



SINO-EUROPEAN RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR AND THE RISE OF A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

Edited by Enrico Fardella, Christian F. Ostermann, and Charles Kraus
With a foreword by Her Excellency Federica Mogherini

History and Public Policy Program
Critical Oral History Conference Series

SINO-EUROPEAN RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR AND THE RISE OF A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

A Critical Oral History

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With a foreword by Her Excellency Federica Mogherini

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Cover image: Sun Suozhang (left) and Roy Denman (right) sign an agreement promoting trade between the European Economic Community and the People's Republic of China on February 3, 1978. Source: European Commission Audiovisual Services P-004296/02-13.

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Executive Summary

From June 29 to July 1, 2012, the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA), the Wilson Center's Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), and East China Normal University's (ECNU) Center for Cold War International History Studies convened a critical oral history conference in Palermo, Italy, on the relationship between China and Europe during the Cold War. For the first and last time, a group of veteran diplomatic officials, all active in Sino-European relations during the Cold War, assembled together with a group of international scholars in an effort to provide context to, and fill gaps in available documentary record, on China's relationships with countries in Eastern and Western Europe from the 1960s through the 1980s. Though the dialogue at the conference often dealt with individual bilateral relationships between China and various European countries, the conference was anchored by a much broader theme: identifying the transition from bi-polarity to multi-polarity during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras.

Sino-European Relations during the Cold War and the Rise of a Multipolar World: A Critical Oral History is the result of that historic conference, and features the transcript of the conference proceedings as well as key primary source documents from international archives and a comprehensive bibliography on Sino-European relations.

Sino-European Relations during the Cold War and the Rise of a Multipolar World is a weighty resource for individuals wishing to understand the dynamics of Sino-European relations, past and present, and recent and ongoing global power shifts. To highlight only some of the volume's most interesting findings, concerning China

and Eastern Europe, the extended and probing discussions and archival documents contained within suggest that:

- China was a keen observer of differences within the socialist bloc, and utilized “differential treatment” in managing its relations with Eastern European countries in order to change the balance of power in China’s favor, though not necessarily to topple the Soviet Union.
- China and Romania coordinated policies and actions closely during the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, with China promising to support Bucharest in the event of Soviet intervention in Romania.
- China’s relations with Eastern European countries gradually improved in the late 1970s and 1980s as a result of concurrent changes in domestic Chinese politics and mixed signaling from Moscow to its allies in the Eastern Bloc.
- Erich Honecker may have sought exile in China after October 1989.

Bearing on China and Western Europe, the volume indicates that:

- China gestured that it was willing to normalize relations with West Germany as early as 1956, following the Soviet Union’s recognition of Bonn, but West Germany did not reciprocate until following the Sino-American opening.
- China’s normalization with France in 1964 was a symbolic overture which allowed Mao Zedong to implement his “two intermediate zones theory,” dilute superpower bi-polar hegemony, and bridge Asian and European initiatives toward multi-polarity.
- The Cultural Revolution may not have been the main bottleneck preventing the development of China’s relations with Western Europe in the 1960s.
- China did not have a uniform approach toward normalizing relations with Western European countries, instead adjusting its strategies depending on the importance of a given country, its attitude toward Taiwan, and its past treatment of the People’s Republic.
- Western Europe was part of Mao Zedong’s global strategy and China, unlike the Soviet Union, was a strong supporter of European political and economic integration because it believed it would be useful in forging a multi-polar world.

Acknowledgements

Such an ambitious project on China, Europe, and the Cold War could have been conceived and excuted successfully only by a large group of dedicated and generous people.

First and foremost, the contribution, both professional and human, of Professors Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui, and the staff at the Center for Cold War International History Studies of the East China Normal University in Shanghai, were essential in organizing the conference whose proceedings are published in this volume, and, together with Peter Vamos, in collecting many of the Chinese documents presented here in translation.

Our deep gratitude for their support also goes to the Roma Mediterraneo Foundation; to Professor Emmanuele Emanuele, president of the Foundation and one of the first to believe in this project; Professor Ercole P. Pellicano, the Foundation's vice president; and Carla Capocasale, a tireless and attentive partner in organizing the event.

Thanks are also due to the Società Siciliana per la Storia Patria, particularly its President, Professor Giovanni Puglisi, and Scretary General Professor Salvatore Savoia, for their generous hospitality.

The assistance of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in particular the efficient cooperation provided by Consul Sergio Maffettone, was of vital importance for the success of the conference and the visa procedures.

The same is true of the work of all the translators and the organizing secretariat composed of Antonella Giuggioli, Federica Cedro, and Elena Zacchetti and the support provided by Graziella degli Innocenti and colleagues at the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA) in Florence.

The support of the MacArthur Foundation allowed for the translation of many of the documents included in the appendix, as well as for the publication of this volume. Laura Deal, Pieter Biersteker, and Timothy McDonnell at the Cold War

International History Project assisted with organizing and cataloging many of the documents.

Our sincere thanks go to the Chinese diplomats, Cai Fangbo, Chen Baoshun, Fan Chengzuo, Ma Zhengang, Mei Zhaorong, Yang Chengxu, and Zhou Xiaopei, and to the European diplomats, Roland Bimo, John Boyd, Ioan Romulus Budura, Ksawery Burski, Staffan De Mistura, and Gabriele Menegatti, for having agreed to tell their sides of the “story,” as well as to all the other scholars who participated with curiosity and passion in the proceedings: Bruna Bagnato, Jovan Cavoski, Chen Jian, Deng Yang, Marilena Gala, Matteo Gerlini, Massimiliano Guderzo, Ana Lalaj, Luo Yangyi, Garret Martin, Mircea Munteanu, Niu Jun, Leopoldo Nuti, Svetozar Rajak, Maria Stella Rognoni, Bernd Schaefer, Shen Zhihua, Peter Vamos, Xu Siyan, Qiang Zhai, Zhang Baijia, and Zhang Jing.

Thank you to Ennio Di Nolfo for kindly providing us with the Italian documents used in his volume on Sino-Italian diplomatic normalization. Special thanks also go to Martin Albers, Ioan Romulus Budura, Ksawery Burski, Margaret Gnoinska, Ana Lalaj, Garret Martin, Elidor Mehilli, Mircea Munteanu, Bernd Schaefer, Peter Vamos, and Qiang Zhai for their crucial support in collecting some of the other archival sources published in this volume, and to Xi Zhao for the majestic translation of the conference proceedings.

Finally, our thanks and heartfelt sympathy go to Madame Pan Qi, Ambassador Yang Chengxu’s wife, and to Professor Richard Baum. We will always remember them with sincere admiration for having followed their love with devotion and elegance until the end of their days.

Foreword

Of the many global challenges facing policymakers today, China's rise in the twenty-first century stands out as prime amongst these. Will China act as a responsible global stakeholder contributing to peace and mutual development? What can the West do to encourage this Chinese trajectory?

When policy-makers dwell upon this question and seek to forge a way forward, scholarship looking backwards at China's historical evolution is of key importance. Arduous as it may appear at times, a constructive conversation between academia and practitioners lies at the heart of sound policy as well as of effective policy-relevant scholarship.

This volume—and the larger project from which it derives—is one of the classic examples of a mutually beneficial exchange between academia and public policy. It sheds light on the evolution of Sino-European relations against the backdrop of the Cold War, and the impact this historical trajectory had on the relationship we know today in a fundamentally transformed global context.

This publication is the fruit of a one-of-a-kind conference, which took place in Palermo, Italy, in 2012. The conference brought together veteran diplomats from Albania, China, Italy, Poland, Romania, and the United Kingdom, and paired them face-to-face with historians from around the world. For several days, participants engaged in what is known as “critical oral history.”

Methodologically, critical oral history allows for substantive dialogue between foreign policy practitioners and scholars. It allows participants to go beyond and challenge individual recollections and to fill in the blank spots in the historical record. The dialogue that took place between former officials and the scholars in Palermo was unique, making this a milestone event in the discipline.

What is perhaps most interesting about this volume is that the wealth of information and perspectives contained herewith have not been publically accessible before. This arises from the volume's unique composition. It combines translations of formerly secret documents from ten different countries, with the rich oral history

testimonies of ambassadors and diplomats from nearly as many nations. History could hardly be more international than how it is presented here.

The new data collected here is all the more valuable because the subject matter, Sino-European relations during the Cold War, is so fascinating, so timely, and so relevant. The “socialization” between China and the West in 1960s and 1970s, examined exhaustively in this volume, still weighs heavily on the international system today. Why? If the bipolar system of the 1960s and 1970s was marked by superpower détente, the parallel tentative emergence of a new order—an increasingly multipolar world—was grounded in the dialogue between middle powers: China and Europe.

As this volume demonstrates, Sino-European interaction and the resulting transformation of the Cold War order were the outcomes of Europe’s forward thinking diplomacy and Beijing’s genuine desire for independence on the international stage. De Gaulle’s vision of French grandeur inaugurated Europe’s overture to Beijing in 1960s. Later, the universalist impulses of and the emphasis on inclusiveness in Italian foreign policy found fertile ground in the ashes of the Cultural revolution. These and other shifts in the European political landscape added a normative horizon to Europe’s diplomatic contacts with Beijing and opened the door to Beijing’s return to the broader family of nations, thanks to its participation to the United Nations since the 1970s.

Presenting profound insights into the diplomatic paths that determined these historical transformations, this volume is not just useful for seasoned academics. It is also highly instructive for the new generation of diplomats. It is this generation which must appreciate how the different political cultures of Europe and China affect relations today, but it also this generation that ought to understand the shared history between Europe and China and its role in shaping the challenging times we live in.

Federica Mogherini

Minister of Foreign Affairs
Italian Republic

September 2014

Editors' Preface

This volume is the result of an initiative that began with a gargantuan critical oral history conference organized in Palermo, Italy, in June 2012, and continued over the next few years as the editors and, primarily, our colleagues and friends completed exhaustive searches of archives across Europe and China. This part of the journey led us to Beijing, Berlin, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Kew, Paris, Rome, Shanghai, Tirana, Warsaw, and, finally, Washington.

The structure of this volume reflects this process. The first half presents the edited transcript of the three-day conversation between veteran diplomats once posted in Europe and China and scholars with deep expertise in Sino-European relations. The second part consists of formerly secret documents from ten different countries, all translated into English, and a comprehensive bibliography of relevant secondary sources published in several languages.

In compiling this volume, we have aimed to fill gaps in the historiography of China's foreign relations and in the historiography of the Cold War. Our primary goal, however, is to stimulate new research on Sino-European relations during the Cold War *and* the implications of those relationships for the world today. In order to promptly do so, we have enlisted historians and international relations specialists to review the new evidence for the next phase of the project. An edited volume of analytical essays on Sino-European relations during the Cold War should be on bookshelves soon.

While our research initiative on Sino-European relations has produced new sources and findings, it has also been beset by many complications. The problems we faced almost always arose in the archives. For instance, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive closed in 2012, reopened in 2013 (but with the majority of its files missing), and then closed again in 2014. It is still closed, at least at the time of writing. The restrictions implemented in Beijing have made it impossible for us to balance the evidence available from the European side with more Chinese materials. This is unfortunate not only for us and our readers, but also for Chinese historians. We hope the dismal archival situation in Beijing will not persist for long.

Designed as a reference volume, the abovementioned complications means that the project is far from complete. More research and interviews are needed to complement this volume, improve upon its weaknesses, and corroborate or challenge the evidence it offers. We hope, then, that this volume will inspire others to further enrich our understanding of the history and legacies of Sino-European relations.

We gratefully acknowledge the indispensable support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (Chicago) and the Roma Mediterraneo Foundation for their support of the conference and publication. We also thank our colleagues and friends who collaborated with us on the volume.

Enrico Fardella, Beijing/Sicily
Christian F. Ostermann, Washington, DC
Charles Kraus, Washington, DC

March 2015

Chronology

1 October 1949 / The People's Republic of China is founded after several years of civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang.

6 January 1950 / The United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China extend recognition to one another but do not exchange ambassadors.

14 February 1950 / The People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance.

9 May 1950 / Sweden extends diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China.

11 May 1950 / Denmark extends diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China.

28 October 1950 / Finland and Norway establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

26 April 1954 / Representatives from the USA, the USSR, China, France, and the UK attend an important international conference in Geneva, Switzerland from 26 April-20 July 1954 to resolve the Indochina and Korea problems.

1 August 1955 / China and the United States begin a series of ambassadorial level talks in Warsaw, which last until 1970.

September 1955 / West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer visits Moscow and meets with Nikita Khrushchev, paving the way for the exchange of diplomatic recognition between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany.

14 February 1956 / Nikita Khrushchev delivers a speech criticizing the leadership of and cult of personality surrounding Stalin at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's speech greatly offends Mao Zedong and other leaders in the Chinese Communist Party.

28 June 1956 / The Polish people protest against the communist regime in power in the People's Republic of Poland.

23 October 1956 / The Hungarian people revolt against the Hungarian People's Republic in protests lasting until 10 November 1956.

14 November 1957 / The "Moscow Conference" involving delegates from 64 communist parties is held November 14-19, 1957. The conference concluded with the passing of the "Declaration of the Twelve Communist and Workers Parties," or, as it is more commonly known, the "Moscow Declaration."

5 May 1958 / The Chinese Communist Party passes the "General Line of the Great Leap Forward" on May 1958 and begins the people's commune movement and the drive to increase steel production. Ultimately a failed political campaign, the Great Leap Forward leads to the deaths of millions of people across China in what is commonly known as the Great Famine.

31 July 1958 / Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev visits China and holds several uneasy meetings with Mao Zedong.

10 November 1958 / Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev demands that United States, Great Britain, and France remove troops from West Berlin.

20 June 1960 / The “Bucharest Conference,” or the 3rd Congress of the Communist Party of Romania, is held from June 20-26, 1960. During the conference, Nikita Khrushchev and Peng Zhen openly sparr, and of the communist parties in attendance, only the Albanian delegates come to the defense of China.

18 July 1960 / Moscow decides all Soviet advisors and experts in China are to be withdrawn, bringing the Sino-Soviet schism into a new and heightened phase. By the end of August, approximately 1,400 Soviet personnel leave China and more than 200 projects of scientific and technological cooperation are abruptly brought to a halt.

13 August 1961 / Walter Ulbricht orders the construction of the Berlin Wall in order to prevent travel between East Berlin and West Berlin.

11 January 1962 / The Chinese Communist Party convenes a conference of over 7,000 cadres from 11 January-7 February 1962. Mao Zedong acknowledges “leftist mistakes” in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward and famine.

19 March 1962 / The Algerian War of Independence concludes after seven years of fighting as a result of the Évian Accords and Algeria obtains its independence from France.

14 October 1962 / A thirteen day standoff between the United States and the USSR over Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba begins, bringing the world closer to nuclear war than ever before.

20 October 1962 / The Chinese People's Liberation Army strikes at the Eastern and Western Sectors of the Sino-Indian border.

September 1963 / Mao Zedong begins to espouse his theory of the "Two Intermediate Zones," with Asia, Africa, and Latin America constituting the first, and Europe and North America constituting the second.

7 October 1963 / The Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is signed and ratified by the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

21 October 1963 / Edgar Faure visits China until November 2, 1963, on behalf of French President Charles de Gaulle and meets with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.

27 January 1964 / The Chinese and French governments issue a joint communiqué and agree to exchange diplomatic recognition.

27 April 1965 / China agrees to begin assisting North Vietnam with transportation construction, anti-aircraft artillery, and other material support.

16 May 1965 / Mao Zedong launches the Cultural Revolution, a ten-year political campaign aimed at suppressing counterrevolutionaries and purifying the Chinese Communist Party.

December 1967 / Warsaw Pact countries convene the first "Interkit" meeting to coordinate policies related to the People's Republic of China.

21 August 1968 / The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact invade Czechoslovakia, seeking to roll back ongoing political reforms instituted by Alexander Dubček.

2 March 1969 / A bloody conflict erupts on Zhenbao Island (Damansky Island), located near the Chinese bank of the Ussuri River between China and the Soviet Union.

1 April 1969 / During the 9th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held from 1 April-24 April 1969, Lin Biao is elevated higher within the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong Thought is reinstated into the constitution, and Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping are purged.

5 November 1970 / Italy and the People's Republic of China sign a joint communiqué announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations.

9 July 1971 / Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's National Security Advisor, secretly visits Beijing and meets Zhou Enlai.

25 October 1971 / The United Nations General Assembly passes Resolution 2758, recognizing the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations and expelling Jiang Jieshi's delegation.

21 February 1972 / On 21 February 1972, US President Richard Nixon arrives in Beijing and begins a historic seven-day visit to China.

13 March 1972 / The United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China exchange full recognition and exchange ambassadors.

25 September 1972 / Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visits China at the invitation of Premier Zhou Enlai, and on 29 September, the two leaders issue the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, restoring diplomatic relations between the two countries.

11 October 1972 / The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and the People's Republic of China establish diplomatic relations.

22 February 1974 / On 22 February 1974, Mao officially proposes the Theory of Three Worlds, claiming that the "First World" is made up of the rich and nuclear armed USSR and US, the "Second World" refers to Japan, Europe, Australia, and Canada, and the "Third World" covers the undeveloped countries of Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

16 January 1975 / Chairman of West Germany's Christian Social Union (CSU) Franz-Josef Strauss meets Mao Zedong in Beijing.

2 May 1975 / The European Economic Community (EEC) establishes diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

12 May 1975 / Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping pays an official visit to France from 12-17 May

8 January 1976 / Long-time Chinese leader and skilled diplomat Zhou Enlai dies, sparking a wave of memorials in Tiananmen Square. The commemorations of Zhou's life are soon suppressed by the Gang of Four.

9 September 1976 / The founder of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong, dies. Mao's death leads to the end of the Cultural Revolution.

2 May 1978 / Vice Premier Gu Mu leads a delegation of the People's Republic of China to France, West Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and Belgium from 2 May-6 July.

11 December 1978 / The Third Plenary Session of the 11th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and creates room for the political and economic transformation of China ushered in by Deng Xiaoping.

16 December 1978 / The Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States and China is unveiled, leading to the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States on 1 January 1979. The United States withdraws its recognition of the Republic of China, or Taiwan, as part of the Joint Communiqué.

16 February 1979 / The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance expires and is not renewed.

17 February 1979 / Chinese troops invade Vietnam, beginning the Sino-Vietnamese War.

18 July 1979 / The European Community grants the People's Republic of China most-favored-nation status (MFN), an important step in China opening its borders and strengthening its economic relations with Western countries.

October 1979 / Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Hua Guofeng visits France, West Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom from October to November.

13 December 1981 / Martial law is declared in Poland in an effort to crackdown on the Solidarity movement.

1 September 1982 / The Chinese Communist Party convenes its 12th National Congress from 1-11 September and proclaims an “independent foreign policy.”

15 May 1989 / Mikhail S. Gorbachev travels to Beijing for meetings with Deng Xiaoping from 15 May through 18 May 1989, the first high-level summit meeting to take place between China and the Soviet Union since 1959.

4 June 1989 / Calling for government accountability, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and the restoration of workers’ control over industry, the student-led movement of spring 1989 is suppressed by hardline leaders who order the military to enforce martial law.

9 November 1989 / The German Democratic Republic (East Germany) begins to allow its citizens to cross into West Berlin.

3 October 1990 / German Democratic Republic (East Germany) reunites with the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany).

26 December 1991 / The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dissolves.

Conference Participants

EYEWITNESSES

ROLAND BIMO was Third Secretary in charge of press and political affairs at the Albanian Embassy in Beijing (1982-1986) and Warsaw (1986-1990). He later served as Desk Officer for the Far East and the Pacific at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1990-1992). He was appointed Ambassador to the US (1992-1994), Hungary (1994-1997), and the UN & OSCE (1997-2002), Netherlands (2006-2009), and Brazil (2009-2010). He also served as the General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2002-2006) and Director of the Albanian National Institute of Diaspora at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010-2012).

SIR JOHN BOYD was British Ambassador to Japan (1992-1996) and subsequently Master of Churchill College, Cambridge. He was Chairman of the British Museum (2002-2006). He is currently the Chairman of Asia House in London and of the Joseph Needham Research Institute in Cambridge. Sir John was a member of the British Diplomatic service from 1962-1996. He served twice in Hong Kong (on the second occasion as Political Adviser to the Governor) and Beijing twice. Other postings included Bonn, Washington, and the UK Mission to the UN. At home he served as Deputy Under-Secretary for Defence and subsequently Chief Clerk of the FCO before his posting to Japan.

IOAN ROMULUS BUDURA studied at Tsinghua University and Beijing University in Beijing. He entered in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1954, and served at the Romanian Embassy in Beijing as Attaché (1954-1959), Secretary (1961-1964), Minister-Counselor (1979-1981), and Ambassador (1990-1996). He also acted as an interpreter in meetings between ranking Roman and Chinese officials.

KSAWERY BURSKI was stationed in Poland's Embassies in China, Singapore, and Malaysia from 1961 through 2004. He was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary-Counselor at the Embassy of Poland in Beijing (1991-1994) and later Ambassador of Poland to the Republic of Indonesia (1995-1998), Singapore (1998-1999), and China (2000-2004).

CAI FANGBO joined the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1964, and he was appointed successively as First Secretary, Counselor, and Minister-Counselor of the Chinese Embassy in France. In 1985, he became Deputy Director-General of Western European Department and then ambassador to Switzerland (1987-1990) and France (1990-1998).

CHEN BAOSHUN joined the newly established Italian-China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) in 1964 and was subsequently sent to the Embassy of the PRC in Italy following the normalization of diplomatic relations. He was later appointed as Consul General in Milan, where he worked from 1985 to 1989.

FAN CHENGZUO graduated from Tirana University in 1957 and joined the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the same year. He served as an Albanian translator for Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, and worked at the Chinese embassies in Albania and Greece. He was appointed as the Ambassador to Albania from 1986 through 1989.

MA ZHENGANG served as Deputy Director, Director, Deputy Director General, and Director General in the Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs within the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was also stationed at the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia, at the Consulate General in Vancouver, and at the Embassy in the US. He was Vice Director General of the Office of Foreign Affairs under the State Council from 1995 to 1996, Ambassador to UK from 1997 to 2002, and President of China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) from 2004 to 2009.

MEI ZHAORONG was sent to East Germany as a student in August 1953. He subsequently worked at the Chinese Embassy in East German from 1956 through 1963 and again from 1970 through 1972.

GABRIELE MENEGATTI was First Secretary of the Italian Embassy in Beijing (1971-1972) and the Consul General in Hong Kong (1983-1987). He was later appointed as the Ambassador to India (1990-1995), the Coordinator of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Asia Pacific (1997-1998), the Ambassador to Japan (1999-2003), and Ambassador to China (2003-2006).

YANG CHENGXU was secretary, counselor, and minister-counselor successively in the Chinese Embassies in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic (1982-1985). He was subsequently appointed Chinese Ambassador to Austria (1985-1989). Before Germany's unification, he was instructed to lead an investigation team in Germany. After returning home, he was appointed Deputy Director-General of the West European Department and later Director-General of Policy Planning Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

ZHOU XIAOPEI joined the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1973. He was appointed as the Chinese Ambassador to Ukraine (1998-2000), Poland (2000-2003), and Kazakhstan (2003-2005). He was a participant in the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, including the Deng Xiaoping-Mikhail Gorbachev meeting in 1989.

SCHOLARS

BRUNA BAGNATO is Associate Professor in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the University of Florence.

RICHARD BAUM was Professor Emeritus of Political Science at UCLA before his death in 2012.

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VLADISLAV ZUBOK is Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science.



GIOVANNI PUGLISI

Opening Remarks

GIOVANNI PUGLISI: Please allow me, considering where we are, to start with a sense of pride as the President of the Società di Storia Patria (Society of National History).

Professor Nuti, Mr. Deputy Secretary De Mistura, Professor Pellicanò, Ambassadors, Authorities, Ladies, and Gentlemen.

I am particularly honored on behalf of the Società di Storia patria and the Fondazione Banco di Sicilia, another institution that I have the honor to chair, to pay tribute and express my conviction of the absolute relevance of this initiative, which can boast such prominent figures of a culture and an experience so important in the field of international relations right here in this land.

From this point of view, I believe that today, the international system of globalization, as they say, is not a death sentence but an opportunity. An opportunity because it facilitates the world of interpersonal communication across the world and because, by favoring communication, it also makes it possible to tap the identity-based experience of different cultures.

Today, the Chinese world is the “new frontier” of the West, a basin of opportunity that cannot be avoided. Italy has always looked to the Far East, and to China in particular. It is almost rhetorical to remember that we have a great tradition, which, starting from a great Italian, Fr. Matteo Ricci, has yielded a cultural relationship that has become increasingly stronger and richer over the centuries. I hope that, under the aegis of our sponsor, the Fondazione Roma-Mediterraneo (Rome-Mediterranean Foundation)—and I would like to extend my most cordial greetings and thanks to its President, Professor Emanuele, through the Vice President of the Foundation present here today, Professor Pellicanò—this experience can lead to further opportunities to develop relations and mutual knowledge.

So thank you, Your Excellencies, for giving us this unique opportunity and for being our guests here today. I am convinced that your presence here will be seen over



MAYOR LEOLUCA ORLANDO

the years and in the future as an important page of Sicilian history, which is written in the books of this prestigious institution, the Società di Storia Patria.

Thanks again, all the best and see you over the next few days during the proceedings.

MAYOR LEOLUCA ORLANDO: I wish to extend, as is the duty of a mayor, my greetings to all those who have come to Palermo on the occasion of this initiative. However, it is not a formal welcome. A special greeting to Deputy Secretary de Mistura, an old friend. We met several times in this city and in other cities around the world, most recently in Kabul during his mission in Afghanistan.

Let me introduce myself by saying two simple facts: I am an honorary citizen of Chengdu in Sichuan and, along with Benjamin Barber, I promoted the process of interdependence through the initiative of the “interdependence day.” I think that this is precisely the key to this meeting. The subject of this meeting is in a certain way provocative, a challenge. Imagining that in the Cold War years there was a multi-polar system is frankly a provocation. And it is a provocation because in the collective imaginary of the Cold War these were by definition the years of bi-polarity; by definition the years that denied the multi-polar world; that denied interdependence; that denied those values that are recognized by all today, especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

If it is true, as it is, that until November 1989 we imagined the world divided into two opposing blocs, it is also true that in November 1989 the two opposing blocs were deeply transformed and the race to a multi-polar world began, which is often mistaken as the sum of different forms of bi-polarity. I believe that multi-polarity is not and cannot be the sum of different forms of bi-polarity or of bilateral relations. I think that one of the real flaws of international politics is that of having transformed the bi-polar world into a sum of bilateral relations between individual states.

I believe that that we need to get to the bottom of the horizontal dimension of multi-polarity and from this point of view it will be interesting to collect the testimony of those who lived through the Cold War, in order to capture, from their experience, the seeds of the prophetic intuition on the potential existence of a multi-polar world.

Sometimes history is provocative, because it often shows us that reality is different from what we had imagined. I am convinced that this meeting will offer us many useful insights into a new multi-polar dimension of the Cold War. It will be interesting, in this respect, to see whether during the years of the Cold War there was a form of cultural multi-polarity that went beyond the economic and political dimension of the bi-polar system. Culture and science in fact have never experienced any “Berlin Wall.” They have never known the limits of communication: Chinese and American scientists continued to talk, even when dialogue seemed impossible. If it is true, as it is, that Chinese intellectuals and the rest of the world have had a dialogue, the question to be asked is what provided the seeds of dialogue—the input for dialogue—in the economic and political spheres during the Cold War years. It will be extremely interesting then to search for these seeds in the experiences of those who are here today.

With these brief remarks, I thank you for your presence. I hope that your stay will be fruitful and that you can also capture the beauty of a tormented and beautiful city that it is trying to retrieve its lost visibility. Palermo is a city that in recent years has once again become invisible, and unfortunately invisibility is not always a positive value. Mafia, for instance, though invisible, still exist. And I’m here to bring back visibility to my city, a visibility that aims at attracting capital, resources, and cultural and artistic events on the basis of the above-mentioned spirit of interdependence, a spirit that looks at China and its contribution as a precious opportunity.

In this spirit, I welcome you and wish you a pleasant stay in Palermo.

ERCOLE PIETRO PELLICANO: Thank you and good morning everyone. I totally agree with Mayor Orlando and, speaking in the name of the Fondazione Roma-Mediterraneo, I would like to stress that our institutional goals include the promotion of integration. Our Foundation goes beyond the broader integration of cultures, moving from bi-polarity to an economic and political multi-polarity. As regards to Palermo’s visibility, you have a great fellow citizen like Emanuele Emmanuele, who loves Palermo and incessantly works to increase the visibility of this noble Sicilian land and its capital, Palermo.

The Fondazione Roma-Mediterraneo is an important branch of the Fondazione Roma (Rome Foundation)—an old institution that dates back to 1540—founded



ERCOLE PIETRO PELLICANO



SHEN ZHIHUA

by the initiative of its president, Professor Emanuele. The strong determination of President Emanuele to consider the Mediterranean as an area where everything originates, as the birthplace of culture and civilization, has meant that Fondazione Roma has opened a space for action in this field as well, and it is with great regret that he is not here today because of a concomitant institutional commitment. Of course, he is present in spirit and heart.

The Fondazione Roma-Mediterraneo has always paid great attention to relations with the Near East and China. In these difficult times that we are experiencing, that are hitting indiscriminately the West and bringing Africa to its knees, I believe that resuming a direct dialogue between the peoples of the Mediterranean and China is absolutely necessary and we at the Fondazione Roma-Mediterraneo will develop and pursue initiatives in this regard.

The history of the Mediterranean and the central role that it had in ancient times has shown us that this area is a privileged interlocutor of the East. Today's initiative will allow us to understand, through the study of the past, how this dialogue could be consolidated and continued in the future.

I would like to add a simple personal note: today is my birthday and I believe in fortunate coincidences. Today is a day of celebration for me and in this climate I wish to conclude my remarks with my best wishes for the future of these international relations, which will see China as the main protagonist, will be able to grow further to the benefit of the world and human civilization. Thank you.

SHEN ZHIHUA: First I would like to say that it is a great pleasure to be here, at this meeting, in this beautiful city of Sicily, and I believe that's a pleasure shared by all the Chinese scholars and diplomats here. Six years ago, in 2006, Li Danhui and I came to Italy, to Sicily, for the first time, invited by Enrico Fardella. At that time, he was already saying: "I'm going to hold a major international conference here in Sicily." I thought he was just talking then, and I never thought that six years later he would turn that thought into reality. So my special thanks are to Enrico, for his vision and efforts.

This conference is very different from other academic conferences where the scholars are the primary actors: this time the scholars will only play a secondary role. The primary actors at this conference are the diplomats from China and Europe—

the insiders, the veterans of the diplomatic process that designed the evolution of the relations between China and Europe during the Cold War. Why should we have this meeting? This is something we discussed for a long time. We feel that the current historical study of the period, from the 1960s on to the 1980s in particular, is subject to disadvantage because a lot of documents have not been declassified yet. Consequently, many crucial events that happened at the time can only be found in the notebooks, diaries, and the memories of those who participated in them. Hence, we think that it is extremely important to have this conference, to provide a forum for the veterans of Sino-European relations to share their experiences. In this process, scholars play a secondary role. We are here to ask questions. Since scholars are very familiar and know a lot about the historical context, they can ask a lot of important or insightful questions, to which the veterans may answer; or, at the very least, they may talk about what they thought at the time.

Speaking of that, I want to say that I was quite surprised by the words of Mayor Orlando. In his speech, Mr. Mayor talked about the friendship between China and Italy, which I found no surprise as I kind of expected it. He talked about the bi-polar structure and the tri-polar structure, which was no surprise either; but then quite unexpectedly, he came to talk about the mafia, which really surprised me, because we Chinese have a saying, “domestic embarrassments are not to be aired in public.” It also got me thinking that this talk is actually quite a good example for what we should do at this conference, because both China and Europe have had in history many “domestic embarrassments;” if those domestic embarrassments are not to be aired, then scholars would not be able to do research. So I hope we will conduct this conference in the spirit of Mr. Mayor’s talk and try our best to capture history as it really happened. Thank you.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN: It’s an honor and a pleasure to be here, Mr. Mayor, dear Excellencies, dear Colleagues and Friends.

I’m Christian Ostermann. I direct the History and Public Policy Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and we have been delighted to have played a small part in this historical and historic conference. I want us to appreciate for a moment that this conference is in fact an historic one: it’s very, very

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unlikely that we will come back in this formation. So we have a unique opportunity and a unique responsibility here to advance scholarship over the next three days.

The conference fits well with what we do at the Wilson Center. The Wilson Center, based in Washington DC, tries to provide a bridge between the world of policy and the world of scholarship. And here we are, former diplomats and policy-makers talking to scholars across the divide of nationality and language. So it very much fits what we do at the Wilson Center.

Many of you know that at the Center we are focused on archives and documents through our Cold War International History Project. Some of the documents that we have amassed are outside—big, fat document readers since many of you have contributed to the collection over the years. We are acutely aware that the documents only tell us part of the story and that we need, as my colleague Shen Zhihua said, the oral testimony, the witnesses, the veterans of the policy, diplomatic, and intelligence process to help us understand history, to help us understand the documents. So what we are engaging in today is what we have come to term “critical oral history,” a methodology invented by two scholars, American scholars at Brown University, James Blight and Janet Lang.¹ And over the years we have organized together with them and others, including our partners at the Machiavelli Center here in Italy and in partnership with our colleagues at East China Normal University, a number of these critical oral history conferences. This is a special type of conference—a conference in which we will not have monologue but want to get into a real conversation. As Shen Zhihua mentioned, the primary actor at this conference will be the veterans of the diplomatic process. They will help us to try to fill in the gaps between the documents, extend the historical record where the documents trail off. They will allow us to add texture to the fabric of international relations of decades past.

So the primary focus is on our esteemed ambassadors who are here and who will share their memories with us over the next few days. The real challenge for you is to put yourself back into the shoes of where you were, what you thought, what you decided, what you recommended some twenty, thirty years ago. Forget everything you

¹ See, for example, James G. Blight and Janet M. Lang, “When Empathy Failed: Using Critical Oral History to Reassess the Collapse of U.S.-Soviet Détente in the Carter-Brezhnev Years,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 12, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 29-74; James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993).

have learned since and try to put yourself back into the situations of the time that we are talking about here today. For the scholars, you indeed play a secondary role here today and we urge your restraint. We have asked all the chairs for the sessions to be very conscious of the restraint that we would impose on the scholars. Your role is to foster a conversation between the eyewitnesses through your questions, your comments, and your references to documents.

We will start each session with two “provocateurs,” but they will only speak for five minutes or so, not too long. We will cut you off if you speak too long. So we want to give space and room and time to the ambassadors to really get into a conversation. That is the purpose here. It is the purpose to add to historical record. We will tape and transcribe this conversation, and the transcript will become the raw materials for future historians, as they write the history of international relations and especially Sino-European relations in the 1960s, 1970s, and the 1980s.

I would be remiss if, at the end of my remarks, I did not thank the veteran diplomats from Europe and especially our Chinese colleagues who have traveled so far to be here with us today. I would also like to thank our co-sponsors, the Machiavelli Center and East China Normal University, but especially our Sicilian hosts and especially the Fondazione Roma-Mediterraneo, which made this important event possible. Thanks to the Società per la Storia Patria for providing this amazing venue, that should put us all into the right mood for the discussions of the next couple of days. And finally I cannot conclude without thanking the remarkable Dr. Enrico Fardella for pulling all of these together. I think a round of applause is well deserved here. When I mentioned the idea to Enrico we should someday do a conference on Sino-European relations some years ago, I would never have imagined that we are here today in this round. So Enrico, we thank all of you and of course your team, especially Federica Cedro and Elena Zacchetti, for the organization of this conference. And now I wish us a good conference for the next few days. Thank you so much.



CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN

Panel I

The Sino-Soviet Split and China's Relations with Eastern Europe

SESSION I

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN: Let's get started. Welcome back to the first panel on the Sino-Soviet split and its impact on the relationship between China and Eastern Europe. Again, just to underline, the goal of this conference is to get into a conversation between all of us, but especially between the ambassadors from Europe and China with scholars interjecting ideas and questions to stimulate the discussion. References to specific documents are most welcome, as are very specific recollections. Those kinds of things are most useful for historians later on. Obviously, your broader recollections on the period are very welcome as well.

Let me remind ourselves that, the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance in fact marked the transformation of the Cold War world from bi-polarity to multi-polarity. Superficially an ideological partnership between the world's two largest communist countries, the Sino-Soviet alliance began on February 14, 1950, with the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. From its inception, the seemingly monolithic union was fraught with constantly shifting expectations about its precise place in the socialist world, subjected to American, to Western attempts to split it, and deflected by the progressively ideological radicalism by PRC Chairman Mao Zedong. Although Sino-Soviet disagreements over Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 de-Stalinization campaign remained hidden for a time, the advanced state of the alliance's disintegration became known to the outside world in the early 1960s, because Mao exploited the ideological conflicts for domestic purposes. The final breakdown of the Sino-Soviet partnership in mid-1966 coincided with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, launched both to purge the Chinese Communist Party of alleged ideological revisionists and to create



SHEN ZHIHUA AND PÉTER VÁMOS

a communist utopia.² But in the mid-1960s, the military alliance between Beijing and Moscow factually ceased to exist, although the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance did not officially expire until 1979. Until the rapprochement inaugurated by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s, for nearly twenty-five years Sino-Soviet relations consisted only of low level cultural relations and limited trade links. So the question for this panel is the impact of this split on the relationship between Europe and China—Eastern Europe and China in particular. We have two well-known experts on the subject, Professor Shen Zhihua from East China Normal University and Professor Péter Vámos from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences who will speak for a few minutes. And then we'll start the conversation, which I hope will involve many of you, especially Ambassador Fan Chengzuo and Ambassador Mei Zhaorong.

SHEN ZHIHUA: The question I'm most interested in is, after the disintegration of the Sino-Soviet alliance, what were the reactions of the Eastern European countries? Because we know that after the establishment of the Sino-Soviet alliance, particularly from 1956 to 1958, there was a big shift in the Chinese Communist Party's position within the socialist camp, in that China, who had before chosen not to get involved in the affairs of Europe, after a series of events, including the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the incidents in Hungary and Poland, and then the June events in the Soviet Union, began to get involved in European affairs.³ That was a time when Mao Zedong really wanted to assume the leadership of the entire socialist camp, as suggested by his behaviors in the 1957 Moscow

² For two divergent interpretations of the Sino-Soviet split, see Lorenz M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), and Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967* (Washington, DC: Wilson Center Press; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).

³ See Dandan Zhu, *1956: Mao's China and the Hungarian Crisis* (Ithaca, NY: East Asia Program Cornell University, 2013); Péter Vámos, "Sino-Hungarian Relations and the 1956 Revolution," *Cold War International History Project Working Paper* 54 (November 2006); Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 145-162.

Conference.⁴ But a little more than two years later, in the early 1960s, following the Sino-Soviet split, the Eastern European countries, without exception, all fell on the Soviet side. Why? Was it because of political views? Or the cultural differences between Asia and Europe? Or for reason of geopolitics, that the Eastern Europe had to follow the Soviet Union? Or was there some economic reason? So I really want to hear what the veterans, the ambassadors here could say about their knowledge of the time, including the details, which I believe will help us tremendously.

Another big change was in the 1970s, with China's sudden rapprochement with the US. At the time, how did Western Europeans countries view that? How did the ambassadors here from Eastern Europe view that? I wonder from what perspective they understood this change in Sino-US relations. This is what I'm interested in. I hope the ambassadors could share with us their own experiences of the time, some details of the time that may be of great significance for our study of history. That's all.

PÉTER VÁMOS: Let me start by stating that ever since the establishment of the PRC, Beijing's main concern was its relationship with Moscow. And Eastern Europe in itself played a secondary role in Chinese foreign policy. The importance of the region stemmed from the fact that they became part of the Soviet-dominated socialist world after 1949. The two most influential factors in the development of Sino-Eastern European relations were the so-called Chinese "differentiation" and Soviet intentions to control its satellites' relations with China.

So let me summarize these two aspects. After the Sino-Soviet split, actually starting from 1960-1961, China started to distinguish among socialist states based on their degree of autonomy from the USSR. And this policy was referred to as a differentiating approach towards the socialist community. China identified basically three groups among the socialist countries, as they were friendly, unfriendly, or hostile based on their relations with the PRC and their attitudes towards China's enemy

⁴ The "Moscow Conference" was held November 14-19, 1957, and involved delegates from 64 communist parties. The conference concluded with the passing of the "Declaration of the Twelve Communist and Workers Parties," or, as it is more commonly known, the "Moscow Declaration." The conference also marked one of two occasions when Mao Zedong traveled outside of China. See Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, "Hidden Currents during the Honeymoon: Mao, Khrushchev, and the 1957 Moscow Conference," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 11, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 74-117.

at that time, the Soviet Union. In the 1960s, only Albania was considered socialist. In the early 1980s, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Yugoslavia, and Romania belonged to the category of friends, and, until 1983, only these countries were referred to as socialist. The “social imperialist” Soviet Union—it was a label used until 1982—as well as Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, and Mongolia were labeled as enemies. The third group included the five Eastern European countries that coordinated their China policies with the USSR, with Moscow. These included Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR or East Germany, Hungary, and Poland. According to the Chinese, these countries did not directly serve the implementation of Soviet foreign policy goals and their experiences in domestic reforms were useful for China in the solution of its economic tasks.

That policy of differentiation played on the various nuances and changes in the domestic political and economic situation of socialist countries and was characterized by Chinese attempts to penetrate into various spheres and areas of their domestic life. To undermine and change the unity of the Soviet bloc and to spread China's influence into various struts of the population, including the intellectuals and the young people. As I said, ever since the establishment of the PRC, Beijing's major concern was its relationship with Moscow. Let me illustrate this attitude with a document from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It's a directive from 1964, which called for focusing our efforts to attack Khrushchev's revisionist clique. The document says: “That of course when the Eastern European and Mongolian revisionist cliques outraged against us and attacked us, a certain counterattack is necessary, but the main struggle should focus on Khrushchev's revisionist clique. When the wolf is rampant why shall we bother with the fox, what we have to do now is to overthrow Khrushchev's revisionist clique—this great devil, and the small devils will follow him, just as when the tree falls, the monkeys scatter—in this way, the problem can be easily settled.”⁵ So these words clearly show that China's Eastern European policy wasn't on par with Soviet policy. In other words, Chinese foreign policy considered relations with individual states and with the whole region as a de-

⁵ “Waijiao bu juemi fadian guanyu jizhong liliang daji He xiu de zhishi” (“Top Secret Cable from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Concentrating Strength to Attack the Revisionist Khrushchev”), August 19, 1964, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (hereafter PRC FMA), 109-03903-01.

rivative of Sino-Soviet relations and subordinated its bloc policy to its policy towards the Soviet Union. The relationship between China and the Soviet satellites was probably best described by Hungarian Party leader János Kádár in 1970 when he said, “regarding the sense of the matter, what is definitive how Chinese intention relates to the Soviet Union. To their eyes, we are only puppets.”⁶

China’s policies towards Soviet satellites followed a unified pattern, and I won’t go into the details. On that, it was differentiated in the sense that they proposed the improvement of relations in different aspects and to different countries in different times. On the other hand, let me summarize Soviet considerations. The Soviet intention was to control all spheres of cooperation between its satellites and the PRC from economic and cultural relations, to more sensitive technological cooperation, not to mention military and party-to-party relations. The close coordination meant a certain process starting from the highest levels, meetings of party general secretaries, to ministers of foreign affairs, to the central committee, to international department officials, to so-called Sinologists, and even the annual bilateral trade agreements had to be approved by the Soviets. The tight Soviet control of the socialist bloc’s relations with China stemmed from the danger that, in the Soviet opinion, China could pose by winning over the Soviet Union’s closest, but in several aspects, still uneasy allies. The Soviet grip on Mongolia was the strongest, but the 1956 events in Hungary, the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia, and the Polish events in 1980-1981 showed that the threat posed by the Brezhnev Doctrine of “Limited Sovereignty,” which could as well be called the Stalin Doctrine or Khrushchev Doctrine, and the presence of Soviet armed forces, was strong enough to keep the satellites away from maverick activities. The basic principle for Eastern European Soviet satellites in conducting their relations with China was that the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations was a precondition to significant changes in Sino-Eastern European relations. When a country went beyond the limits of Soviet tolerance, Moscow immediately reminded its allies that the China policy of the closely-coordinated socialist countries was defined at the highest levels.

“The improvement of Sino-Soviet relations was a precondition to significant changes in Sino-Eastern European relations.”

⁶ “Jegyzőkönyv a Politikai Bizottság 1970. április 7-én megtartott üléséről” (“Minutes of the HSWP Political Committee meeting held on 7 April 1970”), National Archives of Hungary (MNL) OL M-KS 288. f. 5/515. ő.e.

**“Albania was
the only East
European
country**

that stood on
China’s side at
the Bucharest
Conference in 1960.

So the question arises, and of course each country is different, whether the Eastern European countries were “policy makers” or, rather, “policy takers”? And that’s a question that can be discussed in relation to each and every country’s relationship with China. Thank you very much.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN: Thank you. We now turn to our first two eyewitnesses. Ambassador Fan, would you like to start?

AMBASSADOR FAN CHENGZUO: First a bit of self-introduction. My name is Fan Chengzuo and I am former Chinese Ambassador to Albania. It’s a pleasure that we gather here today, at the beginning of the second decade of this new century, in Sicily, the beautiful island of our hospitable host, and I’m very glad to see that the relations between China and Europe have now entered into, what we could say, their best period in history, with China having friendly and cooperative relations with most European countries, Albania included, and in some cases even comprehensive strategic partnerships.

But twenty years ago, during the Cold War period, and especially during the time from 1960 to 1970, the relations between China and Europe were nothing like this. At the time, some countries still wouldn’t establish diplomatic relations with New China; some countries adopted an unfriendly attitude towards China; and China was yet to restore its legitimate seat in the UN. This was a period of time characterized by, as we call it, the “Big Three”: “big upheaval, big division, and big reform.” Mostly due to the widening of ideological differences, Sino-Soviet relations began to sour until, in the 1960s, there came a point of armed confrontation and border clashes between the two sides. Albania, as our Hungarian scholar Mr. Péter Vámos just pointed out, was China’s best friend, partner, and comrade in Eastern Europe at the time. After China and the Soviet Union fell out, Albania was the only East European country that stood on China’s side at the Bucharest Conference in 1960.⁷ From then on until the early 1970s, for more than a decade, China and Albania stood together firmly against Soviet revisionism and hegemony. But why Albania, led by Enver Hoxha, would part company with the Soviet Union, whom

⁷ Colloquially known as the “Bucharest Conference,” the 3rd Congress of the Communist Party of Romania was held from June 20-26, 1960. During the conference, Nikita Khrushchev and Peng Zhen openly sparred. Of the communist parties in attendance, only the Albanian delegates came to the defense of China.

the Albanians once regarded as a sort of big parent to them? Due to time limits, I am not going to answer this question here. I'll just speak from China's perspective about the major changes in Sino-Albanian relations in the 1950s and the 1960s.

Albania was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China following China's founding in 1949.⁸ Throughout the 1950s, with their shared ideology and social system and without any historical dispute and actual conflict of interest between them, China and Albania maintained friendly and cooperative relations; and especially after the two countries established embassies in each other's capitals in 1954, Sino-Albanian relations gained momentum. And it was also the time when China began to offer Albania economic assistance, which started with small amounts and then grew over the years. Because before 1954, before China and Albania established embassies with each other, Albania's main source of assistance was from the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. But after the embassies were established, starting in 1954, China began to offer Albania economic assistance, which started from initially small amounts to large sums later on. And China, with its policy of equality and respect towards Albania, as well as its opposition to chauvinism both in speech and action, won the goodwill of the Albanians from the leadership down to the common people. In the 1950s—in 1954—when Chinese students were sent to study in Albania—I was one of the students—the first thing we were told before we departed was “no chauvinist behavior in Albania.” This instruction against chauvinism was something I always kept in mind, from my very first day in Albania to the completion of my years there—first study and then many years of work. This policy on the part of China was greatly appreciated by the Albanians.

Then the 1960s, the falling out between China and the Soviet Union, as I mentioned, in which Albania joined China in opposing the revisionist Soviet Union, resulting in the Soviets cutting off their assistance to Albania and the severing of Soviet-Albanian diplomatic ties. After that, China took over the full scale of assistance which previously was provided by the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries and on top of that China kept raising, even doubling the amounts of the assistance. And in a short period of time China and Albania formed

⁸ The People's Republic of China and the People's Socialist Republic of Albania exchanged diplomatic recognition on November 23, 1949.



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a special bilateral relationship—a relationship between a big country and a small country that drew a lot of attention in the world. If you wonder what that special relationship was, I would tell you that it was not the normal kind of relationship, but one rarely seen in state-to-state relations.

I divide the development of the Sino-Albanian relations, from their establishment at the end of the 1940s following the founding of the People's Republic of China to their breach at the end of the 1970s—please note here, it was a breach, not a severing of diplomatic ties, because China and Albania did not sever their diplomatic ties. Why? Because later when Albania took an anti-China turn and voiced against China, China made no response to what they said nor took any action to aggravate the situation; so there was no severing of diplomatic ties between the two sides. I emphasize this because some media reported that China and Albania broke off their diplomatic relations; or that China and Albania resumed their diplomatic relations. But China and Albania didn't break off their diplomatic relations; it was a breach of the relationship.

I divide the process of the Sino-Albanian relations, from their establishment at the end of the 1940s to their breach at the end of the 1970s, into four stages which I call the spring, summer, autumn, and winter of the Sino-Albanian relationship. I'll start with the summer of the Sino-Albanian relations so as to illustrate the special relationship between the two countries; what were the contents and expressions of that special relationship? In the 1960s, Sino-Albanian relations developed in such a way that it is best described as a sharp ascent rather than an upward spiral. Between the two sides, there were frequent high-level contacts and a broad range of cooperation; there was also a steady flow of large amounts of assistance from China to Albania; and the two countries piled on each other high praises and constantly exceeded reception and other official protocols for each other. Here I'll give you a few examples. Mao Zedong, in the name of Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, sent a telegram of congratulation on the occasion of the 5th Representative Congress of the Party of Labour of Albania.⁹ Mao Zedong attended the National Day reception hosted by the Albanian Ambassador to China,

⁹ "Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Message of Greetings to the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour," *Peking Review* 9, no. 46 (November 11, 1966): 5. In the telegram, Mao claimed that the "heroic people's Albania has become a great beacon of socialism in Europe."

which was a very rare and hardly seen gesture in Beijing's diplomatic scene at that time. Mao Zedong hosted a banquet for Hysni Kapo, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania. Also in 1967, Mao Zedong received the visiting Albanian Prime Minister Shehu not once, but twice.¹⁰ These were just one aspect. The special relationship between the two sides was also reflected in other aspects. In 1966, all major party and government leaders, including Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Deng Xiaoping, with the exception of Mao Zedong, went to the Beijing airport to receive the visiting Albanian party and government delegation, led by Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Albanian Council of Ministers. The welcoming line—the Chinese often use the expression “millions of people welcome the visiting foreign guests”—but the welcoming line for the Albanian delegation that time was one-of-a-kind; it was the longest line staffed with the biggest group of people. Those who have been to Beijing may know what kind of a spectacle it would be to have a welcoming line stretching from Dabeyao in Chaoyang District all the way to Diaoyutai State Guesthouse on the far side of Xicheng District, flanked on both sides by a million people calling out “welcome our distinguished Albanian guests;” streets festooned with streamers, banners, et cetera. It was unprecedented, and I would also say, you will never see the like of it again. For other countries' visits, Beijing's usual welcoming line would be from Dongdan to Diaoyutai and also without so many people. Sometimes for more important occasions the line would start further up at Jianguomen. But this time it started from Dabeyao.

This is one. Let's see another example. Zhou Enlai, as China's Premier, went to Albania three times for friendly visits. Of the three visits, the longest visit was during his tour of fourteen Asian, African, and also European—for Albania was included—countries in late 1963 and early 1964. That time Zhou Enlai stayed in Albania for nine days—that the Premier of a big country stayed in a small country for nine days is a rare thing in the highest-level visits. Zhou Enlai also spent the 1964 New Year in Albania. On another front, the Chinese government mobilized

¹⁰ Mehmet Shehu met Mao Zedong on September 30, 1967, and on October 12, 1967. For the Albanian records of conversation, see Ana Lalaj, Christian F. Ostermann, and Ryan Gage, “‘Albania is not Cuba’: Sino-Albanian Summits and the Sino-Soviet Split,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 16 (Fall 2007/Winter 2008): 328–337. For Chinese summaries of the conversations, see, Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Mao Zedong nianpu (yijiusijiu-yijiunian)* (Chronology of Mao Zedong, 1949–1976), vol. 6 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2013), 128, 133.

**“Whatever
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the entire nation to raise assistance for Albania. The total assistance from China to Albania amounted to ten billion renminbi. It was in the 1960s and 1970s, so it was equivalent to 6 billion US dollars then. Whatever Albania asked for, China gave; no request was unanswered. Even if the Albanians made no request, China still offered—you don’t have to say it, we’ll say it for you.

On the Albanian side, they in turn supported China on three fronts: supported China’s opposition to Khrushchev’s revisionism, supported China’s Cultural Revolution, and supported the restoration of China’s UN representation. I won’t go through the first two—supporting China’s opposition to Khrushchev’s revisionism and supporting China’s Cultural Revolution. Because there was this big Sino-Soviet debate regarding the first, and what was said in it I won’t repeat. Then about the support for China’s Cultural Revolution, since the Cultural Revolution is regarded as an upheaval, Albania’s support of China’s Cultural Revolution might seem equal to Albania’s support of an upheaval in China. So it’s better to leave it aside as well.

But what is worth pointing out is the last—Albania’s support for the restoration of China’s UN representation; a valuable, consistent, committed, and effective support which China will always remember. China is a country that remembers the hostility and kindness that has come upon it, but it remembers more dearly the kindness. The Chinese people will never forget this support on the part of the Albanians for the restoration of China’s UN representation.

There are more examples of this special Sino-Albanian relationship. For both sides, when it comes to describing the bilateral relationship between China and Albania, expressions such as “unbreakable,” “arm-in-arm,” and “growing with each passing day” no longer cut it; better expressions include “strong as steel and pure as crystal,” “advancing from climax to climax,” and even direct quotations from poetry like “long distance separates no bosom friends.” We who were responsible for drafting speeches at that time were all racking our brains to come up with better phrases or expressions. Also, the level of treatment that Albanian politicians enjoyed in China was the best they could get anywhere, and in any other place they couldn’t expect anything remotely like that. For instance, during the Albanian Defense Minister Beqir Balluku’s visit to China, he asked to meet with Lin Biao alone, and the Chinese side agreed; and this was the only occasion that Lin Biao met with any visiting foreign guest alone. Again, when the new Albanian Ambassador to China

arrived in Beijing, he was received by Mao Zedong and all standing members of the Politburo—the collective of the highest echelon of China’s leadership. Only the Albanian Ambassador could get this kind of special treatment.

Throughout 1960s and in the early 1970s, for over a decade the Sino-Albanian relations developed at a hectic pace, or as I said, experienced a sharp ascent. But as people say, “extremes meet, rise fast, and fall hard.” The once ideologically-driven bilateral relationship between China and Albania was vulnerable to say the least. In the 1970s, the Albanian leaders reacted strongly against China’s approval of Nixon’s visit and the Sino-US summit and consequently the special relationship between the two sides came to an end.¹¹ I was actually going to move on to why Albania objected to China’s reception of Nixon, what they did and what the results were, but I’ve already talked for quite a while, so I’ll stop for now. I’ll talk about the rest when I get the chance in the following sessions. Thank you. That’s all.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN: Thank you very much. I should have introduced Ambassador Fan a little bit before giving him the floor, just to say that he graduated from Tirana University in 1957; then joined the Foreign Ministry that same year and used to be in fact the leading Albanian translator for both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. So later on he worked in the Chinese Embassy to Albania and Greece in the 1970s and 1980s, and was the Chinese Ambassador to Albania from September 1986 on. So we look forward to hearing from you later when we discuss that time period. Now I’d like to turn to Ambassador Mei Zhaorong, who is a Germany expert. He was chosen and sent to East Germany to study German in August 1953, a pivotal moment in East Germany, the wake of the uprising. He then worked for the Chinese Ambassador to the GDR from 1956 to 1963, and then again from 1970 to 1972. He also worked in the Chinese Embassy to West Germany from 1972 to 1975; and for the West Europe Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1977 onwards. He later became the Chinese Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany from 1988 to 1997. Ambassador, you have the floor. If we can keep

¹¹ Enver Hoxha wrote that the Sino-American rapprochement “fell like a bombshell on us Albanians.” See Jon Halliday, ed., *The Artful Albania: Memoirs of Enver Hoxha* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1986), 285.

it to ten minutes or so, so we can have enough time for discussion, that would be wonderful.

AMBASSADOR MEI ZHAORONG: I'm going to talk about the impact of the Sino-Soviet split on the relations between China and the German Democratic Republic—that is, East Germany.

Before I embark on my speech, I would like to respond to the demands raised by Mr. Shen Zhihua and Mr. Vámos earlier. Mr. Shen Zhihua said that we were the real players in the diplomatic process at that time, so he wanted us not to be held back by the concern of “airing our own family embarrassments in public,” and to tell things as they were at the time. Mr. Vámos also said that we should try to remember and talk about what we thought, suggested, or did at that very time. But I'd like to add a point here. At that time, we were not decision-makers, but only young staff members whose work mostly involved acting as translators for our superiors or taking care of some specific matters concerning certain countries. If we really had been decision-makers at that time, we would have been at least ninety years old by now and mostly likely would not have been able to attend this meeting. Also, I find that, as diplomatic staff, we tended to report things as they happened at the time. But in terms of interpreting those things, we certainly had our own opinions, which however may be different from those of the scholars today. My feeling is that some scholars look at the past issues from today's perspective; that's why we always feel a bit out of place here and there. That is, however, not an issue. We can exchange different views just so that we can see the past more truthfully. My point is, we can bring to the table what happened as it happened—this I can do; and I can say I won't be held back from talking about the “family embarrassments.” I think I can give a truthful representation of the things at the time.

Up until 1959, the relations between China and East Germany could be summed up by three words: friendship, solidarity, and cooperation. A smooth development, you should say. I remember clearly that, on October 7, 1959, which was the GDR's tenth anniversary National Day, the East German Ambassador to Beijing hosted a celebration reception at the Beijing Hotel. Chairman Mao Zedong, Premier Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, personally attended this reception, in which Premier Zhou

Enlai also gave a speech.¹² I worked as a translator that time. At the reception, both Chairman Mao Zedong and Hermann Matern, head of the party and government delegation sent by the East German side for the occasion, who was also a member of the Politburo of the Socialist United Party, expressed support for each other's political lines, correct political lines as they called it. Around the same time—as you may know, October 1 was China's tenth anniversary National Day—Khrushchev, returning from the Camp David talks in the US, came to Beijing to attend our celebrations. At our National Day reception—I was also there—he was already making pointed allusions to the people's commune movement in China. Later when he got back to Vladivostok, he criticized Mao Zedong for trying to test the strength of the Americans. So it appeared that by the time East Germany and the Soviet Union hadn't, in Khrushchev's words, “compared watches” between them. So East Germany was still looking at things the old way, but the differences between the Soviet Union and China began to come to the front.

The pre-1959 relations between China and East Germany had some notable aspects. The first was the two countries' respect for each other's political lines. East Germany was positive toward China's general political lines, namely, the “Great Leap Forward,” the people's communes, and the “Three Red Banners.” Though we have disapproved of these three movements now, they were the party lines upheld by us at the time. The second was the frequent high-level visits between the two sides. In 1954, after attending the meeting in Geneva for discussions on the Korea issue and the Indochina issue, Premier Zhou Enlai immediately went to East Berlin for a visit.¹³ I was studying at Leipzig at the time. All of us Chinese students were taken to East Berlin to participate in the events of Premier Zhou's visit. So at that time we were supportive of East Germany. As we all know, before this, in 1953, there were riots, or from the West German point of view, “an uprising,” that broke out in East



MEI ZHAORONG

¹² See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949-1976)* (Chronology of Zhou Enlai, 1949-1976), vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997), 259.

¹³ Zhou Enlai visited East Germany from July 23-26, 1954. See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949-1976)*, vol. 1, 404.

**“We wouldn’t
allow** the Soviet
Union to control us
and turn us into one
of its satellites”

Germany—but for East Germany what happened were “riots.”¹⁴ But at the time, we were still supportive of each other. The third aspect was the successful exchanges and cooperation between the two sides. In 1953, the first group of Chinese students was sent to study in East Germany; I was one of the students. In terms of the trade between the two sides, we should say both China and East Germany played a relatively weighty role in each other’s foreign trade, because the other Eastern European countries were not as economically developed as East Germany. East Germany was, at that time, a front runner among the Eastern European countries. Then the final aspect was that the great respect the German party had for Chairman Mao. To borrow their own words, “Chairman Mao is the greatest Marxist theorist alive;” and they held in high esteem a few of Chairman Mao’s works such as “On Contradiction,” “On Practice,” “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People,” and “Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers.” These works used to be the materials for our theoretical studies in the universities.

But things began to change in 1960, which meant that in 1960 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union gave clear instructions to the Central Committee of the East German Socialist Unity Party, requiring East Germany to follow the Soviet Union in opposing China. Here I would like to specify a little. At that time, that is, during the Cold War period, our conflict with the Soviet Union was mainly on two points. The first point was a theoretical one, “opposition to Soviet revisionism,” as we called it. Now we have come to see things differently and have long since renounced this view. Neither we nor the Soviet Union were correct on those issues. We won’t argue with that. But the other point, our policy at the time, that up till now we still hold as correct, was the insistence on our independence, not subjecting ourselves to the Soviet command. We wouldn’t allow the Soviet Union to control us and turn us into one of its satellites; that kind of policy was unacceptable to us. So this contradiction was, in the last analysis, at the core of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Of course in relation to this, we had other differences. For example, we had different opinions in terms of the strategies towards the United States, towards West Germany, but these

¹⁴ Christian F. Ostermann, ed., *Uprising in East Germany: The Cold War, the German Question, and the First Major Upheaval behind the Iron Curtain* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001).

were not the heart of the problem. The heart of the problem was that the Soviet Union wanted to control us, and we wouldn't allow it.

Now I'll briefly talk about in what ways East Germany followed the Soviet Union in opposing China. It started in 1960; the official start was at the Bucharest Conference of that year. In that conference, Khrushchev called up the Eastern European communist parties, worker's parties for a collective—and surprise—assault on the Chinese Communist Party, and Ulbricht, General Secretary of the East German SED Central Committee at the time, was leading the assault on China's policies. From then on East Germany began to fight China on a series of policy issues, sometimes in total contradiction to their previous views.

For example, on the issue of the Sino-Indian border conflict, the Soviet reaction, in the latter half of 1959, was to dole out the blame evenly, meaning criticizing both China and India.¹⁵ But meanwhile, Otto Grotewohl, the East German Prime Minister at the time, remarked that the cause of the Sino-Indian conflict was an Indian provocation. But later, after pressure from the Soviet Union, in October of the same year, Otto Grotewohl made a statement, saying that the Sino-Indian conflict, the armed confrontation between the two sides in Ladakh, was completely uncalled for; and that he expressed regret and so on. It still went on, but due to the time limits, I'll leave the details for now. Just say that later on Ulbricht commented that this conflict was completely uncalled for, was harmful; that the Chinese Communist Party was not fighting the imperialist United States but fighting India in Ladakh. So they took a complete U-turn from their previous position.¹⁶

Another example: East Germany's attitude towards the people's commune movement in China. On June 4, 1960, when Ulbricht visited the agricultural exhibit in Leipzig—China was a participant in this exhibit—he made a speech before the exhibit's official opening ceremony, in which he praised the people's commune in China and said it was a creation of the people. But shortly afterwards, an article came out in *Neues Deutschland*, claiming to clarify the issue. According to the article, China's statement that the people's commune movement also applies to East

¹⁵ See Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 8, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 54-101.

¹⁶ See Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Vol. 3: The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961-1966* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 322.

“Wu Xiuquan commented, “Is this your German civility?” The German translator refused to translate that.”

Germany has caused Germany’s internal disorder, so it must be refuted. So they completely changed their position. There was a lot of changing at the time.

On the other hand, at the time, we still carried on many exchanges with East Germany. We sent a succession of party and government delegations to participate in East Germany’s National Day events, and delegations for President Wilhelm Pieck’s birthday celebrations; and upon the death of Wilhelm Pieck, we also sent a delegation to East Germany to offer our condolences. But the East German party leadership was cold and prejudiced against our delegations. I can give you an example. We had one time Vice-Premier Lu Dingyi—an alternate member of the Politburo—go to East Germany to participate in the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the liberation of East Germany. So we went there to congratulate them. But it turned out that there was something in our speech that was not completely in line with the opinion of the East German leadership, so they asked us to delete that part. We refused and said we would stick to the speech we prepared. So we made the speech, but as we came to the part they didn’t like, they cut off the microphone. We protested, but they said it was a technical malfunction. So they resorted to some very cheap means. The worst of all was in the 6th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany in 1963, to which, as you all know, we sent a CCP Central Committee delegation, led by Wu Xiuquan. At this congress, Khrushchev launched an attack on the Chinese Communist Party and afterwards he suggested that from now on we should stop the debate; he asked the Chinese Communist Party to agree to that. So first he attacked us and then he didn’t allow us to respond or comment.¹⁷ Another thing is, at the time, we had disagreements with the Soviet Union on the issue of Yugoslavia, which we mentioned in our speech as our criticism of the revisionist group of the Yugoslav Communist Party. The Soviet Union demanded us to rewrite that and we of course refused. Later when Wu Xiuquan gave the speech at the congress—I was also there, working as a translator—the Chairman, a member of the SED Politburo, rang the bell four times, trying to stop Wu Xiuquan’s speech. Every time he rang the bell, people hissed, pounded on the tables, stamped their feet, and the whole conference room was in a chaos. Then Wu Xiuquan commented, “Is this your German civility?” The German translator refused to translate that. He

¹⁷ See Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*, 234-235.

said quite frankly that he refused to translate that sentence. I was there, so I went up and grabbed the microphone to do the translation. So things were very intense at that time.

On all these issues, East Germany was acting as, in our words, “the spearhead of Khrushchev’s anti-China campaign.” As a result, the relations between the CCP and SED basically stopped in 1966. Then in 1967, the SED invited us to attend the 7th SED Congress. Our reply was that in view of your party’s consistent, disreputable anti-China behaviors, we are not going to send a delegation this time. In the event of this congress, the SED not only sent letters with anti-China contents to other parties within the socialist camp, but also attacked China in the process of the congress. So the party-to-party relations between the two sides completely broke off in 1967.

This situation continued. Of course in the meantime there were some small changes; there were changes in our position on the German Question. At the beginning, we supported and assisted the GDR, because it was also a member of the socialist camp and was on the frontline of the Cold War against the West. But on the question of West Germany, we had differences with East Germany, which reflected our party’s difference with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. According to East Germany, the militarist West Germany was more dangerous and adventurist than the imperialist United States. We didn’t agree with that. But since at that time we were less under the influence of the Soviet Union, we also said watch out for the revival of West German militarism. But East Germany said that it is not reviving; it has been revived. So we didn’t even agree on that point.

But in 1964, relations between East Germany and Khrushchev’s Soviet Union came into some trouble.¹⁸ As we all know, Khrushchev’s son-in-law Adzhubei visited West Germany, and then words came out that West Germany wanted to buy out the GDR with 100 billion Deutsche Marks. As a result, East Germany was very worried and wanted to get support from China. But even with that, at the time, the Sino-East German relationship was still subject to the Sino-Soviet relations. That didn’t change essentially. But still, there were signs from East Germany that they wanted our support. The worst thing East Germany did to us was in 1960, during

“There were signs from East Germany that they wanted our support.”

¹⁸ See Jonathan Haslam, *Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 212.

the years of China's natural disasters.¹⁹ At the time, the Soviet Union withdrew their experts from China and terminated all contracts with us. In such a great difficulty, we had to adjust our economic policy, and therefore we brought up the issue with East Germany about cutting down on our supply of soybeans and peanuts to them since we indeed were in a famine. Then East Germany sent a Politburo member, Herman Matern, to China to put pressure on us.²⁰ He was saying this: "I'm not here to ask for assistance; I am here to demand you fulfill the contract." Premier Zhou Enlai talked with him at that time and he was outraged. Premier Zhou said to him, you are asking our Chinese to starve to maintain your maximum living standards and this is not a communist attitude, not an attitude of internationalism. As a result, the relations between the two sides were very tense at the time. That was basically it.

But at the beginning of 1970, the Sino-East German relationship began to turn about. The real turning point came after 1976, during the presidency of Erich Honecker, when the East German side made some conciliatory gestures to us, indicating their intention to improve relations with China. And in return we made some gestures. We sent people to visit East Germany and we made it clear that in dealing with the Sino-East German relations we couldn't say we didn't make mistakes. So starting in the second half of 1981, the Sino-East German relationship improved, until 1989 when the big change came.²¹ In 1990, East Germany was incorporated into West Germany, and so ended the existence of East Germany as well as the Sino-East Germany relationship. That's it. Thank you.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN: Thank you. I'm sure we will get to the later-time periods, but I'd like to—in this session, especially in the discussion—I hope we'll focus on the early periods, the 1950s and the 1960s. And I know there are a couple of people who've already indicated that they would like to speak. Ambassador Budura?

¹⁹ "Natural disaster" is a common, but severely misleading, way of describing the Great Leap Forward in Mainland China. See Frank Dikötter, *Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-1962* (New York: Walker & Co., 2010).

²⁰ See Hope M. Harrison, *Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 165-166.

²¹ See Zhong Zhong Chen, "Defying Moscow: East German-Chinese Relations during the Andropov-Chernenko Interregnum, 1982-1985," *Cold War History* 14, no. 2 (2014): 259-280.

AMBASSADOR IOAN ROMULUS BUDURA: My name is Ioan Romulus Budura. I am from Romania. I'm eighty-one years old. I started to learn Chinese in the 1950s, and I worked at the Romanian Embassy for twenty years in China and the rest of time in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Then I became, how to say, a scholar and studied a lot of documents regarding Romanian-Chinese relations. Here I have two volumes, from 1880 to 1975.²² These works are done by a team, coordinated by me, and the third volume will appear in a few months' time, in October I think, from 1975 to 1981; and then next year, from 1982 to 1989. I have been an interpreter, as the Ambassador was, for Romanian leaders and Chinese leaders. I had the opportunity to meet Mao Zedong several times and to spend a lot of time with Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and others. And I would say I was quite fortunate, to work with our own Romanian leaders, whom I will praise for their many virtues. One of them is the pragmatic, non-ideological approach to international topics and problems. This is why today I'm going to tell you something which I've learned as an interpreter at the highest level, as an ambassador for a long time, and as a scholar for almost sixty-two years. First of all, I think that we have to approach differently the alliance between Soviet Union and China. Why is that? Because in 1945, in February at Yalta, Stalin and Roosevelt reached a secret agreement that after the war China will become part of the American sphere of influence; and later Roosevelt accepted the idea that Outer Mongolia would be a different country, not part of China; that Port Arthur and Dalian would be two ports available for the Soviet Union; that the Manchurian railway would become once again part of the Soviet economy; and that the privileges in Xinjiang, which were obtained before, would remain under the control of the Soviet Union. And you know, Roosevelt succeeded in convincing Jiang Jieshi to send a delegation to Moscow and to sign that treaty. This is one thing. At the same time, Stalin sent a letter under the name of Filipov to Mao Zedong, asking for the same arrangements. And Mao Zedong sent a delegation to Moscow, led by Liu Shaoqi; convened the 7th Congress; he prepared the speech on the coalition government, but he never, how to say—the document was only circulated. Then he started the negotiations with Jiang

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²² Romulus Ioan Budura, coord., *Relații româno-chineze, 1880-1974: Documente* (Romanian-Chinese Relations 1880-1974: Documents) (București : Arhivele Naționale ale României, 2008), and Romulus Ioan Budura, coord., *Politica Independență a României și Relațiile Româno-Chineze 1954-1975: Documente* (Romania's Policy of Independence and Romanian-Chinese Relations, 1954-1975: Documents) (București, Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Arhivele Naționale, 2008).

“Leaning to one side...is an unnatural position, which is not to last a long time.”

Jieshi, which did not reach any conclusion. And at the same time, Mao Zedong sent Lin Feng, Lin Biao to Northeast China and prepared for the civil war—

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN: Ambassador Budura, we cannot have a history lecture here. Everybody here is familiar with the historical context, so if you could focus your question on the specific subject of the panel which is the impact of the Sino-Soviet split.

AMBASSADOR IOAN ROMULUS BUDURA: This is what I’m going to say. This split is the result—a rebuff to this arrangement. Mao Zedong said, I’m not interested in your arrangement; I would incline to one side, I would lean to one side. So the whole alliance, cooperation, and friendship between the Soviet Union and China was the result of leaning to one side, which is an unnatural position, which is not to last a long time. So this is my point, but I had to make use of some information as far as history is concerned, otherwise some people would not understand. So the inclination on one side was the expression of that alliance and so on; and it was unusual, abnormal. Impossible to last for a long time. For Mao Zedong, one thing is very important: how to correct the side effect of that policy? Because there were very serious side effects. Of course China had to announce the policy of the Three Worlds, had to announce the New Democracy, had to announce the other different policies carried out in China. You know in 1954, I accompanied my President, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, invited by Mao Zedong. He was a former capitalist, owner of banks, of lands, and so on. Mao Zedong invited him, come here please, and convinced my capitalist, my banker, my trader, to accept the socialist transformation. Because at that very beginning, before the leaning to one side, Mao Zedong’s conception about the development of China was a different one, was a multi-polar world. So what I try to tell you is that policy was a policy that the Soviet Union and the whole international situation compelled Mao Zedong and others to adopt. You have to remember still, at that time there were two levels of leadership in the Communist Party of China: there was the front leadership, Liu Shaoqi and others; and the second one with Mao Zedong and others. So I think that the public polemics, the Cultural Revolution was the way, not a very idealistic way, not a very pleasant way, to correct the negative side effects of leaning to one side. Thank you.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN: Thank you very much. Just one follow-up question: Ambassador Budura, your visit was when in 1954? You said you met Mao Zedong in 1954?

AMBASSADOR IOAN ROMULUS BUDURA: I met him in 1954, 1957, twice in 1958, 1960, twice in 1964, and in 1967.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN: In 1954, do you remember the date?

AMBASSADOR IOAN ROMULUS BUDURA: That was in October.²³

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN: October 1954. Thank you very much. Chen Jian?

CHEN JIAN: Regarding the previous speeches of the two ambassadors, I would like to ask them each a question. One question concerns Sino-Albanian relations, because the relations between China and Albania were kind of special. I'm wondering: can I say that if there had not been the Sino-Soviet split, then Sino-Albanian relations wouldn't have come to what they were? My question first is to Ambassador Fan. Is it correct, if I assume that if there had not been the Sino-Soviet split, then we probably would not have seen that kind of Sino-Albanian solidarity? That's my brief question. Also, at the time, Albania sent a lot of delegations to China, I'm wondering whether the Chinese side paid for all the costs. Because I remember back in the time of the Cultural Revolution I subscribed to the English edition of *New Albania*, which was fully published in China, and it seemed that many Albanian radio stations had relations with China as well. This is one question. Then I have a question for Ambassador Mei, or maybe for Ambassador Fan as well. Ambassador Mei, you just mentioned that at the time of the rapprochement between China and East Germany, the Chinese side said that we can't say we didn't make mistakes. In retrospect, in China's conduct of relations with East Germany and other Eastern European socialist countries, what mistakes did China make? I mean in hindsight.

²³ The meeting took place on October 29, 1954. See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Mao Zedong nianpu (yijiusijiu-yijiunian)*, vol. 2, 311.

There is also another thing, a comment I would like to make. I think we should reconsider the statement that the reason why the Sino-Soviet relations soured was because the Soviet Union wanted to control China, since according to Professor Shen Zhihua and many others' studies, the two principle examples taken by the Chinese side as proof of the Soviet intention to control China—that is, the Soviet proposals of a “long-wave radio station” and a “joint fleet,” could hardly be said, in terms of ally-to-ally relations, to have shown that the Soviet Union had the intention to control China.²⁴ That's all of my questions and comments.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN: Would you like to respond, Ambassador Fan?

AMBASSADOR FAN CHENGZUO: If there hadn't been the Sino-Soviet split, how would China have treated Albania? As I said, I divide the process of the Sino-Albanian relations, from their establishment in 1949 to their breach in 1978, into four stages which I call the spring, summer, autumn, and winter. If there hadn't been the Sino-Soviet split, Sino-Albanian relations would have stayed in their spring, which is to say the relationship between the two countries would have been that of friendship and solidarity; and China would have provided Albania with an appropriate level of assistance, instead of what happened later on, when the entire country was mobilized to help Albania and give whatever was asked for. Because China and the Soviet Union and others would have shared the responsibility of helping out this small poor country; no question about that. As for the details you just asked, I would say that, considering the large amounts of assistance China gave to Albania, China wouldn't stint on some publication cost or travel cost. It was not just in the 1960s, but starting from the 1950s, a year after the establishment of embassies, in 1955, the Chinese side paid for the travel costs of all visiting Albanian delegations; and not only that, but also, for example, at the time, on the very day the Albanian guests arriving in Beijing, they would receive customized clothes service and then would each wake up the next morning to a brand new tailored suit. That was how thorough the Chinese side went. As I said, the special relationship already played a

²⁴ See Vladislav M. Zubok, “The Mao-Khrushchev Conversations, 31 July–3 August 1958 and 2 October 1959,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001): 244–272.

role in all these. You can hardly see these kinds of things in our relations with other countries or in the state-to-state relations in general. We helped with their publications, including the publishing of the Collected Works of Enver Hoxha, which were also published in China.

CHEN JIAN: In response to Ambassador Fan, I think that one thing is open to debate. In my opinion, if there hadn't been the Sino-Soviet split, there would have been problems for Sino-Albanian relations. Because at that time there was this issue of Yugoslavia, Kosovo. Soviet-Yugoslav relations improved, but the relations between Yugoslavia and Albania were pretty bad. So what I'm saying is if the Sino-Soviet relations hadn't run into difficulties, logically the relations between China and Yugoslavia would have improved, which would have posed a problem for Sino-Albanian relations. I'm wondering what you think about that.

AMBASSADOR FAN CHENGZUO: I agree to what you said. There was one big obstacle to relations between Albania and Yugoslavia and the obstacle was there for a long time and not easy to overcome. If you look at it from today's point of view, this is still true. But from China's perspective, since Yugoslavia and Albania are, after all, quite far from us, China generally would not overly get involved in their business. We would still have given Albania assistance matter-of-factly if they requested it, and also Albania would not have easily turned against China. The fundamental cause of Albania's switch to the anti-China side was China's normalization of relations with the United States. Albania objected to that, Albania's supreme leader objected to that—what he called “the collusion of China and the United States.” In his words, the foundation for the Sino-Albanian friendship and solidarity is the two countries' shared opposition to the imperialist US and to the revisionist Soviet Union; now that China is colluding with the United States, you have at least destroyed half of that foundation. Later on, as the Sino-US relations developed further and faster, which led to the eventual establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, Albania of course could not have tolerated that and went ahead with the anti-China line. That is the reason.



CHEN JIAN

**“How could East
Germany not
yield to the
Soviet Union?”**

AMBASSADOR MEI ZHAORONG: I am not an expert on Albanian issues, but I would like to add one point. I think your question—if there hadn’t been the Sino-Soviet split, would the Sino-Albanian relations have been so strong—that is a hypothetical. It’s perfectly okay for scholars to make hypotheses like that, but reality is trickier. Since the question itself is hypothetical, well, if there hadn’t been the Sino-Soviet split, then probably the Sino-Albanian relations would have been fine on one issue, but you can’t rule out the possibility that they run into trouble on other issues, which nobody could predict. So I think this is probably how we, as ambassadors, are different from the scholars. We act on the actual situation—what it is, and then we make a judgment; we don’t think from our own assumptions. It’s very hard to say about “if.” This is my first point.

The second point, about what mistakes China made with respect to the Eastern European countries. I think the Eastern European countries towed the Soviet anti-China line because they were, to a considerable extent, forced to do so as a result of Soviet pressure. Since, as we all know, in the case of East Germany, 400,000 Soviet troops were stationed there at the time, so East Germany’s security completely fell under the Soviets. Also in the 1950s the appointment of all East German ministers had to be first approved by Moscow. Under these circumstances, how could East Germany not yield to the Soviet Union?

But in dealing with the case of East Germany, we sometimes were a bit emotional, for instance we used some strong words. But so far as our relations with the Eastern European countries go, frankly speaking, it was not China who made the first move against the relations, but that they followed the Soviet Union in opposing China. We found that quite unacceptable, since you are not treating China as it is but doing as the Soviets do. Just yesterday you were singing praise to us and now today you change that tune completely, where are your principles? Right?

Another thing, you just said that the view about the Soviet intention to control China doesn’t hold up, but it seems to me that the view still holds. Because it wasn’t just the problem of the “long wave radio station” or the “joint fleet,” there were a bunch of other problems. And as a matter of fact, it was not just after the founding of New China that the relations between China and the Soviet Union encountered problems, but before that, during the period of the revolutionary war, on dealing with Jiang Jieshi, on dealing with a series of issues, the Soviet Union gave us some

suggestions that were not quite right.²⁵ So our Chinese Communist Party held a degree of watchfulness towards the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Why, after the founding of New China, would Mao Zedong or the Chinese Communist Party lean towards the Soviet Union on the one hand, but on the other hand always maintain relative independence and vigilance in relations with the Soviets? That we leaned towards the Soviet Union was in large part due to the pressure from the United States. After the founding of New China, we tried very hard to contact the Americans through internal channels; we had the Indian Ambassador pass on our message to the Americans that we hoped to establish friendly relations with them, but the Americans made no response. Why? Now we still don't know why. Maybe the Indian Ambassador didn't pass on our message, or maybe the Americans just wouldn't do.²⁶ We had no choice but to lean towards the Soviet Union. We were compelled by the situation to do so but that doesn't mean that we—also you said that as a member of a camp, an ally in an alliance, you should be compliant with what your ally says, I don't think that statement is right.

QIANG ZHAI: I have a question for Ambassador Fan. You just talked about the changes in the Sino-European relations for the period of 1960 to 1970, in which you emphasized it was a decade that the relations between China and Europe were pretty bad, with the exception of China's relations with Albania, which was a special relationship. I think in that decade there was actually another highlight in Sino-European relations: the establishment of Sino-French relations in 1964 was a major event in the development of the Sino-European relations. So my question is, at the time, how did Albania or Eastern Europe at large react to the establishment of Sino-French diplomatic ties? The second question, in the 1960s—in 1963—a significant change took place on the international scene—that is, the signing of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by the three parties of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, which both China and France firmly objected to and refused to sign, holding the view, even at that time, that the three signing par-

²⁵ See Dieter Heinzig, *The Soviet Union and Communist China 1945-1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004).

²⁶ For an alternative perspective, see Chen Jian, "The Myth of America's 'Lost Chance' in China: A Chinese Perspective in Light of New Evidence," *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 77-86.



LI DANHUI

ties, especially the US and the Soviet Union wanted to control the world, dominate the world by way of the nuclear issue. So I'm wondering, what was Albania's attitude at the time towards this treaty. Just these two questions. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR FAN CHENGZUO: I will briefly answer Mr. Qiang Zhai's question. Albania and France had diplomatic ties. Albania didn't object to the establishment of Sino-French relations and, on the contrary, it was quite supportive of that. Because at that time Albania had a good relationship with France, as much as it has now. So Albania objected to China's establishment of diplomatic ties with the US, with the Soviet Union, but it was okay with China and France, even more okay with China and Italy, so to speak.

LI DANHUI: My question is for Ambassador Mei, Ambassador Fan, Ambassador Zhou; and also Ambassador Yang, since you once worked at the Foreign Policy Research Department in the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs.

My first question: from 1969 to the early 1980s, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union set up "Interkit," which I'll translate for now as "China-targeted International," and then, within a year or two, all Eastern European countries within the socialist camp hosted an Interkit meeting—and later it was even held in Cuba and the Mongolian People's Republic.²⁷ The participants of the meetings were heads of the international departments or the foreign liaison departments of all the parties and what they discussed at the meetings was the coordination of their China policies and certainly there were some anti-China or China-discrimination elements involved. Now I just want to ask this question, at that time, did China know about this? Did the ambassadors know about this? If they knew, did they report it back to Beijing? And if they reported back, what instructions did they receive from the Foreign Ministry, regarding this? Because in China, it was an issue barely talked about, as it seems, this "China-targeted International" issue.

²⁷ See James Hershberg, Sergey Radchenko, Peter Vamos, and David Wolff, "The Interkit Story: A Window into the Final Decades of the Sino-Soviet Relationship," *Cold War International History Project Working Paper* 63 (February 2011).

Then my second question: Ambassador Fan, as the Interkit meetings didn't include Albania, did Albania know about that? And what were their reactions? That's all.

NIU JUN: I just have a question for Ambassador Mei, because there were some new perspectives in your comments on East Germany which I am quite interested in. Actually two questions. The first question: you just mentioned that there were some changes in East Germany's approach to China in the second half of 1976 and then the two countries began contact. From what I've read, after the death of Mao Zedong, there were also changes in Soviet policy, possibly in hopes that this would influence Mao's successor to change policy towards the Soviet Union. I also notice that at the time of Mao's death a few telegrams sent by the Eastern European countries were different from the one sent by the Soviet Union, in that the message was more earnest. So my question is, what was China's view on these gestures from the Eastern European countries? That they were just following the Soviet Union, or they themselves had some new thoughts? This is the first question. The second question: there were some changes in China's policy towards East Germany in the second half of 1981, I'm wondering why these policy changes took place in the second half of 1981?

SVETOZAR RAJAK: Since we are focusing more on Albania, questions on Yugoslavia come naturally. To follow up on something that Chen Jian initiated, to what extent did the relations between Albania and China prevent rapprochement between Yugoslavia and China in the 1960s, and particularly prior to the 1968 Czechoslovakia invasion? And also as an ambassador, you know, in Albania, or a diplomat in Albania, being able to monitor Yugoslavia I presume at the time—to what extent was China's leadership involvement in the anti-Yugoslavia campaign, starting from 1956 and then in 1958, a prelude to Sino-Soviet confrontation?

ANNA LALAJ: I want just to make a comment on the Albanian documents. The Albanian documents suggest that in 1960, there was a great turning of the Albanian Labour Party towards China, because the Sino-Soviet split came to the rescue of Albanian leader Hoxha and others. Because in 1956, after the 20th Congress of

CPSU, Enver Hoxha went to China to open the way for close relations, but he came back to Tirana very disappointed about the policies of Communist China towards the middle class, from an economic point of view, and also about the behaviors of Communist China towards the “inner enemies.” So in a meeting with Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong told Enver Hoxha that—in 1948 when Albania was divided from Yugoslavia, Mao Zedong said, it was not your fault; it was not Tito’s fault, but the mistake was Enver Hoxha’s, and this was a new thing for Enver Hoxha. But in 1960, the situation was quite different, and in that moment Enver Hoxha was in a difficult position; in that moment, the danger to remove him from power, as had happened to other senior communist leaders in Eastern Europe, was approaching to him, so he made a turn towards China. China was anti-Soviet at that time, was anti-America, and especially anti-Yugoslavia. Enver Hoxha built his entire political line from 1948 to 1960 on the anti-Yugoslavia line; everything, everything, all the phrases, all the blusters, was that we have fought against revisionist Yugoslavia and treachery and so on; we have defended our independence from Yugoslavia, and so on.

AMBASSADOR IOAN ROMULUS BUDURA: I heard the speeches of Professor Shen Zhihua, of Professor Vámos, and some other speakers here, who mentioned that the Eastern European countries just followed Soviet Union in their policies towards China. I would like to point out that, from 1954, already Romania took a different position towards China. In 1954, the Head of State, of the Romanian State, visited China at the personal invitation of Mao Zedong to assist him to convince the bourgeoisie to accept socialist transformation, because that idea of acting like the Soviet Union against the capitalists and so on was not agreed by Mao Zedong.²⁸ Mao Zedong was the supporter of the United Front, including the bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and the petite bourgeoisie. Then in 1956 when Gheorghiu-Dej, the First Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, visited China, he had a very interesting conversation with Mao Zedong; and there were at least three points very

²⁸ See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Mao Zedong nianpu (yijiusijiu-yijiugiliu)*, vol. 2, 311.

important.²⁹ One, that the Soviet model of development is not the best; and Mao Zedong tried several times to invite him to criticize the model. The second point, that the relations with Western countries, including America, are profitable for us. Gheorghiu-Dej asked if Mao Zedong would like them to assist you to have this kind of relations. And the third one, both of them criticized the previous relations between this communist party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. And on those three points, they already built up a kind of sympathy, solidarity. In 1960, at Bucharest, I was there too at that conference; I was at the conference in Moscow of the 1981 Party Conference. I was there too. And I know that exactly from that time—Gheorghiu-Dej already told us, do not touch upon the ideological dispute and problem; they are not important; the relevance of the dispute is not ideological one; and you have to see the speeches of the Romanian delegation. That, in 1963, I personally took a very secret document from China to Gheorghiu-Dej, and when I left the cabinet of the First Secretary, he just told me, be careful, China and Yugoslavia will very soon be together. And the delegation that was sent at that time in China had for forty minutes pleaded for the normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and China. And then I can raise a lot of examples, at which I was personally present, to demonstrate the relations between Romania and China during all this time were different. We established those relations on the principle of the international norms, not on the Stalin or Brezhnev construction of the first socialist victorious country and so on. So my point was, please accept the idea that Romania had all the time different relations with China based on mutual respect on the respect of the international norms, principles and the international moral. Thank you.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN: Thank you very much. I want to give the ambassadors a chance to respond and including some of the other members of the Chinese ambassadorial delegation.

AMBASSADOR SIR JOHN BOYD: Thanks very much, Chairman, I intend to be brief. My name is John Boyd; I was a diplomat; but I have also worked as an academic. I'm running Asia House in London. I think a point that's not being made—

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²⁹ The meeting took place on September 27, 1956. See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Mao Zedong nianpu (yijiusijiu-yijiunian)*, vol. 2, 639.

it's not in the heading but it should be in a way—is the important secondary effect of this fascinating discussion for Western Europe, the scared Western Europe. And just a one-line reminder, I grew up in the generation where I learned for two years how to shoot down Russian bombers, in principle I'm glad to say, if they should invade British air space. The sense of threat for Western Europe from the Soviet Union was palpable, ergo we had acute interest and a very good analytical focus on what was going on in the Sino-Soviet dispute from an early stage. I dispute what was said by an earlier speaker that we in the Western world had been very laggardly in taking the Sino-Soviet dispute seriously. The British took it very seriously from an early stage, not in the least because we had a post consistently in China from 1950—a point worth noting. Now in a diplomatic capacity, and I will be brief, I was at one stage—not only did I have the pleasure working with Eastern European colleagues in Beijing in 1965 and 1966, but I was desk man for Poland and Eastern Europe generally immediately after that. I can tell you, I can affirm very clearly, that the picture we had of the interests and relationships with the different Eastern European powers, we took very good note of what was going on in their relationships not only with Russia but China; and Ambassador Burski would be amused to know that all we did in the junior room in the Foreign Office on Eastern Europe was to recount the latest Polish jokes to each other which themselves were an education on the political situation. Thank you.

SHEN ZHIHUA: I have a question for Ambassador Fan, as well as the ambassadors from Eastern Europe. Last year we had a meeting in Freiburg and there it was mentioned that during the period of disruption in Poland, China went to work on Poland, trying to foster a pro-China faction there. Things like that, I think, can be imagined, since Mao Zedong was especially good at dividing the enemies, sowing discord here and there. So I want to ask the Eastern European ambassadors and the Chinese ambassadors to Eastern Europe whether, during the period of the Sino-Soviet split, China did ever go work on the parties of the Eastern European countries—since, as you just said, we knew those countries were different from the Soviet Union, or did China try to divide the Soviet-Eastern European group? Were there cases like that, apart from Poland?

VLADISLAV ZUBOK: Well, if possible, Ambassador Mei mentioned that at that time he and Ambassador Fan were not decision-makers; they were young people. And my question is to them, as young people who for the first time came to Eastern Europe, particularly how they formed the first impressions about the relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries? From conversations with the Eastern Europeans, by talking to maybe some Russians, detecting some signs of Great Russian chauvinism, hearing the jokes, like the Polish jokes—what was their source of information that allowed them to form their personal opinion that not everything is correct within the Soviet camp, or alternatively they just got political instructions from their superiors?

LEOPOLDO NUTI: I have a very brief question but it could also be turned into a more complex one for Ambassador Mei Zhaorong. If he could briefly tell us a little bit more about what was the Chinese attitude towards the German Question in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, and in particular about the building of the Berlin Wall? What was the Chinese position? Because we very often read that there was a similarity of views and indeed you mentioned that there was a very similar position between the GDR and the Chinese government that they both felt close to each other at the time, in particular in criticizing certain position of Khrushchev. So if you could please tell us a little bit more about the Chinese position on the problem that East Germany was facing at the time, the exodus of the population and the decision to build a wall. Thank you.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN: Thank you. Lots of questions, you will not have endless time to answer all of them, so what I would like you to do is to pick one or two and to respond in terms of your initial views on Eastern European-Russian relations, perhaps on the Berlin Crisis specifically, and going broader to the question about the Interkit and to what extent you perceived the work of that organization. Ambassador Mei?

AMBASSADOR MEI ZHAORONG: The answer to the Interkit question is simple. It is nothing out of the ordinary that, at the time, the international liaison departments of the central committees of the Soviet and other East European com-

“We always held the view that the split of Germany was not natural and should be redressed.”

munist parties compared notes with each other; there is no problem in that. I don't know much about the details though. They were coordinating their China policies and it was not likely that the number-one man of each of the parties participated in it. It was done by the international liaison departments, which reported the result to the leaderships and thereafter the leaderships approved—that was perfectly normal. But as to the details of their discussions, I've no idea. This is one thing.

The second point, I agree with the point just made by the Romanian Ambassador. As we talk about the Eastern European countries at that time, it should be noted that not only Albania was a special case, but also that Romania was different from the rest of the countries. Just remember that in 1966 we basically stopped our contacts with East Germany, but also in 1966 Ambassador Fan Chengzuo and I accompanied Premier Zhou Enlai in his visit to Romania and Albania, which just showed how much we appreciated Romania pursuing an independent policy instead of following the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to oppose China.³⁰ It is necessary to differentiate that.

The third point, regarding the question of the unification of Germany, which I think is a very complicated issue. We should say that on the German Question, at the beginning, China was more or less influenced by the Soviet Union. Since East Germany was a member of the socialist camp, one that was also on the frontline, we offered them political support. But gradually we developed a different view from that of the Soviet Union and East Germany. The Soviet Union was always changing its position on the German Question, creating a crisis over the Berlin problem at one time and making concessions to the West at another time. Given the circumstances, China gradually stopped following the Soviet Union around; we stopped going ahead with them. Also we always held the view that the split of Germany was not natural and should be redressed; and that the unification of Germany was just a matter of time and should be left to the German people themselves. That was our view. At the time we had this proposal: “support the unification of Germany based on peace and democracy,” in which we didn't mention socialism; no word on that. Later on when East Germany discarded the banner of the unification of Germany, they objected to even the use of the word “Germany;” they thought that

³⁰ Zhou Enlai visited Romania from June 16-24 and Albania from June 24-28 in 1966. See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949-1976)*, vol. 3, 37-39.

the unification of Germany was not possible, nor the existence of one German nation, and then came up with the theory of the existence of two German nations, to which we made clear our objection; we said we couldn't understand. I remember Premier Zhou Enlai said: this statement is theoretically wrong and politically harmful and we cannot agree to it. That was in the 1960s, 1970s, during the later years of Ulbricht's presidency, when he made the proposal of two—actually it was Honecker who first made the proposal of the existence of two German nations, one socialist and one capitalist, which we did not agree with.³¹ Later on when we wanted to establish diplomatic relations with West Germany, East Germany objected. But in fact by that time the Soviet Union and some other Eastern European countries had already established diplomatic ties with West Germany. Still they were just afraid that China would establish diplomatic relations with West Germany, which didn't make sense. In order to establish diplomatic relations with West Germany, China then—we'll come to that later. So among the big countries China was the only one that held the view that the split of Germany was not natural; Germany should be unified; and how to unify Germany is the affair of the Germans themselves and should be decided by the German people. And our position of supporting the unification of Germany never changed. That's it.

³¹ It was under Erich Honecker, the First Secretary of the SED Central Committee, that East Germany and West Germany recognized one another. This was accomplished through the December 21, 1972, Basic Treaty.



VLADISLAV ZUBOK

SESSION II

VLADISLAV ZUBOK: I want to reiterate what the previous Chairman said about the importance of witnessing history. Despite the fact that I am presenting here as a Russian, I want to soften this line a little bit, to soften the line in the following way. There are at least three generations sitting around this table, with different experiences. Of course we are all interested in the experience of the senior generation, but of course if esteemed ambassadors and diplomats can specify what they learned at the time from their personal friends, from their contacts, their first experiences in the country they served. That would be the most valuable. But also I would be, for instance, interested in what did they find out later when they had access to documents, as senior diplomats, and how it changed their views at the time. But this is my own methodological suggestion, you may agree or disagree with that.

The previous session revealed that we all tried to learn about each other, and let me tell you, despite of all these flags around, we're not only representing countries, we're representing history, we're representing how history is viewed. So I just urge everyone to step over certain, I would say, temptations to save face for one's country and think about historical truth as pleasant or unpleasant it can be, to the best of our abilities. So the structure of the session is the same as the first one. We will continue to discuss the same area: Eastern Europe primarily and the impact of the Sino-Soviet split on Eastern Europe. Let me say that there were some questions already asked that remain unanswered, and all the participants of this session should be reminded of these questions. For instance, there was a question raised by Professor Shen Zhihua about why all Eastern European countries supported the Soviet line after the Sino-Soviet split. This is a simple question, but it is not so simple for historians. I will start with the discussants and again as I see the purpose of the discussants is primarily to come up with brief provocations and questions, no more than five minutes; and then we will give the floor to panelists who will have ten to fifteen minutes. Let me start with Professor Li Danhui from East China Normal University.

LI DANHUI: Sino-East European relations and Sino-Soviet relations were closely interrelated and the time from the 1960s to the 1980s was a period in which Sino-Soviet relations went from split to full on military and political confrontation and

then to détente. I want to be clear on a few issues in that process. The first issue concerns the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the so-called “Prague Spring.” In this case, China’s attitude changed, and so did the Eastern European countries actually. Compared with China’s position on the events of Hungary and Poland—that is, supporting the Soviet dispatch of troops to crack down on the revolution in Hungary, in the case of Czechoslovakia, the Prague Spring, in which the Soviet Union basically did the same thing, China labeled the Soviet Union as a “socialist-imperialist” (*shehui diguo zhuyi*). Such was China’s change of attitude. And in fact there was also a change of attitude on the part of the Eastern European countries. At the time of the events of Hungary and Poland, they had a big reaction, which caused their relations with Khrushchev’s Soviet Union to deteriorate and China was required for a time to act as a mediator between the two sides. But in the case of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, it seemed that the Eastern European countries didn’t have much of a reaction, quite uniformly. Why was that?

In 1969, after the Zhenbao Island incident, China and the Soviet Union came to the verge of war.³² At that time, did the Soviet Union ask the Eastern European countries for a coordination of China policies so as to collectively enforce sanctions on China? Did they have that kind of intention? From what I’ve read on the materials, it appeared that Brezhnev did, but the Eastern European countries resisted. Why they resisted?

Starting from 1969 to the early 1970s, China and the United States began to send each other signals of seeking a détente in their relations and began to make adjustments in their relationship. This was a huge event. So what were the Eastern European countries’ reactions to that? I’m still not very clear on this.

China began to adjust its foreign strategy in the early 1980s, abandoning the strategy of “one line, one large area, opposing the Soviet hegemony and united front” and also no longer mentioning “Three Worlds” theory.³³ With these adjustments in China’s foreign strategy, together with the signals sent by the Soviet Union around that time of seeking a détente with China, Sino-Soviet relations began to

³² See Christian F. Ostermann, “East German Documents on the Border Conflict, 1969,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995): 186-193.

³³ The “Three Worlds Theory” (*san ge shijie de lilun*) was developed by Mao Zedong and put into practice in Chinese foreign policy in the 1970s.

thaw. During this time, what were the reactions of the Eastern European countries? What role did those reactions play in the process? I mean, did the Eastern European countries play a positive role in the process of China's adjustment of its relations with the Soviet Union?

My final question is, since China adopted a policy of differentiation towards the Eastern European countries, then how big a role did this policy of differentiation play in the Sino-East European relations? For instance, compared with China's relations with other Eastern European countries, the Sino-Polish relationship was relatively good. Did this have something to do with China's policy of "differentiation"? I am asking this because I want to clarify the elements of this policy, what role did it actually play? So I would like the ambassadors from Eastern Europe to talk about this issue.

ZHANG BAIJIA: China's relations with most Eastern European countries paralleled China's relations with the Soviet Union and there were only three exceptions: Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania. The Sino-Yugoslav relations and the Sino-Albanian relations were actually quite special, but to me the Sino-Romanian relationship was the most interesting. Because Romania's relationship with China was once a bit like those other Eastern European countries' relationships with China, but then it developed differently. Also I think Sino-Romanian relations at the time were the closest to normal state-to-state relations. I hope that the Romanian ambassador could tell us why Romania would adopt a different policy from those of the other countries.

At the beginning of the Sino-US rapprochement, the Soviet Union actually wanted to re-establish normal relations with China as well. So there was actually a certain competition on this front between the United States and the Soviet Union. Regarding this, I especially want to know whether the Soviet Union, at the time, briefed the other Eastern European countries on their intention to change policy; whether they wanted the other Eastern European countries to change their policies towards China as well, and if so, in which way? The Soviet Union wanted the other European countries to send their feelers towards China first, or they wanted them to hold up on the change of policy until their own relations with China changed?

ANNA LALAJ: It is often mentioned that Khrushchev did not exclude Albania from the Warsaw Pact, leaving open a possibility for military intervention. We do not know if there was any intervention plan. However, three years ago, I read an article in a Russian magazine, a scientific magazine, that described the battle prepared by Khrushchev towards Albania and he asked for help from Tito to leave Yugoslavia as a passage for the Warsaw Pact armies. I don't know if this is a bluff or not, but I have several documents that hint at the fact that the Soviets were really prepared for an attack. And I don't know if any ambassador from Eastern Europe, from the Warsaw Pact can speak about that event; was the Soviet Union prepared to attack Albania or not?

The other thing, in 1964 when Communist China had a congress, Albania was not invited to China.³⁴ The Albanian leaders felt very disappointed, and they protested to the Chinese Communist Party. The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party invited only Romania, the Romanian party. I don't know why they did so. But after the Albanian protest, they invited the Albanian and some other communist parties, but I don't know why the Chinese Communist Party only invited the Romanian party to the congress. This was in 1964.

Also I have another point that the Albanian Labour Party wanted to have a pact of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with China; and Beqir Balluku, as the head of military delegation to China, asked for signing of this treaty, but we don't have those documents in Albania. The argument, we don't know the argument—China at that time had mutual pacts with neighboring countries, but not with Albania. Maybe it thought that Albania was a distant country and that a similar obligation would be too costly, but nonetheless there were in fact some declarations from the Chinese side that nobody should attack Albania as China might intervene. Thank you.

VLADISLAV ZUBOK: When was this?

³⁴ There was no Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in 1964, nor was a Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee. The meeting referenced here is unknown.



VLADISLAV ZUBOK AND MEI ZHAORONG

ANNA LALAJ: The offer for the pact of friendship was in 1964, but this declaration of the Chinese leadership was in several occasions. It was in 1968 when Czechoslovakia was attacked by the Soviet Union, by the Warsaw Pact.

VLADISLAV ZUBOK: Before we pass to panelists, I was given a paper of the participant Jovan Cavoski who couldn't attend, and I will read parts of his paper, at least those parts of his paper on the Yugoslavian dimension of China's Eastern European policy in the 1960s. And there are two questions that can be raised on the basis of this paper that is quite rich and is based on Yugoslav archives and other new archives. First question, there was a tension in the 1950s and maybe in the early 1960s between the concept of unity of the Soviet socialist camp and the independent foreign policy of each country that was a member of this camp. For instance, Cavoski writes that Yugoslavia's independent foreign policy and its experimentation with its own socialist model were regarded in the late 1950s by China as a dangerous precedent for the unity of the socialist camp. This is a very important statement, because it leads to this tension: on the one hand, some countries including China, wanted to have more independence from Moscow, from the Soviet Union; at the same time, there was a notion of dangerous precedents and complete disintegration of the unity of the socialist camp. It definitely raises the question for diplomats: did they feel this tension? Were they aware of this tension in the 1950s and the 1960s?

The second important episode that comes out of this paper for discussion is the rapprochement between the People's Republic of China and Yugoslavia after the invasion of Czechoslovakia when both China and Yugoslavia criticized the invasion of Czechoslovakia. But this rapprochement, as Cavoski writes, presented Beijing with a difficult question: how to preserve a special relationship with Albania and build a

better relationship with Yugoslavia at the same time? I think it's another important episode to discuss.

