militarily disadvantageous to NATO. Another procedure -- the study of models by expert subgroups -- was established to develop guidelines.

In June 1968, NATO adopted a position that "it was desirable that a process leading to mutual force reductions should be initiated."

After the Czech invasion, the NATO meeting admitted that the "prospects for mutual and balanced force reductions have suffered a severe setback," but asserted that the Allies should continue their studies. This decision was confirmed in the April 1969 NATO Communique which stated that the Allies would pursue their efforts and studies in the fields of disarmament and arms control, including Balanced Force Reduction.

In the interim, the US chose to push this as a principal negotiating item.

IV. CONFERENCE MODALITIES

The original Soviet proposals, in February 1954, relegated the US to the status of an observer. Subsequently, however, the Soviets addressed numerous proposals and plans directly to the US. When Rapacki raised the issue of a conference in late 1964, he specified that the US should take part (as the Poles have consistently done since), but at the Bucharest Warsaw Pact meeting the Soviets returned to the idea of an all-European meeting, leaving open the question of US participation. In response to prodding by NATO members as well as the US, the Soviets came up with a formula this year, that the US and Canada could participate on the understanding that both Germanies would participate on an equal basis. This was the content of Dobrynin's aide memoire to Rogers.

In all the proposals of recent years, the actual call for a conference has usually been accompanied by a proposal that preparations should start between interested parties. The Budapest formula (March 1969) is that there should be an "early meeting between officials of all interested European states at which they could jointly fix the procedures for convening the all-European conference and define questions to be placed on the agenda."

In May the Finnish Government circulated notes stating its willingness to host a conference. The Warsaw Pact naturally responded favorably

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to this initiative. And in the October 31 meeting in Prague, they proposed an agenda and suggested discussing it in bilateral and multilateral meetings. They also indicated readiness to "examine any other proposals which serve the preparation for and the success of the all-European conference."

Dobrynin's conversation with Rogers (November 19) however, was a departure in that he directly solicited American views on the conference and the agenda, in effect proposing bilateral talks. This was followed up in Gromyko's conversation with Beam on January 7, 1970.

The standard Western response has usually included several stipulations: that a conference be well-prepared in advance, that it concentrate on concrete issues susceptible to early resolution, and that preparations could be pursued through multilateral or bilateral channels.

Since European security has been so closely bound to the German and Berlin issues, in effect, our response has been that there must be some indication of progress on these issues before a full-fledged conference could be contemplated. At the same time, we have become nervous over bilateral conversations between the Germans and the Soviets, and reserved in our talks over Berlin, since there is little for us to negotiate. Thus, we seem to be in a somewhat inconsistent position.

As already noted European security issues are in large measure synonymous with German and Berlin issues, so that if there were in fact significant success on these issues, the need for a formal conference would recede.

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January 8, 1970

PART II: CHRONOLOGY OF SOVIET/WARSAW PACT AND WESTERN STATEMENTS

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BOX 667 FOLDER 3

Soviet/Warsaw Pact

US/NATO

March, 1966 - Brezhnev speech to 23rd Party Congress declared Soviet interest in strengthening European security. In effect a reply to Bonn's peace note of March 25, and prelude to exchange with Bonn and new campaign on European security. (Tab A)

June, 1966 - DeGaulle visit to USSR; Franco-Soviet agreement that the "problems of Europe should be considered first of all in a European framework."

June, 1966 - Secretary McNamara statement that the time might be ripe to consider a reciprocal reduction of forces in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

July, 1966 - Declaration on European security by Warsaw Pact (Bucharest) listed a seven-point program for European security and called for convocation of an all-European conference to discuss question of ensuring security in Europe and establishing all-European cooperation. (Tab B)

October, 1966 - President Johnson speech on "bridge-building."

December, 1966 - Statement by Chancellor Kiesinger renewing offer to conclude renunciation of force agreement.

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Soviet/Warsaw PactUS/NATO

January, 1967 - Soviet note to Britain, France, US denouncing Bonn and reminding Allies of responsibility under Potsdam for preventing German resurgence.

April, 1967 - Statement on European security by European Communist Parties, at the conference in Karlovy Vary generally reaffirmed the position of the Bucharest Declaration (Tab C)

September, 1967 - Gromyko at UNGA observes possibility for security in Europe cites growing tendencies toward a detente in relations on Continent. Calls for abolition of NATO and Warsaw Pact; denounces Bonn for refusing to recognize borders and two Germanies, to renounce Munich agreement, or claims to West Berlin.

September, 1967 - Letter from Stoph to Kiesinger and GDR draft treaty on establishing normal relations. (Tab D)

November, 1967 - Soviet memorandum to Bonn enclosing draft of a declaration on renunciation of force, recognition of existing borders and respect of special political entity of West Berlin. (Tab E)

December, 1967 - Harmel Report, on Future Tasks of the Alliance -- the ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security measures... Allies resolved to direct their energies to this purpose by realistic measures designed to further detente in East-West relations. (Tab F)

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Soviet/Warsaw Pact

US/NATO

January, 1968 - Soviet aide memoire to Bonn protesting German lack of seriousness in supressing neo-Nazis.

February, 1968 - Soviet Government statement protesting same position.

June, 1968 - NAC Ministerial Meeting Reykjavik; specific endorsement of balanced force reductions. (Tab G)

July, 1968 - Agreement on NPT.

July, 1968 - Breakdown of Soviet-West German talks, 5-12 July.

August, 1968 - Czech invasion.

November, 1968 - NATO Ministerial Meeting Brussels denouncing Czech invasion and noting that Soviet actions had "seriously set back hopes of settling the outstanding problems which divide Europe;" "scope and level of Allied contacts with five Warsaw Pact countries have had to be reduced." (Tab H)

February, 1969 - First conversation between President and Dobrynin; European security not touched on, as such; general discussion of era of negotiation and question of linkage. (Tab I)

March 17, 1969 - Budapest meeting of Warsaw Pact, shorter version of 1966 declaration but reconfirming it; call for European Conference. (Tab J)

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Soviet/Warsaw PactUS/NATO

March 26, 1969 - Letter from President to Kosygin delivered by Ambassador Beam on April 22, 1969. (Tab K)

April 4, 1969 - Dobrynin conversation with Richardson suggesting bilateral exchange of views on European security questions. (Tab L)

April 11, 1969 - NATO Ministerial Communique, Washington, noting Soviet proposals for conference; stating that negotiations must be well prepared in advance, concrete measures for improving the situation in Berlin would be substantial contribution toward peaceful European settlement. (Tab M)

April 22, 1969 - Beam/Kosygin conversation; Kosygin touches on Europe; USSR seeks to avoid tension but not tolerate any revision of results of WW II. (Tab N)

May 27, 1969 - Kosygin reply to President's letter; does not object to exchange of views on Berlin; relations with other countries and USSR cannot develop independently of Bonn's foreign policy course; this course still based on conditions which contradict aims of strengthening European security. (Tab O)

June, 1969 - International Communist meeting; Brezhnev calls for European security and for first time mentions

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Soviet/Warsaw PactUS/NATO

system of collective security in Asia; final document of meeting includes long statement on European security noting Bucharest, Budapest and Karlovy Vary statements. (Tab P)

July, 1969 - Gromyko speech calling for Berlin negotiations, endorsing European conference and Bucharest Declaration, and desire for friendly relations with US. (Tab Q)

September, 1969 - Gromyko UN speech on stability of borders as indispensable condition for peace; readiness to improve relations with Bonn. (Tab R)

September 22, 1969 - Conversation between Secretary Rogers and Gromyko, only European item was discussion on Berlin based on Gromyko inquiry whether we intended to pursue in bilateral or four-power framework. (Tab S)

October 20, 1969 - Conversation between President and Dobrynin; latter read statement dealing in part with NATO, Berlin. (Tab T)

October 28, 1969 - Conversation between Ambassador Stoessel and Vice Foreign Minister Winiewicz. Polish view of three-part agreement: (1) borders and renunciation of force, (2) regional disarmament, and (3) economic cooperation; conference to convene by mid or late 1970. (Tab U)

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Soviet/Warsaw PactUS/NATO

October 31, 1961 - Prague meeting of Warsaw Pact, proposing agenda of two items; (1) creation of security in Europe, renunciation of the use of force; (2) widening commercial, economic, technical and scientific relations; conference to be held in first half 1970. (Tab V)

November 4-5, 1969 - Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting; remarks by Elliot Richardson to the effect that balanced force reductions and declaration of principles were two items warranting further consideration; in separate conversations with Allies he advocated negotiations on force reductions as parallel effort to SALT. (Tab W)

November 11, 1969 - Dobrynin conversation with Hillenbrand, who said American-Canadian participation in conference presents no problem. (Tab X)

November 17, 1969 - Polish Ambassador called on Hillenbrand to hand over Prague Declaration, plus outline of proposed Polish paper on European security. (Tab Y. See Tab V)

November 19, 1969 - Dobrynin-Rogers conversation; Dobrynin handed over aide memoire calling for conference and proposing two-point Prague agenda, asked for US views. (Tab Z)

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Soviet/Warsaw Pact

US/NATO

November-December 1969 - Various Gromyko remarks to Westerners on conference, especially negative view on including German question or balanced force reductions. (Tab AA)

December 4, 1969 - Statement by leaders of Warsaw Pact on relations with Germany. (Tab BB)

December 5, 1969 - NATO Declaration on European Security. (Tab CC)

December 6, 1969 - Speech by Secretary Rogers in Brussels; "areas for Soviets to show interest in constructive negotiations" are (1) improve situation in Berlin, (2) response to Bonn's plan for inner-German modus vivendi and renunciation of force agreements, and (3) positive response to repeated proposals for mutual and balanced force reduction. " (Tab DD)

December 8, 1969 - Beginning of German-Soviet negotiations in Moscow.

December 21, 1969 - GDR Draft Treaty on establishing relations with Bonn. (Tab EE)

December 30, 1969 - Richardson/Dobrynin meeting; the latter complained of no response to aide memoire of November 19 given the Secretary; Richardson said earliest proposal on balanced force reduction would be after June meeting;

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Soviet/Warsaw Pact

US/NATO

he indicated we raised the matter now to indicate great seriousness of our approach. USSR would reply to specific proposal but objected to force reductions as counter-proposal to European security conference. (Tab FF)

January 7, 1970 - Gromyko conversation with Ambassador Beam, complaining of US opposition to conference and desire to introduce old issues to prevent positive results. (Tab GG)

January 7, 1970 - British proposals to US for establishing Standing Committee on East-West Relations (SCEWR). (Tab HH)

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By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

ACTION

March 25, 1970

RECORDED DATA

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NIXON MATERIAL
NSC INSTITUTIONAL (H) FILES
BOX H-166 FOLDER NSSM 83 [1 of 4]

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: NSSM-83, European Security--May NATO Ministerial Meeting

Though the Review Group on this study is, unfortunately, several weeks away, I thought you might want to familiarize yourself with this study. The attached package includes an analytical summary (Tab A), the study and its summary (Tab B), a box score done by State of the various Western ideas that have been floating around (Tab C), plus a copy of an earlier memo on German views which are becoming of special importance (Tab D).

As a basic examination of policy options, the paper itself suffers from several defects. It does not present an in-depth discussion of the broad concepts of European Security and how they might be achieved. Nor does it take up the German and Berlin issues. It also does not go into the problems of conducting a strategy review, on the one hand, and conducting an active (or passive) European Security policy, on the other.

Thus, the study is largely a tactical-procedural paper. Nevertheless, the tactical issues have become quite important. This study is probably the only way to get an NSC framework for and some Presidential control over the decisions that will be made in NATO in May on a European conference and a proposal on balanced force reductions. You will recall that Brosio mentioned to you how important it was for the other Allies to know the US position well before May.

As it now stands, the schedule does not permit an NSC before early May. Thus, some policy will again be made by cables. Since Secretary Rogers will be personally involved in the Rome meeting, an NSC meeting would be the proper vehicle to involve the President. If it slips beyond the first week in May, I see no way to intervene in the dialogue between Brussels and the Department, which by then will be fairly frantic in any case.

One alternative might be to squeeze in a Review Group meeting and send an agreed memo to the President concentrating on the question of a conference and balanced force reductions, with some expanded argumentation and background.

Whatever you decide, it seems to me that these will be the issues to lift out of the paper and present to the NSC or the President:

1. Do we still want to try to impose certain preconditions to any multilateral conference:

--if so, on what issues should we insist on progress: Berlin, Bonn's negotiations?

--is there any action on our part called for?

2. Is it in our interest to allow balanced force reductions to become the central negotiating issue, assuming the Soviets can be brought around?

--if not, how do we defuse it without causing a great conflict with the Allies?

--if we do want to move forward, is it for psychological reasons (i. e., to provide excuses not to make unilateral cuts) or for serious purposes; the difference would matter in developing a negotiating stance.

We will be in a somewhat better position after the military analysis of balanced force reduction models by the Military Committee is finished on April 20. But it seems likely that we will face a State-Defense split with State wanting to move ahead for political reasons and Defense rejecting any BFR proposals that might be negotiable. This is another, and perhaps the most important reason for putting the issues under Presidential aegis.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you consider speeding up RG consideration of this paper.

Approve HK Disapprove _____ Yes _____ No _____

Other _____

2. That you consider requesting State to forward promptly a supplementary paper on the issues to be resolved before the May NATO Ministerial meeting.

Approve HK Disapprove _____ Other _____ SECRET

*State (Jim Cannon)
3/31
wifoned
JWD*

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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NSSM-83

CURRENT ISSUES OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

Introduction

As the 1970's begin and memories of the invasion of Czechoslovakia recede, both halves of divided Europe increasingly are inclined to pursue a more active dialogue that could lead to reduced tensions. But there are as yet few hard indications the Soviets would agree to proposals acceptably settling the central issues of European security. They still seek to consolidate and obtain recognition of their substantial political and security gains from World War II. We and our Allies do not want to ratify the present bisection of the continent or permanent Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.

Relations today, then, are at an uncertain half-way point in which neither side probably feels as threatened by the other as in the past, but in which there is no clear path for the future. Thus, negotiations for the near future, as for the past, are likely to center on discrete, and well-defined subjects essentially peripheral to the basic political and security problems of Europe.

The ensuing paper focuses principally on available options on major current issues related to East-West discussions on European security and cooperation. It also sketches relevant past East-West efforts to negotiate; Eastern and Western approaches to European security; and the German and Berlin issues.

I. The Setting

A. Antecedents to Today's Negotiating Situation

Current cautious probes and limited agendas on European security problems are pale shadows of proposals in the 1950's for sweeping "plans", Four-Power summit meetings and ministerial conferences -- frequently played out in a context of crisis.

Many of these proposals were either unrealistic in ignoring the questions of Germany and Berlin, or else included propositions unacceptably undercutting opposing positions on the future of Germany. Although they led to little substantive agreement, they probably contributed to the transition toward recent less abrasive exchanges, and also generated among the Allies an attitude of

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STUDY MEMORANDUMS (1969-1974)
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By KW NARA, Date 2-17-03

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reserve to proposals for high-level East-West conferences that stimulated public expectations but led to little or no agreement.

B. Current Soviet/Eastern European Approaches to European Security

1. Soviet

The major thrust of Moscow's current European policy is not only to stabilize the present territorial and political arrangements in Europe by persuading the West Europeans, and hopefully the US, to endorse them, but also to promote in Western Europe a feeling of diminished threat and consequent relaxation of defense efforts, including diminished solidarity of action between Western Europe and the US. The principal recent vehicle for this is the Warsaw Pact proposal for a European Security Conference (ESC), suggested earlier by the Soviets in 1954, and reiterated in 1966 and 1967. In contrast to earlier appeals, however, the Warsaw Pact countries have vigorously pursued ESC in the Budapest Declaration of 1959 and subsequent statements, which have been largely non-polemical and devoid of specific unacceptable preconditions. In October 1969, the Warsaw Pact for the first time proposed a formal ESC agenda: mutual renunciation of force and increased economic and technological contacts. The Soviets also have made clear that an ESC should not deal with such difficult problems as Germany and Berlin and disarmament. Moreover, they have indicated that they would have no objection to our attending, while East German participation would be expected.

Soviet objectives in pursuing the conference idea are not difficult to discern: They seek to

- foster a letting down of the guard and divergencies between the US and its Allies;
- stabilize relations with the West, so as to have a freer hand in dealing with Sino-Soviet problems;
- achieve greater access to Western technology; and
- in the process of all this to acquire Western acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the Soviet preserve in Eastern Europe.

2. East European

Fed by a resurgent nationalism, the East Europeans look upon the conference idea as a way to promote their own individual national interests, including a freer hand in internal and external affairs.

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C. Current Western Approaches to European Security

1. US Goals

US security is bound to that of Europe. With 300 million people, a gross national product in excess of \$600 billion, and industrial output constituting about one-fourth of the world's total, Western Europe is an area of vital interest to the US, reinforced by myriad other bonds. Our long-range security goals remain:

- A stable and peaceful situation effectively guaranteeing the independence and sovereignty of all European states, based upon a military equilibrium sufficient to ensure that this settlement is on terms satisfactory to the US and its Allies.
- A strengthened, prosperous and cohesive Western Europe able to bear its full responsibilities for the preservation of peace and stability.
- The resolution of the German question.
- Peaceful and constructive US relations with the USSR and the other countries of Eastern Europe.
- Diminution of Soviet control in Eastern Europe and the gradual liberalization of Communist regimes.

2. Tripartite and FRG Approaches to the Problems of Germany and Berlin

The German question and the status of Berlin lie at the heart of European security. Movement to resolve these questions on terms acceptable to the West has depended largely upon the willingness of the Soviet Union, East Germany and, to a lesser extent, Poland and Czechoslovakia. However, there are few signs the Eastern countries are willing to make serious adjustments.

The recent Tripartite Allied (US, UK, France) proposal to the Soviet Union for talks on the Berlin situation assumes that the Soviets might agree to modest improvements in the restoration of communications within Berlin and movement of persons and goods.

The FRG is also engaged in complex and inter-related bilateral negotiations with Eastern states: USSR (non-use of force); East Germany (transport and postal matters); Poland (involving possible West German recognition in some form of the Oder-Neisse line).

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This German policy contains few risks for the West and even the achievement of limited successes would be in our interest. The danger of a substantial weakening of FRG ties with the West as it seeks to improve its relations with the East seems remote, and we have given full public support to Bonn's Eastern policies. We and our Allies will follow closely the new FRG policy towards the East as developments unfold.

3. Other Western and Neutral Initiatives

As the most active advocate since 1966 of "detente, entente and cooperation", the French have placed heavy emphasis on a policy of abolition of blocs and on bilateralism in dealing with the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries.

While East-West bilateral discussions on economic, technical and cultural exchanges continue on a broad scale, apart from West Germany and France, the other European Allies have not yet entered into negotiation with the USSR or other East European states on political matters.

The Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium have, however, sought to reduce tensions by participating in the Group of Ten (which also comprises Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Yugoslavia). The Soviets do not favor activity by this Group.

The European Neutrals, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, have all welcomed the ESC proposal. The Finns, for example, have offered Helsinki as the site for an ESC.

4. NATO Initiatives

Since 1967, NATO has become increasingly engaged in consultations relating to European security. In response to the Warsaw Pact's 1969 call for an ESC, the NATO Ministers called for a list of specific subjects for possible negotiations with the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe.

The culmination of the ensuing study of issues was the affirmation in December 1969 of the Allies' interest in:

- Mutual and balanced force reductions, and further study of other arms control measures.
- Responses from the East to FRG bilateral and tri-lateral efforts on Germany and Berlin; and
- Economic, technological and cultural exchanges, and in cooperation in environmental and oceanographic activities.

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On procedures for negotiations, the Ministers stated that progress in bilateral and multilateral contacts on some of the fundamental issues of European security would help to insure the success of any eventual European Security Conference.

II. The Issues

Bearing in mind the considerations related to US policy in Europe and the preliminary discussion of some key issues considered January 28 by the NSC 1/, this section summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of specific options related to issues to be considered at the May 1970 NATO Ministerial Meeting.

A. Basic US Approach to Resolution of East-West Issues

1. The Issue: The root question is whether to (a) seek a settlement based on US-USSR agreement, not in consultation with our Allies; (b) preserve the existing situation in Europe, but not actively seek a resolution of the central issues; (c) seek a comprehensive settlement; or (d) maintain the present approach: making progress on concrete issues where possible.

2. Options for the US:

Option (1): Negotiate a settlement directly with the Soviets, not in consultation with our Allies.

Advantages: Provided the Soviets were prepared to negotiate seriously, this approach could facilitate agreement since we would not necessarily be inhibited by Allied views.

Disadvantages: Would appear to our Allies to be dealing over their heads, in condominium fashion, with issues related to their national security interests. Moreover, it would undercut consultation in NATO, thus weakening Alliance ties, and would appear to the East Europeans also as conceding Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.

Option (2): Conserve the present balance and territorial division, and not actively seek a resolution of the issues dividing Europe while conceivably eventually agreeing to ratifying the current situation in a treaty of the Locarno type.

Advantages: Acceptance of the status quo in these terms could reduce points of possible future East-West friction, encourage a larger role by the Europeans in their own affairs, and lead to reduced US military budget outlays in Europe.

1/ Memorandum from Mr. Kissinger dated January 26, 1970, attaching Background Paper on Europe.

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Disadvantages: Would nourish a tendency toward neutralism by some of our Allies, encourage Warsaw Pact military adventures, and lead to a reduction in US security as a result of diminished US influence over developments affecting Europe.

Option (3): Adopt a leadership role in pursuit of a resolution of issues dividing Eastern and Western Europe, looking toward a comprehensive settlement with elements of the Western Peace Plan (Herter Plan) 1/ of 1959, and involving appropriate consultation in NATO and among the Four-Powers. 2/

Advantages: Provided it were the venue for Allied consultation, NATO would be sustained as an instrument of Allied cooperation, with attendant advantages in deterrence, military burden-sharing and political solidarity. Moreover, it would support FRG and Tripartite efforts, and would maintain pressures on the USSR to make progress toward reduced East-West tensions.

Disadvantages: Most Allies would view the effort as premature, since Allied agreement on negotiating positions would be difficult to achieve. In addition, negotiations on a plan acceptable to the US would likely not succeed.

- 1/ The Western Peace Plan, discussed at the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting May-August 1959, combined German reunification, a peace treaty, European security and disarmament in the following four stages: I - Reunification of Berlin by free elections; II - Establishment of a Mixed German Commission to expand contacts between the two parts of Germany, and US-USSR agreement to reduce their forces; III - All-German elections to establish an all-German Government, and IV - A final peace settlement. The Soviets objected to linking the German problem with disarmament and espoused a GDR proposal for a "Confederation" of the two Germanies.
- 2/ The Four Powers (US, UK, France and the USSR) assumed certain post-war responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole as a result of agreements stemming from World War II.

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Option (4): Continue pragmatic efforts along present lines to make bilateral and multilateral progress on concrete issues where and when possible.

Advantages: By dealing individually and flexibly with issues, it allows them to be shaped to probe Soviet intentions, to advance our interests in Eastern Europe, and to take advantage of openings for genuine, if perhaps unspectacular progress on European security issues with the USSR, without necessarily linking negotiations, or involving euphoria in Allied countries.

Disadvantages: Thus far, this approach has had limited appeal to West European public opinion, and thus adds to domestic political difficulties of some Allied leaders.

B. Basic US Approach to a European Security Conference

1. Issue:

The Soviets have proposed a European Security Conference on five occasions, including three in 1969. The Allies earlier had written off the proposal as largely a propaganda gambit. Moreover, were it held on Soviet terms an ESC would enhance the legitimacy of the GDR, and of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Persistent advocacy by the Warsaw Pact combined with the interest of some Allied leaders in being visibly engaged in East-West discussions had added an aura of responsibility to the ESC proposal.

The current US and Allied posture toward an ESC is reflected as follows in the December 1969 Ministerial Declaration: We would favor a carefully prepared ESC which deals with meaningful issues, and includes US and Canadian participation. At the May 1970 NATO Ministerial Meeting, however, possible revision of the Allied stance on an ESC promises to be an issue.

Any possible benefits for the US in a conference would largely depend upon (a) the price which the Soviets would be willing to pay to have an ESC convened, and (b) the outcome of any actual conference in terms of real gains in resolving outstanding problems of security and cooperation.

2. Options for the US:

Option (1): Continue present US policy, retaining ESC as long-term objective.

Advantages: Given Soviet intransigence on central issues, this approach would practically insure against an early ESC, and its attendant risks of appearing to endorse the division of Germany and Europe, enhancing the status of the GDR and arousing Western public expectations detrimental to national defense efforts. This approach is supported by the FRG, among others.

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Disadvantages: Would be unsatisfactory to those Allies favoring a more forthcoming approach. Also, it provides the Soviets with a pretext for insisting that the Western states -- particularly the US -- perpetuate the Cold War, and give the Soviets a further basis for holding other Eastern Europeans in line.

Option (2): Accept the view that some progress in East-West negotiations and inscription of one or more "concrete" security issues on the agenda represent a sufficient precondition for the convening of an ESC.

Advantages: By making the ESC appear to be a nearer-term prospect, it would stimulate other countries to bear down on the Soviets to meet the Western desire for prior progress on fundamental issues, and hold out to the smaller Western Allies the prospect of a role in East-West negotiations, while creating more maneuver-room for the Eastern Europeans.

Disadvantages: It might lead the USSR and its Allies to make only temporary concessions as bait for an earlier ESC, creating as well unwarranted optimism in the West.

Option (3): Short-term prospect: Agree to an early conference, including the US, to discuss issues not central to European security.

Advantages: It would permit leaders of some of the smaller Western Allies to be seen actively engaged in East-West negotiations, and begin a process of negotiation which might evolve into progress on larger questions. Moreover, it would afford the East Europeans an additional chance of contact with the West, and could lead to projects which would encourage a feeling in Eastern Europe of being part of a larger European community.

Disadvantages: The mere convening of such a conference, even if it were to fail, would give the Soviets a propaganda gain without any corresponding real improvement in European security, while stimulating Western public euphoria--and consequent decreases in defense efforts, appearing to acquiesce in Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, and enhancing the GDR's status

Option (4): Indicate to our Allies that we do not object to an early ESC, but that the US will not take part.

Advantages: It would obviate accusations the US was the prime factor in Allied resistance to an ESC, would allow West European leaders to play leading roles,

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and might encourage better relations between Western and Eastern European states.

Disadvantages: The Allies, without US leadership, would be easily divided, and would be negotiating from a position of weakness and uncertainty. Our refusal to participate also might be construed as representing a diminished US commitment to Western Europe.

C. Basic US Approach to Negotiating Modalities Other than a European Security Conference

1. Issue:

Other procedural substitutes for or complements to an ESC have been proposed for advancing an East-West dialogue, and will be under discussion in NATO in the period before the May 1970 Ministerial Meeting.

2. Options for the US:

Option (1): Standing Commission on East-West Relations (SCEWR) comprising representatives of both sides and the European neutrals. Proposed by the UK in NATO (and separately by the Romanians and Poles), SCEWR is viewed by the UK mainly as a propaganda counter-plot to ESC. It is opposed by the FRG and France.

Advantages: It would probably receive public support without necessarily creating unwarranted expectations, and could provide a continuing, relatively private forum for East-West discussions of security and cooperation.

Disadvantages: GDR participation, as in an ESC, could create difficulties. Moreover, there has not yet been sufficient progress elsewhere on East-West issues to give meaningful work to such a Commission.

Option (2): Encourage greater use of the Group of Ten. This informal grouping of small European countries (three NATO members, three Warsaw Pact members, and four others) usually meets during sessions of UNGA. The Soviets do not favor an active role for it.

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Advantages: It would provide some smaller European Allies with opportunities to be seen engaged actively in discussing problems of East-West cooperation.

Disadvantages: It would add a superfluous multilateral forum, and absence of the two super-powers and key European states like the UK, the FRG and France would limit its utility.

Option (3): Continue present ad hoc utilization of various appropriate fora.

Advantages: This would likely avoid an ESC, and its attendant risks. Moreover, it offers flexibility in pursuing pragmatic progress on specific issues.

Disadvantages: It does not provide an adequate psychological counter to the public appeal of the Warsaw Pact ESC proposal, and gives the impression NATO is dragging its feet in the search for relaxation of East-West tensions. Moreover, there is no existing forum which is currently suitable for negotiations on mutual force reductions or other European arms control measures.

D. Issues for Possible East-West Negotiation: The following have been identified by the Allies:

1. Mutual East-West Force Reduction Balanced in Scope and Timing (MBFR).

(a) The Issue

(1) Background: In November 1968, April 1969 and December 1969, NATO Ministers reaffirmed the June 1968 Reykjavik Declaration which called for NATO studies on MBFR. In December 1969, Ministers also asked the Council to report as soon as possible on the preparation of illustrative models for MBFR. The purpose of the study of the models is to permit a more detailed analysis both of the adequacy of the NATO MBFR guidelines and of the feasibility, verifiability, advantages and disadvantages of those specific MBFR models being prepared for consideration by Ministers in May.

Political and Military Implications: Decisions on the future direction of MBFR should await the outcome of the NATO studies currently underway. But two generalizations about mutual and balanced force reductions are possible at this stage:

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First, although mutual East-West reductions could have military disadvantages for NATO, they also could be preferable to unilateral reduction of US forces in Europe, which might carry serious risks for vital US interests. Moreover, the process of negotiation with the East could also help counter domestic pressure for US unilateral cuts.

Second, the advantages and disadvantages of mutual force reductions would vary with the terms of the agreement with the East. To illustrate:

- Asymmetrical reductions -- larger cuts in Warsaw Pact forces than in NATO forces -- would be advantageous to the West, if the difference in the amount of reductions were sufficient to improve the security of NATO. However, an asymmetrical proposal might be non-negotiable if it were obviously detrimental to Soviet interests.
- Large equal percentage cuts, in the order of one-third of NATO/Warsaw Pact forces near the Central Front could reduce political tensions and the confrontation of East/West forces. On the other hand, the Soviets would be able to return greater forces more rapidly over a short distance than the US. The area which NATO is required to defend would not be reduced, and thus probably could not be defended with the forces remaining after reductions.
- Small cuts of about 10 percent could make the military disadvantages mentioned above less severe and might also allow us to make some savings in present troop costs (assuming the US force were demobilized when they returned to the US) while obtaining a quid pro quo from the Soviets. However, they could be more difficult to verify and military disadvantages would continue to exist.

There has been no positive Soviet or Warsaw Pact response to the NATO MBFR "signals", beyond an indication they would consider an MBFR proposal if and when one is made by the West. Further, the Soviets may well feel that reductions in the West are likely to occur without concessions on their part.

3. Outline of Possible NATO Proposals: Subject to the outcome of NATO studies on symmetrical reductions of 10-30 percent, the following are illustrative basic elements of possible NATO proposals to the Warsaw Pact:

- The geographic area involved would be the FRG and Benelux countries vis-a-vis the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
- All indigenous and stationed (foreign) forces would be involved
- Conventional, nuclear (delivery systems not warheads) and dual-capable forces would be reduced.

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- Air forces reductions, if any, would probably be proportionately less than ground forces.
- An agreed limitation on forces at their present levels might be considered as a first step, but only if part of a reduction agreement.
- Verification would need to be adequate to: detect significant breeches of the agreement with sufficient timeliness and in such a manner as to enable other parties to react effectively in order to maintain their own security; deny the violator the advantages which he had hoped to gain; provide evidence of violations to be used to confront the violator; and sustain public confidence that a BFR agreement is being observed.

The NATO working group will also develop MBFR plans based on asymmetrical reductions designed to compensate for the Warsaw Pact ground force and geographic advantage. Criteria for asymmetrical reductions have not yet been defined.

(b) Options for the US:

Option (1): Kill the MBFR project by "studying it to death".

Advantages: Would avoid military risks involved, provided unilateral troop cuts were not made.

Disadvantages: Our Allies would have difficulty accepting this policy, and the Alliance would be less well prepared should the Soviets respond favorably to NATO "signals" on MBFR. It would gradually erode MBFR as a tactical device for dealing with US domestic pressures for unilateral troop cuts.

Option (2): Attempt to develop a NATO consensus for killing MBFR.

The advantages and disadvantages would be the same as those cited for Option (1) except that Option (2) might be more disruptive to our Allies and would also increase pressures for other detente initiatives.

Option (3): Continue with NATO studies involving preparatory and analysis of illustrative models to determine MBFR's desirability and feasibility, with the studies and possible preliminary explorations with countries of the Warsaw Pact providing Ministers sometime after the May 1970 meeting with a basis for assessment of the desirability and timeliness of negotiations on MBFR.

Advantages: Would help both to convince the Allies and public opinion that we seriously support continuing progress on MBFR studies while avoiding possible premature proposals for negotiation. Would permit considered analysis of the adequacy of the MBFR guidelines and the verifiability, negotiability, feasibility, and political and military advantages and disadvantages of MBFR, as well as an assessment of the political advantages and military risks.

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Disadvantages: Could create frictions within NATO should the other Allies wish to open negotiations with the East at an earlier date.

Option (4): Press forward with NATO's MBFR effort in order for Ministers to decide in May on Alliance negotiating proposals for MBFR.

Advantages: Would convince the Allies that we are interested in getting on promptly with specific measures; would serve as a more compelling signal to the East; and would prepare the Alliance to undertake discussions sooner should the Soviets respond favorably.

Disadvantages: It would probably not allow sufficient time for an adequate analysis of the implications of MBFR. It could also tend to confirm fears on the part of some Allies that we are interested in early reduction of our forces committed to NATO, without regard for Western European security interests.

Option (5): Should the NATO study effort prove abortive, we may wish to consider first within the US and then within NATO other approaches to MBFR, such as seeking NATO support for a bilateral US-Soviet force drawdown in Central Europe either by agreement or by mutual example.

Advantages: It would focus on an important reduction target, Soviet forces in Eastern Europe would relieve Congressional pressures for unilateral US reductions, and could be easier to verify and negotiate than an MBFR agreement involving forces of other states.

Disadvantages: Unless there was full agreement in NATO, could be disruptive to Alliance solidarity in that the Allies might see such a proposal as a sign of US-Soviet great power "collusion" in which European states did not directly participate and from which they derived no relief from current defense spending. It could lead to unilateral reductions of forces by NATO Allies and consequently to military imbalances in Europe.

2. Lesser Disarmament and Confidence-Building Measures

The Ministers agreed in December 1969 to undertake further studies of the following: exchange of observers at military maneuvers, advance notification of military movements and maneuvers, observation posts, and joint study of methods of inspection. They indicated that these measures "could accompany or follow" an MBFR agreement. Some Allies may wish to develop negotiating proposals on these issues, without waiting for progress on MBFR.

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Option (1): Unilaterally frustrate any conclusions to NATO studies of the measures.

Advantages: Would serve as a clear signal to the Allies -- if desired -- of US hostility to partial measures alone.

Disadvantages: Would prevent the Allies from being prepared to negotiate such proposals should the Soviets desire.

Option (2): Keep work in phase with MBFR Project.

Advantages: Possibly it would strengthen the MBFR proposal by adding safeguards and providing means for verification.

Disadvantages: Creates the possibility that Allies agreement on MBFR proposals -- and eventual negotiations with the East -- might be hampered by inability to agree on some of these lesser issues. Eliminates possibility these issues would be considered separately as concrete issues for East/West negotiations to reduce tensions and build confidence.

Option (3): Independently of work on MBFR, press forward with these studies.

Advantages: Agreement could facilitate later negotiations on verification in connection with MBFR, and take the edge off Allied appetites for faster movement on MBFR, or they could be considered separately as concrete issues for East/West negotiations to reduce tensions and build confidence.

Disadvantages: Could stimulate unwarranted expectations in the West, which could lead to reductions in defense spending.

3. Joint East-West Declaration of Principles.

Rebutting again the Brezhnev doctrine, NATO Ministers in December 1969 set forth principles for "peace and security in Europe", including "non-intervention in the internal affairs of any State by any other State, whatever their political and social system". The Allies did not agree in December, however, to further studies on ways to seek Eastern adhesion to these principles. Moreover, the FRG wished to postpone a possible multilateral declaration pending its current bilateral explorations with Eastern states. The issue is whether to pursue such an East-West declaration.

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Option (1): Not pursue further.

Advantage: This would please most of the Allies, especially the FRG, which opposes negotiation of a declaration, and avoids provocation to the USSR in proposing principles which the Soviets might not accept.

Disadvantages: It could create the impression that the Allies acquiesce in the Brezhnev Doctrine, and would deny the West an issue for possible eventual negotiation.

Option (2): Formally ask the Eastern European countries in the May 1970 NATO communique to subscribe publicly to these principles, without negotiation.

Advantages: This would provide evidence of Allied willingness to seek East-West accords, and maintain public pressures on the Soviet Union to redefine the Brezhnev Doctrine along acceptable lines, without involving the GDR in negotiations.

Disadvantages: It provides an opening for the East to respond by repeating their call for direct East-West negotiations on this subject in an ESC.

Option (3): Seek Allied agreement to undertake negotiations with the East on a joint statement of principles.

Advantages: Same as Option (2) above.

Disadvantages: In addition to the disadvantages of Option (2), negotiations could create a false impression of greater security. Moreover, they could involve GDR.

4. Stimulating Trade and Other Cooperation. NATO Ministers called in December for freer movement of peoples, goods and ideas between East and West. The central question is how far the US and the Allies should go in "bridge building", specifically in US bilateral initiatives, and in multilateral efforts, bearing in mind the continuance of tight controls over the export of strategic materials.

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(a) US Bilateral Efforts

Option (1): Maintain the present permissive but not promotional attitude toward trade with the East.

Advantages: Avoids appearance of stimulating trade with countries assisting North Vietnam.

Disadvantages: It would forfeit a potentially valuable instrument of policy in dealing with the East, while enabling Western European countries to continue enjoying greater access to Eastern European markets than the US.

Option (2): Stimulate contacts with the East to maximum extent feasible, within bounds of current legislation. While US trade with the East is restricted, there are opportunities for trade expansion within the legal limits permitted by the Export Administration Act of 1969.

Advantages: It would increase possibilities for expanded exports to the East, build better lines of communication, and enable the Eastern European countries somewhat greater room for maneuver with the USSR.

Disadvantages: Could provide the East with a propaganda argument for clamping down on Eastern Europe countries.

Option (3): Attempt to obtain Congressional approval for further loosening of selective restrictions on trade: Presidential discretion in granting most-favored-nation treatment and permitting Export-Import Bank financing of trade with Communist countries.

Advantages: It would enable the US to increase substantially its influence in Eastern Europe, and provide smaller Eastern European countries with greater latitude for dealing with the US.

Disadvantages: Further liberalization might induce other member countries of the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM) to push for liberalization of COCOM List to undesirable degree.

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(b) Multilateral Efforts

Option: Stimulate enhanced East-West cooperation in the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and greater use of other multilateral organizations like OECD and GATT to develop contacts.

Advantages: It would build on recent public expressions by Warsaw Pact countries of interest in enhanced East-West cooperation.

Disadvantages: In ECE, it potentially could involve the UN in European security questions, including East German participation question. Because the US cannot participate in GATT discussions concerning terms of accession of countries to which we do not extend most favored nation treatment, we would have little voice in development of contacts through GATT.

5. Environment

Option: To pursue actively East-West cooperation in environmental studies through ECE; through proposals put forward by OECD; through the proposed East-West Institute for Allied Systems Analysis; and perhaps eventually through the work of NATO's Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society.

Advantages: It would provide opportunities for joint endeavors of possible real benefit to East and West, and might divert to this channel some of the pressures for an ESC.

Disadvantages: It could politicize international environmental programs to their detriment.

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YI. Sonnenfeldt
Mr. Kissinger

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RESEARCH MEMORANDUM

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

April 7, 1970

To : The Secretary
 Through: S/S
 From : INR - Ray S. Cline *(RSC)*
 Subject: West Germany/USSR: The Bahr-Gromyko Talks

INTRODUCTION

Since last December, high-level officials of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and of the Soviet Union have held four sets of lengthy discussions in Moscow. Initiated to explore the possibility of negotiating a bilateral agreement on renunciation of force, these talks have ranged far beyond the specific field of West German-Soviet relations and have dealt with a wide variety of issues in the FRG's relations with Eastern Europe as a whole. Moreover, they have been part of Bonn's coordinated effort-- which includes West German-Polish conversations in Warsaw and Chancellor Brandt's meeting with East German Premier Stoph--to bring about a relaxation of tensions in Central Europe and a general improvement in the FRG's relations with the Warsaw Pact states.

The Moscow talks were begun as a result of a proposal made by the Kiesinger-Brandt Government in July 1969 that Bonn and Moscow should exchange declarations on the renunciation of force. Following a later exchange of notes, a national election in the FRG, and the advent of the Brandt Government, the first meeting was held on December 8 with Foreign Minister Gromyko representing the USSR and Ambassador ~~Walter~~ Allardt, West Germany. Gromyko and Allardt met two more times in December.

The talks were then recessed until January 30, 1970, when State Secretary Egon Bahr of the Chancellor's Office became the leader of the FRG delegation. During this series, Bahr met with Gromyko five times and with Premier Kosygin once. After almost three weeks in Moscow, Bahr went back to Bonn for consultations. Returning to Moscow on March 1, he then had three more talks with Gromyko. Following further consultation in Bonn, he returned to Moscow and met with Gromyko on March 21. After that talk, the talks were adjourned sine die.

Brandt has indicated that he wishes to talk to President Nixon (April 10-11) before any more meetings with the Soviets are held. Furthermore, both Bonn and Moscow want to await further developments in

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Review

(Signature)
 April 7, 1970

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the Brandt-Stoph dialogue, in the Four-Power talks on Berlin, and possibly in the West German-Polish talks (due to start again some time in April) before they resume their discussions in Moscow.

The picture of the Moscow talks that we have been able to obtain so far is detailed but not entirely clear. In part, this lack of clarity is due to the nature of the discussions themselves--dealing as they do with issues that have defied resolution for over two decades. As the West Germans and the Soviets have probed each other's positions, sought to win concessions, and tried to find eventual areas of agreement, each side has repeatedly stated and restated its position on all of the major issues, in the process sometimes shifting emphasis and frequently changing terminology or nuancing its arguments differently. In part, the lack of clarity is due also to the variety of sources from which we have received information. In some cases, it has been given to US officials directly by FRG participants in the talks or other West German spokesmen. In others, our information is based on clandestine accounts of what FRG participants or other West German officials have said in private or in government or party meetings.

This paper analyzes the Allardt/Bahr-Gromyko discussions of the major problem areas--European border issues, East-West German relations, the Berlin problem, the proposed Conference on European Security (CES)*, and Soviet intervention claims--and attempts to show where there has been some movement and where (as has been the case in most of these areas) the appearance of movement is belied by close analysis of available material.

(...)

pages iii to 10 not included in Reader

* Although during the period of the Moscow talks, this proposed conference has been called both a "European Security Conference (ESC)" and a "Conference on European Security (CES)", this paper will use only the latter term.

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Bahr thought at this point that he had convinced Gromyko that the FRG was unable to discuss (sic) Berlin because it was a Four-Power responsibility. A Foreign Office official in Bonn confirmed the FRG impression that Gromyko had shifted his ground and was no longer insisting on explicit coverage of Berlin in a renunciation of force agreement. After his last meeting with Gromyko on March 21, Bahr told the Western Ambassadors in Bonn that he had told Gromyko that the FRG could not enter into an agreement with the USSR on renunciation of force which conflicted with existing treaty obligations of the FRG, and that this naturally included Berlin.

According to an intelligence source, Bahr, in reporting to the West German Cabinet on March 25, did not mention Berlin in enumerating the main areas where agreement with the Soviets had not yet been reached. Brandt reportedly intervened forcefully in the discussion to say that Berlin constituted such an area and that if the Soviets were not willing to accept an increased status for West Berlin there could not be any renunciation of force agreement as far as he was concerned. Brandt evidently meant that it was not enough to ensure that West Berlin was excluded from the agreement, but that it was necessary to obtain Soviet acceptance of the "realities" of Berlin as the FRG sees them. Again here, it was not clear whether Brandt was thinking of an understanding on the status of West Berlin achieved in the Four-Power framework or in bilateral negotiations.

