January 14, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Issues Paper on CSCE

Attached is an issues paper for the Secretary's use in briefing the President on CSCE.

For the Secretary's further information, there are also attached:

-- a basic background paper on CSCE prepared for the Secretary's use in briefing the President last August; and

-- a more detailed memorandum recently sent to the Secretary on the current state of play in CSCE.

George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
1. Issues Paper on CSCE.
2. Background Paper on CSCE.
3. Memorandum on Current State of Play in CSCE.
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

I. Background

CSCE, a Soviet initiative, is seen by Moscow principally as a way to furnish in a summit-level final gathering Western insistence on the territorial and political status quo in Eastern Europe, including the division of Germany. The Soviets also view CSCE as a vehicle for promoting a general sense of detente euphoria, especially among our European Allies.

For their part, our Allies were attracted to CSCE because of the visible role it offered them in multilateral East-West negotiations. At the same time, they sought, through CSCE, to promote the freer exchange of peoples, ideas and information, including tangible gains, for example, with regard to the reunification of families, access in the East to Western publications and improved working conditions for journalists in Eastern Europe.

The Allies also have sought to obtain agreement on military confidence-building measures (CBM's) like prior notification of major maneuvers and troop movements (neither the Soviets nor we favor the latter).

Europe's neutral states generally have joined in support of Allied objectives, and in some cases have been even more demanding.

The conference, which includes the US, Canada and all except the smallest European states, began in December 1973, with preparatory talks in Helsinki which reached agreement on the following agenda items:

1. Principles guiding interstate relations and CBM's.
2. Cooperation -- economic, scientific/technical and environmental.
3. Humanitarian cooperation (freer movement of peoples, ideas and information).

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Stage 1 of the conference itself opened in Helsinki in July 1973 with a meeting of foreign ministers to approve the above agenda and the related "mandates" for the official-level, detailed negotiations of stage 2 that opened in Geneva in September 1973, recessed last July, and will resume September 2.

Based on progress to date, the Soviets appear likely eventually to meet their objective of obtaining from CSCE an agreement on a declaration of principles of relations among states, including the principle of frontiers inviolability, and connoting multilateral endorsement of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties. While this declaration would not be legally binding and would not constitute formal US recognition of post-World War II border changes, the Soviets want to give it maximum political and moral force by having it signed at a summit-level concluding stage of CSCE. At the same time, however, the FRG has had a particular interest in seeing that the principles declaration cannot be read as sealing forever the division of Germany. To meet this concern, the Allies have sought and won, with US support, Soviet agreement in principle to language leaving open the possibility of peaceful border changes.

As CSCE has progressed, however, serious differences emerged between the Soviets and the Allies on freer movement, with some of the latter insisting on very significant liberalization of Eastern European practices with regard to such issues as emigration and public access to information. In order to increase their bargaining leverage on freer movement issues and CBM's, the Allies consequently have dragged their heels on other aspects of CSCE, including the principles declaration, any commitment to a summit-level CSCE conclusion or to post-conference permanent machinery.

As Allied demands persisted, the Soviets increasingly have looked to us to aid in abating Allied accusations for far-reaching Eastern concessions, and the Allies at the same time have sought our support for their demands. Since neither side, as yet, has significantly altered its positions, the conference had bogged down prior to the summer recess.
II. Prospects

When negotiations resume September 2, the Soviets will doubtless continue to press for a rapid conclusion at summit level, while offering only minimal concessions on freer movement and CEM's. However, the cooperation issues (item 2) can probably be wrapped up without much difficulty. Moreover, we anticipate few further difficulties on the principles of interstate relations (item 1), though the Allies will withhold final agreement to retain negotiating leverage on other issues.

The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies will seek also CSCE agreement to establish a permanent organization to meet periodically for further discussions of European security and cooperation. Such machinery is doubtless viewed by the Soviets as a way station toward an "all-European" security system that would ultimately replace NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It is likely that the Allies will agree to some form of conference follow-on, but they will not be inclined to reach any firm decisions until there is further progress on freer movement and CEM's.

Our current expectation is that the talks will spin out at least until Christmas and likely beyond.

III. Issues and Choices

We have never seen much to be gained for ourselves in CSCE and attach less importance than do our Allies to Soviet concessions on freer movement and CEM's. At the same time, having acceded to Allied wishes to participate, we have tried to get-CSCE concluded expeditiously, have avoided breaking ranks with our Allies over CSCE issues and have suggested that the Allies consult in NATO to agree as soon as possible on a realistic minimum acceptable CSCE outcome.

We have told the Soviets we are making this effort to narrow the range of Allied desiderata. However, our Allies have been reluctant to define goals in detail, fearing that this would establish fall-back positions that would leak to the Soviets.
Intense Soviet interest in CSCE continues, nonetheless, to offer possibilities for leverage in connection with other East-West negotiations, and serves as an incentive for the Soviets to continue on a restrained course in international relations. For this reason, we have held open the prospect of a summit-level conclusion.

The Soviets, for their part, probably will keep stalling on HEP until CSCE is concluded. We will thus wish to weigh carefully the tactics we pursue in CSCE against the background of the full range of our relations with the USSR.

IV. Next Steps

We intend to seek Allied agreement on the minimum CSCE results warranting a summit finale, while maintaining a bilateral dialogue as appropriate with the Soviets. We ourselves are not pressing for a summit gathering, but we believe a meeting at that level will be practically a foregone conclusion, once substantive disagreements have been ironed out in Geneva. We should therefore plan for a possible summit, in Helsinki, perhaps next spring.

We also will wish to consider, at an appropriate time, plans for informing the Congress and US public opinion on the likelihood of a CSCE summit.

Drafted: EUR/RPM: EJStreator: ACFloyd: gp
x21626: 8/27/74
Concur: EUR - Mr. Lowenstein
C - Mr. Sonnenfeldt
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S

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To: The Secretary
Through: C - Mr. Sonnenfeldt
From: EUR - Arthur A. Hartman

CSCE: State of Play and Next Steps

Against the background of the current state of CSCE stage II negotiations, this memorandum describes the scenario we propose to follow as the conference moves toward conclusion.

State of Play

Good progress was recorded on basket 3 before the Christmas break; and, assuming the Soviets hold to their posture of pressing actively for agreements while showing some flexibility, basket 3 issues could be wound up completely by the Easter recess in late March. However, the conference has yet to come to grips with two remaining difficult issues -- audio visual information (the radio jamming question); and the French proposal on libraries/reading rooms. On these and other basket 3 issues, the Allies will be negotiating on the basis of more realistic texts, as you proposed at the Ottawa NATO Ministerial meeting. Moreover, apart from hard-nosed delegations like the Dutch and Italians, the other Allies have not insisted on language that Moscow clearly could not accept.

With respect to the principles declaration and related issues in basket 1, considerable work remains. While the negotiators have completed a first reading of seven of the ten principles, and reached virtual

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agreement on the eighth (self-determination), they have not yet begun to draft the preambular and concluding clauses of the declaration. Moreover, after completion of the first reading of the paragraphs covering the ten principles themselves, a second reading will be required to eliminate a tangle of bracketed language reflecting issues left unresolved during the first reading. We doubt all of this can be accomplished before the Easter break likely to begin about March 20.

There also remain the following important, unresolved substantive issues in Basket I:

--- the peaceful change of frontiers question, where we will need to be in touch with the Soviets to discuss language we have agreed with Bonn;

--- the clause reserving quadripartite rights in Germany and Berlin (language has been agreed among the Four Powers and the FRG but may be challenged by some of the smaller countries);

--- the matter of the "equal value" and "interrelationship" of the principles; and

--- the Romanian non-use of force proposal (which may become a separate conference document or may be merged with the principles declaration), where Soviet-Romanian differences blocked agreement just before the Christmas break.

On the Romanian proposal, our delegation actively pressed to the satisfaction of the Romanians for completion of drafting on the key third paragraph prohibiting entry of "armed forces" on the territory of other states without their consent. The only remaining difference on this language pits the Soviets against the Romanians; for doctrinal reasons not entirely clear to us, Moscow insists that the language enjoin the use of "military force" rather than "armed forces" against another state.

Work on military security issues in Basket I has lagged because the Soviets failed to respond to repeated
signals of Allied flexibility on the major parameters
governing preannouncement of maneuvers (threshold for
notification; amount of advance notification; and
extent of Soviet territory to be covered). Our Allies
and the neutrals also insist that the conference
should deal with major troop movements, while the
Soviets want to remand that issue for further study
to a CSCE follow-up body. Finally, the neutrals
(especially Yugoslavia), with strong support from
Romania and some sympathy among the Allies, want some
recognition of the right of CSCE participants to be
kept informed about disarmament negotiations affecting
their interests -- i.e., MBFR.

In basket 2 (cooperation issues), the drafting
work on most topics has nearly been completed, though
we expect further tough wrangling, and eventual compro-
mises on doctrinal points relating to trade policy.

On conference follow-up, basket 4, drafting has
begun on noncontroversial preambular paragraphs but
has not yet addressed major substantive points. We
are requesting by separate memorandum your guidance
on this issue.

Meanwhile, we will be working with our Allies and
others to obtain an explicit understanding that all
will consider agreed CSCE texts as political documents,
not juridically binding instruments.

After completing the drafting on the four agenda
items, and on the separate Mediterranean declaration,
the conferees will then have to decide the form of the
final document(s), verify for conformity the six offi-
cial language versions, and agree on a date and on
detailed procedures for stage III. We estimate that
these issues will take at least a month to settle and
that CSCE will not address them until after the Easter
break, which is likely to end about April 15.

Timing of Stage II and Stage III

In light of our preference for a stage III finale
in late June or July, we should strive to wrap up
stage II by May or early June (the Finns will need about a month after the end of stage II to make preparations for stage III). An earlier conclusion of stage II would not be in our interests since there will be considerable pressure, especially from the Eastern side, to hold stage III as soon as feasible after the end of the Geneva talks, and we would not wish stage III to coincide with the May 8 anniversary of the end of World War II.

Assuming no shift in the attitudes of the Soviets and the major Western European participants, it should be possible to meet the timetable set out above, though some "sleepers" issues, described below, could involve protracted wrangling as stage II draws to its conclusion. As indicated above, the Geneva negotiations should make considerable progress between January 20, when the talks resume, and March 20 when they will likely break for the Easter holidays, but a good deal of work will be left over for the post-Easter session.

Thus, to meet our preferred schedule, we believe it will be sufficient to hold essentially, in Geneva, to our previous posture of encouraging a timely conclusion of stage II, while giving quiet support to Allied positions on most of the substantive issues that they consider important. We will, of course, need to reassess our position periodically in light of developments in Geneva and elsewhere.

In addition, we should give early consideration to arranging for a NATO summit to precede the likely CSCE stage III summit. We could use the already scheduled February 7 NAC consultations on CSCE to surface this matter with all of the Allies, but it would be preferable to consult bilaterally in selected capitals before raising the issue in the NAC. A separate memorandum will outline a suggested scenario and request your guidance.

Possible Problem Issues

Several issues, peripheral to the concerns of most but of prime importance to one or several small and middle powers, could delay the progress of stage II
negotiations. When agreement comes within sight on the central CSCE issues -- and especially if the Soviet and some larger Western delegations seem anxious to wrap up stage II in a hurry -- delegations with special causes to plead may conclude that their bargaining leverage has increased. The more determined among them might then decide to block consensus as a means of forcing the conference majority to give them some satisfaction.

The most troublesome issues in this category likely will be the Maltese proposal for a European-Arab federation and a post-CSCE standing committee to monitor progress in that direction; a series of military security proposals (the movements CBM; MBFR oversight; military self-restraint; and preannouncements of separate naval and air maneuvers); and the Cyprus dispute. The individual delegations most likely to use the consensus-blocking tactic to force concessions on one or more of the above issues are perhaps Malta, Yugoslavia, Greece and Romania. These delegations would not stand entirely alone and could count on at least nominal support from several others, depending on the specific issue.

If any of these issues, described in more detail below, should threaten to delay conclusion of stage II beyond our late May-early June target date, we will seek your specific guidance.

The Maltese Proposal. Malta has proposed that the European states should move toward a federation with Arab and Persian Gulf countries. The political weight of this grouping would match that of the two superpowers, who would in due course be invited to remove their fleets from the Mediterranean. CSCE should establish a permanent committee to monitor progress toward this European-Arab federation. Presumably Mintoff personally authored this proposal.

The Maltese proposal is so absurd our assumption is that Mintoff does not take it seriously but hopes to use it to get something else: some form of regularized exchange or views between any CSCE follow-up
bodies and the nonparticipating Mediterranean states
(NPMS); and/or the presence of NPMS’ representatives
at stage III. Bearing in mind Maltese stubbornness
during the last days of the Helsinki MEP and Mintoff’s
temper tantrum during the CSCE stage I ministerial,
we expect the Maltese will threaten to refuse consensus
in stage II until they get some satisfaction.

If Malta stood entirely alone, it might be possible
to work around the problem and, as a last resort,
to convene stage III without the Maltese. However,
many of the smaller participants, aware of the added
negotiating weight the unanimity principle provides
them, would block any moves to carry on without the
Maltese. We have spoken out against the Maltese pro-
posal ourselves in CSCE and will continue to urge our
Allies and others to take a firm stand against it.

Military Security Issues. All the neutrals and
Romania would like to broaden the content of the CSCE
military security text well beyond what we and the
Soviets regard as acceptable. On the issue of a
movements CBM, they are, of course, joined by most
of our Allies. The neutrals and Romania also want
language that would have the MBFR “forum” inform
CSCE participants of the status of the negotiations
and receive and “take into account” the views of non-
participants. The Yugoslavs especially seem firmly
wedded to this proposal. Their basic concern is to
prevent redeployment of withdrawn Soviet forces into
Hungary. While acknowledging that they could use bi-
lateral channels, both to keep informed on the state
of play in Vienna and to make their concerns known,
the Yugoslav CSCE delegation insists that formal CSCE
acknowledgement of their right to be kept informed on
a multilateral basis and to state their views is a
matter of cardinal interest to them. In addition,
the Yugoslavs, Romanians and others want operative
language pledging CSCE participants to the exercise
of “self-restraint” in the military field, and finally,
Malta, Cyprus, and Spain, with broad neutral and some
Allied support, insist on preannouncement of separate
naval and air maneuvers.
We doubt that the delegations named above will allow themselves to be pushed back, without a long struggle, to the preferred US (and Soviet) positions on all of the military security issues mentioned above, although we cannot now predict where they will make their last stand or precisely what concessions would appease them.

The Cyprus Issue. The Greeks have said, both in the CSCE Coordinating Committee and in NAC sessions in Brussels, that they would block consensus in stage II unless there is some movement toward a solution of the Cyprus question. While the Greeks may continue to threaten such a step, we doubt they would actually take it unless there is renewed conflict on Cyprus or a serious deterioration of the situation on the island. The Cypriot delegation has also threatened to block stage II consensus but generally lets the Greeks take the lead on this issue.

Even short of a Greek/Cypriot move to block consensus, the Cyprus problem will continue to complicate the Geneva negotiations. The Greeks, for example, may insist on unacceptable amendments to the Romanian non-use of force proposal or to portions of the principles declaration treating such concepts as sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention. Each of these problems will have to be dealt with as it arises. If any of them assumes major proportions, we will wish to consider urging restraint on the Greeks, in concert perhaps with selected West European Allies.

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x21626:1/10/75
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Resumption of CSCE Negotiations

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will resume in Geneva on January 20. Because the Soviet Union wishes to conclude Stage II of the Conference and proceed to the third stage (the heads of government summit), the upcoming session should produce progress toward resolution of still outstanding issues. The paragraphs below discuss the timing of a CSCE summit, the current status of the negotiations and key issues remaining, the prospects for the next session and the U.S. negotiating position.

Background

In brief, CSCE is seen by Moscow principally as a way to confirm, in a summit-level final gathering, Western acceptance of the territorial and political status quo in Europe, including the division of Germany. Our Allies, for their part, have sought in CSCE a visible role in multilateral East-West negotiations, as well as the possibility of promoting freer exchange of peoples, ideas, and information and of obtaining agreement on limited military confidence-building measures (CBMs) like prior notification of major maneuvers. The European neutrals generally support Allied objectives, and in some cases have been even more demanding.

Possible CSCE and Western Summit Meetings

We want the concluding CSCE stage III meeting, likely to be at summit level, to be set for late June or July -- not in May, a date the Soviets likely prefer because it would coincide with the 30th anniversary of V-E Day. To meet our preferred timetable, stage II negotiations in Geneva should conclude by late May or early June, giving the Finns a month to prepare for the Helsinki finale, which we expect to be a largely ceremonial, three-or-four-day session where heads of government will make formal statements and sign CSCE final documents.

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While these documents will not constitute legally binding instruments, their signature by 35 heads of government could be misconstrued by Western public opinion as marking a profound change in East-West relations. To redress the balance in the public mind, we have been exploring informally with key Allies the possibility of a NATO heads of government meeting just before the CSCE summit.

**Current Status of the Geneva Negotiations**

When the stage II talks recessed for Christmas, progress on the four "baskets" was uneven. There was encouraging movement in basket III (humanitarian cooperation), including agreement on a text covering family reunification. If the Soviets hold to their posture of pressing actively for agreement while showing some flexibility, basket III issues could be wound up completely by the Easter recess in late March. However, the conference has not yet addressed two particularly contentious issues: the radio jamming question and the French proposal on libraries reading rooms.

With respect to the principles declaration in basket I, to which Moscow attaches primary importance, considerable drafting work remains, as well as several sensitive and unresolved substantive issues, including the language on peaceful change of frontiers which we have agreed, at the request of the FRG, to try to work out with the Soviets. Work on confidence-building measures (CBMS) has lagged because the Soviets have failed to respond to repeated signals of Allied flexibility with regard to the terms of prior announcement of maneuvers (level of forces whose movements would be notified; time of advanced notification; and the extent of Soviet territory to be covered).

Drafting has nearly been completed in basket II (cooperation issues), but on the question of conference follow-up (basket IV) the conference has not addressed the major substantive difference between those (Warsaw Pact states, neutrals and some Allies) who want the conference to agree to a regular system of post-CSCE consultations, and those Allies, including ourselves, who prefer to re-examine the decision on institutional follow-up to a meeting of senior officials to be held after a two-year, post-CSCE probationary period.

**Stage II Prospects**

Assuming no shift in the attitudes of the Soviets and the major Western Europeans participants, we expect the Geneva negotiations to make
considerable progress between January 20 -- when the talks resume -- and March 20 when they will likely break for the Easter holidays. After Easter, in addition to final drafting on the four main agenda items, and perhaps also on the separate Mediterranean declaration, CSCE will have to decide the form of the final document(s), verify for conformity the six official language versions, and agree on a date and on detailed procedures for stage III. These issues will take, we believe, at least a month to settle.

U.S. Position

To meet our preferred schedule for the conclusion of stage II (late May, early June), we believe it will be sufficient to hold essentially to our previous posture of encouraging a timely conclusion of stage II while giving quiet support to Allied positions on most of the substantive issues that they consider important. We will, of course, need to reassess our position periodically in light of developments, bearing in mind that the unanimity rule of the conference could make it possible for a determined minority of delegations to block consensus as a means of forcing the conference majority to give them some satisfaction on issues peripheral to the concerns of most but of prime importance to one or several small and middle powers.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6320
S-E-E-R-E SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 0738

NODIS

E.C. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PPGP, UP, US
SUBJECT: CSCE: AMBASSADOR’S CALL ON KOVALEV

REF: A. STATE 11524 B. GENEVA 7461

SUMMARY. SOVIET CSCE DELEGATION CHIEF KOVALEV RECEIVED ME CONCILIALLY JANUARY 17 FOR WHAT TURNED OUT TO BE A DE-
TAILED DISCUSSION OF CSCE. KOVALEV EXPRESSED HIMSELF AS
"MODERATELY OPTIMISTIC" ABOUT CSCE PROSPECTS AS A WHOLE,
AND HE SEEMED PARTICULARLY UPEATED ON BASKET THREE. KOVALEV'S
STRONGEST PITCH WAS ON PEACEFUL CHANGE: HE CALLED IT THE
CENTRAL QUESTION NOW BEFORE CSCE. HE SAID HE HAD "CLEAR
INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE LEADERSHIP" TO GO NO FARTHER THAN THE
SOVIET FORMULATION GIVEN THE U.S. IN SEPTEMBER, HE ACCUSED
THE U.S. OF BAD FAITH AND URGED U.S. SUPPORT FOR "RUNNING"
The JULY 28 LANGUAGE ON MILITARY MANEUVERS. HE SAID THERE
WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF A SOVIET COMPROMISE ON THE VALUE OF
THE PRINCIPLES. KOVALEV SAID THAT THE USSR COULD ACCEPT
THE HELSINKI LANGUAGE ON FREE ELECTORAL RESPECT
FOR THE PRINCIPLES BUT COULD NOT AGREE THAT ALL THE
PRINCIPLES ARE OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE. ON TIMING, HE SAID THAT,
AN EARLY CONCLUSION DEPENDS LARGELY ON WASHINGTON: WHILE HE
WOULD NOT BE PINSRED DOWN ON A DATE FOR THE THIRD STAGE,
HE DO SAYS BY THE END OF THE SPRING. ON THE FOLLOW-UP,
HE CRITICIZED THE DANISH PROPOSAL BUT SAID THE USSR IS
FLEXIBLE. AS THE FIRST HIGH-RANKING SOVIET OFFICIAL I
HAVE SEEN SINCE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SOVIET MFN REJECTION,

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NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
KOVALEV GAVE EVERY SIGN OF A DESIRE TO CONTINUE THE BI-
LATERAL RELATIONSHIP. HE DID NOT MENTION INTERFERENCE IN
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, EVEN IN THE BASKET THREE CONTEXT, AND HE
WARMLY AGREED WITH ME WHEN I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT OUR
TWO COUNTRIES COULD MOVE AHEAD ON ALL ISSUES BEFORE US,
INCLUDING TRADE. END SUMMARY.

2. PRESENT WITH KOVALEV WAS A. L. ADAMISHIN, A CSCE EXPERT
WHO HEADS THE MFA ADMINISTRATION FOR GENERAL INTERNATIONAL
PROBLEMS. KOVALEV SAID HE PLANNED TO Leave FOR GENEVA BY
PLANE JANUARY 19 TO BE THERE FOR THE OPENING THE NEXT DAY.

3. BASKET THREE. IN RESPONSE TO MY REMARK THAT ENCOURAGING
PROGRESS SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE IN DECEMBER, KOVALEV SAID THAT
A GREAT DEAL HAD BEEN DONE AND THERE WERE ONLY A FEW QUES-
TIONS LEFT TO RESOLVE ON BASKET THREE. HE MENTIONED WORKING
CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS AS THE MOST IMPORTANT PENDING
PROBLEM; EVEN HERE, HOWEVER, THE SWISS PROPOSAL PROVIDES
THE BASIS FOR A COMPROMISE AND THE SOVIET SIDE IS
OPTIMISTIC. I ASKED ABOUT READING ROOMS. HE REPLIED THAT
THE USAH HAS A STRONG, CLEAR POSITION; THERE IS NO
POSSIBILITY OF COMPROMISE; THE PROPOSAL IS DEAD. HE
SAID THAT THE FRENCH ARE WELL AWARE OF THE SOVIET
POSITION.

4. BASKET TWO. KOVALEV SAID THAT HERE THE SOVIET
PROBLEMS, LARGELY CONCERNING MFN, WERE WITH THE EC, NOT
THE U.S.

5. PEACEFUL CHANGE. KOVALEV THEN LAUNCHED INTO A STRONG
ARGUMENT ON PEACEFUL CHANGE. HE SAID HE HAD MADE THE
SAME ARGUMENT WITH AMBASSADOR SHEPHERD (REFTEL B), BUT HE
WANTED TO BE EVEN MORE FRANK WITH ME (WHICH I TOOK TO
MEAN HE WAS GIVING ME A CONSIDERED SOVIET POSITION
FOLLOWING A POLICY REVIEW DURING THE RECESS). THERE IS
NO PROBLEM WITH PLACEMENT ON PEACEFUL CHANGE; HE SAID, ALL
AGREE IT SHOULD BE IN THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY PRINCIPLE.
BUT THE FRC IS MAKING REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE
SUBSTANCE OF THE LANGUAGE FROM THE APRIL 5 FORMULATION
WHICH WAS AFTER ALL REGISTERED BY THE PARTICIPANTS. THE
JULY 25 U.S. FORMULATION WHICH GREATLY SURPRISED THE
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SOVIET UNION IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO ITS REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, AS WELL AS TO PEACEFUL MEANS AND AGREEMENT, IS NECESSARY. AN APPROPRIATE BURIAL SHOULD BE ARRANGED FOR THE JULY 26, 1949, MASS. THE FRG REFUSES TO DISCUSS THE PEACEFUL CHANGE ISSUE WITH THE USSR, SAYING THAT IT WAS A U.S. PROPOSAL. KOVALEV ACCUSED THE FRG OF GROUCH OF FAITH.


7. IMPORTANCE OF PRINCIPLES. KOVALEV SAID THAT THE USSR ACCEPTED THE HELSINKI BLUE BOOK LANGUAGE ON EQUAL RESPECT FOR AND APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES, BUT IT CANNOT AGREE THAT ALL THE PRINCIPLES ARE OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD TALKED WITH THE FRENCH ABOUT THIS AND THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET POSITION HAD "DEEPENED."

8. NON-USE OF FORCE. I ASKED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR RESOLVING THE SOVIET-ROMANIAN DISPUTE. KOVALEV TREATED THE ROMANIAN SOFTLY, SAYING THAT THE PROBLEM WAS NOT SOLELY A SOVIET-ROMANIAN ONE. HE SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION WITH ROMANIA ON A PRACTICAL BASIS.

9. FOLLOW-UP. KOVALEV EXPRESSED GREAT SUSPICION ABOUT WESTERN MOTIVES IN OBJECTION TO THE VZECH PROPOSAL: HE WISHED THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WOULD EXPLAIN EXACTLY WHAT THE PROBLEM WAS. IN TURN HE CRITICIZED THE DANISH PROPOSAL CALLING IT "VERY BUREAUCRATIC." THE SOVIET POSITION, HE SAID, WAS VERY FLEXIBLE. THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MIGHT BE

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Along the lines of the Second Stage Coordinating Committee, it would not need to be in permanent session and the level of participation and its place of meeting could be worked out. It would be a flexible organ, for exchange of views, consultations, and consideration of complaints. It would provide continuity, a bridge from one conference to the next. Again, he stressed that the Soviets are open-minded on the question.
10. CGM's. ON MANEUVERS, KOVALEV SAID THERE COULD BE NO COMPROMISE. THE USSR IS READY FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BUT CANNOT GO ANY FURTHER THAN IT HAS. HE MAXIMALIST PROPOSALS FROM THE WEST AND THE NEUTRALS IF IMPLEMENTED COULD LEAD TO A PERMANENT STATE OF ALARM IN THE WEST SINCE THERE ARE SO MANY MANEUVERS, INDEED OUR MILITARY MEN SAY IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO CREATE A SECOND GENERAL STAFF SIMPLY TO HANDLE ANNOUNCEMENTS OF MANEUVERS. KOVALEV RAISED THE ISSUE OF MOVEMENTS, NOTING SOVIET OPPOSITION TO IT. I SAID THAT THE ISSUE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH KONNIYENKO AT VLADIVOSTOK AND THAT AMBASSADOR SHERER HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO TAKE IT UP AGAIN WITH THE SOVIET ELELEAGION IN GENEVA. KOVALEV SEEMED CONFUSED ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE HARTMAN-KONNIYENKO TALK IN VLADIVOSTOK, APPARENTLY FEELING THAT THE U.S.-SOVIET DIFFERENCES WERE SUBSTANTIVE RATHER THAN TACTICAL. I Sought TO REASSURE HIM ON THIS POINT, SAYING THAT OUR POSITIONS WERE CLOSE, AND THAT OUR BASIC PROBLEM WAS WITH THE SOVIET TACTIC OF REMANDING THE ISSUE TO A FOLLOW-UP. I REPEATED THAT AMBASSADOR SHERER WOULD HAVE MORE TO SAY ON THIS IN GENEVA.

11. TIMING. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, KOVALEV SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT CSCE FINISH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS AGREED IN VLADIVOSTOK, HE SAID THIS SHOULD MEAN LATE FEBRUARY OR EARLY MARCH. HE ADDED THAT THIS DOES NOT DEPEND ON MOSCOW; MUCH DEPENDS ON WASHINGTON, WHICH CAN GIVE THE CONFERENCE THE IMPULSE IT NEEDS. KOVALEV SAID THE THIRD STAGE SHOULD COME SOON AFTER THE END OF SECRET.
STAGE TWO, BUT HE WOULD NOT SPECIFY A DATE BEYOND SAYING THAT CSCE SHOULD BE FINISHED IN THE SPRING. I ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY LINKAGE IN TIME BETWEEN CSCE AND THE RUPEAN COMMUNIST CONFERENCE; HE STRONGLY DENIED ANY SUCH LINKAGE.

12. KOVALEV EXPRESSED HIS SATISFACTION AT THE CLOSE BILATERAL COOPERATION AT GENEVA AND AT THE OPEN CONTACTS THERE. HE ENDED BY SAYING THAT, IF THE U.S. WOULD GET MORE ACTIVE, RESULTS WOULD FOLLOW QUICKLY.

13. AS HE WALKED OUT, SAID THAT IN GENERAL IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE U.S. AND USSR TO WORK TOGETHER. I NOTED THE CURRENT PROBLEM IN REGARD TO TRADE. NEVERTHELESS, I HOPE HE COULD MOVE AHEAD ON OTHER PROBLEMS AS WELL AS OVERCOME THE TRADE PROBLEMS. KOVALEV WARMLY AGREED AND EXPRESSED HIS OWN CONVICTION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP IN ALL FIELDS.

14. COMMENT: IT WAS ENCOURAGING THAT KOVALEV SEEMED TO BE TAKING PAINS TO INDICATE THAT U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION CONTINUES DESPITE THE TRADE PROBLEM. IN THE CSCE CONTEXT, HIS TOUGH POSITION ON PEACEFUL CHANGE CONFIRMS THE COMMENT IN REFTEL # THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT MAKE A GREAT DEAL OF THIS ISSUE. THE LACK OF GIVE ON CSCE'S DOES NOT STRIKE ME AS UNSUAL AT THIS STAGE IN THE PROCESS. FINALLY, THERE SEEMS NO DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE LEANING HARD ON THE U.S. TO FIND SOLUTIONS, NOT ONLY TO THE PEACEFUL CHANGE ISSUE, BUT TO MANY OF THE OTHER PROBLEMS WHICH CAN DELAY THE CONCLUSION OF CSCE.
Department of State

SECRET

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ACTION NOUS-50

INFO OCT-61 7091 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6568

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 1117

NOOS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFO, UP, US

SUBJ: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

SECRET

SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

1. SUMMARY. MOSCOW 1047 SETS OUT THE EMBASSY'S VIEW OF HOW THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP CURRENTLY SEES ITS DETENTE POLICY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES, CLEARLY, IT IS IN THE U.S. INTEREST TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO REINFORCE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO DETENTE IN ITS MAJOR ASPECTS--TO CONTINUE PURSUIT OF STRATEGIC ARMS AND OTHER MILITARY AGREEMENTS, TO THE EXERCISE OF MAXIMUM RESTRANT IN AREAS OF TENSION, AND TO A CLOSE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WHICH REINFORCES SOVIET INCENTIVE FOR POLITICAL RESTRAINT AND COOPERATION. GIVEN THE SOVIET DOUBT, NOTED IN THE REPORT, ABOUT THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO DETENTE, A LARGE PART OF OUR PROBLEMS IS TO CONVINCE THE SOVIETS--BY SPECIFIC ACTIONS, NOT SIMPLY VERBAL REASSURANCES-- THAT THE BROAD SPECTRUM OF RESPONSIBLE U.S. OPINION REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE LONG-TERM BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP ENVISIONED AT THE 1972 SUMMIT.

FOUR AREAS OF PRIME IMPORTANCE IN THIS REGARD: SALT, THE MIDDLE EAST, CSCE, AND BUT BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP. IN EACH WE SHOULD TRY, WITHOUT DAMAGE TO OUR OWN INTERESTS, TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE SOVIETS THAT OUR POLICIES ARE TO THEIR BENEFIT OF, OR AT LEAST COMPATIBLE WITH, THEIR INTERESTS. NEEDLESS TO SAY, OUR APPROACHES NEED NOT BE MADE IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF MEA CULPA OR OF "REWARDING" THE

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6A 7/3/81
1. SOVIETS FOR THEIR STIFF ACTION ON MFN; OUR OWN INTERESTS, AS WELL AS THEIRS, SHOULD BE READILY APPARENT TO THEM.

2. ON SALT, CONTINUED PROGRESS TOWARD A SUMMIT AGREEMENT IS THE BEST STABILIZING FACTOR WE HAVE IN OUR CURRENT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP; THE SOVIETS MAY WANT AN AGREEMENT BADLY ENOUGH TO BE RECEPTIVE TO A FAIRLY QUICK LOWERING OF THE NUMBERS, AT LEAST ON KIRVIS. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE BEST SERVED BY BRINGING THEM BACK INTO THE POLITICAL PROCESS, RECOGNIZING THAT THIS MAY NOT BE IN THE U.S. INTEREST JUST YET. I RECOMMEND THAT NO ACTIONS BE TAKEN WHICH WOULD LEAD THE SOVIETS TO CONCLUDE THAT THE U.S. INTENDS TO FREEZE THEM OUT INDEFINITELY; SHORT OF THAT POINT, I THINK THEIR IRRITATION IS MANAGEABLE AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. ON CSCE THERE IS A REAL OPPORTUNITY FOR THE U.S. TO ADVANCE THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, WITHOUT SACRIFICING ANY OF OUR OWN INTERESTS, BY APPEARING TO HELP CLEAR THE WAY FOR A 1975 HELSINKI SUMMIT, AND ON THE BILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUE, APART FROM TURNING CONGRESS AROUND ON THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS IT HAS ImPOSED, THE BEST THING I CAN THINK OF WOULD BE EARLY U.S. APPROVAL OF THE AEROFLOT AND INTOURIST REQUEST FOR COMPUTER SALES. MHFR, IN MY VIEW, IS NOT AN AREA IN WHICH WE NEED TO MAKE EARLY OR MAJOR MOVES TOWARD SOVIET DESIDERATA. I BELIEVE THEIR POSEIONS MAY CONTAIN ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY, WHICH THEY HAVE NOT YET SHOWN US.

AN IMPORTANT MOMENTUM FACTOR, SO WILL THE APOLLO-SOVYUZ FLIGHT. IF THE U.S. PRESS REACTION TO BEING EXCLUDED FROM THE LAUNCH SIT
IS NOT TOO ADVERSE, IN ADDITION TO SALT, AGREEMENTS SIGNED
EITHER AT OR BEFORE THE SUMMIT (E.G., AREN, MARITIME) WOULD HELP, IN
THIS REGARD, WE MIGHT WELL PROPOSE AN AGREEMENT AT THE
SUMMIT TO INSTITUTE LEADERSHIP-LEVEL EXCHANGES (U.S. CABINET
TO TOP DEMOCRATIC/REPUBLICAN LEADERS FOR SOVIET POLITBRO
OR SECYAPIAT), THIS COULD LEAD OFF WITH A ROCKEFELLER
VISITING THE USSR AND A KOSYGIN OR MIGYUV VISIT TO THE
U.S. (PERHAPS IN CONNECTION WITH THE APOLLO-SOVYUZ LAUNCH)
OR WITH AN EXCHANGE OF DEFENSE SECREATIRES. I WOULD ALSO
ADVOCATE ESTABLISHMENT AT THE SUMMIT OF AN UMBRELLA COMMISSION
TO OVERSEE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TEN SCIENCE-AND-
TECHNOLOGY-RELATED COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS; THIS WOULD PUT
THE U.S. IN A BETTER POSITION TO PRESS FOR IMPROVEMENTS
IN AREAS WHICH HAVE BECOME REAL BILATERAL PROBLEMS (E.G.,
ON ACCESS TO INFORMATION). WHILE THE WORKING CHAIRMEN OF THE
COMMISSION COULD BE AT SUB-CABINET LEVEL, I WOULD ENVISION CHAIRMEN
(OR HUNGARY CHAIRMEN) AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL, AGAIN perhaps ROCKEFELLER
AND KOSYGIN.