And finally, I abuse the privilege of the chairmanship of raising the question that is always on my mind when we talk about the 1960s, probably one of the most dangerous times in the history of the Cold War. My question is about fears of war, and I have in mind in particular two periods. The first period is 1961-1962, the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis; and the second period when war fears definitely existed; and we can find them in Romanian discussions, the politburo discussions in the briefing book in January 1966 and certainly in Soviet memoirs and documents for the same period, 1965-1966, when Americans landed their forces in South Vietnam. There was this broad discussion: would this American landing in South Vietnam lead to a greater war, with the participation of China, and then the Soviet Union, and then a general European war? So at some point I want all the witnesses to address these fears, to the extent they remember those fears during the 1960s.

I spoke too long. Now I'm happy to give the floor to our esteemed panelists, and the first is Ambassador Ksawery Burski from Poland. Ambassador Burski served as Ambassador to the People's Republic of China from 2000 to 2004; but more importantly for us at this conference, he was in China during the 1960s at the Polish Embassy. He observed both the consequences of the Great Leap Forward and China's famine, as well as the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. So the floor is yours.

AMBASSADOR KSAWERY BURSKI: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I would like to stress, regarding the Polish Communist Party—the Polish United Workers' Party—we had a few generations of different leaders. The leaders in the early 1950s were clearly pro-Soviet. The leaders from the 1950s were those who spent a few years in jails. When Władysław Gomułka was discussing with Enver Hoxha in Moscow in 1960 about his attitude toward the split between the Chinese and Soviet parties and Mr. Hoxha was criticizing him, he simply asked Mr. Hoxha, why weren't you equally courageous when Stalin was alive? Enver Hoxha couldn't answer this question. Gomułka could because he was sentenced and spent a few years in jail because Stalin and his colleagues didn't like him. So he started a new policy. Then we had a leader who, before the war, spent years in France and Belgium. He was an ordinary worker there, a miner, but he had some knowledge about the

“The Chinese people as a nation enjoyed in Poland in the 1950s, and later on, a lot of sympathy.”

West. Then we had a tragic leader, Mr. Jaruzelski, who spent the beginning of the war in a Russian camp in Siberia; he was cutting trees there, before becoming an official in the army. So the leaders were different. Some of them were very idealistic; some were very simple people; some were a bit nationalistic, but patriotic; some were open-minded; some were not, not at all. Among the leaders, we had the Foreign Minister who was educated in Italy before the war, Mr. Rapacki.

Now before answering any of the questions, I would like to say that, China as a country and the Chinese people as a nation enjoyed in Poland in the 1950s, and later on, a lot of sympathy; and this is because during the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century, and the beginning of the twentieth century, Chinese themes and topics were quite often reflected in Polish literature, in arts, and so on. And of course the Polish communist leaders felt gratitude to the Chinese Communist Party for its attitude toward the conflict between Poland and the Soviet Union in October 1956. Mr. Peng Zhen was raising this question in Moscow in 1960 to Mr. Gomułka, expressing his surprise that, although China supported Poland in 1956, now the Polish party doesn't support China in Moscow. He simply said to Mr. Peng Zhen: I thought you were a serious man. This I was told recently by a participant of that meeting. Judging by the questions, some of the questions, I think, have to be looked through one prism—as the main background is the Sino-Soviet split. The Polish communists, to my mind, were a bit, maybe, naïve; maybe they just believed that things can be solved; they were trying to reconcile, to find a way, to find a compromise between the Soviet party and the Chinese party. That was after 1960. Before 1960, they were surprised, because they were against the Chinese wording of “a socialist bloc headed by the Soviet Union,” or “a communist party bloc headed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.” Gomułka was against this wording. Then soon after that, the Chinese party changed. There was a shift in China's attitude. They didn't understand why. At the beginning they thought that it is a question of interpretation of ideology. In fact there were political reasons. The Polish communists were also surprised that the Chinese didn't criticize us; we Polish were actually the most revisionist after the Yugoslavs, because we preserved private ownership of land in the countryside; we had freedom for the church, limited freedom, but still freedom; we had, after 1956, liberal policy in culture, cinema, music, and painting; so we were actually the real revisionists. The Chinese didn't touch us; they concentrated on Yugoslavia and on the Soviet Union. So there was some misunderstanding

among Polish leaders—why is that so? Only after 1964, when there was a split in the Polish party and another party was established; the Polish Communist Party was established with the help of the Albanian party.³⁵ And in 1966, the leader of that party was received in Beijing by Chairman Mao.³⁶ I have somewhere here a photo of that meeting. The Polish party started to look in another way at the Chinese Communist Party. Still, they wanted to mediate, they wanted to find a compromise, and they were sending delegations in 1965, in 1967, and even in 1969 after participation in the funeral of Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi. One of the Polish leaders stopped over in Beijing and had talks with the Chinese leaders.

Now why the Polish leaders didn't side with the Chinese party in the split? There were many reasons. At the beginning, one of the participants told me, that the reason was ideological, but later on there was mainly a political reason. Poland was too dependent on the support of the Soviet Union. Only after General de Gaulle visited the Polish western territories and only after Willy Brandt visited Poland in 1970, did we feel safer, and sure that the western territories were Polish—because the German society questioned this and many other people questioned this and the whole West was not supporting us. So we had to defend our own interests; we had to take into consideration that Mr. Adzhubei, the son-in-law of Khrushchev, before Khrushchev fell, was having some links and was trying to make some deals with some German politicians. With that knowledge, the Polish leaders had to be cautious. It was not an ideological question. When territorial issues were raised in the Sino-Soviet split, the Polish leaders were thinking in a very simple way. These are issues which are too difficult to touch. Let them resolve them themselves. And they managed to solve those issues recently. At that time there was no sense in joining any party, in supporting anybody in solving such issues, so they avoided those issues; simply not get burned. This would be for the very beginning.

Later on, during the Cultural Revolution, we managed at least to maintain trade relations with China. I want to remind you we had a joint venture, a shipping com-

³⁵ This is a reference to the so-called “Mijal” Communist Party of Poland, founded by the exiled Kazimierz Mijal in Albania. See Andrzej Paczkowski, *The Spring Will Be Ours: Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom*, trans. Jane Cave (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), 298.

³⁶ Mao Zedong met Kazimierz Mijal on December 21, 1966. See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Mao Zedong nianpu (yijiusijiu-yijiunian)*, vol. 6, 18.

pany in Shanghai—the first joint venture China established with any foreign country, at least it is so presented by the Chinese side. It is a fifty-fifty joint venture; nobody has a privileged position in it. Secondly, there is an organization of trade of a railroad corporation situated in Warsaw. This organization was established in the 1950s among the communist or socialist countries. It was functioning even during the Cultural Revolution, although at the moment it was completely paralyzed by the quarrel, by the Sino-Soviet dispute. Warsaw was the venue of the Chinese-American dialogue from 1958 until 1969, so we were only happy that the result of this dialogue brought about further improvement of relations between the two superpowers. Why not? They conducted the dialogue—the Chinese Ambassador to whom I talked a few years ago, Ambassador Wang Guoquan, he told me he had full access to Polish leaders in spite of the quarrels, in spite of the debates; he could at any time visited the Prime Minister, or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, or even Gomułka. He was very happy, and he was unhappy when he was recalled from Poland.

I would add one thing. We had four, five, six Chinese scholars and scientists as members of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Guo Moruo was a member of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Qian Weichang was a member of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Liu Guoguang is still a member, still alive, of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Not all Chinese students were recalled during the Cultural Revolution. The students in Poland stayed and continued their studies from 1966 to 1968. So not everything was brought to a standstill. There were some contacts that still continued; of course most of the contacts were blocked. We were proposing at the time to have some exchanges. For example, China had a film, *Di dao zhan* (Tunnel Warfare), we wanted to show it in Poland.³⁷ The Chinese side refused. Well, there were some other problems. Later on in the 1980s, we started reconciliation process, thanks partly to Hungarian colleagues, thanks to some other efforts by the less important parties as the Democratic League of China and the Polish Peasants' Party, then the Communist Party and the United Workers' Party established full relations, because Mr. Zhao Ziyang visited Poland in 1977; in 1978 Mr. Jaruzelski visited China. The Chinese attitude was similar—

³⁷ *Di dao zhan* (Tunnel Warfare), directed by Ren Xudong (Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun bayi zhipianchang, 1965).

VLADISLAV ZUBOK: I'm sorry to interrupt. We have some problem with time. We are running late. And also a reminder that the 1970s and the 1980s will be discussed in the next few days.

AMBASSADOR IOAN ROMULUS BUDURA: Yes. From the very beginning I have a problem, because I prepared my speech to deal with the 1970s—1976 to 1981. That is because, as I said, the documents published already are quite, how to say, convincing in order to ensure the understanding of the relations between Romania and China in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. But as I'm only dealing with the 1976 to 1981, please accept my few words about this period of time.

This afternoon, once again, I noticed that formula that all the Eastern European countries followed Soviet Union. I would like to emphasize that such formula is not correct. There is another one, which I feel it is my duty to show from the start that the special Romanian-Chinese relations spanning in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s mirrored the independent policy of Romania which was not inspired by Moscow and was not conducted under the instruction from the Soviet Union. I met several times people who believe that the independent policy of Romania, the special relations between Romania and China were in fact something inspired by Moscow and conducted by Moscow. Romania's independent policy originated in the fact that the Communist Party of Romania, which rose to power in 1944-1945, was the product of the workers' movement in Romania and got rid, from the very first years, of the influence of Comintern activists. Beginning with the arrest of the leaders of the military dictatorship on August 23, 1944, in collaboration with the monarchy and continuing with other important moves, the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party proved its capacity to approach, in a non-doctrinal manner and in keeping in line with the national interests of the Romanian people, the problems of the area of international relations. For this very same reason, I would say, it is not an accident that the Romanian leadership felt attracted to Yugoslavia and China, for the people brought to power the communist parties by their own struggle and sacrifices, acting at the same time as an honest member of Warsaw Treaty Organization and Comintern.

At this point I think I should mention the virtue of a non-doctrinal approach. Romania contributed to the normalization of the relations between China and the

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US, on the one hand, and the USSR and Yugoslavia on the other. I would use this moment in order to say a few words about our contributions in these two respects. First of all, in 1964, as I said during this morning session, our delegation used about forty-five minutes in 1964 in order to convince the Chinese leadership—there were present Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng, and others—that it’s wise to normalize the relations between China and Yugoslavia. Even Gheorghiu-Dej told me personally that you have to convince the Chinese comrades about this truth. And it was not until in the 1976 or 1977 when this process was accomplished.

As far as the relations between China and the United States are concerned, in 1967 when Nixon visited Romania—something unusual indeed—Ceaușescu told him be aware of the necessity of normalizing relations between China and the United States, and Nixon took note of that. Then in 1968 the Romanian leadership invited, once again, Nixon at that time. And I have to tell you that, we already arranged half a year in advance that the Party Congress will be held during the first week of August; and just three weeks before that, the Congress was postponed just to allow the President of the United States to visit Romania. And during that talk, one important issue was the normalization of the relations between China and the United States.³⁸ That was in 1969. Then in 1970, as you know, Ceaușescu took part in the session of the United Nations and then visited the United States of America. After some weeks, the Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers visited China and offered to Zhou Enlai and to all other leaders all the arguments used by Nixon, by some senators, by some congressmen that they are very willingly disposed to come to China and to discuss the normalization of bilateral relations. That was in September and October 1970. After that, we provided some information to the American friends, and in spite of the fact that—I’m talking about myself. I was a Consul General in Australia in those years. And coming back from Bucharest I was approached by a representative of the CIA, and we started for the following eight months to talk about how to normalize relations between China and the United States; and we succeeded in doing so. It is a fact that during the reception given by Nixon to Ceaușescu in 1973, the American President said that there are some hori-

³⁸ US President Richard Nixon visited Romania on August 2-3, 1969. See Mircea Munteanu, “Romania and the Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969-1971: New Evidence from the Bucharest Archives,” *Cold War International History Project* 16: 405.

zons, there are some doors which would not have been opened without the efficient assistance of my distinguished guest.³⁹

Here I'll continue to deal with Romanian-Chinese relations, as I said, from 1976 to 1981. You know, the Cultural Revolution is often harshly labeled as a "national catastrophe" or "social disaster." It is a phenomenon not to be repeated in the history of China. I believe the so-called Cultural Revolution began as a cultural operation, but in 1965 it was assigned also another motivation, which began to prevail. Abolition of the so-called "leaning to one side;" denunciation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, discrediting the Soviet model of political, economic, and social organization and development; rehabilitation of the outlook that prevailed during the Chinese revolution, that is before 1945, and was to guide the political thinking of the new regime, had it not been for the Yalta understanding between Stalin and Roosevelt. Romania and China met in their aspiration for national dignity. Romania dealt wisely with the dramatic events in 1976, as everybody knows, that's with Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Mao Zedong, and so on—maintaining friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries. The leadership of Romania hurried to send to Beijing, in autumn that year, a delegation that was supposed to understand the real situation in China and to usher a new way of developing the relations between China and Romania. And I have to say, because I studied a lot of documents, that the period from 1976 to 1981 was one of the richest periods of contacts, exchanges, treaties, agreements, commerce, and so on between Romania and China.

VLADISLAV ZUBOK: Let's continue the session with observations of the third panelist, Ambassador Roland Bimo. Ambassador Bimo started as the Third Secretary in charge of press and political affairs at the Albanian Embassy in Beijing in 1982; then he served in Warsaw and was Ambassador in the US, Hungary, and United Nations. Now he is the Director of the Albanian National Institute of Diaspora at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And we keep repeating the same thing: we don't want general declarations about friendships or good relationships; we want to tease out from the witnesses the historical details and personal observations that are of value for history. Please, Ambassador, the floor is yours.

³⁹ Nicolae Ceaușescu visited the United States from December 3-6, 1973.

AMBASSADOR ROLAND BIMO: On many occasions we see that there is such an assessment that how come Albania, such a small country, played a role in the Sino-Soviet split which far outweighed its size and importance in world affairs and in the communist world. I don't have any specific or satisfactory answer but I'll give a try. Now what was special, to me it seems that we came together following separate courses. We stood together against Khrushchev policies regarding peaceful co-existence, de-Stalinization, and Yugoslavia's road to socialism. I think there hasn't been any preparation or earlier discussions on that, in making two parties come to the same conclusion, so they came separate ways. Another thing I believe should be kept in mind at this juncture is that we simply mentioned three concepts: peaceful co-existence, de-Stalinization, and Yugoslavia's road. But all of us are aware that behind these three concepts there are volumes and volumes that speak for the particular positions, because de-Stalinization is in fact connected very much—and this is one of the most important points I'd like to make this afternoon—to the resistance to change in the leadership because in the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, part of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign was to remove the old leaders in the socialist bloc, or at least leaders who were perceived by him as not following orders from Moscow. So it was clear for Enver Hoxha and perhaps Mao Zedong that de-Stalinization was a threat to their political power within the country.

Now going back to the unusual alliance between China and Albania, the basic element was the need for reciprocal support in the function of internal political needs. Because all of us remember that 1960-1980 was a political period characterized by internal infighting within the parties and the state organs, purges, and very often—particularly in Albania's case—we had the execution of real or perceived opponents and that was sometimes very difficult to establish to what extent they presented a danger to the power at that time.

What happened in relations between China and Albania? I think it is very clear, if from today's perspective, to see that Albania benefited a lot from economic assistance, industrial projects, ten billion *yuan* of assistance, as it was mentioned before—although Albanian sources very seriously dispute that figure. But it is a fact that the economic assistance from China to Albania was enormous and contributed to a significant increase in the well-being of the lives of the Albanian people. So

Albania clearly benefited and, most importantly, this economic assistance came with no strings attached, with no conditions. China was not interfering in what Albania should produce, in setting quotas, or what to do with our production. It might seem not so important, but at that time it counted very much that Chinese technicians that came to Albania—six thousands of them in 20 years' time—were paid almost the same wage as the Albanian workers. One might say that this is not any indicator but at that time it counted very much, as it was perceived by the population as such. In return, Albania stood very firmly in supporting China in many international issues including non-proliferation: in 1964, Albania supported China in opposing the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty that was signed in 1964.

It's interesting to see that you can reach a better conclusion analyzing the relations between China and Albania at that time by using a prism of chess played on three levels. That was the party relationship, national interest, and personalities involved. In these circumstances you have to be careful to take into consideration each of these elements to certain extent in order to draw the right conclusion.

Everything was developing extremely well, to the extent that in 1967 during a visit by Albanian Prime Minister Enver Hoxha to China, China went so far as to undertake a security commitment to Albania by proclaiming that Albania is our closest comrade-in-arms and if Albania is attacked then China will react.⁴⁰ Premier Zhou Enlai at that time was quoted as saying that “this has already become a norm in international relations between communist countries.” How much this might have been taken seriously by those who were interested remained very suspicious, but at least it boosted very much the morale of the Albanian leadership within the country. I think, from the documents, it looks that the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia might have been a turning point where two leaderships of the countries, Mao Zedong and Enver Hoxha, drew the same conclusion about the threat of the Soviet Union, but didn't agree on the way how to deal with this threat; and it looks that in the Albanian position there might have been ups and downs in the assessment: first agreeing to work together with Czechoslovakia and Romania in facing Soviet threat,

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was enormous and contributed to a significant increase in the well-being of the lives of the Albanian people.”

⁴⁰ The Albanian Council of Ministers Chairman Mehmet Shehu, not Enver Hoxha, visited China in September 1967 and met with Mao Zedong. For the Albanian records of conversation, see Lalaj, Ostermann, and Gage, “‘Albania is not Cuba’: Sino-Albanian Summits and the Sino-Soviet Split,” 328-337. For Chinese summaries of the conversations, see, Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Mao Zedong nianpu (yijiusijiu-yijiuqiliu)*, vol. 6, 128, 133.

but then retreating from this position, although in Enver Hoxha's book *Reflections on China*, he's saying that Albania would never become a tool of the Chinese for their policy in the Balkans against the Soviets.⁴¹ The fact is that Mr. Balluku, the Minister of Defense at that time, was accused of colluding with China for overthrowing the party and state leaders. This was the beginning of the end.

Kissinger's visit to China and the Nixon trip followed and Enver Hoxha wrote Mao Zedong that he did not approve the visits.⁴² So by 1972 the relations were very shaky, although I personally remember that in 1973 when I set off to be a student in China we were very bluntly told that we would have been held responsible for any behavior that would have been perceived as not in line with the friendship between China and Albania, with many other warnings. So I don't know how true it might have been, but we were told that we were like fifty ambassadors that Albania is sending to China to serve the friendship. Nonetheless by 1973 the relationship had deeply deteriorated. The final blow came in 1977 when a high leader from China visiting Yugoslavia declared that national issues are resolved in accordance with Marxist teaching. It was too much for Enver Hoxha, as he had in mind the situation of the Albanians in Kosovo. In a couple of weeks, on July 7, 1977, an extremely inflammatory article appeared in the newspaper, *Zëri i Popullit*, criticizing China's "Three Worlds Theory;" and exactly a year later on July 7, 1978, in a clear reference to what he was referring to, the Chinese government handed over a note, cutting off the assistance. Nonetheless, as it was said earlier, the diplomatic relations were kept.

I think this was the end of an unusual relationship: we both proved to be incapable of maintaining a certain balance between ideology and national interest in international affairs. My generation, however, is still extremely grateful for the assistance that the Chinese people gave to Albania. Thank you very much and sorry if I have spoken for too long.

AMBASSADOR SIR JOHN BOYD: You challenged us this morning in relation to perception of the threat against China, and you also challenged us specifically,

⁴¹ Enver Hoxha, *Reflections on China*, 2 vols. (Tirana: 8 Nëntori Publ. House, 1979).

⁴² Enver Hoxha wrote to Mao Zedong on August 6, 1971, to make clear his objections to Nixon's proposed visit to China. See Albanian Central State Archive (AQSH), F. 14/AP, M-PKK, V. 1971, Dos. 3, Fl. 48-66.

or so I've read it, on what you were doing during the Cuban Missile Crisis. So I'll speak for my generation on that. I was learning Chinese with other young people as a foreign office contact in Hong Kong, and I would say on the Cuban Missile Crisis that we there were faced the thought that maybe we would wake up the next day and Hong Kong would be the only bit of turf anywhere that had survived the Holocaust, so that's my frank impression of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Two other little episodes: what did the Soviet threat against China look like—certainly to Western Europeans in Beijing at the time? And I would say it looked real, it looked real, unlike, I would add, our perception of Chinese's view of a US attack on China that always seemed much more in the land of illusion. And I think that possibility was summed up for me by my cook, whom I would not mention were he still alive but I think I safely can. One day my cook pulled out a clutch of old greenback dollars from under a brick in the wall and said, “boss, the Americans are not gonna come back, are they? So could you change these greenbacks into renminbi?” I think that summarized the popular position. But the Soviet threat was not a joke, as Ambassador Burski would remember; well you spoke about *di dao*, by that I mean there was tunnel digging all over Beijing—this was a country that had many other things to do with its money and its labor, suffering still from the aftermath of the Great Leap, it was not rich at all indeed. Nevertheless the citizens were mobilized on a very grand scale, to dig tunnels which were clearly intended either for major political purpose or even for actual defense, which brings me to my third and last contribution to the history of the subject. In late 1965 or late 1966, I was sent up by my embassy to fill our seat in Ulan Bator for three or four weeks as the man in charge had to go on leave. I went there on the basis that nothing would happen. I was told, “nothing will happen, John. You know, enjoy this weird experience.” And in fact Mr. Brezhnev turned up with—I can't remember exactly how many generals with enormous scrambled eggs all over their lapels. I could not make any real sense of this at the time. In retrospect and in the light of many books which have appeared since, clearly it was a signal of a very great intention vis-à-vis the Chinese leadership. So there you are, even when you are very young and ignorant, there are a little bit of history that flowed past you. Thank you.

“The Soviet threat was not a joke.”

AMBASSADOR GABRIELE MENEGATTI: Well I was certainly as young as John Boyd, and certainly as useless. I was in Beijing at the time. I got there at the very beginning of 1968. And after Czechoslovakia, I found myself in the extraordinary position of not having a NATO or a Western European cover, as I simply presided over a mere commercial office. So we were not supposed to see too many Soviet colleagues. So from the Soviet Embassy you had two sorts of information coming out. One was, world war—tomorrow we're going to war with China. But even after August 1969, whenever I asked my friends at the Soviet embassy the question, "Are we really going to war?" They will say, "No, no, no, no. We can give them all the lessons they deserve but it's not going to be any war. And actually in Xinjiang we gave them a lesson which should be enough. So there is no war." I remember I wrote back to the ministry, and from Paris the Italian ambassador replied: "well, that corresponds exactly to what we believe." Thank you.

LEOPOLDO NUTI: Now just on this issue of the war fears after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the diaries of Pietro Nenni, who should be familiar to most of you, the head of the Italian Socialist Party and then in a few months the Foreign Minister in the new government in early 1969.⁴³ The diaries of Pietro Nenni have a number of interesting references to the fact that he was talking to the Romanian Ambassador, to the Yugoslavian Ambassador in Italy and that they expressed to him their fears that they would come next after Czechoslovakia. So I wonder whether any of the diplomats could comment on this, I mean how strong were these fears? Because you don't just go in to talk to someone who is not even in an official position in the government of the country where you are being posted. Nenni was not Foreign Minister at the time; he was just the leader of the Party. And to go and talk to him and express to him these fears sounds like the intention of conveying a message, a very specific message. So I would like to know whether some of you could comment on this.

CHEN JIAN: I would like to present one very specific moment, post-Czechoslovakia 1968. In the history of the People's Republic of China, the only time when a very unique delegation was sent to a foreign country with the title "Party, Government,

⁴³ Pietro Nenni, *I conti con la storia. Diari 1967-1971* (Milano: Sugarco, 1983).

and Military Delegation”—that was the Chinese delegation sent to Albania in November 1968, headed by Huang Yongsheng. I don’t know if Ambassador Bimo or Ambassador Fan has anything to say because that was very, very unique.

And if I may, in the spirit of the Cold War conference, I volunteered at one point, a long time ago, when we were talking about the Sino-Soviet relations, I sang a song “Sino-Soviet Solidarity.” If I may sing something about Chinese-Albanian relationship, and maybe my senior colleagues can recall this. We have the tradition of singing songs in our Cold War conferences, so here I’d like to sing a Chinese children’s song about the Sino-Albanian relations.

Xiao Lingling likes to sing about Tirana/
Her singing is loud and clear and is heard far and wide/
Long live Chairman Mao/
Long Live Enver Hoxha.

VLADISLAV ZUBOK: Ok, on this note, Svetoazar Rajak, you continue.

SVETOZAR RAJAK: Thank you, chairman. I’m going to start with 1968 because we’re now talking about 1968, although I also have question about 1958. We mentioned rapprochement between Yugoslavia and China. Well after 1968 it was surprisingly slow. And one of the reasons was fear. And what you just mentioned, the first meeting with Tito was immediately after the invasion, when Tito advised to be very cautious and as much as possible tried to please the Soviets because it was a true fear that Romania and then Yugoslavia may be next; and this was not just a contemplation of the ambassadors to Nenni, it was very genuine, and in Yugoslavia it really evolved into a military preparation of unprecedented scale. This is when the “Territorial Defense” concept was introduced. But this leads me to the point that was raised earlier today, as to why, after the Sino-Soviet split, the Eastern Europeans regimes more or less sort of grew closer in many ways to the Soviets and to Moscow? And I think there are two things worth discussing. One is the attraction of the Chinese model within the communist movement at the time, and the second thing is what Ambassador Burski mentioned earlier and what I mentioned earlier as well, the fear throughout the decades even the most liberal Eastern European regimes, even Yugoslavia, who broke up with Moscow in 1948, the relations with the Soviet

Union were pivotal. The only thing of Yugoslavia's foreign policies that to the end of his days remained within Tito's firm grasp was relations with Moscow. It was never delegated to others in the leadership and that remained true, I think, with all Eastern European regimes.

Now going back to other issues, one is with regards to 1958, which I asked earlier, that is, at the time, China was the forefront of the anti-revisionist campaign against Yugoslavia; by that time the splits or the cracks within the Sino-Soviet relationship were already evident within the leadership at least. Something I would very much like to hear among those who were present, the ambassadors or people who participated in some way, is whether they were aware or heard evidence of the decision-making process within the Chinese leadership, and to what extent it was used by the Chinese leadership to prepare grounds for a conflict with the Soviet party.

And when talking about the fear of the Warsaw Pact invasion—I spoke with my dear colleague Ana in the intermission. There was never any contemplation among Yugoslav leadership to allow or agree to the Soviet invasion of Albania. It was so far-fetched that it was not even contemplated. However, to what extent, as we heard previously, was there ever consideration of this possibility within the Chinese leadership and when determining relations with Albania. And in this respect, how much, or what was the extent of the military aid amongst the aid overall? And how important was the Chinese support of Albania?

And just the last thing is, we talked a lot about the friendship, Albanian-Chinese friendship, and so forth, trying to be very analytical and cold in historical critical analysis. Well, was there ever a coherent, strategic evaluation in China of what does this friendship represent to China? Putting aside decorations of friendship, help, and so forth. What was the strategic—was there ever a cost/benefit analysis of what does this bring to China? And in particular, since six billion US dollars at the time for China was a lot of money. Today it won't be anything for true or serious consideration, but at the time it was real; and was there ever an analysis within the Chinese leadership of what does this aid bring to China in strategic terms? Thank you very much.

VLADISLAV ZUBOK: Thank you. Svetozar. You may actually ask the members of the Chinese delegation if anyone wants to answer this question. What was the value of this friendship with Albania? Yes, please, please Niu Jun.

NIU JUN: I have a simple question for Mircea Munteanu. In about 1968, after the event of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, did Romania ever ask China to provide some kind of help in case Romania and other Eastern European countries would become the next target of the Soviet aggression? Because there are some records there in China, so I want to see if the Romanian side can confirm that.

AMBASSADOR IOAN ROMULUS BUDURA: May I answer or not?

I received a very direct question about the Romanian leadership asking for assistance on the part of the People's Republic of China on the eve of the events in Czechoslovakia. I have to tell you that we received the information from Prague very quickly because we had not only a correspondent, a press correspondent there, but also someone taking care of these problems. As you know, Ceaușescu visited Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia a few months earlier and we had very good relations with the leadership of Czechoslovakia, a good understanding; and we were prepared to assist them. So on the night of August 21, the leadership of Romania received information that Russian paratroops were already in the airport of Prague. During the night, Ceaușescu was informed immediately, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, the Prime Minister, was informed immediately; so during the night, the so-called Political Executive Committee had a meeting and they decided the next day to have a meeting; they decided to reinforce the armed forces along the border with the Soviet Union. The leaders also decided to arm the so-called militia, civil militia. I was also one of those persons. At the same time I recall that the Military Attaché of the Chinese Embassy was invited to the Central Committee and was received by Bodnăraș. I saw that document but even if I tried, quite seriously, I didn't find a document answering this question: what was the Chinese reaction to this intervention of Romania? But as far as the reception in Beijing, the Romanian Ambassador informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Foreign Ministry informed Zhou Enlai; and they made a special speech. The reception was postponed half an hour in order to allow the Premier Zhou Enlai to consult Mao Zedong; Mao Zedong also saw the

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speech which was later delivered by Zhou Enlai. That was quite a difficult position to adopt from the Chinese side because Czechoslovakia was among the revisionist countries and some kind of criticism should have been included in the speech, and it was in fact; but at the same time the Chinese leaders expressed support for the resolution of the Romanian people to defend their own country. And I can tell you, because I was there, the people were prepared to fight very seriously against an eventual Soviet invasion. The meeting was, I would say, the highest expression of the sympathy of the people towards Ceaușescu because almost every Romanian citizen tried to engage in such resistance in face of the invasion of the Soviet Union.

You know, after the establishment of special relations with China, Romania carried out a policy of, I wouldn't say liberalization, but in the traditional control over the population, over the social activities. And in 1967 we held a conference of the party, which, among other things, delivered passports to all the citizens without any restriction; liberated the political detainees; abolished the, how to say, the Soviet information systems in Romania; and at that conference we decided to adopt the kind of policy like that in 1978 in China; that was in 1967. But then came that event in 1968. And I remember that I was asked by a French journalist what happened after that, and I said that event in 1968 stopped the process of liberalization, of reforms, and democratization in Romania. Thank you.

MIRCEA MUNTEANU: To follow up on Ambassador Budura's point. There was a palpable fear on the part of the Romanian leadership about what happened after Czechoslovakia. Part of that was felt by reports in the media and so on; reports in the Western media specifically of preparations for the Soviet invasion. Part of that was just the fear of Ceaușescu; there was a re-organization of defense within Romania and a re-organization of the security police too, basically to focus more on the threat from the Soviet Union, then necessarily on the threat from other places. That was also not the first time where Ceaușescu or the Romanian leadership disagreed with Soviet intervention; you brought up the Cuban Missile Crisis; Romania did have a different position following the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Soviet Union and there were some fascinating discussions there in 1963. But I have one point and then a question that actually relates to all this. The question is, as Ambassador Bimo said, in terms of Albania, the position adopted by the Albanian leadership vis-à-vis

China stemmed from its interpretation of the process of de-Stalinization and what it meant for its legitimacy at home. I would suggest that this is the exact reason why the Romanian leadership adopted its position towards China as well; it stemmed internally from its own debate within the party more so than from any other reason. What I'm wondering though is how did the Chinese view the Romanian position? Certainly the Romanian leadership attempted several times to carry out some mediation between the Soviet Union and China in 1964 and a little bit later. We have a number of the Romanian documents out there, but what we don't really have is the Chinese interpretation of those documents, and I was wondering if the Chinese delegation here would be able to shed some light on how China viewed Romania's mediation attempts and Romanian's position in the bloc. Thank you.

CHEN JIAN: Mircea and Ambassador Budura, you still have not answered Niu Jun's question: did Romania explicitly ask China for some kind of extra support, including military support, especially on the evening of August 23, 1968? Because indeed, as the ambassador pointed out, there was a major last minute change, on the Chinese side, in the arrangements for the National Day. Originally it was already decided that Guo Moruo, a kind of a figurehead of China, would be attending; and Zhou Enlai, after meeting with the Romanian Ambassador, came. So what happened in that meeting? What did the Romanian Ambassador tell Zhou Enlai? Did he directly ask China—this is Niu Jun's question—for military support?

MIRCEA MUNTEANU: I don't think that was necessary to ask for direct military support; I'm not really sure how China would have actually given direct military support even if it was asked. Certainly, Zhou Enlai makes the offer in a private meeting with the Ambassador on August 23 that, you know, "if you are invaded, then fight; and if you fight, we'll give you weapons."⁴⁴ If there was a direct plea for help, that was a direct plea for help in terms of a public position, it was the exact same plea for help that Romania would have made to the West as well, in terms of you have to show support for our position; and it was fully within the interest of China, fully within the interest of the West, to support Romania's position, in our position

⁴⁴ See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949-1976)*, vol. 3, 253.

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to the Soviet intervention; by doing so, it delegitimizes the Soviet intervention immediately. I don't think there was an actual—and maybe Ambassador Budura has other information, but I don't think there was an actual “we need weapons, we need military support from you; we need direct support from you.” It was mostly we need public support.

VLADISLAV ZUBOK: I want to give a word to Professor Li on this crisis of 1968, but then I want to ask Ambassador Fan directly what was happening in Beijing in relationship to this.

LI DANHUI: I'll follow up on what Mircea just mentioned. One particular form of support which China gave to Romania was after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Zhou Enlai himself attended the reception hosted by the Romanian Ambassador to China. At that reception the Soviet Union was called a “socialist-imperialist country” for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Now I would like to ask this question, was it pre-arranged with the Romanian side that Zhou Enlai spoke those words? Because China made that statement at the Romanian Embassy and that actually was big support for Romania.

AMBASSADOR FAN CHENGZUO: I would like to answer a few questions. After listening to the discussions this morning, and particularly I would like to answer Professor Chen Jian's question concerning the “Party, Government, and Military delegation's” visit to Albania.

According to my knowledge, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, China not only expressed that it would support Romania but that it certainly would give bigger support to Albania; and China was quite worried that Romania and Albania would become the next target of Soviet invasion.

As for Professor Li Danhui's question as to how “socialist-imperialist,” the term for describing the Soviet Union came about, I don't know the details. However I think it is quite logical to call the Soviet Union like that given its invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In those years, for those of us who were involved in dealing with Chinese-Albanian relations, September and October of every year were really important.

That was because October 1 is China's National Day; and then November 28 was Albania's National Day. So we had to give a lot of thought as to how to prepare for both occasions that would reflect the state of the relations between China and Albania.

After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, for the two coming National Days, both we and, I believe, my Albanian colleagues were considering the same thing: how to make that year's National Day celebration a bigger, more notable event.

And quite naturally China and Albania reached the same conclusion; that is, the delegations they sent for each other's National Day celebration this year must be headed by an important military figure. So Albania sent to China a delegation headed by General Balluku, Albania's number-four person in command; and China sent to Albania a delegation headed by General Huang Yongsheng, a key military official at that time.⁴⁵

I would not talk much about Balluku's visit to China. But in the case of Huang Yongsheng's visit to Albania, it was unprecedented that the delegation he headed was named the "Party, Government, and Military Delegation," while in the past it was only the "Party and Government Delegation." Professor Chen Jian caught this very unique naming.

I have written a book, called *The Past is Like a Poem*, and in it there is chapter that specifically talks about the Chinese delegation's visit to Albania, highlighting the military presence.⁴⁶

It was impossible for China to send troops to help Albania's defense; nor is it possible for China to militarily support Romania.

But Albania needed China's strong support and by gaining such to show to the Soviet Union and those Soviet allies who joined in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia that China was on Albania's side.

⁴⁵ Beqir Balluku visited China from January 12-February 13, 1967. He met with Mao Zedong on February 3, 1967. For the Albanian record of conversation, see AQSH, F. 14/AP, M-PKK, V. 1967, Dos. 6, Fl. 12-32. For a Chinese version, see *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui (1961-1968)* (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought, 1961-1968) (internal circulation), 288-289. For a Chinese summary, see also Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Mao Zedong nianpu (yijiusijiu-yijiuciliu)*, vol. 6, 45-47.

⁴⁶ Fan Chengzuo, *Wangshi ru shi: Fan Chengzuo huiyilu* (The Past is Like a Poem: The Memoirs of Fan Chengzuo) (Nanjing: Nanjing chubanshe, 2008).

There was a small episode during General Huang Yongsheng's visit to Albania. Mehmet Shehu, Albania's Premier at the time, drafted a brief communiqué for the visit. In this communiqué, it was emphasized that, in addition to discussing the normal issues concerning the relations between China and Albania, a specific discussion was conducted on the issue as to how China would support Albania's defense against the Soviet invasion.

Actually during the talks there was no specific discussion of military cooperation between the two sides; the focus of the talks was, as always, on how, in various aspects, China could support the socialist construction in Albania.

General Huang Yongsheng, the head of the Chinese delegation, of course was not in the position to approve such wording as the Albanian side requested; it was Beijing who finally gave full approval to this request from the Albanian leader.

So the brief communiqué published by the *People's Daily* in fact included something that was not covered in the talks. The inclusion was therefore for diplomatic purpose.

I would say, not only was the Albanian side satisfied with China's handling of this issue; but also the Romanian leadership at that time was pleased seeing this communiqué.

VLADISLAV ZUBOK: Thank you, Ambassador. This was a fascinating discussion. This is an example of exactly what we want to hear at this conference, more of such frank reminiscences and discussions. And I cannot just resist comparing this discussion with a discussion on the Cuban Missile Crisis when Khrushchev expressed sympathy for Castro. Khrushchev would later have to face the situation when the Soviet Union would have to defend Castro against the American invasion. In this case, fortunately, the Soviet Union never planned any invasion of Romania and Albania. But from the viewpoint of the People's Republic of China, strategic viewpoint, they were not ready to defend Albania, Romania in case of Soviet offense. So that puts Chinese strategy in East Europe in a kind of interesting light historically. They prepared strong words and expressions of sympathy, symbolic defense; but not, of course, the real means to do anything.



CHEN BAOSHUN, GABRIELE MENEGATTI, CHEN JIAN, AND BERND SCHAEFER

BERND SCHAEFER: I have a question that's not related to either Romania or Albania. Because this is a session on Eastern Europe, and unfortunately we were unable to have more diplomats from the former so-called pro-Moscow, if you will, Eastern European countries, East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia; we have a representative of Poland and I know in the East German case I tried myself to find somebody but it was pretty hard.

Now I have a question with regards to the normalization of relations between the Eastern European-Moscow camp countries and China, in the early 1980s, mid-1980s, against the will of the Soviet Union. How did this come about? And are there any people here who could say something about it? Obviously Ambassador Burski from Poland, but according to the biographies here maybe also Ambassador Mei and also Ambassador Yang could also reflect on that. My question goes as follows: according to my reading of East German documents, there was no prospect of any normalization of state-to-state relations, not to speak of party-to-party relations, after the break of 1964 between the Eastern European countries, except Romania and Albania of course, and China until the death of Mao Zedong. But with 1977, the game gradually began to change. Now the Eastern European countries apparently had feelers towards the Chinese government; and my first question would be—of course it's counterfactual—it would not have been the conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea and everything involved with that and Chinese-Vietnamese conflict in 1978-1979, would we have had normalization between Eastern European countries, except the Soviet Union, and China earlier, maybe the end of the 1970s? I know that East Germany was prepared for that; and if there wouldn't have been the conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea and then Chinese intervention in Vietnam, it would have come earlier. The East Germans made a second attempt in 1980 to change the character of the Interkit meetings and the Soviets completely blocked it. The Interkit in Poland in 1980 is the last one where all countries signed,

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after which East Germany refused to sign it; and this blocked Interkit for the time being. Then East Germany had contacts with the Chinese, with the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. There were party-to-party contacts between East Germany and China in 1981. Visits, delegations, more delegations, Chinese representatives to East Berlin and vice versa; this leads then in the mid-1980s to rapprochement by official visit by East German leader Erich Honecker to China—heavily fought and contested by the Soviet Union—very bitter, harsh conflict, and particularly by the first two years of Gorbachev's reign, 1985-1986. In order to punish Honecker, not to be the first one, they pushed Jaruzelski with it in 1986 which is also, my question, Soviet attempt to deny Honecker to be the first one. So, now my question: Can Mr. Burski of course and then maybe some of the two Chinese ambassadors—Ambassador Mei, Ambassador Yang—say something about this process of normalization between Eastern European countries and China starting from the late 1970s going to mid-1980s against the explicit will of the Soviet Union at the time? Thank you.

AMBASSADOR KSAWERY BURSKI: Very good question. In the case of Poland, we had our own problems. We had Solidarity and we had military rule in 1981 and after that Poland was isolated all around by the West. So we were in economic, political, and social crisis. But still, the leaders were hesitating whether it's time to improve relations with China. There were signs from our Hungarian colleagues that the Chinese side is interested; there were signals from other sources, academic sources. There was a Director of the Institute of Marxism, who is now in the US—he was also sending signals via Yugoslavia that they would like to have better relations with Poland. The Polish party somehow hesitated because they were preoccupied with other issues. But then the Chinese offered us economic assistance, a credit to buy meat from China. So this was a gesture which influenced some of our Polish leaders: look, the Chinese are coming with economic assistance, probably it's time to start political talks. But it took us three or four years; it was a gradual process.

In the case of the GDR, I remember in Beijing a very strange moment. The GDR Ambassador was complaining to other people. He was a Sinologist; I knew him from earlier times. He said, well, the Russians are not happy with our move: we

are trying to re-establish contacts with the Chinese party and leadership. I don't understand this Soviet criticism of my embassy and my side, because we actually got some signals from the Soviet side that we should do this. So we are doing this in accordance with certain signals we received. Well, the reason was simple. There were different views within the Soviet leadership. One faction was against improving relations with China; another faction was giving signals to the communist parties of East Europe that, well, do try, maybe we can manage to improve relations; you first and us later. So there was such a faction and later on the impression was that this faction was within the military group of the Soviet leadership.

But in our case, it took a few years; only in 1986 actually there was a breakthrough. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR MEI ZHAORONG: I would say the relations between China and East Germany started to change in 1970, and after 1976 there were some bigger changes; and then after 1981 East Germany took a series of initiatives to improve relations with China. There are many reasons for that. One of the reasons is that the Soviet Union became relaxed on account of relations with China. The Eastern European countries registered this new situation, and seeing that the Soviet attitude towards China began to loosen, they of course would want to start improving relations with China, considering that ideological difference aside, their anti-China attitude or actions in the past were to a considerable extent developed under the pressure from the Soviet Union; they had to do it, or else they would themselves become the target of the Soviet criticism.

On the other hand, on the part of China, there was also change. Starting in 1964, China's policy towards the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries began to change. At that time, one of our general protocols was, our primary target is the revisionist Soviet Union, so we will leave aside the other Eastern European countries in our criticism and won't react to their offenses as strongly as we used to. Certainly we carried out this policy depending on the situation. For example, in the case of East Germany and especially Ulbricht, as he once again spearheaded the opposition to us at the congress of party representatives in Germany in 1967, we were quite harsh in the criticism towards him. But after 1968 we no longer aimed our criticism at East Germany; even when they criticized us, we let it go. We had

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play a role
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countries.”**

this policy at the time, which means from 1964 on we changed our attitude towards the other Eastern European countries. This is one thing. Of course it is a two-sided thing. The Eastern European countries themselves had the need to improve relations with China as the situation developed, so they took the opportunity. However it was a very complicated process. While the Soviets wanted to improve relations with China, they got upset and came to interfere when the other Eastern European countries went on their way to improve relations with China. So the process was more often than not very complicated. But in general you could say that it was the result of all the above factors.

This, actually, provides an answer to a previous question asked by Professor Shen Zhihua and others, on whether the Chinese Communist Party was trying to divide the Eastern European countries? It is true that there was this consideration, since we would not want the Eastern European countries to follow the Soviet Union to act against China. At that time, Albania of course was with us and you could say it was our non-aligned ally. Romania, on the other hand, followed its own independent policy and didn't take part in the Soviet anti-China offensives; instead it acted as some kind of mediator between China and the Soviet Union; so in effect Romania gradually became our ally and it wasn't a target of our criticism. However, in the case of the Eastern Europeans countries, some were mild in their attitude towards us, while some were pretty aggressive. And when they were aggressive, we certainly reciprocated with some strong reactions, but that was only at the beginning. After 1964 our policy changed.

Therefore in this sense, we did play a role in dividing the Eastern European countries; but not in the way as you mentioned that we wanted to break up the Soviet Eastern bloc. That analysis, in my opinion, is a bit over board and doesn't fit with the actual situation, not to mention the reality that at the time China didn't have the means to break up the Soviet Eastern bloc; that was simply impossible. We were mostly concerned about reducing the anti-China forces and making our views known to the other Eastern European countries, because they didn't really know our views but had only heard what the Soviet Union told them. So that was our primary concern. In this sense, I think we did what we had to do as any other country would as the situation requires, but we didn't intend to break up the Soviet Eastern bloc. It is not right to draw that conclusion, which I disagree with. That's it. Thank you.



ROLAND BIMO, IOAN ROMULUS BUDURA, AND KSAWERY BURSKI

AMBASSADOR KSAWERY BURSKI: Ambassador, I would not agree with your conclusion, your opinion that you expressed just now. Maybe China's policy was, as you have said, towards most of the Eastern European countries, but Poland was an exception. Until 1964, there was no Chinese, as I said earlier, open criticism of our revisionism; we were revisionist. But in 1964, a new communist party appeared in Poland, which was a competitor to the ruling communist party; and this communist party was established with the assistance of Albania's communist party and the leader was received in China by Chairman Mao. Here I have the photo. Chairman Mao and Mijal in Beijing. So, as for the specific Polish case, probably the new policy of China after 1964 that you have just described it was not applied to Poland.

AMBASSADOR MEI ZHAORONG: I would like to briefly respond to that. The whole thing involved complicated changes and developments. You can't challenge the whole policy we had at the time with one specific detail, it must be looked at as a process.

VLADISLAV ZUBOK: I have, as a historian, never heard of the second Polish communist party. Maybe at some point you would explain to the rest of us, we don't know how was it possible to start a second Polish communist party?

AMBASSADOR KSAWERY BURSKI: It was a split group which was very pro-Albanian and pro-Chinese. It was established with the help of the Albanian party. The leader illegally left Poland holding Albanian passport and then from Albania he went to China, where he was well received. He went there twice. The second time he was there was 1975; again there was a picture in Remin Ribao received, I think, by Kang Sheng and Geng Biao and some other leaders. So that was a sign as well that

the Chinese Communist Party got involved in the Polish party's domestic affairs, so to say.

AMBASSADOR MEI ZHAORONG: There was another thing that might explain this. You should be aware that at the time, within the Chinese Communist Party, there was a pro-Albanian faction, an ultra-left faction headed by Kang Sheng; so did their actions necessarily reflect the will of Mao Zedong? Not so much. Certainly Mao Zedong couldn't be onto all things. Because as far as I know, a lot of things we adopted at the time such as the slogan "Albania is the beacon of socialism" was put forward by the Kang Sheng group. So the situation was very complicated and you can't deny a whole policy with a specific element.

RICHARD BAUM: I think it's unfortunate that we don't have a former Soviet diplomat here to give the other side of the picture, because this has been a very one-sided conversation, or two-sided with Eastern Europe and China, but the third side has been painfully missing. I don't think it takes a great deal of speculation to understand why the Russians would be— though they themselves were providing a message of encouragement for rapprochement with China—upset when other countries got out in front of them and started moving farther and faster than they did. The danger of separation was very great and the problem of keeping Eastern Europe together became even more difficult. So I think that's one problem we can lay to rest. The Russians wanted badly to explore rapprochement with the post-Mao leadership but they didn't want the Eastern Europeans to do it for them.

VLADISLAV ZUBOK: If I may add, what I found in the discussion that we have the Soviet Union, many Eastern European countries, China behaving in a different way but nobody wants to destroy the socialist bloc. Nobody wants to destroy the socialist bloc. So there is a tension, as I said in my introductory remarks, between the desire to, in a sense, assert more independence but at the same time preserving the socialist bloc. If I'm wrong maybe some veterans would correct me.

AMBASSADOR KSAWERY BURSKI: If you would be absolutely right, then the socialist bloc would still exist.

VLADISLAV ZUBOK: If there is no other comment on this question, I have Professor Guderzo on the list.

MASSIMILIANO GUDERZO: Thank you. It is still linked to the part of our discussion on Czech problem, 1968; and it's partly out of what we have been saying now because I was just recalling when Professor Nuti talked about the minister and then party leader Nenni; that just two or three hours after the invasion there was a conversation between the President of the United States, Lyndon Johnson, and his main counselors and advisors; and they were, as I remember, mentioning the Romanian problem and now the Ambassador is not any more with us. So this leads me to ask, mainly on the Chinese side but also on the Eastern European side, how do you feel that the post-1968 period was useful from the Chinese point of view in the rapprochement to the United States? That is the story we are talking about of course was not just a story of what was happening with the bloc; and of course all the things we said are very important that was the idea of preserving the bloc; there was a struggle for leadership within the bloc. But maybe the relations with Eastern Europe were useful not only to the leadership within the socialist bloc, but the possible rapprochement with the United States. So from 1969 to 1972, do you feel that this awareness was there, from the Chinese point of view? From the Eastern European point of view? I'm asking that because I have been working a bit on Johnson and I remember that 1967 and 1968 were the years of the so-called "bridge-building" policy to Eastern Europe. China, if she wanted to preserve the bloc of course, had to oppose this policy at the same time maybe was already calculating that it was a good point to do the same in Eastern Europe. I was just trying to get the United States into the picture but not going in the direction that we are going to discuss tomorrow, but just to have the variable there. Thank you.

RICHARD BAUM: Yes I'd like to go back to one statement that was made this morning in an earlier session. Ambassador Fan, this morning you mentioned some Albanian leaders opposed Nixon's visit to China. We now know that there was a great deal of opposition from some Chinese as well, including Mao's wife, including Defense Minister Lin Biao. I would like to ask our Chinese colleagues while this subject is still warm in their memory, if anyone can shed any light about inter-party



ZHANG BAIJIA AND LI DANHUI

discourse in China about Nixon's visit? Because there were within a year a set of remarkable documents that were published, defending Mao's invitation to Nixon, and there is no need to defend a decision that isn't controversial. So this was by definition controversial. Would any of our Chinese colleagues like to comment?

LI DANHUI: I would like to briefly respond to the question raised by Professor Guderzo. If, say, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had any impact on China's policy towards the United States, then it would be China's labeling of the Soviet Union as "socialist-imperialist." This label served as a kind of theoretical base for Mao Zedong later on to make strategic adjustments to his foreign policy, in the sense that it made it easier for the Chinese people to accept those adjustments. Now that the Soviets are also imperialist, so with the two kinds of imperialists—the imperialist US and the socialist-imperialist Soviet Union, it makes sense that we ally ourselves with one imperialist to fight against the other imperialist. So in this way a theoretical base was laid. Therefore I think that the "socialist-imperialist" label could be counted as China's response to the Czech incident.

ZHANG BAIJIA: I would like to make a very brief response to the question about whether there was internal opposition in China to the decision of improving relations with the United States. Although a lot of people now believe that there were different opinions within the Chinese Party itself regarding Mao Zedong's decision to improve relations with the United States, particularly that raised by Lin Biao, based on the documents we now have, we haven't found a record of any explicit opposition to this suggestion of Mao Zedong of improving Sino-US relations. Lin Biao seemed to have said something, but first, there isn't any material to prove that he did say those things; and even if he did, what he said is not a de facto opposition to the improvement of the Sino-US relations; he was just saying that Zhou Enlai was very

active in improving the relations with the Americans, but if you look at history all those who got close to the Americans ended badly. He just said that, if anything. I just want to add this.

CHEN JIAN: You know, I want to avoid all of this. There are so many things and I just want to concentrate on one thing, one dimension. I just want to add one thing. From the mid-1970s on a very important change took place, which we should consider, especially since we are having this conference now in Italy. The split of the international socialist camp itself is already a settled issue; as for the national communist movement, for much of the period from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, China indeed fostered a group of minor parties in other countries. In Germany alone, as Professor Bernd Schaefer just counted, there were five parties, pro-Albanian, pro-China, and pro-Albania and pro-China; but I won't dwell on that. My emphasis is that a big change took place in the mid-1970s, which was the rise of communism in Europe. Also starting in the mid-1970s the Chinese Communist Party's relations with the Italian Communist Party, with the French Communist Party, began to improve, and the party-to-party rapprochement between China and these countries happened before the state-to-state rapprochement between China and East Germany. With the Chinese Communist Party's improved relations with these major Western European communist parties, including the Spanish Communist Party, the Italian Communist Party, and the French Communist Party, who were also in a good relationship with the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Romanian Communist Party, but not with the Albanian Labour Party, just when the relations between China and Albania soured, so the whole situation began to shift. Under the circumstances, within the whole communist movement, apart from the Eastern European communist parties, there was actually another channel for the Chinese Communist Party to conduct party-to-party communications with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European communist parties, which was the Western European communist parties, who kept urging the Chinese Communist Party to improve relations with the other communist parties. So this is also a factor we should really consider.



GABRIELE MENEGATTI

Panel II

The Sino-American Engagement and China's Relations with Western Europe

SESSION I

MASSIMILIANO GUDERZO: I hope that this discussion will be organized, more or less as yesterday's: very short questions, and if possible, short answers, right to the point. So Ambassador Menegatti, the floor is yours. Thank you very much.

AMBASSADOR GABRIELE MENEGATTI: Thank you. Thank you Mr. Chairman. If you want to talk about perception then I would immediately eliminate Europe, as such, as a bloc, as a concept. If you're a European—well first of all, you are French, and if you're French you'll think that in a multi-polar world, you're France, you're one of the winners. Germany is a defeated country, Italy is in between. Britain is too much interested in Hong Kong. So everybody has their own national agenda. So I would leave it apart that this is true for the 1960s and 1970s, but it's also true for 1980 to 1985.

I'll try to put everything in black and white. I shouldn't even speak of these periods, why? First of all, if you look into your paper, in principle, I was in Beijing in 1970 or 1971, I don't know, actually I went to the Burma Embassy, the Burmese Embassy in China, at the end of 1967 to take my visa at the very moment when two Chinese ships were between Venice and Genoa with guns against the "fascist Italian government." So you have to go back to that period.⁴⁷ But, nonetheless, I was in the commercial office and we managed to have any sort of contacts within the diplomatic corps, especially within the Eastern bloc starting from the Soviets. As China was seen as "the enemy," the Soviet bloc was extremely open even to the NATO countries. After the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968, however, the Embassy of the

⁴⁷ I.e., the Cultural Revolution

“Italy acted
according to its own
sense of history.”

Soviet Union started being cut out. Luckily, being a mere staff of the commercial office, I didn't even have a diplomatic passport so I could see absolutely everybody.

We opened the office in 1965. Now the question is why our talks stretched from 1965 until 1970? Well, even if you do not look at the documents you can guess that the time that goes from 1965 to 1968 was certainly not the best for negotiations. And if you come to September 26, 1969, you have the French Ambassador, Etienne Manac'h, in his book, who says he has already met Pompidou; he has already met Guo Moruo; and eventually has delivered all these messages ten times saying that the Americans want to get out of Vietnam; the Americans want to get into business; Nixon has been meeting de Gaulle twice in Paris and in United States.⁴⁸ The answer of Zhou Enlai, it was in September 1969, was “I don't believe.” They have to show it, they have to prove it. Are you speaking personally? I go back to these histories now because Zhou Enlai went to Manac'h to say, “how about Italy? And what about Canada? You didn't have proof?” Possibly it was only a test: a test from the Chinese point of view. But despite the messages Zhou Enlai had been receiving from everybody, from de Gaulle, from the Romanians—even from my sister!—saying, “the Americans are good boys, and they're going to do this and that,” and so on and on. Possibly Zhou Enlai was not ready, so only the Chinese diplomats here can tell us how strong he was at that very moment.

Now if France normalized with China for a specific reason, then Italy did it, I must say, for a similar one. But Italy is not France, doesn't aspire to be one of the leaders of the world; nor did it aspire to play the Chinese card, like the Scandinavians. Italy acted according to its own sense of history. What does that mean? Sense of history means if you are a socialist, like Nenni, you cannot close your eyes to the fact that the Chinese party has been able to feed the Chinese. You cannot forget that that government has given back to China pride, sovereignty, independence. The vision of Nenni was very similar to the vision of, I would say, de Gaulle—a multi-polar world without, in the back of the mind, aspiring to any kind of grandeur.

Second. If you're a Christian Democrat—and we, Italians, had had for thirty years a Christian Democratic Prime Minister—you believe in “universalism” which means that “you cannot isolate everybody;” you must include everybody; you in-

⁴⁸ Etienne Manac'h, *Mémoires d'Extrême-Asie, La Chine* (Paris: Fayard, 1980), 411.

clude and you never exclude. And that was the vision of Nenni, as much as the vision of Fanfani. When you talk to the British, the Germans, or the French, you know that either de Gaulle does it or nobody does. So I can understand a certain confusion in their head. So the Americans are always out; you know this perspective, “the Americans are always out,” but why? They couldn’t intervene, or as in football, with their own legs like that, and make you fall down, because the British were there; the Dutch were there; Switzerland was there. So you could say you were supposed to do it at a time, why didn’t you do it in the fifties? Fine, but why not to do it in 1965 or 1966? Well the answer is: China was not ready. Thank you.

VLADISLAV ZUBOK: I have a very specific question. And we’ve discussed small factors, big factors, and we somehow never discussed an eight-hundred-pound gorilla sitting in the corner of the room, using an American expression, which is the impact, the perceptions by the Europeans of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. And I was provoked by what yesterday Ambassador Budura said about the perception—his own perception of this event, somehow rectifying the leaning to one side, one-side policy. And I know this revolution had a huge impact not only on the Soviet government, but on Soviet dissidents, who basically came to conclusion: “Okay, we have a stagnant Brezhnevian regime, but what’s going on in China is absolutely awful. This is a destruction of the intelligentsia and culture, and we don’t want to have that.” I know in Eastern Europe it was more complicated and the left intelligentsia loved the Cultural Revolution. So my question is to both ambassadors, Ambassador Menegatti and Ambassador Ksawery Burski: What were your impressions at the time before you came to China and after you came to China about this huge event?

AMBASSADOR GABRIELE MENEGATTI: About Cultural Revolution, you mean? My feeling is that it was a tragedy, because we were looking into the face of people we loved and we worked with, and it was very, very clear that not everything was in order at the social level. Italy had been through difficult times, such as during fascism, so we knew that countries can go through turmoil, and in those times people suffer. But in Europe there was this sort of blind sympathy for any revolutionary, but that’s the stupidity of the French intelligentsia. So, you know, that’s why

**“We saw how
the Red Guards
were destroying**

the old restaurants

and many other
places.”

I say we look at history through historical eyes. So we knew it was a revolution, we knew people would suffer.

VLADISLAV ZUBOK: Can I ask what’s your first impression, for instance, when you first came to Beijing?

AMBASSADOR GABRIELE MENEGATTI: I arrived right in time to see May 1. Children were enjoying themselves. The younger they were, the more they would enjoy themselves; and actually were all very, very charming and there was a lot of enthusiasm in the “plaza,” in the square. But that of course was, how to say, the superficial view. You just read the memoirs of whoever was an ambassador there. My friend Percy Chan from Hong Kong, when I complained about the fact that we were sort of isolated, he said: “you foreigners are never happy; before you would build a wall to keep us out. Now we do it for you, and you start complaining.” Well, this was partly true. The Chinese were struggling, trying to survive, looking at the future; they were heroic in facing those difficulties.

AMBASSADOR KSAWERY BURSKI: Well, I do not have much to add. I saw only the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in Beijing. I left Beijing in December 1966. Now, from May or June 1966 to December 1966. My first impression was that we were lucky in Poland not to have such a movement. We saw in Beijing at that time, demonstrations; we went to Qianmenwai, we saw how the Red Guards were destroying the old restaurants and many other places. And the same happened in this street with the ancient shop selling Chinese porcelain and paintings and so on. So we were in the sense of feeling lucky. Then I returned to Poland and my main problem was how to talk with the Chinese Embassy in order to preserve contacts. We had this shipping company which encountered some problems but they survived and they were doing not so badly, even during that period. Then the question was how to invite the Chinese, invite the Vice Minister of Transport to celebrate the anniversary of that company. And we managed to get the Vice Minister to Poland in 1968. Well, why? Because that company was approved by Prime Minister Zhou Enlai himself. So evidently nobody dared to spoil that business. It was different with another organization, such as the railroad corporation: in that case there were some

problems due to the constant conflict of interests between China and the Soviet Union. This organization still exists, and well, it works better today but at that time it was very difficult. We were trying to have some contacts in culture, in academic exchanges, this didn't work, but trade as such, well, that did continue. There were negotiations every day, every year. Of course the amount of trade was limited, but we did have it. However, I managed to escape all the difficulties, as I was in Poland instead of being in China. When I returned to China in 1977 the Cultural Revolution was over. Beijing was full of structures for the people who suffered from the earthquake, Tangshan. The streets were full of temporary houses, wooden structures for those who suffered; and of course a gradual normalization of life. Thank you.

ENRICO FARDELLA: Thank you. Actually I have a follow-up to what Ambassador Menegatti said, which is connected to my previous presentation and my questions asked before. I'm not making any special revelations, just a comment on some specific passages in the negotiations between the Chinese and the Italians at the end of 1960s. The first one is connected to what Ambassador Menegatti said. He said that from 1965 to 1970, the Chinese were not ready so we should ask the Chinese if that is so. I would like then to ask Ambassador Cai and Ambassador Chen—who took part in those negotiations—why, as it emerges from the documents of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archive, in June 1964 Mao slowed down the negotiations with the Italians on normalization. The second question is: can you recall a moment, an episode, that influenced the change of Chinese position in the negotiations with the Italians at the end of 1969? Thank you.

AMBASSADOR CHEN BAOSHUN: I do not think that we were not ready—between 1965 and 1970—because when I worked at the liaison office we already thought that formula was the first step in the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries. However, you just said that it was forthcoming, but it was not. Six years went by. We were puzzled why nothing followed. I think that there were probably problems on the Italian side because it was subject to external pressures, probably from the United States. In the wake of these events, after establishing Sino-French diplomatic relations, all of this sounds unrealistic. Maybe we should say that everything was happening way too hastily. The Cultural Revolution

in China was still in progress. However, I do not think that this is the case. Perhaps we were ready to open an embassy. Immediately, right after signing the joint communiqué, I came straight to Italy three months later.⁴⁹ It means that China was ready. Therefore, we should think about the international situation that was influencing the two countries and especially Italy. However, China was certainly influenced by the Cultural Revolution.

AMBASSADOR CAI FANGBO: I'd like to respond to your question, which you yourself actually have answered already. While you were asking the question, you said that the US pressured Italy to stick to the position of "two Chinas." Given that it was impossible for China and Italy to start the negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations. As the Italian government was under the US pressure at the time, it was impossible for the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two sides. It was later on, in 1969, that the Italian Embassy in France asked the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to help contact us and express their intention to negotiate with the Chinese side the establishment of diplomatic relations. I was a participant and direct interpreter of the negotiation process and therefore I knew the whole story.

Then, at the time, what problem was bothering the establishment of Sino-Italian relations? The problem, in my opinion, was still the US influence, insofar as Italy was reluctant to acknowledge that Taiwan is an integral part of China's territory. The negotiations went on for over a year, from 1969 to 1970, all because of this problem. Here I'll tell you an interesting episode that happened during the negotiation process. The Italians wanted to copy what the French did with respect to the communiqué for the establishment of Sino-French diplomatic relations; the Sino-French com-

⁴⁹ Italy and the People's Republic of China signed a joint communiqué on November 5, 1970, announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations. See Enrico Fardella, "The Normalization of Relations between Italy and the People's Republic of China," in *Italy's Encounters with Modern China: Imperial Dreams, Strategic Ambitions*, ed. Giovanni Andornino and Maurizio Marinelli Basingstoke (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 135-136.

muniqué has only two sentences.⁵⁰ The Italian side for the negotiations had a consul general who spoke Chinese, and after the negotiations started, this consul general took out *Quotations from Chairman Mao* and began to quote from the book. What did he quote then? “Chairman Mao taught us, ‘be concise in writing.’” He was quoting this because the Italians wanted to avoid touching on the heart of the Taiwan issue. Because at that time, it was common for all Chinese, whether giving a speech at a meeting or writing an article, to say things like Chairman Mao taught us this or that, so we should do things accordingly. So he quoted that and said since Chairman Mao taught us to “be concise in writing,” we should be brief with our communiqué. That was his whole point. Of course, we could not accept that. Then he raised the case of the Sino-French communiqué, asking why you agreed to let the French have only two sentences in the Sino-French communiqué, why can’t you do the same with our Italians? We told him that was because we had three tacit understandings with the French. Earlier in the meeting, I talked about the three tacit understandings and some of you might think I went on a bit long with that, but still I think it’s necessary to be exact on those points. The three tacit understandings settled all those fundamental issues: Taiwan is an integral part of China’s territory; the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China, and so on. In our many rounds of negotiations with the Italians, we first thought about establishing a tacit understanding between us before the announcement of the establishment of our diplomatic relations, and then we talked and talked but it didn’t work. Then there was a time that we were thinking about producing a communiqué and the Italians were thinking about making some concessions, but the negotiations fell through nevertheless.

Now you’ll ask, how did the two sides finally come to an agreement? By learning from the example of Sino-Canadian communiqué, as a matter of fact.⁵¹ In the communiqué for the establishment of the Sino-Canadian relations, there are only

“Since Chairman Mao taught us

to “be concise in writing,” we should be brief with our communiqué.”

⁵⁰ The Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People’s Republic of China and the French Republic read only that “the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the People’s Republic of China have jointly decided to establish diplomatic relations.” To this effect, they have agreed to designate Ambassadors within three months.

⁵¹ Canada and the People’s Republic of China signed a joint communiqué on October 13, 1970, announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations. See Arthur E. Blanchette, ed., *Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-2000: Major Documents and Speeches* (Kemptville, Ontario: The Golden Dog Press, 2000), 138-140.

two sentences. The first sentence reads that the government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China, and Taiwan is an integral part of China's territory. These are the statements of the Chinese government. Then comes the second sentence saying that the Canadian government takes note of the above positions of the Chinese government. It was by following this approach that the negotiations between China and Italy finally came to an agreement. So the first paragraph of the Sino-Italian communiqué is where the Chinese government reiterates its position on the Taiwan issue; and the second paragraph is where the Italian government expresses notice of the above position of the Chinese government. In this way the agreement was executed.

So in terms of the establishment of Sino-Italian relations, the key issue at the time was not about whether China was ready or not; China was ready whenever Italy was ready. The key issue was still the Taiwan issue, which has to be settled neatly before any agreement is signed. There was never the issue of whether China was ready or not; such issue never existed. After China's establishment of diplomatic relations with France, China conducted negotiations with ten to twenty countries for the establishment of diplomatic relations in Paris, and in all those negotiations the settlement of the Taiwan issue always came first and made talks of other issues easier. That's all.

AMBASSADOR SIR JOHN BOYD: Thank you very much. A couple of points from, on the spot, experience which I think worth underlining that have come up in this conversation so far. The first is the very, very limited quality or quantity any way of Western presence in Beijing when I got there in 1965. We bow of course to our Eastern European colleagues who had in relative terms a privileged position and very high skills in sinology, and were in their way very good companions and guides to us. But speaking of the West in the more conventional sense, you have to remember it, it was a tiny mission: Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and the Dutch, as have been mentioned, and the Swiss.

And that was it, apart from the press corps who were important because they were part of the outside world's eye on China. They were a very mixed bunch; the *Toronto Tribune* had sent the son of the proprietors who spent all his time drinking Chinese martinis in Hotel. Martini was translated by the press corps as "galloping horse," on the grounds of the effect it had on the consumer. There were a couple of

other serious press people, and of course the Reuters office. Reuters at that point were doing their best to report objectively on China, but the correspondents became a hostage to the extremely disagreeable way during the Cultural Revolution, which brings me to my second point.

We've been slightly tiptoeing around the Cultural Revolution point, but whether from observers on the ground or young radicals in Western Europe or sensible and objective observers, this was a very major event and one in relation to which, as an observer, I'm tempted to use the word "disaster" rather than anything softer. And that's because I've always been interested in and concerned for my Chinese colleagues, and because it's settled British policy from 1950 when we set up our first office to "bring China out of her isolation," and I wish I had sixpence for every briefing paper I signed off to go to British Ministers when I was a young man saying our objective is to bring China out of her isolation. So that ideal which later bore of course diplomatic fruits in all sorts of ways was intimate to our own policy.

Now I've been asked again to say something from first-hand experience of living in Beijing at this time, so I'll tell you very quickly, roughly, how the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, I was there from 1965 to 1967 at that stage, how it affected a typical Western young observer and indeed formed a very much part of his own political education. First of all, we felt something was brewing up but we were reassured; we were allowed to have Chinese teachers at that stage and they were saying no, we've had movements before, "*fangxin ba*" ("don't worry"), it's not going to be anything out of the ordinary. Then we of course read the *People's Daily*, and the other materials we could get as young secretaries. And the next thing was this very complicated debate that started in Shanghai concerning a historical play.⁵² In retrospect, it turned out this was a way of trying to attack the people who had attacked the Chairman over the outcome of the Great Leap. But we weren't sure again whether this was just a theoretical debate, but then I went to have drinks on National Day at one of the Scandinavians', and they said, "have you heard? Have you heard the Mayor of Beijing Peng Zhen has fallen?" A complete surprise to the Western analysts, this was somebody who has seemed to the outside extremely well established and quite capable of resisting any theoretical attack from Shanghai. We

⁵² The play referenced here is *Hai Rui ba guan* (Hai Rui Dismissed from Office). See Harold M. Tanner, *China: A History* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co., 2009), 524.

were all wrong. And then the thing escalated. We were told that Chinese politicians were individuals, they had their agendas. And if like me, you rushed around town reading every wall poster you could lay your hands on, you then got the impression of how, in the broad sense, the Chinese politics were working.

Now I won't dwell on the personal consequences, my own feeling is that, pretty obviously, this movement had a ferocious impact on Chinese educational future, Chinese science and technology, China's leverage in the outside world which is an explanation why diplomatic openings were tended to slow up in that period. And indeed, as has been mentioned to me a couple of times by a couple of people this morning, even the Russians were somewhat hassled. The French would arrive in 1964 and that was very welcome. Their embassy was remembered to be plastered with wall posters, and their diplomats again were somewhat hassled. A detail in the British mission in 1967 was burned down. What I'm saying is, I think, from total sincerity, like those who said they were concerned the impact on China and the Chinese people, I joined that rank on the grounds of my own personal experience and seeing the misfortunes inflicted on the Chinese citizenry. If people read the archives, they will read a Percy Cradock's account of Leonard Appleyard, later Ambassador, and myself crawling out under the bushes late at night at the Yutan Park and seeing the beatings that were taking place.

These are sincere and exact impressions, which brings to the final point. I'm sorry, I've gone on rather long, and I hope we'd get a chance to say this, but one of the reasons we can communicate so freely now with our Chinese colleagues and can so vigorously attach ourselves to the wish to see China succeed in future is the return of Deng Xiaoping. I hope I'd have to chance just to mention one or two, not now but later, two personal impressions of that extraordinary man. Thank you.

CHEN JIAN: I would like to ask Ambassador Cai a few questions. Actually I have a lot of questions, but I'll just ask this one here. Ambassador Cai, I feel, you as a participant and witness of the development of Sino-French relations as well as the rise of China, you must have over the years experienced many important moments, and there must have been moments of great excitements as well as moments of great difficulties. So my question is, of all those great moments, memorable or influential, what do you feel was the most exciting moment? And also the most difficult

moment? Could you share your personal experience of it with us? In terms of Sino-French relations or France the country itself, since you've had such a rich experience.

AMBASSADOR CAI FANGBO: The happiest moment, for me, was when China established a comprehensive partnership with France during the presidency of Jacques Chirac, which came after a very difficult time for Sino-French relations. The Sino-French comprehensive partnership is the first comprehensive partnership China has established with a major Western power and marked a significant development in the relations between the two countries. After that, China and France further entered into a comprehensive strategic partnership. During my time as the Chinese Ambassador to France, that was no doubt my happiest moment.

The most difficult moment, as I feel, was a period after I arrived in France in 1989. At the time, the Socialist Party was in power and Francois Mitterrand was the President and he did three things then that sent Sino-French relations to its lowest point. The first thing was leading the sanctions on China after the "June 4th Incident" in Beijing in 1989. The French took the lead on that. The next thing was the sale of six Lafayette frigates to Taiwan in 1991. Then there was another sale of sixty Mirage 2000-5 jets to Taiwan in 1991. All these happened when I was the Chinese Ambassador to France. That for me was the most difficult time. At that time, except for the withdrawal of ambassadors, trade relations, personnel exchanges, and political exchanges between the two sides all came to a stop. I remember I was telling my friends at the time that my bags were already packed, and as soon as the order from Beijing came, I would be right on my way back to China. So the Socialist Party government really did great damage to Sino-French relations, and as a result China was compelled to adopt anti-sanction measures.

I was sent the meeting agenda before the conference and one of the question listed in the agenda is, why Sino-French trade and economic relations fell behind in terms of progress? Of course there are many reasons for that; some concerning economic structures and others. But one of the main reasons is France's participation in the sanctions on China and its sales of weapons to Taiwan. So in the five years from 1989 to 1994, Sino-French relations basically came to a halt. That is an important reason why the trade between the two sides lagged behind. Another important reason is that, there was an underdevelopment of small and medium-sized businesses

"The Socialist Party government really did great damage to Sino-French relations."

in France, which resulted in insufficient current accounts between the two sides. China's trade with France were driven by big projects. So whenever France had a big project like the construction of a nuclear power station, the trade volume between the two sides went up; when the project was completed, the trade volume dropped—unlike trade relations between China and Italy or between China and Germany that developed a substantial current-accounts portion based on small and medium-sized businesses and as such, more steady and prosperous. Anyway, as I said, in my experience, that was the most difficult period for Sino-French relations.

AMBASSADOR IOAN ROMULUS BUDURA: The first point I'd like to raise here is that in 1964 in January, my ambassador was invited to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China for a secret meeting. He brought me with him, and then at the very beginning told the Chinese Vice Minister that Comrade Luo Ming—this is my Chinese name—is a trusted man, the Romanian leadership trusts him, so you can tell him anything you wish. And the communication was that, in a few days' time, the Chinese government will publish a communiqué regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations between France and China. And just because we're good friends, I mean, Romania and China, we think that it's proper to inform you in advance. We congratulated our Chinese friends and we assured them that we'll do everything in order to improve the relations between China and European countries. And I have to tell you that during the years—in 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967—Romania was instrumental in promoting the international relations of China, not only with African and Latin American countries but also with European countries. This is the first point.

The second point is regarding my vision about the Cultural Revolution. First I'd like to remind you that Mao Zedong told us that the revolution is not a banquet; the revolution is not supposed to come well dressed and to observe some rules and so on; the revolution is something special and he described what the revolution is.⁵³ But particularly in the view, in the conception of Mao Zedong, revolution was always in fact mass movement, the movement of the masses. So you cannot always control

⁵³ Mao Zedong wrote that "a revolution is not a dinner party" in March 1927. See "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 1 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 28.

every action, every deed of the masses. This is the first thing. The second thing, we had the opportunity to meet Mao Zedong, as I told, several times in 1964, in March, in October. Then in November, our leaders had the opportunity to meet Zhou Enlai and other leaders in Moscow. And I would say that in October for the first time the Romanian delegation had the opportunity to meet Jiang Qing. She was at the table with us, the Romanian delegation, and Mao Zedong.⁵⁴ And I remember I asked Kang Sheng who is she, and he told me that she is a nurse for Mao Zedong, taking care of him, but others did not answer to this question. But this thing is a very important one, because after some months, Jiang Qing would take the place of Peng Zhen as the head of the Cultural Revolution “*xiaozu*,” or the “small group.”

In 1972, I think, my Prime Minister who was all the time present in the conversations with Mao Zedong and other leaders of China was asked by a good friend of mine: “You had the opportunity to meet a lot of important leaders, which do you think is the most important? You most admire?” And the answer was very direct: “Mao Zedong.” But then he added, he was quite, quite successful in deceiving me by his left-wing rhetoric. I think this is also very important thing, because during the Cultural Revolution, according to the stratagem, I would say, adopted by Mao Zedong, the left-wing rhetoric was very, very important and everyone knows that the whole stratagem collapsed. So from 1965 to 1976, and even later, I would emphasize this point, until 1979-1980, until the treaty between Soviet Union and China was not invalidated officially, the Chinese leaders didn’t renounce that kind of discourse, of speeches, of rhetoric.

So I emphasize my point that the Cultural Revolution was in fact a stratagem meant to correct the effect of the policy imposed to China, imposed to Mao Zedong by the agreement in Yalta, and to correct the effect and to put China once again on the road conceived by Mao Zedong when he elaborated the way, the road of Chinese revolution. I’d like to remind you of the work of Mao Zedong before it was sterilized by the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party. The first two pages are dedicated to the greatness of China, to the independence of China, to the personality of China and its dignity. And then there is the article as I mentioned,

⁵⁴ See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Mao Zedong nianpu (yijiusiji-yijiuqiliu)*, vol. 5, 415.

“Three Worlds and Song?,” so I think that it’s important to take into consideration these facts. Sorry for being too long.

AMBASSADOR KSAWERY BURSKI: I’d like to just add one thing. In the Chinese strategic thought, there are many ways and means, we know about “*san-shiliu ji*,” the “thirty-six stratagems.” The question is what should be used to achieve certain goal? And the second question is: wasn’t the price too high? I remember Hu Yaobang’s assessment of China’s Cultural Revolution when he was talking to Greek journalist from a Greek communist newspaper. That’s all. Thank you.

NIU JUN: I have two questions for Ambassador Cai. The first question. You mentioned just then in your speech that the agreement entered into between Algeria and France in 1962 helped remove an obstacle to the establishment of Sino-French diplomatic relations. So my question is, during the time from the Geneva Conference in 1954 to the establishment of Sino-French diplomatic ties in 1964, when did China and France begin contact for the establishment of relations? When did China tell France that China saw the Algeria issue as an obstacle to the establishment of Sino-French relations? And when did China begin to see the Algeria issue as an obstacle to the establishment of relations with France? That is my first question, since this is the first time I’ve heard about this thing and I think it’s really important.

My second question: as China and France were developing nuclear weapons at the same time, I want to ask you this, what was China’s view on France’s nuclear weapons development? Just these two questions. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR CAI FANGBO: Well, China didn’t make the settlement of Algeria issue a condition for the establishment of diplomatic ties with France; instead, it was France who used the Algeria issue to put off establishing relations with China. Why? Because the French told us that they could establish diplomatic relations with China if China would not support the Algerian War of Independence; they actually said this to sound us out. But given the times, it was impossible for China to accept such terms, since supporting national liberation movements was then an integral part of China’s foreign policy. In this case, because we supported the Algerian War of Independence, the French didn’t want to establish relations with

us. But with the end of the Algerian War of Independence, the obstacle no longer existed, and the establishment of Sino-French relations therefore became possible.

NIU JUN: Excuse me, may I ask when France raised such condition?

AMBASSADOR CAI FANGBO: There was no “when,” since as long as the Algerian War of Independence was going on and China supported the Algerian National Liberation Front, the Algerian issue by default was an obstacle to the establishment of Sino-French ties. It is not possible to pinpoint the exact date; it was not like that. What is your other question?

NIU JUN: My other question is that the Chinese government—

AMBASSADOR CAI FANGBO: Nuclear weapons? France was developing nuclear weapons; China was developing nuclear weapons. So in all our different ways we were thinking the same thing. The Americans, the British and the Russians came up with a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty at the time while both China and France were engaged in nuclear development, and without any exchange of opinions between the two sides, we both refused to sign the Treaty. At the time, China was developing nuclear weapons to break the nuclear monopoly, since historically China twice had become the subject of nuclear threat. The first time was by the United States; the second time by the Soviet Union.⁵⁵ So the purpose of China’s nuclear development was to break the nuclear monopoly. De Gaulle’s France was developing nuclear weapons because they wanted to seek a great power status and play a major role in the international arena and they couldn’t do that without possessing nuclear weapons. So the necessity of nuclear development was what China and France had in common at the time and on this issue we served as each other’s support. Thank you.

“France was developing nuclear weapons;

China was developing nuclear weapons. So in all our different ways we were thinking the same thing.”

⁵⁵ The United States raised the possibility of using nuclear weapons during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954-1955. The Soviet Union threatened to use nuclear weapons during the 1969 Zhenbao Island Incident. See, respectively, Matthew Jones, “Targeting China: U.S. Nuclear Planning and ‘Massive Retaliation’ in East Asia, 1954-1955,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 10, no. 4 (Fall 2008): 37-65, and Yukinori Komine, *Secrecy in US Foreign Policy: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Rapprochement with China* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub., 2008), 87.

GARRETT MARTIN: Ok, I'll try to be brief, but I have one specific question and one more general question. The more general question is for any of the Chinese ambassadors: How did they understand the development of the European integration, because that is a process that, even for the Soviet Union, took them time to react to. So the question is, when did they start paying really close attention to that process?

And I have a specific question to Ambassador Budura: when de Gaulle recognized China, he wanted this to be a blow against the United States and also Soviet Union, but yet when it was made public the Soviet Union didn't seem surprised at all. The future President was in Moscow that day. He met Khrushchev and Khrushchev seemed actually quite happy about the announcement. So my question is since Romania had been warned in advance, did they then tell the Soviet Union that this was about to happen? And this is a very specific question, if you could also maybe tell me when that meeting with the Chinese happened, before the official announcement? That would be interesting for the record.

AMBASSADOR IOAN ROMULUS BUDURA: The announcement was made in January, I would say, ten days before the announcement. And I have to tell you very solemnly that the relations between Romania and China were based on mutual respect. We observed very rigorously the mutual confidence. We did not tell anyone what was told us by the Chinese, especially something confidential. After March 1964, discussions which lasted ten days in China, we received the agreement of the Chinese leaders to tell something about our talks in Beijing to the Russians.

On the way to Bucharest we met with Khrushchev, and other leaders, who belonged in fact to the leaderships of Georgia; what we discussed with the Chinese, and it was really something very constructive. We tried to convince the Soviet leaders that they have to continue their efforts in order to normalize the relations between the Soviet Union and China. And as you probably would remember, we succeeded before going to Beijing to convince the Soviet side to stop the public debate, and the Chinese side also stopped the public debate.⁵⁶

So during those ten days, the debate, the polemics stopped, and that was because we had the confidence of the Chinese, in spite of the fact that this is a kind of a story as Ambassador Chen told us. When we started the conversation with Mao Zedong in March 1964, one of the first questions he put, "who are you representing," mean-

⁵⁶ See Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*, 280-281.

ing that we had come to Beijing not representing ourselves, but Moscow or somebody else. And I remember that the first speech of Premier Maurer, a page and a half, was dedicated to the idea that we came by our own will and we're representing ourselves.

So please be assured, Monsieur Martin, we maintained very special relations with the Chinese leaders. Sometimes I assisted some non-official meetings, in Kunming, or in Xi'an, or somewhere else. The leaders of Romania and China are very good friends. I can tell you one thing: on January 8, 1976, Zhou Enlai died. At that time because the prominent leaders of Romania were also in the hospital, I was almost all the time with him. And he told me, if Zhou Enlai had gone, it's up to me to follow him. That kind of relations was between Romanian leaders and Chinese leaders. And after five days, he died too. Thank you.

BRUNA BAGNATO: I will just ask four of the many questions that I have written down. One is about normalization of relations with France, another about normalization of relations with Italy; and the other two, however, aim to compare and contrast Italy's situation with France's. With regard to the establishment of diplomatic relations with France, I would like to ask Ambassador Cai and the other Chinese ambassadors whether the French move is to be re-interpreted in the light of de Gaulle's policy in 1966. Please let me explain. In the light of France's exit from the integrated military organization of the Atlantic Alliance and also in the light of de Gaulle's trip to Moscow, how should we view his choice in 1964?

The second question regards Italy: I wonder if the Chinese authorities were aware of the importance that the internal dynamics in Italy had for Italian diplomacy: the relations among the parties, the relations among the different majorities, and so on.

Third: Ambassador Menegatti talked about the perception that Nenni could actually have of the Chinese experience. Now I wonder, in the case of the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and France, the process was deliberately non-ideological, because this was the nature of de Gaulle's policy. I wonder if this is also true in Italy's case, or if, also under the weight of ideology, there was a significant difference between Italy's case and France's case.

Fourth and final point: I would like to ask both ambassadors—Ambassador Cai and Ambassador Chen—to express their opinion as to whether the development of



BRUNA BAGNATO

“Establishing relations with China was a very key strategic measure adopted by France.”

economic relations between the two countries was a prerequisite to normalization, because I seem to have understood that in France’s case, the development of economic relations was absolutely irrelevant. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR CAI FANGBO: France’s withdrawal from NATO was a way for de Gaulle to express his dissatisfaction with the US control of NATO and to assert France’s independence. It had nothing directly to do with the establishment of Sino-French diplomatic ties and only suggested the French intention to seek an independent position and a great power status in the Western world. As I said just then, the Americans and the British didn’t allow the French to join them in the leadership of NATO and the Western world, and as a result, the French withdrew from NATO. That had nothing directly to do with the establishment of diplomatic ties between France and China. The establishment of relations with China was de Gaulle asserting the independence of the French to the Americans, and in order to assert France’s independence, de Gaulle did many things, and establishing diplomatic ties with China was one; and withdrawing from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was another more notable way. That’s my answer to your first question

What made France want to establish relations with China in the first place, as I said, was France’s desire to seek a major power position; since after the establishment of relations with China, France would be able to conduct dialogues with China, the Soviet Union, and the US. Neither the Soviet Union nor the US could do that, there would be only France. So establishing relations with China was a very key strategic measure adopted by France to assert its independence while expanding room for its strategic maneuvers. As to China’s strategic considerations in establishing relations with France, there were two aspects. First, China was then subject to the pressure and isolation imposed by the US. Second, our conflict with the Soviet Union was coming to a head and was getting intense. I talked about that a lot yesterday, so I won’t repeat it here. So for China, establishing relations with France was a strategic choice that could expand the room for China’s maneuvers in the international affairs. We could, by conducting dialogue with France, expand the room for our maneuvers, expand the circle of contacts, and further expand our influence.

As for the relationship between the establishment of relations and the economy, it should be said that economic relations was one of the considerations, though not

a major consideration given China's economic conditions at that time; still it was one of the considerations, since de Gaulle saw that China's rise would be inevitable. Why am I saying that? When de Gaulle met with Nixon, he said to Nixon, "you should establish relations with China, because now China is sort of behind, that makes your job easier; wait till China is stronger, and the conditions will be less favorable for you."⁵⁷ This talk suggests that de Gaulle was positive about the prospects of China's development. Therefore, even if economic issues weren't major issues for the talks for the establishment of relations between France and China, they were certainly among the considerations of the leaderships.

Regarding the other question you asked, China's view on the EC and European unity. China has always taken a positive view to Europe. As I mentioned in my talk earlier, Chairman Mao established the theory of the second intermediate zone in 1963 and Mao's intermediate zone included Western European countries and Canada. That indicates China took its relations with Western Europe into its strategic considerations at the time. And as things developed with the multi-polar world, by the 1970s the EC had become a community of considerable influence. The Soviet Union was denouncing the common market at the time, so it said that the development of the EC was a development of monopolistic capitalism; the EC would collapse eventually, things like that. But China thought differently. In China's view, with the development of a multi-polar world it was very likely for a European union to develop and become one of the "poles" in the futures. After the EC was established, no country was willing to recognize it, and the heads of the EC sought our ambassadors out for establishing diplomatic relations with China. After many deliberations, China agreed to conduct the negotiations for establishing relations in China with an EC delegation led by one of the EC's Vice Chairman. The negotiation was a success, so China became the first country to establish diplomatic relations with the EC. So on the whole, China supports the unity of Western Europe for its own development and for the goal of being united, strong, and independent and

⁵⁷ Nixon met de Gaulle on March 1, 1969. During the Meeting, de Gaulle informed Nixon "that the French already had relations with the Chinese and it would be better for the U.S. to recognize China before they were obliged to do it by the growth of China. He felt that this would be better and that was why the French had chosen to do it earlier." See Louis J. Smith and David H. Herschler, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume I, Foundations of US Foreign Policy, 1969-1972* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2003), 63-65.



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becoming a “pole” in a multi-polar world. That is conducive to peace, stability, and development. That’s all, Thank you.

AMBASSADOR CHEN BAOSHUN: The opinion of Italy’s parties about the normalization of diplomatic relations with China by the Italian government was something that even the Chinese government believed in. And, after establishing the embassy, we kept in touch, for instance with Vittorino Colombo and other politicians; they always told us that in the Italian parliament there was always a diverging opinion on every issue, except China. I think I have answered.

As for economic relations, however, I agree with Ambassador Cai, but in the relations between China and Italy everything has always gone smoothly when it comes to the economy. So I have provided the figures that show this procedure. I have nothing else to add.

Thank you.

RICHARD BAUM: I would like to take a slight issue with what Ambassador Cai said about the Chinese motives in establishing relations with Western Europe. There was a very substantial Chinese fear of Soviet aggression towards the West in 1973-1974, and Zhou Enlai made a point of emphasizing the threat and wanting to build up European Community as a blockage against this threat. It wasn’t just internal Chinese reasons.

AMBASSADOR GABRIELE MENEGATTI: Well on this very point, I don’t think Europe is that important. I don’t know why we keep on talking about Europe. The only thing that mattered was NATO. When the Soviet threat becomes real, after 1969, the more pro-American, the more pro-NATO, the better. One has to be very clear cut on this; the threat was perceived and real, was serious. So it’s perceived,

it's real, what matters is that there is no such thing as Europe. I understand that, being politically correct, we have to invent Europe in the eyes of the Chinese, but this is out of the picture. Thank you.

QIANG ZHAI: I'd like to ask Ambassador Cai another question. Just then during the meeting break, you told me that you were part of the advance team that was sent to France for the establishment of the Chinese Embassy in France after the establishment of Sino-French relations. I recently read the Deng Xiaoping's almanacs and yearbooks, and it records that from the end of 1963 until the beginning of 1964, Deng Xiaoping, then Vice Premier, was the Acting Premier of the State Council because Zhou Enlai was visiting abroad. Deng Xiaoping was at the time in charge of the establishment of Chinese embassies and the book records the order he gave to the advance team to France. He said, when you get there, your task is to edge out the GMD Embassy as soon as possible; if they hang on, then we must make the preparations to avoid the situation of "two Chinas" in France; that is to say, if they hang on, we will not send ambassadors to France within the next three months, which means we take a step back and handle the situation the way we did with the British, only keeping the relations between China and France at semiofficial *chargé d'affaires* level. I'd like to ask, if Ambassador Cai still remembers, if it is true that Deng Xiaoping gave your team this order. It was a long time ago, so you may not remember the details, but can you remember the atmosphere of that meeting?

AMBASSADOR CAI FANGBO: I wasn't there when Deng Xiaoping met with the advance team members, because I was then studying abroad at the University of Geneva. It was after that meeting I was transferred to work at the Chinese Embassy to France. The advance team arrived in Switzerland first before we advanced together to France. But it is a fact what you just mentioned. At that time France recognized that the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and that Taiwan is an integral part of China's territory. But the key to France's problem was that it was unwilling to sever its relations with Taiwan voluntarily. According to relevant materials, the Americans also advised Jiang Jieshi not to sever its relations with France. But under the circumstances, without the Taiwan representatives gone, our ambassador wouldn't assume office in France, though the

head of our advance team was a chargé d'affaires. Given the situation that, if Taiwan wouldn't withdraw its diplomatic mission from China, de Gaulle couldn't conduct dialogues with China, shortly before our advance team arrived France informed the GMD government and told the Taiwan government's representative in France that they weren't representing anybody any more once the representatives from the People's Republic China arrived. It was in this way Taiwan was forced to sever its relations with France and withdraw all of its diplomatic personnel in France. So the advance team accomplished its task. After that both China and France sent their respective ambassadors to each other's capital as scheduled. That was the whole process. Thank you.

LEOPOLDO NUTI: I have several questions actually, but since the hour is getting late, I will limit myself to a couple of them. Particularly my questions are addressed to Ambassador Chen, who was in Italy in the 1970s. And since we asked about the perception of the European diplomats in China about the Cultural Revolution, I would like to know what was your impression of the situation in Italy in the 1970s, in particular about two serious problems we were facing. The first is the problem of terrorism, which created so much trouble in Italy through the 1970s. Did you at the Embassy see Italian terrorism as a purely domestic phenomenon, or did you think it was somehow connected to international dimension? And if this was the case, how did you explain between each other, with your colleagues, what was going on? And if there is still time, the second question I would like to ask is what was your impression of Euro-communism? Did you see it as an opportunity for a variety of interpretations of communism, or did you see it as a problem?

AMBASSADOR CHEN BAOSHUN: It is true. I experienced the terrorism crisis in Italy, but I would also like to offer a tangible example of what I proved. One day I was traveling with my ambassador from Rome to Verona to attend the inauguration of the agriculture trade fair. We stopped at the highway exit; the police stopped our car despite having the embassy's flag. They informed us that Aldo Moro had been kidnapped in the morning.⁵⁸ And the ambassador, having heard this, was really very

⁵⁸ Aldo Moro was kidnapped on March 16, 1978, and his body was found on May 9, 1978.

sorry. There was no inauguration. We expressed our deepest understanding. So, on the way back to Rome, we followed this incident with the utmost attention. Aldo Moro, a great Italian politician, of course, gave us the greatest opportunity to follow the normalization of diplomatic relations with China. I also had personal contacts with him, so I have always had great respect for him. It is a shame that a politician like Aldo Moro died at the hand of terrorists. But I do not think that the terrorism of those days had an international background. It was purely Italian. It is like the Mafia when the mayor said, in Sicily, that although it is invisible now, it also has a link in America; it is either Italian or American. However, there is no international background, because then too Italian domestic politics would have an international scope as well.

It was difficult even for the economic development of the time. Because, after the excessively fast development in the economic field came the economic crisis. So then, around 1973, came the oil crisis. Even in those days, there was talk of this story, after the sanctions on Iran. It then created all the difficulties for Italy's economic growth. So it is natural that all these problems arose among all the politicians and then also, of course, terrorism is not part of politics, but they did, as they wanted. So I consider it a unique, random phenomenon. There was no international link. As to Eurocommunism, yes later, with the Cultural Revolution, many so-called Marxist, Leninist, communist parties were created, like that of a sort of—what's his name?—Pesci, Mr. Pesci who came to Beijing—yes, yes, I know him too—he was even received, welcomed by Mao a few times, but now they're gone, you cannot find them anywhere. It means that they did not have an “energetic life,” just for the occasion. It was born out of circumstance, or by speculation. So I do not consider them real communists. So I did not approve of this phenomenon. So, I would say, Italy, as a democratic country, is free; so it leaves the possibility to all these phenomena from their birth to their end. So this is a logical consequence. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR GABRIELE MENEGATTI: Italy has got the largest communist party of course. I would even say the most sophisticated, we're talking about Western Europe of course. Both Togliatti and Berlinguer are certainly more sophisticated than Marchais, just to give you an example. But as far as China is concerned, there might be one-hundred reasons why they should be criticized, both of them,



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even after Czechoslovakia, even after the Prague Spring. I don't think the Italian Communist Party made a clear cut decision. I think altogether—Berlinguer goes to China for the first time after the invasion of Afghanistan in 1980. The Italian Communist Party's clear criticism of the Soviet Union comes out only in 1979, and so that is when Berlinguer can go to Beijing. I think that we have all underestimated, talking about 1965, 1966, 1967, the struggle between the two lines, the revolutionary diplomacy, which pushes China to Africa, to Indonesia, which brings back 600 diplomats from abroad.

AMBASSADOR CHEN BAOSHUN: Sorry. I would like to add something to the words of Ambassador Menegatti. The Italian Communist Party did everything for the Italian people also in the normalization of relations with China. There is no doubt about the divergence with China after the meeting in China. Because the communist party was rather different from the others in my opinion; because it was a party independent from the Soviet Union, not like some Italian politicians who would say that they supported the Soviet Union. I do not believe it. So it had a certain autonomy. Sure, there was even pressure by the Soviet Union against China, regarding above all some of China's domestic policies. So there was no prejudice despite this dispute. I believe that in 1966, for the first time, the Italian Communist Party invited a Chinese delegate to its convention in Rome. Of course, their relationship affected China; so the Chinese delegate replied and then Giancarlo Pajetta replied again and the Chinese delegate was no longer entitled to speak. It was the only time that there was an open disagreement. Then the Chinese published nine documents on the disagreement with Togliatti.⁵⁹ This, as Ambassador Mei already mentioned yesterday, was also the fruit of the work of Mr. Cong Chen, of the far left. If we look back to all these opinions, many were wrong. I do not believe that they knew the so-called "structural reform" because it was the main issue to be criticized in these documents. So, this dispute between the Italian Communist Party and China continued, though always within certain limits. The détente started with the death of President Mao Zedong. On that day, Longo, then president, and Berlinguer, the secretary general, came to our embassy to give their condolences in front of Mao's

⁵⁹ See *Le divergenze tra il compagno Togliatti e noi* (Divergences between Comrade Togliatti and Us) (Pechino: Casa Editrice in Lingue Estere, 1963).

photograph. Of course, we reported this back home to China and, a few months later, our ambassador—the second ambassador—invited the Berlinguer family—his wife, daughter, two sons and himself—for dinner to express our thanks. So we could have a conversation in an informal atmosphere. Then there was an easing and, as Ambassador Menegatti said, a visit to China by Berlinguer was being planned. Then, I believe in 1982 or 1983, the Chinese Communist Party sent a representative, as a member of the embassy, to the cultural office, in collaboration with the Italian Communist Party, in the person, I believe, of Mr. Lupi. So, the relationship between the two parties experienced a positive period. Not happy; there was rather an easing. Thank you.

SESSION II

CHEN JIAN: We're continuing the discussion from this morning. Basically we're discussing the Sino-American engagement, and it's interesting because I must emphasize "engagement"—and its impact on the relations between China and Western Europe.

And my understanding is we'll be covering different issues and different areas, regions, and countries. I will particularly ask my discussants to be very, very brief in presenting your questions and therefore we'll have more time for our panelists to share their experiences and perspectives with us; and also we'll have more time to leave for discussion. So without further ado, let me just call our first presenter, Bernd Schaefer, from the Wilson Center.

BERND SCHAEFER: I will be very brief and I have already prepared a set of questions and I will basically just outline those questions. We are fortunate to have some experts among us, particularly with regards to Germany, two excellent Chinese diplomats who really served in West and East Germany, Ambassador Yang and Ambassador Mei. This substitutes more than we can imagine probably for the fact that unfortunately we don't have any West or East German diplomats among us. Now I will briefly ask you a few questions about the West German angle and then about the broader context.

My first question would be: why did Germany not follow France's policy towards China in 1964? And what efforts were made by West Germany and China in that regard? West Germany actually was in a very good position because West Germany never recognized Taiwan. Just for this reason, which then came to the forefront in the 1960s and 1970s, both China and West Germany had the similar concept of the unity of the nation, so with regards to the unity of the nation China and West Germany were much closer than China and East Germany.

Then about the establishment of diplomatic relations between West Germany and the People's Republic of China, which officially occurred in October 1972. So my question would be: what did China think of the "Ostpolitik" of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt? And what did China think of his domestic political opponents, especially Josef Strauss, who in January 1975 received the most extensive welcoming of any Western politician in China?

Then with regards to the establishment of the diplomatic relations in October 1972. Do we know whether the West German government waited first for the Nixon visit to occur before establishing those relations; or they waited for the rectification of the Eastern Treaties in the Parliament in Bonn with Moscow before establishing diplomatic relations with China?

And finally, we can definitely say that West Germany was aware of Soviet anxiety about China. Did West Germany consider this Soviet anxiety useful for German interests, according to the Chinese? And China obviously was aware of West Germany's pretty close contacts with Moscow at the time in the early 1970s, was China afraid of those contacts, or wasn't it?

And finally, what was China's position on the CSCE, which was concluded in the first of the Final Act in Helsinki? And why did China strongly lobby West German politicians like Strauss and Schmidt not to sign the Helsinki Final Act? Why did we have this huge drama? Why the Chinese leaders—particularly Chairman Mao but also others—when they talked to the West German politicians suggested not to sign the CSCE? And they didn't follow the advice, as far as the government is concerned. Okay, I think that's enough.

LUO YANGYI: The Cold War, as it is known, specifically means to differentiate friends and foes on the basis of ideology. However, the history of the Cold War

indicates that ideology and national interest did not necessarily coincide. Therefore, looking at the national relations within a group, the paradox arises that maintaining a uniform ideology within the group may cause damages to the interests of certain participating nations; and insisting on one's own global interests may cause conflicts within the interests of the group. This paradox exists not only within a group of nations but also in a nation's own diplomatic activities. Our discussions of the past two days have proved that well. Relations between China and Albania, the Sino-Soviet split, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which we talked about yesterday, were all good examples of that. Ideological diplomacy collides by definition with national interests.

In China's case, from the early stage of the Cold War till the early 1970s, ideological diplomacy was a major part of China's foreign policy and China paid dearly for that. The drawing closer of Sino-US relations signified that China was moving from ideological diplomacy to national interest diplomacy. This transition was quite obvious, and the closer relations between the two countries were meant as an opposition against the Soviet Union which had its root in national interests.

So my question is, because China and the US became closer quite suddenly; as not long ago, in 1970, "the May 2nd Declaration" made by China still held the position that "the American imperialists are China's chief enemy of China;" but in 1971 the relations between China and the US suddenly drew close; and in 1972 Nixon visited China.⁶⁰ The situation exerted a huge impact on the Chinese people, though it was not expressed in a pronounced way. I would like to know, what did the diplomatic personnel, who were very sensitive to foreign policies, think about the situation? This question is of great interest to us. Then regarding ideological diplomacy and national interest diplomacy, as well as China's two top leaders, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, what were the differences in their diplomatic styles and ideas? This is also of great interest to us. That's all. Thank you.

⁶⁰ This may be a reference to a speech by Mao Zedong, "Quan shijie renmin tuanjie qilai, dabai Meiguo qinlüe zhe jiqi yiqie zougou!" ("Peoples of the World Unite and Deaf the American Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs!"), May 20, 1970, in *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao bu and zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi*, eds., *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan* (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe; Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994), 584-586.



LUO YANGYI

BRUNA BAGNATO: I would like to ask you three questions very different in nature and I will be short as the chairman suggested.

First question: in the 1960s and 1970s, did Chinese diplomacy manage to follow and have an adequately clear picture of what was brewing in the European Community? And if it did manage to follow the development of the European construction, even in case of setbacks, through what channels did it obtain this knowledge? In other words, what was the relative weight of Europe and of the developments of European integration in China's wider strategy?

Then, another question linked to the first: when speaking of Western Europe in China, was there a conceptual overlapping in the 1960s and 1970s between Western Europe and Europe engaged in the process of European integration?

Second issue: when China changed, tried to change, or managed to reshape its relations with some Western European countries, what were the main objectives? Were they objectives of an overall strategy? Were they economic objectives? Or objectives of a political nature? Or objectives covering different levels?

Third issue: when there was the fast rapprochement between China and the United States, i.e., when relations between Beijing and Washington were reshaped, did China consider the effects of this change in its relations with Europe and in the relations within the Western alliance? That is to say, the fact that there was a substantial change in US policy, did Chinese diplomacy see this also as an element that could alter the very structure of the Western alliance?

Last issue, but it is rather a curiosity of mine: Bernd rightly insisted on German Ostpolitik. In China's view, was there just an Ostpolitik of Western Germany? Was there instead an Ostpolitik of Western Europe towards Eastern Europe? Or were there several Ostpolitiks, each made to measure for each Western country? And in this regard can we leave out the Holy See's Ostpolitik?

AMBASSADOR YANG CHENGXU: Before I begin, I also would like to tell Professor Schaefer that, among the ambassadors present at this meeting today, Ambassador Mei Zhaorong was a participant in the negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Germany, and later he also served as China's Ambassador to West Germany. And I had the impression—I don't know if it is correct—that of all the Chinese ambassadors to Germany, he served the lon-

gest term. As for myself, after China's establishment of diplomatic relations with West Germany, I, as a junior diplomat, stayed in West Germany for more than eight years, the longest among China's diplomatic personnel to West Germany. Later I served as the second in command—that is Minister-Counselor in East Germany for almost three years. So both Ambassador Mei Zhaorong and I are glad to answer questions about Germany.

I think there were three stages in the development of the relations between China and West Europe. Stage one was when the People's Republic of China was just founded and the first group of Northwest European countries established diplomatic relations with China. That was stage one. Stage two was when President de Gaulle decided to establish diplomatic relations with China and a few other West European countries followed France's lead to establish diplomatic relations with China. Stage three was when Nixon visited China around 1972 and—well, you all know the story after that. After the founding of New China, China had always been regarded by the US as its biggest opponent and the relations between the two countries were hostile, and as a result the US tried all sorts of ways to obstruct China's establishment of relations with European countries. I think that was only natural. As even Nixon himself visited China, many other countries including West Germany established diplomatic relations with China, which I think was also a very natural development of things. Then what happened? China came to establish relations with most of the West European countries. That is the first thing.