Conference on European Security (CES)

Discussions of this issue have focused on what relationship there should be between moving toward bilateral renunciation of force agreements and moving toward a CES. FRG officials have told US officials that first Allardt and then Bahr had, in effect, sought to link a renunciation of force agreement with West German support for a CES and that Gromyko had steadily rejected any such connection. But, according to clandestine sources, Bahr and Brandt have stated in private that it was the Soviets who appeared to be suggesting that Bonn's support for a CES would facilitate progress toward a renunciation of force agreement.

Allardt-Gromyko Talks. During his first meeting with Gromyko on December 8, according to a West German Foreign Office source, Ambassador Allardt, acting on instructions, said that the FRG wished to conclude bilateral renunciation of force agreements with the USSR and with the Eastern European countries as a step toward the normalization of relations. Exchanges of such bilateral declarations, Allardt went on, could be a matter for a future CES. The way could lead through a network of bilateral renunciation of force arrangements to a multilateral renunciation of force agreement.

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Gromyko observed that the FRG appeared to be seeking to establish a connection between the success of bilateral negotiations and a CES. Allardt, denying a desire to establish an explicit link, expressed the view, however, that the clarification of bilateral questions between the FRG and the USSR, as well as of other bilateral questions between the FRG and such other EE nations as might be feasible, would strengthen the case for, and facilitate FRG participation in, such a conference. Gromyko then, and again during his second meeting with Allardt on December 11, firmly rejected any assumption that bilateral negotiations were a precondition for a multilateral conference.

Bahr-Gromyko Talks. Much the same ground appears to have been covered in the first series of Bahr-Gromyko talks, which began on January 30. In their second meeting of that series, on February 3, for example, Gromyko, according to an intelligence report, rejected as an "imposition of conditions" the FRG view that progress in bilateral talks would improve the atmosphere for a CES. Bahr denied that the FRG was trying to lay down preconditions. He went on to ask, however, what good it would be to have a CES at all, if the FRG and the USSR could not make progress toward a normalization of relations.

According to intelligence reports, however, both Bahr and Brandt have said in private that it was not Bonn, but Moscow, that was trying to link a renunciation of force agreement and West German support for a CES. Thus, on February 23, Bahr expressed the view that the Soviets were "playing games" with the talks. He said that the CES issue was in fact more important to the Soviets than all other questions. He said that they had indicated willingness to discuss a renunciation of force agreement seriously only after Bonn would make clear to its own allies that it would unconditionally support the calling of a CES. Bahr believed that Moscow's objective was to get the West Germans to urge the US to make concrete proposals for reductions of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact military forces. Chancellor Brandt, in his own distillation of Bahr's and Allardt's talks with Gromyko, had expressed similar views some days earlier (on February 13). Brandt concluded that the USSR was interested in continuing the talks with the FRG principally in order to "fit them in with talks between the USSR and the US about troop reductions and a CES". Bahr, said Brandt, had asked Gromyko whether the Soviet Union would be prepared to make corresponding reductions of troops in the Warsaw Pact area if the US made withdrawals from Europe; Gromyko had indicated that this question could be a theme for a CES and had added that that was why the USSR was so much interested in getting West German support for such a conference.

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At the March 3 Bahr-Gromyko meeting (as reported to Ambassador Rush by State Secretary Duckwitz), Gromyko specifically asked Bahr whether the Germans considered there to be a linkage between a renunciation of force agreement and FRG support for a CES: Bahr said that the two were not related; in Bonn's view, the CES was a separate matter which should be discussed with West Germany's allies. In the March 10 talks, Bahr told Ambassador Beam in Moscow, Gromyko had not linked a renunciation of force agreement with a CES; rather, Gromyko--without mentioning a date--had "merely" asked for a "favorable declaration".

In his report to the West German Cabinet on March 19, Bahr indicated that he and Gromyko had made some progress in trying to reach agreement on a formulation specifying that both the USSR and the FRG would "work toward" bringing about a CES. Two days later, after Bahr's March 21 meeting with Gromyko--the most recent--the German Charge in Moscow, briefing Ambassador Beam, reported that "rapprochement though not specific agreement" had been reached on the CES issue (as well as on several other points). The proposed language was: "depending on the progress of the conversations but not necessarily in advance of the settlement of the German problem, the plan for holding a CES should be encouraged".

On March 30, German Disarmament Commissioner Roth briefed Embassy Bonn on an FRG draft paper on the MBFR and CES issues. Responding to a question, Roth stated that the FRG had received "no specific indications" in the Bahr-Gromyko talks of Soviet interest in MBFR. (Apparently Roth did not mention the CES in this connection).

Also at the end of March, a member of the German Chancellery staff (Sanne) told Embassy Bonn that the Soviets appeared to be in no hurry to proceed to serious negotiations with the FRG, preferring to await the outcome of the Quadripartite talks in Berlin and Bonn's talks with the Poles and the East Germans. Thus--in Sanne's view--the Soviets would derive little advantage "right now" in moving from the current bilateral talks with the FRG into a multilateral (e.g., CES) arena.

While the Roth and Sanne statements might seem at variance with the formulation reported by the German Charge in Moscow about the tentative understanding that Bahr and Gromyko supposedly had reached on the CES issue, in our judgment, there is not necessarily an inconsistency. The formulation reported by the German Charge is specific neither as to the timing nor the subject matter of a CES. It will admit to broad divergencies of interpretation as to when, and under what circumstances, such a conference "should be encouraged" by the FRG--or, for that matter, by the Soviets. Thus, the CES issue would appear to be far from resolved.

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The UN "Enemy State" Clauses Issue

The FRG has long wanted to persuade the Soviets to renounce their claim of a right to intervene in West Germany on the basis of Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter. It was therefore natural for the FRG to raise this subject in Moscow. Gromyko has reportedly expressed the view that it would be possible to find a formula which would satisfy the FRG's need for assurances against these Soviet claims. However, the Soviets have apparently tried to link their acceptance of such a formula to the FRG's agreement to recognize its border with the GDR and the Oder-Neisse line.

Allardt-Gromyko Talks. According to an FRG Foreign Office spokesman, Allardt first broached the subject of Articles 53 and 107 in his third talks with Gromyko, on December 23. Gromyko dismissed the subject as not being a subject for the current discussions. Allardt countered by noting that the Soviets themselves had raised the subject in their note of July 5, 1968.

Bahr-Gromyko Talks. Despite the initial Soviet rebuff, Bahr raised the subject at his first meeting, with Gromyko, on January 30. The latter appeared to have backed off from his earlier position that Articles 53 and 107 were not subjects for discussion. Gromyko said he understood that the FRG wanted Article 2 to be the basis of FRG-USSR relations and that it should be included in a renunciation of force agreement. He said, "We can do that," but balked at making specific mention of individual articles in the Charter.

In his second conversation with Bahr on February 3, Gromyko again asserted that it was more customary to cite the Charter as a whole than to single out individual articles. He also reiterated that the Soviets had no objection to being guided by the principles and objectives of the Charter in their relations with the FRG. This development led an FRG Foreign Office official to report to the Bonn Group that the Soviet position on Article 2 seemed to have become more flexible. Other Foreign Office sources also detected a willingness on the part of the Soviets to include an express reference to it in a renunciation of force agreement. In the Bahr-Gromyko talks on March 6 and 10, according to reports given to Embassy Bonn, the Soviets finally started talking about a formula that would include specific mention of Article 2.

On March 19 Bahr briefed the FRG Cabinet on the status of the Moscow talks, and, according to a clandestine report, indicated that Gromyko thought it would be possible to find a formulation which would satisfy the FRG regarding Soviet claims to the right of intervention under the UN Charter. However, the Soviets reportedly linked their readiness to agree to such a formulation to West German recognition of the GDR border and the Oder-Neisse line (this account did not make clear whether Gromyko was

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thinking of a formula providing for general recognition of existing borders or of something more explicit.)

Following his March 21 conversation with Gromyko, Bahr, according to an intelligence report, said that the Soviet Union appeared willing to state that its relations with West Germany should be based on the UN Charter, and that disagreements between them must be resolved by peaceful means, particularly under Article 2 of the Charter. Bahr indicated that this Soviet position, which made no mention of Articles 53 and 107, was contained in one of the "non-papers" that he and Gromyko had worked out. However, Bahr said that he had pointed out orally to Gromyko that, in view of the specific mention of Article 2, the Soviets could no longer invoke the "enemy state" clauses. Bahr apparently hopes to rely on this oral statement to overcome FRG objections to the Soviet right of intervention claim. He also believes that this formula--specific mention of Article 2 combined with his oral statement--puts the Soviet-FRG relationship on the same basis as the FRG relationship with the three Allied powers.

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Authority E O 12958By RAO ARA Date 7-1-03TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLYMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: July 20, 1970 -- 10:30 a.m.

Place: The Map Room, The White House

Participants: Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

The meeting was requested by Ambassador Dobrynin. He was extremely jovial and friendly, and opened the conversation by asking me whether I could recommend any good movies. I said no, I very rarely went. He said he had read reports that "Patton" was very popular in the White House. I replied that I had seen these reports also. He asked how I compared "Patton" with the "Battle of Kursk" which he had shown at the Motion Picture Association. I told him they were not easy to compare. "Patton" was about a romantic hero and stressed the role of the individual while the "Battle of Kursk" stressed the role of materiel, not of the individual.

Dobrynin said the only individual who really counted in World War II in the Soviet Union was Stalin, and his great attribute was that he had absolutely iron nerves. He was the one senior leader who refused to leave Moscow even though the Germans were only 10 miles away and, by this act of defiance, he rallied a lot of doubters. Also, Stalin had unbelievable powers of concentration. He, Dobrynin, was a young aide in the Foreign Office and he remembers that on the way to the Tehran conference, Stalin gave orders to be left alone in his compartment. He was not shown any documents and he sat there for three days, as far as anyone knew just staring out of the window, thinking and concentrating. Then, from the Soviet point of view, he gave an absolutely masterly performance at Tehran.

Dobrynin also told me that Stalin personally picked the Soviet Chief of Protocol in 1943 at the Tehran Conference because there was a young Soviet diplomat who knew a Churchillian idiosyncrasy which was always to ask for three Scottish tunes from visiting bands that no one had ever heard of in order to embarrass them. The young diplomat found out and when Churchill requested these tunes, the Soviet

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honor guard was ready to play it. Stalin asked who had thought this up and immediately appointed him Chief of Protocol in the Foreign Office even though he was only 30 years old at the time. Dobrynin said that he turned out to be the best Chief of Protocol the Soviet Foreign Office had ever had. He added that being Chief of Protocol in the Soviet Union was even more difficult than here because we had only one man in charge, while after Stalin, placing the Soviet leaders in their proper order was an act of political significance.

European Security

Dobrynin then turned to the subject at hand. He read me a Note Verbale which his government had asked him to transmit to us. The text is as follows:

"In continuation of our exchange of views on the questions touched upon at our meeting of June 10 I would like to say the following to be transmitted to President Nixon.

"The affirmations made in the course of the above meeting by President Nixon and, on his instructions, by you, Dr. Kissinger, concerning the interest of the US in maintaining the territorial status quo in Europe and the absence of intentions on the part of the US to act counter to this or in general to take any steps in the direction of aggravation of the situation in Europe, have been noted in Moscow. Likewise noted in Moscow was President Nixon's statement to the effect that the US Government recognizes special interests of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and has no intention to ignore or undermine them due to the unrealistic nature of such a course. Those are, without doubt, realistic judgments.

"Likewise, the Soviet Union is convinced that recognition of the realities that have come into being in Europe, constitute that necessary foundation upon which a stable peace on the continent as well as in the world at large can and must be built.

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"An important step on the way to strengthening peace in Europe would be speedy preparation and convocation of an all-European conference on problems of security and cooperation in Europe as proposed by the Soviet Union and other European Socialist countries.

"It should be emphasized that the Memorandum adopted by the Governments of European Socialist countries in Budapest on June 22 takes into account also the wishes of other possible participants in such a conference expressed in the course of bilateral and multi-lateral consultations. Taken into account, too, are the wishes expressed by the American side both with regard to participation of the US in the all-European conference and regarding questions to be discussed at the conference or in connection with it.

"Taking into consideration, in particular, the wishes of the US Government the Soviet Government together with the other Governments which adopted the said Memorandum, have come to the conclusion that consideration of the question of reducing foreign armed forces on the territory of European states would serve the interests of detente and security in Europe.

"In our view, this question could be discussed in a body on questions of security and cooperation in Europe which is proposed to be established at the all-European conference. At the same time we are prepared to discuss this question also in another manner acceptable to interested states, outside of the framework of the conference. Such an approach opens wide possibilities in selecting appropriate methods of discussing this question and takes into account the experience that has already been accumulated in considering outstanding problems of such kind, in particular between the USSR and the US.

"The questions of man's environment, which the American side is interested in, could be, in our opinion, discussed within item 2 of the proposed agenda for the all-European conference.

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"We proceed from the assumption that in view of these clarifications the United States should have no reason for delaying further the convocation of the all-European conference by way of presenting various preconditions. We hope that the US Government will adopt a more constructive position and will thereby contribute to making the preparation of the all-European conference a more practical business."

I asked what the phrase meant that in connection with a mutual balanced force reduction, an approach "opens wide possibilities in selecting appropriate methods of discussing this question" on a bilateral basis. He responded that the choice of appropriate forums could be determined after we had agreed in principle. He said he recognized that he owed me some answers to other questions, and they would be forthcoming within the next few weeks. I told him, of course, that I had to check my answer with the President, and I wanted to remind him that I had listed European Security as one of the three topics for high level talks at our last conversation. I thought the tone of his note was constructive, and we would try to handle our reply in a constructive manner. I would let him know what the response would be.

SALT

Dobrynin then turned the conversation to ~~SALT~~. He said that we had not yet presented our formal proposals and he wondered when they could expect them. I replied that they would have them certainly the next day, but they would be along the lines foreshadowed in my recent conversation. He said he recognized that we would not split off ABMs as a separate agreement and asked about the accidental war question. I told him that Smith was under instructions not to split off anything, but that I would be willing to explore with him separating out of the accidental war question those issues which concerned only our two countries, such as unauthorized launches of missiles or mass flights of bombers, from issues that affected third countries, such as the note Semyonov had handed to Smith at a concert. I stated that there might be a possibility of a limited technical agreement along these lines, but that Smith was not authorized to negotiate it. This would have to be done between Dobrynin and me. Dobrynin said he would come back to me on that.

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By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 17, 1970

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TO: NSC - Mr. Henry Kissinger
FROM: S/PC - William I. Cargo *WIC*
SUBJECT: Current Issues of European Security

In connection with current consideration of European security issues, enclosed is an additional paper, entitled "European Security Perspectives from the East." Concurrence outside the Department has not been sought on this paper, which we are sending for use as appropriate in connection with forthcoming discussions in the NSC framework.

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By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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August 1, 1970

Revised August 14, 1970

EUROPEAN SECURITY PERSPECTIVES FROM THE EAST

Americans thinking about European security matters are apt to focus on Soviet objectives and Western responses, sometimes not giving full consideration to the situation in Eastern Europe and the way that situation propels and limits Soviet policy. This paper is about that part of the European security equation. It approaches the subject through the proposal for a conference on European security.

Several Assumptions. (1) Since the Russians have blown hotter and colder on the question of a European conference, changing their formulas and conditions, we can assume that they have conflicting pressures leading towards and away from such a conference.

(2) Their first consideration is their own assessment of their strengths and weaknesses in Eastern Europe. They know how strong the drive is for greater independence from Moscow, and they know how great the need is for closer economic intercourse with the West. But they also know that their control over the East European regimes is closely tied in with their own security. The East Europeans also recognize this as a fact of life.

(3) The Soviet relationship with the Germans is crucial--and we know how sensitive it is by the role it played in the demise of Beria and the downfall of Khrushchev. Right now, the Soviet leadership is pushing better relations with Bonn, and this process itself affects all other security issues as they are seen from the East.

(4) Throughout, we cannot forget the underlying weakness in the Soviet position, that they are a regime ruling in their own country without the consent of the governed and exercising rule over other countries in Eastern Europe whose peoples do not want their rule. No matter how brutal and effective their control is--and Czechoslovakia demonstrated it anew--this weakness

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By KW NARA, Date 7-17-83

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persists. Those involved in Atlantic Alliance affairs express concern that detente might weaken NATO solidarity, and this is a valid concern. But from the viewpoint of Eastern Europe, amply demonstrated by the historical record, any loosening of Moscow's control brings East European attempts to reassert independence. In this sense Moscow is far more vulnerable than we are. And in this sense, detente is far more dangerous potentially for them than for us.

Tactics and Strategy. In examining Soviet and East European motives, the distinction between tactics and strategy is important. Our strategic goal is a secure Europe--especially Western Europe, of course--where American interests are safeguarded. The Soviet strategic goal is a Europe where their security is insured by Soviet dominance, which unfortunately still means to them the reduction of U.S. power and influence as much as possible. In this perspective, East and West cannot agree on what a "secure Europe" is, but it should be eventually possible to devise a careful modus vivendi where "detente measures" could take place without affecting the strategic balance. No one, East or West, should think that a security conference could be a new Congress of Vienna, creating a new "security system." But at the same time, Westerners should not see a conference as merely a Soviet gimmick, as some kind of circus where the Russians cleverly shill the West. The conference idea has acquired a momentum of its own, which the Russians can accelerate or slow but cannot stop; and various forces are at work, not all of which the Russians like.

It would be well to avoid making hard assumptions about Soviet positions and on the basis of these assumptions posing unreal alternatives. Perhaps the alternatives of "change versus status quo," or of "a real security conference versus a diplomatic circus," are illusory. Perhaps a closer look at the complexities of the Soviet and East European security situation will show that we need not fear that "detente atmospherics" will necessarily help their side and hurt ours. Even if their use of the conference idea is tactical, not aimed at what we would consider a secure Europe, there is no reason we cannot match our tactics against theirs and work towards our own goals.

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Soviet Motives. Although we must carefully separate Soviet and East European motives, obviously those of the Soviets weigh most heavily. Some important Soviet motives are:

(1) To get the widest Western recognition of the post-war territorial and political situation in Europe. In particular, to promote acceptance of the GDR. The Russians would hope to make formal their predominance in Eastern Europe.

(2) To obtain through European detente a much-needed wider access to Western capital, industrial goods, and vitally required technology.

(3) To erode the FRG's position in the NATO defense system and seek an increase in Soviet influence over Bonn.

(4) Overall, to work towards achieving a shift in the European balance of power, away from the U.S. and towards Moscow. Attaining greater influence in other West European countries--for example by a greater role of the Communist Parties in France and Italy--would be part of this picture.

(5) To quiet the Western front at a time of uncertainty in Sino-Soviet relations, and at a time when the expanding Soviet presence in the Middle East, and elsewhere, brings risks of Soviet-American tension outside Europe.

(6) To seek a decline in NATO's cohesion as an aspect of detente, in expectation of a decline in the American military presence in Europe and an attenuation of American political influence within and without the Alliance.

While discussing these Soviet motives, we cannot ignore the negative side of a security conference from the Soviet viewpoint. Some arguments Soviet opponents of a conference might use are:

(1) The weakness of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe would perhaps come on view, and the hold on independence by some countries, notably Rumania, might be strengthened.

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(2) Soviet desires to tighten up the Warsaw Pact could be hurt. Over the longer run, "normality" in Europe might erode Soviet hegemony.

(3) Improvement in FRG-Soviet relations, which might be further underscored by a CES, has implications for the Soviet relationship to the GDR and Poland, endemically suspicious of any such development.

Obviously the pros outweigh the contras in Soviet eyes. But we should remember that contras do exist and that the tactics of a European conference are probably not much easier for the Kremlin to decide on than for the Western Allies.

The Problem for the Soviets.

A. Political. For twenty-five years the number one problem for the Russians has been their inability to put a firm foundation under their position in Eastern Europe. The so-called Brezhnev doctrine is not the solution, and the Russians know it. In fact, when the Russians talk about "new norms" of international relations among socialist states, they may intend to provide cautionary guidelines for the growth of East-West intercourse during this period of change.

The Russians must know that they cannot pursue detente for its passing, optical, atmospherical effect without venturing into the changes that East and West Europeans want detente to bring. They cannot promise benefits and then try to shorten the leash on Eastern Europe, without hurting themselves.

Hungary is instructive. After the trauma of 1956, today the Russians probably could not hope for a better situation with any ally than they have with Kadar. Many Russians might long for a return to an alliance based on rigid obedience to Moscow. But those times are gone for them, just as the NATO of 1949 is gone for us, and some Soviets at least recognize the need for new patterns of control in Eastern Europe which will enable them to meet the pressures and demands of a new technological era. The cautious, wavering Soviet drive for a security conference shows that they are not always sure of themselves in facing up to their alliance problems in an admitted period of flux.

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Their treatment of a conference--as a tactical vehicle--shows that they have an eye on the larger picture but are leaving themselves leeway to back off if detente begins to look risky.

Finally, the USSR is naturally interested in increasing its influence at a time when the Soviets see a forthcoming diminution in American presence and influence in Western Europe. They probably calculate that attenuation of our influence can best be pursued by a reasonable Soviet posture, promoted through a security conference. A "hard" Soviet stance might risk the danger of holding the U.S. in Europe, or of consolidating Western Europe into more of a third force. But by seeking, through a European security conference, to intermesh Eastern and Western Europe through carefully managed contacts, the Soviets might hope eventually to achieve a "Finlandization" in Europe, that is a situation where leaders would pause to consider the Soviet attitude before undertaking any course of action. The basic point here is that for the Soviets, as for us, there are clear opportunities in the evolving European security scene, but also clear dangers and liabilities. The conference concept is a microcosm of this scene, offering opportunities and hazards to both sides.

B. Economic/Technological Considerations. The recently-concluded FRG-Soviet negotiations point up the degree to which the Russians expect detente to expand significantly the present levels of East-West trade. This is no less important for the Russians than for their East European allies. During its negotiations with the Russians, the FRG has assumed that economic factors weighed heavily in Moscow's calculations. There is some evidence that Bonn's analysis of Soviet motives is substantially correct. During Brandt's visit to Moscow for the treaty signing, Kosygin reportedly discussed with him at length the possibilities of expanded economic cooperation between the two countries, particularly FRG participation in exploitation of Soviet mineral and energy resources.

Faced with a serious technology gap, the Russians must also strive towards lowering existing barriers to their obtaining sophisticated computers and computer-based technology. There is ample evidence of long-standing Soviet attempts to narrow the technology gap through both bilateral and multilateral channels. For example, there has been a keen Soviet interest in the

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creation of the Institute of Applied Systems Analysis proposed by McGeorge Bundy. In conversations with responsible Western participants in this planned program, the Russians have explicitly stated their intense interest in the theory and application of systems analysis and methodology, particularly as it applies to large-scale industrial systems, information systems, and the like.

We should not underestimate the extent to which the highly-bureaucratized, centrally-planned economy of the USSR requires the soft and hard technological wares to rationalize existing and widespread inefficiency and dysfunctionality. It is, after all, a matter of both pride and necessity for the Russians to avoid falling still further behind the West in this era of technological change. As has happened before in Russian history, catching up will require Western assistance and capital. The current Soviet approach towards European detente, utilizing both the conference mechanism and ongoing negotiations, is designed to help promote Western willingness to provide these inputs. A Soviet journal recently quoted a West German publication to the effect that "there is still no green light given to Red trade," and concluded that a "green light for trade and economic cooperation is also a green light for the consolidation of peace and security."

We should, rather, interpret the quoted Soviet view in the reverse order: the USSR realizes quite well that real East-West trade--which would supply needed technology--must be preceded, not followed, by measures towards political relaxation in Europe.

Eastern European Motives. Eastern Europe is too diverse to be characterized generally, but it is true that all Eastern European countries have a pressing interest in obtaining Western industrial goods, capital, and technology--things not available from the USSR. Politically speaking--and for quite various motives--there is not a single East European government or party leadership--or at least elements thereof--that does not see wisdom and value in pursuing greater contact with the West. Such intercourse offers them the means of first, asserting national identity and interests through trade and diplomacy; and second, reducing the danger they face

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that particular national needs will be subordinated (at best) or sacrificed (at worst) to those of the Soviets if the USSR holds the initiative. Detente and greater freedom of action in Eastern Europe go hand in hand. The possibility remains, of course, that a given country may transgress the vague and undefined limits of Soviet tolerance while exercising freedom of action and contact with the West. The Soviets may reckon that a general increase in East-West intercourse, under Soviet aegis and within certain limits, is preferable to the dangerously varying individual policies pursued by the East European countries in the past.

A brief consideration of what a European security conference would mean for each East European country follows.

Czechoslovakia. Since the 1968 invasion, Husak apparently has believed that Czechoslovakia must subordinate its foreign policy interests to those of the USSR, in the hope that Prague will get in return some degree of latitude in the conduct of its own domestic affairs. As a consequence, the leadership can be expected to abide by Soviet wishes on a security conference and to make no initiatives unless the Soviets bless them. Prague will keep up a pretense of foreign policy initiatives by working with the smaller West European countries (Benelux, Scandinavia) as it did under the Novotny regime. Within the very narrow scope given it by the Kremlin, the Czechoslovaks probably see a security conference as a justification for renewing and furthering their contacts with Western Europe, especially in the hope of getting badly needed economic and technical assistance. Even this will get close scrutiny from Moscow and the Moscow-aligned elements in Prague.

Hungary. Somewhat paradoxically, Hungary represents the current East European "success story" in terms of prevailing political and personal freedom and the extent of economic reform. But always the Hungarians are punctilious about checking with Moscow before taking even innocuous steps. Certainly on a European conference Budapest checks very closely. The Hungarians probably feel that their role in actively promoting a conference is especially beneficial for them, with their demonstrated loyalty allowing them a wider margin of Western contacts. Economic contacts are what matters to the Hungarians. They are particularly interested in a variety of "joint ventures" which would provide them with Western capital,

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technology and marketing know-how. They have more experience with various forms of cooperation already than any other Warsaw Pact country and are likely to remain in the forefront.

Poland. Poland has economic problems which cannot be handled effectively with Soviet assistance alone, and the economic impulsion for the Poles is important. Polish security matters are even more important, of course. If the Polish-FRG negotiations succeed, Poland would get West German recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. Promotion of a European conference offers the Poles additional leverage in their desire to combine politics and economics in dealing with a "sanitized" FRG capable of satisfying many Polish needs. Like the Hungarians and others, the Poles have no desire to get too far out in front--or too far behind--in pursuing the Western Grail. A security conference offers them an appropriately safe mechanism.

Bulgaria. As Moscow's "most loyal ally," Bulgaria has used every contact with the West since the Czechoslovak crisis to push the Soviet formula for a security conference. But while serving Moscow the Bulgarians also serve themselves. Although Sofia has got massive Soviet economic aid, the Bulgarians know they direly need Western trade and technological help, and have already obtained a sizeable portion. A security conference might also aid a return to the "nationalist policy" of the mid-sixties--before Czechoslovakia--which combined movement towards cautious domestic experimentation with a somewhat more identifiable "Bulgarian foreign policy."

Rumania. Pursuing their nationalist policies, the Rumanians see negotiations for a security conference through bilateral efforts as well as preparatory conferences as a means to increase ties with Western Europe, loosen bloc ties, and undercut the so-called Brezhnev doctrine as a pretext for future Soviet interference or intervention. Thus, the Rumanians have promoted the establishment of an "organ" which would keep the Soviets more engaged multilaterally and, they hope, lessen the chance of Soviet meddling in bilateral dealings. But if a conference got channeled into a bloc-to-bloc approach the contrary would happen. The hastily launched initiative in March 1970 to host a preparatory conference--with no fixed agenda and open to all interested states--was an attempt to prevent the bloc-to-bloc approach. Some of the Rumanian viewpoint was taken account of in the Warsaw Pact's call at Budapest

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for the participation of all interested states in preparatory conference activity as well as in a conference itself. For the Rumanians, security happens to be a real consideration in talk about a security conference. As to the economic motivation, the Rumanians have long and successfully pursued an independent policy of expanding economic ties with the West. They will presumably continue to do so regardless of the outcome of the conference initiative. However, any movement toward European detente along non-bloc lines would help take pressure off the Rumanians as they continue to seek Western trade and credits.

Yugoslavia. Like the Rumanians, the Yugoslavs have a vital stake in European security, and have been in the forefront of detente activity, especially the kind aimed at "dissolving the blocs." The Yugoslavs are suspicious of a perpetuation of the status quo by the super-powers, and like the Rumanians they campaign for participation by all European states on a strictly equal basis. Politically, the Yugoslavs have an especial interest in East-West stability at a time, following Tito's eventual passing, when their country will suffer severe strains. Trade and economic considerations are also important for the Yugoslavs at a time when they are welcoming considerable Western investment which may, in turn, enable them eventually to pursue a more advantageous trade with both Western and Eastern Europe.

East Germany. A European conference offers the GDR an important opportunity to further her legitimacy and acceptance by other European states and, by repercussion, around the world. Especially if held soon, before the GDR's status is affected by the outcome of the Bonn-Moscow and Bonn-Warsaw negotiations, the GDR's participation in a European conference on the basis of equality would greatly enhance its status. Partially offsetting this advantage, however, is the GDR's concern that an atmosphere of detente would stimulate unwelcome trends to the regime's detriment. It is a difficult equation to balance for the Germans, but overtly at least the GDR remains loyal to Moscow's line.

Conclusion. (1) The Russians probably consider that, by and large, the West accepts Eastern Europe as within the sphere of predominant Soviet influence, or at least within a "sphere of mutual restraint" under Soviet influence. Within understood limits, the Soviets probably

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believe, the West will tread lightly and with due regard for Soviet sensitivities when dealing with the East European countries. HOWEVER . . .

(2) The Russians recognize that the East Europeans have growing needs and aspirations which cannot be met by the Soviets in view of their own deficiencies. THEREFORE . . .

(3) The Western countries, the "haves" in this situation, can meet certain needs of the area where the Russians lack the means themselves and, more importantly, where the Russians have some means but themselves seek more from the West for their own needs. Letting the West meet East European needs will take the heat off the Soviets, BUT . . .

(4) The Russians realize that this must be done carefully and within fixed boundaries where all the players know the limits of the permissible. HENCE . . .

(5) The Russians now regard "systems" of European security particularly from the standpoint of their effect and usefulness for Eastern Europe--and especially the degree to which they can serve to enhance the very imperfect alliance system between the USSR and the East European countries. It is perhaps not too wide of the mark to say that the Russians see a European security conference as a "controlled reaction" vehicle to let the necessary and inevitable process of technological adaptation occur in Eastern Europe--with absolutely essential Western assistance but in such a manner that it will not assume a "critical mass" as Czechoslovakia did.

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Authority EO 12958 HOUSEBy RAA Date 7-1-03 ONTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President
 Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko
 Soviet Ambassador A. F. Dobrynin
 Secretary Rogers
 Mr. Kissinger
 Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter, Soviet Ministry
 of Foreign Affairs
 William D. Krimmer, Interpreter, State Department

DATE & PLACE: October 22, 1970, 11:00 a.m. - 1:30 p.m.
 The Oval Office

Berlin

Mr. Gromyko said he was convinced that it was in the interests of both countries to achieve a reduction of tensions in Berlin and to create a situation there which would work for stability, detente, and general peace in Europe. The American side had many times referred to the status of West Berlin. He wanted to assure the President that the Soviet Union had no intention to weaken the status of the allied powers in West Berlin. In fact, at times he had the impression that the Soviet Union did more than anyone else to respect the special status of West Berlin. The principal question there was the political presence of the Federal Republic of Germany in the city. This presence affected the interests of the Soviet Union and undermined the special status that the American side had so frequently talked about. The Soviet Union advocated the inviolability of the inter-allied agreements concerning Berlin which were in effect. The Soviets were against anything that would violate these agreements. In his view it was possible that the American side misunderstood the Soviet position to some extent. He sometimes felt that representatives of the United States, at least at the ambassadorial level, regularly meeting to discuss the Berlin question, misunderstood the Soviet position. The Soviet Union as well as the German Democratic Republic, were ready to find a favorable solution for the two principal problems affecting West Berlin, those of transition from West Berlin to West Germany and vice versa, and access to West Berlin itself. These solutions would certainly serve the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany as well as those of the people of West Berlin. The major stumbling block at the moment

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appeared to be the question of political ties (and he stressed the word "political") between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. He strongly felt that there was a real possibility of reaching agreement here and this would help ease the situation in the area.

Mr. Kissinger asked for clarification. He had heard that the Soviet position was that West German political activity in West Berlin must be "curtailed", rather than "eliminated." Was this a correct interpretation?

Mr. Gromyko [using the Russian word "svyortyvaniye"] said that in his view there was no need to continue the political activities of the Federal Republic since they presented an eternal issue and gave rise to constantly new disputes. It would be comparatively easy to list what activities of the Federal Republic in Berlin could be continued and which political functions it should not be permitted to exercise in West Berlin. Above all, this referred to such matters as meetings in Berlin of the West German Bundestag, meetings of various Bundestag committees, and activities of the West German Chancellor in West Berlin. It was entirely possible that some of the activities in West Berlin had not come to the attention of the Allied Powers, they might require close examination under a microscope as it were. First and foremost, the West Berlin problem, from the Soviet point of view, consisted in the political presence of the Federal Republic as a state in that city.

Secretary Rogers also inquired whether the word meant eliminate or curtail. He said that elimination was certainly out of the question and that the Government of the FRG would be unable to enlist the support of its people for complete elimination of all political ties with West Berlin.

The President said that the umbilical cord between the city and the FRG could not be cut. Looking back over the years at the numerous Berlin crises during the Eisenhower Administration, he saw the city as a central problem in Europe. It was precisely for this reason that we must have a clear understanding on West Berlin in order to reduce the frequency of these crises. Mr. Gromyko must be well aware of the fact that ratification of the nonaggression treaty between the Soviet Union and the FRG depended upon substantial progress on the West Berlin problem. On this point, he, too, said that all political ties

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cannot be cut, this simply cannot happen. West Berlin cannot be allowed to become a third German state. But if he understood Mr. Gromyko correctly, a low profile of the federal authorities in West Berlin, as opposed to the high profile represented by meetings of the Bundestag might be acceptable to the Soviet side. We could not agree to eliminating all political ties for the simple reason that we could not sell this to the FRG any more than the FRG could sell this to its own people.

Secretary Rogers remarked that it should be a matter for negotiation what lines and limits should be drawn for the FRG in West Berlin. If we were to continue negotiations on this issue some progress must be made.

Mr. Gromyko again said that it was a matter of bodies and sub-bodies of the Federal Republic in West Berlin. As for a method for achieving concrete progress on this question, we should list specific activities to be eliminated. Mr. Gromyko expressed his appreciation to the President for the fact that the United States had taken a positive view of the treaty between the FRG and the Soviet Union. He considered this treaty to be an important step in the direction of creating a detente in Europe. As for the list of activities in West Berlin, these could be considered in detail in the course of negotiations.

The President said that our reaction to the Soviet-German treaty was based upon the fact that we respected the independence of the FRG and that when it signed a treaty in its own interests we approved of this action, of course. The treaty had been their idea, not ours. It was the Federal Republic that had taken the initiative to negotiate on the questions of borders and nonaggression. It should be realized, however, that this was only the first step. To complete it and obtain ratification of the treaty it would be absolutely necessary that progress in the Berlin question be achieved. If we could cool down the Berlin problem, even apart from our bilateral relations over Germany, the whole situation in Europe would be very positively affected.

Secretary Rogers said it was a simple fact of life that the Federal Republic would not ratify the treaty unless a satisfactory solution was found for West Berlin. He thought we might hold two more Ambassadors' meetings to see if we can make some progress, and also that all of these various matters, political presence, transit and access, should be negotiated at one and the same time.

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Mr. Gromyko agreed and expressed the hope that the U. S. Government would work with the Soviet Union to find appropriate solutions.

Secretary Rogers added that in his view an agreement on West Berlin should also provide for negotiation of any possible disputes that might arise.

European Security Conference

Mr. Gromyko inquired about the attitude of the United States Government toward the idea of convening a European Security Conference. He did not know whether the President had had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the Soviet proposal to call such a conference. The substance of that proposal was to call a conference of all European states as well as Canada and the United States in order to see if there was a chance of improving the relations between various states in Europe in the interests of a political detente. The United States had said that it favored such a detente, and so had the Soviet Union. On the other hand, he had the impression that the U. S. was somewhat apprehensive in regard to the ESC. It should be clear that any decisions adopted at such a conference would be joint decisions taken in the interests of all the states concerned. There was no question of trying to impose a one-sided position on any state during this conference. For this reason, he believed the U. S. apprehensiveness was quite unfounded. According to information he had received, the United States seemed to be bringing their influence to bear on some other countries to discourage them from taking a positive attitude toward the ESC. He wanted to emphasize that the Soviet Union had no intention of trying to claim the major credit for calling such a conference, that it was the position of the Soviet Government that a detente in Europe which could result from the ESC would benefit all interested parties and the world as a whole.

The President wanted to tell Mr. Gromyko quite directly that in our view the success of such a conference would depend primarily on the United States and the Soviet Union. Mr. Gromyko's impression that we were trying to discourage the convening of the conference was incorrect. We took the position that for the successful conduct of a conference it would be necessary to sit down and explore an appropriate agenda. By saying that the success would depend on our two countries primarily, he did not mean to speak of a condominium of the two powers in Europe.

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Secretary Rogers remarked that there was no point in having a conference unless we could foresee what results would likely be achieved. In this respect, our Berlin negotiations could serve as a good indicator. If we could make progress on the question of Berlin, the prospects for a European conference would improve. But, if no progress was achieved on Berlin, what would be the purpose of holding another conference?

Secondly, we were not too sure that the Communique of the Warsaw Pact Powers had indicated a willingness to discuss reduction of military forces in Europe. The Soviet Union had suggested that this question be included on the agenda of a European Conference. The Communique had also mentioned a reduction of foreign troops in Europe. What was meant by foreign troops? Did this include Russian troops in Eastern Europe? Mr. Gromyko replied that in the Soviet view, it would be better not to consider military questions at the European Conference. We could agree, however, that if some kind of a body were created at the European Conference, this body could discuss the question of troops. The Soviet Union would be agreeable to such a procedure. As for the term "foreign troops", it had been meant to include Soviet troops as well.

President Nixon remarked that a Soviet-American understanding on primary issues, such as SALT and Berlin, would have a beneficial influence upon any possible conference of European states.

Secretary Rogers said that if complex questions were to be excluded from discussion at a European Conference, it was difficult to see what could be accomplished. In brief, if we could foresee the achievement of positive results, we would be interested. If not, we would have doubts about the usefulness of such a conference.

Mr. Gromyko said we could not ignore the fact that for 25 years the Soviet Union had discussed disarmament questions in the United Nations with the United States, and with other countries, without being able to find any solution. For this reason, the question of disarmament and force reduction was not perhaps quite suitable for discussion at an ESC. Should a body be created by that conference, however, he would have no objection to force reduction being discussed in that body. The President said that in principle we were not opposed to the conference. We would be in favor of it if preliminary discussions showed that it would be helpful.

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Authority EO 12958
By MM/NARA Date 7-8-03

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION

January 18, 1970

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN ADVISED

SUBJECT: Soviet Reaction Against December NATO Meeting *A*

As reported in the attached memorandum from Secretary Rogers (Tab A), Ambassador Dobrynin handed us a Soviet aide memoire on December 28, criticizing NATO, and especially the US, for impeding detente in Europe. Specifically, the Soviets are complaining about measures taken at the recent Ministerial meeting to strengthen NATO militarily. More important, they come down hard against NATO's linking progress toward a European security conference with a Berlin agreement, and other ongoing East-West talks. In familiar fashion, the Soviets present their anti-linkage position, terming insistence on "preconditions" as "unsound method of conducting international affairs." They contend they are ready to proceed now, on both a bilateral and multilateral basis, with preparations for a European conference, citing again the Finnish proposal for preliminary consultations in Helsinki. Finally, Moscow tries to single out the US from other NATO allies and implies that, contrary to the spirit of your recent conversation with Foreign Minister Gromyko, we are preventing progress on European security.

Undoubtedly meant to express general Soviet displeasure with what they see as a US brake on Ostpolitik and pressure on them to be forthcoming in SALT and in the Berlin negotiations, the Soviet paper seems mainly directed at influencing the policies of our European allies. As the Secretary observes, the Soviets want to establish a case against us. During the past week, Soviet ambassadors have delivered similar representation -- either orally or in writing -- in five other NATO capitals. The North Atlantic Council has already taken note of the various Soviet approaches and will be coordinating allied responses. The British have already replied in terms close to our own. We expect our other allies will do likewise, adhering to the terms of the NATO communique.

The Secretary gave an oral response to Dobrynin when he delivered the Soviet note, reaffirming our interest in a Berlin agreement and arguing that

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the Soviets have not been very forthcoming in the negotiations. He also took exception to the Soviet portrayal of our attitude toward a European conference, and your interest in making progress on European security. In a subsequent talk with Dobrynin, Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand also took a firm line. State is planning to draft a formal written reply to the Soviet demarche.

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Box 714 FOLDER 2THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

7104048

March 23, 1971

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Soviet Statement on a European Conference

On March 17 the Under Secretary of State called in Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on another matter. Dobrynin took advantage of the call to present an oral statement on a Conference on European Security (CES).

The Soviet comments were in effect a follow-up to the Bucharest meeting of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers (February 18-19). The Ministers cited the "need for additional measures" to remove obstacles to CES. Dobrynin's statement seems to present the "additional measures" as proposed by Moscow. (We are not sure all Pact members would agree with every point.)

The Soviet statement proposes movement forthwith to meetings leading to the convening of CES. The Soviets claim that several matters are not disputed (relaxation of tension as the aim of CES, Helsinki as the site, the attendance of all European states plus the US and Canada) and could be agreed on immediately; then agreement on an agenda and on a date could be negotiated. Or, they say, all of these questions could be decided simultaneously. This practical-step package represents the most concrete proposition the Soviets have yet presented for early talks clearly identifiable as preliminary to CES.

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On the polemical side, the statement's main thrust is against the West's linkage of CES with an agreement in the Berlin talks. All sorts of linkages are possible, the Soviets say--for example, ratification of the FRG-Soviet and FRG-Polish Treaties would help the Berlin talks--but making linkages merely hinders progress towards detente. (In this context they mention the need for FRG ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the first such reminder lately.)

We find the Soviet statement a logical but heavy-handed development of their argument for a Conference and their attempt to portray the US as blocking movement in that direction. Several passages fall particularly rudely upon US and West German ears. The Soviet proposals will not be acceptable to our NATO Allies, who in considering a Conference have formally declared the necessity for a satisfactory solution on Berlin and progress in other talks.

We believe the Soviets have two things in mind. First, they can use this "practical" proposal at the Soviet Party Congress starting March 30 as "proof" that the USSR and its allies are moving forward in Europe towards detente and a Conference, while the West--especially the US--is resisting this movement. Second, the Soviets are continuing to do what they can to foster dissension in the West on the tactics and pace of movement towards CES. Dobrynin said they would present these same observations to the European countries and Canada.


William P. Rogers

Enclosure:

Soviet Statement.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION ✓

March 29, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN... ✓

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*
SUBJECT: New Soviet Pressures for a European Security Conference.

While calling on the Under Secretary of State on another matter recently, Ambassador Dobrynin presented an oral statement on the need for further movement toward a European Security Conference (Tab A).

The main points were:

-- sufficient agreement exists on such broad issues as the need to relax tension in Europe that preparatory discussion for a conference should begin immediately;

-- an agenda and date could be negotiated, or all of these questions relating to preliminary steps and preparations could be agreed simultaneously.

This is the most specific proposition from the Soviets for early talks which would be clearly identified as preparatory to a general conference. Much of their presentation, however, is in the form of arguments against NATO's current policy of linking any movement toward a conference to a satisfactory conclusion of the Berlin negotiations. The Soviets argue strongly against such pre-conditions, and accuse us of opposing a conference.

It seems that this is a rather routine Soviet effort to keep alive the notion of a conference and keep some pressure on the Europeans (who received similar notes) to reduce pre-conditions to a conference. In fact, the Europeans are uneasy about sticking to the agreement that Berlin must be settled first of all. Some now talk of "progress" on Berlin as a sufficient prerequisite for a conference.