6. FINALLY, OF A LOWER ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, THER ARE
SEVERAL UNILATERAL STEPS WHICH THE U.S. MIGHT TAKE TO SHOW
THE SOVIETS OUR WILLINGNESS TO MOVE ON ISSUES WHICH HAVE
BEEN NEEDLESSLY IRITATING TO THEM. THE U.S., AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE, SHOULD REVERSE ITS POLICY AGAINST UNION TRADE UNION
EXCHANGES BY BEGINNING TO ISSUE VISAS TO SOVIET TRADE UNION
OFFICIALS WHO WANT TO VISIT THE U.S. ON UNION BUSINESS,
AND WE SHOULD UNDERTAKE AN URGENT REVIEW OF OUR VISA POLICY
LOOKING TOWARD ELIMINATION OF UNNECESSARY OR OBSOLETE OB-
STACLES TO VISA ISSUANCE. END SUMMARY.

6. SALT. WHILE OBVIOUSLY I CANNOT COMMENT FROM MOSCOW
ON THE FULL GAMUT OF THIS ISSUE, I WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT
EVERY INDICATOR WE ARE GETTING HERE IS THAT A SALT II
AGREEMENT IS OF CARDINAL IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIET AND THAT
THEY SEEM ANXIOUS FOR AN AGREEMENT ALONG THE LINES WORKED
OUT AT VLADIVOSTOK. SALT RANKS ON A PAR WITH CSCE AS PROOF
TO THEMSELVES AND TO THE WORLD THAT THEIR POLICY IS WORKING.

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THIS GIVES US SOME ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY;
WITHIN REASON, I BELIEVE THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE WILLING TO
MEET SOME OF CONGRESS'S PROBLEMS WITH THE VLADIVOSTOK
UNDERSTANDING, PARTICULARLY ON MIRV NUMBERS.

7. MIDDLE EAST. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE
IRRITATED AT BEING KEPT OUT OF THINGS, AN WE NEED TO RECOGNIZE
THAT THIS IRRITATION IS A POTENTIAL WEAPON IN THE HANDS
OF THOSE HERE WHO MAY FEEL THAT THE SOVIET U.S. CONNECTION
HAS NOT REAPED ENOUGH DIVIDENDS. NEVERTHELESS, I THINK THE
RISK OF KEEPING THE SOVIETS OUT A BIT LONGER IS AN ACCEPTABLE
ONE. LOGICALLY, THEY MUST KNOW THAT YOUR STEP-BY-STEP
APPROACH CARRIES THE BEST CHANCE OF A SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE
TO THE ARABS. WHAT WE MUST AVOID IS PROVOKING A SOVIET
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SECRET

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NC015/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY

CONCLUSION THAT WE WANT TO KEEP THEM OUT OF THE POLITICAL
PROCESS INDEFINITELY. I ASSUME THAT FOR THE TIME BEING THE
ONLY WAY WE CAN DO THIS IS TO KEEP THEM AS WELL INFORMED
AS POSSIBLE OF WHAT WE ARE DOING. IF THEY ARE PROPERLY
HANDLED, I THINK THEY WILL BE PATIENT A BIT LONGER.

6. CSCE, THIS AN AREA IN WHICH WE MAY BE ABLE TO REAP
SOME SIGNIFICANT REWARD FROM THE SOVIET WITHOUT GIVING AWAY
 MUCH OURSelves. IT IS CLEAN (AND KOVALEV MADE IT EXPLICIT
 TO ME LAST WEEK) THAT THE SOVIETS EXPECT US TO GO TO BAT
 FOR THEM IN GETTING THE WAY CLEARED FOR A 1975 CSCE SUMMIT.
 WITH MUCH OF THE BASKET THREE UNDERBRUSH NOT CLEAR AWAY,
 I THINK WE CAN AND SHOULD PLAY THE ROLE (ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT
 NEED TO BE IN A HURRY), MAKING OURSELVES
 THE AGENTS OF COMPROMISE ON PEACEFUL CHANGE, CBM'S, THE
 FOLLOW-UP, AND SUCH OTHER ISSUES AS MAY PROVE DIFFICULT.
 I THINK IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO DO THIS WITHOUT DAMAGING
 OUR POSITION WITH OUR ALLIES, ALTHOUGH I REALIZE THAT THIS
 COULD BE A PROBLEM. (THE CURRENT DOUBTS IN WESTERN EUROPE
 ABOUT CONTINUED SOVIET COMMITMENT TO DETENTE MAY MAKE OUR
 ALLIES SOMEWHAT LESS RIGID AT GENEVA.) IN ANY CASE, SEEN
 FROM THE MOSCOW PERSPECTIVE, CSCE GIVES US AN EXCELLENT
 OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE TO THE SOVIETS OUR COMMITMENT TO THE
 BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. A CSCE SUMMIT IS SOMETHING THEY
 NEED BADLY, AND ONLY WE CAN ENSURE THAT THEY GET IT. A
 BREAK-THROUGH DURING BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, IF WE

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Can stage-manage it, would be ideal.

9. The bilateral economic relationship. Obviously a
lt will depend on the extent to which Congress can be
turned around on the conditions it has placed on the Soviets.
I believe the leadership here would like to be in a position
to welcome an increase in the Exim credit ceiling. But
at the moment I can see no circumstances under which it
would be able to accept any conditions which could be
constituted as meddling in internal affairs. Thus, additional
action by Congress will have to apply not only to the
economic, but also to the political, aspects of the December
legislation if credits or MFN are to be revived. In
addition to trying to resolve the congressional problem,
we should do all we can to show the Soviets that we are
interested in a growing economic relationship. The best
first step, I believe, would be U.S. approval of the sale
of computer systems for Intourist and Aeroflot. The embassy
pointed out last September (Moscow 14926) that the Soviets
would interpret U.S. approval or disapproval of the computer
package as a signal of the U.S. view of the importance of
the economic relationship. This is all the more true now,
therefore, assuming no overriding national security con-
siderations to the contrary, I recommend immediate approval
of the computers for Intourist and Aeroflot.

10. Mfpr. I believe that the Soviets are seriously in-
terested in an agreement and have yet to reveal all of the
flexibility of their positions (Moscow 743). Therefore
I do not believe that we need to be stampeded into meeting their
deisdes. I would recommend proceeding slowly and cautiously
in order to force their additional flexibility to the surface.

11. Vietnam. It seems evident that the
want to see Vietnam returned to the arena of U.S.-Soviet
contention. It is not clear, however, how much of a
restraining influence they would try to place on North
Vietnam if Hanoi decided to go all-out in an effort to win
South Vietnam. The Soviets may feel that, given the dovish
attitude of the old Congress and the apparently similar
attitude of the new one, a major North Vietnamese offensive
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WILL NOT CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., THEY SHOULD BE LEFT UNDER NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THIS, AND SHOULD BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND THAT A MAJOR OFFENSIVE BY MANIAK, USING SOVIET EQUIPMENT, WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE REGARDED BY THE U.S. PEOPLE AND CONGRESS AS A SIGN THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT SERIOUS ABOUT DETENTE AND WOULD SEVERELY COMPLICATE U.S. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS. THIS IS A POINT YOU MIGHT WELL MAKE TO DOBRININ IN THE CONTEXT OF A DISCUSSION ON VIETNAM WHICH EMPHASIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT THERE. ALTERNATIVELY OR CONCURRENTLY, I COULD TAKE THE SAME APPROACH WITH GHOMYKO HERE.

12. BILATERAL FACTORS. BOTH THE FORD-BREZHNEV SUMMIT AND THE APOLLO-SOYUZ FLIGHT SHOULD PROVIDE WELCOME IMPETUS TO THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND SHOULD THUS BE USEFUL IN TERMS BOTH OF THE U.S. CONGRESS AND OF ANY ADVOCATES WITHIN THE SOVIET REGIME. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, TO ENSURE U.S. PREACCESS TO THE SOYUZ LAUNCH SITE. THE SOVIETS REMAIN RIGIDLY OPPOSED TO THIS; IT MAY SOON BE NECESSARY FOR YOU TO LEAN IN WITH DOBRININ. THE SIGNING OF SALT I AT THE SUMMIT WILL GREATLY REDUCE THE NEED FOR MANY OTHER AGREEMENTS. IN ANY CASE, I THINK WE ARE PAST THE STAGE WHERE ADDITIONAL COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS WOULD BE OF MUCH HELP, EITHER IN A SUBSTANTIVE OR IN A PUBLIC RELATIONS SENSE. OF COURSE, SIGNING OF PNE AND PERHAPS MARITIME AGREEMENTS (PROVIDED CURRENT CARGO-SHARING ARRANGEMENT CAN BE PRESERVED) AT OR BEFORE THE SUMMIT WOULD BE MINOR PLUSES.

13. LEADERSHIP-LEVEL EXCHANGES. ONE PROMISING AVENUE FOR EXPLORATION IS AN AGREEMENT AT THE SUMMIT TO INSTITUTE LEADERSHIP-LEVEL EXCHANGES BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. I HAVE IN MIND EXCHANGES AT THE CABINET/TC, AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTY AND POLITICAL/SECRETARIAT LEVEL. IN ADDITION TO THE DETENTE-MOMENTUM ASPECTS, SUCH AN EXCHANGE COULD BE USED TO GIVE IMPORTANT SOVIET LEADERS A FIRST-HAND LOOK AT THE U.S., I AM CONVINCED THIS IS GREATLY IN OUR INTEREST (THE PONOMAREV VISIT, FOR EXAMPLE, PUT AN IMPORTANT SOVIET IODELOGICAL CLEARLY ON RECORD AS FAVOURING DETENTE). I BELIEVE IT WILL TAKE A SUMMIT DECISION TO GET SUCH EXCHANGES OFF NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY...
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THE GROUND FOR OUR INVITATION TO MAZUROV HAS LAIN ON THE TALOE FOR ALMOST A YEAR NOW. A GOOD BEGINNING WOULD BE A VISIT BY VICE PRESIDENT ROCKEFELLER TO THE USSR, PAIRED WITH A KOSYGIN OR MAZUROV VISIT TO THE U.S. THE APOLLO-STYX LAUNCH MIGHT BE ONE CONTEXT FOR A ROCKEFELLER-KOSYGIN VISIT EXCHANGE; ANOTHER COULD BE AN EXCHANGE OF VISIONS BY DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER AND DEFENSE MINISTER GRECHO. MAZUROV WOULD BE ANOTHER WAY TO KICK OFF A TOP-LEVEL EXCHANGES IN THE WAKE OF A SALT II AGREEMENT. THE ATMOSPHERE SHOULD BE QUITE CONDUCIVE TO SUCH VISITS, WE MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER ADDITIONAL DEFENSE EXCHANGES—PERHAPS AT CHIEF OF STAFF AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICER LEVEL.

14. A COMMISSION TO OVERSEE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS, A MAJOR PROBLEM IN THE U.S. APPROACH TO OUR COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS WITH THE USSR IS THAT WE HAVE NOT TAKEN A SUFFICIENTLY UNIFIED APPROACH TO THEM, AND HAVE THEREFORE DENIED OURSELVES THE FULLEST OPPORTUNITIES FOR WEIGHING PROS AND CONS ACROSS THE WHOLE RANGE OF AGREEMENTS. RATHER THAN PRESSING FOR NEW AGREEMENTS, I WOULD LIKE TO SEE A MORE COORDINATED U.S. APPROACH TO THE AGREEMENTS WE ALREADY HAVE. ONE VEHICLE FOR ACHIEVING THIS WOULD BE TO SET UP A JOINT U.S.-SOVIET UMBRELLA COMMISSION TO OVERSEE AND REVIEW THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS, PARTICULARLY THOSE INVOLVING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. THE Principal ADVANTAGE FOR THE U.S. WOULD BE THAT WE COULD USE THE COMMISSION TO FOCUS ON SERIOUS PROBLEMS THAT ARE COMMON TO SEVERAL AGREEMENTS. THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND INSTALLATIONS IS A CASE IN POINT; ASSURANCE OF RECIPROCITY IS ANOTHER. IN ADDITION, IT WOULD GIVE US AN OPPORTUNITY TO STRENGTHEN OUR INTERNAL MONITORING OF COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS, TO ENSURE THE PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL ELEMENTS.


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MEETING COULD BE USED FOR A HIGH-VISIBILITY VIP VISIT TO ONE OR THE OTHER COUNTRY. THE AGREEMENTS IT WOULD COVER COULD INCLUDE: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AGRICULTURE, ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL SCIENCE, TRANSPORTATION, WORLD OCEAN, ATOMIC ENERGY, ENERGY, HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION, AND ACADEMIES OF SCIENCE.

14. OTHER STEPS, ON A LOWER ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WHICH COULD BE TAKEN AT THE SUMMIT MIGHT INCLUDE THE LAYING OF CORNERSTONES FOR THE NEW EMBASSIES, ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE NEXT SET OF CONSULATES, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL CULTURAL CENTERS IN EACH OTHER'S CAPITALS. HE WILL BE FORWARDING ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON THESE AND OTHER SUGGESTIONS, AND IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO DISCUSS SOME OF THEM AT MY NEXT WORKING LUNCH WITH KORNIYEVIC IN MID-FEBRUARY.

15. FINALLY, THERE ARE SEVERAL UNILATERAL STEPS WHICH THE U.S. COULD TAKE WHICH—WHILE IN OUR INTEREST ANYWAY—COULD HELP REDUCE AREAS IN WHICH THE SOVIETS FEEL OUR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ARE UNNECESSARILY IRRITATING TO THEM. I
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SECRET SECTION 3 OF 3 MOSCOW 1117
NODS/5/CHEROKEE
FOR THE SECRETARY

WOULD MENTION TWO. FIRST, THE U.S. SHOULD LOSE NO TIME
IN REVERSING ITS POLICY AGAINST TRADE UNION EXCHANGES. THIS
IS THE ONE GLARING EXAMPLE OF U.S. FAILURE TO PRACTICE
WHAT IT PREACHES ON THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPANDING HUMAN
CONTACTS. I CAN UNDERSTAND WHY IT MAY HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT
NOT TO INFLICT GEORGE MEANY'S DISPLEASURE WHILE THE TRADE
UNION POLICY WAS BEING DEVELOPED. BUT I WOULD HOPE THAT THIS FACTO

HAS DIMINISHED IN IMPORTANCE. TALKS HERE WITH VISITING
OFFICIALS OF THE UMW, THE STEELWORKERS, AND OTHER AMERICAN
UNIONS INDICATE, IN ANY CASE, THAT THE MEANY POLICY IS FAR
FROM UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED AMONG U.S. TRADE UNIONS. WE
MIGHT SIMPLY TELL THE SOVIETS PRIVATELY THAT WE ARE NOT
PREPARED TO ISSUE VISAS TO TRADE UNION OFFICIALS WHO WANT
TO VISIT THE U.S. IN RESPONSE TO INVITATIONS ISSUED BY U.S.
UNIONS--AND THEN DO SO. SECOND,

I HOPE WE CAN SHAVE OFF SOME OF THE NECESSARY OR OBSOLETE
OBSTACLES IN OUR VISA POLICY TO SOVIET TRAVEL TO THE U.S.
IN AN AREA OF CURRENT CONCERN IS SOVIET ANNOYANCE OVER RECENT
CHANGES IN OUR VISA PROCEDURES FOR SOVIET COMMERCIAL VISITORS
(MOSCOW 613 AND PREVIOUS). IN ADDITION, WE SHOULD SEEK
WAYS TO ELIMINATE COLD WAR HANGOVERS IN OUR VISA LAWS AND
REGULATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE SECTION 212(a)(28) WHICH GROUPS
COMMUNISTS WITH NARCOTIC TRAFFICKERS AND PROSTITUTES AS
PERSONS AUTOMATICALLY INELIGIBLE FOR MOST CATEGORIES OF VISAS.
A REVIEW ORDERED BY YOU OF VISA POLICIES AND PRACTICES COULD

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SET THIS PROCESS IN MOTION. U.S. ACTION IN THE TRADE UNION
AND VISA AREA, WHILE NOT IMPORTANT ENOUGH TO GIVE US MUCH
LEVERAGE ON THE SOVIETS, WOULD AT LEAST PUT US IN A BETTER
POSITION TO INDUCE SOVIET MOVEMENT ON SUCH WORKING-LEVEL
OBJECTIVES AS THE REDUCTION OF TRAVEL CONTROLS, GREATER
ACCESS FOR JOURNALISTS, AND ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS FOR U.S.
SCHOLARS.

16. IN SUM, THOUGH OUR NEW BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP HAS
JUST SUFFERED ITS FIRST SERIOUS SETBACK, I WOULD HOPE THAT
WE CAN KEEP IT INTACT BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET INTEREST
IN DETENTE WITH THE U.S. CONTINUES TO RUN VERY DEEP.

STRESSSEL
CONFIDENTIAL 3580

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ACTION SS-2S.

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1028 W
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FM AMBASSAD MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7570
AMBASSAD BERLIN
USMISSION USBERLIN UN
AMBASSAD RONN
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMBASSAD LONDON
USMISSION NATO
AMBASSAD PARIS
AMBASSAD ROME
USREL MFR VIENNA
USREL SALT TWO GENEVA

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 2588

EXDIS

GENEVA FOR USUEL CSCE

F.O. 11521 GUS
TASS UR, GW, WB
SUBJECT: DEPUTY FOMIN ON BERLIN, CSCE

1. SUMMARY. THE FRG EMBASSY HERE HAS FILLED US IN ON DETAILS
OF A CALL BY AMBASSADOR SAHM ON DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
ZEMSKOV ON FEBRUARY 21. SAHM HAD JUST RETURNED FROM BONN, WHERE
HE SPOKE TO SCHMITT, GENSCHER, AND OTHERS IN THE GOVERNMENT
IN PREPARATION FOR THE CALL. BOTH ZEMSKOV AND SAHM WERE
APPARENTLY PREPARING THEMSELVES TO TALK ABOUT THE TWO CENTRAL
ISSUES IN CURRENT SOVIET-FRG POLITICAL RELATIONS: BERLIN AND
PEACEFUL CHANGE IN CSCE. ON THE LATTER, SAHM REPORTEDLY CAME
AWAY WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT ZEMSKOV TRIED TO BE FLEXIBLE IN
TONE WHILE REMAINING VAGUE ON SUBSTANCE. HOWEVER, ZEMSKOV WAS
CATACRICAL IN SAYING THE ISSUE CANNOT BE ADDRESSED IN THE

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PRINCIPLE ON INVOLIABILITY OF FRONTIERS, ON BERLIN, BOTH SAHM AND ZEMSKOV RE-STATED IN CATEGORICAL TERMS THEIR GOVERNMENTS' OPPOSING VIEWS ON THE ISSUE. SAHM INFORMED ZEMSKOV THAT NO BILATERAL TREATIES AFFECTING MATTERS OTHER THAN QUESTIONS OF SECURITY AND STATUS WILL BE CONCLUDED WITH THE SOVIET UNION WITHOUT THE INCLUSION OF A BERLIN CLAUSE. ZEMSKOV REPLIED THAT "IT IS USELESS TO EXPECT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL COMPROMISE" ON THE ISSUE. ON OTHER QUESTIONS, A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE DATES FOR THE SCHEEL AND GENSCHER VISITS TO MOSCOW PRODUCED NO SUGGESTED TIME FRAMES. END SUMMARY.

2. FRG EMBASSY (VON BRAUNMühl) HAS BRIEFED US ON CALL BY FRG AMBASSADOR SAHM ON DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ZEMSKOV ON FEBRUARY 21.

3. VON BRAUNMühl, READING FROM OUTGOING CABLE, SAID THAT SAHM MADE A GENERAL INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT TO ZEMSKOV, NOTING, INTER ALIA, THAT HE HAD BEEN ESPECIALLY RECALLED TO BONN TO PREPARE FOR THIS CALL. ZEMSKOV RATHER AIRILY DISMISSED THE PLEASANTS AND SAID THAT HE WANTED TO COME DIRECTLY TO A DISCUSSION OF THE TWO MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST: PEACEFUL CHANGE AND BERLIN.

4. SAHM SAID ON THE FIRST POINT HE HAD NO MANDATE TO NEGOTIATE. HE CONTINUED THAT IN VIEW OF ZEMSKOV'S ACCUSATION IN JANUARY THAT THE FRG "HAD NOT FOLLOWED THE RULES IN NEGOTIATIONS" ON THAT ISSUE, HOWEVER, HE WAS PREPARED TO OUTLINE THE HISTORY OF DISCUSSIONS ON THE PEACEFUL CHANGE ISSUE. ZEMSKOV SAID THAT HE WANTED TO HEAR NOTHING ABOUT THE HISTORY OF THE ISSUE BUT RATHER TO DISCUSS ITS SUBSTANCE. SAHM REPLIED BY REPEATING THE FRG POSITION: IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO INSERT THE LANGUAGE ON THE ISSUE IN THE INVOLIABILITY OF FRONTIERS PRINCIPLE, THE BEST SOLUTION IS THE LANGUAGE PROPOSED BY THE U.S. ON JULY 20.

5. ZEMSKOV ANSWERED THAT IN THE SOVIET VIEW THERE ARE TWO ELEMENTS WHICH MUST BE INCLUDED IN LANGUAGE ON PEACEFUL CHANGE: (1) THE ISSUE CANNOT BE ADDRESSED IN THE PRINCIPLE ON INVOLIABILITY OF FRONTIERS (ZEMSKOV WAS REPORTEDLY EMPHATIC AND "CATEGORICAL" ON THIS); AND (2) IT MUST CONTAIN ALL OF THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS WITH EQUAL STRESS ON EACH: (A) INTERNATIONAL
LAW, (B) PEACEFUL MEANS, AND (C) AGREEMENT BY ALL CONCERNED.
ZEMSKOV CONTINUED THAT HE WAS NOT READY TO DISCUSS CONCRETE
LANGUAGE, BUT THE JULY 26 LANGUAGE SEEMED TO HIM TO INCLUDE
AN ELEMENT OF "PROMOTING" CHANGE. UPON QUESTIONING BY SAHM,
ZEMSKOV REPEATED THIS POINT AND SAID THAT THE PROPER LANGUAGE
WOULD BE THAT WHICH SIMPLY MAKES "ALLOWANCE" FOR CHANGE.
SUCH LANGUAGE, ZEMSKOV CONTINUED, HAD ALREADY BEEN INCLUDED
IN THE (UNSPECIFIED) SOVIET PROPOSAL.

6. ZEMSKOV THEN TURNED TO A DISCUSSION OF BERLIN. HE EMPHASIZED
THE SOVIET DESIRE TO MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP FURTHER GOOD RELATIONS
WITH THE FRG. BUT HE SAID THERE COULD BE NO ROOM FOR FLEX-
IBILITY IN THE SOVIET STANDPOINT ON BERLIN. SAHM REPLIED THAT,
JUDGING FROM HIS CONSULTATIONS IN BONN, THE SOVIET POLICY ON
BERLIN RUNS THE DANGER OF CREATING THE IMPRESSION IN WEST GERMANY
THAT THE SOVIET INTENTION IS TO EXCLUDE BERLIN FROM ANY
IMPROVEMENT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. SAHM THEN QUOTED FROM A
SCHMIDT INTERVIEW SLATED TO APPEAR IN LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
(THE GERMAN EMBASSY DOES NOT KNOW WHEN) THAT THE FRG POLICY ON
BERLIN IS "FULL APPLICATION" AND "STRICT OBSERVANCE" OF THE
QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT, WITH NO CHANGE IN STATUS. ZEMSKOV
COMPLIMENTED SCHMIDT ON THE STATEMENT AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE
THAT THE FRG ATTITUDE TO BERLIN WOULD CONFORM TO THOSE
PRINCIPLES. SAHM CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION BY NOTING THAT THE
AIM OF THE FRG POLICY IS TO INSURE THAT BERLIN IS INCLUDED IN
ANY IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET-FRG RELATIONS; THIS OBVIOUSLY
REQUIRES THAT THE CITY BE INCLUDED IN BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.

7. SAHM THEN REFERRED TO A CALL BY SOVIET EMBASSY COUNSELOR
KOPTELTSYEV ON FOREIGN OFFICE IN BONN ON FEBRUARY 12.
KOPTELTSYEV APPARENTLY INFORMED THE FOREIGN OFFICE THAT CONSULAR
SERVICES FOR CITIZENS OF WEST BERLIN IN THE SOVIET UNION "POSE
NO PROBLEM." SAHM EXPANDED ON THIS TO EXPLAIN THAT THE FRG
CONCEPT OF "SERVICES" (VON BRAUNMÜHL SAID THAT WORD "CONSULAR"
HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY DROPPED) COULD BE ILLUSTRATED BY THE
FOLLOWING EXAMPLE. WHEN THE WEST BERLIN PHILHARMONIC ORCHESTRA
COMES TO THE SOVIET UNION, THE FRG WOULD EXPECT THE ORCHESTRA
TO BE MET BY THE FRG AMBASSADOR AT THE AIRPORT; WOULD EXPECT THE
AMBASSADOR TO INVITE THE WVERAGE ORCHESTRA TO ATTEND THE
CONCERTS; AND WOULD EXPECT NO
SOVIET OBJECTION TO THE AMBASSADOR HOLDING A RECEPTION FOR THE
ORCHESTRA WHICH APPROPRIATE SOVIET OFFICIALS WOULD ATTEND.

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Sahm continued that for some West Berlin organizations this of course would not be necessary and "services" by the FRG embassy would be scaled accordingly. He said that the FRG is ready to discuss such questions on a case-by-case basis.
EXDIS

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ACTION 68-25

INFO OCT-01 ISC-08 1826 W

R 251645137 75
FM AMBASSADOR MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7571
AMBASSADOR BERLIN
USMISSION USBERLIN UNN
AMBASSADOR BONN
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMBASSADOR LONDON
USMISSION NATO
AMBASSADOR PARIS
AMBASSADOR ROME
USREL MARR VIENNA
USREL SALT TWO GENEVA

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EXDIS

GENEVA FOR USREL COGE

B. SAHM, CONTINUING ON THE ISSUE OF CULTURAL EXCHANGE, SAID THAT IN THE CASE OF DIRECT CULTURAL EXCHANGE BETWEEN WEST BERLIN AND THE SOVIET UNION, THE FRG MAY WISH TO ISSUE A UNILATERAL STATEMENT. (VON BRAUNMühl EXPLAINED IN THIS REGARD THAT THE FRG DOES NOT INTEND TO STOP ALL SUCH DIRECT INTERCOUERSE BETWEEN WEST BERLIN AND THE SOVIET UNION, BUT WOULD WANT TO MAKE CLEAR IN SUCH A UNILATERAL STATEMENT THAT THE CONTINUATION OF DIRECT EXCHANGE DID NOT IMPLY THE EXISTENCE OF WEST BERLIN AS A THIRD UNIT IN GERMANY.) ZEMSKOV REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT BOTHER HIMSELF WITH DETAILS OF THIS NATURE BUT WOULD REPORT SAHM'S STATEMENT TO THE PROPER AUTHORITIES.

B. ZEMSKOV, SUMMING UP HIS ARGUMENTS, SAID THAT SPEAKING IN HIS ROLE AS "ADVISOR TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON GERMAN AFFAIRS," HE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR TO SAHM THAT IT IS THE INTENTION OF THE

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SOVIET UNION THAT BERLIN CONTINUE TO BE INCLUDED IN DETENTE. THE EFFORTS OF THE SOVIET UNION WERE AIMED AGAINST ATTEMPTS BY THE FRG WHICH COULD CREATE THE "IMPRESSION" THAT WEST BERLIN IS A PART OF THE FRG OR IS GOVERNED BY IT. ZEMSKOV SAID THAT WAS THE FINAL CATEGORICAL STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION. HE SAID THE SOVIETS WERE NOT READY TO MAKE ANY CONCESSION IN THIS REGARD; FOR THEM IT IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE.

10. SAHM REPLIED THAT THE UNITY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS (RECHTSEINHEIT) BETWEEN WEST-BERLIN AND THE FRG WHICH HAS DEVELOPED UNDER THREE-POWER AUSPICES WILL CONTINUE TO BE MAINTAINED BY THE FRG EXPECT IN MATTERS CONCERNING SECURITY OR STATUS. SAHM MENTIONED THAT THE MARINE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE A BERLIN CLAUSE. ZEMSKOV ASKED BARTISTICALLY ON WHICH SEA BERLIN WAS LOCATED. SAHM REPLIED THAT JUST AS MUNICH AND STUTTGART WOULD BE INCLUDED IN SUCH AN AGREEMENT, SO WOULD WEST BERLIN BECAUSE OF THE UNITY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS.

11. SAHM THEN SAID THAT THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF CONCLUDING BILATERAL TREATIES OR AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE SOVIET UNION ON ANY ISSUE, EXCEPT THOSE AFFECTING WEST BERLIN'S SECURITY OR STATUS, WHICH DO NOT INCLUDE A BERLIN CLAUSE.

12. ZEMSKOV SUMMARIZED REMAINING DIFFERENCES, WHICH HE SAID WERE OBVIOUSLY IRRECONCILABLE IN THE PRESENT DISCUSSION, AS FOLLOWS: (1) THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. MUST NOT BE OPEN TO "ARBITRARY INTERPRETATION" AND (2) "IT IS USELESS TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL COMPROMISE ON BERLIN."

13. AFTER DISCUSSION OF ABOVE MAIN ISSUES, SAHM ALSO RAISED QUESTION OF DATES FOR SCHOEL AND GENSCHER VISITS. ZEMSKOV MADE NO SUGGESTIONS FOR TIME FRAMES, BUT SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE MATTER.

14. COMMENT: SAHM'S INTERPRETATION OF ZEMSKOV'S REMARKS ON CSCE WAS THAT ZEMSKOV, PERHAPS IN AN EFFORT TO SMOOTH OVER GLARING DIFFERENCES IN OPINION DURING SAHM'S LAST CALL ON JANUARY 29, HAD BEEN "MORE FLEXIBLE IN TONE." SAHM FELT, HOWEVER, THAT ZEMSKOV HAD BEEN TO VAGUE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE TO PERMIT ANY CONCLUSIONS ON POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE SOVIET STANCE, FROM THE FRG EMBOFF'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE

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DISCUSSION ON BERLIN, IT APPEARS TO US THAT BOTH SIDES ARE FIRMING UP FOR SHOW-DOWN ON THE ISSUE. (A SIGNED COMMENTARY BY VLADIMIR KUZNETSOV IN THE FEBRUARY 21 ISSUE OF ZA RUBEZHOM, A WEEKLY REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, TOOK A SIMILARLY HARD-LINE STAND ON BERLIN. IT WARNED AGAINST "DUBIOUS INTERPRETATIONS" OF THE Q.A., SUCH AS GENSCHER'S CONTENTION IN A FEBRUARY 9 PRESS CONFERENCE THAT THE Q.A. IS NOT "STATIC," BUT RATHER ALLOWS "DYNAMIC DEVELOPMENT" OF TIES. THE COMMENTARY CONCLUDES BY STATING THAT ANY ACTIONS OTHER THAN THOSE IN STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE Q.A. "WOULD AMOUNT TO LOOKING FOR CONFRONTATION." Von Braunmühl said that as far as his government is concerned, there will be no progress on bilateral agreements until the Soviets case on the issue of a Berlin clause. He said that if this requires a long time, then his government is prepared to live with such a wait. He said in passing that this year (i.e., the 30th anniversary of the end of the war) holds no great promise for much movement in PRC-Soviet relations in any case.

STOESSEL
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Willy Brandt, Former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
President Ford
Amb. Berndt Von Staden, Federal Republic of Germany Ambassador to the United States
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, March 27, 1975
11:00 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

SUBJECT: Portugal; Middle East; Turkey; CSCE; Southeast Asia

President: It is delightful to have you here. I had a fine opportunity to get to know the Chancellor. We talked economics, the situation in Europe, broad topics. We had a good opportunity to talk substance and to get acquainted.

I know you are interested in Portugal. I would appreciate your observations.

Brandt: The last word I have is that the new government has been formed but they haven't gone as far as might have been feared. Soares, with whom we Socialists have ties, is still in the Cabinet, as Minister without portfolio, so he can be in the campaign. Also, the Minister of Interior stayed in his post -- that is important to the elections. We shouldn't give up. The question is what kind of moral and material help we can give.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

We have done a little. The Dutch did some and the Swedes did. I plan to get a little group of officers together to try to make contacts.

President: Are the military in the grip of the Communists?

Brandt: Some are Communists, some are Social Revolutionaries. Like Peron. There are Cubans among them. The Soviet Union may not be playing so critical a role. They may be playing a more minor role.

Kissinger: But wouldn't it be even harder to manage if they had a rabid left dictatorship?

Brandt: It's difficult to say, but it may go like Finland. They had a difficult period but got the Communists out eventually.

President: What effect will the election have?

Brandt: The Socialists will be stronger than the Communists if they don't falsify the results. They plus the PDP will be much stronger. Soares says he will be tough and if he doesn't get represented proportionally, he will go underground. But the Revolutionary Council looks like it will continue to play a dominant role.

President: What will be the parliamentary role?

Brandt: Their main task will be to draft a Constitution. Then they will have elections for parliament.

President: I have read that Cunhal is very able.

Brandt: He seems to be able and may be relatively independent vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

President: It would certainly complicate our situation in NATO.

Kissinger: The Portuguese representative will also get MBFR information when it goes to the NAC.

President: I appreciate Schmidt's phone call. We certainly are willing to work with you.

Brandt: I talked to the Latin Americans about this, and the Venezuelans and Mexicans were very interested. They were concerned about the
influence on Spain. Spain is very different from Portugal, but it could have an impact. We would like to see a gradual evolution in Spain and I can eventually see them in the European Community.

**President:** Let's talk a bit about the Middle East. We are disappointed in the Middle East, naturally. We made a massive effort which would have gone a long way toward peace. I am not optimistic about what may happen at Geneva. I think Israel may be disappointed at the prospects of Geneva. Any help you can give...

**Brandt:** I don't know when I will see any of them. Based on my talks with Allon, I thought there would be more flexibility.

**President:** We did too. I spoke with Rabin, with Allon, with Mrs. Meir, and we had the same impression. We can see a difficult situation in Geneva.

**Kissinger:** I told Mr. Brandt to see if he and Schmidt can try to induce flexibility of mind. They have thwarted us and now they seem to be doing the same with Geneva -- to return to the period after the '67 war. That would mean a war.

**President:** Stalemate certainly would enhance the chances of war, with all the dangers of a confrontation, a new embargo.

We must seek to avoid a stalemate and we may be forced into a different relationship with Israel. We have to look to our self-interests.

**Brandt:** Has Sadat been weakened?

**President:** I think he will have to align himself more with the other Arabs. If he does that, he may be all right.

**Kissinger:** We heard he is likely to suffer because of his orientation with us. Even if he moves to the radicals, they all know it is his second choice.

**Brandt:** I met with him and was amazed at how close he feels to the United States. He said he had daily contact with two leaders -- Boumedienne and Faisal. Now one is dead. The Vice President is there now.

**President:** Yes. He met there with Sadat. We feel we have a very constructive relationship with him.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

Brandt: I thought he was in danger of forgetting there was another great power.

President: We are also concerned about Turkey. We are doing what we can but Congress is difficult. If Turkey moves away from NATO it would be very serious.

Kissinger: Germany has many Turks working there.

Brandt: I met with Ecevit. He was flexible but he said that as time goes on it is more and more difficult to reduce the Turkish area of Cyprus. He thinks the Greeks now understand that there will be only two zones, not cantons. That is important -- that, and some reduction of the zone.

President: What is it now -- about 40 percent?

Kissinger: Bitsios said they would settle for 20-28 percent. The Turks are willing to go to 30-35 percent. We are close, but as long as they think they can run to Congress....

Brandt: Ecevit told Waldheim he would settle for 30 percent.

Kissinger: If Ecevit were Prime Minister it would be settled in one month. The problem is that only the Parliament can dissolve itself.

Von Staden: It's similar to our structure.

President: They have more than five major parties.

Kissinger: They have two major fairly balanced ones and some minor ones. Ecevit gambled and lost last fall. They were all afraid of his popularity and blocked him.

President: We are hamstrung because of the aid cutoff. I can't certify that there has been progress and the cutoff has taken place. The Greek opposition is very vocal and there are some tough Congressmen. I think we can get something through the Senate but it looks impossible right now in the House.

What are your thoughts on CSCE?

Brandt: My feelings are that we should bring it to a conclusion. It has been a good exercise -- developing positions and discussing with the other
side in a way I wouldn't have thought possible. This is one more way which links the United States and Canada to Europe, in a way that is not derived from the last war. This shows that the United States, like the Soviet Union, is a European power, not just as a result of World War II. The Soviet Union talks about a permanent secretariat. The West isn't in favor of that, but I would recommend -- and my Government agrees, I think -- that after one or two years the Foreign Ministers should meet to review the results of the agreement.

Kissinger: We are basically in favor.

Brandt: It gives the Communists something to work for.

Kissinger: It puts pressure on them not to be intransigent.

Brandt: I would move it from Helsinki to Vienna also. It would be less under Soviet influence.

President: We would appreciate any help with Israel. It is a difficult period and we have to be firm. Any help to avoid stalemate will be helpful.