Next I'd like to focus on the issue of why China approached the US. First I'd like to quote a journalist of *Le Monde* who was in the company of Alain Peyrefitte during his visit to China. The journalist said a few things in his article that really impressed me, and after forty years when I re-read that article I feel what he said is still quite right. He said, China has been long encircled, but now it feels victory is within reach. There was a time that its war with India spilled over its borders, the Americans were almost at its doorstep and alarm went off on the Sino-Soviet border, it was forced into the situation of fighting on both sides; and then, worse still, there was internal turmoil crippling the whole nation. China was losing in the international chess game. But it eventually managed to navigate in those dire circumstances. And in those circumstances, China had to consider how to get itself out the situation of facing enemies on both sides. So China had a very specific idea in getting close to



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the US. Americans began to retreat from Indochina and Sino-US relations began to thaw.

When Peyrefitte visited China, Premier Zhou Enlai said something to him, which, even if you look at it today, was very meaningful. He said, “The key to the negotiations between China and the US is basically this: unless the US withdraws all its forces from Indochina, there won’t be peace in Indochina. Next he said, “Unless the US withdraws its forces from Taiwan, the Taiwan issue will never be solved. If Taiwan continues to stay in the UN, China won’t return to the UN. Assuming that Washington won’t rescind the legitimacy and existence of the so-called Taiwan government, China won’t establish diplomatic relations with the US.”⁶¹ I think China was very clear on these points. Nixon’s visit to China was a bold move, but after that he had second thoughts. When President Carter was thinking about establishing diplomatic relations with China, Nixon said—so far I know—at least fifty times that he couldn’t forget his old Taiwanese friends. Given that, it was difficult for China and the US to establish diplomatic relations.

But the drawing close of China and the US had an impact on European countries. Among the European countries, one of the most important countries—the Federal Republic of Germany—established relations with China. Next I’ll talk about what the Chinese leadership’s considerations were in establishing relations with the FRG. The first consideration was how to get China out of the situation of facing attacks on both sides, meaning that China couldn’t fight the US on one side, while fighting the Soviet Union on the other side; that was impossible for China. Mao Zedong was a man of history. When Mao met with Wang Shu, Xinhua News Agency’s correspondent who just returned to China, he told Wang that he was studying historical issues. He asked why the German Emperor William I was defeated in World War I and how could Germany lose two World Wars. Then he said, in 1914, the German Emperor William I first battled the British and the French, and then in 1915 he called on a large number of troops to attack the Russians; his purpose was to force Russia to withdraw from the whole war. But then, while Russian forces were resisting German advances, William I transferred sizeable forces back to the Western front, but at that time the British and the French had received reinforcements and

⁶¹ See Alain Peyrefitte, *The Immobile Empire* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013), xx-xi, and Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949-1976)*, vol. 3, 469.

the Americans were joining the battle; as a result, Germany was defeated in World War I. Everybody knows what happened with Hitler: he also first fought the British and the French and then turned around towards Moscow, he overstretched his defense lines and, eventually, he lost.

So China moved closer to the US for the same reason. It was a choice based on an assessment of the whole international situations: China couldn't fight the Soviet Union and the US at the same time. A large number of Soviet troops were stationed at the border with China, along the Ussuri River, posing a direct threat to China; plus, China's conflict with the Soviet Union was more severe than China's conflict with the US, though the latter still existed. The Americans had similar considerations in mind and they also believed their conflict with China to be milder than that one with the Soviets. So it happened that both sides chose to approach each other. So my first point is, there were similarities in China and the US's political premises in approaching each other, not exactly the same premises, but quite similar.

The next problem China needed to solve was, after the Ussuri River battle, the Soviet Union stationed large forces on the borders and talked about attacking China with nuclear bombs. So was it the Soviet Union shifting the center of its attention to the East? This was a subject of priority for studies at that time. Then there were a lot of meetings in Europe as well as a lot of articles in newspaper on this subject. Only a few people thought that the Soviet Union was likely to shift the center of its attention to the East, but the majority in China believed that, the Soviet Union wouldn't shift the center of its attention to the East because the Soviet Union's proximity to Europe; at the time Europe was coveted by both the US and the Soviet Union; also it would face great difficulties in China and reckoned that they wouldn't necessarily gain much by going to war with China. So in view of that, our conclusion was, if there were a few people thinking that the Soviet Union was shifting its strategic center towards the East, what the Soviet Union was actually doing was creating a diversion, while its real strategic focus still remained in Europe. That was the second issue we solved.

The third issue was about our establishment of diplomatic relations with Germany, which in fact went go quite smoothly. I could spend a whole day talking about it to tell you all the details. So here I'll just be brief. The first step was that of Gerhard Schroeder, the CDU Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee at German

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but now it feels victory is within reach.”

Parliament, when he proposed to visit China. We agreed. Before his visit to China, he met with both Brandt and Scheel, which meant his visit was approved by the ruling party at the time. Schroeder's talks with Beijing went well. Both Vice Minister Qiao Guanhua and Premier Zhou Enlai met with him several times. Schroeder felt his talks with Premier Zhou Enlai went especially well as Zhou's talk had a human touch. As you all know, Premier Zhou Enlai studied and worked in Germany in the past. So the negotiations were actually done quite fast and then both sides agreed to establish diplomatic relations. As soon as Schroeder left Beijing, he flew to Austria to report to Scheel, as the Foreign Minister was then vacationing in Austria. And shortly after that, a communiqué was published and a press conference was called to announce the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Germany. The whole negotiation process only took about forty days. And in the communiqué for the establishment of Sino-German diplomatic relations, there was only one sentence, even shorter than the Sino-French communiqué Ambassador Cai mentioned this morning. It was very precise, just saying that China and Germany establish diplomatic relations on which date. That's it. Just one sentence. That was the process. I don't want to go into too many details.

As to China's view on Brandt's "Ostpolitik" policy. I feel that Brandt was hesitant about the establishment of relations with China. He was waiting for the Soviet reaction, and then when he saw that there wasn't any strong reaction from the Soviet Union, he agreed to establish relations with China. But I am talking about my personal experience here. I arrived at China's Embassy in West Germany in 1973 and there I served for three Chinese ambassadors, Ambassador Wang Yuxian, Ambassador Wang Shu, and Ambassador Zhang Tong. I remember at that time, most of the German politicians who came to the embassy were leaders of the opposition parties. Helmut Kohl for instance, then head of state, who afterwards became the CDU Chairman. He came quite often to our Embassy for talks and stated that he would like to improve the relations between China and West Germany. Also Franz Josef Strauss. He publicly said that China and Germany must work together more closely to fend off the Russian bear. So from our talks with the opposition parties, we had this impression that, on the issue of dealing with the Soviet Union, we had more in common with the opposition parties than with the ruling party. When talking about the Soviet Union, the ruling party, if not to say very cautious, was at

least very reserved. I remember at the time we had very little contacts with the Social Democratic Party, but there was one exception; that is Schmidt. He was then the Finance Minister of Brandt's government. Our ambassadors came to visit him and every time the talks were pleasant. He told us as much as possible about his views on the European economy and the world economy. At a very early stage, he expressed that he would like to visit China. Of course under the circumstances, there was one issue, because Franz Josef Strauss, the CSU Chairman, as I've mentioned, he was a right-wing politician on the anti-communist and anti-Soviet front and was very conservative. However, since we shared a common language on the anti-Soviet front, we had slightly better relations with him. He was the first German politician, as a member of the opposition party, that was invited to visit China. He met with Chairman Mao and the two had a friendly talk.⁶² After he came back from his visit, he helped to promote the relations between China and Germany. As for Helmut Kohl, he was at the time yet to become the CDU Chairman. Then in 1981 he became Chancellor of Germany and served eighteen years in that office, the longest serving Chancellor of Germany after World War II. During his office, he did a lot of work to promote the relations between China and West Germany. Also, as far as I know, he is perhaps one of the handful of incumbent Western politicians who have visited Tibet.

So it happened that China had relatively more contacts with the opposition party. As for China's relations with the ruling party, I felt Brandt, while carrying out his Eastern Policies, was very concerned about whether or not his closeness to China or Germany's improvement or strengthening of relations with China would cause reactions on the part of the Soviet Union. He had this concern. This is one thing. So we felt that we didn't go well with him on the issue of improving and developing our relations with Germany. That's how we felt. However on the other hand, Brandt, as a Social Democrat, helped ease Germany's relations with the East. In his visit to Poland, Brandt kneeled before the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial and acknowledged and apologized for the war crimes committed by the Hitler government. This gesture caused a big repercussion in China. The Chinese people in particular, I think, highly appreciated this gesture of the Social Democratic Party. Why? Because the Chinese people suffered tremendously in China's eight-year war against the Japanese inva-

**“We shared
a common
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⁶² Mao Zedong met Franz Josef Strauss on January 16, 1975. See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Mao Zedong nianpu (yijiusijiu-yijiunian)*, vol. 6, 568.

sion. However, unlike Germany, Japan never publicly acknowledged its war crimes. So the Chinese people were very impressed by Brandt's gesture. After Brandt resigned in 1974 as a result of Guillaume Affair, Schmidt succeeded him as Chancellor of Germany. As I have just mentioned, Schmidt had been on good terms with us before, and also because he was on the right-wing side of the Social Democratic Party, he contributed greatly to the promotion of relations between our two sides. We also maintained good relations with the SPD, especially with Schmidt, who has always valued China's role in the world. Schmidt is over ninety years old, but he is still writing articles, mostly adopting a positive view on China's role and influence in the world.

Based on all that, as far as Germany is concerned, I'd say we maintained relatively good relations with the CDU, the CSU, and the SPD, regardless of which was in power and which was in the opposition. Certainly there were difficulties, but generally speaking, in Germany, the conflict between the ruling party and the opposition parties haven't overly affected the country's relations with China. That's it. Thank you.

CHEN JIAN: Thank you, Ambassador Yang Chengyu, for summing up and sharing with us your thoughts on the topic based on your personal experience and certain views of the time. You gave us some very interesting ideas and insights in China's development of relations with Germany's ruling party and opposition parties. Our next presenter is Ambassador Ma Zhengang

AMBASSADOR MA ZHENGANG: Thank you, chairman. Before I get on with my speech, I'll say a few words off the subject. I feel quite nervous coming here, because unlike the other ambassadors, my work in the past, for most of the time, didn't involve Sino-European relations. In the period from 1970 to 1974, I was working in Belgrade, where I did more or less work on issues concerning Eastern Europe and developed a relatively better idea of China's relations with Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania. However later on, for a long period of time, I mostly worked on Sino-US relations until 1997 when I was appointed the Chinese Ambassador to the United Kingdom.

My focus will be on the development of Sino-UK relations. I didn't participate in the process of the establishment of Sino-UK relations at the ambassadorial level. At that time, I was just an attaché at the Chinese Embassy to Yugoslavia and only heard the news. It was not until later when I took the office of the Chinese Ambassador to the United Kingdom that I had to make myself familiar with that episode of history and read up the documents.

The development of Sino-British relations reflects more evidently the role that the Sino-US rapprochement has played in facilitating the relations between China and Western Europe. As we all know, the United Kingdom is a different case in comparison with most of the other Western European countries; and one of the most prominent features of the British diplomacy is its sustained special relationship with the United States. An observation on the basic British foreign policies from the late World War II to the present will tell you the Churchill's "three-party diplomacy" has been, more or less, passed on, and the most essential component of the "three-party diplomacy" is the maintenance of special diplomatic relations with the United States. The foreign policy of the Great Britain, whether in terms of strategies or major international affairs, has in most cases had the country keeping to the side on the United States. That is fairly obvious. Whatever the Americans want to do, the British generally support or at least raise no objection. That is to say, on issues of importance, Britain won't go against the US's basic policy.

That being said, Britain is also a very pragmatic country with many special interests to attend to. Therefore, while following the US, they have their own policies on a series of specific issues based on their own conditions, which makes them different from the US in a way. This explains why Britain has had certain ambiguities in their policies towards Europe, Russia or the Soviet Union, as well as China. We only have to take a brief look back to see that. For example, the British were positive about the European Community, but when it was time for them to join, they had reservations. They wanted to improve relations with Russia, but in the meantime were concerned about their alliance with the US. They wanted to develop relations with China but had to take account of the US attitude. You can see that over time.

Actually, the United Kingdom, as a major Western power, was one of the first countries to recognize the People's Republic of China. On January 6, 1950, the British Foreign Secretary Bevin contacted our Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai to ex-



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press that the United Kingdom recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and that they wanted to establish diplomatic relations with China.⁶³ This was in January of 1950, only two months after the founding of the PRC, so it was quite early. Then it started our negotiations with the British chargé d'affaires on the establishment of Sino-British diplomatic ties, but many rounds of negotiations failed and yielded pretty much nothing. But why the British adopted this policy towards China while the Americans were adamant in refusing to recognize New China and having an isolation policy against us. Why? There are a few points to explain this. The first is that Britain basically didn't get involved in the Chinese Civil War between the CCP and the GMD, and therefore unlike the United States, they could be flexible in their policy. That made the British quite special. The second point is that Britain, as China's biggest investor among the Western countries—that is, with a total of approximately 270 million invested in China, had a relatively bigger economic stake in China. The third point is that between Britain and China there was the issue of Hong Kong. It would have made the Hong Kong issue more difficult to resolve if they had been antagonistic to us. The fourth point is that the British Commonwealth had a couple of big member states in Asia, such as India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, known back then as Ceylon, who wanted to develop relations with the newly founded PRC. Under the circumstances, the British had to consider how to handle well the relations. Of course, there was another saying that, because the Americans had cut off all ties with China, the British wanted to act as a mediator between the two sides and pull, as the British said nicely, "China out of isolation a bit," and so on. Whatever their reason was, the British just wanted to develop relations with China. That was one part of the story.

But why the relations between the two countries failed to grow? The fundamental reason was the refusal of the United States to recognize New China, China's UN status, and the Taiwan issue, a position that the British did not dare to contravene. In the case of the Taiwan issue, the British wanted to establish diplomatic ties with China, but in the meantime, they wanted to maintain a certain substantive relationship with Taiwan. For instance, they were unwilling to withdraw their consulate in Danshui, Taiwan. In the case of China's UN status, the British didn't support or

⁶³ See Qiang Zhai, *The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1958* (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1994), 44.

completely support the PRC to regain its legitimate seat. As a result, for a considerable period of time, these two issues had been major obstacles to the establishment of Sino-British diplomatic relations. Later, after the outbreak of the Korean War, Britain took a series of hostile actions towards China, such as sending troops to participate in the war against China and signing the UN resolution on China as the aggressor, which made negotiations impossible.

So the issue dragged on until 1954 when the Korean War ended and afterwards the Geneva Conference was convened. In the process of the Geneva Conference, both China and Britain felt the need to establish some kind of cooperative relationship. Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary sent to the conference, asked Premier Zhou Enlai, China's representative at the conference, this question: "Why wouldn't China recognize the United Kingdom? We have recognized China but you still wouldn't recognize the United Kingdom. Why is that?" Premier Zhou Enlai's reply is that you do have recognized China but you didn't recognize China's UN status. Eden then suggested: we have somebody in Beijing, but you don't have anybody in London. Premier Zhou picked up the hint and responded that we could send somebody over. In this way, the two reached an agreement to send *chargé d'affaires* to each other's capitals. *Chargé d'affaires* is of course a diplomatic office and therefore the arrangement constituted the establishment of a diplomatic relationship. That was in 1954. After that, both sides expressed the wish to upgrade the relationship. Eden told us: let me first talk to the Americans and then our two sides can establish diplomatic relations. But then eighteen years passed and nothing came out of that talk, and as a result the relations between the two sides cooled off. During the whole time, the obstacles were still the same old issues: the Taiwan issue and the issue of the PRC's UN status. Also the British created a new issue unacceptable to the Chinese. That is, the British began to advocate the "undecided status" of Taiwan with a lot of false reasoning and comments, which surely offended the Chinese. So a further upgrade in political relationship was out of the question. But even with that, in the meantime, there were still a lot of exchanges between the two sides. Due to the time limits, I won't go into that.

Then it was the 1970s; the international situation changed drastically. As several ambassadors here have mentioned, significant changes happened in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. President Nixon made a speech in Kansas City, in which, as

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you probably know, he stated his views on the world’s five major power centers. He said: today’s world is a multi-polar world, a diversified world and the five new major power centers of the world will be the US, the Soviet Union, Europe, Japan and China. I think something very significant happened in the speech was that, unlike before, the US began to admit China was a major power in the world. And it was not just the Americans who held this view. Having experienced many difficulties since its founding and despite the still existence of some domestic issues and mistakes made then and later, such as in the case of the Great Leap Forward, the PRC was after all firmly established and was developing. The whole world saw that. With China’s ascent as an emerging power, more and more people felt unreasonable to keep isolating China and denying recognizing China. Adding to the situation was a rising and a more ambitious country: the Soviet Union. The US felt the aggression coming from this new opponent, who, in comparison with China, was a much bigger threat. At the time, China and the Soviet Union already had over five years of antagonism between them and with that, the Americans saw a strategic choice to ease and improve relations with China and make a common stand with China against the Soviet Union. It was after China’s conflict with the Soviet Union over the Zhenbao Island—a real, however small, war where blood was shed on both sides. Then there was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which, along with the million Soviet troops stationed on the Sino-Soviet borders, made China feel really threatened. Under these circumstances, it seemed inevitable that China and the US drew close to each other. But before and after that happened, many European countries also realized the threat of the Soviet expansion and seeing the antagonism between China and the Soviet Union, once the two biggest members in the same camp, they also wanted to work together with China to deal with the Soviet threat. So it was not just the US who thought this way, but there were some other countries. And so it happened that Western European countries began to improve relations with China. The momentum started and shortly afterwards Italy and some other European countries established diplomatic ties with China.

Affected by the larger environment, the British began to act. On January 11, 1971, in an important speech made in New Delhi, the newly elected British Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath delivered two new points about China: first, isolating China is wrong; second, the China seat in the United States should belong to

Beijing. With that, the prior difference of views between China and Britain on the two fundamental issues was resolved. Four days later, on January 15, the Political Director of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, officially conveyed to the Chinese chargé d'affaires to the United Kingdom the British government's wish to upgrade the British diplomatic representation in Beijing and asked for China's response. As we all know, at the time, China wanted very much to improve relations and work together with the Western European countries to deal with the Soviet threat. Therefore, China responded very positively; Mao Zedong responded very positively. On March 2, Premier Zhou Enlai met with the British chargé d'affaires to China and expressed the willingness of the Chinese side to upgrade the relations between the two countries. But Premier Zhou Enlai also pointed out that Britain must make policy changes on two issues: the Taiwan issue and the UN issue, meaning that the British should not keep a consulate in Danshui, Taiwan, and should not object to the restoration of China's legitimate seat in the UN. After three months of deliberation, on June 12, Roy, on behalf of the British government, met with the Chinese chargé d'affaires again and said that Britain was willing to consider the two conditions raised by China and that they would like to consider establishing diplomatic ties with China once getting a positive response from Beijing. He even named the candidate for the British Ambassador to China and provided the person's information and resume to the Chinese side. So the British seemed really ready to upgrade relations with China. But China still had one concern: though the British indeed were prepared to shut down their consulate in Taiwan as well as change their policy on voting on the China seat in the UN, there was still another issue unsettled, which was that the British were still ambiguous about their stand on the "undecided status" of Taiwan. Therefore, on July 10, the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua met with the British chargé d'affaires. We were being a bit roundabout. We said that we were willing to set down the principles for the establishment of relations between our two sides by way of official exchange of notes and then we offered our draft of the notes, in which it was mentioned that the United Kingdom should acknowledge Taiwan as a province of China. The British, however, were hesitant once again and reluctant to accept it, saying that we British had held our view for over two decades and it was difficult for us to accept that. Then there was a lot of

“Britain wanted to develop relations with China, for which of course they had their reasons, but in the meantime they were constrained by the US attitude towards China.”

back and forth on this issue, and I won't get into that. So the year 1971 passed and things were still unsettled.

On February 27, 1972, the US President Nixon visited China and the famous Shanghai Communiqué was published between China and the United States. In the Shanghai Communiqué, the US recognized that the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait think there is only one China and that the United States won't challenge that position—I can't remember the exact words.⁶⁴ That was actually an acknowledgment that Taiwan is a part of China. Given that, the British finally were ready to make compromises. So this time the negotiations succeeded and delivered the joint communiqué for the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United Kingdom, in which it was added the statements that “the United Kingdom—acknowledging the position of the Chinese government that Taiwan is a province of the People's Republic of China.”⁶⁵ Then the British side also made an oral commitment that the British government would not advocate the “undecided status” of Taiwan or be involved in any action in that aspect. Thus the British made the commitments and addressed China's concerns with respect to the three issues of principle. Subsequently, on March 13, diplomatic relations between China and Britain were upgraded to the ambassadorial level.

That was the whole process. I recounted the process because—due to the time limits I will make it simple—because I want to make the point here: Britain wanted to develop relations with China, for which of course they had their reasons, but in the meantime they were constrained by the US attitude towards China. As the international situation evolved, the improvement of the relations between China and the US helped, to a certain extent, the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Britain. Many people asked this morning questions such as why China required different wordings on issues while establishing relations with France, with Italy? The

⁶⁴ See Joint Statement Following Discussions With Leaders of the People's Republic of China, February 27, 1972, in Steven E. Phillips, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2006), 812-816.

⁶⁵ The Joint Communiqué of the People's Republic of China and the United Kingdom of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Exchange of Ambassadors was signed on March 13, 1972. The communiqué stipulated that “the Government of the United Kingdom, acknowledging the position of the Chinese Government that Taiwan is a province of the People's Republic of China, have decided to remove their official representation in Taiwan.”

answer is actually quite simple. While considering establishing diplomatic ties with a certain country, China took into account many issues such as the importance of such country and its attitude towards the Taiwan issue. As we can see from my accounts, China was a bit stricter with Britain on the Taiwan issue. So I don't think there is a uniform standard there. China indeed wanted to develop relations with the Western European countries, but in the meantime China took into consideration the countries' behaviors in the past and ensured things to be made clear without leaving any loose ends. I think that is the case.

After the establishment of diplomatic ties, bilateral relations between China and Britain developed rapidly and helped solve a few big issues. Here I'll briefly give you three significant examples. The first example was after the establishment of diplomatic ties, China and Britain reached a solution to the historical issue of Hong Kong. It was true that over the issue, there were still long, difficult negotiations, but an agreement was finally reached between the two sides and that was a significant achievement. The second example: exchanges between the two sides increased very quickly and most significantly, on October 1986, Britain's Queen Elizabeth II made an official state visit to China. That was the Queen's first visit to a socialist country. The Chinese leaders, such as Hu Yaobang, Party General Secretary at the time, also made trips to Britain. So there were many high-level exchanges. The third example concerns the trade between the two sides, which was developing at a fast rate. In 1972, the volume of trade between China and Britain was 3.2 billion USD and in 1989 it was quickly increased to 17.18 billion USD. Those were basically the developments in Sino-British relations from 1972, the year the diplomatic ties were established, to 1989—a honeymoon period that lasted more than a decade.

I feel that there was another important thing very representative of Sino-British relations of that period—that is, the military exchanges between the two sides. In April 1978, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Neil Cameron, the British Chief of Defense Staff, led a delegation to China. He was the first senior British military leader to visit China. In a speech delivered during his visit to the PLA 6th Tank Division, Marshal Cameron said that Britain and China had a common enemy, whose capital city is Moscow, and that if necessary, our two armies should join forces to fight the Soviet tank force. The speech caused quite a repercussion in both Britain and the Soviet Union. Another thing, one minute. An anecdote. At the time,

there was a comment in the Soviet newspaper, saying that these people were like drunken hares talking nonsense, but however clamorous the hare is, it is no opponent for the bear. The British then went back to set up a club called “Drunken Hares.” Later, when I was the Ambassador to Britain, the club was still active and they had held the view that Britain and China should cooperate against the Soviet expansion. But later, as China’s relations with Britain, with the Soviet Union and with Europe changed, the function of club was no longer that significant, but their support of China remained. That is one thing.

As for the military cooperation between China and Britain, I will give you a few examples. The first example. As you may know, Britain had a Harrier jet, a quite advanced aircraft at the time that was capable of vertical take-off and landing. The British said that they were willing to sell it to China. Though later on the transaction fell through due to failed negotiations, it at least showed that the British were willing to sell advanced weapons to China. The third example. There was also an agreement between the two sides that Britain would help China remodel the J-7 fighter jet, the most advanced fighter plane China had at the time. China spent a lot of money remodeling the plane. That showed the two countries still had a good relations at the time. Also, there was another agreement about remodeling China’s Luda Destroyer in a project called “051 Project,” but for various reasons, the agreement was never carried out. Also Britain was prepared to export “Skyflash” missiles and other weapons to China. I’m saying this because I want to emphasize that at the time, there was an important factor influencing Sino-British relations, which was the improvement of Sino-US relations amid the confrontations of the Cold War; and especially after the formation of the triangular relationship between China, the US and the Soviet Union, Western European countries such as Britain who were on good terms with the US drew close to China and wanted to work together with China to deal with the Soviet Union.

I think that is all for today. In my speech, I talked about a few specific issues as well as the triangular relationship between China, the US, and the Soviet Union and the change of that relationship from the early 1970s to 1989. I find the histories of Sino-European relations, Sino-US relations, and Sino-Soviet relations very interesting to explore and examine. As to some of the questions asked just then, we can further discuss them in the following sessions. Thank you.

CHEN JIAN: Thank you, Ambassador Ma Zhengang. You were being modest. From what I've heard just now, you have plenty of insights into the subject. One detail I would like some further comment on: why China must ask the United Kingdom to clearly state its stand on the status of Taiwan? One important reason is because of the Cairo Declaration; because the United Kingdom was a participant of the Cairo Conference, which had a lot to do with the establishment of Taiwan's status in the international laws as well as international politics. Therefore, the British had to say the words themselves. Is that right? May I invite Ambassador Boyd to speak?

AMBASSADOR SIR JOHN BOYD: I would like to begin by of course complimenting the previous speakers but particularly the two last Ambassadors who spoke—for particular reasons of course—Ambassador Ma gave what I regard as a very objective and sympathetic portrait of the relationship with Great Britain to which I really would not wish to add and Ambassador Yang spoke in terms I could only support totally about the reality of the perceived Soviet threat to Chinese interests. It would be tempting if we had more time and I know time is the enemy here, for me to do something to enlarge on the picture of the central British foreign policy problem which is as you said, Ambassador Ma, the balance between the US interests and the Continental European interests. I won't say anymore now except that it's a difficult balancing trick. The relationship with the United States rests not only on things like language and sentiments and history, but is of great material importance to the UK. But similarly, history teaches us that it is folly not to be involved deeply in decisions that will govern the future of Continental Europe. So I will leave that on one side but hoping for an invitation to the conference that will address that one in due course.

Now the period, where I can perhaps make a little bit of contribution from personal experience, is 1969 to 1973 when I was in post in Washington covering the Asia desk working to Ambassador Freeman and Lord Kromer at a time of great change obviously in the US relationship with all sorts of bits of Asia. What happened between the United States and China, I think everyone here will agree, was of colossal significance. It conditioned so much of the structure of the world we live in now. I think I agree with those who suggested this morning that it was inevitable

that there were many turns in the road. I would like to start I think from what I just said, the reality of the Soviet threat, with the add-on indeed as Ambassador Ma pointed out of Afghanistan on top of everything else. But Zhenbao Island was only one part of it, there were well-placed, well-sourced leaks in the press in, I think, 1969 suggesting that the Russians were really fishing around for permission to do something atomic against China. Certainly that's the impression I derived from stuff that was in the Anglo-Saxon language press at that time. The other thing we haven't mentioned quite so much is the significance of Nixon's own mindset and politics. The famous article in *Foreign Affairs* gave a very good indication of what he really wanted to achieve long term with China. He seemed to take the position, to put it in English Literature terms, that United States without China or vice versa was, as we say, Hamlet without the Prince. Nixon was driven by two things: one was that quite right perception of the importance of China to US interests—perhaps three things—the second was his ambition to be remembered as a statesman of enormous vision and he certainly earns, I think, some medals on that score. But the third is to deal with the Vietnam problem, and I don't think anyone here has reminded us so far today of the enormity of that problem for the United States. The size of the engagement, the losses of personnel, the inability to win, you have to remember that the Tet Offensive though seen by some as a tactical sort of victory on the ground, completely ruined the administration's position with American public opinion and the Congress. That shift in will and emphasis between the administration and Congress was of a very great significance.

Now, I drafted two dispatches during my time for my approval or disapproval of my Ambassador. One was indeed on, and I mentioned this, because Enrico seems to have access through the Foreign Office files to all sorts of things I had forgotten writing. But somewhere there you'd probably find an analysis of the importance to the United States of getting out of Vietnam on acceptable terms and of course in the Nixon-Kissinger thinking, China was a key, perhaps the key, to a successful extraction of the United States from that position. Trying to achieve these things was very difficult against a background which had sort of popped-up from time to time, but the intervention in the civil war, the presence of the 7th Fleet offshore of China; the China seat, as Ambassador Ma mentioned. There was a whole list of things, in many cases common with the problems that Britain had, yes indeed, which would

always be challenging to deal with in the process of rapprochement. Nevertheless, I think my contention is that this was inevitable in the sense that China badly needed insurance against the Russian threat. China must have welcomed what was in fact a terminal line under any sort of a direct US threat and another inevitability, once that process was in train, that much would flow China's way in resolution of Taiwan difficulties, the China seat, the embargo and so on. There was a lot for China to play for. I would hesitate to say whether it was more important to the States or it was more important to China, though in many analyses I've read it is thought that China came out as it were ahead on points in the advantages secured immediately from the process.

Let me say something about my experience of the US team. First of all, Nixon was obviously not alone in wanting to find a new way of relating to China. I went to many seminars in the early part of my posting, at which figures like Professor A. Doak Barnett, Bill Bundy of famous Harvard family, various pupils of what you might call the "John Fairbank School of Harvard." There was quite a coterie of people who were serious about improving the relationship with China and obviously the State Department itself was crammed with professionals who were very, very good. I think one must dismiss from one's mind any thought that American officials were clumsy or not interested in China. Absolutely the reverse was true. I won't inflict upon you a list of names but one of the advantages of being British in Washington was pretty good access to those people and many of them turned up and swapped names with one of two people here, they turned up in the negotiations or turned up in US Liaison Office or turned up accompanying President Nixon to China. But I would commend a book by my pretty much oldest American friend, that's Nick Platt, who wrote an extremely amusing and enlightening book called *China Boys*—the "China Boys" being the team of young men who helped prepare the Nixon visit and it's full of insights, I think, and very sympathetic comments on his Chinese vis-à-vis. Now, it's not enough to have skilled operatives.⁶⁶ What America lacked of course was direct access to China. There was a channel of sorts of communication through the Warsaw talks at which could be dealt with, but it's not quite the same as the kind of access you have living and working in Beijing. Of course, the American



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⁶⁶ Nicholas Platt, *China Boys: How U.S. Relations with the PRC Began and Grew* (Washington, D.C.: New Academia Pub.; Vellum, 2010).

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system compensated for that by huge amounts of information sifting, very active and very ably staffed Consulate General in Hong Kong, but again with the disadvantage that they could peer over the border but not go there.

And if there’s any lesson I carry out from my experience, it’s somehow “try and be there.” “Be there” is a very good motto really for any diplomatic service in virtually any circumstances. And the same thing is the virtues obviously of examining political themes and events in context. I shared some impressions of life in the Cultural Revolution earlier. There was something extra that came from thinking about these issues actually in the atmosphere of Beijing and recognizing the real physical constraints on Chinese life and Chinese policy. It doesn’t, certainly with any fantasies about China preparing, in the words of John Foster Dulles, I think, to “march to the Tropics.”

Now, I think we’ve dealt with the motives. I haven’t dealt with Henry Kissinger. Extraordinary man. If Nixon was in it for the raw politics, Vietnam, a better international position for the United States, Kissinger was one sometimes thought in it for the sheer intellectual joy of it. He was very curious about the Chinese leadership. He was much more, how shall I say it without offense, in his mindset about global balance. And in one of the dispatches, as I mentioned, that I had a hand in drafting, I thought it well to mention—okay, Kissinger in the things he says to us is very persuasive, but actually the real world is not a physical laboratory in which you just turn a lever or run a ball bearing down a slope and you get a predictable result. It’s much less predictable and much more human place. Now what I don’t want to do is to take everyone blow-by-blow through the history of the early 1970s. However, everyone would have been struck and the American Press was struck by the whole series of events: the Edgar Snow visit, the Ping-Pong, the invitation not immediately made public to Kissinger. The process went on largely, I think, as “dictated by Chinese timetable rather than the US timetable.” And it’s been widely remarked on that the American side were allowed to get very over-excited about the progress they were making—a factor which was played on very cleverly by the Chinese top leadership. Anyway, be that as it may, Nixon and Kissinger were delighted to get there.

And to bring the discussion back to the impact on Western Europe, as I think it has been made very clear today, the terms of the Shanghai Communiqué in particular pretty much set the parameters for the West Europeans—funny enough in my

next posting back in Beijing—once more the consequences, the Western European consequences of this process. So Western Germany came; post set up by Alfred Stegar then occupied by a fine man, a son of the hero of the Stalingrad. The Germans coincided equally with the spread of the habit of EC coordination in Beijing. Now there was a huge difference between my two postings. The first time around, the very, very small West European community, which I've described, mostly living in the old town still. And a process centered now on Sanlitun whereby we spent as much time conferring with European colleagues about what was going on as we did observing what was going on.

To summarize the impact on the West Europeans: In some ways it opened the gates for all of us, as I say, based on essential principles established in the US negotiations. But at the same time, I think we have to face it as West Europeans, it tended to marginalize us. The serious world game moved steadily into the hands of the US and China. Now one can think of—no world is ranging from finance to the climate which can't be solved if we don't have the participation of the US and China. I leave out of the discussion, the enormous economic advance that's been made by China. But essentially they are the two key powers now. Do I conclude from that that the Europeans should give up and accept whatever comes their way? Not for a second. What I do say however, is that there is a very serious challenge to our ability to set the pace in relations with China and that we need to work harder. In the paper I brought with me but haven't deployed there are a number of suggestions about working more closely together on issues of the world architecture, financial or otherwise, promotion of student exchanges, much more scientific research jointly aimed at solving or oppressing global problems, and both private and public support, much more for Chinese language study. This for instance is an issue in the UK right now where ministers are looking at the primary school curriculum and have half an instinct to say: "let's have more language." But of course, when they say more language, what is clearly in their mind is, say, French. And I think, and I'm trying to do something about this in the UK. We must have a drive. I would like to see that echoed right around European continent to advance the proposition that young Europeans in the next generation will not eat, will not have jobs, and as they come to grips with the realities of Asia, and in the front rank of the skills should be the Chinese language.

Now the other aspect of this—it is a dual aspect—is the role of Deng Xiaoping in, as it were, following up on what Chairman Mao had achieved in relations with the Americans. In my own personal book, this is arguably the great man of the century. In after-dinner speeches I often compare Deng Xiaoping to Winston Churchill as the kind of person who could grip a situation, set the pace, show total determination, to achieve a result. I base this partly, and I confess it is very personal, on the visit of Edward Heath, which was mentioned a little earlier. Edward Heath came to Beijing, having just fallen from, having lost an election and ceased to be British Prime Minister, but he was treated then and for many years as a great friend of China. Deng Xiaoping who had only recently come back into activity in Beijing was the host. I took the notes and I saw that this leading British Prime Minister, for all his virtues, still had his pile of files and his notes and his advisor. Deng Xiaoping did it all out of his own head. He didn't need a single note. He knew exactly what to say. He had an extraordinary grasp of the foreign policy agenda from whatever angle and I felt absolutely thrilled to have a chance to see this in operation. And indeed if Enrico looks in the files he may find my reporting telegram on that discussion. I don't think anyone in the room would disagree with the proposition that Deng Xiaoping's contribution to the advance of China was absolutely astonishing and it counts for a very great deal of what we now see and wish to relate to today. I think I have had my say. Chairman, thank you very much.

CHEN JIAN: Thank you very much Ambassador Boyd. Let me have a chance to briefly, while I'm waiting for questions to come in, let me just briefly say something about Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger. Henry Kissinger when he was attending the first meeting with Premier Zhou Enlai, he also brought with him a heavy, heavy background briefing book, and then he found that Zhou Enlai was talking without a single piece of paper as his note. For whatever reason, for his own pride, Henry decided not to use his briefing book. I don't know how Mr. Heath did. How did he do? Did he still use his notes?

AMBASSADOR SIR JOHN BOYD: Yes, from time to time he referred to his notes. I would be interested in Ambassador Ma's psycho-analysis but I think it is just there is an enormously strong bureaucratic tradition in Chinese history with great

intellectual tests, set one way of another as you go up the ladder, and of course Zhou Enlai was quite exceptional man with an exceptional mind. I think it's as simple as that.

CHEN JIAN: I cannot agree more.

SVETOZAR RAJAK: I have a few questions. I really appreciated and enjoyed much the presentation we just heard from the three ambassadors and I'll try to have a question for each of the Ambassadors.

Ambassador Yang, I read in your bio that you headed the investigation team in Germany ahead of its unification and I would be very interested to hear your personal opinion at the time of what was happening in Germany, implications for Europe, and to what extent and what role did such a report play in the Chinese policy orientation at the time. I would be very interested to hear that. And also with regards to, you mentioned a very cordial relations with Strauss. Did this have much to do with the CSCE process? And I'm following up on what Baum said earlier or mentioned earlier, the extent to which China was interested in undermining this process and this was one of the steps towards this aim and goal.

And to Ambassador Ma, I very much appreciate—since you were in Britain, you served in Britain but also for many years were in the Department for North America in various positions. To what extent or how did you view or how special in your view, was the relation between Britain and US? And this in view of many debates that go in the UK in particular ahead of the elections and also post-Blair period? And I would be interested to hear your views and how Chinese diplomacy saw this special relationship, in particular in the sense that Britain did not play an important role in comparison to other European countries in China's rapprochement with the West. And the second question is with regards to the military cooperation. You mentioned a few figures and how huge it was—how important was it with regards to Britain for China?

And Ambassador Boyd, something that follows up on my question to Ambassador Ma: why was British diplomacy satisfied in playing a junior role throughout this process from 1970s onwards in rapprochement with China, in particular given that Britain had longest diplomatic relations with New China, longer than any other

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Western European country and in this respect, could have served as a bridge and or given its special relationship and proximity to Washington? Thank you very much.

AMBASSADOR MA ZHENGANG: To be frank, most Chinese are not fans of the special relationship between Britain and the United States. History aside, just say the recent events, in particular the problems in the Middle East. During my tenure as the Chinese Ambassador to the UK, I experienced two major events in that aspect. The first was the Kosovo War. From what I know, the American President Clinton was reluctant to make war, because he was at the time embattled domestically in the well-known “zippergate” and was having a rough time with it.⁶⁷ But Europe insisted on war and they had to urge the Americans to get involved. So as it happened, the Europeans had Prime Minister Blair to go and try to persuade the Americans. Eventually the Americans participated and the war was fought and the British played a significant role in the process. At the beginning, only a bombing campaign was planned, but later on Blair strongly urged ground operations and he proposed that if the United States agreed, Britain would take the lead and send ground troops. Blair planned to go to the US to do the persuading and it seemed that Clinton was not very happy with that; Clinton said “please don’t bring me new troubles,” so Blair didn’t go. The Kosovo war was badly received by the Chinese people, especially after the incident of the bombing of the Chinese embassy there. After that incident, the Americans and others said “sorry,” but Blair only expressed “regret” the first time he remarked on the incident, and the Chinese people were outraged and called him “a running dog” for the Americans.

The second event was, of course, the Iraq War, during which the British was especially motivated and offered counsel and gave lots of suggestions to the US President Bush. Also, at the time, Prime Minister Blair voiced many opinions that our Chinese found acceptable. For example, Blair once advocated the idea “human rights above sovereignty” to make it okay to adopt humanitarian intervention, and other ideas like that, which are not very much in line with the Chinese thoughts and they were seen as ideas in favor of the Americans.

⁶⁷ I.e., the Monica Lewinsky scandal.

But in fact, the special relationship between Britain and the United States is not smooth all the time and has gone through ups and downs since its establishment; there were rainy days and there were sunny days. For instance, the special relationship was basically non-existent during Heath's term as Prime Minister, and then it rebounded back in prominence during the Thatcher years. So there have been ups and downs. Of course I can understand that Britain needs the special relationship with the United States because after World War II, Britain's influence was on the decline, and in order to maintain its status as a major power, it needed, as our Chinese say, to "find a patron"—a power backup to lean on; so it found the United States. On the US part, the United States needed a country like Britain to serve its counsel, just as Blair often said: our British should play a role in the world not commensurate to our actual strength and one of our recommendations is "the British sophistication in handling international affairs."

But to be fair, Blair had been friendly in handling the relations with China and I have mentioned that in my talks with the Chinese leaders. Despite our disagreement with him on several international issues, he had been relatively positive in his attitude towards China. In his nearly-a-decade term as Britain's Prime Minister, he didn't do many things offensive to China and the Chinese people, and instead he actively promoted the development of the relations between Britain and China. I think I'll just say this much. What is the other question?

Yes, the question about the weapons. I don't want to go too much into that, since I only gave those examples just then to emphasize the point that it is possible for two countries that have a common strategic goal to cooperate with each other. And in terms of the current military arms embargo policy the European countries have against China, I think it's just very unreasonable. In the time we are talking about, the Europeans seemed not concerned about the possibility of an armed-up China, but now they are concerned that China arm itself up. It just doesn't make much sense. To be honest, even if the embargo is lifted, it is still an uncertain business whether China is going to buy weapons from Europe, since we have developed a lot ourselves. This is also an important issue here. The armaments industry is a significant industrial sector in France, in Britain and in a certain sense in Germany. If we can develop cooperation in that aspect, I think it also benefits the economic exchanges of these countries. An important aspect of Britain is that the country has



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been pursuing a complete open and *laissez-faire* policy towards commercial activities and international trade matters greatly to it. The circumstances were that at that time the cooperation between China and Britain was driven by strategic considerations as well as practical benefits. Later, as I mentioned, an agreement was made between the two sides on the remodeling of the Luda destroyer and, approximately 320 million USD was involved. But then for various reasons, including considerations of its own development, China didn't go on with the contract. The British was very cross and said they were very disappointed. They had made a lot of efforts with the prospect of a potential big business deal and then it came to nothing. So you see, in it there were strategic considerations as well as commercial considerations. That's probably it. I think just these two points. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR SIR JOHN BOYD: Well once again Ambassador Ma is more kind about British policy than I would necessarily be, but I think there are some answers to our interlocutor. Yes, it's taken a long time. Yes, that might reflect a failure of political imagination, but it doesn't diminish the reality for Britain of having many irons in the fire with the United States, and well, we certainly wanted to develop our relationship with China. There was nothing in it for us having a major tussle with the United States on this. I listed just two of three things: I mean the NATO issue, missiles in Central Europe, open market as Ambassador Ma mentioned, world finance, even Ireland, an issue of crucial interest to the UK, though of no particular interest to China. So there was a whole stash of real solid interests at hazard in having a major quarrel with the United States. United States, until they were ready, were not going to move on China. But believe me, we were feeding in our perspective and our appreciation for the need for everyone to move way back but that's different from putting it to, what you might call, the ultimate test.

ANA LALAJ: Thank you very much. In 1960, as we all know, Albania left the Soviet Union and sided with China. The United States and the West would be happy to see the Soviet bloc divided, but the Western countries, also the United States, were quite silent. No state gave any offer to Albania. I have consulted some American documents and I have read that the American Secretary of State Dean Rusk at the time suggested and instructed all the American embassies to adopt a

“hands off policy” towards Albania. Also the American Ambassador in Yugoslavia followed the same line as they see Albania as a great danger for their bloc, as we name, capitalistic bloc. Why is Albania so dangerous at the time? The second question is, was the policy of the West, the United States and Great Britain all the same? Because with the United States and Great Britain, we had no diplomatic relations, also at the beginning of 1970s? Or was there any proposal to Albania to establish diplomatic relations, especially when they were established with China? And another question for the Chinese Ambassador: had any discussion or any meeting—I know one, but it is not enough—with the Albanian Ambassador in China or between Albania leaders and Chinese leaders before Kissinger’s visit or American President Nixon visit to China?

AMBASSADOR SIR JOHN BOYD: All right. Yes, Ambassador Menegatti’s saying he doesn’t know anything about it, and I’m rather in the similar position. However, I think the first thing I say is I’m very sorry if Ana, you and your compatriots feel let down. As you know, because we have discussed this offline. I mean there are a number of traditional issues between Britain and Albania in the post-war period, which certainly would have colored the view and moderated the enthusiasm in London, for anything sort of forward-looking. And I don’t think we need to go into them just to chart them on the map; there was the Corfu Channel incident which took years to deal with, in which Britain lost a destroyer to mines, which Ana assures me were planted by the Yugoslavs and not by the Albanians, but they did know about them, and we confiscated a lot of Albanian money as a consequence, money which sat in the basement of the British Central Bank for decades. So that was one conditioning factor. And another on the intelligence front, and I don’t attribute blame to any living Albanian colleague at all, but as the consequence of a very regrettable double agent operation by the Russians in London, the names of a lot of Western intelligence operatives in Albania, in the immediate post-war, were leaked and I think they were executed and that left, I’m afraid to say, that left a flavor in any discussion about Albania for many years that unfortunately may have conditioned the response you regret.

CHEN JIAN: Ambassador Yang, two of Rajak's questions just then were actually directed to you. Also I would like to ask Ambassador Mei, since I think you probably would like to respond to some of the earlier questions Professor Schaefer asked about Germany. After Ambassador Yang speak; I am wondering if you feel like giving a response. Let me first give the floor to Ambassador Yang.

AMBASSADOR YANG CHENGXU: About the question on the reunification of Germany: in early 1990, I was the Deputy Head of the Department of West European Affairs in the Ministry, and I was assigned by the Ministry to head an investigation team to GDR to find out if German reunification could happen soon or if there were great obstacles. Because at the time, if you read the newspaper, the Americans seemed to switch from their previous doubts to thinking that German reunification was entirely possible. That was one thing. The second thing was, Gorbachev publicly criticized the Honecker government, saying it had problems. The third thing was that in the meantime, there seemed to be some agreements reached, after several rounds of negotiations, between Gorbachev and the Americans. Also, Britain and France, who were against German reunification at the beginning, began to change their positions through the persuasion of the Americans. Under these circumstances, the focus of our trip to GDR was to find out whether the unification would be carried out as required by the GDR Socialist Unity Party—that is, achieved by negotiation between East Germany and West Germany. The other option would be that East Germany could apply for being incorporated into the German Bundestag according to the FRG Constitution. So my task at that time was not to get further information on the basic stands and policies of the US, the Soviet Union, Britain and France. That was no longer my responsibility. My responsibility was to see who would decide the whereabouts of German reunification.

And because I had contacts with some GDR leaders from my work back in the 1950s as well as my post as Minister-Counselor there in the 1980s, I first sought out those people for talks. They told me that German reunification was not likely to be achieved soon. It was just at that time—I'm now recalling the things back then—just at that time, Helmut Kohl proposed that after reunification, if it happens, one East German mark should be worth one West German mark. The day I heard the news I immediately went to an economic institute in West Berlin and asked the economists

there what the chances the one-to-one exchange rate proposed by Helmut Kohl were to happen. As experts in economics, they told me “not a chance” and said that if it were so, then German reunification would mean the total collapse of East German industry. They gave me an example. At that time, the color TVs manufactured in the GDR still used electron tubes and the price was around 600 East German marks, while the production in West Germany in whole had adopted semi-transmitter—a much advanced technology, and the price was only a bit over 500 West German marks. There was also a big gap between the two places in terms of daily supplies. So West Germany didn’t think Kohl’s proposal would work. So the first week I was in East Germany, I had the impression that German reunification probably wouldn’t happen soon. But at the same time I knew that our trip this time was to know what the common people thought about the issue, not the thought of the East German government or people or radicals in the party or government departments. Therefore I decided that the five people of our team should go separately to different cities. We chose Alsfeld, Dresden, Leipzig, and some other cities. Anyway, I went to Leipzig—to Dresden. When I got there, I didn’t go to the hotel; instead I scanned the accommodation ads on the electric poles and found that a man had a room for rent in his apartment. Then I went there. The man was a diesel engine installer and while I stayed there we talked and he said to me: “I have a good life here in East Germany; I am well-paid and I often have the opportunity to go abroad, but still I think there is a huge gap between East Germany and West Germany and I hope the reunification will happen soon.” My other four colleagues who went to other cities talked to the young people on the street and from the talks, they sensed that a tide was setting in at the time in East Germany, especially among the young people, which was the hope for the reunification to occur soon. So in the end, I concluded my report back home with the opinion that it was very likely that German reunification would happen soon. As you may know, we as diplomats are never inclined to say things in absolute terms. So I said “very likely” and that was it. I didn’t say anything else. So our trip that time was to make sure. Recently, China’s CCTV did an interview with the Chinese diplomats who used to work in the embassy in East Germany and had been to West Berlin. The replies to the question about German reunification were quite simple: West Berlin and East Berlin were two different worlds back then and one was very prosperous while the other was in difficulties. As you may remember, at

the time, East Germany, for many decades, had been using a kind of small vehicles called Trabant, but in West Germany things were totally different. So everybody just had the general impression that simply, the common German people hoped reunification would happen soon and that was the basis of our report.

As for the second question, the relationship with Strauss. My opinion is that our relationship with Strauss was not entirely in the political aspect, but indeed because Strauss, and we had more common language on the anti-Soviet front, our party and government attached more importance to the role he played and then he became the first West German leader to visit China and was received by Chairman Mao. In specific issues, since Strauss was Minister President of Bavaria at the time, after he came back from his China visit, he vigorously promoted the exchanges between Bavaria and China, particularly in the economic and trade fields, where the development was relatively fast. Strauss also liked to frequently exchanged views with our ambassador. Here I can tell you an episode. When Brezhnev visited West Germany, Strauss made the statement that West Germany could develop well and improve relations with the Soviet Union. After he said that, he called our embassy and asked to meet with Ambassador Zhang Tong. But it happened that Ambassador Zhang Tong was not available that day; he had a previous appointment. So we asked what about tomorrow. But that made Strauss angry and he said that he would never meet Ambassador Zhang Tong again. Then he especially went to Vienna to meet Ambassador Wang Shu, the Chinese Ambassador to Vienna at that time. In meeting with Ambassador Wang Shu, Strauss explained that although he made that statement, it doesn't mean that he has had a different opinion of China and although he wants to develop relations with the Soviet Union, it doesn't mean he has changed his previous view on the Soviet Union. That's all.

AMBASSADOR MEI ZHAORONG: I actually intend to address many of the questions just asked by Mr. Schaefer in my presentation at tomorrow morning's session, because tomorrow morning I'm going to talk about a train of events that exemplified the US and Soviet influence on the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and West Germany—a very complicated process as it was. Today, however, I'm afraid there is not enough time for me to address these questions. But I do want to add a few points to Ambassador Yang Chengxu's reply to some of the questions.

First, the question of German reunification. I think German reunification was first of all the result of the collapse of the Soviet-Eastern bloc. As we all know, the process of German reunification started with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the fall of the Berlin Wall itself was partially the consequences of the removal of Hungary's border fence with Austria near Vienna, which resulted from the US president's visit to West Germany at the time. That was a very logical process. In that case, East Germany could no longer, as it used to, prevent its people from crossing over to West Germany and further to the West. That prohibition was no longer effective. That is one important factor.

The second factor is economic. West Germany's infiltration of East Germany or its great appeal to East Germany at the time. A popular saying among the East Germans was, "either the West German mark comes to us or we go to West Germany to look for the West German mark." Kohl's so-called monetary union with East Germany on July 1, 1989, was essentially using the West German mark to buy out the East German mark and overhaul East Germany's economy. It was a determining step for German reunification. Since once East Germany's economy was controlled by West Germany, political unity became inevitable; it was only a matter of process. Of course the inevitableness also had to do with the fact that the division of Germany was not natural but the result of the occupation and joint administration of Germany by the four great powers, the consequence of two big blocs' contention in Germany. Therefore, it required the participation of all four countries—that means, the consensus of the Soviet Union, the United States, France, and Britain to resolve the issue of German reunification.

The Soviet Union had been against German reunification. Gorbachev remarked in 1988 that German reunification would be an issue in 100 years and there was no point at all in talking about it then. But in 1989, Gorbachev changed tune, saying that the principle of national autonomy also applied to the German people, which meant it could happen if reunification was the will of the German people. That was a remarkable change. There were other details involved in that, I won't go into it.

Both Britain and France were against German reunification, because they believed the reunification of Germany reopened the possibility of a rising Germany in Europe and there would be again the issue of the German threat. So they objected. Mitterrand visited Leipzig in October 1989, a time when the East German regime

**"I concluded
my report back
home** with the

opinion that it
was very likely
that German
reunification would
happen soon."

was on the verge of crumbling. What message Mitterrand intended to send with that visit? Still a show of France's support of the Honecker government. West Germany had big issues with France at the time, but later Mitterrand and Kohl struck a deal: France will support German reunification, provided that Germany is to give up the German mark and accept the Euro. Mrs. Thatcher strongly disapproved of German reunification. After German reunification, a minister of the Thatcher government made a lot of unpleasant comments, the idea of which was that the Nazi Germany is coming back. The Germans were very offended by that. So up to now, as I know, Kohl still has problems with Mrs. Thatcher.

The United States, at the beginning, was not supportive of German reunification, but later George Bush changed tune in the consideration of using the reunification of Germany to weaken the Soviet influence in Eastern European. So he later supported German reunification. When Kohl developed the Ten-Point Plan in November 1989, proposing the establishment of a German federal state encompassing both West Germany and East Germany in order to attract East Germany to reunification, he didn't even inform Foreign Minister Genscher, a member of his own cabinet. But six hours before he made the plan public, he gave notice to George Bush. So George Bush was informed beforehand, but Genscher was not. Why was that? Because—Kohl told me this—if Genscher had known about the proposal, since he was a FDP member, he would have immediately reported to his own party; and once was known, the proposal would promptly meet opposition and be killed, since the chairman of the SPD at the time, was against reunification and held that it was unacceptable. In that case, a series of actions would have been aborted. So Kohl made the quick decision to work out the proposal overnight, along with his foreign policy advisor Teltschik, and publish it the next day and gave George Bush six hours' notice before the publication. I knew about this because the next day I had a lunch appointment with Teltschik at the Chinese embassy. During our lunch he appeared very sleepy. Then I asked him what was the matter and he replied he was working the previous night on the proposal. So that was the case.

So my conclusion, my opinion on German reunification at the time was—I was required to submit a report on that to the Foreign Ministry after I got back to China—my conclusion in the report was: by 1990, all conditions required for the reunification of Germany had been met. A year or so before that, back in 1988,

the conditions were not met and a year from then, things might change since we couldn't rule out the possibility of the change in Gorbachev or Yeltsin's position within the Soviet government. A few years ago, I mentioned that opinion to the German Finance Minister Theodor Waigel; he was also serving as Chairman of the CSU at the time. He completely agreed with my opinion. So my point is that the reunification of Germany was the work of intertwining necessity and chance.

German reunification was undoubtedly an extraordinary political achievement in German history. In fact, without the reunification of Germany, the EC couldn't have materialized, considering that Eastern Europe couldn't have changed so rapidly with the still divided state of West Germany and East Germany. But on the other hand, the reunification impaired the fiscal capacity of the Federal Republic of Germany, insofar as it had less financially capable to advance the European integration. In that sense, a lot of difficulties the EU has encountered so far could be traced to that. So everything works both ways, positively and negatively. I think all these were very complicated issues that defied a simplistic view. First of course you should admit that German reunification was a remarkable achievement, in that a rare opportunity was seized; and if once missed, such opportunity would never come again. It was in a way Kohl, the West German leader at the time, who seized that opportunity. As I know, Schmidt, Kohl's predecessor, once looked down upon Kohl as "provincial" and without strategic vision. But in terms of this issue, Schmidt has fully acknowledged Kohl's contribution as a prime minister that advanced German reunification. That also suggests that at critical moments in history, a leader's decision could make a big difference.

Now I have briefly gone over this issue. Ambassador Yang Chengxu talked about other issues concerning the relations between China and West Germany, and there are things that I could add. But Sino-West German relations is a really big issue, so I think I will follow up on that in details tomorrow. Okay?

LI DANHUI: Thank you. I just want to ask Ambassador Mei and Ambassador Yang this question. After German reunification, Honecker asked to take refuge in China, but the CCPCC International Liaison Department, after deliberation, didn't allow. I don't know whether the Foreign Ministry knew about the situation at the

**“Honecker
expressed**

his wish to take
refuge in China
or North Korea.”

time; whether you, as ambassadors, got involved in the situation; and whether West Germany said anything to China about not accepting Honecker. That’s my question.

AMBASSADOR MEI ZHAORONG: It is true that Honecker expressed his wish to take refuge in China or North Korea. But I can frankly tell you that the Chinese side made no response; no expression of yes or no; just no response. As for the West German side, they didn’t raise the issue to us. As far as I know, Honecker did contact us. At that time, he was taking refuge in the Soviet Union, the Chilean Embassy in the Soviet Union to be exact, because the Chilean Ambassador was a crony of Salvador Allende when he was still Chilean president. Back in the days, the Allende regime was overthrown by a military coup and the fighting resulted in lots of deaths; Allende’s proxies found refuge in East Germany. So later when Honecker was in trouble, that former official of the Allende government, who at the time happened to be posted as Chilean Ambassador to Moscow, rescued him. Honecker took a Soviet military plane that belonged to the Soviet troops stationed in East Germany at the time to Moscow and then took refuge in the Chilean Embassy. But at that time, Chile was no longer ruled by the Allende regime; it was another regime.

SHEN ZHIHUA: Through what channel did Honecker contact China?

AMBASSADOR MEI ZHAORONG: I’m not sure, but I know it happened. He had the wish and conveyed it to us.

BERND SCHAEFER: Who asked the Chinese government about exile for Honecker in China? What institution, what individual? The Honecker family? I’m not aware of that. You know he first was with the German pastor, then he was in the East German government house, then he was in the Soviet hospital, and then he was flown to Moscow where he resided for about two years; he was eventually expelled and moved to Chile. But who asked about exile for Honecker in China? Which institution or person?

AMBASSADOR MEI ZHAORONG: I just answered Mr. Shen Zhihua's question. I didn't know the details, but I know such thing happened. Later, Honecker went into exile in Chile, because his daughter married a Chilean, who had taken refuge in East Germany when the military coup overthrew the Allende regime. So now Honecker's wife Margot is still in Chile. She used to refuse to go back to Germany, but I recently read something saying that she said she missed Germany and wanted to go back. As to the details of the story, I'm not sure.

LI DANHUI: I interviewed an official of the CCPCC International Liaison Department and he was the one that mentioned the thing with Honecker.

RICHARD BAUM: I'd like to return to a subject approached about an hour ago. It may not be fresh in people's minds. I'd like to ask Ambassador Boyd a little bit more about his time in Washington, which coincided with very great changes in the world situation. I'd like to ask first of all about the well-known conflict between the National Security Council and the State Department. Your "China Boys" were all in the State Department as far as I know. Maybe not all, but in any event I'd like to know what their view was of the emerging relationship between Henry Kissinger and the bureaucracy of foreign policy making. That would be one question. The second concerns something you mentioned in passing: Soviet nuclear blackmail or nuclear threat perception issue of the summer of 1969. You were in Washington at that time, you had your ear to the ground. There have been several different accounts given in various memoirs about the nuclear blackmail. Did they mean it, did they not, was it a bluff, was it a real threat? I'd like to know what your perception at the time was.

AMBASSADOR SIR JOHN BOYD: Yes, I'm tempted to use the word symbiosis, perhaps that's too generous of a word on relations between the State Department and the NSC. In fact, on the point of fact, Nick Platt worked on the NSC for quite a while in preparing that. But I think the answer to your question is in the end, Kissinger had the whip hand and decided very much what he was prepared to share with State, let alone with foreigners. So I would add that because my ambassador at that time was rather prone to lying in bed in the morning, reluctant to get up early,

and Kissinger always summoned the Brits at a good brisk early hour, the man who has just been mentioned in the German context, Charles Powell who was much later key advisor to Margaret Thatcher; he was then the Ambassador's private secretary, he was the one who didn't mind getting up at six o'clock and going down to see Kissinger and then got to come back and write the cable. So that gave him a real role and real leg up in the bureaucracy. I mean the man is very able intrinsically but it didn't do any harm. I mean somehow the system worked in terms of the ultimate outcome anyway. It wasn't easy I'm sure.

Sorry, second question? Yes, nuclear blackmail. No, I mean, I supposed I was eager to believe what I read in the press and there were definite articles I recall by well-placed Washington correspondents reflecting possibly in turn stuff that had been planted by interested parties; I don't know. I just don't know. It's just the more I read in later years the more those accounts seem to have been justified. There's a piece by Margaret MacMillan who runs, you know—what's its name—in Oxford, who is apparently the key source on this. She's quoted in recent books as endorsing that. But I can't claim to have read all the documents. I haven't read any documents, Chairman, for about ten years. It's amazing I'm here. But my contribution is sort of street-flavor also I'd like to think.

QIANG ZHAI: I have two questions, one for the Chinese ambassadors, and one for Ambassador Sir John Boyd. The first question arises from Ambassador Yang's presentation. Ambassador Yang mentioned an important phenomenon in China's diplomacy towards the West in the 1970s, a sort of diplomacy with opposition parties, meaning that great attention was paid to liaison, communicating with and gaining over the opposition parties in other countries with relatively strong anti-Soviet attitude, the so-called "hawks." Ambassador Yang mentioned Strauss; Ambassador Sir John Boyd mentioned British Prime Minister Heath. China is still very friendly with Heath after he stepped down, due to his conservative political attitude. We know that in the case of the United States, China paid a lot of attention to a Democratic senator, named Henry Jackson, from Washington, because he was strongly anti-Soviet. So here is my question. Back to an important episode in the period of the Sino-US détente, in 1969, a Democratic Senator named Mike Mansfield conveyed, via a third party, i.e. Cambodia, to China that he was ready to visit China for the

improvement of the relations between China and the US.⁶⁸ We know that in the same year, in a discussion of a few Chinese generals on the direction of China's diplomacy, the Mansfield matter was mentioned. I just want to ask the ambassadors: have you seen any document or heard anything as to whether the Foreign Minister discussed the matter at that time? I understand that at the time you were mainly onto the European affairs, but I just want to ask if you knew anything about that.

The second question, a quick question to Ambassador Sir John Boyd: can you say something about the British reaction to the Sino-French normalization in 1964? Were they embarrassed? Jealous? Or indifferent?

AMBASSADOR MEI ZHAORONG: Actually this question was supposed to be for Ambassador Yang, but I'll take the liberty to briefly respond to it. I think our liaison with the West German opposition parties could not be termed as "diplomacy with opposition parties or factions." I'm afraid that was a wrong concept, because our policy was in fact the establishment and development of relations with all kinds of political groups in Germany.

It took us a while to get to know Strauss's party, the so-called "anti-Soviet hardliners." At the beginning, in the 1950s or early 1960s, we didn't know very well about West Germany's various parties and their positions, and what we thought were more or less under the Soviet influence. At the time, the Soviet Union labeled the "anti-Soviet hardliners" led by Strauss as "the representatives of militarism and revanchism." To be frank, we adopted the same line in our own publications in China. But then in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, we learned from our own sources, our Xinhua correspondents in West Germany for example, and gradually got to know more about West Germany's internal situation. By our own studies, we no longer thought that Strauss's party was a representative of militarism but a political force strongly against the Soviet threat and its expansionist policy at the time. In 1973, Strauss published an article proclaiming the end of bi-polarity, the passing of the Yalta structure, and the coming of a multi-polar world. In view of that, he proposed the strategy of West Germany-China axis against the Soviets. Such a strategy of course was welcomed by China and the Chinese leadership including

⁶⁸ Senator Mike Mansfield wrote to Prince Sihanouk in June 1969. See Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, 247.

**“[Strauss]
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strategy
of West Germany-
China axis against
the Soviets.”**

Chairman Mao, and therefore we got into contact with him. But to be frank, we actually wanted Schmidt, Chancellor of West Germany at the time, to visit China first, but we waited and waited and Schmidt didn't respond to our suggestion—he had his own concerns—he just became chancellor and had a lot of things to attend to. So he couldn't do it. So it came down to Strauss to be the first West German leader to visit China and he was received by Chairman Mao. The event caused quite a stir and had a significant political effect on the relations between China and West Germany. And it also drove the West German government to develop relations with China. So the result was positive. It was not like that we were trying to divide West Germany by associating with the opposition parties. We had no intentions of that.

As for Heath, when I was later President of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, I could say that I invited him to visit China every year as long as he still could walk, because he was a big contributor to the development of relations between China and Britain and he had been friendly towards China. As President of the CPIFA I also paid visit to him in Britain. We received him every year when he visited China. Even when his health was failing, but as long as he could walk, we still invited him to come over. But later because of his health, he couldn't come. We believed in a Chinese saying, “Don't forget your old friends,” which is also a tradition of our diplomacy. We never forget the people that did good to our foreign relations and we will always be cordial to them. I'll stop my answer here. Mansfield was American. I'm sorry, I don't know much about that part of story. That's all.

AMBASSADOR YANG CHENGXU: I just want to add one thing here. We were not specifically working on right-wingers and conservatives; in the meantime we paid great attention to our relations with the SPD. But as I said, in the early days of our diplomatic relations with West Germany, since the SPD advocated the “Ostpolitik” and was concerned about the Soviet reactions, they had scruples about contacts with us. It was shown, at least, in the fact that their politician didn't come to our embassy that often. As I recall, at that time, Egon Bahr, Brandt's advisor, had very few contacts with our ambassador. And then I remember there was one time Ambassador Wang Shu, the Second Chinese Ambassador to West Germany, who asked to meet the Deputy Chairman of the SPD faction in the German Bundestag. I called his secretary about the meeting and she gave me a very cold response. His secretary replied:

“you have to submit an official letter stating that your Chinese Ambassador offered to meet with our Deputy Chairman and then we will see if we can do the meeting.” I use this example to illustrate our relations with the SPD. From early on we were willing to develop relations with the SPD and the SPD on their part were in general not against developing relations with China. That was the situation. But in specific cases, in terms of setting up a meeting and having a talk with someone, it was a bit difficult sometimes to have contact with the SPD. That’s it.

CHEN JIAN: Did the meeting eventually take place?

AMBASSADOR YANG CHENGXU: As I recall, not officially, but there were conversations during some public occasions.

AMBASSADOR SIR JOHN BOYD: May I also thank Ambassador Mei for his nice remarks about Ted Heath, who was also very kind to me and my wife as well. On the French, no, we were never jealous of the French. What an extraordinary question. We just have a little tugging and pulling from time to time. I think the answer to your question is it was suited for a great man like de Gaulle and a great man like Mao to proceed in the way they did. There was no hope of Britain proceeding at that particular moment in time in exactly that way. Anyway, we have other ways of coming back at the French. I’ll just mention two, which may interest the group. The first was the famous de Gaulle visit to Warsaw when suddenly, this written in foreign office files, he did a walkabout and he mingled with young people and students and he went straight up to a young man and harangued him warmly about the future relations between France and Poland. The only snag was that it was the Third Secretary from the British Embassy! And the second thing is, on sort of surprising recognitions, during a conference in Korea, I don’t remember the exact year, it’s a few years ago, Tony Blair decided to recognize North Korea, thereby getting in ahead of the French and causing definite annoyance in that direction. But this is a game diplomats play. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR KSAWERY BURSKI: Thank you very much. The information that Ambassador Mei just presented about the unification of Germany is extremely

interesting and important. I would like to add two points. First, the economic relations between the GDR and the Federal Republic and the scope of indebtedness of the GDR to the Federal Republic, as well as the scope of Soviet indebtedness to the Federal Republic. This has some influence on the process of reunification. Secondly, I would like to remind you that when the wall, the Berlin Wall was collapsing, Chancellor Kohl was paying an official visit to Poland, signing new agreements with the Polish new government elected on the June 4, 1989, and this was not a communist government; the first non-communist government. We had Mr. Mazowiecki as prime minister and Professor Skubiszewski, a well-known expert on Germany and International Law, as Foreign Minister. And the two men were negotiating with Chancellor Kohl the future relations between Poland and Germany. Chancellor Kohl cut short his visit, he returned to Berlin for two days, and then again returned to Poland to continue his official visit in Poland. That's all, thank you.

AMBASSADOR ROLAND BIMO: Thank you very much. In fact I would like to direct this question to Ambassador Boyd and it has to do with China's admission to the United Nations. It occurred to me that this happened between two visits: Kissinger's visit to Beijing and then Nixon's visit. So my question is, how did this Sino-American engagement influence the position of Western European countries in the debate at the United Nations when it came to Chinese admission, the restoration of the lawful right as Security Council member?

AMBASSADOR SIR JOHN BOYD: Shall I? I should think the reaction of Western Europeans as a whole was one of huge relief to have the China seat problem settled. I think Britain abstained in that vote, I think the United States was the only one to vote against but clearly in the recognition of what was going to happen and probably there was great relief in the State Department too.

LEOPOLDO NUTI: My first question is to Ambassador Yang about a crucial question in German foreign policy at that time—you were there—namely the Euro-missiles question. I've read some accounts that the Chinese government actually encouraged the Western Europeans to go ahead with NATO "dual-track" decision and deploy the missiles, and I would like to know from you if you have any personal

recollection of the time you were there of any meetings with people in the German government, particularly in the Kohl government since the 1982 elections when Kohl was elected as Chancellor. If you have any recollections of the Chinese government urging the East German government to go ahead with the deployment. So if you could please find, if you have any memories about this specific issue.

And I have a second question for Ambassador Boyd and I will try to be brief. And that is, I've come across one interpretation of Kissinger's triangular diplomacy that somehow relates to this discussion that was going on about the fear of Russian attack against China. Namely that Kissinger's triangular diplomacy was mostly meant to buy time in the sense that what Kissinger really wanted was to calm the Russians down while he was building China up and so that any overture towards Moscow was not really meant with Moscow in mind, but in a way it was meant to ring truer to Moscow in order to prevent it from striking against China while China was being built up. And I wonder whether this was your interpretation of what was going on at that time or whether you had a completely different one. So how did you interpret the ultimate goal of Kissinger's triangular diplomacy at that time? Thank you.

AMBASSADOR YANG CHENGXU: I didn't quite catch the question.

LEOPOLDO NUTI: Okay. Yes, my question is: one of the crucial questions for German foreign policy at the time—you were there in the early 1980s—was the so-called Euro-missiles question, which played such a central role in the foreign policy debates at the time. And my question is, do you remember talking about this particular problem with the German politicians? And what was the official Chinese position on this specific problem? Because I have come across several secondary sources claiming that the Chinese government actually urged the Western Europeans to deploy the missiles and that the Chinese government approved the NATO decision on 1979 to deploy these weapons.

AMBASSADOR YANG CHENGXU: As I see, at the time, China didn't encourage this proposal of West Germany or Schmidt about the deployment of intermediate-range missiles directed at the Soviet Union. As far as I remember, we didn't encourage the Schmidt government to do that. But on the other hand we had a

consistent policy at the time—that is, European countries should adopt appropriate measures to cope with the Soviet threat. That’s basically it.

AMBASSADOR MEI ZHAORONG: I want to briefly respond to that question. In the early 1980s, during our contacts with the West German government, the Schmidt government, we constantly reminded them of the danger posed by the Soviet Union. We reminded the Western European countries of the Soviet danger in response to the détente in relations between the Soviet Union and Western Europe. But in the case of the deployment of middle-range missiles, or the “double decision” advocated by the Schmidt government, meaning that if you Soviet Union won’t do it, we Western Europe won’t do it, we didn’t make specific comments nor adopt any position since the matter concerned the relations between the Soviet Union and Western European, NATO countries in particular. However, we could understand that decision, so to speak. Since we were of the opinion that the Soviet Union was a threat to Western Europe, we could understand that Western Europe would take some counter-threat measures. But we didn’t voice support or made public statements on that.

AMBASSADOR SIR JOHN BOYD: Thank you. Just on that last point, I think probably the warning was sufficient to indicate where China’s sympathies lay in this matter. I moved onto my posting in Bonn, it so happens in that period, and I’m sure that was influential warning.

Now, Kissinger, well I can’t read Kissinger’s mind in retrospect. My own mind is simpler, I think it was, he hoped that it would stop the Russians. It was tantamount to a US veto on an adventurous ploy that was in the Soviet mind. Of course, the person who would ultimately decide in the case of that kind would be the President himself; he knew what balance he wanted to see struck in that triangular situation. The sad bit if you’d like, coming back to Kissinger is that, that linkage business didn’t really help the United States over Vietnam as Kissinger had hoped I think. Thank you.

SESSION III

MASSIMILIANO GUDERZO: I think the discussion so far has enabled us to understand what we want from this meeting, this conference. Today we're going to the Western part of Europe and of the things that we might try to understand today is whether in those days—the 1970s and 1980s—there was a kind of calculation of what could come out of the new relations that were being set down with Western Europe against the background of the rapprochement between the United States and China.

I don't think I have to introduce our distinguished guests and panelists because we have the notes together with us. So let me just say that we have on the witness side two ambassadors, who, though not yet ambassadors, were in very special positions, I would say, at the beginning of the 1970s. So we might ask them their views on those very important years—1969, 1970, 1971, 1972—a moment, of transition, in which the so-called bi-polar world appeared to be not so bi-polar any longer. Even if it's still easy to think of the Cold War in bi-polar terms; probably the Cold War was bi-polar for a very, very short time and then the 1960s are much more interesting if we started them from an intra-bloc perception rather than from an inter-bloc perception. What was happening within the Atlantic Alliance? What was happening within the Warsaw Pact, and within of course the two blocs?

And then there is another moment of particular interest for us, and it is the one when you were in the determining position, not only as politicians on the spot, but also as policy-makers, and I'm referring to the extremely interesting period—1980-1985. I think in those days you were in positions within your departments at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and you could see how the policies, respectively, of Italy and China, were being made and decided. You probably, also made important decisions in that sense. So what was happening in that first half of the 1980s? I'm very interested in asking this because if we go to the dates, 1980-1985, we are talking about the days in which, probably, a new kind of multi-polarity could be at least thought of, because the Cold War was apparently coming to an end, especially 1985 when Gorbachev came into the Kremlin. The rules of engagement are the same as yesterday, so you know how many minutes you have. And I first give the floor to Professor Qiang Zhai from Auburn University.



MASSIMILIANO GUDERZO

QIANG ZHAI: The 1960s was an eventful decade and a turning point for China's diplomacy. In yesterday's session, many scholars gave relevant discussions, so today I will follow up to talk about the 1960s and then the 1970s. About the 1960s, as we all know, China encountered many crises in terms of its standing in the international communist movement; it had arguments, strained or ruptured relationships with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries; meanwhile, there were serious tensions in relations between China and India due to the border dispute. So China's international standing and diplomacy faced difficulties, but amidst difficulties Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders were seeking new breakthroughs. Mao Zedong adopted pragmatic approaches in several important ways, which, so to speak, put into full practice his pragmatic strategy of "making use of conflict to divide and conquer;" then it happened the establishment of Sino-French diplomatic relations, followed by the détente in relations between China and the United States in the late 1960s and the early 1970s.

I'll start with the establishment of Sino-French diplomatic ties. Among the presenters of this session, Ambassador Cai Fangbo once served as China's Ambassador to France, and I very much look forward to hearing his detailed account of the event later. My view is that the establishment of Sino-French diplomatic ties, as a significant event in China's diplomacy of the 1960s, hasn't been given much attention, while Sino-Soviet relations and the Sino-US détente have inspired volumes. As a matter of fact, the establishment of Sino-French relations paved the way for the Sino-US détente; there was continuity in the development of things. The key question is: why did the establishment of the relations between China and France happen in the 1960s? Especially considering earlier, in 1949, shortly after the founding of the PRC, France expressed a wish to—and showed positive attitude towards acknowledging the PRC, but the Chinese side didn't respond in kind. Why? Why was the mutual acknowledgement put off for fifteen years and not made until 1964? What contributed to the delay, the pause? Why did the turning point come in 1964? What connection did the establishment of relations have with the "two intermediate zones" theory Mao Zedong put forth around the same time?⁶⁹ At the time, Mao

⁶⁹ See "Zhongjian didai you liang ge" ("There Are Two Intermediate Zones"), September 1963, January 1964, and July 1964, in Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao bu and zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, eds., *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan*, 506-509.

Zedong pointed out that there existed “two intermediate zones” in the world: the colonial and semi-colonial states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that are seeking national independence, they constitute the first intermediate zone; the developed capitalist countries in the West, such as Western Europe and Canada, and Japan, constitute the second intermediate zone. Mao Zedong’s view was that China could seek cooperation with those countries for building a united front against the United States and the Soviet Union and managing the world affairs. It was in this context that China sought cooperation with France.

Another thing of interest concerning the establishment of Sino-French relations is that it was the first and only time in the history of the PRC’s diplomacy that China hadn’t demanded the other country to first break off diplomatic ties with the GMD government as a precondition for establishing diplomatic relations with China. The French case was a very special case. Why was the Chinese leadership willing to make that strategic adjustment to establish diplomatic ties with France? What impact did the establishment of Sino-French relations have on the détente in relations between China and the US later on? What role did it play in the debates on China policy within the US government and in the US society? Especially we know that Nixon was personally very close with de Gaulle, who advised him on several occasions to pay attention to the PRC’s existence and the need to improve relations with China. In that sense, the establishment of Sino-French relations actually served as reference for the US to ease relations with China. Then, what impact did the Sino-US détente in the late 1960s and the early 1970s have on the Western European countries? Meaning, how did the US allies in Western Europe react to the development? I hope the ambassadors will later talk about these issues.

As we know, in the 1970s, one major concern of Mao Zedong was how to build an international anti-Soviet united front. As some scholars mentioned yesterday, at that time, Mao Zedong put forth the theory of so-called “*yitiaoxian, yidapian*.” Recently I read Kissinger’s book *On China*, in which he translated “*yitiaoxian*” as “a horizontal line,” meaning a line of countries, from the United States to Japan to West Europe, that China could cooperate with; “*yidapian*,” translated by Kissinger as “a big terrain,” meaning that China could also cooperate with those countries close to the “horizontal line” in order to secure an international anti-Soviet united front as

extensive as possible.⁷⁰ Here I want to know how the Western European countries viewed this proposal from Mao Zedong, particularly in relations to China's opposition to Europe's gestures at the time towards easing relations with the Soviet Union. At the time, there were a lot of talks in China, about the Soviet Union adopting diversion tactics, about shifting troubles to the East; anyway, a lot of concerns about some actions Western Europe and the US took at the time in easing relations with the Soviet Union. I want to know what impact China's concerns had on the Western European countries. I hope there will be more discussions in that aspect. As for the later period, the 1980s, I will not raise further questions and the scholars after me may have relevant questions. That's all.

ENRICO FARDELLA: I have four questions that are connected with what my colleague first said.

The first question is for the Chinese ambassadors and it is connected to the different perspective that Beijing had towards France and Italy in 1964. As said before, in 1964, in order to reach diplomatic normalization with France, Mao never demanded the simultaneous breaking of relations with Taipei, Taiwan, as a precondition. In fact, it happened as an initiative of Jiang Jieshi, not because Mao imposed it. Soon after, the Italian Socialist Party, that same year, tried to follow the French example and, as reported in a memorandum dated May 29, 1964—with the conversations between Vittorelli, a socialist senator, and Chen Yi—in order to speed up the recognition of the People's Republic, it was decided to open a commercial office with diplomatic status in the capitals of the two countries, so that diplomatic normalization could be reached with Beijing by the end of 1964.⁷¹

Now, the tensions caused by the war in Vietnam seemed to have prevented the plan from being successfully completed. This appears in several Chinese documents as well as Italian documents and it was confirmed by Fanfani to Chinese diplomats.

The Chinese believed, therefore, that because of the war in Vietnam, the Americans had forced the Italians to cool the political component of their relations with the People's Republic.

⁷⁰ Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), 277-292.

⁷¹ Memorandum for Chen Yi, May 29, 1964, PRC FMA 110-02011-08.

In another memorandum, however, on June 2, 1964—which reported the conversations between Vittorelli and Mao—Mao was the one who slowed down the normalization process proposed by Vittorelli and the Italian Socialist Party. Mao said that there was no hurry and that it was first necessary to normalize economic relations as the basis for diplomatic normalization.⁷² So my question is: why did Mao make this decision? If normalization with France had demonstrated the effectiveness of Mao's strategy, which sought to deepen the contradictions in the imperialist front, why didn't he consolidate this strategy reaching normalization with Italy immediately?

The second question is linked instead to the first and refers to the way in which the Chinese looked at negotiations with Italy during the second phase, around 1969-1970. As rightly suggested yesterday by Ambassador Menegatti in our conversation, in 1968-1969 Italy was not very appealing for the Chinese economy. It is therefore obvious that normalization with Italy in 1970 had a purely political value. As Ambassador Huang Zhen said to Italian Ambassador Malfatti in September 1969, the Chinese were trying to use the negotiations with Rome and with Canada as a test to create a precedent that could be used with other more important powers such as the United States or Japan.⁷³

The negotiations with Italy seemed to be indirect negotiations with yesterday's opponents rather than another step in the old strategy aimed to underscore the contradictions in the imperialist front. The same could also be said of the Americans. Immediately after the recognition of the People's Republic by Canada in October 1970—that ushered in the famous formula of "taking note"—the United States strongly pressed the Italians—as Ambassador Ortona said—to propose yet again the theory of two Chinas. Italy, they said, could be a bridge for all other countries that would later recognize the People's Republic, including the United States.

I would like to know what the ambassadors think about this.

The third consideration is specifically for Ambassador Menegatti and it concerns the notes exchanged between November and December 1968 between the Head

⁷² Memorandum of Conversation between Mao Zedong and Vittorelli-Santagnello, June 2, 1964, PRC FMA 1110-2011-013.

⁷³ Letter n.429, Malfatti to Moro, September 30, 1969, Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (hereafter ASMAE).

of Political Affairs of the Italian Foreign Ministry, Roberto Gaia, the Italian ambassador in Washington, Egidio Ortona, and Italian Foreign Minister Nenni. The two Italian diplomats reported to the Minister that the climate in the United States seemed to be favorable for a radical revision of their policy towards the People's Republic, especially after the approval of negotiations with the North Vietnamese by the Chinese.

In January 1969, in a personal letter sent to Nenni, Ortona wrote that the United States and Italy had “parallel differences” (*divergenze parallele*) in their policy towards the People's Republic.⁷⁴ And I would appreciate if Ambassador Menegatti could share his critical comments on this issue with us.

The last consideration is linked to the negotiations with Italy. The return to Paris of Huang Zhen, appointed in the 9th Congress in April 1969 to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, seemed, as Mario Crema, the delegate of the Foreign Trade Institute in Beijing, wrote in June 1969, a step which seemed to go beyond the Cultural Revolution and aimed at the return of China in the international community and thus at a consolidation of relations especially with European countries.⁷⁵ A clear progress in negotiations with Italy, however, came only in the fall of 1969, a perfect coincidence with the progress of those days in the field of Sino-US relations. As we know, in fact, starting from September 1969, the Marshals finally suggested to Mao to play the American move and, between December 1969 and February 1970, the channel with Warsaw was opened again. The Chinese agreed, in fact, to high-level meetings with the Americans without binding them to the solution of the Taiwan issue. At the same time, the Chinese dropped some of their demands at the negotiating table with the Italians.

I would ask the ambassadors if they could help us reconstruct those steps and to pinpoint a specific crucial moment or an episode at that stage that influenced the Chinese approach to negotiations with the Italians. Thank you.

GARRETT MARTIN: The normalization of relations between France and the People's Republic of China in January 1964 was a very important moment in relations between China and Western Europe. Now for French President Charles de

⁷⁴ Personal Letter n. 825, Ortona to Nenni, January 28, 1969, ASMAE.

⁷⁵ Letter, Crema to Nenni, June 26, 1969, ASMAE.

Gaulle, the normalization of relations was a sort of result of his political philosophy which emphasized national identity over ideology. It was the result of a common view of multi-polarity, that common opposition to the Limited Test Ban Nuclear Treaty of August 1963. For de Gaulle it was also a sign of trying to act like a great power and also I would say specifically for France, they hoped that by establishing a dialogue with the People's Republic of China, they could have more influence over the escalating events in Indochina. I think that's another feature—the Vietnam War does become a very important facet of the relations between Western Europe and China in the 1960s and I think that's an element that needs to be discussed as well.

Now I don't want to talk too long but I think I would try to come up with some specific questions for our distinguished witnesses, so I'm just going to list a couple of questions and hopefully we will be able to focus on some of them. So my first question would be for our two Chinese diplomats, specifically how did they view relations between the United States and Western Europe as a whole? How did they view it specifically in the 1960s and 1970s when Western Europe does become a more significant actor on the international stage? How did that view fit within the "intermediate zones" presented by Chairman Mao at the time? And also another feature is, how did they understand the developments of the process of European integration? How did the European economic community feature in the sort of strategic thinking of China in the 1960s and the 1970s? Now I think we have a great witness in Ambassador Cai next to me who was really present at the creation of Sino-French relations, since from what I learned this morning he was sent to France even before the first Chinese Ambassador Huang Zhen. So maybe I'll be curious if Ambassador Cai could talk a little bit about his expectations when he arrived in Paris in 1964. What did he imagine would happen? How did he imagine relations between the two countries would develop? Did they meet expectations?

Thirdly, I think an important aspect of relations with China from the perspective of de Gaulle was his ambitions towards the Soviet Union. Certainly having relations with the People's Republic of China was leverage in his desire to have a dialogue and détente with the Soviet Union. But how did the Chinese government view the building or the blossoming European-Soviet détente in the latter part of the 1960s. Did they view that as a problem? Maybe this question is more for Ambassador Menegatti but also if I can involve Ambassador Boyd, since they were both present in China in



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the mid- to late 1960s during a pretty troublesome period. How did they view the developments in China when they were stationed there? Did they have contacts with other Western diplomats? How did they share information? I mean specifically, how much of a long term impact did the Cultural Revolution have on their country's understanding or vision of China? Maybe a final question, something from the French perspective, there was a hope that down the line, having privileged political ties with China could be a bridge towards better economic ties. But yet that did not happen. It seems from the French perspective that the Chinese government was happy to separate political ties with economic ties. Now to what extent was that a correct assumption? Thank you very much I look forward to your replies.

AMBASSADOR CAI FANGBO: Thank you, chairman. There have been a dozen or so questions asked. I will try to answer them in my following presentation, and as for any further questions, let's leave it for future discussions. First I would like to say that I'm very glad to participate in this conference, and since I am both a witness and a researcher of Sino-French relations for the past forty-eight years, I would like to give a brief retrospect of the establishment of Sino-French relations, its great significance and its impact. There is an old Chinese saying, "Learn the past for the future," and I hope what I am saying now can serve that purpose.

My presentation on the establishment of Sino-French diplomatic relations will address the following four aspects: first, the background; second, the obstacles; third, the historical significance; and fourth, the impact of the establishment and development of Sino-French relations on the relations between China and Europe.

Now first, the historical background of the establishment of Sino-French diplomatic ties. We all know that France was under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle in the early 1950s and de Gaulle's political philosophy emphasized national independence and breaking down the bi-polar world structure, along with the strategy of, by association with both the United States and the Soviet Union, gaining leverage with both countries and seeking for France the position of a great power. Such pursuit increased the chance of France and West Europe to develop relations with China. On March 18, 1962, France and Algeria signed the Évian Accords which put an end to the Algerian War and thus removed the last political obstacle to the establishment of Sino-French relations. Some people asked earlier: Why the establishment of rela-

tions happened in 1964? Because before that, there was the Algerian War, on which China's clear position was supporting the Algeria's fight against the French colonial rule. So at the time, it was not possible for France and China to establish diplomatic ties. But after 1962, the Algerian issue was solved and so went the last political obstacle for the two countries to establish diplomatic ties. Things became possible.

Also, on the Chinese side, as some people just mentioned, Chairman Mao Zedong's theory of "the two intermediate zones" defined the Western European countries as "the second intermediate zone" possible for China to win over and co-operate with. On August 30, 1963, de Gaulle called in the former Prime Minister Edgar Faure and told him, "I asked you about establishing relations with China in the past, you said it was not the right time because of the Algerian War. Now that things are different, what do you think?" Faure replied that now the General could work on it. De Gaulle then sent Faure on a visit to China, with the secret mission of talking with the Chinese leaders on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two sides. Faure visited China in October 1963, at the invitation of Zhang Xiruo, President of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs. Faure had a personal handwritten letter from de Gaulle authorizing him as de Gaulle's representative in the talks with the Chinese leadership on the establishment of relations. So Faure had an interview with Chairman Mao and then had six meetings with Premier Zhou Enlai, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Chen Yi and other Chinese leaders. In the end, an agreement was reached between the two sides, which was only possible against the backgrounds I just described. That is the first thing I want to talk about.⁷⁶

The second thing: what were the problems facing the establishment of Sino-French relations? In general, it was a smooth process, but there were difficulties and complications regarding details. But since both sides had the political will to quickly establish diplomatic ties, all the problems over details were eventually solved through negotiations during the six meetings Faure had with Premier Zhou Enlai

⁷⁶ Edgar Faure visited China from October 21-November 2, 1963. He met with Mao Zedong on November 2. He also held several meetings with Zhou Enlai prior to meeting Mao, including on October 23, October 25, October 31, and November 1. See, respectively, Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Mao Zedong nianpu (yijiusijiu-yijiunian)*, vol. 5, 275-277, and Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949-1976)*, vol. 2, 590-593.

**“Faure had
a personal**

handwritten letter
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representative in
the talks with the
Chinese leadership.”

and Vice Premier Chen Yi. Then what were those problems? The primary problem was Taiwan. In the negotiations, Faure expressed two points: first, France does not like to break off its relations with Taiwan on its own initiative; second, France would like to maintain a low-level consular post in Taiwan. In response, Premier Zhou pointed out China’s absolute opposition to the concept of “two Chinas” and emphasized that there was no arguing on that point. And as for France to maintain a low-level consular post in Taiwan, Premier Zhou said that was not possible for China either and mentioned that the reason that China was still in semi-diplomatic relations with Britain at the time was because Britain was having a consulate in Taiwan. With that said, the negotiations came to an impasse. Under the circumstances, Premier Zhou Enlai suspended the talks for the time being and arrange for Faure and his wife to have a trip to two Chinese cities—Datong and Hohhot. Why the trip? The purpose was to allow both sides some time and space to think. Three days later, Faure came back from the trip and was presented with a proposal from the Chinese side. Based on that, after repeated negotiations, on November 2, the two sides finally reached a tacit understanding on three points that broke the deadlock created by the Taiwan issue. Then Faure went via Rangoon and New Delhi back to France to report to de Gaulle.

Then what were the three points agreed by the two sides in the tacit understanding? According to the declassified documents so far, the two sides reached a tacit understanding on the following points: one, the French government acknowledges the legitimacy of the PRC government as the sole legal government in China, which automatically implies that capacity no longer belongs to the so-called “Republic of China” government of Taiwan; two, France supports the PRC’s representation and no longer supports the representation of the so-called “Republic of China” in the United Nations; and three, after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France, France withdraws its diplomatic representative or mission from Taiwan or demands the so-called “Republic of China” government of Taiwan to withdraw its diplomatic representative or mission from France. That was the content of the “tacit understanding” in the agreement reached and signed between Primer Zhou Enlai and France’s former Prime Minister Faure.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ See untitled Chinese Foreign Ministry report on the establishment of diplomatic relations with France, 1964, PRC FMA 110-01998-01.

After Faure got back to France, he reported the deal to General de Gaulle and de Gaulle approved it with alacrity. In December of the same year, the French side sent Jacques de Beaumarchais, Director of European Affairs of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Chinese Embassy in Switzerland to meet and negotiate the details of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Ambassador Li Qingquan, the Chinese Ambassador to Switzerland. During the first meeting, de Beaumarchais proposed to announce the establishment of diplomatic relations through both sides separately publishing a joint communiqué of the same contents, instead of through the procedures agreed in Beijing; and as for the contents of the communiqué, he said the simpler, the better. That changed the procedures agreed in Beijing. Under the circumstances, Ambassador Li Qingquan said he was not authorized to agree or disagree.⁷⁸ Why did the French side want to change the previously agreed procedures? Why for them, was the joint communiqué the simpler, the better? The key issue was still the French reluctance to take the responsibility of breaking off their diplomatic ties with Taiwan. In terms of the contents of the joint communiqué, the French side proposed to be two sentences. The first sentence is: “the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Republic of China have jointly decided to establish diplomatic relations.” The second sentence is: “to this effect, they have agreed to designate Ambassadors within three months.” That was all to it; very simple.

Then Ambassador Li Xinquan flew to Algiers, Algeria, because Premier Zhou was visiting Algiers at the time. He went there for reporting to Premier Zhou about the meeting. Premier Zhou went to meet Ambassador Li and gave him specific instructions on many details concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations with France. Afterwards, Ambassador Li returned to Switzerland and had a second meeting with de Beaumarchais. During the second meeting, Ambassador Li said, “We still want to follow the agreement reached in Beijing and establish relations by exchange of notes.” The French side replied, “Our proposal doesn’t change the spirit of the Beijing agreement.” In that case, Ambassador Li agreed to the French proposal and then the spirit of the communiqué proposed by the French side. So the issue with the joint communiqué was settled. But then the Chinese side demanded that

⁷⁸ See “Zhong Fa jianjiao di si ci huitan jilu” (“Conversation Transcript of the Fourth Talk for the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and France”), January 24, 1964, PRC FMA 110-01997-07.

our side make a separate statement that the PRC government establishes diplomatic relations with France as the sole legitimate government of China. De Beaumarchais in turn said he couldn't decide and would have to ask Paris for instructions. He did that and Paris agreed. So besides the publication of the joint communiqué, the Chinese side released a separate statement. Thus diplomatic relations were established. That's the second thing I wanted to talk about.

The third point, about the significance of the establishment of Sino-French diplomatic relations. Its significance, to use an expression of the media at the time, was “a diplomatic nuclear explosion.”⁷⁹ Why was the event called “a diplomatic nuclear explosion?” I understand it from three aspects. First, China and France were two big countries belonging to two different camps, and therefore the establishment of diplomatic relations between them—the act itself broke through the bi-polar structure controlled by the US and the Soviet Union. Second, both China and France had their respective independent foreign policies and the establishment of diplomatic relations between France and China set an example for other countries to follow, as General de Gaulle said in the press conference in January 31: Some people are still hesitating, but they will follow the footsteps of France in the future. That turned out to be true. The other countries, including the US, followed the footsteps of France and established diplomatic relations with China. Third, the wish to establish diplomatic relations for both China and France was the result of the respective strategic environments the two countries were in. General de Gaulle's aim with relations with China was to break away from US control and seek for France the status of a unique great power in international affairs. Back in 1958, de Gaulle wrote letters to the heads of the US and British governments, proposing a US-Britain-France triumvirate in control of the West, but both the US and Britain rejected the proposal. Under the circumstances, de Gaulle adopted the policy to ease relations and make reconciliation and cooperation with the Soviet Union on the one hand and establish diplomatic relations with China on the other hand and express France's independence. In that sense, the establishment of Sino-French diplomatic relations was the first step to a multi-polar world.

⁷⁹ Though “wajijiao he baozha” (“diplomatic nuclear explosion”) is widely used in Chinese sources to describe the Sino-French normalization, the origins of the phrase are unclear.

The last point, about the impact of the establishment and development of diplomatic relations between China and France on the relations between China and Europe: the establishment of Sino-French diplomatic relations opened the grounds for Western European countries to develop relations with China, though at the time, some countries such as Germany and Italy still had concerns because of US pressure and as a result did not dare to follow France's footsteps to establish diplomatic relations with China. Under the circumstances, Italy and Austria, successively, established a commercial representative's office in China; West Germany and Belgium increased contacts and developed trade with China. Led by the French example, the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Italy in November 1970 initiated another wave of countries establishing diplomatic ties with China. In that context, Sino-British relations and Sino-Dutch relations were upgraded from the chargé d'affaires level to the ambassadorial level in 1972. Then the European Community sought to establish diplomatic ties with China, which was realized in 1975. The event was greatly appreciated by the whole of Europe. At that time, Deng Xiaoping was on a visit to France, and from the French President to the Prime Minister to the French Parliament expressed appreciation for China's acknowledgement of the EC.⁸⁰ So in his report on the French visit, Deng Xiaoping added a sentence, "the measure we have recently taken to establish relations with the Common Market is correct."

It is true that the relations between China and France also have had negative effect on the relations between China and Europe. From 1989 to 1993, Sino-French relations were at their lowest level, mainly as a result of three issues. The first issue was that after the June 4 incident in Beijing in 1989, France took the lead on the sanctions on China. Then France twice sold weapons to Taiwan, which damaged the relations between our two sides; then—

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN: Unfortunately, ambassador, we have to bring this to a close. We have other speakers as well and we want to give them time as well. So please.

⁸⁰ Martin Albers, "Seeking Truth from Facts: Deng Xiaoping's Visit to France in 1975," *CWIHP e-Dossier* no. 45 (November 2013).

"Why was the event called

"a diplomatic nuclear explosion?"

AMBASSADOR CAI FANGBO: I think, with globalization and the development of multi-polarity in the world, Sino-French relations were not only back on track but also have developed into a comprehensive strategic partnership. However, regrettably, some leftover issues from the Cold War period are still troubling the relations between China and Europe. For example, the EU still follows the policy of arms embargo against China, made twenty-three years ago for sanctions on China at the time. Now that policy not only conflicts with the reality of the Sino-European relationship but serves no practical purpose; it is also political discrimination. And in the last analysis, it is not even in the interest of Europe itself. China has been relying on its own efforts to build a modern defense industry and we have been seeing positive results of that effort. Such erroneous policy goes against the tide of history and I hope our European friends will address the error soon. Thank you.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN: Thank you. May I just interject before we go to the next speaker? Ambassador Cai, you were in a unique and privileged position at the time to shed light on the beginnings of the PRC-French relationship. And what is much more interesting to the scholars here is not an account of the history of the establishment of that relationship, because that history is well-known. What we are really interested in, is your personal perspective of these events. Your view of these events. So with regard to the following speakers, I would really suggest not to give another historical account, but to respond to the questions that were asked. That's why we have this unique opportunity here together. Not to give general accounts, but to take advantage of your tremendous knowledge and insights and experience from being a witness to these events. So I would like to encourage all of the witnesses here not to re-iterate histories that are well-known already, but to give your personal insights and experiences; where you were of meetings, where you were part of the process, to highlight those episodes. That I think what's of real interest to the scholars here. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR CHEN BAOSHUN: Thank you. Distinguished scholars, ladies and gentlemen, my presentation will be less heavy than yesterday's and earlier. I am very honored to have been invited to the conference with you to remember a bitter time that existed in the world; but first of all, I wish to extend my best regards

to all of you and, in particular, my heartfelt thanks to the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies, Beijing University, and Shanghai's Jiaotong University, and to Professor Enrico Fardella with whom we became good friends during the preparations of the conference in Beijing. Returning to Italy, I cannot hide my joy that I am close to my favorite people, the Italians. I feel as if I were at home, the place where I used to stay, among university professors and classmates, dear friends and colleagues who will always have a place in my heart. My warmest greetings go to you. After forty-eight years, it is also a joy for me to be in the land of Sicily, which I have always admired for its splendid history, the beauty of the nature, and its kind and hospitable people, it too proven by the wounds of war. Then I saw, with my own eyes, the ruins and rubble in the center of the city of Palermo, which hurt my heart deeply.

Today we are all here because we are sure that the bitter period of the Cold War has now been relinquished from the process of human history. The fire of the Second World War was quenched in May in Europe and in August 1945 in Asia when Japan surrendered. Then the peoples of the world had to start the reconstruction of their countries, helping one another, to recover from the serious wounds and losses caused by the war to live in dignity. Unfortunately, a specter was hovering in the sky and enveloped every country of the world including Italy. That specter prevented normal relations of economic and cultural exchanges between all countries. The same happened between the Italian and Chinese peoples. I started my visits to Europe in January 1960, as a university student, first in Geneva and then at the Sapienza University of Rome. Then I worked as a diplomat at the Chinese Embassy in Rome. I have gained a long and intense experience to remember in my life and I witnessed the enthusiastic efforts and contributions of the Italian people to the reconstruction of their country. Italy's economic development proceeded at high speed, as high as 15 percent, opening the so-called "period of the economic miracle." The standard of living of the Italian people improved and I felt deep down their satisfaction. All this happened in a historical context. Italy, after accepting the help of the United States—the Marshall Plan—could not help being subdued by US pressure and hence by the Cold War. However, at that time, the Italian government did not fail to explore opportunities to normalize relations with China. However, under the wrong assumption of the so-called "two Chinas," any effort by the Italian government was in vain.

“The French case convinced Italian politicians to think about the issue.”

The Chinese people resisted more than eight years against the Japanese invaders. The war had claimed thirty million lives, Chinese lives—not to mention the loss of wealth! However, the birth of New China in 1949 was not welcomed by the majority of Western countries, burdened by the nightmare of the Cold War, because the United States was pursuing a hostile policy of sanctions against the New China.

However, the events would often take a different twist that politicians did not expect. France, with an independent foreign policy, was the first to emerge from the nightmare of the Cold War. In January 1964, the French Government decided to establish diplomatic relations with China, which resulted in a broad and strong relationship in the world, with a whole series of countries that followed France’s example to normalize relations with China. Unlike France, Italy did not have an independent foreign policy. However, due to their own interests, Italian politicians were trying to get in touch with the Chinese government in several ways. However, the French case convinced Italian politicians to think about the issue. In July of that same year, Senator Paul Vittorelli visited China and was received by Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Chen Yi.⁸¹ Then, in December, a Chinese delegation composed of the Chinese Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, Lei Yeming, came to Rome with three other prominent officials. On behalf of China, the consul signed, with ICE officials, an agreement to open a trade relations office in the two capitals respectively. Clearly, the Italian senior politicians were seeking with their wisdom a way to minimize the American intervention and the influence of the Cold War, following the evolution of the international situation. It was the first agreement on bilateral Sino-Italian relations. The agreement marked the first step towards the normalization of relations between the two countries which would be imminent. So it was of great significance for better mutual knowledge between the two peoples. The nightmare of the Cold War was about to disappear and this facilitated Sino-Italian relations.

On January 20, 1969, Pietro Nenni, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated on behalf of the Italian Government that it recognized the government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of the entire Chinese people. After a long negotiation, in Paris, on November 6, 1970, representatives from the Chinese and Italian embassies signed the joint communiqué on the establishment of

⁸¹ Paolo Vittorelli met Mao Zedong on June 2, 1964. See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Mao Zedong nianpu (yijusiji-yijiuqiliu)*, vol. 5, 356.

diplomatic relations between the two countries. The two peoples together were writing a new page in history and that statement marked a milestone to tighten relations between the two countries in every sense. The arrival of the first Chinese ambassador to Rome offered further proof of the sympathy of the Italian people towards the Chinese people and of the good will of the Italian government towards China, with a simple protocol arrangement, holding the audience at the Quirinale in a very short time, only after less than thirty hours from the ambassador's arrival.

On April 20, 1971, His Excellency Ambassador Shen Ping presented his credentials to the President of the Italian Republic, Giuseppe Saragat, an historical moment in the contemporary history of both countries. During the conversation, the President told the ambassador that for years he had nourished a most genuine and warm feeling of friendship for the Chinese people and expressed the desire of the Italian government to develop the broadest possible relationships of cooperation and friendship with China. They had freed Sino-Italian relations from the nightmare of the specter of the Cold War. Both governments wanted to accelerate the steps to forward relations between the two countries in all fields.

Here I would like to dwell on a few significant and historical figures to learn more about the process of development of diplomatic relations between the two countries. After the founding of New China in 1950, the volume of imports and exports between the two countries amounted to only USD 3.22 million; at the establishment of the commercial relations offices, the volume of trade reached USD 85 million, and in 1980, after the establishment of diplomatic relations, it exceeded USD 1 billion. Italy was the first European country that offered credit facilities to China in November 1979; the Italian government then offered China a loan of USD one million to China. Meanwhile, the two governments decided to form a joint committee, which held its meeting from year to year in their respective capitals to launch various development projects in the economic and technical-scientific fields.

Italy saw China as the main country to which it would grant the most favorable conditions by providing mixed credit facilities, including donations and low interests to support the implementation of economic and technical-scientific projects between the two countries. In the political and cultural fields, it is worth mentioning a few examples to acknowledge the efforts of Italian politicians. Senator Vittorino Colombo, a prominent disinterested and faithful Christian politician, set up the

Italian-Chinese Institute for economic and cultural exchanges with China. This institute still plays an active role. In November 1971, Senator Vittorino Colombo had made his first visit of friendship to China and was welcomed by Premier Zhou Enlai. From then on, the senator devoted his entire life incessantly and tirelessly to building the friendship between our two peoples and made a major contribution to the promotion of economic and cultural exchanges between the two countries with more than twenty trips to China.

Now I need to pause for a moment on the official visit of the President of the Italian Republic, Sandro Pertini, in September 1980, at the age of eighty-five years. He was the first Italian president to visit since the times of ancient Rome. He is an extraordinary figure, the most beloved by the Italian people. He was welcomed by Deng Xiaoping, with a face-to-face meeting, talking about the state of the world in an international context generated by the Cold War and declaring their strong support for the development of Sino-Italian relations in every sector. The visit of the Italian head of state captured the overall picture of Sino-Italian relations as these entered a new phase of contemporary history. Since diplomatic relations have been established, the two governments have stood the test of time and relations have been developed with success and consolidated day by day. Both countries carried on exchanges and cooperation in various fields that have led to great results. Between China and Italy there is no conflict of interest.