The next NATO Ministerial Meeting in June will have to deal with some problems of the conference issues if Berlin is settled. We are engaging the Allies in more discussion to point up the many problems that have to be dealt with not only in terms of procedures, but also in terms of substance. We will also discuss in the Senior Review Group some of the issues that we foresee arising following a Berlin agreement.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 21658
R-XVIII
Russian

Considerations of the Soviet
Government on the question of convening
an all-European Conference

1. The speediest convocation of an all-European conference would promote a further relaxation of tension in Europe, the normalization of relations between all European States regardless of their social and political systems, and the strengthening of security on the European continent.

This viewpoint was reflected in the Statement on questions of strengthening security and developing peaceful cooperation in Europe adopted by the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty in Berlin on December 2, 1970, as well as in the Communique of the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States Parties, to the Warsaw Treaty in Bucharest on February 18-19, 1971.

At present a possibility exists of accelerating the preparation for convening the all-European conference. This can be done on the basis of the proposal made by the Finnish Government on the holding of preparatory meetings of all interested States in Helsinki. The Soviet Government, as well as the Governments of the other States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, fully supports this initiative of the Government of Finland, having in mind that the holding of preparatory meetings would permit discussing and coordinating the practical matters connected with the convocation of the all-European conference.

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However, certain States are striving to handle the whole matter so as to postpone the convocation of the all-European conference for an indefinite time. With these aims in view they are trying to link the convocation of the conference and the transition to a more active phase of preparing it with the preliminary settlement of other questions.

This policy of "preliminary conditions" was evident in the Communiqué on the results of the NATO Council meeting held in Brussels in December 1970, and is being actively exploited by the USA and some of their allies in order to avoid discussing the question of the convocation of the all-European conference. As is known, the successful outcome of the talks between the USSR, France, Britain and the USA on West Berlin as well as "the continuation of other talks" are presented as such "preliminary conditions."

The Soviet side already pointed out the unsound and unjustifiable nature of the policy aimed at tying in one package several questions as a condition for solving each of them. The entire record of international relations confirms that such a policy leads to the slowing-down of the process of solving pressing international problems. It was pointed out also that by its nature the question of West Berlin has neither a legal, nor a political, nor a factual connection with the question of convening the all-European conference.

It is impossible, of course, to deny that the settlement of any question in the relations between the States in Europe would have a positive effect on the general situation on the European continent. The fewer disputed or unresolved problems remain between the States in Europe, the better it will be for the cause of peace. It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet Government comes out in favor of settlement,

including also the questions connected with West Berlin. It was itself, as known, the sponsor of the on-going talks on West Berlin.

Moreover, the above is also true with respect to all the other problems existing in Europe. So, the sooner the treaties concluded between the Soviet Union and the FRG and between Poland and the FRG are ratified and the sooner the relations between the FRG and Czechoslovakia are settled on the basis of recognizing that the Munich Agreement was invalid from the outset with all the ensuing consequences, the more solid and sound will be the relaxation of tension in the relations between the FRG and the Socialist countries of Europe.

The sooner equitable relations between the GDR and those States which have not yet established such relations are set up, the sooner the relations between the FRG and the GDR are settled on the basis of generally accepted norms of international law, and the earlier the opposition to accepting the GDR into the United Nations and other international organizations ends, the more substantial a contribution will be made to strengthening European and international security.

The quicker the FRG, Italy and some other West European countries ratify the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which has already been ratified by many countries of Europe, the more confidence there will be in that the high goals of that Treaty will be fully achieved as applied to the European continent, and this will represent a substantial move toward creating in Europe a situation of lasting peace.

The same can be stated with full justification also with regard to the question of convening an all-European conference: the sooner it takes place,

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e more confidently Europe will proceed along the way of a further laxation of tension.

In the opinion of the Soviet Government all these questions are important and their solution is urgent. One can say even more: progress in solving any one of them will have a positive effect on the solution of all of them. There can be no doubt that if the treaties between the USSR and the FRG and between Poland and the FRG were already ratified and in force, that would create a still more favorable situation for the success of the negotiations on West Berlin while the convocation of the all-European conference would help solve many European problems.

However, this does not mean at all that until any one of the European questions is settled it would be impossible to settle the rest of them. Such an approach can have but one aim - that of hindering and discontinuing the process of normalizing the situation in Europe. And only those who favor, not peace and cooperation between European States, but a return to the times of the "cold war" in the relations between them, may wish this. The Soviet Government proceeds from the premise that it is necessary to advance the solution of all the questions pertaining to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe and to act simultaneously in all important directions of European policy.

It is with these considerations in mind that the Soviet Government resolutely opposes linking the question of holding the all-European conference with other questions and making their solution a preliminary condition for holding the conference. It regards such an approach not only as erroneous but also as detrimental to the cause of peace in Europe.

Authority EO 12958By SMC NARA Date 7-8-03

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This is also the joint viewpoint of the Warsaw Treaty States, clearly expressed in the Bucharest Communiqué of the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

3. The Soviet Government considers it advisable to undertake without any delay certain practical steps in terms of preparing the convocation of the all-European conference. At the preparatory meetings in Helsinki, proposed by the Government of Finland, or at first in the course of bilateral, group or multilateral contacts, it might be possible to agree first of all on those questions regarding which there are already no differences of opinion. Such questions obviously include: definition of the principle^a purpose of the all-European conference, i.e., the further relaxation of tension in Europe; selection of the place where it will be held, i.e., Helsinki; agreement on the body of participants, i.e., all the European States as well as the USA and Canada. Having fixed agreement on those questions, it might then be possible to proceed to a more concrete and thorough exchange of opinion on formulating the agenda for the conference. Having agreed on the agenda, the would-be participants could then agree on a date for holding it, acceptable to all.

It is possible, of course, to seek agreement on all these questions, not on the basis of the above "step-by-step" principle, but simultaneously.

The Soviet Government is prepared to consider the possible viewpoints of the other interested States on the manner of preparing the conference. The only thing the Soviet Government does not agree to is the policy of dragging out the whole matter. It is our deep conviction that there is not a single State or people in Europe whose national interests would be served by such a policy.

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Authority EO 12958
By RAA ARA Date 7-1-03

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

September 3, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: AL HAIG
SUBJECT: The European Scene

I am somewhat concerned and I know Sonnenfeldt is as well that recent events, including the Berlin Agreement, the U. S. monetary actions and even the Peking Initiative have changed the European environment drastically and requires a reassessment of where we are going. The following factors have emerged:

-- An obvious effort by the individual powers (France, Germany and others) to race frantically to Moscow so as not to be found lacking as the other powers improve their relations.

-- Displeasure and distrust of U. S. motives with respect to the Western Alliance sharpened immeasurably by the economic initiative.

-- A reactivated Soviet diplomacy designed both to wrest the initiative from Peking and to temper the impact of U. S. summitry with Peking.

-- Increased momentum for MBFR and a European security conference in the wake of progress in Berlin and anticipated progress in SALT.

These phenomena and others will all tend to erode the fiber of the Western Alliance and seriously threaten the confidence in U. S. leadership which resulted from the President's trip to Europe in 1969 and his personal discussions with key European leaders. This situation leads me to believe that we should consider seriously a new Presidential trip to Europe which would be timed carefully to take cognizance of other major events which you are aware of -- the full impact of which will further contribute to the trends outlined above.

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The foregoing are preliminary thoughts which you might wish to consider over the weekend. I am very concerned that we may have set in motion forces which will ultimately jeopardize the fundamental interests which are essential to the stability of Western Europe and the resources so fundamental to U.S. survival. A similar case could be made for the Asian scene which is, of course, much more complex and will require equally intense review in the months ahead.

It might be that we should consider a Summit meeting, perhaps in Bermuda, or at some other location which would include the U.K., France and Germany and which would demonstrate the universality of Big Four ties at a time when all the trends would suggest a worrisome erosion of traditional confidence and cooperation.

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By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03



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S E C R E T USNATO 3721

POLICY

SUBJECT: CES: A NEW CHAPTER BEGINS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. COMPLETION OF QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON BERLIN HAS LED TO GENERAL ASSUMPTION AMONG ALLIES THAT MINISTERS IN DECEMBER WILL WANT TO MOVE DECISIVELY TOWARDS A CES. THIS MESSAGE DESCRIBES SOME OF THE MAJOR POLICY ISSUES WHICH WILL BE IMPLICIT IN DISCUSSION HERE BETWEEN NOW AND DECEMBER MINISTERIAL. END SUMMARY.

2. BEYOND BERLIN. OUR SOUNDINGS INDICATE THAT, AS LONG AS



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BONN GROUP REMAINS UNITED ON THIS POINT, OUR ALLIES WILL AWAIT CONCLUSION OF ALL THREE STAGES OF BERLIN AGREEMENT BEFORE OPENING MULTILATERAL CES PREPARATIONS. IT IS EQUALLY EVIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT ONCE FINAL PROTOCOL ON BERLIN IS SIGNED, ALLIES WILL EXPECT TO ENTER MULTILATERAL CONTACTS WITHOUT DELAY.

3. FRG'S POSITION WILL BE A MAJOR FACTOR AFFECTING THINKING OF EUROPEAN ALLIES, PARTICULARLY ON TIMING OF A CES. BONN WILL PRESUMABLY WISH TO MAINTAIN SOME CORRELATION BETWEEN PACE OF CES ACTIVITY AND SENSITIVE QUESTION OF DEVELOPMENT INNER-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP AND GDR PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL BODIES. FRANCE WILL PROBABLY STRETCH LIMITS PERMITTED BY BONN; UK, FEARING A CES LESS THAN MBFR, WILL LIKELY STAY IN STEP WITH ITS POTENTIAL COMMON MARKET PARTNERS; AND THE OTHER EUROPEAN ALIES WILL FOLLOW THE LEAD OF THESE THREE.

4. MBFR/CES RELATIONSHIP. THIS SUBJECT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ARISE DURING DEPUTY FONMIN MEETING. WHILE WE STILL HAVE FULL FLEXIBILITY ON THIS QUESTION, THE PROSPECT OF COMPLETED BERLIN AGREEMENT PRIOR TO MBFR NEGOTIATIONS MAKES IT HARDER FOR ALLIES TO SEE HOW MBFR AND CES CAN BE KEPT ON COMPLETELY SEPARATE TRACKS.

5. WE RECOGNIZE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING TO HIGHLIGHT MBFR AS A NATO INITIATIVE AND CERTAINLY WOULD NOT FAVOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TAKING PLACE IN A FULL-DRESS CES. IF CES PREPARATIONS GET UNDERWAY FIRST, HOWEVER, CES "UMBRELLA" FOR MBFR MAY, IN FACT, PROVIDE CERTAIN ADVANTAGES:

--GIVES CES A SECURITY FOCUS AND AVOIDS CREATING IMPRESSION FROM LESS SUBSTANTIAL AGENDA THAT ALL EUROPEAN PROBLEMS HAD BEEN SOLVED IN SINGLE CONFERENCE

--PROVIDES A FRAMEWORK IN WHICH STATES OTHER THAN THOSE DIRECTLY CONCERNED CAN BE ASSOCIATED AS APPROPRIATE WITH MBFR WITHOUT NECESSARILY PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS

--MAY MAKE FRENCH PARTICIPATION EASIER.

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6. DECISIONS FOR DECEMBER MINISTERIAL. WHETHER OR NOT ALL THREE STAGES OF BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED BY DECEMBER MEETING, AS LONG AS THESE TALKS ARE PROGRESSING SATISFACTORILY, THE MINISTERS WILL NEED TO PUT SEAL OF APPROVAL ON NATO'S SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL APPROACH TO CES PREPARATIONS (SEE SEPTTEL FOR DETAILS ON STATE OF THESE PREPARATIONS). MOREOVER, AS WE APPROACH THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL MEETING WE MAY FIND AN INCREASINGLY SHARP CONFRONTATION BETWEEN TWO CONCEPTS OF CES:

- (1) A HIGH-LEVEL CES HELD IN THE SPRING OF 1972 PRIMARILY TO PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO VENTILATE NATIONAL VIEWS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND COOPERATION, WITH ANY SERIOUS WORK BEING REMANDED TO WORKING LEVEL WHICH WOULD REPORT BACK LATER TO A SECOND CES.
- (2) A HIGH-LEVEL CES HELD LATER IN 1972, IF THEN, WITH THE PRIMARY TASK OF RATIFYING UNDERSTANDINGS PREVIOUSLY REACHED AT LOWER LEVEL ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. EXCEPT FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF A POSSIBLE DATE, THIS IS THE CURRENT U.S. POSITION.

7. THE FIRST APPROACH COULD BE REPRESENTED AS AN EXPLORATORY "FIRST" CONFERENCE, FROM WHICH NO GREAT RESULTS SHOULD BE EXPECTED EXCEPT TO SET IN TRAIN LOWER-LEVEL, POSSIBLY LENGTHY NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECOND APPROACH HAS THE IMPORTANT ADVANTAGES, TO WHICH WE ARE GIVING HEAVY STRESS, OF PROVIDING OPPORTUNITY FOR SERIOUS EXAMINATION OF SPECIFIC ISSUES AND OF ENHANCING PROSPECTS FOR SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS BEFORE AGREEING TO A CES.

8. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THESE TWO APPROACHES CAN BE FULLY RECONCILED BEFORE THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL OR THAT THE FIFTEEN ALLIES ARE LIKELY TO AGREE ON ALL SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL POINTS. NEVERTHELESS, CAREFUL PREPARATIONS, LED BY THE U.S., WILL CONTINUE TO PAY DIVIDENDS IN TERMS OF IDENTIFYING KEY PROBLEMS IN ADVANCE OF A CES. GP-4.
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S E C R E T USNATO 3723

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03



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SUBJECT: CES; STATE OF ALLIED PREPARATIONS.

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. NATO CONSULTATION THIS FALL WILL ENTER NEW PHASE OF ACTIVE PREPARATIONS FOR OPENING EAST-WEST MULTILATERAL CONTACTS. ON THE EVE OF THESE CONSULTATIONS, THIS MESSAGE REVIEWS STATE OF ALLIES' WORK ON POTENTIAL CES AGENDA ITEMS AND EXAMINES WHAT NEEDS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED TO MOLD PREVIOUS STUDIES INTO USEFUL DOSSIERS FOR WESTERN NEGOTIATORS. TO HELP BLUNT FRENCH OBJECTIONS TO THESE PREPARATIONS, WE SUGGEST THAT THE SECRETARY BROACH THIS QUESTION WITH FRENCH FONMIN SCHUMANN ON SEPTEMBER 24.
END SUMMARY.

2. ALLIES SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH TO CES. SINCE MID-1969, ALLIANCE STUDIES, BASED MAINLY ON U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS, HAVE BROUGHT A LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON BASIC OBJECTIVES WHICH ALLIES WOULD WISH TO PURSUE AT A CES. AS SIGNALLED IN SUCCESSIVE NATO MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE, THE ALLIES HAVE EXPANDED UPON THE WARSAW PACT'S TWO-ITEM CES AGENDA (RENUNCIATION OF FORCE AND ECONOMIC/TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGE) TO IDENTIFY THEIR OWN PREFERRED AGENDA. ALLIED PREFERENCES FOR CES AGENDA AND THEIR UNDERLYING GOALS (AS REFLECTED IN MOST RECENT NATO STUDY ON EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS) FOLLOWS:

A. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING RELATIONS AMONG STATES. ALLIED GOAL: UNDERCUT BREZHNEV DOCTRINE THROUGH A STRONG REAFFIRMATION OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENCE OF EACH STATE IN EUROPE IRRESPECTIVE OF SOCIAL SYSTEM. THE ALLIES WOULD ALSO LIKE TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHER THIS REAFFIRMATION COULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY "SUBSTANTIAL MEASURES." (THUS PRESERVING OPTION THAT AN AGREEMENT ON PRINCIPLES MIGHT BE REINFORCED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY THROUGH CONCRETE SECURITY MEASURES, E.G., MBFR NEGOTIATIONS/AGREEMENT, COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS, PERMANENT MACHINERY.)

B. FREER MOVEMENT OF PERSONS, IDEAS AND INFORMATION. ALLIES GOAL: CHALLENGE SOVIETS TO TAKE "SPECIFIC LIBERALIZING MEASURES" TO NORMALIZE HUMAN CONTACTS IN EUROPE. (NOTE: FRANCE HAS SHOWN NOTABLE ENTHUSIASM FOR STRONG ALLIED POSTURE IN THIS FIELD, AND

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LED VIEW, ACCEPTED BY OTHER ALLIES, THAT ALLIES SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE DEGREE OF WESTERN CONSIDERATION OF MATTERS OF INTEREST TO SOVIETS (E.G., TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY) WILL BE AFFECTED BY SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARDS WESTERN PROPOSALS FOR FREER MOVEMENT.)

C. ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION.

ALLIED GOAL: SEEK APPROPRIATE STEPS, LARGELY THROUGH BILATERAL CONTACTS AND EXISTING ORGANIZATIONS, TO INCREASE MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TRADE. AT SAME TIME, DEFLECT EASTERN ATTACKS ON WESTERN "DISCRIMINATION" BY FOCUSING ON TRADE-INHIBITING PRACTICES OF WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES AND POSSIBLE MEASURES FOR THEIR AMELIORATION.

D. COOPERATION TO IMPROVE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT.

ALLIED GOAL: ENCOURAGE BROAD MULTILATERAL COLLABORATION AND IDENTIFY SPECIFIC AREAS FOR EAST-WEST ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION IN EUROPE. (NOTE: ALLIES ARE CONSIDERING ASPECTS OF CCMS WORK WHICH MIGHT BE RELEVANT IN EAST-WEST CONTEXT.)

E. PERMANENT MACHINERY. ALLIES HAVE BEEN STUDYING VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES, BUT DO NOT APPEAR READY TO MAKE EARLY DECISIONS IN THIS AREA.

3. WE RECOGNIZE THAT AS WE GET CLOSER TO A CONFERENCE, SOME ALLIES WILL WISH TO SOFTEN THESE POSITIONS ON BASIS THAT SOME ARE "NON-NEGOTIABLE" AND WOULD "TORPEDO" A CES. NOR DO WE WISH TO EXAGGERATE LIKELY RESULTS OF CES PRELIMINARIES. NONETHELESS, MOST ALLIES CONTINUE TO AGREE WITH U.S. ARGUMENT THAT TOUGH APPROACH STRENGTHENS ALLIES' BARGAINING POSITION AND PRESERVES WESTERN OPTIONS, AND THAT IT IS PREMATURE TO BEGIN CONSIDERING FALLBACK POSITIONS.

4. FURTHER PREPARATIONS. NEXT STEP IN INTERNAL ALLIANCE PREPARATIONS, AND PRINCIPAL WORK OF NATO COMMITTEES THIS FALL, WILL BE TO DEVELOP DOSSIERS ON EACH POTENTIAL AGENDA ITEM BASED ON PREVIOUS ALLIANCE STUDIES. THE NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF HAS PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING THREE-SECTION FORMAT -- WHICH WITH SOME MODIFICATION SHOULD MEET OUR NEEDS -- FOR THESE DOSSIERS:

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QUOTE: 1. IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEM/DIFFICULTIES:

2. POLITICAL/LLEGAL PRINCIPLES AS BASIS FOR SOLUTION;

3. CONCRETE FORMULATION OF IDEAS WHICH COULD ENTER INTO
EVENTUAL WESTERN PROPOSITION. UNQUOTE.

5. OBJECTION TO "POSITION PAPERS." THE MAJOR OBSTACLE
TO SATISFACTORY CONDUCT OF THIS WORK IS OBJECTION BY SOME
ALLIES TO DEVELOPING ALLIANCE "POSITIONS" AND, LESS SO,
TO DRAFTING TEXTS WITHIN NATO FOR USE AT A CES. WE CAN
ONLY BLUNT THE ALLIED OBJECTIONS IN THIS AREA BY REMINDING
ALLIES AT ALL TIMES OF IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO MAINTAIN-
ING ALLIED COHESION IN EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS AND TO ENSURING
THAT INDIVIDUAL APPROACHES ARE COMPLEMENTARY. IN ANY
CASE, IN VIEW OF SPECIAL "NON-BLOC" CHARACTER OF CES,
INTERNAL ALLIANCE STUDIES WOULD BE ONLY ADVISORY TO
GOVERNMENTS AND NOT BINDING. RECOMMENDATION: IN VIEW
AGGRESSIVE FRENCH DRIVE IN THIS AREA, IT WOULD BE
HELPFUL IF THE SECRETARY WOULD IN HIS BILATERAL WITH
FONMIN SCHUMANN ON SEPTEMBER 24 EMPHASIZE IMPORTANCE WE
ATTACH TO CAREFUL PREPARATIONS WITHIN NATO FOR MULTI-
LATERALIZATION.

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By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03



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File European Security

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 170121

SUBJ: GERMANY-BERLIN ISSUES AT A CES

REF: BONN 11198, PARA 4

1. GERMANY-BERLIN ISSUES WERE EITHER NOT ADDRESSED OR WERE LEFT UNRESOLVED IN EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS STUDY CONDUCTED PRIOR TO LISBON NATO MINISTERIAL (CM(71)40). HOWEVER, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE TO REACH MAXIMUM POSSIBLE ALLIED CONSENSUS WITH RESPECT TO THEM, FIRST IN BONN GROUP AND THEN IN NATO, BEFORE THE OPENING OF ANY MULTILATERAL DISCUSSIONS PRELIMINARY TO A CES. US VIEWS ON SUBSTANCE REMAIN AS SET OUT IN STATE 67460, 68274 AND 82079. (RECENT FRG VIEWS ON TIMING WERE CONTAINED IN STATE 168348, WITH HILLENBRAND-NOEBEL MEMCON ON FURTHER FRG VIEWS TO FOLLOW.)

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WM THREE DISTINCT BUT CLOSELY RELATED PROBLEMS ARISE:

A) GDR PARTICIPATION AT CES PRELIMINARIES AND CONFERENCE ITSELF. THIS QUESTION IS OF PRIMARY INTEREST TO FRG, SINCE CES MAY WELL CONVENE BEFORE FULL DETAILS OF INNER-GERMAN MODUS VIVENDI AND GDR ADMISSION TO UN HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT. BEGIN FYI. HOWEVER, GERMANS NOW WISH TO DEFER CONVENING CONFERENCE ITSELF UNTIL ALL MAJOR INNER-GERMAN ISSUES ARE RESOLVED (STATE 168348). FRENCH, WE ASSUME, WILL OPPOSE LINKAGE OF CES TO FINAL AGREEMENT UPON INNER-GERMAN MODUS VIVENDI. END FYI.

B) EUROPEAN BORDERS - ALLIED ATTITUDE TO WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL THAT CES ISSUE DECLARATION AFFIRMING RESPECT FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES WITHIN THEIR EXISTING BORDERS. UNDERLYING QUESTION HERE IS EXTENT TO WHICH AGREED CES STATEMENT ON BORDERS WOULD UNDERMINE QUADRIPARTITE RIGHTS WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY AS A WHOLE AND BERLIN. EVEN THOUGH LAST NATO STUDY DID NOT ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE, ALLIES WERE STILL UNABLE TO AGREE UPON STATEMENT OF THEIR GENERAL APPROACH TO IT; HENCE THE TWO VERSIONS OF PARAGRAPH 26 IN CM (71)40. MOREOVER, BONN GROUP MEMBERS DID NOT AGREE AMONG THEMSELVES, AND FRENCH, SUPPORTED BY SEVERAL OTHER ALLIES, FAVORED Milder OF TWO VERSIONS, WHILE US AND UK PREFERRED SOMEWHAT FIRMER LANGUAGE PROPOSED BY FRG.

C) EFFECT ON QUADRIPARTITE RIGHTS OF POSSIBLE CES DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD GOVERN INTERSTATE RELATIONS. CES WOULD PROBABLY ADOPT DECLARATION ON THIS SUBJECT, REAFFIRMING VALIDITY OF SUCH PRINCIPLES AS RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES. SINCE GDR PARTICIPATION IS ASSUMED, THIS COULD HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR BERLIN ACCESS AND FOR QUADRIPARTITE RIGHTS MORE GENERALLY UNLESS BALANCED BY APPROPRIATELY DRAFTED SAVING CLAUSE.

3. THESE MATTERS WERE RAISED BY US REP IN BONN GROUP IN APRIL (BONN 5324), BUT UK AND FRENCH REPS MADE NO REPEAT NO INSTRUCTED RESPONSE TO OUR STATEMENT. HOWEVER, FRG REP DID PRESENT TENTATIVE STATEMENT OF GERMAN VIEWS. HE INDICATED THAT APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE FOR RESERVATION OR DISCLAIMER WITH RESPECT TO GDR PARTICIPATION COULD NOT BE WORKED OUT IN DETAIL UNTIL AFTER CONCLUSION FINAL BERLIN AGREEMENT. RE

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BORDERS, GERMANS BELIEVED THAT, IF CES ADDRESSED ISSUE, FRG WOULD INSIST THAT DISCLAIMER BE INSERTED IN CES TEXT (BONN 5713). WHILE SUCH FORMULATION SHOULD BE AGREED UPON PRIOR TO CONVENING OF CES (AND APPARENTLY ALSO BEFORE BEGINNING OF PRELIMINARY MULTILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, ALTHOUGH THIS NOT EXPLICITLY STATED), FRG THOUGHT ISSUE BEST LEFT OPEN FOR DISCUSSION WITH SOVIETS BY THREE POWERS AND FRG, AFTER CONCLUSION OF BERLIN AGREEMENT. GERMANS ALSO OBSERVED THAT "BORDER PROVISIONS OF MOSCOW AND WARSAW TREATIES WERE ONLY ACCEPTABLE WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF COMPLEX POLITICAL CONTENT" (BONN 5383). FRG PRESENTATION IN BONN GROUP DID NOT ADDRESS THIRD PROBLEM MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE (EFFECT ON QUADRIPARTITE RIGHTS OF POSSIBLE CES DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES).

4. OUR OWN CURRENT THINKING ON THESE MATTERS FOLLOWS. WITH RESPECT TO GDR PARTICIPATION AT CES AND PRELIMINARIES, WE WOULD GIVE WEIGHT TO GERMAN VIEWS SINCE FRG INTEREST HERE IS PARAMOUNT, BUT WE WOULD WISH TO AVOID AT THIS TIME ANY COMMITMENTS TO DEFER CES UNTIL ALL INTER-GERMAN QUESTIONS ARE RESOLVED. IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE FOR GERMANS TO STATE THEIR VIEWS IN NATO, AND TO SEEK ALLIED SUPPORT FOR THEM, BEFORE THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL RATHER THAN TO RUT OFF ALL FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF MATTER UNTIL BERLIN AGREEMENT FINALLY CONCLUDED.

5. WITH RESPECT TO BORDERS PROBLEM, GIVEN DIVERGENT VIEWS, BOTH WITHIN BONN GROUP AND AMONG ALLIES MORE GENERALLY, WHICH SURFACED DURING PRE-LISBON DISCUSSIONS, WE DOUBT THE ADVISABILITY OF DEFERRING FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE, AS GERMANS HAVE SUGGESTED, UNTIL CONCLUSION OF FINAL BERLIN AGREEMENT. IF CES PRELIMINARIES BEGIN SHORTLY AFTER SIGNATURE OF BERLIN ACCORD, BORDERS ISSUE WOULD PROBABLY NOT RECEIVE CAREFUL PRIOR CONSIDERATION BY ALLIES WHICH WE BELIEVE IT DESERVES. ALLIED DIFFERENCES WOULD THEN EMERGE IN CES CONTEXT, THUS WEAKENING OUR BARGAINING POSITION.

6. FINALLY, WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE EFFECT ON QUADRI-PARTITE RIGHTS OF OTHER ELEMENTS OF CES DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT APPROPRIATELY DRAFTED SAVING CLAUSE WILL BE REQUIRED.

7. WE WOULD WELCOME EMBASSY BONN'S COMMENTS ON ABOVE, PERHAPS

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AFTER FURTHER SOUNDING OF OTHER BONN GROUP REPS. IF THERE IS DISPOSITION TO AWAIT FINAL BERLIN AGREEMENT BEFORE TURNING ATTENTION TO THESE QUESTIONS, WE SHOULD POINT TO POSSIBILITY THAT OTHER ALLIES WILL WISH TO PURSUE NATO DISCUSSION OF SOME OF THEM, WHETHER OR NOT BONN GROUP PRODUCES AGREED POSITION. REQUEST USNATO COMMENTS ON THIS ASPECT OF MATTER AND MISSION'S ESTIMATE OF WHEN THESE ISSUES ARE LIKELY TO ARISE IN CURRENT NATO STUDIES. ROGERS

1828

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03



Department of State

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ACTION SS-25

FILE COPY 3

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 FILE-01 /027 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7322
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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- ~~ANDERSON~~
- ~~BEER~~
- ~~BOSTEN~~
- ~~CLARK~~
- ~~FRIGGE~~
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- ~~HELAN~~
- ~~FRANZHOFF~~
- ~~FRANZ~~
- ~~SANDERS~~
- ~~STUBB~~
- ~~WRIGHT~~

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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 2877

EXDIS

SECTO 17

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION; FM GROMYKO (U-S-S-R)
DINNER
SEPTEMBER 24, 1971; 8PM
WALDORF TOWERS.

FOLLOWING IS NOFORN, FYI ONLY, UNCLEARED AND SUBJECT TO REVISION ON REVIEW.

1. PARTICIPANTS: USSR - FM GROMYKO, AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, PERMREP MALIK, MR. MENDELEVICH, MR. KORNIENKO, MR. VORONTSOV, MR. ISSRAELYAN, MR. SUKHODREV (INTERPRETER/NOTETAKER); US - THE SECRETARY, AMBASSADOR BUSH, AMBASSADOR BEAM, MR. PEDERSEN, MR. SISCO, MR. DEPALMA, MR. HILLENBRAND, MR. MUROMCEW (INTERPRETER/NOTETAKER).

2. THE SECRETARY OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY STATING HIS GRATIFICATION AT THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF THE BERLIN TALKS AND FELT IT USEFUL NOW TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND THEIR RELATION TO THE BERLIN PROBLEM. THE US SIDE HAS ALREADY MENTIONED ITS INTEREST TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR. NOW WAS THE TIME TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE PROCEDURES.

3. FM GROMYKO REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD NOTED US'S STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND, IF CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD, THE USG IS SYMPATHETICALLY CONSIDERING

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A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE. AS EARLIER INDICATED THE SOVIET SIDE HAS NO INTENTION TO PURSUE ANY TREACHEROUS AIMS OR TO HARM ANY NATION. THE SOVIET SIDE IS BEING GUIDED BY THE DESIRE TO FIND A WAY TO REDUCE TENSIONS IN EUROPE AND TO IMPROVE THE EUROPEAN SITUATION AS WELL AS THE RELATIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES. ALL COUNTRIES, GROMYKO STRESSED, NOT ONLY BETWEEN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. WHAT HE HAD SAID SO FAR WAS NOT NEW BUT NOW IT WAS NECESSARY TO SEE WHAT PRACTICAL MEASURES CAN BE TAKEN TO PURSUE ABOVE AIMS.

4. IT WOULD BE WELL HE CONTINUED, TO HAVE A PREFERABLY MULTI-LATERAL MEETING TO DISCUSS THE AGENDA, THE PARTICIPANTS, AND TO FINALIZE OTHER QUESTIONS SUCH AS THE TIME FOR SUCH A MEETING. HE FELT THAT THE FINNISH PROPOSAL SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO SPEED UP THE WORK. HE WOULD HOPE ON HIS RETURN FROM THE UN TO REPORT TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT THAT THE USG AGREES TO SUCH AN APPROACH AND WOULD AGREE TO SUCH A MEETING NEXT YEAR. AND HOPEFULLY BE EVEN MORE SPECIFIC ON THE DATE, TO WHICH ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE TO AGREE.

5. THE SECRETARY THEN ASKED FM GRONYKO TO CLARIFY HIS THOUGHTS ON THE AGENDA AND WHETHER ALL OR ONLY SOME OF THE PARTICIPATING NATIONS WOULD TAKE PART IN THE PRELIMINARY MEETING. FM GROMYKO REPLIED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEEK ALL NATIONS PARTICIPATING IN SUCH A PRELIMINARY MEETING. THE SECRETARY THEN ASKED ABOUT THE LEVEL OF SUCH A PRELIMINARY MEETING AND ALSO ABOUT THE TIMING IN RELATION TO THE RATIFICATION (AFTER FINAL SIGNATURE) OF THE BERLIN AGREEMENT.

6. FM GROMYKO THOUGHT THAT NO STRICT RELATIONSHIPS SHOULD BE APPLIED BUT THE DEVELOPMENTS WERE SUCH THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE THE RATIFICATION FIRST. THE FRG GOVERNMENT, TO HIS KNOWLEDGE PROCEEDED FROM THE SAME ASSUMPTION. HE EXPECTED THE RATIFICATION TO TAKE PLACE EARLY NEXT YEAR BUT THIS SHOULD NOT BE A PRE-CONDITION FOR THE PRELIMINARY. HE STRESSED, PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS THE AGENDA AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FULL CONFERENCE. HIS SIDE WAS OPEN MINDED AS TO THE LEVEL OF THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE. IT COULD

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BE, FOR INSTANCE, ON THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL OR THEIR EQUIVALENTS. IT WAS UP TO EACH OF THE GOVERNMENTS TO APPOINT A SUITABLE REPRESENTATIVE. SOME COUNTRIES COULD AUTHORIZE THEIR AMBASSADORS TO FINALDN. THE MAIN POINT IN HIS VIEW WAS NOT TO GET TIED UP BY A PROTOCAOL CONSIDERATION BUT TO REMAIN FLEXIBLE.

7. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT ANY MEETING OF THIS NATURE WOULD ASSUME THE AURA OF A CONFERENCE. THE US SIDE PLANNED TO BE FLEXIBLE AND FIND WAYS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WITHOUT A CONFERENCE. ONE COULD, FOR INSTANCE, HAVE BILTAERAL EXPLORATORY TALKS ON PROCEDURE AND AGENDA WITHOUT CONVENING A CONFERENCE. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEM OF HAVING A CONFERENCE BEFORE THE RATIFICATION.

8. GROMYKO REPLIED THAT PERHAPS A VERY MODEST TERM COULD BE FOUND TO DESCRIBE SUCH A MEETING. HE FELT THAT BILATERAL TLKS WOULD NOT SERVE THE PURPOSE SINCE THE AGREEMENT OF OTHER COUNTRIES WAS NEEDED. IT WOULD TAKE TOO LONG TO DO THIS IN WRITING. THE PROBLEM WAS TO FIND A SUITABLE AND RATIONAL FORMAT TO PREPARE FOR THE CONFERENCE. HE WAS AGAINST SITTING AND WAITING FOR THE RATIFICATION. AFTER ALL, HE ARGUED, THE US AND THE USSR ARE CONDUCTING PARALLEL TALKS ON DIFFERENCT SUBJECTS.

9. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION TO DICIDE ON THE CONFERENCE IN A BILATERAL MANNER BUT WAS LOOKING FOR A LESS STRUCTURED APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM. HE FORESAW DIFFICULTIES WITH A CONFERNECE BEFORE THE RATIFICATION. THE FRG STATED THAT IT HAS TO HAVE A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION ON BERLIN BEFORE THEY COULD PARTICIPATE IN A EUROPEAN CONFERENCE. HE THEN ASKED FOR THE SOVIET VIEWS ON MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES, THAT IS, TO DISCUSS IT AT THE CONFERENCE OR TO NEGOTIATE IT SEPARATELY.

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By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03



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ACTION SS-25

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FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7323
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3010

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EXDIS

SECTO 17

10. FM GROMYKO REPLIED THAT HE WOULD PREFER SEPARATE TALKS ON THE REDUCTION OF FORCES IN ORDER NOT TO BURDEN THE MAIN CONFERENCE WITH TOO MANY ITEMS. HE ALSO THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE REDUCTION OF FORCES BEFORE CONVENING THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE. IT WOULD ALSO BE POSSIBLE TO CREATE A SPECIAL BODY OR MACHINERY TO DEAL WITH THIS QUESTION AT THE SECURITY CONFERENCE IN WHICH ALL COUNTRIES WOULD PARTICIPATE. HE STRESSED THAT THE REDUCTION OF FORCES COULD ALSO BE TREATED SEPARATELY AS AN ISOLATED ITEM.

11. THE SECRETARY INQUIRED WHETHER THE SAME NATIONS WOULD BE PARTICIPATING IN BOTH CONFERENCES. FM GROMYKO REPLIED THAT ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES INTERESTED IN IT WILL PARTICIPATE BUT THIS SHOULD NOT MEAN THAT IT WOULD EFFECT THE ARMAMENTS OF ALL THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. HE COULD NOT PRESENT A DETAILED PLAN AT THIS POINT AND HOPED THAT THE US SIDE WAS NOT EXPECTING IT FROM HIM. HE COULD HOWEVER LIST SOME, IF NOT ALL, PRINCIPAL POINTS: (A) THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES WILL PERTAIN TO FOREIGN AS WELL AS NATIONAL FORCES. (B) THIS QUESTION MUST NOT BE VIEWED IN TERMS OF BLOCs BUT ON BASIS OF SEPARATE STATES. TO USE THE BLOC APPROACH WOULD PUT MANY COUNTRIES ON GUARD. THIS WAS ALL HE COULD SAY AT THIS TIME AND COULD OFFER NO FURTHER ANALYSIS. HE WOULD HOPE TO HAVE AN EXCHANGE WITH

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THE US SIDE ON THIS SUBJECT OF A MORE CONCRETE NATURE.

12. BUT THE SECRETARY INQUIRED WHETHER A SINGLE PERSON COULD DEAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN THIS MATTER. FM GROMYKO COUBTED THAT THIS WOULD BE THE BEST APPROACH BECAUSE HAVING ONE PERSON FROM EACH GROUP WOULD GIVE THIS ENTERPRISE A BLOC ASPECT. THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT AFRAID OF THIS BUT IN GENERAL WAS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC FEARING THAT SOME COUNTRIES MAY REACT NEGATIVELY AND NOT WITHOUT A REASON. THEREFORE A MORE ACCEPTABLE FORM WAS NEEDED TO PLEASE POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS. THE SECRETARY THEN SUGGESTED A COMMITTEE. FM GROMYKO CONTINUED THAT THE ABOVE RESERVATIONS DID NOT APPLY TO A US REPRESENTATIVE WHO WOULD MEET A SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE. IN NO CASE SHOULD THIS BE A NATO REPRESENTATIVE OR A WARSAW PACT REPRESENTATIVE. A MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE WAS NEEDED. FOR INSTANCE, A US AND A SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE COULD MEET AND THEN THE USG WOULD SHARE THE VIEWS WITH OTHERS JUST AS THE SOVIET UNION WOULD DO WITH HER ALLIES. LET US GO OUTSIDE OF THE BLOC FRAMEWORK AND I INVITE YOUR ATTENTION TO THIS PROPOSAL, CONCLUDED FM GROMYKO. THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED TO CONTINUE THESE TALKS IN WASHINGTON.

13. AMBASSADOR BUSH THEN PRESENTED A BRIEF REPORT ON THE PARLIAMENTARY SITUATION IN THE UN ON THE CHIREP ISSUE. THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE FOR THE US. ALTHOUGH HIS COLLEAGUE, THE SOVIET PERMREP MALIK, WOULD ARGUE THAT THE MIDDLE EAST IS A FAR MORE IMPORTANT QUESTION AT THIS TIME. THE PROBLEMS INCLUDED DIFFERENCES OF OFFICIAL POSITIONS OF SEVERAL GOVERNMENTS AND SOME PEOPLE AT THE UN THOUGHT THAT THE US SIDE WAS NOT SERIOUS ABOUT IT. THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY HAD DETERMINED TO WORK ON A SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM, IN PARTICULAR ABOUT SEATING TAIWAN AND PEKING.

14. ON THE CHINA QUESTION FM GROMYKO WANTED TO SAY AGAIN THAT THE POSITION OF HIS GOVERNMENT WAS KNOWN AND HAS NOT CHANGED. IN THE INTEREST OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S POLICY AND IN THE INTEREST OF THE UN HE COULD

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NOT ACT OTHERWISE. THERE WAS NOTHING NEW HE COULD STATE AND HIS GOVERNMENT WILL MAINTAIN THE SAME POSITION DURING THE WHOLE SESSION. IF THE USG WOULD LIKE TO COMMUNICATE SOME NEW NUANCES HE WOULD BE GLAD TO HEAR THEM AND TAKE NOT OF THEM. IN CONCLUSION HE CONGRATULATED AMB BUSH ON HIS EFFORTS.

15. TURNING TO THE SECRETARY FM GROMYKO ASKED HIM FOR HIS VIEWS ON THE OUTCOME ON THE CHINA QUESTION. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO TELL BUT THE US SAIDE HOPED TO SUCCEED. GROMYKO THEN ASKED WHETHER THE SECRETARY EXPECTED THE CHINESE TO COME IN CASE OF A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THEIR PRESENT POSITION BUT THAT GOVERNMENTS HAD A WAY OF CHANGING THIER VIEWS IN FACE OF REALITY. HE ADDID THAT THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION WILL HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

16. AMBASSADOR BEAM THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF DIVIDED FAMILIES IN THE USSR AND IN THE US ADDING THAT THIS QUESTION HAD BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION SINCE 1959 AND MEANT A LOT TO THE FAMILIES CONCERNED BUT WAS SUCH A SMALL MATTER FOR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. HE THEN TRANSMITTED A LIST TO THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE KORNIENKO.


17. THE QUESTION OF A STATEMENT TO THE PRESS WAS BRIEFLY DISCUSSED IN LIGHT VEIN. IN CONCLUSION THE SECRETARY SAID AGAIN HOW GLAD HE WAS ABOUT THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED DURING THE LAST YEAR AND HOPED TO CONTINUE IN THE SAME SPIRIT AND WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING FM GRONYKO IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. IN REPLY FM GROMYKO ASSURED THE SECRETARY OF THE WILLINGNESS THE SOVIET SYDE ALSO TO CONTINUE IN THE SAME APIRIT OF COOPERATION.

ROGERS

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REUN-68



INTELLIGENCE NOTE

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

October 15, 1971

NATO: DÉTENTE IN AUTUMN

The NATO Allies will have to decide at their Ministerial meeting at Brussels in December what their next moves will be on the two principal issues now the subject of Alliance deliberations: a Conference on European Security (CES) and mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). Given their persistent doubts about the intensity and purpose of Soviet interest in détente, they will probably continue to affirm the requirement that all stages of a Berlin agreement must precede multilateral preparatory talks on CES. Because of the uncertain security impact of any early modification of the East-West military situation, most will remain unenthusiastic about MBFR, and will prefer to slow it down by pressing for the inclusion of MBFR on the agenda of an eventual CES.

Allied Concerns Regarding MBFR. With the Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting behind them, and the appointment of former Secretary General Brosio to act as an "explorer", the Allies must now begin to address the question of "what next" on MBFR. All of the Allies except France agreed on the utility of further explorations of Soviet intentions regarding MBFR. But there remain divergences among them about the political and security implications of force reduction negotiations and about the modalities of further initiatives, including the

relationship between MBFR and a CES. These broader issues are linked

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

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to the continuing difficulty in formulating an Alliance position that will reconcile disparate views of the interests of security and negotiability. The Allies have been concerned for several months, despite repeated Administration assurances in respect to unilateral US troop withdrawals from Europe, that renewed Congressional pressures or other factors may influence the timing and substance of future US initiatives on MBFR. The Allies maintain, further, that they themselves cannot define their own positions on relevant issues until the US position is known.

Renewed Prospects for a CES? While NATO political activity has for several months concentrated on efforts to develop a common Alliance policy on MBFR, there have been recent indications of renewed Allied attention to the prospects for holding a CES. The prospect that the inner-German talks, the second stage of the hoped-for Four Power agreement on Berlin, may be completed by the time the NATO Ministers convene in December may stimulate a shift of détente interest toward multilateral preparations for a CES. Of course, much depends on the attitude of the USSR, and Soviet references to "reverse linkage" requiring FRG ratification of the Moscow-Bonn treaty before final Soviet signature of the Four Power agreement on Berlin may presage new problems, and new delays, for CES preparations.