Brandt: May I make one remark on Southeast Asia? It is very hard to make up my mind on what is right, but you should know that whichever way you decide, it would not influence our belief in the vitality of the United States and its institutions.

President: It is a very difficult situation. It is a tragedy for those of us who have supported President Johnson and President Nixon. I haven't made a decision, but my feeling is to be strong. On a worldwide basis, too.
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: Mr. CHf

SUBJECT: Status Report on CSCE

The information memorandum for your signature to the President at Tab A would forward a status report on CSCE in the current phase of the Stage II negotiations. The memorandum states that earlier expectations of progress by Easter have proved unfounded and that, despite general acceptance of a Stage III summer summit, there has been no rush of concessions by the Soviets -- or by anyone else. It points out that the Soviets are beginning to get nervous about timing and that they are starting to lean more heavily on pressure tactics. The report briefly reviews the four major remaining issues at the Conference, concludes that the substantive negotiations will probably continue down to the wire, and points out that this will make it more difficult to meet an early summer deadline for Stage III.

This memorandum is based on the reporting cable from Ambassador Scherzer at Tab B.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

RGates: mw: 4/2/75
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Status Report on CSCE

Summary

As the pressures of the final negotiating phase of CSCE start to build, the Soviets have tried to advance in certain subject areas, but have continued to probe Western positions and to remain firm on issues which they consider sensitive, such as individual contacts. Thus, there has been no rush of Soviet concessions and, partly as a result of this, many Western and neutral delegations are sticking to the ideas they consider important. The Soviets may have begun to feel time pressure, but thus far have been unwilling to make concessions to meet their own schedule. Nevertheless, our delegation in Geneva believes that if the Soviets make at least some key concessions, it is still possible to finish Stage II negotiations in time for a Stage III in early to mid-July.

The Current Situation

As Stage II of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe resumes following an Easter recess, earlier expectations of visible progress by Easter have proved unfounded. The optimism and compromising spirit of two months ago have been tempered by the dawning realization that the Soviets will not produce a rush of concessions -- at least not yet. The lack of Soviet willingness to find reasonable compromises has produced a similar attitude among Western and neutral participants, who believe that if they simply accept Soviet terms, even on minor issues, the Soviets will be encouraged to insist on their way on issues of more fundamental importance.
The Soviets have reacted in this situation by beginning to use pressure tactics, coming down particularly hard on the French and the FRG. It seems likely that they have perceived the negotiating box now closing in around them: a deadline for completion of the Conference set by Brezhnev himself, and a limited number of concessions to offer in order to meet it. These trends are expected to continue to develop in the post-Easter period, which will compound the difficulty of trying to meet the timetable envisaged by most participants -- completion of Stage II about the end of May or mid-June and a Stage III in early to mid-July.

Summary of Remaining Issues

The key remaining substantive issues at the Conference are as follows:

-- Principles (Basket II): Agreement is blocked by a knot of interlocking issues related to Germany and the Brezhnev doctrine. The United States has tabled a draft on peaceful changes of borders which is widely accepted. The French, however, have linked their agreement to this text to acceptance of language which would protect Quadripartite rights and responsibilities in Berlin and which would assert the equal value of all the principles. Romania objects to the U.S. peaceful change text and, with the neutrals, strongly rejects the French position on Quadripartite rights as too general and as reinforcing the Brezhnev doctrine.

-- Confidence Building Measures/Maneuvers: The Soviets have announced that they would be flexible on the geographic area and size of forces subject to prior notification of maneuvers if the Conference can agree "in principle" that such notification will be voluntary. The NATO countries and neutrals generally see no objection in principle to a voluntary approach to prior notification, if the Soviets will give a clearer idea of parameters acceptable to them. The Romanians have rejected the voluntary approach, with support from the Dutch.

-- Freer Movement (Basket III): Several separate questions relating to the overall issue of freer movement remain unresolved: introductory language for the human contacts and information sections of Basket III (human contacts), language on travel, audio-visual information
(broadcasting), working conditions for journalists, libraries/reading rooms, and direct contacts among creative artists. Four out of the five remaining subjects under human contacts and information are presently stalled, due entirely or in part to US-Soviet differences. Our efforts to achieve better texts on the introduction on human contacts, travel, journalists and broadcasting have run up against the Soviets on matters they consider quite sensitive.

-- Final Documents (Basket IV): The EC-9, NATO and most neutrals support a Dutch proposal to include all CSCE resolutions in one overall signed document called "The Final Act" of the Conference. The Soviets indicate that they prefer four separate signed documents, one for each Basket. The Western participants believe that one overall document is the only way to ensure that each Basket has equal status. This promises to be a difficult issue.

-- Peripheral issues: There are several political issues which, while not central to the CSCE negotiations, could make it difficult to conclude the Conference at an early date. These include Cyprus (with the Greeks and Cypriots stating they will not join a consensus on the results of the Conference unless there is clear progress toward resolution of the Cyprus situation, and the Turks threatening to question the credentials of the Cypriot delegation and refusing to accept the presence of Makarios at Stage III) and Mediterranean representation (the Maltese and Yugoslavs might hold out for some role for non-participating Mediterranean states in Stage III). Other international events, in the Middle East for example, or internal developments in participating states (such as Portugal) could also affect the timing of a summit conclusion.

Conclusion

Soviet reluctance to reach reasonable agreements on sensitive subjects, and the general unwillingness to give up important points has slowed Conference progress and will add to negotiating pressures in the weeks to come. However, it is still mechanically feasible for Stage II to be completed about the end of May or mid-June, provided the Soviets make some key concessions and peripheral problems can be kept under control.
This status report is for your information. As the Conference works toward a conclusion of Stage II during the next several weeks, I will keep you informed of the substantive developments and the timing of the Stage III summit in Helsinki.

RGates:nw:4/2/75
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

April 2, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Dobrynin

You have agreed to receive Dobrynin Thursday, April 3, at 3:30 p.m.

Check List:

-- SALT. You agreed in your meeting with Dobrynin last Saturday to discuss SALT in greater detail at this meeting. Dobrynin raised Backfire, MIRV verification, changes in launcher dimensions, and entirely new types of systems. At Tab A are talking points and background information. [Initials]

-- Soviet Submarine. Dobrynin handed you a note protesting the raising of the Soviet G-class submarine. Talking points for your response and the Soviet note are at Tab B.

-- US/Japanese Space Cooperation. Dobrynin handed you a note raising this issue as contravening efforts to limit strategic arms. The note you approved in response is at Tab C, together with the Soviet note. We recommend that you hand the US response to Dobrynin.

-- Berlin Camera. Dobrynin handed you a note protesting photography of Soviet forces as evidenced by a camera which fell out of a US military aircraft approaching Berlin. The Soviet note and talking points which Hartman has used with Vorontsov are at Tab D.

-- Middle East. Apart from any further discussion of the diplomatic situation--Geneva--you may want to reinforce the protests already conveyed to Vorontsov.

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
by Sonnenfeldt (3/31) and Hartman (4/2) concerning continued Soviet propaganda intimations of US complicity in the Faysal assassination. The text of the latest Soviet broadcast is at Tab E.

--- Threshold Test Ban Talks. These are on track and we see no reason for you to raise them. A status report is at Tab F.

--- CSCE. A status report is at Tab G.

--- V-E Day Preparations. A status report is at Tab H.

--- McClellan Case. Soviet authorities on March 31 turned down the application of Professor McClellan's wife to emigrate to the U.S. A memorandum recommending that you express your disappointment to Dobrynin is attached at Tab J.

Attachments:

Tab A - SALT Talking Points & Background Information
Tab B - Soviet Submarine Talking Points and Soviet Note
Tab C - Soviet Note on US/Japanese Space Cooperation and Your Approved Response
Tab D - Soviet Note on Berlin Camera and Talking Points
Tab E - Text of Soviet Broadcast on Assassination of King Faysal
Tab F - TTBT Status Report
Tab G - CSCE Status Report
Tab H - V-E Day Status Report
Tab I - Sonnenfeldt-Hyland Memo of March 28, 1975
Tab J - Hartman Memo on McClellan Case
Brezhnev's recent letters to the President, and other Western leaders pressing for acceptance of June 30 as a target date for the Helsinki stage III meeting reflect Moscow's growing desire to conclude CSCE by mid-1975. At Geneva, the Soviets have been showing limited flexibility on some key issues—the CBM on notification of maneuvers, in particular—but have made a strenuous effort to eliminate or weaken formulations on "individual contacts" in texts under Baskets 2 and 3 and displayed increasing nervousness over their steadily shrinking timetable. After Easter, Moscow might make sufficient concessions at Geneva to permit conclusion of at least substantive aspects of stage II before the end of May—the 30th anniversary month of VE-Day. If so, Brezhnev's objective of meeting in Helsinki on June 30 might attract increasing support from many conference participants. In our judgment, it still appears more likely, however, that stage II will not be over until about early June. Thus, a more realistic date for convening stage III appears to be mid-July.

Basket I--Principles and CBMs

On the eve of the Easter recess, tentative agreement was reached on the 9th principle--cooperation among states. Thus, negotiations will soon begin in earnest on the 10th and last principle--fulfillment in good faith of international obligations. We are pleased with the compromise text recently reached with the Soviets on the "peaceful change" issue and hope both Moscow and Bonn will display continuing flexibility in resolving differences over the German language version of this text. Because of firm French views that the peaceful change text should not be provisionally registered until agreement is reached on Quadripartite Rights and responsibilities and on "equal respect" and interpretation of every principle in the context of all the others, the US delegation has refrained from pushing hard for early registration of the peaceful change compromise. The Soviets appear to understand French concerns and have not pressed us on this point.

With regard to "equal respect" of principles, our objective is to concur in any consensus acceptable to our Allies and the Soviets. The French tell us that Moscow can accept a compromise on the basis of paragraph 18 of the Helsinki Final Recommendations, which
states inter alia that "the participating states \textit{will} respect and apply the principles equally and unreservedly." Gromyko accepted this approach at the stage I meetings in July 1973, and it would now be helpful to elicit continuing Soviet support for it, as well as for a formulation calling for interpretation of every principle in the context of all the others.

Regarding Quadripartite Rights, we continue to follow Sauvagnargues' lead in defending the Bonn Group formulation of last year that was tabled by France in December for inclusion in the 10th principle. However, we believe that sooner or later this formulation must be either altered to meet concerns of the neutrals, who believe it plays into Moscow's hands by reinforcing the Brezhnev Doctrine, or it must be replaced by a separate disclaimer protecting Allied rights. The Soviets are generally taking a low profile on this question.

The Soviets have recently announced that they would be flexible on parameters for a CBM on notification of military maneuvers, if it were agreed in principle that such a CBM would be "entirely voluntary." The Allied and neutral reaction has been that there is no objection in principle to the idea of voluntariness, provided Moscow can give a clearer picture of parameters it can accept. The Romanians oppose the idea of a voluntary CBM on maneuvers.

**Basket 3--Human Contacts**

In basket 3, the West has been facing very heavy pressure from the Soviets who are trying to keep their concessions to a minimum. Their attitude has recently provoked a corresponding stubbornness among many Allied and neutral delegations. Meanwhile, we continue to press for "realistic," not minimal, basket 3 results.

Key issues yet to be resolved in basket 3 are: introductory language for the human contacts and information sections; placement of agreed language in the text on right to travel; the radio jamming issue; working conditions for journalists; the French effort to open reading rooms in the USSR; and individual contacts among creative artists.
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ACTION EUR-12
INPC OCT-01 NEE-09 T0-10 ISU-08 CIAE-06 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
930-08 USE-00 INRE-00 ERD-85 M-02 INR-07 L-02
OIC-02 OHR-01 PA-01 PM-73 PRA-61 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02
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F.O. 116521 GUS
TABS: CSSC, PFOR, PARM, ESER, FEWT, SSERM, XG
SUBJECT: CSEI STAGE II HIGHLIGHTS - APRIL 7-11

1. SUMMARY: THE PACE UP NEGOTIATIONS WAS RENT AND SERIOUS
THIS WEEK, AS EAST AND WEST BEGAN TO STEP UP THEIR EFFORTS

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TO COMPLETE WORK ON PENDING BUSINESS, AND DOUBTS BEGAN TO BE VOICED AS TO WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COMPLETE STAGE II WORK IN TIME FOR STAGE III THIS SUMMER. CONCRETE PROGRESS WAS LIMITED BUT WORK ON TENTH (AND LAST) PRINCIPLE NEARED COMPLETION. INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS BEGAN ON QRF SAVING CLAUSE. MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE VIRTUALLY AGREED TO MOVE AHEAD WITH PARALLEL CONSIDERATION OF SPECIFIC PARAMETERS AND SOVIET IDEA FOR A VOLUNTARY BASIS FOR QRF ON MANEUVERS. IN PRACTICALLY US-SOVIET DIFFERENCES OVER HUMAN CONTACTS INTRODUCTION, WORKING CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS AND BROADCASTING BECAME MORE APPARENT AS SOVIETS PRESSURED FOR PROGRESS ON THESE AND CERTAIN OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES. END SUMMARY.

2. PRINCIPLES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION -- PRINCIPLES SUBCOMMITTEE NEARED COMPLETION OF WORK ON TENTH PRINCIPLE (FULFILLMENT IN GOOD FAITH OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW), WITH QUESTION OF QRF SAVING CLAUSE PUT ASIDE TEMPORARILY FOR PRIVATE DISCUSSION. MEANWHILE FRENCH DELEGATION MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF NEUTRALS TO DISCUSS THEIR OBJECTIONS TO QRF LANGUAGE. NEUTRALS HAVE EVIDENTLY REDUCED THEIR DEMANDS FOR CHANGES IN QRF TEXT. AND WAY MAY NOW BE OPEN FOR PROGRESS TOWARD RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE. IN SPECIAL WORKING BODY ON IMPLEMENTATION, SOVIETS CONTINUED TO RESIST DRAFTING ON PREAMBLE TO ROMANIAN NON-USE OF FORCE PAPER, WHICH THEY SAID WOULD PREJUDICE QUESTION OF WHETHER THIS WILL BE A SEPARATE DOCUMENT.

3. MILITARY SECURITY -- BY THE END OF THE WEEK VIRTUALLY ALL SUBCOMMITTEE REPS HAD AGREED ON PROCEDURAL UNDERSTANDING FOR FURTHER WORK ON MANEUVER QRM, WHICH WAS READ OUT BY AUSTRIAN REP AS FOLLOWS: "THERE WAS A WORKING ACCORD TO DEAL, IN PARALLEL, WITH THE PARAMETERS WHICH Have BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS AND THE CONCEPT OF A VOLUNTARY BASIS, BEARING IN MIND THAT THIS CONCEPT AND THE PARAMETERS ARE INTERLINKED." TEXT WAS DESIGNED BY ALLIES TO SHOW LIMITED POSITIVE REACTION ON VOLUNTARY BASIS WITHOUT ACCEPTING IJFA IN PRINCIPLE, AND TO PROCEED TO DRAW SOVIETS OUT ON THEIR PROMISED CONCESSIONS ON PARAMETERS. ROMANAINS
SECRET

ITALIAN SOVIET OBJECTION TO ANY REFERENCE TO VOLUNTARY BASIS, WITH RESULT THAT TEXT COULD NOT BE ENTERED IN RECORD, DESPITE ROMANIAN OBJECTION, SUBCOMMITTEE WILL BEGIN INFORMAL PARALLEL SESSIONS NEXT WEEK, AND ALLIES WILL PROBE FURTHER FOR SOVIET FLEXIBILITY, PARTICULARLY ON ISSUE OF PRINCIPLE THAT MANEUVER CBM SHOULD APPLY IN ALL OF EUROPE, WITH EXCEPTION FOR PORTIONS OF TERRITORY OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BORDERING OTHER CONTINENTS (I.E., USSR AND TURKEY).

4. ECONOMICS AND SCIENCE/TECHNOLOGY -- FULL COMMITTEE CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF PARAGRAPHS ON LDC'S BUT MADE LITTLE HEADWAY. SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES CAME NEAR TO AGREEMENT ON INTRODUCTION TO PARAGRAPH ON DOUBLE TAXATION AND REPATRIATION OF CAPITAL, ONE OF ITS FEW REMAINING ISSUES. SUBCOMMITTEE ON OTHER ECONOMIC AREAS FINISHED ITS RESOLUTION ON TRANSPORTATION BY REMOVING ALL BRACKETS AFTER AGREEING ON TWO PENDING PARAGRAPHS. THIS SUBCOMMITTEE HAS NOW COMPLETED TWO OF ITS FOUR RESOLUTIONS -- TOURISM AND TRANSPORTATION -- AND HAS TWO MORE -- MIGRANT LABOR AND TRAINING OF PROFESSIONAL STAFF -- STILL TO BE FINISHED. LAST TWO PAPERS ARE EACH ONE PARAGRAPH SHORT OF COMPLETION.

5. HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION -- IN HUMAN CONTACTS SUBCOMMITTEE, SOVIETS SEEMED SOMEWHAT IMPATIENT, EXPRESSING ANNOYANCE AT THE FAILURE TO REGISTER THE TOURISM TEXT, WHICH THEY WISH TO PUT ASIDE UNTIL THE QUESTION OF TITLES AND SUBTITLES IN BASKET III DOCUMENT IS RESOLVED. SOVIETS HAVE PROPOSED THAT SUBCOMMITTEE SEEK TO REMOVE BRACKETS IN TEXT ALREADY REGISTERED, WHILE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS CONTINUE ON OUTSTANDING TEXTS, AND SAID THEY WOULD NOT OBJECT TO AN FKG SUGGESTION THAT THE SUBCOMMITTEE ALSO TAKE UP THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FINAL TEXTS. INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF THE TRAVEL TEXT WAS MOVED FORWARD BY AGREEMENT TO CONSIDER ALL FIVE PARAGRAPHS IN PARALLEL AND BY SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DROP REFERENCES TO WORKERS AND TRADE UNIONS. THERE WAS NO PROGRESS ON INTRODUCTORY TEXT, WHICH REMAINS STUCK. IN INFORMATION INFORMAL MEETINGS WERE HELD ON INTRODUCTORY TEXT AND WORKING CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS, WITH NO CONCRETE PROGRESS. IN SUBCOMMITTEE ON CULTURE, EAST/WEST

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TELEGRAM

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STALEMATE CONTINUED, AND EC-NINE BEGAN CONSIDERATION OF FRENCH PROPOSALS DESIGNED BREAK IMPOSSIBLE ON KEY ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO WEST. IN EDUCATION SUBCOMMITTEE, LIMITED PROGRESS WAS ACHIEVED ON RELATIVELY NON-CONTROVERSIAL EXCHANGES OF EXPERIENCE IN TEACHING METHODS. MEANWHILE, FRENCH DELEGATION INITIATED INFORMAL TALKS WITH SOVIETS IN KEENLY EFFORT TO AGREE ON WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR CONTACTS AMONG EDUCATORS AND ON CONTROVERSIAL USSR TEXT CONCERNING CONTENT OF TEXTBOOKS.

6. MEDITERRANEAN -- WORKING GROUP HELD INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF THREE PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS WHICH RESULTED FROM CONSULTATIONS AMONG DELEGATIONS WHICH SPONSORED DRAFTS FOR MEDITERRANEAN DECLARATION, AGREEMENT ON THESE PARAS WOULD LEAVE ONLY ONE, OR POSSIBLY TWO, PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS TO BE DRAFTED TO COMPLETE SUBSTANTIVE WORK ON MEDITERRANEAN DECLARATION.

7. FINAL DOCUMENTS AND STAGE III -- NEWLY ESTABLISHED WORKING GROUP ON STAGE III HEARD FINISH PRESENTATION ON TECHNICAL PREPARATIONS FOR STAGE III, AND RECEIVED ADDITIONAL VIEWS ON LIST OF ISSUES RELATING TO STAGE III WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE END OF THE STAGE II NEGOTIATIONS.

8. FOLLOW-UP -- SWISS DELEGATION PRESENTED COMPOSITE DRAFT FOR FIRST ELEMENT OF OPERATIVE PART OF FOLLOW-UP RESOLUTION, AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER WORK, BUT FRENCH AND BELGIAN DELS STRONGLY RESISTED EFFORTS TO MOVE DISCUSSION FORWARD ON THIS SUBJECT, AND PROGRESS WILL PROBABLY BE SLOW, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING.

9. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH CONCRETE PROGRESS WAS LIMITED THIS WEEK MANY ISSUES MOVED TOWARDS POSITIONS WHICH WILL FACILITATE THEIR RESOLUTION. THIS WAS TRUE PARTICULARLY IN THE CASE OF THE PRINCIPLES AND CBMs, WHERE THE GENERAL LINERS OF EVENTUAL AGREEMENT ARE BECOMING CLEARER. THE SOVIETS, WHO CONTINUE TO EXHIBIT CERTAIN INDICATIONS THAT THEY ARE GROWING ANXIOUS UNDER THEIR SELF-IMPOSED DEADLINE, ARE NOW MOVING MORE ACTIVELY AND OPENLY TO PRESS FOR CONCLUSION OF WORK IN BASKET III, NEVERTHE-
LESS, THEY HAVE MAINTAINED THEIR STUBBORN RESISTANCE TO EVEN MINOR CONCESSIONS ON SUBSTANCE, AS WELL AS THEIR CONVOLUTED NEGOTIATING TACTICS. DESPITE A GENERAL WILL ON THE PART OF WESTERN AND NEUTRAL DELEGATIONS TO FINISH THE STAGE II NEGOTIATIONS, THIS CONTINUED SOVIET OBSTINENCE HAS RESULTED IN THE FIRST INFORMAL EXPRESSIONS OF DOUBT BY DELEGATES HERE THAT SUBSTANTIVE WORK CAN BE FINISHED IN TIME FOR A STAGE III CONCLUSION THIS SUMMER. THOSE DOUBTS APPLY TO WORK ON THE PRINCIPLES, CBMs, AND BASKET III, BUT ALSO RELATE TO NEWLY OPENED ISSUES SUCH AS THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FINAL DOCUMENTS, AND TO PERIPHERAL MATTERS LIKE CYPRUS WHICH COULD DELAY PROGRESS. MEANWHILE, NATO ALLIES AND NEUTRALS HAVE SHOWN APPRECIATION FOR THE FIRM LINE TAKEN BY US ON SEVERAL SPECIFIC ISSUES IN BASKET III. END COMMENT.

ABRAMS
Briefing Item

Soviet Policy After CSCE: Ambassador Stoessel has offered his views on what actions the Soviets may take following the CSCE summit. He expects the Soviets to use the summit as a springboard for advertising the triumphs of their detente policy, for devoting new emphasis to arms control (including SALT and MBFR, but also including a world disarmament conference and other unhelpful initiatives), for convening a European communist conference, for increasing their presence in Western Europe, and for pressing their idea of an Asian collective security system. While the Ambassador believes that Basket III is a clear, if modest, asset for the West, he suspects that one immediate result of the Helsinki Summit will be an ideological tightening up in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union.

In terms of the Soviet leadership, a CSCE summit will be viewed as a major plus for Brezhnev and his policies. From a Western point of view, the ending of CSCE will remove an element of Western leverage on Soviet behavior. The Ambassador thinks that there are enough additional moderating factors to keep the Soviets after Helsinki from a qualitative increase in their efforts to exploit Western weaknesses. In any case -- short of a rapid Portuguese collapse into communist dictatorship, which he assumes would make a CSCE third stage academic -- he does not think the West would gain by delaying a CSCE conclusion, since Western leverage
would soon reach a point of diminishing returns. It seems likely that, at the Helsinki finale, the West will come out with more, and the Soviets less, than either side expected when the Warsaw Pact leaders renewed their call for a conference in 1969. But, while the Soviets will make more of it, CSCE should be a plus for both sides and a further step toward consolidating a Soviet detente policy, important elements of which remain in the overall U.S. and Western interest.

(RGates: 4/29/75)  (Moscow 05822)
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: Mr. Clift
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Gromyko: Soviet Impatience at CSCE Growing

In a two hour conversation with Ambassador Sherer on May 15, Soviet CSCE delegation head Kovalev focused on problems of concern to the Soviet delegation and asked what steps were necessary to bring Stage II to a quick conclusion. Kovalev alluded several times to the need to have a clear idea of U.S. positions on CSCE issues before Foreign Minister Gromyko's meeting with you in Vienna. Several of the substantive issues raised specifically by Kovalev included:

-- Working conditions for journalists: the Soviets are annoyed by what they view as a tougher U.S. position on this Basket III text; Kovalev even accused the U.S. of trying to unite the NATO Allies on this subject. Ambassador Sherer reports that the Allies are indeed now united in pursuing the main points in this text -- travel, individuals as news sources and no expulsion for pursuit of professional activity.

-- CBMs: Kovalev asked what the Soviets should do to reach early agreement on this item and Sherer urged him to come forward soon with maximum moves toward Western positions on numerical parameters.

-- Timing: Kovalev said the Soviets are now prepared to do everything possible to move forward. He asked for U.S. view of the key issues which would bring an early conclusion to Stage II and was told travel, journalists and CBM's.

Kovalev's démarche to Ambassador Sherer is the latest indication of growing Soviet impatience at their inability to wrap up Stage II quickly and without major concessions. In fact, their obvious need to fulfill Brezhnev's timetable of a Stage III conclusion this summer has the Soviets in a corner and, so far, their pressures and bluster aimed at the allied and neutral participants have not produced agreement on the unbalanced pro-East texts they are seeking.

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[Signature]

NATIONAL ARCHIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

1/13/1975

[Stamp]
It therefore would seem very much in our interests to impress upon Gromyko the need for the USSR to take a more reasonable position on issues of importance to the West, and, at the same time, for us to encourage the Allies to stay together and hold their ground in the coming weeks. The Soviets should be forced either to make important concessions or face a major political reverse -- and will probably opt for the former.
May 16, 1975

SECRET

THE SECRETARY'S PRINCIPALS' AND REGIONALS' STAFF MEETING,
Monday, May 16, 1975, 8:00 a.m.

pp 2 - 7 Withdrawal of US forces from Thailand. The
reaction of Mayaguez affair. Secretary
requests he consider any US response to Thai
complaints. He is opposed to apologizing to
Thailand.

pp 7 - 14 MAP and economic assistance for Greece. Formulas
for a Cyprus solution.

pp 14-17 Discussion of consultation with Congress on our
Egyptian assistance effort.

pp 18-19 Philippine situation as it relates to our bases.

pp 20-23 Secretary asks for a list of agreement letters,
notes, etc., upon which our military presence in
Thailand is based, particularly any "secret"
agreements involving US obligations.

pp 23-29 US policy in a "Congo type" situation in Angola
discussed. Secretary asks for US foreign policy
decision memorandum with two or three major options
to avoid a Congo type situation.

pp 29-36 OAS developments. Election for Secretary General.
Panama, China and Cuban issues mentioned. Rogers
will brief the Secretary on OAS elections before
decide Saturday afternoon.

pp 36-41 Need for decision on capacity for uranium enrichment.
NSC involvement in decision process.

pp 39-41 OECD and IEA presentations

-42

pp 41-44 CSCE conversations status. Plans for the Chiefs
of State meeting discussed.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: He may be on very weak ground.

MR. KATZ: It's supposed to be a private project. The whole idea was privatization, and it will rest on a substantial contribution from the U. S. Treasury.

MR. INGERSOLL: And any guarantees. In fact, it's all guarantee.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That may be. I'm not for Lynn, but I'm for Lynn getting a hearing.

MR. INGERSOLL: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: He can raise just too much havoc if he doesn't.

How about the OECD presentation?

MR. KATZ: I think that's coming along pretty well. I mean that's essentially elaboration of your Kansas City speech, but that's coming along well.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but that has to be cleared with the other agencies too.

MR. KATZ: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: O.K. Art? I mean with a different philosophical framework -- or at least with a philosophical framework.

MR. HARTMAN: On the CSCE, I think both in your
conversations with Schmidt and with Gromyko the date is going to loom large. The Soviets are coming in now from all sides saying they definitely want to nail us down and they want to have a meeting in July. They're very concerned about any efforts -- either consciously or not through design -- to postpone it into the fall. I think, also, the European leadership is going in the same direction.

We know a little bit of that from the Germans. They want to fix the schedule. They want to fix their calendars, and Schmidt particularly -- he's thinking of the third week in July -- so that will come up at that time.

The Europeans have come up with a minimum package now to really wind up that Conference, and we're supporting it. It has everything in it that one could expect, and there are some concessions the Soviets are going to have to make.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't know what I expect. What does it have in it?

MR. HARTMAN: It has the minimum acceptable texts on all of the humanitarian affairs. You've got family reunification, marriage texts -- what are the others?

MR. HYLAND: Travel.

MR. HARTMAN: Travel.
MR. HYLAND: Radio broadcasting, exchange of information -- radio broadcasting where there will not be a commitment.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Will I get a memo?

MR. HARTMAN: You will have a memo which should be with you now, which gives you a status report.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Where is it, Jerry?

Where are any of these memos?

MR. ADAMS: I think they're in your action folders.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This I have to read before I go to Europe.

MR. HARTMAN: On dates, I'd like to be able to tell people -- for example, on the President's schedule in Brussels -- give them the exact hour.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You can not, until I have shown it to the President.

MR. HARTMAN: I wondered whether you had done that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I can't show that to the President until my friends here put it in my folder to take to the President.

O.K. As soon as that's done, I'll take it to the
President, along with his statement. Where is that?

MR. ADAMS: It's in a special folder.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If you want me to take it up with the President, you might put it in the folder with the papers that I'm taking to the President. That isn't an unreasonable request, is it? (Laughter.) It doesn't mean I'm harassing you.

MR. HYLAND: According to what Art said, my figures say there will be 175 hours in speeches at the CSC (laughter) -- if the present plan prevails.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Which is what?

MR. HARTMAN: 20 minutes ahead of that.

MR. HYLAND: 20 minutes ahead. But this is --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: How can that be?

MR. LORD: That with 50 countries? (Laughter.)

MR. HYLAND: I'm just kidding. This is an issue that has to be taken up -- how long it's going to last.

MR. HARTMAN: Schmidt would like to have five days in order to allow for good long bilaterals with people.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It's absolutely out of the question. Our press will kill us. It will be an unbelievable nightmare to have five days.

MR. HYLAND: Most Europeans want at least four.
MR. HARTMAN: The signature is on the last day; three days of speeches.

MR. HYLAND: Three days of speeches; one day of ceremonies.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think it will be ridiculed in our press as a total fraud.

MR. HYLAND: But as a practical problem we will have three full days of speeches. And, presumably, every Head of State has to sit there while his colleagues speak.

MR. HARTMAN: If you could ever persuade the Western countries to nominate representative spokesmen. But I can't imagine a guy going there and not wanting to say something. We can discuss it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: On the other hand, I think three days of speeches and one day of ceremonies, plus the bilateralns that will be inevitable is going to be a nightmare.

MR. HYLAND: You'll probably want to talk to Gromyko about this because I don't think the Russians particularly want to have Brezhnev to sit there for three or four days. They happen to be one of the few countries who want to keep it down.
MEMORANDUM

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of the American Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vasily G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief, American Section of the American Department
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
William C. Hyland, Director, INR
Jan M. Lodal, NSC Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME:
Monday, May 19, 1975
6:15 - 8:35 p.m.

PLACE:
Gobelin Saal
Hotel Imperial
Vienna, Austria

SUBJECT:
CSCE

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXCEPT FOR GENERAL CLASSIFICATION
SPECIAL MARKING INSTRUCTIONS
Exemption Category 5 (B), (1,3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp to Del.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

Gromyko: [points to portrait on wall, next to tapestry] There is a good view of a hunter there. It's good for Sonnenfeldt. We need a wild boar.

Kissinger: Sonnenfeldt will shoot it.

Gromyko: Perhaps, as we agreed, we could start by having an exchange on European affairs and the European Security Conference.

Kissinger: I agree. And Mr. Foreign Minister, since we're technically on our ground, I'd like to take this opportunity to reaffirm what I told you privately:

The basic line of United States policy remains intact and we are determined to overcome problems where differences exist. I want to say this in front of my colleagues, and I was asked specifically by President Ford to say this.

Gromyko: Let me say briefly what I've just had occasion to tell the Secretary of State personally, that the line of the Soviet Union towards the United States is the same as the line that has taken shape in recent years mainly as a result of the Soviet-American summits and the documents signed by the two countries. We, for our part, are rigorously following that line and we believe both sides should pursue it. We feel we should not allow events or any countries or combination of countries to cause any harm to that policy or the principles underlying that policy. In other words, we should follow the line to strengthen detente and Soviet-American relations and strengthen peace.

That is something that reflects the thinking of the entire Soviet leadership and of General Secretary Brezhnev personally.

Kissinger: Should we turn to European matters?

Gromyko: Yes, I think we should turn to European matters and take up the European Security Conference first.

Kissinger: As one of the world's great experts on the European Security Conference and as the only Foreign Minister who has read the documents, why don't you start.

Gromyko: I don't know.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

Kissinger: Did I tell you the story about Vladivostok, how you undermined the President's confidence in me?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: He [the President] turned to me and asked "What is he talking about?" and I said I didn't know. [Laughter]. That problem is settled -- between "equal validity" and "equal applicability." I had two difficulties -- I couldn't tell the difference between the two positions, and what is more embarrassing for a Foreign Minister, I didn't know which side had which position. [Laughter].

Gromyko: Your mind must have been on more significant matters than the European Security Conference.

Kissinger: It's now solved, isn't it?

Gromyko: Let us then turn to those matters, and I trust our discussion will be both serious and productive.

Kissinger: That is our intention.

Gromyko: I may have to say some words on this subject that may not be very pleasant for you to hear. Maybe pleasant, but not very pleasant.

Kissinger: The Foreign Minister is a disciple of Maréchal Foch, always on the attack.

Gromyko: Of late we have formed the impression that the American position at the Conference has become harsher and tougher on several matters related to the European Security Conference and the questions in that forum. In the past the Soviet Union and the United States have in several examples shown they can cooperate quite well. In this context, I'd like to refer to the understanding you and I reached in Geneva on peaceful change of frontiers, and there are other examples of such cooperation. But of late -- I say this just half in jest -- I say it's as if someone has switched somebody else for the American delegation at Geneva, though it's the same good people. Someone has done this.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

Kissinger: Sonnenfeldt.

Gromyko: I hope the line pursued by the United States will be a line aimed at removing differences and reaching agreement. Of course, only you can give clarity to this situation. I say this by way of introductory remarks and I'm sure you'll have something to say in reply.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I'm aware of your view that the United States has perhaps not proceeded as rapidly as desirable. I do not believe this is the case. I believe perhaps it's the Soviet Union that has not made all the moves it could. Be that as it may, I have reviewed the European Security Conference and we believe it's possible to conclude the European Security Conference in substantially the time frame we've discussed, and concluded at the summit level, and have it all concluded by the end of July.

So perhaps we could most usefully spend our time on what needs to be done.

Kissinger: The principles are done. Quadrupartite rights and responsibilities. We have the problem of Basket III, of confidence-building machinery, and while we are here we should say something about how it [the summit] should be conducted — the length of time, speeches, if you're ready.

Gromyko: I am ready.

Kissinger: So that's how we think we should spend the time.

Gromyko: I certainly agree to that approach. Let's direct our gaze into the future and see how we can do away with the remaining complexities and difficulties and see how we can conclude in the period we have agreed upon.

Kissinger: On confidence-building measures, the differences concern the number of days of prior notification, the depth of the zone to be covered, and the size of forces that would be concerned. Those are the three issues.

Regarding the length of time, the Soviet view is 14 days and the Western view is 40 days.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
Hartman: 49 days.

Kissinger: [to Hartman]: How did we arrive at that?

Hartman: Seven weeks.

Gromyko: Ours is 12 days.

Kissinger: Well, we won't accept 12.

On the depth of the area, we have said 500 kilometers, and you had said 100 kilometers. On the size of forces, you had said 30-35,000, informally. What is the formal position.

Hartman: 40,000.

Kissinger: And we had said 20-25,000.

We are prepared to find a compromise on all of these points, and not to insist on our position, if you don't insist on yours. And we could instruct our delegations accordingly to find a compromise.

Gromyko: Let's take up point by point. Depth.

Kissinger: On depth, we'd be prepared to settle in the middle, say 300 kilometers, we had said 500 and you had said 100.

Gromyko: [Thinks] That is not the basis. Even now, 100, when you say it takes all the territory, when compared to Western Europe, our territory is larger, and the whole line, from north to the south. Try to compare it—all the territory, a stripe down.

Kissinger: There is more territory because the Soviet Union is larger?

Gromyko: Eastern Europe is covered. But this is not taken into account by your and the Western European delegations.

You mentioned formal and informal positions.
Sonnenfeldt: On numbers.

Gromyko: No, on depth.

Kissinger: We gave you no informal position on that.

Gromyko: On numbers.

[Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt confer]

150. I think 150 is much larger if you compare the territory.

Dobrynin: In square miles.