In 2009, President Hu Jintao came to Italy on an official visit. Premier Wen Jiabao had come to Italy on official visits in 2004 and in 2010. During his first visit, the two governments decided to establish a strategic partnership and laid solid foundations not only for more friendly cooperation between the two peoples, but also to jointly address the new issue of world peace and to face side by side the development and challenges of the twenty-first century. Of all the countries of the European Union, Italy has been China's 5th most important economic and trade partner for years. According to statistics, in 2011 the volume of trade between the two countries reached USD 51 billion. It increased by 13.6 percent in comparison with the previous year. Up to April of this year, Italy has invested USD 5.5 billion in China for a total of 4,672 projects. You didn't know that, right? Economic globalization in the world is continuing. Relations between all countries of the world are becoming

increasingly tighter and inseparable, helping one another to overcome the current economic and financial crisis.

The pursuit of peace, development and cooperation have always been the common goals of the Chinese and Italian peoples all around the world. Dear Mr. Chairman, dear distinguished scholars, I have always had great sympathy and feelings of friendship towards Italy and its people. I devoted the years of my youth and the best years of my life to the cause of development and to relations between the two countries to make them closer and stronger. It would be a great honor for my whole life if I could make a contribution, be it even small and modest, to consolidating the friendship of our two ancient nations. The Sino-Italian friendship is rooted in the most ancient history of China and Italy. In our two peoples, heirs to valuable traditions and ancient cultures, there is a common language that transcends the centuries and creates an affinity that are handed down from generation to generation. Indeed, today we aim to make this age-old friendship between the two countries even more dynamic. Although geographically distant, our two peoples have also built a deep feeling of friendship since ancient times and they have made a major contribution to the cultural heritage of humanity. We, the people of today, are here in Sicily with you as once Marco Polo was in China, not only to remember the bitter period of the Cold War, but also our friendship and peace. After having spoken of all this, I think you did not know something before. And what comes to my mind right now is a question to all the distinguished scholars present: if it had not been for the so-called “war,” where would Sino-European and Sino-Italian relations be today? Thanks to all.



SVETOZAR RAJAK

Panel III

The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle and China's Relations with Europe

SESSION I

SVETOZAR RAJAK: To our discussants and the distinguished panelists, let me just put forward a few provocative remarks, and observations that may help us discuss a few things during the panel. Now, history, in my opinion, does not really know successful examples, nor is human nature comfortable with equal-sided triangular relations. Sino-Soviet-American triangular relations, which is the title of this session, were in my opinion no exception.

Nor were they intended to be equal-sided from the very beginning. One could go as far as to assert that the Sino-American strategic partnership in particular after Afghanistan in 1980 was a geo-strategic earthquake that fatally undermined the Soviet Union's strategic power and precipitated the end of the Cold War. At the same time, I do not think I could subscribe to an assertion put forward yesterday that the Sino-American rapprochement was inevitable. I would also like to follow up on Professor Luo Yangyi's observation of yesterday, or perhaps go a step further and speculate that, in 1970, China's strategic outlook was transformed from ideological to national. This provided a rationale for Sino-American rapprochement in a way.

It is then no wonder that, as someone underlined yesterday, Chinese diplomats did not follow ardently in the 1970s the emergence of Eurocommunism as otherwise they would have within the frame of ideological rivalry with Moscow like in early 1960s. The possible question to our distinguished Chinese diplomats: whether they would describe their understanding of Eurocommunism as an effort as performing an international communist movement that was still a Moscow-centric one. And at the same time, by the early 1970s, this was no longer a consideration for China. Can one say that from then on, following rapprochement with the US and the strategic

shift that I had mentioned earlier, the task of Chinese diplomats in Europe and Chinese diplomacy was not to ideologically counter-balance the Soviet Union but to undermine it at whatever cost and in whatever way? In this respect one could then understand the building-up of relationship with someone like Strauss in Munich, an ardent opponent of Brandt's rapprochement with Moscow and Eastern bloc. In this manner, can one understand what an esteemed ambassador mentioned at some point, if I understood correctly, that China was not uninterested in seeing this CSCE process undermined?

It is then interesting to hear whether at any point in your own evaluation—I'm thinking of our esteemed Chinese guests as top Chinese representatives in Europe and analysts of European developments—did you perceive the ultimate corrosive impact of the Helsinki process and its instruments would have on the cohesion and stability of the Eastern bloc? If this was not the case, was it due to the lack of communication between the Chinese diplomat in Bonn and the SPD leadership, as illustrated yesterday by Ambassador Yang? Egon Bahr, for example, the architect of Brandt's "Ostpolitik," in his confidential exchanges in Washington underlined the centrality of the issue of human context and human rights that were enshrined in the Helsinki process and pushed by the West German as aimed at undermining the Eastern bloc. If there was a lack of recognition on the Chinese side of the long-term corrosive impact of the Helsinki process in Europe and détente on the Soviet bloc, was it due to the fact that it was détente and fear of East-West accommodation? In particular, with the experience of Stalin-Roosevelt agreement in Yalta on China so imprinted in Chinese leaders' consciousness that perhaps encouraged the Chinese leadership to consider shifting strategic priorities from ideological to national and embark upon rapprochement with the United States. On the other side if we flipped the coin, to what extent did the Sino-American rapprochement and Washington's focus on relations with Beijing cause anxiety in Europe and fear of abandonment of Europe? Did this have any impact on the quickening of the process of European détente?

Now, as we have often pointed out in the past two days that what we would really, as historians, like to hear from you—practitioners, esteemed diplomats—are your personal accounts, personal views, and assessments of the situation at the time. I'd like to refer to something that Ambassador Menegatti pointed out yesterday when

he said that the Chinese were not ready between 1965 and 1969 or 1970. Well, this period as we know is a difficult period for Chinese diplomacy and many senior diplomats were recalled during the Cultural Revolution. Now, from 1970s then, a new generation of professional, knowledgeable diplomats were entrusted with the task, and you were among them, to carry through something that would be a gargantuan task for any diplomacy, in particular one undergoing a reconstruction, if this was the case at that time of the Chinese diplomacy, this gargantuan task of a change of foreign policy strategy. As you all belong to this new generation—educated, professional diplomats—it would be hugely interesting to know how you managed this transformation. How difficult was it to address the—from a completely different perspective on the international environment and a requirement for new interpretation of international affairs, in particular changes that were happening in Europe in 1970s and 1980s.

Now, talking about the changes in Europe at this time—one aspect that is often puzzling for me, and I hope I'm not off the mark completely, but to me sometimes it seems that the Chinese diplomats emphasize bilateral relations in dealings with the European states—members of the EC—rather than building or looking at Europe as a union. Another point, how did you, as top Chinese observers in Europe, perceive and understand two seemingly contradictory processes through which Europe was going through in 1980s? On the one hand, the quickening pace of European integration leading to the European Union in Maastricht, and on the other hand, the disintegration of the Eastern European bloc and the demise of socialism in Europe and the collapse of the Balkan confederation of Yugoslavia into ethnic states.⁸²

Above, for me, is particularly interesting since you come from a background which on the one hand prioritize cohesion as one of the principle tenants of Chinese state and society, and on the other hand were a result of an ideological upbringing in your youth.

These just a few questions which I thought would be of interest in deliberations and personal accounts of our esteemed guests. Now without further ado, I'd like to give floor to the discussants. Our discussants today are Professor Niu Jun, the professor of the School of International Studies at the Peking University, and Professor

⁸² The Treaty of Maastricht on European Union was signed on February 7, 1992, and entered into force on November 1, 1993.



NIU JUN

Richard Baum, the distinguished professor emeritus from University of California, and Mircea Munteanu, the Office of Historian of the Department of State, United States.

NIU JUN: It's an honor to be here to learn and consult with so many senior diplomats from China, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe. The meeting is brief, but the benefit to our research is tremendous. Due to the time limits, I will just be direct with my questions. Based on my own studies, my questions focus on the 1980s, China's relations with five Eastern European countries, namely, East Germany, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia and—I forgot—the five countries, on which I have some very specific questions.

The first question: I want to ask the senior diplomats from Eastern European countries, following the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976, how did your countries consider the impact of this event on China's diplomacy and China's future? Did you have exchanges and discussions between you or with the Soviet Union for a concerted action? I would like to know about this. This is my first question.

The second question, which I raised following Ambassador Mei's speech on the first day of the meeting, but due to some arrangement issue, I didn't get a direct response from the ambassador. My question was, what exactly were the main reasons for China to ease relations with the five Eastern European countries in the second half of 1981? After the end of the 1981 Spring Festival, the Chinese Politburo held three—at least three, maybe five—discussions on China's diplomacy. During the discussions, there was a big internal difference of views regarding China's Soviet policy and in the end Deng Xiaoping personally cut off a considerable part of the discussions from the meeting minutes. What I'm trying to ask is, did those internal discussions on China's foreign policy have anything to do with China wanting to ease relations with the Eastern European countries? Or was it just a simple response to the external change that happened at the time?

My third question: in May or July of 1983, Qian Qichen, Deputy Foreign Minister on Soviet and Eastern Europe Affairs, and Ma Xusheng, Director of the Department of Soviet and Eastern European Affairs, together visited the five Eastern

European countries.⁸³ What was the purpose of that visit? Was it pushed forward mainly by the five countries, or the result of China's internal discussions? What was the reason? I just want to know how this visit was proposed and for what purpose. I hope the ambassadors here who were involved in the matter at the time could shed some light on it.

The fourth question is about a memoir I read on the events of 1983. I think it was in the summer or autumn of 1983, at the 5th Diplomatic Envoy Conference. Ma Xusheng made an important proposal for the improvement of relations with the five Eastern European countries. As Ma Xusheng recalled in his memoir, his proposal got a lot of attention and became a hot topic for discussion at the meeting.⁸⁴ Here I would like to know more details about this discussion of China's relations with the Eastern European countries as well as what the impact it had on subsequent events. Because according to Ambassador Ma Xusheng's own accounts, the proposal caught the attention of the central leadership and based on the discussions of the meeting, instruction came for all embassies to step up their research and diplomatic activities with respect to the five Eastern European countries. I want to know if that was really the case, because only he talked about it—the impact of that envoy meeting on China's relations with the five Eastern European countries from 1983 on. I just want to ask these specific questions, and due to the time limits, I'll stop here. Thank you.

RICHARD BAUM: I want to shift the focus briefly away from European reactions to the events of this period, and put the focus instead on the changing structure of the strategic triangle itself, among strategic relations, among the three powers: the Soviet Union, the United States, and China. Without delving too deeply into the history of this period and to the history of these relations, we can say, I think, that there were five main periods in which this strategic triangle shifted and each period

⁸³ See Christopher S. Wren, "China Seeks Better East European Ties," *The New York Times* (May 5, 1983).

⁸⁴ The text referenced here is unknown. Ma Xusheng has published a reflection on his past government service in a journal, but it deals with Sino-Soviet normalization rather than China's policies toward Eastern Europe. See Ma Xusheng, "Jiemeng duikang jun buke qu—Yi bashi niandai Zhong Su guanxi shixian zhengchanghua de guocheng" ("Neither Alliance nor Confrontation: Recalling the Normalization Process in Sino-Soviet Relations in the 1980s"), *Dong Ou Zhong Ya yanjiu* no. 2 (2001):



RICHARD BAUM AND
MIRCEA MUNTEANU

was marked by different set of characteristics and each one raised a set of questions and I want to address those questions.

The first period, I think the beginning of multi-polarity if you will, was in 1963-1964. It started with the failure of the Moscow summit in the summer of 1963. It went through France leaving NATO in 1964, and then China testing its first weapon—nuclear weapon—later in 1964. Thereafter, neither the Eastern nor the Western bloc was the same. It was a very different phenomenon as a result of the events of this period. What I want to ask is, how did these events play out? We've already talked at some lengths about France, so we can exclude France from this discussion, but how did these events play out in Eastern and Western Europe?

The second period was 1968-1969. It began with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia; it continued on to the border conflict between China and Russia at Damansky or Zhenbao Island, and then it ended with the Soviet threat, whether it really occurred or not, to destroy China's nuclear capacity. One wonders of this period: why did the Chinese attack? It seems to be conventional wisdom that the Chinese launched the first attack and did so deliberately. Why did they attack? And secondly, were the Russians serious in their threats, in their veiled references to an attack on China's nuclear capabilities? Because if they weren't serious, and awful lot of change that were adverse to the Russians occurred thereafter.

The third period that I'm most interested in is 1971-1972. The period began with Ping-Pong diplomacy, Kissinger's secret visit to China in the summer of 1971, and then Nixon's week that changed the world. It's ironic that Nixon and Mr. Kissinger thought that they were using China to help extricate the United States from Vietnam. That was much more important at the time. It was dominating the political agenda. And what's ironic about it is that China had very little capacity to influence events in Vietnam. We were barking up the wrong tree in a classical case. By the same token however, it seemed to be surprising that Henry Kissinger was so ready, so willing to let Taiwan go. I think Mao and Zhou were caught by surprise at how pliable Henry Kissinger was. Richard Nixon was thinking in political terms but Henry Kissinger was thinking in historical terms and there is a very different perspective. You can let a little island like Taiwan go historically, whereas it's more difficult politically as Nixon's successors found out.

And I also wanted to know from some of the practitioners in the room: how was the Japan formula arrived at for recognizing China? We've talked about some of the difficulties involved in Western European countries recognizing China as long as the United States was not doing so. And yet as soon as Nixon went to China, there was a rush to recognize, to exchange ambassadors, and the Japan formula was quickly worked out whereby countries that recognized China could continue to have cultural and economic relations with Taiwan. That was a major breakthrough. I'd like to know a little bit more about it from those who were in the field.

The fourth period was the period surrounding Mao Zedong's death in 1976. Were expectations raised about the possibility of a quick thaw in Sino-Soviet relations? Those relations had been very bad for a very long time and it seemed to many people at the time that it was an opportunity to restore the relationship and yet it didn't happen. It certainly didn't happen right away. Didn't happen for several years. There was no diplomatic initiative possible in China it seemed. And I would like to know why that was true in the late 1970s. Even after Deng Xiaoping took power, he didn't touch the Sino-Soviet relationship for a while. I'd like to know more details about that period.

And then finally, the period—the fifth period—is 1978-1979. From the first visit by Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security advisor, to the final normalization by Jimmy Carter.⁸⁵ It seems that the Chinese response to Brzezinski's challenge—by the way in that period what made normalization of relations between the US and China possible was Brzezinski's sudden movement towards the Chinese away from the Soviet Union. His famous dare to his counterpart in the Foreign Ministry about racing to the top of the Great Wall. If you get there first, we'll take on the Russians in Ethiopia. If we get there first, you take them on—a clear statement that the United States was prepared to lean to one side in the Sino-Soviet relationship. Prior to that time, under Secretary of State Vance, we had been playing even-handed politics. So the Chinese response to Brzezinski, I would like to know more about it. I would like to know how Chinese diplomats responded to Brzezinski's challenge, and as if the challenge was not enough, he then went on the state the “H”

⁸⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski visited China from May 20-23, 1978. See David P. Nickles, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XIII, China* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 390-462.

word, which American diplomacy had avoided for several years—“hegemony”—it was a code word for Russian imperial ambition. After Brzezinski’s trip to the Great Wall, he used the “H” word for the first time for the reinforcement of the idea that the United States was leaning to one side. And finally, how important in this course of normalization of US-China relations, to what extent was the timetable driven by the need to get the United States on board for the Chinese punitive counterattack against Vietnam. We know that Deng Xiaoping had Vietnam very much on his mind when he came to the United States. How important was it to Deng Xiaoping and to China generally? Thank you.

MIRCEA MUNTEANU: I want to begin by talking a little bit about, well was referred to as China’s policy of differentiation towards Eastern Europe. And the way it was described, it struck me because it sounds very much like a precursor to Carter’s policy of differentiation to the so-called Presidential Directive 21 that basically suggest that the United States would treat Eastern European countries differently based on their foreign policy and their internal liberalization.⁸⁶ And it sounds to me like China was doing very much the same thing quite a little bit earlier. What I didn’t quite understand was the goals that Chins had in treating the Eastern European countries differently in that respect. There was some suggestion that it was simply a way of responding in kind. “If you treat us well, we will treat you well, if you don’t, we will not.” But I wonder if there was a little bit more behind it. What I was trying to ask, I hope, is what was China hoping to, what was Beijing hoping to accomplish treating the Eastern European countries differently? Were they trying to pull Romania closer to the Albanian position? Were they trying to pull maybe Hungary or Czechoslovakia, or Poland closer to the Romanian position? What were they hoping to accomplish with it? Did they actually want to split the Soviet bloc? It seems to me that Chinese policy, beginning with maybe 1957-1958, but certainly after

⁸⁶ The exact wording of Presidential Directive 21’s opening paragraph is: “The President has directed that policy toward Eastern Europe should be based on the objectives of working with governments of the region to enhance their independence internationally and to increase their degree of internal liberalization. To that end, the United States will demonstrably show its preference for Eastern European countries that are either relatively liberal internally or relatively independent internationally.” See Presidential Directive/NSC-21, “Policy toward Eastern Europe,” September 13, 1977, available at <http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd21.pdf> (accessed May 15, 2014).

the 1960s, is a constant challenge to Soviet legitimacy, both in terms of the international communist movement but in general, a challenge to Soviet legitimacy, and I was hoping that some of the Chinese diplomats could address that idea of how the Chinese viewed their competition globally with the Soviet Union.

I also wanted to ask a couple of questions about the policy of cooperation between China and the United States, because in that challenge that China was putting forth to the Soviet Union. It seemed that after 1971-1972, but to some extent even before, there's an ongoing cooperation with the United States in challenging the Soviet Union. It is visible in Chinese actions and cooperation with the United States in Africa. It is clearly visible in Chinese cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan. And in the public eye, probably the most visible effect of that was Chinese boycott of the Soviet Olympics in 1980 and Chinese participation in the American Olympics in 1984. So I'm hoping that some of the Chinese participants can talk a little bit about China's foreign policy and international goals in that 1970-1980 period in terms of their cooperation with the United States. Was it driven by internal dynamics? Was it driven by foreign policy and security considerations? To what extent the two interacted? And so on.

Lastly, I'm wondering if the Chinese participants can talk a little bit about how much, if at all, the Chinese government and Chinese foreign policy decision makers paid attention to what the United States was doing in Europe. To what extent did they—what were they required to analyze and report back on some of the things the United States—on the United States policy towards Europe and towards the Soviet Union, including the buildup, the military buildup they did from the 1980s—started by the Carter Administration and then continued by the Reagan administration—the modernization of nuclear forces in Europe. We talked a little bit about it yesterday but I'm hoping to find out more. And, the SALT II treaty, and then later on in the Reagan administration the START Treaty. And I'm hoping that's possible based on the assumption that, you know, for all the differences there are, foreign ministries operate in similar fashion, which is the center makes a decision, transmits that decision to the embassies, and then the embassies respond in kind. But there's a flow of information and of goals and of directions going from the center to the embassy and from the embassy to the center and I'm hoping even if you might not have been directly involved with it, I'm hoping some of the information concerning some

of those issues had reached your particular embassy or your particular department at some point, so thank you.

AMBASSADOR MEI ZHAORONG: Thank you, Chairman. Our topic today is the impact of Sino-Soviet-US triangular relations on China's relations with the European countries, and therefore first of all I'll address the topic, which means I can't respond to the questions asked right away.

I'm going to give an example of how the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and West Germany was under Soviet and particularly US influence, as the issue fits into our topic today. As everyone knows, after 1949, there appeared in German territory two German states belonging to two opposing camps: the Federal Republic of Germany, or West Germany, and the German Democratic Republic, or East Germany. The situation, in our opinion, was created as a result of the occupation and divided administration of Germany at the end of World War II by the four Allied powers who competed with each other for zones of influence. So at the beginning our view was the division of Germany was not natural but man-made.

After the founding of New China in 1949, China pursued a policy of "leaning to one side"—meaning the Soviet side, and became a member of the Soviet camp led by the Soviet Union. In the same period, the West German government, under the leadership of Adenauer, leaned towards the West politically and became a member of the US-headed Western camp. The situation led to two results. One result was the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and East Germany, another member of the Soviet camp, early in October 27, 1949. On the other hand, for a considerably long period of time, there had never been any official relations between China and West Germany, since as we all know, in the early days, the West German government pursued the so-called "Hallstein Doctrine" that established that the Federal Republic would not establish relations with any state that recognized the GDR. This policy continued until 1955 when Adenauer visited Moscow and the agreement was reached that the FRG would establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. As a result, the "Hallstein Doctrine" became difficult to maintain because the Soviet Union had recognized the GDR. Also at the time, China, as a participant of the World War II, had yet to declare an end of the state of war against

Germany. The final declaration, by Chairman Mao, came in 1955.⁸⁷ Before 1955, although we had established diplomatic relations with East Germany, our diplomatic presence in East Germany was called a diplomatic mission rather than an embassy, because East Germany at the time was not yet a fully sovereign state. Similarly, West Germany wasn't a fully sovereign state either and only after the General Treaty took effect did it have rights to full independent foreign policy. That's a brief account of the historical background.

China was in the Soviet camp, but China was different from the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries. West Germany was in the Western camp, but West Germany was different from the United States. When it came down to the German Question, China had to agree with the Soviet Union and East Germany to an extent and couldn't act independently, but on the other hand China believed from the beginning that the division of Germany was man-made and couldn't continue in the long run and the reunification was inevitable. We had the view at that time and we held on to that view till the end. As for the West German side, although Adenauer wouldn't recognize New China, he never established any official relations with Taiwan. One basic idea of Adenauer's was that the future world would be dominated by three big powers, the United States, the Soviet Union and China—who would decide the fate of that world. Of course you can have a different opinion on that, but I think Adenauer showed considerable foresight, as he didn't establish any diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Then in 1955, West Germany normalized relations with the Soviet Union and after that China signaled to West Germany that we were willing to normalize relations with them. Our signal was the publication of an editorial on the *People's Daily* on September 16, 1955, in which it was said that the Chinese people think the time for normalizing the relations between China and West Germany has arrived and there is no reason not to do so. That was our first signal. In 1956, the year after, at the second meeting of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Premier Zhou Enlai said that he'd welcome the normalization of relations with the FRG, but there was no response from the West German side. So all the way up to the early 1960s—1964—we hadn't had any official contact with West Germany. As Ambassador Cai mentioned yesterday,

“West Germany

was in the Western camp, but West Germany was different from the United States.”

⁸⁷ See Gene T. Hsiao, *The Foreign Trade of China: Policy, Law, and Practice* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 35.

it was in 1964 that de Gaulle offered to establish diplomatic relations with China and what followed was the first time a major Western power had recognized New China. Of course before that, in the 1950s, Northern European countries such as Sweden established diplomatic relations with China; the UK and the Netherlands established—semi-diplomatic—that is, chargé d'affaires level relations with China. Only chargé d'affaires level because their attitude towards the Taiwan issue was dubious. But we didn't have any diplomatic relations with West Germany, though West Germany was straightforward in their attitude towards the Taiwan issue and hadn't had any contact with Taiwan.

Then in the early 1960s, with the relations between China and the Soviet Union deteriorating and the disagreements between the two sides becoming public, plus the feeling that West Germany clearly had at the time that the major obstacle to German reunification was Soviet opposition, there were internal voices in West Germany calling for developing relations with China, using China to contain the Soviet Union. The proposal was to contain the Soviet threat as well as the Soviet expansion towards the West on the one hand and on the other hand, to get China's support on the German issue since China had different attitude from the Soviet Union. The view was notably held within West Germany at the time, particularly among the group of hardliners against the Russians led by Strauss. That, together with economic considerations as West Germany in its fast economic development needed to expand the global market and wanted to sell products in China, resulted in an internal push to develop relations with China, which in turn led to the first contact between the diplomats of the two sides in the Chinese Embassy in Switzerland in 1964. From the contact, we discovered that the West German government wanted to sound us out on mainly three issues: one, to see whether China's attitude towards the GDR had changed after the Sino-Soviet split—it was a question of particular interest to them; two, to see whether China would accept the West German government to represent West Berlin; and three, to see whether China would enter into a trade agreement, official or unofficial, with West Germany since trade was basically the other thing, apart from politics, on their minds. There were obvious political as well as economic intentions in all that. However, West Germany was met with strong opposition from the US in their intentions.

The Johnson government put a lot of pressure on Erhard during his visit to the US. As a result, on June 13, 1964, Erhard held a press conference in the US making clear that West Germany had no intention to establish diplomatic relations or sign trade treaty with China, nor the intention to loan China 300 million dollars or take any other such actions.⁸⁸ That meant that under the US pressure, West Germany pulled back on its intention to develop some sort of relations with China. Given the circumstances, though later on we had a few contacts with the Germans, the hope was lost, apparently as a result of the US intervention. But in 1972—in the early 1970s, things began to turn around. Nixon made a speech around 1969 that showed an obvious change of attitude towards China. Then there was Kissinger's secret visit to China and then Nixon visited China and shortly afterwards China's legitimate seat in the UN was restored.⁸⁹

With that, US obstruction was gone. Although the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the US in 1979, our relations with Western European countries picked up—please note this—it was around 1971-1972 we established diplomatic relations with West Germany and Austria, suggesting that with the US opening its door to China, Western European countries dared to establish diplomatic relations with China. So it was obvious where the problem had been. The role that the US played in all this was an undeniable fact.

Also by that time, West Germany had gone through a lot of internal changes. Erhard stepped down in 1969 and the SPD was in power; Brandt first served as Foreign Minister, then Chancellor. As Foreign Minister, Brandt was quite positive in making contacts with China and had sent out feelers to us hinting West Germany's readiness to negotiate and establish diplomatic relations with China and also clearly stating that they wouldn't be like the former Erhard government that bowed to the US pressure. He made that point clear.

But then the Soviet influence began to register. After the SPD came to power, they pursued, as it was mentioned yesterday, the “Ostpolitik” policy, which was

⁸⁸ See Max Frankel, “Erhard, Assuring the U.S., Rules out Peking Tie Now,” *The New York Times* (June 14, 1964): 1.

⁸⁹ US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger secretly visited China from July 9-11, 1971. US President Richard Nixon visited China from February 21-28, 1972. The People's Republic of China became the lawful representative of China to the United Nations on October 25, 1971, following the passage of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758.

“We saw eye-to-eye with them

on this big strategic issue.”

to achieve rapprochement with the Soviet Union and warmer relations with East Germany, recognize the existence of two independent sovereign German states, and normalize relations with Eastern European countries through a series of treaties including the Treaty of Moscow, the Treaty of Warsaw, the Treaty of Prague, and the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin. After Brandt took the office of Chancellor, he felt that establishing diplomatic relations with China might cause Soviet displeasure. It then followed that the Brandt government was making positive gestures towards us on the one hand, while on the other hand they slowed down the pace of establishing diplomatic relations with China. Brandt wanted to put the establishment of diplomatic relations with China after the complete realization of the “Ostpolitik” policy in case of Soviet displeasure. That attitude of his was quite obvious. But on the other side, within West Germany, there were the CDU and the CSU, two opposition parties advocating an alliance with China to contain the Soviet Union and their attitude were quite clear-cut. Strauss was especially representative of the group.

Somebody asked earlier whether we especially worked on the opposition parties, to sow discord or what. That was actually not the case. In this case, the German parties sought us out. I can tell you this, Strauss himself told me in 1973 that he was an anti-communist but he was pro-China. Those were his own words, quite frankly. Our knowledge of Strauss and his party CSU went through a process of change. As I mentioned yesterday, at the beginning, we were more or less under the Soviet influence. But over time, with the Sino-Soviet split going public, we became increasingly independent in our thoughts, in our research and analysis of issues, and we discovered that Strauss’s party was not, as the Soviet Union loudly claimed, the representative of the revival of militarism, but rather a voice that reflected the interest of the German people as well as the German attitude against the Soviet threat and Soviet expansion. In that sense, we had something in common, and because of a common goal, we approached them. So, although we didn’t agree with the CDU, the CSU on every single issue, we saw eye-to-eye with them on this big strategic issue, and that it easier at that stage for our two sides to get close to each other. The opposition party took note of the SPD’s ambivalence and deference to the Soviet attitude and therefore they pushed for better relations with China.

In 1972, the CDU Presidium passed the resolution to push the federal government for the establishment of diplomatic relations with China. Based on this resolu-

tion, the party sent Gerhard Schroeder, one of the party leaders and Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the German Bundestag to visit China. This Schroeder was not the Schroeder from the SPD that later became Chancellor, but the two shared the same name. Schroeder came to visit China and met with Premier Zhou Enlai, Qiao Guanhua, and Vice Minister Zhang Wenqing—he is our discussant Zhang Baijia’s father—to discuss the issue and at the end of the discussions, our two sides reached an internal agreement and signed an internal memorandum. Schroeder brought this memorandum back to Germany, delivered it to Minister Scheel and said, “I have talked with China and we and the Chinese have reached an agreement. Now it’s your turn, as government, to talk with China.” This development helped speed up the diplomatic negotiations between the West German government and China.

So in August 17, 1972, I went from East Berlin to West Berlin to participate in the negotiation process, which started on the 18th and lasted a month—it only took about a month for the two countries to reach an agreement. But one thing should be pointed out: the Adenauer government had never recognized nor established any official relations with Taiwan, and therefore it was settled in the earlier talks between our Premier and the German opposition party that this issue was basically nonexistent between the two sides and considering it already set in favor of China, we could skip it in the negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations. In our negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations with all the other countries, we have followed an uniform policy on the Taiwan issue—that is, the other country must recognize Taiwan as an integral part of Chinese territory and recognize that the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the entire Chinese people; these two recognitions must be made, but in reality, we have had different approaches with different countries as the case may be. In the case of West Germany, we didn’t ask the West German government to make such recognition on the Taiwan issue in the negotiations because the issue didn’t exist with respect to West Germany.

The negotiations were mainly about the German Question, brought up by the West German side, with focus on a West Berlin clause, about whether West Berlin should be represented by West Germany. Again, this issue came within the sphere of US as well as Soviet influence, since the two countries didn’t agree on the status

of West Berlin. I won't go into the actual disagreement, but as we know, although a compromise was eventually made with the Berlin Treaty, the status of West Berlin was still unsettled with the Soviet Union and the West claiming whatever suited their respective positions. So our talks with West Germany came down to this very complicated issue—eight rounds of negotiations all on this German Question. The final conclusion was that China would abide by the consensus reached between the Four Powers: that West Berlin is not recognized legally as a part of the constitution of the Federal Republic, however in dealing with actual issues between China and West Germany, China would accept the representation of West Berlin by the West German government. The expression, in English—what was the expression? So a West Berlin clause was included in every single treaty. It reads, “in conformity with the existing situation, this agreement is also valid for Berlin West.” That means, the present agreement also applies to West Berlin according to the existing situation. Just this one clause. The expression was not in conflict with the agreement reached between the Four Powers, since we didn't recognize West Berlin as a part of West Germany in the legal sense, only West Germany's representation of it in actual affairs. Though East Germany was not happy with this clause, they couldn't do anything about it, as it was something the Soviet Union had accepted. Of course, we also talked about other issues in the negotiations, like Chinese immigrants in FRG, but that was too specific, so I'll just leave it. But that was also in the talks.

The West Berlin issue actually reflected the sharp divide between East and West Germany on the German Question. Given the circumstances, the process of establishing diplomatic relations between China and West Germany was largely smooth, but it could only have happened with changes in the larger environment. On the one side, US obstruction was gone. On the other side, there was still Soviet opposition, Soviet pressure. For all we know, Brandt sounded Brezhnev out on the issue on one occasion. Once in a talk with Brezhnev, Brandt mentioned in a quite offhanded way that West Germany wanted to establish diplomatic relations with China. He meant to test Brezhnev's reaction and Brezhnev didn't react in any way. So Brandt figured that meant the Soviet Union probably wasn't going to be a concern. But even with that, he had to mind the Soviet attitude. So the case was that at that time, West Germany was in for establishing diplomatic relations with China, which was in its strategic interest, but on the other hand it was afraid to offend the Soviet Union

and had to take account of the Soviet attitude. You can see from the case that the contention the US and the Soviet Union had—although China wasn't part of the broil—had subjected us to a lot of constraints, in one way or another. It was only with changes in the larger environment, changes on the part of the US as well as on the part of the Soviet Union, that we were able to establish that normal diplomatic relations with the FRG.

Recently, our Premier Wen Jiabao commented that the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and West Germany in 1972 built a bridge to peace and cooperation. But the issue only became possible within such a larger environment that I mentioned. If the Cold War between the West and the East had continued to rage on, we probably would have encountered a great deal more opposition. That's all for me now. Thank you.

SVETOZAR RAJAK: Thank you very much, Ambassador Mei. And thank you all for your understanding, trying to keep within our time limits, particularly since this session has been shortened and we'll appreciate your understanding. I will, sort of help out, by reminding this discussants when then the three minutes are approaching. So, let me now give the floor to Ambassador Zhou.

AMBASSADOR ZHOU XIAOPEI: In response to the sensitive issue of triangular relations raised by the host, I'd like to say a few things about Sino-Soviet-American triangular relations and its impact.

As we all know, in the 1950s, China and the Soviet Union established a friendly alliance, while China and the United States were enemies to each other. But as the international situation changed and domestic factors weighed in, the ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union deepened, leading to a gradual cooling of relations between the two countries. The 1969 Zhenbao Island incident was a notable mark of the change in Sino-Soviet relations from ideological Cold War to armed conflict and then up to a point where both sides regarded each other as principal enemies. Against the background of the escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict, subtle overtures for rapprochement were being exchanged between China and the United States despite their enmity. All this led to a Cold War period of unprecedented dramatic changes in Sino-Soviet relations and Sino-US relations.



ZHOU XIAOPEI

The 1960s was a period of an intense US-Soviet arms race, a tense East-West standoff, and fierce ideological conflict between socialism and capitalism. Within such special context, each side of the Sino-Soviet-US triangular relationship was complicated in itself while connecting to, constraining, and benefitting from the two other sides, and there were even times when two parties of the triangular relations were united against the third party. According to what Kissinger later revealed in his memoirs, Nixon viewed the bloodshed on the Sino-Soviet border as an opportunity for the US to open the China door.⁹⁰ So at the time, while China was concerned about preemptive strikes from the Soviet Union, the US sent Beijing signals hinting at interest in a fundamental improvement of relations between the two countries. The internal opinion in China was also that the US-Soviet conflict was greater than the Sino-Soviet conflict, which was in turn greater than the Sino-US conflict, and therefore we could use the US-Soviet conflict strategically to open up relations between China and the US in order to cope with the threat from the north. In September 1969, the Soviet Premier and the Chinese Premier had an emergency meeting at the Beijing airport, where the two sides reached an understanding of settlement of border disputes through negotiation, and the severe tensions between the two countries were instantly relieved as a result.

Once the commencement of border negotiations between China and the Soviet Union was announced, the US, suggestively, became anxious to resume the suspended negotiations for the establishment of ambassadorial-level diplomatic relations with China. With efforts on both sides, the negotiations were resumed in Warsaw in 1970. In the process, the US side officially stated that they would like to improve relations with China and were ready to send representatives to Beijing for more thorough exploration of the scenario. In response, the Chinese side expressed welcome. Without comparing notes, both sides proposed to enter into negotiations of a higher level. We all know the rest of the story. In 1972, US President Nixon visited China. At the end of a meeting in Zhongnanhai, Nixon held Chairman Mao Zedong's hands and said that together they would "change the world." This visit not only rocked the world but also transformed the global power structure of that period. In 1973, Mao Zedong put forth the "one line" strategy, which referred to

⁹⁰ See Yang Kuisong, "The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement," *Cold War History* 1, no. 1 (August 2000): 21-52.

forming an alliance against the “Northern Bear.” From the East-West standoff to the Sino-Soviet alliance and joint opposition to the US, to the Sino-Soviet split, then to the Sino-US rapprochement and Sino-US joint combat against Soviet hegemonism—friend turned foe, foe turned friend, the entire structure of international relations had gone through major transformations, for deep ideological reasons as well as for reasons of national security considerations.

Europe’s passive choices in the Cold War era—there was no doubt that China and Europe had a traditional friendship and between them there was no fundamental conflict of strategic interests. However, the state of hostility between China and the US indirectly influenced the Western European countries’ attitude towards China, while the Sino-US détente indirectly led to accelerated improvements in relations between China and Western Europe. Ambassador Mei as well as several ambassadors and scholars talked about this yesterday.

As for the array of Eastern European countries, they were more deeply embroiled in the ups and downs of Sino-Soviet relations. Of course, the socialist camp wasn’t a monolithic bloc. There were countries that followed closely after the Soviet Union and took the anti-China line and we called these countries “small revisionists that follow the Soviet revisionists.” There were also countries that had reservations but, due to geopolitical realities, had to defer to the Soviet Union. Very few countries sided with China against Soviet revisionism and became our closest comrades-in-arms. One or two countries took the role of mediator in hopes that the CCP and the CPSU would stop with the polemics and reconcile. In the mid-1960s, with heated debates leading to escalation in hostilities between the two sides, the CCP’s party relations with the CPSU and with some other Eastern European communist parties completely broke down, China no longer participated in any level of meetings of the Soviet camp, and China’s diplomats abroad were absent from all events of the host countries. Exchanges and cooperation in all fields but trade ceased. All these carried severe consequences for both sides.

In the 1970s, the foreign policy China pursued was: “opposition to the two superpowers;” “anti-imperialism must be anti-revisionism;” and “differential treatment” or “drawing lines according to ideology and closeness to the Soviet Union.” These policies objectively forced some countries to choose sides and as a result cast a shadow over China’s bilateral relationships with other countries. On the other hand,

“The state of hostility between China and the US indirectly influenced the Western European countries’ attitude towards China.”

Eastern European countries themselves suffered dearly under Brezhnev's theory of "limited sovereignty," but at the same time they had to defer to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Here I'd like to point out one thing. In January 1964, Chairman Mao Zedong said quite clearly, "when the wolves are in power, what's the use of picking on foxes?"⁹¹ People then asked: who are the "wolves" and who are the "foxes" The "wolves" were the Soviet Union and the United States and the "foxes" referred to a group of small countries. The main idea of that expression was, to differentiate Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union and for the former, let bygones be bygones and concentrate forces on striking at Khrushchev revisionism. During the period of Cultural Revolution, China's foreign policy was indeed under the influences of the "left," but, overall, we still pursued an independent foreign policy and were committed to dealing with state-to-state relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence with special emphasis on non-interference in other countries' internal affairs. We were opposed to the control of a "patriarchy party" and condemned the Soviet occupation of brother countries. All this had a positive effect on the continuation of the traditional friendly relations between China and Eastern Europe and paved a good way for the correction of our Eastern European policy in the early 1980s.

Last but not the least, the implications for the big power relations in the new century. We can see from Sino-Soviet relations, Sino-US relations, and Soviet-US relations, as well as Sino-European relations in the 1960s and the 1970s—in varying degrees—the mark of the Cold War era, which was basically one party siding with another party against a third party in the picture, mindless of world peace, development, and cooperation. The big power relations of the Cold War era have cost both the West and the East dearly. This is the lesson we should learn, "peace benefits all and fighting benefits nobody." As we are moving towards a multi-polar world of globalized economy and information, the world is only becoming smaller and there is an unprecedented level of interwoven interests between countries. Countries with different social systems and values actually are all part of a global community

⁹¹ Mao Zedong is alleged to have said "by catching wolves first and foxes later, we have found the problem. It'd be impossible if we don't start with the power holders" ("*xian gao chailang, hou gao huli, zhe jiu zhua daole wenti, ni bu cong dangquan pai zhuoshou buxing*") at a December 20, 1964, meeting of the Central Committee. See "Highlights of Forum on Central Committee Work," December 20, 1964.

of shared interests. Although the Cold War mentality will still stubbornly rear its head once in a while, rising above ideological differences and cooperating in coping with grave global challenges has increasingly become a common view. Within this new context, China and Europe have more common interests, more room for strategic cooperation, and broader prospects for the development of a mutually-beneficial partnership. Finally, I want to emphasize that all in all, the progress from the vicious interplay of Sino-Soviet-US triangular relations to the positive adjustment and interactions in big power relations, then to a creation of a democratic and harmonious world that advocates peace in diversity, equality, and cooperation and mutual benefits reflects human society's common aspirations and is an inevitable trend of the times. I'll stop here, please feel free to correct me.

AMBASSADOR IOAN ROMULUS BUDURA: In the 1950s, China promoted a policy according to “leaning to one side” principle. I wish to emphasize this truth because it is very important in understanding the whole system of the international relations of China. I remember that China and the Soviet Union tried to convince us that that friendship—it’s eternal, that it’s very solid, and it will last for a long time. I have to agree that policy of leaning to one side was beneficial for China as well as for Soviet Union. But even in those years, we Romanians—we started from 1958-1959, to approach differently the international relations taking into consideration the principles of international law and the norms of international morality—had many opportunities to see that the policy had some problems.

In 1954, Mao Zedong invited the Romanian Head of State to assist him in convincing the industrialists and the traders to accept willingly socialist transformation. In 1956, as I told you already, Gheorghiu-Dej discussed with Mao Zedong the efficiency of the Soviet model, and they criticized that model.⁹² Gheorghiu-Dej also offered possible assistance to China in order to have some contacts with United States of America. And they also discussed their own unpleasant experiences during the years in relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In 1957, when the speaker of the Romanian Parliament came to China, there was another opportunity of being aware that there was something in common in the



IOAN ROMULUS BUDURA

⁹² See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Mao Zedong nianpu (yijiusijiu-yijiuqiliu)*, vol. 2, 639.

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the Romanians were
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positions of the two sides. And then in 1959—I was also here accompanying our delegation—we were already aware of the divergences during 1958 meeting between Mao Zedong and Khrushchev.⁹³ But at that time in 1959, I remember we went to the airport to wait the 2114—a Tupolev 2114—bringing Khrushchev directly from Camp David to Beijing. And contrary to the expectations, Khrushchev was very desirous to make a speech; no other delegation tried to do that. But it so happened that when he started his speech, the audio system went wrong and nobody had the opportunity to listen to what Khrushchev was going to tell us. That was already a sign that something was going wrong, and that—even on the next day—at the People’s Theater, we were waiting for the Russian delegation—for the Soviet delegation, that is Khrushchev—and Mao Zedong to come to the performance. And we waited and waited and nobody appeared, so it was once again a sign that something was going wrong. And I remember that the head of Romanian delegation was a very important personality—phoned home and told to Gheorghiu-Dej about the situation there and the next day, the Romanian delegation left Beijing.

In 1960, Khrushchev had the fantastic idea to make use of the Romanian Third Congress of the Party and to organize an international conference, and in spite of the fact that Gheorghiu-Dej did not want to preside over that conference, Khrushchev imposed to him to be the Chairman of the conference. But then—being just I was in the room, you know, being just beside Gheorghiu-Dej—Khrushchev was the person who, how to say, led the discussions and so on. And he had in front of him that report of sixty pages incriminating the Chinese Communist Party. Of course after some years, the Romanian delegation expressed excuses for the—how to say—unpleasantness greeted to the Chinese delegation, but I have to tell you that it was impossible to stop Khrushchev. The one thing which Gheorghiu-Dej realized was to convince Peng Zhen to come to Khrushchev and to have a drink together in order to express good will.

So in the 1960s, the Romanians were already aware of the essence of the dispute between the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. It was not the question of war and peace, of the ways of how to go through with the socialist revolution and so on and so on. The problems were the rehabilitation of the position of People’s

⁹³ See Zubok, “The Mao-Khrushchev Conversations, 31 July–3 August 1958 and 2 October 1959.”

Republic of China as a great power equal to the Soviet Union. From that time already started that, what I call, the correction of the policy of leaning to one side. “Long live Leninism” was the first signal of such strategy or stratagem. And that stratagem was carried out until 1980, even after the death of Mao Zedong.

So now, if that period of correction started in 1960 and the conflicts between Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China grew stronger and stronger, what was the position of Romania and the relations between Romania and China? First of all, we informed the Chinese about our own difficulties in the Warsaw Treaty Pact organization. And we received a very sympathetic reaction. Mao Zedong even said that if we entered into Comecon, this organization will collapse because we cannot agree with the positions of Soviet Union.⁹⁴ Then the Romanians pronounced themselves against the ex-communication of China. In several occasions during the 1960s, there were such risks, such dangers. The Romanians pronounced themselves for the atomic bomb experiment. You know, I have to tell you that the atomic bomb experiment was held on October 14, the day when Khrushchev was demoted.⁹⁵ But the Chinese leaders told us in March, some months before that, that such an experiment would be held, and they asked—Liu Shaoqi asked us—I mean the delegation—“Would you agree with that or not?,” and our answer was “We cannot stop you and we have nothing against that.” Then in a later one, we took a very strong position against the enlargement of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which was to comprise Mongolia in order to get near to China. As I remember, the Polish friends expressed the same idea but Romanians were very active. We were against the Russians and their own supporters, against—criticizing the installment of Russian rockets in the center of Europe, but at the same time, to criticize China for experimenting the atomic bomb. We took different kind of this position in support of China. At the same time, our relations developed very well.

Now as far as the United States of America is concerned. We were together with China all the time until the 1960s when we started to convince the American leaders that it’s much better to have good relations with China. So in 1967, 1969, and 1970, we had very serious discussions with the Americans, with President Nixon and others; and in October, our Deputy Prime Minister came to China and delivered a

⁹⁴ Comecon is an abbreviation for the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

⁹⁵ Nikita Khrushchev was ousted as Premier of the Soviet Union on October 14, 1964.

**“Deng Xiaoping’s
input into the**

solution of the Hong
Kong problem was
overriding.”

very strong message. What was interesting was the fact that, after several talks with Zhou Enlai, the formula was that: President Nixon is desirous to come to China; the Chinese government extended an invitation to him. You have to think over this kind of formula in order to understand that no one was ready to be the initiator of such a meeting. I had the opportunity, as I told you the day before, to continue this talk with the American friends, and Henry Kissinger went to China, and then I remember that one of the last meetings I had with one of the American representatives was: “You tell our friends in China that everything was arranged by Henry Kissinger and it has to be observed; any change, any modification, will disturb the whole arrangement, and another thing of whom we have to approach in order to continue our discussion, I propose Huang Zhen and Huang Hua.” We were very pleased to have this contribution as far as the détente between China and Soviet Union and in the rapprochement between China and United States of America, thank you.

AMBASSADOR SIR JOHN BOYD: Thank you Chairman. I will make a sincere effort to be very brief. Let’s pick up a couple of points first which were made this morning just to align myself to those who regard this as an earthquake in world affairs. I think that is the right word. I had thought of using it myself yesterday. It’s certainly my view. May I challenge the chair on “inevitable?” I think it was inevitable in a sense, to use a slightly Marxist analysis, it met the objective—overriding objective needs—of the two big players at that time, which is not to say it could have been carried through without the extraordinary personal contributions at the top on both sides. Can I just put on record, cause nobody else is going to do it, the debt, the international community owes Nixon—not as a person, not as a domestic politician—as a farseeing international practitioner.

And moving on from that to remarks yesterday I made in great admiration of Deng Xiaoping, let me just mention really in square brackets one thing, out of the general background at that time which greatly affected not, of course, Europe as a whole but the specific interest of one European power, namely the UK. Deng Xiaoping’s input into the solution of the Hong Kong problem was overriding, essentially caused the problem to disappear and cleared the way for a much more constructive relationship in the future. I was there from 1985 to 1987 helping to see through the implementation at local level of what had been decided and I can cer-

tainly say fairly that the solution worked to the benefit of the Hong Kong people and that the long-term outcome for Hong Kong has been astonishingly positive.

Now coming back to an underlying theme which comes through this entire discussion; of the international situation and its consequences: the perception of the Soviet threat. As I, I think, made very clear yesterday, I took that as a very real component of the international problematic. In terms of real time personal experience, after the Hong Kong job I went back to a defense job in the Foreign Office from 1987 to 1989. Now, an indication of how seriously we took the conventional imbalance in Europe and the possibility of disagreeable Russian action, I had a music group. We used to meet weekly in my office to play of all things; Haydn string quartets and Beethoven string quartets. And I used to put a notice on the door, partly in joke but partly also underlying the seriousness, which said, “Do not disturb—unless Russian tanks cross the boundary.” That gives you some flavor of the way people were thinking.

Now, Ambassador Ma yesterday gave us a very vivid picture of the improving relationship with the UK and indeed the defense or defense equipment component in that developing relationship/ I can say almost that certainly, speaking for myself, when I was doing that job, and this is not meant to be in any sense discreditable to China, I regarded that the fact of China’s political resolution and arms strength as making them, you might almost say, an honorary member of NATO from the perspective of the kind of work I was doing. China’s role in the global balance was absolutely crucial. Moving on from that and picking up a brief remark I made yesterday, I would say that the strategic triangle was of enormous importance to Europe as a whole, but left us with a challenge. The shift of the world game into the hands of those three big players, and particularly United States and China, did as I say, pose a challenge to Europe. It was welcome; it led to the growth of all those Western missions in Sanlitun and all the rest. But at the same time, I think it did have an effect of marginalizing us when it came to the big operations, the big calls. And I do not think this is a challenge which the Europeans can fail to meet, but I think they need some recipes, and if I may, chairman, I would give a couple of quotes and then read out a list of my proposals. The quotations are mostly from reputable journals like the *Economist* and *Financial Times*. “China will continue to grow;” “the economy will not crash;” “there is nothing in the financial situation that China cannot handle.”

And a very strong sermon to us in the European Union: “Stop quarreling and look to Asia.”

Now to save time, I had given myself a note and I will whiz through it, but the recipes are pretty obvious, but they need to be implemented and they will be implemented as a function of genuine political cooperation and general growing solidarity in the Union. I wrote the following: “set the tone, encourage wider and more confident engagement by China with the international system. In domestic debate which there clearly is in China show sympathy for the reformed drive. I was saying, Premier Wen’s speech probably a couple of months ago struck a very big chord among my colleagues and I imagine widely in Europe, it was a very important speech. “Promote transparency and open markets, work together to strengthen international architecture.” That’s a reference to the progress that has been made in developing for like G20, but there is surely much more that can be usefully discussed. “Support the open door for Chinese investment in Europe, recipes should include sending more students to China, more public investment in Chinese studies, rapid broadening of Chinese language study in European schools system, exploitation of scientific links”—which are I’m glad to say very strong on the whole between Europe and China—“but exploiting these links to develop new and innovative solutions to global problems”—something I didn’t mention yesterday but in a sense flows out of this conference which is “closer liaison between European institutes studying China and everything to do with China.” All these are kind of fairly obvious means but in totality would increase convergence with China. I would take it further: our policies need to be clear, obviously; they need to have staying power; they need to be based on mutual respect. Europe and China’s assessments of global challenges should be shared and compared. We might work more closely together on sustainable infrastructure, development aid, and disaster relief, much else—did I hear someone yesterday mutter space. Peaceful uses of spaces is a very promising area in my view.

Of interest also to Europe—Professor Baum touched on this—are future relations between China and Japan. We do not want to see these two falling out. There’s probably no very obvious role for Europe in helping to improve the atmosphere, but if opportunity offers, if we can spot ways that would be helpful, we should bare that in mind.

Finally and very politically, in my view, Europe should discourage any temptation in Taiwan to declare formal independence. In Korea, which we continue to encourage China to use its leverage on the North; a debatable point I know but there is some leverage. And probably together we might agree it's pointless to moan about the essentials of US strategy in Asia. The US remains a key global stabilizer and most sensible people want the US to stick around, but Europe does have a role in arguing consistently for the right balance, a thoughtful balance, between reinsurance and engagement as pillars of US policy with strong emphasis on engagement. More transparency all around would help. Let me finish this as the only official statement in my comments over the last couple of days. This is Mr. Hague, our Foreign Secretary, "We want China to succeed, and to play a more active leadership role in addressing global issues."⁹⁶

I mentioned it yesterday, but we really must, all of us think about preparing the next generation to deal with the Europe-China link, prepare themselves linguistically but more in terms of historical and general information on the realities and as my neighbor certainly remarked yesterday, we need to be guided by realism. Thank you very much.

AMBASSADOR CHEN BAOSHUN: I'd like to respond to a question raised by the chair. The chair restated an issue that the Italian Ambassador, Menegatti, talked about yesterday—the issue is whether China was ready to establish diplomatic relations with the European countries from 1965 to 1970. I'd like to respond to the issue. From 1965 to 1970, China was ready to establish diplomatic relations with any and all European countries. There was no question of our readiness. However, we had a few principles in our establishment of diplomatic relations with the European countries. The first principle was that it has to be on the basis of peaceful coexistence and we wouldn't accept any unequal relationship. The second principle was that it must be recognized that Taiwan is an unalienable part of the Chinese territory; this is our bottom line, and there is no way we could establish or normalize relations with any country which does not recognize that, including the United States. In our establishment of diplomatic relations with the US, we raised three conditions: we

⁹⁶ Speech by William Hague MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, United Kingdom, at the Fullerton Hotel, Singapore, April 26, 2012.

“The US obstructed the process of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France.”

demanding that the US: one, abrogate its defense treaty with Taiwan; two, withdraw its troops from Taiwan; and three, sever its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The same goes for the European countries. The Taiwan issue must be clarified. In fact at that time, you should say that it was the European countries that weren't ready, not China. For instance, in our negotiations with Italy for the establishment of diplomatic relations, a key issue that took our two sides the longest, which was over a year, to discuss and settle was the Taiwan issue. Italy was under the US influence and the US wanted Italy to insist on the idea of “two Chinas,” and therefore our two sides couldn't agree on the wording of the Taiwan issue. Then we thought about using our approach with the French, striking up an internal understanding with the Italian side and then from there we could proceed to a simple—anyway, the Italian side wouldn't budge on this issue, but eventually thanks to some work done by the Canadians the issue was settled. That's an example of the US influence at the time.

I would also like to talk about how the US obstructed the process of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France. At the time of the negotiations between China and France, the US followed the situation closely. In November 5, 1963, in a meeting with de Gaulle, the US Ambassador to France asked de Gaulle how the things went with the Chinese. De Gaulle responded by saying that everything was possible and facts would be acknowledged one day. Then he concluded by saying that however he didn't think that “one day” would be very far away.⁹⁷ That was the first time the Americans had sounded de Gaulle out on the issue. The second time was on December 16, 1963, when de Gaulle met with Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State, the issue was mentioned again and at that time, de Gaulle's response was that it was not merely up to France and if indeed one day the French government would make the decision to establish diplomatic relations with China, he would certainly let the US know.⁹⁸ On January 15, 1964, the French

⁹⁷ Charles de Gaulle told US Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen that relations between China and France would be established “sooner or later.” See Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State, December 16, 1963, in Edward C. Keefer, David W. Mabon, and Harriet Dashiell Schwar, eds., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 409-410.

⁹⁸ See Fredrik Logevall, “The French Recognition of China and Its Implications for the Vietnam War,” in *Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World beyond Asia*, ed. Priscilla Roberts (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 156.

Ambassador to the US, Hervé Alphand, notified Rusk that the French cabinet had decided to establish diplomatic relations with China.⁹⁹ Then the US lodged a strong protest, saying France's action jeopardized the interest of the Free World. France refuted it by sending back a note stating the French government thought that recognizing China would actually benefit the security and interest of the Free World. So that is an example showing the US had been all the while obstructing the Western European countries' efforts to establish diplomatic relations with China. Yesterday, Ambassador Ma talked about a few problems encountered in the process of upgrading the Sino-British relations to the ambassadorial level, there were also US elements involved. And Ambassador Mei just said that the US objection was also a problem for the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and West Germany. So the heart of the issue is that some Western European countries weren't ready to go beyond US control and pursue an independent foreign policy, a China policy, as de Gaulle did. That's one thing I want to talk about.

There is another thing. Mircea just asked whether the Soviet threat was real. The Soviet threat to China is an undeniable historical fact. So much of it was talked about yesterday; the battle on the Zhenbao Island, where blood was shed. You just raised the question that the Chinese attacked first, but don't you forget that Zhenbao Island is Chinese territory, and what is it supposed to mean that China fought the Soviet Union on Chinese territory? Who was the aggressor? Isn't that obvious? This is one. There was also the thing that the Soviet Union once threatened to use nuclear weapons on China, as well as Soviet provocations in places like Xinjiang. Wasn't that threat real? Thank you.

SHEN ZHIHUA: I have a question for the ambassadors about China's sense of the Soviet threat following the Sino-Soviet conflict on Zhenbao Island. At that time, I was in the navy and I was quite young—eighteen, nineteen years old—and I remember our instructor was telling us that, although we all heard in the big meeting that we are in a very dangerous situation and there may be a nuclear war coming,

⁹⁹ On January 15, 1964, French Ambassador Herve Alphand met with Averell Harriman and "said French Cabinet has decided to recognize Communist China. Announcement will be made in 'next several weeks.'" See Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France, January 15, 1964, in Harriet Dashiell Schwar, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1998), 1-3.

don't panic, we will be okay if everybody just digs a hole in the ground and hides in it. That we did. The hole was called "cat-earhole" and it was actually very small. We were told that when the nuclear bomb dropped, we would be safe by just hiding in it. So what does that story suggest? It suggests what was happening in Beijing at the time. The evacuation had started. A lot of people were leaving Beijing. The transfer of Liu Shaoqi, who was in jail at the time, to Henan, also happened then. So what is my question? I think it is a different question as to whether the Soviet Union actually meant it when it sent out the information about the threat, and from the information we've gathered, it was unlikely that the Soviet Union intended a war like that, but the information was out nevertheless. So my question is, after the information came out, what were the reactions of the Eastern European countries? Did they want to stop this or join the Soviet Union in its threat against China? I want to know whether the Chinese ambassadors to the Eastern European countries knew anything about this? Or whether the Eastern European diplomats knew anything about this? I'm wondering who could give me a response on the matter.

AMBASSADOR ZHOU XIAOPEI: Whether the Soviet Union indeed intended a nuclear attack on China at the time? This is the question raised by the American friend. Also the Chinese friend just asked, how did the information come out? In order to better discuss the issue, I'd like to say a few words on the actual context of the time, a review of the situation forty-three years ago.

In my previous speech, I mentioned the Zhenbao Island incident, which happened in March 1969. Then there was another incident some of the younger generations may not know. In August 1969, a serious bloody incident broke out in Xinjiang, in Western China.¹⁰⁰ In that case, our border patrol was besieged by the Soviet border forces and we suffered losses. Within such context, it was a touch-and-go situation between the two sides.

According to our American sources, on August 30, 1969, after the border incident, Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the US, had an emergency meeting with Kissinger and made a test of the US reaction to their plan of nuclear

¹⁰⁰ The incident took place on August 13, 1969.

attack on China. That was August 20, 1969.¹⁰¹ Shortly after that, on August 28, the *Washington Star* made the information public with an article entitled “Soviet Union Plans Surgical Nuclear Strike on China.” That means it was only after August 28 that the rest of the world, including China and Eastern Europe, got the news.

As to whether or not it was a serious threat, I think I’ll just tell you the Chinese reaction to it at the time. Professor Shen just then talked about his personal experience. China’s official reaction was a proposal of preparation for war and a statement issued in the name of the People’s Republic of China—that is, an official government statement. It was said in it that, if a handful of war maniacs dare to make an assault on China’s nuclear facilities, that means war, that means invasion, and our Chinese people will rise up and fight them and put an end to that war of invasion with a revolutionary war.

I just talked about the situation at that time. Here I also have a question: why did the US disclose the information at a time of great tension between China and Soviet? There was clearly strategic intent on their side.

RICHARD BAUM: There seems to be a common convention among our Chinese colleagues to call the Zhenbao affair of March 1969 “an accident.” According to my reading of what occurred, it was no accident; it was an ambush. I’d like clarification because we have photographs of the battlefield, which shows Russian casualties spread out with open eyes; they were caught unawares by an attack, the first attack, and then there was retaliation two weeks later. I’m not sure Zhenbao was an accident. That’s my question.

MIRCEA MUNTEANU: I just want to bring up the recent publication of a *Foreign Relations of the United States* volume on China from 1969-1972. There was a memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon about the Soviet feeler in terms of a possible attack and there is—“in the last two months”—it’s September 29, 1969—“the increase

“If a handful of war maniacs dare to make

an assault on China’s nuclear facilities, that means war, that means invasion.”

¹⁰¹ Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin met with Henry Kissinger on March 11, 1969, during the fighting on Zhenbao Island. It is unknown whether Dobrynin also met with Kissinger following the border skirmish in Xinjiang in August 1969. See Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, March 19, 1969, in Erin R. Mahan, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969-October 1970* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2006), 95-97.

**“We never
believed that
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of the Sino-Soviet tension has led the Soviets to sound out numerous American contacts on their attitude towards a possible Soviet air strike against China’s nuclear missile facilities or towards other Soviet military actions.”¹⁰² And it goes on to describe a little bit some of those contacts, but a lot of those contacts were somewhat low level and the reaction of the United States and especially of Kissinger and of Nixon is to put the United States in a position to disavow any sort of Soviet action, any sort of military action against China. So the idea that the United States would have sat by and sort of let the Soviet Union attack with nuclear weapons or any other way China I think is unwarranted. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR IOAN ROMULUS BUDURA: Both sides, I mean the Soviet side and the Chinese side, were making a show of it, trying to demonstrate that they had certain strength and were fully capable of handling the other. In the middle of such tensions, I remember what our Prime Minister said. When someone said that the Soviet Union prepared to attack the Chinese bases in Xinjiang and other places with atomic bombs, his response was, “are they crazy?” That meant that we never believed that those scattered conflicts would turn into a big war. That’s it. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR KSAWERY BURSKI: Yes. To the question by Professor Shen. In our ministry of foreign affairs, there was no discussion at all about such an issue. I asked colleagues, retired of course, who worked in the Central Committee of the Polish party. They didn’t hear any discussion in their place. They told me if there would be any discussion, it would be only at the highest level. Nobody at the medium level discussed any such issue. There were rumors from Western press. The answer was like my colleague Budura also said. Nobody would believe that the reasonable people would take such steps.

I would also like to answer to some questions by Professor Niu Jun if it’s possible now. The reconciliation process, at least with Poland in the 1980s at the beginning, was very slow. Why? I think that the Polish leaders, although they welcomed the

¹⁰² Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 29, 1969, in Steven E. Phillips, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1979-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2006), 101-103.

breakthrough in the relations between China and Yugoslavia, especially when we learned much a few years later what Deng Xiaoping told Tito—may I quote it from a Chinese press: “in 1977, Comrade Tito visited Beijing and I met with him in the capacity of a soldier. I told him: ‘our two sides quarreled a lot in the past and there were indeed mistakes on our side, but you couldn’t say you did everything right. The solution is to let bygones be bygones and look ahead.’”¹⁰³ That was the Deng Xiaoping’s opinion regarding solving the issues between Yugoslavia and China, between the two communist parties. While this was welcomed in Poland, this is from the *Renmin Ribao* ten years later, the quotation. But there were signals from the research institute, Mr. Su Shaozhi, the then head of the Marxist Leninist Institute in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He visited Hungary, and from Hungary he was asking us whether he would be received in Poland. At that time, nobody dared in Warsaw to invite him. It was too early still. However, a few years later, there was a deputy minister of Foreign Affairs in 1983 who visited Poland. And this was a kind of breakthrough—a new atmosphere for political dialogue at the level of deputy foreign ministers. Next year, we had Vice Premier Li Peng, who visited Poland and we had a few delegations of Chinese economists, and all the people were concentrating on the Polish experiences in economic reforms. It was evident from the questions they were asking the Polish deputy prime minister in charge of economic reforms and many other people; that the main question was, how to—China started its reforms and China encountered problems. They wanted to know what were the Polish experiences in giving more freedom to state-owned enterprises, in introducing tax system, in reforming the banking system, in allowing the banks to give loans to the factories, to the state-owned enterprises, to make them as the Chinese would say “*zifu yingkui*”—to be responsible for their losses or for their profits, and to increase salaries as well, to improve the standard of living. So these were the main topics of the Chinese visitors in Poland: exchanges of experience in economic reform. Thank you very much.

¹⁰³ Josip Broz Tito visited China from August 30–September 8, 1977. See *Peking Review* 20, no. 36 (September 2, 1977): 3–13.



LEOPOLDO NUTI

Roundtable

The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle and China's Relations with Europe

PÉTER VÁMOS: We have two discussants: Leopoldo Nuti and Shen Zhihua. They might add some more comments or raise some more questions. So please Leopoldo?

LEOPOLDO NUTI: Thank you. Actually, I'm trying to raise two very broad questions which somehow came to my mind as a result of the discussions we've been having over the past couple of days and this morning. And what I'm trying to do is, I'm trying to link together some of the ideas and interpretations that were discussed around this table. So the first one is mostly an interpretive question. And it has got to do with the way we look at these periods in international relations—say in particular from the 1970s on—because I think what we are facing here are two very different narratives. We have the traditional Cold War narrative that looks at the world in a bi-polar—through a bi-polar lens. If we add up the Cold War traditional interpretive paradigm, the international system rotated around bi-polarism until the collapse of the Soviet Union. And then you have a completely different alternative, which is the one that in a way inspired the title of this conference, the rise of multipolarism and I'm thinking in particular of the fact that there is a new historiographical trend that looks at the 1970s as the period which really gave rise to the modern world because of a number of reasons that differentiated the international system that took shape in the 1970s and made it quite unlike the international system that existed until the mid-1960s. From the discussions we've had, I have an impression that there is some sort of tension between these two different ways of looking at what happened. If we trust the rise of multi-polarity, ignoring the Cold War paradigm, then we don't really understand what was going on. But the opposite is also true; if we look at the evolution of the international system, only through the lenses of the Cold War, we do not really understand the transformation of the international



SHEN ZHIHUA

system. So I would like to hear some comments about this idea; which paradigm do you think captures better the essence of what happened in the international system since the 1970s? I'm tempted to paraphrase, I think it was Madeline Albright who said that—and this first point with comments such as “multi-polar if we can, bi-polar if we must,” in the sense that there was a tendency to become a multi-polar world beginning from the late 1960s early 1970s, but when push came to shove and tensions dominated once again the center of the international system, then this idea of a multi-polar world sort of took second stage because the bi-polar tensions of the Cold War reaffirmed their priorities and I'm thinking in particular of the late 1970s and early 1980s. But I would like to hear some comments about this.

And my second point is also related to the first one in a way, because what we have been discussing, particularly since yesterday I think, is how to look at the end of bi-polarism and the end of the Cold War, and I think we are engaging here in a very difficult interpretive exercise of what was the closest to the end of the Cold War. This is one of the key historical issues we have been discussing. We as historians have been discussing this issue for over twenty years. As we all know there are very different interpretations and I would like to think—I would like to have your opinion on this. I also think we need to look at the end of the Cold War from a different perspective and start thinking that the Cold War did not end just in 1989 or 1990-1991. Perhaps the Cold War in Asia ended earlier. I mean after the deepening of the Sino-American reconciliation at the end of the 1970s, basically the Cold War in Asia was almost over, or there was very little Cold War and the center of gravity shifted back again to Europe. Did the Sino-American rapprochement with Nixon, and particularly with Carter and Brzezinski and Deng Xiaoping, create a crucial moment in this transformation of the international system that in a way opened up the road to the end of the Cold War because we've finally isolated the Soviet Union, forcing it to take a number of measures which eventually lead to its disintegration? So this is just another idea that I would like to discuss with you, together with the previous one. These are just my own ruminations about these things that have been discussed over the last couple of days which I throw to the floor for further discussion. Thank you.

SHEN ZHIHUA: I think we've had very successful talks over the past two days. If you have a meeting and there is still time but nobody wants to talk, that is not a very

successful meeting. But if you have a meeting and there are a lot of people who want to talk but there is not enough time for everybody, then that is a successful meeting. I have been waiting to talk in the past two days but have had to wait in line, therefore I think our meeting is a big success.

Here are a few of my thoughts. Why should we have this conference that concentrates on relations between China and Europe? I think, and my field is “socialist studies,” that the Cold War was a state of antagonism between two camps—the socialist camp versus the capitalist camp; but if looking at it from the perspective of relations between countries, there were some peculiarities in the state-to-state relations within the socialist camp.

We see that throughout the Cold War there weren’t major conflicts within the Western camp, though admittedly there was the French withdrawal from NATO, France’s tense relations with the US, the conflict between Germany and Britain, and the US conflict with Japan and also South Korea. None of these tensions or conflicts however escalated to bloodshed. If we look at, on the other hand, the relations between the countries in the socialist camp, they tended to go to extremes. For instance, the Soviet conflict with Yugoslavia and Hungary, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, China’s armed conflict with the Soviet Union and later China’s war with Vietnam. That brings us to this question: why wasn’t there a platform to mediate or a mechanism to reconcile the relations between the socialist countries? Why did it have to get to the point of armed conflict or war? This is the question that I have tried to answer in the recent years during my study of the Sino-Soviet relationship, the Sino-North Korean relationship, the incidents in Poland and Hungary, and many other issues. Is it possible that there was something special in the relations between the socialist countries that separated them from the normal state-to-state relations? I have been thinking about this question, and I hope the witnesses and the scholars here would consider this question as well and help answer it.

Next I would like to say something about the formula of our meeting this time. We all study history, and the study of history is based on nothing more than two types of materials. As far as the first-hand materials go, there are one, documents, and the other, oral histories, such as memoirs, interviews and witness accounts. So our meeting this time is mainly to hear the witnesses talk about their experiences and thoughts. For historians, details are of vital importance. I’m not saying not to

have some general ideas, general views. Those are of course important. But they must be drawn on the basis of details. If we don't know much about the details, then we are susceptible to developing an opinion or interpreting a phenomenon following our own logic and drawing a conclusion that may conflict with a lot of details discovered later on. So for historians, details are of vital importance. I hope we will have more meetings of this kind in the future and will be able to hear more. Actually I find this meeting quite meaningful. I saw that between the sessions, over drinks, and in other unofficial occasions the participating Chinese ambassadors and diplomats had some very interesting talks, among themselves or with other participants. I really wish I could record those talks, because a lot of things they said were completely unknown to us before but were nevertheless their own experiences. I hope that, if the ambassadors and diplomats don't feel like talking about those things over the sessions, they could write a memoir later on, if not just to leave a record for our historians. That will be of tremendous help to our studies.

Finally, I want to say thanks to Mr. Fardella. Because this meeting stands out for many reasons and one important reason is for the number and quality of the service staff. I counted that they are about the same number of staff people as the number of official participants; including those who have been taping and providing us with cold water and other treats; and the translators who have been busy working in a separate room. I think we owe them big thanks.

PÉTER VÁMOS: Thank you very much for the comments. And now I would like to open the floor and invite especially the ambassadors, diplomats to respond to some of the questions that were raised during the morning session. Niu Jun, for example, raised some very specific questions about the changes of the Chinese foreign policies after Mao's death. Yes, Chen Jian, please.

CHEN JIAN: I would like just to raise another question. I feel that the end of the Cold War had a huge impact on the relations between China and the European countries. France, one of the first Western European countries to establish diplomatic relations with China, is a good example. Sino-French relations changed dramatically before and after the Cold War. Why so? And what are the ramifications for the future? I would like Ambassador Cai to talk more about this, since yester-

day he didn't have enough time to touch on this point. Particularly, why had there been such a big impact and such a dramatic change in Sino-French relations since Mitterrand came to power? Since these issues are all too familiar to you, I'm wondering if there are some observations, some first-hand experiences that you could further share with us.

AMBASSADOR CAI FANGBO: Yesterday I gave an overview of Sino-French relations from their establishment to their later development, so I am not going to repeat that. Here I'd like to take up the question you just asked and zoom in on the stages of the development of Sino-French relations. What made Sino-French relations prosper at one stage but run into difficulties at another stage?

The first stage of the development of Sino-French relations was from the year 1964 to 1989. During those years, Sino-French relations developed quite well despite the Cultural Revolution. Why? The reason was that at that time both China and France wanted to break away from the bloc politics, to break up the bi-polar structure and to pursue an independent foreign policy. Guided by the same strategic thought, China and France managed to develop their relations quite smoothly. Even though the Cultural Revolution brought about a lot of disagreements and conflicts between the two sides, the leadership of both countries always handled their relations from a strategic height. During the Cultural Revolution, when Sino-French relations were at their most strained, de Gaulle called to meet with our chargé d'affaires in France three times. Let me first quote what de Gaulle said. De Gaulle told our chargé d'affaires ad interim three times in 1968 during the period of January to July: "Please send my regards to Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai; there exists no difficulty or obstacle to the development of the relations between China and France; whatever the media says or comments on China's internal affairs or even against China, that won't change France's policy of conducting good cooperation with China in various aspects." This is what de Gaulle said at a time when Sino-French relations were at their most strained. After de Gaulle said that, Vice Premier Chen Yi, who was at the time also the Foreign Minister, made a response. And that was at a banquet held by the French Ambassador to China; and as a response, Vice Premier Chen Yi said: "China and France had a lot in common such as their opposition to the American invasion and the world domination by the Soviet Union and

the US; although our two countries have different social systems and hold different positions on various issues, that doesn't prevent us from cooperating with each other on issues of great importance." This is also a good example that shows de Gaulle's strategic and long-term vision in terms of the development of Sino-French relations. So this was the first stage.

The second stage was from the year 1989 to 1993, which was the most difficult period for Sino-French relations. I, as the Chinese Ambassador to France, to use a Chinese expression, was "sitting on a cold stool," or "sitting on the bench," during all those four years. It was a period of great tension between the two countries. Why? As I mentioned yesterday, mainly because of three things. First, in 1989, after the "June 4th" incident in Beijing, France led the international sanctions on China; then in 1991, France sold six advanced frigates to Taiwan, frigates in the La Fayette class; and shortly after that, in 1992, France sold sixty advanced Mirage jets to Taiwan. As a result, Sino-French relations were plunged to their lowest point. But, why out of a sudden such a dramatic change happened in a pair of relations which before had been developing quite smoothly? The key issue here was the French leadership's wrong judgment of the situation at the time and the relations between the two countries. Their logic was simple: the Soviet Union was a socialist country, it collapsed; China is a socialist country, therefore China will collapse soon. In their view, since China will collapse soon, in a few months' time, they can just sell the weapons to Taiwan without worries; the Chinese government will no longer exist anyway. So they made this wrong judgment and consequently followed a wrong policy. Although their Ambassador to China disapproved of this view, later with all sorts of activities by various interest groups, the weapons sales went through, and its consequences, I would say, France lost in it more than China. I explained this yesterday, so I won't repeat on that.

Finally, after 1994, when the Socialist Party lost the election and the right-wing Gaullist Party stepped into power; then later Chirac was elected President and China and France entered into a comprehensive partnership. All of this happened, still, because of the demands of the time. The reasons were mainly in two aspects. First, the US was pushing unilateralism at the time as well as military action against Iraq, which brought China and France closer due to their common views. Then on the French side, Chirac is a man of very particular insights in the past and present of



QIANG ZHAI, ENRICO FARDELLA, AND GARRET MARTIN

China, and the policy he adopted was to constructively settle past issues and develop Sino-French relations. So in 1997, France became the first major Western power to enter into a comprehensive partnership with China; and then in 2004 this partnership upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership and now it still continues, but I'll leave out the more recent development. Because of the above reasons, Sino-French relations have been in the front row of development. I agree to what Mr. British Ambassador said just then, that the relations between China and Europe must be developed on the basis of equality and mutual respect and benefit; and only by that the relations can last and develop in the long term and achieve win-win results, or else they won't last. That's all.

GARRETT MARTIN: Yes, I want to just add a little bit to this question, but also to tie together some of the points about the late 1970s as a pretty key moment in the long term and all the Cold War dynamics. For Mitterrand in the 1980s I think, and other figures of the socialist party, I think they were really surprised by the economic changes initiated by Deng Xiaoping. Because when Mitterrand comes to power in 1981, he wants to sort of move away from the market economy, so in a sense there was a sort of ideological economic split between France and China and I think that does play a role in explaining why relations, even before 1989, between France and China are not quite as good. But I would like to ask on another note some of the witnesses here, how they reacted to those dramatic economic changes in China? Because I mean that's a pretty significant change. And whether there were any discussions in Eastern Europe to ever consider similar changes? Because I mean obviously the economic situation in Eastern Europe in the 1980s was pretty terrible. So whether there were any considerations of a kind of Chinese option—keeping political power but economic reforms?

**“Deng Xiaoping
adopted the
policy of reform**

and opening up,
otherwise China
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VLADISLAV ZUBOK: I had an immediate reaction to what Ambassador Cai said and I have a question for him and maybe to Ambassador Mei. We haven’t discussed it, and I’m afraid we’ll not have time to discuss it, but in July 1989, Gorbachev made a speech about the “Common European Home.”¹⁰⁴ And whatever you think about this rhetoric, it had immediate implications for China and there were negotiations between the Soviet Union and China on the Ussuri and the Amur borders. What was the reaction in China to Gorbachev’s rhetoric about the “Common European Home,” particularly between July and November 9, 1989, between July and the fall of Berlin Wall when the Soviet Union still looked like a super power?

AMBASSADOR CAI FANGBO: The “Common European Home” that Gorbachev put forth was actually an expression of his own idealism. It was impractical for the Cold War period. Since Europe, Western Europe, was incorporated in a system that is the Atlantic Alliance, and the Soviet Union was viewed by Europe as a threat to its security. So Gorbachev wanted to use this concept to ease the tensions. But a simple slogan wasn’t going to solve that. You practice a different economic system and your armaments in every aspect pose a threat to Europe; and then there was the Warsaw Pact, a military alliance. In this case, the West actually made use of this slogan to divide the Warsaw Pact which eventually led to the disestablishment of the Warsaw Treaty and then the Soviet Union itself.

Of course I think that there were external factors that led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, but the main reason lies in the Soviet rigid system of planned economy that was unable to adapt to the development of productivity in the country itself and other Eastern European countries. A rigid economic system together with the leadership’s adherence to rigid doctrines that didn’t allow room for reform—without reform, without opening up, the system was bound to fail. This is something China felt deeply, since China once followed the Soviets and their model of planned economy. But later on we found that the model didn’t work, so after the Cultural Revolution Deng Xiaoping adopted the policy of reform and opening up, otherwise China would have come to the same end as the Soviet Union. “If we don’t reform,” said Deng Xiaoping once, “if we don’t reform and open up to the outside

¹⁰⁴ See Neil Malcolm, “The ‘Common European Home’ and Soviet European Policy,” *International Affairs* 65, no. 4 (Autumn 1989): 659-676.

world—it'll be a dead end.”¹⁰⁵ And “dead end” means the collapse of the system. Thank you.

VLADISLAV ZUBOK: Just to follow up, at that time when Gorbachev said it, were there any fears in Beijing that Gorbachev was turning away from normalization of Sino-Soviet relations by offering a grand scheme of integration with the West, which could be viewed as an anti-Chinese move?

AMBASSADOR MEI ZHAORONG: I'll follow up on Ambassador Cai's point. For we as a government, as a country, to take a stand on anything, we have to first consider the specific meaning and content of whatever that thing is. You cannot declare where you stand just upon hearing any slogan, any statement. Gorbachev put forth the notion of perestroika but what was that exactly? He himself couldn't really say. Quite frankly, I had, for several times, talked with former German Chancellor Schmidt about the Soviet reforms. The first time I asked Schmidt what his assessment was of the chance that Gorbachev's reform might succeed, he said no more than fifty percent; a year later, I asked him what you think is the chance of success for Gorbachev's reform, he said no more than thirty percent; then the year after that, I asked him once again the same question, less than twenty-five percent he said. In 1987 before I left my post, I visited Schmidt and again I asked him this question. Then he said, I simply don't know whether or not the Soviets could succeed in their reform as they appeared to have absolutely no idea of how to manage the economy; the other time when I raised a few economic figures to Brezhnev and Gorbachev, Brezhnev just couldn't get it; how could you carry out a reform like that; that is simply impossible.

Also there was no consistency to Gorbachev's statements. On the issue of German unification, in 1988, he said that it would be in one hundred years from now and really no point to think about. Later on Shevardnadze said that Germany could be unified if it withdraws from NATO. But shortly after that this position was aban-

¹⁰⁵ Deng Xiaoping is alleged to have made this statement—although his exact words vary from source to source—during his “Southern Tour” of 1992. See, for example, John Pomfret, *Chinese Lessons: Five Classmates and the Story of New China* (New York: Henry Holt, 2006), 179.

done as well. Finally, Gorbachev said the principle of national self-determination applies to the German people as well. You know they acknowledged that German could be unified. Just like that their positions kept changing, and there was no way to follow it. So it was impossible for us to make a response or to make a comment on anything.

I saw Gorbachev twice at Brandt's funeral. He saw I was wearing a Zhongshan suit, because it was a very solemn occasion, and he wanted to talk to me. But unfortunately, since he couldn't speak German nor English and I couldn't speak Russian, we couldn't talk and only shook hands. My feeling is that the Germans, the Europeans—although they heaped praises on Gorbachev and when he visited Germany they treated him like a hero—deep down the Germans, I could say, thought Gorbachev was nothing, had nothing to offer, because he had nothing to offer. I once asked the former German Foreign Minister Genscher why Gorbachev kept changing position on the issue of German unification. His answer was that Gorbachev was an idealist, which means he had a lot of unrealistic thoughts. The same question I asked Kissinger, Kissinger said “I don't know.” I asked Kohl; Kohl said “I don't know.”

Then why exactly? But from what I've gathered from various sources, I see that, in the Gorbachev years, the Soviet economy was on the verge of bankruptcy, so he had to appeal to West Germany for internal, financial assistance, otherwise he couldn't manage. That is why he made further and further concession on the German unification issue. That is the reason. Then how could a leader of a country, who was not sure at all about his own policy, lead the country and carry out a successful reform? That was simply impossible. To be blunt, those Western European countries were not stupid. You say a “Common Home” and they build you a common home. Not to mention that at that time, such talk of a common home was far from the point. So this is my first point.

Another thing I want to talk about is, from yesterday and today's questions, two questions that particularly interested me. Here I'm not really answering them, but rather giving some timely response or making some comments. One question was why in the 1960s and 1970s and the early 1980s the relations between China and the Eastern European countries changed for the better? To answer this question, one has to take into account many aspects. One aspect was the Soviet Union's internal

changes. As it was just mentioned, Khrushchev stepped down in 1964; the time when he stepped down, I was flying from East Germany to Irkutsk, and a bomb was found underneath the plane; shortly afterwards when I got back to Beijing, China detonated the first atomic bomb.¹⁰⁶ So I experienced two bombs in one day; one regular bomb, one atomic bomb. So that was a very memorable episode.

Then after Khrushchev stepped down, inside the Soviet leadership there was definitely a change of attitude towards China, though the change was little. They prepared to change but still didn't know how. That was the situation at that moment. But over time the Soviets wanted to improve relations with China. In 1969, on his way back from Hanoi, Kosygin insisted on stopping by Beijing to meet with Premier Zhou Enlai; and eventually the two met at the Beijing airport.¹⁰⁷ This episode suggested that some people inside the Soviet leadership wanted to improve the relations with China. But after Kosygin got back to Moscow, and at a meeting of the Politburo members, his opinion was rejected by the other faction led by Brezhnev. So at that time it was very difficult to make a guess on the Soviet Union. But one thing was sure, that is, the Soviet control of the Eastern European countries loosened, it weakened at that time; not as strong as in the Khrushchev era. Besides, the Eastern European countries didn't really want to have tense relations with China from the beginning, which was not in their best interests. Once Soviet control was loosened, these countries had more room to maneuver, so they became more active. I remember that in the early 1970s, in 1976, after Honecker was elected President, he kept making friendly gestures towards our ambassadors. Before that, when our ambassadors attended diplomatic occasions, they didn't even speak to our ambassadors; but from 1976 on there were greetings, ceremonious talks—talks such as that our relations go way back, and so on. So they were trying to mend relations with us. That suggested that the Eastern European countries were making changes for their own interests.

¹⁰⁶ China successfully detonated an atomic bomb for the first time on October 16, 1964. See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988).

¹⁰⁷ Alexei Kosygin and Zhou Enlai met on September 11, 1969, at the Beijing International Airport. For the Russian version of the conversation between Kosygin and Zhou, see Ostermann, "East German Documents on the Border Conflict, 1969," 191-193. For a Chinese summary of the meeting, see Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949-1976)*, vol. 3, 320-321.

On the other hand, there was change on China's side as well. China's change was, after Hu Yaobang became Chairman, we sorted out and refuted a few trends of thought that had been in the party for some time. Then Hu Yaobang said to East German delegates that we were fraternal parties and that we shouldn't have bad blood towards each other; we should seek peace; we should cooperate with each other, and so on. Deng Xiaoping also said, in a word, "look forward;" "now we don't do things the same way we did in the past;" "we have been right and we have made mistakes on this or that domestic issue or international issue." While on the East German side, by means of internal communication, they told us in clear terms that a decision had been made within the German Party that starting from 1976 they would pursue improvement of relations with China. After 1982, their internal decision specified that the relations with China would be personally supervised by Honecker and only Honecker. So there was also internal change on the East German side.

But of course these developments also had to do with the entire international situation, along with, directly speaking, the deposition of Khrushchev in the Soviet Union and the death of Chairman Mao in China in 1976. So the situation was poised to change. And several factors, on various sides, contributed to it. You could say that both sides had the need, so the relations continued to improve and after 1981-1982, developed at a relatively faster pace. But here I won't go into details of that.

About the other question, so far as I remember, somebody just expressed a bit of surprise at our policy of differential treatment towards the Eastern European countries. In my opinion there is nothing surprising about that. All countries develop their foreign policy according to their own national conditions, and there is always an element of differential treatment in it. To quote Chairman Mao, "no differentiation, no policy."¹⁰⁸ Chairman Mao was speaking in theory, but in reality every country does it. Your country treats us better—for instance, Albania stood on the same line as us at that time, and naturally we in turn called Albania the "beacon of

¹⁰⁸ The phrase "*meiyou qubie jiu meiyou zhengce*" ("no differentiation, no policy") is often attributed to Mao Zedong, though these were not his exact words. See "On Policy," December 25, 1940, in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 2 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 441-449.

socialism” and were on friendly terms with it. Romania pursued relatively independent policy rather than trailing behind the Soviet Union and it had its own independent thoughts. We admired that. One of our basic stands was, so long as a country treats us a bit nicely, we would like to conduct friendly exchanges with it; however if it dances to Khrushchev’s anti-China tune, then we have to make certain response. But even after 1964, we kept our focus on the Soviet revisionists; and as for the Eastern European countries, considering the special situation they were in, a situation that limited their freedom of action because of the Soviet pressure, we would be more lenient and wouldn’t react to them the same way we react to the Soviet Union. Even when they criticized us, we made no response. In the case of Germany, the last time we rebuked against it was in 1968. After 1968, whenever East Germany criticized us, we made no response. We did not use this differential treatment, as many people might think, because we wanted to destroy the Soviet Union or to bring down the Soviet Union. That was not what we meant. We did it because we wanted to win over more friends to our side; we wanted to reduce the anti-China forces and to protect our own interests. At that time we were quite aware that we didn’t have the power to strike down the Soviet Union and then to replace it as the head of the socialist camp. That wasn’t right. In fact in the 1950s—in 1956-1957—Chairman Mao did work on the Eastern European countries, urging them to acknowledge the lead of the Soviet Union. At the time of the Moscow Declaration, some Eastern European countries disapproved of that idea, but Chairman Mao worked on them, saying that we still need to look at the Soviet Union as our big brother, we need them to lead us; and let’s not raise the idea of China as the lead.¹⁰⁹ That suggested that we didn’t want to be the lead, didn’t want to replace the Soviet Union as the lead of Socialism. We didn’t have that intention. However we did have to protect our own interests and our own national sovereignty and try to reduce the anti-China forces. That’s our responsibility. I’m not saying that some people here believe that, but more or less people have that impression, which is not true to the actual situation.

My last point is, I want to express this, that our meeting this time is for discussions of the Cold War period, which is in fact history. We study history for the future. On the one hand, we learn more by re-examining the past; and the study of

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¹⁰⁹ See Austin Jersild, *The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 109-131

history gives us new insights. On the other hand, we make the past serve the present and we draw lessons from history. Now the Cold War is of course over, but the Cold War mentality has not died out yet and still endures today. Take for instance, the EU's arms embargo on China. Isn't that a product of the Cold War period? Still haven't got rid of that even now. What's the fundamental problem there? I think the problem is not entirely with the European countries; the fundamental problem is the US. So that is to say that the US still maintains a Cold War mentality in that aspect. I have talked with some senior officials—who are more or less in charge—of the European countries about this issue, and they told me, it's not that we wouldn't lift the embargo, it's just that the US threatens that if we do that we will suffer; our defense industry will be finished, for we won't get the supply of any parts, so we have to follow the American line and can't lift the arms embargo. So that's the fundamental problem. So this Cold War mentality still exists. As I said, now we are here discussing the past, we do that for the future. So I'm saying that the European countries also have the task of how to draw lessons from the Cold War period. We all need to do that. As a matter of fact, from what I see, in terms of geopolitics, now there is no direct conflict of interests between China and Europe, instead there is very much mutually complementary economies. In response to the European debt crisis, a certain country has been standing aloof and wants your European countries to be kept in that lifeless state so as not to challenge its leadership position. But not China. We are willing to help. But you have to show some appreciation, some guarantee, otherwise we'll be throwing our money away and we wouldn't do that. Also, you have to achieve a consensus within yourselves; if you don't have an internal consensus, we can't help. We want to buy your European bonds, but you don't have bonds, what are we supposed to do? All these issues require cooperation and coordination between our two sides. We hope that the EU countries can learn from this and won't just follow any super power but decide their own positions based on their own interests; be independent. In that case, there will be better prospect for the cooperation between China and Europe. During the Cold War period, it was just because China didn't want to follow the Soviet lead in everything that caused the Soviet reaction against China. We wanted to be independent in making our own decisions. As for the Western European countries, they wanted to be independent, but sometimes there were difficulties. France was an exception. De Gaulle was defi-

ant against the pressure from the Americans. Now I'm saying this, because today we are facing a similar situation; surely not exactly the same as then, but it is more or less like that. So how to draw lessons from the past, I think that's really worth thinking about. I'll just end my speech here. I don't want to dwell on these things too much, since we are all very informed and sensible people here. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR YANG CHENGXU: This session has been going on for a while. Since nobody is eager to speak now, I would like to make a comment, with regards to my view on the international situation. I sum up the period of the rivalry between the two superpowers, which was the period we are focusing on—the 1960s to the 1980s—with twelve Chinese characters: “*Mei gong Su shou, Su gong Mei shou, hu you gong shou*,” meaning “US offense against Soviet defense, Soviet offense against US defense, sometimes offense and sometimes defense for both sides.” This is my very brief characterization of that period. This is one thing.

My second point is, the American professor Fukuyama once called the period following the upheaval of Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the end of history,” but now it doesn't seem likely.¹¹⁰ That period was, if to describe it more aptly and from the US point of view, a period of one-polar world structure in which the US was the sole superpower, the sole hegemony that no other country dared to challenge. But later on as things developed and with the rise of emerging countries such as the five “BRICS” states, consisting of China, India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa, all signs indicate that the world has been undergoing a significant change; and also if you add to the picture the 2008 financial crisis in the US and the European debt crisis that we're facing now. But as far as I can see, whatever problems the US and Europe are facing, they are problems of a different economic development stage from those faced by China, India, and other emerging countries. Now we say Europe is facing such a big problem, but by comparison the problems faced by China and India are far graver; considering that the money the Europeans get for relief is a lot more than most Chinese and Indians get for salary; and they enjoy far greater social security and medical care benefits than people in China, India, Brazil, and other developing countries. So Europe's problems and the developing

¹¹⁰ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

countries' problems are problems of different development stages. But my point is, no matter what system or ideology a country has adopted, now we are all facing unprecedented issues that we need to address. To address those issues, I think first of all we should rely on our own strength and efforts, but of course we will also need external support.

Given the above, as I think about the international situation, I don't think the rivalry of the two superpowers in a bi-polar world past as well as the questions that have been under a lot of discussion here—the questions about whether China had the intention to divide Western Europe so as to oppose the US or whether China had the intention to divide Eastern Europe so as to oppose the Soviet Union—I don't think that these things are still that important to our own time. In my opinion, the conflicts of the world today are manifest, in a greater way, in a kind of triangular state-to-state relations. For example in Asia, the relations between China, Japan, and the US have great significance. I remember it was only four or five years ago when Yukio Hatoyama took office, he put forward these three points. First, to achieve equal status with the US and demand the US withdrawal its troops from Okinawa. Second, to strengthen relations with China. Third, to establish an East Asian community excluding the US. But two or three years later, Japan changed its policy drastically, completely falling on the side of the US, with hostility directed at China. From a long-term development point of view, I think this kind of triangular relations will not last for long and is bound to change, but it will require responsible people in the world to work together to foster that change. I was listening to the British Ambassador just then; he was saying he hopes the relations between China and Japan will get better; and that made me think. I had worked for ten years for the improvement of friendships between China and Japan. I was a member of the China-Japan Friendship Committee. I have had many contacts with Japan and for several times I have asked Japanese diplomats and scholars this question: Why could the Germans acknowledge their war crimes, and for that Brandt even knelt before the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial? Why can't you Japanese do that? The Japanese told me that the Germans committed genocide; the Germans carried out a policy of genocide, but Japan just had a war with China; they even wouldn't acknowledge that war was an invasion. So when Junichiro Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine once again, I met my German friends and I asked them, why can't you come out and

say something? The Germans said we are in a very difficult position. So I think we should know that all the changes we are seeing now are only temporary and won't persist. I don't think the triangular relations between China, Japan and the US will last. After the US returned to the Asia-Pacific, it certainly has helped strengthen the alliance between Japan and the US and even the future cooperation between the US, Japan, and Korea. Whom are all these activities aiming at? The Americans keep saying it's not China, but of course China wouldn't believe that.

I think Europe is also involved in this kind of triangular situations, like the relations between Russia, Europe and the US; and I think this kind of triangular situations is now manifest in all aspects of the world politics. The relationships between the three sides of the triangle are mutually restrictive, which is quite interesting; once the relationship between two sides improves, their respective relationships with the third side diminish. I could say in a similar way China is involved in this kind of triangular relations with Europe and the US. China has never thought that it can undermine the relations between Europe and the US, because it is very clear to us that the mutual investment that Europe and the US conduct with each other is still for both sides the highest and the most important; and also Europe and the US share the same ideology and values. We don't want to waste our energy there. However we should still seek common grounds with Europe and cooperate with them on issues that serve the interest of our both sides. But our actions are not necessarily directed at the US, and besides we are only doing the same thing that the Americans are doing. So when last year the US proposed the "Group of Two" or G2 theory, I was the first one to step out to voice objection. I don't think that the world can be managed by two big countries and I believe that all countries should work together to address the problems of the world, especially given the circumstances that we are all facing some very serious issues. All countries, including China, Europe, the US, Russia, Brazil, India, and South Africa, are all facing some very serious issues that, if not addressed, will threaten the peaceful development of the world. And today's world, as I see it, is no longer a world where two superpowers contend with each other and seek to undermine each other for advantages.

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Finally, I want to make a comment with regards to a recently published book by Brzezinski.¹¹¹ In this book, Brzezinski says that, in the future, in order to balance China's power, the US can only seek alliance with Europe, with Turkey and with Russia. I won't make more comments on this book, but I think this statement is very doubtful. Thank you.

ENRICO FARDELLA: I have a general comment that I think on account of what has been said at the end of the previous panel and the beginning of this one, by Richard Baum—I would like to stress the importance of the passage in 1978-1979. Professor Nuti mentioned the end of the Cold War and the possibility that the Cold War ended earlier in Asia. And I also like what Ambassador Yang just said about China-America and the possibility of a special relationship between China and the US, the so-called G-2. So I would like to start with the end of the Cold War.

I think it's true that the Cold War ended earlier in Asia and I think it's quite possible to generalize and identify the main origin of this process: the reform and opening brought forward by Deng Xiaoping in China, which is I think the real turning point of the 1970s and a crucial phenomenon that really changed the Cold War in Asia. But the point is that, as we know, the reform and opening put forward by Deng Xiaoping was made possible through the cooperation between China and the US, who guaranteed the creation of a secure environment that favored the progress of the reform and that process; as I understand it, it also freed the Chinese leadership from the obsession of invasion of war with the Soviet Union. So I think we should start to discuss about how China and the US, and how Europe and China, cooperated in order to create the safe and secure environment that promoted the reform and opening of China and favored the integration of China into the international system. Namely I think there are two main points: one is the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, which I think is extremely important; and the second one is also the military cooperation between Europe and China from 1977 onward. And I have a few questions for the ambassadors, namely Ambassador Boyd, Ambassador Budura, and maybe Ambassador Mei and Ambassador Yang for the Chinese side.

¹¹¹ See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2012).

I would like to know whether they can say something about the role of Europe in promoting Chinese modernization efforts, in the crucial phase 1977, 1978, 1979. Whether, for example, Romania had some role or previous warning about the sign of Sino-Vietnamese War? And from Ambassador Mei and Ambassador Yang, they can say about the cooperation between China and Europe in that stage, that very important stage of reform and opening. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR SIR JOHN BOYD: Well I just had my knuckles wrapped for intervening in the relationship between China and Japan, so I'm certainly not going to intervene in a discussion about relations between the PLA and the political bosses. However, and I think the factual answer is I'm not aware of any attempt by British interests to meddle in that field. But I did, as you would have gathered, follow very closely the return of Deng Xiaoping, the thoughts of Deng Xiaoping, the writings of Deng Xiaoping, and I do note that there was an issue about military behavior and that set of topics which appears in Deng Xiaoping's published writings and his view is very clear on how improvements might be made. I cannot improve on the formula printed there. Could I say, at the same time I hope my remarks on Japan were not misunderstood? It is just that simply, I hope to see Europe playing a more useful, constructive, and visible role in Asia. We have been so turned in on ourselves in recent years that I think the statement has to be made. One of the things we would like to see—it's an aspiration—is a stable, secure environment in East Asia. I served of course in Japan myself and I would not for a minute say that their record is outstanding or perfect or that there are not some alarming views expressed from time to time. But I would say about Japan, on the basis of experience, that views about the relationship with China are actually very divided, and there are those who are hostile in a very old-fashioned way, but there are many interests who have an economic stake or other interests or a respect for Chinese culture whose friendship needs to be sought. I think that's all I was trying to say.

I do agree absolutely with those who say more changes are on their way whether in great power relations or foreign policy relations more generally. We must be alert to that. We must, as I've preached, be trying to train our next generation to cope with them. I think one abiding issue will be, who if anyone is a dominant power in the European landmass? It's not Cold War rhetoric to say that that is a permanent

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concern and interest for European powers. And as one great British Foreign Minister said more than a hundred years ago, “You don’t have permanent friends. You do have permanent interests, and they are a guideline for foreign policy.”¹¹² Thank you.

AMBASSADOR IOAN ROMULUS BUDURA: You know in 1976, after the death of Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and Mao Zedong, we sent a delegation to Beijing in order to understand the situation after the deaths of these three important leaders; to understand the opportunities and possibilities of developing our bilateral relations according to the tradition between our two countries. I have to tell you that the reaction of Hua Guofeng and other leaders was very positive, and I would say that from 1976 to 1981 when a change occurred in the leadership of China, the exchanges, the contacts, the cooperation, and everything reached a very high level. Among these projects or activities were also some linked to the military cooperation. I would say that in 1978, in September or October, we signed two agreements with the Chinese government. We received at that time two credits—300 million dollars and 300 million renminbi—and these credits were directed to the development of Romanian military industry. And I have to tell you that the president of China, Jiang Zemin, was then appointed as the head of the group which was entrusted with the activities in this field. This is the moment when Jiang Zemin learned Romanian language and even has a very good understanding of the Romanian poetry and songs.¹¹³ So I would say that in those years, I mean during the Hua Guofeng’s, and even a little bit earlier, this kind of relations developed very well. And they were very important for the Romanian national defense. Thank you.

ENRICO FARDELLA: Maybe I can make more direct questions. My interest is to know whether you can tell us something about the role of Sino-European cooperation, especially in terms of the military, in 1977-1978? The Americans strongly pushed the NATO allies of Europe to exchange military technology with China and there were several meetings going on, even in Brussels at NATO-level; Chinese

¹¹² Foreign Secretary Henry John Temple Viscount Lord Palmerston (1784-1865) said “we have no permanent allies, we have no permanent enemies, we only have permanent interests.”

¹¹³ See Bruce Gilley, *Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 61-62.

official of the PLA shared with the NATO officials information on Europe. And so I would just like to know whether you can tell us something about this kind of exchange.

AMBASSADOR MEI ZHAORONG: In 1976-1977, the relations between China and Western Europe should be in the process of development, and as to whether or not we imported weapons from Western Europe? I'm not really sure, but there seemed to me no direct, large-scale weapons imports. 1978 was the year we started our reform and opening-up, and in 1978 we sent our first delegation to visit Western Europe, a big delegation consisting of a dozen ministers and led by Vice Premier Guo Moruo.¹¹⁴ The purpose of the visit was to know more about Western European capitalist countries' development, their achievements and their experiences, and see if those could serve as references for China's own reform and opening-up practice. As we all know, in December of 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee passed the historic decision to carry out "internal reform and external opening-up" in China.¹¹⁵ So the delegation's visit to Western Europe served that purpose. After China opened up to the outside world, my impression was that the Western European countries were welcoming. Since at that time, the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries weren't opened up to the rest of the world, the Western European countries hoped that China's opening-up practice would set an example for the other socialist countries to follow, meaning leading to the reform and opening-up of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in general. So at that time, our relations with the Western European countries just got started. We might have had some dual purpose imports from them, but there were no large-scale imports.

¹¹⁴ The 1978 delegation was led by Vice Premier Gu Mu, not Guo Moruo, and it visited France, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, and Belgium. See Ezra Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 221-227.

¹¹⁵ The Third Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee was held from December 18-22, 1978. See "Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," *Peking Review* 52 (December 29, 1978): 6-16.

Prior to 1989, the United States probably didn't take any action to block the Western European countries' weapons sales to China; that might be the case. But after 1989, the Americans changed attitude. I think Ambassador Cai Fangbo just mentioned this as a reason. Ambassador Cai said that the Western European countries made a wrong judgment of China's situation, thinking that China would soon collapse like the Soviet Union and the Eastern European communist regime. I remember I saw an article at the time while I was in Germany; the article called China "a giant made of pillars of clay" and suggested that China would fall down if the West only gives it one good strike. This was basically what they thought about China at the time. But that is not the most important reason; the most important reason is the decrease of the role and value China held in Western Europe's anti-Soviet and Soviet-containment strategy. The Western European countries were planning to team up with China to combat the Soviet Union, whom to them was the biggest threat. But the Soviet Union collapsed, disintegrated in 1991 and in place of the old system there emerged a completely, western-style new political system. Similar changes also came to the other Eastern European countries. However, China, as Deng Xiaoping said, would always uphold the Four Cardinal Principles, in which there is the emphasis on "the socialist road and the leadership of the Communist Party of China."¹¹⁶ This didn't go well with the Western European countries. In addition, they considered that China was not as important as it used to be to their strategy. As a result, the Western European countries intended to take full advantage of the Eastern European situation and imposed a coercion policy on China, forcing China to change in the way that the Western-style system would prevail universally. That was their plan. But sorry, it didn't work. Not long after that, in 1992, I heard comments: the Western European countries were saying that China's communism isn't going to collapse that soon; the Chinese Communist Party has differences with the Eastern European communist parties, so the coercion policies applied to Eastern Europe aren't working in the case of China. Consequently, they adjusted their China policies, adopting a policy of taking so-called "small steps" to cooperate with China

¹¹⁶ The "Four Cardinal Principles" (*"si xiang jiben yuanze"*) include: (1) the principle of upholding the socialist path; (2) the principle of upholding the people's democratic dictatorship; (3) the principle of upholding the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party; and (4) the principle of upholding Mao Zedong Thought and Marxism-Leninism.

and by getting close to China, to gradually influence China's policies and Chinese society. So they switched to this new policy, one that would also allow them to benefit from China's economic development. If you observe it for a period of time, although China was subject to the so-called "comprehensive sanctions" imposed by the West, China's economy in the 1989 and 1990 was on the ascent; there was no sharp decline in the economy because of the Western sanctions. Seeing that didn't work, the West changed their strategy, which has continued up to date.

I feel, with our European friends here today, that the Western European countries, the European countries, should reconsider a question—that is, how to treat a rapidly rising China? How to view the rise of China: whether it is good or bad for the European countries? Whether it presents a threat or an opportunity? I think that is really something to think about. My view is that China's development presents a very good opportunity for Europe; surely it cannot be ruled out that our two sides would have competition over certain products, but the competition will be in the low-end, not the high-end segment. The products we have developed are still way behind those of the European countries in terms of sophistication. So you shouldn't have concerns in this aspect. Not to mention that one principle of the market economy is equal competition, which the European countries have always preached, but when it comes to practice they become worried about competition. I'm afraid that is not fair. When I was still ambassador, I had European friends, German friends constantly telling me, "your country should learn to compete and competition makes progress." Indeed competition makes progress, but you are only okay with Europe coming to China to compete; you should also be okay with China coming to Europe to compete; only that's reciprocity, that's equality. So that's my proposal, to rightly treat the rise of China.