CES-MBFR Linkage. The FRG, the UK, Italy, and the Benelux countries are stressing again the utility of a CES-MBFR linkage, particularly if a CES or preparations for it get underway before MBFR negotiations. According to an Italian disarmament official, Foreign Minister Moro, for example, believes that too much attention

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is being devoted to MBFR and not enough to CES. This view, echoed in varying ways in other Allied capitals, reflects not only considerations of timing and phasing but also misgivings about MBFR's military consequences, now that the subject is being examined more closely. It reflects also a broader concern about the implications of force reduction negotiations as a bellwether of US intentions regarding Europe. While some of the Allies still see MBFR as offering the possibility of long-term benefits, they are concerned not to let it move ahead too rapidly and without sufficient European participation.

In this connection, a CES-MBFR linkage has several attractions for the European Allies. By stressing the importance of including force reductions on the agenda of an eventual security conference, the Europeans are trying to increase the likelihood:

- that reduction talks remain multilateral;
- that indigenous (particularly German) forces are included; and
- that a MBFR-CES linkage defers US force reductions while satisfying Congressional needs for visible movement toward reducing force levels.

In essence, a CES may now appear to some Allies as less dangerous than MBFR negotiations. Most of them seem to regard CES as inevitable and hope that a MBFR-CES linkage will minimize the damage to Western security which they fear is implicit in force reduction negotiations. Allied judgments on how to proceed inevitably will reflect their

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assessment of US intentions regarding Europe. Ultimately, the Allies are looking to Washington rather than to Moscow for the signposts of the future.

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By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03



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file CES

90 ACTION EUR-18.

INFO OCT-01 ACDA-19 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12 IO-11
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FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1525
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 6650

SUBJECT: ITALIAN POSITION ON CES

REF: A) STATE 188298; B) STATE 183356

1. IN CONVERSATION OCT 18 WITH FONOFF POL DIRECTOR GENERAL (DUCCI), EMROFF RECALLED DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM LAST SPRING IN WHICH WE HAD FULLY OUTLINED REASONS WHY USG SUPPORTED CAREFUL EXPLORATORY AND PREPARATORY TALKS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL PRIOR TO ANY CES. USING ARGUMENTATION CONTAINED IN REF A, WE STRESSED THAT WE STILL STRONGLY HELD TO VIEW THAT THIS PROCEDURAL APPROACH OFFERED BETTER WAY OF PROTECTING WESTERN INTERESTS THAN FRENCH PROPOSAL. WE SAID THAT IN LIGHT OF OCT 19-20 MEETING IN ROME OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS GENERAL IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT GOI HAVE CLEARLY IN MIND WHY WE WERE NOT IN FAVOR OF FRENCH APPROACH.

2. DUCCI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT FRENCH WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY PRESS THEIR VIEW AT ROME MEETING, BUT HE PERSONALLY DID NOT BELIEVE THERE WAS

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MUCH SUPPORT FOR FRENCH APPROACH. HE SAID THAT WHILE MORO WAS IN FAVOR OF A CES (OR AS GOI PREFERS TO CALL IT, "CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND COOPERATION"), HE WAS DETERMINED THAT IT SHOULD NOT REPRESENT "A DEFEAT FOR WEST." WHEN WE RECALLED PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AT PRESS CONFERENCE OCT 12, DUCCI SAID GOI WAS ABSOLUTELY FIRM THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF HOLDING A CES, OR ANY EXPLORATIONS OR PREPARATIONS THEREOF, UNTIL BERLIN ACCORD HAD BEEN FULLY ACCOMPLISHED. DUCCI NOTED THAT IN HIS OCT 13 DEMARCHE (ROME 6585) SOVIET AMB RYZHOV HAD SUGGESTED THAT PROGRESS ON BERLIN NOW MADE POSSIBLE THE BEGINNINGS OF CES PREPARATIONS. THE GOI WAS NOT RECEPTIVE TO THIS POINT NOR DID IT LOOK FAVORABLY ON SOVIET "REVERSE LINKAGE."

3. DUCCI DOUBTED THAT POLITICAL DIRECTORS GENERAL WOULD REACH AGREEMENT ON CES PROCEDURE FOR SUBMISSION TO FOMINS MEETING ON NOV 4-5. HE WAS INCLINED TO THINK WHOLE QUESTION WOULD REMAIN OPEN UNTIL DECEMBER NATO MINISTERIAL. HOWEVER, HW WAS CONCERNED THAT UNLESS DECISIONS WERE REACHED IN FAVLY NEAR FUTURE, NATO MIGHT LOSE CONTROL OF ISSUE AND FIND ITSELF TRAPPED AND UNPREPARED.

4. REGARDING EC PRESENCE AT CES, DUCCI DOUBTED WHETHER FRENCH WOULD EVER AGREE TO HAVE EC AS SUCH REPRESENTED. POSSIBLY FRENCH WOULD AGREE TO HAVING EC FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO WAS PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL AT TIME, SPEAK FOR EC ON MATTERS UNDER EC JURISDICTION.

5. DUCCI SAID HE HAD NOTED DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON WITH MORO USG "FRIGIDITY" TOWARD A CES AND INQUIRED HOW THIS WAS TO BE INTERPRETED. WE REPLIED THAT WHILE THE IDEA OF A CES SEEMED TO HAVE ASSUMED A LIFE OF ITS OWN, NOBODY HAD YET BEEN ABLE TO EXPLAIN WHAT ADVANTAGES THE WEST WOULD REALLY DERIVE FROM A CES. USG BELIEVED THAT A CES SHOULD BE APPROACHED WITH HARD-HEADED CAUTION AND THAT THE WEST SHOULD GO INTO A CONFERENCE ONLY IF THE ADVANTAGES CLEARLY OUTWEIGHED THE RISKS. IT WAS FOR THIS VERY REASON THAT WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD RETAIN CONTROL OF ALL OUR OPTIONS THROUGH EXPLORATORY AND PREPARATORY PHASES.

6. DUCCI SAID THAT HE WAS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH OUR VIEW, AND COMMENTED THAT WHILE CERTAIN BENEFITS MIGHT DERIVE TO WEST THROUGH ADOPTION OF DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (PARTICULARLY VIS-A-VIS ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA), THERE COULD WELL BE OTHER AREAS WHERE WEST MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO MAKE RISKY CONCESSIONS ON THE GENERAL GROUNDS OF "PRO BONO PACIS."

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7. DUCCI PROMISED TO BRIEF US LATER THIS WEEK ON POLITICAL DIRECTORS' MEETING. IN CONCLUSION HE EXPRESSED VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR US TO SET FORTH AGAIN ITS BASIC APPROACH TO CES AT AN EARLY NAC MEETING.

GP-3. MARTIN



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File CES

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ACTION EUR-18

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12 NEA-09 RSR-01

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R 191754Z OCT 71
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8511
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USNATO 1776

S E C R E T LONDON 9657

SUBJ: CES

REF.: (A) STATE 188098; (B) STATE 49306

SUMMARY: WE HAVE HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH FCO ON CES, IN WHICH BRITISH HAVE BEEN CANDID IN THEIR SCPTICISM ABOUT US APPROACH. BRITISH DESCRIBE THEMSELVES AS "SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND AMERICAN POSITIONS ON CES". THEY CONSIDER CES INEVITABLE, NOT EXPECIALLY DANGEROUS, AND SEE SOME MERIT IN GETTING IT OVER AND DONE WITH. END SUMMARY.

1. WE HAD LONG TALK OCT 18 WITH WIGGIN, ASST UNDER SECRETARY, FCO, AND BRAITHWAITE, WESTERN ORGANIZATIONS DEPARTMENT, AND ANOTHER LENGTHY TALK WITH SIR THOMAS BRIMELOW, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY, OCT 19. WE PRESENTED US POSITION IN DETAIL AND ARGUED THAT US APPROACH TO EXPLORATORY AND PREPARATORY PHASES AT OFFICIAL LEVEL WAS NECESSARY TO ENABLE ALLIED NATIONS TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF EVENTUAL CES WOULD NOT BE DISADVANTAGEOUS AND, IF NECESSARY, TO ABORT PROCESS IF IT APPEARED THAT DEVELOPMENTS WERE INIMICAL TO ALLIED INTERESTS. WE ARGUED THAT FRENCH PROPOSAL WOULD GIVE SOVIETS MUCH OF WHAT THEY DESIRE BY MERE FACT OF EARLY

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FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS WITH CONSEQUENCES OF EUPHORIA AND POSSIBLY DIMINISHED WESTERN DEFENSE EFFORTS IF MEETINGS APPEARED SUCCESSFUL, OR ALTERNATIVELY, DISRUPTION OF EAST-WEST ENGAGEMENT IF MINISTERIAL MEETINGS APPEARED TO BE FAILURE. AS RESULT THESE DISCUSSIONS, IT IS CLEAR THAT FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US AND BRITISH IS THAT WHILE WE PRESUMABLY REGARD PREPARATORY PROCESS AS MEANS TO DECIDE WHETHER CES SHOULD BE HELD, BRITISH BELIEVE CES IS INEVITABLE AND THAT WHILE IT WOULD SERVE LITTLE USEFUL PURPOSE FOR WEST, IT IS UNLIKELY TO CAUSE MUCH DAMAGE.

2. BRITISH BELIEVE LOGIC OF SATISFYING "BERLIN PRECONDITION", AND NEED FOR SMALLER NATIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN EAST-WEST DIALOGUE (A NEED GIVEN GREATER EMPHASIS BY BRANDT AND NIXON JOURNEYS TO MOSCOW AND BREZHNEV VISIT TO FRANCE), MAKE CES ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO AVOID.

3. FCO NOT ESPECIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT DANGERS. THEY RECOGNIZE THAT CES COULD CONTRIBUTE TO A SENSE OF EUPHORIA ABOUT EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND COULD THEREFORE MAKE WESTERN DEFENSE IMPROVEMENTS LESS PALATABLE POLITICALLY, AND HENCE MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE, BUT THEY ARE NOT TOO WORRIED ABOUT EITHER POSSIBILITY AND FEEL THEMSELVES UNDER LITTLE PUBLIC PRESSURE FOR DETENTE AND REDUCED DEFENSE SPENDING. INDEED, IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY ARE MORE WORRIED - MUCH MORE WORRIED - ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF MBFR THAN CES. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, THEY SEE SOME MODEST AND BENEFICIAL CATHARTIC EFFECT FROM CES FOR THE SMALLER COUNTRIES OF EUROPE - IT WILL LET THEM "GET IT OUT OF THEIR SYSTEM."

4. THE QUESTION OF TIMING ASIDE, THE BRITISH ARE ATTRACTED BY THE FRENCH APPROACH: (1) "CUPS OF TEA" AT OFFICIAL LEVEL, (2) FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING TO MAKE SPEECHES AND AGREE ON AN AGENDA, (3) OFFICIAL-LEVEL WORKING GROUPS, AND FINALLY, IF WORKING GROUPS SUCCESSFUL, (4) A FINAL FONMINS MEETING.

5. THE BRITISH SEE SOME ADVANTAGE IN EARLIER FONMIN MEETING AS THE FRENCH PROPOSE, AND SOME DISADVANTAGE IN LETTING EXPECTATIONS "BUILD UP TO A CRESCENDO" IN THE

SECRET

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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WAY USG PROPOSES. BRITS DO NOT BELIEVE OUR APPROACH REFTEL WOULD, IN PRACTICE, PERMIT US TO CONTROL VERY MUCH EITHER THE TIMING OR THE CONTENT OF A CES - AND CERTAINLY WOULDN'T PERMIT US TO SCRUB A CES ALTOGETHER; THEREFORE THEY REASON THAT THE FRENCH IDEA OF GETTING ON WITH IT AND GETTING IT OVER QUICKLY HAS POSSIBLE MERIT.

6. WITH REGARD TO TIMING OF CES, BRITISH INTEND TO TAKE THEIR CUE FROM GERMANS. BRITS DO NOT THINK BRANDT GOVERNMENT HAS YET THOUGHT THROUGH IMPLICATIONS OF CES, BUT MUST DO SO VERY SOON OR WE WILL BE IN A MUDDLE FOR DECEMBER MINISTERIAL. FCO HAS VERY MUCH IN MIND POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF REVERSE JUNKTIM ON ENTIRE BUNDLE OF OSTPOLITIK AND EAST-WEST PROJECTS AND IS WATCHING CAREFULLY TO SEE HOW GERMANS PROCEED TO DEAL WITH PROBLEM.

7. FCO SUGGESTED INFORMALLY THAT IF WE FEEL STRONGLY ABOUT OUR VIEWS IT WOULD PROBABLY BE WELL TO GET THEM OUT ON THE NATO TABLE. NOTING THAT FRENCH ARE PEDALLING THEIR VIEWS IN THE SIX, AND ALSO HAD GO AT BRITISH LAST WEEK, FCO THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE BETTER FOR OUR PURPOSES IF THE FORUM WERE CHANGED TO NATO POLADS.

8. BRIMELOW TOLD US THAT SOVIETS HAD FINALLY GOT AROUND TO MAKING CES APPROACH IN LONDON OCT 18.

GP-9.
ANNENBERG

SECRET

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

33840

SECRET/SENSITIVE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: General Haig

SUBJECT: Secretary Laird's Memorandum on MBFR and a
European Conference

21 Oct. 1971

Secretary Laird has sent you a memorandum (Tab B) outlining some of his concerns over European sentiment that favors linking the question of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) with Soviet proposals for a Conference on European Security (CES). He fears that if MBFR is put under the aegis of a conference rather than maintained as a separate issue, then MBFR will become a wholly unmanageable political process, involving European neutrals and unwieldy forums.

He proposes, at the forthcoming NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting next week, to make the following points, if you approve:

-- The US does not look on MBFR as a means for a quick US force cut; our objective is an agreement to improve European security.

-- MBFR and CES should be kept on separate tracks; under present and foreseeable circumstances the US will not agree to negotiate MBFR at a CES.

-- The participants on MBFR should be limited to those countries with forces in the area of reductions and NATO can be kept informed through the North Atlantic Council.

Comment: We have asked the agencies to participate in a NSSM on a European conference, including the issue of any linkage of MBFR and the Conference. Meanwhile, we may be talking very privately with the USSR about the Conference.

While the Secretary's concerns about putting MBFR under a broad European Conference are valid points, nevertheless we cannot at this time completely foreclose the possibility that the order of negotiations will be such that a Conference will begin before we are ready for MBFR negotiations. If this should happen, it is conceivable that we would want to use the Conference to

SECRET/SENSITIVE

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

SECRET/SENSITIVE

-2-

to launch the MBFR talks, not with neutral participating or controlling the talks, but merely to give an otherwise disadvantageous conference the appearance of dealing with real security issues.

In any case, it would be unnecessarily binding for the Secretary to confront the Europeans with an unqualified opposition to any linkage of the two issues, particularly since you have publicly said Secretary Rogers will assume the responsibility for this issue and have indicated to the Soviets that we will pursue the issues surrounding a conference through private channels.

I have drafted a memorandum to the Secretary approving his position, but noting the need to retain some flexibility on both MBFR and a European Conference pending the outcome of current reviews.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize me to send the memorandum (Tab A) approving his position to Secretary Laird, including the caveat against taking too rigid a position.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

*Amc - defense told
to send copy
of memo, to
State.*

SECRET/SENSITIVE

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

33840

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

19 OCT 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: MBFR

Jack Irwin did an excellent job on the substantive issues before the NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers MBFR meeting. Brosio's mandate for "exploring" with the Pact is one we can approve and support.

But, despite this success, I am concerned at the tone of much of the debate at the Brussels meeting. It revealed a strain of discontent and divergence of purpose within NATO that will be difficult to deal with in the months ahead.

There has apparently been a substantial shift away from the enthusiasm many of our Allies once felt for MBFR. A year ago we were being pushed to move more rapidly; today MBFR is looked upon by many as a device for a quick, politically motivated US troop cut.

In its place, a Conference on European Security, with MBFR closely linked to it, has gained increasing favor within the Alliance. The reasons for this are numerous, and sometimes contradictory:

- Most of our Allies appear to see CES, particularly if MBFR is made a part of it, as a way of delaying troop cuts. A CES cannot convene for many months; when it does it will have a crowded agenda and some 30 to 40 participants (including neutrals), all of whom will want to be involved.
- A few (particularly the UK and FRG) seem anxious about French opposition to MBFR. Since France favors a CES, they see it as a way to keep themselves in step with France, keep her involved in the collective "detente" process (instead of going off on her own), and eventually, perhaps, as a way of involving her in MBFR (as an adjunct of CES).
- Many (the Scandinavians, Belgians, and Germans) apparently have come to see MBFR as a threat to their concept of detente. The Germans, particularly, it appears, believe that any troop cut negotiations will weaken their bargaining position with the GDR -- particularly if the East Germans participate in the talks -- and will shift the focus of interest away from their Ostpolitik, thereby slowing its momentum.

GROUP-3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not

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NIXON MEMORANDUMS
NSC INSTITUTIONAL FILES
BOX 41 - 1971 folder NSC 11 152
[10/12]

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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Thus, it looks like a number of disparate purposes have come together in ways which can have serious repercussions in the coming months. The danger is not that progress toward MBFR negotiations will be brought to a halt -- we and our Allies have probably moved too far down the road for that --, but that the issue will be so confused and complicated that it will become an unmanageable, wholly political, process.


MBFR, should we ever get to negotiations, will be difficult enough to manage if Western participants are kept -- as I think they should be -- to those countries with forces or territory within the area of reductions (at most, the US, UK, FRG, Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands). To add other NATO countries would greatly complicate our problems; to include the neutrals, which would be almost inevitable should MBFR become part of CES, would make a serious negotiation improbable.

If we are to head off a continuation of these Allied pressures toward subsuming MBFR under CES, and broadening the number involved in the negotiations, the US will have to take an early and positive stand.

Therefore, unless you desire otherwise, I plan to take the following line in my bilateral conversations at the NPG later this month:

- The US does not look upon MBFR as a means for a quick US force cut in Europe. Our objective is an agreement which will improve the security situation in Europe.
- In keeping with that objective, MBFR and CES should be kept on separate tracks. Under present and foreseeable circumstances, the US will not agree to negotiate MBFR at a CES.
- The US strongly believes that, on the Western side, participants in MBFR negotiations should be limited to those countries with forces or territory in the area of reductions.
- The North Atlantic Council can be used, perhaps following the SALT pattern, to assure that other NATO Allies are kept informed of, and consulted on, the progress made in the negotiations.

I hope to have further suggestions for you within a week or so on how we should proceed with MBFR. But irrespective of any future MBFR decisions, I believe the points listed above are essential if we are to keep our Allies from settling now on positions we will later be unwilling to accept.



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By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Response to NSSM-138

NSSM-138 directed that the Interdepartmental Group for Europe (IG/EUR) prepare for consideration by the NSC Senior Review Group an interagency study to examine issues related to a Conference on European Security, and discuss differing concepts of such a conference, as well as US objectives under alternative concepts. The attached study in response to NSSM-138 was prepared under the aegis of IG/EUR, and has been reviewed and approved by representatives on IG/EUR of the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Agency for Arms Control and Disarmament.

M. J. Hillenbrand
Martin J. Hillenbrand
Chairman

Interdepartmental Group for Europe

Attachment:

Response to NSSM-138

*NIXON NSC "H" FILES
STUDY MEMORANDUMS (1967-1974)
Box H-182 Folder NSSM-138 [10/2]*

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Reply to NSSM 138:

A Conference on European Security

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Reply to NSSM 138roduction

A strong NATO legislative history favors multilateral East-West talks, looking toward a Conference on European Security (CES), contingent only upon successful Berlin negotiations.^{1/} On the basis of our joint commitment, the Allies expect us to continue to participate fully in preparations for CES, and to take part in CES itself when convened. The prospect of a Berlin accord, desires to enhance the detente climate and prospects of being able to play a role in a major East-West negotiation are whetting Allied appetites for early multilateral preparations. Moreover, the Soviets are mounting a renewed campaign to stimulate multilateral talks in Helsinki.

In sum, we are faced with the prospect of an unprecedented East-West multilateral gathering.

Moreover, the basic choice now for the US is not whether to participate. The Allies strongly want the US present. Abstention, moreover, would play into Soviet hands by splitting us from the Allies, and probably undermine confidence in our long-range intentions toward Western Europe. It could possibly also stimulate turbulence in US-USSR relations. Finally, barring a serious setback in Soviet relations with the West, the Allies would resist US efforts to prevent a conference.

Our realistic choices, rather, involve efforts to shape CES to serve US objectives. This paper examines US, Allied, and Soviet objectives, and alternative procedural and substantive approaches to CES, against the background of progress to date in preparation for CES.

I. Assumptions and Objectives: A Perspective on CES
The Transatlantic Community. Western Europe is of primary and vital US interest. Our mutual relationships, moreover, are articulated in a single transatlantic community. Descriptions of this relationship, however, have

^{1/} For example, in their June 1971 communique, Ministers expressed the "hope that before their next meeting the negotiations on Berlin will have reached a successful conclusion and that multilateral conversations intended to lead to a conference on security and cooperation in Europe may then be undertaken."

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By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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ed to date to imply differentiation between discrete
ties in such formulations as "Atlantic partnership"
"the dumb-bell theory." The concept of separation in
part has led us, moreover, to encourage the West Europeans
to pursue integration, building an enhanced entity capable
of greater responsibility for its own future. Simultaneously,
though, we are increasingly husbanding more carefully
our own resource flow into the European scene. The result
is a reinforcement of separatist trends at a time when,
in fact, our identity of purpose in terms of our mutual
policy interests has never been greater.

Ultimately, if we fail to respond positively to im-
peratives for continued and active US participation, we
may face the negative implications of exclusion, and
contradiction of the basic premise of US policy recog-
nizing the centrality of our relations with Europe.

The community of US-Western Europe interests holds
strong attractions for Eastern Europe, too, with the
possible exception of the USSR. To the extent the influence
of the Western community can be extended eastward, common
Western purposes are served. We and our Allies consis-
tently have sought to diminish barriers to concourse,
provided Western security is not threatened in the process.

The basic security problem in Europe -- the presence
of powerful Soviet forces in Central Europe -- is likely
to persist for the foreseeable future. The central question
facing the Allies is how to stabilize a credible long-term
US presence and a reliable deterrent in Western Europe.
If backed by a convincing Allied defense posture, East-West
negotiations can be used as an argument against premature
reductions in US forces. Moreover, Western leadership
could use the imminence of a CES as a further reason for
strengthening US-European ties in the trade and monetary,
as well as the defense and security, fields.

CES as a Step Toward a Broader Community. Within the
longer perspective of an emerging trans-Atlantic order,
involving not only Western but Eastern Europe, CES assumes
heightened potential relevance, particularly to the extent
it can contribute to building a broader community of
interests, necessarily entailing a US (and Canadian) role.
Of at least equal importance, CES, because of the clearly
limited results it promises, can only be a step in a
larger process, not an end in itself.

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In approaching CES, then, it will be in our interest to shape the meeting itself and post-CES organisms to serve basic interests of the US-West European community, encouraging, to the extent possible, its expansion, in line with our declared longer term objectives of greater partnership, sustained strength and willingness to negotiate East-West differences.

A. US Objectives. Our specific aims are:

- to reaffirm that Europe is the central element in US foreign policy.
- to assure continued US participation in the evolution of Europe toward a peaceful order, with a commonality of purpose embracing North America, Western, and eventually Eastern Europe.
- to preserve and improve the structure of the present Western security system pending emergence of a stable peace order.
- to support steps toward further integration of Western Europe, devising means to maintain a US role that can contribute to closer US relations with an increasingly integrated Europe.
- to contribute to reduction of tensions in Central Europe, through increasing contacts and normalization of relations between East and West.
- to avoid undercutting our and Allied rights in Germany as a whole and Berlin.
- to avoid a CES outcome that would strengthen domestic pressures for unilateral US troop withdrawals.
- to assure that the complex and sensitive negotiations on MBFR be kept separate from more general references to MBFR in CES.
- to reduce dependence of East European states on the USSR.
- to seek reciprocal access to Eastern and Western European markets and resources.

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By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03 p

-- to avoid CES in the resolution of post-war problems: CES is not itself a peace settlement, but a step toward a more normal East-West relationship.

The governing relationships between the transatlantic community, US objectives and CES can be summarized as follows, as a basis for weighing other Allied, Soviet and East European objectives:

- the US and Europe are ineluctably linked.
- we have a vital national interest in Europe's security and in the evolution of its economic relationships.
- steps toward building a peaceful order in Europe can take many forms, of which CES can be one, but not the final one.
- CES accordingly can be only a preliminary step to:
 - work toward expansion of areas of common interests in a community of nations;
 - lay groundwork for machinery to facilitate the further development of the transatlantic community, as well as the dialogue between East and West; and
 - discern an eventual pragmatic arrangement engaging both East and West through clearly defined steps which, while maintaining essential security and safeguarding our special rights, can lead to extension of the area of common interests.

B. Allied concerns and Differences with the US. As CES approaches, the Allies are calculating their steps in light of major developments affecting Europe, manifested in

- private Allied apprehension about the Administration's ability to resist Congressional pressures for unilateral US troop cuts, perhaps leading some to favor an accommodating approach to the Soviets as reinsurance against any such reductions;
- mounting concerns about the effect of MBFR;

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By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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- preparations by the Six for the enlargement of the EC, including perhaps a summit meeting of the Ten in the early months of 1972;
- US economic policies and international efforts to resolve underlying economic problems on new bases; and
- our anticipated increased efforts to press the Allies for further force improvements.

Specifically with respect to CES, the Allies, while generally subscribing to the requirement of a Berlin accord before opening multilateral East-West talks, increasingly believe that a conference, regardless of its content, would relax tensions and open possibilities for increased East-West trade and cooperation. They thus tend to prefer that CES discussion focus on areas of possible agreement rather than on matters which could challenge the Soviets and East Europeans. Moreover, they recognize that CES would give them a role on the detente stage thus far dominated by Quadripartite powers, particularly the US.

In seeking topics which promise easy East-West consensus, they have discussed, within the Political Consultative Group of the Six, economic issues and procedural approaches to CES. They may seek Eastern acceptance of the EC and thus may press for EC representation, as such, in CES. Most favor, as well, inclusion of MBFR on a CES agenda, in order to give some "security" coloration to the proceedings, while recognizing that CES itself would be an unwieldy forum for dealing with this complex issue (see Part III, below).

Specifically, the FRG also will wish to maintain momentum in its Eastern policy and to avoid conflict with Moscow over matters not of vital German national interest. France sees CES as a promising vehicle for pressing its own Eastern policy. The UK, preparing to enter the EC, will be reluctant to stand apart from France and the FRG. Most smaller Allies want a visible role.

The US, thus, confronts an evolution in Allied attitudes toward CES in which the prospect of a Berlin agreement and possibilities for enhancing a detente atmosphere are building momentum toward CES. On the other hand, the US has held that CES should not be held until there

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There are substantial chances for meaningful agreement. This difference in view on CES likely cannot be bridged in terms consistent with US objectives unless the US is prepared and the Allies agree on a new approach to CES that takes account of Allied desires, broadens the likely CES focus beyond narrow areas of non-provocative cooperation, and provides a larger framework within which the Allies can maintain continuity of joint security policies, pursued since World War II, while working toward resolution, step by step, of outstanding East-West issues.

C. Soviet Objectives. Moscow sees CES, above all, as a step toward its vision of a European security system that would ratify present boundaries, reduce tensions on its Western flank so it could have a freer hand in the Far East, enhance access to Western markets and financial resources, reduce US influence in Europe, undercut NATO solidarity, slow West European integration, and leave the Soviet Union the dominant continental power. A CES would enhance the status of the GDR, a prime Soviet goal. The outcome of a conference along the lines the Soviets desire would allow them to portray it as acquiescence in a Soviet sphere of control and suasion in Eastern Europe.

The Soviets doubtless also calculate that relaxation of East-West tensions after CES could make control of their Warsaw Pact Allies somewhat more difficult, but that the potential problems are manageable.

D. Objectives of East European States. Other Warsaw Pact states generally share Soviet objectives -- detente, recognition of existing frontiers, and enhanced East-West trade and technical exchanges. However, Romania believes that CES will give it at least some added protection against Soviet intervention, and most Warsaw Pact states expect limited additional freedom to develop relations with the West, including with EC, as such.

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II. Alternatives

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

Assuming the US could delay, and
ward CES, there follow three illustrative approaches.

-- The first examines the advantages and disadvantages of alternative concepts of CES as at present envisaged: (a) results essentially in accord with Soviet aims, for the sake of enhancing the appearance of detente; and (b) results involving only limited agreements, protecting Allied positions in key areas, in an approach that assumes the US could be successful in limiting CES to a single exercise of limited importance.

-- The second examines a conference on cooperation in Europe that eliminates security issues and concentrates on economic, scientific, environmental, cultural and technical exchanges.

-- The third examines an approach which treats CES not as an end in itself, but as a means to serve US long-term aims in Europe, based upon the concept of an enhanced US role in European developments, as a member of the Western community, and of institutionalizing full US participation in major East-West affairs in Europe through permanent CES machinery.

A. CES as Now Envisaged

1. The Agenda

Allied and Pact concepts of CES to date have delineated the outlines of a conference comprising the following agendas which partially overlap, and contain no item dealing with a concrete issue of security. Notably, in this connection neither NATO nor the Pact has yet proposed publicly that MBFR be included on the agenda, a prospect the Soviets have tried to exclude by indicating that MBFR should be dealt with in a body to be created by CES or in any other appropriate forum. Most Allies, however, now favor linkage of MBFR and CES (see Part III, below).

WARSAW PACT

NATO

1. Force renunciation and respect for existing borders;

1. Principles which should govern relations between states, including renunciation of the use of force;

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

- Economic, scientific, technical, cultural and environmental cooperation;
3. A permanent "organ" for questions of security and cooperation in Europe.
 2. (a) Economic, scientific, technical, cultural and environmental cooperation;
(b) Freer movement of people, ideas and information;
 3. Possible establishment of a permanent body (though publicly stated to date only as a means of embarking on multilateral negotiations).

Pact and Allied positions on these items are:

a. Principles Governing Relations Between States. The core of the conference, from the Soviet viewpoint, is the first Warsaw Pact agenda item which would pledge respect for existing frontiers in Europe and force renunciation. To broaden the scope of this item, NATO Ministers proposed that CES discussions should treat, in addition to force renunciation, general principles governing interstate relations, such as sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity, non-interference and non-intervention in internal affairs. Allied Ministers have affirmed that these principles would apply "regardless of political and social systems". If accepted by the Soviets and others, this would go a step beyond recent UN elaborations of these principles, and could inhibit to some extent Soviet intervention by armed force in Central Europe. However, the recent Soviet-Canadian communique contain such a formulation; thus the effect of Soviet acceptance of it in CES would not mark a departure from the current Soviet public posture.

A declaration that reaffirmed such principles in a conference where the GDR was a full participant could have adverse implications for Quadripartite rights and responsibilities in Germany as a whole and Berlin, as could a declaration of the GDR, which we would hope that all NATO states would make, such a declaration on principles or frontiers would require a specific saving clause or caveat by the U.S., U.K., and France

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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ing that Quadripartite rights were not affected. Ideally, would prefer that the Soviet Union also agree to the saving clause, but only if it were cast in appropriate language. While some Allies would be prepared to accommodate Soviet desire for a declaration pledging respect for existing frontiers, there would be general support efforts to protect Quadripartite rights in Germany as a whole and Berlin.

b. Cooperation. None expect that CES could negotiate specific agreements on economic, technical and scientific exchanges or environmental cooperation, though some believe discussion in CES, and also in a permanent body established by CES, might stimulate bilateral and multilateral efforts, as in ECE. The Soviets can be expected to use a CES as a platform for attacking 'economic blocs' such as the EC, strategic controls, and other alleged forms of Western "discrimination" in the economic field. Allied studies suggest responding by asking Pact Members to take practical steps on their own to facilitate trade.

c. Freer Movements of People, Ideas and Information. The Soviets would resist any concrete concessions in this area, though there are tactical and propaganda advantages in keeping the issue in play, and there might be some significant Soviet concessions, if the Allies press firmly. We have suggested that the Allies, at CES and preliminaries, urge the Warsaw Pact states to:

- end radio jamming;
- relax exit restrictions on their nationals;
- permit freer circulation of books, magazines and periodicals; and
- allow foreign journalists normal working conditions.

Many Allies, however, would prefer to treat only easier issues, seeking initially little more than minor improvements in the closely controlled programs of East-West cultural exchanges, and hoping reduced tensions following CES would abet further progress.

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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d. Permanent Machinery. The Pact in June 1970 proposed CES create a permanent "organ" to discuss questions of security and cooperation. This was, in part at least, a response to an earlier NATO suggestion, at UK instance, that a body be established to prepare for CES. The Pact has not stressed the issue subsequently, and the Allies have given it only cursory study.

An illustrative US proposal (Annex I), tabled but not yet discussed in NATO, suggested that either a permanent secretariat, or a negotiating forum with procedures roughly similar to those of the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament (CCD) might be considered, but that it is too early to judge whether either would usefully supplement existing bilateral and multilateral channels for East-West negotiation. In any case, a permanent body could not, we conclude, assume meaningful responsibility for maintenance of European security, but could open the way toward a continuing East-West dialogue.

2. Procedural Approaches

We prefer careful explorations followed, if appropriate, by more structured preparatory talks, at official level, that would draft agreed texts, leaving a minimum of disputed points for resolution at a short Ministerial conference. This approach, which was designed to allow halting the proceedings in the event of impasse, was proposed to NATO in April 1971 (see Annex II), and was favored by most Allies during NATO consultations prior to June 1971.

French Foreign Minister Schumann, however, since has proposed, in contrast, brief preparatory talks mainly on procedure and not on draft texts of possible agreement, leading to an initial meeting where Foreign Ministers would discuss the issues and establish official-level working groups. Thereafter, Foreign Ministers would reconvene to negotiate themselves the questions unresolved by the working groups. The French at present are attempting to win Allied support for this approach, which is consistent with France's general preference to enhance the appearance of an independent status in relations with the East.

An Allied compromise may emerge involving careful preparations at official level, review of this preliminary work at deputy Ministerial level, followed by a Ministerial gathering.

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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The Soviets, meanwhile, insist that the Berlin precondition for a CES has been met, and that multilateral preparatory talks should open among interested Ambassadors at Helsinki.

Concerning the venue for CES, the Pact and most Allies have accepted the Finnish offer of Helsinki, at least for the initial phase. We will confront heavy pressures to agree. The venue of the conference itself need not be addressed until later. However, the Pact and many Allies will likely continue to agree it should be held in Helsinki. Another possibility is Geneva, and the Austrians have offered Vienna as the site.

The Western sectors of Berlin are another possibility since they offer excellent conference facilities and since the first phase Quadripartite agreement specifically sanctions the holding of international conferences there, hosted by the Berlin Senat either separately or jointly with the FRG. Moreover, holding CES in the Western of Berlin would serve as a reminder that CES itself will not resolve outstanding East/West differences. In the event the Soviet Union were to propose that the CES meet in the Eastern sector of Berlin, however, there could be problems since we could not accept any description of East Berlin in the standard communist phraseology "Berlin, capital of the GDR".

3. Possible Results of CES as Now Conceived: Two Variants:

There follow analyses of a CES along the lines now foreseen by most, resulting in (a) only the appearance of greater detente, or (b) limited agreements protecting Western interests.

a. A Conference for the Sake of Detente. After extensive discussions touching only marginally on fundamental East-West differences, Ministers would agree on declaratory texts on general themes that do not bind participants to specific actions, and that

-- affirm generally accepted principles governing relations between states, including force renunciation and respect for existing frontiers;

-- declare the intent of participants to promote cooperation in all fields; and

-- establish a permanent body.

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Participants might also express their views on regional permanent questions, including MBFR.

Assessment. This approach, in effect, accepts the Soviet concept. The likely results would meet immediate political goals of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europeans, and corresponds to the current aims of France, most neutrals, and the smaller, more detente-oriented Allied states. Once an inter-German modus vivendi is reached, the FRG, too, will likely seek to enhance the detente climate by avoiding confrontation with the East.

Advantages

- The benign atmosphere engendered by the conference might lead to increased East-West contacts; and
- possibly some relaxation of Soviet pressures on Eastern Europe.

Disadvantages

- based upon likely Soviet propaganda highlighting Western acceptance of the status quo, including Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe, public opinion might conclude that the Cold War was ending, and that military efforts thus safely could be relaxed;
- probable increased US Congressional pressures for troop withdrawals;
- a weakening of Allied resolve; and
- a general sense that the US was conceding objectives sought since World War II

b. A Conference Making Some Concessions but Protecting Western Interests. In this damage-limiting approach, the Allies would decline to meet major Soviet aims, including a declaration of respect for existing frontiers, unless the Soviets also make significant concessions, agreeing, for example, to freer movement. Preparatory sessions would be prolonged and probably marked by heated discussions, reflected in media reporting. Substantively, the conference might result in

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-- a compromise, in which the Soviets make some concrete concessions on freer movement and accept a declaration on principles that would apply regardless of political or social systems, while the Allies agree to a formulation pledging "respect" for existing European frontiers.

- modest Soviet concessions on freer movement;
- agreement to pursue issues of economic and technical cooperation; and
- establishment of permanent machinery.

Assessment. Some minimum goals of major participants would be met as a result of public reports of East-West debates in the course of CES, and the results of the conference would be portrayed as Western acceptance of the territorial situation in Eastern Europe, but not Soviet political domination.

Advantages

- since the climate of East-West relations would not change materially, dealings with the Warsaw Pact states could proceed as before;
- would minimize decline in public support for Allied military efforts;
- perhaps some gains in human contacts between East and West; and
- more intensive subsequent discussion in various fora on modest improvements in economic and technical cooperation.

Disadvantages

- a risk that the preparatory talks, or CES itself, would break up in acrimony; and
- a risk that the US would be isolated, with most Allies joining neutral and Warsaw Pact states in concessions favoring the Pact.

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B. A Conference on Cooperation in Europe

An alternative CES approach could entail limiting the agenda of the meeting to issues of cooperation in the economic, technical, scientific, cultural and environmental spheres. Issues of security, including renunciation of the use of force and principles governing interstate relations would be specifically excluded, and the title of the conference changed.

The conference would result in declarations of intent to promote cooperation, leaving detailed agreements to subsequent bilateral and multilateral negotiations in other fora.

Assessment. The Soviets would probably resist an Allied proposal to change the terms of reference and to make such a change publicly clear. They might charge the Allies with bad faith, noting repeated public statements in NATO Ministerial communiques of willingness to begin preparations for a "conference on security and cooperation in Europe" under proper circumstances. Most Allied governments might also oppose such a change, fearing charges from important sectors of domestic opinion that NATO was reneging on a commitment at the very moment when fulfillment of the precondition (a satisfactory Berlin agreement) seemed in sight.

Advantages

- by stressing publicly that ^{MBFR and other} security issues were excluded, the risk of declining support for necessary defense expenditures following a "successful" conference would be avoided;
- similarly, the Allies would avoid any appearance of acquiescence in the Eastern European status quo; and
- if successful, the conference could lead to easier reciprocal access to markets and technology, while simultaneously advancing such Allied goals as
 - more human contact between East and West;
 - reducing Eastern European dependence upon Moscow; and
 - furthering long-term trends toward internal liberalization of Pact regimes.

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Disadvantages

- refusal to begin preparations for CES on terms earlier discussed might sour the East-West political atmosphere. This could also impede further efforts to resolve East-West differences, and lead to a possible decline in public support for NATO, stemming from charges that, by refusing to begin preparations for CES, the Allies, and the US in particular, were deliberately attempting to prevent a relaxation of tensions;
- such a conference would leave unchallenged the Brezhnev doctrine;
- if the foregoing difficulties were sidestepped, the conference then could create unwarranted public optimism, if it were believed generally to mark a significant advance in resolving basic East-West differences; and
- would weaken the arguments for US participation in CES.

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C. A New Approach: CES as a Step Toward
Maintaining a US Role in Europe.

This new concept of CES departs from the damage-limiting approach we are now pursuing. It would entail a new US initiative in NATO and international CES planning aimed at:

-- reassertion of US long-term interests and determination to remain involved in Europe;

-- increased emphasis on permanent machinery to provide an institutional framework involving the US intimately in a long-term process of East-West negotiation of issues of security and cooperation, while maintaining and improving present Western security; and

-- added weight to issues of security -- MBFR, and other arms control and disarmament matters.

In terms of presentation, this approach would provide a new substantive rationale understandable to domestic US opinion for continued active participation by the US in Europe, because CES becomes not an end in itself, but a way-station toward resolution of European problems directly involving US interests. Under this concept, moreover,

-- the US would exert leadership in approaching CES, based upon explicit recognition that the US is a member of the transatlantic community, and is therefore intimately involved in, and cannot be excluded from, matters related to European security;

-- we could help offset Allied fears the US is on the verge of massive disengagement, at a time when their doubts are reinforced by current international economic difficulties;

-- CES would be considered a positive step in the longer process of strengthening the transatlantic community, and maintaining its defenses, while the US and our Allies seek further relaxation of East-West tensions designed to enhance European stability on a basis that accords with Allied objectives by making clear the importance they attach to issues of security, and to progress in East-West cooperation

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in non-security matters, such as freer movement of people, ideas, and information, and economic and technical exchanges.

1. Agenda. To meet these objectives, the Allies could propose in the December 1971 Ministerial Communique the following CES agenda as an alternative to that advanced by the Pact:

a. Issues of East-West Security

(1) continuing arms control and disarmament efforts and renunciation of the use of force and universal respect for principles governing relations between states, regardless of political or social systems. It is possible that any consensus that emerged might be embodied in an East-West declaration, which might be pursued in permanent machinery established by CES (see Part II CIC, below).

(2) associated with the foregoing, or separately, statements of support for MBFR. If MBFR negotiations had begun prior to CES, reference could be made in CES to progress to date, based upon reports by participating MBFR states. Otherwise, CES could encourage states directly involved in MBFR to negotiate. Although MBFR could also operate under the "umbrella" of a CES (see Part III), the conference would have no authority to direct or approve the form or substance of MBFR negotiations.

b. Issues of East-West Cooperation

(1) freer movement of people, ideas, and information, stressing the importance the Allies attach to this issue:

(2) economic, technical, scientific, cultural and environmental cooperation. Economic issues for discussion could include a range of improvements on both sides to encourage increased trade and possible ties to Western international economic institutions. In the environmental sphere, support could be sought for strengthening ECE efforts. Beyond this, enhanced bilateral contacts in the other areas could be encouraged, as well as efforts in UN and other appropriate fora.

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c. Permanent Machinery Established by CES

(1) Possible Functions

The US has tabled in NATO illustrative views on permanent machinery (Annex I). We proposed that such machinery might discuss problems of security, cooperation and arms control and disarmament, along the following lines:

(a) Security

-- as a framework for quiet diplomacy to resolve disputes endangering European security; and

-- for dealing with grievances, permitting states to raise actual or potential violations of a possible CES declaration on principles that should govern interstate relations.

(b) Cooperation

-- for discussion of policy issues that impede East-West cooperation in various fields, leaving detailed implementation to the ECE or other appropriate fora.

(c) Regional Disarmament

-- in connection with MBFR, while this issue undoubtedly would be referred to in CES, actual negotiations have been envisaged in a body comprising states directly concerned. Results of MBFR negotiations, however, could be reported by the states directly involved in MBFR negotiations to CES for noting, as appropriate; and

-- if agreed among the Allies, for discussion of complaints of non-compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements; and for examination and dissemination of reports produced under any arrangements that may eventually be developed on verification and collateral constraints.

Beyond the foregoing, it is possible that permanent

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machinery could evolve further, embracing additional functions in a continuing East-West dialogue. However, the USSR and others should not be allowed to manipulate or characterize CES permanent machinery as a substitute for NATO, or as superceding Western security arrangements generally.

(2) Advantages and Disadvantages

Advantages

-- would provide an added US institutional role in European developments;

-- could facilitate serious discussions and negotiations of concrete problems of European security and cooperation;

-- could marginally inhibit Moscow's use of force or threatening behavior to impose its will upon the Eastern European states;

-- might give the smaller Warsaw Pact members additional latitude to develop their relations with the West; and

-- would give the neutrals and non-aligned states a voice in security and arms control and disarmament matters, meeting their desire not to be excluded from matters affecting their interests.