Kissinger: Our problem is some of our allies -- I don't want to mention names because we don't want to be in the position of negotiating separately--say that 300 is their minimum. So we want to agree on something that has a chance to be implemented. I really think the lowest number we could get without difficulty or checking with our allies is 250 kilometers. This is not bargaining because I've taken no interest, but we think that's the lowest.

Gromyko: 150 is our position. This is on depth.

On numbers.....

Kissinger: The official allied figure is 12,000. Our personal compromise is 20-25,000. Your position is 30-35,000.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: If we would get everything else worked out, we'd recommend to our allies something between 25-30,000 and that would bring us very close to each other.

[There is a conference on the Soviet side.]

Gromyko: On 30,000, that's good. We would be prepared to agree on that, but without being conditioned on another condition. 30,000, that we could agree on, because that represents the maximum you
are prepared to agree to and it's the minimum we are prepared to accept, but we cannot accept the other figure regarding depth. But the area of the Soviet Union that would be subject to notification would be greater than all of the area in Western Europe.

As regards the third element, that is, the time of notification, frankly speaking we believe this question is raised especially artificially. Why should we be expected to give two months' notice in advance?

**Kissinger:** Seven weeks. So we can mobilize to go to war.

**Gromyko:** Let us reason coolly on this. Maybe for one country, one regiment or two or an entire division is a great force which, when it starts moving, really causes the whole world to shake, and maybe they take three or four months to plan. It may take three months for them to get boots and uniforms fitted. But for us a division is nothing.

**Kissinger:** You're talking about number.

**Gromyko:** I'm talking about preparation.

**Kissinger:** My view is, when we need the warning we won't get it, and when we get the warning we won't need it. If one is going to attack, one can violate the agreement.

So I'm not going to insist on seven weeks. I was supporting you. Because I was prepared to settle for six and one-half weeks.

**Gromyko:** I was just about to come out in solidarity with you when you said the same thing about me.

Two weeks.

**Sonnenfeldt:** From twelve to fourteen days.

**Gromyko:** Two weeks ahead of time we notify you that 30,000 troops are about to move.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

Kissinger: In two weeks that information couldn’t possibly get from the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They couldn’t put it on the agenda of a NATO meeting in two weeks.

Gromyko: Maybe we should put an effort to rectify matters where it is really needed.

Two weeks.

Kissinger: I gave up four days; you gave up two days. How about 30 days?

Gromyko: Mr. Secretary, I can’t give an agreement to that because we think, especially after what you said about the real importance of such matters, that someone is just giving vent to psychology matters.

Kissinger: The whole thing is psychological.

Gromyko: The whole thing is being lauded to the skies.

Kissinger: But you want it to be, because that gives the European Security Conference its importance.

Gromyko: You think it’s that that will give it importance.

Kissinger: No, it’s “equal applicability” compared to “equal validity.”

Gromyko: Is that Mintoff’s view?

Kissinger: Mintoff got a tremendous reception in the People’s Republic of China and hasn’t been the same since.

Gromyko: We read about that.

Kissinger: The minimum we could convince our friends to do is 25 days.

Gromyko: In that case we will have to leave that question open.

Kissinger: All right. Then we have depth and warning....

Gromyko: We cannot accept that figure.

Far more important than this question of number of days are the questions of depth and warning. On numbers, like Apollo, we’ve managed a docking.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

Kissinger: If it's too short a time and too narrow [an area], it has no significance.

Dobrynin: Here, you can pick up the telephone and call anywhere in two minutes.

Gromyko: Mintoff must have frightened everybody.

Kissinger: A very persuasive man.

Gromyko: He must be virtually terrorizing everyone at the Conference.

Kissinger: He's threatening to join Libya.

Gromyko: Let me add to that, that those who want agreement on a different time should give earnest thinking to our latest proposal. And generally speaking, a strange phenomenon is visible at the Conference, that it's only the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries that should retreat and retreat and retreat and then we'll come to an agreement.

You know our delegation at the Conference has told the Conference that the Soviet Union is prepared to send notification to all participating countries and not only to those bordering on the Soviet Union.

Then when we mention a depth of 100 kilometers, that depth will apply also to Turkey.

Kissinger: What do you mean?

Hyland: Turkey has to notify countries of movements 100 kilometers from its borders.

Gromyko: Turkey won't have to notify everyone of movements, but only those 100 kilometers from its borders.

Kissinger: Not on Bulgaria and Greece. [to Sonnenfeldt:] Well, what's your answer?

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

Gromyko: I'm sure your advisers are advising you to accept that proposal.

Dobrynin: They're all making notes urging you to agree.

Makarov: Even Sonnenfeldt.

Gromyko: Even Sonnenfeldt.

Try measuring in terms of square mileage the size of the zone about which we intend to give notification.

Kissinger: Yes, but that's not the problem. It cannot be done on the basis of territory, but it has to be done in terms relevant to the problem people are concerned about.

Dobrynin: It's on the whole border, north to south.

Kissinger: Let me say this: that the problem of voluntary notification raises this problem. When we testify to Congress we will say that though it's voluntary, we will expect it to be done, and if it is done and not notified, it will be inconsistent with the spirit of the treaty.

Sonnenfeldt: Agreement.

Kissinger: Agreement. If it is not voluntary, since we will hold you to it anyway, we could be more flexible on other elements.

Gromyko: When we mention the figures we are prepared to accept, we can accept them only on the condition that the principle of the voluntary notification is recognized. This is the principle we discussed with you at Geneva. All we accept is conditioned on that.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: And we discussed it with France and England, and they accepted. So we consider that's accepted.

Kissinger: Yes, but.....

Gromyko: We received the suggestion of the form of words from Britain or NATO; we are not entirely satisfied with those, but we have some amendments. Not big ones, but some amendments.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

Let me also say, if the voluntary principle is accepted, the mechanism of notification would operate more effectively in fact than if some other principle will be agreed upon. It's a less sharply worded formula, and would affect the scheme of things less than the other formula. It would be more acceptable politically and legally, and would in fact be more effective. I want to emphasize, more effective.

Kissinger: But in fact that means there would be notification.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: And we would testify to that effect to Congress.

Dobrynin: Yes, Henry.

Gromyko: If you are prepared to look into this British formula, we are prepared to discuss an amendment to it.

Kissinger: May I see it?

Sukhodrev: This is in Russian, sir.

Gromyko: But we are prepared to lend it to you in Russian. At a very low interest rate.

[Hartman looks for it]

If you are prepared, I could make our suggestions

[Sukhodrev hands over Tab A. Hartman discusses it with Secretary Kissinger]

Korniyenko: The top part, Mr. Secretary.

Sukhodrev: The top part is the British.

Kissinger: What's the second part?

Korniyenko: Some neutral countries.

Gromyko: Don't pay attention to that.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
Korniienko: The Minister would like to suggest some changes in the British text.

Gromyko: My suggestion is the following:

Sukhodrev: Here is the amendment.

Kissinger: We'll agree to take it out if you add 50 kilometers.

Gromyko: We already added 50 kilometers. [laughter]

Kissinger: 50 more. We have both learned that in some parts of the world that you never get paid anything for services already rendered.

[There is a conference on the Soviet side.]

Gromyko: The preamble does not cause enthusiasm.

Kissinger: I have no particular recollection of this preamble. If this is the agreed text, I have no problem with deleting "therefore" from the preamble. Let us check it. If this is correct text, we agreed to drop "therefore."

Gromyko: This is the original English.

Kissinger: We'll agree to drop the word "therefore". If the British disavow this, then we're in a new situation. But on the assumption that this is the agreed text, we agree to drop the word "therefore".

Gromyko: Check with your delegation and verify it.

Kissinger: We will do it tonight. By the end of the meeting tomorrow, we'll have it.

Gromyko: What I've told you is my tentative concern. Tentative.

Kissinger: We just want to check. If they confirm it, we agree to drop the word "therefore".

Gromyko: The Third Basket.

Kissinger: We'll leave this then. I just want to check. We have not settled the issues of depth....
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

Dobrynin: And timing.

Kissinger: And length of notification.

Can I have a 3-minute break?

[There was a break from 7:25 to 7:34 p.m. The meeting then reconvened.]

Makarov: [Shows a bottle of mineral water on the table labeled Gussinger.] Kissinger.

Kissinger: I saw it. I had the same idea.

Gromyko: Cult of personality. [Laughter]

[Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt confer]

Kissinger: Shall we leave the confidence-building measures now and go to Basket III. Have we finished?

Gromyko: Let's take up Basket III.

Kissinger: All right.

Gromyko: Let me ask you: Is it your intention to set up a state within a state? Because that's a new one in international practice. Up until now we have spoken in terms of -- and this is something you have spoken of on several occasions -- that domestic legislation must be respected. Now it appears -- and I repeat you have spoken of it on several occasions -- that newsmen are to set up a state within a state?

Kissinger: That's already the case in the United States.

Gromyko: On that we can only sympathize with you, but here we are dealing with an international agreement.

Kissinger: We have made a major effort to get our allies to make a global proposal on Basket III, where in turn, we have made a major effort to meet your concerns. If this is acceptable as the basic approach, in Geneva we could instruct our delegation to be flexible in dealing with yours and make an effort to meet your concerns. But we have made a major effort.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

As for journalists, no one has suffered more from journalists than I have, so I have no particular affection for them. But in the United States how it will be received will depend very much on how the press presents it, so to be hard on all the press points would be counterproductive.

Gromyko: To accept it as the basis for discussion wouldn't solve the problem. We would be prepared to discuss the text, but only after we get clarification on what we regard as the most thorny, the most prickly. So let's take those points up one by one.

You, in that text, try to put forward the point of view -- even though not in those literal words -- that journalists should enjoy absolute freedom. If we accept the point of view that both journalists and the practices of the states concerned would take into consideration the laws operating in the country concerned, that would help us overcome that difficulty.

Kissinger: Don't we already have that in there?

Gromyko: But, secondly, there is the question of sources of information and accessibility of those sources.

We see one provision, one clause, which says in effect that there must be free access to information including individuals. Now we see that as a sally against us, and we don't think any state could sign such a clause. We don't have any laws that state that journalists cannot have access to individuals. There are no such laws. So if the present situation continues in being, that should suit everybody concerned. But to demand that we give our stamp of approval to an idea which for some reasons -- and you know best for what reasons -- is aimed against us, is at best an insult.

And there is the clause calling for equality in terms of treatment between journalists and so-called technical personnel. I'm sure there are people who come in your office every couple of months to check on maintenance and so on; it's as if we called them diplomats. Just because they work in the same roof.

Kissinger: Are you sending people into my office to check my telephones?

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
Gromyko: It is the same with journalists and technical people -- why should we extend the same rights to them on the same footing? That's not in your interest. That's another one that has thorns in it. Even from a purely technical standpoint, if a certain apparatus is used unlawfully, whatever such persons are called -- whether journalist, technician or an angel -- he'll get slapped down.

Kissinger: There is no question about doing something unlawful. There is no question here of sending TV crews onto your strategic missile bases.

I have to go back to the original question. If we could reach an agreement on this as the basic approach, we could take a look at some of the concerns you raise. We are not saying every point here is on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. I can say now, several of the points you raise here are reasonable -- without going into language.

Gromyko: Let's take out the parts of it that are objectionable, and we will not be against taking it as a basis for discussion.

Then there is another question, and that is the freedom of broadcasting. Where did that question spring from? Let me quite frankly say, do you expect us to sign a document whereby we would be sanctioning the creation of radio stations directed against us and other Socialist countries? Do you expect us to accept that?

Kissinger: We can always try. I didn't think you would notice it.

I understand your point on this one. There are two aspects to this. So that we get to the key issues. I have innumerable times expressed my view on Basket III. I don't think you'll change your system as a result of Basket III.

Gromyko: I think there are grounds for doubts.

Kissinger: This paragraph has to do, to put it crudely, with jamming. I think it's poor drafting. It shouldn't be put in terms of sanctioning broadcasting into the Soviet Union. We'd be prepared to put it into better language.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

Gromyko: The problem here doesn't simply boil down to polishing the text. Because you yourself would never accept calling for broadcasting of all forms of propaganda for friendship, peace, detente....

Kissinger: I wouldn't accept it?

No, it's not a question of polishing the text. It's a question of encouraging information flow and not interfering with legitimate broadcasting. One is a positive concept; one is a negative concept.

Gromyko: The word "legitimate" wouldn't solve anything because immediately we'd come to polarization along ideological lines. You know we'd never accept broadcasting that undermined our system or offended public morality. There are some countries that permit publication of pornography or other materials.

Kissinger: Your objection is to access to individuals as laid down in this document, second to treating technicians as journalists, and to this text. Those are your objections.

Gromyko: No. It's not just freedom of journalists. What about questions of security?

Kissinger: What do you mean by freedom of journalists?

Gromyko: If a journalist drove up to a missile installation, I don't think he'd be comfortable there after a while.

Kissinger: Where is it in the text?

[Hartman indicates for the Secretary the place in the text, in his briefing paper.]

But this makes a specific reference to areas closed for security reasons.

Gromyko: You submitted many versions.

Kissinger: The version we submitted on May 18 refers to "regulations relating to the existence of areas closed for security reasons."

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
Gromyko: We have areas closed for security reasons, but we would have to open up some.

Kissinger: [reading from briefing paper] The text says "to ease on a reciprocal basis, the procedures for arranging journeys by foreign journalists, thereby facilitating wider travel by them within the country in which they are exercising their profession subject to the observance of regulations relating to the existence of areas closed for security reasons."

Gromyko: It says "wider" in comparison to the existing situation. It means we would have to get rid of some areas.

Dobrynin: We want the status quo.

Kissinger: My impression is that it's not easy for journalists to travel in the Soviet Union. It would have to be somewhat wider, yes.

Is security the only reason?

Gromyko: Yes. Only security.

Kissinger: Can a journalist just buy a ticket and go to Khabarousk?

Stoessel: He would have to get permission.

Dobrynin: It is the same in your country.

Kissinger: But we would abolish some too. It would be reciprocal.

Gromyko: I don't think this can be done.

Kissinger: Let me say a word on some other matters, I see your concerns. On this one, all we want is that in areas permitted for travel, that it be facilitated on a wider basis than before.

Gromyko: I'm sure travel in open areas and assistance given to such travel is greater than in many countries, even the United States.

Dobrynin: In six years, I don't remember a single case where the State Department arranged a tour for Russian journalists.
Kissinger: It's a different system. We don't organize trips, but we approve them.

Gromyko: We pay attention more to "facilitate" in this country.

Kissinger: You can also keep an eye on them better that way.

Dobrynin: You can too.

Kissinger: We suggested this to take account of the concerns of the journalists. Do you have any other concerns?

Gromyko: Let me make just one general comment. The media and journalistic people generally should be concerned with one basic task -- to strengthen friendship among peoples, and they should do nothing hostile to the social system of the country of their stay.

Kissinger: Can we apply that to American journalists in America?

Gromyko: It would be an interference in your domestic affairs!

But when formulated proposals are placed before us, it turns out they amount to absolute freedom. When someone walks down Park Avenue and insults someone or knifes someone, the police can't do anything?

Kissinger: It happens every day on Park Avenue. We had Human Kindness Day in Washington last week -- we had five people killed. I went to a meeting of the Organization of American States last week and I noticed my security had increased. I asked why? They say, "they're celebrating Human Kindness Day across the street." One senior official lost an eye.

Gromyko: You have efficient writers on your staff. You can change it.

Kissinger: This is something we worked out with our allies, and we made a major effort to meet your concerns. This was not made on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

Gromyko: You said that.
Kissinger: There are some of your points we could take into account.

Gromyko: If you take them into account, I would like to see what text you come up with.

Kissinger: I suggest our Ambassador meet with yours in Geneva, rather than my negotiating it here where I can't consult with other countries.

Gromyko: If that is your suggestion, there is nothing we can do about it. That's an expression of a perfectly good desire. But even when we make certain understandings with you, it is very hard to get it across to Geneva.

So what I want to emphasize here is the question of time.

Kissinger: I agree with you. If we work with your characteristic precision, Mr. Foreign Minister, I think we are going to have trouble meeting the deadline. If you can tell us tomorrow which of these paragraphs you can accept, if we give you a new text on three paragraphs, after which the negotiation only begins -- as the entrance price to a negotiation.....

Gromyko: Which do you want? Who can do it? We or you? We, ourselves, could sit down and look.

Kissinger: That's a good idea. We'll take Korniienko. It's nine paragraphs.

Gromyko: Do you swear by that? Only nine paragraphs?

Kissinger: Ours has nine.

Gromyko: This is a human text.

We'll give you a text with our corrections.

Kissinger: Ours begins with human contacts.

Korniienko: There are two separate things, contacts and information.

Kissinger: Yes, but we've given you both and we'd like a reaction to both.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

I think this would be a good way to proceed.

Gromyko: I haven't yet read the text on contacts.

Kissinger: This is an historic occasion. Never have we had an occasion when my friend Gromyko hadn't read every document.

Korniienko: We just got it from Moscow.

Kissinger: When did we present it?

Korniienko: Today in Geneva.

Kissinger: If you keep in mind that the fewer changes you have, the easier it will be to meet your concerns on the key paragraphs.

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: What else?

Gromyko: You mentioned certain organizational matters with the third stage in Helsinki.

Kissinger: Yes. One of our concerns, Mr. Foreign Minister, is the length of the Conference. If we give every speaker a half hour, it would take four and a half hours. The most our President can give is two and a half days, and we would prefer two days. The symbolic importance is not in the speeches made, but in the documents that will be signed. The newspapers will have to report every day. It will devalue the conference. We should focus on a few key speeches.

Gromyko: I spoke also to the General Secretary on this. He, too, would prefer three days, two and a half.

Kissinger: We think it should be two days for speeches and a half day for ceremony.

Gromyko: We're thinking in the same categories.

Kissinger: So, shall we work in the same direction?

I'll tell you, the President won't come for more than two and a half days, so if they want more, it will have to be at a lower level.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

Gromyko: How can we work it out as far as length of time is concerned?

Kissinger: It will be tough.

Gromyko: Mintoff the Terrible.

Kissinger: Mintoff the Terrible will want a half hour. The Greeks and Turks will want a half hour.

Gromyko: We're thinking in the same terms.

Kissinger: The alternative is to begin at the lower level and have the heads of state arrive later.

Gromyko: That will not be good.

Kissinger: If necessary, we'll agree to 10 minutes for everybody.

Gromyko: I think it's better what you said -- five key countries.

Kissinger: If 35 heads of state each speak a half hour, that's 17 hours. No head of state can leave while another head of state is speaking.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: It's mind-boggling.

Gromyko: You convinced us.

Kissinger: Let's work together on it.

Gromyko: Let's work together on it.

Kissinger: I have to tell you, the President just can't come for five days. I think two days of speeches and one day of ceremony.

Gromyko: You convinced us.

Kissinger: Reluctantly.

Gromyko: So, the other way: We convinced you.

Kissinger: Let's discuss post-Conference machinery.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

Gromyko: What's your thinking?

Kissinger: We would support the Danish proposal, that a group of deputies meet two years from now to discuss....

Gromyko: Foreign Ministers?

Kissinger: Deputy Foreign Ministers, senior officials.

Gromyko: What will be the terms of reference?

Kissinger: To see how best to implement the agreement, and to see what steps should be considered.

Gromyko: Some kind of conference?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: In two years, such a group would be convened?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: To see how it's going?

Kissinger: And to see what could be done to strengthen the terms of the agreement and to consider possibly what permanent institutions there might be.

Gromyko: You are not in favor of consultative machinery?

Kissinger: No.

Gromyko: The terms of reference should be simple: to consider the terms and possible institutions.

Kissinger: I would add: to review the progress in implementation, and number two, your formula.

Gromyko: Let us think this over.

Kissinger: All right.

Gromyko: Will your European friends go along with this?
Kissinger: I think we could convince them.

Gromyko: What about the neutrals?

Kissinger: The neutrals are more difficult.

Gromyko: What about Mintoff?

Kissinger: Yes, we could discuss shortening the interval, if this helps anybody -- to 18 months.

Gromyko: Three to four years.

Kissinger: No, shorten it.

Gromyko: So we would have more experience.

Kissinger: This would not help us with the neutrals.

Gromyko: Fine. Let us think it over.

Kissinger: All right.

Should we have something to eat?

Gromyko: Probably. For the time being. [Laughter]

Kissinger: For the time being? That's all we wanted you to do. We don't expect you to eat all night.

Gromyko: We're in a plot with the Secretary of State to have the dinner last only 30 minutes flat.

Kissinger: We can't do it with dinner, but we'd appreciate it if we could do it with lunch tomorrow. Seriously. A working session. All my colleagues would appreciate it -- a very light lunch.

[The meeting ended]
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Viktor Mikhailovich Sukhodrev, Counsellor, MFA (Interpreter)

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, May 20, 1975
9:50 - 10:17 a.m.

PLACE: Soviet Embassy
Vienna

SUBJECTS: CSCE Summit; India-Pakistan

Gromyko: Your press is very ingenious.

Kissinger: But we are going to beat them down. I am going across the country and speaking.

Gromyko: Of the newspapers, which ones do you recommend I read?

Kissinger: In Washington, the Washington Post and New York Times are the most influential because everyone reads them. In the country, in St. Louis, no one reads the New York Times and the Post.

Gromyko: Well, Mr. Secretary, what do you think we should discuss, just the two of us?

Kissinger: I leave it up to you.

Gromyko: After all, in which direction are you and your friends conducting matters at the All-European Conference? Can I tell General Secretary Brezhnev...

SECRET/NODIS/NGDS

CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
and my colleagues the thing is in good hands, that Dr. Kissinger and President Ford have things firmly in hand and are working toward an early conclusion?

Kissinger: We are working toward a summit the last week of July. What is the Monday?

Sukhodrev: [Checks calendar] The 28th.

Kissinger: No.

Sukhodrev: The 21st.

Kissinger: Yes. We are planning on that week.

Gromyko: Regarding the length of time to be set aside, I have had several occasions to talk this over with the General Secretary, and his opinion is not in discord from President Ford -- that is, two, two and a half, three days. That too is acceptable to us. It should be conducted in a businesslike style. Who needs those speeches?

Kissinger: I talked to Kreisky and he agrees. I'll talk to Schmidt tomorrow.

Gromyko: I heard he wants four-five days.

Kissinger: So have I.

Gromyko: But I don't think he will be very strong on it.

Kissinger: If we can get Schmidt, I think the French and British will go along.

May I tell him this is agreeable to you?

Gromyko: You may. You may.

Another question I have is this: Yesterday you and I discussed certain specific matters regarding the European Security Conference. You said you would continue to be in touch with your West European friends -- this is our understanding.

Kissinger: That is correct.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
Gromyko: Are you sure they won't cast reproaches on you for being in some kind of collusion? Am I correct you were speaking with their knowledge?

Kissinger: No. It was my best estimate.

Take the confidence-building measures: If we say 30,000, 21 days and 250 kilometers, that I am sure we can get them to accept. If we said less, I can only say we will try. I am not saying it is impossible. It is our best estimate.

Gromyko: I was now asking really about the broad fact. In your estimate, will no one reproach us for collusion?

Kissinger: On what?

Gromyko: On CSCE generally. The French will say, "we are not bound"? I am just asking; because in the past it has happened.

Kissinger: Yes. Look, it is a problem. and it depends how it is handled. If we come to an understanding here and you let us handle it first with them before you approach them...

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: I think it is better we deal with it.

Gromyko: All right. Let me say quite frankly what we would be prepared to accept on these CBM's. I was quite frank in my opinion yesterday on the depth of the zone. I would like you to understand our situation. And the same with the numbers.

Kissinger: Thirty.

Gromyko: But as regards the time limit of notification, we would be prepared to agree to 16 days. Our private position was twelve. We would be willing to do 18.

Kissinger: Why don't we talk urgently to our allies, and let you know by next Monday, or Tuesday. We want to move it to a conclusion. There is no sense arguing about two days and 50 kilometers.

Gromyko: All right. Do that.
Kissinger: I think they will find it 50 kilometers too little. But why don't we talk to them and make counterproposals if we have to?

Gromyko: Up 'til now we have felt that whenever the U.S. really had the desire, problems were solved to mutual advantage. It happened in many cases, and we feel it will happen in the future.

Kissinger: We will talk to them.

Gromyko: As regards journalists, we have revised your text and made amendments. Kornienko is supposed to give it to Hartman. But as regards the first part, human contacts, that is for the delegations to go into because I haven't had time.

Kissinger: Except we should discuss them together. Our delegations can do it. Journalists and contacts together. Let them do it at Geneva. But they will move it.

Gromyko: Yes, but please don't forget to give your delegation instructions at Geneva. In earlier cases when we reached agreement, sometimes we had the impression they didn't get instructions.

Kissinger: Sometimes we had the impression your delegation didn't get instructions. [Laughter] Maybe our delegations are both very cautious. We will do it, in the meeting. It depends really on what instructions you give. We have made a major effort; we would like to see some Soviet move.

Gromyko: Please don't demand of us the impossible. Surely you don't want to topple the Soviet system with that document.

Kissinger: I had great expectations. [Laughter]

Gromyko: We don't try to topple the capitalist system.

Kissinger: If the Soviet system toppled, which I don't expect by this document or otherwise, I am not sure the successor wouldn't be more of a problem. The government Solzhenitsyn would establish would be more aggressive.

Gromyko: To us, Solzhenitsyn is a zero within a zero.
Kissinger: On Basket III, we have met several of your points, and made a major effort. On several points of yours yesterday, I told you your positions were reasonable.

Gromyko: On "appropriate" points.

Kissinger: But also it depends on whether you accept some of the other points.

Gromyko: Then on those several points, Korniienko probably already has given you our final communique. He has probably already done it.

Kissinger: It should not be significantly shorter than on the earlier occasion. It can be somewhat shorter.

Gromyko: This is a little bit shorter. It might be hard to go into detail, and not good to repeat formulas.

Kissinger: Let's look at it.

There is one point I raised at dinner, that is, our view of Indian intentions, especially since India is buying a lot of Soviet arms. I just hope you keep an eye on it. Because so far, we have sold nothing to Pakistan. We have lifted the embargo but sold nothing.

Gromyko: India's behavior gives us no concern.

Kissinger: If there were another Indian attack, it is something we would not take lightly.

Gromyko: We, generally speaking, are behaving very modestly regarding arms supplies to India. Maybe the information you have is exaggerated. We have absolutely no information that would cause us any concern regarding Indian intentions. There would be no sense for us to ignore any danger there because we are very concerned with the situation there, if there were any. And we say this to India.

Kissinger: And we say it to Pakistan and Iran. There is no danger now. It is for the long range.

Gromyko: We will act in this direction.

Kissinger: Good.
[At 10:17 a.m. the Secretary and Foreign Minister Gromyko joined their colleagues in the conference room for the main meeting.]
SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the
Department of State
Prime Minister Harold Wilson
Foreign Secretary James Callaghan
Sir John Hunt, Cabinet Secretary

DATE AND TIME: Friday, May 30, 1975
8:35 a.m. - 9:20 a.m.

PLACE: Residence of the American Ambassador
Brussels

[The first five minutes of the breakfast were taken up with picture taking.
There was then some discussion of the British Referendum campaign.]

Wilson: Ted Heath seems to be a new man. He is out campaigning
vigorously. He is actually writing his own speeches.

Kissinger: He has the advantage now that he doesn't have to face you at
question time in the House.

Wilson: Mrs. Thatcher is being criticized for not speaking enough.
She is being called a reluctant debutante. Of course, I never attack people
unless I am attacked. I always answer in the spirit of the question.

[The conversation then turned to the traditions and uses of question time
in the House of Commons.]

Callaghan: Mr. President, do you miss not being in the Congress any
longer?

SECRET/SENSITIVE
Wilson: I am relaxed about it. Schmidt is going to talk on economics. I don't know yet exactly what he is going to say. Last year he was all excited about the collapse of the banking system and I don't know yet what his main problem is this year. As far as I am concerned, I will be saying that we never doubted your commitments and your solidarity with us. Of course, more will be done on the fringes here, on Greece, Cyprus, Portugal.

Callaghan: Should we discuss the political consequences of relations with the LDCs? I must say that at the OECD, the US proposals were well received. Of course, people had a chance this time to look at your speech beforehand.

Wilson: I have only read half of my speech so far.

It looks like the snarl-up on producer relations on the question of raw materials has eased a bit.

President: It seems so from my talk with Giscard last night.

Kissinger: We had a good response to my IEA speech.

Callaghan: These problems are as much political as economic. At the Commonwealth Conference, after shouting into the mikes people then began to talk sense. The same thing will happen at the special UN session.

Kissinger: Your initiative at the Commonwealth Conference took a lot of the sting out of the talk.

Wilson: Well, Burnham at first attacked it but he then settled down.

Callaghan: The US proposals for commissioner were well received.

President: What do you think are the prospects for CSCE?

Wilson: What do you think?

Kissinger: The Soviets are moving on Basket III. The only real sticking point is CBMs -- the question of the depth of the zone. I think we could settle on 250 kilometers. On follow-on, I had an exchange with Gromyko in Vienna. I said we supported the Danish proposal, but I said that perhaps there could be meetings after a year or 18 months, but Gromyko said no, it should be after three to four years.
Callaghan: The Romanians want a much shorter time.

Kissinger: The East Europeans want permanent machinery because they want to be able to monitor the Soviets.

Callaghan: One of the results of CSCE is that it has brought the East Europeans into equal status with other countries.

President: Is a summit likely to be in July?

Kissinger: Yes. I think the chances are two out of three that it will be unless the Soviets change their tactics. They are dribbling out concessions.

Callaghan: Stage II should really be settled in two weeks if the summit is to be in July.

Wilson: It really would kill the Geneva industry. We will need a public works program for all the diplomats who have been so busy with CSCE.

President: How long should we allow for the CSCE summit? Five days is very long. There will be 35 speeches.

Wilson: The more time you allow, the longer the speeches will be. Maybe we should plan to arrive on Monday in the afternoon or evening, and then work Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and into Friday.

Callaghan: At the OECD meeting in Paris, I got rid of 20 speeches in one morning. Yours was long though, Henry.

President: It will lose luster if the speeches are too long.

Wilson: Yes, like at the UN.

Callaghan: So maybe it would be arriving on Monday, and then Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday.

Wilson: Will it all be wrapped up at that point or will there still have to be negotiations?

Callaghan: No. There would be valedictory speeches only.

Kissinger: You know that the Turks don't want Makarios to be there, but Denktash.
Callaghan: Yes, I gather, Mintoff will make trouble on relations with the Arabs and he may hold that until we all get there.

Kissinger: The conference could end on Thursday and we could then stay on Friday for bilaterals. The press in the United States would get very impatient if it drags on. They are already saying there has been no accomplishment.

Callaghan: There is very little in Basket III.

Kissinger: And it is unenforceable.

Callaghan: We should go for a short conference.

Wilson: I would like to miss question time in the House for once.

Callaghan: And Cabinet.

President: You don't enact bills when you are not there?

Wilson: No, no, it goes right on.

On Turkey, we are going to supply arms.

Callaghan: But no trumpets! I prepared the ground with the Greeks. We will have staff talks with the Turks. Unfortunately, they are harassing UK nationals.

Kissinger: We will tell them to stop. Demirel keeps saying that if we lift the arms ban they will move.

Callaghan: I agree with Henry that the Greeks should make a proposal.

Kissinger: I told Karamanlis that they should accept 30% of Turkish territory. He said maybe they could do 25%, so maybe we are moving. Ecevit seems prepared to accept 32%. If we can get to within 5%, maybe we can move. But I told Karamanlis to drop the percentages for a while and to focus on the general question of territory.

President: What about Famagusta?

Kissinger: It is like pulling teeth, but the Turks might give up something.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania
George Macovescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vasile Pungan, Counsellor to the President
Corneliu Bogdan, Romanian Ambassador to the U.S.

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Amb. Harry Barnes, U.S. Ambassador to Romania
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:
Wednesday, June 11, 1975
3:00 p.m. - 4:15 p.m.

PLACE:
The White House
The Oval Office

SUBJECTS:
Bilateral economic relations; CSCE;
Middle East; Korea; Spain; Disarmament.

[The press took photographs]

Ceausescu: You had quite a trip.

President: You have just completed a trip to Brazil and Mexico.

[The press was dismissed]

President: Let me say, Mr. President, it is very nice to see you. It is particularly nice of you to stop so we could have this opportunity to discuss matters of mutual interest on your way back to Romania after your trip to Latin America.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (1.5)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON APR 1, 1983
President: If the European Security Conference is in late July and Congress would act on the Trade Agreement for Romania by August 1.

Amb. Barnes: It could come out of committee by July 15, but they may not take action until early September because they have 60 legislative days and the August recess may intervene.

Kissinger: You do not have to link these two things that closely for your visit.

President: But it would be helpful to get the Trade Agreement done and not have it complicated by any announcement. This reinforces the need to get favorable consideration and action before the Congressional recess.

Otherwise there will be five weeks delay. So it is important to get Congress to act, preferably prior to the visit, and then we could announce we would be having a long-term agreement.

CSCE

Ceausescu: As far as European Security is concerned, we are concerned not so much by the fact of delay as by the content and expected results of the Conference. For us, it is not a problem of the dates, but of the results of this Conference. Of course, if it can take place in July, that is fine, or if it is in August or even September, that is fine. The principal thing is to get results which will contribute to the strengthening of confidence and will enhance detente. Therefore, it is not Basket III which is essential, the question of now many journalists or artists travel. That is for the experts. This isn't what is so essential. As far as we are concerned, let as many as want travel around. The essential problems are in the first Basket. On this hangs the movement toward detente and for that matter the conditions of things like cultural exchanges.

In connection with this we see some problems which must be solved if the Conference is going to wind up with good results. First of all there should be firm engagements of states on the renunciation of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Secondly, there is the problem of certain military aspects. Granted it is not a question of resolving basic problems, but we have sought nonetheless to make sure that there will not be interference in the internal affairs of other states. It is a question for example, of these engagements regarding military maneuvers. And even here it is not so much whether it will be 250 or 180 kilometers or 10 to 20 thousand men, but the very fact that the content of these measures should be obligatory and not something voluntary. Therefore if all these problems

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
are going to be reduced to something voluntary, it no longer makes any sense
to waste time and energy over 100 kilometers of distance here and there.
But what we are doing is introducing into international law certain rules
which have existed up to now. When a group of states arrives at certain
understandings, these would be mandatory and not voluntary. That is
important.

Nawyevsky: One of the other principal problems is that connected with
continuity of the Conference, the follow-up.

Ceausescu: I don't know what your opinion is but we believe the most
dangerous situation is still in Europe where there are the two military
blocs with modern armaments, huge concentrations of troops, atomic weapons
as well. Therefore we would want to have the summit meeting represent not
the conclusion but rather the beginning of European security. For this reason
we are in favor of an organism, a process for assuring the continuity of
this conference.

President: How often do you see it meeting? Every year, every two years?

Ceausescu: Once a year, once in two years, any time when it is necessary.
If there should appear some tense situation, if something should happen,
then it could discuss what might be done to prevent things getting worse.

Kissinger: What do you think of the idea of a review conference in 18 months
or two years?

Ceausescu: In our opinion that is a good idea. We think as a matter of
fact that this sort of permanent organism could have the role of preparing
such a conference. I don't have in mind something that would be set up
with a lot of bureaucracy, but rather something that would meet periodically
once a year or every six months. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of one
of the countries would have the role of coordinator, and this could be on
a rotational basis.

Kissinger: For example, rotating?

Ceausescu: United States, Soviet Union, Romania.

President: [Smiling] Romania.

Kissinger: We have explained to Romania and we have been in close touch
with the Romanian delegation to the Conference, that the very reason Romania
wants this is why we are not agreeable. We are not eager to grant to
countries the right of permanent interference in the West. Quite frankly, this is the problem with a permanent mechanism. I understand why you want something to which you could appeal, but we do not want established structures in the West to be exploited. We are sympathetic, though, to your concerns.

Ceausescu: We don't think of this organism as having any sort of right to do this, and in order to avoid this problem we could regulate the basis on which it would act to exclude such possible intervention. We see it as preparing for new conferences and for solving such problems as will appear. We don't want any Eastern intervention in the West or Western intervention in the East or Eastern intervention in the West or Eastern intervention in the East. I would ask you to reflect some more on this problem and to review your position.

[Both Presidents and the Secretary nod agreement.]

Middle East

Ceausescu: With regard to the Middle East, you are now having discussions with the Israeli Prime Minister.

President: We tried very hard to keep progress going last March, but unfortunately the negotiations had to be suspended. We are now doing our reassessment. We want to avoid any stagnation or stalemate. I have just finished talking with President Sadat. Today and tomorrow we will be discussing with Prime Minister Rabin his observations on the situation.