Another point: I think there was a period of time that some European countries let ideology guide their thoughts and treatment of their relations with China. I think we should talk about this. Your ideology and values, honestly speaking, have worked for you, and we Chinese respect the values, national systems, concept of human rights and other ideas that you Europeans have developed through history. But we Chinese have our own values that are deeply rooted in our five thousand years of history and culture and you should respect that too. So on the ideology front, we should respect each other, and if there are differences, we should conduct open dialogue in

“How to view the rise of China: whether it is good or bad for the European countries?”



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order to understand each other more and reach some common understandings; and where we cannot reach an agreement, we should agree to disagree and seek common ground in other places, common interests where we can cooperate and both benefit. As we Chinese say, grow the “cake of common interest” to the benefit of both, instead of trying to change each other, which is just impossible. The Chinese will never become the Europeans and the Europeans will never become the Chinese.

Another thing is, we should learn a lesson from history—that is, we should respect each other’s core interests. In the case of the Sino-European relations, so far the European countries have been unfair to China and hurt China in essentially two issues. One concerns the arms sales to Taiwan, which Ambassador Cai have mentioned. In Europe, there are three countries that sold weapons to Taiwan at one time or another. The Dutch were the first; they sold submarines to Taiwan, causing the Sino-Dutch relations to be downgraded from the ambassadorial level to the chargé d’affaires level. Two years later, the Dutch changed their mind. They’ve learned their lesson. The French were the second. In their case, as Ambassador Cai Fangbo said, their losses far exceeded their gains; not worth it. Germany was the third. The Germans once thought about selling weapons to Taiwan, but after talks with us, they decided not to do it and also made that their policy. The Germans are smart. By doing that, they benefited not only in gaining the goodwill of the Chinese, but also economically. So France’s loss was Germany’s gain. The second issue is the Tibet issue, the Dali Lama issue, of which I won’t go into details. I’ll just say that both France and Germany made mistakes over the issue and ended up with big losses. Because all these issues are issues concerning China’s sovereignty, China’s core interests. And with respect to these issues, China didn’t yield to the Soviet Union in the past and China won’t yield to anyone now. As long as you respect us on these issues, we think we can conduct, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, very good cooperation, to the benefit of us both. Now both sides are facing a series of systemic threats, systemic challenges, which cannot be addressed by any country alone but only the concerted effort of the whole world. This I think our European friends should bear in mind. The Chinese bear that in mind and we know we must cooperate with the European countries and other countries, including the United States. I hope our European friends also think in that way.

Also about the arms embargo issue that was just mentioned. Honestly, we don't have the intention to import large amounts of advanced weapons from Europe. Firstly we don't have the need. Secondly we don't think the Europeans would sell us advanced weapons. This is essentially political discrimination. On the one hand they establish a strategic partnership with us—a comprehensive strategic partnership—but on the other hand they discriminate against us like this, which the Chinese people find quite unacceptable. The Chinese people ask: haven't we established a comprehensive strategic partnership with the Europeans, then why are they still discriminating against us? So the very concept of strategic partnership is corrupted and its weight reduced. A policy that is not understood and recognized by the common people is a policy that is hard to implement. Certainly I don't expect that the European countries would easily change their position on this issue, but I think they should really think deeply about it. This issue is detrimental to the relations between the two sides and to the political trust between us. Now I've said all these things, but that doesn't mean I am pessimistic about the Sino-European relations. On the contrary, I think that the prospect for the Sino-European relations, in the long run, should be very good. Since 2010, or 2009, generally speaking, Sino-European relations have been moving in a positive direction and developing smoothly. We hope such momentum will keep up and not be disturbed by interferences from any other side. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR KSAWERY BURSKI: Well I would like just to add one thing. I'm occasionally reading the online Chinese newspapers and magazines and I found that there is very vivid debate in China going on regarding China's foreign policy, regarding global situation. Even in the May 2012 issue of contemporary international relations, *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (Contemporary International Relations), there are at least three or four articles including that one by Yuan Peng, the head of the American Research Institute, in which there are very interesting proposals.¹¹⁷ For example, assessment of the situation and then proposals regarding China's future

¹¹⁷ See Yuan Peng, "Guanyu guojian Zhong Mei xinxing daguo guanxi de zhanlue sikao" ("On the Strategic Thinking of Constructing a New Type of Major-Power Relationship between China and the United States"), *Xiandai guoji guanxi* no. 5 (2012): 1-8.



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relations with the US and with China's neighbors and also with Europe. So I think that the Italian scholars and historians have a chance to, not only Italian but all scholars in Europe should read more carefully what the Chinese scholars do propose for future relations between China and the world. Regarding the question by Professor Martin, as I already said, there were signals in Poland via Hungary in 1982 that Chinese economists and Chinese officials would like to exchange experience in economic reforms. China was starting its reforms and so did we; and the view was that in Europe, Yugoslavia was much more advanced in reforms, Hungary was trying to reform, and also Poland was reforming. Not only Chinese Vice Premier Li Peng at that time and many economists visited Poland, but Polish economists, ministers, visited China. They were invited to Shenzhen and they had a chance to exchange a lot of experience regarding very difficult reforms. I think that in this field, the reforms are much more advanced in China than in Poland probably, but still there is space for further cooperation and exchanges of experiences. We invited one of the Chinese reformers at that time, Professor Liu Guogang, to be a member of Polish Academic Sciences, and he played an important role in the processes of exchanges. So I would say that the exchanges were very fruitful, very useful for both sides, but both China and Poland would still have room for further dialogue in this field. Thank you very much.

AMBASSADOR CAI FANGBO: Thank you. I would like to respond to Mr. Enrico's question as to whether or not China and Europe had military cooperation in 1977 and 1978. In 1978 and 1979 and even some time after that, China and Europe did have military exchanges, mostly in two aspects. One was the exchange of visits by the two sides' military leaders, defense ministers, chiefs of the general staff. We had a lot of such exchanges with France. The other aspect was arms transactions between the two sides; though often in conventional weapons, some deals were made, some fell through. That did happen. But after 1989, all such exchanges stopped. Such was the case. As for the arms embargo, as I said yesterday and so did Ambassador Mei just now, to still have such a policy is against the tide of development and conflicts with the nature of the Sino-European relations. To tell the truth, China does not want to rely heavily on weapons purchases from Europe to build a modern defense. China has been building a modern defense mostly with its own ef-

forts and you can see what we have achieved so far. No need for me to dwell on that. And just as Ambassador Mei said then and I said yesterday, that is all just political discrimination. Our relationship with Europe is a comprehensive strategic partnership. So that is a true discrimination.

From here I want to move on to another point. Since we are now talking about Sino-European relations during the Cold War, I think there are a few important points we, historians or diplomats, should remember. The first thing is that China has never, not even during the Cold War, regarded European countries, including Western European countries, as opponents, but partners—always has been and still will be in the future. During the Cold War, although China and Europe had differences and disagreements, we never regarded you as an opponent, but a partner with whom we should seek cooperation where we could, and where we couldn't we should agree to disagree. This is the first point. The second point is that it must be a case of equality and mutual benefit. Without that, the cooperation between the two sides would be out of the question. About this, I think both sides should get rid of the Cold War mentality, the ideology—driven thinking, and put national interest and the interest of the people in the first place to conduct closer cooperation. In my view, in today's multi-polar world of global development, two economic models cannot sustain. The first is the model of having high welfare standards sustained by heavy borrowing. This cannot be sustained and now there are facts to prove that. Reform is a must. All systems need continual reform. The other model is China's dependence on export and investment to drive economy. This cannot be sustained either. Now China is reforming its growth model. So both China and Europe need reform. But one single reform cannot solve the problems once and for all, and as situations develop, reform should be a continual process. Fukuyama called the end of the Cold War "the end of history," which is, to be honest, a not very smart thing to say. History will never end. If history were to end, you historians would be unemployed! History will never end. An economy and an economic model develop along with the times and therefore a continuous reform is required. The last thing: people, like our Europeans friends, have been wondering is with China's rapid development which direction the Chinese diplomacy would take in the future? As a matter of fact, another important policy China has been upholding, apart from the reform and opening-up, is a win-win strategy to build a harmonious world of lasting peace.

"Both China and Europe need

reform. But one single reform cannot solve the problems once and for all."

You should be able to see that. So China will pursue a path of peaceful development and that will be the basic direction for the Chinese diplomacy. If you fail to grasp the big picture and get suspicious whenever anything comes up, you can never make big decisions. China and Europe are now in an important time of history that requires and presents the two sides the opportunity to cooperate more closely for mutual benefit and win-win results. Take this opportunity, Sino-European relations will develop to the benefit of both; waste it and hold on to mutual suspicion, both sides may suffer as a result. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR FAN CHENGZUO: I'll speak for just two minutes. This time my former ambassador colleagues and I came to this conference—as you probably know, we are now sixty-seven to eighty-two years old—we came here to attend this meeting, in such hot weather, just to remember, together with the European ambassadors here, our own experiences of Sino-European relations. The day before yesterday I was given the opportunity to talk first and I talked about Sino-Albanian relations. Sino-Albanian relations were once very good and even today, China's relations with any European country or any country in the world cannot surpass Sino-Albanian relations at that time in terms of closeness. Regrettably, the Albanians opposed China's reception of Nixon and the normalization of the Sino-US relations; they said that China colluded with the United States and sabotaged the revolution. As it turned out, the normalization of Sino-US relations was not only to the benefit of both China and the United States but also to China's relations with Europe. We spent a lot of time yesterday and today discussing Sino-French relations. Sino-French relations developed quite well in the 1960s, then bumped along, but eventually warmed up and were back on a good track. China once had an especially good relationship with Albania, but then Albania turned against China. But after the 1990s, China and Albania patched up their relations and have been on good terms since. Now if we look at China's relations with Europe, whether Eastern Europe or Western Europe, we can see, as I mentioned earlier, that those relations have entered a stage of rapid development. Today's situation is not like the Cold War situation that, as I described yesterday, was characterized by “big upheaval, big division, and big reform.” Instead, the theme of the current era, as our Chinese leaders and Chinese media often emphasize, is to “pursue peace, seek development, and promote

cooperation.” Now we have a good relationship going on here. I think we should treasure that good relationship. I hope in my remaining years I can keep seeing Sino-European relations in harmony. I also hope that we will share bigger common grounds in the future when we meet again to discuss the next episode of the Cold War period. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR CHEN BAOSHUN: Following on Ambassador Cai’s earlier answer to Enrico’s question, I want to add one point. I want to mention an example—that is, China’s proposal of the “Four Modernizations.” Among the “Four Modernizations,” there was the “modernization of national defense,” which might have given people the impression that China intended to take certain actions in that aspect. But at that time, China didn’t have the means for big spending on national defense; so even if we had the thought, it was but an ideal situation or a goal, which didn’t amount to any real action of large-scale purchases, because we didn’t have the means at the time. But there were indeed contacts of the sort, as Ambassador Cai just mentioned. For example, one time the Secretary General of the Italian Ministry of Defence Bartolini led a delegation to visit Beijing. Bartolini was in charge of weaponry. As translator I was present in his talks with the Chinese side, where he mentioned that Italy had some advanced weapons, long-range artilleries, Panther tanks, and so on, and asked if the Chinese side was interested. Obviously he came to sell weapons to us. But we really were in no position for big purchases and therefore told him that we probably could do with 100 million pieces of artilleries and one Panther tank if they wanted to sell and of course he understood what we meant. So I just used this example to emphasize that it was impossible for China to go for big weapons purchases at the time.

Another example: we had one-billion USD loan from the Italian government and of it, we actually only spent a bit over twenty million USD. That means, if we had wanted, we could have used that money to purchase weapons. But no country would use borrowed money to buy weapons, except in the event of war. So here I answered your question, and since you like details, I gave you this detail, this point for reference.

Thank you.

LI DANHUI: As we all know, China is a one-party state, so party diplomacy has played a significant role in China's foreign relations. This was especially true with China's relations with the other members of the socialist camp, in that for a long time party-to-party relations in effect superseded state-to-state relations. Party diplomacy also had an impact on the development of Sino-European relations. After the end of the Cultural Revolution and especially after the reform and opening-up, China's ideologically-driven policy of party diplomacy went through a process of change. For this Shen Zhihua and I once interviewed officials from the International Liaison Department of the CCP's Central Committee. The whole process was basically like this: the policy following the end of the Cultural Revolution still emphasized contacts with the Marxist parties, which later on changed to contacts with all communist parties, regardless of Marxist or revisionist leaning; then in 1984, when Willy Brandt, President of the German Socialist Democrat Party, visited China, Hu Yaobang made a speech about rising above ideological differences and seeking understanding and cooperation.¹¹⁸ After the speech was made, rising above ideological differences became the guideline for China's party diplomacy, which further developed into development of relations with the communist parties and other parties of all countries; then in the early 1990s, adjustments were made again to do away with the class attribute of all political parties and the guideline then was to develop relations with all parties of all countries. That was the whole process.

Then my question is for the Chinese ambassadors and the European ambassadors here. Since the CCP is the ruling party, it has emphasized development of relations with all parties. I don't know much about the European political parties: what is the case with the relations between the ruling party and the opposition parties? As the ruling party, the CCP has this guideline of party diplomacy, I wonder whether that has played, more often than not, a positive role in China's development of state-to-state relations with other countries, or has in some cases had a negative effect? Suppose that we develop relations with an opposition party of a European country

¹¹⁸ Hu Yaobang said that "[there is] a desire for agreement and co-operation above ideological differences and rifts in the interests of détente, disarmament, defence of peace, progress and development of friendly relations between peoples." See Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Jan Rowinski, "Diplomatic and Political Relations between Denmark and the People's Republic of China 1949-97," in *China and Denmark: Relations since 1674*, ed. Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Mads Kirkebæk (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2001), 218.

who have big quarrels with its ruling party, what would the CCP do to China's development of state-to-state relations with that country? How does this party diplomacy influence the state-to-state relations between China and the European countries? I don't know how the European countries view this. Maybe this question is a bit sensitive for the Chinese ambassadors. You may choose not to answer it.

AMBASSADOR CAI FANGBO: The process you just described is true. Now our International Liaison Department has contacts with all legitimate political parties of all European countries as well as other countries. Then what is the effect, impact of those contacts? You ask whether there would be negative effect. I think the key to the question is that all our contacts with the legitimate parties of a country have been carried out on the premise of non-interference in that country's internal affairs. We conduct exchanges with those political parties with a view to introducing China's policies, development, and conditions, and exchanging opinions on international issues. It is true for the ruling party and as much as for the opposition parties. As to the quarrels and conflicts between a country's ruling party and any of its opposition party, we don't interfere. So in this sense we just keep communication with them. Because the ruling party of a European country or a Western country always changes. So the benefit of our approach is that when a former opposition party steps into power, we don't have to spend that much time in making them understand our policies and conditions. In this sense, I think, in general, this policy plays a positive role in our diplomacy and in improving the understanding between us and other countries. That's all. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR CHEN BAOSHUN: Actually communications with the foreign political parties are not exclusive to the International Liaison Department; our Institute of Foreign Affairs also does that. I worked there for a while, as Secretary General. Let me give you an example. Italy's Alleanza Nazionale, Gianfranco Fini's old party. Those who are familiar with Italy's situations should know what a political party this Alleanza Nazionale was, but our institute invited them to visit us and have exchanges with us. Fini also came to visit China and that of course was before he became the President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. So what I am saying is that party diplomacy has been mostly handled by the International Liaison Department,



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but some other departments have also been involved and the purpose is the same: to increase understanding between the parties, which certainly will help increase the understanding between the peoples and facilitate better cooperation between the governments and development of the diplomatic relations between the countries. That is the purpose.

AMBASSADOR CAI FANGBO: I'll add a few words here. Take this recent change of leadership in France for instance, we have a good relationship with Sarkozy's party, the Union for a Popular Movement, but at the same time we have maintained regular communications with Hollande's Socialist Party. Therefore when Hollande was elected President, he already had an understanding of China from all our previous communications. After he took office, the first ambassador he met with was our Chinese ambassador and he also remarked very positively on Sino-French relations, saying that he wanted to further develop the Sino-French comprehensive strategic partnership. That is the effect of party diplomacy. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR MEI ZHAORONG: The opposition parties are not the underground parties. Just to clarify the two concepts here. We would contact any party, any faction, as long as it is legitimate. We wouldn't have contact with any party that is illegal, underground, like the Neo-Nazis in Germany or any anti-government party; we wouldn't interfere in other countries' internal affairs. But it seems to me that some Western countries are trying to connect with the so-called dissidents in China—we don't do this sort of things.

NIU JUN: Thank you, Péter, for getting me back in line to talk. And also we are back again to the academic realm. I want to ask a few specific questions. The first question is for Ambassador Zhou. In the early 1980s, what exactly was China's

policy towards the Solidarity in Poland? I am asking this because I feel there was a course of change but I am not very sure about that, so could you give me some pointers there?

The second question is for Ambassador Burski. When Mao Zedong passed away in 1976, what were the reactions on the Polish side? Did you discuss what you expect would happen to China after that?

The third question is a very specific one. Ambassador Mei, you mentioned just then that in 1981 the German party made the internal decision to develop relations with China and put Honecker in charge of that. Did this have, directly, something to do with, as you mentioned earlier, China's development of better relations with East Germany later in 1981? Meaning, did the East German side inform China of that internal decision? This is a very specific question. That's all.

AMBASSADOR KSAWERY BURSKI: Well I think there were no special feelings, except for ordinary expression of sorrow when the leader passes away. But we had some strange experiences when Kang Sheng passed away. When Kang Sheng passed away, the Polish government or the Minister of Foreign Affairs sent an official not high enough in its ranking to the Chinese Embassy to express condolences and the Chinese Ministry, I think, expressed its disappointment at that time, hoping that the Polish side should have sent maybe a minister or anyhow a higher official. So when Chairman Mao died I think they thought very carefully how to express condolences to avoid any misunderstanding. I think there was a, these were matters for the protocol department, but as far as I remember, the protocol department prepared a draft of the condolences letter and then this was "fixed" many times, re-edited various times. Finally they worked out a kind of good letter which was suitable for the moment. As to expectations, of course everybody expected that this would be the end of an era in China and everybody was expecting there would be a new beginning, which was true. It took two years to have a real new beginning, but even in the next year, in 1977, there were also visible changes in China's domestic policy and in China's foreign policy. Regarding Solidarity Trade Union, I think Ambassador Zhou would know better. I'm not aware of China's reactions to that movement. Ambassador Zhou can explain better.

AMBASSADOR ZHOU XIAOPEI: Internally, we did have our own opinion on the Polish Solidarity, but in the 1970s, especially in the latter half of the 1970s, our relations with the Eastern European countries, party-to-party relations included, were strictly conducted on the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs. I worked in Poland from 2000 to 2003, and during my time there, I got on quite well with a few Solidarity leaders, who revealed to me that they knew what the Chinese side thought about the Solidarity at that time, but they were also aware of the view that China had strictly abided by the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.

Also I want to add a point here regarding party diplomacy. Party diplomacy has been mostly handled by the International Liaison Department, but our embassies and ambassadors also have been involved in that aspect, just as many of the ambassadors here just mentioned. We, as diplomats stationed abroad, had to maintain normal contacts with all legitimate parties of a given country, ruling party or opposition parties regardless. But some countries, including some European countries, had prejudices against us. I'll give you an example, something I experienced myself. While I was working in Poland, a Vice Minister of our International Liaison Department visited Poland at the invitation of the Polish Peasants' Party. A Polish newspaper published this news on its front page, criticizing the Peasants' Party's invitation of the CCP delegation; it said some really bad things about us. The next day I looked for the chief editor of that newspaper. When I met him, the first thing he said was, "I hate the communist party." I interrupted him and said, the reason I pay you a visit today is not to discuss anything about political parties, but to talk about China's relations with Poland. Then I told him that the CCP has established contacts with all legitimate parties of all countries around the world and I gave him examples: this party in the United States, that party in Japan or Germany; a total of more than 400 political parties, I said, but we don't get into contact with one kind of parties. He asked, what kind of parties. Fascist party, I answered. He was embarrassed after hearing that. The reason I'm telling the story now is because I want to emphasize that party diplomacy is an important supplement to government diplomacy. It is not about communist parties only having contacts with communist

parties; we are talking about rising above ideological differences and maintaining normal contacts with all political parties, like establishing normal relations with all political parties. We are not developing relations with secret, underground parties, but using party diplomacy to promote equal, friendly, and cooperative relations between China and other countries.

NIU JUN: Ambassador Zhou, may I ask a question? You don't have to answer it if you don't feel inclined to. You just mentioned that we had our own opinion on the Solidarity. Then what opinion was that?

AMBASSADOR ZHOU XIAOPEI: The opinion was of course ideologically-tinged.

NIU JUN: Ideologically-tinged. Okay, thank you. I got it.

AMBASSADOR KSAWERY BURSKI: I would like to add one thing. We should distinguish Solidarity Trade Union as a trade union at the first stage when it was organized and very active politically; and then Solidarity Trade Union when it came to power as divided into various political parties; by then their behavior was different from that at the beginning. So I suppose that China's attitude was also different in different periods of time. I remember a moment when the Chinese Foreign Minister visited Poland in 1991, Mr. Qian Qichen, Deputy Prime Minister, and he was received by the Polish President, Mr. Wałęsa; and we in the ministry were worried a bit that this visit might be a failure but it turned out that they had a very good, very friendly conversation, and everybody was surprised.¹¹⁹ Probably this was also the contribution of the Chinese Ambassador who earlier had good contacts with the Polish President. The Chinese Ambassador was an excellent diplomat, spoke brilliant, fluent Polish; and later on the President invited him to work for him as advisor in the case of his visit to China. So there were moments, of course, of tensions but there were moments of very normal diplomatic exchanges. Thank you.

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¹¹⁹ Qian Qichen visited Poland in March 1991. See Czesław Tubilewicz, *Taiwan and Post-Communist Europe: Shopping for Allies* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 64.

AMBASSADOR MEI ZHAORONG: Mr. Niu Jun asked a very specific question. Mr. Shen Zhihua just said about knowing details, but honestly, in diplomatic process, some details are difficult to spell out. But I can give an answer to your question. In 1976, the director of the division in charge of the China affairs in the German Foreign Ministry officially notified us that a decision had been made within the German party to improve relations with China, starting from improving the state-to-state relations and then moving gently forward, step by step; he also added that, in his personal view, the German side had made mistakes with respect to China before. I don't know at the time whether this director was saying these words by authorization or by his own initiative, but judging from East Germany's strictly disciplined diplomatic practice, I am positive he was authorized, though we can't know for sure. There was another case, in 1980, since we lived in the embassy, we knew this: the German party, in order to unify the thoughts within the party, made the decision to improve relations with China and then issued a circular providing a series of rules and regulations. We don't have it here, but you can look it up. You can find proofs for both the two cases. However, despite all these, we had differences with East Germany on some specific issues; also East Germany was improving relations with China on the one hand, but on the other hand the Soviet Union still had a grip on them. It was a very complicated situation. East Germany was not free to make its own decisions. It was not like that. That's it.

CHEN JIAN: Let me first emphasize one thing. I believe I'm in a position to represent every participating scholar to state that this is an excellent learning experience for us. And distinguished Ambassadors, you not only have shared your experience with us, you have also taught us with your perspectives, with your visions, farsighted visions which are based upon your experience, how we as scholars should study the past. And within that context, let me try to put into highlight, three my personal perspectives, by no way I mean to conclude this workshop.

The first, I must say through this process of workshop, I found a central in our discussion is something I can call is the "China challenge." The "China challenge" is so crucial in the shaping of the multi-polar world which has finally replaced the

Cold War's bi-polar world. And in some key senses, China's role was central. Let me be very brief what I mean by "China challenge." This is a challenge for the rest of the world, but in the first place the "China challenge" has been, still is, and will continuously be, the challenge for the Chinese and for China to try to deal with. And the way how China and the Chinese will deal with the "China challenge" is going to have a huge impact on the entire world. Let me go back to Chairman Mao. When Chairman Mao announced the establishment of the People's Republic of China, on October 1, 1949, China was rising. Mao already introduced around that very same time, his "intermediate zone" theory. According to this theory, the bi-polar Yalta system had been defined in ways, in a Chinese way, that was different from either the American way or the Soviet way. Mao emphasized in fact that the main contradiction in the world was not between the two super powers but rather between the intermediate zone of whose China was part, and the two super powers. So, despite the fact that a few months after the establishment of the PRC the Sino-Soviet strategic alliance was signed, the seed, the very seed for Sino-Soviet split was already sown. That was not because of ideology. That was because Mao's definition of China's position in the world already fundamentally challenged the bi-polar world order.

Now let me make a very big jump to the late 1960s and early 1970s, which we have discussed, the Chinese-American rapprochement. And I must give big credit to Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai. Mao and Zhou were not without their own dark moments. That was still the time of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution. Still, Mao and Zhou and that generation of Chinese leaders made a great decision by favoring the Sino-American rapprochement. The Sino-American rapprochement changed the balance of power in the world and, more importantly, it opened a whole array of new opportunities. Most important among these opportunities were that China was abandoning its revolutionary foreign policy; to change from an outsider of the existing international structure and order gradually into an insider of the existing international order. And one thing we marginally mentioned, but which actually should be regarded as central, was that at the time of the Sino-American rapprochement, the Chinese leaders had already made the decision of this important 4.3 billion dollar imports project. Most of the imports were from Western European

countries. That was about importing new technology, whole-set technology from the capitalistic West. Don't tell me this is just about technology; this is also about China's attitude towards the capitalist-dominated world market. And that opened a very important door that finally led to, what I will emphasize, my third point, the coming of Deng Xiaoping's reforms and opening era.

The reform and opening era is still continuing. It has witnessed great success, which is symbolized in what we are now calling "China's rise." Accompanying this China's rise are many challenges, many problems. But one thing I would like to emphasize. I think this is extremely important and this is something I have learned in the past, but the knowledge has been greatly enhanced by my learning from the ambassadors during the workshop. China's rise is first and foremost presenting a series of very profound challenges to the Chinese themselves. This is not just about politics. But that also involves many other dimensions. It is about a society. The Chinese society today is much, much more plural than any time before. It is about culture. How will China's age-old culture be transformed and befitting into the world of modernity and post-modernity? It is about environment. How can China's continuous development be keeping pace with the demand of environmental preservation? And in the final analysis, it is about morals: how can China's newer generation deal with this kind of moral challenge, a challenge that stems from a long series of revolution which destroyed many of the older moral standards? And that destruction was combined by the new moral difficulties that come up together with commercialization and a world that is increasingly pushing people towards a money-looking-forward mentality.

May I say this? If I must conclude my own so-called concluding remarks, what I have learned is that, there is no way that China or Chinese people alone can deal with the "China challenge." And certainly there is no way that the rest part of the world can try to impose some sort of solution on the Chinese so that the "China challenge" can be dealt with. There is only one way, especially in the emerging multi-polar world, there is only one way. That is through cooperation; that is through all kinds of means that will promote mutual understanding, putting yourselves into others' shoes. And learning from what the Chinese ambassadors have told us, that

China and the Chinese people are very much willing to do so. So the question is, what are the answers from the country where I am living now, the United States of America, and from one of the main targets of this conference, Europe? Let us come together to try to answer that challenge which will, I will say, to a very large extent, determine the fate of the human race in the twenty-first century. Thank you.



PANEL PARTICIPANTS

Document Appendix

In selecting the more than fifty documents included here, the editors have tried to offer a balance in terms of the country of origin of the documents and the issues discussed within them. The documents come from Albanian, Chinese, East German, French, Hungarian, Italian, Polish, Romanian, and West German archives and published document collections. No documents from the British (or American) archives are included here simply because they tend to be more easily accessible and there is a greater need for non-English language sources to be brought into the historiography on China, Europe, and the Cold War.

This appendix is long but it is by no means comprehensive. For instance, no documents dated beyond 1965 are available at the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (PRC FMA). Scholars writing about Chinese foreign relations during the Cultural Revolution and in the post-Mao era must rely more on sources from outside of the PRC, and the documents included here reflect this unfortunate state of affairs.

Furthermore, new restrictions on access to archival documents were introduced at the PRC FMA in 2013-2014. The majority of documents once accessible—including some of those translated below—were removed. As a consequence, the editors and partners involved in this project were unable to obtain many materials related to China and Western Europe, although earlier work at the PRC FMA had netted considerable materials on China and Eastern Europe.

Translations from volumes of *Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany) include the helpful footnotes written by the original editors at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte. Other documents appended here include occasional notes from the translators and editors.

The documents published here will also be available on the Wilson Center's Digital Archive (www.DigitalArchive.org), along with many others that were not included as a result of space limitations.

DOCUMENT NO. 1**CABLE FROM THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN ROMANIA, “THE CHANGE OF ROMANIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD CHINA BEFORE AND AFTER THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE,” 24 DECEMBER 1960**

[Source: PRC FMA 109-01598-02, 32-34. Translated for CWIHP by Lu Sun.]

The Change of Romanian Attitude toward China before and after the Moscow Conference

To the Foreign Ministry and the International Department, Central Committee of CCP:

Ever since the end of the Moscow Conference, there are some indications that the Romanian attitude toward us has warmed, which can be summarized as follows: First, for the Chinese Embassy bulletins, which were suppressed ever since the Bucharest Conference, the eighth and tenth issues were all of sudden printed on 30 November [1960]. (The seventh issue was not printed. We estimate that this is because its opinions were too confrontational.) [The two issues] were sent to our embassy before the ink was dry, [so] we can see that this was a rush job. Secondly, according to the cultural cooperation plan, we will hold a photo exhibition on agricultural construction. When we asked our Romanian counterparts on 7 November, they replied that they did not have the location for the exhibition. [They said that] it was difficult to materialize the exhibition in a short time, [and they would] make efforts to put on the exhibition this year. But on 29 November, they informed us all of sudden that they had probably found a location for the exhibition, and notified us to put on the exhibition, and it would officially open 6 on December. We can see it was a rush job as it was such a short time in-between. The location was quite good—at the center of the city. Besides, about the booklet for the exhibition, when we negotiated with Romania this September, they once insisted that they would not allow us to include the “People’s Commune.” But when the exhibition opened on 6 December, Romania printed our booklet as a whole without any abridgement. Then, the four central newspapers reported Chairman Liu [Shaoqi’s] visit in the Soviet Union day after day in a conspicuous way. Among this, even though some opinions from Chairman Liu’s

speech were [only] partially reported, in general [the reports] reflected the situation that Chairman Liu was warmly received in the Soviet Union and the significance of Sino-Soviet friendship.

In the meantime, when Romania negotiated with us on business, it demonstrated a change of attitude. It was willing to help us solve problems. For example, on 12 December when we negotiated with the Romanian Foreign Ministry on the issue of [removing] the flag of the Jiang [Jieshi] regime in a Romanian painting exhibition, Romania removed the flag in two and half hours and repeatedly apologized to us. Before the Bucharest Conference this year, we once asked Romania to draft a topographic map of the embassy and it did not give it to us.¹ We did not ask again. But this time when we went to the Foreign Ministry to negotiate about the flag of the Jiang regime, Romania took the initiative to give the topographic map to us. Recently we proposed to set a display window outside the embassy. We sent the proposal to Romania on 12 December, and it replied on 20 December and gave it full approval. One graduate student of China needed to go to the Soviet Union for study; the Romanian university will notify this student and ask the Chinese Embassy to negotiate with the Soviet Union directly. After the Moscow Conference, [the Romanian university] complained that this graduate student should not tell the embassy and said this problem should be solved by the university itself.

Besides, Romania began to take the initiative and show friendly gestures. For example, when the Romanian delegation of the party and the government went to the Soviet Union and accompanied Ambassador Xu back and forth, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej only shook hands [with the delegates] without saying a word, but showed warm feelings especially toward Ambassador Xu. When the delegation returned back to Romania, Ambassador Xu greeted him. The delegation showed friendly gestures. Besides shaking hands, they also exchanged a few words of greetings (on the same day among all the diplomatic envoys, only the Soviet ambassador and the Chinese ambassador exchanged greetings.) In the past, when Ambassador Xu visited the International Department of the Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, they were extremely indifferent. We took the initiative to talk and they did not want to talk more. Since the Moscow Conference, they have been willing to have more conversations (but they still avoid politics.) On 12 December, the Romanian Foreign Ministry organized diplomatic envoys for hunting. The deputy

¹ Trans. Note—the meaning here is not clear.

minister also took the initiative to converse with Ambassador Xu. After the [North] Korean ambassador and Albanian ambassador departed, Ambassador Xu went to depart, the deputy minister asked Xu to stay a bit more, and said: “we are friends and a big family.” One month before the announcement of the declaration, our journalist once asked a *Scinteia* (“Party Life”) team to talk about how the Romanian Communist Party leads economic work. They were indifferent and did not set a date for a while. But one day after the announcement of the declaration, they called us immediately and arranged talks, and their tone became friendlier. The Romanian Fine Arts Press did not send us pictorials ever since the Bucharest Conference. But on the third day after the announcement of the declaration, they started to send us pictorials again. Some professors and teaching assistants in Bahun University were scared to approach Chinese students after the Bucharest Conference, but recently they began to be friendly with Chinese students as they did in the past. At present our aesthetics education delegation, which is visiting Romania, is receiving more friendly treatment. The Romanians expressed that they would like to meet the needs of our delegate. They could see whatever they want to see. For a while before the Moscow Conference, Romania did not want to arrange visits and meetings [for foreign visitors]. This time they arranged visits to other places and three meetings, and told us that they would ask many questions at the meetings. When visiting a comprehensive art school in Bucharest, the delegate initially wanted to stay for an hour, but it turned out to stay for three hours. The school was extremely friendly.

On the aspect of reporting, after the Bucharest Conference, [the Romanian media] rarely reported news on China except a few reports on [China’s] National Day. But on 20 and 22 November, *Scinteia* published the news on the Chinese State Council’s resolution to pardon a group of the reformed POWs from the Jiang regime and the puppet Manchukuo regime, as well as the news of a short summary of the Chinese government’s statement of supporting the Laos government to establish friendship with China. On 12 December, [it also published] the summary of communique from the Sino-Cuban meeting, as well as the amount of Chinese aid to Cuba. Afterwards [it also] published a concise summaries of an editorial on the Chinese government’s announcement about the Moscow Conference and a letter to the people of the world, our people’s feedback to the announcement, our announcement on the situation in Congo, and our second announcement on the situation in Laos, as well as a few reports on King Norodom Sihanouk’s visit to China and the future visit of the [Chinese] Premier [Zhou Enlai] to Burma. [We] can see that, as a development of the

Moscow Conference and the announcement of the declaration, there is an increase of reports on China. On the other hand, [the Romanian media] still avoids reporting on the achievements of our economic construction, the Three Red Flags, and other policies.²

Within one year, it is obvious that Romania's attitude toward us has shifted according to the Soviet Union's attitude. Thus by estimation, this shift of attitudes is due to the influence of the Soviet approach. From the perspective of Romania itself, even though it is scared of war, it is also scared of breaking away from 650 million Chinese people, thus it has to pay attention to Sino-Romanian friendship. As for some of the divisions on some major international issues with us, it's hard to solve them in a short time. Especially on the issue of war and peace, Romania's fear of war still exists. On the editorials on the Moscow Conference and the letter to the people of the world, and other reprints of editorials of other countries, it is obvious that Romania emphasized the aspect that war could be avoided, rather than the aspect that the danger of war still exists and [we should] heighten our vigilance.

The Chinese Embassy in Romania
24 December 1960

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DOCUMENT NO. 2

CABLE FROM THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN POLAND, "A SUMMARY OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN OCHAB AND COMRADE DENG GANG," 1 FEBRUARY 1961

[Source: PRC FMA 109-02311-01, 1-3. Translated for CWIHP by Lu Sun.]

A Summary of the Conversation between Ochab and Comrade Deng Gang
To the Foreign Ministry and the International Department of the Central
Committee of the CCP:

² Trans. Note—the "Three Red Flags" refers to the Great Leap Forward, the General Line, and the People's Commune.

On the evening of 31 January [1961], [Aleksande] Zawadzki, the chairman of the Polish State Council, set up a banquet to entertain delegates of different countries who came to Poland to attend the celebration activities, along with public figures from the Polish press. [Jozef] Cyrankiewicz, [Edward] Ochab, [Stefan] Jędrychowski, [Marian] Spychalski, Zambrowski, and other leaders of the party and government attended the reception. At the banquet, Zawadzki and Ochab took the initiative to contact our delegate, and made warm and friendly conversations with our delegates in succession.

Zawadzki first extended his welcome and joy to our journalist delegation for visiting Poland. He said, “We should greatly develop and strengthen the cooperation and friendship between journalists in China and Poland.” Secondly, he said that he read in the newspaper PAP (*Polska Agencja Prasowa*) the journalist Shen-chai-er-bi-ci’s [sic] reports on the People’s Commune in the countryside and city of China. Among these reports are described “the great imitative spirit and patriotism of Chinese masses.” He thought the articles were written “in a beautiful and insightful way.” The People’s Commune was “described as a positive and good phenomenon.”

Ochab mentioned to our delegation, “We request Polish newspapers and magazines to report more about China.” Among such requests was to ask the “People’s Forum” to introduce religious issues in China, intending to influence Polish people with the introduction of Chinese people’s attitude toward religion. He said, “In order to solve the religion problem in Poland, and to liberate people from religious superstitions thoroughly, [we need to do] a lot of work patiently. Our party decided to actively solve the religion problem, rather than let it take its own course.”

Ochab mentioned that: “China needs to develop at high speed in order to narrow the gap between itself and developed countries. Poland needs to develop rapidly as well.”

Ochab said from many reports written by Polish journalists and the embassy, he knew that the situation in China was difficult. “Due to natural disasters, you are facing big challenges in material supplies. We are very concerned about how the Chinese comrades overcome difficulties of food supply.”

Comrade Deng Gang said: “Due to a two-year consecutive natural disaster, we do have some difficulties, which was mentioned in the recent Ninth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CCP.”

Ochab said: “Because the Chinese newspapers and magazines did not publish, we don’t know what kind of measures the Chinese government is taking to overcome

food difficulties. Has the Chinese government conducted negotiations with other countries, and signed additional treaties?”

Deng told Ochab that before leaving Beijing, he had not known that China signed any treaty with other countries. Deng said: “We are confident that we could rely on our own efforts to overcome this temporary difficulty.” He also said: “The Chinese people had undergone much more severe periods and we all survived.” Ochab continued to say: “Undoubtedly to us, a great nation like China could overcome any kind of difficulty in the longer term, but we are concerned about how the Chinese government will overcome the short-term difficulty that it is faced with right now. American imperialists attempt to take advantage of the food shortage that the Chinese government encounters, and launch the so-called aid-China ‘humanitarian’ movement. Their motive is totally obvious. Whatever the imperialist conspiracy is, the Chinese people always need to come up with measures to overcome difficulties, get through the hard times, and persevere to the first crop harvest period of this year.”

Deng told Ochab that at the end of May and beginning of June, new crops would be gathered and taken to threshing ground. Ochab said: “We have four months to survive this difficult period. We hear that it is difficult for China to deliver goods to Poland. We hope the Chinese comrades won’t get upset about it. If it is difficult to deliver goods now, it is okay to delay one period. Because we are better off than China, our problem can be much more easily solved. Both of our industry and agriculture over-fulfilled the plan in 1960. Due to serious disasters, China has a graver situation to deal with. We hope the Chinese government will overcome this temporary difficulty either with its own reserves or foreign assistance.”

Deng expressed his gratitude toward Ochab for his concern over the Chinese situation, and said: “We believe we could overcome the difficulty.”

Ochab said: “I am discussing with other comrades, it is not only an issue of moral concern, but of material concern as well. We are negotiating with other countries to see their attitudes toward the Chinese predicament and what will be further steps to take. We should all help China overcome difficulties, because it is not an issue of China alone, but it involves countries of the whole socialist camp. Not only do Polish people cherish deep friendship toward Chinese people, but peoples of all socialist countries all cherish profound sympathy toward Chinese people.”

Based on Chinese development experience, Deng talked about the meaning of agriculture in the national economy and mentioned that agriculture was the foundation of the national economy.

Ochab expressed that this piece of experience was quite helpful for Poland to solve its own agricultural problem. He felt very happy for Chinese comrade's proposal on agricultural issues.

Ochab mentioned that, with the rapid development of China, the Soviet Union and China, the two socialist powers, would definitely surpass the United States. However, it would take twenty years for Poland to overtake the United States in aspect of the per capita GDP.

When Deng expressed his thanks for the hearty conversation with Ochab, Ochab said: "When we were in Moscow drafting the joint statement, we had many, sometimes very difficult, talks with Chinese comrades. Even though we had these difficulties, we were glad that we finally signed the joint statement. We hope in the future we will carry out this statement seriously together. To us, what matters are not the quarrels which happen between brothers occasionally, but cooperation and mutual trust forever."

This report hasn't been checked and approved by Comrade Deng Gang yet.

Chinese Embassy in Poland

1 February 1961

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DOCUMENT NO. 3

CABLE FROM THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN POLAND, "WORK SUMMARY FOR THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN POLAND, 1960, AND PLANS FOR 1961," 14 APRIL 1961

[Source: PRC FMA 109-01526-02, 17-30. Translated for CWIHP by Max Maller.]

Work Summary for the Chinese Embassy in Poland, 1960, and Plans for 1961

I. Poland's Political Climate over the Past Year

Khrushchev's visit to Poland in July of 1959 left a significant impact on Poland's development from that point on. Even though we were aware of this situation at the time, we did not take full account of it. In his interviews, Khrushchev repeatedly praised [Władysław] Gomułka as "Poland's loyal son, the most eminent player in the worker's movement." He also said that Gomułka's domestic road "applied Marxist-Leninist reasoning to the utilization of national characteristics." He openly endorsed the "conservatives" and "resolved to support" Gomułka. Through this approach, Khrushchev is evidently supporting Gomułka in his fight against him. At the same, by supporting Gomułka, he will muscle out the anti-Soviet opposition, led by [Roman] Zambrowski and [Edward] Osóbka-Morawski. Gradually, he will make Poland heed his word. Moreover, by supporting Khrushchev, Gomułka can obtain economic aid and political support from the USSR. He can combat the "conservatives" within the party, weakening the strong, ambitious faction headed by Zambrowski and consolidating his own position. Despite Poland's assertions of independence from the USSR, due to the basic unity of Khrushchev and Gomułka's thought, any divergence in their discussions is instantly remedied. "In resolving this country's internal living issues and its international policy," they have adopted "the same beliefs." Poland's development in the year 1960 was closely related to the circumstances outlined above.

After Khrushchev's visit to Poland, in terms of international relations Poland continued to support and energetically propagandized each and every one of the Soviets' policies and actions. Under these circumstances, Gomułka made public a great many mistaken notions in this regard. Poland went astray too in their relations with the United States. They invited Nixon to visit Poland; Gomułka published an article in *Foreign Affairs*; in begging for American dollars they were even more unscrupulous than in years past; they borrowed their fourth loan from the American imperialists; they compensated the US for assets not extracted during Polish nationalization; and American customs received most-favored-nation treatment.

On the issue of the Sino-Soviet split, Gomułka has always stood with Khrushchev in terms of ideology. But due to many different factors, the specific appearance of this relationship can be divided chronologically into three stages:

- (1) The first stage came at the end of last April, before the CCP published three articles in commemoration of Lenin's 90th memorial. At this point the Sino-Soviet split was already becoming apparent; Khrushchev's attacks against us were already an "open secret." During his visit to Poland, Khrushchev had attacked the communes: "They don't produce a thing." At this point, Poland

was watching Sino-Soviet relations extremely carefully. Worrisome that a split would disseminate too broadly, they released a few news bulletins related to the friendly exchange and collaboration between China and the USSR. The Polish United Workers' Party released some similar reports. In a few important arenas, they juxtaposed China and the USSR evenly alongside one another, like at the Mayday celebration, where Chairman Mao's portrait was hung with Khrushchev's. The ordering of our delegations remained USSR first, China second. With regard to China's domestic policy, even though the Polish United Workers' Party did not acknowledge the general significance of the "Three Red Banners," they believed in their correctness under China's unique conditions. Their propaganda and sense of approbation were effusive. The China-Poland friendship society continued to develop its members and organize new groups, so as to advance China-Poland friendship and the work of propagandizing for China.

- (2) The second stage was between the publication of the three articles and the Sixth Plenary Session of the Communist Party of Poland. At this moment, Khrushchev was about to send in his troops. He was vehemently anti-China. The CCP took steps toward a rational and penetrating criticism of his ideology; struggle was becoming increasingly sharp. In fact, the CCP's manner of supporting reasonableness was related to the right-wing opportunism of Gomułka himself. In May, first [Zenon] Kliszko and then Gomułka went to the USSR and the CPSU for meetings. After that, they stood with the USSR and issued public criticism of the CCP at both the World Federation of Trade Unions meeting and the Bucharest conference. In their own press they limited the amount of China-related news and perspectives, but unremittently published Soviet criticisms and judgement toward the CCP. On the other hand, while attacking us at the Bucharest Conference, they did not stand on the very front line; they did not issue party level transmissions related to the Sino-Soviet split; despite justifying his actions from mistaken viewpoints...he still did not dare to engage in open polemics with us, almost as if he absorbed some secret meaning in what we said. He still seemed very cordial to our delegation, particularly the CCP delegation led by Bo Yibo that visited Poland in May. He still permitted newspaper publications on the Three Red Banners. In any case, at this juncture, Poland was taking a more or less center-right position on the

Sino-Soviet split.

- (3) The third stage was between the Sixth Plenary Session and the Moscow Conference in November. The Sino-Soviet split had reached the point of no return. Gomulka and Khrushchev held a secret meeting; this was when the Polish United Workers' Party began launching libelous polemics against the CCP. They made anti-Chinese comments toward our Plenary Session, issuing an opinion to our Party. They made internal statements about the Sino-Soviet split and contributed their own anti-Chinese articles, adding to the ones they circulated from the USSR, Italy, France, and Eastern Europe. In anticipation of the Sixth Plenary Session they began reorganizing the Chinese monthly review's editorship in an effort to keep news from China out of Poland. They eliminated any press on the Three Red Banners. They denounced our pamphlets and decided to investigate them. At the Moscow Conference they stood on the front lines as they played the role of anti-Chinese thugs.

Another byproduct following Khrushchev's visit to Poland last year were a series of major personnel changes between Winter and Spring in party, government, military, cultural and educational arenas. Over 17 department-leading cadres were fired, transferred, and reappointed, along with 7 provincial committee secretaries and 18 high-ranking military cadres. The defining feature of this shift was following the Eighth Plenary Session, one after other every opponent of the USSR had to step down. This phenomenon was especially apparent among military personnel.

Judging from the above situation, the sharp increase in personnel changes is directly aimed at Zambrowski (there were even rumors last Spring that Zambrowski would be leaving politics). As such, it has garnered the support of the "conservatives." Gomulka's position came one step closer to consolidation. In order to preserve himself, and with the Sino-Soviet split was emerging, Zambrowski frantically devoted all his efforts to supporting Khrushchev and Gomulka's anti-Chinese stance. Poland's internal personnel changes were brought to a halt; Khrushchev and Gomulka's disagreements reached a momentary resolution. The lead general of Zambrowski's party, [Jerzy] Albrecht, who had not shown his face for four months, became active once again in September, garnering the support of the Łódź city government. The recent results of this mutual compromise are that Albrecht left the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, and lowered the position of Vice Chairman of the State Council to Minister of Finance.

According to a year of investigations, these personnel changes have not led to any significant fresh starts regarding the general line.

In agricultural matters, socialist transformation continues to fall into disuse. With increased agrarian exploitation and class separation in the villages, the tension between backward agriculture and developing heavy industry has become extremely sharp. Provisions of agricultural goods remain scarce. Grains and spices are largely imported. Their grain imports for the year totaled 2 million tons. This year it could be as high as 2.3 million tons, reaching 8.25 million tons over five years. Although the issue of grain self sufficiency over the next several years was brought up at the Sixth Plenary Session last September, alternatives were only discussed academically. They did not so much as touch on collaborative trade arrangements or China's prosperous agriculture. It seems that the Polish United Workers' Party's strategy going forward will be to continue to rely on middle peasants, well-to-do middle peasants and rich peasants to settle the question of development for the agriculture industry.

In industrial matters, there has been a strengthening of discipline in labor and finance over the last year. Labor efficiency has gone up. Important industries like steel, coal and chemicals have reached their quotas early. Overall industrial production is up about 10%. However, since the beginning of the year, people's living standards have gone down slightly due to a decrease in purchasing power. The phenomenon of [illegible] of industrial market goods is intensifying, such that a number of light industry and durable goods manufactures are undermanned. It is not clear what should be done at the present moment. The problem of importing raw and unprocessed materials continues to be at the root of Poland's industrial difficulties. Right now half of Poland's offices rely either directly or indirectly on industrial importation of raw materials for their work. This sort of reliance on foreign trade for industry is a growing trend. All planned national economic development over the next five years will be decided by the development of trade and agriculture. This is why Poland has emphasized the importance trade for so long. Over the past year, they have gone out with still greater intensity in search for foreign markets, directing their searches particularly toward Asia, Africa and Latin America. After expending much effort, exportation of industrial goods has seen a marked increase, yet they are still helpless to lower the importation of raw materials and agricultural goods. Last year's projected trade deficit was 900 million rubles. Poland has not yet found a solution for this sort of pauperism, which has characterized their affairs since 1954, and which moreover is steadily deteriorating. Since Gomułka took office he has solicited

loans from America and other Western European nations in order to shore up the deficit; the American loan they have requested a full four times, asking a total of 426.3 million USD. Their fifth attempt at procuring such a loan was made during a discussion in Washington, D.C. For Poland's economy to rely on trade and American dollars for its support is the main reason that they beg for peace and moderation rather than opposing the American empire.

In matters related to the united front of political thought, they have made progress in attacking and controlling the reactionary influence of the church. They have suppressed religious troublemaking and taken steps toward eliminating religion classes in some schools. Labor education has strengthened its discipline. The movement to suggest competition and rationalization in the workforce has begun its recovery. There has been an expansion of education on the consolidation of long and short-term benefits for workers. In the cultural arts, 'black literature' continues to be banned, contaminated Western movies have come under some control, and films that slander the nation's socialism have been subjected to criticism. Voicing support for degenerate abstract art has been prohibited. Therefore, they have taken a restrictive attitude toward these popular but disgraceful objects. However, all of this has yet to touch upon the substance of the Socialist revolution's political ideology united front. Revisionism and capitalist classism are still the ruling doctrines. Poland has no evidence plans for disrupting this. The revisionist [Leszek] Kołakowski, once the subject of Gomułka's open polemic, has even begun writing articles again. More importantly, the Polish United Workers' Party has assigned [Oskar R.] Lange and other revisionists to systematize and theorize the political lines implemented since Gomułka took office, to issue propaganda calling them Marxist-Leninist, and to indoctrinate both cadres and young people. This year they will start publishing Gomułka's selected works. This is an important step toward consolidating his ideological positions. Despite the appearance of a few good signs in Poland's domestic politics this year, at a fundamental level there have not been any positive changes. In fact, the overall trends point to insidious developments.

2. Some Things We have Learned about Our Work

This past year was a year of sharp struggle between two political roads. This type of struggle impacted every aspect of our work. Taking our directions from the orders given by the Central Committee and ministries, we were basically accurate in our

responses to this new situation. The following are some specific observations we have made.

- (1) Problems with manufacturing pamphlets: For the embassy to print pamphlets from within fraternal states, issuing propaganda for Marxism as well as the given state's internal and foreign policy measures, is the ordinary work of any embassy, in keeping with the conventions of foreign relations. However, this past year, due to the Sino-Soviet split and the uniformity of Polish and Soviet viewpoints, there was deep dissatisfaction directed toward our pamphlets being printed and distributed, particularly with regard to the three articles we printed in honor of V.I. Lenin. Yet the Polish United Workers' Party did not express their views until several months after the fact. At the end of last August, when struggle began to sharpen, the Polish United Workers' Party formally criticized the embassy for publishing pamphlets "behind their backs," calling this "abnormal." They wished to investigate; during the Moscow Conference, Gomułka personally suggested this to [Vice] Chairman Liu Shaoqi, accusing the embassy of not paying attention to their ideas, an erroneous claim. This showed that the two sides' embassies could publish their own newspapers, but that posting divergent viewpoints would not be allowed. Such circumstances demonstrate that Poland bears extreme apprehensions toward our embassy's propaganda. They particularly fear that we will influence people within the Polish United Workers' Party who have misgivings toward their leadership, which would be harmful to them. In light of this situation, we believe that from now on, when we publish pamphlets in Poland, we must put "*seeking common ground while holding back differences*" into practice. We were admittedly never actively involved in provoking polemics, but we must not give the opposite side a pretext for accusing us of such behavior. We do this to adapt to the new post-Moscow situation in fraternal party harmony.
- (2) Problems with diplomacy: The diplomacy organized over the past year in Poland, in accordance with the Central Committee and ministries' recommendations, can basically be divided between the "two Chinas" discussion and the three genres of unfriendly divergence from us in ideology and appearances. That Polish officials have continuously supported our side in the "two Chinas" discussion is obvious. Last year, at the United Nations Global Summit meeting organized by Poland, having heard our diplomacy,

Poland refused the certification of the Bandit Jiang's [Jiang Jieshi] "delegation". However, Poland's social situation is complicated; there are many reactionaries. The "two Chinas" problem often appears in within certain labor unions' activities and publications. After our diplomatic discussions with the Foreign Ministry, on average they demonstrate acceptance and go along willingly with our demands. But even after diplomacy, the "two Chinas" phenomenon still pops up. This is likely due in large part to Poland's inability to completely control its political situation. We kept a record of press coverage on the "two Chinas" problem. After a certain period, we notified the Polish side that their method of oversight appeared to be correct. If our notices had been too frequent we might have brought on a misunderstanding. Concerning Poland's unfriendly displays toward us, such as not planning a speech by our ambassador during last year's Chinese National Day celebrations, changing the wording of our message on Maoism for the exposition without our permission, etc., we promptly went to the Polish side with objections. This method is the correct one, and it obtained good results. For example, regarding the wording of the notice on Maoism, Poland made corrections in accordance with our objections. Concerning the bilateral split in ideology, the embassy, in accordance with the Central Committee's recommendations, presented many of the party's documents. Following last year's diplomatic experience, we learned that foreign diplomacy is very serious work, and it must not be done half-heartedly. The situation must be made clear beforehand. The nature of the problem must be clearly delineated. We must go to the state for directions, and then implement those directions. Before conducting diplomacy, we must not reveal any areas of dissatisfaction for objections. We should direct our diplomacy to foreign ministries as opposed to specific business entities. Our experience has been that when matters of diplomacy are directed to foreign ministries, on average the results are fairly satisfactory. When we direct diplomacy to industrial offices, the results have sometimes fallen short of our goals. At the International Stamp Exposition, with the Jiang Jieshi clique [Taiwan] and the "False Manchu" [Japan] stamps, for example: we tried diplomacy with the industrial offices, but in the end we were refused. Concerning the related issue of bilateral divergences in ideology, the embassy can only be held responsible for providing clarification and publishing the Central Committee's decisions. The embassy itself will not publicize its feelings.

- (3) Problems with activities for foreigners: The embassy is the nation's representative entity: we must confront the upper classes and officials. Since the interior of the Polish United Workers' Party is out of harmony, there is a constituency that side with the CCP on the matter of the Sino-Soviet split. Therefore, in those activities of ours that are geared toward foreigners, we absolutely must strive to confront the officials on the basis of reason, in order to avoid getting dragged in to the Polish United Workers' Party's internal struggles. In the past, we had already made note of this point, but in a few of our activities this past year we overstepped our boundaries to a certain degree. In dealing with fraternal states should uphold our position of not gathering intelligence. From now on this will be doubly important: it is in our interest that we not collect their classified documents, so that we will experience fewer collisions with the "conservatives," both in and out of office. This way we will avert the present paranoia. When visiting with personnel from fraternal embassies, we must avoid discussion of living within the state, and not comment on the third state.
- (4) Problems with foreign talks: The embassy is the representative entity of foreign affairs. Talks with foreigners must be handled with prudence. The perspectives of the CCP must be retold correctly and completely. The questions we came up against most often in our activities with foreigners over the past year had to do with war and peace: questions related to peaceful coexistence and harmony. In our conversations we must endeavor to prevent one-sidedness. If we do not keep a firm grasp on Marxist doctrine, peace, and harmony (the Three Banners), we will then easily become passive. This is why it is imperative for us to diligently study and learn from the Central Committee's policies and ideologies. When conversing with the leaders of host states on the topic of the split, in order to guarantee some leeway, it is best not to end after just one discussion. It is not good to announce one's disapproval of the Sino-Soviet split to middle and high-ranking party cadres, either. Before May of last year, we rarely dared to acknowledge the split; in fact, this tended to blur our ideological boundaries, and its impact on foreign policy was rather negative. We made immediate corrections later, thus taking a more active role. When we encounter provocation in our discussions, we must provide a counterattack, while at the same time resisting a quarrel. In the past, we usually presented as relatively tolerant; our counterattacks were not forceful. In conversations with

the public, the important thing is to relay our points of view with clarity; we do not denounce the Sino-Soviet split, nor do we completely acknowledge it. We especially emphasize that harmony [illegible]. This is instrumental in straightening out confused ways of thinking.

- (5) Problems with bilateral collaboration: It is an internationalist necessity for fraternal states to support each other politically before the eyes of capitalist states. Since last year, when the Polish United Workers' Party began following the Soviets due to the ideological split, Poland has turned its back on this obligation, maintaining a neutral position in Chinese-Indian border affairs. Moreover, we have followed internationalist reasoning in our staunch support of Poland's Western border. This has had a good impact on the population. In matters of economic cooperation, Poland has always declared that they wish to expand their purchasing, and this year China is again faced with practical difficulties. It will be hard to fulfill Poland's requests. In order to offer complete justification, [illegible] obtain a positive understanding. While collaborating with fraternal states, one's obligations must not be borne lightly; obligations already taken on must be diligently seen through, particularly in the present circumstances. We must not agree to a resolution, as we did at the last meeting, and then refuse it at the next meeting. For example, at the Ministers of Posts and Telecommunications Conference in Berlin the year before last, fraternal states decided to provide mutual material aid; at the Railway Transport Conference in Sofia, it was decided that East and West would adopt a uniform set of rules for light rail shipping. Our delegations at these meetings did not express dissenting views. During the first meeting in Warsaw last year, we demonstrated our disapproval for these decisions, inciting the disapproval of fraternal states. The educational value of this experience should be absorbed.

All in all, last year's occurrences allow us to acknowledge more clearly that the Socialist states' harmonious cooperation is leading us toward a guaranteed victory. Therefore, fraternal states mutual relations must be resolutely constructed on the basis of the five points and proletarian internationalism. Sino-Soviet bilateral unity is thus at the foundation of the international communist movement and the harmony of the Socialist camp. Once China and the USSR are united, our unification with Poland and other Western European fraternal parties will be simple. The basic interests of the fraternal parties are identical. Their theories and goals are shared. But the tension

between and incorrect objections, and the bureaucratic conflict between harm and benefit, remain ever-present. In sorting out these problems, we should traverse the road of interior consultation. At the moment, we cannot be unified, but we must base ourselves on the spirit of “*seeking common ground while holding back differences*,” and patiently wait until the time is ripe to make a decision.

. Perspectives on the Post-Moscow Conference Situation and the Embassy's Work Plans for 1961.

The unanimous agreement of the Moscow meeting having been declared, the international communist movement and the Socialist camp have a new foundation for harmony. They share a common language. Chairman Liu's visit to the USSR was especially noteworthy, allowing Sino-Soviet bilateral harmony to achieve a new level of strength. This type of climate constitutes a serious attack against imperialism, and an extreme form of encouragement to the people. It is not advantageous for revisionism, but for Marxism; it is not advantageous for the compromisers, but for the revolutionaries. For China it is indeed advantageous: we ought to embrace this advantageous weapon and advance the harmony work. Of course the meeting did not resolve all elements of the split. Reaching a pact is one thing but whether or not the pact will be respected is quite another. Struggle must remain ongoing for now. But for now harmony and unification is the primary focus. This situation cannot help but have an enormous influence on world affairs in the year 1961. It seems that in 1961, the storm of Asian, African, and Latin American peoples' revolutions will escalate further still. Workers movements in capitalist states will continue to develop. While vying for neutrality, struggles between imperialist and socialist states will reach new levels of violence. In order to get rid of its own economic crisis, American imperialism will continue to expand its Armed Forces in preparation for war. In addition, they will use their two counter-revolutionary hands to additionally strengthen their conspiracy against Socialist state participation in the Cold War, thus calming and regulating their internal conflicts. Poland's attitude toward the declarations of the Moscow conference can be classified as partly accepting and partly reserved. Their propaganda related to the declarations have been on the whole vigorous and panegyric. However, while at the same time exposing the Kennedy administration, they still harbor grand illusions. They call Yugoslavia a socialist state in public. Despite continual references to “protecting” Soviet-Polish friendship, they do not obey the Soviet Union in every case. Concerning Sino-Polish relations, in their propaganda they have upped their coverage of Chinese construction's successes. Sometimes they print the words “Three

Red Banners.” [Aleksander] Zawadzki has even remarked that friendliness with China must be strengthened. This indeed reflects the stance toward China called for by the vast majority of Poles. Yet on the other hand, the Polish United Workers’ Party still restricts the expansion of our party’s influence within Poland. They speak endlessly about the strengthening of harmony between Socialist states, but the only one in Gomułka’s mouth is the USSR, and not China. While spreading the declarations of the Moscow Conference, Gomułka even launched repeated and strikingly violent attacks against the CCP. Polish-Albanian relations are deteriorating, due to the CCP’s support for Albania’s just position. This has escalated Poland’s concerns toward us. Add to this our vehement scaling-back of Sino-Polish trade over the last year and the cuts in Sino-Polish cultural exchange projects, which altogether have left a substantial impact on bilateral relations. This type of relationship between China and Poland will not see its fruits for some time; even in the course of this year it will not develop much further. This is decided by objective factors. Therefore, our plans to become slightly warmer toward the USSR, and slightly cooler to Western European states, are completely justified.

In accordance with the above perspectives, the Embassy’s work in 1961 ought to diligently carry out the decisions of the Central Committee’s Foreign Affairs meeting, and patiently open up friendly harmony work in Poland. Our specific plans are as follows:

1. Friendly Visitations

Last year we extended an invitation to the Sino-Polish Friendship Committee Chair Ying-de-li-qiao-fu-si-ji [sic] (a member of the Polish politburo). This year the [illegible] delegation is visiting China. Ying-de-li-qiao-fu-si-ji has already accepted the invitation: whether or not he goes, we will notify the Polish side at that time.

2. Economy

(1) This year, the Sino-Polish trade talks work will be exceedingly difficult due to the extremely steep declines. However we must strive to clearly explain the truth, and struggle to reach an understanding.

(2) We have already decided to attend the Poznan International Fair in June. We will decide as soon as possible whether or not to send a political delegation, in order to discuss internal affairs.

(3) In September, Poland will hold a Polish socialist construction victory fair in Beijing. It will be the largest scale exposition commissioned by Poland in a foreign state. In order to emphasize the importance of this event, it is possible that Poland will send director-level personnel to facilitate the curtain ceremonies.

3. Culture

(1) According to the principle of “*lowering quantity and raising quality*,” we must put our agreements into practice.

(2) It would be best for our major opera troupes to book appearances in Poland.

(3) Completing the work of bringing the Polish Vice Cultural Minister’s cultural delegation to China.

4. Research

(1) Within the embassies own projects, we foment rising tides in research, raising the quality of our investigations. In our intimate examinations of internal and foreign relations movements, we will take world affairs, socialist camp affairs, and the facts pertaining to Poland as our starting points. Our communications to the government will be swift.

(2) In order to systematically investigate in Poland, we will depend on politburo members to personally see to the following special topics:

- 1) Poland’s methods of propaganda for the Moscow conference documents (assigned to the research office)
- 2) Polish-American relations (assigned to the Embassy)
- 3) Polish agricultural policy (assigned to Officer Yao)
- 4) Affairs within Poland’s artworld (assigned to Officer Zhu)
- 5) Polish zeitgeist (assigned to the research office)
- 6) Relations between church and state (assigned to the research office)
- 7) Polish military affairs (assigned to Military Attaché Zhou)
- 8) Movements within Polish youth thought (assigned to Secretary Zhang)

9) Poland's trade policy in its second five-year plan (assigned to Officer Shang)

10) Problems in Poland's Western region (assigned to General Consul Cui)

5. Study

(1) With regard to training cadres, we must unceasingly strengthen Mao Zedong Thought education. We will facilitate rigorous study of the fourth chapter of the *Selected Works of Chairman Mao* and assign every Wednesday and Saturday afternoon for study time.

(2) In order to raise cadres' correct awareness of international issues, we will organize debates on special topics once every two months. The subjects will be assigned ahead of time.

(3) Relevant developments in China's international policy and national concerns will be assigned accordingly for study.

6. Cadres will all put into practice the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention; continually strengthening cadres' organization and discipline education.

Please reply with corrections if you consider any of the above views unsound.

[Chinese] Embassy in Poland

14 April 1961

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DOCUMENT NO. 4

CABLE FROM THE PARTY COMMITTEE AT THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN POLAND, "REGARDING THE RESULTS OF DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO THE SITUATION IN POLAND OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS," 16 AUGUST 1961

[Source: PRC FMA 109-02305-04, 16-18. Translated by Max Maller.]

Regarding the Results of Discussions related to the Situation in Poland over the Past Six Months

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Liaison Department:

We have recently commenced a two-week discussion on the situation in Poland over the past six months. The present results of these discussions are announced below:

- (1) Under the influence of the Moscow statements, as well as the Kennedy administration laying bare its true features, the Polish United Workers' Party's attitude has actively expressed itself over the past year. They have engaged in certain exposures and reprehensions of imperialism and colonialism, demonstrating their support for the people's liberation movement. They took a rather firm stance in response to the US invasion of Cuba. On the issue of Laos, they basically adopted an identical position to that of China, the USSR and Vietnam. They continue to lay emphasis on the unity of Socialist states. However, in other respects, the Polish United Workers' Party leadership still adheres to their original views in their interpretation of the Moscow statements. On the issue of war and peace, they continue to emphasize the horrors of war. They take great pains to romanticize war's unpredictability. They are one-sided in their emphasis on peaceful coexistence. They continue to advocate for the "realism" of total demilitarization. They recommend using the money saved from demilitarization to "improve" the lives of people in many different countries and "help" develop backward countries; they also recommend not giving nuclear weapons to other countries, and so on. In terms of their relations with other socialist states, their own interests are the reason for their advocacy of international division of labor and specialization, and their opposition to self-sufficiency. Beneath the sway of this way of thinking, Poland has initiated a certain level of criticism against the US Empire's aggressive preparations and invasions, but they also continue to solicit loans from the US. They neither expose nor attack the ever more rigid American conspiracy known as "peaceful evolution." Concerning Yugoslavia, they admit on the one hand that it is a revisionist state, and they appear not to want diplomatic relations with their Party. On the other hand, they still recognize Yugoslavia as a Socialist state, suggest peaceful policies and even devote attention to their foreign relations events, continuing to struggle on their behalf. Concerning the USSR: on the one hand, they place forceful emphasis on unity; they support those words

and actions of the USSR's that conform to the Polish United Workers' Party's views; they depend on the USSR to protect their western border; in foreign relations matters they basically follow the USSR, relying on them economically and strengthening their friendly exchanges with them; and they pay a high degree of respect to Soviet personnel. On the other hand, they strive to preserve "equality and independence," and they do not desire a high degree of restraint. In addition, they hope to lower the level of Soviet control over them by way of a reserved, hot and cold relationship with China and the receipt of US aid. This positive turn in their views toward the USSR ought to conflict with the USSR's change in attitude toward America. Yet at the same time, they are concerned that an overexpansion of Soviet influence would reflect poorly on them. Therefore, they have restructured, restricted, and significantly consolidated their Soviet friendship apparatus.

- (2) Domestically, the production situation over the past half-year has been quite good. Industrial production has outpaced that of the same period last year by 11.4%. Investment in capital construction has gone up 14%. Agricultural yields and the domestic market are basically stabilized. However, there are still major economic difficulties. Industrial development relies increasingly on imported raw materials and the international sales market. This year they plan to import over 2 million tons of grains. Their trade deficit over the past six months has reached 593 million zloty in foreign exchange. We have heard that they are continuing to make arrangements with the US to borrow \$180 million more. The basic cause of Poland's economic hardship is the ever-expanding contradictions between small private farms and large Socialist industry. Under these circumstances, the basis for the national economy is the Polish United Workers' Party leadership's ongoing support for industry, their continuing efforts to strengthen the development of industry, and their disregard for the Socialist strategies toward agriculture. This leads to the continual sharpening of the contradictions lying beneath the prosperous, whitewashed surface layers.

Politically, it appears that the two roads aspect of class struggle has grown significantly sharper. As a result of the elections by Parliament and local people's conferences, the prominence of the Labor Party has increased, and their position has seen consolidation. Furthermore, the democratic faction's struggle to expand its power and fight for leadership has also developed. The Polish

United Workers' Party and government have continued their attacks against organized religion, notably by completely shutting down all religious education in schools. The Church has retaliated by using parliament as a legal platform and holding some small disturbances. Of particular seriousness is the further escalation of class separation in the villages: exploitation by rich peasants, the separation of high and low, and land dispersals, are growing more rampant. Agricultural cooperatives, once numbering 1800, had shrunk to 1600 or so by last year. Failed cooperatives are moving toward dissolution. Farmer bankruptcy and failed crops are growing more serious by the day (right now there are between 300-350,000 hectares of failed crops). There have been demands for change from within the party and among farmers; the calls for finding a new path grow louder. For now, the Polish United Workers' Party has decided first to nationalize some provinces' agriculture. In other provinces, the acceptance of bankrupt farmers' lands as payment is a manifestation of the impasse faced by the new agricultural policy and the fear of collectivization.

Judging by the Polish United Workers' Party's present circumstances, the influence of the Party has expanded. Over the past six months, Party membership has increased by 110,000. Total Party membership has gone up from the end of last year by 10%. There are an estimated 1,270,000 members at the present time. Due to his support from the USSR, Gomułka's position has begun to strengthen. However, there is no unity among the various factions of leaders. Gomułka hopes to essentially rely on the USSR, and exchange his followership for the continuing support of the Soviet government and the Polish conservatives. But he does not support overly firm dependence. Instead, he wants to take advantage of Sino-Soviet and Sino-American conflicts, maneuvering amongst political enemies and benefiting from their disputes. Former Party members [Józef] Cyrankiewicz and [Adam] Rapacki are obsessed with peaceful coexistence. They argue that Poland must embrace the role of bridge between East and West, thus exhibiting the special uses of small states and strengthening their ties with Western European Democratic Socialist parties. This year, Cyrankiewicz repeatedly conferred with the Corporate Manager of the Krupp office in West Germany [Berthold] Beitz about building up relations, which is a kind of expression of their thinking. [Roman] Zambrowski is the representative for Jewish intellectuals; he is not pleased with

Khrushchev's policies toward Jews and has heavily anti-Soviet feelings. There are rumors that Zambrowski has relations with [Palmiro] Togliatti of the Italian government. These three factions all have power and mutually strive against one another, and yet they share a rightist appearance in their political thinking. Moreover, for the moment they are all inseparable, so therefore they can still maintain the appearance of unity. This is such that the conflict continues to develop between the leaders in the party and the leftists. Thanks to his newly consolidated position and the Soviets' support, Gomułka has adopted a set of more authoritarian methods, discriminating against dissenters and continuing to force a constituency of veteran party members to either retire or leave important posts. Despite the leftists being pushed aside and losing some posts, their relations with workers and young people have expanded considerably. When the US invaded Cuba, they were the ones who organized the public protests and the fight with the American consulate.

- (3) Sino-Polish relations: Due to the right-deviation of the Polish United Workers' Party leadership, there has been deep divergence between them and the CCP. They treat our support for Leninism, our advocacy against the American empire, and our exposures against modern revisionism, with fear and dissatisfaction. Therefore, they hope to rely on and support the USSR and other fraternal states in their boycotts against the CCP. On the other hand since they have come to us for economic help, they wish to take advantage of our boycott against Soviet control of Poland, while at the same time coercing the American empire into giving them more loans. Thus they will not take too excessive of an attitude toward the CCP, so as to benefit from the two sides' dispute. Due to these considerations, in one respect we have been treated tepidly by the Polish United Workers' Party this past six months: they continue to restrict the influence of our Party; neither Polish United Workers' Party bulletins nor their newspapers propagate our "Three Red Flags" and the success of our construction efforts; they do issue propaganda when we face difficulties, which they secretly distribute among the Socialist infantry; they have completed market discussions with everyone except for China. The Polish United Workers' Party politburo cancelled the Sino-Polish friendship society's planned 40th Independence Day celebration for China. They have essentially taken a blockade policy against our foreign policy, actions and rhetoric. They have simultaneously begun using

the slur “friend of China, foe of Russia” to refer to veteran Party members who are sympathetic to the CCP, so as to increasingly push out and harass them. They monitor any contact between the left and our Party. In other respects, they still maintain a surface-level friendliness toward China. They continue to support our liberation of Taiwan, as well as our legal membership in the United Nations, and they reject the “two Chinas” conspiracy. In trade negotiations, following a lively debate, they have basically reached an agreement based on our strategy. They believe that our appearance at the Poznań Expo this year was a demonstration of our support for Poland. They have demonstrated understanding and approval for this year’s cooperative cultural program “Three Degrees of Reduction.” The Sino-Polish friendship society has organized a limited amount of propaganda for friendly events, the most prominent being the economic expo they are preparing for China, their largest in a foreign country. In addition, they will be sending politburo committee member and friendship society chairman [Stefan] Jedrychowski to lead a delegation in overseeing the commencement ceremonies. It is possible that they will use this as an opportunity to learn about our national situation and learn what is really happening with our expansion of bilateral trade. In societal terms, the right-wingers and reactionaries have begun a ludicrous anti-China movement in the last six months. They slander the CCP thus: “they have committed errors”; “the people’s commune has collapsed”; “China is starving people to death”; “the Sino-Soviet split is not finished”; “China still supports dogmatism,” etc. etc. However, the public is quite friendly toward us. While attending the Poznań Expo, the majority of people who visited our booth were laudatory and approving of Mao Zedong’s heroism, the correctness of our Party line and the success of China. In addition, they severely denounced the slanders of that slender reactionary minority.

All in all, judging from the situation this past six months, the Polish United Workers’ Party has demonstrated two-facedness in their reception toward statements from Moscow and their attitudes toward other Socialist states. The Polish United Workers’ Party leadership has a fairly systematic right-deviating brand of nationalism. Under the present international conditions, this will be hard to correct. We should base ourselves on the CCP Central Committee’s strategy of “supporting principles, supporting harmony, and working harder,”

and continue to struggle for Poland to develop in a positive direction.

Party Committee of the Chinese Embassy in Poland
16 August [1961]

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DOCUMENT NO. 5

CABLE FROM THE PARTY COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN ROMANIA, "SUMMARY BULLETIN OF ROMANIA'S DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY AND SINO-ROMANIAN RELATIONS SINCE THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE," 21 AUGUST 1961

[Source: PRC FMA 109-03791-02, 1-14. Translated by Max Maller.]

Summary Bulletin of Romania's Domestic and International Policy and Sino-Romanian Relations since the Moscow Conference

[...]

Developments in Romania's circumstances since the Moscow Conference have been heavily mixed. They have made progress on some issues, however they have upheld their mistaken views on several issues related to basic Marxist-Leninist principles. Relations between the party and the government have taken a step closer to Soviet domestic and international policies. In foreign relations, Sino-Romanian relations have basically normalized. On matters of basic principles, Romania has avoided directly contradicting us. At present, post-Moscow domestic and foreign policy in Romania and Sino-Romanian relations are as follows:

Since the Moscow Conference, Romanian opposition to imperialism and support for the people's liberation and independence movement has demonstrated significant changes. Their exposures of imperialism, above all American imperialism, have increased. With Kennedy in office for half a year, he has provided the people of all nations with a perfectly fine negative example. At a certain level, he has also educated

the people of Romania and their leaders, leaving them on guard against the Kennedy administration's foolish policies and military strategies. The Romanian press has also borrowed from the Soviet phrasebook, saying, "American imperialism is the primary fort for global reactionary power. They are the world's police, the enemy of the world's peoples." However, Romania's exposures against imperialism have basically been put forth according to the fashion of a movement supporting ethnic liberation. Direct and straightforward exposures have been few and lacking in force. Their stance toward ethnic liberation is clearer now than it was before the Moscow conference, and their support has proved to be quite powerful. Romania has built up quite good relations with Cuba. They have made a large scale show of support the Cuban people's militarized struggle against the American empire's plot. In economic terms, they have given Cuba 15 million USD in payments and assisted their oil explorations. They have exposed the American empire's interference with Laos and come out in support of the Lao Patriotic Front and [Prince Souvanna] Phouma's positions. They have built up quite good relations with [Congoese Prime Minister Antoine] Gizenga and the Legitimate Government of the Congo. After [Congoese Prime Minister Patrice] Lumumba was assassinated, they organized 100 students at the Belgian Congoese embassy for a protest. Before and after the Ta-ta-na-li-fu [sic] meeting, there were also exposures made against the American empire. They have shown support for the struggles of the people of Albania. During Algeria-French diplomacy, Romania exposed and condemned France's planned conspiracy to use undercover means to colonize Algeria and divide the Sahara from Algerian territory. During this time, there was an increase in their assistance through press coverage to the people's struggle against servile followership of the American empire in Japan, South Korea and South Vietnam, to the people's struggle against the colonizers in Angola, and to the struggle within the labor movement in capitalist states against the class system. Within the socialist camp, they have tightly grasped the flag of unity, advancing their relations with the USSR. They have strengthened their exchanges with Eastern European nations. With the aid of visits from high-ranking heads of state, they have rectified some contradictions within their political policy and economic relations. They have escalated their struggle for North Korea and Vietnam, providing significant support for the people's struggles in those states. They have agreed with Vietnam to establish full time embassies and they have given them 22.5 million USD in conditional payments (15 million old rubles). Sino-Romanian relations have substantially warmed up since the Moscow Conference.

However, Romania's changes given above do not represent fundamental changes. Since the Moscow Conference, Romania's foreign policy and their relations with China, in addition to their methods of propaganda for Moscow's statements, their points of emphasis, and other kinds of behaviors all demonstrate that their divergence with us on major principles has still not been remedied.

As concerns their relations with other socialist states, despite Romania's vehement emphasis on unity, and a generally warm attitude toward us, their attitude toward Albania has worsened significantly since the Moscow Conference. They have collaborated with the USSR and other fraternal Eastern bloc in administering their own noticeable, independent attacks. Nor have they merely denied political support, moreover they have enacted rigid censorship in their propaganda, such that the press does not print news from Albania. They have deliberately imposed numerous difficulties on the Albanian embassy's news bulletin. In a meeting with the Albanian ambassador, [Communist leader of Romania Gheorghe] Gheorghiu-Dej said that the lack of friendly treatment toward Albania was due to the fact that Albania did not stand with them (meaning the USSR, Romania, etc.).

Their dealings with imperialist states have also seen some changes, particular in terms of strategy. Their primary goal is still to cozy up to and enter into peaceful competition with capitalist states by way of developing economic and cultural connections. Therefore, despite their inability to resist supporting ethnic liberation movements, and contemporaneous with their slight exposures against the imperialist states, they are still harbor certain illusions about these states. Their relationship with the US is a clear example. Since the beginning, their strategy with Kennedy has been that of "cozying up first, hitting back second." We hope there will be changes in their foreign strategy. Before and after Kennedy took office, the Romanian press consistently placed the blame for US aggression and military policy on Eisenhower. In March, the Kennedy administration stepped up their aggressive tactics against Laos and Cuba. Even then, Gheorghiu-Dej still entrusted his hopes for peaceful diplomacy in a meeting to be held between high-ranking leaders of four countries. His address to voters emphasized, "The policies put in place by the US are major obstacles to the development of entente and collaborative international relations... They have thwarted the positive results of numerous international summits and engagements." After news spread of the meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev, the Romanians announced a "victory for diplomacy." In order to complement this meeting, they showed four American films. Afterward, they separated the People's

Democratic Party and the Republican Party. They stated that the Republicans were against diplomacy. On 16 August, based on an article posted in the *New York Daily News* and abstracted by ITAR-TASS, *Scinteia* and three other news outlets announced that Kennedy's foreign policy was essentially that of Eisenhower, the result of pressure by right-wing republican politicians. In the course of progressive economic and cultural development with the US, UK, France, USSR, Italy and FRG, they deeply worship Western civilization, particularly American skills. Their dependency on American trade went up from 10.1 million *leu* in 1959 to 41.6 million *leu* in 1960. In 1960, their trade with England, France, West Germany and Italy went up 71.5%, 86%, 110% and 130%, respectively. In 1961, their trade went up again by 30% with France and 60% with Italy. In the first part of 1961, France, Australia and Italy have successively held industry showcases in Romania. American businessmen, the chairman of England's international trade initiative, and a business delegation from West Germany have made successive visits to Romania, all treated with extreme importance by Romania. In June, the Vice President of the Council of Ministers [Alexandru] Moghioroş brought an unofficial government delegation to US and Canadian meetings, not returning until mid-August. The primary objective of this was to study some agricultural practices, while at the same time conducting some friendly political activities. This is not unrelated to the issue of petrochemical equipment brought up by the Americans during the businessmen's visit to Romania earlier in the year. By the early part of 1959, Romania had already begun to accept payment in the form of equipment from the UK, France and other states. In recent years they have begun signing three to five year long-term trade agreements with Western states. Romania's cultural exchange with France, Italy, etc. was initially very frequent, but after the US-Romanian cultural exchange association agreement last year on 9 December, the volume of personnel and cinematic exchange has already begun to surpass that with France and Italy. The US-Romanian cultural exchange association is involved in education, science, training, industry, performing arts, radio, television, sports, travel, etc. Its scope is extremely large. Since this year, American personnel in Romania include: a 94 person wind orchestra from the University of Michigan, a 30 person basketball team, and high volume tour groups (400 people just in mid-February). The strengthening of economic relations with "Americanist" states cannot but reflect on Romania's foreign policy and the development of cultural exchange. It will also inevitably broaden the influence of the bourgeoisie in Romania.

Following the Moscow conference, Romania made certain to contain Romanian-

Yugoslav relations within the realm of national relations. For example, during the 40 year anniversary of the Romanian government, the Yugoslav ambassador was not invited to the ceremony. However, since they still harbor certain illusions about Yugoslavia, they plan to advocate for Yugoslavia's return to the socialist camp, which they say will benefit a relaxed international climate and the advancement of peaceful coexistence. They are more so afraid that if they tarnish Romanian-Yugoslav relations, it will create tension at their southwest border. Therefore, in seeking to remedy their relations with Yugoslavia, Romania has been very cautious, and they have struggled to the utmost to create good relations. Although the pamphlets and articles published by Romania since the Moscow conference occasionally bring up the responsibility of opposing modern Yugoslav revisionism, these are just standard slogans that are brought up for their own sake. They have certainly not made any deep exposures or criticisms. Speeches by the Romanian leaders are even more hesitant to oppose Yugoslav revisionism by name. Not only do they refuse to support the Yugoslav anti-revisionist rebels in exile, but they have even taken steps to obstruct them. Through reporting the Yugoslav political exiles, Romania and Pakistan want them to either become Romanian citizens or citizens of another socialist country, their motive evidently being the limitation of Yugoslav exiles' anti-revisionist activities. Since this year, public organizations between the people of Romania and Yugoslavia, particularly trade unions, has gone up considerably. Women's organizations and social justice committees also come into contact. Athletic and artistic exchanges, along with other cultural forms, are also quite frequent.

Since the publication of the statements from Moscow, despite their acknowledgement of the dual character of an authoritative national bourgeoisie, they have still continued their cozying up with nationalist states and their refusal to explicitly criticize them. For example, they have always believed that India and the UAE are Afro-Asian powers, that they have a great influence over Afro-Asian nationalist states, and they haven't dared to condemn them. They have even helped whitewash their deeds. Even as India was drawing closer to the US day by day, on 15 August the Free State of Romania reprinted an article published by India with some real bragging in it, saying that [Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru's Indian government has enacted a socially just national security policy and made substantial contributions to solving many international issues. At the Bandung Conference, they contributed especially to the struggle to defend and strengthen the principle of peaceful coexistence, etc. etc.

Also, in considering Romania's methods of propagandizing of statements from Moscow and the contents of that propaganda, it is clear that Romania's old views still have yet to shift. After publishing the statements, Romania did not in any way energetically mobilize to divide up the public and conduct debates. Moreover, what they did first was to take whatever there was in the Conference that implicated the CCP's "mistakes" and disseminate this down so as to consolidate the internal opinion and understanding (it has been reported that the Romanians sent some speeches by Khrushchev and [French Communist Party leader Maurice] Thorez to certain members of the central committee). Afterwards, they quoted some passages from the statements to explain their mistaken viewpoints. During their studies, they advanced the discussion through articles published in the press as part of an effort to deny the public's suspicion, which stemmed from Romania's history of mistaken viewpoints and from discontinuities between their oratory and the actual statements from Moscow. As far as the contents of their propaganda, there were things said in there that had not been said in the past. In addition, their wording was somewhat more comprehensive. But overall, regarding epochs, war vs. peace, peaceful coexistence, peaceful transition, etc., they still maintained their same outdated points of view. They asserted that Lenin's definition of the modern era "already cannot precisely reflect the basic facts of the present," going on to say that supporting Leninist beliefs is just "one-sided indoctrination." They verbally acknowledged both views, that the World War can be stopped and that the dangers of war are still present. Based on the theory of the unique importance of weapons, they claim, "It is difficult to predict whether the most bellicose of Pentagon generals would make this argument, if he were aware that what death awaited him within the first few days of a hot nuclear conflict." They depict the terrors of war in extreme terms and bully those who say that it will "strengthen people's willingness to struggle for peace." They still primarily rest their hopes on bringing about total disarmament, and they make this out to be an achievable goal in the present time. They fantasize that "total, comprehensive disarmament is the quickest, most effective path to peace and world leadership, because total, comprehensive disarmament essentially eliminates the possibility for war." The slogan of achieving the Three "Withouts" World through nuclear disarmament appears constantly in the press and in speeches by leaders. (When Gheorghiu-Dej visited the USSR, his wording of the Three "Withouts" World was already different than the previous version). The general line of the socialist state foreign policy is to continue to emphasize peaceful coexistence. Although acknowledging peaceful coexistence

is an important form of class struggle, emphasizing this form of struggle should demonstrate the peaceful competition of the two opposing systems in every field. Merely emphasizing peaceful coexistence helps the development of class struggle within capitalist states, as well as the possibility for individuals in colonized states engage in nationalist activities. Moreover, never mentioning revolution or ethnic liberation movements also advances the consolidation of peaceful coexistence. Acknowledging the transition from capitalism to socialism raises two possibilities, but further emphasizing the transition to peace means the belief that “the power of the world’s stage to benefit socialist transformation is such that, under peaceful conditions, it is possible to break through the front line of imperialism.

Both domestic and international elements have led to the above mistakes in Romania’s interior beliefs and actions. After 19 years of peaceful construction following independence, their economic situation has changed drastically. They fear that a world war will shatter their precious pot. With the development of their economy, the standard of living has gone up—though relative to other Eastern bloc fraternal states it is still low. Their people are inclined toward taking life easy, and as such the Romanian leaders are emphasizing material stimulation for their economy. Ideological government has adapted to being left behind; in foreign relations their only emphasis is peaceful competition. Therefore, capitalist pleasure-seeking and pacifism have grown enormously. In international matters, this arises on the one hand from the influence within the socialist camp of the Soviet foreign policy and global perspective, but on the other hand it is the product of pressure from the imperialist states, which is why Romania does not dare to confront them with sharp struggle, but instead plans to give up ground and make unprincipled compromises, easing international tensions in exchange for peace.

The USSR has a decisive influence over Romania’s foreign policy. Since the Moscow Conference, Soviet-Romanian relations have grown even more intimate. Romania does its best to praise Khrushchev and the Central Committee. They sent a party and government delegation headed by Gheorghiu-Dej to the USSR in July, emphasizing the complete unity between their views and taking the opportunity to offer their political support. It appears that Romania has become the USSR’s most respectful and competent role-player within the international communist movement. Concerning foreign policy, Romania is fundamentally in agreement in the USSR. However, since they have their own interests in mind, their attitude toward the American imperialists seems particularly weak compared with that of the USSR.

This is the manner in which Romania blindly follows close behind Khrushchev. First of all, the Romanian leaders' thinking is basically identical to Khrushchev's. In addition, Romania and the USSR share a long, unique history; their economic and political connections offer great benefits. The USSR is Lenin's homeland, the first socialist nation: this fact cannot help but give rise to superstitions about the USSR. At the same time, it was the Soviet army that liberated Romania, therefore earning their admiration. Economically, Romania has an immense dependence on the USSR. According to the Eight Nations Economic Assistance Committee's integrated program, this dependence is increasing every day. Romania's six year plan and their projections through 1980 were all formulated in the USSR. Their mining and industrial infrastructures were all completed using Soviet equipment. Their police methods are modeled on the Soviet example. Their training requirements, in addition to many of their materials including pellets, coke, [illegible], cotton, etc. are predominately dependent on the USSR. Moreover, the USSR is the leading market for Romanian goods. As such, Romania's domestic economic plan has essentially been rolled into the Soviet economic plan, and their products carry a heavy component of Soviet input. Any single measure within the USSR's economic relationship with Romania can have an enormous influence, and serious after effects, upon the country's economic life. Therefore, Romania's economic reliance on the USSR has led to major political pressure, and it has become a deciding factor in the determination of Romania's foreign policy. Meanwhile, Soviet control over personnel in the Romanian government and Communist Party, particularly the military, foreign ministry, economic and political offices, even civilian organizations, has reached an exceedingly high degree. For example, appointments at the colonel level and above must all undergo Soviet training. It has become commonplace in recent years for young Soviet-educated cadres to replace the original cadres in schools and factory enterprise. Following the Moscow Conference, there have also been substantive shifts within decision-making organs of the Romanian Central Committee. The result of this recent shakeup has been to elevate the ranking within the core of Romania's leadership of those who support and adhere to the USSR: [Gheorghe] Apostol, [Nicolae] Ceaușescu, [Alexandru] Drăghici, [Leontin] Sălăjan, etc. The current Chairman of the Council of Ministers [Ion Gheorghe] Maurer has never been anything but tepid toward us. Most of the officials from the old government, supporters of reason and objective researchers, not to mention bearers of good feelings toward China, have been deposed, including President of the National People's Assembly [Constantin]

Pîrvulescu and Vice President of the Council of Ministers [Dumitru] Popa. Other individuals with good impressions of China, such as Chivu Stoica and [Emil] Bodnăraş, have managed to maintain their posts in the new government, but have been designated to posts concerned with socialist state relations. The Foreign Ministry has also made adjustments. The present Foreign Minister was a colonel in 1952. Since then, his career has skyrocketed. He quickly became major general, then lieutenant general, then foreign minister, only because he was not a Central Committee member. He clearly has a history (as of now the details are still unclear). On 1 May of last year, Mu-er-nai-shan [sic], always tepid toward us, replaced Du-mi-te-lei-si-ku [sic] as the Deputy Foreign Minister, a position chiefly occupied with China. Soviet control over Romanian personnel matters is one of the deciding elements that compel Romania to follow the USSR in its domestic and foreign policy.

There are also a few points of conflict between the USSR and Romania. This demonstrates the paradox between the USSR's increased restrictions upon Romanian politics and economics, and Romania's struggle for a certain degree of independence. Stalin's brand of patriotism from when he was alive still leaves its mark in the present. Romania is bound to have misgivings about this. The historical struggle between Romania and the Soviets for control of Moldavia still produces anti-Soviet emotions among the Romanian people. Romania has a Soviet-Romanian friendship month once a year. The large-scale Soviet friendship activities held last year in Iaşi are proof that their relationship is not a flawless one. The USSR's strict control over Romania's military poses a threat to Romania's leaders themselves. In terms of their specific actions and positions in international relations, they are clearly not in complete unity with one another. Romania's apprehension toward the international situation comes from their own feelings of fear, which is why they appear weaker than the USSR, since they cannot keep from envisioning that one day war will break out. Will all they have be annihilated? Will they be able to control what happens to them?

However, as far as the present situation, the more important aspect is that which is shared almost completely by the USSR and Romania. The paradoxes are only incidental; some are not particularly obvious.

Soviet-Romanian relations have thawed since the Moscow Conference, and yet, since the basic disagreements over principle are still there, the situation developing now between the USSR and Romania only appears to be loosening. It does not amount to a substantively positive turn. Romania's approach toward China since the Conference has been that of seeking common ground despite the existence

of differences, staying alert to new developments, and awaiting what is to come. Domestically, they are restrictive, and internationally, they loosen up. For over eight months, the situation in Sino-Romanian relations has shown the following signs:

- (1) In terms of international relations and foreign relations etiquette, things have basically normalized. The Romanian reception toward China's visiting delegation was comparatively warm and friendly. There is a marked difference between this and what happened prior to the Moscow Conference. However, this type of warmth and friendliness is rather superficial. Despite the fact that Romania avoids direct confrontation, as well as divergence on issues, during their meetings with us, they are not eager to have deep contacts or sincere discussion either.
- (2) They still strive for blockades against us, and have achieved convergence in some areas. Following the Bucharest Conference, Romania has repeatedly obstructed and assaulted the publication of our embassy's news bulletin. It had already gone into publication following the Moscow Conference. Despite things still not being completely normalized—certain issues have been pulled out, an extremely serious phenomenon—in the end, it is being distributed again (in effect, this is under the condition that we do not discuss matters of policy). Every publication offers coverage of our international struggles and activities, in addition to our successes in economic construction. In the course of commenting on our country's economic development, the emphasis is on the USSR's assistance, the inseparable nature of our success and Soviet aid. When there is coverage of news from China, the majority of it deals with our party's leader Mao Zedong and his strong leadership. When covering our efforts and activities in international affairs, they basically stick to their own interests, violently abridging the piece to symbolize their own points of view. Anything that they do not agree with does not get published. There was not a single word of the Ninth Plenary Conference's bulletin or its resolutions. There was no press whatsoever devoted to the documents we supplied for our "8/1" Army Day.
- (3) They appear to support our claim to legal membership in the United Nations, but they continue to be reticent as concerns our struggles with India and other states. When capitalist states issue attacks against us, Romania neither reprints them nor retorts against them. Nor do they publish or reprint our articles that rebuke and slander imperialism.

- (4) Their manner of generally avoiding public denunciations of China (same as toward Albania) is slightly different from that of countries like Germany or Czechoslovakia. However, there are still denunciations made through recourse to innuendo. Yet these are here and gone again, like flashes in a pan. After our statements are issued, the public can see that all of China's views are reflected therein. The Romanian leadership's strategy for neutralizing the influence of our statements is to act in the spirit of not letting the public engage in deep study of these statements, but instead to internally propagate the statements from the Moscow Conference with language in them that denounces China. This counters the public's feelings of doubt toward them.
- (5) In Sino-Romanian negotiations related to culture and economics, Romania's attitude has been good on the whole. Their policy has been that of advancing in order to retreat. In general, they issue plans that are far more grandiose than the ones we issue, and then retract their plans in favor of ours. During our trade negotiations, they expressed their understanding toward our hardships resulting from the two years of extreme natural disaster, yet they still sought to expand trade volume as much as possible.
- (6) Although they do not wish to propagandize for our experience level, they still study specific categories of our experience which have been effectual, such as our agricultural system's "eight character constitution," our integration of education and labor, our generalist approach within the military, and so on.

All in all, the facts show that Romania has been struggling to avoid a worsening of foreign relations with China since the Moscow Conference. They are still waiting for the situation to develop. We believe that the reasons for this state of affairs are roughly as follows:

- (1) For a long time now, Chairman Mao and the CCP have enjoyed a high amount of prestige, and a significant influence, among the Romanian people and certain of their politicians. Any action that harms the friendship between China and Romania has been met with refusal in the greater Romanian public.
- (2) China is a powerful state with 650 million people. It is a state with enormous political and economic force within the socialist camp. It is unthinkable that our state would be relegated outside of the socialist camp.

- (3) Since the diminution in Sino-Romanian trade volume, a result of the hardships caused by our two years of natural disaster, is already having a certain effect on Romanian economic and political life, Romania's dependence on China for economic goods (particularly rare earth metals and agricultural industrial crops) must continue to increase as our country's nationalized agriculture and skills continue their rapid development. Romania cannot help but take this into account.
- (4) The current international situation is certainly not developing in the direction of the mistaken views and desires. In fact, it continues to prove the correctness of our views. What has happened in regions like Cuba and Laos is bound to be a valuable lesson for them.
- (5) We have adopted correct strategies for managing certain contradictions within a socialist state. Due to our continuing implementation of the Central Committee's strategies, it has been possible to maintain generally friendly relations over the complicated course of China and Romania's long-term struggle, with results that are neither good nor bad.

Coming to Sino-Romanian relations in the present time, we believe that, based on the above circumstances, little in particular has changed, as is the case with the development of the international situation. Over the course of many years, Romania has continued to adopt a generally restrictive policy toward China, waiting anxiously for future developments in Sino-Soviet relations. On many issues, they still seek common ground despite the existence of differences, with firm domestic restrictions, relaxed international policy, and support for friendly harmony. It could be that their propaganda on our successes in construction has relaxed, whereas their propaganda on our strategic policy roads has become more limited. During international events, they are careful about appearances, formalities, not engaging with facts, and avoiding direct confrontations. Sino-Romanian relations change with the times, taking their cue from the status of Sino-Soviet relations. We reckon that they are often more positive, though. Sometimes they are worse; sometimes they get hot, and sometimes cold. The basic status is still cold. If it gets better, it won't be much better. It may get worse, but not to the most hostile degree.

The development orientation in Sino-Soviet relations is proof of the complete accuracy of the predictions made by the Central Committee following the Moscow

Conference, as well as the correctness of its strategies to raise Marxist-Leninist Moscow declarations and statements; elevate the flag of harmony; support principles and harmony; work hard; and, most of all, secure Sino-Soviet harmony, adopting a colder attitude to separatist fraternal states.

In order to complete the project of Sino-Romanian harmony and friendship with honesty, we have to do well in our investigation and research, and continue to implement the Central Committee's strategies and policies, in addition to Mao Zedong thought and measures. During foreign negotiations, we must go up against the upper crust of officials. We have to preserve those who uphold correct views and support China with friendship. We have to harmoniously struggle against those who doubt China, yet still want to have contacts with us. For example, when they bring up a suggestion that there should be a mandatory explanation for Central Committee policies, we must wait patiently and work harder. We should escalate our vigilance toward those who split from our views. For example, when an argument breaks out, we can use sharp verbiage to make our point clear. We will not nag, for we must be considerate in our etiquette, and in form we will be friendly, give ground, and not hurt feelings. But at the same time, we must make the proper mental preparation, get our hands ready, and protect against a spontaneous attack from the opposition. In our propaganda, we must look at the context and the response. We should have different attitudes toward different people. We must take hold of moderation during our speeches, work bit by bit, and wait patiently. At the appropriate time, we can commence our attendances and visitations, thus maintaining as much as possible our close connections with the Romanian Central Committee and upper-level cadres. This will be some of the long term, painstaking work. On issues related to major principles in Sino-Romanian relations, we have to follow correctness to systematize the conflicting ideas and principles within the populace, opening up a stable state of affairs. We will continue to express ourselves and refuse to compromise. This will allow us to reach the goals of harmonious friendship and unity on the basis of Marxist-Leninism and the Moscow declarations and statements.

Please alert us to any mistakes in the above report.

Party Committee of the Chinese Embassy in Romania

21 August 1961

[...]

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DOCUMENT NO. 6

**MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION FROM THE MEETING
BETWEEN VICE PREMIER CHEN YI AND THE ALBANIAN
AMBASSADOR TO CHINA REIS MALILE, 14 OCTOBER 1961**

[Source: PRC FMA 109-02376-02, 9-10. Translated for CUIHP by Max Maller.]

**Memorandum of Conversation from the Meeting between Vice Premier
Chen Yi and the Albanian Ambassador to China Reis Malile**

(Not yet proofread)

1. On Comrade Shehu's Letter to Zhou Enlai, Requesting that China Provide a 40 Million Ruble Economic Credit and Provide a Supplement of 40,000 Tons of Wheat
2. On The Issue of Albanian-Soviet Relations
3. On the Issue of Albania's Postponing its Recognition of Syria

Time: 10:40 a.m., 14 October 1961

Location: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Vestibule

Attending Persons: Deputy Director Xu Ming

Translator: Wang [Illegible]

Record: Yu Hongliang

[Reis] Malile: I have a very urgent letter for you.

Gives the letter, see attached for full contents.

This letter is from [Albanian Premier] Comrade [Mehmet] Shehu to Premier Zhou [Enlai]. It discusses an economic problem. For our part, this is a grave problem of great concern. This is why I asked to see either you or Premier Zhou. Of course, political and economic issues are closely related. You are aware of the Soviets' present attitude toward us.

Chen [Yi]: I understand.

Malile: They have our economy viciously sealed off. That is why we wish for Premier Zhou to know of this issue before he leaves.

Chen: We will translate this letter and get it to him at once. Premier Zhou leaves tomorrow—your relations with the Soviets are well known to us all. Comrade Shehu's conversation with [Foreign Minister] Luo Shigao has already been shared with the Central Committee. On this trip, there must be a struggle. This is our surmise: at the meeting, we cannot appear weak. Not just on Albanian issues, but also on several other matters related to the guiding principles of revisionism and certain international questions; we must fight for all of these. We will be forthright with Khrushchev and tell him that in dealing with Albania they have made mistakes. We shall not compromise.

Malile: Precisely. They are behaving like the real enemy.

Chen: As Marx said, they are their own gravediggers.

Malile: There is another matter I wish to discuss. The steamship headed for Albania is making good progress. We sincerely hope to prepare a shipload with 9000 tons of weaponry, and a second with 3000 tons.

One more thing. I would like your input regarding the recognition of Syria. At this point we have still not recognized them.

Chen: You can recognize them.

Malile: That is what we plan to do. We know [Egyptian President Gamal Abdel] Nassar's policies, so we quickly determined that the Syria situation was a good one. But, on the other hand, as you know, Khrushchev has blockaded us from four sides, such that China is now our only ally. To get to China, we have to cross the Suez Canal. If we recognize Syria, Nassar may give us trouble as a result. Therefore out of consideration for our relationship with Nassar, we wish to defer for a moment on the Syria question.

Chen: It's all right to defer and look out for your relationship with Nassar. The first steamship left on 27 September. Today it reached Suez. And the second one left on 2 October. It is now in the Indian Ocean.

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DOCUMENT NO. 7**CABLE FROM THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN POLAND, “POLISH CELEBRATION OF OUR NATIONAL DAY, THE POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY’S ATTITUDE TOWARD CHINA, AND OUR VIEWS,” 17 OCTOBER 1961**

[Source: PRC FMA 109-02311-01, 13-16. Translated for CWHIP by Max Maller.]

[...]

Polish Celebration of Our National Day, the Polish Communist Party’s Attitude toward China, and Our Views

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Liaison Department: (Secret)

The following concerns this year’s celebration in Poland of our National Day, new developments in the Polish United Workers’ Party’s attitudes toward us, and our views:

This year’s celebration in Poland of our National Day was more vigorous than last year’s. In anticipation thereof, the Party journal issued a statewide announcement. On 29 September, with the exception of [Polish head of state Aleksander] Zawadzki, every member of the Polish United Workers’ Party’s cabinet in the capital made an appearance at the celebration in Warsaw. Vice Premier [Zenon] Nowak made an announcement. They also made arrangements for our embassy to speak (last year they did not). In the evening, the members of the Polish United Workers’ Party visited our embassy, and Zawadzki offered a toast. Between the various regions’ National Day celebrations, there were five provinces that invited our embassy to participate. The atmosphere was warm and friendly. The 121 congratulatory phone calls, letters and telegrams we received from all over Poland are the most we have had in four years. In the National Day period, there have been wide disseminations concerning China in the Polish publications. The Central Committee’s journal ran 12 separate editorials and articles. Twelve provinces reprinted Central Committee-approved templates. Editorials in the Party journal and announcements by Zawadzki essentially follow Moscow’s tone in evaluating the significance of China’s victorious revolution, pointing out that it was the “epoch-making result” of ten months of “promoting the freedom of all nations’ peoples, as well as the work of socialism.” Concerning our

domestic development, he listed the number of our successes in numerous areas. Despite not mentioning “Three Red Flags,” his scope was quite broad; for example, that when the Party publication ran our ambassador’s speech, they edited out a remark I made justifying the “Three Red Flags,” but kept such phrases as “Great Leap Forward” and “People’s Commune.” Some National Day celebrations at the local level actively approved of the “Three Red Flags.” At the beginning of September, *Polityka* even devoted an article to explaining the People’s Communes. Recently, the *Polish Sociological Review*, in an article discussing China’s economic development, described the methodology of the Great Leap Forward and “Both Legs Walking”. Concerning China’s international relations, they acknowledge that we have made a contribution to the consolidation of a unified socialist camp. They quite pointedly denounced the American imperialists’ geographical isolation of China, as well as America’s obstruction against the reinstatement of China’s legal position in the United Nations, and against our dominion over China’s territory in Taiwan. They express their continued support for China.