Disadvantages

-- could provide the Soviets a platform from which to exert influence in Western Europe to hinder further integration;

-- could provide the Soviets another forum for public complaints about US policies and actions, particularly in the military sphere;

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-- in the event of weakening of the Allied deterrent posture, could provide the Soviets an additional framework to manipulate developments to their advantage; and

-- unless carefully presented, positive US advocacy could lead some to believe that permanent machinery itself would establish a new basis for European security, permitting substantial Allied force reductions

2. General Assessment.

US adoption of a positive approach to CES could entail the following advantages and disadvantages:

Advantages

-- would conform to the realities of the situation in Europe by giving at least equal attention to security issues;

-- because it would explicitly assert the continuing US role in the evolution of Europe, it would deny the Soviets their basic objective of getting the US out of Europe;

-- by emphasizing the continuing character of East-West negotiations, Allied defense expenditures might be more easily sustained;

-- CES, seen as a step in the on-going search for an eventual peace order, would give perspective to the work of the conference, thereby limiting unwarranted public optimism;

-- recognition in CES of the importance of other on-going East-West talks would add to pressures on the Soviets to reach agreements;

-- the basic situation of the East European states would not be altered, but their desire for a more independent voice in discussions surrounding a conference would be met; and

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-- issues of cooperation could be dealt with as well in this framework as in any of the other approaches described above.

Disadvantages

-- opening the possibility of reference in CES to MBFR might be opposed by the Soviets;

-- there likely would be no immediate concrete results beyond those possible under other suggested approaches to CES;

-- a possible CES declaration on arms control and disarmament might strengthen public reluctance, in Allied countries, to support the substantial force improvements we seek; and

-- other disadvantages at worst could approximate those flowing from a conference making some concessions but protecting Western interests (paragraph A. 3.b., above), but would be far less than from a conference for the sake of detente or a conference on cooperation (paragraphs A.3.a. and B., above).

3. Developing Allied Consensus.

A positive approach to a CES conforms more closely with the majority Allied view than our present approach. Therefore, we anticipate no difficulty in gaining Allied concurrence. Discussion of arms control and disarmament at CES conforms to current Allied thinking, and therefore poses no problem. Reference in CES to MBFR will be welcomed by most Allies.

The following illustrative steps would facilitate building an Allied consensus around a US preference:

-- the US could underline the Berlin precondition, and clarify its attitude toward CES, and perhaps toward economic and defense aims generally, in a major address

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on European affairs by the Secretary sometime in November;

-- the US position would be conveyed to the Allies in time to allow for consultations at NATO in advance of the December Ministerial meeting;

-- bilateral representations should be made in key NATO capitals;

-- the US would introduce into the Council draft formulations for the December Ministerial communique;

-- following the December Ministerial meeting, bilateral East-West contacts on CES would be pursued;

-- depending on the status of the Berlin agreement, NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers could meet in April 1972 to assess prospects for opening multilateral East-West talks and to discuss the substance and procedures for multilateral East-West talks; and

-- after conclusion of the Berlin accord, and following the President's visit to Moscow, East-West multilateral talks could open.

The issue of deferring multilateral preparations until after the President's trip probably will not be contentious, since it appears the Berlin agreement may be delayed and there are current indications that a number of Allies would prefer to hold a summit of the Ten before embarking on CES.

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III. CES & MBFR

Most Allies and non-aligned states wish to establish a connection now between MBFR and CES. At the same time, most recognize that CES would be too unwieldy a forum for negotiation of so complex and sensitive a subject as MBFR, and that actual negotiations should be restricted to the states directly concerned.

The Pact stated in June 1970 that "in the interests of securing fruitful results from the study of the question concerning the reduction of foreign armed forces, this question could be discussed in a body which it is proposed be set up at the all-European conference or in another manner acceptable to interested states." This position has since been reiterated by the Soviets.

The US has preferred to keep the two issues on separate tracks, in effect assuming that the tracks might cross at some point, but leaving open the option of separately initiating either CES or MBFR discussions. Our approach to MBFR, moreover, has recognized that

-- MBFR addresses the military confrontation of major powers whose forces and territory are directly involved; other states, though interested, have less at stake in such negotiations, and many would likely mount pressures for reductions without necessarily insisting on essential safeguards; and

-- involvement of non-aligned countries would complicate and delay MBFR negotiations, causing inter alia possible Congressional pressures for unilateral reductions.

Given the general preference expressed over past weeks by our Allies, however, for including MBFR in some fashion on a CES agenda -- based largely on their view that MBFR would provide a concrete issue of security for CES in discussion and evidence of movement toward detente -- we are virtually isolated on this issue, and will likely need to deal with it at Ministerial level in December.

Since we cannot prevent participants in CES from referring to MBFR, the alternatives are: (a) to strive for agreement among the Allies (and perhaps with the Soviets) for procedural arrangements to be made in the initial phase of CES that would avoid more than general reference in CES to MBFR; or (b) to deal with the substance of MBFR in CES.

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Beyond this is the issue of whether(c) to deal with MBFR negotiations in a body separate from CES, or (d) in a body that is part of permanent machinery established by CES.

A. Avoiding More than Reference to MBFR in CES.

Advantages

-- would allow latitude for reference to MBFR, while the US and the Soviets would retain some leverage since no meaningful discussion would be possible without their participation;

-- leaves open the possibility of a declaration by CES supporting MBFR efforts in another forum;

-- would recognize the security interests of CES participants in arms control and disarmament measures affecting Europe; and

-- would leave open the possibility that states directly involved in MBFR negotiations could make periodic progress reports, as appropriate, to CES or within the framework of permanent machinery established by CES, for noting by CES participants.

Disadvantages

-- the possibility cannot be ruled out that some CES participants would use the conference as a forum in which to insist on a role in actual MBFR negotiations;

-- despite prior arrangements to avoid the issue arising, some might insist that MBFR negotiations be conducted in CES or in a forum directly responsible to CES;

-- should the MBFR negotiations result in an impasse, or the Allies decide to break off MBFR negotiations, the Soviets tactically could use CES as a vehicle for pressing the Allies for MBFR concessions; and

-- some Allies and other participants in CES may wish to go beyond reference to MBFR and seek a broader debate.

B. Dealing Substantively with MBFR in CES.

While no advantages are discernible, the overriding disadvantage is that so large a forum would render effective multilateral MBFR negotiations extremely difficult, if not impossible, on terms acceptable to the US

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and the Allies. In any event, the Soviets also do not wish CES to deal with MBFR.

C. Negotiating MBFR in a Body Clearly Separate from CES.

Advantages

-- would deny CES participants, except those directly interested, a role in MBFR negotiations;

-- might diminish the utility to the Soviets of CES as a forum for castigating the Allies for lack of MBFR progress;

-- would make easier Allied disengagement from or deferral of MBFR in the event of impasse; and

-- if the Allies agreed, would allow deferral of MBFR negotiations until after CES.

Disadvantage

-- might incur some accusations that issues central to European security were being treated outside the CES framework, and that advantage was not being taken of possibilities for giving CES permanent machinery a tangible task related to a concrete issue of security.

D. Negotiating MBFR in a Special Group Established by CES.

If the terms of reference of the body established by CES were explicitly decided only by the states directly concerned with MBFR, linkage to CES permanent machinery in effect would be only optical, and the advantages and disadvantages would be largely the same as for a body completely separate from the CES framework. An additional advantage, however, might be to attract France to participate in MBFR. On the other hand, if the body's obligation to CES went beyond periodic reports to be noted either at CES plenary sessions or through permanent machinery, the overriding disadvantage of possible interference in MBFR negotiations by states not directly involved would be enhanced.

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IV. CES and SALT

Provided there is a satisfactory resolution on Berlin, the issue arises of the relationship between CES and SALT. The possibilities lie between the following alternatives:

- linkage between achieving success in SALT and proceeding with CES; and
- considering SALT along with other issues as part of the complex of US/Soviet relations which needs to be taken into account in assessing Soviet intentions in regard to CES.

Linkage would have the following implications:

- while it may be argued that Soviet interest in CES could provide additional leverage in SALT, it is unlikely that this interest would affect the Soviet position on SALT issues, since they deal with fundamental matters of state security;
- such linkage would run a considerable risk of damaging SALT at a stage in which the negotiations are both delicate and nearing fruition. Since we have consistently eschewed linking SALT with extraneous issues, a reversal on our part would cause the Soviets to question our basic objectives in SALT, thus delaying and diverting the talks -- precisely the opposite of what would be intended;
- success in SALT would not reveal much, if anything, about Soviet intentions in CES. Failure of SALT would be the occasion for serious re-evaluation of East/West relations, but no specific linkage to CES would be necessary; it would be automatic. Moreover, by linking the two we would be foregoing the option to proceed with CES in order to minimize the consequences of SALT failure;
- SALT is sufficiently close to fruition that it would not necessarily postpone CES, if that were the intent. By making SALT a curtain-raiser for CES, we would exaggerate the importance of the latter to the U.S., and

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-- it would be difficult to persuade the Allies to add another precondition to CES, particularly since we have said it is not a precondition. Given Allied interest in CES they might well put pressure on us to be more forthcoming in SALT.

The second alternative of considering SALT as part of the complex of East-West issues which need to be taken into account would avoid these problems, but would recognize the political reality that all issues in the East-West area are related to some extent. Even in this context, however, it would not be desirable to consider progress in SALT as an explicit "planning factor" in Allied consultation on CES, since this would have most of the adverse implications of "linkage" as it likely would become public.

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SUBJECT: FRG POSITION ON CES AND MBFR.

REF: BONN 13822

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1. CES: MINISTER-COUNSELOR LAHUSEN OF FRG EMBASSY INFORMED DEPARTMENT ON NOVEMBER 5 THAT THE GERMAN CABINET ON NOVEMBER 3 HEARD AND ACCEPTED, WITHOUT FORMAL APPROVAL, A FONOFF PAPER ON CES PREPARATIONS. THIS PAPER IS NO DOUBT THE SAME ONE DESCRIBED IN THE REFTEL, BUT THE INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED BY THE FRG EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON ADD A NUMBER OF POINTS.

2. AS A GENERAL CONCLUSION THE PAPER STATES THAT THE FRG, IN DEALING WITH A CES, SHOULD PRESERVE FLEXIBILITY AND REMAIN ADAPTABLE TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES. NO MOVE CAN BE ACCEPTED, HOWEVER, WHICH WOULD PREJUDICE THE FRG'S APPROACH TO THE GERMAN QUESTION, PARTICULARLY THE GOAL OF REUNIFICATION. WITHIN THIS GENERAL GUIDELINE, A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS ARE DEFINED.

3. THE FIRST OF THESE PROVISIONS IS THAT MULTILATERAL PREPARATIONS FOR A CES SHOULD UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES BEGIN PRIOR TO THE SIGNATURE OF THE FINAL BERLIN PROTOCOL. FOLLOWING SUCH SIGNATURE, HELSINKI MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR A MEETING OF AMBASSADORS (SALON DES AMBASSADEURS) PROVIDED THE FINNISH INITIATIVE FOR TALKS WITH THE TWO GERMAN STATES IS FIRST RESOLVED, I.E., DROPPED. AT EACH PREPARATORY STAGE THE FRG WOULD WISH TO MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY CONCERNING PARTICIPATION IN THE NEXT STAGE AND PARTICIPATION BY GDR REPRESENTATIVES IN ONE MEETING MUST NOT BE CONSIDERED A PRECEDENT FOR GDR PARTICIPATION IN OTHER PHASES. FINALLY, THE FONOFF PAPER PROVIDES THAT ALL DECISIONS CONCERNING PROCEDURES AT A CES MUST BE MADE DURING THE MULTILATERAL PREPARATORY STAGES AND NOT AT THE CES ITSELF.

4. LAHUSEN REMARKED THAT WHILE HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THE SUBJECT, HE UNDERSTOOD THAT STATE SECRETARY FRANK HAD INFORMED ALPHAND DURING THEIR LAST MEETING THAT THE FRG WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN A CES UNTIL AFTER A MODUS VIVENDI HAS BEEN ACHIEVED BETWEEN THE TWO GERMAN STATES.

5. MBFR: LAHUSEN SAID THAT THE FONOFF HAD ALSO FURTHER REFINED ITS THINKING CONCERNING EAST GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THE FRG CONSIDERED THAT THE DECISION TO EXCLUDE EAST BERLIN FROM THE NATO EXPLORER'S ITINERARY EFFECTIVELY RULED OUT GDR PARTICIPATION DURING THE PRESENT

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STAGE. THE FOREIGN OFFICE CONSIDERED THAT NO MULTI-
LATERALIZATION OF MBFR PREPARATORY TALKS (I.E., THE POST-
EXPLORER STAGE) SHOULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE FINAL BERLIN
PROTOCOL IS SIGNED. IF PREPARATORY MULTILATERAL TALKS SHOULD
BEGIN BEFORE A MODUS VIVENDI IS REACHED BETWEEN THE TWO
GERMAN STATES, THE FRG WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER WHAT PROTECTIVE
MEASURES, I.E., DISCALIMERS, WOULD BE NECESSARY. ROGERS

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By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

INFORMATION
November 18, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt ^{with}

SUBJECT: SRG Meeting on European Security Conference

At this meeting, you should discuss the following issues in preparation for an NSC meeting and to identify decisions that will guide the US through the next NATO meeting and beyond.

A. What should our basic attitude be toward a CES, if we assume early completion of all phases of the Berlin negotiations make CES a live issue in the next months.

Our choices seem to be

1. Aim for a Conference that simply promotes detente.
2. A Conference that limits damage to substantive Western positions.
3. A Conference that excludes security issues in favor of European "Cooperation."
4. A "New Approach" that emphasizes security issues, practical measures of implementation, and the establishment of follow-on machinery.

B. What position should we adopt on major operational issues.

1. Stick to the Berlin precondition only?
2. In addition, postpone multilateral preparation of CES until ratification of the German treaties, or at least until after the Moscow summit?
3. Aim for actual agreements in preparatory talks or leave further negotiations for ministers, or second phase after ministerial level meeting?
4. A short Conference preceded by long and intensive multilateral contacts, or a long Conference meeting at several levels -- ministers, working level subcommittees, etc.?

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Underlying all of this, of course, are the issues of what US interests can be served by CES, where it fits into larger scheme of SALT, summit, MBFR and East-West detente.

What we are really deciding is not whether to hold MBFR or CES, but whether to organize East-West relations in multilateral framework for the inevitable second stage after Berlin, or whether to allow bilateralism to grow. MBFR and CES are highly risky, but may be manageable. Bilateralism adds the risks of loss of US influence and control and, perhaps most important, may contribute to a fission of US and Western Europe and division within Western Europe. If we believe these are real risks -- i. e., that Ostpolitik will drive the French into the arms of Russia and split Britain and France from Germany -- then we should be willing to accept the risks inherent in CES and MBFR.

I. Current State of Play

We are committed by NATO legislative history to begin multilateral talks in preparation for an actual Conference "as soon as feasible" after the Berlin negotiations are completed; this means all phases of Berlin negotiations. In practice the Germans would prefer that their treaties also be ratified before a multilateral phase, but will probably not hold to this position unless the reverse linkage forces them to complete ratification simultaneously with signing of the final protocol of the Berlin agreement.

The Soviets accept the Berlin condition in practice, but are mounting pressures for a firm commitment to a Conference "as early as 1972" (their phrase). In addition, the Soviets are accomplishing some of their aims bilaterally: the Soviet-German treaty, the first part of the Berlin agreement, the Soviet-French Declaration, and the Soviet-Canadian communique -- all include either a pledge of non-use of force, or recognition of the territorial status quo. The main aim of the Conference would be American and an all-European acquiescence to these principles.

The main problem, thus, is that the Soviets have clear purposes (not substantially different from earlier proposals dating back to 1954), but the Allies and the US have no conception of what a Conference would achieve other than atmospherics of detente.

The issues therefore are to clarify now our objectives in a Conference, and the operational steps to achieve them.

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A. The Present Course

If we continue along our present lines we will end up with either (1) a Conference on the Soviet type -- with no substantive meaning or (2) with some controlled texts that seem to safeguard our positions, but in fact will probably be of no great value.

-- If we continue along this line, the only saving grace is that we can stay in line with most of our Allies, who, for differing reasons, are willing to have a Conference. In particular, the French see the Conference as a means to defer hard security issues of troop levels and divert attention into "cooperation"; only after a long period of relaxed atmosphere would they approach security issues. (The French, of course, are not averse to ratifying the status quo, especially in Germany.)

-- The Germans, on the other hand, see both CES and MBFR as part of a "process" of testing the Soviets and establishing detente by stages. The Conference would have to deal with some security issues and not be consigned to cooperation questions only. In reality the Germans must deliver a Conference as the next installment payment to Moscow for the treaty.

-- In addition there is a procedural split: the French want several stages but the Germans are inclined to complete-preparations, including actual agreements, and then have one meeting. We incline to the German position, but the French are gaining support for a compromise of reasonably thorough preparations, then first ministerial, followed by subcommittee work, and final ministerial.

One alternative within the context of our present course is to try to add agenda items such as freer movement of people which supposedly limits the damage of Soviet gains on a non-use-of-force agreement.

-- The Allies do not oppose this outright but have little stomach for debate with the Soviets or confrontation; the French would solve this by dealing only with economic, cultural, scientific exchanges, etc.

Agenda

If there is no shift from this course we will go into preparatory talks with the following agenda.

SECRET

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

SECRET

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WARSAW PACT

NATO

- | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Force renunciation and respect for existing borders; | 1. Principles which should govern relations between states, including renunciation of the use of force; but some disclaimer on borders; |
| 2. Economic, scientific, technical, cultural and environmental co-operation; | 2. (a) Economic, scientific, technical, cultural and environmental co-operation;

(b) Freer movement of people, ideas and information; |
| 3. Establishment of a permanent "organ" for questions of security and cooperation in Europe. | 3. <u>Possible</u> establishment of a permanent body (not agreed in NATO). |

II. Alternatives to the Present Course

1. Transform Conference into European Cooperation only -- economics, cultural, etc.
2. Adopt a generally "New Approach" to emphasize security issues, and creation of follow-on machinery.

The alternative of a Conference on European Cooperation might circumvent problems in dealing with the Soviet proposals on non-use-of-force and territorial integrity, but some euphoric fall-out is still likely from any conference; the main issues of cooperation are not suitable for a CES, but more plausible for the EC dealing with CEMA or even the ECE. The US would be a spectator in this proposal and such a conference, if it dealt with economic relations, might raise divisive issues if the West had not straightened out its monetary and trade problems.

New Approach

This is the main contribution of the study, and one obviously considered in a favorable light. In fact it does have some merit and is worth discussion. The problem is that it is ill-defined in both concept and in practice.

-- The main point is to strike a positive attitude toward CES, in effect embracing it in order to press for (a) some element of arms control principles in the various conference declarations, which would then serve as a

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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bridge to practical control measures of constraints on force movements, maneuvers, etc.; (b) to establish post-conference machinery that would institutionalize the US role in European security and provide a forum for Eastern Europeans to exercise some freedom of action and perhaps to influence Soviet policy.

The logic of this course is that MBFR would or could be deferred and CES would endorse it in principle, but not control it.

-- Disadvantages are that the Allies might be apprehensive that we were trying to go too far in placating the Soviets by establishing a new security "system" as a new device for US disengagement.

-- In addition, the Soviets would be in a position to force their demands, and then stall actual implementation of any practical measure and render any "machinery" ineffective.

Operational implications of this approach are:

-- Groundwork would have to be laid at the December NATO Ministerial, at least in outline.

-- Hold special NATO Deputies meeting next spring to complete work on new scheme.

-- Defer multilateral talks until after Moscow summit.

My own view is that there is only one marginal interest that the US can have in the entire ghastly affair: conceivably we can contribute slightly to freedom of action for the East Europeans by some rhetorical devices and some constraints on Soviet forces. Beyond this, our only aim should be to avoid any deep split within the Alliance because of CES; the actual conference may be no worse than interminable wrangling. I would think that a new approach could be adopted without major fanfare under rubric of emphasizing practical security measures (in effect, borrowing from MBFR collateral constraints) and, on this basis, multilateral talks postponed until after the summit, and after sounding out the Soviets.

Otherwise we are going to drift into multilaterals next spring, without any notion of what will be achieved other than that we have to make concessions. In this case, I would support the French approach.

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By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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III. Operational Issues

The Berlin condition should be retained and this is no problem.

Logically, if we expect the Conference to have any chance of achieving substantive results we should also defer preparatory talks until after the German treaties are ratified, without making this a public precondition.

At the same time, it seems logical to inform the Allies that we would have reservations about any Conference unless we had some initial SALT agreement, again without making this a public precondition.

As for the issues of long preparations, short preparations, one meeting or several meetings, etc., this is too marginal to be worth much strain with the Allies. On the other hand, if we are not going to shift to the New Approach in order to limit the impact of a Conference, it would be prudent to dispose of it as rapidly as possible without engaging in protracted follow-on negotiations or several meetings. At minimum, however, preparations should be deferred until after the summit, and the actual Conference until after the US elections. (This is what the Soviets probably expect.)

MBFR and CES

Our position is that never the twain shall meet, but this is up to the Soviets. They can drag out MBFR until Berlin is finished and then press for an immediate start toward CES. They probably will not turn down MBFR beginning first if we seriously press them, but they are certainly in no hurry.

The real issue is which of these two potential disasters we wish to address first.

-- MBFR is at least a substantive issue and deals with security; whereas CES is largely atmospheric.

-- On the other hand, our losses in MBFR are tangible and not to be recouped, whereas CES could pass into the oblivion of the Spirit of Geneva, Camp David, etc.

-- If MBFR risks serious losses, then there is much to be said for holding it off as long as possible: one means to do it is to switch to CES as the first East-West negotiation, after the summit, with MBFR deferred until after CES, which would form an umbrella of endorsement for MBFR.

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By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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IV. Agency Positions

-- There seem to be no real convictions: State wants to avoid con-
trectemps with the Allies, of course, and thinks their new approach may be
a way to make CES respectable (they may be right). ACDA is horrified
that MBFR might be deferred, and ISA wants MBFR first and clearly
separate. However, ISA (Eagleburger) sees some merit in trying to make
CES meaningful along lines of the New Approach, but finds the concept too
vague (so do we).

V. Next Steps

1. Ask State to take the middle part of the Study (pp 7-22) and, subject
to some redrafting, circulate for the NSC meeting.

2. Ask State to take materials from current NATO preparations plus
their own annex to NSSM 138 and set down in a separate paper those operational
decisions that are likely to arise at the Ministerial meeting; circulate for
NSC discussion.

3. Establish agreement of the Review Group that at the NSC we will dis-
cuss MBFR and then CES, and for the latter subject the Agencies should be
prepared to indicate their preference among basic approaches in the NSSM
Study, and comment on operational questions of linkage between MBFR
and CES.

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Authority EO 12958
By LF NARA Date 7/29/03

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN... *[Handwritten mark]*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*
SUBJECT: NSC Consideration of NATO Issues:
(1) Mutual Force Reductions
(2) European Security Conference

1 Dec 1971

The meetings of NATO Ministers next week (December 8-10) will be dominated by two issues: the question of a Western position on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) and preparations for a European Conference on Security and Cooperation. On both subjects our Allies will be looking to the U.S. for an indication of how we wish to deal with them.

-- Both of these issues bear importantly on Western security interests. If not handled properly the results could be highly dangerous. It is important that we maintain our focus on the implications for the military balance of any force reductions and on the substance of European security, rather than drift into ill-defined negotiations that will only work to the Soviet advantage.

-- On neither of these issues is the Western Alliance in a position to move ahead; there is no consensus on the aims of either mutual force reductions or a European conference.

-- We need more time to develop concrete proposals.

-- Finally, multilateral negotiations of this sort on European issues should come after, not before your meeting in Moscow. Moreover, we should have some greater assurance of a satisfactory outcome in SALT.

Background

MBFR: The Western initiative, dating back to 1968, for negotiations on the reduction of forces in Central Europe was largely academic until last Spring when Brezhnev offered to begin negotiations. As a consequence of the Soviet response, we have intensified our study of the issues. Within the Alliance there has been a sharp revival of interest in negotiations

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because of: (1) the Soviet response on MBFR; (2) the on-going U.S. and FRG negotiations with the Soviets; and, (3) the Mansfield proposals for unilateral reductions.

Our own studies have shown that almost every model for reductions that would be negotiable with the Soviets would damage the Western military position. Small reductions that minimize the adverse consequences are almost impossible to verify, whereas larger reductions do major damage mainly because the Soviets withdraw only to Western Russia while we withdraw across the Atlantic.

Though these conclusions are not surprising, they are being submerged in other considerations. For various reasons MBFR negotiations have become a highly political issue in Europe.

-- Many Allies (and some in our own government) believe that our Congressional critics can be placated by MBFR negotiations.

-- Others believe that MBFR is an instrument for European detente, and should be pursued for this purpose.

-- In addition, some of our Allies suspect that we want to arrange a bilateral reduction with the USSR and wish to forestall this through early negotiations.

Our objective, therefore, must be to impress the Allies that we are not interested in reductions for the sake of a better atmosphere and to assure them that no bilateral bargain will be made with the USSR. We want to force our Allies to recognize the problems and implications of MBFR and to focus on the security consequences to the Alliance's military posture. Unless maintenance of a military balance is the principal criteria for judging MBFR, we will be engaged in the impossible task of trading military security for some vague and undefinable degree of detente.

A Conference on European Security and Cooperation. This issue has been pressed with varying degrees of urgency by the Soviets since 1954, and for good reason. As they define it, such a Conference would issue declarations of non-aggression, recognize existing borders, and agree on increased economic cooperation. Their aim is to solidify the status quo in Eastern Europe, while extending their own influence in the Western Alliance.

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Authority EC 12158
By LF NARA Date 7/29/03TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

3

On this issue there is growing Allied pressure simply to move to negotiations. The Alliance consideration of the subjects to be discussed and what the Western position would be has been limited and without consensus. Negotiations at this point would almost certainly result in a Soviet-style conference agreeing on broad generalities.

We need to redirect the work of the Allies so that principles of security are translated into specific measures. If we can do this, a negotiation later may actually enhance the Western position.

Priorities and Timing

We have set no precondition for MBFR, but the Soviets are clearly dragging their feet by refusing thus far to accept Brosio as the NATO "explorer" of MBFR principles. Until they do agree to receive Brosio we need make no further effort to open negotiations; we should use the time for the Alliance to digest the analytical result of our studies. We have just completed a major study and transmitted it to NATO. One approach which deserves further discussion involves phased negotiations, with extensive discussion of principles in the early stages and prior to negotiations on reductions.

On a European conference we are committed to begin the preparations once the Berlin issue is completed. Some Allies, notably Britain and France, and perhaps West Germany, would be willing to move toward a conference as soon as the current phase of the Berlin talks, between East and West German, is completed (perhaps late this week). We want to stick to the condition of completely wrapping up Berlin. The Soviets appear to be insisting that Berlin will be held open until their German treaty is ratified in Bonn. If so, preparations of a European conference will be put over until the spring and, thus, should be held up until your meeting in Moscow. In this case, agreement to begin a European conference might be a summit decision.

Proposed Conduct of the Meeting

Since we can anticipate pressure from the Allies to show "movement" at the Ministerial meeting, it will be important for you to impress on the NSC meeting that we will not move until we are assured that in both issues (MBFR and a conference) we can develop a common Western

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

Authority EC 12458By LF NARA Date 7/29/03TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

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position that insures that our security interests will be maintained intact.

(You may wish to say that both issues should be delayed until after the summit.)

I suggest that you conduct the meeting as follows:

-- Call on Director Helms to brief on the outcome of the November 30 Warsaw Pact meeting on MBFR and the European conference.

-- Call on me to outline the issues and alternatives.

-- Make clear that you do not want a substantive movement on these issues now.

-- Discuss the conclusions we draw from the MBFR options analysis and Allied reactions, calling first on Secretary Rogers.

-- Discuss the sequence of MBFR negotiations, once started.

-- Discuss the preconditions (Berlin) for a Conference.

-- Discuss the character of the Conference we want.

Your Talking Points are written in the above fashion.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

December 2, 1971

National Security Decision Memorandum 142

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Attorney General
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
 Agency

SUBJECT: Presidential Guidance on Mutual and Balanced
 Force Reductions and a European Conference

As a result of the discussion at the December 1 NSC meeting, the President has directed that the following guidance be followed in consultations with our Allies on the issues related to Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and preparations for a European Conference.

After considering the discussions at the meeting, the President has concluded that we are not prepared for definitive decisions with respect to MBFR or CES and that our general approach should be to proceed slowly while developing consensus within the Alliance on positions which clearly maintain our security.

It should be stressed to our Allies that the principal criterion for judging any MBFR proposals must be maintenance of Western military security. This will be the U.S. position in Alliance consultations on preferred MBFR models that would serve as the basis for negotiation. U.S. representatives should develop a maximum consensus on this principle.

At this time, the U.S. cannot support any single approach to reductions. We should urge the Allies to continue analysis of possible reduction

TOP SECRET

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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models. Meanwhile, we should complete ongoing analysis and undertake further studies of asymmetrical models that emphasize limitations and reductions on Warsaw Pact offensive capabilities. We should also complete a study on options dealing with nuclear weapons and pursue further work on collateral constraints.

Our Allies should be told that the U.S. supports the concept of a sequential approach to negotiation similar to that proposed by the FRG. This approach should be applied to further analysis of MBFR models.

In Allied consultations, U.S. representatives should provide reassurance that we will not negotiate bilateral reductions with the USSR.

Until the Brosio mission to Moscow has been completed, the U.S. cannot support other efforts towards MBFR negotiations. While we would consider alternatives to the Brosio mission, if it proves unacceptable to the USSR, it remains essential that an exploratory phase similar to that authorized for Mr. Brosio be undertaken before any multilateral negotiations.

European Conference

We should insist that the final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin be signed before agreeing to any multilateral preparations for a European Conference. Following the signing of the Berlin Protocol, the U.S. should urge a meeting of NATO countries at the Deputy Foreign Minister level to coordinate a common approach to the issues that may be raised by the other side before going into preparatory talks.

At present, Western preparations on substantive issues are insufficiently developed to enter into multilateral East-West contacts. The U.S. will be prepared to contribute to the work of the Alliance on substantive points by submitting more concrete proposals for Western consideration. In particular, security issues (other than MBFR) that might be topics in a Conference will be given more emphasis.

The U.S. has no interest in a conference in 1972 and all preparatory work within the Alliance and with Eastern and other European countries should be geared to this consideration.

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By KW Date 7-17-03


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The U.S. does not wish to alter its current position of keeping MBFR and a European Conference separate.

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
The U.S. should continue to stress to its Allies the importance of additional European force improvements meeting the objectives set by NSDM 133. MBFR should in no way conflict with the force improvements developed under the AD-70 programs; these two concepts must be complementary.


Henry A. Kissinger

TOP SECRET



By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03



Department of State

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C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 20776

INDEX: PFOR/FR.

SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEWS ON CESC MULTILATERALS

1. WE STRONGLY ENDORSE VIEW IN US NATO'S 5015 THAT IF FRG HOLDS TO POSITION AT BRUSSELS NATO MIN REQUIRING SIGNATURE OF BERLIN FINAL PROTOCOL PRIOR TO START OF CESC MULTILATERAL PREPARATIONS, FRENCH WOULD PROBABLY GO ALONG. MOREOVER, EVEN IF FRG AVOIDS TAKING CLEAR-CUT POSITION ON STARTING CESC, WE BELIEVE STEADFAST US INSISTENCE ON PROTOCOL SIGNATURE BEFORE MULTILATERALIZATION -- A POSITION WHICH WOULD PRESUMABLY COMMAND SUPPORT OF CANADIANS, DUTCH AND OTHERS -- WOULD PROBABLY BE SUFFICIENT TO KEEP FRENCH FROM MOVING VERY FAR OUT FRONT OF REST OF ALLIANCE ON BEGINNING OF HELSINKI TEA PARTY.

2. ON SURFACE, OBVIOUSLY FOR MOSCOW'S CONSUMPTION, FRENCH CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO APPEAR POSITIVE ON CESC. INDEED, THEY WILL PROBABLY TRY TO SEEM THE MOST FORTHCOMING MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE ON MOVING TOWARD A CONFERENCE, WHICH THEY CONSIDER INEVITABLE IN ANY CASE. WITH THIS TACK, THEY HOPE TO RETAIN "PRIVILEGED RELATION-

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03



Department of State

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SHIP" WITH MOSCOW AT A TIME WHEN FRG HAS TAKEN LIMELIGHT FROM THEM. AND THEY HOPE TO CONTINUE THEIR IMAGE AS CHAMPION OF EAST-WEST RAPPROCHEMENT.

3. BELOW SURFACE, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE FRENCH HAVE EFFECTIVELY HEDGED THEIR POSITION IN SEVERAL WAYS. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY EMPHASIZE THEY "WILL STUDY VERY CAREFULLY" BRANDT'S VIEWS ON TIMING ENTIRE SEQUENCE OF BERLIN FOR SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION OF FRG TREATIES WITH USSR AND POLAND, AND START OF CESC MULTILATERALS. CLEAR IMPLICATION OF THIS IS THAT GOF WILL FOLLOW BRANDT'S LEAD. SECONDLY, THEY SAY THEY WILL ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT POSITION OF US AND ALL OTHER ALLIES. THIRDLY, THEY STRESS READINESS TO ACCEPT FINNISH PROPOSALS FOR "MULTIPLE BILATERALS" OR OTHER STEPS LEADING TO CESC MULTILATERALIZATION, BUT POINTEDLY ADD THAT FINNISH "INITIATIVE" IS NEEDED BEFORE FRANCE CAN ACT.

4. AT DECEMBER 2 LUNCHEON WITH PARIS DIPLOMATIC CORPS PRESS ATTACHES, FONMIN SCHUMANN TOOK NUANCES POSITION ON TIMING OF CESC MULTILATERALS, WHICH HELPS PUT FRENCH POSITION IN PERSPECTIVE. HE OBSERVED THAT IN 1972 A CESC WOULD PROBABLY TAKE PLACE AND PAISED HIS GLASS TO ITS SUCCESS. HE NOTED INNER-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS WOULD SOON CONCLUDE AND REAFFIRMED READINESS OF FRANCE, FOLLOWING THEIR CONCLUSION, TO START HELSINKI MULTILATERALS. HE THEN SAID: "...BUT THERE ARE SOME, AND I KNOW THEM QUITE WELL, WHO WANT TO AWAIT THE SIGNING OF THE BERLIN FINAL PROTOCL. AND IF I PERCEIVE THINGS CORRECTLY, YOU WILL SEE THAT NEXT WEEK IN BRUSSELS THERE WILL BE A MOVE TO WAIT UNTIL THIS SIGNING TAKES PLACE. IF THIS SUCCEEDS, THEN CESC PREPARATIONS WILL BE DELAYED FOR SEVERAL MONTHS." SCHUMANN STATED IN PASSING THAT HE "UNDERSTOOD" REASONS OF THOSE WHO WANTED TO WAIT FOR FRG SIGNATURE, AND CONSPICUOUSLY REFRAINED FROM INDICATING THAT FRANCE WOULD ACTIVELY OPPOSE SUCH A POSITION.

5. WE SUSPECT SCHUMANN WANTS TO RETAIN MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY AT BRUSSELS, PARTLY IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE IN DRAFTING NATO MIN COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE ON CESC TO WHICH FRANCE CAN CONTINUE TO SUBSCRIBE. AT SAME TIME, WE THINK HE WANTS TO MAINTAIN MANEUVERING ROOM WITH SOVIETS SO THAT IF NATO

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By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03



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MIN DECIDES TO STAND FAST ON FOP SIGNATURE AS PREREQUISITE
TO STARTING HELSINKI TALK PARTY, FRENCH WILL BE ABLE AT
LEAST TO MAKE CREDIBLE CASE TO SOVIETS THAT THEY TRIED
THEIR BEST TO SUPPORT MOVE TOWARD EARLY CESC PREPARATION
BUT FAILED.

GP-BWATSON



By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

WASHINGTON

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December 22, 1971

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Preparations for Initial Multilateral
Talks on Security and Cooperation in
Europe

I informed you December 10 that we obtained general agreement at the NATO Ministerial Meeting to delay opening of initial East-West talks looking toward a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe until after signature of the Final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin. It was clear, however, that most of the Allies will wish to begin such talks immediately following signature of the Protocol. Therefore, we confront the prospect that our Allies, Warsaw Pact, and non-aligned and neutral states will unanimously favor discussions at official level as early as June, 1972, though the conference itself would not convene -- if at all -- until sometime in 1973.

To turn CSCE to our advantage, we must develop our positions during the NATO consultations which will resume in early January. In addition, to provide our Embassies with the necessary general guidance, I have approved instructions setting out our general approach to CSCE substantive and procedural issues, as it has evolved to date. My telegram draws upon NSDM-142, as well as upon my December 1 speech -- which I discussed with you, and upon my subsequent statement to the NATO Ministers in Brussels. On the basis of these

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BOX 11-152 TOWSON, MD 21286

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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instructions, our Mission to NATO and our Embassies in selected capitals can begin consultations and discussions necessary to shape CSCE toward constructive ends.

In the initial multilateral talks, we will find ourselves increasingly engaged in an exercise resembling the United Nations, involving some thirty participating states, and rapidly shifting tactical situations. We will need to be able to respond flexibly to developments, and to issue promptly the necessary instructions on the basis of fully cleared positions. An early start here in Washington and in NATO is essential to the proper advancement of our interests.

To provide the detailed elaboration of our approach required to carry on the day-to-day discussions in NATO and bilaterally, I am establishing an interagency Task Force, chaired by the Department of State, and comprising representatives of the NSC staff, the Department of Defense, USIA, the Department of Commerce, ACDA and other interested agencies.

I have instructed Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand, who will chair the Task Force, to assure that procedural and substantive issues are fully considered in a timely fashion. As circumstances require, I will seek your further guidance.



William P. Rogers

SECRET

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

TOP SECRET

36067

ACTION

January 4, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Secretary Rogers' Planning for European Security
Conference (Tab B)

NIXON MATERIALS
NSC INSTITUTIONAL (H) FILES
BOX 44-187 Folder: NSSM 158 [1 of 2]

In a memorandum for the President, the Secretary notes that once the Berlin protocol is signed, we will have to begin multilateral preparatory talks for the CSCE. In anticipation of the day to day consultations that are now beginning, he informs the President that he has instructed the embassies and missions of our position, and will establish an interagency task force chaired by Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand (this is the first we have heard of the task force).

There are two problems raised by this memorandum. First, the "instructions" go beyond the Presidential guidance in NSDM 142 (Tab C). Whereas that document indicated that our general approach should be to proceed slowly while developing a consensus on concrete issues within the Alliance the Secretary's latest instructions (cleared everywhere but the White House) states that we will begin multilateral talks "as soon as possible" after the signing of the Berlin protocol. However, the Secretary in his conversation with Walter Scheel said that preparatory talks ought to be delayed until after the EEC summit meeting, which Scheel anticipated in September. Thus, where we really stand is anybody's guess.

More important, however, is that you maintain the control over the substance that you established at the SRG and NSC meetings, and through the NSDM. It is therefore time to issue the second part of the NSSM, calling for a detailed report on what we propose to accomplish in the alliance consultations.

This need not conflict with the interagency task force mentioned in the Secretary's memorandum. Indeed, it would dovetail with it, since the Secretary's task force could serve as the backstopping mechanism.

TOP SECRET

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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Assuming you do not want to wait too long before reviving the CSCE planning,
I have done a draft NSSM asking for a more comprehensive report.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the NSSM at Tab A.

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NIXON MATERIALS
NSC INSTITUTIONAL (4) FILES

Box: H-152

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(2 of 2)

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03



Department of State TELEGRAM

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AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USMISSION BERLIN
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS UNN
USMISSION NATO

Mikes

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 1414

SUBJECT: DIFFERENCES WITH FRENCH ON CSCE

1. SUMMARY. IN WAKE OF JANUARY 13-14 EC POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS IN LUXEMBOURG AND REPORTED AGREEMENT OF SIX ON STARTING MULTIPLE BI-LATERALS WITH FINNISH FOR MIN TO PREPARE FOR CSCE, WE HAVE STRESSED TO QUAI OFFICERS THAT THESE EC ACTIONS UNDERCUT DECEMBER NATO

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03



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MIN POSITION AGAINST BEGINNING CSCE MULTILATERAL STEPS BEFORE SIGNATURE OF BERLIN FQP. THE QUAI HAS ACKNOWLEDGED EC POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS ON CSCE HAVE GONE BEYOND ORIGINAL CONCEPT, I.E., IMPACT OF CSCE ON EC. QUAI ARGUES, HOWEVER, THAT EC POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS, INCLUDING DISCUSSION OF CSCE PROCEDURES, DO NOT DUPLICATE ALLIANCE WORK ON GROUNDS PROCEDURES MAY THEMSELVES AFFECT FUTURE EC RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS AND EES. FRENCH TAKE POSITION NATO MIN COMMUNIQUE PLEDGING TO "KEEP IN TOUCH" WITH FINNS RE CSCE PROVIDES AGREED ALLIED BASIS FOR MULTIPLE BI-LATERALS, WHICH THEY INSIST DO NOT REPRESENT TRUE MULTI-LATERALIZATION.

2. ACTION RECOMMENDED. WASHINGTON CONSIDER AUTHORIZING US ALONG WITH OTHER NON-EC ALLIES IN NATO MAKE EFFORT INDUCE EC MEMBERS TO ESTABLISH IN NAC CONTEXT PROCEDURE WHEREBY EC MEMBERS COULD ROUTINELY CONSULT WITH OTHERS BEFORE AS WELL AS AFTER EC MEETINGS ON CSCE (SEE COMMENT). END SUMMARY.

3. ASKED ABOUT FRENCH VIEW OF LUXEMBOURG TALKS, QUAI DEP. DIR. FOR USSR AND EE PAGNIEZ (WHO WAS PRESENT AT LUXEMBOURG) MADE FOLLOWING POINTS IN TALK WITH EMBOFF JANUARY 20. PAGNIEZ ARGUED SIX WERE SIMPLY FOLLOWING UP NATO COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE NOTING ALLIES WOULD "KEEP IN TOUCH" WITH FINNS ON CSCE MATTERS. FOR SEVERAL MONTHS, FRENCH HAD MADE KNOWN THEIR READINESS TO ACCEPT FINNISH PROPOSALS FOR SUCH CONTACTS, WHICH GOF STILL REGARDS AS BILATERAL, NOT MULTILATERAL, DESPITE WELL-KNOWN DIFFERENCES WITH US ON THIS POINT. QUAI BELIEVES TIME HAS COME TO SPELL OUT TO FINNS IN INCREASING DETAIL WESTERN COUNTRIES' VIEWS ON HOW TO MOVE INTO "TRUE MULTILATERALIZATION" AFTER SIGNATURE OF BERLIN FQP. FRENCH THINK WEST MIGHT GAIN "TACTICAL ADVANTAGES" FROM TAKING INITIATIVES, RATHER THAN LEAVING FIELD OPEN TO EES. PAGNIEZ SAID FRENCH HAVE NOT DISCUSSED LUXEMBOURG DECISIONS WITH FINNS AND HAVE NOT YET SENT INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADOR ANDRE IN HELSINKI. BUT HE LEFT NO DOUBT THAT GOF ALREADY TO DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS TO ANDRE BEFORE LONG.

4. EMBOFF EMPHASIZED ALLIANCE HAD CONSISTENTLY TAKEN POSITION, STILL SUPPORTED BY US AND REAFFIRMED JUST LAST MONTH IN BRUSSELS, THAT CSCE MULTILATERALS OF ANY KIND SHOULD BEGIN ONLY AFTER BERLIN ACCORD FINALLY WRAPPED UP. MOREOVER, SINCE MOSCOW HAS INDICATED READINESS TO ACCEPT DELAY ON CSCE IN ORDER OBTAIN BUDESTAG RATIFICATION OF TREATIES BEFORE SIGNING BERLIN FQP, IT

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SEEMS ENTIRELY UNNECESSARY FOR WEST TO ADVANCE CSCE PREPARATIONS VIA MULTIPLE BILATERALS. PAGNIZE MERELY REITERATED THAT FRENCH BELIEVE SIX AGREEMENT ON STEPPING UP "LONG STANDING BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH FINNS" IS COMPATIBLE WITH NATO MIN COMMUNIQUE.