Ceausescu: Of course the problems, as you know even better than I, are very complicated. We will certainly welcome it if any new steps towards disengagement can be realized. There are conditions now in which agreement could be achieved. Egypt and Syria are in favor of reaching a solution. We know very well the situation can change very rapidly, that the present favorable conditions might no longer appear. I think that Israel too has understood this very well. We have told them our views.

President: You met with Foreign Minister Allon recently.

Ceausescu: Yes, I talked with him for four hours.

Aside from the question affecting Egypt and Syria there is the Palestinian problem and the need to achieve the formation of an independent Palestinian state. There can be no solution unless this problem is resolved.
June 13, 1975

Secretary's Principal's and Regional's Staff Meeting
Friday, June 13, 1975, 8:00 a.m.

pp 2-11 US actions re German-Brazilian nuclear suppliers agreement discussed. Secretary asked Deputy Secretary to apologize to Brazilian Ambassador Castro when he lunches with him June 13. ARA also to draft message to Brazilian Foreign Minister. Secretary requests a memo on discussions we are holding with nuclear suppliers and progress of preparations for the nuclear suppliers' conference.

pp 11-14 CSCE Conference in Geneva discussed. Site of next conference session.

pp 14-16 Simon speech mentioning Shah. Secretary wants reference deleted from speech.

pp 16-18 Worsening situation in Chile (New NIE has been published. Secretary would like to see.

p 18 US delegation walk out at ILO conference. Secretary wants George Meany to know that Israeli Government delegation did not.

pp 18-19 Cyprus meeting of Security Council visit of Clerides to Washington next week.

pp 19-20 New Soviet submarines and their missile capability.

pp 20-23 Mrs. Gandhi's political setbacks discussed.


pp 25-33 Soviet military facilities in Somalia discussed. Somali challenge to inspect facilities. Secretary believes we cannot refuse to go. Senator Culver's position. Secretary wants Senator briefed.

pp 33-37 Clashes between Thai's and Cambodia's SEATO implication. Secretary requests a paper. Clashes between Cambodians and Vietnamese. Situation in Cambodia.

pp 37-44 Habib reports on his trip.
SECRET

We will still announce publicly that you did it.

(Laughter)

Will you draft a letter? We are not accusing them of having done anything wrong.

MR. VEST: We will do that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Okay.

We will get to you last, Phil.

MR. HARTMAN: We have now a message from Bud Sheare: which at least lays out some dates on how we could wind up this conference in Geneva.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. But we have this problem -- I want to talk to you and Hal afterwards -- on the tactics.

MR. HARTMAN: He at least thinks it is still possible --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: How late can it go?

MR. HARTMAN: The 24th of June, on his schedule. It involves mainly trying to get the EC --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: All that is left is the CBMs?

MR. HARTMAN: Well -- and there are a couple of other issues. He thinks the follow-on can be kept even after they have agreed to a date --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The quadripartite -- I have
had a letter from Sauvagnargues that I want you to look at.

MR. HARTMAN: Yes. That presents a problem.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why do we get out in front on everything?

MR. HARTMAN: We are not out in front. The British and the Germans feel very strongly -- we can accept any position -- I think we ought to tell them that. But the point is that it is our judgment that his particular solution is not going to be accepted.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: By the Germans?

MR. HARTMAN: Well, they are upset -- the British are upset by it. The neutrals don't like this vague word "responsibilities" which they think has implications for the Brezhnev doctrine.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Is the time enough to let me see the formulation?

MR. HARTMAN: Yes.

MR. SONNENFELDT: It is the one you saw at breakfast, that crazy, convoluted --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have forgotten it.

MR. HARTMAN: In fact, he is doing more, according to the Germans and the British, to undermine the quadripartite rights by this fuzzy formulation than --
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I just want to make sure we are staying with the Germans on this.

MR. HARTMAN: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't care about the British. But I want to stay with the Germans.

That means about one more week.

MR. HARTMAN: That is right. And there are so many things that can go wrong there. We still have not heard from all of the smaller countries.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't care if the conference doesn't take place in July. If it doesn't take place, I want to make sure we don't get blamed for it. In fact, I would prefer it in September.

MR. HARTMAN: I think it would probably have to wait until after the Finnish elections, which means October.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Or hold it somewhere else.

MR. HARTMAN: Never. Getting agreement on another place I think would be harder than winding up the conference.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Vienna?

MR. HYLAND: They are already in Geneva, all the delegations.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is nothing like what is going to happen when the heads of governments get together.
We will bring at least 800 to 1,000 people. That is our normal travelling party, with the President.

MR. EAGLEBURGER: This is after the fiscal year, I hope.

MR. KATZ: We may have another allusion to the Shah again today. Simon is making a speech in Amsterdam.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Didn't we get a chance to clear it?

MR. KATZ: Yes. Enders saw it in Paris and asked Simon to remove one phrase, and he doesn't know whether he will. I am trying to get another message going through Parsky. The phrase is that the Shah is engaging in sheer demagoguery.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Impossible. Is that in or out of context? Is he attacking the Shah directly?

MR. KATZ: That is my understanding. It is a reference --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: When is he giving the speech?

MR. KATZ: Later today, or this evening.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Later today is now in Europe.

MR. KATZ: Yes. Well, Enders --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You people have to stop negotiating. On a thing like this, that is my responsibility.
I would like once again to draw your attention, Mr. President, to the question of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation having in mind today's, to be frank, rather strange state of things in Geneva.

On one hand, there is not just a simple movement forward at the Conference especially lately, but a major breakthrough. Now practically the whole set of issues put on the agenda of the Conference has been resolved on the basis of the balance of interests of the sides.

We think you would agree that to a great extent it was possible to achieve due to the goodwill shown by the Soviet Union. Given a desire to complete final agreement on the Conference documents, it would be literally a matter of days to clear fully the way to holding its final stage at a summit level in Helsinki. A similar view, as we have noted with satisfaction, was recently expressed in public also by your at a press conference.

However, we cannot help getting the impression that some new pretexts are being constantly sought, some artificially created and worthless issues are being tossed in with the aim to delay the conclusion of the work in Geneva. Over several weeks in a row the attempts are being made to conduct the matters in such a way that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries would make unilateral concessions. It is clear that this is not the way that could lead to a successful conclusion of the common cause which this Conference in fact represents. We have conceded all that might have been conceded, and what, by the way, the U.S. side had requested in confidence that this would be followed by complete agreement. It is difficult for us to judge who is behind all this and what goals are
persuaded by this. But if someone conscientiously takes up the course of delaying the Conference then we at least should have been told about it straightforwardly.

We talk about all this with frankness since we believe that reservations and lack of clarity on this account could damage the mutual understanding that exists between our countries on the questions of the European Conference.

It may be hardly contested that by now there exist all objective prerequisites to bring the Conference to a conclusion within the shortest period of time. Only one thing is needed - the political decision on the part of the governments of all the countries represented at the Conference.

I would like to express the hope, that you personally, Mr. President, and your Government will proceed, including your contacts with other Western countries, in such a way as to contribute in a maximum degree to the conclusion of the second stage of the Conference and to hold its final phase starting on July 22, which has been agreed upon between us.
The President has carefully considered the oral message from General Secretary Brezhnev delivered by Ambassador Dobrynin on June 16. The President agrees that there has been major progress in recent weeks at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and he fully appreciates the constructive role of the Soviet Union in bringing this about. From a review of events at the conference, it can be said that there is now a strong movement to bring it to a successful conclusion in the very near future. We are not aware of any deliberate efforts to delay the conference; in any case, the United States will continue, as it has in the past, to use the influence at its disposal to bring about compromise solutions on issues where differences still exist.

As the General Secretary will have been informed, we moved immediately following the very positive Soviet proposals concerning the advance notification of maneuvers -- and we agree that these were indeed a breakthrough -- to have this problem solved on the basis of the Soviet parameters. While we regret that it did not prove possible, despite our efforts, to persuade others to go along with the solution proposed, it is our strong conviction that a compromise can be achieved in the very near future. If the depth of territory subject to notification were not at 300 km, the United States believes it can
persuade its allies to accept the other parameters as proposed by the Soviet side.

The President would like the General Secretary to know that we have been in the most intensive contact with our Allies in recent days in an effort to bring matters to a rapid conclusion and we will continue these contacts. We remain prepared to set the beginning of the final stage during the week of July 21 or, at any rate, before the end of July. Once the question of maneuver notification has been settled, our representatives should be in immediate contact to determine how best to bring about conference acceptance of this time frame, bearing in mind the fact that more than 30 sovereign states are involved.
The Soviet Union first proposed a European security conference on February 10, 1954, and periodically reiterated the proposal over subsequent years. But there was little enthusiasm from Western and neutral nations. It appeared that Moscow's principal objective was to exploit such an event as a quasi-peace conference to produce a surrogate World War II peace treaty. However, as nations of both East and West began to take increased bilateral initiatives in recent years toward detente, a renewed Warsaw Pact appeal from Budapest on March 17, 1969, elicited a cautiously positive reaction from NATO. We and our Allies took the position that such a conference might serve a useful purpose, but only after concrete progress had been achieved on the most sensitive aspect of East-West confrontation in Europe—namely Berlin.

Berlin Precondition

It was specified in successive NATO documents, beginning in December, 1969, that conclusion of a new Four-Power agreement on Berlin, aimed at effecting practical improvements in relations between the people on both sides of the Wall and between Bonn and West Berlin, could lead to Allied willingness to participate in a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Allies also increasingly emphasized the importance they attached to improving FRG relations with the GDR, USSR, Poland and other Warsaw Pact countries. The Berlin Accord, signed September 3, 1971, took effect in June, 1972, as did the FRG-GDR Basic Treaty normalizing relations between those two states. CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks therupon opened at Helsinki the following November, after the Warsaw Pact countries agreed to commence exploratory talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) at Vienna, beginning in January, 1973.

Stage I of CSCE took place at Foreign Minister level in Helsinki from July 3-7, 1973. Ministers approved the "Final accommodations" of the preparatory phase, which set the agenda and established mandates to committees and subcommittees during the stage II negotiations.
Stage II began September 18, 1973, in Geneva, where experts from the 35 participating countries met to work out an agreed final document organized under the four agenda items, or "baskets." After almost two years of often intense and difficult negotiations, stage III opens in Helsinki on July 30, 1975 -- where heads of state will sign the final document in the six languages of the conference.

Stage II

CSCE work has covered four major substantive areas, known as "baskets," concerning: political and military questions; economic, scientific and technological cooperation; cooperation in strengthening human contacts, the exchange of information, and cultural and educational relations; and post-conference follow-up arrangements.

Basket I

Under the first agenda item, conference negotiators have produced a declaration of the following ten principles of interstate relations:

-- Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty.

-- Refraining from the threat or use of force.

-- Inviolability of frontiers.

-- Territorial integrity of states.

-- Peaceful settlement of disputes.

-- Non-intervention in internal affairs.

-- Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.

-- Equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

-- Cooperation among states.

-- Fulfillment in good faith of international obligations.
The Soviets were especially anxious to gain Western acceptance of an unambiguous principle on inviolability of frontiers by force. Western participants made absolutely clear, however, that their agreement to this precept would in no sense constitute formal recognition of existing European frontiers or imply that present borders are immutable. The Federal Republic of Germany, with the firm support of its NATO allies, insisted on a reference in the Declaration of Principles to the possibility of effecting border changes by peaceful means. The United States took an active role in negotiation of this key text on peaceful border changes, which is included in the principle of sovereign equality.

Also under agenda item 1, CSCE participants have negotiated limited military security measures designed to strengthen mutual trust and confidence. Specific texts were produced on two modest but significant "confidence-building measures": prior notification of military maneuvers, and exchange of observers at these maneuvers.

Basket 2

Under agenda item 2, the Geneva talks have produced a series of declarations or resolutions concerned with economic, scientific and technological, and environmental cooperation. These declarations should help broaden East-West industrial cooperation, reduce barriers to trade, increase scientific exchanges, and cooperation in the environment.

Basket 3

The third agenda item -- the famous "basket 3" of the conference -- deals with increased human contacts, flow of information, and cooperation in cultural and educational relations. This item was included on the CSCE agenda only as a result of energetic efforts by the United States, our Allies, and the neutral states. Here we have negotiated especially sensitive issues for both East and West, partly because they deal with "ideological coexistence," which has always been anathema to Moscow. At Geneva, agreement was reached on basket 3 texts dealing with such issues as: family reunification,
family visits, marriages between nationals of different states, the right to travel, access to printed, as well as broadcast, information, improved working conditions for journalists, and stepped-up cultural and educational cooperation.

Basket 4

Under the fourth agenda item, the conference produced a text on post-CSCE "follow-up" arrangements. The debate here turned on the degree of institutionalization and continuity to be accorded post-conference activities. The final compromise text provides for unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral actions designed to carry forward the work of the conference and monitor the implementation of agreed texts. A meeting of experts will be convened in the first half of 1977 to prepare for a gathering of senior officials, later the same year, to review results of CSCE and plan for possible additional meetings in the future.

Conference participants view the final CSCE document as a statement of political resolve or declaration of intent, not as an agreement legally binding upon governments. The final document resembles the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the UN Friendly Relations Declaration. A more formal document could be used by the Soviet Union to portray the results of the conference as tantamount to a World War II peace treaty. We remain loyal to the letter and spirit of the Potsdam Agreement of 1945, which states that the political and territorial problems affecting Germany since World War II must be resolved in a formal peace treaty.

CSCE is sometimes wrongly compared to the 1815 Congress of Vienna that influenced the political order in Europe for much of the 19th Century, but it is a much more modest event. The results of the conference are but a step in the process of detente, raising the hope of further improvement in East-West relations. CSCE is also the beginning of a new approach to consultations on matters of importance by all European states, whether East, West or neutral. The extent to which CSCE agreements are implemented over time will be the true test for judging the success of this conference.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

SECRET

To: The Secretary
Through: C - Helmut Sonnenfeldt
From: EUR - Arthur A. Hartman

CSCE

Your meeting with Gromyko takes place during what may be the last full week of negotiations at Geneva. There are no significant differences between US and Soviet positions on remaining CSCE issues which involve mainly EC-Soviet disputes over details or last minute haggling by the smaller powers, especially the Dutch and Romanians.

If Gromyko attacks us for not effectively lining up Allied support for compromised texts, you might point to Romanian obstructionism on the Warsaw Pact side.

This paper briefly outlines issues and offers suggested talking points.

Timing of Stage III

The CSCE Coordinating Committee is holding intensive discussions aimed at setting a date for commencement of stage III, and it is not possible to predict where this issue will stand on July 11, when you meet Gromyko. The French formally proposed on July 7 that the Helsinki finale take place before the end of July, provided all remaining texts are registered by mid-month, and over half of the CSCE delegations reportedly now favor a July summit. But the Finns adamantly insist they must have three weeks advance notification from Geneva in order to make arrangements.

Your Talking Points

— We are impressed with the substantial progress achieved in Geneva in recent weeks and, for our part, would consider a late July stage III meeting both desirable and feasible.
-- However, there are those among our allies, your allies and the neutrals who insist that key unresolved issues be settled before a flat commitment is made to any specific date.

Basket 1 -- Principles

The Allies are supporting Genscher's efforts to register final texts on quadripartite rights, peaceful change, and a "Europe clause" extending CSCE benefits to all of Europe (including Berlin), before declaring their willingness to attend the Helsinki finale on a precise date. Virtually all other questions related to the declaration of principles are now settled.

QRR. On July 5, the following revised text was agreed, ad referendum to governments:

"The participating states, paying due regard to the principles above and, in particular, to the first sentence of (the tenth principle), note that the present (title of document) does not affect their rights and obligations, nor the corresponding treaties and other agreements and arrangements."

We support this text and continue to follow the lead of France on QRR matters.

Your Talking Points

-- We support the recently revised text on quadripartite rights and responsibilities and hope that it will provide the basis for a final compromise.

-- We have supported the French initiatives and appreciate Soviet flexibility on QRR matters.

Peaceful Change. The Four Powers plus both Germanies are ready to register the peaceful change formulation, which we negotiated with the Soviets. However, the Romanians have asked that the text be revised, mainly by linking it specifically to sovereign equality language in the first principle. We have emphasized to the Romanians our strong hope that they drop efforts to change this hard-won compromise formulation.
Your Talking Point

-- We believe it would be in everyone's interest to persuade Romania to drop its request that the peaceful change text be modified; Soviet help in this regard would be welcome.

"Europe Clause." On July 5, the Soviets and FRG worked out a compromise text extending CSCE benefits to all of Europe, implicitly including Berlin. Subsequently, the FRG has sought to steer this text toward rapid provisional registration.

Your Talking Point

-- We welcome the Soviet and FRG success in developing a "Europe clause" and believe it only proper that results of this Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe should be extended to all Europeans.

Basket 1 -- CBMs

Since your last meeting with Gromyko, the Soviets have come around to acceptance of realistic parameters for the maneuvers CBM -- 250 kilometers, 25,000 troops, and 21 days -- and are ready to accept compromise texts on maneuvers as well as movements, provided Ankara drops its demands for notification within only a limited zone of 100 kilometers inland from the Turkish sea coast. The Turks, however, are stubbornly pressing their insistence on exceptions and show little predilection as yet to give way to a compromise acceptable to all parties. At last report, Turkey indicated it would take its case to the NATO Council on July 9. The Soviets recently accepted a CBM on movements based on "voluntary" notification, and Gromyko may emphasize the need for unequivocal NATO acceptance of the "voluntary basis" concept. In NATO, the Dutch continue to balk at voluntary notification, and in the Warsaw Pact, the Romanians also object to this concept.

Your Talking Points

-- We welcome Moscow's acceptance of realistic parameters for the CBM on notification of maneuvers.

-- It is now necessary for both of us to press our Allies to accept final compromises that will permit swift registration of voluntary CBMs on maneuvers and movements.
Basket 2

The last remaining substantive hurdle to concluding Basket 2 negotiations is development of a text ensuring reciprocity in reduction of trade barriers. We are following the lead of the Nine in their attempt to work out with the Soviets a balanced formulation taking account of MFN, EC quantitative restrictions, and COMECON trading practices.

Your Talking Point

-- We hope all parties will display realism in the search for a final compromise on the question of reciprocity in the reduction of trade barriers.

Basket 3

-- Since their positive reaction, on the eve of the NATO summit, to the Western "global initiative" on basket 3 texts concerning human contacts and information, the Soviets have shown great flexibility on all basket 3 questions, and all texts in this area are now provisionally registered.

Your Talking Points

-- We warmly welcome Moscow's flexibility in recent weeks in permitting a satisfactory conclusion to the negotiations in basket 3.

-- We had long argued for realism on basket 3 issues with our Allies, and we are pleased that the Soviet Union ultimately reciprocated with realistic positions of its own.

Basket 4 -- Follow-up

With the Swedes chairing a Special Working Group on follow-up, negotiations are nearly complete on a satisfactory compromise text which will probably provide for: a preparatory meeting 18 months after completion of stage III; a meeting of senior officials about 24 months after stage III; decisions in follow-up to be taken by consensus; future meetings to be rotated among CSCE capitals; and acceptance, in principle, of a new Conference at some time in the future. The Soviets have displayed flexibility in the Working Group, while trying to enhance the political content of follow-up arrangements.

SECRET
Your Talking Point

-- We are following with interest the negotiations on a final compromise on post-CSCE follow-up arrangements, and are prepared to join a consensus on this issue.

Final Document

The Soviets have accepted inclusion of a disclaimer in the CSCE final document making clear its politically, but not legally, binding character and the submission of a letter to the UN Secretary General, the effect of which is to draw a distinction between international treaties and/or legally binding agreements, on one side, and the CSCE declarations of intent, on the other.

Your Talking Point

-- We appreciate Soviet flexibility in negotiations on CSCE final document, which appears to be taking shape in a manner acceptable to all sides.

Helsinki Summit and Public Opinion

We suggest that you consider discussing with Gromyko the US and Soviet approaches to characterization of CSCE results. You could get across that if Brezhnev takes an extreme position in propagandizing CSCE as, for example, a quasi World War II peace conference, the Allies will inevitably have to react sharply.

Your Talking Point

-- We believe it is in the interest of all sides to display moderation in characterizing the results of CSCE as a useful, if limited, step forward in the continuing process of East-West detente.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoli G. Kovalev, Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief of Soviet Delegation to CSCE
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Georgi M. Korniienko, Chief of the American Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vasily G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief, American Section of the American Department
Yuri E. Fokin, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Amb. Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Chief of U.S. Delegation to CSCE
William G. Hyland, Director, INR
Jan M. Lodal, NSC Staff
Mark Garrison, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
DATE AND TIME: Thursday, July 10, 1975
5:15 - 6:35 p.m.

PLACE: Soviet Mission
Geneva

SUBJECT: CSCE

[Large bottles of Coca-Cola were on the table]

Kissinger: This is the biggest Coca-Cola I've ever seen.

Gromyko: Our Pepsi Cola, when you pour it into a glass, it's full and it remains full after two minutes. Your Pepsi, after you pour it, it's half gone.

Kissinger: Ours -- you pay for it all, and don't get it.

Gromyko: That's why you are so rich. Why do we have Pepsi Cola and not Coca-Cola?

Dobrynin: Because their chairman is more energetic.

Kissinger: And he was a friend.

Gromyko: May I greet the Secretary of State and all other gentlemen who are here with him.

We are indeed pleased to have this new opportunity to exchange views on several important problems. These matters we are to discuss relate both to our bilateral relations and to broad international concerns. I would submit -- and we had a brief exchange on this a minute or two ago -- that we start by having a word on European affairs and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Those were my brief opening remarks and our proposal.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, let me say I am glad we are meeting again, and given the responsibility of our two countries, the increasing regularity of our discussions is important to the stability of the world and we should meet even if we have no urgent matters to discuss.
SECRET/NODS/XGDS

In spite of the public notices you may hear from America, the President and I are committed to the course we have pursued since 1972 and we believe it is of great importance to peace and security of the world.

As for the agenda, I am in agreement.

Gromyko: Then let us begin to exchange views on the European situation and, first and foremost, the European Security Conference. Would you like to say a few words first?

Kissinger: In my experience no one understands the European Security Conference as the Foreign Minister does. As I understand it, the only thing holding up agreement on the date is Malta, and all the issues are settled. They are getting ready to register all the rest. As I said to the press in Paris, our government favors the most rapid possible conclusion, preferably at the end of this month. I understand the date they're now talking about is July 30th.

Gromyko: I would say the following: The situation at the European Security Conference as of today is this. In substance, practically all questions have been agreed upon. If perhaps there are some third-rate nuances, we believe, given the desire, it would require hours -- literally hours, -- to clear away all those nuances, and would take a matter of days to prepare all the texts for signing. There is a question which is of particular interest to Turkey and they have not given final agreement, and that relates to the depth of the zone on one's territory for giving notice of troop maneuvers. But the basic question is setting a definite date for the final stage of the European Security Conference. Everyone seems to be in agreement with the Canadian proposal to begin the final stage on July 30th, although we have not given our formal approval because we believe more suitable is the proposal you and I discussed, and in fact no one in the Conference objected to it.

Kissinger: To meet on the 22nd.

Gromyko: And no one objected.

Kissinger: It's a little late now.

Gromyko: If we don't agree on an earlier date, we'll probably agree to July 30.
It is true we are now faced with a most formidable force -- Malta -- and there does seem to be the real possibility that Malta will twist all the others into a ram's horn. But let us see whether all the European states can talk Malta into July 30th as a real possibility. I think it is a possibility.

Kissinger: We are prepared to meet on the 22nd, and we would also accept the 30th. We think there are no issues remaining and we think we can do it. That's really the latest we can do. If we do not have it then, we will have to move to the end of August, because we have other visitors.

Gromyko: Well, let us on both sides make an effort to get that date accepted. Let us then really act in that direction to assure it's accepted. Let us agree that this is not a formal agreement to this, because usually it happens that as soon as the United States and Soviet Union agree on something, someone else comes up with reproaches and says, "Aha, the United States and Soviet Union reached a separate agreement again. And we must have our own view." Let us act so as to insure success. If you want to refer to this agreement for any purpose, you're free to do so. The important thing is to do it defacto.

Kissinger: Let's get Kovalev and Sherer to both come here. I'm prepared to instruct him to work together with you. They know the tactical situation.

[Gromyko tells Fokin to go and call Kovalev. Garrison goes out to call Sherer.]

Don't you think that's the best way?

I want our representative here because I told him if we couldn't do it at the end of July we would do it at the end of August. I don't want him to be confused. He's waiting for a call.

Our preference is the earlier the better. July 28 would be better than the 30th.

Gromyko: What about on the duration?

Kissinger: Two and a half days. On this proposal, we would arrive the evening of July 30.
Sonnenfeldt: The end of the day on Wednesday...

Kissinger: The end of the day in Finland in July is...... [Laughter]

What about 5:00 p.m.?

We'll talk to our representative.

I spoke to the French President today. He'd prefer to have it
in July. Otherwise, August.

Gromyko: July would be best.

Kissinger: He'd prefer July. I see no problem. When I left his office
I told the press we wanted it to conclude as rapidly as possible. The
Germans I don't know. I'll see Schmidt tomorrow.

But how do you move Malta?

Gromyko: 2-3-4 days -- what do you mean two and a half?

[Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt and Hyland confer.]

Kissinger: Well, we'll just... Let's talk to our two representatives.
It's a purely practical problem.

I have no idea how to move Malta. Maybe we could sell it to
Libya.

Gromyko: The whole island?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: As a last resort. As a last resort. But we should first
have the meetings. As a precondition.

Kissinger: How to move Malta I don't know. We'll certainly agree to
make a joint representation.

Gromyko: Let's set the date and go to Finland, and Mintoff will go to
Finland. If he doesn't, well...
Kissinger: He got a big reception in China. They had four people on the street who had lived in Malta.

The problem is countries that agreed to the 30th may not agree to this procedure, where everybody just accepts and Malta is just left out.

Gromyko: But there is a consensus.

Kissinger: We will agree with you to begin on the 30th. You will hear my instructions to Sherer: to work with you and consult with the Germans, French, and British, but to bring it to a rapid conclusion. We will work it out.

[Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt and Stoessel confer.]

What is old Garrison doing? Is he calling Hartman for authority?

[Laughter]

Did the one who went out for you come back yet?

Makarov: Not yet.

Kissinger: All I want is to make sure the speeches are kept to 15 minutes at the European Security Conference.

Ours is on the way. Yours is coming.

Gromyko: Let me say a few words about our cooperation, while we're waiting. There was businesslike cooperation, but there were times when cooperation was uneven. There were times when the American side preferred to remain on the sidelines. But in recent days it has been smoother.

Kissinger: In the cases when we remained on the sidelines, we were working to the same result, as on the 250 kilometers.

[Garrison and Fokin return.]

He's on the way?

Fokin: Yes.
Kissinger: [To Garrison] Is Sherer on the way, or is he checking with Hartman?

Garrison: He's on the way.

Kissinger: When I was in Hanoi, I stayed at a palace in the center of town. I went for a walk. They wouldn't let me back in, because I had no pass.

Gromyko: You told me that last time.

Kissinger: Now they're yours.

Gromyko: What's happening?

Kissinger: I understand they're making English a compulsory subject, but they won't have much of an opportunity to practice it.

Gromyko: By two and one-half days, you mean no business on the day of arrival.

Kissinger: I'm told by Sonnenfeldt that the French President is willing to stay only two nights. So we arrive the afternoon of the 30th, stay a full day the 1st and 2nd. That would be our definition.

Gromyko: Three full days.

Kissinger: This gives us two and one-half days. What Schmidt wants to do is to see some people. He can come right before and see them in the morning.

Gromyko: It's really three days.

Kissinger: Probably many delegations will arrive before.

I've talked to Anatol about the possibility of the President meeting Brezhnev while we're there.

Gromyko: All right. I tell you, all right.

Kissinger: Two meetings?

Gromyko: All right.
Kissinger: The morning after the Conference closes.

Gromyko: Yes.

They'll probably be arriving any minute now, so we can wait. Let's not switch to other subjects yet.

Kissinger: I agree.

Gromyko: Soon mothers will start frightening their children by saying, "Malta will come get you." Mintoff. If they said, "Mintoff will get you," that would be the cult of personality. [Laughter]

Did you see Mintoff?

Kissinger: I've never seen him. He's often asked me.

I already have half the madmen of the world as my clients. I have to leave some for after.

That's our strategy: We want him to join the Warsaw Pact; we'd never have a conclusion.

He was voted in by a one vote majority. They must be due for another election.

Gromyko: I saw him at Helsinki. He was at the meeting.

Kissinger: Why? Was it a Foreign Ministers' meeting?

Sukhodrev: He's both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

Gromyko: It will be speech after speech after speech.

Kissinger: I don't know how I am going to live through two and a half days of speeches.

Gromyko: Suppose they are 20 minutes. Suppose. It would take two and a half days. Two working days, six [hours] plus six.

Kissinger: Plus the closing ceremony.

Gromyko: For signing.
Kissinger: Can't we make it 15 minutes?

Gromyko: For us, 15 and 20 are the same.

Kissinger: They will take more time anyway.

[Kovalev comes in. The Secretary greets him.]

Gromyko: Here is a victim of Malta.

Kissinger: Where is Sherer? [Garrison goes out.]

Gromyko: Do you think Malta is melting? Maybe Malta is inclined to declare merci. He refused to answer his phone for 24 hours.

Sukhodrev: He is holed up somewhere where there is no phone.

[Lodal goes out.]

Gromyko: Malta wants the unconditional surrender of the United States.

Kissinger: We are prepared to surrender to Malta. As long as we do it in startling fashion.

Where is Lodal? This is all a Soviet trick to cut down our delegation. Will someone go out to get Lodal? [Lodal comes in.]

Gromyko: He [Kovalev] wanted to go to attend NATO. They rejected our proposal. How narrow-minded.

[Sherer and Fokin come in.]

Kissinger: We wondered how you two fellows managed to prolong this negotiation.

Gromyko: Malta intercepted him.

Sherer: They are doing their best.

Kissinger: Could you describe the situation?
Sherer: I will try to, but it's a fast breaking situation. When I last spoke to Minister Kovalev, before meeting the Secretary's plane, we were faced with a very hard, very hard position by Malta with respect to the situation in the Mediterranean. Even though 34 countries favored the Canadian proposal to go to Helsinki on July 30th. But Malta, it looks like, is going to interfere with that.

While I was meeting with the Secretary, the Soviet Union came forward with two very good initiatives, in my view. The first was to ask the Romanians to talk to Malta to try to soften their position.

Kissinger: That is very clever.

Kovalev: And the Yugoslavs too.

Sherer: I don't know whether it was the Yugoslavs and Romanians who brought about this possible compromise.

Kissinger: When the United States and the Soviet Union have to use intermediaries to talk to Malta!

Sherer: The compromise is that we will ask the Maltese to accept in toto the follow-up paper, which they have also tried to monkey with, fool around with. We will also ask them to accept Quadrupartite Rights and Responsibilities by 7:30 tonight, no changes. We will also ask them to accept the Canadian proposal as is. We have to give them something.

Kissinger: Sicily.

Sherer: Two points on the Mediterranean paper that are boring but might be of interest. There are two phrases; that concern not only "contributing to peace and strengthening security in the area" but also "lessening tension." There was concern by someone that this could be used to remove the fleets. But that is arguable. It could be argued that the fleets contribute to stability.

Kissinger: Could you read me the sentence?

Sherer: "In order to advance the objectives set forth above, the Participating States also declare their intention of maintaining and amplifying the contacts and dialogue as initiated by the CSCE with the nonparticipating Mediterranean States to include all the States of the Mediterranean, with the purpose of contributing to peace, strengthening security, lessening
tensions in the area, and widening the scope of cooperation, ends in which all share a common interest, as well as with the purpose of defining further common objectives."

Kissinger: Is all of this new?

Sherer: Only "lessening tensions." All the rest of the paragraph is agreed to. Only this sentence.

Kissinger: That is all right. We accept it. Is that all right, Mr. Foreign Minister?

Should I refer it to Washington? [Laughter] I will accept it as Assistant to the President.

We have no reason to add it but we have no objection.

My colleagues tell me if I hold out a few minutes, I will get an additional concession.

Sherer: The second one is a compromise worked out by Romania, Yugoslavia and Malta: "The Participating States would seek, in the framework of their multilateral efforts, to encourage progress and appropriate initiatives and to proceed to an exchange of views on the attainment of the above purposes."

Kissinger: What are "the above purposes?"

Sherer: The Mediterranean paragraph.

Kissinger: Could you read it again?

Sherer [Reads the whole paragraph again.]

Gromyko: Without enthusiasm, we will accept it.

Kissinger: This means that all members of the European Security Conference agree to discuss a Mediterranean solution, right?

Gromyko: You see, "the Participating States would seek in the framework of their multilateral efforts" -- it doesn't say what kind, -- "and would encourage."
Kissinger: "Encourage" doesn't bother me. It's "to proceed to negotia-
tions ...."

Gromyko: The substance of the matter is in the first paragraph.

Kissinger: [To Sherer] What do our allies think?

Sherer: When I left the Center, there was no problem.

Kissinger: [To Kovalev] Do you know?

Kovalev: According to our information, all the Western Europeans are
in favor of this. That is what the French told me. I don't know what the
NATO meeting did.

Sherer: There is not time for a NATO caucus.

Kissinger: Let me say that unless there is some objection by our NATO
allies, which I don't know about, I will accept. We accept, with that one
proviso.

Sonnenfeldt: Malta has not accepted.

Sherer: Mr. Mintoff has been out on the beach, or out riding.

Gromyko: Or on a mountain.

Sherer: Possibly, Mr. Minister. But their representative, Mr. Kingswell,
is possibly high enough to accept for the President.

Kissinger: We will accept these two paragraphs. We will support the
July 30 date.

[To Sherer] Our allies have no objection to the July 30 date?

Sherer: There is a consensus on July 30.

Kissinger: The only problem is these two paragraphs and to get Malta to
agree to the date.

Sherer: It may be hard for Mintoff to swallow.

Kissinger: What happens if they don't yield?
Sherr: We have several alternatives. There is one which is proposed by
the head of the Soviet delegation.

Kissinger: Just issue the invitations.

Sherr: To go on a bilateral basis with the Finns.

Kissinger: Can we get our people to go along?

Sherr: No. The Dutch and others will dig in their heels.

Kissinger: What other alternatives do we have?

Sherr: That is hard to say. We are dealing with a man who is just
unreasonable.

Kissinger: [Whispers] Assassination. [Laughter]

What do you think, Mr. Foreign Minister?

Gromyko: I think we must be serious about this. We are doing a serious
piece of business and we can't let it turn into a children's game. If one
or two don't go along, we can't drag them there. If all the others go,
Mintoff will probably go. If he doesn't . . . it will be a precedent of
how to go about a serious job.

Kissinger: Our problem is the Dutch won't go, and many neutrals.
[To Sherr:] Any others?

Sherr: The Italians.

Kissinger: And some nonaligned.

Gromyko: It's not serious.

Kissinger: The problem will be that some will say it establishes a
precedent about treating small countries.

We will know by 7:30.

Gromyko: It's not a matter of principle, it's a matter of meeting the
absurd.
Kissinger: We will know by 7:30 if Malta accepts, true?
Sherer: I can't say.

Kissinger: Why don't we do the following: Let's see by 7:30 whether the allies will accept these two paragraphs. Maybe Malta will accept them. Maybe it's not a good idea to go around about these; Malta will hear about it.

Gromyko: Let me make one correction: We should not start asking other countries their views before 7:30.

Kissinger: I agree. I modified my instruction. Why don't we ask both of them to come back as soon as they know.
Sherer: We should know by the end of the dinner. 9:30.

Kissinger: Does the Maltese Ambassador think he can get through?

[Kissinger and Sherer confer.]

Mr. Foreign Minister, I have no objection to stating -- at the end of this evening, if there is no agreement -- that we and you are prepared to meet on July 30.

Gromyko: Perhaps we could couch it in this form: We have come to an understanding and we agree with those states who agree to July 30.

Kissinger: We agree with those states who accept July 30.

Gromyko: Yes, and to inform the Finns that our heads of government and heads of state are prepared to go to Helsinki.

Kissinger: That will be more difficult. Why don't we wait until 9:30?

Gromyko: All right.

Could we have a 15-minute break?

Kissinger: All right.

[Kissinger and Sherer confer briefly.]
Gromyko: And then we will go to another subject. We will meet in 15 minutes.

[The meeting broke at 6:35 p.m. It was agreed that Ambassador Sherer would speak to the Maltese representative in the name of the Secretary of State. Kovalev had done it in the name of the Foreign Minister. At 6:40 p.m. the meeting convened in a small group in the anteroom to discuss SALT.]
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoli G. Kovalev, Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief of Soviet Delegation to CSCE
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of the American Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mikhail D. Sytrenko, Chief of the Near East Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vasily G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
Viktor M. Sukhadrev, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief, American Section of the American Department

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Amb. Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Chief of U.S. Delegation to CSCE
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME:
Friday, July 11, 1975
10:45 a.m. - 1:07 p.m.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY_ Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY_ 5(b)(3)
PLACE: Carnival Bar
      Intercontinental Hotel
      Geneva

SUBJECT: CSCE; Middle East

[Photographers and press came in to photograph.]