This positive turn in Polish opinion toward China has also manifested in other areas. Most significantly, since July coverage on China in the Polish party journals has increased each month (40 stories in July, 54 in August, and all the way up to 64 in September). Friendship and respect were shown to the Chinese special delegation that visited Poland for the international summit. In trade negotiations between Poland and China, with the aid of our diligent efforts and our resolute struggle against the opposite side, Poland has made concessions, pledged its support for China’s difficulties, and overruled the 1962 plan. Their attitude here was essentially friendly. Concerning their support for the unveiling of Beijing’s Exposition, they had originally planned to send Vice Premier [Piotr] Jaroszewicz and Trade Minister Te-lang-pu-qin-si-ji [sic]. Later, they exchanged Jaroszewicz for his superior Politboro member and Chairman of the Sino-Polish friendship society [Stefan] Jędrychowski. This was clearly not to discuss issues, but to demonstrate a friendly stance and an understanding for our national situation. After returning to Poland, Jędrychowski expressed his satisfaction, giving assurance of his belief in the existence of deep friendship between our two states.

The above demonstrates in various ways that Poland consciously wishes to improve Chinese-Polish relations. The essential reason for this is that last year’s bout of pro-Soviet, anti-Chinese policy failed to win the people over, such that the ends did not justify the means. They had no choice but to turn to a “pro-Soviet, while appeasing

China” policy. Specifically, this means the following:

- (1) Politically, since the Moscow summit, they have practiced and proven the correctness of the CCP’s perspectives and policies. Those slanders used against our Party in the past have self-destructed, such that certain individuals in the Polish United Workers’ Party have had no choice but to reappraise the CCP’s policies. As Zawadzki has recently expressed: “The CCP is a true Leninist party...A principled party...There is no bilateral confusion between our two states, Poland and China...Chinese-Polish relations have no reason to be bad.” The Polish attaché based in China, Zhuan-la-tuo [sic], said, “When I returned to Poland this year, not only did I not hear anyone speak ill of China, on the contrary, I say that the support for our Chinese comrades had increased. Many people say that China is correct on a whole series of issues.”
- (2) China’s status as a world power, the international prestige of the CCP and Chairman Mao, and the unbroken victories of our country in peaceful foreign relations, have not only won the support and camaraderie of many other parties. Moreover, they have had a significant influence within the Polish United Workers’ Party. This has made it so that, in responding to specific actions of ours, they have had no choice but to take a cautious attitude in order to break free from last year’s passive position.
- (4) Poland has economic difficulties. Trade holds a precarious position in the national economy. In this matter, there is no doubt that Poland predominately relies on the USSR, but they cannot or do not wish to rely on them completely. At the same time, they believe that we can become the greatest patron of their industrial products. They also hope to obtain grains and raw materials from us. They vigorously support the development of trade relations with China. They feel that the anti-Chinese stance has already garnered them unprofitable outcomes. If they do not change their policies, it is possible that they will continue to suffer losses.
- (5) The ideology of the Polish leaders is roughly the same as the Soviet Union’s. They essentially follow them in foreign policy. However, they still strive to maintain ascertain independence. Thus Polish-Soviet relations have their basically united side, and their contradictory side. Particularly since the internal struggles in the socialist camp have died down, the contradictions between the

Poles and the Soviets have gradually resurfaced. The USSR has never trusted Gomułka. They object to his policies toward the United States, agriculture, and intellectuals. This is why they sent [Soviet ambassador to Poland Averky] Aristov to Poland to strengthen their efforts. On the other hand, Gomułka has always harbored a wary eye. This year, he reorganized the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society; he intends to limit the Soviet Union's influence. On the issue of signing a treaty with the two Germanys, he believes that even if they only manage to sign with the GDR, he would still be able to shatter any illusions among the undecided constituents and, sooner or later, appropriate the open road left behind by East Germany. On the question of West Berlin, because of their fear and nervousness Poland has not maintained its support of the Soviets' forceful measures. Moreover, due to the tenseness of the situation, Poland's market has been thrown into ever-increasing chaos, leading to a series panic-purchases, and they have been forced to carry the burden for some of East Germany's struggles. With regard to all of this, Gomułka is not without objections. Despite the USSR's soft attitude toward Gomułka, their reconciliation efforts are not strong, and there is significant dissatisfaction and quarreling. Under these conditions, it is no surprise that Poland hopes to improve its relations with China, so as to strengthen its position in the partnership with Russia.

Thus Poland's positive turn in its attitude toward China is not wholly due to a change in ideology, more so it is due to considerations of their wellbeing. Therefore, it is possible that this change will exhibit complications, and that it will not take place all at once. As long as we continue to support reason and harmony, and work hard, it is possible that we can press for the continuation of Poland's positive turn.

[Chinese] Embassy in Poland
17 October [1961]

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DOCUMENT NO. 8**CABLE FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, “NOTICE REGARDING THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK PREMIER’S ATTACK ON OUR PARTY,” 27 NOVEMBER 1961**

[Source: PRC FMA 109-02989-05, 1-2. Translated for CWHIP by Max Maller.]

[...]

Notice regarding the Appropriate Response to the Czechoslovak Premier’s Attack on Our Party

To the Chinese Embassy in Czechoslovakia, the office of the charges d’affaires, the Geneva delegation, the Laos cultural and economic delegation, the office of the liaison in Kaesong, and the offices of international and external affairs in all provinces, cities, and autonomous regions:

On 24 November [1961], the international edition of *Rudé právo* ran a speech published by committee member of the Czechoslovak Politburo and Czechoslovak Premier [Viliam] Široký, delivered at the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia’s (KSČ) Central Committee Plenum, in which he attacked the CCP by name for “not agreeing to firmly criticize personality cult. In their own country they have not taken any steps to criticize the results of personality cult. Quite the opposite: after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, their personality cult deepened once again. They have not expended any diligence toward the recovery of Leninist standards in the lives of their party and country; they do not agree with the verdicts of the 20th Congress.”

Regarding this issue, the CCP Central Committee is going over how best to respond to the KSČ. For the moment, all international personnel, as well as domestic personnel in contact with foreign guests, should, when coming into contact with Czech personnel in the course of your interactions with foreigners, make specific reference to individuals and actively express the following to your interlocutor:

“Široký’s speech was a malicious slander before the world against our party, our leader Chairman Mao, and the people of our country. It crudely violated Moscow’s declarations and statements, as well as the standards of relations between fraternal parties and states. It seriously undermined the international communist movement

and the socialist infantry, and did extreme harm to the friendship between the peoples of Czechoslovakia and China. This has had the effect of saddening their friends and quickening the spirits of their adversaries.”

We greet these facts with extreme displeasure. We must use plain language to briefly explain our position, to lift the veil, since we cannot get too entangled with them.

In conversation, be sure to differentiate between the upper and lower levels. Toward the KSČ Central Committee, the responsible members of the Czech government, and the Czech delegations, express resentment and protest. Toward lower level personnel, emphasize the presentation of facts and discussions of reason; struggle for them to empathize with us. If this topic comes up in your interactions with personnel from other fraternal parties and states, we should still follow the feeling of the above directions in our conversations. Non-party leftist personages from capitalist states, if they bring up this topic, can be plainly told the facts and our points of view. As for the incitements and provocations of reactionary constituents, one should resolutely fight back.

Forward any relevant perspectives to the Department at your convenience.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

27 November 1961

[...]

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DOCUMENT NO. 9

CABLE FROM THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN POLAND, “OPINIONS ON THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE POLISH PARTY,” 2 DECEMBER 1961

[Source: PRC FMA 109-02016-01, 5-6. Translated for CWIHP by Max Maller.]

[...]

Opinions on the Ninth Congress of the Polish Party

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Liaison Department:

- (1) The 22nd Congress has caused a great disturbance throughout the world. The enemy states have taken this opportunity to unrestrainedly attack the CCP. The situation with fraternal parties and capitalist states is dire. There are some parties who are either in serious internal disorder or else hurtling toward a split. There are some parties who despite echoing Khrushchev are simultaneously calling for Sino-Soviet harmony, reflecting their inner fear of partition. The parties who support and encourage Khrushchev's actions face heavy difficulties, as does the entire Eastern Bloc. The CCP's correct position at the 22nd Congress not only made it so fewer parties went over to Khrushchev's side than last year, but also won us more general sympathy and support. Albania's opposition to Khrushchev on the basis of reasonable struggle also won sympathy from others. Khrushchev's actions, including "moving the coffin"³ by renaming Stalingrad, to general dissatisfaction, have taken him still further toward exposing his true face. This as a whole has brought a deep response within the Polish KPP and outside of it. Gomulka's allegiance to Khrushchev at the 22nd Congress did not meet with the support of either politicians or the public, making the situation even tenser.
- (2) It is under these circumstances that Gomulka's actions at the Ninth Congress of the Polish Party were intended to rally those present in support of the 22nd Congress, exposing his passive position. On the one hand, he echoed the slanders of the Bolshevik party and Stalin, libeled the dictatorship and consolidation of the Soviet proletariat, opposed Albania as well as China, maintained his support of the 20th Congress, advocated for harmony on the basis of the 20th Congress, took mutually disagreeing positions, made justifications for Khrushchev, protected himself, and sang the praises of peace and unity in order to seduce the people. In another respect, he made up his face as if to appear "objective," contradicting himself with some words of justification for Stalin, a few phrases of commendation for China, purposefully differentiating between the Albanian and Chinese communist parties. At the same time the claims concerning Poland had been settled already, without him daring to lift up in struggle against the rightists.

³ Trans. note—apparently a reference to a Chinese custom, considered "superstitious" by PRC moral codes but still practiced, especially in Taiwan, involving moving the coffin of a recently deceased person several inches after they have been interred. Here used metaphorically.

Gomułka's two-faced behavior stems from his frail nature. China enjoys high prestige in Poland; the rightist forces in the KPP are great; the leftists are not in agreement with one another. The reason he has been stuck on the defensive within his country is due to his lack of a strong backup plan.

- (3) From today on, Gomułka will absolutely continue to follow Khrushchev in opposing China and Albania, but with regard to actions, they will have their differences. With Albania he will make blind attacks, escalate pressure, and cut off inter-party relations, even going as far as to support Khrushchev and Tito in undermining them. Before Khrushchev had openly attacked the CCP, it is likely that Gomułka would not have dared to openly oppose China, but instead opted to spread damaging rumors, attack through oblique reference, and pursue still other methods to destroy the CCP's popular trust. This was a step toward locking out information and lessening China's influence. At the same time, he wanted an opportunity to deceive people, to disrupt friendships and the situation at hand, such that he might get some material financial benefit.
- (4) In light of this kind of situation we should uphold the CCP Central Committee's "24-word strategy" in our dealings with the Polish side. "If he does me no wrong, I will do him no wrong"; "If he wrongs me, I must repay him"; "Principle, benefit, moderation." Be careful and prudent. Work hard: continue to examine any developments in Poland's situation. We should be adequately prepared in spirit for any detrimental changes of direction. We should be receptive to the unexpected.

Party Committee of the [Chinese] Embassy in Poland

2 December 1961

[...]

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DOCUMENT NO. 10

CABLE FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, "QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GERMAN DIPLOMAT WANTING TO ESTABLISH

FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH CHINA," 27 APRIL 1963

[Source: PRC FMA 109-02574-02, 1-2. Translated by Max Maller.]

[...]

To embassies and charge d'affaires abroad:

The German Democratic Republic's nominal chief envoy of its trade mission to Algeria, Fo-li-xiao Si-tu-te [sic], said to our former ambassador, "After Germany had finished with the Inner Six, the German foreign ministry convened a meeting, based on a decision that despite divisions between parties, all German diplomats should strive as much as possible for friendly relations with China, [North] Korea, etc. Furthermore, we need not wait for Soviet approval to suggest the friendliness project; it should begin immediately."

Over the last three years, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany has served as Khrushchev's anti-Chinese vanguard. Their attitude toward us has been most harmful. They continue to uphold their erroneous position with one face, while another face is done up to look friendly. They wish to solidify foreign relations, but this seems to reflect Germany's desire, in light of the upcoming talks between China and the Soviet Union, to get a leg up toward improving relations with us. In addition, they vainly hope to mooch some material advantages from us, do some intelligence work, and obtain our assistance in the Afro-Asian state programs. Faced with this, we must grasp the flag of harmony, while still adopting a cold attitude. We must further elevate our alert so as not to be fooled. If Germany approaches all of our offices in this manner, our response could be: China has always valued its friendship with you. We have actively supported your struggles, fulfilled your desires as much as possible, and never done anything unfair toward you. But you have rewarded virtue with grievances: in the border issues between China and India you have neglected proletarian internationalism and openly attacked us. You even insulted our representative committee at the Germany's meeting with the Inner Six, etc. Now you want to solidify relations. If these are honest words, we welcome it; however, we must continue to keep an eye on your actual behavior. If Germany comes to us with suggestions or demands, they can simply deliver over their intelligence research. There will be no assumption of liability.

If the German side speaks about "harmony" and "friendship", and then complains,

makes oblique insinuations, or engages in provocation, we should resolutely struggle, trounce them in the act, and not fear for nervousness.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

27 April 1963

[...]

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DOCUMENT NO. 11

CABLE FROM THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, “SEVERAL NOTEWORTHY SIGNS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA,” 30 APRIL 1963

[Source: PRC FMA 109-03406-01, 1-3. Translated by Max Maller.]

[...]

Several Noteworthy Signs in Czechoslovakia

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Liaison Department:

Over the past few days, there have been several noteworthy signs in Czechoslovakia's international activity.

- (1) During a trade negotiations signing ceremony, the Czechoslovak side demonstrated, on the one hand, satisfaction with this year's increase in trade, while on the other hand reminiscing about still higher levels in the past. That evening, while drinking tea after a banquet I had organized, the first deputy manager of the Czechoslovak Foreign Trade Department pulled aside the attaché Yi to explain to him that he wanted to have additional expansion outside of the protocols. One day later, the Czechoslovak chief secretary Banai-ke [sic] also arranged to meet with Yi, saying that they could supply us with 10,000 metric tons of steel and that this would be taken from trade bulk intended for the West, meaning to open up exchanges for several more items. The Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Trade seized upon something I had said offhand: “I still don't know your minister, when there is a chance we should

have an audience so you can introduce him.” After just this one sentence, which was only meant to actively seek out an introduction in the foreign relations context, it was arranged for us to meet after “Mayday” for a chat. During our conversation on the evening of 28 April, at the banquet organized to welcome China’s naval shipment cooperative representative group, he even more baldly expressed his hopes for trade expansion. A former company manager on his way to Beijing to become a business attaché (this person had always been a friend of mine) said, “If we continue to be diligent alongside Yi Qindang, our trade gains will not be 14.7%, but 50%.” One of the company’s deputy managers in charge of finance says, “The fights they pick with me over politics do not actually come from anything economic. The Czechoslovak deputy department head of foreign trade Huo-nu-sai-ke [sic] grabbed fierce hold of this topic, saying something like, ‘In economics we must begin with friendly collaboration’... ‘Economic cooperation will bring about political cooperation’... also, ‘It is imperative for us to cooperate well. We should not be agitated by those unforeseen or unstable elements, etc.’

“These signs fully reveal that Czechoslovakia, faced with dire economic difficulties, wishes to get something from us. They have taken a fancy to our expansive and rich marketplace. We have plainly articulated that China and Czechoslovakia do not have any serious discord, nor is there any reason to compare marketplaces. For instance, based on our states’ long term interests, there should be a mutual compromise for equal, friendly collaboration...”

At the same time he attached a fair amount of delusions, all without assigning any specific responsibility.

- (2) Yesterday the President of Czechoslovakia received a prize. At the luncheon that day I encountered Du-bu-qie-ke [sic], a reserve candidate for the Czechoslovak Presidium, who in fact had already gone to Slovakia to replace Ba-chai-lian-ke [sic] (he is a new socialist). He actively came over to socialize with me, saying he hadn’t seen me since China’s National Day and that he had recently become a Bratislavan (Slovakia’s capital). He continued to stammer, concealing his intention and speaking in riddles, and said the following: “When the ambassador came to us, he said he must speak with me. The comrade and I talked... I know the ambassador is rich in military, political and

economic experience. There are some things I need not explain to fully, you will understand... Our affairs are public, so we must abide walking a public road, there is no other choice... I was very pleased to hear the news that China's agriculture has taken a positive turn. Converting a private economy to a socialist economy is something many states have not been able to succeed in doing..."

After that, he discussed Czechoslovakia's agricultural hardships. He discussed nostalgia for his visit to China, nostalgia for the familiarity of his interactions with China's leaders. And he often repeated: "The most important thing is that we are all communist party members." What he had to say was very disconnected. Sometimes he would pause and say nothing for a long while, even stopping his walk. It seemed as if he had many things to say, but could not find the appropriate language for them. It seemed as if he wanted to discuss the issue of divergence, and that he had a mind to reach an understanding with me, but found this difficult to say with clarity. And it seemed as if, faced with their manifold difficulties, he had a sense that there was no way out. He appeared unconvinced that their chosen strategy would be fail-safe. Lastly, he repeatedly invited me to come and see him, desiring a substantive talk. When we shook hands, he held very tightly onto my hand.

- (3) At the same luncheon the President of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences František Šorm [1913-1980] and Vice President Shi-tuo-er [sic] both actively sought me out to socialize with me. They repeatedly proclaimed their nostalgia for their visits to China and their fervent aspiration to go back again. They extolled the industriousness, courage, inventiveness and studiousness of China's workers. Shi-tuo-er took the liberty of telling me that he had read all of our documents (pointing out in particular a small volume on anti-revisionism). "I was in China for two months," he said. "I was able to study a great many things, filling up an entire thick notebook. If I retire, I will work on writing a book on China," etc. These two men have been known to praise China. The problem is that the 12th Congress [of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in 1962] tricked China in the past. Shi-tuo-er also tricked me at the 10th Congress of the Italian Communist Party. In this atmosphere, their discourse could have other meanings besides the expression of devotion.

We feel that Czechoslovakia's situation is in the midst of changes. [I] will follow up

after further research and discussion.

Zhong Xidong
30 April 1963
[...]

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DOCUMENT NO. 12

**REPORT SENT TO GENERAL DE GAULLE, PRESIDENT OF THE
FRENCH REPUBLIC, BY EDGAR FAURE, ON HIS MISSION TO
CHINA, 7 NOVEMBER 1963**

[Source: Documents diplomatiques Français 1963. Tome 2, 1 Juillet - 31 Decembre (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 2001), 469-478. Translated by Garret Martin.]

Report sent to General de Gaulle
President of the French Republic
By Edgar Faure, on his mission to China
Paris, 7th November 1963
Top Secret

I. Schedule

I am honored to send you a short summary of my trip to China, which took place between 18th October and 5th November. During my trip to the People's Republic of China, the Chinese authorities showed, through their respect in all domains, the exceptional consideration that they felt they owed to a visitor entrusted by you. As they also wanted to respect the discretion that had been stipulated, each of these concerns was limited by the other, and their combination came across through subtle behavior nuances.

Having arrived in Beijing on the evening of 19th October, I was received on the morning of Wednesday 20th by Prime Minister Zhou Enlai. That same evening, deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, took part in the dinner

organized by the Institute of External Relations, but the welcome toast was given by M. Zhang Xiruo. The next day, I had a long talk with Chen Yi, and on Friday again with the two Ministers who hosted me for dinner. That ended a first series of meetings.

The 22nd and 23rd October were dedicated to a trip to Inner Mongolia and Shanxi province, a trip organized by the Chinese authorities in part for our pleasure and information, but certainly also to give them time to study the situation, to discuss it and to come up with an approach.

After returning to Beijing, the 26th and 27th October were dedicated to more meetings with the two Ministers, together or separately. Our meetings took place in my own residence, where I hosted M. Chen Yi for dinner, and they were not mentioned by the press. On 27th October, my wife and I hosted in Beijing, at the Great Hall of the People, our farewell dinner, which included the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, and where M. Zhou Enlai even gave a reply to my toast. They accompanied us for an official audience with President of the Republic Liu Shaoqi.

It had been planned, by a sudden change of the program, that I would spend my last two available days in Shanghai. We headed there on 28th October via a special plane, and M. Zhou Enlai and M. Chen Yi joined me that evening. After a last conference on the Saturday morning, we had an official visit with President Mao Zedong, again accompanied by my two usual interlocutors. That evening, they insisted on seeing me so to expose their views on the Sino-Indian dispute.

I want to add that if, as this schedule suggests, many long and repeated meetings were necessary, they only amounted to about fifteen hours. The Chinese leaders constantly gave me an impression of clarity, of good faith and good will, without any hint of what some refer to as 'exotic knick knack'. We left Shanghai on 3rd November by special plane for Kunming, from which we headed to Rangoon on 5th November via the direct Sino-Burmese line.

II. Approaching the Problem

Even before my first contact at the governmental level, I could not doubt that the Chinese leaders considered my visit as an event of great political importance and from which they expected important and imminent consequences. Moreover, Zhou's representative, who welcomed me at the border, had broached the subject of our

political relations after barely fifteen minutes and even before we had left the station's waiting room. Furthermore, the mayor of Guangzhou who hosted us for dinner—which is already striking since the duties of representation are generally the role of deputies—had made, in his toast, a clear hint to the political, economic and cultural relations between our two countries, which would be unthinkable without formal instructions from the top.

However, I think that the Chinese leaders were perplexed by the exact extent of my mission, until the moment where they read your letter, which caused a shock among them. They afterwards expressed with insistence, I would nearly say with emotion, the honor they felt because of the attitude you displayed towards them and because of the content of your message. They did not fail to share their admiration for you; you should already be aware of this.

After this reading, the question of diplomatic relations was naturally the center of our focus; it was nearly the sole subject of our discussions. M. Zhou Enlai easily jumped on the expression: *all domains*. He wondered if he should understand it as including the political relations between the two states. I answered that the clarity of the French language meant there were no doubts in this instance. This led to the question of how we envisaged to improve these political relations. I replied that we hoped, on the condition of reciprocity, for the establishment of official diplomatic relations. I reminded them of the indications that had been given in this respect and from their side. I added, in line with your instructions, that we were not petitioners and that we had no urgent reasons to modify the current state of affairs, while deploring the current anomaly.

M. Zhou Enlai confirmed the Chinese desire to restore diplomatic relations, while using oratory precautions that were similar to the ones that I had resorted to. I did not doubt that this was simply tactical (and noting that my interlocutors probably made the same observation about us). In fact, it was confirmed during all our meetings—and it is clear from their conclusion—that the Beijing government is very keen to normalize relations with Paris, and keen to do it as soon as possible.

However, those dispositions cannot be only attributed to the sole desire of ending their diplomatic isolation, because then we could not understand the attitude of the People's Republic of China towards England. The obvious preference shown towards us results from the *independence* of French policy, illustrated by all its positions. I brought up this theme in line with your instructions, and I found an already receptive audience.

Currently, China views three non-socialist powers—and with which it does not have normal diplomatic relations—as presenting a certain potential of sympathy: France, England, and Japan, but from this group only France escapes the *subordination to America*. Thus, we are the only ones who offer sufficient guarantees that make the complete normalisation of relations seem possible and desirable. They think the Sino-French rapprochement could have a good influence on England and Japan, and would push them to move away from the American circle of influence, at least for Asian problems. They also possibly hope that we could be a source of support or advice. The fact that after a long day, M. Zhou Enlai and M. Chen Yi chose to spend a whole evening speaking of the Indian problem seems quite significant.

From another point of view, those considerations explain both the absolute priority of the political problem in the mind of the Chi leaders, and the certainty they have that there is a similar perspective on our side. The development of economic and cultural relations, or at least their normalization, only seems to interest them as a transitional stage, or more exactly a means of pressure, according to the precedents of the UAR [United Arab Republic] and Cuba, where the manipulation of a commercial delegation, or an information agency, helped to 'sicken' Taiwan's representation. In our case, the hints to these types of relations always meet with an approval of convenience. The subject was naturally discussed, it was even mentioned that if we came to exchange economic delegations, we would have to give them a sufficiently official character. But obviously, their heart is not into this. Our interlocutors did not believe for a moment that General de Gaulle could take a strong interest in increasing the volume of our commercial exchanges, and as for the precedents of Cuba and the UAR, they believe—or seem to believe—that France is too big a power, and General de Gaulle too important a statesman, for such expedients to be used.

To sum up, they intensely want to renew with us, and they are convinced that the initiative of the head of state, sending to them a *political personality*, means that we are also inclined towards this innovation. They thus tried, during our meetings, to come up with procedures susceptible to reconcile the demands on which they cannot compromise with our point of view, which they understand well, on what can and cannot be accepted.

III. Analysis of the Discussion

From the moment where we noted a reciprocated desire to restore official relations,

and in the case where such a situation would happen, the Chinese concerns can be organized along 4 categories:

1. The question of the two Chinas, which I do not need to elaborate on;
2. Taiwan's status, and the eventual creation of a Republic on that territory;
3. Restoring the rights of the People's Republic of China and its seat at the UN;
4. The existence and the future of the representations of Taiwan in Paris and of Paris in Taiwan.

As a prerequisite I mentioned the following points to my interlocutors:

That if we indeed wished to establish normal diplomatic relations, we were not petitioners; that, as a consequence, this normalisation could not include a negotiation as such, but only an exchange of information and reciprocated clarifications, which was the purpose of my mission; that the decision to be taken could include no prerequisite condition, which would go against our dignity and incompatible with our desire not to be a petitioner; that, in case of success, the protocol notifications should be simultaneous; that these notifications had to be pure and simple; that they could not include on the part of the People's Republic of China any question or condition, even if they were not presented as suspensive; that, to speak in more concrete terms, we could not take the risk of finding ourselves in the uncertain and ridiculous position of the Sino-British relations; I add by the way that the Chinese took the initiative on this point and always assured me that renewing such an experience was not desirable for them.

That said, I declared that I was instead willing, since I had the mandate, to examine with them the *normal consequences* of the establishment of diplomatic relations for the problems that they were concerned with. I underlined that we envisaged such an innovation in our relations with the value and scale that it includes, which could only be determined by implementing the rules of *international public law*.

We would be completely aware, if we decided to recognize the Beijing government, of the obligations that this decision would entail for us on the natural and legal level. We do not and would not intend to hide from such implications. It is important to consider if the implementation such a principle could in reality sufficiently appease the apprehensions of our partners. I thought that it was the case.

1. As for the two Chinas thesis, I said that I could not quite understand the danger that our interlocutors feared, to the extent that we were concerned and within

the frame of the planned approach. In fact, no one has really defined what these two Chinas would be. In regard to intentions, it is not at the moment that we are making a gesture toward Beijing that one could ascribe treacherous designs to us that we had never had until now and associate us with undertakings, supposing they are real, that we have already avoided. Finally, in regard to the law, the situation, as our partners never cease to remind us, with in addition the guarantee of Marshal Jiang Jieshi whose views on this point are absolutely similar to theirs, is clear and unambiguous. There cannot be a coexistence of *two legitimate authorities* for the same territory and population. The indivisibility of sovereignty is one of the fundamental notions of civil law. Our recognition of the People's Republic of China will render obsolete, *ipso facto*, the recognition of any other *legitimate authority* making a claim to the *same sovereignty*, toward the territory and population that are effectively under the authority of the newly recognized state. This consequence will fully apply toward the said Republic of China (Taiwan) without it being necessary to formalize any such measure (this latter point will be covered later).

2. The question of 'Taiwan's status' is quite different. My interlocutors mentioned several times the reasons that seem to justify for them the affiliation of this island to the overall Chinese territory. I indicated that I was not interested in objecting to this point, but that question was outside our competence, and we did not pretend to decide it. In fact, we only need to point out that there is no current problem with Taiwan's status, since the Taipei authorities paradoxically agree the Beijing ones to eliminate the existence of a Taiwanese state. It thus cannot be a question for us of recognizing, currently, a *Taiwanese Republic*, since this Republic has not managed to define itself. If, in the future, the Chinese leaders fear *American machinations* on this subject, it does not seem judicious for us to add further elements of complication and uncertainty to our already delicate decisions. All that we can say is that the normalization of relations between Beijing and Paris could only make us more favorable, in any case, to the positions and the interests of a power that we have stopped ignoring. This conclusion was tacitly admitted, and this issue was no longer on the agenda in the last phase of the meetings.
3. As for the UN, the solution seems to follow logically from 1. The recognition of the People's Republic as China's legitimate government normally leads

one to consider as justified its claims to the rights and seat which had been attributed during the creation of the UN to a state with the same name and content. In addition, given that some countries, who only have incomplete or truncated relations with the People's Republic of China, have recently voted in favor of this restitution, it is not conceivable that France, in the case of a full normalization and exchange of ambassadors, could stay away from such a position. How could we do less than Britain if we had obtained more? I thus felt that, either legally or politically, I could not take a quibbling position on this subject.

4. The thorniest discussion had to do with the reciprocated representations in Paris and Taipei. In line with your instructions, I refused to take any engagements on this issue: be it in regard to notifying the Taiwanese authorities of a withdrawal of recognition as the Republic of China; be it on the issue of expelling the Taiwanese representation in Paris; or be it on the issue of calling back our own representation. I indicated, in line with your instructions, that our resistance on this subject resulted from concerns about decorum and processes, and not political intrigue.

It is undeniable that the recognition of the People's Republic of China will affect the character of these relations, but I indicated that we could allow these to evolve empirically. To the courteous complaint that I was lacking in clarity, I replied that even the clearest minds had to be able to create at times some dark zones. When finally asked in a precise manner on the possibility of keeping relations on a consular level, I added that we maintained the option to act in this way; I also mentioned the example of our delegation in North Vietnam.

I thought that our meetings could have ended early at this point, since it is England's maintaining of a meaningless consular agent which has led it to refuse a complete normalization of diplomatic relations. After some thoughts, my interlocutors decided to go beyond this and to step back to a particular approach, which was in line with their wishes and probably their predictions. If the Taipei authorities took the initiative to withdraw—or reduce—their representation in Paris, would France proceed with a withdrawal—or the corresponding reduction—of its own representation? I felt that I could, without any inconveniences, give a positive answer. A different attitude on our part in this envisaged situation would indeed be unthinkable, if not in law according to international customs.

This analytical part of our meetings went on during my two successive trips in the capital. On 31st October, on the eve of our departure from Beijing, the debate was over. Our interpretations presented three points of agreement: China's unity; the legitimacy of its claims to the UN; the reciprocity in our relations with Taiwan in case of a spontaneous break from the Taipei government. On the other points (future status of Taiwan, maintaining of representations), there was no agreement and it seemed pointless to continue the discussion.

M. Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi told me they would think about it and they would mention their points of views in Shanghai. I assumed, without any other clue, that they had already determined their positions, but that they wanted to chat with President Mao Zedong.

IV. Proposal of the Chinese Government

When we restarted our talks in Shanghai, the Chinese Ministers announced that they were ready to hand me a precise proposal from their government, taking my observations into account. This proposal was first expressed orally, then examined through a note given to me by M. Zhou Enlai, and he invited me to review the draft. This note, which is a unilateral document and destined to remain secret, will be placed as an annex with this report. I still think it is necessary to summarize here the elements as they surfaced in our meetings.

The first part of the Chinese proposal concerns the procedure. The Beijing government envisages, in line with the viewpoint I expressed, 1) that this procedure be reduced to a simple exchange of notes, 2) that these notes be published simultaneously, and 3) that they come immediately into being, followed by an exchange of Ambassadors to avoid the English type of procrastinations.

If we are ready to accept the Chinese proposal, we will just need to address such a communication via the normal channel (Bern Embassy). The response from the Beijing government would not include conditions, questions or comments. It would only mention the following qualification: 'as sole legal government representing the Chinese people'—expression which seems to me not only acceptable, but fortunate, since it puts the emphasis on the people and does not decide the contentious territorial questions.

The second part of the Chinese proposal relates to the tacit agreement which would, hypothetically, exist between the parties on the interpretation of the consequences of this normalization. The Beijing leaders show the greatest trust in the French authorities and are not asking for a correspondence. Their own note will not be made

public. The sole fact that we would engage in the procedure mentioned above would mean that there was no misunderstanding on the three points evoked. If this is not the case, we would just need not to initiate the official mechanism.

The three points in question are those I listed when relating the conclusion of our meetings: exclusive representation, restoration in the UN, reciprocity in a case of a break from Taiwan. I think it is futile to reproduce here the whole text in the note. As for the wording, it seemed preferable for me to limit my observations to the points where the formulations could affect the content.

1. In the preamble, the initial draft indicated that I had put forward, on your behalf, the proposal of restoring diplomatic relations. I did not accept this description, which was not in line with reality, and the formula ‘expressed the desire’ was used instead. Moreover, in the following sentence, where the initial draft stated that the Chinese government ‘lets it known that it shares the same desire’, I corrected it to ‘confirms’, which corresponds to the reciprocated character of our own intentions.

2. In the first indent of paragraph III, after the first segment of the sentence that went: ‘The Government of the French Republic will only recognize the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government representing the Chinese people’, I removed the primitive expression that said ‘and will not recognize this quality for’, as it would have implied a voluntary stand on our part, and it seemed more appropriate to only mention a legal and automatic effect.

Moreover, the sentences used in the note are not always the ones I would have chosen, but I thought, considering the nature of the text, that I should leave the responsibility of the drafting to the authors, as long as it did not include any distortions and that the style mishaps did not present any real disadvantages. The typical example is the one at the beginning of the paragraph 3, where there is a mention of a ‘tacit agreement’ between M. Zhou Enlai and M. E. Faure. This expression is of course wrong, as it is a formal agreement...for what would be a tacit agreement—but re-engaging the discussion for such nuances did not seem to be sufficiently important.

Of course, I told my interlocutors that at this moment, the coming decision belonged only to General de Gaulle, and that I could not prejudge the reply that would be given to the formal proposal of the Chinese government. I think personally that the leaders of the People’s Republic of China have adopted an entirely conciliatory position, and I do not see how we could ask them for concessions or a withdrawal from the defined position. How can we suppose that they consider

themselves in any other way but as the sole legal government of the Chinese people? How could they not envisage that the recognition of their state authority should lead, in regard to the UN, to the rights attached to this authority, when some governments, which are not as welcomed as we are, do not put forward any reserves on this point? Finally, what would be our interest in maintaining ties with the Taiwan authorities, if they took the initiative of breaking them?

None of these points of 'tacit agreement' could be usefully undermined now or later. As for the form, it is probably superfluous to underline with what scrupulous care they took into account our views. As a whole, a comparison between the proposal made to use and the jurisprudence maintained toward England dispenses us from any other development.

Likely, this behavior can be explained, as said above, by the desire of the Chinese to renew with us and maybe they are keener than we are. But from this desire and this haste, incidentally stimulated by the major impression that they felt following your initiative, it would be stubborn to deduce that they can accept anything or even that they would accept at any time what they are offering today. The appeal of your independent policy, the security they find in our non-participation in the intrigue they fear the most, cannot in any case lead them to fall in the 'trap' of the 'two Chinas'. Since they do not ask anything else from us that the moral certainty of having being heard, it is hard to see what would be the object of a negotiation and what would be the logic of a refusal. We took a fair account of these intentions and the reactions of our partners when the decision was taken to open a dialogue.

So your predictions have proven correct, you can now collect the fruits of a long meditation, at the moment you chose and it appears that it was the most favorable. "You arrive on time" Mao told me when he welcomed me in Shanghai. I respectfully emit the wish that this whole collection of complex facts, of which you are the sole judge, will allow you to conclude a step whose historical benefits are suggested by all clues.

New Delhi, 7th November 1963

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DOCUMENT NO. 13

CABLE FROM THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN GERMANY, “BRIEF OF A CONVERSATION WITH THE POLISH AMBASSADOR,” 27 NOVEMBER 1963

[Source: PRC FMA 109-02600-01, 21-25. Translated by Max Maller.]

[...]

Brief of a Conversation with the Polish Ambassador

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

On the 20th of this month I invited the Polish ambassador to Germany [Feliks] Baranowski and his wife to my house as guest.s From our conversation I can see that Baranowski's views are revisionist, but with a slight centrist lean. His attitude toward me was still friendly, however. He was very perturbed by the issue of divergence; therefore we mainly exchanged our views on this topic. The brief of our conversation is roughly as follows:

Baranowski desperately wishes for public quarreling to end. “Due to public quarreling about divergence,” he believes, “the socialist infantry has arrived at the weakest point in history. The open polemics should be brought to an end no matter what. The socialist infantry cannot be weakened any further. We must not allow it to disperse!”

“Your concerns and worries about divergence are completely understandable,” I said. “We have never agreed to publicize divergence. But the Soviet leadership would settle for nothing but a public quarrel, which is what has resulted in the present circumstances. Now they have propagated so many poisonous and erroneous opinions, proceeding wildly toward being anti-Chinese. How could we keep silent? If we do not speak up, it will not only be disadvantageous to our party, but will be especially disadvantageous for the worldwide revolution. The influence would be horrendous.”

“At this point,” Baranowski said, “we must let bygones be bygones. Who started this is no longer the most important thing. At present, what's important is stopping the polemics. What needs to be written has all been written already, there will not be any new developments. The opinions of both sides are already known to all.”

“We have always emphasized the elimination of divergence and the strengthening of harmony,” I said. “But this is both sides' private business, only honesty will be

accepted. Lately, they have still spoken of stopping open polemics on the one hand, while on the other hand remaining robustly anti-Chinese and anti-Marxist-Leninist. And in fact Si [sic] has certainly never stopped openly discussing military action. Since the publication of the Soviet Central Committee's open letter, the Soviet Union has already published over 2,000 anti-Chinese documents (including reprints), and here they have written 160 or 170 (not including reprints). Under these circumstances, how could we stop from rebutting? The responsibility for us not stopping is absolutely not in our hands. They have written over 2,000, while we only have five, and they're the ones who can't take it anymore. There is plenty more talk and ideas where that came from, too."

"The amount is not great on your side," Baranowski replied, "but each one is a thick, thick volume. The recent one stands out for being written so sharply. The Soviet documents are quite a bit warmer."

"That depends on how you see it," I said. "If we're talking about labeling people without pretense, they have already given us more than our share of unwarranted labels. Our documents 'seek truth from facts, grasp reality, and reason well.' Maybe that is why they are perhaps a bit sharper. But the other side is all barbaric and illogical. All the 'facts' they claim are either crooked or else fabricated. Naturally, they cannot possibly have much power to persuade. And as far as the amount is concerned, what they have written greatly surpasses our output."

"You must watch your tone during these discussions," Ba said, "particularly within the Worker's Movement. I read a report in West Germany's *Die Welt* newspaper about a recent document of yours (the Fifth Criticism of the Soviet Communist Party [published 19 November 1963 in *Renmin ribao* and *Hongqi*]). In the document, you all equate Khrushchev with a 'buffoon'. This kind of tone is inappropriate for referring to a politician."

"Everything we say is fact," I replied. "Whatever the facts are, that is what we say. A lot of what is written was said by Khrushchev, many of the actions were committed by Khrushchev. Of course we have to criticize him. Faced with such serious ideological errors within the Marxist-Leninist movement, how can a serious Marxist-Leninist party not take up a serious attitude in referring to them? Is it possible to be liberalists and refuse to struggle?"

"Every politician makes mistakes," Baranowski said. "This is evidenced throughout history. Khrushchev is a political leader; that is a reality. The Soviet Union is a socialist state; Khrushchev has assumed leadership in that environment and represents that

environment; that too is a reality. To say Khrushchev has broken with the party leadership or the populace, this is not nor cannot be a reality.”

“Whatever the case may be,” I replied, “those are his words, this is the situation he has caused, and we must struggle with him. If we do not criticize mistaken ideology, this will bring great losses to the international communist movement and abort the worldwide revolution. You all understand the facts of history quite clearly. Khrushchev attacked Stalin, saying that Stalin committed unforgivable errors. But Stalin never incurred such losses for the worldwide revolution, and Khrushchev has indeed brought the communist movement to such a low point that it is on the brink of dispersal. This is why many people criticize him, and he goes on with his savagery. If we just went along with what he said, following his deeds in locked step, who knows to what depths the movement’s efforts would fall! If we do not criticize him today, many things would continue to evolve, such as the Hungary and Poland situation, the Albania situation, China’s situation, and so on. How many times have we as a party repeatedly investigated before finally being pulled into the struggle with Khrushchev over his erroneous road. Before divergence was made public, our party had many ideological struggles with him, all without ever achieving results. Later, he made divergence a public matter, such that we had no choice but to begin a public struggle with him. We have to uphold Marxist-Leninism, we have to uphold revolution, and it is imperative for us to struggle with Khrushchev.”

“The facts of history are all clear,” Baranowski said. “The issue at hand is eliminating divergence and finding a path to harmony. In this regard, China and the Soviet Union share a special responsibility as brothers. Otherwise imperialism will inevitably benefit. You must watch your tone during discussions. You cannot be too sharp, as when you say that by signing the test ban treaty the Soviet Union has turned its back on the interests of all the nations’ peoples. Other brother nations also signed it, does that mean that they have turned their backs on the interests of all the nations’ peoples as well?”

“You wish to eliminate divergence and find a path to harmony,” I said. “This is a worthwhile desire. I empathize with this wish of yours. We have also had this wish since the beginning. But it is not enough for us to merely wish this in order to bring it about. Even based on innumerable facts and learning, it is so hard to get the opposite side to trust us. They say that their desire to end open polemics is sincere? We have always made our speeches based on true facts: the partial test ban treaty is a treaty that turns its back to the people’s benefit. Aside from its function of deceiving the people,

it does not have any positive aspects for the people, and in fact behind its veneer it is concealing an enormous conspiracy, one that is disadvantageous for the worldwide revolution. One has to consider the essence of the problem. With its signing of the test ban treaty, the Soviet leadership has simply turned its back on the interests of its people and the people of all nations. When we speak of a conspiracy, we are talking about the United States, England and the Soviet Union.”

“Even our comrades in Cuba do not completely agree with your ideas,” Baranowski replied. “A few individuals even say that by *not* signing the partial test ban treaty, it is *you* who have turned your back on the global struggle to obtain peace.”

“This situation of which you speak does not conform to facts,” I said. “Cuba to this day has also not signed the test ban treaty. In fact, the ones who are turning their backs on the interests of the people are not us, but those people who are using the treaty to dupe the peoples of the world. History is the best witness, in the end it will compose the epilogue.”

“You say,” Baranowski said, “that ideological divergence does not permeate into international relations. But trade between Poland and China has declined by half these past several years. This decline is not due to any error of ours.”

“We do not want to reduce trade either,” I said. “However, due to Chinese agriculture’s three years of disaster and the Soviet Union’s complete withdrawal of China-based experts, innumerable connections have been severed, which has brought our industrial production an extreme amount of difficulty. We were unfortunately constrained to make adjustments. We do not have goods to exchange with you, thus that manner of trade necessarily declined; this is completely natural. In point of fact, the decline in trade with you has been comparatively minor. As economic conditions take a turn for the better, trade could conceivably make a gradual recovery.”

“You understand that our party is aligned with the Soviet Communist Party on strategic and policy issues,” Baranowski said. “But when we write documents, we do not adopt the stance of discussing military action. We clarify our points of view head-on.”

“According to my knowledge,” I said, “despite the existence of divergence between us, your party is relatively cool and calm toward the issue of divergence. Relations between us are quite positive.”

Judging from the complete discussion, Baranowski is very interested in the issue of divergence. Our conversation went on deep into the night. Despite Ba’s views inclining toward the right, his attitude was quite good. In our discussion he supported

Khrushchev's perspective, but espoused different views in terms of conduct. He admitted that Khrushchev had made some mistakes, and even intimated his hopes that the CCP would give Khrushchev an opportunity to correct his mistakes. He even said that signing this treaty did mean turning one's back to the interests of the people of the world. He had a great many ideas and hoped for an improvement in trade relations. Overall, Ba-fu-fu [sic] treated me as a friend, and we should continue to strengthen our work.

Wang Guoquan
27 November 1963
[...]

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DOCUMENT NO. 14

CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY REPORT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH FRANCE, 1964

[Source: PRC FMA 110-01998-01. Translated for CWIHP by Fan Chao.]

I. The Process of Chinese-French Negotiations for the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

The former French Prime Minister [Edgar] Faure visited China from 21 October 1963 to 4 November 1963, which was, to the public, nominally a private visit, but he actually paid his visit on behalf of Charles de Gaulle to discuss the issue of establishing diplomatic relations with China. During his visit, Chairman Mao [Zedong] and Chairman Liu [Shaoqi] received him respectively. Premier Zhou [Enlai] and Vice Premier Chen Yi held several talks with him. Finally, both parties reached an agreement regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France.

During the talks, Faure said that France had not recognized the People's Republic

of China for fourteen years, and this was a mistake. So, France should take the first step [towards recognition]. If China was willing to accept this, France was prepared to establish diplomatic relations with China and to exchange ambassadors. If France recognized China, then it would be a logical move for France to support the restoration of China's seat in the United Nations. While he repeatedly stressed that the French side hoped China would not embarrass France by setting preconditions for the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France, such as [France] breaking off all relations with the Jiang Jieshi clique. France could deal with the relationship with the Jiang Jieshi clique on its own, according to "the result of the legal situation formed out of" the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France, and he inquired if France could preserve its consulates in Taiwan. At the same time, Faure stressed that Charles de Gaulle did not support any activities which would create "two Chinas."

In view of Faure's attitude, Chairman Liu, when receiving him, pointed out that China is willing to establish diplomatic relations with France. We have no other requirements as long as "two Chinas" are not created. Premier Zhou also repeatedly stressed that the stance China took against "two Chinas" was firm, and he emphasized that the French side should make two points clear: (1) what we [China] are recognizing is the Republic of France, while what France is recognizing is the People's Republic of China, and France has no intention to create "two Chinas." After China and France establish diplomatic relations, France should treat the representatives of the Jiang Jieshi clique, if they were unwilling to leave France, as ordinary Chinese nationals; (2) Taiwan is Chinese territory, and it is an inalienable part of China.

Faure definitely expressed that recognizing the People's Republic of China surely meant that France would not recognize "two Chinas." As to the status of Taiwan, Charles de Gaulle did not take an interest in it, and he had not expressed his opinion about it. He was now searching for procedures and solutions to break off relations with the Jiang Jieshi clique.

In view of maximizing the strategic guiding principle of isolating and striking the US imperialists, to establish diplomatic relations with France is advantageous to us, and means we are going to make a new and important breach in the second intermediate zone, give a heavy blow to the US imperialists, increase the contradictions among the imperialist countries, and strike at the plot put forward by the Soviet revisionist leadership of solving world problems through Soviet-American cooperation. And the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and

France will probably lead to a chain reaction, which will be good for us in expanding our international influence, especially our political influence in West Europe and Africa. Out of this consideration, in the meeting we, on the one hand, insisted on the principle against “two Chinas,” and on the other hand, we wielded flexible tactics, confirming the French obligations in the form of three tacit agreements (see File III). In this way, we not only gave consideration to the difficulties the French side would face, but also insisted upon our principles and stances. Based on the three tacit agreements, we put forward a scenario for the direct establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France, and we finally reached an agreement with the French side.

On 12 December 1963, under the orders of the French government, the chief of the Department of European Affairs of the French Foreign Ministry came to Switzerland to discuss the issue of establishing diplomatic relations between France and China with the Chinese Ambassador to Switzerland, Li Qingquan. He expressed that the French side believed that the time was right for the two countries to establish diplomatic relations and suggested announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations in the form of a Sino-French joint communiqué. In the spirit of insisting on firm principles in substance but on being flexible in procedures, our side agreed to take the form of joint communiqué, instead of insisting on the exchange of notes, which was agreed upon with Faure. At the same time, our side put forward that the wording of the joint communiqué must include the sentence that “the Government of the People’s Republic of China acts as the sole legal Government of China representing the Chinese people.” But the French side expressed that it was difficult to accept this wording, stressing that simpler content in the joint communiqué would bring about a much better effect. Therefore, our side expressed that if the French government did not substantially support the stance of creating “two Chinas” and merely had difficulties accepting the above-mentioned wording, then the Chinese government could agree to remove this sentence, but would issue an official statement to the public after the announcement of the communiqué to clarify China’s explanation of the communiqué. The French side confirmed this. So, both sides then reached an agreement (see File I) on the terms of the joint communiqué on 9 January 1964, and decided to announce the joint communiqué at the same time respectively in Beijing and Paris at 7:00 p.m., Beijing time. After the announcement, we were to issue the statement (see File II) by the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman on the next day (28 January).

II. A Couple of Related Problems after the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and France

1. The problem of expelling the diplomatic organs of the remnant Jiang Jieshi clique in France and the stance against “two Chinas”

After the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France, if the remnant Jiang Jieshi clique takes the initiative to sever diplomatic relations with France, recalling its embassy in Paris, while France accordingly recalls its embassy in Taiwan, then the problem would be solved satisfactorily and the whole thing would be relatively simple. But France is not willing to take the initiative to officially declare the severing of diplomatic relations with the remnant Jiang Jieshi clique, while the US is pressuring the remnant Jiang Jieshi clique to not take the initiative to sever diplomatic relations with France. Under such circumstances, it is entirely possible that the embassy of the remnant Jiang Jieshi clique in France will continue to stay in Paris. Nevertheless, it is still quite possible to drive away the embassy of the remnant Jiang Jieshi clique. Because (1) the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France caused a great shock and momentum in the whole world, exerting a lot of pressure on the remnant Jiang Jieshi clique. If the embassy of the remnant Jiang Jieshi clique continues to stay in Paris and is willing to admit that it only represents Taiwan, then it would be very unfavorable for the remnant Jiang Jieshi clique to maintain its internal unity and support its endgame; (2) France decided to establish diplomatic relations with us out of its global strategy of maintaining independence from the US and striving for great power status, which is a strategic step; if France breaks its promise and creates a situation of “two Chinas” in Paris, it would end up with the severing of the Sino-French diplomatic relationship, which would be very embarrassing and disadvantageous to France; (3) Faure, on behalf of Charles de Gaulle, repeatedly expressed that France did not support any plot of creating “two Chinas” when he was in China; the first tacit agreement reached by premier Zhou and Faure regulates that France “only recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China representing the Chinese people,” which automatically means that this representative capacity does not belong to the so-called Republic of China in Taiwan any more. The statement of our Foreign

Ministry Spokesman also emphatically reiterated our stance on this issue. So, if even though the “representatives” of the remnant Jiang Jieshi clique continue to stay in France, the French government would no longer recognize them as the representatives of China, and they would only be regarded as ordinary Chinese nationals living in France. If France intentionally takes an ambiguous attitude on this problem, we will struggle resolutely to force the French government to completely keep its promise.

There could probably be another situation in which the remnant Jiang Jieshi clique keeps its diplomatic personnel in France as consuls. According to the international law, consuls have no diplomatic status, and do not represent a country, so the conduct of preserving consuls does not lead to the legal problem of admitting two Chinas. If this finally happens, we would take appropriate struggles according to a reasonable, favorable, and restrained principle and the progress of the event.

In brief, the stance that we oppose “two Chinas” and insist that Taiwan is Chinese territory is unwavering. Although there will probably be a sharp struggle on the problem of expelling the Jiang Jieshi clique after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France, the situation is favorable to us.

2. Estimate of the Influence on the United Nations

After the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France, it will be much harder for the US to continue its control over the United Nations and to obstruct the restoration of China’s legitimate rights. Two possibilities can be expected. One possibility is that, if France stikes at the US this year or later on and leads the countries of the French African Community to vote to support restoring China’s legitimate rights in the United Nations; if Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg of the European Common Market also follow France’s measures; and if some countries that established diplomatic relations with China this year vote, then the votes supporting our rights in the General Assembly of the United Nations will probably increase from 42 last year to about 60 [this year], exceeding half of the number of total members of the United Nations, 113. The former obstructive measures of the US in the United Nations will become bankrupt.

Another possibility is that, out of the obstructive measures of US, some countries of French Africa and Western Europe will temporarily not follow the French example of recognizing us. Then the votes in the General Assembly of the United Nations to support the restoration of our legitimate rights will not become an absolute majority.

However, it is inevitable that the situation will favorably change for us, no matter which possibility happens. The time during which the US can continue to control the United Nations and reject our country is becoming shorter and shorter.

In face of the above situation, we should pay attention to researching the situation and counter-measures about restoring our representation in the 19th session of the UN General Assembly. We should continue to carry on the Central Committee's guideline of not hurrying to join the United Nations; at the same time, we should strike at the anti-Chinese activities by the imperialists and modern revisionists who take advantage of the United Nations, and especially the conspiracies about "two Chinas."

3. Estimate of the Influence on the United Kingdom

The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France shocked the United Kingdom greatly, making it rather jealous. This is because the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France led to the UK losing its unique leading position among the western powers in the field of their relations with China, and the United Kingdom has met a new and strong competitor in taking advantage of Sino-US contradictions in the Far East and in Southeast [Asia], and in maintaining its remaining interests. In developing its trade with China, the United Kingdom is also worried about French competition. But, at the same time, because France has withstood pressure from the United States and has exchanged ambassadors with us, this situation will make the United Kingdom less scrupulous to improve its relations with China in the future. So, the process of our establishing diplomatic relations with France has taken advantage of the Franco-American contradictions, giving the US a direct and heavy blow, and has also taken advantage of Franco-British contradictions, trapping the United Kingdom in a more passive position.

In 1963, the United Kingdom voted to support discussing the restoration

of our representation in the United Nations on one hand, and stated that it believed that Taiwan's status had been unsettled. This was to create two Chinas in a flagrant way. So we could not improve relations with it, which means to promote a semi-diplomatic relationship into a full-fledged diplomatic relationship. Now the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France will probably force the United Kingdom to consider taking a substantial step to improve its relations with China. Of course, the United Kingdom's willingness to take this step is dependent on the progress of British-American relations. Currently, the United Kingdom is preparing for its elections, so we need to wait a while before we make a conclusion. In sum, we believe that, in the view of the general trend, the United Kingdom is sure to improve its relations with China, so that it can catch up with France. But it seems that it will take a wait-and-see attitude temporarily in the current period.

In order to continue to exploit Anglo-American contradictions and isolate the US, and to take further advantage of Franco-British contradictions, we are supposed to do more work on the United Kingdom. If there are some favorable conditions for us, we can also consider exchanging ambassadors with the United Kingdom.

4. Estimate of the Influence on the Countries of the European Common Market

The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France will spur those countries of the European Common Market, such as Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg, to consider improving their relations with us, even to the point of establishing diplomatic relations with us. But they probably care about their relations with the US, and will take a wait-and-see policy for a while. If they demand to establish diplomatic relations with us, we can agree when the circumstances are favorable to us.

Holland may demand to elevate the bilateral relationship to the ambassadorial level. If it supports the restoration of our legitimate right and the expulsion of the Jiang Jieshi clique from the United Nations, we can agree [to this].

West Germany is more reliable to the US in both foreign and military affairs, and faces the problem of West Germany and East Germany. It is estimated that, in a period after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and

France, West Germany will probably not take more initiatives in its political relations with China. But in the field of trade and exchanges of figures, West Germany is likely to take a more active attitude than before. We still take a cold attitude to West Germany, but should do more business and carry out more exchanges of figures to keep more contacts, in order to exploit its contradictions with the US when the circumstances are favorable to us.

5. Estimate of the Influence on the French African Community

The Premier's visit to Africa and the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France will greatly favor our work with French Africa. Although the thirteen countries of the former French African Community currently retain diplomatic relations with the remnant Jiang Jieshi clique, the influence of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France could possibly prompt some or most of them to improve their relations with us. On the other hand, it must be estimated that France could make those countries slow down their steps to develop relations with us in order to prevent the expansion of our influence. But the people of all these countries have demanded to fight against imperialism and colonialism, so some of them may possibly break away from French restrictions, attempting to establish diplomatic relations with us. As to those who are willing to expel the Jiang Jieshi clique, we are surely willing to establish diplomatic relations with them. Even among those French African countries who have not decided to establish diplomatic relations with us, we should also take advantage of the already-emerging favorable situation to do more work on them in order to develop our relations, which could lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations.

6. Estimate of the Influence on Japan

The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France has caused a great impact on the Japanese monopolistic-capitalist clique. France claimed independence from the US, while the latter could do nothing about this. This is an encouragement and stimulant for the independence of the Japanese monopolistic-capitalist clique from the US, and Japanese-American contradictions will develop further. Under the current circumstances in which the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France is widely known, the clamor by both officials and semi-officials that Japan should take

an independent policy toward China is increasing. But on the other hand, the Japanese monopolistic-capitalist clique is still heavily reliant on the US, and the US still has a tight control over Japan, so Japanese strength against US control is still far from that of France. Therefore, it is impossible for Japan to follow the French example, but it is entirely possible for Japan to take some steps to develop its relations with China towards the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, such as opening official trade organizations in the other country, extending the categories of trade by deferred payment, and expanding official and semi-official cultural exchanges and personnel exchanges. We should make a full estimate and prepare for this.

Conclusion

The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France has proved that China has very high international prestige and no one can ignore China's important and significant role on the stage of international politics. It has become an active demand for all the countries in the world to take a realistic attitude toward China. Even if, temporarily, those countries in the capitalist world who have not yet established diplomatic relations with us cannot follow the French example to establish diplomatic relations with us because of US pressure, they are now sure to take all kinds of steps to develop trade and cultural relations with China as a path toward the normalization of political relations with China. The current international situation is very favorable to us, and China, far from being isolated, is now in a progressive situation. This is the victory of Mao Zedong Thought, and the victory of the united peoples' struggle throughout the country. Let us keep at it, and win more and greater victories in the international struggle!

Annex I

The French Official Response to the Establishment of Sino-French diplomatic relations

1. The Belief that France's Recognition of China is Beneficial to France:

On 8 January [1964], the French Prime Minister [Georges] Pompidou expressed that "China does exist, and it is rising to prominence domestically and internationally, so we have to consider this point." On 20 January,

the Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the French National Assembly, [Maurice] Schumann said that recognizing China “is advisable and inevitable.” On 22 January, the French Defense Minister [Pierre] Messmer, after his visit to Cambodia, said that “it is very impressive that China can not be ignored if a policy is to be actively carried out in Southeast.” On the same day, the French Foreign Minister made a similar statement.

2. The French government is conscientious that this is an important step to disrupt the political strategy of the imperialist US, and is a stroke at the heart of the imperialist US through direct opposition against the US policy to China, so it has to take two kinds of measures:

- (1) On one hand, France takes a independent policy to China resolutely, regardless of US pressure, but on the other hand, it boasted that the initiatives taken by France is “a great help” to the US. The US government is concerned about the establishment of Sino-French diplomatic relations after Faure returned to France from China, so the US State Department propagated that “the US has got Charles de Gaulle’s promise” and “France now has no plans to recognize Communist China,” after [Dean] Rusk met Charles de Gaulle on 16 September. But the Agence France-Presse denied this statement the next day, reiterating that France “is keeping its freedom of action” to recognize China. After Faure divulged the issue of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France when answering a journalist of *Le Figaro* on 9 January after China and France reached an agreement on the joint communiqué, the US State Department spokesman Philip made a public statement on the same day that, “we believe that if France recognizes China, it would be unfavorable to us and other free countries, so the US opposes recognizing Communist China,” believing that France’s recognition of China would “not be a help to the US.” On 20 January, France informed the US that it would recognize us [China]. On 21 January, the US government’s note of protest regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France, said that the action of France “was not conducive to the Western interests.” But on the other hand, France did the utmost to express that France’s taking initiatives in Sino-French relations would be “a great help” to the US. France could make the Chinese open the door for the West, making the US policy to Asia escape

the “dead-end street.”

- (2). France would reiterate the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France has no preconditions, and France would not take initiatives to break off the relationship with the Jiang Jieshi clique; in order to show that it needs no help from us, instead, France conducts propaganda that China reduced conditions, to dignify France. On 8 January, when answering the journalist of *Le Figaro*, Faure said that France established diplomatic relations with us on the premise of full reciprocity and did not accept any prerequisites, and France had no obligations to withdraw its recognition of Jiang Jieshi. (On 22 January, the French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, in the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the French National Assembly, said France’s establishing diplomatic relations with China is “unconditional.”)

Annex II

Responses of Some Countries in the World

France

French public opinion, especially those pro-government newspapers, coordinated with the government to prepare for the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France. The propaganda said that the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France was beneficial to both France and the West, and the conduct of France was aimed to contain China’s penetration to Southeast [Asia], and was a contribution to détente. Meanwhile, France expressed strong dissatisfaction to the US opposition to the French action, hitting the US back in a tit-for-tat way. Those pro-Charles de Gaulle newspapers attacked the US, saying that (1) this is extremely stupid behavior, with the US attempting to treat France in the way “Louis XIV treated his courtiers,” but there are now no more courtiers (*Nationale*). (2) The US policy in the Far East would lead to the failure of the West, so France should replace the US; France’s entering Asia meant it could “stop the ship of the free world to possibly strike a reef,” and it was believed that what is beneficial to the US could not be good for France and the free world (*Combat*).

The United States

The United States is very furious at the conduct of France and brought pressure on France. US newspapers reported that US felt “outraged,” and was overwhelmed with “great emotion;” this conduct had brought serious political problems to the United States, and disturbed all the US political strategies. The West German newspapers said the wound that the US has on the problem of China always opens during the US elections, and Charles de Gaulle has poked a knife on the wound deeply, causing the US to feel the utmost embarrassment.

Regarding the talks of Faure on 8 January, the US State Department spokesman issued a statement to oppose the conduct of France in recognizing China. Moreover, it is rumored that the US is still pressing the Jiang Jieshi clique not to automatically break off diplomatic relations with France, in order to create a situation of “two Chinas.”

The Jiang Jieshi Clique

The Jiang Jieshi clique felt very anxious, and had been busy with senior meetings of the Guomindang [Nationalist Party] and of the military for days, thinking hard about good countermeasures. On 22 January, the Standing Committee of the Guomindang Party’s Central Committee held a meeting to study the problem of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France. The meeting unanimously reiterated that the Guomindang stance against “two Chinas” would change under no circumstances. The Jiang Jieshi clique “foreign ministry” spokesman Sun Biqu, when he met the press on 21 January, also reiterated that Jiang Jieshi’s attitude was strongly against the concept of “two Chinas” and would change under no circumstances. But the Jiang Jieshi clique was consulting with the US. The story went that the US was pressing Jiang Jieshi to accept “two Chinas,” requiring Jiang to sit tight and to make no room for the Communist Party of China. Some foreign news agencies reported that Sun Biqu expressed his ignorance of the rumor that the US was trying to persuade the Guomindang Party from breaking the diplomatic relationship with France.

Japan

Japan reacted violently and was shocked greatly. There are demands for realistic policies to China. There existed a great wave within the Japanese government, the ruling party, the Social Democratic Party, and the Japanese monopolistic-capitalist clique, and the pressure demanding for similar actions by Japan is increasing. It was

said that there were disagreements within the Japanese foreign ministry. One group advocated for the strengthening of relations with China, while the other group advocated that do not want to irritate the Jiang Jieshi clique. On 22 January, the Japanese government held a cabinet meeting to study this problem, but the meeting did not reach a decision about the issue of establishing the diplomatic relationship. [Hayato] Ikeda, [Ohira] Masayoshi, and so on all stressed that China and Japan were separated only by a strip of water; China had a vast territory and a large population; the Chinese problem was an international problem, so Japan should take a realistic policy toward China in a cautious way, and to carry out a careful study on the Franco-Jiang Jieshi relationship and other countries' actions to determine Japan's stance. They also expressed that Japan still needed to keep a "formal diplomatic relationship" with the Jiang Jieshi clique, but meanwhile Japan should keep the contacts with China in a non-government level, such as trade. However, the Japanese media spoke favorably of the French decision to establish diplomatic relations with China, demanding that Japan take actions to decide its relations with the US and the Jiang Jieshi clique, and to make an independent policy on Japan's own. "Now it is the time to meet the trend and to take independent policies." Japan should not be so trapped in the old relations with Jiang Jieshi clique that it would lose a sense of reality, and Japan must make a decision and take actions bravely. The *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* said because France was recognizing China, Japan would take brave steps to gradually expand Sino-Japanese trade and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry would allow the Japan-Chinese Trade Promotion Association to open a trade office in Beijing, and it would allow China to set a trade office in Tokyo, and it planned to abandon the restriction to export only one set of equipment to China by deferred payment every year.

The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has complicated emotions. It felt unhappy about the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France, as it had established diplomatic relations with us, and wanted to improve relations with us, so it was hard to blame France. So the UK government has not expressed any ideas until now.

British newspapers said that this conduct of France was a wise move, and a sound and reasonable behavior, but also mocked that France ought to have followed the UK's example long ago; they also felt worried that France would regain its status in Southeast by recognizing us, disturbing the status quo of maintaining the balance of

power in Southeast by the UK and the US. The UK newspapers were making a big fanfare over the conduct of France, saying that the time and intention of recognizing us was not right, and France was intended to embarrass the US in the hardest period. And the UK sowed discord between France and West Germany, saying that France did not consult with West Germany in spite of their treaty.

Asian and African Countries

Cambodia, Mali, Tunisia, Algeria expressed welcome. Sihanouk referred to the France's recognizing us with "heartfelt praise" in Kuala Lumpur on 22 January. The official organ of the Mali government, *L'Essor*, said France's recognizing us was not only the victory of both China and France, but also favorable to the most brilliant victory of mankind; the *Morning News* of Tunisia said the French attitude was brave and realistic, hoping that other countries could follow its example; the *Algeria News Agency* believed that those African countries who still confine China as Taiwan until today would be harder to refuse to establish diplomatic relations with us.

South Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines and South Korea all showed anxiety. The foreign reports said that those anti-communist countries in Asia felt depressed regarding France's recognition of China, worried the puppet regimes may collapse. The South Vietnam foreign ministry held an emergency meeting on this on 18 January, claiming its consideration to break off diplomatic relations with France; the premier of South Vietnam called in the French merchants on 21 January and blamed France for "planting a knife in South Vietnam's back." The Philippine foreign ministry spokesman was worried that we could cause a serious crisis in Southeast and in the United Nations. South Korean officials were also worried that this would exert a great impact on the Korean problem.

The **West German** government expressed that its attitude toward China would have no change in spite of French recognition. Several times, its newspapers expressed this would not influence the principles of West Germany in solving the Berlin problem and the German problem. The West German government spokesman, Von Hasse, expressed that France did not consult with West Germany as regulated in the France-West German treaty, when he was answering the reporters. Meanwhile, West Germany had sent its Federal-Minister for Special Tasks, Krone, to France for consultations. West Germany was concerned that the sharp conflicts between US and France would make Western Germany's situation less comfortable, and it would be

harder to deal with France; if the French status was improved, attacking that Charles de Gaulle overestimated his own strength and acted independently regardless of the advice of his allies.

The rest of **Western Europe** and Canada began to loosen their stances. On 17 January, the *New York Times* said Portugal was considering establishing diplomatic relations with us, and the Portuguese foreign minister had informed this consideration of the Spanish foreign minister on 16 January. On 20 January, the Italian foreign minister expressed that recognizing us “was unfavorable” to ease the international situation and could “aggravate tensions” instead. But the Italian government would study and consider it at a proper time. The Belgian Foreign Secretary, Spaak, said at a press conference in Tokyo on 22 January, that he disagrees to the time and method of recognition but not the principle of recognition, as he believed that all countries would be forced to recognize China eventually.

The Canadian prime minister said in Paris on 17 January that Canada had recognized us to some extent, because it had extensive trade with us, saying that Canada was considering establishing a more formal relationship with us, but the precondition of establishing the diplomatic relationship was China’s abundance of our sovereignty over Taiwan.

The Soviet and the Revisionist Bloc

The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union kept silent, and treated this issue with a complicated and unspeakable emotion, fearing the expansion of the Chinese influence. According to the foreign reports, Khrushchev said to the French ambassador in the banquet reception for Castro that he did not oppose the French recognition of us. *Pravda* published the first report about the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France by Tass News Agency regarding the US White House spokesman declaring that France had informed it that France had decided to recognize us.

Poland

The major Polish newspapers published the foreign reports about the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France in prominent positions. *Zycie Warszawy* published its comment on 21 January, that the French recognition of us could exert impact to the whole international situation.

East German and Hungarian newspapers also reported this on 21 January. the East German organ's title underlined that the French recognition of us would be a terrible strike to the US.

Czechoslovakia's newspapers all made brief reports on 21 January. Czechoslovakian radio published comments according to the foreign reports, saying that the French realistic step was a knife on the back of the US policy of blockading China, and would exert significant influence to the problem of our legitimate seat in the United Nations.

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DOCUMENT NO. 15

CABLE FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, "FORWARDING THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE NOTICE REGARDING PROPAGANDA POINTS ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND FRANCE," 26 JANUARY 1964

[Source: PRC FMA 110-01998-03. Translated by Fan Chao.]

[...]

Forwarding the Central Committee Notice regarding Propaganda Points on Diplomatic Relations between China and France

To All Overseas Embassies, Offices of Charge d'Affaires, and Overseas Organs,
Foreign Affairs Bulletin 13

The notice of the Central Committee from 24 January [1964] is forwarded as follows:

The "Propaganda Points on Diplomatic relations between China and France" are now being distributed to you for your use with foreign contacts. All public written propaganda should be based on the statement of the Foreign Ministry spokesman and the editorials of *People's Daily*.

Propaganda Points on Diplomatic relations between China and France

I

China and France have formally established diplomatic relations. We should have a correct understanding of the worldwide significance of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France. The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France is another great victory of our country's foreign policy, reflecting the bankruptcy of the imperialist US policies toward Asia and China. The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France is also a significant political step of the De Gaulle administration to confront the US, to strive for a great power status, and to restore its great power role in world affairs, especially in Asian affairs. This matter gives a direct blow not only to the imperialist US, expanding the contradictions among imperialist powers, but also to the conspiracy by the revisionist Soviet Union of solving world problems through Soviet-American cooperation. After the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France, some countries of the French African Community, the European Common Market, and other countries who are still taking a wait-and-see policy toward China may follow the French example one after another, therefore leading to a situation in which our foreign relations are going to develop further, having a great influence on the future international situation.

But on the other hand, although the De Gaulle administration confronts the imperialist US, we must also pay attention that France is also an imperialist country, so it has dual character in its attitude toward us and its stance on the "two Chinas" issue. Meanwhile, those African and European countries influenced by France may take different attitudes and conducts. We cannot harbor any unrealistic notions when we are exploiting Franco-American contradictions, maximizing the isolation of the US imperialists, and pulling the Second Intermediate Zone over to our side to form the most extensive united front against the US imperialists.

II

Our foreign propaganda should welcome and affirm the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France, but it should not be exaggerated. We should avoid creating an impression that we want favors from France or overemphasize this event. [Although we should] expose that the imperialist US is insisting on a hostile policy toward our country and opposes the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France and exploit Franco-American contradictions, we should not make a fanfare over this event against the US. Our reports should fulfill the aim to

objectively support De Gaulle's opposition to the US, but should not affirm all of the stances of the French government.

As to the content of our propaganda, we should emphatically clarify that the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France conforms to the essential interests of the peoples of both countries and to the interests of world peace; that the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France is a great achievement of our country's peaceful foreign policy and is another failure of the imperialist US's hostile policy against our country; and we should stress the resolute stance that our country will always establish and develop friendly relations with all countries of different social systems based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Moreover, we should clarify that the Government of the People's Republic of China reached the agreement to establish diplomatic relations with the French government as the sole legal government representing the Chinese people and reiterate the stance that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and China opposes the US plot of creating "two Chinas."

III

The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France is a significant event, attracting the attention of the world, so many foreigners may raise all kinds of questions. In contacts with foreigners, we should affirmatively elaborate our country's stances and attitudes according to the statement by our Foreign Ministry Spokesman and the editorial of *People's Daily* on 28 January [1964], instead of getting entangled in specific questions with others. If they raise questions with ill intentions or provocation, we should resolutely hit back at them. Possible questions and answers in foreign contacts are listed as follows:

1. 1. The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France is an important event. How does the Chinese side evaluate it?

The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France is an event worth celebrating. It conforms to the interest of peoples from both countries. It is favorable to the further development of the friendship between both countries' peoples, to the reinforcement of economic and cultural connections between the two countries, to the realization of the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems, and to the world peace.

2. Why does China now agree to establish diplomatic relations with France? Is it because China now feels “isolated”?

At all times, China is willing to establish diplomatic relations with all countries that are willing to establish diplomatic relations with China, under the principles of equality, reciprocity, and mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.

China’s role and influence in the international affairs is increasing, China’s international status and international prestige is improving, and our friends are all over the world. All the facts have proved that the isolated party is not China, but the US imperialists, who pursues a policy of antagonizing China and “not recognizing China,” and its followers.

3. Does the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France mean that China’s policy of opposing “two Chinas” has changed?

The Chinese government and the Chinese people resolutely oppose the US government’s plot to create “two Chinas.” The US government attempts to separate Chinese territory and to infringe on China’s sovereignty by making “two Chinas,” legitimizing the US occupation of Taiwan. Opposition to the US plot is China’s consistent stance. It is totally impossible to exploit the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France to distort China’s stance. As the statement of our Foreign Ministry Spokesman on 28 January says, the Government of the People’s Republic of China held negotiations and reached the agreement of establishing diplomatic relations with the French government as the sole legal government representing the Chinese people.

4. Does the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France mean that China has lowered its conditions for establishing diplomatic relations?

China is willing to establish diplomatic relations with all countries which are willing to comply with the principles of equality, reciprocity, and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty and all of the countries which make no plot of “two Chinas” or “two Chinas” in a disguised form. China has established diplomatic relations with more than forty countries, and now has established diplomatic relations with France. The Chinese principle of establishing diplomatic relations

with other countries is consistent, and there exists no problem of lowering or raising the conditions of establishing diplomatic relations.

5. Does China still insist that countries which establish diplomatic relations with China must support the restoration of China's legitimate rights in the United Nations and expelling the Jiang Jieshi clique? If some countries support China's joining the United Nations, while do not support expelling the Jiang Jieshi clique, then what would be your attitude?

For a long time, the US has been controlling the United Nations, forcibly making the Jiang Jieshi clique that was overthrown by the Chinese people unjustly occupy the Chinese seat in the United Nations, depriving the People's Republic of China with a population of 650 million of its legitimate rights. The Chinese government and the Chinese people resolutely oppose the arbitrary behaviors of the United States. The Chinese government insists that the United Nations must expel the Jiang Jieshi clique and restore China's legitimate rights. Any country who has established diplomatic relations with China should respect China's legitimate rights in the United Nations and in other international organizations or conferences, instead of allowing the so-called "representatives" of the Jiang Jieshi clique to stay in these organizations, since it has recognized that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate government representing the Chinese people.

6. Before and after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France, someone has preached that Taiwan should exist as an independent country. What stance the Chinese government is taking on this point of view?

Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. This was confirmed by the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, both signed by the US. Taiwan was formally returned to China on 25 October 1945, and became a province of China. Preaching the so-called Taiwanese independence is an attempt to separate Chinese territory, to infringe upon Chinese sovereignty, and to interfere in China's internal affairs, which could never be permitted by the Chinese government or the Chinese people.

7. Since both China and France issued a joint communiqué on establishing diplomatic relations, why would the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman publish a separate statement?

The stances of the Chinese government and the Chinese people of opposing “two Chinas” are well known throughout the world. Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory, and our country’s sovereignty over our own territory, Taiwan, can never be changed. But recently during the process of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France, someone distorted and slandered the well-known stance of the Chinese government. So, the Chinese government believes that it is necessary to publish such a statement to reiterate this stance.

8. If some one asks if France is to keep consulates in Taiwan, do not give a direct answer.

Foreign Ministry
26 January 1964

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DOCUMENT NO. 16

RECORD OF FORMER AMBASSADOR TO POLAND WANG BINGNAN’S CONVERSATION WITH GOMUŁKA. 7 APRIL 1964

[Source: PRC FMA 109-03905-02, 10-17. Translated by Max Maller.]

Record of Former Ambassador to Poland Wang Bingnan’s Conversation with Gomulka

Chinese Side: Ambassador Wang

Polish Side: Gomulka

Date: 8 April 1964

Location: Party Central Committee

Interpreter/Record: Gao [Illegible]

A month and a half ago, [Władysław] Gomulka received me for a meeting. Afterward, I announced Comrade Gomulka’s ideas to the CCP Central Committee; the party paid great attention to these ideas. On 29 February [1964], the Central Committee

sent a letter to the Soviet Central Committee, responding to their letter of 29 November of last year. This was as Gomułka had wished. In the letter, the party brought up four recommendations connected to ending the open polemics. Later on, the representative committee from the Romanian Communist Party visited Beijing, and their views were basically in line with those of Gomułka. After a consultation, the CCP General Secretary, Comrade Deng Xiaoping, introduced himself to the Polish ambassador to China, Comrade [Jerzy] Knothe, with an eye toward later communications. The party expressed appreciation for some of Comrade Gomułka's ideas, for example the idea to develop relations between the two countries and parties. Moreover it responded in the affirmative that our party had some aspirations as well. In our party's letter of 29 February in reply to the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, we brought up the list of more than 50 brother nations who had attacked our party. We do not know if Gomułka noticed, but some parties were not mentioned, including the Polish Communist Party and the Romanian Communist Party.

I had come today to say my goodbyes. During my time in Poland, I had met with Gomułka on several occasions, which had all been helpful to me. Under Comrade Gomułka's leadership, relations between our two countries and parties are presently developing. I give thanks for your help in my work. In our previous meeting, Gomułka had brought up Polish people's friendliness toward the Chinese people. I have been a witness to this for nine years. I can also guarantee to you that the Chinese people also have an enormous bond and a deep friendship with the people of Poland. This is the outcome of the friendly policies implemented by both parties.

"I agree with the ambassador's remarks on the situation of our past discussion," said Gomułka. "Ambassador Knothe has already sent me Comrade Deng Xiaoping's remarks toward from last time, as well as the general situation of his remarks. I already know the contents of the CCP Central Committee's response of 29 February to the Soviet Communist Party's letter of 29 November, which was sent to me by the ambassador. I also know that the Soviet Communist Party has recommended that I meet immediately with the CCP, and to prepare to hold an international meeting of communist party representatives. But now the situation has changed, for which we can only express our deep regrets. The diligence of our efforts connected with ending the open polemics has not achieved results. After our last discussion, the CCP published another new document attacking the Soviet Communist Party. Recently, the Soviet Union has put out [Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the

Soviet Union Mikhail] Suslov's announcement, again sparking argument. We are very worried about this situation; we do not know where it will lead. Without a doubt, this argument will weaken the international communist movement. All of socialism's enemies, along with imperialism, will use this to their advantage. It will weaken socialism's infantry, [including] us, all nations. Now there is a question raised before communist party members, workers, and members of the working class: to wit, what is socialism? This word 'socialism' originally represented brotherhood, friendly sharing and cooperation. Now, two large states are not only engaging in an argument, but a political argument. It is hard to reckon what the outcome will be.

"I often come across this saying of the CCP's, that it did not start the argument. I do not wish to go into details here, or to say that the Soviet Communist Party has never made a mistake. But in recent times, the Soviet Communist Party has expressed decent aspirations. They desperately seek an end to open polemics. CCP documents that attack the Soviet Communist Party indeed take a hostile tone. The CCP believes that there are advantages to openly discussing military action now and that they should continue their struggle. We have great difficulty agreeing with this point. If the arguments are carried out with civility, in that case there might still be room for agreement. But that course has long since been abandoned. Both sides make their arguments on impermissible grounds. I do not know you have noticed, Comrade Ambassador, but yesterday when we published the abstract of Suslov's announcement, we deleted those sharp and unnecessary words, phrases and criticisms. I must express that I do not understand why the CCP brought up those dishonest and impermissible allegations, such as saying that the Soviet Union and imperialism were colluding against China the power of people's liberation, saying that capitalism had been restored to the Soviet Union. Nobody could seriously respond to these views. For the CCP to make such ridiculous allegations against the Soviet Communist Party was a serious mistake. That capitalism would be restored in the Soviet Union is inconceivable and not worthy of debate.

"Then as now, we wish to distance ourselves as much as possible from this argument. We do not participate in these arguments, as we have always believed that they could only do us harm. For many years, this has been our attitude on a whole score of issues. This present climate has made it necessary for us to express our position.

"In our last discussion I explained to the Ambassador that, as the comrades in the CCP Central Committee know, we disagree with the CCP on a series

of points, particularly the ‘Twenty Major Criticisms of the Soviet Union.’ The Soviet Communist Party certainly did not compel us to accept twenty major pronouncements—this is how our party felt then as now. In addition, as far as an understanding of peaceful coexistence, our party is in accord with the Soviet Communist Party—the CCP may well have other views, in which case they could debate matters calmly and in a comradely fashion. Under complicated circumstances, an appropriate strategy could be formulated. But this can only be done by internal, calm debate. These present tactics do not work.

“Now the CCP has brought these recent ultimatum-like conditions against the Soviet Communist Party, the Party’s only option for stopping the argument was to denounce those 20 or 22 positions. This is unreal—not only does it involve the Soviet Communist Party, but also other parties who have had to accept these conditions. These demands and policies of the CCP’s can only lead directly to fragmentation.

“Due to all of the above reasons, our party is compelled to express make our position clear yet again, even though we are extremely opposed to a completely open argument.

“We are the kind of people that communist parties need, the kind that is satisfied with both China’s internal infrastructure and its international successes. If the People’s Republic of China supports the struggles of people from other nations to achieve victory, we believe that this is a victory for all of us. This is our opinion—past, present and future. The domestic and international achievements of the Soviet Communist Party and all socialist countries are also, we believe, all of our achievements. These achievements can strengthen our struggle against imperialism, making us more powerful. But the kind of mutual vilification and unacceptable behavior can only weaken all of those states, including Poland, and bring positive benefits to imperialism and our enemies. Therefore, we find it very hard to agree with the arguments contained in the CCP’s letter, as does our party. We believe that in the past, it was a wicked thing to openly debate the past; now, it is acceptable. In the past, it was not good to argue out in the open; it is still not good to do so. It is my deep belief that the CCP Central Committee is in error on this point. This is not a good thing, but a wicked thing.

“As for relations between the People’s Republic of Poland and the People’s Republic of China, between the Polish people and the Chinese people, and between the Polish Communist Party and the CCP, I still believe that these are normal and brotherly. I do not believe that there is anything obstructing these types of relations. Although the

situations are complicated, and the argumentation is hot, we support these relations, as communists should within the socialist and internationalist sphere.

“I must thank the Ambassador for all that this comrade has done to strengthen friendship between the peoples of Poland and China. We have diligently performed our duty to express our appreciation. Although the situation is complicated, the Ambassador has not created any trouble. We have also avoided making things more troublesome to the best of our ability. Even though in the past there has been some interference, we have not paid it any mind. We are satisfied with the Ambassador efforts and behavior in this regard. We wish you success in your new post. We hope that the Ambassador will still remember our country after his return, and that soon he will become a defender of the strengthening of the two countries’ friendship.”

“We are all longtime party members,” the Ambassador said. “There are two things that we had never imagined in the past: 1) That after seizing power, nation-building would not be an easy task for the proletariat. This is an arduous and complex task. 2) We originally thought that communists the world over were also internationalists. We never thought that an abnormal situation like the present one would emerge.

“First of all, concerning argumentation, our party has expressed more than once that we were opposed to open argumentation. Second of all, concerning the relations between brother parties, we have always advocated the pursuit of comradely cooperation, but the Soviet Communist Party has summarily neglected this reasoning. Third of all, if Comrade Gomułka looked closely at the Soviet documents, he would see that their language is absolutely not comradely in nature, but rather consists of innumerable malicious attacks. They were the ones to foment open argumentation, so they should be the ones to find a fair and reasonable solution. Lastly, Comrade Gomułka in his conversation touched on other issues. The reply we sent to the Soviet Communist Party on 29 February, along with Deng Xiaoping’s conversation with Ambassador Knothe, clearly expressed our party’s position relative to these issues. As far as whether the present argument is a good thing or a bad thing, actual practice will determine the proof.

“I thank Comrade Gomułka for his criticism of my work. It is rare for one to remain at a position for nine years. Since our countries’ peoples share many common points in their histories, it has been easy for us to understand each other. As I leave Poland, I feel friendly sentiments and a pleasant impression. As for Comrade Gomułka’s wish that I will continue to strive as a protector of friendliness between the peoples of Poland and China, that can hardly be doubted.”

As he approached the moment of the handshake, Gomułka said: “Please forward my proletarian respects to Comrade Mao Zedong, Comrade Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP’s other leaders. I hope the CCP will, to the fullest extent possible, give some consideration to my ideas. We are the protectors of harmony. Please help us, CCP!”

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DOCUMENT NO. 17

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN POLISH LEADER WLADYSLAW GOMUŁKA AND CHINESE PREMIER ZHOU ENLAI, MOSCOW, 7 NOVEMBER 1964

[Source: Sygnatura XI A15, KC PZPR, AAN, Warsaw. Obtained by Douglas Selvage and translated by Malgorzata Gnoinska.]

Meeting between the CCP Delegation and the PUWP Delegation

Moscow, 11.7.1964

On November 7, 1964, a meeting took place between the party-state delegations of the PRC and the PPR which arrived in Moscow on the occasion of the 47th anniversary of the October Revolution. The meeting took place in the headquarters of the Polish Delegation. It was initially announced by the Chinese comrades that this was to be an official visit. It lasted from 19:15 hours until 21:30 hours.

From the Polish side, [the following comrades] participated in the meeting:

Cdes. Wł. Gomułka, Zenon Kliszko, Adam Rapacki, Fr. Waniółka and E. Pszczółkowski.

From the Chinese side: Cdes. Zhou Enlai—Vice Chairman of the CC CCP and Prime Minister of the PRC State Council; Ho Lung—Member of the CC CCP Political Bureau, Vice Minister of the PRC State Council and Marshal of the People’s Republic of China; Kang Sheng—Deputy Member of the CC CCP Political Bureau and Member of the CC Secretariat; Liu Shaoqi - Member of the CC CCP and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC; (the Ambassador to Moscow was not present during the meeting).

Zhou Enlai began to speak first after the heads of the delegations mutually introduced the participants of the meeting.

Zhou Enlai: We are very happy that we have the opportunity to meet with the Polish comrades in Moscow. We would like to hear the opinion of Cde. Gomułka.

Gomułka: We are also pleased that we can meet.

Zhou Enlai: (He, once more, expresses his satisfaction from the Chinese side.)

Gomułka: We positioned ourselves positively towards the initiative of the leadership of the CCP and the PRC government, as well as the CPSU leadership and the Soviet government, regarding the visit of the delegations to Moscow on the 47th anniversary of the October Revolution.

We would like to see in this some kind of a beginning of a certain type of changes in mutual relations between the parties in the entire international communist movement. We want this occasion, at which a series of party representatives met in Moscow, to become a good beginning for the creation of a better atmosphere in the mutual relations between the parties. This is at least how we understand this initiative put forth by the CCP.

I think that it would be good if, on the occasion of this visit, Zhou Enlai presented his views on some issues on behalf of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

Zhou Enlai: We, just like you, also hope that, after the changes which took place in the Soviet government leadership and the CPSU, a good beginning will take place for outlining new mutual relations. This, however, depends on both sides. As far as other brotherly parties, this depends on many sides.

Deputy Director of the Foreign Division of the CC PUWP, Cde. Kowalczyk, spoke recently with our ambassador. Does Cde. Gomułka know anything about this?

Gomułka: I haven't received the report yet.

Zhou Enlai: Our ambassador invited him for supper at the embassy. We take very seriously what Comrade Kowalczyk, Deputy Director of the Foreign Division of the CC PUWP, said.

We had already expressed our wish and hope in our letter to the CC CPSU and the Soviet government. We had expressed it for the second time in our letter to the CC CPSU and the Soviet government which we dispatched on the occasion of the 47th anniversary of the October Revolution.

The new leadership of the CPSU welcomed our propositions with delight and we understood that it would be ready to express its opinion while taking the opportunity of the occasion of the visit of the brotherly parties in Moscow.

We made an appointment with them for tomorrow afternoon; [it will be] in a smaller circle. That is why we are still not sure what their views are and what steps will the leadership of the Soviet Union take in order to improve the relations. After the meeting with the new leadership, if it takes place, we will relay to the Polish delegation, and especially to Comrade Gomułka, what we have learned.

We will briefly present our position:

Our wish is clear: we desire for the two parties, the CCP and the CPSU, as well as the two countries, to unite on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and the proletarian internationalism in the fight against the common enemy and in our united fight.

We have the same wish as to the parties and countries of the socialist camp, they also have to unite on the same basis [Marxism-Leninism].

As far as the international communist movement [is concerned], our position is the same [that it has to unite on the basis of Marxism-Leninism].

This is our wish, but this is only a wish. Its realization requires time and substantiation [*skonkretyzowanie*] since the existing divergences are relatively big and they cannot be immediately eliminated. I can speak more specifically:

We think that the resignation of Khrushchev is a good thing. The change will surely bring a certain type of changes in the policy of the party and the Soviet government. This change will surely have some influence on the internal situation of the Soviet Union and on the relations between the parties, as well as on the fight against the enemies. The most important [thing] is how far-reaching this change will be and how big of an influence will it have; but this, we will have to see. This is our position; the position of the CC of our party and the Chinese government, because, first of all, we support all positive steps undertaken by the new leadership of the party and the Soviet government; and secondly, if it will be possible to “push” them towards something better, then we will make such efforts.

For example, we proposed the initiative to the USSR to send out invitations to all parties to participate in the celebrations of the 47th anniversary of the October Revolution, so in this way it [the USSR] would show the expression of unity and it would make it possible for the parties to celebrate this holiday jointly and to meet together. The CC CPSU acknowledged that this initiative of ours was a good thing.

We cannot, however, be sure if they think the same as us and if they [would] take

the same steps. For example, today Cde. Gomulka asked me why the representatives from Albania didn't come. I already said that, on the one hand, they [the Soviets] did not invite them, and, on the other hand, they [Albanians] didn't want to come. We think that we had already fulfilled our duty by putting forth our initiative. And, if this is not carried out here [by the Soviets], then this is a totally different matter.

We also proposed that all the countries of the socialist camp dispatch their party-state delegations to Moscow. We were in contact with your ambassador [about this], so he should have relayed this to you.

Comrade Gomulka said that the Soviet Union and China must undertake the steps towards strengthening the unity right now. The Central Committee of the CCP and the Chinese government like this statement.

In our initiative, we mentioned 12 socialist countries, except for Yugoslavia, because it did not sign the Moscow Declaration from 1957 and it did not sign the Statement from the Conference in 1960. That is why we did not mention Yugoslavia. But, they invited the state delegation from Yugoslavia. After its arrival to Moscow, this delegation called itself a party-state delegation. This does not correspond with our propositions and that is why we are not pleased [about that]. This proves that, although he [Brezhnev] accepted our initiative, he does not think like us. And, some changes may still [be yet] to come despite the fact that he accepted our initiative.

We were at the Academy yesterday. We prepared a speech to be presented at the Academy. Our speech is in the same spirit as our letter to the new leadership. We expressed a wish that, in case we could not give the speech at the Academy, the speech [should] be published in the newspaper for the public information. Brezhnev said that he had to think about it. I think that they will give us an answer tomorrow, and that is why I cannot express my opinion today. Today, for example, there was a banquet. We also prepared the text for a toast which was maintained in the same spirit of unity expressing our wishes and congratulations. The CC CPSU informed us that it did not welcome any speeches from the delegations of the brotherly countries. Respecting certain views of the hosts, we did not adhere to our wish and we did not give the speech at the party.

The party was in the form of a cocktail party, and that is why some of us talked to the comrades from the CC CPSU. It turns out that some of the Soviet comrades talked to us in a demagogic manner.

Foreign correspondents had already found out about some of these pronouncements and one does not have to wait long for their reaction. We will see what they say; today

we cannot foresee [what will happen].

We wish to explain [to you that] offering congratulations and wishes of unity is not an easy thing for us [to do]. The communists must take these matters seriously, as Cde. Deng was saying. There are parties which hold serious positions and one has to approach these matters with utmost seriousness. I am not saying this as if we were to lose hope. The efforts must be made by both sides; this is a long process. If there is order [stability], then it already means a lot. As I was already saying in the beginning, we will have to wait and see how some matters will develop.

The basic divergences are so big that all problems cannot be resolved immediately.

We are convinced that imperialism, reaction [reactionary forces] and their serfs are undoubtedly exploiting the split between the Soviet Union and China, the split within the socialist camp, and in the international communist movement. We have to act differently in order not to bring joy to them and [in order] to go against their wishes.

That is why we are willing to stay longer in Moscow if this will be possible and necessary. We will make all the efforts in order to improve the situation. But, when it comes to the fundamental matters, we have to restrain ourselves. We think that if a certain type of matters cannot be explained [resolved] at once, then they have to be put aside. Perhaps we will be able to undertake at least a few steps towards the unity; we'll see.

We would like to, if at all possible, to conduct the meeting with Comrade Gomułka, and the Polish delegation, and to exchange views.

I would like to talk about one particular matter; about the matter which is more pressing for us. There is this passage in yesterday's letter from Brezhnev: they [the Soviets] feel that the situation had already matured in order to convene an international conference of the communist parties. We look at this differently. We think that the situation has not matured yet and that many more efforts are needed. The conference, which they planned to call for December 15, is illegitimate [unlawful]. It should no longer be mentioned. Now, we have to work towards [having] bilateral meetings, maybe multilateral ones, [and towards] creating [favorable] conditions; and this all requires time. The convening of a conference would mean sealing [*przypieczętować*] the split; we do not agree to this. We will not participate in such a conference, and many parties will not participate in it either.

We also know that the Polish party is also feeling certain difficulties towards such a conference. I do not know if I understand your position well.

This is how much I would like to say today. Perhaps other members of the delegation would still like to add something. In any case, we want to state, once more, that we think that our meeting today is only the beginning of meetings with each other. We hope that, while here [in Moscow], we will meet several times [and] exchange our views.

Gomulka: First of all, on behalf of our delegation I would like to thank Comrade Zhou Enlai for presenting, in a very general manner for now, the position of the CCP on some matters.

First of all, I will present the general position of our party.

We were, and we continue to be, in favor of the unity of the communist parties and the socialist countries. We also think that such unity should be based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

We represented this position in the past; we represented it during the time when there were still no differences of opinions; we represented it at the moment of the most heated dispute; and we represent it until today. We express it publicly at times.

We think that we shouldn't do anything that would exacerbate it [the disunity] more given the situation which currently exists. The imperialists are already benefiting and would benefit from this. Many examples could be mentioned here [which testify to the fact] that the breakup in our camp, [and] in the international communist movement, encourages the imperialists towards the intensification of the aggressiveness against our socialist countries. It is enough to mention, as one of the very glaring examples, the American aggression against North Vietnam [and] the bombing of Vietnam [in August 1964 following the Tonkin Gulf incident]. This [American aggression] is somehow related to the breakup within our camp. In our opinion, if there were no breakup, then the imperialists would have to think very hard whether to take such provocative steps as they did towards Vietnam.

Therefore, the restoration of the unity is not the matter of wishes of this or another party, but it is a necessity which is dictated by life itself. If we don't do this [now], we will all pay for it [later].

We publicly emphasized many times that it was only the enemies who were happy with the disputes that are taking place within the international communist camp; the imperialists are rubbing their hands with pleasure. That is why we think today, as well as in the past, that the restoration of unity depends, foremost, on the two biggest parties within our camp; it depends on the leadership of the CCP and the CPSU. If

the dispute continues between the two biggest parties and the two biggest countries in our camp, then it is difficult to imagine how the unity can exist in our movement.

I was pleased when our ambassador in Beijing, [J.] Knothe, repeated the [following] words of Zhou Enlai [to me]: “I am pleased with the formulation that the restoration of the unity depends foremost on the two parties.”

It just so happened that our countries are distant geographically, and that we are more familiar with the position of the CPSU than with the position of the CCP. It is clear that I don’t want to speak for the CPSU. I am not authorized to speak on behalf of another party. I can only speak on behalf of our party. But, as much as I understand the position of the current leadership of the CPSU, I know that they desire unity and reaching an understanding with the CCP [and] the People’s [Republic of] China.

We treat the changes in the CPSU leadership and the Soviet government as their internal affair.

We have always thought, we think today, and we will continue to think that a party should not meddle in the internal affairs of another party [and that] a country [should not meddle] in the internal affairs of another country.

Objectively [speaking], the situation is such that the departure of Cde. Khrushchev has created, in some sense, a better climate for the talks, for rapprochement, and for working out a common platform for the most important problems which exist in our movement [and in our] camp.

Comrade Zhou Enlai presented us with some facts, which, in his opinion, are said to attest to a not-so-good will of the CPSU towards the rapprochement and paving the path towards an understanding; namely, the issues of the speeches in the Academy, at the banquet, and the issue of inviting the Yugoslav delegation.

I didn’t know about this; no one told me that. In a sense, I can understand the Soviet comrades, because in a situation when one party, even as important of a party as the CCP, were to give a speech, then why couldn’t the PUWP, as well as all the 12 parties, which participated in the celebrations of the October Revolution and were now at the Academy, to also give speeches? We would somehow feel hurt if we arrived unprepared and the Soviet comrades told us that other parties would be giving speeches. One speech could have possibly taken place if one party would wish and congratulate [the USSR] on the occasion of the 47th anniversary of the October Revolution on behalf of all the others. But, this would also require [prior] consultation.

This evidently was not foreseen in the program. I don’t know if the Chinese

comrades turned to the Soviet comrades, prior to [their arrival], about their desire to give a speech. [If that would be the case] then, we would also be contacted and we could have coordinated such a thing. However, since there was no prior consultation, then announcing the speech on the last day would surely create difficulties.

We know the position of the Soviet comrades regarding the suggestion of the Chinese comrades of not to invite Yugoslavia. The Soviet comrades informed us about it. We deemed it the internal decision of the CPSU and the Soviet government whose right it is to invite delegations from every country to its national holiday—the 47th anniversary of the October Revolution.

Two issues should be distinguished here: the participation of a delegation of some country in celebrations of a national holiday and the participation of a delegation and party in specific party conferences.

The Soviet comrades did not invite Yugoslavia to a party conference, but they invited it to participate in its national holiday. Our party also expressed its view that if the CPSU and the Soviet government wanted to invite the Yugoslav delegation, then this was their business and we absolutely had no reservations. If, however, the point was to invite the Yugoslav party to participate in an international conference, then the opinions of other parties would have to be heard; and this is already a matter of consultation.

I asked Comrade Zhou Enlai about Albania today, because I understood the initiative of your leadership in such a way that individual parties and countries would turn to the Soviet ambassadors in their countries with the desire to participate in the celebrations of the October [Revolution] holiday. And, this is how other parties must have understood this, because our ambassador in [North] Vietnam informed us that the Vietnamese party at once announced its desire to dispatch their delegation to Moscow, and it immediately obtained an invitation. Had the Albanian party also approached [whom] [trans. note— Gomułka is not clear in here. Albania could not have approached the Soviet ambassador, as did other parties, since Albania didn't have one due to the fact that there were no diplomatic relations between Albania and the Soviet Union at the time since they were broken off on 3 December 1961], and [expressed that] it also wanted to come, I am convinced that, of course I cannot speak on behalf of the USSR, it would have been invited; even though I cannot guarantee it. The Albanian comrades not only did not do that, but already after the resignation of Comrade Khrushchev they made a series of attacks on the new leadership of the party and the Soviet government.

Comrade Zhou Enlai was right to say that neither an understanding nor rapprochement can be achieved if the other side does not want to do so. The Albanian side clearly showed that it did not want this rapprochement. It showed this particularly through its campaign in the press against the new Soviet leadership. The Association of Soviet-Albanian Friendship invited, as far as I know (I don't know exactly, but this was to be done), the Albanian delegation. And, no one came even at this social level. Therefore, one should have an objective view and this is the objective approach towards the absence of Albania; [this is] all the more since it does not maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. I hope that Comrade Zhou Enlai will share this opinion since there are no excuses for the Albanian comrades.

What do we consider to be the first and most fundamental condition to create such an atmosphere which would further the talks, the rapprochement, the agreement of opinions and the elimination of the divergences?

First of all, the renunciation of all public attacks of one party against another party. We were pleased to learn that after the statement of the Soviet comrades regarding the departure of Comrade Khrushchev, the polemics between the CCP and the CPSU were stopped in the press and on the radio. The Soviet comrades told us recently that they also prohibited the publishing of any articles which would maintain an unfavorable spirit towards the CCP and the Chinese government. Today, however, we found out about an unpleasant thing. The Soviet comrades told me that the Chinese press had reinstated, since a few days ago, unfriendly publications towards the USSR in the form of reprints of articles from other parties, and especially from the Albanian one. Therefore, [we see] here some kind of deterioration; this is a bad phenomenon. One would like to think that this was of a temporary nature, because if these types of publications begin [to appear] again, then this will create an atmosphere not conducive to the talks. And, as far as I am informed, the Soviet comrades would like to create such [a friendly] climate. Our party and we are working towards this [goal] very much; besides, not since today.

Both you and we are in agreement that we are basing [our policies] on the Declaration and the Statement from 1957 and 1960 [respectively]. But, very significant differences have emerged, haven't they? We should explain to each other what constitutes these real differences and those illusions [phantasms]. And this seems to us the most essential, most important and fundamental matter.

We are fully aware that, what happened after the whole polemics [and] the discussion between the communists, in which a [negative] language started to be used,

[a language which is] foreign to us, the communists, will not facilitate improving the relations. Much residue remained after such discussion and this will make it difficult to work out a united position and to take a joint path. As far as the matters of ideology [are concerned], it will perhaps be difficult [to achieve] the identity of views [and] positions. In any case, a longer period of time is needed for these positions to get as close to each other as possible. But, we think that, even in face of the differences of a certain types of views in ideological matters, the most important thing is to work out a united position and a uniform action [policy] towards imperialism [and] towards the aggressive moves [of the imperialists]. It is the most important thing to have a unified position on this point. One can differ on many issues, but if there is a common enemy, [then] one has to be together. After all, this occurred, for example, during World War II, when the Soviet Union had to ally even with the imperialist nations, with the US, England, and France, against a common enemy, the Nazi Germany and Japan. Sure, I don't doubt that even now the countries which are at odds with one another would also unite in face of war, if it were to break out. But, the point here is not to wait for the outbreak out of a war, is it? We need a unified position. Our party had never had the slightest doubts as to the position of the CCP and the Chinese government in matters of war and peace; we did not doubt that you base [your policy] on peace [politics]. At the same time, it seems to us that we are both realizing that only through a unified action of our parties [and] our socialist camp, can we create a necessary force in the world which would be able to paralyze the military intentions of the imperialists. Now, a somewhat new situation has evolved related to the recent nuclear test carried out by the PRC [on 16 October 1964]. I think that this should be a factor which must further the rapprochement and the unified activity between the USSR and the PRC, instead of distancing them from each another.

We know the previous position of the CC CCP on the issue of convening the Editorial Commission for preparing an international conference. Personally, I think that there are many misunderstanding which are taking place here, and that, in our opinion, the Chinese comrades did not assess rightly the intentions by which some of the parties were guided [and which] expressed their consent of participating in the work of the [Editorial] Commission.

Comrade Zhou Enlai is correctly saying that something has changed after the departure of Comrade Khrushchev. And, wouldn't the Chinese comrades see it as appropriate to draw proper conclusions and change their attitude regarding the

abovementioned Editorial Commission (we adopted such a name which we agreed upon)? I would personally say that, even if Comrade Khrushchev were to stay in his position, then the matters would develop in such a way as formulated in our letter from July 30. Therefore, even before the changes there was no such a situation in which he [Khrushchev] could impose on other parties his views on this issue. To be sure, we perhaps shouldn't even talk about this today, because it is no longer topical. In any case, in our opinion, there is a need for a conference. It existed before and it exists today. The point here is not to prejudge the date of the Conference since the first deadline was rather unrealizable. However, the need exists to prepare the Conference, to get in contact with other parties, to consult on how to convene it, what matters to discuss, and to bring about such a Conference. And, if we come jointly to an understanding that such a need exists, so why reject from the start the deadline of the meeting of several parties? (**Rapacki:** The point here is to discuss the method.) It seems to us that nothing should stand in a way in order to come to an understanding in this matter. Perhaps some would care about the composition of the parties, which are to assemble and to discuss the problems, but even this issue could be agreed upon; just the same as it was in the original conception.

In our opinion, there should also be a new view on the part of the Chinese comrades in light of this new situation. It seems to us that, regardless of the need of [convening] such a meeting, this would also be one of the expressions of goodwill on the part of the Chinese comrades [that is wanted,] to discuss, consider and achieve mutual understanding.

It is difficult to predict how the world events will develop. In any case, the faster we begin to act on the fundamental matters, while having the uniform position, the better for us. (**Rapacki:** No one wants a split.) Correct. But the facts remain facts.

Comrade Zhou Enlai expresses hope that we would be able to consult with one another, to exchange our views, etc. I get the impression that you deserve a return visit from us. If we didn't repay the visit, it would be right for you to have grievances against us. (General amusement.)

Zhou Enlai: The point here is not the return visits.

Gomułka: To be sure, we are speaking as the state-party delegations, but even at the [level of] party relations it happens that due to some deficiencies in the officially recorded matters, some residue remains. That is why we would like to announce our visit with the comrades. When—this is yet to be decided. We came here without

any specific program. No one presented it to us, because it did not exist at all. We understood it in this way that we would be able to exchange views on certain matters at this occasion. We attach great importance to the results of your talks with the leadership of the CPSU. We also don't think that our role is of no significance. We are very interested in the results of these talks; we would like to take part in achieving this rapprochement; we would like to make our own contributions to the rapprochement between the parties; and to the restoration of the unity within the camp. But, we did not come here with the purpose of staying in Moscow for some time. On November 20th, we have the CC Plenum, and, as you know, the preparations require a lot of work. We cannot arrive the day before the Plenum; we have to be there at least 8 days ahead of time. It is difficult to judge how long we will stay and how long we will need to stay here. We can explain many things to each other until this time.