5. EMBOFF COVERED SIMILAR GROUND IN JANUARY 20 LUNCHEON TALK WITH QUAI EE AFFAIRS OFFICER DE LA COSTE. LATTER EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE SIX WOULD COORDINATE WITH OTHER ALLIES BEFORE STARTIIG MULTIPLE BILATERALS. HE NOTED DUTCH HAD EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF COORDINATION AT LUXEMBOURG. DE LA COSTE ALSO UNDERSTOOD EC POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS HAD INCLUDED NON-CONCLUSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON ESTABLISHMENT OF "PERMANENT ORGAN" FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY AND COOPERATION.

6. ROBIN, QUAI DEP DIR WESTERN EUROPE, TOLD US JANUARY 20, PROGRESS ON TOPICS ORIGINALLY PROPOSED FOR EC CSCE DISCUSSIONS (PARIS 3276, MARCH 3, 1971) HAD BEEN MINIMAL. INDEED, OF FIVE ASSIGNED TOPICS, DISCUSSIONS WERE ONLY REALLY CONTINUING ON PROPOSALS EC COUNTRIES MIGHT MAKE AT ANY CSCE WHICH WOULD AFFECT EC AND ON PROCEDURES FOR A CSCE. OTHER TOPICS HAD EITHER BEEN ABANDONED AS TOO SPECULATIVE OR STALEMATED BECAUSE OF LACK OF AGREEMENT.

7. IN RESPONSE EMBOFF'S QUESTION, ROBIN IMPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGED QUESTION OF PROCEDURES HAD NOT, IN FACT, BEEN AMONG ORIGINAL TOPICS AND EXPLICITLY AGREED CURRENT EC POLITICAL SUBCOMMITTEE DISCUSSION OF CSCE PROCEDURES HAD MOVED BEYOND ORIGINAL CONCEPT THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS WOULD DEAL ONLY WITH TOPICS DIRECTLY RELATED TO EC. IN EFFORT BRIDGE THIS CONTRADICTION, ROBIN ARGUED PROCEDURES AT CSCE COULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON FUTURE EC RELATIONS WITH EES AND SOVIETS. FOR EXAMPLE, HE SAID FRENCH WANTED PREVENT CONFERENCE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD GIVE SOVIETS WATCHING BRIEF OVER EC UNIFICATION EFFORTS.

8. ACCORDINTLY, ROBIN SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE CURRENT EC SURCOMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS ON CSCE PROCEDURES WOULD DUPLICATE NATO WORK. CLOSE COORDINATION AMONG ALLIES REMAINED IMPORTANT. THE FRENCH BELIEVED THE WEST SHOULD APPROACH A CSCE ON THE BASIS OF A COMMON PLATFORM. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT THINK IT NECESSARY THAT ALL WESTERN NATIONS HAVE A COMMON POSITION ON EACH SPECIFIC SUBJECT.

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OM COMMENT. FRENCH HAVE OBVIOUSLY AND NATURALLY BEEN USING EC POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS AS VEHICLE FOR RALLYING EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR THEIR POSITIONS RANGING FROM MIDDLE EAST TO CSCE. THIS, OF COURSE, IS PART OF PRICE FOR ADVANTAGES WE EXPECT GAIN FROM CLOSER EUROPEAN UNIFICATION. WE DOUBT, THEREFORE, THAT FORMAL DEMARCHE TO FRENCH OR OTHER EC MEMBERS PROTESTING THEIR "GANGING UP ON US" WOULD BE ADVISABLE OR EFFECTIVE.

10. REPORT THAT EC SUBCOMMITTEE CONSIDERED HOW TO IMPROVE COORDINATING ITS EFFORTS WITH NATO AND HOW TO INFORM NATO ALLIES OF DEVELOPMENTS IS ENCOURAGING (US NATOIV244). WE BELIEVE US SHOULD, THEREFORE, CONSIDER SUGGESTING TO EC MEMBERS THAT IN ADDITION TO FORMAL OR INFORMAL POST MORTEN BRIEFINGS ON SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS, PRE-EC SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING SESSIONS BE ESTABLISHED FORMALLY OR INFORMALLY IN NAC CONTEXT AT WHICH US VIEWS COULD BE MADE KNOWN ON APPROPRIATE AGENDA ITEMS SUCH AS MODALITIES FOR CSCE.

11. AS OPENING DATE FOR MULTIPLE BILATERALS APPEARS DRAWING CLOSER, NEITHER WE NOR EUROPEANS CAN AFFORD TO HAVE US PLACED IN POSITION WHERE IT CAN ONLY REACT TO POSITIONS REACHED BY SIX AND SOON NINE OF OUR ALLIES. FRENCH AND OTHERS MIGHT BRIDLE AT ABOVE SUGGESTION, BUT AT TIME WHEN WE ARE ALREADY HAVING SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH E' ON ECONOMIC FRONT, WE SHOULD TRY EVERY MEANS CONVINCE THEM OF IMPORTANCE KEEP CLOSELY TOGETHER ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS, INCLUDING CSCE. GP-3.
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By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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March 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE)

By memorandum of December 22, I informed you of my intention to establish an interagency Task Force on CSCE, comprising representatives of the NSC staff, the Departments of Defense and Commerce, USIA, ACDA and other interested agencies.

The Task Force, chaired by Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand, has prepared an interim report, cleared with all participating departments and agencies, which I have approved and sent to our Mission to NATO. The Mission thus has general guidance, for use in the current NATO consultations, on the following CSCE issues:

- freer movement of people, ideas and information;
- principles that should govern relations between states;
- cooperation in the economic, scientific and technical, and environmental fields; and
- a preferred procedural approach.

We wish to use those discussions to develop a firm and constructive Allied consensus, looking toward further decisions at the NATO Ministerial meeting in Bonn May 30-31.

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NSC MEMORANDUM (H) FILES
 POLICY PREPARED 1969-1974
 Box H-233 folder NSD/H 162

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A copy of the full Task Force report is enclosed for your information, together with brief sections drawn from the report that summarize major issues and the approach we intend to take in Allied consultations.

The Task Force is developing US positions on the matter of military security questions on the CSCE agenda, and particularly on the possible introduction of MBFR and related issues into the CSCE context. An NSC Senior Review Group Meeting has been called to discuss these topics on March 22. It will also address the question of possible post-conference permanent machinery, based on the illustrative views in the Task Force report.

I have thus requested the Task Force to continue its work on these items. The Task Force and its constituent working groups will also meet as required to provide specific further guidance to our Mission to NATO for use in the continuing Allied discussions.


William P. Rogers

Attachments:

1. Extracts from the Interim Report on CSCE.
2. Interagency Task Force Report: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

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EXTRACTS FROM THE
INTERIM REPORT OF THE INTER-AGENCY
TASK FORCE ON CSCE

INTRODUCTION

On December 22, you approved the establishment of an Interagency Task Force on CSCE under the chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. The Task Force and its constituent working groups have met over the past two months. This is an interim report of the work accomplished to date. The Task Force will continue in being to follow current NATO discussions and preparations for a CSCE, and to undertake the additional work outlined herein.

The Task Force believes the US should continue to take the lead in current NATO studies on CSCE issues to develop constructive positions broadly supported by the Allies, looking toward review of these issues by ministers in Bonn May 30-31. If the Final Quadripartite Protocol is signed in June or July, as expected, the Bonn ministerial may offer the last occasion for you and your colleagues to examine the issues collectively before the opening of initial East-West talks.

Your further and more detailed guidance is thus required to enable our Mission to NATO to shape the on-going Allied studies along lines consistent with our overall interests, as defined in NSDM-142 and in your telegraphic instruction of December 23 (State 230032). This report analyzes the principal questions at issue and makes specific policy recommendations.

Allied Attitudes:

Most of our Allies hope to begin initial East-West talks soon, although they accept our position that these should commence only after signature of the Final Quadripartite Protocol in Berlin.

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Bonn regards the conference as an unavoidable development which should be exploited to supplement the FRG's bilateral Eastern policy. Anxious to foster a benign climate of East-West relations which it hopes may eventually bring progress in inter-German negotiations, Bonn prefers to forestall debate on potentially contentious issues and to place emphasis on seeking an enhanced atmosphere of detente rather than significant concrete results.

France intends to use the conference to reassert at least the appearance of a preeminent role for itself as the leader of Western Europe on the East-West stage -- a role Bonn has recently played. The French probably expect the conference will somewhat reduce both Soviet and US influence in Europe. Paris wishes thus to keep up its special brand of dialogue with Moscow, while simultaneously attempting to loosen the reins of Soviet control in Eastern Europe. The inherent conflict is evident, but for the moment both strands of French policy converge in enthusiastic advocacy of a CSCE.

The British think that the conference is inevitable and that it will do no harm. They have no strong national policy objectives they wish to advance in this context and thus are unlikely to contest positions upon which the French and the Germans can agree.

Italy and the Benelux and Scandanavian Allies, for their part, expect the conference to give them a visible role in the process of East-West negotiations which, so far, has directly engaged only the major powers. On substantive matters, these states will gravitate toward positions that Paris, Bonn and London find acceptable.

France and Germany thus play pivotal roles. Both see the conference, for the moment, through the prism of their respective Eastern policies. Neither has given much weight to the consideration

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that a conference devoid of debate over real issues dividing East from West could add to domestic pressures in Europe to cut back on defense outlays and increase pressures in the United States to reduce our military presence in Europe.

These attitudes do not augur well for achieving our objective of assuring a conference that puts emphasis on substance over atmospherics. Therefore, active US leadership will be essential to develop an Allied consensus upon firm positions looking toward meaningful and constructive results from an eventual CSCE.

Soviet and Eastern European Goals:

The Warsaw Pact states continue to urge early convocation of initial talks and prompt movement thereafter to a ministerial conference.

Moscow probably sees CSCE as a step toward its ultimate goal of a European security system that would replace existing alliances, eliminate the US military presence in Europe, and leave the USSR the dominant continental power. Its proximate aims are to obtain ratification of present boundaries; reduce tensions on its Western flank in order to have a freer hand in the Far East; enhance access to Western markets, financial resources and technology; reduce NATO solidarity; and slow West European integration. A CSCE would also enhance the status of the GDR, a prime Soviet goal. The outcome of a conference along the lines the Soviets desire would allow them subtly to portray it -- within Pact countries -- as Western acquiescence in a Soviet sphere of control and suasion in Eastern Europe.

The Soviets doubtless also calculate that relaxation of East-West tensions after CSCE could make control of their Warsaw Pact Allies somewhat more difficult, but that the potential problems are manageable.

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Other Eastern European states share some of the Soviet objectives -- detente, recognition of existing frontiers and enhanced East-West trade and technical exchanges. However Romania and Yugoslavia believe that CSCE will give them at least some added protection against Soviet intervention, and most Warsaw Pact states expect limited additional freedom to develop relations with the West.

Thus, within the Warsaw Pact, CSCE is not a zero-sum game, where Soviet gains are balanced by the losses of smaller Pact states. The latter apparently reckon that an atmosphere of detente and an on-going process of East-West talks will, of itself, lighten Soviet constraints and limit Moscow's ability to coerce. However, none of these regimes would wish to leave the Pact or to defect from the "socialist commonwealth."

* * *

The desire of Moscow and its allies for a "successful" conference will offer some leverage, if the NATO Allies remain largely united, and insist, during preliminary multilateral talks, that discussion of Western proposals must evolve at the same pace as those on matters of primary interest to the Warsaw Pact countries.

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The Agenda

Recent NATO and Warsaw Pact communiques on CSCE have established essentially the following sets of agenda proposals:

NATO

WARSAW PACT

Questions of security,
including

- Principles governing relations between states (including renunciation of force);
- "certain military aspects of security."*

Freer movement of people,
ideas and information, and
cultural relations.

Cooperation in the economic,
scientific, technical and
environmental fields.

Renunciation of force,
"unconditional respect"
for existing European
frontiers, and support
for disarmament.

(Cultural relations and
tourism -- see following
item.)

Mutually advantageous
contacts among European
states in the economic,
scientific and technological
and cultural fields, as
well as in the fields of
tourism and protection
of the human environment.

Creation of a "standing
body of all interested
states participating at
the conference" to carry
on the work of the con-
ference.

*US has only agreed to study; other Allies favor inclusion on agenda.

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The most extensive elaboration of the Warsaw Pact proposals is contained in the "Declaration on Peace, Security and Cooperation in Europe," adopted on January 26, 1972, in Prague at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact. This declaration lists and describes seven "fundamental principles of European security and relations among states in Europe": inviolability of borders, non-use of force, peaceful coexistence, good neighborly relations and cooperation in the interest of peace, mutually advantageous contacts among states, disarmament, and support for the United Nations.

An elaboration of Allied positions is contained in the following chapter (Objectives, Issues, and Recommendations) and, in greater detail, in the subsequent chapters devoted to each individual topic.

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Chapter II

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OBJECTIVES, ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

Substance

The conference should constitute a modest step forward within a broader and long-range process of negotiation intended to lead toward more stable East-West relations. (Representatives of some 30 states of diverse interests and regimes could, of course, not directly address the central problems of European security.)

To this end, the conference should:

- yield meaningful concrete results;
- emphasize substance over atmosphere;
- deal as much as possible with underlying causes of tension, not merely their superficial manifestations;
- address some difficult issues, thereby directing public attention to the fundamental problems in East-West relations and helping to avoid exaggerated public expectations; and
- avoid gratuitously acrimonious exchanges with the Soviets, which could have damaging side-effects in other and perhaps more promising areas of East-West or US-Soviet negotiations.

In contrast, the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact Allies will (allowing for some internal differences):

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- skirt contentious issues and seek agreement on bland texts designed to enhance the atmosphere of detente in Europe;
- seek Western recognition of the political and territorial status quo in Eastern Europe; and
- stress pan-European themes, including the desirability of on-going machinery for essentially intra-European cooperation.

Many neutrals and some Allies will also tend to favor a conference for the sake of detente, and these leanings may become more pronounced after the East-West talks have begun. They will argue that a more benign climate of East-West relations would help to:

- overcome gradually the basic East-West differences;
- give limited additional freedom of maneuver to the smaller Warsaw Pact states; and
- increase internal pressures for liberalization in the Soviet Union and some other Pact countries.

However, the disadvantages of a conference for the sake of detente atmospherics are serious and include:

- increasing pressures in the US Congress and public opinion for unilateral troop withdrawals;
- undercutting public support for necessary Allied force improvements.

THUS, a vigorous US lead -- first with our Allies and later at the initial multilateral talks -- will be required to ensure results compatible with our interests.

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Timing

The US position is that initial multilateral talks should not begin before signature of the Final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin, and preferably also not before the fall EC summit. Thereafter, to meet our substantive objectives, careful preparations are essential. No ministerial-level meeting should convene until 1973.

Specific Agenda Topics

(1) Security Issues

(a) Principles Which Should Govern Relations Between States

The Warsaw Pact states made public in October 1969 a draft declaration in which CSCE participants would renounce the threat or the use of force and declare that they "recognize and unconditionally respect the territorial integrity of all European states within their existing borders." In Moscow's view, this text would be the core of the conference and would constitute the security element of the agenda.

NATO ministers, in the December 1969 and subsequent communiques, proposed broadening the discussion to encompass the generally accepted principles which would govern relations between states as a means of contesting the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty within the "socialist commonwealth."

WE SHOULD support a CSCE declaration reaffirming the generally accepted principles governing relations between states, including renunciation of force consistent with the UN Charter, that clearly contradicts the Brezhnev doctrine. The declaration should thus go beyond recent UNGA resolutions and assert the application of those principles in relationships between states regardless of the divergence or similarity of their political, economic or social systems. An agreed text of this kind might somewhat inhibit coercive Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe.

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However, it would not materially enhance Allied security and could be damaging if public and parliamentary opinion in the West concluded that it marked a new era in East-West relations, permitting a relaxation of defensive efforts. Thus any declaration on this subject should be modest in what it purports to accomplish, avoid pretentious phraseology, and eschew treaty-type undertakings that would require Senate ratification. Four (or Three) Power disclaimers would be required to make clear that references to sovereignty of states would not alter the status of the GDR in respect of Four-Power rights and responsibilities for Germany as a whole and Berlin.

Recognition of existing frontiers, or a pledge to respect their inviolability, is a major Soviet goal but would serve no direct Western interest.

THUS THE US AND ITS ALLIES SHOULD NOT accede to likely Soviet pressures on this issue unless the Soviets make major counter-concessions in other aspects of the negotiations. In no event, however, should a CSCE text entail "recognition" of frontiers, and any language pledging "respect" for frontiers would have to be qualified in an appropriate manner to safeguard Quadripartite rights. Hence, this issue would offer the Allies negotiating leverage with respect to other agenda topics.

- (b) The CSCE-MBFR Relationship
- (c) Military Stabilization Measures in CSCE

(These issues are currently under study and will be the subject of separate papers to serve as a basis for US decisions.)

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(2) Freer Movement of People, Ideas and Information,
and Cultural Relations

We have taken the leadership, in NATO consultations, to develop this topic as a major Western proposal. It offers specific possibilities of concrete results advantageous to the Allies. However, some Allies prefer to stress more easily obtainable improvements in traditional cultural exchanges.

WE SHOULD continue to work toward an inter-Allied consensus that, during the initial multilateral talks, the Allies should press for concrete and significant steps toward lowering the barriers to freer movement, going beyond modest improvements in the existing pattern of East-West cultural exchanges. This topic should thus constitute a separate agenda item, of equal standing with the other major proposals currently in play.

SPECIFICALLY, THE US AND ITS ALLIES SHOULD urge the following (not listed in order of priority):

- relaxation of exit restrictions of the Warsaw Pact states;
- freer circulation of books, magazines and periodicals;
- better working conditions for journalists;
- cessation of radio jamming.

Moscow's desire for a "successful" CSCE, and particularly for formal pledges to "respect" existing frontiers, should give the Allies negotiating leverage on this issue, if they remain largely united and press it firmly. Moreover, the public airing of restrictive Soviet practices will be embarrassing to Moscow's detente policy, could constitute an added inducement for some relaxation, and would encourage domestic advocates of liberalization within Warsaw

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Pact countries. Finally, the propaganda value of the issue is obvious. By raising it for open discussion, we can emphasize the fact that the closed nature and restrictive practices of the Warsaw Pact states are major obstacles to the normalization of relations, on all levels, between the nations of East and West.

(3) Cooperation

Both NATO ministerial communiques and various Warsaw Pact texts have identified the topics discussed below as suitable for CSCE discussions.

(a) Economic Cooperation

Warsaw Pact states will seek to place the onus for limits on East-West trade on Western practices, particularly EC quota restrictions, lack of MFN status for their exports to the US, credit restrictions (particularly US), and Western strategic export controls. However, the various trade-inhibiting practices of Warsaw Pact states are also serious obstacles to expanded East-West trade.

WE SHOULD use the conference to focus attention on these Eastern European obstacles and to provide added political impetus to practical negotiations, in bilateral or other multilateral fora, intended to remove some of them, realizing that economic advantages and, over the longer run, some political advantages could be gained by expanded trade and economic cooperation with the East. Thus we and our Allies could agree to a balanced, even-handed declaration expressing the intent of all participants to take appropriate steps to increase trade, on the basis of mutual advantage.

THE US AND THE ALLIES -- while recognizing that the conference and its preliminaries would not be an appropriate forum for specific negotiations, and that Western security interests must be safeguarded -- should nevertheless be prepared to put forward for

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discussion proposals of advantage to the West, in order to further the prospects of productive negotiations in other contexts and to counter any Soviet propaganda offensive against Western trade and credit restrictions.

The Task Force notes that the possible impact on US trading interests of any European Community proposals to increase imports of Pact agricultural products should be carefully studied.

(b) Scientific and Technological Cooperation

The Warsaw Pact states want access to Western science and technology for the purpose of refining and intensifying their industrial development. However, we also stand to gain from increased exchanges in this field because of our greater ability to put scientific and technological knowledge to use, our interest both in promoting the position and influencing the attitudes of scientific elites in the Soviet Union, and our desire to lessen Eastern European dependence on Moscow.

THE US SHOULD thus seek expansion of cooperation in these fields with individual countries of Eastern Europe, and the USSR, on the basis of mutual benefit and at a rate they can sustain, while ensuring the protection of our security interests.

IN THE CONTEXT OF A CSCE, WE SHOULD be prepared to agree to a general declaration of intent calling for enhanced exchanges in science and technology as being of benefit to all peoples, but should seek to couple this with specific meaningful improvements, particularly in the area of greater freedom of movement for scientists and technologists.

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(c) Environmental Cooperation

Expanded East-West cooperation in this field will be advantageous to the extent that it expands personal contact among environmental experts and brings a two-way flow of tangible benefits.

WE SHOULD seek to identify specific activities and programs which meet these criteria. Further study will be required of appropriate projects and organizational frameworks within which they should be pursued.

(4) Permanent Machinery

The Warsaw Pact states have proposed creation of a "standing body of all interested states participating at the conference which could continue after the termination of the conference in the joint work on the basis of an [agreement] concerning further steps in this respect."

The Allies have taken no public position on this, but most assume the conference will at least discuss a permanent body of some kind. We tabled a paper in NATO last September -- not yet discussed by the Allies -- giving illustrative U.S. views.

WE SHOULD remain ready to discuss the issue in NATO when the Allies wish. Further internal study will also be required to develop a firmer U.S. position.

Procedures

The Allies accept our position that the opening of initial multilateral talks must await signature of the Final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin, and most of them also recognize that a ministerial-level gathering before 1973 is not a practical possibility. The Allies differ, however, on the desirable extent of ministerial participation in CSCE, the French favoring two rather lengthy ministerials, while we

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have argued for a single short ministerial meeting to be convened only after the most contentious issues have been resolved in official-level talks.

WE SHOULD avoid inter-Allied debate on this subject and should thus continue to take the position that it is premature to address it for the time-being.

Future Work Program of the CSCE Task Force

The Work of the Task Force to date provides a basis for furnishing continuing guidance to the US Mission to NATO for use in inter-Allied consultations on preparations for CSCE. In the period ahead the Task Force will:

- develop and refine current US studies, based upon the positions reflected in this report;
- prepare instructions to the US Mission to NATO, as required, for use by the Mission in the joint preparation of Allied positions for review by Ministers at their May 30-31 meeting at Bonn;
- prepare for high-level inter-agency consideration alternative approaches to the issue of questions of military security on a CSCE agenda, including specifically the relationship between CSCE and MBFR and possible CSCE discussion of stabilizing measures (such as advance notification of military maneuvers); and
- prepare for high-level inter-agency consideration, a further study of the possible role of permanent machinery to be established by CSCE, a subject not yet formally addressed in any detail in the Alliance.

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By RAO NARA Date 7-1-03

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: MBFR-CSCE

In view of your earlier decisions and of NATO's views, decisions on your approach to the Summit involve:

-- Deciding on an approach to procedural issues. Can we get Soviet agreement to prior MBFR discussions? How can we use CSCE as leverage to further MBFR?

-- With respect to substantive matters: How should we handle the MBFR principles which have been developed in NATO (and which are a hodge-podge both in substance and procedure)? Which principles should be discussed? Should attempts be made to negotiate agreement in any of the principles or related issues?

The U.S. position on MBFR and CSCE continues to be that we want MBFR as a separate negotiation and that we prefer some movement on MBFR (possibly an exploratory phase) prior to commencement of a CSCE and that we are, in any case, only lukewarm towards CSCE. We have generally supported Alliance arguments that a CSCE should address some substantive security issues rather than be a forum for Pact polemics but that it should avoid MBFR.

The Soviets have insisted on a CSCE before any MBFR and have not been very receptive to MBFR per se.

In NSDM 162 of April 5, 1972, you reaffirmed the separateness of MBFR but:

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-- Approved a cosmetic link between CSCE and MBFR which would allow a group to explore MBFR simultaneously with the preparations for CSCE if MBFR explorations had not yet been started;

-- Approved a discussion at CSCE of "constraints" (also referred to as stabilizing measures and confidence building measures) in connection with principles governing relationships between states;

-- You directed that any discussion of MBFR at CSCE should aim for a definite date for commencing MBFR negotiation.

Our NATO delegation has presented our position with a view towards getting NATO agreements prior to the Summit. Initial response to the U.S. approach has been very favorable since it is perceived as an accommodation to allied views. Thus, it appears that our approach will not meet resistance in NATO and that you have a certain latitude at the Summit. This is reinforced by general expectations in NATO that you will act, to some extent, in the stead of Brosio and explore principles with the Soviets.

The following elaborates on the important considerations underlying your decisions.

CSCE

If the Bonn-Moscow Treaty is ratified, CSCE multilateral preparations are almost inevitable starting this fall. If it is not, there will likely be a period of stocktaking (East and West) which could put off CSCE for a time. By the time of the Summit the fate of the Bonn-Moscow Treaty and the imminence of CSCE should be clear. I think we must assume for now that the treaty will be ratified.

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The Allies favor CSCE but there is little consensus on substance -- particularly on the security issues. In order to avoid a CSCE that is entirely atmospheric, the Allies want to include some confidence building measures, taken from NATO MBFR studies, such as advance notification of military movements and maneuvers. The West Germans, with support from some Allies, want CSCE to issue a declaration in supporting MBFR and endorsing NATO's MBFR Principles.

MBFR

The Soviets have not invited Brosio to Moscow to conduct MBFR "explorations." There is no prospect they will do so.

The Allies generally agree that we should continue to support the Brosio Mission until the May NATO Ministerial but consider alternatives after that. NSDM 162 supports this approach and implies that our alternatives would be a special MBFR group in parallel with CSCE.

The Allies half expect that you will carry out the Brosio Mission at the Summit. They are concerned, however, that the Summit talks not go beyond Brosio's Mandate nor get into bilateral negotiations on MBFR.

Substantively, Allied interest in MBFR has cooled, since there is now no apparent pressure for U.S. unilateral reductions and studies to date reveal no MBFR options that are both manifestly negotiable and without some detriment to NATO security. They want to keep MBFR alive because it is a NATO initiative with public appeal and because it is a hedge against unilateral U.S. cuts.

The focus is on CSCE and they believe MBFR should follow. The positive but ambiguous Soviet statements and the recent Warsaw Pact communique are about the minimum they would have to do to keep from taking the onus for blocking MBFR.

U. S. Position on MBFR and CSCE

In greater detail than earlier noted, NSDM 162 sets out our current position on MBFR and CSCE procedural issues. It states:

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- MBFR negotiations and CSCE should be separate;
 - We continue to believe explorations should be the first step in MBFR;
 - We will continue to support the Brosio Mission until the NATO May Ministerial; afterward we may want to examine alternatives;
 - We are prepared to participate in CSCE multilateral preparations;
 - If these preparations take place before MBFR explorations, we will use the fact of such preparations to establish contact for MBFR explorations:
 - Either in a special group of states directly involved in MBFR,
 - And/or in a general CSCE discussion of Military Security Issues which includes general aspects of MBFR,
 - Our objective is to reach an understanding that MBFR negotiations will take place in a separate forum by a specific date.

There is no substantive consensus on MBFR in NATO or the U.S. government beyond the so called MBFR Principles worked out last October for Brosio's Mandate. These Principles are, in fact, a melange of procedural ideas, negotiating criteria and possible objectives -- in short, they are issues for negotiation.

The MBFR Principles state that "reductions should be:

- Consistent with the principles of undiminished security for all parties;
- Mutual and balanced;
- Phased in their scope and timing, where appropriate;
- Adequately verified;
- Substantial and significant;

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- Related to certain specified types of forces;
- Preceded possibly by an agreed freeze in force levels;
- Concerned with a certain specified geographic area."

The NATO agreed instructions elaborating these Principles are substantively thin and paper over many unresolved issues in the Alliance. A substantive discussion of many of them will need to avoid treading on sensitive ground. The touchy issues are:

- The need for on-site inspection;
- The exact relationship between reductions and indigenous forces;
- The precise geographic area;
- The specific types of forces which should be addressed;
- The initial objectives of MBFR -- whether this should be a freeze, simple reductions, or deeper cuts.

U.S. Interest in MBFR

U.S. objectives for MBFR have not been clearly spelled out. MBFR was inherited as an on-going exercise from the previous Administration. As a consequence, our internal studies have been oriented toward the continuing work in NATO and have focused on detailed analysis of reduction models.

These analyses show that any symmetrical reductions aggravate existing imbalances and disparities with the Pact. How this would affect NATO security is open to debate; our assumptions are conservative, the results theoretical and abstract, and the advantages for the Pact are not overwhelming. Nonetheless, we are seeking better outcomes by examining asymmetrical reductions and mix-package trades. These, in effect, are aimed at restructuring forces on both sides.

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Thus far we are not able to foresee an outcome for MBFR that is both manifestly negotiable and clearly in our security interest. Therefore, we are not in a position to commit ourselves to reaching agreement in MBFR. Thus, MBFR is similar to the broad disarmament negotiations of the 1950s and early 1960s. Our interest appears to be primarily political.

-- We want to use the process of MBFR to hold the line against unilateral reductions on the western side and, if satisfactory mutual reductions prove non-negotiable, to maintain public support for an adequate defense effort.

-- If we advance tough proposals which maintain Western interests, then even if major breakthroughs are not made, negotiations could reveal Soviet intransigence and thus lend further support to defense efforts.

These objectives require that we soon make a further visible effort to get MBFR underway.

How You Might Proceed

Concerning procedural issues, there are three alternative outcomes which are consonant with your earlier decisions and with our consultations in NATO. We might pursue the following alternatives in sequence since they represent a descending order of preference for the U. S.

We could say to the Soviets that we are willing to support CSCE if:

-- (a) the Soviets first engage in MBFR explorations and agree that actual negotiations will take place some time before CSCE concludes its work, or

-- (b) the Soviets would agree to set up a special group to explore MBFR during CSCE preparatory talks with the objective of setting a date for separate MBFR negotiations, or

-- (c) the Soviets agree that the outcome of the first CSCE Ministerial (there likely will be two, or more) is to set a date for separate MBFR explorations. In this case, we would make clear that we would plan to discuss MBFR at CSCE.

The Soviets do not want MBFR injected into CSCE [(option (c) and this may encourage them to go along with the special group idea (option (b))].

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Since the Soviets may feel we could not stand in the way of a CSCE in any event, we may find it desirable to tone down the linkage in discussion. In this event, we could say that we would be willing to go to CSCE but that we expect that the Soviets would go along with one of the above options.

While seeking Soviet agreement to these procedural steps we will want to emphasize that MBFR should be a multilateral negotiation.

For a substantive discussion of MBFR you may want to start with the four points contained in NATO's May 1970 Rome Communique. This is NATO's public position on MBFR; it follows below. Depending on the Soviet response, you could elaborate on this with material from the MBFR Principles in Brosio's Mandate.

You may want to avoid a detailed discussion of these Principles since this could lead to discussion of many sensitive areas on which Allies still disagree.

An appropriate discussion could cover the following points:

1. The objective of MBFR -- a more stable defensive relationship at lower levels of forces and costs -- this implicitly means a long-term restructuring of forces on both sides.
2. The position of the Allies on MBFR (From the Rome Communique.)
 - a. Mutual force reductions should be compatible with the vital security interests of the Alliance and should not operate to the military disadvantage of either side having regard for the differences arising from geographical and other considerations.
 - b. Reductions should be on a basis of reciprocity, and phased and balanced as to their scope and timing.
 - c. Reductions should include stationed and indigenous forces and their weapons systems in the area concerned.
 - d. There must be adequate verification and controls to ensure the observance of agreements on mutual and balanced force reductions.

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3. The issues in MBFR. (This discussion would be aimed at responding to Soviet interest in some points in the Rome Communique and at emphasizing the need for exploratory talks. The following draws on the MBFR Principles but avoids some of the more touchy issues in NATO in order to guard against the possibility that the Soviets might exploit current differences in the Alliance. Keeping the discussion general is also advisable in order to avoid having the Soviets embrace certain elements which if taken out of context may prove to our disadvantage.)

a. "Balanced" Reductions - To meet basic security interests, MBFR will have to take account of differences in

- geography,
- general reinforcement capability,
- overall size of forces.

b. Verification - MBFR should be verifiable, the modalities should be consistent with the scale and type of reductions and hence are subject to negotiation. Collateral constraints to enhance verification should be considered. (The question of "national" means versus on-site inspection should be avoided. There is a split in NATO on this issue -- we favor national means, the UK and Belgium favor on-site inspection.)

c. Types of forces. MBFR should consider both stationed and indigenous forces. The U.S. believes stationed forces should be emphasized. The weapon systems of these forces should be included. The U.S. has been studying trade-offs of weapon systems which the sides might consider destabilizing. (The Allies agree that stationed forces could be considered as a first step, but many Allies want tight linkage to indigenous cuts. The exact relationship is quite sensitive and unresolved. There also is no consensus on the types of forces (ground versus air) or weapon systems (conventional versus nuclear) and a detailed discussion of this subject should be avoided. The idea that destabilizing systems deserve particular attention comes from your Foreign Policy Report of 1971.)

d. Geographic Area. MBFR should focus on Central Europe. Neutral states should not be included. Their military capabilities are marginal. The states participating in MBFR should comprise the states in the area and the states stationing forces there. (The precise

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geographic area for MBFR is not agreed in NATO. There is agreement to focus on Central Europe but not limit this solely to the two Germanies. There is a consensus to include at least the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia on the eastern side and the FRG, the Netherlands and Luxembourg on the west. Belgium is willing to be included only if Hungary is added on the east. We are open minded on this, but the Allies have not reached a consensus.)

We should avoid being drawn into a discussion of the initial limitation objectives for MBFR. Brosio's Mandate mentions a freeze on force levels as an initial step. Others prefer simple (e.g., 10% symmetrical) reductions. There is no agreement in NATO nor in the U.S. Government on this question.

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[p. 67]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506TOP SECRET

415/72

National Security Decision Memorandum 162

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Presidential Guidance on Mutual and Balanced
Force Reductions and a Conference on Cooperation
and Security in Europe

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS
NSC INSTITUTIONAL FILES "H"
POLICY PAPERS (1969-1974)
Box H-233 folder NSDM 162

The following guidance has been approved by the President.

The contents of NSDM 142 remain valid, except as affected by the directives in this memorandum.

Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE)

The United States' position should be to proceed in preparing an Allied position for CSCE that reflects a maximum consensus. It would be preferable, however, that the East-West multilateral preparatory phase not begin until after the US Presidential elections. The possibility of a high level Allied meeting prior to the beginning of the multilateral preparatory talks should be kept open, though such a meeting is not a condition for US participation in CSCE.

In dealing with both CSCE issues and procedures, Allied unity should take precedence. US policy is that a careful multilateral exploration should precede the opening of a Conference. These preparatory explorations should be substantive rather than purely procedural. Allied interest in curtailing the multilateral preparatory phase may be taken into account, provided there is an understanding in the Alliance that during this phase some substantive discussions will be conducted on each of the agenda items proposed by the Alliance.

As noted above the US would not object to a general discussion on Military Security Issues in CSCE, but it would not be acceptable to aim

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for agreements that limited or reduced forces in Europe. Rather, the US would prefer to limit discussion to some general measures of constraint that might be suitable for adoption by European states. Such constraints might be related, in CSCE, to a declaration of principles governing relations between states.

MBFR

The US continues to support separate and distinct negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe; an exploratory discussion as the first step toward such negotiations continues to be US policy. In the period between now and the NATO Ministerial meeting on May 30-31, the US will continue to support the Allied proposal for an exploratory mission led by Mr. Brosio. After the President's meetings in the USSR, the US would be willing to consider a review of alternatives to the Brosio mission.

MBFR and CSCE

Concerning the relationship between MBFR and CSCE, the US position is that the former is not an issue that should be negotiated by the CSCE. Should the preparatory discussions of CSCE begin before any exploration of MBFR with the USSR or other Warsaw Pact countries, the US objective in these circumstances would be to use the fact of CSCE preparations to establish contacts for the simultaneous exploration of MBFR. The establishment of a special group of states directly involved in MBFR in Central Europe would be an acceptable procedure for exchanging views on MBFR. Alternatively, or in addition, the US would be willing to consider a general discussion in CSCE of Military Security Issues, including some general aspects of MBFR; in this context, however, the main objective would be to reach an understanding that MBFR negotiations will be initiated in a separate forum by a specified date.

In general, the relationship between MBFR and CSCE should be minimal. No authority should be established by CSCE over the course or content of MBFR negotiations. The overall objective of the US is to obtain a commitment from the USSR to begin discussion of MBFR before the CSCE has concluded its work.


Allied Consultations

The reaction of the NATO Allies to this approach should be sought promptly. The goal of consultations should be to develop a consensus in advance of the NATO Ministerial meeting.

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An interagency paper on collateral constraints that might be appropriate for discussion at a CSCE should be developed and forwarded to NATO as soon as possible. A separate paper on constraints suitable to MBFR should also be prepared for submission to NATO.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Acting Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

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NIXON RESIDENTIAL
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Folder: NSDM 162
4010
NSDM 162

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

13 MAY 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Moscow Trip: MBFR and CSCE

MBFR and CSCE will occupy an important place in your discussions in Moscow. What follows are my personal thoughts on how these two items should be played during your visit.

Your most recent guidance (NSDM 162) plots a considered course toward MBFR negotiations and a CSCE. To achieve our objectives will take some firm and forthright dealings both with the Soviets and with our NATO Allies.

Three points are of particular concern:

- First, we should push for multilateral MBFR explorations as soon as practicable. They are a logical and necessary first step to any further progress on mutual force reductions, which cannot progress without them. Early explorations will keep MBFR high on the agenda of East-West negotiations, an important consideration both for Congressional and Alliance reasons.
- Second, any multilateral MBFR talks should be confined to states with forces or territories directly involved. Broadening participation beyond this formula would severely complicate an already difficult management problem and introduce a new range of disparate and potentially divisive interests.
- Third, we must insist, both with our Allies and the Soviets that a CSCE deal with substantive issues, not simply provide a forum for ratifying the status quo in Europe and giving the appearance of an improved East-West "atmosphere."

MBFR apparently is not high on the Soviet agenda. Rather, they have their sights firmly fixed on CSCE and want to delay any substantive MBFR exploration at least until after a CSCE. Thus, it is important that we stress with the Soviets the position advanced in NSDM 162: if MBFR explorations have not begun earlier, we will want to initiate separate multilateral force reduction explorations at the same time we open preparatory CSCE discussions.

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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his will place upon the Soviets the onus for blocking progress on MBFR -- and any concomitant delay this might generate with regard to a CSCE. Bill Rogers' recent consultations have shown that the Allies are prepared to support this position.

Nor should we leave any doubts in Soviet minds about whether we are prepared to turn MBFR into a bilateral negotiation -- we are not. But, at the same time, it would be consistent with the agreed NATO mandate for Brosio, and your past MBFR guidance, to tell the Soviets that we want to emphasize stationed forces, both in terms of priority and size of reductions. This is, in my view, in our interest, since it is the Soviet forces in Central Europe that are our main concern.

The issue of who should participate in any MBFR talks is a somewhat more difficult -- but equally important -- question. The Soviets have hinted that they might want to include neutrals and nonaligned in MBFR talks; this may be no more than a delaying tactic, since their basic interests -- like ours -- would dictate a small group of involved states. We must make clear to them that we are interested in a serious and substantive MBFR effort in the Central Region, and that only a forum restricted to states directly concerned is consistent with such an effort. Soviet insistence on broadening participation to include neutrals and nonaligned would inevitably raise questions about their seriousness of purpose in MBFR.

This position on our part will, inevitably, lead to problems within our own Alliance. The Italians, Greeks, and Norwegians -- during Bill Rogers' consultations in NATO -- stressed that their interests were also involved in MBFR. Clearly, MBFR does affect NATO countries outside the Guidelines area; for political reasons all would prefer an active and visible role in this major NATO detente initiative. This accounts, at least in part, for the drive in NATO to put MBFR or parts of it into the CSCE context.

We need to meet this issue squarely with our Allies at an early date. We should, on the one hand, frankly state that in our view states whose forces or territories will be directly involved have special interests and responsibilities that must be recognized in MBFR negotiations and that a forum restricted to those states will enhance the prospects for successful MBFR talks. On the other hand, we should also assure those of our NATO Allies who will not be directly involved that we support the development of special consultative arrangements within NATO that will give them an adequate opportunity to express and advance the interests they have in MBFR. Such special consultative arrangements in the NATO context -- and not CSCE treatment of MBFR -- are the best way of securing an appropriate role for them in MBFR.

As for CSCE, within the US Government we are substantially agreed on the need to present the Warsaw Pact with a strong substantive agenda. The same is less true for many of our Allies. The closer we come to exploratory talks, the more concerned I am that many of these governments will be willing

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
By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

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accept a Conference for its own sake -- a Conference which will permit the Soviets to mislead public opinion on the degree of progress made toward resolving outstanding East-West issues. We must, therefore, continue to impress upon our Allies the need for cohesion behind a challenging agenda which will force the Soviets to grant meaningful concessions or face the prospect of damage to their detente image. We should also make clear to the Soviets our intent to press for a strong and substantive CSCE agenda, and leave them with the clear impression that movement on our part toward a CSCE will, in large measure, depend upon movement on their part toward MBFR.

In sum, I recommend that we hold to the NSDM 162 course in our dealings with both the Soviets and the Allies in the weeks ahead. I plan to do so myself -- drawing as appropriate on the points sketched above -- in my remarks at the May 23 NATO DPC Meeting.





PRMPA

By: KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

COPY FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE WASHINGTON, DC

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of
the Central Committee of the CPSU
The President
Viktor Sukhodrev, Soviet Interpreter (notetaker)

DATE & TIME: Monday, May 22, 1972
6:15 p.m. - 8:10 p.m.

PLACE: The General Secretary's Office
The Kremlin, Moscow

General Secretary Brezhnev: I should like first of all to greet you, Mr. President, on the occasion of this visit to our country and to express gratification that as a result of protracted preparatory work the summit talks between our two countries have begun.

Before setting out several considerations on the substance of the questions that we will be discussing with you, I should like to ask you how you feel. Are you tired?

The President: I am fine. The hardest thing in these trips is the time difference. The first says you simply don't know when to get up and when to go to bed.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I certainly know what that feeling is. I have experienced it on many occasions too. For that matter, I don't even have to leave the Soviet Union to experience it. After all the time difference between say Moscow and Khabarovsk is seven hours.

The President: We experience that in our own country when we fly from Washington to California, though there the time difference is only five hours.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I should like to observe that I have known you for a long time, Mr. President, ever since your visit to the Soviet

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By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

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Union in connection with the U. S. exhibit. There is even a photograph that shows me among others during your conversation with Khrushchev.

The President: I have seen that photograph. I must say the General Secretary has not changed at all since then. But on that occasion you didn't have a chance to speak.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That's right. On that occasion I took no part in the conversation at all. But of course even apart from that meeting you and I know one another as politicians. And politicians usually know one another through the policies they pursue.

Let me now tell you, Mr. President, that we attach great importance to our talks with you and we intend to conduct these talks regardless of the questions that come up for discussion in a spirit of complete frankness, of an open and honest expression of our position and our views. We are hoping that you for your part will respond in kind. Only this, only such mutual frankness can create the necessary prerequisites for mutual understanding and a favorable atmosphere for the development of our cooperation.

As regards the substance of our talks, I believe we should bring to the fore those questions which would serve the cause of improving relations between our countries. I believe that it is this that both the American and the Soviet peoples are expecting of us. Moreover, the achievement between us of agreements which would promote the improvement of Soviet-American relations would undoubtedly be welcomed not only by your own peoples but also by the peoples of other countries.

I should like further to say the following. Obviously, Mr. President, you know as well as we do that there is in the world no small number of opponents of the strengthening of cooperation between the USSR and the USA. There is no need for me to name them -- this is easily understood even without that. They are acting under various guises and pretexts -- but they are acting vigorously. The fact that we are conducting negotiations with you and the very fact of our meeting is a worthy rebuff to such circles.

We attach great importance to our discussions also by virtue of the fact that objectively the Soviet Union and the United States hold a very prominent place in the world. We proceed from the assumption that the

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By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

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achievement of a certain measure of accord between us in the case of these negotiations would have a most serious significance for the shaping of the international situation and for determining the direction which the development of international relations will take toward a lasting peace or toward a new war. I should like to say outright (and you probably know this perfectly well yourself) that the organizing of such a meeting as the one that has now commenced between us was not an easy thing.