CSCE

Kissinger: Twice I've given briefings in bars in Moscow in the Intourist Hotel.

Mr. Foreign Minister, first let me welcome you to -- I can't say our place. Could we have our Ambassadors here? I see Ambassador Kovalev. Where is Sherer?

[He looks over draft of joint statement.]

Gromyko: Mr. Secretary, you are the chairman. You didn't know you were elected?

Kissinger: Oh. I thought Mr. Kovalev would give us a report.

Kovalev: We've just received a reply from the Maltese. They are prepared to accept the entire text of yesterday of the Canadian proposal, including the date of July 30, to register all the understandings except the one on the Mediterranean which was the subject of discussion yesterday between the Foreign Minister and Secretary Kissinger. Let me read the text.

Kissinger: To whom did they communicate this?

Kovalev: We received it just now from Mintoff's special representative, Kingswell.

Kissinger: Did we get it too?

Kovalev: It was virtually two minutes ago.

Sherer: I was probably at the hotel.
Kovalev: "In order to advance the objectives set forth above, the Participating States also declare their intention of maintaining and amplifying the contacts and dialogue as initiated by the CSCE with the nonparticipating Mediterranean States to include all the States of the Mediterranean, with the purpose of contributing to peace"--the amendment is "reducing armed forces in the region"--"strengthening security," and so on.

Kissinger: The only amendment is "reducing armed forces in the region?"

Kovalev: Right.

Kissinger: Do you have any problem with this?

Gromyko: Why don't we talk for a minute?

[Kissinger and Gromyko get up and go to corner of the room to confer alone, from 10:57 - 10:59. Kissinger then confers with Sonnenfeldt, Stoessel, Sisco and Sherer to 11:02.]

Kissinger: I assume if we now accept this, you will not be calling for a nuclear-free zone or disarmament.


Kissinger: I will instruct Ambassador Sherer to call the NATO caucus and discuss it. I foresee no problem. If there is, we can discuss it.

Sherer: There will be no problem.

Kissinger: We should know, say, within an hour. Then we can conclude it today.

[Sherer leaves. Kovalev gets up and talks to Gromyko.]

Gromyko: I'm telling him [Kovalev] to grab Sherer by the coattails.

Kissinger: He's joining the NATO caucus?

Gromyko: He will be active among our friends and the neutrals.

Kissinger: I think it will be settled in the next hour.
10 pages discussion on
Michelle East
Gromyko: We believe that on this question too we could engage in some preliminary consultation or exchange of views to reach a common position. There are two possibilities: we could hear initially what the parties want to say and propose, and then we could weigh and assess their proposals and maybe put forward our own viewpoints. Or secondly, they could make their proposals -- and they are the appropriate ones to do so since they are the parties directly involved -- and the United States could make its viewpoints known, perhaps concerted, and we could put forward our own. These possibilities could be the subject of exchanges of views between us. After all, we have agreed on occasion to consult on these things, and included this in many documents. So we are flexible on this.

Kissinger: We have two approaches that either of us could pursue. Either of us could compete at this Conference to drive out the influence of the other, for advantage. This would, one, have an effect on our relations and two, would immediately produce a stalemate. Or, we could be a moderating influence. The parties have enough complexities without our adding to them. My view tends to be to let the parties put forward their ideas, and we could consult to try to put forward a common viewpoint. This would be the most constructive approach. Because a stalemate would serve neither of our interests.

CSCE

[Kovalev and Sherer return at 12:29 p.m.].

Kissinger: Should we hear from our Ambassadors first?

Gromyko: Can we guess what they have? Augurs used to guess from looking at them.

Kissinger: I think it is now humanly impossible to make the European Security Conference fail. [Laughter].

Sherer: It took a little time to assemble the NATO chiefs of delegation. They were aware of the Maltese amendments. I polled the room to find out how people felt and I think without exception the major powers have to seek instructions before giving any opinion at all.

Kissinger: You should have said that too.
Sherer: And the countries almost all took a generally negative view.

Kissinger: Which? Italy?

Sherer: Italy, France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Germany.

Kissinger: Does Germany have forces in the Mediterranean?

Sherer: They all spoke in a generally skeptical way.

Kissinger: Let me talk to Mr. Sherer for a minute.

[Kissinger, Sherer, Sisco, Sonnenfeldt and Stoessel confer in the corner until 12:37 p.m. and then return to the table.]

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, on the European Security Conference first, as I understand it from Mr. Sherer, all the NATO delegations are asking for instructions and the answer is expected to be negative. I am asking Sherer to ask the delegations to hold an answer until I have a chance to confer with Schmidt and Callaghan, and I can get in touch with the French.

I think the Conference will take place on July 30. It is only a question of tactics. It's a stupid... We are only committed to maintain contacts and dialogue on these questions.

Sisco: It is not operative.

Kissinger: We are not committed to do anything. I will recommend to them that we stay in low gear on this. [To Sherer] Tell them we construe this only as a commitment to a dialogue, that we don't construe it as calling for a reduction, and we have no intention on our part to reduce our forces. And I don't detect a burning desire by my Soviet colleagues to reduce. No, you speak for yourself.

[The Secretary confers with Sherer]

Sherer will proceed as I indicated. I am seeing Genscher tonight and Schmidt tomorrow and Callaghan. I will call Sauvagnargues tonight or tomorrow. I think the Finns should proceed as if it will go forward on the 30th. It is inconceivable to me that it should fail at this late date.

I'm told the Finns are proceeding anyway on the assumption that it will go forward.
And our two Ambassadors will stay in touch and we will let you know everything we are doing. We will let Vorontsov know Saturday night or Sunday morning what the results are.

Gromyko: All right. I think evidently somebody somewhere seems to be not too aware of the consequences of what is going on.

Kissinger: You are talking about the European Security Conference?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: I think it has become an industry in each Foreign Office working on the European Security Conference. No one asks himself what the purpose is.

I think of all the countries, Turkey is the most difficult one on this question of reducing forces.

[Gromyko confers with Kovalev]

Gromyko: Yesterday they agreed with the Canadian proposal.

Kissinger: Yes. But on the Maltese addition.

Gromyko: We don't know, since the NATO countries discussed it.

Sherer: The Turks here will consult their government, but the delegation here had a generally negative attitude.

Kissinger: We could cut off arms to them.

[To Sherer] Will they be able to get instructions by this afternoon?

Sherer: The Turks will take a while.

Kissinger: All of them.

Sherer: They are all phoning now.

Kissinger: Let me know the lineup before I leave.

Sherer: All right

[Exeunt Sherer and Kovalev].

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
Middle East:

[Gromyko and Sukhodrev confer.]

Gromyko: I was just recapitulating my last remarks on the Middle East: You said we should discuss whether we should concert to put forward proposals of our own or not.

Kissinger: What is your reaction?

Gromyko: That is a possible mode of action.

We can talk over these questions, but what do we do with the Geneva Conference?

Malta is not a factor.

Kissinger: Wait until your Syrian friends go into action. They will drive us all crazy.

[Sonnenfeldt shows him a draft of the joint statement of the meeting.]

I was prepared to add "constructive talks in a friendly atmosphere." "Cordial," I would prefer "cordial."

Gromyko: "Friendly''.

Kissinger: We will do "friendly."

Gromyko: Do you have any idea when the Conference should be convened?

Kissinger: We will have a more precise idea when the General Secretary and the President meet in Helsinki, because we will know whether there will be an interim agreement or not. It will probably be some time in the course of the fall, but a more precise date we will know perhaps by then.

Can I ask, for my understanding, one or two other questions?

You said there is a possibility of partial settlements coming out of Geneva. I have no fixed view on it. Should they be made as stages of an overall -- that is, first we agree on the overall and then we agree on these as steps in it? Or can there be a partial agreement and then overall?
July 23, 1975

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

The Soviet Union first proposed a European security conference on February 10, 1954, and periodically reiterated the proposal in subsequent years. It received little initial enthusiasm from Western and neutral nations, but following increased bilateral initiatives toward detente, a renewed Warsaw Pact appeal from Budapest on March 17, 1969 elicited a cautiously positive reaction from NATO. The United States and our NATO allies took the position that such a conference might serve a useful purpose, but only after concrete progress had been achieved on the most sensitive aspect of East-West confrontation in Europe, namely Berlin.

It was specified in successive NATO documents beginning in December 1969 that conclusion of a new Four-Power agreement on Berlin, aimed at effecting practical improvements in relations between the people on both sides of the wall and between Bonn and West Berlin, could lead to allied willingness to participate in a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The allies also increasingly emphasized the importance they attached to improving F.R.G. relations with the G.D.R., U.S.S.R., Poland and other Warsaw Pact countries. The Berlin Accord, signed September 3, 1971 took effect in June 1972 as did the F.R.G.-G.D.R. Basic Treaty normalizing relations between those two states. The Warsaw Pact countries agreed to commence exploratory talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) at Vienna beginning in January 1973. CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks thereupon opened at Helsinki in November 1972.

Stage I

Stage I of CSCE opened with a meeting of Foreign Ministers of 33 European states plus the United States and Canada at Helsinki from July 3 to 7, 1973. Ministers approved the "Final Recommendations" of the preparatory phase, which set the agenda and established mandates for committees and subcommittees during the Stage II negotiations.

Stage II

Stage II began September 18, 1973 in Geneva. Senior officials from the 35 participating countries met to work out an agreed final document organized under the four agenda items or "baskets:"
1. Questions relating to security in Europe;

2. Cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment;

3. Cooperation in strengthening human contacts, the exchange of information, and cultural and educational ties (the so-called "freer movement" issue); and

4. Post-conference follow-up arrangements.

Basket I

Under the first agenda item, conference negotiators have produced a declaration of the following ten principles of interstate relations:

--Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty.

--Refraining from the threat or use of force.

--Inviolability of frontiers.

--Territorial integrity of states.

--Peaceful settlement of disputes.

--Non-intervention in internal affairs.

--Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.

--Equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

--Cooperation among states.

--Fulfillment in good faith of international obligations.

The U.S.S.R. viewed this declaration as the central document of the conference. The Soviets were especially anxious to gain Western acceptance of an unambiguous principle on inviolability of frontiers by force. Western participants made clear, however, that their agreement to this precept would not constitute formal recognition of existing European frontiers or imply that present
borders are immutable. The Federal Republic of Germany, with the firm support of its NATO allies, insisted on a reference in the Declaration of Principles to the possibility of effecting border changes by peaceful means. The United States took an active role in negotiation of this key text on peaceful border changes, which is included in the principle of sovereign equality.

Also under agenda item 1, CSCE participants have negotiated limited military security measures designed to strengthen mutual trust and confidence. Specific texts were produced on two modest but significant "confidence-building measures:" prior notification of military maneuvers, and exchange of observers at those maneuvers. Adoption of these measures was urged by the smaller European countries.

Basket 2

Under agenda item 2, the Geneva talks produced a series of declarations, or resolutions, on economic, scientific and technological, and environmental cooperation. The United States did not pursue major economic policy objectives at CSCE preferring to leave them to such fora as the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. We took care to ensure that the CSCE texts would not conflict with the U.S. Trade Act of 1974. We hope the practical understandings in this area will broaden the scope of East-West exchanges, help reduce barriers to trade, and make a useful contribution to detente.

Basket 3

The third agenda item, "basket 3", deals with increased human contacts, flow of information, and cooperation in cultural and educational relations. This item was included on the CSCE agenda only as a result of energetic efforts by the United States, our allies, and the neutral states. At Geneva, agreement was reached on basket 3 texts dealing with such issues as family reunification, family visits, marriages between nationals of different states, the right to travel, access to printed as well as broadcast information, improved working conditions for journalists, and increased cultural and educational cooperation.
Basket 4

Under the fourth agenda item, the conference produced a text on post-CSCE "follow-up" arrangements. Debate focused on the degree of institutionalization and continuity to be accorded post-conference activities. The final compromise text provides for unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral actions designed to carry forward the work of the conference and monitor the implementation of agreed texts. A meeting of experts will be convened in the first half of 1977 to prepare for a gathering of senior officials later that year to review results of CSCE and plan for possible future meetings.

Special Topics

In addition to the primary East-West focus of the conference, a number of the smaller participants had special interests which were taken into account in evolving a CSCE consensus. Romania urged acknowledgment of the special status and needs of developing countries; and Malta, Cyprus and Yugoslavia requested consideration of the interests of non-participating Mediterranean states. Special consideration was given to the concerns of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. In general, the smaller countries of Europe appreciated the opportunity CSCE gave them to participate in the detente dialogue.

Stage III

Stage III will be held at Helsinki from July 30 to August 1, 1975. The U.S.S.R. through Communist Party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev requested that Stage III of CSCE be held at the summit level. The United States and its allies maintained that a final decision on the level of Stage III should come after achievement of satisfactory results in Stage II. In intense negotiations during June and early July, all substantive issues were resolved to the satisfaction of all participants and the date for Stage III agreed.

The CSCE final document resembles the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the UN Friendly Relations Declaration. Conference participants view the final document as a statement of political resolve or declaration of intent, not as an agreement legally binding upon governments. However, as a carefully negotiated text, solemnly signed by high-level representatives of the 35 nations involved, it generally will be seen as having considerable moral and political force.
CSCE is sometimes incorrectly compared to the 1815 Congress of Vienna that influenced the political order in Europe for much of the 19th Century, but it is a much more modest event. The results of the conference are but a step in the process of detente, raising the hope of further improvement in East-West relations. CSCE is also the beginning of a new approach to consultations on matters of importance by all European states. The extent to which CSCE agreements are implemented over time will be the true test for judging the success of this conference.
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SUBJ: CSCE AND EASTERN EUROPE: SOME RANDOM THOUGHTS
REF: MOSCOW 5822

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1. SUMMARY. HERewith ARE OUR thoughts ON CURRENT misconceptions STEming FROM csce, ITS MAJOR benefit TO US FOREIGN policy TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE, AND SPECIFIC suggestions FOR OUR policy IN THE POST-CSCE period. end SUMMARY.

2. THERE IS A MYTH BEING PROPAGATED IN THE AMERICAN PRESS AND ELSEWHERE THAT THE CSCE DOCUMENTS SOMEHOW CONFIRM THE STATUS QUO IN EASTERN EUROPE AND CONSOLIDATE SOVIET control OVER THE NATIONS OF THE AREA. THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS, OF COURSE, THAT EASTERN EUROPEAN boundaries WERE CONFIRMED BY THE VARIOUS FRG-EST European treaties—IF NOT BY THE CONQUERING SOVIET ARMIES IN 1944-45. AT MOST, THE CSCE LANGUAGE ON THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS SIMPLY PUTS THAT IDEA IN A MULTILATERAL CONTEXT, EVEN AT THAT, THE CAVET ON PEACEFUL CHANGE DILUTES THE CONCEPT OF THE PERMANENCY OF EASTERN EUROPEAN BORDERS TO THE POINT WHERE THE WEST GERMANS THEMSELVES NO LONGER OBJECT. AS FOR THE POLITICAL STATUS QUO, IT IS PRECISELY THIS THAT THE SOVIETS FEEL CSCE MAY UNHINGE through BASKET I ASSURANCEs OF SOVEREIGNTY AND BASKET III EMPHASIS ON EAST-WEST contacts. IN ANY case, WE WOULD FIND IT HARD TO SEE MERIT IN A LINE OF ARGUMENT IMPLIED ANY benefit TO U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTs FROM RAISING once MORE THE HOARY BALKANESQUE TERRITORIAL disputes THAT HAVE PLAGUED EUROPE FOR THE PAST TWO CENTURIES. IT IS TRUE THAT THE QUESTION OF THE ULTIMATE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY STILL HANGS OVER EUROPE LIKE A TIME BOMB—TICKING INEXORABLY, BUT SLOWLY AND FAR IN THE DISTANCE. HOWEVER, CSCE DOES NOT AFFECT THIS ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.

3. IN ANY EVENT, THE SOVIET POSITION AT HELSINKI AND THEIR OVERALL TREATMENT OF THE CSCE DOCUMENTS ARE FAIRLY PREDICTABLE. THE KREMLIN WILL TRUMPET THAT CSCE STEMMED primARILY FROM BREZHNEV'S "PEACE PROGRAM" AND THE NEW "CORRELATION OF FORCES" IN THE WORLD AND HENCE IS A TRIUMPH FOR THE USSR AND FOR LEONID ILICH PERSONALLY. UNDERLYING THIS CLAIM WILL BE A LEITKOMOTIF SUGGESTING THAT BREZHNEV HAS FINALLY ACHIEVED WHAT PETER THE GREAT AND THE VARIOUS SUCCEEDING RULERS OF RUSSIA COULD NOT—i.e., acceptance of
THE USSR AS A FULL AND EQUAL VOICE IN MATTERS AFFECTING ALL OF EUROPE, THE SOVIETS WILL TEND TO PORTRAY THE CSCE DOCUMENTS AS MARKING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN EUROPE. THEY MAY WELL ARGUE THAT COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD PLUS A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE ARE NEXT IN PRIORITY IN MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY.

4. AS WE HAVE NOTED IN REFTEL, WE EXPECT THAT DURING THE POST-CSCE PERIOD THE SOVIETS WILL WORK HARD TO BLUNT THE EFFECTS OF BASKET III BOTH IN THE USSR ITSELF AND IN EASTERN EUROPE AS WELL. KGB CHIEF ANDROPOV'S ELECTION SPEECH IN EARLY JUNE (MOSCOW 8097) DEMONSTRATED CLEARLY THAT THE KREMLIN WILL DO ALL IT CAN TO LIMIT THE CONSEQUENCES OF BASKET III FOR SOVIET SOCIETY AND THE SOVIET SYSTEM. THIS SAME CONCERN UNDOUBTEDLY EXTENDS TO ITS ALLIES, AND WE EXPECT AN EFFORT BY MOSCOW IN EASTERN EUROPE TO PROMOTE VIGILANCE CAMPAIGNS DESIGNED TO WARD OFF DESTABILIZING CONSEQUENCES OF THE CSCE OBLIGATIONS ON HUMAN CONTACTS.

5. WE BELIEVE OUR MAJOR ASSET FROM CSCE IS THAT DURING STAGE II THE TOPIC OF HUMAN CONTACTS ON ALL LEVELS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BECAME ESTABLISHED AS BEING AMENABLE TO EXAMINATION AND DIALOGUE IN AN ALL-EURPEAN CONTEXT. ONE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT LONG-RANGE PURPOSE IN PROMOTING A POLICY OF DETENTE IS THE HOPE THAT BY DOING SO WE CAN HELP TO FOSTER A MORE HUMANE SOCIETY IN THE USSR, ONE THAT IS NOT OBSESSED WITH THE THREAT FROM THE WEST. THE VARIOUS LEVERS AT OUR DISPOSAL TO PROMOTE THIS AIM, GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM, ARE MODEST AND LIMITED. BUT ONE IMPORTANT CHANNEL AVAILABLE TO US THROUGH WHICH TO INFLUENCE THE SOVIETS IS VIA THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE. IT SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT THE SOVIETS INVADED CZECHOSLOVAKIA BECAUSE THEY FELT THAT THEY COULD NOT ALLOW IN PRAGUE WHAT WAS IMPERMISSIBLE IN KIEV OR MOSCOW. HOWEVER, TIMES HAVE CHANGED SINCE 1968 AND DUBECK, IN ANY CASE -- AND HOWEVER ADMIRABLE HIS ASPIRATIONS--PROVED TO BE A BUMBLING POLITICIAN. EVEN AT THAT TIME HAD HE MOVED IN A DIFFERENT FASHION HE MIGHT HAVE ACHIEVED HIS GOALS, BUT IT IS INCONTESTABLE THAT DEVELOPMENTS
IN EASTERN EUROPE HAVE AN IMPORTANT, BUT OFTEN INDEFINABLE, EFFECT ON THE OUTLOOK OF SOVIET LEADERS. IT IS NOT UNREALISTIC, THEREFORE, TO THINK OF THIS AREA AS A CONDUIT OF SOCIAL CHANGE FOR THE SOVIET UNION. THE TRICK, OF COURSE, WILL BE TO INFLUENCE THE EAST EUROPEANS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION WITHOUT BRINGING THE ARMED WRATH OF THE KREMLIN DOWN ON THEM.

6. WITH THE ABOVE IN MIND, AND TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION DOMESTIC SKEPTICISM REGARDING CSCE AS WELL, WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS, BOTH LONG AND SHORT RANGE, WHICH U.S. POLICY-MAKERS MIGHT CONSIDER IN THE POST-CSCE PERIOD:

A. FIRST OF ALL, AS NOTED IN REFTEL, WE FEEL STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE SUPINE IN THE FACE OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF BASKET III. WE THINK WE SHOULD DO ALL WE CAN TO CONVEY TO THE EUROPEANS, INCLUDING THE USSR, THAT WE REGARD CSCE OBLIGATIONS AS REAL GUIDEPOSTS TO FUTURE CONTACTS BETWEEN PEOPLES.
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6. WE SHOULD USE OUR OWN MEDIA TO EMPHASIZE THE CONTENT
OF THESE OBLIGATIONS (E.G., DISCUSSION PROGRAMS ON VOA, BBC,
DEUTSCHE WELLE, PERHAPS EVEN IN TANDEM; A COVER OF
AMERIKA MAGAZINE SHOWING BREZHNEV AND FORD SIGNING CSCE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR.
C. (We would suggest in the above regard that one of our better wordsmiths coin a euphonious substitute for "Baski III"—e.g., the European Charter of Human Contacts.

D. The Soviets will be emphasizing the importance of Basket I in their media. We should take pains in our own commentaries to point out to Eastern Europe and Soviet audiences the potential importance of the language of Basket I with regard to sovereignty, freedom of thought, and prohibition of interference in the internal affairs of other nations, presumably including socialist ones.

E. In various public and private commentaries on CSCE we should eschew mere rhetorical tribute and stress that our major challenge is to bring these agreements to life through concrete actions on the part of all the signatories.

F. We should also in our commentaries call attention to the fundamental differences in philosophy and world outlook which continue to divide Europe, and perhaps note that the UN Charter remains the definitive source of principles governing international behavior.

G. We should consciously and repeatedly make efforts to refer to the CSCE documents, and urge our allies to do the same, in dealing with the Soviets on bilateral issues such as divided families, working conditions for journalists, radio broadcasting, etc.

H. We should also make crystal-clear that MBFR, not the world disarmament conference or collective security in Asia, should be next on the multilateral agenda.

I. Finally, we would suggest that a careful effort be undertaken by the Department to monitor the record of compliance by CSCE signatories and that such a record be published regularly, perhaps on a semi-annual or annual
6. Beyond the immediate suggestions put forth above, I would recommend that a broad study be undertaken to examine whether we are doing the utmost possible and giving the weight it deserves to our relations with Eastern Europe. Our preliminary impression is that more should be found to expand our political and economic presence there. More visits by American leaders, such as the current ones by the President, would be helpful in this regard. Perhaps equally important, we believe we should examine seriously whether our missions in Eastern Europe are not now ready to operate under new guidelines in this era of detente and whether they are not understaffed, particularly on the USIS and political side, if they are to be expected to expand contacts and interchange of ideas with Eastern European leaders and populations. In this regard, we would recommend that consideration be given to the possibility of greater consular presence in the cities of Eastern Europe.

7. In sum, we would hope that full advantage will be taken of Soviet and Eastern European adherence to the CSCE documents. In addition, we would recommend that as a result of the current focus on CSCE, consideration now be given to perhaps assigning greater priority to U.S. policy and efforts in Eastern Europe. Not only is it an area of great importance to the U.S., both politically and strategically, but it is of perhaps equal significance for the potential effect developments there can have on the USSR itself.
SECRET

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE)
Wednesday, July 30 - Friday, August 1, 1975
Finlandia Hall
Helsinki, Finland

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

The United States, Canada and 33 European states will participate in the
third and concluding summit phase of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. You and each of the other political heads of
state or government will sign the CSCE's final act, and each leader will
address the Conference.

Through your presence at the Conference, you will demonstrate that the
United States retains a vital interest in Europe, and that the security of
the United States is tied through our participation in the Atlantic Alliance,
to the stability of the European continent.

Your address to the Conference is scheduled for the morning of August 1,
1975. (Speaking order for the 35 participants was drawn by lot: Prime
Minister Wilson is first, General Secretary Brezhnev 13th and you are
26th.) Your speech, which will command worldwide attention, and your
bilateral meetings during the conference will provide you with the very
valuable opportunity to place the CSCE results in correct perspective.

Your purpose will be to:

-- evaluate the results of CSCE by stating that its declarations are
not legally binding but, instead, represent political and moral commit-
ments to lessen East-West tensions and increase contacts and cooperation;

-- stress that while CSCE is a step forward, it is not the culmination
of the process of détente, that large standing armies still oppose each
other and that major differences between East and West remain to be
SECRET

-- urge concrete implementation of the promises contained in the declarations, noting the importance the United States attaches to the humanitarian provisions and stating that Europe's military security problems still must be dealt with in MBFR and that SALT II must still be concluded.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. Background: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is the product of a long-standing Soviet proposal first raised in 1954 and resurrected in the aftermath of the Czech invasion in 1958. The Western governments recognized the proposal for what it was -- a vehicle by which the Soviet Union hoped first to freeze the political map of Europe and then to extend its political influence westward. The strong Soviet interest in the Conference led the West to exploit it in three ways:

-- to gain Soviet concessions in East-West political issues. The successful conclusion of the Berlin agreement in 1971, the agreement between East and West Germany, and the initiation of MBFR talks all were to some degree related to the linkage established by the West between progress on these political questions and the West's gradual acceptance of a CSCE.

-- to allow governments of Western Europe, both neutrals and members of NATO, to participate in the detente process. Western governments were thus able to respond to a strongly held public feeling that relations between East and West were changing, that the process should be encouraged and that the management of the process should not be left to the US and USSR alone.

-- to introduce into the CSCE, as a condition for its successful conclusion, the issue of human rights -- the so-called "freer movement" questions.

The United States has participated in the CSCE with restraint, wishing neither to block the efforts of its Allies nor to have the CSCE seen as a source of contention between the US and the Soviet Union. Our objectives have been to maintain Alliance cohesion; to insist that the CSCE's declarations are political, not legal; and to seek such possibilities of easing tension between East and West as might be possible.
After two years of difficult negotiation, a CSCE balance sheet shows that:

-- the Soviets have achieved a CSCE. It will be concluded at the summit, in a historically unique event. The final declarations will give the Soviets some basis to claim that Europe’s frontiers have been confirmed along their present configurations, and that the political consequences of World War II have been digested and are universally accepted.

-- the CSCE results are not wholly what the Soviets wanted. The documents are not legally binding. The statement of principles, even if the Soviets seek to lend it the color of law, by its language falls short of supporting the Soviet objective of freezing Europe’s political configuration. Peaceful change of borders is allowed; the right to self-determination is stated in sweeping terms. Our rights in Berlin have been preserved. The Soviets did not get agreement to a post-CSCE European security arrangement designed to undermine NATO.

-- beyond that, the philosophy which permeates most of the CSCE’s declarations is that of the West’s open societies. The thrust implicit in the declarations is toward greater human rights, the freer movement of peoples and wider access to information. In response, Warsaw Pact members have tightened internal discipline.

Final judgment on the results of CSCE will depend

-- initially on which side is able most persuasively to propagate its version of the CSCE and its version of future European security. The solemnity of the occasion will favor the Soviet Union, as will the simplicity of the Soviet message -- that peace has arrived. The West has a more complex story to tell: that CSCE achievements are modest, that the proof of the CSCE’s success lies in the future, and that a strong Allied defense posture is a precondition for security and future detente.

The Conference Documents. CSCE work has covered four major substantive areas, known as "baskets," concerning: political and military questions; economic, scientific and technological cooperation;
cooperation in strengthening human contacts, the exchange of information, and cultural and educational relations; and post-conference follow-up arrangements.

Basket I

Under the first agenda item, conference negotiators have produced a declaration of the following ten principles of interstate relations:

-- Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty.
-- Refraining from the threat or use of force.
-- Inviolability of frontiers.
-- Territorial integrity of states.
-- Peaceful settlement of disputes.
-- Non-intervention in internal affairs.
-- Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.
-- Equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
-- Cooperation among states.
-- Fulfillment in good faith of international obligations.

The Soviets were especially anxious to gain Western acceptance of an unambiguous principle on inviolability of frontiers by force. Western participants made absolutely clear, however, that their agreement to this precept would in no sense constitute formal recognition of existing European frontiers or imply that present borders are immutable. The Federal Republic of Germany, with the firm support of its NATO Allies, insisted on a reference in the Declaration of Principles to the possibility of effecting border
changes by peaceful means. The United States took an active role in negotiation of this key text on peaceful border changes, which is included in the principle of sovereign equality.

Also under agenda item 1, CSCE participants have negotiated limited military security measures designed to strengthen mutual trust and confidence. Specific texts were produced on two modes but significant "confidence-building measures": prior notification of military maneuvers, and exchange of observers at those maneuvers.

Basket 2

Under agenda item 2, the Geneva talks have produced a series of declarations or resolutions concerned with economic, scientific and technological, and environmental cooperation. These declarations should help broaden East-West industrial cooperation, reduce barriers to trade, increase scientific exchanges, and cooperation in the environment.

Basket 3

The third agenda item -- Basket 3 -- deals with increased human contacts, flow of information, and cooperation in cultural and educational relations. This item was included on the CSCE agenda only as a result of energetic efforts by the United States, our Al and the neutral states. Here we have negotiated especially sensitive issues for both East and West, partly because they deal with "ideological coexistence," which has always been anathema to Moscow. At Geneva, agreement was reached on basket 3 texts dealing with such issues as: family reunification, family visits, marriages between nationals of different states, the right to travel, access to printed, as well as broadcast, information, improved working conditions for journalists, and stepped-up cultural and educational cooperation.

Basket 4

Under the fourth agenda item, the conference produced a text on post-CSCE "follow-up" arrangements. The debate here turned on the degree of institutionalization and continuity to be accorded...
post-conference activities. The final compromise text provides for unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral actions designed to carry forward the work of the conference and monitor the implementation of agreed texts. A meeting of experts will be convened in the first half of 1977 to prepare for a gathering of senior officials, later the same year, to review results of CSCE and plan for possible additional meetings in the future.

The CSCE Signing Ceremony. The concluding ceremony at which the CSCE Final Document will be signed will take place immediately after the last plenary session at approximately 5:00 p.m. August 1, on the stage of Finlandia Hall. The 35 heads of state or government will be seated around a horseshoe-shaped table in French alphabetical order. You will sit between FRG Chancellor Schmidt and Austrian President Kirchschlaeger, and will be third to sign. The participants will each sign once after the last item of the CSCE document.

B. Participants: The principal CSCE participants are listed alphabetically by country at Tab A.

C. Press Arrangements: The CSCE summit will receive full press coverage.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. The current working draft of your address to the CSCE summit is at Tab B. The text is being cleared with Paul Theis.

2. Talking points for your bilateral meetings during the course of the summit are being staffed in separate memoranda.

* * * * *

The accompanying Department of State briefing books contain:

-- additional CSCE background.

-- biographic sketches of the CSCE participants.
SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: US

The President
The Secretary of State
Walter Stoessell, US Ambassador to the USSR
General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
William G. Hyland, Department of State
Jan Lodal, NSC Staff
Alexander Akalovsky, Department of State

USSR

General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev
Andrey Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mr. G.M. Kornienko, Chief of American Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. A. Aleksandrov, Assistant to Mr. Brezhnev
Mr. K. Chernenko, Member of the Central Committee Staff
General Kozlov, Deputy Chief of General Staff
Mr. Detinov
Mr. V. Sukhodrev, MFA
Mr. A. Vavilov, MFA

DATE & TIME: August 2, 1975, 9:05 a.m.

PLACE: Soviet Embassy, Helsinki

Brezhnev: I think the Conference in Helsinki has been received very well by the public.

The President: Yes, I think the press coverage was very good. I have also seen a lot of good pictures in the papers.
Brezhnev: Let's take off our coats; it will be easier to work that way.

[Everybody takes his coat off.]

Brezhnev: How should we start? Perhaps we should draw lots. If the lot is in my right hand, Gromyko will start.

Gromyko: Perhaps. Why not?

Brezhnev: No, maybe we should ask Dr. Kissinger to start.

The President: Mr. General Secretary, I believe you made an outstanding speech at the Conference. I liked its tone and I believe the emphasis you placed on MBFR and SALT has set a correct atmosphere for today's meeting. I would like to compliment you on your speech.

Brezhnev: Thank you very much. If your comment is not merely an expression of politeness, I thank you all the more. [Pause] You know, Mr. President, after this conference, it is morally more difficult to talk about increasing our armaments levels, about introducing new types of weapons, and the like.

The President: I believe it is very interesting to note that the only dispute that surfaced during the conference here was not a dispute between the US and the Soviet Union, but one between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. This is a pleasant change.

Brezhnev: My close colleagues, when they heard those speeches, thought there would be a fist fight.

The President: If there had been one, I believe that from the standpoint of appearance Demirel looked stronger.

Brezhnev: There was also a divine representative there, with a heavy cross!

[Pointing to the cookies which had just been brought in] Dr. Kissinger, this is all for you, you seem to have grown weaker!

[Laughter]

Mr. President, I must thank you for your support and assistance in having this conference precisely at this time. This is something we greatly appreciate and it would be rude of me not to say so. There is also something I would like to...
say off the record, and those taking notes please don't do so. Well, we have an agreement, and we also have arms that could put both of us into the grave. After this conference, we were to make announcements about the introduction of additional arms or of new types of armaments, that would be inappropriate in this atmosphere. But we do need a new agreement. The first one is valid until 1977 and the next one should cover another eight years. This, I am sure, would bring greater tranquility into the minds of our peoples. What we have to discuss is the shape of a new agreement.

The President: I agree. I hope, indeed I believe, that it is possible to reach agreement, and I am looking forward to your visit sometime in the fall to sign, and if need be, to complete the agreement. I believe Dr. Kissinger and your Foreign Minister have moved a number of issues to a point where technicians in Geneva can work out the specifics. We have made substantial progress on such issues as verification of MIRVs; on submarine MIRVs, I don't think the remaining differences are very serious; as regards dimensions, it is a more technical problem. We could draw up a check list of the points where differences continue to exist. Perhaps we could proceed in that way. Last Friday, we gave you our communication. Perhaps you have looked at it and perhaps this would be a good starting point.

Brezhnev: [Pause] Mr. President, this is the second time I am meeting with you on this problem, which is so delicate and most important for our two countries as well as for the entire world. With Dr. Kissinger, we have had numerous meetings on this problem. I would like to speak openly: have we really done everything correctly? First we talked about throw weight, launching weight, modifications of dimensions by 10 to 15 percent, and a ban on the construction of new silos. That is fine, but the fact is that you and we have different fuels which are not comparable. After all, a cup of tea is not a cup of mercury, because the weight of the two is different. But if missiles are used, the result will be the same: Brezhnev dies and Kissinger dies. From the standpoint of the Pentagon and our Ministry, there may be a difference, but from the standpoint of our people at large there is none.

Now, Dr. Kissinger, what do you want: launching weight or throw weight? I am sure you could not answer this question.

The Secretary: I could try.
Brezhnev: We have made a number of concessions: for example, missiles once tested with MIRVs are all to be counted as equipped with MIRVs, although initially our approach was different. But when we asked you not to build B-1 bombers, you said you would. Also, we asked you not to build the Trident, but you are going ahead just the same and that means that we will have to build our Typhoon. Now we have the issue of cruise missiles, which can be launched from both the ground and the air. This is such a complex and delicate issue that it is very difficult to deal with it. But we must give some basic guidance to our representatives in Geneva so that we can sign a document.

(Pause)

Now, I remember that in Vladivostok you agreed... [confers with Gromyko] you indicated agreement concerning B-1 missiles of over 600 kilometers. I am raising this issue of cruise missiles only reluctantly, not because I would like to bypass it, but because I want to avoid anything that could spoil our relations, so that we could find some compromise.

When Gromyko met with Dr. Kissinger, we made a very big concession on verification of MIRVs, and it was really a major concession that was not easy for us to make. But Dr. Kissinger was told that this was linked with cruise missiles. [Gromyko prompts him] We told Dr. Kissinger that the solutions of the two issues should be treated as one complex of issues. Also, we said that each cruise missile should be counted as one, just as those on B-1 bombers. Furthermore, we said that air-based cruise missiles of over 600 kilometers and land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range should be banned. But I must tell you, Mr. President, that Dr. Kissinger has completely ignored this proposal.

The Secretary: This is a total violation of the President's instructions. I did all this on my own. If you hadn't told this to the President, he would not have known it, so now I am in deep trouble.