Let us end at this. We presented our view on the fundamental matters as much as we could, albeit in a very general manner, and we became familiar with the position of the CCP which was represented by Comrade Zhou Enlai.

Zhou Enlai: Thank you for your information regarding these matters. This will contribute to [our] better understanding of the position of the PUWP. First of all, we think that we share a mutual position on two points. First, as Comrade Gomułka was saying, even though fundamental differences exist between the CPSU and the CCP, as also [happens] between other parties, we have to act together against [our] common enemies, and especially when, for example, the Americans are showing their very aggressive face. This is the position which we held in the past and which we hold also today. I told [CPSU Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan that we had to have a unified position in face of [common] enemies.

Secondly, as Comrade Gomułka was saying, everyone is sincerely hoping for strengthening the unity between the CPSU and the CCP in this current situation and at this moment. We also have the same desire to strengthen the relations with other parties.

We will be meeting with the leadership of the CPSU. The Polish and Chinese parties also must meet and to contribute to the realization of this wish.

These two issues unite us since the strengthening of the unity is certainly not beneficial to our enemies.

Since we already have convergent views on these two points, then it will be easier for us to talk about more specific matters. I will discuss them only briefly today.

1) We want to see the improvement of the relations between the CCP and the CPSU as well as the improvement of the state relations between both countries. We want to “push” and to add efforts, but this is not such an easy thing.

Comrade Gomułka stated that this depends on both sides. Comrade Gomułka said that he heard from the Soviet comrades that they also wished for that. We met with their leadership yesterday. They also told us so. We are thus saying that we want to contribute [our] strengths, and we will, in order to improve the situation; but here I would like to explain two matters.

First, as Polish comrades know, very big and fundamental divergences exist between the CCP and the CPSU. Comrade Gomułka also said that, in his opinion, the gradual elimination of the divergences requires time. We also think that this is a matter of time. We therefore share a mutual view on this issue. But, for example, the Polish comrades know very well where the public polemics came from. I am only talking about the public polemics as to the fundamental, and not secondary, matters.

Twenty days have passed since the resignation of Khrushchev, and the CPSU also published articles in “Pravda” (preliminary articles) which contained a series of issues regarding fundamental matters with which we don’t agree. A series of important issues were also broadcast in radio programs, in the press, and in the statements of Comrade Brezhnev; we don’t agree with them. We will explain our positions on these important matters; this is the duty of our party. The divergences still remain despite the fact that Khrushchev is gone. We have not yet given an answer. Our congratulatory letter did not contain an answer. This proves that the change in the leadership of the CPSU does not yet signify the end of the disputes. But, even though there are still differences on the fundamental issues, this does not mean that nothing can be done in the area of strengthening the unity between the CPSU and the CCP as well as other parties. We think that much has to be done in this area. I will quote one example. We invited the party-state delegations from all the socialist countries for our national holiday. Khrushchev was still around. At that time, we did not discuss, either in our publications, articles or pronouncements, the issues which contained fundamental divergences. We directed the blade of these materials against the common enemy.

Your delegation took part in the celebrations and your ambassador serves as the witness to what I had said. This means that we were able to create such [favorable] conditions. Khrushchev was [still the leader of the USSR] at the time.

The situation is more favorable after Khrushchev resigned. I want to say that there are [favorable] conditions, but if there were no efforts from either side, we would not

be able to create such a situation; we could not afford to talk about these essential matters.

Comrade Gomulka brought up this matter, so I would like to explain. We made a proposition to the CPSU to invite all [socialist] countries for [their] holiday, but we did not talk about a speech. We did not invite other delegations to our holiday to give a speech either. Liu Shaoqi, the deputy prime minister, proposed the speech. The blade of this speech was directed against the enemies.

The Soviet comrades of the CC CPSU informed us that if the brotherly parties wished to give a speech, then the Soviet comrades would create [favorable] conditions [to do so]. The main content of this speech boils down to the need for unity in the fight with the common enemy. Besides, our speech contained a high assessment of the October Revolution.

After a few days have passed, they informed us that a series of brotherly parties did not intend to make speeches and that is why they would not invite the CC CCP to give one either, although they said that they would think about it. I asked the leadership of the CPSU whether I could give a speech, and I said that if that were impossible, perhaps our speech could be published in the press. We did not pressure the CPSU to express their consent, because we were told that they still had to consult the matter among each other. The issue of our giving a speech at the Academy was to be, as they informed us, consulted with other brotherly parties. In light of this, we gave the texts of our speeches to the comrades in the CPSU. Brezhnev said yesterday that the [Chinese] ambassador informed him that after the arrival of our delegation we would be consulting the matter, and that is why I asked him. He said that he wanted to meet with other parties and that is why I gave him my statement. The Academy took place yesterday and we have not received any reply, and most likely, I will not give a speech. I asked Brezhnev during the break at the Academy whether he became familiar with my statement. He said that he hadn't had the time yet [to do so]. I asked him to read it carefully and to publish it in a newspaper. It was then when he gave another answer, that is, that he had to consult it with his comrades and that is why I told you [the Poles] that I haven't received an answer from him yet.

What I am saying here is that, even though we may have our goodwill, some difficulties still persist. This does not mean, however, that we no longer wanted to come here with the wishes, with congratulating [the Soviets] and to conduct meetings.

When it comes to the Yugoslav delegation, then, of course, it is their [Soviets'] business. The Soviet comrades informed us that they only invited a state delegation.

We did not protest this, because we are not authorized to do so. We also did not proceed as to give up coming here due to this reason [the Yugoslavs], because this would not correspond with our own proposition. But, once I was already here, I realized that they invited a party-state delegation of Yugoslavia.

Gomułka: Until now, I was of the understanding that this was a state delegation.

Zhou Enlai: It was officially published in the paper [that it is otherwise].

Gomułka: This does not change things, because it is their delegation.

Zhou Enlai: What I tried to say here is that the issue had not been successfully resolved.

The issue of Albania had a somewhat different aspect. We want some kind of a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Albania after the resignation of Khrushchev. This is a matter of unified efforts. We talked with the Albanian comrades and we told them that we had hopes that they would send their delegation to the USSR. We also told the Soviet comrades to invite the Albanian delegation. We think that our position is fair.

Objectively speaking, the USSR must come out with the initiative of inviting Albania.

Gomułka: Why?

Zhou Enlai: Because the Soviet Union broke off its diplomatic relations with Albania [on 3 December 1961]. Khrushchev began the attack [on Albania] for the first time at the [October 1961] XXII Congress. We both participated in this congress. My speech at the XXII Congress was very moderate. We expressed the wish of not attacking publicly any parties which were not invited and [therefore] absent. What conclusion did Khrushchev draw from my words? He thought that public polemics was necessary. He did not ponder our suggestions. You [already] know how the situation developed afterwards. Therefore, if one is to talk about the pronouncements and about the initiative, then he made this turn himself. The Albanian comrades did not express their wish to come and [therefore] they are excused. We expressed our wish to both of the sides, and we received such answers: from one, that it wouldn't invite, and from another, that it wouldn't come.

That is why we are informing you today. That is why we do not agree with the reprobation of the Albanian comrades, because I personally talked [to the Soviets?]

regarding this matter. I have been [trying to] take care of this matter [ever] since the XXII Congress and I would like to resolve it today. We can no longer [try] to persuade Khrushchev, because there is already a new leadership and that is why we began to have hopes.

I will yet talk to Brezhnev.

As far as publishing articles of the brotherly countries, we think that either none should be published, or they should all be published. The members of our party must be well informed about these matters.

Gomułka: And to broadcast on the radio?

Zhou Enlai: We also published your opinion in our press and we broadcast it on the radio.

Gomułka: [But this was a] positive opinion!

Zhou Enlai: We publish both positive and negative ones. We published the speeches of Kosygin and Brezhnev. We broadcast [them] on the radio. [We also published] Kadar's statement, and he attacked us [in it], didn't he? Your speech [was published] on the same occasion.

Gomułka: It is hard to say that Kadar attacked you in his statement. There was a subjective twist, but not an attack.

Zhou Enlai: In any case, this is their criticism of us. Why, then, wouldn't we publish Albania's critique of the USSR? The French party also had their position, so did the Italian one. We published everything.

Kliszko: The language, which is being used in these articles, is a very important matter.

Zhou Enlai: As far as the language, we have to look into the past. Much was said over there.

Kliszko: That's true.

Zhou Enlai: We cannot behave in such a way as we are getting close to one, but distancing [ourselves] from another. There is already new leadership in the CPSU, but even after these changes, the newspaper, "Sovetskaia Pechat", had already published an article attacking the Japanese communist party. Therefore, if we are to talk about those things, we should talk about them from the point of view taken as a whole.

Both sides must make the efforts. Comrade Gomulka is also of this opinion. Even though difficulties exist and even though the matter is not simple, [nevertheless] we will not give up our efforts. And, even though they expressed their opinion today about a certain matter in such a way that it felt like an insult, it would still not make us give up [our] efforts.

Gomulka: An insult?

Zhou Enlai: I will talk with you after my meeting with the Soviet comrades. Suffice it to say, even a group of American journalists, who were present at the party, got the picture [trans. note—it is not quite clear what Zhou Enlai is referring to here. It's hard to discern whether he is happy or sad about the fact that the Americans took the picture].

But we do not despair. We did not despair [even] when Khrushchev was around. We believed that the Soviet people and the party prefer positive factors. And all parties should have such faith. This is where the strength of our camp and our movement [lies]. Efforts must be made, but this takes time.

We think at the same time that we shouldn't hurry with convening the conference. I don't want to say here that such a conference will not be needed in the future. However, [favorable] conditions must be created [for such conference]. Were the conference to take place on December 15, we would not accept it, because this was not consulted with us. As to some parties, which are announcing their [desire] for participation, then we understand their intentions. For example, we understand the Polish position and there was no misunderstanding here. You want the conference, because you don't want the split. However, Khrushchev imposed his will on other parties more than once. This is the past and we don't have to talk about him, but it is [also] better not to talk about December 15. If the Soviet comrades once more put forth the issue of December 15, then it means that they want the split.

Comrade Gomulka was talking about a unified position and a uniform action. Brezhnev also referred to the Statement from 1960 yesterday. However, the Statement is also our unified position. Comrade Gomulka participated in the conference in 1960 and [therefore] he knows very well about it. All agreed with the Statement. It proclaims that consultations must take place between the parties and only then can the conference [take place]. We must make efforts in order to return to this position. Even though this will take time, and the steps will be slow, nevertheless this will bring benefits in the end for our united fight against our enemies.

Here is my explanation as to the major issues.

As to the goodwill of Comrade Gomułka, which was expressed in [his] speech on the occasion of Tsedenbal's visit in Poland, then we are happy about it, we have respect for your statement and that is why we hope that Comrade Gomułka will stay here longer and that we will meet and talk [more], because there is also a need for talks between China and Poland, and not only between the CPSU and the CCP. These are the matters which are connected to the interests of the entire movement and the entire socialist camp. The parties have an equal right and we would like to hear your opinion. That is why we don't want a return visit, but a meeting.

Gomułka: We are not fighting about the deadlines. (General animation, laughter.)

Zhou Enlai: Perhaps you could come to sample Chinese dishes the day after tomorrow?

Gomułka: We are on for the 9th, the day after tomorrow. We will set the hours later since the hosts are preparing a joint lunch on that day.

Zhou Enlai: In this case either before or after that lunch. Our ambassador will be in contact with your [ambassador]. But this is not the end of our talks.

Kliszko: It's just the beginning.

Gomułka: I reserve the right to return to this [issue] which Zhou Enlai does not want to hear about. I have such right and I will use it.

Zhou Enlai: The difference of opinions will bring about a discussion, because without a difference there would be no discussion.

Rapacki: And there wouldn't be any point of meeting. (Again animation, laughter.)

Gomułka: (Warmheartedly thanks Comrade Zhou Enlai and proposes the toast to friendship and the success of the talks).

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DOCUMENT NO. 18

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN POLISH LEADER
WLADYSLAW GOMUŁKA AND CHINESE PREMIER ZHOU
ENLAI, MOSCOW, 9 NOVEMBER 1964

[Source: Sygnatura XI A15, KC PZPR, AAN, Warsaw. Obtained by Douglas Selvage and translated by Malgorzata Gnoinska.]

The Second meeting of the Polish delegation with the Chinese delegation.

1964

The second meeting between the Polish delegation and the Chinese delegation took place on November 9. The meeting took place at the invitation of the Chinese side in the edifice of the PRC Embassy in Moscow. The talks lasted from 21:00 hours until 23:30 hours. All members from both the Chinese and the Polish party-state delegations, who were in the Soviet Union on the occasion of the 47th anniversary of the October Revolution, participated [in the meeting].

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Zhou Enlai: I propose for Comrade Gomułka to speak first as we agreed upon during our first meeting.

Gomułka: To tell the truth, I don't recall such an agreement, but, of course, I can speak first.

I would like to communicate to the Chinese comrades that due to the upcoming session of the parliament as well as the Plenum, which is also to take place, we have to leave Moscow on Wednesday, November 11. Tomorrow, that is Tuesday, 11.10, we want to conduct talks with the Soviet comrades.

As I already mentioned during our last meeting, the leadership of our party welcomed the initiative of the CCP to have the party-state delegations from socialist countries come to Moscow on the occasion of the 47th anniversary of the October Revolution. We were convinced that, taking the opportunity of such a meeting, we would be able to exchange views on some matters which interest all of us. We thus assessed positively your initiative and we thought that the arrival of the delegation would serve as not only the manifestation of the unity of the socialist camp on the anniversary of the Revolution, but we would be able to take this opportunity to discuss many matters, to put forth new propositions, and so on. Our conviction was all the more justified due to that fact that, after the recently carried out changes in the USSR, both the Chinese and the Soviet comrades stopped the polemics which hitherto were conducted publicly. As far as I know, this happened somewhat

spontaneously and ending of the polemics occurred without a previous agreement between the Soviet and Chinese comrades. The leadership of our party also stopped using polemic [controversial] themes in its pronouncements despite the fact that we never conducted such harsh polemics in our speeches, publications, etc, before the changes in the USSR were carried out.

After the discussion in the leadership of our party, we thought it appropriate to come out publicly at the rally in Warsaw with an appeal directed at the CPSU and the CCP for the two parties to try to come to an understanding since the strengthening of the unity of the international labor movement, as well as the socialist camp, depends foremost on these two parties.

That is why our leadership, while coming to Moscow, counted on the fact that some understanding will be reached on the issue of abandoning the polemics not temporarily, but permanently. We thus think that this is an indispensable condition for creating a better atmosphere within the labor movement; indispensable, so we could calmly exchange views on the matters which are most important to us. We realize that no party which has a different opinion on this or that issue can be silent in stating its position, but we think that it can do so in a positive manner without conducting direct discussions [on] the position of another party. Instead, it can explain what its position is on this or that issue without using polemics nominally with another party. This, in our opinion, is an indispensable condition to the improvement of the atmosphere for achieving further understanding.

I had already told the Chinese comrades during our last meeting that we found out, to our regret, that the Chinese press is again undertaking the critical problems [*problematyka*] directed at the new Soviet leadership. We know that the Chinese press is publishing pretty much all the articles, not only those which contain the opinions that are in accordance with the views of the Chinese leadership, but also those which criticize the Chinese position. We recognize that the Chinese press not only published the voices of the Albanian press, the Japanese and Indonesian party press, but also the opinions of the Czech, Soviet, our and other parties' press. Nevertheless, we think that this negative polemics should be stopped.

I had found out from the information in the press, already after our first meeting, that the extent of the polemics broadened, and that the Chinese press is not only reprinting the controversial articles of other parties, but also that the "Renmin Ribao" [People's Daily], published its own harsh article which criticized Khrushchev, and which also contained a destructive critique which accused Khrushchev for the betrayal

of Marxism-Leninism, and for the betrayal of the interests of the proletariat, and so on.

I intend to neither assess the activity of Comrade Khrushchev here nor to present our view on the subject of his steps [maneuvers] in the [area] of the international policy, as well as in the internal affairs; I have my own opinion about these issues. After all, this is not the subject of our current talks. The changes have occurred and Comrade Khrushchev is no longer the First Secretary of the CC or the Prime Minister, and why [should we] return to these matters?

It seems to me that a similar critique cannot be favorable to creating a good atmosphere since it indirectly strikes a blow at the new leadership of the Party and the Soviet Government.

Our party and the leadership of our party had never meddled in personal affairs of another party, and it never endorsed such meddling. We have always regarded the personal affairs to be internal affairs of each party. Each of the parties, including ours, carries out changes in the organs of the party and government leadership every so often. If a party, regardless of which one, undertook the criticism, be it condemning or praising the decisions made by us on some matters, we wouldn't be pleased with that. Not only the leadership would be unhappy, but I don't doubt, that the entire party, and even the society [would feel the same], because the conclusions which would be drawn from this would be that other parties, or other countries, are meddling in the internal affairs of our country. Therefore, this applies all the more towards the situation which arose in the USSR given that Comrade Khrushchev is still the member of the CC and the State Council.

While referring to the [above] matter, I naturally don't speak on behalf of the CPSU. I don't know what attitude the Soviet comrades assumed in the conversation with you, but as much as I understand from the meetings which I had with the Soviet comrades, they negatively assess your position and they are not entirely sure how to treat this kind of practice [of yours]. I am saying this because it is firmly connected with the position taken by us regarding the issue of the polemics as well as because I hope that, as the result of our meetings, the polemics will be abandoned and a better atmosphere will be created in the intra-party relations.

We judged that the Chinese comrades and Comrade Zhou Enlai will put forth, in the conversation with our delegation, some propositions and suggestions. We have not heard anything along those lines as of now, and, as far as I know, the leaderships of other parties would like to know your view on the subject of the polemics.

The second matter, which has fully matured to be discussed [here], is the issue of the Editorial Commission which was to assemble on December 15. We admit that Comrade Zhou Enlai is correct when he says that both the makeup of the commission as well as the date of its convening were not consulted, in a more detailed manner, with the leadership of the CCP. We know that the makeup and the date were set against the position of the CCP. We expected therefore that this issue would be the subject of the talks which would be conducted in Moscow.

We base our position on the Statement from 1960, that similar decisions and more important matters should be consulted between the parties prior [to the conference]. We were therefore convinced that we would be able to conduct precisely these types of conversations during the meeting in Moscow. We can consider our bilateral talks as bilateral consultations also in this matter, that is, the issue of the Editorial Commission.

I made several general remarks on the subject of the conference of the parties during our first conversation. We think that, along with the Soviet comrades, we should think about the participation and the date of a possible conference, on the subject of the procedure which we should adopt and the preparatory works which we should undertake which are necessary in order to have the conference. Specific facts have thus emerged: 26 parties were informed and invited to the conference of the Editorial Commission [to be held] on December 15. Nobody has declined so far. The Chinese comrades don't agree either to the date or to the makeup of the Editorial Commission, and we don't know at all what their view on the conference is. We should come to some kind of an understanding on this issue.

I cannot imagine what should be done if such an understanding were not to be reached. What are the parties, including ours, which are to participate in the conference of the commission, to do? It is plausible that there are, after all, other solutions regarding this issue. If the Chinese comrades expressed their consent, we could set a different date. We could decide on a different makeup of the Editorial Commission which the Chinese comrades would accept. We could possibly think about sending a letter to the parties which are the members of the Editorial Commission which would call off the announced conference for December 15 as well as [send out] a second letter, after the consultation with the CCP, which would call for another conference.

This is the second, and most burning and pungent issue, which we should consult in the course of the current meetings in order to take a specific position. In our

opinion, there is an indispensable need to make the decision as to the conference, regardless of its date and the manner of convening it; the preparatory works are indispensable to convene such a conference. All these matters, the entire program of action, and the entire conception could be discussed during the conference of the Editorial Board; it could be convened in two or three sessions, depending on the need. We don't have any specific propositions regarding these matters since we think that they should be precisely the subjects of our consultations.

Despite the fact that such work and mutual activity would create a better atmosphere, especially among the parties of socialist countries, there are many burning issues which require discussion, consultation, taking a position and strengthening our front. One of them, which is the most important at the moment, and which is of great urgency, is the issue of the national-liberation fight in Vietnam. We had talked about this subject with the Vietnamese delegation under the leadership of Comrade Pham Van Dong. They turned to us regarding this matter, among other things, because Poland is a member of the Commission [the International Supervisory and Control Commission: the ICC] which supervises the implementation of the [1954] Geneva Accords in Vietnam. They asked us to contribute, to the extent of our capabilities, to the political solution of the Vietnam problem. They did not present any concrete propositions, but they thought that there was a need to prepare some kind of a solution at the political level.

(**Cde. Rapacki:** Regardless of the fact how long the fights will go on, [favorable] conditions should be created for the political solution of the problem.)

The Vietnamese comrades wanted to make sure that we wouldn't withdraw our representation from the Commission for Supervisory and Control [the ICC]. We stated to them that we had no plans to withdraw from the Commission. They asked us to study political options regarding the solutions, even if the war were to last for the next three, or more, years.

In our opinion, the creation of a better atmosphere [to resolve the issue of] Vietnam depends, foremost, on the unity of the workers' movement, because the American imperialism is exploiting the existing divergences and disputes within the labor movement, and, thanks to it, it can conduct more aggressive maneuvers. Besides, regardless of the political and military solutions of the Vietnamese problem, the issue of exchanging the views, consultation regarding their positions and actions in order to strengthen the National Liberation Movement in South Vietnam, faces all the parties.

Vietnam is one of the examples of the need to agree upon such [unified] action

of the parties, but one could bring up more of such examples. Naturally, we have no interests in Vietnam of our own, but we think that our participation in the International Commission of Supervision and Control places specific duties on us which result from proletarian internationalism. We even have some difficulties in the trade relations with the US due to this fact, but I am only bringing this up as a secondary matter.

The third matter, about which I would like to ask you, is the issue of the continuation of bilateral talks between the CPSU and the CCP which began last year in Moscow. They were supposed to be continued in Beijing. I am asking about that because this [issue] is along the line of the thought which was contained in my speech in Warsaw at the rally related to the visit of Comrade Tsedenbal when I was talking about the fact that the opening of the road towards strengthening the unity of the entire movement depends, foremost, on the two parties, that is, the CPSU and the CCP. Strictly speaking, the talks between the two parties, the CPSU and the CCP, are an issue which pertains to the two parties, but they are also in the interest of other parties, and we would be glad to know your opinion on this subject.

Generally speaking, we are aware that the ideological differences within the international labor movement can last for a long period of time. But, regardless of these differences, there is a possibility, and each party should contribute its strength towards it, to undertake a united front, especially against imperialism, to tighten the ranks and to conduct jointly the fight even if the divergences still persist.

Here are, in a sketch, the main issues which we would like to discuss during today's meeting and we would desire for Comrade Zhou Enlai to present his attitude towards them.

Zhou Enlai: I would like to thank Comrade Gomulka for his information on these subjects. First of all, I would like to say, once more, that we like your formulation in the statement at the rally [in Warsaw] on the occasion of Tsedenbal's visit, which was the appeal for unity between the CPSU and the CCP, and for [establishing] the contacts between the [two] parties. We fulfilled this proposition and we sent the delegation to Moscow.

In addition, Comrade Gomulka was saying that socialist countries must act in uniformity in their joint fight against enemies, against imperialism. We see the convergence here with our position. We will also look for ways of carrying out this task.

The conditions, of which you were talking about, are positive, we agree with them and we also have mutual wishes.

Now, I would like to reply to the specific matters which were brought up by Comrade Gomułka. Comrade Gomułka warned us, in the previous talks, that he would be talking about things that I wouldn't like. But, I liked what he said; there was nothing unpleasant in it. Since you already broached this topic, I will be talking about the facts in a comprehensive manner, so Comrade Gomułka could make comparisons. Comparison is a scientific method. Different facts have to be compared with each other. Comrade Gomułka reserved the right of not speaking on behalf of the USSR, but, after all, Poland is the member of the socialist camp and it has the right to express its opinions on these matters. And if so, you should hear the opinions of both sides and compare the positions taken by both sides.

In [January] 1957, I personally, along with Comrade Ho Lung, visited your country. We took an objective position; we heard both sides, both yours as well as that of the CPSU. At that time, we were guided by the wish of contributing towards the unity between Poland and the USSR. I think that Comrade Gomułka remembers this. I personally took part in this assignment [*praca*] on the instructions from our party.

Now, we are faced with [the following] issues: How to stop the public polemics? This is the first issue that Comrade Gomułka was talking about. We should first see what the fundamental divergences are, because, as a matter of fact, the fundamental divergences do not exist only between the CPSU and the CCP, but the divergences of a fundamental nature also exist between the brotherly parties. Therefore, we must, first of all, ask the question: Can this be immediately done? Of course, it cannot. And the Soviet comrades think so, too. They even think that their views can be changed not in the least. This means that we cannot count on the rapprochement; we cannot discuss [issues with them].

Of course, the efforts are needed which would lead towards a better atmosphere. We should look for new roads and new ways in order to carry out the requirement [*postulat*] for unity and solidarity. This requires time and mutual contacts. Only this will further the gradual realization of our wishes and postulates. If, however, only the opinion of one side is being heard, while the other one is being condemned, then this will not contribute towards the solution of the task.

Now, I would like to present our position on some points on which Comrade Gomułka condemned us somewhat, and he had grievances towards us. We think that if one party criticizes another, this is interference in the internal affairs of that given

party. But, one should remember who started it [all]. I called on the CPSU, already three years ago, to abandon the public polemics and the critique of the Albanian party. This was at the XXII Congress. But they didn't go for that. On the contrary, Comrade Khrushchev slandered [defamed] the Albanian leaders; he said that they sold themselves for 30 silver coins [*srebrnikòw*]. This was the position which they took.

During the congress of his party, Comrade Gomułka also criticized us, but we have not yet replied to this criticism. (**Gomułka:** I did not criticize anyone by name!) I mean [you criticized] the name of the party. Until this day we have not yet assumed our position towards this criticism. Your ambassador in Beijing can attest to this since our party had not engaged in the polemics in the press with you.

Why do we have to criticize Khrushchev so [much]? Because it was precisely he who started it all. He began the public polemics and he thought that it [polemics] had to be continued. He began to attack publicly the leaders of other parties by using, or not using, names, and he slandered the leaders of our party. Why wouldn't we have the right to respond to this? Now, he [Khrushchev] has been ousted. It is true that this is the internal affair of their party and the government. He was removed not only from the position of the first secretary and the prime minister, but also of member of the presidium. The books and brochures about Khrushchev have been recalled [withdrawn], and his portraits taken down. All this attests to the fact that this is not only the issue of personal changes in the Soviet leadership, but it is a political problem. A series of brotherly parties, until this day, praise his contributions, which means that they support his views. Brezhnev and Kosygin did not mention anything about Khrushchev in their pronouncements on 10.17 of this year, while some other brotherly parties praise him to this day. Does this signify a unity of opinions? If some brotherly parties praise Khrushchev that means that they think that the ousting of Khrushchev was unfair [*krzywdzący*] to him. If other parties are allowed to give such an assessment of Khrushchev, then why does our party, which was criticized by him, not have the right to express its own opinion [or] its own assessment? If a discussion exists, then why are some parties, which take a positive position, allowed to express their opinions, while those which express a negative opinion are not allowed to do so? When Stalin was criticized, after 1956, two [*dwojaki*] types of publications appeared. We also published our views and we gave an assessment of Stalin's errors and contributions. At that time, Khrushchev was condemning Stalin in [his] entirety. This [criticism] developed to such a level that he "burned his corpse" at the XXII Congress. Some parties supported such a position, while others were against it. We do

not agree to oppose entirely the contributions of Stalin. We have the right to express our opinions. But, when we were talking about Stalin no one accused us of interfering in the internal affairs of another party. But this was already after his death; perhaps that's why. Why, then, after the ousting of Khrushchev, only praises are allowed, while criticism is not? We don't think that this is fair and we have to work so both sides are able to express their assessment and their opinions. That is why, after the ousting of Khrushchev, we published different voices in our press [which were] both positive and negative. Comrade Gomulka, for example, gave a speech regarding his position as the correct one. We published this speech. We also published the speech of Kadar. These [speeches] attest to the fact that there are different opinions, even contradictory ones. That's not all. We also published, in their entirety, the statements by Brezhnev and Kosygin from 11.6 of this year. In a word, we published in our press all speeches like those [the Soviet ones] and those of the brotherly parties, because we want to inform our party and the masses.

Comrade Gomulka accused us for using in our article the formulation that Khrushchev betrayed Marxism-Leninism, but that, after all, he is still the member of the CC and the presidium of the State Council. But, the Soviet press, already after the ousting of Khrushchev on 10.17 of this year, had reprinted the resolutions of the French party, didn't it? And this [precise] resolution says that the leaders of the CCP betrayed Marxism-Leninism, and that it went down the path [*stoczyła się*] of the provocative behavior [*awanturnictwa*] and nationalism. In turn, on 10.19 of this year, "Pravda" reprinted the resolution of the CP of Iraq which also attacked the CC of China. And, if they are talking about the leaders, then they are talking about those present here, because we are the leaders of the CCP. Even despite this, despite all these publications, we still came to Moscow.

Now Khrushchev is ousted and the situations of both sides, not only one, must be compared. The serious divergences have not yet been eliminated and it must be taken into consideration that this is the fact. That is why we have to look for a way in order to get close to each other; otherwise, there will be no results. Such a solution must be based on fundamental bases, because we will not be able to eliminate the divergences without that.

The second issue, which Comrade Gomulka brought up, is that of the Editorial Commission, which was to convene on December 15. Comrade Gomulka admitted that the convening of the conference was not discussed with the CCP. It is clear that we do not take any responsibility for this. And not only that. It was not the

proposition on the part of the CC CPSU, but their decision. Only after having made the resolution did they call on others to come to the conference. Such maneuvers surely cause a threefold situation. Namely, some believe that such a conference is groundless and could be equated with sealing the split. They don't want to participate in such a conference. Seven parties assume this position: Korean, Vietnamese, Chinese, Albanian, Romanian, Japanese and Indonesian. And these are the parties which would constitute [the makeup of] the Editorial Commission.

There are, however, other parties which found themselves in a difficult situation while faced with this issue. You said that the PUWP also felt some difficulties since convening of the conference which would cause the split was not what you would like to happen. The Italian party assumes the same position. We also think that it isn't good when division occurs in the bosom of one party. How, then, to proceed? One of the examples of this is the Indonesian Party. That is why we believe that we shouldn't bring up the issue of the Editorial Commission. We already told the leadership of the CPSU not to even mention the convening of the Editorial Commission in December. We should look for new ways, in a new atmosphere, and to [look for] a solution.

Comrade Gomułka asked a question regarding this issue. We think that we should conduct the talks, and step by step, look for a rapprochement. In this way, we are heading towards the convening of the conference of all the communist parties—the conference of unity. Since the divergences already exist, and the leadership of the CPSU thinks that it can change its views not in the least, so then when we convene the conference under these circumstances, how will we be able to work out a joint document? If we know from the start that we will not be able to work on a joint document, so why [should we] convene the conference? If we convene the conference in this situation, then, will it not bring about the split? Wouldn't it be better to comply with the Declaration from 1957 and the Statement from 1960? We have much in common [in those documents] and we could base our [views] on that Declaration and the Statement.

Comrade Gomułka was asking: how would the issue of bilateral talks between the CPSU and the CCP look like? We have not yet discussed this, but at the moment there are already mutual contacts between our parties, and this is already a positive step.

The third issue refers to what Comrade Gomułka said, that is, that we will have to coordinate our steps and take a uniform position in face of the enemies and imperialism in order to solve important problems. This is a positive thought and we

need to work in this area.

We want to say that Poland has done a lot by participating in commissions in Indochina and Korea and that it deserves recognition [approbation] for that. I would like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to Minister Rapacki. Your work is fruitful. Thank you! Your work is the testament of [a truly?] international attitude.

You asked about our meeting with the Soviet comrades. We met twice already; we will send you a broader communiqué later. During today's talks, Brezhnev spoke at the meeting on behalf of all the comrades from the leadership of the CPSU and he brought up three points: first, he said that the public polemics should be abandoned which corresponds with what Comrade Gomułka was saying; second, [he] said that we should look for ways to convene the conference of the brotherly parties; and in the third point he asked whether the Chinese comrades had any other ways [of resolving the divergences?].

He brought up only these three points. I stated at the meeting, while replying to the second point, that the issue of seeking ways to convene the conference of the brotherly parties should not be connected with convening of the Editorial Commission in December of this year. This is our position. We will provide the Soviet comrades our answer regarding these three points after a careful study. Since Comrade Gomułka is already leaving the day after tomorrow, we will not be able to contact you directly one more time. This does not matter [since] we will indirectly contact each other further.

As to the issue of restoring negotiations between the CPSU and the CCP, we will inform you through our ambassadors in Moscow. This information can also be relayed through our ambassador in Warsaw who will inform the Foreign Division of the CC of your party.

The Polish comrades are interested in this matter, because it is related to the interests of the entire communist movement.

Gomułka: Let me thank Comrade Zhou Enlai, on behalf of the Polish delegation, for providing us with these explanations, although [they were] not exhaustive, [but] which give us a general sense of your position. I would like to return briefly to some matters.

It seems to me that it would be unfair to return to the past and to begin to look for who started the polemics and who should be blamed regarding this matter. If this is the point, then the card of our party is clean; we did not start the polemics, and

we were perhaps least involved in it. (Comrade Zhou Enlai affirms that the PUWP did not begin the polemics.) We tried, in our publications, articles in the press, and pronouncements, and so on, to avoid meddling in the internal matters of other parties, and especially not to use names, to attack specific persons, etc. We belong to those parties which said perhaps the least on the subject of Stalin. If, therefore, someone does not say very much about something, this also means taking a position.

While talking today about abandoning the polemics, we don't think, at all, that this should be stopped only by one side. This applies to all parties. As far as the French and the Iraqi resolutions, which were published in "Pravda," I think, that they were the result of not [being able to] stop the already galloping circle of the polemics. We assess negatively similar facts. We also informed the French comrades about our position on this matter.

Comrade Zhou Enlai said that some parties were condemning, and others were praising, Comrade Khrushchev after the recent changes. One should assume that he [Zhou Enlai] included us in those parties which praised him. I would not like to engage in the polemics on this topic, but if one were to compare our "praises" with the criticism contained in the "Renmin Ribao" [People's Daily], then there is a huge difference, isn't it? We used an indirect sentence, that is, that even though Comrade Khrushchev made contributions, then it was right for the CC CPSU to receive his resignation. Meanwhile, the Chinese comrades called Comrade Khrushchev a "traitor" in the article mentioned previously. We would never allow, despite the total severity [harshness] and the inadmissibility of such polemics, to call a leader of another party a traitor of Marxism-Leninism [and] traitor of their own nation. We understand that the Chinese comrades have many reasons to criticize Comrade Khrushchev, but according to our party consciousness, we will never accept that Khrushchev was a "traitor"! We are broaching this matter only within the context of improving the atmosphere, since these types of words do not further it [the atmosphere].

Some of the positive voices about Comrade Khrushchev, after his resignation, were onetime voices and I suppose that, of course I cannot vouch for other parties, they will not return to this topic again. If the abovementioned article in the "Renmin Ribao" was also a onetime, critical enunciation on this subject, then we can understand it as such and recognize that it will not cause greater damages. If, however, a policy of the old-type criticism were to be continued, then this will not create a better atmosphere.

Comrade Zhou Enlai was talking about the criticism of the CCP [carried out] by our party to which the CCP did not respond. At the congress of our party, we

brought up the issues which pertained to the entire socialist camp and its unity. We therefore couldn't omit some matters. We presented them at the Congress within a positive context just like we understood and assessed these matters. While bringing up this topic, Comrade Zhou Enlai must know our statement from the Congress very well. The sections in the statement deviated in its content and conclusions from those analogical assessments given by other parties. We never said, either by using names or in general, as was done by other parties, that the leaders of the CCP betrayed Marxism-Leninism, etc. We never created any division between the leadership of the CCP and the entire party and the nation. We never used any epithets and offensive definitions which could be found in the publications of other parties. We recognized, and we recognize, the right of the People's Republic of China to maintain the position in the world which it deserves. Right after signing of the [July 1963] Moscow Treaty about the partial ban on nuclear experiments, at the rally on the occasion of Ulbricht's visit in Poland, we assumed a definitive position on this matter recognizing that the PRC was a sovereign nation and that it had the right not to sign this treaty. We also have a different opinion from other parties when it comes to other rights [of the PRC]. We have never assessed or criticized the internal policy of the CCP since we represent our position of not interfering in the internal affairs of other parties.

We will not feel offended if the Chinese comrades provide us with a response to our pronouncements in the Congress statement as long as they respond [using] the same language as we did. I also conducted discussions with the CCP on other occasions, for example, during the visit of our party-state delegation in the USSR and during the rally in Moscow with the participation of Comrade Khrushchev. The Chinese comrades have the full right to also respond to the issues which I brought up at the time. We would have appreciated if these responses appeared before the recent changes in the USSR, but we will not feel offended if they appear now. We also understand that there was an indirect allegation made, which was directed at our party, for the "contemporary revisionism," although the name of our party was not mentioned. We think, however, that these are matters of small significance.

I would like to explain one more matter. Comrade Zhou Enlai stated that the issue of the conference should be discussed first through bilateral and multilateral consultations, but one cannot talk at all about the Editorial Commission of December 15. What's exactly going on here? Is it the terminology, or the commission itself? Or, one should perhaps understand that if this meeting were to be called something other than the Editorial Commission, but if the parties met at the multilateral and

consultative conference, would then the Chinese comrades express their agreement to participate in this meeting?

I would also like to take this opportunity to straighten some inaccuracy when it comes to our position on the issue of the conference. By no means is this true that our position was imposed by Comrade Khrushchev. It is no longer topical to be going back to the beginnings of the issue, and I am saying this only in order to dispel false impression that someone else allegedly imposed his position on us.

We deemed it necessary for the representatives of the parties to convene on December 15. However, the further course of action, which was proposed by us and the one which was subsequently adopted by the Soviet comrades before the changes in the leadership of the CPSU [took place], did not correspond with the content of the CPSU letter regarding the conference. It is not true that the commission was to work out a joint document on December 15 and that the conference had to take place in the middle of 1965.

As a matter of fact, the Soviet comrades adopted our propositions both as to the course of the work of the commission and as to the preparations of the conference. Neither the CPSU nor Comrade Khrushchev imposed anything on us. We were saying openly about what was, in our opinion, wrong as to the position of Comrade Khrushchev regarding the conference. Comrade Khrushchev, as well as other members of the leadership, knew about this, too. If the Chinese comrades were to look more deeply into these matters, then perhaps their criticism of Comrade Khrushchev would be different.

We would like to, once more, express our wish for the Chinese comrades to come to an understanding with the Soviet comrades as quickly as possible on the matters of the polemics and the preparation for the conference. Both sides state that they are basing [their policy] on the documents from 1957 and 1960, but even despite these statements, deep divergences occurred, didn't they? It would then be advised to establish a possibly uniform interpretation of these documents, because if a uniform interpretation existed, then, in reality, the need for convening such a conference would not be so burning. I don't know what the statement of the Soviet comrades was referring to, in the meeting with you [today], when they said that they would not change their position in the least. I don't suppose that we would discuss this topic. If, however, a uniform interpretation of the Declaration from 1957 and the Statement from 1960 is achieved, then it may turn out that both sides, while not yielding their positions, may [in reality] achieve an understanding.

[Let me say] a few words on the subject of the bilateral state relations between Poland and the People's Republic of China.

We desire for our trade and state relations to develop successfully and we can state with pleasure that there was a certain progress in this area during the recent period. We would like for this progress to strengthen, especially if it could lead to the signing of the long-term trade agreement. I don't intend to discuss these matters here, [but] I am only mentioning them since, regardless of the overall situation, we would like for our state relations to be as best as possible.

Zhou Enlai: First of all, I would like to say that we are in favor of the development of [our] state relations; after all, we are brotherly nations, aren't we? The example from last year attests to that we can develop our state relations and that they should be developed. This can be done either through diplomacy or through international trade.

Comrade Gomułka brought up many issues again. I would like to express my opinion only on two issues. Comrade Gomułka said that the unity of the communist camp depended foremost on the CCP. But previously he said that [it depended] on the CCP and the CPSU. Did I understand it correctly? (The Polish delegation explained that a misunderstanding occurred since there was no change in the position of the PUWP). This means that the efforts must be made on both sides. Second issue—in what way [should we] abandon the public polemics? Currently, big divergences exist; the parties criticize each other and even the positive explanations also differ from each other and each one is different. I talked about allegations and that is why I stated that this problem should be approached from a general point of view. I will talk with the Soviet comrades tomorrow regarding this matter. We don't see the possibility of abandoning the public polemics. We will think about this with the Soviet comrades. I will give one example: Almost all contentious points in the polemics between the CPSU and us are mentioned in the introductory article in "Pravda" from November 1 [1964]. We stick to our views, but if we wanted to discuss this article, then, the polemics would have to develop once again. The issue regarding international organizations is also similar. If they publish one document—this causes the polemics.

Now, I will respond to the third matter which was brought up by Comrade Gomułka. He asked whether a multilateral meeting and [multilateral] talks could replace the Editorial Commission (Gomułka explains that this meeting would not have to be called [a meeting of] the Editorial Commission, but a meeting in the

agreed-upon makeup [of communist parties].

Multilateral talks should not be associated with the Editorial Commission which is to be convened on December 15, because we are not responsible for it. The Editorial Commission is to work out a joint document, whereas the purpose of multilateral talks is the exchange of views.

When it comes to the views of the PUWP and its participation in the Editorial Commission—we understand your position. Since the Polish party informed us about its position, and we trust you, we [only] now understood and we see that your position differed to some degree from the position taken by Khrushchev.

Gomułka: The Soviet comrades agreed with our position at the time when Khrushchev was still in office.

Rapacki: This was not reflected in the published documents.

Zhou Enlai: In this case, we should give our analysis and our assessment. We will give our assessment of the situation after having acquainted ourselves with the documents.

Gomułka: I would like to explain briefly how I imagine [see] the issue of the polemics. The point here is not to have both sides not to express their opinions and not to defend their positions due to which the divergences surfaced. But this could be done in a positive manner, without discussing and without engaging in the polemics directly with the position of the other side. The article in “Pravda” from November 1, which was mentioned by us, discussed matters of dispute, but it did not do so in the form of the discussion with the position of the CCP. The CCP can, and it has the full right to do so, present its position on a positive way without discussing it with the CPSU.

Zhou Enlai: Is this possible?

Gomułka: Not *a la longue*! [Not for a long time!], but for a certain period of time such positive form of presenting the issues can be adopted before some kind of a rapprochement is reached.

Zhou Enlai: The positive formulations of various parties will differ from each other. If we do not criticize what is erroneous, how will we be able to explain what a positive position is? We are Marxist-Leninists. We must explain our position to the masses and to the peoples [nations] of the world.

Gomulka: If we continue the previous polemics and discussion, even by using a different language without insults, which in general are inadmissible, then we will never create a better atmosphere. The arrival of the party-state delegations in Moscow created hope in our international movement, within the ranks of the communist parties and in our public opinion, that some kind of a rapprochement or the improvement of the situation within the movement would come about. However, if the polemics is continued, then a conviction will develop that our meetings in Moscow ended in fiasco and that the delegations came, talked and achieved nothing. Everyone will be disappointed and the overall impression will be negative since nothing will have changed. That is why we think that the issue of the polemics is the most urgent and, after all, the easiest step to be taken. Comrade Zhou Enlai said that we had to proceed step by step, didn't he?

I would also like to explain what I mean by positive and negative manner of presenting views. If each party presents its views, without engaging in polemics with another position [party]—it is doing it in a positive manner. If, however, it expresses opinions and assessments about the position of other parties, naming them and engaging directly in polemics directly with the arguments of another party—this is a negative form.

Zhou Enlai: We all, our parties, must undertake concrete steps. After all, the power is in our hands and our task [job] is not only to write textbooks as if nothing else interested us. The friction in views is unavoidable, because when, for example, international conferences of various organizations take place, then there will always be friction of contradictory views.

Gomulka: Please let me, Comrade Zhou Enlai, refer to the previous position of yours. You stated that in the past the CCP was against public polemics and that it demanded that all contentious matters be settled by way of inter-party consultations. Later, a situation developed in which the public polemics became heated. You are placing responsibility on Comrade Khrushchev [for that]. Let us omit for now what its causes were. Comrade Khrushchev is no longer the first secretary of the party and the prime minister. A new situation arose; that's the fact. We agree as to that. Couldn't you then, in this new situation, stop the polemics and return to your previous position?

Zhou Enlai: We want to believe that the situation has changed, because only under

the new situation can we move forward.

We want to become familiar with the reasons for ousting Khrushchev. We think it was due to political reasons, but the leadership of the CPSU did not explain it to us as of yet. But, at the same time, the Soviet comrades stated to us that, as far as the matter ideological split with the CCP, the entire collective leadership of the CPSU fully shares the views of Khrushchev, that is, it was unanimous with Khrushchev even in “the nuances and shades.” Therefore, it is not clear to us what this issue looks like. Unless, Comrade Gomułka, who may be familiar with this matter, could inform us, but we are not putting matters in such a way and we are not asking him [Gomułka], because this is an internal affair of the CPSU.

The purpose of our trip to Moscow is to acquaint ourselves with the situation; to become familiar, through contacts, with the [Soviet?] views; and to find ways. We are therefore resigned to go slowly forward and not to hurry, but at the same time not to lose hope either. We are not entirely convinced, but we know, however, that only with the changed situation can we move forward. Our motto is to combine efforts with patience. We must not hurry. You are right when you say that the communists in the entire world desire unity and solidarity. We also want that and we came here with such a hope. Besides, it was we who came up with the initiative of this meeting. I would like to say once more that I very much appreciate your statement.

Kliszko: We all want improvement, but somehow things are not working out.

Gomułka: It turns out that when, in politics, two [people] say the same thing this does not mean [that they are] the same! (Overall cheerfulness.) Thank you for the meeting.

Zhou Enlai: (Also thanks for the meeting and asks everyone for supper.)

Drafted by:

S. Trepczyński

W. Wojtyga

Interpreted:

An interpreter from the Chinese side who knew the Polish language.

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DOCUMENT NO. 19

**CABLE FROM THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, “OUR CONTACTS
WITH MIDDLE- AND LOWER-LEVEL PERSONNEL,” 3
DECEMBER 1964**

[Source: PRC FMA 109-02736-03, 27-29. Translated for CWIHP by Xi Zhao.]

[...]

Our Contacts with Middle- and Lower-Level Personnel

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

Our contacts with a few middle- and lower-level personnel at the banquet hosted by the Indonesian Embassy on the 2nd gave us the feeling that people were willing to talk with us and listen to our opinions and that their thoughts are changing after the removal of Khrushchev: the left are becoming more confident; the middle are more hesitant; and the right are becoming more timid. Suffice it to say that now it is possible for us to take advantage of all the opportunities that come our way to make more contacts with people from various circles in order to bring them to our side.

- (1) A veteran cadre from the Czech National Athletic Committee said that, in the debate within the international communist movement, you people have the correct stand, since true communists should keep on fighting. He mentioned that sports exchange is a good way to expand influence. Citing the recent decision of the Pan American World Airways to set up a branch in Prague, he said that the closing line of a stage play currently run in Prague is “Comrades, where are we going from here?” which captures, he said, a growing concern of the people here.

The day before, one Embassy interpreter encountered the old mayor of Prague in the hospital, who, unpromptly, said that “I am really glad that the situation has cleared up and I believe it will remain clear.”

- (2) In a talk with us three journalists expressed the following opinions: (1) The urgent need at present is to strengthen solidarity, for which both sides of the debate should make compromises and concessions to each other. [But] they didn’t object when we emphasized that principles are not to be sacrificed. (2) An international conference should be held and open debate should be called stop. [But] when

we pointed out that an international conference was only good for solidarity when held with sufficient preparations and under the principle of consensus, they admitted that a conference wouldn't be helpful at this point; and then they had nothing to argue when we explained that the open debate is caused by the existing deep chasm of [ideological] paths [between the two sides] and therefore cannot cease based on subjective wishes. (3) For now, the removal of Khrushchev only marks his own personal failure and doesn't mean the failure of his policy, since the new Soviet leadership is still implementing Khrushchev's policy. (4) In today's world, there are only three major powers that truly have and are able to hold on to an independent policy while the other small countries, dependent on these major powers economically, politically and militarily, are unable to do so. (5) As journalists they have limited access to information and only know what was told to them from the top down. (6) They paid attention to our article commenting the removal of Khrushchev and said they read from Western media report that we raised five prerequisites for Sino-Soviet reconciliation

- (3) The Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy came to talk with us. [During the talk] he still stressed on the points of convening an international conference and ceasing open debate and said he wished the Sino-Soviet relations would be improved and the trade between the two sides would be restored to the previous level. He mentioned that in their letter to our party, they said they'd like to reconsider sending experts to China. [In response] we explained our principled stand on the issue and emphasized that strengthening solidarity has been our consistent position, but solidarity must be established on the bases of Marxism and Internationalism. We said we firmly object to convening a conference with divided agendas and pointed out that withdrawing experts was a mistake that has done serious damages to our economic development. [After we said that] he didn't argue with us but instead avoided these subjects, saying that they have the wish to strengthen solidarity and improve relations [with us]. He also mentioned that Czechoslovakia said they wished to increase trade with China but China said no. After we pointed out such was not the fact, he didn't say much.

Chinese Embassy in Czechoslovakia
3 December 1964
[...]

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DOCUMENT NO. 20**MINUTES OF CONVERSATION OF THE DISCUSSIONS HELD WITH THE DELEGATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH CONGRESS OF THE ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, 26 JULY 1965**

[Source: ANIC, Bucharest, Romania; CC RCP Chancellery, folder 105/1965, pp. 2-15. Obtained by the Parallel History Project and translated by Viorel Buta.]

Minutes of Conversation

of the discussions held with the delegation of the Chinese Communist Party which participated in the proceedings of the 9th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party

26 July 1965

The following comrades took part in the discussions:

On the Romanian part : Nicolae Ceausescu, general secretary of the Central Committee (CC) of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP); Chivu Stoica, member of the Executive Committee (EC), member of the Permanent Presidium (PP) of the CC of RCP, president of the State Council of the Romanian People's Republic (RPR); Ion Gheorghe Maurer, member of the EC, member of the PP of the CC of RCP, president of the Council of Ministers of the RPR; Vasile Patilinet, secretary of the CC of RCP; Dumitru Gheorghiu, substitute member of the CC of RCP; the ambassador of RPR in Beijing; Andrei Pacuraru, member of CC of RCP, chief of the Direction of Party Affairs of CC of RCP.

On the Chinese part : Deng Xiaoping, member of the Permanent Committee (PC) of the Political Bureau of the CC, general secretary of the CC of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); Kang Sheng, substitute member of the Political Bureau, member of the Secretariat of CC of CCP; U Siu-tsiuan, member of CC of CCP and Liu Fan, ambassador of the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) at Bucharest.

The discussions began at 10.30.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: Did you have a good rest yesterday?

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: Yes, very good.

I want to congratulate you for the success of your Congress; we congratulate the new elected organs of your party; we are very glad about all these things.

The main purpose of our visit here is to congratulate you on the occasion of your Congress. Taking this opportunity, we are once more imparting the best good wishes from the part of comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De addressed to comrades Nicolae Ceausescu, Chivu Stoica, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, and to the other comrades in the leadership of your party.

It was apparent from what we have seen in your country that both the industry and the agriculture of your country are developing well. This proves the correctness of your party line. You have overcome the difficulties that you had before and we are very glad about this.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: Comrades, we thank you for this visit, for the greetings addressed to our Congress. We look upon this as a contribution towards the strengthening of the relationships between our parties, between our peoples. The fact is true that we would have wanted you to see more things in our country, but we hope that the comrades will come on another occasion to visit our country, to know the work of our people.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: The plan you have drawn up is a grandiose plan. We are convinced that we will again have the opportunity to come to your country; we are convinced that you, too, will come to our country because we understand the relationships between our two parties very well.

These relationships are built on the basis of a common ideology, are built on the basis of a common experience. The relationships between our two parties and our two countries are not only normal, but they develop very well. Of course, this does not mean that we have identical views about all the international issues; differences of opinions may exist, but we have a lot of things in common and this is the essential thing.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: We agree with this. It is certain that the relationships between our parties are good; they also have a good basis for further development and the issues on which we have common points of view ensure a fruitful collaboration.

In this collaboration, we will also find solutions to the problems on which we have different opinions.

Comrade Ion Gheorghe Maurer: And this the more so as we found, a long time ago, a very good way: sincere, open, comradely discussions. We have already done this, we are doing it now, and we will do it from now on; this is a very good basis for understanding.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: We discussed with you in Beijing last year. The effect of an exchange of opinions can be no other than making our friendship closer.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: As regards our present meeting, we would like to listen to our guests, if they have issues to raise. We have spoken a lot; we have kept talking for six days; now we want to listen. And, of course, we will say a few things in connection with the talks we held with some of the delegations attending the congress proceedings.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: We think that the proceedings of your Congress enjoyed a big success. From the reports presented and from the speeches made at the Congress the correctness of your party line was readily apparent to us. We have seen that all the delegates trusted the political line promoted by your party and the plan of future development adopted by your party; we have noticed the cohesion and unity of your party and, frankly speaking, we see such a phenomenon very rarely in the other socialist countries. If we were to make an assessment, this is our assessment, and this is something we are very satisfied with. We have seen that, at the Congress, you generalized not only your experience, but also the experience regarding the relationships between the socialist countries, and you also generalized the experience in the field of international relationships. In many respects, this experience is our experience as well.

You have changed the name of your party and of your country, you have strengthened the leading role of the party in the state, you have made the ties of the party with the masses stronger. We have noted, with attention, the fact that you have intensified the educational work with the youth.

We have a common experience of all these issues; the issues you are thinking about are issues we are thinking of, too. This is a very good thing.

In view of our previous discussions with comrade Maurer, we understand the organizational forms of your party very well; we understand that such forms are very

good; if we are not mistaken, these forms presuppose both the attraction of a bigger number of comrades in taking part in the leadership of the state and conditions for a more centralized leadership; all these also offer a wider democracy and a more intense centralization.

The fact is very good that you have adopted a separate decision for the Vietnam issue. We are of the opinion that your using this method and your solemnly adopting a decision on this issue is a very good thing. Of course, there are certain differences of opinions between us in connection with the form of expression, but the fact that you have adopted a separate decision is very good. We have discussed the Vietnam issue with comrades Ceausescu and Maurer over the dinner we had together. Last night we handed over to comrade Patilineț the duplicate of the letter of our Central Committee addressed to the CC of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) as a reply to the letter of the CC of CPSU of April 16 [1965].

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: We have received it.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: This [reply] letter contains some differences of opinion between our party and the CPSU on the Vietnam issue. The Soviet said that they would invite us to a meeting [intended] to help the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. We have informed you about it. The Soviet Union wanted to send to Vietnam 4,000 soldiers specialized in remote-controlled missiles, and it also asked that one or two airports in our country be put at its disposal. On these airports 500 Soviet soldiers were to be stationed. The Soviet Union also wanted to open an air corridor between the USSR and Vietnam over our country. The Soviet forgot that we had a certain experience in this respect. On the ground that we refused to accept these requests, we are accused of not wanting the Soviet Union to help Vietnam.

Comrade Kang Sheng: The Soviets do not respect the sovereignty of our country; in order to discuss this issue with us, they sent only their embassy's counselor; they look upon our country as a province of the Soviet Union.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: In this letter, a duplicate of which we handed over to you, we replied to the Soviet proposal regarding the meeting of the representatives of the CPSU, CCR, and the Workers' Party of Vietnam. We told them: if the issue is the help for Vietnam, then we have already contacted the Vietnamese comrades and rendered help to them; if you wish to help Vietnam, contact the Vietnamese comrades. The greater the help, the better. In their letter of April 17 [1965], the

CPSU accused us of placing ourselves in a special position. We have known this for several years. As if we had encouraged the USA aggression against Vietnam!

Subsequently, the Soviets proposed—several times—the undertaking of common actions. From the speech of [Walter] Ulbricht it was apparent that he would have wanted to take advantage of the proceedings of your Congress for this purpose, but we had discussed this issue at our previous meeting. The delegate of Venezuela also raised this issue.

In our letter we replied as regards this issue of common actions as well. We understand what the Soviets are pursuing in connection with the help to be rendered to Vietnam. In the spring of last year, the Soviet government officially raised before the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the issue of both South Vietnam and North Vietnam becoming neutral countries. They officially informed us about this issue, too. Immediately after the Vietnamese comrades had been informed about this issue, they replied. In the past we declared for the creation, in the southern part of Vietnam, of a government which would promote a policy of neutrality; the Vietnamese comrades also agreed with the neutralization of South Vietnam. The Soviet Union, however, declared for the neutralization of North Vietnam, too. This means the neutralization of a socialist country—the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Even of late, the USA still speaks about this. Even during the visit which [Averell] Harriman paid to the Soviet Union, they still talked about the neutralization. A government of the same type as the government of Laos should be formed not in South Vietnam, but in North Vietnam. From this we can very clearly see the kind of bargaining being perpetrated between the Soviet Union and the United States of America when negotiations without conditions are contemplated. Holding negotiations “without conditions” is the result of an agreement concluded with the United States of America. On February 16, 1965, the Soviet Union officially proposed to our government the holding of negotiations without conditions. The Soviets first proposed this to the Vietnamese comrades, and after a day or two informed us, too. They said they would like to know first of all the opinion of the Vietnamese and Chinese comrades and afterwards to undertake actions in this direction. The Vietnamese gave their answer the same day they were informed; we have not answered to this proposal yet.

The Soviets, through the agency of their ambassador in Paris, raised this issue to [Charles] de Gaulle. So that is the way the bargainings are made.

We have recently received precise materials of which it results that the USA are

still wondering if they should bomb Hanoi and Haiphong because this would mean bombing the guided-missile bases of the Soviet Union. However, through diplomatic contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, the latter were officially informed about the locations of the Soviet guided-missile bases. That is what these common actions mean! To act jointly with them?! The Soviet wanted us to act jointly with them under the aegis of solving the Vietnamese issue on the basis of the collaboration between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. This is their real purpose.

For this reason, if we participated in a meeting with them and made a fine decision, this would mean that we would help them deceive people.

After we have answered to their proposal regarding the convocation of a meeting of the party representatives of the three countries, they speak even louder and oftener, including at the international conferences, in favor of common actions being undertaken.

Their purpose is to isolate China. We are thinking a lot about this issue and realize what isolation means. We will be able to see what this isolation means only in the final analysis. Isolation is not necessarily a bad thing. In our view, you have such an experience, too. Within the framework of COMECON, are you isolated or not?

Comrade Ion Gheorghe Maurer: [Yes,] But we keep on fighting.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: As a result of your isolation you have more tomatoes and cucumbers than others, to say nothing of other things.

Concerning the Vietnam problem, we told you about our point of view; to cut a long story short, we have made all the preparations, including the military one. We also talked about this with the Vietnamese comrades. We can give them everything they need. If they think this help is not necessary, we do not want to impose it; I am mainly referring to the military help. We all agree with the Vietnamese comrades' opinion that they must rely on their own forces to resist the aggression of the United States of America, and that China be looked upon as being "behind the front line". We deployed our troops to the frontier with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, but if the Vietnamese comrades feel that these troops of ours are not necessary, we will not send troops there. Currently, there are in Vietnam engineer troops, transport detachments, and anti-aircraft artillery troops sent by the Chinese People's Republic. Their effectives are not small. We send troops in accordance with their needs; we pay heed to their opinion even with respect to the way these troops are to be sent [to Vietnam].

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: As to the Congress, I would like to thank comrade Deng Xiaoping for his beautiful words. Apart from the plan and economic development issues, we thought it was good to clarify a number of issues in connection with which there are discussions or attempts at letting them sink into oblivion. That is why we raised the broader issue of the necessity of industrialization, the issue of the party and state roles, and the issue of the nation role because lately there have been attempts at saying that the nation is something obsolete, that the emphasis must be laid on nations getting closer to one another and [eventually] merging. We think this to be wrong and dangerous for our general cause of socialism and communism. This is the reason why, within the framework of the Congress, we referred to a larger extent to these issues.

As regards the Vietnam issue, it is true that we discussed it last time [we met]. The day before yesterday we also discussed with the Vietnamese comrades and we agreed on all of the issues; we rendered them some help, too, including in armament. We met almost all of their requests.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: Very well.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: We agree with the Chinese comrades' viewpoint that it is up to the Vietnamese comrades to make the decisions.

During the Congress proceedings, we met some delegations, [among them] the delegation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) headed by comrade Ulbricht. Naturally, we agreed on all the issues in the long run. The German comrades especially raised the issue of our relationships with the Federal Republic Germany (FRG). They expressed their opinion [in this matter], and they also talked with us about it yesterday before leaving for home, saying that it is good to establish diplomatic relationships with the FRG. There is a tendency, however, to establish such relationships somehow through the agency of the GDR. We showed the German comrades that this issue was each state's business, and we alone will know what must be done and how. They agreed with us eventually.

We had a meeting with comrade [Todor] Zhivkov; we discussed more about our future visit to Bulgaria. We do not have special problems with the Bulgarian comrades; what we have are normal/usual problems.

We also had a meeting with the Yugoslav delegation, with [Eduard] Kardelj. In our program we also have [Josif Broz] Tito's visit to our country, in autumn. The building of the hydroelectric power station on the Danube is under way. Kardelj said that

he was very enthusiastic about the proceedings of our Congress and that they had a lot to learn [from it]. As I told comrade Deng Xiaoping at the reception two nights before, the Yugoslavs said they wished to improve the relationships with the Chinese comrades. I told them to talk to the Chinese comrades in order to find together the ways of improving their relationships.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: We are not against improving the state relationships. In our talks with our two parties which were held in Beijing, we told you that we wished from the bottom of our hearts the improvement of your state relationships with Yugoslavia. As regards the way Yugoslavia must be looked upon, there are differences of opinions between our two countries, but this aspect is not important. It will be clarified in time.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: They are concerned with making things right in their country. They also have a lot of difficulties from the point of view of the economic situation.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: Why do they have such difficulties; after all, they received a lot of dollars and rubles?!

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: You can do nothing out of handouts. Actually, you must first rely on your own forces. This is the soundest kind of development.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: We paid attention to the actions undertaken by Yugoslavia on the international plane. Concerning the Vietnam issue, during your Congress Kardelj also spoke about supporting Vietnam, but we pay more attention to a series of actions and declarations. For instance, when the USA planes were bombing the DRV territory and fresh [USA] troops were sent to South Vietnam, the Yugoslav press published a commentary, where it was asserted that the USA had full recourse to their right of self-defense.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: But there also was an official declaration, whereby the Yugoslavs condemned the American intervention and aerial bombardments. However, they can be helped to adopt a more just line. We hope this will happen and wish that each one of us meets them halfway and helps them.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: We hope that the work performed by you will yield good results. In Beijing, too, when we held talks, we said the talks we hold with the other European countries did not have results, but if you work with them results will

be obtained. We hope that the most important thing is your experience, and this experience will have a bigger influence.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: Afterwards we had a short meeting, more of a protocol nature, with parties from Latin America. It was apparent that, concerning lots of issues, the comrades agreed with our party's position. It was also apparent that about many issues they had information that was contrary to reality, and taking part in our Congress enabled them to better realize what our party's activity and position actually were.

We also had meetings, of a protocol nature, too, with the representatives of parties of Arab countries, with whom we had an exchange of opinions.

We had exchanges of opinions with the Soviet comrades as well. The last meeting took place yesterday. Comrade Brezhnev expressed the wish of improving the relationships between our two countries and doing away with all of Khrushchev's subjective actions. He told us that Khrushchev had been ousted from his position because they did not agree with these actions of his and we agreed to have, probably in September, a meeting to discuss a series of issues regarding the relationships between our parties and countries.

An issue raised by the Soviet comrades was the issue of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. In their view, towards the end of the year, a meeting of the Consultative Committee should take place as a result of the necessity to make some improvements as regards the organization of the military high command with a view to ensuring a broader participation of the representatives of the other socialist countries in this high command. We told the Soviet comrades that we will see. Since we have a common high command, it is to be assumed that the leadership of the current high command also be common. But the leadership of the current high command is Soviet. We will see what proposals will be made. We had told them on other occasions that within the framework of all this organization one must ensure that each army be independent, that each socialist country have an army of its own.

Comrade Ion Gheorghe Maurer: The relationships should be of collaboration, of cooperation, not of subordination.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: We will analyze the proposals which will be made on that score.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: This means the Soviets want to strengthen their control

over the others.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: It is hard to say. The criticisms made so far were only about the fact that this command is Soviet. Naturally, they want to ensure a broader representative basis of the command, but we do not want only that and, mainly, not a formal representation, but really the organization of the command on a new basis, not as a unified command, but as an organ of collaboration between independent countries.

Comrade Ion Gheorghe Maurer: This means that we want to act in such a way that no supranational control over these countries exist. But let us see how things will pan out.

Comrade Kang Sheng: On this score I would like to say that a book bearing the title “*Military Strategy*”, edited by [Marshal] Sokolovsky, was published in the Soviet Union. In the second edition of this book some modifications have been made, but the book is used as basic material in the Soviet military academies. In it, it is stated that if there is a war against the imperialists, then all the socialist countries will have to act in common and all the armies of the socialist countries will have to be under the command of the Soviet Union. This is their strategic conception.

Comrade Ion Gheorghe Maurer: If each one of us devises such a conception, things will go really well!

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: The fact is that this [conception] exists not only in handbooks; actually, in the organization of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and that of the united/common command, the armies of the other socialist countries of Europe are subordinated. We want to do away with this state of affairs.

Comrade Ion Gheorghe Maurer: This is very important because a big issue arises. The COMECON was such a big issue and maybe it will be again; now comes the Warsaw Treaty Organization, an issue which emerges. Maybe it will not be easy, but at any rate we must see.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: Of course, we understand that in case of a war against imperialism we will have to act in common, but these actions—which require the mobilization of the whole people—must be performed on the basis of a close cooperation, with the independence of each country being observed, and the participation of each army as an independent army, as a national force. This will

ensure that the effort of each country will really be an effort from all the viewpoints.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: We wholly agree with your opinion. We acted like that during the war in Korea. We can tell you that, together with the Korean comrades, we drew up a battle plan, but on the basis of the principles put forward by comrade Ceausescu just now. We cannot admit the fact that Vietnam and Korea be subordinated to our country because China is a bigger country. But your experience is richer than ours because you came across such problems within the framework of COMECON and of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. We know that you have fought and think that there are many people who agree with you.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: We imparted our opinion to comrade Ulbricht because he also raised this issue. He said: it goes without saying that we must make improvements since we do not want things to happen as in 1962, during the crisis in the Caribbean Sea. If we are a pact intended for defense and fight in common, the steps that are to be taken must be the result of everybody's will.

It is with this issue in mind that we want to discuss when we meet the Soviet comrades in Moscow in autumn.

We agreed to debate these issues and proposed to the Soviet comrades to call to the session of the Consultative Committee the Albanian comrades as well. To call them not only to the session, but also to its preparation. The Soviet comrades agreed with this proposal. It goes without saying that we will have to see to it that the Albanian comrades participate. Albania is a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and it would be good for it to take part [in the session]. If there are more of us, we will be able to obtain better results.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: Regarding the Albanian issue we discussed with [Aleksey N.] Kosygin when he passed through our country on the occasion of his visit to Vietnam. Comrade Mao Zedong told Kosygin that the Soviet speak about the unity of the socialist camp, but why do not they want to solve the Albanian problem likewise? This problem is not difficult to solve. If they admit that they made a mistake as regards Albania, it is enough for the problem to be solved. If they do not say that they made a mistake, the Albanian comrades will not come to the session even if they are invited. At the 22nd Congress of the CPSU a strong action against Albania was launched. If the Soviet Union does not solemnly admit that it erred, how can the Albanian comrades accept the invitation?! We are convinced that you will justly

approach this issue within the framework of COMECON and within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and then fairness will be on your side.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: These are about all the problems that did not arise at the Congress. We also had a meeting with the Indonesian comrades, with Aidit. Of course, we do not have any special problems with the Indonesian comrades; generally speaking, we agree on all the problems.

We also had a meeting, more protocol-like, for a quarter of an hour, with the Korean comrades. Neither with them have we special problems; we have common views on the main problems.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: I feel it my duty to thank comrade Ceausescu and the other comrades who informed us about these issues.

Maybe you are aware of the situation in our country. The situation in both the industry and the agriculture is good. The movement for the education in the socialist way of the whole people is proceeding and we have obtained good results on this score. Initially, we made provisions for finishing this movement in a period of five years, but we can finish it, by and large, next year or in 1967, that is to say in three or four years' time. This movement unfolds according to a plan, in stages. In the first stage we obtained very good results, especially as regards the solution of a number of problems related to cadres and the improvement of the relationships between the state and the people. By using the existing production capacities, we increased the production. For example, in the industrial enterprises, after this movement had unfolded, it was found that the work quality had improved. Although the number of workers was reduced by a third, the production increased.

Now we are working on a five-year plan and a ten-year plan of perspective. After three years of big difficulties and after three years of recovery and development, we have created good conditions for drawing up a plan of perspective. We now tell you that, in keeping with our line of thinking, we are not going to publish our plan of perspective. We will let the imperialists guess what we want to do.

We deem this visit an official one, a courtesy one, paid to the Central Committee of the party, and—concurrently—a goodbye visit.

The relationships between our parties and countries are very good; there are no special problems; everything is developing normally; we have to further develop our friendship.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: Comrade Zhou Enlai was to pay us a visit. It could not take place this spring due to the known circumstances. We now wish to renew our invitation for this visit.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: I will not fail to let him have it. It is good that several exchanges of visits take place. About our current problems we can say that we have an exchange of opinions very often. We have received lots of very important materials from your leadership. In certain respects, you have broader and closer contacts than we have.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: I would ask comrade Deng Xiaoping to send warm greetings to comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and to the other comrades from us, the leadership of our party. We wish them all good health and much capacity for work.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: We thank you.
The discussions ended at 12.00 hours.

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DOCUMENT NO. 21

RESOLUTION OF THE 14 SEPTEMBER 1965 SESSION OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE HSWP CC ON THE RELATIONS OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, 28 SEPTEMBER 1965

[Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL), M-KS 288. f. 5/374. őe. (1965.09.14). Obtained by Péter Vámos, translated by Balázs Szalontai.]

Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
Strictly Confidential!
Central Committee
Prepared in 3 copies.

Department of International Liaisons

Budapest, 28 September 1965.

Resolution of the 14 September 1965 session of the Political Bureau of the HSWP CC on the relations of the Hungarian People's Republic with the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

The Political Bureau of the HSWP CC takes notice of the report on the relations of the Hungarian People's Republic with the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and for the development of inter-state relations between the Hungarian People's Republic and the aforesaid countries, it considers it expedient to adopt the following principles and fulfill the following tasks:

1. Concerning all three countries:
 - a) In the spirit of the Political Bureau resolution of May 11, in proportion to the readiness displayed by the other side, and taking the principle of appropriate gradualism into consideration, one should make efforts to develop our inter-state relations, including primarily our foreign trade relations and partly our cultural relations.
 - b) During the development of our relations, one should display appropriate patience.
 - c) On the Hungarian side, more initiative should be shown to develop our relations.
 - d) Every state organ of ours should pay particular attention to the precise fulfillment of our contractual obligations to these countries.
2. Concerning the People's Republic of China:
 - a) We should broaden our current products exhibitions, and investigate the possibilities of holding a greater industrial exhibition in China.
 - b) At domestic and international forums, we should continue to support the legitimate international demands of the People's Republic of China (UN membership and Taiwan).
 - c) Through diplomatic channels, we should inform the Chinese side about

the date of the passage of the HSWP delegation that is going to travel to Vietnam and Korea through China. In case our delegation is invited [to visit China], we should express our standpoint on the topical issues of the international Communist movement and the development of relations between the two countries. We should act in a similar way in the case of the high-ranking NCTU [National Council of Trade Unions] delegation visiting Vietnam and Korea, with the difference that if a meeting is to occur [with Chinese officials], the Hungarian delegation should conduct discussions only about questions related to contacts between our trade unions.

- d) Besides adhering to the principle of mutuality, we should inform the official representatives of the People's Republic of China about the issues discussed at various international conferences, provided that [the issues in question] are of interest to them, too, and that our standpoint on them is not at variance with the Chinese standpoint.
3. Concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea:
- a) On the basis of the Political Bureau resolution passed on 11 May 1965 and in the name of the HSWP Central Committee and the government, the Hungarian party delegation travelling to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should repeat the invitation to Comrade Kim Il Sung, [asking him] to visit our country on the occasion of his expected trip to the 2nd Afro-Asian Conference.
 - b) Comrade [Foreign Minister] János Péter should invite his Korean counterpart for a visit in Hungary.
 - c) In 1966, we should invite a Korean parliamentary delegation to our country.
 - d) We should arrange an exchange of sponsored students, in the course of which 2-3 Hungarian youth should travel to Pyongyang in order to learn Korean and Japanese language.
 - e) In addition to the problems of national unification and the Japanese-South Korean agreements, the Hungarian press should also publish news, on the basis of mutuality, about the domestic economic and cultural achievements of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
 - f) At domestic and international forums, we should continue to support

the Korean people's struggle for the unification of Korea and against the Japanese-South Korean treaty.

- g) In such international organizations of which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not a member, we should continue to represent the interests of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We should inform the DPRK about the issues discussed in the international organizations if they are related to Korea.
 - h) h) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should share the information we obtain about Asian and African issues with the Korean embassy in Budapest if it is of interest to them, too.
4. Concerning the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:
- a) We should fulfill our economic agreements, and provide the aid we offered, according to schedule and in a punctual manner.
 - b) We should invite a Vietnamese parliamentary delegation next year.
 - c) We should invite a Vietnamese military delegation.
 - d) We should provide maximum assistance to the establishment and operation of the NLFSV office in Budapest.
 - e) Our social and mass organizations should continue to mobilize [the population] against the [American] aggression, and focus their attention and efforts on dealing with the Vietnamese question. They should establish contacts with their Vietnamese counterparts, or renew their contacts with them.
 - f) The staff of our embassy in Hanoi should be increased by one person of diplomatic status.
 - g) The MoD [Ministry of Defense] should examine the question of assigning a deputy military attaché [to the Hungarian embassy in Hanoi].

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DOCUMENT NO. 22**CABLE FROM WANG GUOQUAN TO MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION, “LUN-KE TALKED ABOUT ISSUES IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AND THE SINO-POLISH RELATIONS,” 30 SEPTEMBER 1965**

[Source: PRC FMA 109-02910-01, 75-76. Translated for CWIHP by Xi Zhao.]

[...]

Lun-ke Talked about Issues in the International Communist Movement and the Sino-Polish Relations

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Transportation:

We invited Lun-ke [sic], Deputy Director of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of Polish Communist Party, for dinner on the 28th [of September] in an effort to bring the Polish party around. At dinner, we had a general discussion with Lun-ke and the atmosphere was amicable. From what we see, the foreign policy of the revisionist Poland is still founded on Polish-Soviet alliance, but Poland is nevertheless reluctant to fall out with us. Lun-ke said: the Polish-Soviet alliance is a bottom-line issue and the achievements of the Polish-Soviet relations in the past two decades after the end of the World War II are fairly obvious. Talking about the Sino-Polish relations, he said that “The Sino-Polish relations cannot be viewed as separate from the entire international communist movement and the Polish-Soviet relations. But it is Poland’s hope that the relations between China and Poland will not only maintain the status quo but further develop; there are however conditions to make such development possible. Thanks to the efforts of both sides, the Sino-Polish relations have circumvented many misunderstandings and tensions that have come up in other quarters. The Polish leadership has been paying great attention to it [the development of relations with China]. For example, in his public talks about the debate, Gomulka always stressed on the achievements, role and deserved status of China and the Chinese Communist Party. We believe that this is the only way that enables our two sides to maintain positive relations.” Poland, as it seems, shows no sign to want the Sino-Polish relations to go bad. Lun-ke said, “The China-Polish Joint

Stock Shipping Company is a concrete example of the effective economic cooperation between our two countries, where the achievements of the many years' cooperation between China and Poland are pretty obvious. Poland thinks that the problem of the company's ship routes, having been resolved, won't affect the political relations between the two countries. Poland hopes to maintain and develop the cooperation the two countries have in the company."

Our comrades at the company who are stationed in Gdansk were right to stick to the principles and take a firm stand in the recent anti-capitulation campaign, but their approaches were too blunt and simple and they did a not-so-good job in communicating with the Polish side. And because of that, until today, within the company, the internal mood and relationship between the two sides are still far from desirable. Apart from our effort to bring them [the Polish side] around, we hope that the company's Shanghai headquarters will pay attention to this problem.

Wang Guoquan
30 September 1965
[...]

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DOCUMENT NO. 23

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3725-59 FROM M. LUCIEN PAYE, 16 NOVEMBER 1966

[Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1966 tome 2 (1Jun-31Dec) (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2006), 874-878. Translated for CWIHP by Garret Martin.]

Beijing, 16th November 1966
Received at..... 13h15
M. Lucien Paye, French Ambassador in Beijing

to

M. Maurice Couve de Murville, Foreign Minister

Telegram number 3725-59
Limited Distribution

A few weeks ago, I had mentioned to the Protocol Services my imminent departure for France, adding that I would be available if the Foreign Minister wanted to see me before then. I was told this morning that M. Chen Yi would see me an hour later. We had a nearly two hour conversation during which we mostly discussed domestic questions and the Cultural Revolution, as well as the Vietnamese question.

I started the meeting by saying that during my trip to Paris, the personalities that I would surely meet would undoubtedly ask me questions about Chinese policy, and in particular the actions of the Red Guards. Before leaving, I wanted to make sure I got information from the best possible source.

The Foreign Minister, to give me time to think, then asked me to first start by mentioning how I viewed the situation. To direct his presentation, I referred to what President Mao Zedong had told me in September 1964 on the necessity to allow the youth to prove itself, and I emphasized the points on which we wanted more information: organization of the movement, origin of the participants, differences between cities and regions, control from the party or the army, durability of the movement, etc...

M. Chen Yi, using a presentation that he cherishes, made sure to place this period within a vast historical framework, which allowed him to both give a general value to the current episode of the revolutionary movement and to limit the importance of the hesitations that we have witnessed recently. He recalled, according to a well known approach, the development of revolutionary forces delineated by the great upheavals of 1789, 1917, 1949, and even referred, as he had already done with me, to the Paris Commune.

As for the Red Guards, he admitted that their creation had stirred some criticisms, with some sharing their reservations and others expressing their fears. But one could only pass judgment in a few years. We had noted after several years the success of the people's communes, which had been criticized by the Soviets. In the same way, for the Red Guards, facts and experience will help to convince the skeptics and the opponents.

It is a movement that started spontaneously before 18th August, but which was sanctioned by the first demonstration to which Mao Zedong took part. From the start, President Mao approved, supported and directed this movement. It is an

organization that is specific to universities and schools. There are ten million students in higher and secondary education, and there is roughly the same number of Red Guards. Responding to one of my questions, M. Chen Yi acknowledged that not all students were Red Guards, and there was freedom to join the movement or stay away. Nonetheless, he still believed that only a minority had chosen to stay aside.

I tried to get the Minister to say more about the importance of the opposition that he had referred to during his presentation, but he only stuck to general considerations. We can note many oppositions and different ideas. That is normal as all factions must be able to express themselves. There are some bourgeois factions, others who are tempted by revisionism. There are even some elements interested in the United States, which is not surprising considering the important number of Chinese who were trained in that country. Currently, we are witnessing many debates that are of interest not only to the Red Guards, but also for the general public, and that is how we can reach a consensus. But in the end, decisions will be made by Mao, by the Central Committee, and the Council of State Affairs, who determine policies.

Through these developments, the main idea that M. Chen Yi wanted to put forward was that the vast majority of the population agrees on a certain number of fundamental principles like the construction of socialism, the fight against imperialism, the support for the party and President Mao, but that opinions can diverge on more specific problems. Yet, he refused to say more about the points that are subject to opposition, or about their scale.

The Minister finished this part of the conversation by reminding me, as he had said earlier before, that the current movement also aimed to strengthen China's defense capacity. In case of an American aggression, the movement is ready to support a war effort. 'As a Marshal, he added, I am very satisfied. I hope that the time comes where I could lead, on the front, millions of Chinese, including the Red Guards, in the struggle against the American aggressor. Maybe the Red Guards have made some criticisms against me, but that did not prevent them from obeying my orders'. I have the impression that my interlocutor, by replacing the Red Guards' movement in the context of China's revolutionary history, was trying to reduce it to a limited episode, 'to a little wave' to use his expression.

The words of the Foreign Minister on the possibility of a war with the United States allowed me to shift to the question of a settlement of the Vietnamese conflict. I brought up the declarations of General de Gaulle in Phnom Penh, as well as those in his press conference and the known position of the French government.

M. Chen Yi indicated that these texts had been studied carefully in Beijing. He reminded me that it was thanks to the General de Gaulle that friendship had been restored between China and France, and he expressed his approval of the 'opposition policy to the dominance of the two superpowers' led by our country. China, he added, agrees with the demand made by General de Gaulle calling for the withdrawal of American military bases: they have been removed from France, while the United States have still not left our province in Taiwan.

In the same way, the Chinese government agrees with France to oppose the nuclear monopoly of the United States and the USSR. It would be very dangerous, added the Minister, to provide nuclear weapons to West Germany. The latter, like Japan, can be a source of war. True, it is hard for us to talk about German affairs, but we hope that General de Gaulle can have a positive and peaceful influence there.

As for Vietnam, when General de Gaulle called on the United States to withdraw their armed forces from the country, he is expressing a correct opinion. In Phnom Penh, he proposed that the interested parties negotiate to solve the problem: these words imply that we recognize the rights of the NLF. We agree on these points. That proves the depth of the Sino-French friendship.

The Minister then dismissed the idea of a resort to the Geneva conference to settle the Vietnamese problem: that would be a trap laid out by the United States, which want Great Britain and the USSR to convene a new meeting. They have already sabotaged a conference and can sabotage another. 'We are not advocating that the five powers, or the six powers, solve world problems through negotiations. We are not interested in the policy of the great powers'. World problems, he added, must be solved by all countries, big and small. And to avoid any confusion, he briefly took up the usual argument against the UN, dominated by the United States.

I brought the discussion back to the Vietnamese problem by recalling two essential points of General de Gaulle's declarations: the necessary participation of China in any negotiation on this question, and a call on the United States to accept to make a commitment to withdraw their forces within a determined delay.

In his reply, M. Chen Yi clearly defined the three positions that had surfaced until now on this problem: we start negotiations, and the withdrawal of troops happens afterwards, during the negotiation; we first ask a guarantee from the United States on the withdrawal and then we start the negotiation; we demand the withdrawal of American forces before the start of any negotiation. 'Vietnam, he told me, has spoken in favor of the third position, and we agree with it'.

Asked about whether or not China would also support Vietnam if it agreed to the second position, the Minister replied, as he had already done so on 14th July 1965: 'The Vietnamese have the final word in this affair and we cannot speak for them. However, if they asked our opinion, we would advise them to fight until the end'. He explained his perspective by indicating that the United States had not fulfilled promises in the past, especially towards China: their promises were not sufficient. As I alluded to the influence and the eventual guarantee of the other powers interested in a settlement, including France, M. Chen Yi replied that the United States would not listen to the opinions of others.

During the meeting, M. Chen Yi came back several times to the Sino-Soviet dispute. He first mentioned that the people's communes had allowed China to take a step that the USSR had not dared to make. He then spoke about the critical and skeptical attitude of the Soviets towards the Red Guards movement. Our opponents, he said, spoke too quickly on this subject. Moscow will maybe be threatened one day by that danger. The Soviet leaders do not see the ardor of the Soviet youth that surfaced during the struggle against fascism. Sooner or later, it will reveal itself.

Mentioning the 'repression' methods used by the Soviet leaders, the Minister brought up once again the Chinese and Asian student protests in front of the United States' embassy in Moscow, and the police intervention. 'This kind of tragedy, he concluded, would not have happened in Lenin and Stalin's time'.

I took advantage of my meeting with the Foreign Minister to bring up the question of the French exhibition in Shanghai: we are thrilled, I said, with the welcome given to this event and of the interest shown by the many Chinese visitors. However, the exhibition organizers felt that the level of commercial affairs have not matched until now this friendly atmosphere. I was planning to discuss this subject with the Ministry of External Trade: I still wanted to bring this up before hand with M. Chen Yi. He listened with attention and promised to intervene with the Ministry of External Trade.

I indicated to M. Chen Yi that I recently seen the Director of Consular Affairs of the Foreign Ministry in regard to the building dispute and briefly repeated the French position on this matter: we did not want to start discussing details, but we would hope that in exchange for the buildings that we would return to China, we could benefit from additional means to build a new Embassy according to our plans.

I added to the Minister that we would include in this total the wage of the workers that would complete the work. Then, without responding directly, he asked me to work in Paris to ensure the return of the two buildings of the Embassy of China,

adding that the other questions would be easy to settle. He also expressed the wish that the new embassy could be built quickly.

I briefly mentioned with Chen Yi the question of Sino-French cultural relations. Reminding him that France had kept the Chinese students and researchers, I expressed the hope that our own scholarship students could return to China next year. The Minister replied that they would recover their spot at the start of the academic term: for the moment, there are no classes, as we could see. As for the start of the academic term, it might take place either in May, in July or in the fall. We did not know yet. The youth had started a long march, and we cannot make precise plans for the moment.

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DOCUMENT NO. 24

NOTE NUMBER 48 FROM LOUIS DE GUIRINGAUD TO HIS EXCELLENCY M. COUVE DE MURVILLE, "RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES," 18 JANUARY 1968

[Source: Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France. Obtained for CWIHP by Enrico Fardella and translated for CWIHP by Garret Martin.]

French Embassy in Japan
Note number 48
Tokyo, 18 January 1968
Confidential
Louis de Guiringaud
French Ambassador in Japan

to

His Excellency M. Couve de Murville
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Asia-Oceania Department

Relations between Communist countries

During a recent conversation, Polish Ambassador M. Domagala gave me some information about Poland's relations with China and North Korea, which highlight in a clear manner the relations between Communist countries. Before coming to Tokyo, my colleague was in charge for two-three years of Asian affairs in the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw, which adds a certain interest to his words.

It had always been difficult, according to the Ambassador, to expect normal behavior from the authorities in Beijing. The latter tended to treat smaller countries in a way that would surprise many, if it was widely known amongst the public in Poland. That behavior had always existed, even in 1955, 1956 or 1957, when conflicts between member states of the Communist camp had not yet broken out. Mao Zedong considered himself as the heir of the Chinese Emperors and treated the Ambassadors as such. The latter could expect to be convened at any time of the day or night and hosted anywhere, with Mao Zedong calling on them either near a swimming pool, only wearing a swimming trunk, or in his bedroom. In that last case, he would be in his bed and would not offer any of the tea he was being served to the Ambassadors, pretexting that he was ill. During an official visit to China, the President of the Polish Republic had been subject to that treatment: M. Ochab's predecessor had only been given a delay of fifteen minutes to put on his suit and tie and rush to see Mao, who had requested his presence at three in the morning.

The Polish Ambassador added that his colleague posted in Beijing had fallen ill because of the bad treatment from the Chinese authorities. When you protested to the latter, they would not hesitate to remind you that China had 600 Million people and Poland only 30. Warsaw is looking for a new Ambassador, but there does not seem to be many candidates.

M. Domagala spoke with the same candidness of the problems that his country had experienced in the past with North Korea. The regime established by Kim Il Sung was 'Stalinist'. Around 1963, he had not hesitated to kidnap North Korean citizens who were studying in Poland and wanted to remain there, rather than return to North Korea where they were being recalled. The Polish police had managed to find them in the train where they had been forced to board. The Polish government had then granted them asylum.

In the same way, the Pyongyang authorities had not hesitated to expel the European wives that Korean student interns had met in the Communist Eastern European

countries and that they had brought back to North Korea. This expulsion had led to human dramas that the Ambassador still remembered all too well.

‘Westerners only tend to think of the difficulties they have in their own relations or in their relations with the socialist countries. They forget the problems that the Communist countries experience in their mutual relations’ concluded my Polish colleague philosophically.

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DOCUMENT NO. 25

NOTE NUMBER 291 FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF ASIA-OCEANIA, “CHINA AND THE EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA,” 3 SEPTEMBER 1968

[Source: Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France. Obtained for CWIHP by Enrico Fardella and translated for CWIHP by Garret Martin.]

Paris, 3 September 1968

Note number 291, Department of Asia-Oceania

Note

China and the events in Czechoslovakia

Since the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, the worsening of the Sino-Soviet dispute has led Beijing to harden its positions towards ‘modern revisionism’ and to treat all the people’s democracies that gravitate in Moscow’s orbit with the same suspicion. Only Romania, because of the independent policy it practiced towards the Kremlin, had received a preferential treatment from China. Czechoslovakia was lumped together with the Soviet Union. The incidents provoked in Prague in early 1967 by Chinese students, who were later declared *persona non grata* by the Czechoslovak authorities, as well as the expulsion in December 1967 of the correspondent of the CTK agency in Beijing, had only further aggravated relations between both countries. The preparation of the world conference of communist parties, to which the Prague leaders had participated actively by hosting various

meetings in Karlovy-Vary, had given a chance for the Chinese press to virulently stigmatize Czechoslovakia's attitude.

The process of liberalization started by M. Dubcek early this year had only reinforced the mistrust of the Chinese leaders towards a new manifestation of revisionist decay in a socialist country. However, until these last few weeks, China, torn between refusing to back any liberal evolution within the communist movement and its desire to take advantage of Soviet difficulties, had taken a cautious stance. The brutal occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies would push China to go on the offensive.

After the customary delay in China, tied to the difficulties of getting the heavy bureaucratic machinery going, the Chinese radio and press unleashed on the 23rd August against the 'monstrous crime' and the 'atrocious repression' perpetuated by the Russians in Czechoslovakia. On the same day, these attacks were taken up and officially sanctioned by Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, during a speech at a reception hosted by the Romanian Ambassador for his country's national holiday. Until the end of August, not a day has gone by without the press condemning the 'fascist invasion' of Czechoslovakia and, after the Moscow compromise, the 'betrayal' of the Prague leaders. In a very unusual fashion, the Xinhua news agency went as far as publishing a special issue on 30th August on the events in Czechoslovakia which included all the main dispatches published since the intervention by the troops from the Warsaw Pact countries.

An analysis of the dispatches and the official Chinese reactions gives an insight into the scale of the new anti-Soviet campaign initiated by Beijing. To be fair, this was a good opportunity for the Chinese leaders to bring up all the grievances that they had been developing for years against the Kremlin leaders and to draw, once again, some conclusions.

The violence of the attacks by the press and the Chinese leaders against the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies contrasts with the ambiguity of the position adopted by Beijing.

Virulence of the tone: Zhou Enlai's speech attacks the 'savage fascist nature' of the 'renegade and traitorous clique' of the Soviet revisionists. He compares the surprise attack of Czechoslovakia to 'Hitler's aggression' of 1939 and the American intervention in Vietnam. The tenor taken by the Prime Minister set the tone for the stream of insults spread by the press.

Ambivalence of the attacks: the Chinese leaders find a way to tie together 'the

revisionist Soviet leading clique' and 'the revisionist Czechoslovak leading clique'. It is the fear of seeing the latter try to establish contacts with the American and West German imperialists that supposedly provoked the Soviet intervention. After the Moscow compromise, 'Dubcek's clique' is accused of having betrayed their country's interests by openly calling on their people to submit to the occupier.

Skill of the polemic: the Chinese press contrasts the acts of resistance from the population with the 'shameful capitulation' of the Czechoslovak leaders who allegedly sacrificed their state's sovereignty by agreeing to 'Moscow's dirty bargain'. So the ideological requirements, which forbid any complacency towards revisionist deviations, are reconciled with the desire to take advantage of Soviet difficulties. Relying on the Maoist theory of armed struggle, Beijing is calling for a national resistance movement that would undo the Moscow agreement and bring to an end the revisionist bloc.

Beijing had some personal reasons to complain about the intervention of the Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia. During the first week of occupation, it seems that the Soviet troops had only limited respect for diplomatic immunities. On 26th August, the Chinese Foreign Ministry made a 'serious protest' to the Soviet *chargé d'affaires* in Beijing about the repeated intrusion of Soviet troops in the buildings of the Chinese embassy in Prague. The Chinese government expressed its indignation about these 'very serious actions' that directly threaten the security and activities of its embassy. The protest has stayed at this formal stage. It is noteworthy that Beijing has not engaged in any great collective rallies in retaliation, as had happened in early 1967 in front of the Soviet embassy.

The Chinese seem more comfortable today remaining on the field of doctrinal disputes. The campaign orchestrated by the press and the Beijing leaders has sought to discredit the alleged reasons put forth by Moscow to justify its intervention, and to instead reveal the real motivations driving Moscow.

The People's Daily on the 23rd August sarcastically denounced the motivations put forward by the 'Soviet revisionists': defending the gains of socialism, preserving peace in Europe, and the strategic interests of the socialist camp. How can they talk of defending the gains of socialism, an indignant commentator stated, when they have spread 'modern revisionism' throughout a great number of socialist countries? How can they reinforce peace by pursuing a policy of aggression? How can they pretend to preserve the solidarity between parties, when their camp is riddled with 'deception and blackmail', tugging and internal struggles?

According to Beijing, imperialism and colonialism are the real motivations of the Soviet policy. Moscow is openly accused of wanting to build a ‘colonial empire’ so to divide the world with the United States. As for the nature of the ideology in Kremlin, Zhou Enlai described it as ‘social-imperialism’ and ‘social-fascism’ in his 23rd August speech. Using Leninist terminology, a doctrinal article, published on 31st August in the People’s Daily, defined ‘social-imperialism’ as ‘imperialism under the banner of socialism’.

Chinese commentators are claiming that the Prague events will serve as a ‘new lesson’ for the Czechoslovak people. For its part, China drew two lessons – always the same – from the Soviet intervention: it confirmed once again the decay of the revisionist bloc and the policy of open collaboration between the United States and the USSR.

The Czechoslovak events proved the ‘complete bankruptcy of modern revisionism’ (Xinhua on 23rd August). By only supporting the Czechoslovak people in their desire to resist the occupier, the Chinese leaders were careful not to take sides with either of the two ‘cliques’ in power in Prague and Moscow. This is a ‘dog fight’: true revolutionaries can only be indifferent in front of this ‘grand brawl between revisionist cliques’.

The Chinese press has tried, with greater difficulty, to show that the Soviet aggression against Czechoslovakia is a product of Soviet-American collusion. The armed occupation of the country, which follows the logic of the ‘sinister Glassboro meeting’, supposedly happened with the ‘tacit consent’ of the United States (Beijing Radio on 26th August). It is true that three days earlier, the same source was claiming that the ‘clique of Czechoslovak renegade revisionists’ were only thinking about establishing contacts with the American imperialists and that the Soviet intervention was trying to prevent that from happening. We can see that Beijing’s propaganda is not bothered by contradictions.

To be fair, the Chinese are trying to make a connection between the situation in Czechoslovakia and Vietnam. Picking up on the argument of a major English newspaper, Xinhua does not hesitate to claim that ‘the United States gave *carte blanche* to Russia in Czechoslovakia, just as Russia gave *carte blanche* to the United States in Vietnam’. For his part, Zhou Enlai declared on the 2nd September during North Vietnam’s national holiday: ‘Since American imperialism recognized that Czechoslovakia and the rest of Eastern Europe were in Soviet revisionism’s sphere of influence, returning the favor would naturally mean that Soviet revisionism recognize

the Middle East, South Vietnam and the rest of South-East Asia as being part of American imperialism's sphere of influence'. By insisting on the connections between the Czechoslovak and Vietnamese problems, it seems that the Beijing leaders are also trying to criticize Hanoi's support for the Kremlin's approach.

The position adopted by China during the Czechoslovakia affair has allowed Beijing to make a spectacular comeback on the world's political stage. It is clear that the expressions of support for the Czechoslovak people are only circumstantial. The aim of the approach is both to add to the Soviets' embarrassment, by condemning their adventurous initiative, and to indirectly criticize the peace negotiations between Hanoi and Washington by firmly emphasizing the necessity of 'armed resistance'.

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DOCUMENT NO. 26

TELEGRAM NUMBER 5186/92, "CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY," 29 OCTOBER 1968

[Source: Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France. Obtained for CWIHP by Enrico Fardella and translated for CWIHP by Garret Martin.]

London, 29 October 1968

Received..... at 20h35

Telegram number 5186/92

Communicated by the Department to Beijing 206/12 – Hong Kong 114/20 –
Hanoi 190/96 – Moscow 1039/45 – Washington 3173/79 – Tokyo 30/36

Chinese Foreign Policy

The Bureau of Chinese Affairs in the Foreign Office notes that the Beijing government, despite the assets it holds, has not managed until now to rule out the perspective of a negotiated settlement of the Vietnamese conflict. If peace was achieved, not only would that strike a blow to the Maoist conception of revolutionary struggle, but this peace would also end the difficulties that are currently tearing apart America to China's great joy. Moreover, peace would benefit the Soviets who could

trump their conciliatory actions.

But, we are told, the Chinese will be forced to adapt to this less than ideal situation: they would not dare act in a way that could push North Vietnam to the Soviet side, and thus be harshly judged by world opinion. China's press has given up on mentioning Vietnam and finds consolation in bringing up the revolutionary struggles that are taking place in certain Western countries, such as France. But, to compensate in a more concrete manner its eventual Vietnamese setback, it is not impossible, according to the British services, that Beijing might increase its aid to insurrection movements in other Asian countries, especially Thailand and Burma. Such a policy would not necessarily be incompatible, up to a certain point, with the normalization of Sino-Burmese relations that we are currently witnessing. That said, taking everything into account, it is not impossible that the Beijing government might deem that it would have more to gain by returning to the Bandung principles rather than a full support for subversion. From this angle, the Foreign Office is waiting for the trip that Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi are supposed to be taking in certain Asian countries, noticeably Pakistan and Cambodia. But, whatever path the Chinese take, our interlocutors believe it is unlikely that China will regain an undisputed influence with Hanoi, even in peacetime.

Chinese foreign policy, we are told, can be explained less by the enduring debate in Beijing that pits 'revolutionaries' against 'pragmatics', and more by the one between anti-Soviets and anti-Americans. The latter could accept an ideological truce with the USSR in order to have a freer hand to fight American influence in the world. But for Mao Zedong, whose point of view has now prevailed, the number one enemy is the USSR. All methods are acceptable to fight the latter. This explains the alternative use, or even simultaneous use, of a revolutionary tactic and a moderate tactic. The current ambiguity of China's policy is less visible at the strategic level – where undeniably anti-Soviet feelings are dominant – than in regard to tactics: on this level, the dispute between 'revolutionaries' and 'pragmatics' never ends. This analysis is substantiated, we are told, by the continuous deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations and the growing tension on the borders between both countries. According to British experts, this tension does not signal war in the short term, but it does reveal the immense reciprocated mistrust between the two communist giants.

Signed Geoffroy Chodron de Courcel

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DOCUMENT NO. 27**ITALIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 27 NOVEMBER 1968**

[Source: Historical Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Obtained for CWIHP by Enrico Fardella and translated for CWIHP by Joe Calì.]

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Rome, November 27, 1968
D.G.P.A. - Off. XI
CHINA

Italian Policy Towards the People's Republic of China

The vote on the resolution sponsored by Italy to set up a Study Committee to examine the issue of the Chinese seat at the United Nations had a decidedly negative outcome this year, even less favorable than the outcome of the two previous General Assembly meetings, i.e., since our proposal was launched.

It has become clear that our initiative needs to be abandoned in the future, since, with the gradual radicalization of international positions on the issue, it can only lead to increasingly ineffective results and undermine the seriousness of our effort without changing Italy's position in its bilateral relations with Beijing or that of China towards the United Nations.

It seems therefore appropriate to consider the most convenient policy for the future with regard to both **the problem regarding the recognition of the People's Republic of China** and that concerning the stance to be taken on the **issue of the admission of Beijing's representatives to the United Nations**.

These two problems, though not dependent on one another, must nevertheless be examined in tandem, in light of their inevitable connection.

A - The problem regarding the recognition of the PRC

1 - Since October 1, 1949, when the government of the PRC was formed in Beijing, the Italian Government, without any bias whatsoever, had regularly examined the issue of its recognition, but the attitude of the Chinese government - which had even invited all the powers represented in China to recognize it - was neither very receptive nor encouraging in actual practice and created a series of obstacles and hesitations that delayed our decision. Nonetheless, recognition seemed imminent at the beginning of 1950 until the outbreak of war in Korea and Chinese intervention led to the decision to put the initiative aside.

Then, for a number of years, the Italian government adopted the policy of linking the granting of recognition to the resolution of the issue of admission of PRC representatives to the United Nations.

It did not seem appropriate to establish diplomatic relations with the Chinese government for several reasons.

The United Nations had always refused to recognize the delegates of the Beijing government (declared an “aggressor” during the Korean War) as the legitimate representatives of China, and hence to allow them to occupy the seat. The policy of Communist China towards India and Southeast Asia, as well as its activities in the international arena in general, did not seem to indicate, moreover, that it intended to resort to peaceful means to solve international disputes, thus violating one of the basic tenets of the Charter of the United Nations.

Beijing’s refusal to adhere to the Moscow agreement on the partial suspension of nuclear tests was an additional obstacle and underscored the continued aggressive stance of the Chinese.

Ultimately, the Italian government took the view that, until China’s seat at the United Nations was occupied by the representatives of the Taipei government, with which Italy has diplomatic relations, it would be impossible to proceed with a recognition that could be interpreted as a means of exerting pressure on decisions for which the majority of UN Member States did not deem the time had come yet.

On the other hand, the Beijing government, for its part, seemed against

establishing diplomatic relations with those countries, including Italy, which had relations with Taipei and were not willing to break them.

- 2 - However, once the political landscape of the composition of our Parliament and Government changed, our policy was reviewed, considering “in principle” that any recognition would have to come before and not follow admission to the UN in order to have any value for Beijing.

At the beginning of 1964 something new occurred: the French government decided to grant Beijing recognition regardless of UN decisions and without prior consultation with the Allies.

Italy's new stance was set out on February 14, 1964 by President Saragat who, speaking as Minister of Foreign Affairs before the Senate, after repeating that the Italian government did not disregard the historical, political, administrative and de facto situation of Greater East Asia, made it clear that it was not a matter of knowing “if” our Government intended to come to an agreement with Beijing on the recognition of the legitimacy of the communist regime and its right to represent China, but rather “when”, in the interests of Italy and of the free Western world, it was most appropriate to grant such recognition. It was necessary to act quickly, constructively and not alone.

In a speech to the Lower House of Parliament in December 1964, President Saragat confirmed that “the Italian government's position on the recognition of the PRC is an open position,” but adding that, in his opinion, the events up to that moment were not in favor of a more rapid progression of the initiative.

A similar stance was taken on November 19, 1965 in the Senate when President Moro confirmed that “the recognition of the Beijing government is not something we deem impossible. But then again, in the interest of peace, it is necessary for it to come at the right moment.” This same concept was expressed repeatedly in both the Upper and Lower Chambers of Parliament by Foreign Minister Fanfani.

This state of affairs lasted for the whole of 1965, 1966, 1967 and part of 1968. In fact, both the worsening of the situation in Vietnam and the American escalation on the one hand, and the internal turmoil in China caused by the “Cultural Revolution” on the other, made the issue less topical and its solution

increasingly complicated.

- 3 - However, in 1968, two events of the utmost importance occurred with regard to the problem at hand.

The Cultural Revolution in China has gradually lost impetus and there are unmistakable signs of a softening of the Chinese stance in the international arena.

The U.S. decision to suspend bombings of North Vietnam and establish contacts between the Americans and North Vietnamese in Paris have led to what seems to be a crucial turning point in the Vietnamese situation. There are promising signs that the talks in Paris, which also see the participation of representatives of the government in Saigon and the National Liberation Front, will soon reach a decisive stage. Although the path is still long and difficult, especially when it comes to negotiating the substantive political issues, we can legitimately hope that the de-escalation of military operations is now on the right track and that the Vietnam question will be discussed less and less on the battlefield and increasingly at the negotiating table.

The Chinese attitude towards the latest developments in the Vietnam crisis is not very clear: although basically unsatisfied, Beijing does not seem to want to raise insurmountable obstacles, probably because it cannot, given that Moscow's influence on Hanoi is now stronger than its own.

So we should now ask ourselves whether the time has come to fundamentally re-examine the issue of our recognition of the PRC and whether we should start considering that the "when", though not immediate, might be approaching.

- 4 - If, as expected, the government wishes to confirm its stance that the recognition of the PRC should come before the resolution of the issue regarding the presence of Beijing's representatives at the UN, then it is necessary to carefully assess the time and manner in which to address the issue without falling prey to the errors and misunderstandings which have affected other countries in the past.

The optimal solution would see recognition of the government in Beijing and the establishment of normal diplomatic relations, without being forced to break off relations with Taiwan, or at least leaving a similarly serious decision to the

government in Taipei.