I do not wish to be insincere: For us, the organizing of such a meeting was greatly complicated by the actions of the United States in Vietnam. The war which the United States has for many years now been waging in Vietnam has left a deep imprint in the soul of our people and in the hearts of all Soviet people. To take in these circumstances serious steps to develop Soviet-American relations was for us not at all an easy thing.

However, I do not intend, at this time especially, to dwell on the Vietnam issue. We will probably have some more time for this later.

A great deal of complexity is also brought in by the situation in the Middle East in connection with the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries, the unwillingness of Israel to carry out the decisions of the United Nations and to vacate the captured Arab territory, and in connection with the extensive assistance rendered to Israel by the United States in the form of supplies of offensive weapons and through other means.

But this question also has another side to it. The preliminary contacts and discussions that we have had on this problem give certain grounds to believe that we can reach some kind of common approach and even now to formalize some kind of understanding relating to the Middle East.

And it is necessary to achieve such understanding, for the situation in the Middle East is an explosive one. If we let the events run their course war may start anew. And all of the good work that we want to do with you may turn out to be thrown far back. Do you or we need that? Obviously we don't. That means we have to reach agreement.

But this question too is not one on which I should like at this time to dwell in a concrete manner. For this too we shall probably have some time later.

At this moment we can state with gratification that in spite of everything, thanks to the constructive efforts made by both sides -- the Soviet and the

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By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

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American -- and thanks to the certain restraint and realism in these situations (and there have been such situations) we have succeeded in preparing this meeting and the Soviet-American summit talks have begun.

On the whole, summarizing the above, I should like to tell you, Mr. President, that without cancelling our sharply critical attitude to several points in the present American policy, we do see nonetheless in our talks with you a possibility to exert fruitful influence on the entire international situation, a possibility to clear a road leading to the settlement of several complex problems and to strengthen the peace that all nations require so much.

Turning now to the concrete content and probable results of our talks as they appear to us at this time, I should like first of all to say how highly we value the great, many-sided, and fruitful work that has been done by both sides and the course of a long period of time in order to elaborate and reach agreement on Soviet-American relations in many important questions.

Rarely has it been the case in the past that summit talks of this kind have been so carefully prepared in advance.

And here I want first of all to say that a very great achievement has been the elaboration of the document on "The Basic Principles of Relations Between the USSR and the USA." This is a principled and fundamental document. If it is treated not as a formal piece of paper but as the basic document regulating the development of our relations (and we conceive of no other approach) this document can become, as it were, a foundation of a new era in relations between the USSR and the USA.

In my conversations with Dr. Kissinger I have already said, and I should like to repeat this to you, that the name of President Roosevelt who was linked with the normalization of relations between the United States and the Soviet state in 1934 and with the fighting collaboration of our peoples in the struggle against the Nazi aggressors in World War II is warmly cherished in the memory of Soviet people. I believe that no less appreciation among the peoples would be enjoyed also by statesmen who in the present complex situation mustered sufficient courage, realism and good will to lead Soviet-American relations into the channel of broad and many-

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sided cooperation to the good of the Soviet and the American peoples, to the good of all peoples, to the good of universal peace.

It is not to be ruled out that in the future when we shall have passed on to the practical implementation of the good principles and good intentions set out in our joint document on "The Basic Principles of Relations" there may arise a need for more frequent and regular contacts and exchanges of views on one level or another -- particularly in the event of some acute or crisis-like situations. Maybe it would be worthwhile thinking over the form that such regular contacts could assume.

Out of the remaining and quite impressive list of elaborated bilateral agreements, I think we should emphasize the agreements relating to the limitation of strategic arms. We are both fully aware, Mr. President, of the immense effort that was required in order to prepare these agreements. I am sure that we are both fully aware of how useful it has been from the standpoint of the direct national interests of our two states and in terms of their influence on the general international climate.

I have received a report to the effect that two or three specific points now remain unresolved. Our delegates in Helsinki have not succeeded in keeping with them. I should like to express confidence that you and we will be able to bring this matter to a logical and successful outcome.

The President: This is something that you and I have to do, Mr. General Secretary. It is we who should settle the really difficult questions.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I believe that perhaps it is simply a case of some misunderstanding arising between our representatives in Helsinki. All that has already been done should enable us to successfully complete the job. Perhaps indeed you and we should look into the matter.

The President: The positions seem to be very close right now. As for those two or three points that remain outstanding, we should try and see whether we can find a way of breaking the deadlock.

I have studied the history of the relationships between Stalin and Roosevelt, and also to a lesser extent, between Stalin and Churchill, and I have found that during the war differences would arise between their subordinates, but then at top level these differences were usually overcome. It is that kind of relationship that I should like to establish with the General Secretary.

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General Secretary Brezhnev: I would be only too happy and I am perfectly ready on my side.

The President: If we leave all the decisions to the bureaucrats we will never achieve any progress.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Then we would simply perish.

The President: They would simply bury us in paper.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I should now like, so to say, in a particularly confidential way, to express one thought. Despite all the positive significance of the agreements achieved on ABM systems and on offensive types of arms, we have to admit that by themselves such agreements do not lessen the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. And such a danger cannot fail to cause concern in the minds of many millions of people both in your country and in ours. In the agreements that have now been elaborated by us jointly and will be signed people will not find an answer to this question which is causing them concern. I am now giving you these observations so to say as food for thought, and not for public discussion.

The President: Even with those limitations that we are assuming we still have enough arms to kill one another many times over.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Exactly. That is why when we looked into the meaning of all that we have already done, we came to the conclusion that although all this is very useful we ought to raise before you the question of achieving agreement on the non-use against one another of nuclear arms. We placed this question before you in a preliminary way hoping that you would give us your view on this matter. I should like to hope for a positive attitude on your part. I believe that an obligation of this kind could serve as a good example for others and promote the invigoration of the international situation.

You may of course say that the situation is complicated by the fact that you and we have our allies. But I believe that all this can be settled for the sake of delivering our peoples from the threat of nuclear war. An agreement of this kind would have an important and indeed an epoch-making significance. Naturally, I am not asking you to reply to my question right now. I merely wanted to emphasize the importance of an agreement of this kind. Such an agreement would provide an impetus

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for the further advance along the road on the physical reduction of the volumes of armaments. I trust you will agree Mr. President that only a radical solution of the problem -- the destruction of nuclear weapons -- can really rid the peoples of the threat of nuclear war. This would be a tremendous achievement. Our position is that this is what we should strive for.

The President: I think you told Kissinger that this would be a peaceful bomb. As you admit, there does exist a very serious problem concerning consultations with our allies. But after recently receiving a personal message from you at Camp David, I asked Kissinger quietly to work on this problem with some of my White House staff so that a little later we could discuss the matter to see where we could go. For the time being we do not want to put this question into the hands of our bureaucracy who would immediately find lots of difficulties and obstacles in it. In the early stages we would like to study the matter quietly. I would like to take up this matter a little later but not at a plenary meeting.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Very well. We have almost a full week at our disposal. During the forthcoming negotiations which I trust will proceed normally and in a good way we shall certainly be able to come back to this matter.

The President: I do not mean that you and I should waste our time on various words and phrases; that is something that Kissinger, Dobrynin and Gromyko can do. We could give them some general ideas to work on. This applies both to this particular matter and to others.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We shall seek to achieve agreement in principle and then we could entrust the concrete formulations to others.

I should like further to say a few words about Europe. I would very much like you to be very clear in your mind, Mr. President, that the Europe policy of the Soviet Union pursues the most honest and constructive goals and is devoid of any subterfuges -- even though there is certainly no lack in the wide world of people who want to muddy the water and propound all sorts of pernicious fabrications. The Russian people and all the other peoples of the Soviet Union have suffered quite enough from wars that have originated on the European soil. We do not want this to be

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repeated anew. We want to rule out such a possibility. That is the objective of our Europe policy. I believe that the United States too cannot be interested in a repetition of all that has happened in the past. We believe that the United States is in sympathy with the achievement of detente in Europe and the strengthening of European peace. If that is so then you and we have before us a vast scope for cooperation to these ends. And we are hoping that it will be carried into effect under the hallmark of good will and a constructive approach. This hope of ours rests on a certain degree of practical experience. We do genuinely value the cooperation that we had with you at the time of the preparation of the agreement on West Berlin. We also value the steps taken by the American side to promote the ratification of the treaties signed by the Federal Republic of Germany with the Soviet Union and Poland. Permit me to express the hope that you and we will continue that good practice in matters including the preparation of the all-Europe conference.

As regards that conference I should like to say the following. This question too we seek to approach as realists. It is obvious that it will not prove possible to solve all the complex problems existing in Europe at one go. But we would think that such a conference if it passes successfully can lay a good foundation for cooperation between all European states.

I believe there is nothing in this that could be opposed by the United States or Canada.

We have on many occasions spoken publicly on this matter and I should not like to take up your time with a repetition of what has already been said. I believe we could discuss this matter in greater detail later and find mutual understanding.

I believe it would be a good thing to register our common positive attitude to the conference in the joint communique which will reflect the results of our talks. Such mutual understanding would have great meaning and significance.

The President: This is more a matter of form than substance. I was discussing this question on my way to Moscow with Kissinger and Rogers. I think we could reach understanding and that includes the question of timing. The other European countries will certainly be expecting us to mention this subject in our communique so we have to find a way of doing it.

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General Secretary Brezhnev: I believe they will certainly be expecting us to do so. I also feel that we could agree without any public announcement to begin consultations on matters relating to the all-Europe conference on a bilateral basis.

I will not now go into the details of other matters of interest to us. There are many of them and of course they all have great significance for the development of cooperation between us. I want to say that I highly appreciate the fact that the President has agreed personally to sign many of the bilateral agreements that have been prepared. This will be of very great significance.

The President: I think the most important agreements are the ones relating to SALT. I feel they should be signed by the two of us. Also important will be the agreements on space, the environment and trade. I would be prepared to sign all of them. But I understand that you may want some of them to be signed by Kosygin or Podgorny.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I would say that the most important document will be "The Basic Principles of Relations between the USSR and the USA."

The President: Yes, of course. And that's a document that should also be signed by us both. As for the SALT agreements, as I see it, you have the same responsibility in your country for military matters as I have in mine as Commander-in-Chief.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Some agreements on our side will be signed by Comrade Podgorny and Comrade Kosygin.

Permit me in conclusion to say a few words on the procedure of our further talks. On our side the plenary meetings will be conducted by myself, Podgorny and Kosygin. Naturally, if the President should wish to meet separately with Podgorny, Kosygin, or myself, such meetings can be arranged.

The President: I feel it would be important for me to have an early meeting with the General Secretary to consider unresolved issues such as, for instance, the outstanding points relating to the SALT agreements and also to have a confidential talk on the Vietnam problem. That question is one that you and I should discuss between the two of us. But on the whole, I am ready to follow your advice.

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We would not like the question of "The Basic Principles" to be brought up at a plenary meeting because many of our side have simply not been informed of it. I trust we can make to appear as if this question arose and was settled in the course of the discussions during this week. I hope you will help us play this out in this way. We would not like to say openly tomorrow that you and we have arranged everything in advance.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Then perhaps tomorrow we could mention the questions of limiting strategic armaments and several others. As regards the question of "The Basic Principles" it would be a bit awkward for me to discuss it without Podgorny and Kosygin.

The President: No, you can certainly feel free to discuss it with your colleagues any time. I was merely mentioning the difficulties on your side. We've not said anything yet to our Secretary of State for instance.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Maybe we could then start out by saying that it would be a good thing to find some form of registering our common desire to achieve an improvement in our relations. In other words, we could sort of raise the matter in general terms.

The President: I agree. On the whole, I would say that where we face the most difficult questions it's best to have a discussion between two people and where the questions are easy to take in a broader group. I would suggest that kind of division of labor.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I will consult with my comrades and give you a reply tomorrow.

I would now like to express the hope that your visit to Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev will be interesting, pleasant and useful.

The President: We appreciate very much the wonderful welcome and the beautiful quarters we have been given.

Like you, Mr. General Secretary, I have met with the leaders of many states. But like you I too am aware that this meeting is of the greatest importance because you and I represent the two most powerful nations of the world. Of course, we have our differences, but the important thing in terms of the future of our two peoples and the future of the world is for the leaders of the two most powerful nations to be able to meet one another face to face. If we achieve a situation where such meetings become possible

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we shall be able to move forward toward mutual understanding on important issues. And then even if we still have differences on some other matters they will not lead to violence. This will be a great achievement. I believe it is true that peace is at least as important as war, and if the leaders of our two countries could cooperate in time of war it is surely even more important for us to cooperate in time of peace.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We must not only cooperate, we must act in such a way as to prevent the possibility of war breaking out anywhere and not just between us.

The President: I believe the greatest danger is not in a war directly between our two countries, but in a situation where we would be dragged against our will into wars breaking out in completely different areas of the world. That is what we should try to avoid.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I think we should try and avoid all that is linked with war.

[The meeting then adjourned.]

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

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NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
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PARTICIPANTS: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU
Nikolai V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
Aleksai N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the USA
Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to
the General Secretary
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Leonid Zamyatin, Director of TASS

The President
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Martin Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff Member
Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger

DATE & TIME: Wednesday, May 24, 1972
11:40 a.m. - 1:30 p.m.

PLACE: St. Catherine's Hall
Grand Kremlin Palace, Moscow

SUBJECTS: Economic Relations; Europe

[In informal conversation before the meeting began, the Soviet leaders, in particular Kosygin, emphasized the importance of Most-Favored-Nation treatment for the Soviet Union, citing the very high U. S. tariff rates for many Soviet products. The President essentially listened without committing himself.]

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[The Soviet side then said that the meeting would take up European issues. The U.S. side had thought that SALT would be the principal item, and when he heard that Europe would be discussed the President said that he wanted Secretary Rogers and Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand present. He pointed out to the Soviet leaders that Secretary Rogers would have to describe the discussions to the European countries and at home. Dr. Kissinger left the room to call Secretary Rogers.]

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The President: I was talking to Prime Minister Kosygin on MFN. As I told the General Secretary yesterday, I will handle that. I already indicated this to Ambassador Dobrynin at Camp David. I have to get this through the Congress. I have already discussed it with the leaders; if we can get Congressional agreement I will take responsibility.

Chairman Kosygin: That would be a very good thing. I can see that then we will really have a solid basis for the development of our economic ties, because otherwise there can be nothing but talk on this subject and nothing concrete. In fact, we can sell commodities 40% dearer in European markets. So why should we sell to the United States if we can get 40% more in Europe?

The President: That makes sense.

Chairman Kosygin: While we are waiting I can give you some comparable examples: all sorts of heavy equipment, like machine tools and parts of metal cutting machines, power stations, diesels, in short most of the products of the engineering industry that we could sell to the United States would be taxed up to 40%.

Chairman Podgorny: There are some that are even higher.

Chairman Kosygin: Compared to that the general tax [tariff] on goods in other nations is 5% or 7% compared to that of 40% in the United States. There are other examples. On optical equipment, for example, the tax is 50%. On electrical measuring devices and instruments it goes as high as 90%. Can anyone do trade on that sort of basis?

For example, with Canada recently we had a sale of turbines and generators and it was a normal situation where the delegation came over and crossed

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Siberia and saw our equipment at work and bought very important machinery in the electrical power field, and the tax rates were quite normal.

The President: On the whole economic matter, Patolichev, Rogers and Flanigan had discussions yesterday. We have no problem so far as Export-Import Bank credits are concerned. I can do that unilaterally as President. On MFN I have to go to Congress.

It would be helpful, Mr. General Secretary, if whomever you designate, perhaps Prime Minister Kosygin, could talk to Rogers about this so he can sell it to Congress when he gets there. Don't you agree, Mr. Ambassador {Dobrynin}?

Ambassador Dobrynin: [Gestures to Kosygin]

General Secretary Brezhnev: Very well.

Chairman Kosygin: Well, of course, the solution of the question of Export-Import Bank credits will provide the opportunity to achieve some progress, but ways must be found to get over the MFN problem and seek ways to increase trade.

I have already put this to some American representatives. When we really get trade going it will be quite useful for us to have a bank of our own in the United States, as we do in various countries, such as France, Great Britain, Iran and Turkey, like in many parts of the world. We should either have a bank of our own, or it could take the form of a joint U. S. -Soviet venture.

General Secretary Brezhnev: One specific matter. I think on two occasions an important delegation of American businessmen visited this country. Among the questions discussed was a possible large scale agreement on a joint venture in gas, building in the northern areas of our country special liquid gas plants. This could be a very important project for U. S. -Soviet cooperation. Are you familiar with this, Mr. President, and if so how do you view this matter? Because this would be a question involving both vast quantities and also it would be on a long term basis.

[Secretary Rogers and Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand arrived.]

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Chairman Kosygin: The situation right now is this. The representatives of American business circles are suggesting where some of these could be built. We reached preliminary agreement on a gas pipeline in Siberia from Tyumen. The initial duration will be for a period of twenty years and the cost would be somewhere close to \$5 billion. The Americans who came here were quite confident that they had almost agreed on this matter with their authorities in the U. S. I don't know if it has come to your attention. They are quite sure that the total amounts of gas involved would be 25 billion cubic meters, or liquid gas would be 25 million tons. They gave us preliminary projections, a preliminary plan of action which they elaborated for our experts. I made a suggestion to have not just one pipeline but two parallel pipes. Then they made their own additional suggestions. They seemed quite sure a bargain could be struck.

To sum up, I am quite sure there is a basis to study this matter. We are also quite sure that there are enough gas desposits in this area to arrange for a business deal. There is a very important project that could be carried into effect. On account of the credit that would be extended by the American side to us to carry the project into effect, we could place very significant orders, for example for 3 million tons of sheet steel and important orders in the field of compressors. We would thereby, contribute to a fuller scale of operations important to American industry. We would contribute to a lower American unemployment rate. If correctly presented to the Congress it would be welcomed.

The President: [to Secretary Rogers] Would you say a word on the gas project?

Secretary Rogers: This is a very large project, and we have to consider carefully its feasibility. We as a government have not taken a position as yet. We recognize the point that Premier Kosygin has made. We talked to private parties, and we indicated that we would want to consider any proposals that they make. Up to this time we haven't taken a position as a government on it.

Chairman Kosygin: That is exactly what the American businessmen said. But they are interested and confirmed what you said, that the U. S. Government has not taken a position yet.

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The President: [to Secretary Rogers] Before you came I said that I thought it would be helpful if you could meet with Mr. Kosygin and discuss the specifics on this. They also raised the points of MFN which I said we were prepared to move on with the Congress. Would you like to say a word about that?

Secretary Rogers: I would be happy to meet with Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Flanigan at your convenience. As you know, Mr. President, this involves huge amounts of credits and we have to consider it carefully. Concerning natural gas, actually if we were to extend that amount of credit, we would have to work out the lend-lease settlement. Natural gas involves a very substantial amount of credit, about one-third of what the Export-Import Bank has available.

The President: It also involves MFN?

Secretary Rogers: Credit.

The President: That doesn't mean that it isn't possible.

Chairman Kosygin: But this is not just something in our interest alone. It is something of a mutual advantage to both sides.

The President: Oh no.

Chairman Kosygin: This should reflect a mutual desire on our part to develop a cooperation in this field; it is not something that is unilaterally to our advantage.

The President: We would like to work it out altogether, including lend lease, the resolution of that problem. I can move on Export-Import Bank matters, but in regard to MFN I have to go back to the Congress on that. I believe that Kosygin/Rogers discussions would be useful because we get the side of the businessmen, and I would like to hear directly what you have in mind.

Secretary Rogers: I have talked to the businessmen. I will be very happy to talk to Premier Kosygin.

Chairman Kosygin: Well, just adding to what has been said now, we have large agreements on the sale of gas with Austria and the Federal Republic

of Germany and all the Socialist countries and Italy. In short, we have almost more potential consumers of our gas than we need. This should be in the nature of a serious business deal between our two countries.

On the question of lend lease, we think we should set aside a time to discuss that so we know where we are. We should not just float in air so that we can come to a concrete solution on the basis of your proposal and the ones that we have. Certainly that issue is long overdue.

The President: That certainly would help the political climate that we need to get Most-Favored-Nation.

Chairman Kosygin: And here, of course, we must both take a really realistic view of things and remember that after all more than 25 years have passed since the end of the war. None of us can expect very great figures or sums to be involved in solving this matter. On the other hand many in this world want to exploit this matter in their own selfish interest.

Secretary Rogers: The President suggested I say a word about MFN. If we have a satisfactory outcome of the lend lease negotiations and the general relations between the Soviet Union and the United States improve as a result of this visit, and the President supports MFN, then Congress, I think, will follow the President's lead. It is not an easy matter, but I think whatever the President recommends to the Congress under these circumstances, I think that they would do.

EUROPE

General Secretary Brezhnev: Shall we now turn to the subject that has been suggested we discuss this morning, Europe? If you have no objections, I would like to make a few opening remarks on that question. A discussion of the problems relating to Europe is a very important one indeed, and I believe the reasons for that are understood perfectly well on both sides. Europe is indeed an area which is one of the most densely populated ones in the world. It is an area of enormous economic potential; an area of ancient culture and science. All of these are important matters.

On the other hand, it is also an area where in the past many large-scale wars originated. I need only to mention two world wars and especially the last one which the U.S. was dragged into also. And those wars, particularly the last one, involved very much human suffering and sacrifice. It had a very bad aftermath and had a long term effect on the situation

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The question therefore is how to make this area an area of peace and tranquility so that all the peoples of Europe can live in conditions of security, so that we too, and both of us, can be confident that the situation in Europe would not deteriorate. This is certainly not an easy thing to achieve, but it is something that should be the focus of our attention.

In Europe, we have sufficient and quite rich experience of cooperation on various matters. There has been the fighting cooperation of our two nations during the Second World War. There was the fruitful cooperation at the time of the Potsdam Agreement. There has been comparable experience in the post-war period. We regard particularly highly the cooperation of our two nations in the talks on the Berlin agreement and in the matters of the Soviet Union-Federal Republic of Germany and Poland-Federal Republic of Germany Treaties.

However much we value the cooperation in the past, we should not belittle the importance of our role in ensuring the future of Europe, because there are still in Europe the unresolved problems. Very much in the policies of the United States and Soviet Union about Europe would favor not only the interests of Europeans, but also the interests of your country and ours. I should like to say quite frankly that if the U.S. is prepared to take measures to remove the survivals of the past policies of the cold war, the outcome would be an improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. That, too, is a very important aspect of this problem.

And I would like at this point to emphasize again the significance of the concerted policies we both pursued with regard to the problems of West Berlin and the ratification of the treaty. At the same time I wish to state firmly that our line with regard to the Federal Republic of Germany would not be anti-American in character. This is something we said in all frankness to Chancellor Brandt, and this is something we will abide by very strictly. And as a practical step let me say that on May 31 our Supreme Soviet will be ratifying the treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany. As we pointed out in the past, immediately after that we will sign the final protocol on West Berlin so that can be put into effect too. In our view that will not only serve to improve the legal relations between the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and Poland. It will also have a beneficial effect on the general atmosphere in Europe.

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Secretary Rogers: I suggested to Mr. Gromyko that we make the signing on June 3.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I think that seems to be a very acceptable date. We have promised to sign it immediately after ratifying; that is something expected by the Federal Republic of Germany.

Secretary Rogers: There is some suggestion that we delay until June 16, but June 3 is better for us.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We feel the sooner the better. We promised they would come into force at the same time, so it seems logical to do it on June 3.

Secretary Rogers: We will try to work it out with the others.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Good, the British and the French.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That would be a very good thing indeed. In our common policy in Europe it will also be most important to continue to pursue a firm line and not even conceive of the possibility of the violation of boundaries of Europe as they have taken shape in the post-war period. That also is one of the paramount tasks of current foreign policies.

And I would now like to tell you frankly, Mr. President, there have been erroneous, fallacious interpretations of our policy with respect to Europe. Sometimes this is a lack of true knowledge, but more frequently it is deliberate rumors spread to the effect that the goal of our policies is to break the ties that the U.S. has developed with European states. We wish to state in these negotiations that this is very far from the truth. The initiatives that we are taking in Europe, and particularly on the question of European security, pursue a goal that is totally different. We pursue our objective in the interest of not only the European states; we pursue it also with the goal of maintaining and protecting the interest of the Soviet Union and the United States in Europe, if of course, like ourselves, the United States seeks to make Europe tranquil and secure.

In confirmation with what I have said with regard to the goal of the Soviet policy in Europe, we will take into account the role played by the U. S. and and U.S. -Soviet cooperation both during World War II and the post-war

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period, particularly in the earlier talks on the problem of West Berlin and the matter of the ratification of the treaties. We believe it quite normal that in all matters relating to the European Conference and the solution of all serious problems relating to Europe, the United States should participate on an equal footing, even though the United States is not an European nation. This review is confirmation of our views and attitude to the U. S. and to the U. S. being able to defend its own interests in Europe.

Another question to which we attach great importance is the question of preparing and convening an all-European Security Conference. The reasons why we attach importance to this is as follows: We do not see the Conference as an aim in itself. We regard it as one of the possible means that can help bring to fruition the turn that has been discernible toward the normalization of the situation and strengthening of the prospects of securing lasting peace in the continent.

I should like to add the following. Despite the different approaches taken by the U. S. and the Soviet Union to several matters affecting European politics, the strengthening of security in Europe does in our view correspond to the long-term interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States. And if we both act in that direction -- in a direction of building up the guarantee of security of European states -- that will insure that there will be no more nuclear war and there will be tranquility in Europe to a far greater extent than attempts to insure that tranquility through the use or threat of nuclear weapons.

We believe that a turn for the better has become discernible in Europe today, and it will be in our view useful if we could take advantage of that fact in order to strengthen that feeling of security and begin a joint effort to prepare for the convening of a European Security Conference. We should therefore endeavor to begin preliminary bilateral consultations on those matters and in a preliminary way we might say a few words about that at this meeting. And we are counting on the positive attitude of the United States toward this matter. We have expressed our views publicly on this question on many occasions and so have quite a few other European states.

As you know, we have spoken in favor of convening this conference even as early as the end of this year. It is quite clear that in one blow it may

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certainly not prove possible to resolve all the complex problems of Europe, but the important thing is to launch the conference, to get the conference going. It might prove expedient to prolong its work. The important thing is to begin the work, to begin the preparations for the conference.

As in any question such preparations can assume a different form, but as a first suggestion perhaps we could discuss the following: we first begin multilateral consultations in Helsinki. Then, in the first stage of the conference itself the Foreign Ministers of the European states and the United States and Canada could meet to work out an agenda of the conference, to create the necessary bodies, commissions, secretariat and so forth. And then those bodies could get to work in order to elaborate and submit various specific proposals for the consideration of the governments of the European states and the United States and Canada.

Certainly this is not the one and only possible form of addressing ourselves to this problem. Other forms can also be discussed. We are just submitting our own view. This form has in it nothing that can be construed as running against any participants in the conference. Whatever conversations we have on this topic, we should certainly like to emphasize the significance for future developments of our two sides publicly saying something in principle on the problem relating to the European Conference at the conclusion of our meetings here. And you have in principle given your consent to that first meeting. I wish to emphasize that it would be very important indeed to say something at the conclusion on these subjects because if we don't there might be all sorts of wrong opinions and misunderstandings in Europe. People would start saying that the U.S. or the Soviet Union was changing their policy. Even if so, by making public reference we would be doing a very good thing and therefore justify the hopes the people in Europe have placed in these talks and in the people of our countries.

And now we have through joint cooperation settled the matter of the ratification of the treaties and the question of West Berlin, another important matter arises and that is a simultaneous admission of the two German states, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, to the United Nations. The possible solution to this question would certainly remove much tension in Europe and the sources of friction between us on those grounds. This is a major issue, and we feel we should be entitled to count on the positive attitude of your part on this also.

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Although it is an international problem, it also relates to bilateral relations between our two countries. It would help to create a better climate for the relations between us. And that is something to which you made frequent reference during this visit, Mr. President.

Another major issue which concerns not only improving the general climate and relations between our two countries and the relations of our two countries with the states of Europe, but also in line with the interest of generally improving the situation in the world, is the question of the military/political groupings in Europe. You are, I trust, familiar with our position on these matters. We are prepared, together with our allies, to disband military/political groupings in Europe towards a first step to really disbanding military organizations, and we are prepared to initiate consultations with you on this subject.

Those, Mr. President, are in our view just the basic issues we could discuss and talk about with relation to Europe.

The President: Mr. General Secretary, you correctly pointed out our position of agreeing in principle to a European Security Conference, or a European Security and Cooperation Conference. As you know, we have, and you have, the problem of not deciding at this meeting the future of Europe. It is very important, while we agree in principle, that we consult with our allies, you with yours and we with ours. Therefore it is very important that whatever we state here, we will follow through with consultations with our allies.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That's quite natural.

Chairman Kosygin: Do you think the time will come when there are no allies on your part or on ours, that we are common allies?

The President: Surely. It will take time.

Chairman Kosygin: That's what we want to achieve. As long as you have your allies and we ours, we are at loggerheads.

The President: It is very important we recognize that smaller nations are very sensitive about the relations between the two great powers. Small nations object to having their fate decided by larger ones.

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General Secretary Brezhnev: It should not offend them.

Chairman Kosygin: That in fact is why we are so categorically opposed to allegations, these Chinese allegations, about the two superpowers combining to settle all the questions of the world, the affairs of smaller countries. We, for our part, have the immutable position that we respect other countries. And that is our attitude.

[There was a brief discussion about Kosygin and a Deputy Prime Minister for Science.]

The President: He is making a private deal with Mr. Kosygin. As the first nation to send a manned mission to Mars, I will go along.

Chairman Kosygin: I can stand it, can you?

The President: It will take nine months. We will get to know each other very well.

Chairman Kosygin: We will take cognac.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: How could you go without the Foreign Ministers?

Chairman Podgorny: This is not a private deal. We have to give honest thought to who flies.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Perhaps first there should be a preliminary flight of foreign ministers.

The President: If the foreign ministers don't come back, we won't go.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We call Dr. Kissinger to order -- keep him away from submarines.

Chairman Kosygin: If we don't come back, everything will be clear.

The President: Getting to the practical points, as I know the General Secretary likes to do, stated frankly, I see these problems. First to have a meeting this year, 1972, the first meeting of the European Security Conference, would not be possible. It poses for us rather considerable problems. We have elections and the aftermath, and it also poses the

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problem of participation. We can talk in terms of a meeting in 1973. We can have preliminary discussions take place in the fall of this year. That is realistic. One of the reasons that this meeting we are having now is producing such solid results is because it was well prepared. In a meeting involving all the countries of Europe, the preparations, of course, would be very important. Whereas we two might agree on an agenda, smaller nations have various ideas, and it will take time. 1973 is the time for the meeting to aim for rather than trying to compress it and get it done in 1972.

Secretary Rogers: Our allies agree with this. Some of them have elections this fall, like Canada.

The President: You have to know whether you are dealing with a government that will survive or one that's gone. Preliminary discussions at the proper level, the exploratory discussions, could go forward at the times the European nations and all of us agree.

It's your thought that these should take place at Helsinki?

General Secretary Brezhnev: That's where the idea of a conference came to life. Some work has already begun. Since Finland was the initiator we feel that Helsinki should be the city. That seems the general trend of public opinion, that it should be held in Helsinki.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: In fact practically all the countries concerned have indicated their preference for Helsinki, and the U.S. has not in fact registered a negative attitude.

Secretary Rogers: We are talking about preliminary talks, not the conference itself.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That's exactly our understanding.

The President: The second point, with regard to UN representation of East Germany, this is a problem where we, of course, will have to be guided by the attitude of the Federal Republic. And when the Federal Republic has discussed this matter and indicated it is ready to move forward, we will, of course, cooperate. We will be prepared to discuss it with the British and the French. There is the very sensitive problem of four power rights that might be affected by this action.

The situation with regard to what the General Secretary was referring to concerning military forces and military blocs is of course much more difficult and is going to require a great deal of time. As the General Secretary and all the representatives here of the Soviet Government are aware, there have been considerable discussions in the NATO community in regard to the possibility of mutual balanced force reductions. This is naturally a matter that cannot be decided in a large conference involving a number of nations that do not have forces. That is why we are suggesting, I know this is a matter of previous discussion

General Secretary Brezhnev: Of course, there are such states as Luxembourg, with 90 policemen.

The President: . . . we have suggested that there should be parallel discussions on the problem of force reductions, parallel discussions at the time going forward with discussions on the European Conference.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, how do you visualize that in practice? Let us assume that we have the procedure on the conference that I have suggested, the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Helsinki to discuss matters on the agenda, working bodies, the secretariat, etc. In your view they would also discuss the question of force reductions in parallel? Is that your thinking generally?

The President: No. That was the point I was making. We thought that is too large a body for that. Let the countries involved, with forces involved, have discussions; that is the point Dr. Kissinger made in discussions with the General Secretary before.

Chairman Kosygin: But they should proceed in parallel.

General Secretary Brezhnev: In parallel, but different bodies discussing the two different subjects.

Secretary Rogers: We might have the subjects on the agenda and agree to discuss maybe, simultaneously, maybe shortly thereafter.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Or perhaps we really need not have them in parallel, perhaps first agree to getting the question of the European Conference out of the way, and then force reductions. But if we discuss the

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two very important matters of the European Security Conference and force reductions in parallel, perhaps they would get in the way of each other.

The President: If we wait until a multilateral conference, we may never get to parallel discussions.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That matter could be dealt with in parallel but different bodies altogether. We support the earliest possible discussion of that but without hinging these questions together. The crux lies in not tying up these two problems as far as substance is concerned.

Secretary Rogers: I think that as a matter of logic if you are going to have a conference dealing with security certainly one of the most important aspects is forces. Certainly any conference that didn't cover forces would be lacking something.

The President: Let me suggest, Mr. General Secretary, a procedure for your consideration. I would like to do some thinking on how we do this tactically, the date and so forth. If we could have Rogers and Gromyko have a discussion also and then report back to us, maybe Friday, and by Friday then we can consider this question. They could give us some options.

[General Secretary Brezhnev stands up.]

Chairman Kosygin/General Secretary Brezhnev: Okay.

Chairman Kosygin: Because indeed it would be a very good thing if Secretary Rogers and Gromyko could work on this for our consideration, a kind of program for both of us working toward a European Conference. This would indeed help us remove many questions that otherwise would take months of time.

The President: This is too big a group for technical matters.

Chairman Kosygin: Although certainly there are many people in Europe who live under the impression, perhaps false, that we are holding back preparations for the Conference. If we come to an agreement on this, it would be very useful to remove this impression.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Many people in Europe think you oppose the Conference.

The President: Let me emphasize again that although we come to agreement, we must be careful not to irritate our friends -- all our friends, we consider all Europe our friends. For example, we wouldn't want to anger Albania. (Laughter) We don't want to anger them.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: That is a very noble intention.

Secretary Rogers: We don't want to make Luxembourg mad.

Chairman Kosygin: We heed the words of Luxembourg too.

If, for example, we tell Albania that you regard them as best friend, they will be very glad.

Chairman Podgorny: We are prepared to heed the voice of Luxembourg but Albania takes a different view.

Chairman Kosygin: No exceptions. If they don't want to take part, what can we do?

The President: Take a country like Austria. It is very important. It is small but in the heart of Europe. We should heed its voice.

General Secretary Brezhnev: The voice of every country should be heeded.

I think we can accept as a basis the view by the President to make Secretary Rogers and Comrade Gromyko get to work, perhaps throughout the night. While we enjoy our sleep they will do work. We have to cherish our time.

The President: They will not see the ballet.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I am sure he's seen "Swan Lake."

Secretary Rogers: Not here. I am looking forward to it.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, Mr. President, that I feel completes the discussion.

The President: I think we have a direction set. Also on the trade side there will be further discussions with Flanigan and Kosygin.

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FOR THE "CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY." THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE FEEL THE CSCE MUST BE PREPARED CAREFULLY AND WE CANNOT TAKE PART IN IT UNTIL 1973 IN VIEW OF OUR ELECTIONS. WE CAN, HOWEVER, PARTICIPATE IN A MULTILATERAL PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE IN LATE NOVEMBER. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO INCREASED BILATERAL TALKS IN THE INTERIM BUT BELIEVE THAT THERE IS NO POINT IN TRYING TO HOLD THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE BEFORE THE LATTER PART OF NOVEMBER BECAUSE OF UPCOMING ELECTIONS IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES INVOLVED, INCLUDING OUR OWN.

SUBSEQUENTLY IN THE CONVERSATION, GROMYKO ASKED WHETHER WE HAVE IN MIND EARLY 1973 FOR THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IT IS PREFERABLE TO WAIT TO SEE HOW THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE GOES AND THAT IN ANY CASE THE TIMING IS SOMETHING FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS TO DECIDE.

GROMYKO INQUIRED AT WHAT LEVEL THE SECRETARY EN-VISAGES THE CONFERENCE. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE CSCE ITSELF WOULD PRESUMABLY BE AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. GROMYKO ASKED WHETHER WE HAVE IN MIND A HIGHER LEVEL MEETING FOLLOWING THE CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS. THE SECRETARY INFORMED HIM WE HAD NOT BEEN THINKING IN THOSE TERMS. GROMYKO THEN ASKED ABOUT THE BRITISH VIEW ON THE FORMAT OF THE CONFERENCE AND WAS TOLD THAT THE BRITISH ARE FLEXIBLE AND APPARENTLY WOULD ACCEPT EITHER THE U. S. POSITION (A SINGLE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS) OR THE FRENCH POSITION (TWO MEETINGS OF FOREIGN MINISTERS). GROMYKO PRESSED AS TO WHETHER THE U. S. WOULD SUPPORT A HEADS OF STATE MEETING. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THIS IS NOT RULED OUT, BUT HE FEELS WE WOULD PROBABLY NOT SUPPORT IT. THIS IS ONE OF THE SUBJECTS WE CAN TALK ABOUT IN HELSINKI. HE ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS ARE THINKING IN THESE TERMS. GROMYKO ANSWERED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS WEIGHING ALL POSSIBILITIES. A HEADS OF STATE MEETING IS NOT EXCLUDED -- IT COULD BE A GOOD IDEA.

THE SECRETARY GAVE GROMYKO OUR DRAFT COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE ON CSCE (ATTACHED). GROMYKO REA IT WITHOUT COMMENT, THEN RETURNED TO HIS EARLIER QUESTION AS TO

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WHETHER WE CAN HAVE A PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE CSCE. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT WE CAN, BUT POINTED OUT THE NECESSITY OF OBTAINING THE VIEWS OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS, SINCE WE MUST NOT MAKE IT LOOK AS IF WE ARE IMPOSING A DECISION ON THE OTHERS.

THE SECRETARY REQUESTED GROMYKO'S VIEWS ON THE TOPICS TO BE DEALT WITH IN A CSCE. GROMYKO SAID THAT ANY QUESTIONS COULD BE DISCUSSED, THEN LISTED THE FOLLOWING WHICH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS DESIRABLE:

-- GENERAL IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS (POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND OTHER) AMONG THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

-- TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY (I.E., STATUS QUO), THE INVIOALABILITY OF BORDERS (E.G., AS IN THE FRG-USSR TREATY).

-- NON-APPLICATION OF FORCE IN RELATIONS AMONG EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

-- IMPROVEMENT OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

-- TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION.

-- CULTURAL RELATIONS.

THE SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT, AS THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID, IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE CONFERENCE TO HAVE CONCRETE RESULTS. IT SHOULD NOT AIM JUST AT CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE, ALTHOUGH THAT HAS OSOME VALUE. HE AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES, SO LONG AS THESE APPLY UNIFORMLY. WE CONSIDER THE FREER MOVEMENT O PEOPLE, IDEAS AND INFORMATION IMPORTANT. HE NOTED THE REFERENCE TO MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS CONTACTS IN THE WARSAW PACT STATEMENT AND SAID HE ASSUMED THAT IT REFERRED TO SUCH MOVEMENT. ENVIRONMENT IS ANOTHER IMPORTANT TOPIC.

GROMYKO OBSERVED THAT ENVIROMNET SHOULD BE INCLUDED AND ASKED HOW WE FEEL ABOUT A PERMANENT ORGAN ESTABLISHED

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BY THE CSCE. THE SECRETARY SAID WE NEED TIME TO THINK ABOUT THIS. GROMYKO EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS NOT PROPOSING AN ORGANIZATION WITH A LARGE PERMANENT APPARATUS, BUT MERELY A CONSULTATIVE ORGAN. THE SECRETARY SAID WE HAVE NOT EXCLUDED THIS POSSIBILITY, BUT WE HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT IT. NEW ORGANIZATIONS TEND TO GROW LIKE THE UN AND RESULT IN MUCH TALK AND LITTLE ACTION.

GROMYKO THEN ASKED ABOUT THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION AND RENUNCIATION OF FORCE. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT RENUNCIATION OF FORCE IS FINE, BUT IF ONE TALKS ABOUT BORDERS, ONE MUST ASK WHICH BORDERS, SINCE WE DO NOT CONSIDER IT APPROPRIATE TO BE INVOLVED IN TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. GROMYKO SAID THEY ARE THINKING OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND THE INVIOABILITY OF BORDERS AS A PRINCIPLE, NOT WITH SPECIFIC APPLICATION TO BORDER DISPUTES.

DOBRYNIN ASKED WHETHER THE SECRETARY MEANT IN HIS EARLIER COMMENTS THAT THERE IS NOTHING TO TALK ABOUT UNTIL NOVEMBER. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO HAVE BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS, BUT FOR THE REASON HE HAD STATED, WE FELT MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIONS SHOULD NOT BEGIN UNTIL LATE NOVEMBER.

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THE SECRETARY REFERRED TO THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST THE PREVIOUS DAY FOR OPTIONS AS TO HOW WE MIGHT PROCEED WITH MBFR. HE SAID WE REGRETTED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD NOT SEEN FIT TO RECEIVE BROSIO AND WONDERED IF WE COULD NOT START EXPLORATORY TALKS BY DESIGNATING SOMEONE TO CONDUCT THEM. GROMYKO ASKED WHO WOULD DESIGNATE THE REPRESENTATIVE, AND THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT, SO FAR AS OUR SIDE IS CONCERNED, NATO WOULD. GROMYKO SAID THAT IN THAT CASE THE SITUATION WOULD BE THE SAME AS WITH BROSIO: THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS OPPOSED TO BROSIO BECAUSE HE REPRESENTED A GROUP. THE SAME WOULD BE THE CASE WITH ANY OTHER NATO REPRESENTATIVE. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO AVOID HAVING A REPRESENTATIVE OF GROUPS IS TO USE THE ENTIRE INTERESTED GROUP, THAT IS HOLD A CONFERENCE.

GROMYKO ASKED WHETHER THE UNITED STATES COULD DESIGNATE A REPRESENTATIVE WHO COULD SPEAK FOR OUR GROUP. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO DEAL WITH A REPRESENTATIVE WHO REPRESENTS A BLOC OR AN ALLIANCE. MENTIONING FRANCE, HE NOTED THAT SOME OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE THE SAME OPINION. HE REALIZES THAT DEVELOPMENTS MAY OCCUR IN THE NEGOTIATION OF FORCE REDUCTIONS IN SUCH A WAY THAT GROUPS MAY FORM. BUT THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS OPPOSED TO BLOC-TO-BLOC NEGOTIATION IN THE JURIDICAL SENSE.

THE SECRETARY SAID HE SEES NO OTHER WAY TO APPROACH THE QUESTION SINCE THE UNITED STATES CANNOT LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IS MAKING PLANS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES. GROMYKO SAID THAT BREZHNEV TOLD THE PRESIDENT YESTERDAY THAT WE CAN PERHAPS EXCHANGE VIEWS ON

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A BILATERAL BASIS.