The President: We have agreed to ban land-based cruise missiles with intercontinental range. You wanted this and we said OK. We also agreed to limit sea-based cruise missiles to a range of 1500 kilometers, so we have moved towards you on this issue. We have also agreed to include in the ban cruise missiles on transport aircraft.

Brezhnev: When you say cruise missiles of intercontinental range, do you mean land-based ones?
The Secretary: Land-based intercontinental cruise missiles and also cruise missiles on transport planes. You wanted to ban them and the President has agreed.

Brezhnev: It is also good that we have agreed on banning ICBMs based on the seabed and the ocean floor, including inland and territorial waters.

The President: Also in space!

Brezhnev: Yes, that is very good.

We are prepared to refer to the delegations in Geneva the question of the limits on dimensional modifications of silos. There are still some differences on this.

Gromyko [to Brezhnev]: Those differences will remain in Geneva as well!

The Secretary: Did I understand you correctly that the points you mentioned previously, such as cruise missiles with intercontinental range, should also go to Geneva? At any rate, let's make a list of issues.

Brezhnev: No, I don't think so.

The Secretary: Only silo dimensions?

Brezhnev: Silo dimensions and . . . [prompted by Gromyko] cruise missiles of intercontinental range.

The Secretary: We agree.

Gromyko: The problem is that the differences between our approaches will remain the same in Geneva as they are here.

The Secretary: We are not disputing, we only want to be sure we understand you correctly.

[Pause]

Brezhnev: I would like to give the floor to Gromyko.

Gromyko: There are various issues relating to cruise missiles. On some we have reached agreement, on others we have not. We have agreement on the following points. You have given a positive answer concerning cruise missiles of intercontinental range. So this is agreed and could be referred to.
the delegations for drafting appropriate language. We have proposed a ban on cruise missiles on all aircraft other than heavy bombers, and we have also proposed that all air-based ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers, except those on heavy bombers, be banned. You have given a positive answer concerning cruise missiles but are passing over in silence ballistic missiles. So that part of this problem which has been agreed could go to Geneva.

The Secretary: We have agreed to count in the aggregate all ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers no matter what vehicle they are on.

Gromyko: If you say this, and you have not said it before, then we can state that all ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers are banned from all aircraft other than heavy bombers, but if you say that all such missiles are to be counted, then we still have some differences.

The Secretary: Are you, Mr. Minister, saying "count"?

Gromyko: No, not count, ban. Agreement concerning the counting of missiles on heavy bombers was reached in Vladivostok.

The Secretary: Our concern is how to differentiate between heavy bombers and other aircraft.

Gromyko: But you and we have agreed on what types of aircraft are to be regarded as heavy bombers.

The Secretary: Not completely. There is still one type at issue, although you are correct as regards aircraft on our side.

Gromyko: This is a separate issue. It relates to the Backfire and should be discussed separately.

As regards sea-based missiles, we have proposed banning all missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers from all ships. Here we have an obverse situation: You have replied positively as regards ballistic missiles but on cruise missiles you have agreed to ban only those with a range of over 1500 kilometers. So here we have agreement on ballistic missiles but not on cruise missiles, and only the first part of this issue could be referred to Geneva.

The Secretary: For clarity, will you please define what you understand has been agreed regarding sea-based ballistic missiles?
Gromyko: All over 600 kilometers are to be banned.

The Secretary: Correct, we agree.

The President: Yes, we agree.

Gromyko: As Comrade Brezhnev has said, there is also agreement between us regarding emplacement on the seabed and on the ocean floor, so this too can go to Geneva. The same applies to outer space.

All issues are important but the issue of cruise missiles is of particular importance. We understood in Vladivostok that missiles included in the aggregate of 2400 are not to be divided in categories of ballistic and cruise missiles. But you started doing so after Vladivostok and this has greatly complicated matters. As Comrade Brezhnev has said, this is a particularly important issue.

The Secretary: On the other hand, nothing was said in Vladivostok about cruise missiles on aircraft other than heavy bombers. But we are ready to reach agreement on this as well as on sea-based cruise missiles. So we are prepared to generalize this problem.

Gromyko: Well, in Vladivostok the cruise missiles issue was not even mentioned, so that we could not even conceive of drawing a line between cruise and ballistic missiles.

The Secretary: But there was nothing said in Vladivostok about cruise missiles on ships and aircraft other than bombers. Yet, now we are willing to count such missiles in the aggregate. We have also agreed to ban cruise missiles on all aircraft other than heavy bombers, to ban cruise missiles with a range of over 1500 kilometers on ships and submarines, and to ban ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers on ships.

Gromyko: You say nothing was said in Vladivostok on these issues. But it was you who started differentiating between cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. If we had proceeded consistently, there would be no division even today. Now, as regards what should be referred to Geneva. The General Secretary has already mentioned this. If no agreement has been reached on some issues at a high or the highest level, no progress can be expected on those issues in Geneva either. On the contrary, their referral to the delegations might make work in Geneva even more difficult.
Brezhnev: In Vladivostok, in the course of two days, we reached agreement on very important questions and principles.

The Secretary: I would like to make two points. First, we should send to Geneva only those items agreed here. There is no point in sending other issues, because if the General Secretary and the President do not agree, Semenov and Johnson won't either. So I repeat, only agreed items are to be referred to Geneva.

Second, as regards sea-based cruise missiles, most of your sea-based cruise missiles have a range of 300 to 500 kilometers -- and I know that your technicians are always angry when I mention specifications of your weapons. With that range you can hit 40 percent of US cities, a great number of which are along the coast. With similar missiles, we can't hit your cities because you very unfairly and inappropriately have located your cities deep inland. So we have a choice: either you give us a longer range or move your cities to the coast.

Gromyko: A very revolutionary proposal! What kind of binoculars do you use?

The Secretary: Our Secretary of Defense proposed moving your cities to the sea coast.

Brezhnev: Put them on barges!

The President: I thought you would suggest moving our cities farther from the sea!

Brezhnev: Not too far!

[A lengthy pause, with Brezhnev reading his brief and then engaging in a long conference with his advisers, only portions of which could be overheard. After reading the paper, Brezhnev waived Kozlov from his seat and asked him what the issue was, commenting that he could not understand it because all missiles were subject to the 600 kilometer limitation. Kozlov, Gromyko and Kornienko explained that the issue was the difference between cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Somewhat later Brezhnev asked if all SALT I provisions would remain in force until 1977. Gromyko replied in the affirmative but pointed out that if agreement were reached now on new points, the new provisions would come into effect under SALT II. After re-reading his brief,
Brezhnev exclaimed that he still did not understand the essence of the issue. Gromyko and Kornienko repeated that it related to cruise missiles. Brezhnev asked if they had in mind land-based cruise missiles, with Gromyko and Kornienko saying that land-based cruise missiles were the lesser part of the problem; Kozlov added that sea-based cruise missiles with the range desired by the US could hit the USSR from the north. Pointing to a paragraph in his brief, Brezhnev asked what the issue of a definition of heavy missiles was all about. Kozlov's response could not be heard.]

Brezhnev: I don't want to burden you, Mr. President, with this question, but what is your view of the definition of heavy missiles? Should it be according to launching weight, or throw weight?

The Secretary: We proposed both, but if we had to choose we would prefer throw weight.

Brezhnev [to Gromyko]: I can't invent anything new here.

Gromyko: You say both. How do you visualize the combination? Can you spell it out?

The Secretary: Your formula for launching weight is that there should be no missiles heavier than the most heavy of the light missiles you now have, that is the SS-19. We say that there should be no missiles with a throw weight larger than the one of the SS-19. We would use these criteria per missile and not overall.

May I make a suggestion. You have been helpful in giving us concrete ideas, and we gave you our proposals. Perhaps you can give us now your views on our recent proposals so we could discuss them with our colleagues and give you our response in a week or so. Then, when the Foreign Minister comes to the US or when I come to Moscow, we could continue our discussion.

[Pause]

Brezhnev: Mr. President, perhaps you don't know the characteristics of our aircraft, but I want to tell you that what you call the Backfire is not a heavy bomber so that your proposal is completely without foundation.

The President: Our understanding is that the Backfire has sufficient range and arms to be counted as a heavy bomber. Perhaps you could give us some technical information that would show that it should not be counted. We understand
that the Backfire is a replacement for the Bison, and the
Bison is counted. So the Backfire should also be counted
in the aggregate of 2400.

Brezhnev [to Kozlov]: This is not correct, is it?

Kozlov [to Brezhnev]: Myasishchev is a heavy bomber.
But this is a medium bomber. It has half the range. TU-22
is a different matter.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, in including the Myasishchev
bomber, or what you call the Bison, we gave you a big present.
That aircraft is not capable of a two-way mission. But,
nevertheless, for formal reasons, we agreed to include it as
a heavy bomber. As regards the Backfire, it can't do even half
of what the Bison can do. Ask your experts. This is on the
record, and I am responsible for what I say. So how can we
include it?

President: Our intelligence tells us that the range and
the other capabilities of the Backfire are reasonably com-
parable with those of the Bison. The two aircraft have a
similar range and their other capabilities are also similar.
I respect your statement, but our information does not
coincide with what you tell me. I would have a monumental
problem with our intelligence, and with our Congress as
well as the American people at large, to whom I have to
account, if I were to accept your figures. If we could see
the figures, that could perhaps help us in finding some
possible arrangement, but this would take time. I really
cannot dismiss the information presented to me by my advisers.
Every time when we encounter technical problems -- and they
are important -- I am reminded of your opening statement on
the importance of reaching an agreement that would be in the
interests of both of our peoples. So with the time limitation
we have, I believe it would be useful if your Foreign Minister
and Dr. Kissinger, when Mr. Gromyko comes to the United States,
continued discussing this problem. Then, when Dr. Kissinger
visits Moscow, he and Mr. Gromyko could further narrow the
differences. Then when we meet, we could further refine our
views so as to be able to sign an agreement. The differences
we have over the Backfire bomber are a very tough problem.
Therefore, I would like to ask you if you have anything to say
on cruise missiles, so that we could indicate some progress.
If you could give us something on cruise missiles that we
could take back with us, that would be very useful.
Brezhnev: It is most difficult to discuss these questions. You, Mr. Ford, are President, and I am General Secretary. Your intelligence reports to you certain things that are new to me, so what does it mean when you don't believe what I tell you? My intelligence reports to me that you are converting light missiles into heavy ones. So you get your intelligence reports and I get mine. But we sit here and don't believe each other. Perhaps not we, but out intelligence people, should sit here.

The President: You said we should not do anything to disrupt the good relationship we have established. I agree 100 percent with you on this point, and all Europe wants this. This was the opinion reflected in all the statements we heard at the conference. But we have to state our views openly. I rely on my intelligence, and you on yours.

If you could indicate some movement on cruise missiles, then we could say that our two meetings have been productive. We said 3,000 kilometers for airborne cruise missiles. I am willing to modify this, perhaps to 2,500, although this is very hard for me to do. In the case of surface ships and submarines, perhaps we could consider using something less than 1,500, say 1,200. I offer this despite the technical advice I receive to show good faith and to indicate that I make decisions regardless of advice. Again, I recall your opening words about the importance of reaching agreement, which impressed me greatly.

It seems to me that given the excellent environment created in Helsinki and the faith thirty-three nations have put in your and my hands, it would be very unfortunate if we were to walk out of here unable to say that progress has been achieved in this vital area.

Gromyko [to Brezhnev]: This doesn't solve the issue.

[Lengthy pause]

Brezhnev: You know, to work out a good agreement, an agreement that would be mutually advantageous, considerable time is needed. Dr. Kissinger plans to visit Moscow rather late. This will create great difficulties, because we will be preoccupied with preparations for the visit by Giscard, the Party Congress, etc.

So we should agree on when the next meeting will take place. [Turning to Gromyko] With the President?
Gromyko [to Brezhnev]: Well, maybe we will meet with Dr. Kissinger.

The Secretary: What are your suggestions?

[Pause]

Brezhnev: We should advance the meeting somewhat, although I have had no vacation yet. Also, if you come again with cruise missiles and the Backfire, well then we just won't be able to get any agreement. So let's think this over. Gromyko has not only summed up our analysis of the issues, but also has added something to it. I kept silent because it is impolite to repeat the same thing three times.

The Secretary: When is the Foreign Minister coming to New York?

Gromyko: On September 15 or 16. I believe the General Assembly starts on the 16th.

The Secretary: Why don't we propose a date after the President has reviewed the schedule. To speed up things, perhaps I could come at the end of August.

Gromyko: August is not suitable. There is a great deal of work to be done. Our experts have to study the issues thoroughly.

[Pause]
Brezhnev: I propose a five-minute break.

The President: Of course.

The Secretary: But we don't want to offend your allies!

Sukhodrev [to Brezhnev]: That is a reference to their departure for Romania.

Brezhnev: Romania won't perish!

[During the break, which lasted about 15 minutes, Brezhnev read his briefing papers, underlining certain portions in the process. He also conferred with Gromyko but their conversation was inaudible. Towards the end of the break, Brezhnev stepped out of the room for a few minutes.]
The Secretary [to Gromyko]: Ever since you joined the Politburo you have been even more difficult.

Gromyko: I don't think so.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, when do you believe my visit to Washington would be convenient to you?

The President: I would say the second half of October. Would that be convenient to you? We have some flexibility. What can you suggest?

[Prolonged pause]

Brezhnev: You know, Mr. President, there are many issues that require thorough study: what kind of missiles, what characteristics of missiles, etc. I have not been able to study these matters here because I have had talks every day from morning till evening.

The President: As I said, we could be flexible. You asked for our view concerning the timing of your visit. I believe it is more important to reach a good agreement rather than set a deadline and not be able to meet it.

[Pause]

Brezhnev: In these circumstances, it is apparently difficult to solve the problem before us. But we must issue some kind of a statement.

The President: I have asked Dr. Kissinger to jot down the points we have agreed on, and perhaps he could read them to us. This could be reported to the public. We should not disappoint the public although we should not give it undue optimism. At the same time, we should not destroy the Helsinki atmosphere.

The Secretary: I believe we could say that we have agreed to refer to Geneva certain points on which we have reached agreement without specifying those points. As I see it, we have agreed that: (a) ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers on surface ships will be banned; (b) ballistic missiles and cruise missiles on the seabed, including in territorial waters, will be banned; (c) placing nuclear weapons in orbit will be banned; (d) development, testing, and deployment of cruise missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers on aircraft other than bombers will be banned; and (e) development of land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range will be banned. So all these items should be referred to Geneva, but all we would say to the public is that a number of issues have been referred to Geneva.
SECRET/NODIS

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Gromyko: With reference to cruise missiles on aircraft other than bombers, do you exclude ballistic missiles?

Secretary: We want to handle ballistic missiles together with land mobile missiles. I don't believe there are great differences in this area but we are not yet prepared to refer this to Geneva.

Gromyko: Your list of items is correct; we agree on these items.

The Secretary: Thus, the President can say that we have agreed on a number of points to be referred to Geneva. He could also say that we would remain in touch, primarily through an exchange of visits between the Foreign Minister and myself. In this way, we would not create an impression of stalemate.

The President: I would like to add that Dr. Kissinger could come to Moscow on the 6th or 7th of September rather than in August. And then you, Mr. Foreign Minister, would be coming to New York after his visit.

The Secretary: I am also prepared to go to Leningrad.

Brezhnev: You haven't been there?

The Secretary: The city may not even exist!

Gromyko: Don't you believe your own wife?

The Secretary: We are also prepared to refer the verification issue to Geneva!

Gromyko[shaking his head]: No, no. There is no proposal on this matter, so we can't do it.

Secretary: I just wanted to catch you in a weak moment!

[At this point, Brezhnev, with Gromyko's assistance, began making changes in the text of the Soviet press statement on the meeting. This drafting session lasted about five minutes.]

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, the agreed points you have listed are not to be specified. The list is only for our own purposes, isn't it?

The Secretary: Correct.
Brezhnev: So we could perhaps issue a statement, I mean a unilateral Soviet statement, that would read like this, and you could issue a similar one.

[Brezhnev hands the text to Sukhodrev, who translates it into English.]

"On 2 August, a meeting between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev and U.S. President Gerald Ford in which member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger took part was held in Helsinki.

"The CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and the U.S. President highly assessed the results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It was stressed that the final act of the conference, which embodies the collective political will of its participants, creates a good basis for transforming Europe into a continent of peace and fruitful cooperation and makes a major contribution to the consolidation of world peace and security.

"The two sides continued their exchanges of views on problems of the further development of Soviet-American relations. Great attention was paid to the problem of limiting strategic weapons. The questions on which agreement was reached during the talks will be referred to the delegations in Geneva for appropriate finalization. Negotiations on the remaining issues will continue.

"Leonid Brezhnev and Gerald Ford expressed satisfaction with the exchange of views that took place, which was of a constructive character, and reaffirmed the great significance of personal contacts between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States."

[Sukhodrev: The text then ends with a list of participants in the meeting.]

The Secretary: After the first meeting, we said that it had taken place in a "friendly atmosphere". Questions will be asked if there is any difference.

Gromyko: We can include such a phrase in this statement as well.

The Secretary: You make no mention of the discussions between the Foreign Minister and myself, but I believe we can say this unilaterally.
Brezhnev: I see no need for mentioning names.

Aleksandrov: Dr. Kissinger is asking whether he could tell the journalists about those talks.

Brezhnev: Well, the talks might be with me too! But I have no objection anyway.

The Secretary: If we are asked about the General Secretary's visit we will say that there has been no change in plans, but we would not say what the plans are.

Brezhnev: So far, no change is envisaged in our plans.

The President: Mr. General Secretary, thank you very much. I believe we have made a little, although not enough, headway and I look forward to further discussions. We value your readiness to seek agreement -- we certainly seek it -- and I trust that we will be able to reach an agreement that would meet the interests of the American and the Soviet people as well as of the entire world.

Brezhnev: I want to repeat that there should be no public announcement of the points that have been agreed. Otherwise, the question of trust will arise! Now, Mr. President, I would like to have a brief conversation with only you and Dr. Kissinger.

[The meeting broke up at 12:10 p.m., with the President and the Secretary staying in the room for the restricted meeting.]

Drafted by: Alexander Akalovsky
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: August 5, 1972
The White House
10:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: President's First Meeting with Prime Minister Miki

PARTICIPANTS: Prime Minister Takeo Miki
Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa
Ambassador Takeshi Yasukawa
Toshiki Kaifu, House of Representatives and Deputy Cabinet Secretary
Sadaaki Numata, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

The President
The Secretary
Ambassador James D. Hodgson
General Brent Scowcroft, NSC
James J. Wickel, Department of State (Interpreter)

President: First of all let me say that I am most grateful for the warm reception I and all of my associates received in Tokyo last fall.

Miki: I appreciate the cordial reception I, my wife and the members of my party are receiving here in Washington.

Before I left Tokyo for Washington I had an audience with the Emperor, who asked me to convey to you his warm appreciation for the thoughtful arrangements being made for his visit to the United States this fall, and for the personal consideration you have shown, Mr. President, in several areas including whales. The Emperor also asked that I convey to you his warm personal regards, and to tell you that he is looking forward to meeting you again this fall.

President: When you return to your country, Mr. Prime Minister, please convey my warmest regards to the Emperor. I look forward to his visit early in October, and I am delighted to hear that the arrangements are proceeding smoothly.
KUALA LUMPUR TERRORISTS

Miki: I regret the unfortunate incident that occurred in Kuala Lumpur. I regret it particularly because the guiding principle throughout my political career has been to promote dialogue and cooperation. And I regret it especially because the terrorists who resorted to blatant violence are Japanese.

I was first informed of this unfortunate incident at 2:00 a.m. the day before yesterday. I immediately called Tokyo and instructed the Acting Prime Minister to organize a Task Force to deal with it. I instructed him that respect for human life and the safety of the hostages are to be given top priority. I have been informed that a plane carrying five of the seven prisoners whose release was demanded by the terrorists left Japan about 2:00 a.m. (EDT) this morning, and arrived at Kuala Lumpur about 8:30 a.m. (EDT). The other two prisoners refused to go. No one knows yet where these terrorists and released prisoners wish to go, but I fervently hope the hostages in this regrettable incident are released without harm.

President: I know these terrorists acted totally independent. It is unfortunate that they are Japanese, but we recognize that other terrorists from other countries do the same thing. I am grateful, Mr. Prime Minister, that you are personally involved.

Our nation's view is, was, and always will be as long as I am President, that we cannot and should not respond to the demands of terrorists. I know that some may feel our policy does not respond to the lives and safety of hostages, but if it were our policy to respond to terrorist demands, the United States would become the repeated target of terrorists who operate around the world.

Our instructions to our diplomats are not to respond to terrorist demands under any circumstances. That is the only way I know to meet forthrightly those foreign terrorists who want to disrupt the world. I told the Secretary of State, and he has told the Foreign Service not to respond to terrorist demands. I appreciate that this might cause difficulty for others, but I wanted you, Mr. Prime Minister, to know what our policy is.
PURPOSE OF VISIT

Miki: Mr. President, I hope to have as forthright a discussion as possible with you this morning, within the limits of the time available. Let me say that when I met you last January, when you were Vice President and I was Deputy Prime Minister, I did not expect to meet you again on such an occasion as this, with you as President and I as Prime Minister.

On my first trip abroad in 1929 the United States was the first country I visited. Later I studied for several years in a university in California, although my English has since gotten rusty. As a result of these experiences my whole life and my 38-year career in the Diet have been guided by the ideals of freedom and democracy. We have something in common, Mr. President, our long careers in our nation's legislatures, and I share with you the same strong faith in democracy.

My purpose in this visit is to discuss frankly the whole range of Japan-US relations to affirm the unshakeable friendship between our two countries. I hope you will forgive me if I happen to offend you with some of my questions, but may I ask you about several matters of interest.

President: By all means. If we could not speak frankly with each other, this meeting would not be beneficial.

EUROPE - CSCE

Miki: Turning to Europe, Mr. President, you just returned from there last night. In everyone's eyes the European Security Agreement appears to have resulted from Soviet efforts to realize their original concept of freezing the status quo in Europe. I am aware that the United States and other nations attached conditions to their acceptance of participation in the Helsinki Conference, but what I wish to ask, Mr. President, is what is your foremost diplomatic objective in the United States' Soviet policy?

President: First, let me comment on the CSCE. I believe there is a lack of sufficient background information on what the CSCE really does. In the first place, with respect to borders, it reaffirms the borders agreed to in treaties signed in 1947 and 1948, and nothing further, except in the case of Germany, where the CSCE reaffirms the borders agreed to by West Germany in 1971. Therefore, the CSCE does nothing more than reaffirm borders agreed to in 1947, 1948 and 1971. This point is not well enough understood.
Second, the CSCE Agreement adds an element of integrity and morality, in terms of the right way of doing things, so that the Soviet Union would not do again what it did in the cases of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The Eastern Europeans, if I may interpret what they said in the meetings and elsewhere, believe the CSCE is a document that will prevent the kinds of action from being taken as in the instances I described. They do not say this is guaranteed, but they seem to feel they have added protection that they didn't have before. In that sense CSCE is constructive. We will have a meeting in Belgrade in 1977, to review what happens in the subsequent two years.

My endorsement of CSCE is based on the good faith of those who agreed to it, including the Soviets. I expect all 35 signatories to live up to the agreement language.

In our relations with the Soviet Union we do not agree with their system (nor do they agree with ours). We do not feel that détente between the Soviets and the United States is a solution to all the world's problems, but it can be used, and has been in some cases, to ease tensions and avoid confrontations. I expect it to continue as a vehicle for those purposes.

Détente is a two-way street; it is not all one-way for the Soviets (and won't be as long as I am President). It is a mechanism for use at a time of rising tensions and confrontation. In some cases it has been disappointing, in other cases helpful. I do not mean that it is one-sided. It is mutually beneficial, and hopefully, can help solve some of the problems facing the world.

Secretary: If I may add a word, Mr. President, the debate about CSCE is totally cynical. It is generated by those who for 20 years advocated the exact opposite of what they now say. As the President has said, there are two realities in Europe, frontiers and political influence. There has been Yalta, and then the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 and 1948, and the German Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971. As a result there are no contested frontiers in Europe. To talk about frontiers is to reaffirm Treaties and legal language.

The political influence of the Soviets in Eastern Europe is not related to this conference. The Soviet Union has some 40,000 tanks between the Urals and the Elbe, and no
Western nation wants to build that many tanks. Until someone does these critics are only engaging in an exercise of expressing demagogic platitudes.

I'm talking very frankly, but then I didn't have much sleep last night. I'm reading a new novel about Japan ("Shogun") and realize everything I'm doing is totally wrong.

Strategically we wish to weaken Soviet political influence in Eastern Europe, not confirm it. And we believe we can weaken it more effectively by detente than we could by cold war. During the cold war period we could use military force, but under detente we must use diplomacy.

If the President can be welcomed by tens of thousands as he was in Warsaw, Bucharest, Kracow, and Belgrade, this weakens the Soviet Union. This could not have happened without detente.

We are under no illusions about the Soviet Union. If they have the opportunity to use pressure, they will do so. We (and you) must adopt positions that our domestic opponents can't attack if we have to resist. I used the example yesterday of the prize-ring -- is it better for us to fight flat-footed in mid-ring where we can be hit easily, or to move around and make ourselves harder to hit? Then if the Soviets do something, and we can tell our people we have done all we can for peace, we will be in a stronger position to resist.

If we look at the Middle East, detente has not helped the Soviet Union. We do not aim at hegemony, and dividing the world between us, because that would be suicidal. We wish to contain the Soviet Union with modern methods, which are not those of the cold war period but are entirely new.

SALT, MBFR

Miki: Based on the outcome of the CSCE conference what prospects do you see for further progress in SALT and MBFR?

President: I had two meetings with General Secretary Brezhnev, in which we made some headway on SALT. There are some problems which are very technical, and some which are very fundamental. I believe the odds on an agreement are better than 50-50, but not certain. We will continue to negotiate. I believe that SALT is in the interest of the entire world as well as US-Soviet relations. We will
continue to work at it, but we will insist that whatever materializes must be mutually beneficial.

Regarding MBFR, we recognize that the negotiations have been stalled for some time. We are working with our European allies to try to develop a position that might move the talks forward, but this depends on the reaction the Soviets have.

We believe that a MBFR that reduces military forces on an equitable basis is in the best interest of Europe, but the talks are stalemated. We hope the Soviets will be as flexible as we will. We will continue to work closely with our allies so that our efforts will lead to greater unity and not split us.

When are the MBFR talks scheduled to reconvene Henry?

Secretary: September, Mr. President.

CSCE EFFECT ON ASIA

Miki: Turning to the repercussions generated in Asia by the CSCE, the Soviets extended an invitation on July 30 to (LDP Diet Member) Hirohide Ishida, Chairman of the Japan-Soviet Parliamentarians Friendship Association, to hold a meeting to discuss an Asian Security Conference.

In the long term, although it may not be visible yet except in special circumstances, what the Asians are most sensitive to is Soviet and Chinese influence in Asia. The Chinese, for example, view the Asian Security Conference proposed by the Soviets as an attempt to encircle them...

Secretary: They're right.

Miki: ...and therefore oppose any third nation hegemony. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship Japan is negotiating with China, as you know, has been stalled by opposition to the inclusion of the hegemony clause. It is obvious that the Chinese are vigilant against any increase in Soviet influence in Asia. What do you feel will be the effect of the CSCE on this trend in Asia, in the context of Soviet influence?

President: First let me speak about the United States' relations with the People's Republic. Our relations were initiated by Mr. Nixon. I fully support these relations,
and believe they are of vital importance. I expect to
go to the People's Republic sometime late this fall. I
feel that our relations are moving along on schedule. The
Shanghai document is the basis for continuing and expand-
ing our relations. I see no serious problem developing in
that regard.

We all recognize that there is competition in Asia between
the Soviet Union and the People's Republic. We believe
that our continuing relations with China are important in
maintaining stability in Asia, and we will make every
effort, in a responsible manner, to broaden our relations
with the People's Republic. Secondly, we expect to main-
tain continued close relations with your government, Mr.
Prime Minister. We feel this is vitally important for the
stability and security of the Pacific. I have been
encouraged by our discussions in Japan, and this morning.
Tomorrow we can reaffirm the importance of our relations.

I recognize there are problems in the Pacific area, not in
our relations but in peripheral areas. We should be frank
in discussing those relations, as they refer to relations
between the United States and Japan.

Therefore, we seek to broaden our relations with China,
while maintaining and strengthening our relations with Japan.
This will have an impact on the influence of the Soviet
Union in the Pacific area. Henry, have you anything to
add?

Secretary: I was asked in Helsinki about an Asian collec-
tive security conference, and said if there is such a meeting,
it would take place without the United States. I do not
think Asia can be compared with the situation in Europe.

Miki: I agree.

Secretary: We will not participate in an Asian collective
security conference, or anything of that kind.

Second, we believe the Soviet Union is trying to encircle
China, and in no way do we wish to participate. China has
its own aspirations, and in ten years may cause trouble for
all of us, including Japan, but at the present time it is not
in our interest to weaken China. Therefore, we will not
cooperate with the Soviets in any anti-Chinese maneuver in
Asia. It was for that reason that we signed the Shanghai
Communique, with its hegemony clause. We knew what we were
doing, and made it explicit.
SINO-SOVIEET COMPETITION IN ASIA

Miki: How do you view the present state of the Sino-Soviet conflict in Asia?

President: I might repeat what I heard from a number of sources in Helsinki. The Soviet Union has 44 divisions on the Chinese border. That certainly indicates to me that their relations are not better, and may even be considerably worse than before.

As the Secretary said, we do not adopt a policy of favoring one over the other, but at the same time we will keep our relations with you, Mr. Prime Minister, because of the strong influence of our relations on peace and stability in Asia.

Secretary: If there is a danger it is that Japan might over-analyze our policy, and initiate a leap-frog exercise that would be detrimental to both our interests. We are not following a parallel policy with the Soviets in Asia, but if Japan does something to get ahead of us, we might have to do something. Thus it is very important that we coordinate our policies toward the Soviet Union and China. We should not cooperate in the Soviet efforts to isolate China.

Miki: On my part, I believe we should have a full understanding of your China policy. Therefore, I wish to ask your view of the prospects for improving your relations with China, and how far you might go, Mr. President, in developing your relations during your visit to China?

Also, I would appreciate hearing a frank explanation of your long-term policy views regarding China.

President: As I said just a few minutes ago the Shanghai Communique is the basic document by which we are proceeding to develop our relations with China. We feel, and we believe the People's Republic feels, that our relations are within the context of the Shanghai Communique.

As I said, I will visit China later in the fall. There is no agenda, and no details have been worked out. The Secretary will probably go to the People's Republic before my visit, and at that time the agenda will be finalized.

We have made no commitment at this time with regard to our relations with Peking except in the context of the Shanghai Communique.

SECRET
August 6, 1975

Talking Points for the Secretary at the Cabinet Meeting

Overall Impression

Successful trip that
-- put CSCE in perspective;
-- strengthened ties with Allies;
-- graphically illustrated our desire to support independent policies in Eastern Europe;
-- afforded opportunity for important bilaterals on SALT (with Brezhnev), on Cyprus and Eastern Mediterranean (with Caramanlis and Demirel), on economic interdependence (with Schmidt, Wilson, Giscard and Moro), and on Spanish bases (with Arias and Cortina).
In addition, I met with Prime Ministers Palme, Thorn and Tindemans and Foreign Ministers of Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Norway, Finland and Italy, as well as
CSCE

-- The most striking thing about stage III of the CSCE was the extent to which it was a Western show. Despite the Conference's origins as a Soviet foreign policy initiative, intellectually it was dominated by the West.

-- This was not just a question of atmosphere, but quite a real reflection of the substantive outcome of the Conference. The main Soviet goal of obtaining full formal recognition of the situation in Eastern Europe had, as a practical matter, been overtaken by events before the Conference began, and the CSCE thus served quite a different purpose: it gave broad recognition to the possibility of peaceful evolution in Europe, including peaceful changes in frontiers.

-- In fact, the whole thrust of the Final Act of the CSCE, and of the speeches in Helsinki, was toward the possibility of evolution in Europe toward more open relationships between East and West and more open societies.

-- Some of the press, which was critical of the CSCE before they had read the final document, now seems to have come to a better understanding of its real significance.
We continue to regard CSCE as an important element in the overall detente process, which is beneficial to the United States. The CSCE has underlined the need for having a greater human content in detente, and has pioneered in certain aspects of the freer movement of people and ideas. The President's speech, which has the most forceful expression at Helsinki of the Western view of CSCE, made it clear that we will participate fully in ensuring that the obligations undertaken in CSCE are carried out.

Brezhnev

See Tab I.

Western Bilaterals

The main subject in Western bilaterals was the state of the economy. Schmidt and Giscard were particularly concerned about state of our recovery and the need for some mechanism to coordinate domestic economic decisions.

Giscard and Schmidt pressed for a Five-Power Summit. They want the U.S. to stimulate our economy more and take greater account of the effect of our measures (e.g. high interest rates) on their economies.
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-- Schmidt hopes that some monetary agreements can be reached in the IMF meetings (e.g. increased IMF quotas and inter-Central Bank gold transactions), recognizing that fundamental disagreements persist between France and the U.S. on exchange rates. In the interim, he wants us to agree to a system for managed floating and some commitment by the U.S. to support the dollar rate.

-- We also discussed the situation in Portugal. The Europeans are now more pessimistic and seem more willing to take initiatives to strengthen moderate military groups, as well as the Socialists, although they have no very precise ideas about how to do this. Greece, Turkey and Cyprus

-- It is clear that our Congressional action has had a negative effect on the Cyprus negotiations at a time when the parties are moving closer toward an eventual settlement.

-- Demirel said that important concessions on territory could not be made as long as embargo is in effect.

-- The President told Caramanlis how unhelpful the actions of his Embassy had been.

-- Even Makarios has moved toward a bizonal, federal system and more reasonable territorial percentages.

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--- But the embargo has permanently hurt our position in Turkey. We must make a maximum effort to get it lifted in September. The EC-9 want to be helpful and share our view that the embargo must be lifted to make progress.

East European Impressions

--- Poland and Romania, in differing degrees, want to strengthen their bilateral ties with U.S. Poland clearly has less flexibility but their agreement with the FRG shows that ties with the West are important, particularly to develop their economy.

--- Romanians are more outspoken and are alert to any and all opportunities to show their independence.

--- Tito wants to play a helpful role with the non-aligned world on issues like the Middle East.

--- Tito also wants more concrete results on our military sales program. The President promised fast, responsive action.

Spain

--- Arias and Cortina are still trying to see how they can get recognition for the defense contribution Spain makes to the West.

--- We pointed out that their hardware request is exaggerated, particularly if they are going to insist that we cut back on our bases in Spain.
-- We promised to mutually review positions prior to the next round of negotiations in mid-August.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China
Huang Hua, PRC Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Chang Han-chih, Deputy Director, Asian Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Le Hsu, Deputy Director, African Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Shih Yen-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interpreter [Notetaker]
Kuo Chia-ting, Second Secretary, PRC United Nations Mission, Notetaker [Interpreter]
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Patrick Moynihan, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

DATE & TIME:
Sunday, September 28, 1975
8:10 p.m. - 11:55 p.m.
Dinner Meeting

PLACE:
Suite of the Secretary of State
35th Floor, Waldorf Towers
New York City

The Soviet Union; CSCE; Europe; Japan; Angola; Indochina; the President's China Trip; the Global Strategic Situation; Korea
The Soviet Union believes that they can undermine the will to resist of the West politically --

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Of course they wish to achieve this.

Secretary Kissinger: -- but in the East, they must undermine it militarily. That is my view, but it is based on agnosticism.

Our policy is based on the proposition that a strategic gain on either (the U.S. or China) is a disaster for the other. Therefore we seek to prevent either.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: You are right on this point. But you must have a very clear judgment about what is the focal point, as this has a bearing on many policies.

Secretary Kissinger: But if it is in the West, what should we be doing differently?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao (pauses in reflection): Your --

Secretary Kissinger (Ambassador Huang Hua): You are my advisor this evening!

Chang Han-chih (whispers in Chinese to Ch'iao): Helsinki.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Of course, your moves have both internal and external considerations. We have our differences. We notice your moves in the West and Eastern worlds. But some of your moves are not necessary.

Secretary Kissinger: But we are speaking now as friends. I know you want to strengthen Western Europe. We want to also. I would not consider this criticism.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I would not like to mention highly controversial points, even among ourselves. But I should mention the Helsinki Conference. We do not see why it was necessary for you to take such a step. Why didn't you delay? I do not know why you permit them to take such a form which is of need to the Soviet Union.
We do not exactly know your idea. Perhaps it was that Brezhnev is relatively good among the Soviet leaders and you thought you wanted to stabilize his position among these leaders. This is my own idea [of what the Secretary had in mind].