THE SECRETARY THEN RETURNED TO THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR OPTIONS AND PRESENTED TO GROMYKO THE FOLLOWING DRAFT LIST OF FOUR OPTIONS:

1. EXPLORATORY TALKS ON MBFR BETWEEN RELEVANT STATES TO BEGIN PRIOR TO MULTILATERAL PREPARATORY TALKS FOR CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE.
2. EXPLORATORY TALKS ON MBFR BETWEEN RELEVANT STATES TO BEGIN IN PARALLEL BUT IN DIFFERENT BODIES AT HELSINKI AT SAME TIME AS THE MULTILATERAL PREPARATORY TALKS FOR THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE.
3. EXPLORATORY TALKS ON MBFR BETWEEN RELEVANT STATES TO BEGIN IN SEPARATE BODY AND AFTER COMMENCEMENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE.
4. MULTILATERAL TALKS ON MBFR TAKE PLACE IN A SPECIAL BODY CREATED BY THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE.

GROMYKO READ THE LIST AND, IN REGARD TO THE SECOND, ASKED WHETHER "RELEVANT STATES" MEANT ALL POSSIBLE PARTICIPANTS IN THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE. THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT THIS IS NOT THE MEANING.

REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP OF MBFR AND THE CSCE, GROMYKO SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD IT HAD BEEN AGREED AT THE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT THE DAY BEFORE THAT FORCE REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED AT THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT MBFR WOULD NOT BE NEGOTIATED AT THE CSCE BUT SAID THAT IT COULD BE DISCUSSED IN A GENERAL WAY. GROMYKO THEN OBSERVED THAT IN THE SOVIET VIEW FORCE REDUCTIONS COULD BE HANDLED PARALLEL TO THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE, AFTER THE CONFERENCE, OR PERHAPS IN AN ORGAN OF THE CONFERENCE, BUT NOT AT THE

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CONFERENCE ITSELF. THE SECRETARY AGREED IT SHOULD NOT BE NEGOTIATED AT THE CONFERENCE ITSELF.

GROMYKO INQUIRED WHETHER THE OPTIONS THE SECRETARY HAD PRESENTED REPRESENTED THE STATE DEPARTMENT VIEW. THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT THE OPTIONS WERE MERELY SUGGESTIVE, IN ORDER TO MEET THE RESIDENT'S REQUEST TO PRESENT OPTIONS. WE WILL APPRECIATE SOVIET COMMENTS OR SUGGESTIONS.

THE SECRETARY PRESENTED DRAFT LANGUAGE ON MBFR FOR THE COMMUNIQUE (ATTACHED). GROMYKO READ IT AND OBSERVED THAT FORCE REDUCTION SHOULD BE MENTIONED, BUT HE DOUBTED THAT IT NEEDED TO BE TREATED AS SUCH LENGTH. THE SECRETARY TOLD HIM WE ARE FLEXIBLE ON THAT POINT.

BERLIN PROTOCOL

THE POSSIBILITY OF SIGNING THE BERLIN PROTOCOL ON JUNE 3 WAS DISCUSSED. GROMYKO SAID THAT JUNE 3 IS ACCEPTABLE IN PRINCIPLE, BUT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT SIGN THE PROTOCOL UNTIL THE RATIFICATION INSTRUMENTS OF THE MOSCOW TREATY ARE DEPOSITED AND THE TREATY IS IN FORCE. HE SAID THAT THE SUPREME SOVIET WOULD MEET MAY 31 TO RATIFY THE TREATY, AND THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS ATTEMPTING TO ARRANGE FOR DEPOSIT OF THE RATIFICATION ON JUNE 2. HE HOPED TO HEAR FROM THE GERMANS THE NEXT DAY AS TO WHETHER THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

ATTACHMENTS: COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE ON CSCE AND MBFR.

ATTACHMENT NO. 1.

COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE FOR CSCE
 (PRELIMINARY DRAFT)

THE U. S. AND THE USSR ARE IN ACCORD THAT MULTILATERAL CONVERSATIONS INTENDED TO LEAD TO A CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE COULD BEGIN AT A DATE TO BE AGREED BY THE COUNTRIES

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CONCERNED AFTER THE SIGNATURE OF THE FINAL QUADRI-PARTITE PROTOCOL ON BERLIN. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AGREE THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE CAREFULLY PREPARED IN ORDER THAT IT MAY DEAL IN A CONCRETE WAY WITH SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION AND THUS CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROGRESSIVE REDUCTION OF THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF TENSION IN EUROPE.

ATTACHMENT NO. 2.

COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE FOR MBFR
(PRELIMINARY DRAFT)

RECOGNIZING THAT THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE HAS BEEN RELATIVELY STABLE FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, AND THAT THIS SITUATION HAS FAVORED THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, THE TWO SIDES ADDRESSED CURRENT ASPECTS OF MILITARY SECURITY IN EUROPE. PARTICULARLY, THEY DISCUSSED FURTHER CONTRIBUTIONS TO STABILITY AND SECURITY THAT COULD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH THE RECIPROCAL REDUCTIONS OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ANY AGREEMENT MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES.

THEY AGREED THAT, SUBJECT TO THE CONCURRENCE OF THEIR ALLIES, EXPLORATIONS LOOKING TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BEGIN AS SOON AS PRACTICAL BE. IF THEY ARE NOT INITIATED SOONER, EXPLORATIONS COULD OPEN CONCURRENTLY WITH INITIAL MULTILATERAL TALKS PREPARATORY TO A CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE. DISCUSSIONS ON FORCE REDUCTIONS COULD INITIALLY CLARIFY THE VIEWS OF BOTH SIDES ON KEY ISSUES, INCLUDING A WORK PROGRAM FOR NEGOTIATIONS COVERING SUCH MATTERS AS GENERAL GUIDELINES AND COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS, AS WELL AS ASPECTS OF REDUCTIONS.

ROGERS

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION
 July 22, 1972

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Phil Odeen

SUBJECT: Finns Propose Date for CSCE

The Finns have proposed November 22 as the date to start CSCE preparatory talks (see Tab A). State wants to go to our allies saying we could agree to this date.

Agreeing at this time to a specific date for CSCE would seriously undermine the concept of parallel MBFR Explorations and CSCE preparations, and the arrangements worked out in Moscow (which the Soviets appear to be edging away from).

We are only in the initial stages of getting an allied consensus on the procedural aspects of MBFR Explorations (place, participants, etc.). More time is needed to bring preparations for MBFR Explorations abreast of CSCE.

We have already agreed to a tentative date for CSCE preparatory talks of around the 20th of November. I do not believe we should go beyond this until our efforts to get Warsaw Pact agreement to convening MBFR explorations are more advanced, or we will give up any leverage we might have. We may get some help from the FRG on this. They are growing increasingly concerned that CSCE preparatory talks not begin before the FRG elections in early December, and they are talking privately about early next year for CSCE preparations.

State has prepared a cable which could instruct US NATO to tell the allies that we could accept November 22. They are holding it for clearance by Secretary Rogers who returns to Washington Monday. They also plan to get White House clearance.

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I believe we should tell State to take a different approach. We should tell the Allies and the Finns that we are not in a position to settle on a firm date for CSCE preparations. We should be frank with out Allies and explain that we do not want to set a date until we are further along in making arrangements for MBFR explorations so the two can go forward in parallel. This will have the added benefit of encouraging the Allies and our own bureaucracy to move more expeditiously in getting MBFR underway.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve instructing State along the above lines. Bill Hyland agrees.

Approve HK

Disapprove _____

See me _____

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By RAO ARA Date 7-1-03

NSC: PRESIDENT STRIPFILES
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE Aug. 9, 1972
EYES ONLY

HAK

Attached are papers you requested last night: Two new cuts at the nuclear use paper; a paper on MBFR; and a paper on the European Conference.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SECRET/EYES ONLYAuthority EO 12958 AUGUST
By RAO ARA Date 7-1-03 8, 1972CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE -- Outline

You cannot expect to cover the agenda items in any detail in Moscow. Rather, you might (1) indicate what we feel might be accomplished and what the limits on our position are, and (2) find out what the USSR considers prime importance.

I. Atmospherics

-- We cannot expect 30-odd foreign ministers of heads of State to negotiate; the preparatory talks must negotiate most of the issues;

-- we cannot commit ourselves to a summit conference as the last act;

-- how do the Soviets envisage it: would a European summit come before or after a return visit to the US by the Soviet leaders?

-- this might influence how we both proceed at the conference.

II. Political Aspects

-- Our Allies have some strong views on a declaration of principles issued by the Conference;

-- we cannot impose on them our own views, and will not try;

-- if the Soviets have strong views, they should convey them to us in private and we might take them into account in developing the Alliance position;

-- we are probably going to resist any elaborate post conference machinery. Most of the useful work could proceed in other forums;

-- we will have to defer to the Europeans on any border questions.

III. European Cooperation

-- There is a strong feeling within NATO that this conference should loosen up the movement of people within Europe;

-- failure to achieve at least a superficial advance in this area will lead to an impasse, judging by views of some of our Allies;

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-- we have no great aspirations in this regard, but the Soviets should be flexible.

IV. Economic Cooperation

-- We are not prime movers or main actors -- this is of more immediate importance for the Europeans;

-- we want to be sure that bilateral US-Soviet economic relations are not drawn into this conference, and expect Soviet cooperation;

-- the Soviets should recognize that no real breakthroughs are likely at this conference.

V. Military Issues

-- We agree that the conference is not the proper forum to deal with military security, but many of the smaller countries want a voice in the military issues (especially arms control) and want the conference to address them;

-- our view is that there might be some very general measures that all countries could adopt -- i. e., advance notification of maneuvers;

-- we will keep MBFR out of the conference.

VI. General Outlook

-- Developments preceding the conference have made the conference less important; the German-Soviet treaty, the Berlin agreements, the Soviet-American principles, simultaneous MBFR discussions, and SALT;

-- the purposes of the conference continue to elude us;

-- confirming the status quo, or even working out vague cooperative projects are scarcely worth the major effort involved;

-- we recognize that the Soviets have more interest in this conference than we do, and we will be cooperative, but we need some enlightenment on what exactly the Soviets expect.

NOTE: This is going to be quite delicate. We have probably led the Soviets to believe that we are going to be their partner in fixing this conference in advance. In fact we have little freedom of action, given the keen

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interests of our Allies. Your main purpose, therefore, may be to introduce a note of sobriety in Soviet expectations, without appearing antagonistic toward their pet project. Moreover, the outcome will have little meaning except in the political-psychological impetus to detente. About the most we can expect is that this will be tempered by some appearance of breaking down intra-European barriers, and avoiding the pitfalls of moving toward a so-called European security system. You might even suggest that both we and the Soviets stay in the background.

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NSC : HAK U+11CFIG
Box 67 Folder 5

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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August 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *HS*

SUBJECT: MBFR-CSCE

Ambassador Beam, as instructed, called on Kuznetsov to inquire whether the Soviets, in light of summit understanding of MBFR-CSCE parallelism, would be favorable to receipt of notes from Allied countries proposing to start exploratory talks on MBFR on or about November 22 (the date proposed by the Finns for CSCE).

Kuznetsov was negative, harping on the attempt to make CSCE conditional on the start of MBFR explorations:

-- He said that his government's view was that there must be no attempts to bind CSCE and force reductions as regards either preparatory talks or negotiation of substance.

-- He disputed our interpretation of summit understanding that parallel means about the same time.

-- He asserted our approach can only be interpreted as making preparatory CSCE talks conditional on beginning exploratory talks on force reductions. Such a linkage, the Soviet side decisively rejects.

Later in the conversation he did acknowledge that exploratory talks could take place in parallel with preparatory talks for CSCE, but they cannot be made a condition.

We thus are at a procedural impasse. The Soviets obviously want us to accept the Finnish invitation, unconditionally, after which they will study the MBFR issue. If we do that, we will rely on Soviet good faith in carrying out the summit discussion -- the interpretation of which they now dispute.

Technically, the Soviets may be correct. There is nowhere a commitment to begin exploratory talks at about the same time as CSCE. That this was

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the President's and your position is unmistakable in the meetings both before and during the summit. The Soviets did not reject it, and in discussing the communique with Gromyko he was clear on what parallelism meant.

How to proceed: we can (1) accept the CSCE date, and hope to badger the Soviets into MBFR; (2) send MBFR invitations and separately inform the Soviets that we will accept CSCE date in the 'near future' without conditions; and (3) stand fast, and continue discussions with the Soviets to nail down parallelism (this would probably be a subject for you in Moscow).

In your meeting with Dobrynin, you may want to:

- emphasize our impatience with Soviet nitpicking on MBFR-CSCE;
- explain that in agreeing to CSCE, we did so on the understanding that the Soviets would be receptive to MBFR overtures for a parallel start in separate forums; this enabled us to persuade the Allies not to merge MBFR and CSCE;
- if the Soviets now haggle over terms, then either MBFR will become a major CSCE topic, as many Allies desire, or CSCE will be postponed beyond November 22;
- all we really want is a positive sign that the Soviets will accept the start of MBFR explorations within a reasonable time -- whether there is a gap of several weeks between the start of CSCE and MBFR is not a matter of principle -- so that we can keep MBFR out of CSCE;
- once we have this assurance, we can accept the CSCE invitation from the Finns;
- we certainly would not have accepted CSCE talks in November if the Soviets had taken the position in Moscow that Kuznetsov did.

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MEMORANDUM

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August 25, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *HS*
SUBJECT: Relaunching MBFR

The problem of launching or relaunching MBFR explorations is not only an issue with the Soviets but, more immediately, within the Alliance. What the Soviets do not seem to appreciate is that the more they stall the greater the pressures in NATO (and even among neutrals and their own Warsaw Pact Allies) to put the entire MBFR issue into the CSCE.

We have been able to resist these pressures, with tacit French support, but only by having in the foreground some prospect for MBFR. Parallelism was essentially a procedural gambit to extract us from the moribund Brosio mission. (Of course, linkage also gives us leverage which the Soviets recognize.)

Now that Kuznetsov has cast doubt on parallelism, we are going to be under more pressure to (a) accept a CSCE invitation without reservation, and (b) agree that a declaration of principles on MBFR ought to be negotiated at CSCE. It is quite possible that the Soviets may acquiesce in an MBFR declaration with the intention of placing MBFR under the permanent security organ they have proposed as the outcome of CSCE. On balance, however, it would seem that the Soviets and the French should want to maintain maximum separation between CSCE and MBFR.

All of this simply means that we need from the Soviets, before your visit to Moscow, some sign that they will enter into MBFR exploration. This is the minimum necessary to allow us to go forward on CSCE and still keep the issues separate.

We also need an indication of Soviet timing and the modalities of the MBFR explorations.

-- Since the Soviets fear that MBFR will overshadow CSCE, they want it to be deferred until after CSCE is completely finished. A possible

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compromise, that should be acceptable to us, would be to start the MBFR explorations at a fairly low level either (a) in late October, before CSCE, or (b) in January when the CSCE preparatory talks will probably be finished, and before the first CSCE Ministerial session.

-- A problem is that, for domestic reasons, we cannot afford too long an interval between explorations and negotiations. Thus if the MBFR talks are delayed until January, we would probably need to start negotiations by no later than July 1973, so as not to conflict with the CSCE final phase of CSCE or with Brezhnev's return visit.

We have briefed the Allies on the Beam-Kuznetsov conversation and taken the line that the Soviet reply was preliminary, did not rule out parallelism, and that we should now wait for their considered reply. Ambassador Beam suggests that we temporarily ease up on parallelism, and make a straight proposal for an exploratory session in a given timeframe, without specific reference to CSCE, and indicate that the exploration would have a modest agenda.

All things considered, the following is a scenario that should satisfy the Soviets, our Allies and our own interests.

- MBFR explorations for about three weeks in January 1973.
- Agreement to maintain "contacts" afterward, through the US on the one hand, and the USSR on the other, or some "working group."
- Tentative agreement to reconvene around July 1973.

This leaves the question of French participation. There is no way to force the French to participate. They may be mollified by the above scenario, especially if we make a point of talking to them privately.

-- Frankly, we need the French in MBFR because they can be counted on to bring a healthy skepticism to the whole process, whether or not their forces are actually included in the agreement.

-- The French interest is in completing the CSCE, which they view more optimistically than we do, but which also strengthens their own lines to Moscow. They will do nothing to help us promote MBFR at this point.

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-- A compromise is to invite the French to associate themselves with the MBFR talks in a form of their choosing -- i. e., observer, technical expert, without commitment to a reduction of their forces.

The association of the French might be facilitated if we begin to downgrade the profile of the first MBFR talks. Since they are already designated as exploratory, we could, in talking to the Soviets and to our Allies, emphasize that we view them as convening at the level of experts, that is, no high-level US representative.

Finally, we need to stand fast on convening MBFR exploration at a site other than Helsinki, which is sure to be the permanent CSCE locale. This is our position in NATO, which is under strong attack, and if the Soviets want to separate MBFR and CSCE they should come out for separate sites, as they did in their conversations with the French.

In sum, to relaunch MBFR we need the following understanding:

-- As a minimum, a positive sounding reply from the Soviets to Beam's demarche; at least an indication that they are studying it, and, preferably, a stated willingness to receive invitations, and negotiate about the timing, participants and site.

-- If possible, a Soviet suggestion on timing -- either October, or not later than mid-January.

In turn, we would:

-- Accept the Finnish invitation to CSCE on November 22;

-- Send formal notes to the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the GDR, proposing to meet for explorations at Geneva, the timing to be negotiated, if the Soviets do not propose a time.


-- We and the Soviets would try to influence the French to attend in an "expert" capacity or as observer.

-- We could tell the French privately -- as you already did to Debre -- that we anticipate a long-drawn out technical discussion to which we feel they could make a sound contribution.

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt 

SUBJECT: (CSCE) Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe

This memorandum includes a review of CSCE, a talking paper for your use in Moscow (Tab A), and a longer analytical summary (Tab B).

I. Where We Stand

The Conference will begin its preparations about November 22 in Helsinki. More than thirty nations will appear. The time, place and agenda for the actual conference will be agreed. In the Soviet scenario the Foreign Ministers will then convene the actual conference, make speeches, commission working groups, and go home. The working groups will work out some sort of agreed statement on each topic, the heads of State will then convene, make more speeches, and ratify the results. They will go home, and perhaps some hapless committee will remain in permanent session until another conference is held.

The results are almost foreordained:

-- There will be a declaration of principles of European security and cooperation; it will be an amalgam of platitudes, but will confirm that no European state is going to challenge the status quo. It will imply, but certainly no more than imply, that the Brezhnev doctrine is illegitimate. It will renounce force, confirm territorial integrity, promise arms control, and greater contacts among people.

-- Some minimal restraints may be adopted on military movement, e. g. advance notification of maneuvers.

-- The West will press for freer movement of people and information. The East will parry with a general promise not to interfere with movement of people and information. This will be hailed as an important beginning. Nothing much will change.

-- Highly technical debates will occur in the economic subcommittees. All will pledge a greater effort to facilitate trade. Some practical improvements for Western businessmen may result.

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-- A grab bag of other issues -- cultural exchange, scientific cooperation, environmental protection, will be discussed and declarations issued. Nothing much will change.

This is by way of saying that the fact of the gathering probably far exceeds its substance.

From the Soviet view point, a long cherished objective will finally be realized when the conference convenes.

-- There will be an immediate upgrading of East Germany.

-- Boundaries in Europe will be confirmed, force renounced, and the spirit of detente advanced.

From the Western point of view some debating points may be scored; the Eastern bloc will be exposed as a closed society; the Brezhnev doctrine will be indirectly challenged, and, hopefully, a feckless exercise will be finished without serious splits in the Western camp or significant damage to real security.

II. The Issues

Some years ago a European Conference might have been a serious East-West debate or confrontation. Now, the key aspects of European security are being or have been handled independently through bilateral arrangements (Germany) or specialized forums (SALT, MBFR). The conference has been reduced to a symbolic act, more important for its psychological atmospherics than its content.

As a reflection of this change in the conference character, the West has no grand strategic options -- our approach is almost purely damage limiting, with some marginal positive goals in the realm of "freer movement." Moreover, we, the United States, do not have great tactical flexibility. The conference is of more immediate importance to our Allies than to us. In a coalition of 14, we can only lead so far, without dictating on issues that are of secondary importance to us.

The main issue for the United States, therefore, is one of Alliance management rather than East-West bargaining or debating:

-- We must come out of this exercise with a minimum of illusions and a maximum of Allied unity.

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-- This means being willing to defer to a European consensus in NATO.

-- It also means carefully resisting the natural temptation to cook the results of the conference with the Soviet Union, privately behind the backs of our friends. On some matters this might be justified but certainly not the miserable European Conference.

This perspective is justified if we consider what the Soviets see in the conference.

-- It may be that the Soviets have lost some of their original enthusiasm for this project -- since much of its substance is already subsumed in their bilateral dealing with us and with the Germans. But it is still important to their general European strategy.

-- They still want an atmosphere of political relaxation in the West that will erode any collective sense of concern over the predominant Soviet power position. They want to spin a web of overlapping interests in maintaining this relaxation for their own national aims: to prevent a growth of a strong, unified Western camp that can challenge the USSR in Eastern Europe, and to gain the time and political freedom to deal with the threat of communist China.

-- The European Conference, played out on a grand stage of foreign ministers conferences and meetings of heads of State will evoke images of the great 19th Century Congress of the concert of Europe, detente, and so forth. This imagery is irresistible to the Russian leaders, and if only for this reason they will pursue the conference with tenacity.

There are four main areas of substance in the conference:

- Principles Governing European States
- Military Confidence Building
- Freer Movement
- Economic Cooperation
- Post-conference Machinery

A. Principles

As the longer paper (Tab B) indicates there is considerable common ground in so far as the language of a declaration of principles is concerned.

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The real issue is one of conflicting political objectives. At the risk of overworking an old cliché, the Soviet objective is to confirm the results of WW II -- the inviolability of frontiers, the renunciation of force, territorial integrity -- in a document that has a binding legal status. Over the years, and especially in the last three years, the West has conceded most of the Soviet formula, mainly because West Germany, the potential revisionist power has adopted a strategy that builds on rather than challenges the status quo.

All that remains to be settled, and it is by no means an insignificant aspect, is the validity of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty, which the Soviets consider part of the status quo. In other words, the West is asked to concede spheres of influence by the device of agreeing to principles that do not in specific terms challenge the limited sovereignty doctrine.

It is the Western notion, however, that the declaration can lay some inhibitions on the practice of the doctrine. The tactical issue is how far the West can press this without jeopardizing the conference itself, which almost certainly the Western Europeans do not want to do.

-- For the US, the issue is whether, in light of our relations with the USSR, we want to appear as the leading advocate and champion of the anti-Brezhnev doctrine thrust, or begin now to retreat from any untenable positions.

B. Confidence Building -- Stabilizing Measures

Everyone agrees that a Conference on Security ought to deal with military problems. But in practice none of the major powers want to subject their military dispositions to the whims of 30 nations. Therefore, there is a sort of tacit understanding that military issues will be given an optical polish, but will not be negotiated.

The result is a Western scheme that calls for all countries to adopt certain very limited obligations (a) to announce in advance their maneuvers, and (b) to permit some observers at the maneuvers. The theory is that if all states renounce force they should take these measures as an earnest of good intentions.

The issue is whether the Soviet agree. Our intelligence suggest they may be willing to adopt something along the lines of confidence building measures. Certainly the East Europeans have an interest.

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The tactical issue for the US is not to allow this slight opening to be enlarged into a full scale negotiation on MBFR principles, which some Allies still want and which may appeal to neutrals as well.

C. Freer Movement

This may be the crunch. The underlying Western philosophy which we have subscribed to and promoted is that "liberalization" of the Eastern bloc is the only road to the reconciliation of Europe and that liberalization flourishes when exposed to the nourishing influence of Western societies. There is something to this theory. But we are not likely to trick the USSR into opening its doors to a free flow of people, in or out, or to an inundation of Western literature and broadcasts.

In fact, the Western approach is cynical. No one expects to achieve much, but in pursuing the issues the East is to be exposed as the obstacle to European "cooperation."

In sum, this takes on the character of psychological warfare and the issue, therefore, is whether the state of East-West relations justifies such an approach.

- Do we really want to "expose" the USSR, or one of its allies?
- Do we want to drive wedges between Romania and the USSR?
- Do we want to lay out broad schemes and ambitious projects, and then abandon them while pointing the finger of blame on the other side?

Our Allies are becoming very skeptical of this exercise and are leaning on us to scale down the terms. (We are the main supporters; through bureaucratic inertia we have not really re-examined this since 1969, when it might have been tactically justified as a measure to badger the Soviets.)

In short, we can achieve some very limited practical improvement in freer movement -- which might be feasible in light of the loosening up in Eastern Europe -- but not if our aim is polemics.

D. Economic Cooperation

The subject matter is too technical to develop any real basic issues but this is what is lacking -- an agreed Western philosophy. At this stage no one knows what would be the outcome of the economic issues. There is

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a justified suspicion that the Europeans want to use the conference to "legitimatize" the EC and the CEMA interlocutor and perhaps to make some concessions to the East, out of fear of new US competition in Eastern Europe and the USSR. In practice, the conference will be the first channel for some sort of dialogue (since the USSR is excluded or passive in all other European economic institutions).

Our interests are difficult to define. In NATO's preparatory work, we have taken the lead in a fairly tough position. However, we cannot oppose some cross fertilization between East and West institutions. We cannot oppose some reduction of barriers to trade. What we might oppose, should it develop, is a Europeanization of the issue that discriminates against the non-EC countries. In practice, however, we may be stimulating this trend by dealing bilaterally with Poland and Romania, and above all, by our prospective deals with the USSR.

What is needed now is a bureaucratic scrubbing down of the economic aspects of the CSCE so that some concept of our interests will emerge; nevertheless there does seem to be little chance that CSCE will make much progress.

E. Permanent Machinery

In their various European security proposals, the Soviets have always included some notion of a permanent body that would be established by the Conference and remain as a bridge to the next conference in "two or three years." They have blown hot and cold on their interest. Gromyko told the UK that the USSR had no "special interest" in such a body but one ought to be established. Some Eastern Europeans, however, have said that it is a prime objective.

Whatever the Soviet view of what or how the machinery would function, it seems clear that we and the Western Alliance have no interest in it. Once we thought it might have some value as another inhibition on the Brezhnev doctrine -- a sort of European Security Council, but this is far too ambitious. Now we hope to head off any such institution but the outlook is not at all clear -- many neutrals may join the Soviets on this one.

Our main concern is that we not participate in the creation of an illusory "system" of security which would be developed through periodic European Conferences and permanent machinery. The net result would be to dilute the value of the Alliance, and tempt some of our Allies and neutrals to build up the new mechanisms as an alternative to NATO.

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Procedures

There are two scenarios: ours and the Soviets.

-- We assume "careful preparations," and by this we mean that the substantive issues for the agenda be resolved beforehand at the preparatory level. The French and Soviets disagree and view the preparations as mostly procedural. The British are not enthusiastic about our approach on the grounds that they cannot preempt the position of their foreign minister!

-- Nevertheless, we do have Soviet agreement, in the US-Soviet communique, that the conference should be "carefully prepared."

-- After "careful preparations," the next step should be to convene the actual conference at the Foreign Minister level. Our concept is that this would be the last step that the Ministers would agree to the outcome of the conference. The French foresee two Ministerial level meetings, and the Soviet variation is for the last meeting to be at the heads of state level.

-- We are isolated on restricting the CSCE to one Ministerial level meeting: our choice is between another foreign minister meeting, or a summit gathering.

-- Finally, we have to decide, fairly soon, how to respond to the Finnish invitation for November 22, but we cannot accept the date until we have a firmer commitment to MBFR.

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TALKING POINTS
CSCE

PROBABLE SOVIET POSITION

The Soviets will probably make a presentation along the following lines:

-- The preparatory talks should begin on November 22 as the Finns have proposed.

-- This could be a brief phase to agree on an agenda, and the time and place for the actual conference. The Ministers will convene and turn the work over to subcommittees.

-- The agenda might be (1) political-security issues and (2) economic, technical, and scientific cooperation.

-- Under the security rubric there should be a document of legal and binding force, it should include renunciation of force, recognition of the inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs.

-- Military questions must remain separate (though some confidence building measures could be examined).

-- The Conference should conclude with a summit meeting and establish a permanent body.

-- The permanent body would provide a mechanism to implement the work of the conference, to allow members to remain in contact, and to prepare for another conference in two or three years.

(It is possible that the Soviets will hand over a document on security principles; they have hinted from time to time that they want to discuss it in advance of the conference.)

YOUR POSITION

(Since this is their project and initiative, you do not have to take the lead in discussing substance. Indeed, there is not much to discuss, except in a very general way.)

Procedures

(If there is not agreement on November 22 in Helsinki, it will be because we have not obtained satisfaction on a parallelism with MBFR. While we

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have stopped short of making this a precondition, we cannot afford to agree to the time and place for CSCE preparations, if the MBFR is not pinned down.)

-- We regard MBFR-CSCE as a summit understanding that the two will begin in parallel, but separately.

-- Thereafter each project will follow its own logic and timing. As a practical matter, MBFR will go on well after the CSCE. The preparatory phase for CSCE may run longer than the Soviets anticipate: we want to make the most careful preparations, examine all the agenda items, and narrow differences on substance, before the Ministers meet.

-- We have to have some idea of what the conference would accomplish before actually convening it, especially in view of the participation of 34 foreign ministers.

-- In terms of documents that might be agreed to, it would be useful to see any Soviet drafts well in advance.

Security Principles

-- We have examined rather closely the Warsaw Pact statements, the NATO documentation, and the various bilateral agreements.

-- There is a great deal of common ground.

-- None of the differences seem to be of a principled nature.

-- As a practical matter, of course, we must defer to our Allies, especially since there is feeling in our Alliance that the United States and the Soviet Union have preempted the work of the conference by agreeing to the Soviet-American Basic Principles.

-- A European consensus is particularly important on the border questions; the US has no territorial claims or disputes in Europe; we can accept that the existing borders are permanent, but we cannot do so in defiance or on behalf of the countries who are concerned.

-- Respect for territorial integrity is an acceptable formulation.

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On the issues of renunciation of force, we have agreed in the Soviet-American principles:

-- In the CSCE we should be prepared to take a small step forward.

-- If all the participating states renounce the threat or use of force, then to provide tangible evidence of such obligation we could do two things in the military field: (a) agree to announce major maneuvers in advance, and (b) agree on an exchange of observers at such maneuvers. This would be confidence building, and provide an earnest of good intentions.

-- We would not propose to deal with any other military aspects in CSCE.

-- On all the other issues, we foresee no major areas of disagreement, though the experts will have to look at the technical subjects -- cultural, exchange, environmental cooperation.

Freer Movement

There is one issue that should be raised in advance at this meeting.

-- Without going into the reasons, it is a fact of life that contacts among Europeans have not flourished in the post-war period.

-- Since we are going to meet on issues of both security and "cooperation," we think it worthwhile to consider what practical measures might be adopted to increase contacts among people and to increase the flow of information exchange.

-- We are aware that there are problems and sensitivities in these questions, and we have no desire to begin polemics or ideological debates.

-- The USSR could think this over and perhaps suggest in advance how this interest of the Western countries might be dealt with.

Finally,

we cannot at this time make a commitment that the final meetings would be a summit.

-- We could not commit the President at this time.

-- Basically we want to proceed with each step, and examine where the conference is heading.

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IN CONCLUSION

-- We have been skeptical of the value of a conference.

-- Our view has been that most of the key issues have been dealt with in other forums -- bilaterally in the German treaty, the Berlin agreements, in SALT, and in separate MBFR talks.

-- So the conference now appears to us to be more or less symbolic.

-- As you know, our attitude is not to engage in projects that have as their main purposes creating a better atmosphere.

-- We hope, therefore, that the conference can deal with some practical measures -- we have mentioned two (confidence building in military exchanges and free flow of people) and in this way we can, as we did at the summit demonstrate that we are laying a foundation for improving relations in Europe.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

INFORMATION
September 5, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *HS*

SUBJECT: CSCE and MBFR

Attached are background and talking points on CSCE (Tab A) and MBFR (Tab B) for your meetings in Munich.

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The West German government mortgaged its freedom of action on this project a year ago in the Brandt-Brezhnev meeting in the Crimea. At that time, Brandt agreed that the preparations for the Conference should be "accelerated," and since then the Germans have been committed to a Conference without conditions other than the final signing of the Berlin agreements.

The Germans apparently regard the CSCE as an installment payment for their own treaties. But beyond this Brandt (and Bahr) have no objection to the project since it is consistent with their general theory that the status quo must be confirmed if it is to be changed. Accordingly, the Germans are not in the vanguard of those Allies who advocate tough positions in the Conference. They are wary of "freer movement," for example, and wish it to be subsumed under cultural relations. They also, realistically, doubt that the Brezhnev doctrine can be attacked or repudiated in the atmosphere that is likely to characterize the CSCE.

On procedural matters the Germans are committed to the two Ministerial meetings; the US, until now, has preferred only one meeting at the Foreign Ministers level, but State is now prepared to give way to the Allied consensus.

The Germans were also committed to Helsinki long ago, though they are apprehensive that the Finns will recognize the East Germans which undermines the value of Helsinki, where the East Germans would not have been represented by an ambassador.

Brandt, Scheel, et al, will probably not want to waste time in discussing the details, but would appreciate your views of how CSCE fits into the general East-West relationship, and, more specifically, how we see it in connection with MBFR.

Your Talking Points

You may wish to emphasize for Brandt's and Bahr's benefit our continuing skepticism about CSCE and what it is intended to accomplish.

-- In particular, we are apprehensive that it will be pure atmospherics, without substance, unless the Allies are united in their determination to resist the blandishments of the Soviets supported by neutrals and East European

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-- We will be ready for lengthy discussion at the preparatory meeting in order to be sure that we know where the Conference is heading before the Ministers meet.

-- We can defer to the Allies on the question of one or two Ministerial meetings -- although we must be careful not to fall in with the Soviet idea of a summit level meeting at the end of the Conference.

-- We are still strongly committed to separation of MBFR and CSCE, even if MBFR is stalled; under no circumstances should the Allies subject their force levels or composition to the whims of a 34 nation Conference; MBFR is difficult enough without high-sounding platitudes emanating from a European Conference.

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EYES ONLY FOR DR KISSINGER FROM AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND

FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED TEXT OF TELEGRAM REPORTING THAT PORTION OF YOUR CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR BRANDT AT WHICH I WAS PRESENT. BEGIN TEXT.

1. IN A CONVERSATION ON SEPTEMBER 10 LASTING MORE THAN AN HOUR AT BRANDT'S VILLA IN FELDAFING OUTSIDE OF MUNICH, THE CHANCELLOR AND DR. KISSINGER RANGED OVER A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS OF CURRENT INTEREST. EXCEPT DURING THE LAST TWENTY MINUTES WHICH WERE PRIVATE, STATE SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND WERE ALSO PRESENT.
2. AFTER DR. KISSINGER HAD CONVEYED TO THE CHANCELLOR THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE ON THE TRAGIC EVENTS IN MUNICH OF LAST WEEK, BRANDT SAID HE FEARED WE WERE ONLY AT THE BEGINNING OF A PERIOD OF TROUBLE. THE GERMAN AUTHORITIES WERE DAILY RECEIVING FURTHER THREATS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AIMED AT THE RELEASE OF THE THREE ARAB PRISONERS. HE FEARED THAT A STRONG WAVE OF ANTI-ARAB FEELING WOULD SWEEP THROUGH THE GERMAN POPULATION AND MAKE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT A MODERATE POLICY TOWARDS THE ARAB COUNTRIES. HE WONDERED WHETHER THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD NOT BE SEIZED WITH A PROPOSAL FOR A CONVENTION AGAINST TERRORISM WHICH WOULD, OF COURSE, AVOID MENTION OF SPECIFIC COUNTRIES. DR. KISSINGER COMMENTED THAT ON THURSDAY THE US HAD CONSIDERED TAKING THE MATTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, PARTLY TO AVOID AN ISRAELI OVER-REACTION, BUT BECAUSE THE CHINESE WERE IN THE CHAIR AND FOR OTHER TACTICAL REASONS WE HAD DECIDED AGAINST SUCH ACTION. IN PRINCIPLE, WE ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF A UN ROLE AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO BE IN CONTACT WITH THE GERMANS ON THIS.
3. TURNING TO THE SITUATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, BRANDT NOTED THAT HE HAD SEEN BOTH HEATH AND POMPIDOU IN RECENT DAYS. HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE A SUMMIT MEETING IN OCTOBER BUT HE COULD NOT BE SURE SINCE HE WAS STILL NOT CERTAIN WHAT POMPIDOU ACTUALLY WANTED. IT WAS TACITLY AGREED WITH THE FRENCH AND THE BRITISH THAT THE MEETING OF COMMUNITY FOREIGN MINISTERS IN ROME THIS WEEK SHOULD DECIDE. HE HAD TELEPHONED HEATH EARLIER IN THE DAY TO EMPHASIZE THE POINT THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD NOT LEAVE ROME WITHOUT ACHIEVING CLARITY ON WHETHER OR NOT THERE WOULD BE A SUMMIT IN OCTOBER. HE HAD MADE CLEAR TO BOTH POMPIDOU AND HEATH THAT HE COULD ACCEPT A POSTPONEMENT OF THE SUMMIT EVEN UNTIL THE SPRING IF THAT WERE NECESSARY, BUT HE THOUGHT SUCH DELAY WOULD BE BAD PARTICULARLY IN TERMS OF THE NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE NORWEGIAN AND DANISH PLEBISCITES ON COMMON MARKET ENTRY.

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AS FAR AS THE FRENCH POSITION WAS CONCERNED, BRANDT CONTINUED, WHILE POMPIDOU HAD PREVIOUSLY MADE A MAJOR PERSONAL ISSUE OUT OF THE LOCATION OF THE POLITICAL SECRETARIAT IN PARIS, HE HAD AGREED IN MUNICH TO HAVE THE WHOLE ISSUE SET ASIDE FOR THE TIME BEING. THE GERMANS COULD LIVE WITHOUT A POLITICAL SECRETARIAT AT THIS TIME, ESPECIALLY IF THIS WERE NECESSARY TO AVOID A DEADLOCK PRIOR TO OR AT THE SUMMIT. ON THE EEC-US RELATIONSHIP, HE THOUGHT THE MOST RECENT POMPIDOU FORMULATION WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. IT WOULD PERMIT A REASONABLE DIALOGUE BUT IN THE FRENCH VIEW WOULD AVOID WHAT THEY SAID SOME GERMANS LIKE ERHARD SEEMED TO WANT - THAT THE UNITED STATES RULE THE COMMON MARKET.

5. BRANDT WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE GERMAN POSITION WAS NOT INFLEXIBLE ON THE EUROPEAN FUND FOR MONETARY COOPERATION. HE COULD NOT ACCEPT, HOWEVER, AN ISOLATED INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF GOLD. UNLIKE SCHUMANN, WHO HAD TAKEN A VERY HARD LINE IN FAVOR OF SUCH AN INCREASE DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO BONN, POMPIDOU HAD BEEN MUCH MORE REASONABLE AND SEEMED TO AGREE THAT THIS SUBJECT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF GENERAL REFORM OF THE MONETARY SYSTEM. THE GERMANS WOULD COOPERATE, BRANDT NOTED, IN DEALING WITH THE SPECIFIC ITALIAN PROBLEM. HE AND POMPIDOU HAD AGREED THAT THE ITALIANS SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO SELL THEIR GOLD AT THE CURRENT LOW PRICE. ALL IN ALL, BRANDT CONCLUDED, A MAJOR FACTOR STILL DETERMINING THE FRENCH ATTITUDE IN THESE COMMON MARKET MATTERS WAS THE SHOCK OF THE FRENCH REFERENDUM WHICH HAD SERIOUSLY ERODED POMPIDOU'S PERSONAL PRESTIGE.

6. IN RESPONSE TO THE CHANCELLOR'S QUESTION ABOUT US VIEWS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CSCE AND MBFR, DR. KISSINGER SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT IN MOSCOW BUT THAT THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE WOULD REMAIN UNCHANGED. THE LANGUAGE ON PARALLELISM IN THE MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE EXPRESSED OUR POLICIES. MBFR IS THE MAIN CONCRETE SUBJECT PERTAINING TO SECURITY STILL TO BE DISCUSSED AND WE WANTED TO HOLD TO THE PARALLELISM APPROACH. IN HIS MOSCOW TALKS HE WOULD NOT GO BEYOND NATO-AGREED POSITIONS. WE WERE NOT NEGOTIATING BILATERALLY ON THIS SUBJECT WITH THE SOVIETS. AS A MATTER OF FACT, WE HAD NOT YET ARRIVED AT A FINAL US POSITION AND OUR OWN INTERNAL PLANNING CONTINUED. WE HOPED TO PRESENT A PAPER TO NATO WITHIN FOUR TO SIX WEEKS CONTAINING A PREFERRED PROPOSAL TO BE MADE TO THE SOVIETS. BRANDT SAID HE SUPPORTED THE PRINCIPLE OF PARALLELISM BUT NOT, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, TO THE POINT OF MAKING MBFR TALKS AN ABSOLUTE PREREQUISITE FOR THE OPENING OF MULTILATERAL PREPARATIONS IN HELSINKI. PARALLELISM TO HIM MEANT BEGINNING AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME, NOT NECESSARILY THE SAME DATE.

7. REPORTING ON HIS RECENT LIGHTNING TRIP TO EAST BERLIN, EGON BAHR SAID HE HAD UNDERTAKEN IT TO HEAD OFF AN EAST GERMAN INITIATIVE TO SEEK OBSERVER STATUS IN THE UN. DR. KISSINGER NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID IN MOSCOW THAT IN THIS AREA WE WOULD FOLLOW THE LEAD OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. BRANDT OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIETS TELL THE GERMANS THIS IMPLIES THAT THERE IS NO REAL US OBJECTION TO UN MEMBERSHIP FOR THE GDR. DR. KISSINGER POINTED OUT THAT FOR US TO HAVE SAID OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE CAUSED THE SOVIETS TO APPLY EVEN HEAVIER PRESSURE ON THE FRG.

8. FINALLY, IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE FRG'S CHINA POLICY, BRANDT SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD MOVE AHEAD TOWARDS ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS. THERE WERE NO MAJOR PROBLEMS. FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL WOULD TRAVEL TO THE PRC ENROUTE BACK TO THE FRG FROM HIS BRIEF VISIT TO NEW YORK IN OCTOBER FOR THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION. GDS

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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December 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks
at Helsinki

Opening statements by MPT participants were concluded on December 5. Soviet emphasis on "practical matters" (place, date, participation, organizational aspects and agenda for CSCE) contrasted sharply with Western emphasis on substantive questions. The Romanians continue to adopt a strongly independent position. The negotiators at Helsinki will now approach the possibly difficult question of the further MPT work program and also CSCE procedures. The talks will recess on December 15 and resume January 15.

1. Order of Business: In discussions to date, the USSR, supported by other Warsaw Pact countries minus Romania, proposed that MPT decide CSCE venue, date, participation, agenda, organization and procedures, in that order. The NATO allies, supported by Romania and some neutrals, expressed preference for substantive discussions on the CSCE agenda first, including drafting of terms of reference for committees that would undertake further detailed preparations under each agreed agenda topic. However, the Soviets, most Warsaw Pact states, and France will now press strongly for early agreement on the three-phase CSCE format, and many Allied and other participants will probably go along in order to achieve some "concrete" results on MPT prior to the Christmas recess (see below).

2. Procedures: Every delegation which expressed a view on this endorsed the three-stage formula: i.e., initial ministerial; further preparations in committees; final high-level meeting (most prefer this to be at foreign minister level, but the Warsaw Pact countries want a summit meeting). In view of the strong majority preference for this three-stage formula, the US delegation accepted it as a "working hypothesis." The Secretary indicated this position to Sir Alec Douglas-Home in their conversation on December 6 (USNATO 5292).

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3. CSCE-MBFR Linkage: Difficulties are clearly in store on this question, judging from comments by some NATO and nonaligned representatives, but likely will not arise before the holiday recess. A wide divergence of views ranged from endorsement of parallel but separate talks on CSCE and MBFR to support for a close link between the talks and the inclusion of MBFR principles in CSCE.

4. Permanent machinery: The Warsaw Pact states continued to assert this should be a separate agenda item, with support from a few others. The Swiss proposal for arbitration machinery also got scattered support.

5. Upcoming Issues: The question of procedures for CSCE will likely come to the fore this week, as senior advisers return from the NATO Ministerial and neutral and Eastern countries press the issue as a point on which all MPT participants could reach rapid agreement. Discussions will also take up the MPT work program.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

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