I will be very candid. There is a contradiction [in your position]: On the one hand you said that the Helsinki agreement has no binding force. On the other hand, [your agreement with the Soviets] took the form of a conference. This is contradictory.

Secretary Kissinger: Our motives had nothing to do with Brezhnev personally.

I once had the intention of writing a book on Bismarck. I find him more interesting than Metternich, with whom I am usually identified. Bismarck was more modern. He once wrote that a sentimental policy knows no reciprocity.

The European Security Conference cannot be analyzed in the context of just this year. You have to understand it in terms of its history. It was around for more than ten years as an idea. We negotiated on it for three years. We used it as a safety valve these past three years for other problems.

My instructions to our delegation were that they should remain one step behind the other European governments. We did not take the lead — although we did not block the conference either.

Foreign Minister Ch'iiao: This is what you told me last year. But at that time you had not decided whether to convene it as a summit meeting or a conference of foreign ministers.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct. The foreign ministers' meeting was preempted as a result of Giscard's meeting with Schmidt in December [during which they agreed to hold the Conference at the summit level].

But I submit that you overestimate the European Security Conference.

Foreign Minister Ch'iiao: No. That is not the case.

Secretary Kissinger: What is its significance?
Foreign Minister Ch'iao: The American press has almost compared the European Security Conference to another Munich.

Secretary Kissinger: The American press is in a mood of nihilism, complete unreality.

Mr. Foreign Minister, the same people who called the European Security Conference another Munich would organize a real Munich at the first crisis. The most destructive thing we can do is to pay attention to our press in its presently destructive mood.

There is one certain prediction: The only way to pursue a strong foreign policy is to do as we are now doing with the Soviet Union. If we are only rhetorically strong, the Washington Post and New York Times would be saying that we missed an opportunity for progress. Any third secretary in the Soviet Embassy could dangle hints of progress before the press, and we would be spending all of our time explaining why we are unresponsive. Just read our press of the 1960s! I would much rather have the New York Times to my right than on my left.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: About our assessment of the Helsinki conference, there is one point I would like to clarify: We do not attach much importance to that conference. There has not been even one editorial in our papers, only some commentaries.

Secretary Kissinger: I do not know if I like that. Indifference is a worse punishment than criticism.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: In our recent speeches we made criticism of the Helsinki conference. The Soviet Union has lauded it to the skies. But in terms of the international situation, this will all soon evaporate.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree. It [the conference] had to be brought to a conclusion, as its continuation gave it a greater significance than it deserved. It was not worth a battle over the question of [whether to hold] a summit. If the Soviet Union gained [from the conference], it was internally not internationally.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Whether this conference was convened or not, how long it was held, or the form it took -- a summit meeting or foreign ministers' conference -- these things cannot affect the international situation.
Secretary Kissinger: I do not think the results of the conference affected either. Borders -- there are no unrecognized borders in Europe. They were all recognized before the conference.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But there are some difficulties in it. Politically, they [the Soviets] can make some propaganda -- not legally -- that the borders are now more settled.

Secretary Kissinger: But the borders of the Balkans were fixed in 1946, the borders between Poland and the Federal Republic were established at Yalta. There are no unrecognized frontiers. What fixes the borders now is the presence of 25,000 Soviet tanks between the Oder and the Elbe. Until that situation changes there will be no [political] changes.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But at least this conference gives people the idea that the Soviets can station troops in Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: I doubt that we gave the Soviets anything in this agreement. We are trying to weaken Soviet influence [in central Europe] by [Presidential] visits and by our developing military relations with the Yugoslavs. But changes requires a political process in Europe.

At the conference, the attitudes of Yugoslavia and Romania, and less so Poland, were most interesting.

At any rate, I do not exclude the possibility that we make mistakes -- although I seldom will admit it. But our strategy is to weaken the Soviet Union.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I know you have taken some steps toward the Soviet Union -- tactical measures.

Secretary Kissinger: At present no other strategy is possible -- unless you have some other idea?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao (after a pause): Your former Secretary of State Stimson had a policy of "non-recognition."

Secretary Kissinger: We tried that with you for twenty years. It was not one of our most successful policies. (Laughter)
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TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: C - Mr. Sonnenfeldt
FROM: EUR -- Arthur A. Hartman

CSCE Implementation: Overall Concept

The Need for an Overall Concept

As the President said in Helsinki, the real test of CSCE will be in its implementation, and this theme places a burden on us to come to grips with the complex problem of pursuing the implementation of the results of CSCE. This memorandum outlines what we see as basic US objectives in CSCE implementation, and sketches out the overall scheme which we are following in moving forward with our implementation efforts.

US Objectives in Implementation of CSCE

We see three basic US objectives in the CSCE implementation process:

-- Pursuit of Detente. We have a continuing interest in working constructively with the Soviets and the Eastern Europeans in the implementation of CSCE to identify additional areas where cooperation can be to our mutual advantage. In view of the close coordination with our Allies which characterized our approach to the CSCE negotiations themselves, our actions should form part of an overall Allied and Western effort.

-- Soviet and Eastern European Compliance. We have an intrinsic interest in Soviet and Eastern European compliance with specific CSCE provisions on such subjects as family reunification, binational marriages, improved working conditions for journalists and businessmen,

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liberalization of travel restrictions, etc., most of which relate to long-standing bilateral problems between the US and the USSR or the Eastern European states. This is also the area in which there is a strong US public and Congressional interest, and in which critics of the CSCE will be watching our efforts, especially as we move into an election year.

-- Preparation for Belgrade. We have a practical interest in compiling information which will serve as background for the political decisions which will have to be taken at the follow-up meetings set for Belgrade in 1977. Decisions will then be taken on the organization of possible further CSCE follow-up meetings, and will be based to a large extent on the collective judgment of the success of CSCE implementation.

Problems Posed by Implementation

In pursuing our objectives in CSCE implementation, we should be aware of the problems involved. These can be broken down into the following categories:

-- The Lack of Precision of the CSCE Final Act. While some provisions of the Final Act are relatively specific, others are vague, ambiguous or subject to varying interpretations. In many other cases, the commitments which have been undertaken do not lend themselves to quantitative measurement.

-- Different Political Approaches. The political language of the Final Act is seen differently, depending on the political orientation of the country concerned. This is particularly true of the list of interstate principles, perhaps the most fundamental political part of the document. We have already seen in the case of Portugal how East and West can use CSCE principles to bolster their position on the same subject.

-- The Interdependence of the Provisions of the Final Act. The many cross references and linkages in the Final Act make it difficult to refer to specific provisions in isolation. For example, it is stated that cooperation in the Basket III area "should take place in full respect for the principles guiding relations among participating states," which the Soviets...
believe supports their position that Basket III is subject to domestic laws and regulations, and should not be used to interfere in internal affairs.

-- Interpretation of the Status of the Final Act. Some CSCE provisions imply further negotiations; others do not; still others are ambiguous in this respect. Some provisions identify a forum for pursuit of a subject; others do not, leaving this point open to differing views.

-- Possible Contradictions in US Position. Our objectives will not always be in complete harmony; for example, our support for freer travel provisions must be hedged in view of AFL/CIO opposition to contacts with Communist trade union representatives.

Organizing Ourselves for Pursuit of US Objectives in CSCE Implementation

Given the need to pursue the implementation of CSCE in a purposeful way, and the multitude of complexities and difficulties involved, we are moving forward with a concept which would provide overall policy control of the various functional aspects of CSCE, while adapting our specific interests to our bilateral relations with individual Eastern countries, coordinating with our Allies, the EC Nine (and, more informally, with the neutrals), and monitoring implementation efforts. The principle elements of the organization of this concept are the following:

-- Overall Policy Control. We have supported the NSC's recommendation that overall US Governmental responsibility for implementation of CSCE be vested in the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. Approval of this recommendation would provide a framework within which the Department of State (EUR) could exercise policy control over all the functional (military, trade, science, environment, human rights, culture, education, etc.) parts of the CSCE Final Act. Within this structure, small specialized working groups can identify points deserving our attention and decide on methods for pursuing them. This organization would also be used to ensure full US observance of the provisions of the Final Act.
- Bilateral Approaches. We have asked our embassies in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to recommend subjects on which bilateral approaches can usefully be made on the basis of CSCE provisions, avoiding a sterile or contentious dialogue. These approaches will form our principal vehicle for ensuring compliance by the USSR and Eastern European countries, and can be adapted to the situation as it develops, for example in response to specific problems which may arise later. They will also serve to identify areas where further cooperative efforts may be possible and desirable. We plan to consult and exchange information with our Allies on these approaches to ensure overall harmony, to preclude efforts which may be counter-productive, and to maintain Allied solidarity.

- Monitoring. We are proposing a joint monitoring effort in NATO on those aspects of CSCE which lend themselves to record-keeping. We are also asking our posts in Moscow and Eastern Europe to submit periodic reports on compliance in these areas. The first of these reports will be designed to provide us with a series of benchmarks — or a picture of the situation existing at the time of the signing of the Final Act, in order to facilitate, insofar as it is possible, actual measurement of progress. It should be noted that this is possible only in the case of a limited number of provisions. Some of the provisions which are of greatest interest to us, such as family reunification and binational marriages, can be measured quantitatively, but many CSCE provisions cannot be measured in this way. Even where some form of record-keeping is possible, interpretation and judgment will have to be exercised in determining real significance (e.g., in judging the degree of compliance with the provision on expanded travel opportunities for journalists). This monitoring effort will provide the basic factual input to the preparation of the political decisions which will be required in 1977 in Belgrade.
Specific Actions Taken Thus Far

The specific actions we have taken thus far in pursuit of CSCE implementation form part of this overall scheme, and should be seen in this way.

-- CBMs. The Western Allies have given advance notification of five maneuvers thus far, and have invited observers to attend one of these. Coordination within the US Government has formed an example for our work within the structure of the Under Secretaries Committee, and NATO consultations have, of course, been close.

-- Multiple Entry Visas for Journalists. Our demarches with the Soviets on this subject constitute the kind of bilateral approach we envisage where this may be useful. We have also informed our Allies of steps we have taken on this subject.

-- Family Reunification. Our citing of the CSCE provisions in presenting the latest Representation List to the Soviets is the kind of continuing encouragement to progress which we foresee with the Soviets in areas of this kind.

Feeling Our Way

Finally, it should be recognized that in this unique effort we are very much feeling our way. We will be trying to take account of all the factors involved in this complex undertaking, whether they be international or internal US considerations, and will be developing and adjusting the basic concept outlined above in the light of our experience and the evolving situation.

Drafted by:  
EUR/RPM: JIMaresca  
9/26/75 X21358

Clearance:  
L/EUR: HRussell

CONFIDENTIAL
What will happen
Security Agreement as to our relations
with the Baltic groups - Latvian,
Estonian & Lithuanian - who are so friendly & educated?
These groups seem to imply
it will conform USSR. permanent
control. Recognize the facts?
life but does our rule ensure
this in writing?
Yes, I can visualize
the Senate debating this with great
emotion etc.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Impact of European Security Conference on Baltic States

Members of the Baltic American Community have recently been seeking reaffirmation of the United States' policy toward the Baltic States, believing such reaffirmation is important on the eve of the European Security Conference. This memorandum addressed the questions you have raised on this subject.

The anticipated results of the European Security Conference will not alter the status of the Baltic states, and your signature of the final CSCE documents will not inadvertently serve either to confirm or endorse permanent Soviet control.

-- The final CSCE documents to be signed at the Heads of Government level will not be in Treaty form and they will not be legally binding. They will be declarations of a political, humanitarian, and technological/economic character reflecting a political and moral commitment by the participating states -- not a legal obligation.

-- The language of central importance to the Baltic states is that relating to the inviolability of frontiers and the peaceful change of frontiers. While the Soviets have from the beginning of the Conference attempted to turn it into a surrogate World War II Treaty formally confirming the territorial status quo of Eastern and Western Europe, we and the West Europeans have successfully resisted this. Thus, while the CSCE principles will state that borders are inviolable they will also state that borders can be changed by peaceful means. (With the future of the two Germanies in mind, the FRG has insisted on the peaceful change of frontiers language, and the USSR has agreed. This is a positive development in terms of the interests of the Baltic-American community.)
State Department consultations thus far with various Senators would indicate that the CSCE declarations will not become a subject of emotional debate in the Senate. Concerned Senators have sought and have received assurance that the CSCE documents will have no legal force. It is realized that were the Senate to insist on having the documents submitted by the Executive Branch for formal Senate review, it would accord the documents more formal, treaty-like status than is desired.

Background on US-Baltic State Policy

The United States has never recognized the forcible annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania by the Soviet Union in 1940, despite the fact Baltic States have the status of Constituent Republics of the Soviet Union. We have continued to accredit in this country diplomatic representatives commissioned by the last independent governments of the Baltic States (Latvia and Lithuania are represented by charges d'affaires in Washington; Estonia by a consul general in charge of legation in New York).

Despite our non-recognition policy, we regularly deal with Soviet authorities on practical matters involving the Baltic States, such as consular affairs, postal matters, and cultural exchanges. The Baltic-American community generally has not objected to these steps, realizing that we must work through Soviet authorities if we are to have any contact with the Baltic peoples.

Although the Soviets clearly dislike our non-recognition policy, they have brought no public or private pressure to bear in an effort to change it. They may hope, instead, that time and detente will gradually erode our position.

Americans of Baltic background, with the support of some members of Congress, have been active and vocal in urging that we maintain our policy toward the Baltic States. They have been quick to criticize any move which could be interpreted as a weakening of our refusal to recognize Soviet annexation of these countries. They have asked for assurances that U.S. policy toward the Baltic States will not be altered by the European Security Conference.
The Department of State is in frequent correspondence with the Baltic American community and has offered written assurances that the U.S. position in the European Security Conference in no way alters U.S. policy toward the Baltic States.
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: Mr. Clift

SUBJECT: Implementation of the CSCE Final Act

The Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee has sent the President the second quarterly report on implementation of the CSCE Final Act by the Communist signatories (at Tab A).

The memorandum for your signature to the President at Tab I would forward the NSC/USC report, together with a brief summary. It would point out that since November the Communists apparently have developed guidelines for implementation of the Final Act and undertaken specific actions to that end. It would conclude, however, that the Eastern signatories will need to come considerably closer to full implementation before the 1977 follow-up meetings in Belgrade to satisfy Western public opinion. In this connection, it informs the President that communist practices in the sensitive human rights area have not changed appreciably.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

RGates:sw:4/27/76

SECRET (GDS)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:  Brent Scowcroft

SUBJECT:  Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

The Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee has sent you the second quarterly report on Communist implementation of provisions of the CSCE Final Act. The report concludes that the period November 1-January 31 was one of transition from interpretation and organization for implementation by the Communist signatories to one of more active implementation efforts.

The Warsaw Pact governments evidently developed guidelines for implementation at meetings of Communist party leaders on December 9 and January 26-28 and of Communist foreign ministers in Moscow on December 15-16. Subsequent to these meetings and during the November-January period, the Communist signatories undertook the following specific steps toward implementation of the Final Act:

-- The USSR on January 4, in keeping with CSCE confidence building measures (CBMs), gave advance notification of a major military maneuver, "Caucasus," held near the Turkish-Soviet border from January 25-February 6. The Soviets invited observers to this maneuver from CSCE participant states in the area, including two NATO members, Greece and Turkey.

-- General Secretary Brezhnev on December 9 called for all-European conferences on energy, transportation and the environment to continue the process of cooperation in fields covered by Basket II of the Final Act. In connection, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria have issued decrees permitting establishment of foreign business offices in keeping with Basket II provisions on improving working conditions for businessmen.
In the Basket III (human rights) area, the Soviets have somewhat eased regulations governing internal travel by foreign journalists and have taken several steps aimed at simplifying application for emigration and reducing its cost. They have reportedly permitted delivery of some printed religious material and have announced the USSR's intention to permit limited circulation (we would anticipate carefully controlled circulation) of 18 Western newspapers, including the New York Times and Le Monde.

This represents a modest advance over the information contained in my status report of January 29 in which the "Caucasus" CBM notification, multiple visas for journalists, publication of the Final Act, and several reunification-of-divided-family cases were reported.

The report concludes that the Communist countries will need to come considerably closer to full implementation before the June 1977 follow-up meetings in Belgrade to satisfy Western public opinion. In this connection, it points out that Eastern efforts to bring policies and procedures into line with CSCE provisions on human contacts and information represent only a very modest start and that much must still be done to implement fully the provisions of the Final Act in this sensitive area. The report observes that overall emigration and family reunification patterns in the Communist states remain about the same. Among the more publicized cases, dissident physicist Andrei Sakharov was denied permission to go abroad to receive his Nobel Peace Prize and Mrs. Irina McClellan, the Soviet wife of an American citizen, has not been permitted to join her husband in the U.S., despite widespread publicity and repeated interventions by our embassy in Moscow.

At the same time, the Soviets and their allies have taken the offensive in criticizing Western implementation wherever possible in order to defend gaps in their own implementation. The report states that while Western performance in implementing the great majority of the Final Act's provisions cannot reasonably be faulted, the Communists have accused the West of unduly stressing the freer movement provisions of Basket III while ignoring the list of principles for interstate relations, seeking through Basket III to intervene in their internal affairs, and failing to implement certain provisions such as full distribution of the Final Act, easing procedures related to travel and certain U.S. visa practices.
The NSC/USC report concludes that perceptions of the significance of CSCE have continued to mature, and there has been a growing realization -- represented most eloquently Soviet dissident Sakharov -- that the Final Act represents a Western achievement, provided it is implemented in a meaningful way.

The NSC Under Secretaries report is at Tab A.

RGates: nw: 4/27/76

SECRET - (GDS)
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

May 26, 1976

Honorable James T. Lynn
Director, Office of Management and Budget
Washington, D.C. 20503

Dear Mr. Lynn:

This is in response to your request for the views of the Department of Justice on S. 2679, an enrolled bill which would establish a Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Commission would be authorized to monitor compliance with the articles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki Declaration) with particular regard to the provisions relating to cooperation in humanitarian fields.

We note at the outset that 12 of the 15 members of the Commission are to be appointed by officers of the Congress. This raises the question as to whether the Appointment Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, has been violated. In general, that clause requires the President to appoint all officers of the United States. In view of the fact, however, that the powers of the Commission are restricted to collecting information and providing it to Congress, much as a congressional committee might, we believe that its members would not be officers of the United States and that no constitutional problem is presented. See Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976).

It should be noted that the Helsinki Declaration is not a binding international agreement. Great care was taken to emphasize at the time of its negotiation that the declaration is a political statement and not
an agreement. The Legal Adviser's Office of the State Department indicates that it is not to be transmitted to Congress as an international agreement under the Case Act, 1 U.S.C. 112b, nor will it be registered as an international agreement under Article 102 of the U.N. Charter. See H.S. Russell, The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag, or Lilliput, 70 Am. J. Int'l. L. 242, 246-49 (1976). Nevertheless, we see no legal obstacle to creating a commission to monitor compliance with a non-binding declaration. Under the circumstances, it seems somewhat anomalous, however, to provide for a statutory body to monitor compliance with this document to the exclusion of other international human rights arrangements with a firmer legal basis.

The Department of Justice defers to the Department of State and expresses no view as to whether the President should approve this bill.

Sincerely,

Michael M. Uhlmann
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legislative Affairs
MAY 26 1976

Honorable James T. Lynn
Director
Office of Management and Budget
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Lynn:

I refer to Mr. James M. Frey's communication of May 24, 1976, concerning the Senate-House bill (S.2679) to establish a Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

S.2679 calls for the creation of a joint Congressional-executive branch Commission to monitor implementation by signatory states of the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and to encourage the development of programs and activities of the US Government in connection with the CSCE. The Commission would be comprised of six members each from the Senate and the House of Representatives and of one Presidentially-appointed representative each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. The Commission would have the power to subpoena witnesses and documents. The President would be required to submit to the Commission a semiannual report, the first to be submitted six months after the bill's enactment, giving a detailed summary of implementation actions by CSCE states, and a listing and description of present or planned programs by the executive branch and private organizations. The bill authorizes $350,000 to be appropriated to the Commission for each fiscal year.

On January 19, 1976, the Department of State sent identical letters outlining its position on the CSCE Commission to Senator Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and to Congressman Morgan, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee. The Department explained in detail the steps being taken by the US to implement and to monitor the provisions of the CSCE Final Act, and to compile and analyze monitoring
information. The Department further stated that it stood ready to cooperate with the Congress on CSCE matters within the established committee system, and to consult with individual members of Congress with an interest in CSCE. Finally, the Department noted that while it shared the interest of the bill's sponsors in CSCE, it did not believe the Commission would add to efforts and procedures already established.

As stated to the Congress in its letters of January 19, in view of steps already taken within the government regarding CSCE implementation and monitoring, the Department of State questions the need for a Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Nevertheless, the legislation has overwhelming Congressional support. The Department therefore recommends that the President approve S.2673, or, alternatively, allow it to become law without signature.

Should a Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe be established, the Department anticipates that the activities of its large staff, together with the requirement to prepare a detailed semiannual CSCE report, will significantly increase the CSCE workload of the Department of State. This would result in the need to increase staff and related expenses.

Sincerely yours,

Robert J. McCloskey
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

MAY 28, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Enrolled Bill S. 2679 - Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Sponsor - Sen. Case (R) New Jersey

Last Day for Action
June 5, 1976 - Saturday

Purpose
Establishes a Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to monitor implementation of Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Agency Recommendations
Office of Management and Budget Approval
Department of State Approval (or permit bill to become law without signature)
Department of Defense Approval
Civil Service Commission Approval
Department of Commerce No Objection
National Security Council No objection (informal)
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency No objection
Department of Justice Defers to State

Discussion
S. 2679 would establish the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, composed of twelve congressional and three executive representatives, to monitor actions of the signatories "which reflect compliance with or violation of the articles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "signed at Helsinki, Finland on August 1, 1975. The bill directs the Commission to monitor particularly the provisions of the Final Act
relating to Cooperation in Humanitarian Fields (these include sections on human contacts, information, cultural and educational cooperation). It further directs the Commission to monitor and encourage the development of Federal and private programs to take advantage of provisions in the Final Act to expand East-West economic cooperation and interchange of people and ideas.

The fifteen-member Commission would be comprised of three Presidential appointees (one each from State, Defense and Commerce), six members from the House appointed by the Speaker (with one such member designated by the Speaker to serve as chairman), and six senators appointed by the President of the Senate. The six members from each House would include four from the majority party and two from the minority. S. 2679 requires the Commission to report periodically to the House and Senate and to provide information to Members of Congress as requested.

To assist the Commission in carrying out its responsibilities, the bill requires the President to submit semiannual reports to the Commission (the first six months after enactment) which shall include (1) a detailed survey of actions by signatories to the Final Act reflecting compliance with or violation of the provisions of the Final Act and (2) a listing and description of present or planned programs and activities of Federal agencies and private organizations to take advantage of provisions in the Final Act to expand East-West economic cooperation and interchange of people and ideas. Further, the bill grants the Commission subpoena power and authorizes the chairman, or any member he designates, to administer oaths to witnesses. It also authorizes appropriations of $350,000 for each fiscal year for the Commission.

In discussing the purpose of this legislation, the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee states:

"The Foreign Relations Committee agrees that while the State Department and the Defense Department are keeping an eye on compliance with the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation, public attention must also be given to evaluating the degree of compliance, particularly in the all important area of human rights. The Committee believes that a Commission which would reflect the combined views of the Congress and of the executive branch would be an effective voice for the collective concerns of all Americans about the
observance of human rights concerns abroad, and particularly in the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. It would help to make clear once again to the Soviet Union and to the other signatories American interest in the furtherance of basic human rights as well as interest in economic and security cooperation."

The State Department, on behalf of the Administration, opposed enactment of this legislation in reports to appropriate congressional committees. It cited steps already being taken by the executive branch to implement and monitor the provisions of the Final Act and noted the Administration's willingness to consult with Congress through established procedures. In view of the overwhelming congressional support for the bill, however, State's enrolled bill letter recommends that you approve S. 2679 or, alternatively, permit it to become law without signature.

Justice's letter on S. 2679 states:

"We note at the outset that 12 of the 15 members of the Commission are to be appointed by officers of the Congress. This raises the question as to whether the Appointment Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, has been violated. In general, that clause requires the President to appoint all officers of the United States. In view of the fact, however, that the powers of the Commission are restricted to collecting information and providing it to Congress, much as a congressional committee might, we believe that its members would not be officers of the United States and that no constitutional problem is presented."

The Senate debate on S. 2679 tends to support the Justice view. The House did not discuss this constitutional question in its consideration of the bill.

The Office of Management and Budget agrees with State that the organization S. 2679 would establish is duplicative of existing executive and congressional activities and functions. Moreover, it is a hybrid
creation -- a statutory body composed predominantly of congressional officers but with representatives of three executive departments -- which would have oversight functions similar to those of a congressional committee. Further, the requirement that the President must submit reports to such a body is undesirable. Another serious consideration is that this single-purpose organization, outside the President's effective control, armed with appropriations, staff, and the power of subpoena, and with unlimited duration of existence, could become a forum for criticizing the actions of foreign governments, with attendant foreign relations embarrassment.

Despite these objections, the Office of Management and Budget recommends approval in view of Justice's opinion that the bill does not raise a constitutional question and the strong congressional support for this measure.

Finally, State anticipates that enactment of S. 2679 could increase the workload of the Department, resulting in the need to increase staff and related expenses. The Office of Management and Budget will review carefully any requests for such increases.

Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

Enclosures
The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of October 2 and your affirmation of the "deep commitment of the Executive Branch to full cooperation with the Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)."

I am also pleased that you are ready to appoint the Commissioners from the Departments of State, Commerce and Defense, whose presence on the Commission will formalize and expedite that cooperation. It has always been my feeling -- and my understanding with Secretary Kissinger -- that the Executive Branch Commissioners should participate in the work of the CSCE in accordance with whatever instructions you set to govern their conduct and role. Understanding the policy problems raised by the joint nature of the Commission's membership, I am in general accord with your decision to have the Executive Branch Commissioners act in an observer's role in assisting the Commission's deliberations, investigations and recommendations.

The Commission also intends to continue the practice it has already begun of requesting information and documents from the Executive Branch through the relevant agency or department heads, rather than through those "interim representatives" of the State, Defense and Commerce Departments who have taken part in the Commission's work until now. I am hopeful that use of these channels will provide the necessary information and documentation to the Commission in a prompt manner in order that the staff may expeditiously carry out its tasks.

As you know, Representative Millicent Fenwick of New Jersey was the chief sponsor of the legislation which established the Commission. In testimony before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, which I chair, she pointed out how valuable it will be to have one government agency where information on the aftermath of the Helsinki meeting, compiled by the Executive
and Legislative Branches here and abroad, could be pooled and assessed. "I look upon this joint legislative-executive endeavor to produce not only a meaningful and accurate record of European compliance or non-compliance," she said, "but also as an example of intergovernmental cooperation in a most important human field."

I share her sentiments fully, and I intend to do all I can to assure that the Commission conducts itself in a responsible manner, sensitive both to the problems of Executive-Legislative coordination in the area of foreign policy and to the importance of that coordination in fulfilling the role the law has set for the Commission. I see no constitutional problem in the Commission's composition or assignment. I do see a great opportunity, given the will to cooperate on both sides, for the Commission to assist both branches in carrying out a common objective: the fulfillment of an international accord of great significance for the improvement of East-West relations.

As you yourself said before signing the Final Act, "History will judge this Conference not by what we say here today, but by what we do tomorrow -- not by the promises we make but by the promises we keep." I welcome your commitment to the Commission's inquiry into those promises and the subsequent record of performance.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

DANTE B. FASCCELL
Chairman
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

DBF/md1
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

October 8, 1976

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: CSCE Commission

On October 7 the White House announced the appointment of three Executive Branch Member-Observers to the CSCE Commission: Mansfield Sprague of the Department of Commerce, Monroe Leigh of the Department of State, and Harry E. Bergold of the Department of Defense. This action was taken after we had reached general agreement with Dante Fascell on the ground rules under which the Executive Branch Member-Observers would participate in the work of the Commission. We believe it would be appropriate for the President to communicate the appointments to Chairman Fascell in writing.

Unfortunately, in the letter in which he communicated his agreement to the arrangements for Executive Branch participation, Chairman Fascell also characterized the role of the Commission in a manner which is unacceptable. As Chairman Fascell apparently sees the work of the Commission, it would be the Commission rather than the Department of State which could assume primary responsibility for assuring that commitments under the Helsinki Final Act are complied with, and the Commission would become the principal repository of information on such compliance. This approach, we believe, is inconsistent with the President's exclusive responsibility under the Constitution for the conduct of foreign affairs. Moreover, we believe it important at this initial stage to indicate explicitly to the Commission that we are not prepared to accept a Commission role which usurps this authority. For this reason we believe that when

UNCLASSIFIED
the President communicates to Fascell the names of the Executive Branch appointments, he should also set the record straight insofar as Commission activities are concerned.

C. Arthur Borg
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Draft Presidential letter.
Dear Mr. Chairman:

In my letter to you of October 2, 1976, concerning the Executive Branch Member-Observers of the CSCE Commission, I stated that once it was indicated that the arrangements specified in the letter were acceptable to you I would be advising you of the names of the persons I intended to appoint. As you have indicated in your letter of October 6 that you are in general accord with these arrangements, I am pleased to indicate to you that I have appointed the following persons as Executive Branch Member-Observers:

The Honorable Mansfield Sprague
Counsellor to the Secretary for Congressional Affairs, Department of Commerce

The Honorable Monroe Leigh
Legal Adviser of the Department of State

Mr. Harry E. Bergold, Jr.
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)

I believe that you are personally acquainted with all three of these persons and that you will agree with me that they are admirably qualified to serve in these important positions. I have directed them to be prepared to undertake their responsibilities immediately.

The Honorable
Dante Fascell,
Chairman,
CSCE Commission,
House of Representatives.
With respect to your letter of October 6, I regret that I cannot concur fully in your characterization of the role of the CSCE Commission. That characterization, if implemented, carries the implication that the CSCE Commission, rather than the State Department, would have primary responsibility within the United States Government for assuring compliance with the Helsinki accords. We do not believe that such a role for the Commission is consistent with the President's exclusive authority under the Constitution for the conduct of relations with foreign governments. I believe that great care must be taken to assure that the primary authority and responsibility of the President under the Constitution with regard to direct and formal contacts with foreign governments are not confused or misrepresented.

Sincerely yours,

Gerald R. Ford
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 3, 1976

Dear Mr. Chairman: Dante L. Fascell

I am transmitting today the first semi-annual report to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe established by Public Law 94-304.

When I signed the Final Act at Helsinki on August 1, 1975, I stated that:

Our peoples will be watching and measuring our progress. They will ask how these noble sentiments are being translated into actions that bring about a more secure and just order in the daily lives of each of our nations and its citizens.

Since that time our policy toward the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has continued to be that the test of the Conference will be the extent to which its provisions are actually implemented. This concept, advanced by all the Western leaders present at Helsinki, has made of the CSCE a key yardstick for measuring the significance of the development of East-West relations.

The creation of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and its work, is part of this measuring process. It reflects how seriously the United States takes the Final Act and how conscientiously we expect all the signatory States to approach the task of implementing its provisions. It is not our purpose to interfere in the domestic affairs of others. We do expect, however, that all those with whom we pledged our word at Helsinki will work with us closely to give life and meaning not only to the noble goals but to the specific practical undertakings in the Final Act.

The CSCE has a long history of diplomatic preparation and hard negotiation against the background of wider diplomatic efforts. It is part of a broader diplomatic process, both bilateral and multilateral. The West, for instance, stipulated that progress in this larger area was necessary before
the Conference could even be convened. As a result of these diplomatic efforts the Soviet Union and its Allies acknowledged, after a quarter-century, that the United States and Canada do play an indispensable role in security and cooperation in Europe. The four powers with responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole concluded the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, and the East agreed to begin negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe (MBFR).

During the CSCE negotiations we worked closely, cooperatively and harmoniously with our Allies. We attached the greatest importance to ensuring that the interests of our friends in Western Europe were supported and reflected in the results of this Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. We worked throughout the Conference in the closest consultation with members of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. Maintenance of this Allied unity has been a major element of our policy since Helsinki and will continue to be a key part of our approach to the Belgrade follow-up meeting. Largely as a result of this unity, the West succeeded during the negotiations in obtaining significant commitments from the Soviet Union and the States of Eastern Europe on human rights and related matters, including especially the freer flow of people and ideas. Through the CSCE the West succeeded in establishing human rights and fundamental freedoms as a basic subject for legitimate East-West discourse. With these commitments in hand, Western leaders signed the Final Act at the Summit sixteen months ago, almost three years after the initiation of preparatory talks and more than two decades after the idea of a conference was first broached.

Since Helsinki our policy has been based on the need for implementation of the provisions of the Final Act: we have stressed this approach in all our contacts on CSCE. We have made a series of demarches to the Soviet Union to convey to the Soviet government the importance which the United States government and the American people attach to implementation of the commitments contained in the Final Act, and have sought to encourage positive implementation. We have also raised specific CSCE commitments with each of the Eastern European governments and have urged that those states fulfill their Helsinki undertakings. Our Allies and many neutral European states have also urged Soviet and Eastern European implementation of specific Final Act provisions, using high-level visits and contacts to press for progress on CSCE-related bilateral problems.
Since Helsinki, the United States has also carefully monitored implementation activity by all CSCE participant states, and has developed a continuing process of exchange and collation of information with our Allies. We have maintained contact and compared notes with other Western countries in order to have the broadest possible picture of how the provisions of the Final Act are being carried out.

We and our Allies are now preparing for the 1977 Belgrade follow-up meeting that is called for in the Final Act. The Belgrade meeting is, of course, closely related to the broader effort to improve East-West relations, of which CSCE is a part. The course of the Belgrade meeting and the future of the CSCE concept, however, will be determined primarily by the degree to which the participating States carry out the provisions of the Final Act.

The Final Act is not a legal document but rather an expression of political will. Nonetheless, we do not accept the argument of some Eastern states that implementation can only occur if there are supplementary legal undertakings. Nor can we accept that behavior contrary to the Act's undertakings is acceptable, even in the absence of such legal undertakings.

The Final Act has not transformed the behavior of signatory nations overnight, but it has committed the national leaders who signed it to standards of behavior which are compatible with Western thoughts about the relationship of people to their governments. With its profoundly Western orientation, the Final Act reflects the great importance that the West attaches to human rights and the self-determination of peoples. As stated in greater detail in the accompanying report, the United States rejected in the negotiations and rejects in principle the concept of hegemony. Rather than freezing the political face of Europe the Final Act expresses the determination that Europe should again become a continent of nations free to choose their own course, both domestically and internationally.

The Helsinki document provides an agenda and a detailed framework -- accepted at the highest political level by both East and West as well as by the neutral States of Europe -- for addressing the problems which led to the division of Europe. In other words, we and our Allies have, with CSCE, added a dynamic new dimension to our efforts to reduce the barriers between East and West, a dimension which is based on peaceful contacts between both governments and peoples in Europe and North America.
We are generally satisfied with the initial steps taken to implement the military security or confidence-building measures contained in the Final Act. The East has provided advance notification of several maneuvers and has invited observers, although on a somewhat more limited basis than the Western and neutral States.

There has been some limited improvement in cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology and the environment in the last sixteen months, a development which builds upon a process begun before the conclusion of CSCE. Nonetheless, this section of the Final Act affords scope for greater progress.

In the vitally important humanitarian and related fields, progress has been both limited and uneven. Predictably the most difficult areas have involved human contacts and the freer flow of information, concepts in the practical implementation of which the Soviet Union and its Eastern European Allies continue to have ideas very different from the West. There have been some positive developments in the fields of culture and education, which again build upon experiences which predate the Helsinki Summit. It is evident, however, that so far the Soviet and East European record on human rights issues remains inadequate when measured against the important undertakings of the Helsinki Final Act. The success of the Belgrade meeting will depend primarily on constructive Eastern efforts in the period ahead.

As I pointed out in Helsinki, the signing of the Final Act began a process directed toward more normal relations between States and people in Europe. The start has been slow, but a start nevertheless has been made and we are determined to continue our efforts. The Final Act remains a valid set of standards which, if pursued steadily, will contribute toward lowering the barriers between States and people in Europe.

Thus far there has been some limited progress overall, but we are not yet content with what has been accomplished. There is much yet to be done to bring the commitments of Helsinki to life.

The United States intends to continue to work with all the signatories of the Final Act for its full implementation. We will consult widely in preparation for Belgrade and move in concert with like-minded states.
We do not wish to engage in recrimination, but we shall continue to press for real and steady progress both within the context of CSCE and in our broader relationships with the Soviet Union and the States of Eastern Europe. We hope and believe that CSCE will prove a practical and positive step in an historic process. However, as I stated in Helsinki and wish now to re-emphasize, the proof remains in the doing.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The Honorable Dante B. Fascell
Chairman
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515