The previous cases involving Great Britain and France may be useful in clarifying what chance we have of achieving this result:

- a) It seems unrealistic to expect the same treatment as Great Britain, which, as we all know, is the only country that has diplomatic relations with Beijing as well as a consulate in Taiwan. The importance of Hong Kong for the two Chinas is the reason for the preferential treatment that the two governments have granted Great Britain, but Beijing has decided not to accept a British ambassador in the capital of the PRC as a form of retaliation for the favor. The mission is still run by a charge d'affaires who was supposed to represent merely the first step towards establishing diplomatic relations.*

With regard to France's recognition of the Beijing Government, we were officially told at the time by French sources that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing did not imply other commitments with China; that France did not intend to break off its diplomatic relations with Taiwan by its own initiative; that while Beijing may have taken the opportunity to reaffirm that it was the sole legitimate representative of China, France, for its part, would remain silent on this issue.

Upon France's recognition of Beijing, the government of Taipei did not immediately break off diplomatic relations with France. France, for its part, did not take any initiative in this direction, confirming that the Beijing government did not establish this as a condition for recognition. The rift between Taipei and Paris came later on when Beijing demanded and obtained the return of a state-owned property. This property had belonged to China since before the formation of the Taiwan government and had been occupied by Taipei's representatives until then – Beijing subsequently demanded that Taiwan's representatives be expelled from it.

Only then did Taiwan decide to break off relations and France was forced to recall its diplomatic representatives from Taiwan, although there had been no ambassador there for several months.

In Italy's case, please note that we have no diplomatic or consular agencies in Taiwan and that the agencies of the Taipei government in Italy (embassy in

Rome and consulate in Milan) are not located in state-owned property to which Beijing could lay claim.

Therefore, if we obtained the same conditions as France, the practical issues that led Formosa to break off diplomatic relations would not be present, and we could limit ourselves to a completely passive attitude, but it should be noted that there is a strong interest on the part of the Taipei government to retain an agency in Rome, as this represents one of the few left in the West.

With regard to Beijing, it does not seem impossible for it to choose the solution by which it disregards the existence of diplomatic relations between Italy and Taiwan and treats us in the same way it does France considering that it now has greater interest in obtaining recognition by Western countries than in January 1964 when its domestic and foreign policy seemed more solid.

- 5 - With regard to the potential repercussions resulting from our possible action in the international arena, we must consider especially those that might occur in the United States of America. Within the Atlantic Alliance there are many countries that have diplomatic relations with Beijing, while some others, such as Canada and Belgium, have repeatedly examined the possibility of establishing relations.

As for the United States, it should first be noted that in America today there are many lines of thought geared towards a total review of relations with the PRC and that the desirable, and now no longer unlikely, conclusion of the Vietnam affair has significantly changed the perspective of the problem.

It is interesting to observe that at the time of Beijing's recognition by Paris, we were told by the Americans that Washington criticized above all the "timing" chosen by France for the step it was about to take. In addition, the United States "has no bias against the recognition of mainland China and agrees that, in a more or less distant future, this will become inevitable." Washington did not fail to remind the French that many American soldiers were still falling in South Vietnam under the fire of Chinese arms, and ultimately, the United States declared that they intended to persuade Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] not to break off relations with France by his own initiative.

The situation today seems quite different from that seen in January 1964:

“timing” does not seem to be critical; military operations in Vietnam are subsiding. There is no reason why the United States should not want to adopt a much more flexible stance in the current state of affairs.

- 6 - Examining Asian policy from a broader perspective, it must be acknowledged that many anti-communist Asian countries fear a total U.S. disengagement from Southeast Asia, due to the threat of a renewed hegemonic thrust by China.

A step towards the reintegration of the Chinese government in the international community, as the establishment of diplomatic relations with a Western country as important as Italy would represent, may have a significance that goes beyond the value of the fact in itself, and serve to provide reassurance on the shift of China's policy towards the acceptance of democratic methods at least with regard to international relations. It would also mean that Beijing is willing to abandon the self-imposed isolation in which it currently seems to be locked, and which certainly does not help the cause of détente and world peace.

- 7 - Moscow's reaction – and that of the other Communist countries - to such steps remains to be seen. It is clear that, at least in appearance, the Communist world in general and Moscow in particular can only be in favor of recognition of the PRC by Italy.

It is true that the Soviet Union might have some reservations in the convenience of a strengthening of the international position of Beijing; there is no doubt that the Sino-Soviet conflict is becoming increasingly worse. Moscow, however, could ultimately see Beijing's possible acceptance of establishing diplomatic relations with Italy according to the above conditions as a desire on the part of the PRC to reach a détente, with a view to clarifying relations between the two poles of world Communism.

- 8 - In conclusion, a possible recognition of the PRC offers positive aspects that seem to offset potential negative effects.

The following considerations should, however, be kept in mind:

- a) a clear pre-negotiation process would be necessary, to agree on a few basic points with a view to avoiding surprises. The establishment of “full” diplomatic relations should not be subject to a break in relations between Italy and Taiwan, and this, however, should not happen by Italian initiative;

- b) b) if Taiwan does not deem similar steps necessary, Italy would be the first country in the world to have regular relations with both Beijing and Taipei. This would give credit to and consolidate “de facto” a theory hitherto always rejected by both sides, namely that there need not be “two Chinas”, but rather - as already proposed in the international arena - “one China and one Taiwan.” This solution seems, moreover, to be the only one that can lead us out of the current deadlock;
 - c) c) in the field of domestic policy, recognition of the PRC would provide a favorable response to the pressing demands of Italian public opinion and eliminate one of the many sources of disagreement used by the opposition to create difficulties for the Government;
 - d) d) it is worth taking the calculated risk of a decision by Taiwan to break off relations, without ignoring the fact that this could lead to negative repercussions in the field of commercial relations between Italy and Taiwan;
 - e) e) it would be appropriate to immediately inform the Allied governments, and especially the United States, of our intentions, presenting our effort as a contribution to international detente aimed at indirectly promoting future progress in negotiations on the Vietnam crisis;
 - f) f) we should not deceive ourselves with regard to our chances of influencing PRC policy in a decisive manner, even though our action would still be useful as a contribution to overcoming Beijing’s current isolation in the international arena;
- 8) we must also avoid the belief that the aforementioned recognition could lead to substantial favorable changes in commercial relations between Italy and the PRC. Experience has taught us that China keeps the political and economic aspects of its relations with foreign countries well separated. In fact, the volume of trade is often much larger with countries that have not recognized the Beijing government compared with others with which there are regular diplomatic relations.

B - Issue of the admission of Beijing’s representatives to the United Nations

- 1 - It is clear that if the Italian government confirms its willingness to set a priority

between the issue of recognition and the admission of Beijing's representatives to the United Nations, the latter will take on a consequential aspect and the approach adopted so far will have to be changed completely.

Our position when voting on UN resolutions concerning the Chinese seat will also depend on the effect that our recognition of the PRC has on the government of Taiwan.

- 2 - If Taipei were to decide to break off diplomatic relations with us, it is obvious that, in the future, we could maintain a position similar to that of the British, that is, voting in favor of the admission of Beijing's representatives, while insisting on the "importance" of the issue itself when voting in favor.
- 3 - If Formosa were to decide to accept our recognition of Beijing without breaking off relations with us, our voting position would have to be better set out.

In such a case, we should vote in favor of any resolution that allows the presence of the Beijing's representatives in the United Nations without affecting the permanence of Taiwan within the organization. In the case of resolutions which consider the exclusion of Taipei's representatives (the Albanian proposal, for example), we should abstain from voting, as a resolution of this kind would be acceptable to us only with regard to the admission of Beijing's representatives to the UN, and not as far as the expulsion of Taiwan is concerned.

We should, however, continue to vote in favor of the "importance" of the issue as a matter of principle.

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DOCUMENT NO. 28

NOTE FROM THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "CHINESE ISSUE," 20 DECEMBER 1968

[Source: Historical Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Obtained for CWIHP by Enrico Fardella and translated for CWIHP by Joe Calì.]

Copy No. 1
 SECRET
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 The Director General of Political Affairs
 Rome, December 20, 1968

SECRET NOTE

Chinese issue

1. The situation in the Far East and Southeast Asia has recently seen some new facts that are listed below and which can lead us to review the policy we have followed in this region especially with regard to Communist China:
 - a) Washington's and Hanoi's decision to start talks in Paris to put an end to the Vietnam War. In the light of this fact, Chinese leaders now seem to be bracing for an inevitable negotiated solution and hence for the need to have a say;
 - b) the opening of the Beijing government to Washington for the resumption of direct talks in Warsaw. This opening has been characterized by the Chinese initiative of discussing "coexistence";
 - c) the end of the Cultural Revolution ordered by Mao Zedong to rein in the excesses that had substantially tarnished China's international prestige and its economic situation;
 - d) the repercussions in China of the events in Prague and above all the formulation of the new doctrine on the USSR's right to intervene in socialist countries;
 - e) a more direct involvement of Beijing as a result of said "doctrine" and the increased tensions with the USSR over Albania and the situation in the Mediterranean.
2. All these facts lead us to deduce, among other things, that the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China is evolving towards a less rigorous and more open stance towards the Western world. The attacks made by Chinese communist propaganda have shifted gradually away from the West towards

the USSR. It could actually be said that Beijing fears a convergence of Soviet and American interests to the detriment of China, with the two superpowers splitting the world into spheres of influence.

3. In order to take account of the consequences of the facts listed above—and of whether these will be confirmed in coming months—in our policy, especially towards the People's Republic, it should be borne in mind that Italy's stance with regard to Beijing's recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations has been characterized in recent years first by the statement made in 1964 by Saragat, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which he refers to Beijing's recognition as not a question of "if" but rather of "when" and second by our repeated initiatives for the creation of a study committee dedicated to the issue of China's UN seat.

Since it has not been possible to tackle the first issue so far due to a series of circumstances (attack on India, complications in Southeast Asia, etc.), efforts have been made with regard to the other issue through our repeated initiatives.

These too have met with significant difficulties which, at present, do not appear surmountable.

4. The problem of the normalization of bilateral relations with China has two aspects:
 - a) recognition of the People's Republic;
 - b) establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing.

This problem has been addressed by Western countries at different times and with different methods. Some countries, such as Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands, immediately recognized Mao's government at the time of the occupation of Nanjing. This decision did not lead to the immediate establishment of diplomatic relations, but to a long and humiliating wait. Only later did the Chinese government decide to accept the exchange of ambassadors (except in Britain's case, which, having wanted to keep—as it does—its consulate in Taiwan, has never been able to obtain accreditation for an ambassador in Beijing and must limit itself to keeping there its charge d'affaires).

A different procedure was followed by France. Paris, like Italy and the

majority of Western governments, withdrew its representatives from China at the time of Mao's victory and continued to recognize the government of Taiwan. Only around the summer of 1962 did General de Gaulle send an exploratory mission led by Edgar Faure to Beijing, defined as "cultural". Under this cover, and through secret negotiations, the conditions by which France would at the same time recognize the Beijing government and establish diplomatic relations with China were set.

Mao Zedong did not demand—as he had always done before—that France break with Formosa, at least according to what was officially announced by the French. The Americans, for their part, claimed to have persuaded Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] not to break with Paris. The break came nonetheless by the initiative of the Chinese Nationalists when the French government ousted Taipei's representative from the Chinese state-owned building in Paris to return it to Beijing's representatives.

5. In view of the foregoing, if the government decided to consider the possibility of normalizing our position with the People's Republic of China, it would seem advisable to follow the method adopted by the French. It requires recognition to occur simultaneously to the establishment of diplomatic relations and that negotiations to this end are carried out in utmost secrecy. Moreover, it seems that Canada is following a similar procedure.

A prominent Italian figure of proven ability and reserve should then be entrusted with the task of going to Beijing on an "unofficial" commercial or cultural mission to sound out, with extreme caution and "in a personal capacity", the opinions of China's senior leaders on the issue of recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. Our envoy should not under any circumstance give away the actual intentions of the Italian government nor should these be publicized in any way.

It should be borne in mind that a similar procedure was successfully attempted when Senator Vittorelli visited China in 1964; this served to catalyze contacts that had already been under way for several months in Cairo with the embassy of the People's Republic of China for the opening in Rome and Beijing of non-governmental offices.

While establishing contacts in Beijing, the Chinese leaders should be

encouraged to express support for the recognition of China by Italy. The Italian side should solely limit itself to ensuring that China's desire be notified to and recommended with the government in Rome, provided our recognition is matched by the establishment of diplomatic relations.

This mission, which should have a very small number of delegates, should possibly be accompanied by an official of this Ministry (who may also be taken from the ICE mission to Beijing), with apparent cultural and commercial assignments.

Once we are sure of the intentions of the Chinese authorities, we can look to start secret diplomatic negotiations at one of the Chinese missions in Europe. The embassy of the People's Republic of China in Bern, which seems to be responsible for following Italian issues, could be considered the most appropriate venue for contacts. At this stage the Chinese should be informed that we are predisposed to proceeding with the "desired" recognition of their government, but without accepting different or more burdensome conditions than those apparently accepted by the French.

It is likely that the Chinese embassy will, at first, simply report to its government, which—if not interested in recognition according to the conditions that we propose—may not respond at all, or, according to a practice often adopted by Chinese, respond indirectly through Beijing's press in a particularly significant article.

In this case, we would have to review the entire issue and find new ways to address this question.

If the Chinese—as cannot be discounted, if the hypothesis of their current keen interest in re-establishing and strengthening international ties is correct—prove to be receptive to our proposals, negotiations should continue until acceptance by the Chinese of a manner of proceeding that is satisfactory to us.

If and when diplomatic contacts receive an encouraging initial response, it is time to declare our intentions to the Americans by presenting the positive aspects of a general relaxing of policy, and the purpose of preparing for a rapprochement between Washington and Beijing.

At the same time, secret U.S. support of the government of Taiwan could be

called for to avoid negative reactions by the latter. A similar effort was already made—as already mentioned—by Washington with Taipei to urge it not to break relations with France.

In a following phase, the possibility of sending a mission to Taiwan should also be considered, with a view to informing the government of our intentions, as done by France in 1963 when it sent General Pletchkoff, a personal friend of Jiang and De Gaulle, to Taipei—after Faure's trip to Beijing.

The development of contacts between Canada and Communist China that seem to have been underway for some time—with the same purpose of achieving recognition of mainland China and establishing diplomatic relations—may also provide useful information regarding the procedure to be followed after initial discussions in Beijing (which could be scheduled shortly after but anyhow once the new U.S. administration takes office).

It should be noted that negotiations with the Chinese are particularly difficult; it is expected that Beijing will insist on the following as conditions of resuming diplomatic relations with us: that we withdraw recognition of Taiwan; that we liquidate our previous interests in China; that we promise our support at the United Nations; that we compensate for alleged damage caused by us to Chinese ships during their stay in Italy; and that we make a statement declaring that we do not believe that China is responsible for the attack in Korea.

On our part, we should avoid that the resumption of relations with Beijing necessarily entail the denial of Taiwan (for obvious reasons of principle, as well as in relation to our policy of universality at the United Nations) and we should try to avoid any disavowal of our previous actions or stances, particularly at the United Nations.

We should also try to safeguard our interests in China, opening the way for the development of more favorable economic relations.

Finally, we must not forget that the purpose of the negotiation should be to normalize the legal situation, while avoiding undermining our relations with the United States and substantially altering our relations with the major countries of the Far East (e.g., Japan).

The progression of our action must, therefore, take into due account this

aspect of the problem.

Negotiations have a chance to succeed, at least without obligation to accept excessively burdensome conditions, only if one keeps in mind the absolute necessity to conduct all negotiations in the greatest secrecy. The press should not report on the trip to Beijing to be made by the Italian personality chosen, providing merely a brief account of this only if and when information is given by a Chinese source, making it difficult to avoid this issue.

SECRET

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DOCUMENT NO. 29

NOTE GÉRARD DE LA VILLESBRUNNE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER, "NEW INTEREST OF WESTERN DIPLOMACY TOWARDS CHINA: HOPES AND ILLUSIONS," 30 JANUARY 1969

[Source: Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France. Obtained for CWIHP by Enrico Fardella and translated for CWIHP by Garret Martin.]

Hong Kong, 30th January 1969
 Note number 94
 Gérard de la Villesbrunne
 French General Consul in Hong Kong

to

His Excellency the Foreign Minister
 Asia-Oceania Department

New interest of Western diplomacy towards China: hopes and illusions

The perspective of the end of the active phase of the Cultural Revolution, and an

international détente in South-East Asia that could allow for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese problem, has pushed certain Western countries to pursue a policy of 'open arms' towards Communist China. The Italian government, for domestic reasons, is on the verge of recognizing the Beijing regime. According to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Brussels should also follow suit soon. For its part, Canada, which already has important trade exchanges with China, has been considering for the last few months the possibility of a formal recognition of the Beijing government.

This spike in diplomatic activity is accompanied by a certain thaw in the Chinese policy of the great powers that have direct interests in Asia. Thus, during the Japan-America conference held from the 24th to the 26th January in Santa Barbara (California), Americans and Japanese seemed hopeful that tensions with Beijing could be lowered, and they reached an agreement on the means to use to renew contacts with Communist China (cultural exchanges, freedom of movement of private citizens, ending the embargo of continental China). Admittedly, President Nixon did find it necessary to cut short the rumors, which suggested his intention of pursuing a more flexible policy towards Beijing, by claiming on 27th January during a press conference that the United States was not willing to let China join the United Nations. But, he did not exclude a change of attitude from his government in the future, if Beijing changed its own policies.

In Japan, the 'thaw' is even clearer amongst political leaders. Under the pressure of the opposition, especially the Socialist Party, M. Sato was compelled to make certain declarations in front of the Japanese Diet on 27th January. Stating his hope that China would relax its positions in the future, he expressed his support for an 'open door' policy towards Beijing. Observers noted that, for the first time, the Japanese Prime Minister abstained from referring to the need to treat political and economic questions separately when talking about China. Tokyo's review of its Chinese policy will in all likelihood be the main theme of discussion during the meeting of Japanese diplomats, which will take place in Hong Kong on the 13th and 14th February.

All this diplomatic agitation even found an echo in the Philippines: President Marcos, speaking to the Congress on 27th January, made a plea in favor of 'peaceful co-existence' with China in the perspective of a withdrawal of American forces from the Asian continent.

Speculation is rife in Hong Kong, where the press is happy to give excessive attention to any sign of thaw observed in the attitude of non-communist countries towards China. Lauding the Italian and Canadian initiatives that are described here as

'realist', the local newspapers are wondering whether these countries will be compelled to break all ties with Taiwan if they recognize Beijing, or if the time has come for the international community to accept the 'two Chinas' theory. Some commentators underline the fact that the persistence of abnormal situations in the world (Germany, Korea, Vietnam) has not prevented many countries, be they communist or not, from maintaining relations with two state authorities from the same nation. To then believe that we can do the same with the 'two Chinas', this is a step taken too quickly by some.

There is no evidence from Taipei or Beijing that can confirm these speculations. Taiwan strongly condemned the openings made by Rome and Ottawa to the 'regime of the bandit Mao'. In Beijing, the press agencies have remained silent for the moment. But the communist newspapers of Hong Kong quickly denounced the 'two Chinas conspiracy' that the Italian and Canadian leaders are supposedly trying to pursue ('Hsin Wan Pao' [*Xin wan bao*] of 25th January). As for the Japanese government, it is very concerned by the threat of a growing commercial competition from Italy and Canada, and is facing strong pressure from its public opinion, which is pushing for the recognition of Communist China ("Ta Kung Pao" [*Dagong bao*] of 26th January). These reactions, even if local, do not foreshadow any change of attitude from Beijing that could be interpreted as a softening of its traditional position.

The idea that China and Taiwan could be compelled, through the maneuvers of Western diplomacy, to one day adopt under the guise of 'realism' the 'two Chinas' policy, is an illusion and a form of 'wishful thinking'. The diplomatic groups in Hong Kong most concerned by these rumors do not give them any credit. At most, it seems wise to them not to raise this problem immediately and to cautiously proceed with the renewal of contacts with China. Thus, the first stage of recognition would be followed by a second stage of exchanging ambassadors. A certain delay could take place between the two stages. Neither the Italians nor the Canadians are in a hurry in their current process, careful neither to rush Beijing nor to disappoint Taipei.

In any case, the stir among the small colony of the China observers, and which is feeding the most far-fetched speculations, can mostly be explained by the international context, which is showing signs of détente since the opening of talks on Vietnam and the announcement of the renewal of Sino-American contacts in Warsaw on 20th February. But China, still concerned by internal questions, does not seem to be willing to respond to the openings of non-communist countries with as much enthusiasm as hoped for in the West.

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DOCUMENT NO. 30**TELEGRAM NUMBER 1797/1800, "CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY,"
25 APRIL 1969**

[Source: Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France. Obtained for CWIHP by Enrico Fardella and translated for CWIHP by Garret Martin.]

London, 25 April 1969

Received..... at 20h00

Telegram number 1797/1800

Communicated by the Department to Beijing 64/67 – Washington 1020/23 –
Moscow 578/81 –Hong Kong 20/23

Chinese Foreign Policy

The Head of the Far East Department of the Foreign Office notes that the Beijing leaders are absorbed by the 9th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, giving them little time to focus on foreign policy.

Nonetheless, China does seem to be pursuing a more conciliatory line, as shown for example by the commercial agreement with the Yugoslavs, so to better fight Soviet influence and to probably prepare for a renewal of the dialogue with the Americans. Our interlocutor does not exclude the possibility of new border incidents with the USSR, since the Chinese know that the Soviets, already harshly criticized by many communist parties, cannot afford too strong a retaliation, as long of course as the incidents do not go exceed a certain scale. The Beijing government does possess therefore a certain margin of maneuver in regard to its borders, and it would be surprising if it did not use that margin to create difficulties for the USSR.

Moreover, China wishes to establish diplomatic ties with Canada, Italy and maybe other countries, which would strengthen its position for eventual discussions with the United States. On this issue, the Foreign Office believes that the Canadian Foreign Minister was careless by claiming *urbi et orbi* that his country is ready to recognize the

Beijing government even if this means a break with Taiwan. Canada, it is noted here, is thus weakening its position in its negotiation with Beijing and risks causing some dissatisfaction in America.

Our interlocutor feels that we will have a clearer view of Chinese foreign policy when Chinese ambassadors, who had returned home to be re-educated, will come back to their posts.

Signed Geoffroy Chodron de Courcel

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DOCUMENT NO. 31

NOTE NUMBER 399 FROM PIERRE CERLES TO MICHEL DEBRÉ, "CHINA AND EASTERN EUROPE," 16 MAY 1969

[Source: Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France. Obtained for CWIHP by Enrico Fardella and translated for CWIHP by Garret Martin.]

Beijing, 16th May
Note number 399
Pierre Cerles
French *Chargé d'affaires* in Beijing

to

His Excellency Michel Debré
Foreign Minister
- Asia-Oceania Department -

China and Eastern Europe

From the long and dull foreign policy report given by Lin Biao in front of the delegates of the 9th Congress, one small sentence reflects the current evolution of Chinese diplomacy: 'Since Stalin's death, Soviet leaders have moved from a phase of

opportunism to one of imperialism'. Between 1959 and 1968, Chinese propaganda went on the offensive and denounced a great power that had become conservative, which had sacrificed in Camp David or elsewhere the interests of world revolution and that of its Chinese and Cuban protagonists.

This evaluation, which inspired the famous editorials of April 1960 on Leninism and the dispute of both parties in 1963, remains valid. But the tone adopted here has taken on a far more defensive character: the Kremlin leaders, they claim here, are not confining themselves to maintaining 'chauvinistic' positions by seeking accommodation with Washington; they are engaged in a fierce competition with the United States, they are trying to develop their sphere of influence in the Middle East as in South Asia, and are increasing their grip on Mongolia and Eastern Europe. China is not solely defending the cause of world revolution against former Bolsheviks that have become bourgeois; it is claiming its solidarity with the nations that are threatened by the hegemonic tendencies of the 'new Tsars': so Lin Biao's report established a constant parallel between the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet 'encroachments' in the Ussuri region.

Seeking the support of nations which have, for various reasons, grievances against the USSR, Beijing is naturally compelled to attach more importance than previously to Moscow's difficulties in Eastern Europe. Since 1963, Chinese policy has sought in vain for a pressure point: Mao Zedong encouraged the formation of an 'intermediate zone' that could act as a counterweight for the Soviet-American hegemony; Zhou Enlai tried to rally the support of 'proletarian nations'. Yet, the results of these two openings remain limited: since 1965, Chinese influence has receded in Asia and, despite repeated commitments of financial assistance, has not experienced for the moment a spectacular development in Africa.

The Beijing leaders have not managed to get the Third World interested in their anti-Soviet dispute; and they were certainly impressed, during the invasion of Czechoslovakia, by the relative indifference of African and Asian governments. Mentioning the Prague events on 23rd August 1968, the Prime Minister had declared: 'that a great power was able to treat a smaller country in that way, this should serve as a profound lesson for those who have any illusions about American imperialism and Soviet revisionism'. This warning, sent in particular to Arab leaders, was barely followed, with the exception of a fairly useless protest from Dar es Salaam. In the same way, during the incidents in March 1969, the Chinese leaders were unable to stir an anti-Soviet campaign abroad.

The relative apathy of the Afro-Asian world has thus encouraged Beijing to show a renewed interest in Eastern Europe. In his speech on 23rd August, Zhou Enlai mentioned the division of this region in 'spheres of influence', he assured Romania of China's 'support' and he noted that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was a lesson for the people's democracies. This attention to the USSR's Western flank comes across in three ways:

1. Chinese propaganda has effectively stopped criticizing the Yugoslav leaders and seems to favor a Balkans agreement;
2. China hints that the 'betrayal' of the Soviet leaders justifies a re-examination of the USSR's Western borders;
3. The Maoist doctrine and China's example must convince the nations subjugated by Moscow that there is a more effective means of action than the Czechs' passive resistance.

During the active phase of the Cultural Revolution, propaganda barely distinguished the Soviet Union from its allies. The incidents of 1967 affected the embassies of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Mongolia; Polish and Bulgarian diplomats were scolded by the Red Guards. In April 1967, during the Karlovy-Vary conference, the Chinese press attacked the 'leading cliques' of all the people's democracies, including the 'Ulbricht clique of East Germany'. The Yugoslavs were not spared: their embassy was subjected to loud protests in 1967, and a correspondent from 'Tanjug' was expelled; the press and official speeches continued to stigmatize 'Tito's revisionism'. Only Romania was spared, but relations between both states remained formal and the Albanian press did not hesitate to criticize certain decisions by Bucharest, including the exchange of ambassadors with Bonn in February 1967.

After the Czechoslovak crisis, criticisms against the governments of the people's democracies progressively diminished in intensity. President Svoboda and M. Dubcek were described as 'Quislings' during the Moscow agreements, but since then a slightly disdainful silence has replaced this violent denunciation. Moreover, if the ambassadors of the 'socialist' states are still treated coldly – the East German representative was not invited the previous 1st May to salute Mao Zedong at the Tiananmen platform – the propaganda only concentrates its attacks on the Soviet Union. Thus, the 'Communist Party from Poland' led by M. Mijal in Tirana refrained, in its recent message to the

9th Congress, from making any references to M. Gomulka.

But this reserve is particularly obvious for Yugoslavia, which has stopped being vilified since the 20th August 1968. In 1967, Zhou Enlai had stigmatized 'Tito's treacherous clique' during Albania's national holiday. One year later, the Prime Minister refrained from making any offensive remarks towards Belgrade, and the Chinese press only covered in brief and moderate terms Albania's grievances in regard to the Albanian minority of Kozmets. Since that date no official speech has denounced 'Yugoslav revisionism', and some criticisms that appeared in the People's Daily were not taken up by Xinhua. On 15th March, at the height of the Sino-Soviet tension, Beijing and Belgrade signed a commercial agreement; a month earlier, the Chinese negotiators had suddenly accepted the Yugoslav negotiation proposals and had agreed to be more flexible on the settlement of exchanges. Trade between both countries, which only amounted to a million dollars in 1968, could undergo significant development in the next few years.

It is of course an exaggeration – and even ridiculous – to allude, like the Soviet press did, to a Sino-Yugoslav 'collusion'. But the Chinese leaders are certainly willing to spare a government determined to resist Soviet pressures. Last April, 'Zeri i Popullit' reluctantly admitted that Albanian-Yugoslav solidarity could become necessary in case of a brutal Soviet interference; M. Zhou Enlai had hosted the Albanian ambassador for a long meeting a few days before the publication of this editorial. The Prime Minister had evoked in September 1968 the threats that the 'Balkan nations' faced from Moscow. The Chinese press mentioned several times the presence of Soviet military units in Bulgaria; it also cited the Albanian declaration of support for Romania, but abstained from reproducing the passage about the 'ideological differences' between Bucharest and Tirana.

Most observers agree that China is doing its utmost to overcome Tirana's reticence and is trying to promote a 'resistance zone' in the Balkans. By thus favoring a tactical rapprochement between Belgrade, Bucharest and Tirana, Beijing could avoid making too stringent commitments towards its Albanian allies and could try to preserve Romanian independence.

In regard to the Balkans, with three countries maintaining a relative or total independence towards Moscow, the Chinese leaders are therefore sacrificing the purity of doctrine for the necessities of politics and are discretely pushing for the establishment of a 'common front'.

Moreover, the leaders from the Cultural Revolution are not insensitive to the

Romanians' exhortations, who are trying at all costs to prevent a complete break between Beijing and the international communist movement. The Lin Biao report avoided feeding Soviet propaganda by either announcing a formal split with the traditional parties or by suggesting the formation of a new international movement. Instead, the Vice-President insisted on the independence and equality between parties; his speech referred to 'authentic Marxist-Leninist movements', but did not claim that the parties which ignore 'Mao Zedong's ideas' should be ostracized. Indeed, the messages sent by the Romanian and Vietnamese Communist Parties for the 9th Congress were published prominently, even though they include no reference to the ideas of the Cultural Revolution.

The Chinese Communists, who cannot prevent the convening of the Moscow meeting planned for June, do not seem willing to pursue a policy of pushing for the worst case scenario. They are tacitly encouraging the efforts of M. Ceaucescu and are very concerned to spare the Italians who are opposed to any condemnation of the 'Mao Zedong group'; the message sent to the 9th Congress by the 'Marxist-Leninists' of Italy avoided any explicit criticism of M. Longo and his friends. Beijing refrains from discouraging the parties that refuse to espouse its dispute, but which are nonetheless opposed to any formal condemnation of the CCP. China is aware that by its own existence, it encourages the progressive emancipation of the parties and nations of Eastern Europe; it thus avoids any sudden initiatives, which could isolate its supporters in Moscow on 5th June, and would allow the Kremlin leaders to consolidate their grip on the people's democracies.

China's delayed response to the Soviet offers of negotiation on the Ussuri conflict can probably be explained by the same tactical concerns. On 22nd March, the Chinese Foreign Ministry told the USSR *chargé d'affaires* that China was willing to examine any proposal sent by diplomatic channels; on 14th April, a representative of the Chinese Foreign Minister told this same Soviet diplomat 'that there was no reason for concern'; Beijing is preparing a response to the Soviet memorandum of 29th March; Lin Biao was supposed by the way to mention this in his report to the 9th Congress. After months of silence, China suddenly agreed on 11th May to have the mixed commission in charge of determining navigation on the Ussuri river meet in June.

By accepting the principle of a negotiated settlement for the ongoing disputes, China is making no concessions on core issues, but it is strengthening the position of the parties who do not want to be involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Chinese

leaders have thus showed, despite the tough and dogmatic tone of Lin Biao's report, more flexibility than they are generally given credit for. Careful to consolidate and extend their influence in Eastern Europe, it seems they took into account the Romanian positions and avoided any brutal or clumsy initiatives that could be exploited by Moscow.

The tactical approaches do not affect, however, the strategic goal that is being pursued: starting a vast challenge of the Soviet predominance by questioning its state borders and its ideological supremacy. Lin Biao spoke frankly on this point, when he dealt with the 'border question' in front of the Congress. This question cannot be solely explained by the norms of international public law. The Soviet Union's territory acquires a different value, depending on whether it is the 'land of socialism' or a 'social-imperialist' state. Stalin could largely ignore the grievances of the 'Chinese reactionaries'; however, Communist China is determined to oppose the 1920 declaration of the 'new Tsars'. The Beijing leaders are not content with, according to an expression attributed to Mao Zedong in 1965, 'presenting the bill'; they are questioning the ideological basis of the USSR, and the continuity between the old Russian Empire and the federation led by the Bolshevik party.

No official document has taken up, until now, the words used by Mao Zedong on the USSR's Western borders. But Chinese propaganda makes a clear comparison between the Soviet 'encroachments' in Heilongjiang, the military occupation of Czechoslovakia and the threat posed by the Kremlin leaders to the Balkans. The pro-Chinese movements are clearly encouraged along this path: the 'Communist Party of Poland' stigmatized on 24th April the 'treaties that dismembered China and Poland', while the 'Marxist-Leninists' of Hamburg refer to the 'national and social liberation of the German people'.

China thus keeps the option of starting a new irredentism in Eastern Europe and so to prompt a 'leftist' and nationalist movement against the Soviet party. In May 1967, during the Karlovy-Vary conference, the People's Daily observed then: 'the revisionists sleep in the same bed, but do not share the same dreams'. Lin Biao noted, in his report, the importance of 'contradictions' within the revisionist camp. The Chinese offensive is therefore on an ideological and political level: national resistance to the Soviet grip is encouraged; the European proletariat is called on to denounce a new leading class and to adopt revolutionary means of resistance.

Indeed, the Chinese ideologues were impressed by student and worker unrest in Europe, and they are clearly interested by the enduring anti-Soviet feelings in

Czechoslovak opinion. The events of May 1968 provided, in their eyes, the proof that a revolt movement and a general strike are feasible on our continent, despite the 'betrayal' of the 'revisionist' communist parties. So a model of revolutionary action could emerge that would apply to countries where 'leftist' protest can go hand in hand with nationalist agitation.

The aim is thus to convince Eastern Europeans that there are other possible forms of resistance than that of the good soldier Svejek when facing Soviet military forces. That is likely what Lin Biao was referring to when he claimed that 'the revisionist is also a paper tiger'. The Chinese film on the Ussuri incidents is rather discrete on the military aspects of the episode; it insists, however, on the means of resistance that fishermen armed with knives can oppose to a 'herrenfolk' with powerful combat weapons.

There is no doubt that the 'Marxist-Leninist' movements of Eastern Europe will be encouraged to follow this example, to encourage the popular resistance against Soviet supremacy and to 'adapt' Mao Zedong's ideas to the struggle conditions in the people's democracies.

Chinese policy towards Eastern Europe thus appears to reflect the combined influence of the ideologues and the politicians. The former probably resort to a superficial and erroneous analysis of the truly revolutionary capabilities of an industrial proletariat. Mentioning the example of the fishermen of Heilongjiang to the workers of Plzen or Nowa Huta is mostly idiosyncratic. But if the long-term strategy of the Chinese Communists seems largely based on illusions, their tactical behavior does not lack realism.

Indeed, the Beijing leaders seem aware of the risks posed by a real military provocation on the border or a too obvious interference in Eastern Europe. They do not formally discard the option of a bilateral negotiation with the USSR, they only cautiously commit to Tirana, but they are trying to encourage a tactical rapprochement between Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania. Thus they can reduce the chances of a condemnation of the CCP and maybe even reduce, considering the words spoken on 13th May by Marshal Yakubosky, the chances of a true commitment of the Warsaw Pact countries against Communist China.

But this tactical caution does not prevent a real challenging of the socialist nature of the Soviet regime, with a permanent calling into question of its spheres of influence and its borders. It seems unlikely that the Chinese leaders want to abandon their usual caution and push their challenge until breaking point. It is probable, however, that they will try without respite to exacerbate the 'contradictions' between the USSR and

the Eastern European nations.

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DOCUMENT NO. 32

NOTE NUMBER 760 FROM GEOFFROY CHODRON DE COURCEL TO MICHEL DEBRÉ, "CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY," 12 JUNE 1969

[Source: Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France. Obtained for CWIHP by Enrico Fardella and translated for CWIHP by Garret Martin.]

London, 12 June 1969
Note number 760
French Ambassador in Great Britain

to

His Excellency Michel Debré
Foreign Minister
- Asia department -

Chinese Foreign Policy

Questioned by one of my collaborators on some recent aspects of Chinese foreign policy, the deputy-director of the Far East department of the Foreign Office provided the following indications:

1. **The political and ideological clash with the USSR** is increasingly dominating Chinese policy. The Beijing government aims to exploit as much as possible the contradictions of the Soviet camp by encouraging the 'revisionist' parties and by systematically confronting Soviet influence in the Third World.

The repeated incidents at the Xinjiang and Kazakhstan border, and the exchange of accusatory notes between Beijing and Moscow, are more likely a vast exercise in propaganda. Each opponent is doing its utmost to make the

other appear as a 'warmonger' to the parties currently meeting in Moscow. As for the reality of the incidents, they are nearly impossible to verify. The British services tend to believe that most of the incidents brought up by the Chinese are imaginary, as are those that the Russians are blaming on their opponents. That said, it is not impossible that China recently occupied a small fragment of disputed territory, jutting out in its own territory, in Northwest Xinjiang. It was thus tempting for Beijing to modify to its advantage the boundary line before the start of negotiations that could legalize the *fait accompli*. It would not have been surprising that this would have caused a reaction of the Soviet forces. But this would only have been a minor affair.

I note that the specialist Victor Zorza, in *The Guardian* of the 12th June, seemed very pessimistic. Indeed, he believes that the Chinese accusations are far from being solely motivated by the desire to influence the Moscow conference. For several weeks, Soviet radio has allegedly been encouraging the non-native populations of Xinjiang to rebel against Beijing. Significant military reinforcements have been sent by both opponents on each side of the common border. M. Zorza therefore feels that the situation can only worsen and lead to more serious fights than occurred on the Damansky/Chenpao island.

The deputy-director of the Far East department is far more skeptical about the prospect of major fight in the heart of Asia. He thinks that the Chinese probably overdid it, knowing fore well that the Russians would never initiate a major operation or reprisals during the meetings of the Communist movement. But Beijing, we are told, still continues to be prudent and this prudence will probably increase after the Moscow conference.

That said, our interlocutor did not believe that the Khabarovsk talks on 18th June could lead to any sort of agreement on fluvial navigation. The grounds on which the Chinese note on this subject is based do not suggest that the parties in this dispute can or want to reach an agreement. The same is true for the overall negotiation on borders that was proposed by the Chinese in their 26th May note. The Russians will never admit to negotiate on the basis of the 'unequal treaties'. Moreover, the Chinese note is, according to views here, very well written and the ideas it develops are far more relevant than the Russian ones (see the passage according to which the 'USSR occupies a portion

of Chinese territory that is thirteen times bigger than Czechoslovakia'). The Soviets, like the other Eastern European countries, refused to accept the Chinese note.

2. The Chinese, it is believed here, will thus increase their propaganda towards **Third World** countries and strengthen some ties with **Western countries**.

The Chinese Ambassadors, who are slowly heading back to their posts, probably received instructions, we are told, to increase by all means the difficulties between Afro-Asian countries, be they 'bourgeois' or not, and the USSR. The Chinese will also continue their efforts to prevent an increase of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia.

As for the West, the Foreign Office does not think that the more conciliatory attitude of China towards certain countries has any real political significance. Beijing does not expect the Western countries to act as a counterweight to the USSR, but instead wants them to supply the technological and economic assistance that is vital for its development. That explains the Chinese courtesy towards Sweden and France (that our interlocutor did not name explicitly). This also explains the attempt to restore relations with Canada, and maybe Italy. It is quite funny, we are told, to note the growing pressure used by the USSR to push Canada to change its mind.

As for the possibility of a coming renewal of a dialogue between Beijing and Washington, this was not excluded by our interlocutor.

3. A certain détente, we are told, has emerged in Sino-British relations. Great Britain has certainly benefited from the greater tolerance recently enjoyed by foreign diplomats stationed in Beijing. Thus, as I indicated already in my dispatch number 623/AS of 8th May, the British Commercial Counselor will be able to go to the Guangzhou trade show. Moreover, the British *chargé d'affaires* will be making a trip to Hangzhou, Guangzhou and Shanghai. In this last city, he will finally be able to restore contact with the small British colony.

Even more interesting, the Chinese, following discussions in Beijing and London, have finally formally agreed to free M. Anthony Grey, once the last of the 11 communist journalists in jail in Hong Kong will have been released, which will happen in October. However, the fate of the other British citizens

held in China has not changed.

We hope here for the return of the Chinese Counselor who had replaced the *Chargé d'affaires*. This Counselor had been recalled to China recently, leaving the leadership of the Mission to the First Secretary. We do not expect here the return of the *Chargé d'affaires*, since Great Britain has no intention for the moment to upgrade the level of its representation in Beijing.

Signed Geoffroy Chodron de Courcel

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DOCUMENT NO. 33

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NOTE OF ASIA-OCEANIA DEPARTMENT, "SINO-FRENCH RELATIONS," 6 OCTOBER 1969

[Source: Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France. Obtained for CWIHP by Enrico Fardella and translated for CWIHP by Garret Martin.]

Paris, 6th October 1969
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Note of Asia-Oceania Department

Note

Sino-French relations

Sino-French relations, which had suffered from the general hardening of Beijing's foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution and the disparaging attitude adopted by the Chinese press towards our country after the May 1968 events, have shown signs of détente, which, in the current context, represents important progress.

If our relations have not yet returned to the path that had been set in 1964 after the establishment of diplomatic relations, several hints suggest some favorable perspectives.

We should first note that the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, M. Huang Zhen, away from France for two years, was one of the first Chinese diplomats to return to his post after the end of the 9th Congress. In the meantime, he had been promoted to the Party's Central Committee.

The words spoken by M Huang Zhen, during the courtesy visits he quickly made to the French authorities after his return, highlighted Chinese goodwill and their desire to maintain close ties with us. The welcomes given to our new Ambassador in Beijing, M. Manac'h, who was cordially hosted by the Vice-President Dong Biwu (to whom he presented his credentials two days after his arrival), by M. Guo Moruo, Vice-Chairman of the Permanent Committee of the National People's Congress, and by Zhou Enlai on 25th September, confirm this impression; we can hope that the Chinese will progressively agree to engage in a more substantial dialogue with us.

The new atmosphere is also affecting the tone of the Chinese press. Lacking in indulgence insofar as the internal and economic situations of our country, the newspaper editorials are nevertheless moderate in tone. Despite China's reserves towards our initiatives aiming at a political settlement of the conflicts in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, Beijing is still interested as ever by the French government's aspirations to be independent.

This détente in the political field is visible in other domains. The Paris offices of Xinhua, closed in 1968 after the departure of all the staff, are now functioning normally; the Agency's new correspondent recently took his post.

In the cultural domain, there is also some movement, even if it is largely limited. Beijing has sent, as we requested, a Chinese lecturer to the School of Oriental Languages and has nominated a Professor, in the same discipline, for the *Lycée* of Montgeron.

After several inquiries, the Chinese authorities seem ready to soon send a small contingent of Chinese students to France. The current situation in China explains the Chinese reluctance to welcome either French scholarship students or cultural and scientific missions. But we should not hide the fact that much remains to be done to give a real impetus to Sino-French relations, whose achievements since 1964 are very limited.

In the economic field, the situation is more encouraging. China is our second partner in Asia after Japan. After slowing down during the Cultural Revolution, economic exchanges are showing signs of recovery. The exhibition of machine tools in Beijing in May was an important success; the results are significant since half the

material exposed was sold and negotiations are still ongoing.

Early this year, we reached an agreement for the sale of 800,000 tons of wheat, for the supply of urea and ammonium, and for the delivery of 800 Berliet trucks... It is possible that there will be greater sale of trucks in the future.

It remains that the negotiations with the Chinese are laborious. We are dealing with difficult interlocutors, but who recently have made efforts to be friendly.

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DOCUMENT NO. 34

NOTE ON THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE HONOURABLE MINISTER AND THE CANADIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SHARP, AT NATO IN BRUSSELS, 5 DECEMBER 1969

[Source: Historical Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Obtained for CWIHP by Enrico Fardella and translated for CWIHP by Joe Calìo.]

SECRET

Note on the conversation between the Honourable Minister and the Canadian Minister for Foreign Affairs Sharp, at NATO in Brussels, December 5, 1969 at 9:30 am.

After the customary courtesies, the Honourable Minister began the exchange of views on the ongoing negotiations regarding recognition of the People's Republic of China.

M: I would like to mention some points of the ongoing negotiations that seem to be proceeding in parallel. I am not yet in a position to give information on the joint meeting that took place yesterday in Paris, but I intend to inform you as soon as possible of the results of this. However, the latest talks held by Ambassador Malfatti took place in a favorable atmosphere. The Chinese did not seem to be overly uncompromising on the points that still divide us and in particular on the request for open and prior recognition of their position on Formosa.

We insisted on the idea of a statement similar to the French one, and on the

exchange of ambassadors. If necessary we could also accept the additional recognition of the Beijing government as the sole representative of China. In a subsequent comment, we could state that this entails an interruption in relations with Taiwan.

In essence, our action is mainly aimed at a press communiqué like the French one and, as a second line of negotiation, we have conceived (but not yet discussed with the Chinese) of the concept of a sole representative and the indication of an interruption in relations. For now, however, we are still at the communiqué stage.

SHARP: I am aware that our positions are parallel. We too are discussing a communiqué like the French one; among other things, we are prepared to move ahead on the recognition of Beijing as China's sole representative. However, we are against going that far, and allowing Beijing to state that Canada recognizes its rights over Taiwan. We are ready to: 1) limit ourselves to a French-style communiqué, or; 2) release a communiqué that goes as far as including Beijing's recognition as the sole representative of China; 3) agree a verbal process with the Chinese in addition to the communiqué describing the positions of the two governments.

M: It is a hypothesis that we have considered as well, but very realistically, I must say that if a French-style communiqué is followed by the break with Taiwan and we vote in favor of the Albanian motion, in practice we are giving, without explicitly acknowledging it, what the Chinese are demanding. The discussion regards words that will certainly be followed, in actual fact, by the acceptance of what Beijing requests.

The ideal solution would be that of keeping Taiwan in the UN, as a non-Chinese country, but this hypothesis is unrealistic. Let's use the necessary resistance to prevent them from obtaining the formal recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan; however, we should not be deceived: our ultimate action will not be what the Beijing government is asking for.

SHARP: I agree. We have accepted the implications of this eventuality. We have clearly said that as a consequence of the exchange of diplomatic representatives there will be a break with Taiwan, but we have doubts regarding a vote for the Albanian motion. Indeed, there is actually a lot of confusion: the Americans believe that we want to expel Taiwan from the UN, while Canada will simply recognize that China is represented by Beijing and not by Taiwan. In the end, both Beijing and Taiwan agree on one thing, namely that they represent the same state entity, China.

M: I agree, but unfortunately the Albanian motion exists and this time we too

pulled back at the last moment. Unfortunately, the road to be followed to establish relations with Beijing must pass through the Albanian motion. In fact, it is not possible to argue that Taiwan will remain in the UN as a country different from China. Of course, the Americans could submit a motion that, though recognizing the right of the People's Republic of China to represent China at the UN, does not prejudice Taiwan's position at the UN. However, under the current conditions, the Albanian motion is the price to be paid for recognition.

SHARP: We have publicly stated that we will not adopt a policy of one China and one Taiwan. The Japanese may support this formula as they have always argued that the government of Taiwan is an exiled government, but they do not believe that Chang-KaiShek will ever give up claiming that he is the one and only representative of China.

M: I agree that we could settle for a French-style communiqué, accompanied by a statement, also in the form of a comment that the government of Beijing is the only Chinese government. This does not stop us from considering Taiwan to be an independent State entity. On the other hand, I am convinced that our actions will inevitably be followed by the breaking off of relations with Taiwan. Even the vote in favor of the Albanian motion will be inevitable. Until the Albanian motion is the only motion to vote, the game is closed and whoever wishes to maintain relations with Beijing must necessarily resort to the only voting instrument available at the UN. For this reason, we had proposed a study committee at the UN to search for and adopt an alternative solution.

SHARP: I would like to point out two issues: many at the UN will take the same position. Today we have the initiative of negotiations, but once Beijing is recognized we will end up in the same situation as Britain, France and another forty countries. On the other hand, we will be in a position to continue de facto relations - for instance, of a commercial nature - with Taiwan, which certainly will not be abandoned.

The future prospects of the island appear to be at length dependent on the continuity of U.S. presence. This even if *there can be no doubt that it will not last forever*.

The conversation ends with the mutual commitment to keep in close touch and to exchange information on the issue.

SECRET

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DOCUMENT NO. 35**TELEGRAM NUMBER 2592/98, "CHINA AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM," 24 DECEMBER 1969**

[Source: Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France. Obtained for CWIHP by Enrico Fardella and translated for CWIHP by Garret Martin.]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Beijing, 24 December 1969

Received at

Telegram number 2592/98

Forwarded via the Department to: Bonn 197/203, London 1383/89, Moscow 1445/51, Washington 1533/39

China and the German problem: I am referring to my telegram number 2470/73.

Like in 1959 during Camp David or in 1963 after the Cuban Missile Crisis, China is very concerned by the trend towards détente emerging in East-West relations. Apparently, it fears that the steps taken to strengthen détente could go against its efforts in the last three years in order to 'pursue class struggle during the building phase of socialism'. Indeed, consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat can only be justified, here or elsewhere, by the necessity of a continued social revolution inside the country and by a permanent conflict with the non-Communist world.

Moreover, the People's Republic of China dreads the fact that a normalization of the situation in Europe could allow the Soviets to avoid a struggle on two fronts and to sanction the current division of Germany, as well as that of Korea, Vietnam and even China.

The current attempts at a rapprochement between Moscow and Bonn are thus leading Beijing to put on trial the USSR's German policy with vociferous terms. The

party's press organ is denouncing the Soviet-German talks on the non-use of force as a 'betrayal of the interests of the German people' since the USSR required neither the recognition of the GDR as a precondition, nor a preliminary negotiation between Bonn and Pankow.

The 'People's Daily' tries to show that the 'revisionist Soviet clique' tarnishes the cause of reunification and undermines the sovereignty of the German people by going above Ulbricht and by applying the 'famous theory of limited sovereignty' to the GDR. It condemns again Khrushchev's climb down whom, after calling in 1958 for the transformation of West Berlin into a 'free demilitarized city' and the end of the occupation regime, had finally conceded to maintaining Allied troops in the former capital of the *Reich*.

The 'People's Daily' blames his successors for going even further along the path of surrender by implicitly assenting to West Germany's claims to West Berlin, with the authorization given in March to the Bundestag to convene there for the Presidential election as evidence.

In general, Beijing accuses Moscow of engaging in a 'despicable bargain' with the imperialists in order to sanction the division of Europe into spheres of influence, and to 'definitely reduce the countries of Eastern Europe to slavery'.

But, according to Chinese propaganda, a promise to renounce the use of force is meaningless when made by the invaders of Czechoslovakia or by the stooges from NATO which have supposedly decided, in case of war, to 'strike in priority the military targets located in Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR'.

As a consequence, Beijing calls on the people of these countries to revolt so to block the Soviet maneuver aiming to open the doors of Eastern Europe to the 'vengeful warmongers' of Bonn, and to prepare the annexation of West Berlin and the German Democratic Republic by West Germany.

This resurgence of attacks against Moscow goes hand in hand with a new seduction maneuver towards the Pankow regime. Indeed, we know that the Chinese Foreign Ministry just assured the GDR representative in Beijing (see my telegram number 2470) of the steadfast support of Communist China to oppose the 'new Eastern policy' of M. Willy Brandt, which is allegedly even more treacherous than that of his predecessor.

The Chinese are both trying to push M. Ulbricht to reclaim the initiative in the dialogue initiated between Bonn and the Eastern European countries, and to embarrass the USSR when M. Kuznetsov is studying with his government the

conditions for a renewal of the negotiation with Beijing. They are thus placing Moscow in front of a difficult choice: either agree to resume talks when the partner is openly attacking its positions towards its most loyal satellite or, if the head of the Soviet negotiation delayed in returning to his post, accept to take the responsibility for having made the first steps towards breaking talks in the eyes of the world's progressive opinion.

Signed Etienne Manac'h

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DOCUMENT NO. 36

NOTE ON EXCHANGES OF OPINIONS BY THE AMBASSADORS AND ACTING AMBASSADORS OF HUNGARY, THE GDR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE USSR, BULGARIA, POLAND, AND MONGOLIA ON THE SUBJECT OF "THE PRC POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES" ON 21 NOVEMBER AND 3 DECEMBER 1969, 29 DECEMBER 1969

[Source: Political Archive of the [German] Foreign Office (PA AA), C 1362/74. Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]

GDR Embassy to the PR China
Beijing, 29 December 1969

Note on Exchanges of Opinions by the Ambassadors and Acting Ambassadors of Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Bulgaria, Poland, and Mongolia on the Subject of "The PRC Position vis-a-vis the Socialist Countries" on 21 November and 3 December 1969

The Hungarian Ambassador, Comrade Halasz, gave the introduction to the subject. He stated the roots of Mao's current line trace back for some decades already. For instance, after Hitler's Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Mao rejected the Soviet

request to safeguard the USSR in the East through increased military activity against Japan. As a reason, Mao said his army was not prepared. In reality, however, he was of the opinion the Soviet Union had de facto lost the war against Hitler's Germany, and that [communist] China had to hold back its power for a new campaign [within China]. At the VII CCP Party Congress Mao was able to get his concepts approved.

After the foundation of the PRC, China did join the socialist camp. The CCP leadership exploited experiences and support of the socialist countries for its socialist build-up. Internationalist positions held by a part of the Chinese leadership were strengthened, Mao's concept was pushed to the background. The VIII Party Congress (1956) came to correct conclusions and proceeded in the spirit of cohesion of the socialist camp. Influenced by the fight against the cult of personality, Mao's position was weakened further. Then Mao began to plan and implement his "counterattack". At the II Plenum of the VIII Party Congress Lin Biao moved instantly towards the Mao line and agreed with the "Great Leap". The X Plenum (1962) still advocated friendly relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. However, it no longer demanded strengthening the unity of the socialist camp and just talked about its preservation instead. Through their proposals for the general line (1963), the Mao Group then spelled out its new political course. Lin Biao's report on the people's war (1965) was an explicit support of the Mao line. On 11 November 1965 an article appeared in "People's Daily". It denied the existence of a socialist camp and mentioned antagonistic contradictions between the socialist countries, which were said to increasing and only to be resolved through struggle. During the "Cultural Revolution", as well as at the XI and XII CCP Plenum, this line became even more pronounced and reached its current peak with Lin Biao's report at the "IX Party Congress" [1969]. In the eighth paragraph of his report, Lin Biao denied the existence of a socialist world system. He only called China and Albania socialist countries, presented a new definition of proletarian internationalism; and he listed the United States and the Soviet Union equally as China's enemies.

The Mao Group used the events in Czechoslovakia as a pretext to accuse the Soviet leadership of "social imperialism" and to call for the overthrow of the party and state leaderships of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries. Through "equal struggle" against the Soviet Union and the U.S., China wants to become the third great power in the world. Today the Mao Group is viewing proletarian internationalism as loyalty to Maoism. It is dividing the socialist countries into four groups:

1. The Soviet Union. She is China's main enemy, since she represents the largest obstacle to the realization of the Mao Group's hegemonic efforts.
2. The socialist countries agreeing with the Soviet Union's policies (Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Mongolia).
3. China and Albania as "true" socialist countries representing the socialist camp.
4. Countries with specific conditions proposing in part different positions, respectively offer specific conditions for the development and application of Chinese policy:
 - firstly, divided countries such as North Vietnam, North Korea, and the GDR located in the advanced front line of the struggle against imperialism, and which [China] has promised to support in their struggle against imperialism.
 - secondly Cuba, with its certain particular efforts to lead the revolutionary struggle;
 - thirdly Yugoslavia; it is not a socialist country, but Beijing wants to exploit its influence in the Third World.
 - and fourth Romania because of its nationalistic concept.

Comrade Halasz named the following reasons for those categorizations: The main line of attack is directed against the Soviet Union since she first and foremost blocks the Mao Group's hegemonist intentions. The Mao Group aims at bringing a pro-Chinese leadership to power in the Soviet Union. As long as such is not possible, the Mao Group will go for maximum compromising of the USSR, provoke armed conflicts, slander the Soviet Union as a colonial power in order to sow mistrust among other socialist and Afro-Asian countries, et cetera. Despite the continuation of anti-Soviet policies, there is also the possibility of offering negotiations for tactical reasons, et cetera.

With regard to the fraternal socialist countries, the current Chinese leadership wants to isolate and split them from the Soviet Union. Here the Chinese leadership applies both hard and soft methods. Mostly hard methods are applied against Poland. An example for this is the creation of a Maoist "Polish Communist Party" operating from Tirana. It hopes to exploit Polish nationalism, historic contradictions between Russia and Poland, as well as current territorial issues.

In Czechoslovakia the Mao Group supports with its policy the extreme rightist

forces. [The Mao Group] went further [in the criticism of the August 1968 intervention] than the worst reactionary circles. Apparently the Chinese leadership would have preferred a capitalist Czechoslovakia over a socialist [Czechoslovakia] allied with the Soviet Union. [Alexander] Dubcek was attacked because he did not openly come out against the Soviet Union.

The GDR is treated harshly as well as softly. It gets hard treatment since it is very loyal to the Soviet Union and a reliable member of the socialist community. However, the Chinese leadership cannot ignore the escalating struggle of the GDR against West German imperialism. It has to take into consideration that the GDR is the first German workers and peasant state. Therefore the Chinese leadership is attacking the GDR only indirectly through slander against the Soviet Union's policy.

Very harsh methods are used towards Bulgaria due to the close historical ties between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. Comrade [Todor] Zhivkov is openly attacked. He is accused of allowing himself to be used by the Soviet Union against Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia.

The Mongolian People's Republic elicits the wrath of the Mao Group since it is an Asian socialist country and openly goes against the Mao Group's policy from the position of proletarian internationalism. Therefore the Mao Group is directing open attacks against the Mongolian party and state leadership and applies economic sanctions. Although the border issues are officially resolved, a [Chinese] questioning of the border is still possible.

Towards Hungary the Mao Group is using hard as well as soft methods. When leading Hungarian comrades called the relationship with the Soviet Union a litmus test for the loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese leadership attacked them harshly.

It is indicative for relations with those seven countries that China is currently represented in none of them by an ambassador; also that there exists no scientific and technological as well as cultural cooperation, and that there are only minor trade relations.

In the eyes of the Chinese leaders Albania and China are the only socialist countries. They are united in their anti-Sovietism and joint action against the socialist countries. Apparently there exists no perception within the Chinese population of Albania's actual size and relevance. However, [Albanian leader Enver] Hoxha is not copying Chinese policy in every regard. He views himself as extremely smart. In a major military conflict, Albania can receive support only from the countries of the

Warsaw Pact. This situation might lead to contradictions between China and Albania.

As far as the GDR, North Korea, and North Vietnam are concerned, Chinese propaganda is always talking about the struggle of these peoples against imperialism. On the other hand the Chinese leadership is also exploiting problems created by the division of these countries. During the “Cultural Revolution” the Mao Group also voiced open criticism of leading personalities in the GDR, North Korea, and even North Vietnam. It is exploiting those countries’ problems for the [Chinese] struggle against the Soviet Union (Vietnam War, West Berlin question). However, since China is maintaining good trade relations with West Germany, it can hardly criticize the GDR. Although [the Chinese leadership] is generally talking about support for the GDR, it does not raise, however, any word about the recognition of the GDR [by West Germany].

There exist some commonalities between Cuba and China in how they implemented their respective national revolutions. In Cuba the revolutionary army came first, and the party came later. The economy is militarized, democracy is fading into the background (no elections, no party congresses). The cult of personality is very strong. What the Liu [Shaoqi] group was in China, the micro faction was in Cuba. For a while, both countries held the same position on the issue of revolutionary wars. However, the Cuban leadership is aware that only the Soviet Union can provide serious assistance in the case of major military conflict. Cuba also participated in the [1969] Moscow Conference and had a positive attitude towards events in Czechoslovakia. The Chinese leadership is waiting for the right moment to become more active vis-a-vis Cuba. So far open attacks [against Cuba] only occurred concerning the issue of rice. The Mao Group is banking on opposition forces within the Cuban Communist Party, and on the overseas Chinese living on Cuba (60,000).

As far as Romania is concerned, the Mao Group is primarily exploiting Romanian nationalism. Romania is supposed to undermine from within the Warsaw Pact, the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation, and the communist world movement. The swift delegation of a Chinese ambassador was telling. Romania was covered in this regard right after Albania. The Mao Group is using Romania exclusively for tactical considerations. This is why the Chinese did not comment on Nixon’s visit to Romania, and why they did not mention Romania’s exchange of ambassadors with Israel. Although they view Romania as a “revisionist country”, they do not talk this up at this point just in order to benefit from Romanian policy.

China strengthened its relationship with Yugoslavia during the late 1940s and early

1950s. High-ranking Yugoslav delegations visited China while the other socialist countries criticized Yugoslavia's policy. When Soviet-Yugoslav relations improved, Chinese-Yugoslav relations worsened. Right now we can observe similar tendencies. In August 1968, Yugoslavia and China completely agreed with each other about the events in Czechoslovakia. Currently the Mao Group is making efforts to improve its relations with Yugoslavia in order to use Yugoslavia for the increase of Chinese influence in the Third World.

During the following discussion, [GDR Ambassador] Comrade [Gustav] Hertzfeldt stated: when assessing the PRC attitude towards our countries, we have to realize that the Mao Group does not consider our countries as socialist, but as countries with different social orders (see "IX Party Congress" and government declaration from 7 October 1969). China is viewing North Vietnam, Cuba, and the DPRK as "anti-imperialist" but not as socialist countries. Obviously the Chinese leadership cannot say so directly in order not to alienate those countries. Only China and Albania they consider to be socialist. Referring to the events in Czechoslovakia, and Chinese treatment of Romania and Yugoslavia in the aftermath, Comrade Hertzfeldt proved how the Mao Group is addressing those issues arbitrarily, pragmatically, and unprincipled.

Apparently the Chinese leadership wants to create a nationalist anti-Soviet bloc consisting of Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia. For those far-reaching ambitions in the Balkans, Bulgaria, which is closely allied with the fraternal countries, serves as an obstacle for geographical reasons. This why it is supposed to be "softened up" through respective pressure, in particular since geographical "encirclement" seems to offer according opportunities. Therefore Chinese policy towards Bulgaria cannot be explained by historical traditions only (Bulgarian friendship with the Soviet Union), but also by very practical reasons.

Corresponding to practical and tactical requirements, methods of Chinese policy towards our countries may apply wide varieties and changes. The Soviet Union constitutes the main enemy for the Mao Group because it represents the main pillar for socialism and our countries. She also is the key to our unity. Except for Romania, the Warsaw Pact countries are viewed equally. Based on many facts, Comrade Hertzfeldt outlined as the determining element for the Mao Group's policy towards the GDR the latter's firm friendship and fraternal alliance with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries, as well as its position within the socialist community of states, the Warsaw Pact, and the Comecon. Of course, there are attempts made to

exploit our “special situation” as a “divided country” and what flows from that. They want to play off the GDR against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Sometimes the Chinese side talks about “support in the struggle against West German militarism” and asserts the Soviet Union would betray the interests of the GDR (for instance, in the context of the [West German] Federal President’s election in West Berlin, or the Soviet congratulation to [Willy] Brandt for his election as Federal Chancellor). Recently, the Chinese seemingly display “sympathy” for the GDR due to Poland’s willingness to negotiate with Bonn. The Chinese leadership wants to play a role in global policy, and the so-called “German Question” is part of the latter. For the Chinese, the GDR’s problems are means towards that end. At the same time, a [Chinese] establishment of relations with West Germany cannot be excluded. For that the reason, Chinese reiterations of “support for the GDR” are even more needed as camouflage.

North Korea has become a main focus of Chinese foreign policy. Relations between both countries proceed accordingly. The common fear of Japan benefits respective efforts undertaken by the Chinese leadership. China is afraid of Japan as a rival for hegemony in Asia. In some articles in “People’s Daily”, as well as in Zhou Enlai’s speech at the Albanian reception, Japan was massively attacked – among else in order to impress the leadership of the DPRK. Furthermore, Chinese foreign policy is strongly focused on Vietnam. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam is most dependent on the mercy of the Chinese leaders.

Cuba has played a major role in the Chinese leaders’ foreign policy. The Cuban Acting Ambassador told Comrade Hertzfeldt, the Chinese leaders used over a longer period the Caribbean crisis to pull Cuba to China’s side. When Cuba saw through the Chinese motives, relations cooled down. Moreover, the Mao Group is upset over the improvement of Cuban relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Especially furious is the Mao Group about Cuba’s close relations with North Vietnam and North Korea, since China sees both countries as its exclusive sphere of influence. (During discussion some comrades voiced the opinion that—in contrast to statements made by the Cuban Acting Ambassador—Chinese-Cuban relations are possibly warming up again. For example, the Cuban comrades are said to be pleased with the development of trade relations.)

Differentiation in Chinese foreign policy is highly sophisticated and highly versatile. Whatever can be used against our unity and cohesion, the Chinese leaders will exploit. This is why the continuous highlighting and practical implementation of our unity is

a permanent requirement here [in Beijing].

[Soviet Acting Ambassador] Comrade [Alexei] Yelisavetin underlined that this policy of differentiation is nothing new. However, there are some new elements after the “IX CCP Party Congress”. The Mao Group is worried to lose Albania as an ally, since Albania does not agree with Soviet-Chinese [border] negotiations and the downgrade of open slander of the Soviet Union. Therefore the Chinese leaders must do something now to keep Albania in the boat (for example, anti-Soviet attacks at the occasion of the Albanian national holiday).

There had been a period of frontal attacks against the fraternal socialist countries. Now the Mao Group is attempting to influence them by differentiation. For the Chinese leadership, Albania is not enough. They want to add Romania and Yugoslavia. Here the Chinese leaders benefit from some similar Romanian and Yugoslav positions based on anti-Soviet concepts.

Cuba, North Vietnam, and the DPRK are viewed by the Chinese leadership as “anti-imperialist and semi-revisionist” states. The recently established Japanese-American rapprochement serves as the foundation for Chinese-Korean rapprochement. The Chinese press does report nothing about socialist construction in those countries. While there are no reports at all about Cuba, the coverage of Korea and Vietnam is limited to foreign policy matters only.

After the events in Czechoslovakia, the Chinese leaders had to become convinced of the cohesion of the fraternal socialist countries. Now they no longer call for the overthrow of our party and state leaders.

As far as relations with the Soviet Union are concerned, the Chinese has openly declared those may only be continued on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. There are no more relations whatsoever between CPSU and CCP. For two years, no trade protocol has been signed. In 1968 the trade volume amounted to 86 million Rubles, in 1969 it will reach 55 million Rubles. During the meeting between Comrade Kosygin and Zhou Enlai [in September 1969], the latter stated his general agreement to further develop trade relations. He promised to come up with Chinese proposals for the 1970 trade protocol within one and a half months. So far, however, those have not been received. On 10 November 1969 the Soviet Union submitted Soviet proposals suggesting a mutual exchange of goods with a volume of about 140 million Rubles. During the border negotiations [Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister] Qiao Guanhua stated the Chinese side will fulfill everything Zhou Enlai had promised. This year the Chinese side rejected the export of pork with the argument

it would be used by the Soviet Union to feed the soldiers stationed at the border with China. Apparently, however, the bad situation in China's pig farms is the real reason.

Overall, relations are frozen except for railway traffic, the air route, and the low level of trade. The Chinese side has also emphasized that the ongoing border negotiations may not be used for dealing with other issues.

[Polish Ambassador] Comrade Wisniewski reported the Chinese leader have already tried since 1956 to exploit rightist forces in the Polish leadership. Since 1959, when those elements were excluded [from the Polish Communist Party], relations [between China and Poland] gradually deteriorated. As of now, the relationship is very bad. In 1968 the trade volume amounted to 45 million Rubles; now in 1969 it is only 33 million Rubles. The Polish embassy in Beijing has no communication with the [Polish] consulates in Shanghai and Guangdong. He [Wisniewski] has sometimes to wait for up to one week before he is received by the Deputy Division Chief in the PRC Foreign Ministry. An example for the harsh measures applied against Poland is the creation of a "Communist Party of Poland". This "party" is supposed to rally dogmatic elements excluded from the Polish United Workers Party, as well as nationalistic and anti-Soviet elements. All foreign representations of the People's Republic of Poland receive slanderous pamphlets from this "party". They are primarily directed against the leaderships of Poland, the Soviet Union, and the GDR. In Poland those pamphlets do not get traction with the population, since they are unpolished both in terms of content and style.

[Czechoslovak Ambassador] Comrade Kohousek stated the Mao Group has completely broken with Marxism-Leninism. One could talk of Social-fascism, because today the most reactionary and nationalistic elements are in power in China and conduct a policy of great power chauvinism.

The most important criterion for the development of China's relations with other countries is the latter's attitude towards the Mao Group's policy of great power chauvinism. As far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, Mao and his supporters had desired the change of Czechoslovakia into a capitalist country.

[Bulgarian Ambassador] Comrade Bossev said there is an extremely tough attitude on display from the Chinese side against Bulgaria. The close friendship with the Soviet Union, and the historic roots of this friendship, does not provide the Chinese leadership with any angles to undermine this friendly relationship. Bulgarian constitutes a big obstacle to the Chinese plans to form an anti-Soviet bloc in the Balkans.

The policy of differentiation towards our countries expresses itself through the slightest nuances. Therefore we need a uniform presentation of our countries in order not to offer the Mao Group even the slightest openings.

[signed]Kunz
3rd Secretary

CC:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Far Eastern Division (2x)
Embassy Beijing

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 37

MINUTES OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE HELD ON 5 MAY 1970

[Source: Hungarian National Archives, HNA, M-KS-288f-5.a-517. Ő. e. Obtained by Péter Vámos and translated by Gwennyth A. Jones.]

[Page 1]

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Prepared in 3 copies

MINUTES

of the meeting of the Political Committee held on 5 May 1970

AGENDA

1. The state of Hungarian-Chinese relations. Proposals to extend relations.

Speaker: Comrade János Péter

Invited: Comrades László Perjési and András Gyenes

[Page 2]

1. The state of Hungarian-Chinese relations. Proposals to extend relations.

Speaker: Comrade János Péter

Commenters: Comrades Árpád Pullai, Dezső Nemes, Antal Apró and János Kádár.

The Political Committee notes the statement.

It accepts the draft resolution, but the part concerning the press should be corrected.

Responsible: Comrade János Péter

Comrade Zoltán Komócsin is to approve the corrected text.

[Pages 10-14]

Foreign Ministry

Strictly confidential

51/PJ/1970."A" Prepared in 8 copies

Copy no. 1

Proposal to the HWSP Central Committee Political Committee on Hungarian-Chinese relations

I.

From the foundation of the People's Republic of China to 1958, the Chinese Party and state leadership pursued a fundamentally correct internationalist policy, formulated most tangibly in the documents of the first session (September 1956) of the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China.

Beginning in 1958, the Chinese leadership worked out a new internal policy line, announcing the policy of the "three red flags" (general line, the Great Leap Forward, people's communes), and following this, gradually changed its international policy line as well. In the wake of the failures of the Great Leap Forward, an attempt was made to accept a new line of internal policy (policy of adjustment), but this was frustrated by the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." This resulted in the consolidation of the Mao Zedong group's domestic and international policy line which represented a fundamental break with the resolutions at the 8th Congress. This turn won final acceptance at the 9th congress of the Communist Party of China (in April 1969), and was elevated to the status of official Party policy. [*Since the 9th Party congress the leadership has placed the preparation for war at the forefront.*]

At present, the international activity of the Chinese leadership is characterised by the effort to win hegemony over the communist movement and the socialist community. The greatest obstacle to these efforts is represented by the Soviet Union,

which is why the Chinese leadership is concentrating its attacks on the Soviet Union. One of the most important features of the Chinese leadership policy is the effort to isolate the Soviet Union. To this end, and at the same time as attacks carried out against the socialist states, the [Chinese] are doing their best to employ differentiated, divisive tactics against them.

The Chinese leadership has recently somewhat modified its methods of international policy. It has taken steps which point towards the relaxation of tension between China and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries (for example the meeting between Kosygin and Zhou Enlai on 11 September 1969, discussions with the Soviet Union, the application of more cultured methods of diplomacy, etc.). Despite this, there is absolutely no basis to the supposition that the Chinese leadership will fundamentally change their divisive policy any time soon.

II.

1. Hungarian-Chinese relations were fraternal from 1949 to 1959. On the general principles of socialist development and on every critical question of the world situation, our positions were identical. A token of our good relations was the international help we received from China following the counter-revolution.

During this era, we signed numerous interstate treaties, cultural, scientific, technical-scientific and other cooperation agreements, as well as the Friendship and Cooperation Agreement (1959). During these years, a number of high-ranking exchange visits took place (visits of Comrade János Kádár in 1956 and 1957, Comrades Ferenc Münnich and István Dobi in 1959, Zhu De in 1956 and 1959, and Zhou Enlai in 1957). During these years, we invited Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and the foreign minister, although the invitations did not receive a response.

2. Our relations deteriorated in 1960, although we tried to avert this.

There has been no contact between the two **Parties** since 1965. A series of attempts by us to establish relations, in relation to the meeting of Communist and workers' parties, were rejected aggressively by them. In April 1969, the central newspaper of the CPC published a salutatory telegram, addressed from an ostensible Hungarian pro-Chinese group ("Hungary's Marxist-Leninists") to the 9th congress of the CPC.

Our **interstate relations** are at a low point. Beyond routine diplomatic activities, cooperation between us only exists at present in two areas: foreign trade and the transit of our shipments to Vietnam.

Lacking a long-term agreement, we handled **our foreign trade transactions** until 1969 on the basis of annual goods exchange and payment agreements. Our foreign trade transactions declined. Our exports amounted to 42.3 million roubles in 1958, and 8.9 million roubles in 1969, our imports amounted to 37.4 million roubles in 1958, and 8.9 million roubles in 1969. Despite our continued initiatives, we did not succeed in establishing a reverse tendency.

The pricing structure is favourable. The bulk of our exports consists of machinery and semi-manufactured products, for which we import raw materials and consumer goods, the greater part of which we would need to acquire on the capitalist market. Until now the Chinese have proved to be proper trading partners.

One problematic point to further progress is that the Chinese Foreign Trade Ministry wants to agree a goods exchange and payment agreement based on new principles. The new draft agreement they submitted in February 1970 proposes payment in national currency instead of rouble payments used to date, providing for the termination of the maximum price principle and settling the balance in Swiss francs.

Our most important interstate agreement, the Friendship and Cooperation agreement is still legally valid but, due to the behaviour of the Chinese, its stipulations have not been realised since 1966.

The technical-scientific cooperation agreement is legally valid, and was renewed at our initiative in 1964, as well as the declarations on film exchange, telecommunications and postal trade. Cooperation however only exists in the latter areas.

Our agreements on cultural, scientific, radio and television cooperation, as well as the declaration of cooperation against agricultural vermin have expired. In 1968 we attempted to renew artistic and cultural exchange, as well as to renew the agreement between radio and television (the latter also in 1970). The Chinese shunned or ignored our attempts.

We signed a yearly agreement regarding the transit of our special materials to Vietnam. After earlier serious glitches, Chinese transits are currently continuing without interruption.

Since 1967, the **Chinese embassy in Budapest** has been led by a chargé d'affaires at the rank of commercial attaché. The ambassador left without notification or farewell. On occasion, the embassy continues openly hostile propaganda. It distributes its bulletins illegally, in which they refrain from the direct and violent attacks against the Hungarian People's Republic of the last year. The embassy maintains active social contacts.

The **Hungarian foreign representation** in Peking has been headed all the while by the ambassador. Between 1966 and 1968 the Chinese did not ensure even the most basic conditions for diplomatic activity for our ambassador. At present, our embassy is fully isolated from social contacts, and partly isolated from official contacts. It can only order the central press. It has not been able to continue propaganda activity for years.

In Peking, only the MTI [Hungarian News Agency] correspondent is working, since Chinese organs are only willing to deal exclusively with MTI, not the *Népszabadság* [People's Freedom, the Party organ] correspondent, whose predecessor was expelled in 1969. The *New China* correspondent will be arriving in Hungary shortly.

At the end of 1969, a military attaché arrived from China in Budapest. His predecessor left without farewell in January 1967. Hungarian military attaches in Peking have been working continuously.

Participation at national celebration receptions at the embassy was usually at deputy foreign minister level. Noting the round anniversary, in 1969, the Foreign Trade minister represented the Hungarians at the Chinese temporary chargé d'affaires' reception.

The 25th anniversary of our liberation was remembered in China at the same level as last year and on a paltry scale (a one-line greetings telegram, deputy foreign minister level at the ambassador's reception, a short piece about the reception on the last page of *Renmin Ribao*).

In 1968 and 1969, other than agreements, our invitations (international

symposiums, exhibitions) have not received a response from the Chinese.

3. According to the signs, we cannot count on a spectacular turn in our relations in the future. The Chinese maintain what we presume are coldly correct, sporadic relations. It wants to treat the European socialist countries that agree with the Soviet Union like the capitalist countries. In the near future our only hope can be in the slight improvement of interstate relations.

Draft resolution

The Political Committee notes the Foreign Ministry statement on Hungarian-Chinese interstate relations and resolves the following:

1. In the interest of restoring the unity of the socialist community and the international communist movement, we must continue our policy to date: on the one hand, we criticize Chinese steps aimed at disrupting the unity of the communist movement and harming socialist affairs, on the other hand, in proportion to discernible Chinese readiness, endeavour to develop our interstate relations, bearing in mind the appropriate degree of caution.

We should take steps to initiate interstate relations primarily in the area of foreign trade.

2. While taking steps we must weigh the situation of Soviet-Chinese relations at all times, and move in close coordination with Soviet comrades.
3. At domestic and international forums, we must continue to support the People's Republic of China's justified international demands (UN membership, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao).
4. The Foreign Ministry should attempt gradual development of personal contacts with Chinese diplomats, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry.
5. Our delegates travelling to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam should, in strict accordance with central instructions, initiate meetings with authorized Chinese persons, primarily in trade, technical-scientific and scientific areas.
6. We should employ a few invitations in the future, to non-political events (exhibitions, scientific conferences).
7. We shall endeavour to increase the number of more principled writings in our

press. We do not employ the principle of mutuality, in terms of either quantity or tone.

Budapest, 28 April 1970
Frigyes Puja

[Page 120]

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
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MINUTES of the Political Committee meeting held on 5 May 1970

1. The state of Hungarian-Chinese relations. Proposals to extend relations

Comrade ÁRPÁD PULLAI: I ask in relation to point 4 of the draft resolution: is this remotely likely?

Comrade DEZSŐ NEMES: The statement mentions that the Chinese have raised the question of settling accounts in currency, but the material contains no position on this. What is the position on this question?

Comrade JÁNOS PÉTER: Personal contacts with Chinese diplomats have generally become more favourable of late. We have other news on this, like the Mao Zedong speech printed in today's daily report, and also have statements coming from our embassies – and our embassies in capitalist countries too – that Chinese diplomats' behaviour is more cordial, until now they usually avoided political themes in personal meetings, and preferred talking about personal things. There is the latest report from Pyongyang: the Chinese ambassador informed our Pyongyang ambassador of Zhou Enlai's visit. He said things that the Korean comrades had not told our ambassador. Of course, we should not overestimate this. I mentioned all this to illustrate that these questions in point 4 are not unrealistic.

Regarding the currency settlement of accounts, the problem is not completely clear for us. It appears that in relations with the socialist countries, they did not settle accounts on the basis of roubles, but on the basis of the Chinese or partner country's

currency. We should propose something on this at a later date; it is currently being examined by the Foreign Trade Ministry. It's possible that this is not a new problem.

Comrade ANTAL APRÓ: I agree with the submission. Its title is Hungarian-Chinese relations.

It is formulated on the first page that they are striving for hegemony within the socialist camp. This is so. But in relation to this, and their efforts, I would only mention that there are perhaps other sorts of efforts too – even if they are not in the material. We can see that there is an approach between Japan and China against the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong support Japanese territorial demands. Then between the USA and China – the FRG has jumped out as a trading partner. We also have information that rocket experts were working there. Therefore these not China's only attempts, they are also trying to reduce trade with us.

Regarding our practice: a meeting last took place in the sphere of technical-scientific cooperation in 1967, now they are the receiving party, and they should make a move, but this has not happened. They now owe us 3 million roubles (?) until 30 April.

Comrade REZSŐ NYERS: I agree with the submission, I think it very realistic, and its basis on principle is correct. I do not wish to comment on the essence.

Regarding foreign trade relations: I approve of what is here, and do not propose that we decide on currency questions. However, it is my opinion, and I have already discussed this with financial experts, that we should not create prestige out of how accounts are settled. This is clearly a question of form. In principle and in law, the situation is that settling accounts can take place the currency of any country. Of course, there is a step here, in that they absolutely do not want to settle in roubles, but when it has no role of merit, and the Soviet Union is not offended, accounts can be settled in either forints or Chinese currency. The Soviet Union is also going in on this. A problem must be made from a serious question.

Comrade DEZSŐ NEMES: I agree with Comrade Nyers. According to my knowledge, accounts are settled in India in rupees, and our foreign trade people say that this is advantageous for us. We cannot therefore make a particular problem out of this.

Comrade JÁNOS KÁDÁR: It appears from the statement that there is no substantial change. The proposal can be accepted, it is supportable.

I would like to comment on point 7, on press coverage. This question is subordinated to the others, still, to avoid confusion, point 7 should be corrected. We

shouldn't say that we will not employ the principle of mutuality, because basically our policy with them is like this: the 'good day' is the same as the 'good day to you too'. Comrades surely thought that they don't react to roughness and an un-comradely tone in the same way. Our appearances should be principled, corresponding to Party and government foreign policy. This point should be corrected a little, so that it is clear to the press.

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 38

BRIEF SUMMARY OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN COMRADES ZHOU ENLAI AND KANG SHENG ON 16 JUNE 1970 WITH MYSELF [KADRI HAZBIU] AND CMRADE XHOXHI ROBO

[Source: AQSH, F. 14/AP, M-PKK, V. 1970, Dos. 5, Fl. 1-10. Translated for CWIHP by Elidor Mëhilli.]

Brief summary of conversation between comrades Zhou Enlai and Kang Sheng on 16 June 1970 with myself [Kadri Hazbiu] and comrade Xhoxhi Robo⁴

Comrade Zhou Enlai pointed out right away that they have some information on a number of issues that they wish to communicate to comrade Enver, comrade Mehmet, and the other comrades.⁵

1. Following Chairman Mao's declaration of 20 May, we have held meetings with a number of countries, lastly with the Romanian delegation led by Bodnăraş.

⁴ Trans. note—In Albanian documents, the name of the ambassador appears both as Xhoxhi and Xhorxhi.

⁵ Trans. note—Hazbiu composed this document from his point of view, switching between first person and second person without quotation marks or other indications.

- “Chairman Mao spoke about the two possibilities:

- a) Either war strengthens revolution;
- b) Or, revolution ensures that war is avoided.

More concretely, he has said, it has not been determined which one is the main tendency right now.”

- Over one year (from the Congress) there has been a greater push against American imperialism. This was a result of the broadening of the war of various countries against it.

- Over 25 years, American imperialism has done a great deal of harm to China.

- They supported Chiang Kai-shek with all resources and with all means, yet they were both banished from the continent. This was a major defeat for them.

- Then, there was the war in Korea. In fact, they got all the way to the Yalu River. Our volunteers turned them back and defeated them yet again. This is considered the greatest defeat since the creation of the American state.

- With the Geneva conference (on Indochina) still under way, they extended their reach to Vietnam and Laos and now they also went into Cambodia. Just like Kennedy and Johnson, Nixon is even less confident about how he will end the war in Indochina.

- A similar situation exists in the Middle East. By exploiting **the fear of the Soviet revisionists**,⁶ American imperialism has extended its reach in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. The Americans favor a compromise with the Soviets (on account of the Middle East) but the Palestinian war has ruined their plans. The Americans first carried out a provocation in Lebanon, then in Jordan, and now again in Lebanon.

More recently, the White House has threatened to send the 82nd Division to the Middle East, but Arafat told them: “Let them come; we will turn this whole region into a second Vietnam.” Immediately, the State Department denied the White House declaration. In other words, there are contradictions within the American leadership.

⁶ All underlined passages here are also underlined in the Albanian-language text.

- Whereas American imperialism has seen defeat everywhere in the international arena, it has achieved success in Kinshasa (the Congo) because the movement there grew in line with the Cuban example, meaning that it was divorced from the masses. In Nigeria, too, the Soviet-American cooperation achieved victory, but nothing has been definitely settled in these countries.

Thus, American imperialism has constantly engaged in aggression over 25 years, but it has not succeeded.

2. The Americans now support Japanese militarism in Asia, and German revanchism in Europe. But will these two countries, which were defeated in the Second World War, submit to the American dictate?

This is why American imperialism now strives to reach its aggressive goals through talks, such as those in the Middle East and in Vietnam. **These talks are a deception. The people of Indochina do not want talks.**

- The resistance movement within the United States is stronger now and it is becoming increasingly stronger. There are all kinds of contradictions all the way to the American Congress and their government, to the point that Nixon is losing sleep these days. All of this is happening because, among other things, the president there is directly connected by telephone with all of the military bases.

- In Libya, they took back the largest military base they had, after the Japanese one. **In other words, there is an increase in the national movements for independence everywhere and a weakening of the position of American imperialism.** We see the affirmation of Chairman Mao's thesis, that "smaller countries can also defeat a big country ..."

- The United States has a huge military budget, but also inflation, and trade deficits, which have resulted from the expansion of war.

- They funnel money to their puppets so as to pit Asians against Asians and Arabs against Arabs, but this is not working for them.

- The war against imperialism now reaches all the way to Washington. The blacks attack the police forces, and the whites (the students) fraternize with the blacks. Chairman Mao's declaration is published in the most important American newspapers (in full or excerpted) and these newspapers sell fast.

In the Senate and in the military they keep having arguments about the war. Lower-level officers distribute pamphlets against the war; soldiers go happily to vacation in Hong Kong and refuse to return to their bases, to the point where they are dragged back by force. So pronounced is this, in fact, that the English police there say that this kind of demoralization in the American army has never been seen before.

Based on all of this, Chairman Mao reached a conclusion: **that we should be prepared for ever greater provocations and that the main tendency is revolution.** In the development of revolution, there will be zigzags.

- So it is a matter of fact that the 1970s are different from the 1950s and 1960s. This is what Comrade Mao said to Bodnăraș. **He reminded him that the Romanians had advised us in 1964 to end the polemic.** But we did not end it. But now you are beginning it on account of a number of other issues. (Comrade Zhou Enlai added here: In 1964, Bodnăraș, Mauer, and Ceaușescu came here, and Bodnăraș and Ceaușescu had a massive polemic with Kang Sheng, and each side defended its own positions.)

Emphasizing these changes, Chairman Mao said that the main war was against American imperialism and Soviet revisionism. This also infers war against other revisionists of all kind, including those ... in our own country, here in China.

*While emphasizing war against American imperialism, we do not neglect the war against Soviet revisionism. **We depart from the principle that by fighting American imperialism, at the same time, we wage war against Soviet revisionism, because we isolate it further and it suffers just as much as American imperialism. This ensures a better mobilization of the people.***

In Jakarta they held a meeting of puppets. Some countries under the influence of the Americans and the Soviets did not attend. This worthless meeting created a commission composed of Japan, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In the beginning, the Soviets said that this meeting is worthless and the South Vietnam Front made the comment that the Soviet Union did not have full knowledge of this meeting. Today, however, all three members of the commission, including U Thant, are welcomed in Moscow as if they represent the foreign ministries of the respective countries.

Not only Nixon, then, but Brezhnev too is having difficulties. They played along

in this farce, and now they face objections everywhere. This is why they are depressed.

- War is proof of the growth of worldwide revolutionary vigor. We must display our resoluteness.

3. Chairman Mao said to Bodnăraș:

- a) Do not be afraid from disorder and chaos. He brought up the example of the fighting during the Cultural Revolution, which worried some of our friends. This is because instances of disorder differentiate our people from the enemies; our ranks are strengthened.

Only Nixon and Brezhnev are afraid from disorder.

- b) Let us not be afraid from insults, because when our enemies insult us, this means that we have hit them right where we need to (on target).

Zhou Enlai said: You, the Albanians, have published a lot of articles on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Lenin. We have issued one. The Soviet revisionists and their followers continue to hurl insults at us. The Americans say that the Chinese have now directed their war against them, but, really, we target both sides.

- c) Let us not be afraid from war (what Lin Biao said in the 9th Congress is elaborated here).

- d) We are prepared to withstand the Americans and the Soviets, as well as their offspring, one by one, or even all of them at once. At most, they might be able to occupy some territory; they might even get deep within our country, but they can never divide China into zones of influence. In Yalta there were discussions about China's division into zones of influence but we made no mention of this fact because Stalin led the war effort against fascism and this was the most important thing. War cannot escalate. We are prepared to withstand every kind of aggression, but we will not attack anyone. Later on, after their aggression has been rebuffed, we will even reach beyond our borders.

Bodnăraș said: We were worried when Czechoslovakia was occupied. Then we mobilized 1,200,000 reservists and 800,000 young people; in case we were attacked, we would have let the aggressors enter our country for a few

kilometers, and then we would have organized our primary forces along a secondary line and directed our assault from there. Mao praised this plan.

4. Further on, comrade Zhou Enlai said:

- We read comrade Enver's speeches held in the north of the country, in which he said that if Romania and Yugoslavia are attacked, you will support their resistance efforts...

- You have supported Sihanouk, the United Front, and his government. This government finds its support within the domestic forces, which are now led by the Communist Party of Cambodia.

When Sihanouk was in power, the Communist Party of Cambodia had difficulty in working with the masses in order to emancipate them. It is thanks to Nixon's intervention in Cambodia that the Party was able to emerge at the forefront of the war effort there. Vietnam and Laos supported them. In Indochina now you have one big war. The Americans sent troops supposedly to "liquidate the bases in Cambodia" but all of Cambodia has now become a large base.

Chairman Mao has said that all of the Asian countries are bases for the soldiers, whereas China is the largest of them all.

- But in order to convince some parties that are still hesitant, we need more time as well as evidence.

Last year, on 1 October, we hosted Choe Yong-geon. At the time, we did not extend any other invitations, except to Albania.

We extended an invitation to the Koreans on 30 September. Kim Il-sung was not in Pyongyang that day, but as soon as he got word of the invitation, he returned, gathered the comrades, and decided to send Choe Yong-geon. **As a head of state, he was given the most prominent place.** We knew that he would ask for something. During the display of fireworks, he talked to comrade Mao, and it was decided that I would go to Korea in April of this year. Sihanouk is there right now.

What was the reason for this change of course? The enemies made this

possible.

- Last year in Washington, Nixon and Sato talked about their primary interests being in South Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia.

- In the beginning, the Soviet revisionists promised to help the Koreans, but they did not deliver on this; they did not even provide military aid. They put pressure on them on the capture of the USS Pueblo, the airplane crash, and they also suspected that the Koreans were involved in the capture of the Japanese plane more recently.

In other words, the Americans and the Soviets themselves taught a number of lessons to the Koreans. And now the Koreans say that China is their friend.

- In attaining these successes, your support has been total and effective. You supported us with the Indochina issue; you acted immediately after we did. Likewise, you supported my visit to Korea. For all of this, we thank you in the name of our party and our government.

Comrade Enver is a great leader, a great Marxist-Leninist who has made a distinguished contribution to world revolution.

Comrade Kang Sheng said:

We have read all the four speeches made by comrade Enver. They are very good, and they attest, once again, to the fact that we share the same opinions. We express our gratitude for the high praise directed at comrade Mao in these speeches. These speeches are a great lesson for our people.

5. Finally, Zhou Enlai pointed out that the Romanians also voiced some additional opinions:

- a) To establish a mutual airline connection between China and Romania with the itinerary China – Afghanistan, or Iran, or Turkey – Romania – Albania. This itinerary is shorter, and passes neither through the Soviet Union nor through American zones. It allows Chinese aviation to connect to international lines, which would also improve the experience of Chinese pilots.

Related to this issue, he added, we need your government's opinion and approval, which we would welcome as soon as possible. In this context, he also

asked whether we had diplomatic relations with Afghanistan and Iran, and when I explained that we did not, he said that we have good relations with Turkey and we could have a positive influence.

Then, turning to comrade Kang Sheng, he asked: Did the Romanians make any other suggestions? Kang Sheng said that they did and briefly outlined a second issue.

- b) They also emphasized the need for cooperation in the building of military industry, especially in the production of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. The idea is to engage in Chinese-Romanian-Albanian cooperation in the production of these kinds of weapons ...

When I asked for clarifications on this matter, comrade Zhou Enlai explained: Romania would provide you with these kinds of weapons (after the necessary industry has been developed) and this would also address the problem of the long distance, which complicates our efforts now. Nevertheless, we will only know more details on this issue once the Romanian defense minister comes here, after the visit in Korea. We will provide you with this information immediately; we just wanted to alert you to this right now. Then he relayed the greetings of comrade Xie Fuzhi, who, he said, had undergone a difficult stomach operation but is feeling better now. He ended the conversation by relaying his best wishes to comrade Enver, Mehmet, Hysni, Beqir, Ramiz, and the others.

I thanked him for the information and I reassured him that I would accurately communicate it to comrade Enver and the other comrades. I also thanked him for the kind words said in respect to our party and comrade Enver. In light of this, I also emphasized that comrade Enver and our party objectively assess the situation and we have expressed our views on these events. As in the past, we will continue to fight together in the future, arm in arm, against imperialism and revisionism.

Our party will always support the people's war against both imperialism and revisionism, knowing how and where to concentrate our attack at any given moment.

Regardless of the fact that current developments in the world are the outcome of the objective laws of class war, our party will support with every means

available the people's war – by relentlessly unmasking both imperialism and revisionism. This is our obligation, the fulfillment of which accelerates the process of revolution.

We support the idea of carefully exploiting the contradictions that have surfaced and will continue to surface in the midst of our enemies.

Finally, I emphasized the importance of the declaration of comrade Mao and I expressed our wishes that he have a long and healthy life.

My opinion on **a number of issues that were discussed in this conversation:**

1. I do not view as correct what was said: *“by fighting American imperialism, at the same time, we wage war against Soviet revisionism.” Our correct assessment on this matter is well known – without fighting revisionism one cannot properly fight against imperialism.*
2. *Throughout this analysis of developments across the world, I do not see it as correct to ignore the role and struggle of the proletariat everywhere, including in Europe.*
3. *The “high praise” directed at our support of Zhou Enlai’s visit to Korea, in addition to our position on Yugoslavia and Romania, which comrade Enver reiterated in the speeches he delivered in Kukës and Tropojë, seem to me to indicate a one-sided understanding of the matter, as support for politics of closer relations with these countries and revisionist parties. In other words, these seem to be illusions regarding our position.*
4. *With the cooperation in the realm of military industry, and perhaps also in terms of the cooperation in aviation, which was proposed here, they imply more concrete steps in our cooperation with Romania.*

Kadri Hazbiu
/signed

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DOCUMENT NO. 39**LETTER FROM ALDO MORO TO PRESIDENT GIUSEPPE SARAGAT, 2 NOVEMBER 1970**

[Source: Historical Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Obtained for CWIHP by Enrico Fardella and translated for CWIHP by Joe Calìo.]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

November 2, 1970

Dear Mr. President,

In order to provide you with all the elements of judgement with regard to the recognition of the People's Republic, please allow me to send you some documents on our contact with the Canadians in the course of negotiations. Originally, when we agreed to gradually move from economic relations to diplomatic relations with mainland China, we thought it would be useful to act alongside another Western country and friend of the United States, relying on one another. When I took charge of negotiations, started by the Rumor-Nenni government, I focused on achieving this perspective, believing that the time and manner in which to conclude the negotiations would be determined by mutual agreement and with the intent to cause the least possible damage to the position of the United States. Therefore, in my interview with Sharp in Ottawa I insisted that recognition should not take place too close to the UN debate. The documents show, however, that our hopes were unfulfilled, and that Canada shied away from concerted action. I do not know the reason for this. The fact is however that we were left without cover and with no real freedom of choice as to the timing and conditions for recognition. For the first point, in fact, we would have had to adopt delaying tactics, equivalent to a refusal of recognition. For the second point, we would not have gained, over time, any better chance. It should be presumed that after the French and Canadian formulas, more stringent versions will be introduced with regard to Taiwan. Now, although what would have been desirable and fair has not been achieved on this issue, it is also true that we explicitly state that we will not subscribe to Beijing's claim. Moreover, the situation with regard to diplomatic relations with Taiwan was abnormal for many years, since we had no active representation. Of course, the political significance and consequences of the

emergence of the People's Republic is open to much debate. You know how many doubts I have had with due respect to the Americans. But things move on even without us. It can be observed that 1) the U.S. did not prevent and did not influence the moves of their friends in time (starting with the UK, as you have already correctly observed) 2) without wanting to cynically play the China card against the USSR (it would risk war), a more forcefully articulated American position could curb growing Soviet power. The threat to the free world lies in the fact that major Communist powers exist: the politics of recognition and relations, if judiciously expressed, may perhaps reduce, not increase this risk. Of course, we will employ the necessary courtesy with the representatives of Taiwan and will adopt every possible friendly tactic towards the Americans in the vote.

Thanks for your attention, and respectful greetings.

signed ALDO MORO

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DOCUMENT NO. 40

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, ASIA-OCEANIA, NOTE, "STATE OF THE CHINESE QUESTION AFTER CANADA AND ITALY'S RECOGNITION OF BEIJING AND AFTER THE UN DISCUSSION," 30 DECEMBER 1970

[Source: Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France. Obtained for CWIHP by Enrico Fardella and translated for CWIHP by Garret Martin.]

Paris, 30th December 1970
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Department of Political Affairs
Asia-Oceania

Note

State of the Chinese question after Canada and Italy's recognition of Beijing and after the UN discussion

Canada and Italy's recognition of Beijing, as well as the vote at the UN, are evidence of a re-orientation of the foreign policy of Communist China and an evolution of the international attitude towards the latter.

Chinese diplomacy, whose resurgence was already obvious in 1969, has become particularly active in the last year. In particular, it relies on a style, and uses methods, that contrast with those of previous periods.

True, in regard to America and the USSR, while remaining prudent with the first and agreeing to 'normalize' its inter-state relations with the second, Communist China still acts in a way to weaken, as much as possible, the two 'superpowers' and to prevent their collusion which is viewed as dangerous for Chinese interests. However, China has adopted a more open attitude towards the rest of the world. Indeed, it seems keen to build friendships with Third World countries, to end the diplomatic isolation it had trapped itself in during the Cultural Revolution, and even to encourage the independence of nations or group of nations that are likely to counter-balance the power of the 'big' two.

Thus, in Asia, Beijing seems to have moderated its attitude towards Burma and India, and used the opportunity of a change of government in Sri Lanka to strengthen its ties with the country. In Africa, where its preference naturally goes to certain 'revolutionary' or strategically well placed countries, it endeavors to renew relations with old acquaintances such as Mali, Kenya or Tunisia, or even to build new friendships such as with Ethiopia or Equatorial Guinea. In Europe, Communist China is showing a desire to intensify relations with Britain and France, but there again it also wants to build new ties. Negotiations with Italy, which had been dragging on for twenty months or more, were eventually concluded because Beijing finally gave up on imposing a formal recognition of its authority over Taiwan. In the Americas, aside from the establishment of relations with Canada in similar conditions, we have to note the completion of talks with Chile as well as the improvement of relations with Cuba.

In general, Communist China claims to be ready to build ties with all countries on the basis of 'peaceful coexistence'. So it is likely that it would welcome the openings of other countries, such as Austria and Belgium, to establish relations, as long as they agreed to give up official ties with Taiwan. Finally, in regard to the United Nations, China's tone has considerably changed, and while it has until now publicly refused

to confirm whether or not it would send its representatives to New York in case of a favorable vote in the General Assembly, we have reasons to believe, as declared by the Minister during one of his speeches to the Organization, that China would do so.

Nonetheless, this policy that could lead to China's return to the concert of nations is undermined by political and ideological considerations, and it still does not imply that Beijing has given up on its fundamental aims. On the one hand, the Chinese leaders continue to condemn countries, like West Germany or Japan, which they regard either as 'aides' of 'American imperialism' or of the USSR, or both of them as in the case of Germany; not that this condemnation stands in the way of Communist China developing profitable commercial exchanges with these countries. On the other hand, they continue to provide a firm support for the revolutionary movements, especially in Asia where they indirectly serve Chinese interests, but also in Africa and elsewhere in the world where Beijing still maintains relations with Marxist-Leninist groups. There is thus an ambiguity in China's foreign policy, even a contradiction which is very clear in the case of Burma for example, where Beijing seems to be betting both on stabilizing, or even eventually improving, its relations with the Rangoon government, and the development of an internal revolutionary movement.

Beijing's more moderate attitude in the last few months has generally met with positive reactions across the world. Obviously, Communist China only needed to abandon the excessive attitude it had adopted during the Cultural Revolution for some nations - either keen to escape from the pressure of the 'big' two or simply conscious of the future role of Communist China, and of the political and economic advantages that they could draw from establishing relations with Beijing - to follow the example given by France a few years before. That was the case for a number of already mentioned countries. What is the situation for other candidates to establish relations with Beijing? While we have noted several signs of intent, be it from Austria, where the parliament is in charge of the problem, from Belgium, Malaysia or even New Zealand and Iran, it does not seem, though, that we can expect a cascade of recognitions. Many countries - and it is the case for those just mentioned - want to maintain official relations with Taiwan and want to delay as long as possible the moment of decision. We thus have to expect a certain time to pass before the experience of their contacts with Beijing makes them realize that China cannot accept their claims. That said, Beijing could score some rapid successes in Latin America, with the more or less progressive governments of Bolivia and Peru, in Africa by renewing with countries with which previously existing relations had been broken,

and in Europe with Austria in particular.

This situation comes across in the United Nations, where the evolution of things could be faster. Indeed, for the first time this year, the vote on the so-called 'Albanian' resolution, which advocates restoring China's rights, scored 51 votes for and 49 against (with 25 abstentions), while the 'American' resolution, which requires a two-third majority to solve the debate, obtained 66 votes for and 52 against (7 abstentions). If there is no change to the current procedure, only an eight vote shift would be required to allow the Beijing representatives to be admitted to New York. Such an event will happen for sure in the coming years, maybe even next year. Indeed, on the one hand, a number of countries that have relations with Beijing, like Great-Britain, Italy and Canada, and which this year either voted along with the Americans or abstained, could change their attitude; on the other hand, nations like Austria which, without having yet established relations with China, are already voting in favor of the Albanian resolution, and might provide even firmer support to Communist China.

It remains that a number of countries, with the US at the forefront, will do their utmost to keep Taiwan in the Organization one way or another, even if they cannot prevent the Beijing delegates from gaining access to the United Nations. It is hard to imagine what maneuver could succeed in that regard. True, the admission of Taiwan to the UN as a new member state or the representation of the Chinese state by several governments could theoretically be possible solutions, because they would probably be approved by a majority of the General Assembly, but the claim of Jiang Jieshi's regime to represent all of China, and Beijing's radical hostility to these solutions, means they have no chance of succeeding. In the same way, a 'package deal' that would aim to include at the same time in the UN all the divided countries (2 Koreas, 2 Germanies, 2 Vietnams and 2 Chinas) would inevitably face Beijing's opposition. In these conditions, it is possible that the United States would finally stick to their current position so to preserve their bilateral relations with Taiwan after the delegates of that country have been expelled from the United Nations.

As for Taipei's attitude, it does not look that it can change as long as Jiang Jieshi remains in power. Whether or not the 'Republic of China' withdraws of its own volition before the United Nations' final decision or whether or not its representatives are banned by the UN will not change much to the situation.

However, we must not confuse the expulsion of Taiwan's delegates from the Organization with the devolution of this territory to China. The economic prosperity of the island has made it a stable entity whose security will in fact be maintained for a

long time by America and maybe later by Japan.

Will the supporters of Beijing wait for a General Assembly vote to ensure that the Chinese delegates are sitting next to them? That is not clear. Some countries favorable to Communist China could bring this issue up in front of the Security Council when it will convene in January, and when this authority will confront the question of the powers of the representatives. Yet, the composition of the Council means it is not likely that a decision will be obtained this time.

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DOCUMENT NO. 41

LETTER OF ENVER HOXHA, CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY OF LABOR OF ALBANIA, TO MAO ZEDONG, CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, 6 AUGUST 1971

[Source: AQSH, F. 14/AP, M-PKK, V. 1971, Dos. 3, Fl. 48-66. Translated for CWIHP by Elidor Mëhilli.]

Letter of Enver Hoxha, Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, to Mao Zedong, Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 6 August 1971⁷

To the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China
Comrade Mao Zedong
Beijing

Dear comrades:

⁷ Trans. note—One version of this letter first appeared as “It is not right to receive Nixon in Beijing. We do not support it,” in Enver Hoxha, *Selected Works Vol. IV, February 1966 – July 1975* (Tiranë: 8 Nëntori, 1982), pp. 665-682. Some passages, however, were left out of that official translation. These passages appear in bold in this translation, which is based on the original archival document.

The leadership of our Party thanks you for the information that comrade Zhou Enlai sent to us through our ambassador in Beijing in connection with Nixon's upcoming visit to China.

Comrade Xhorxhi Robo, who came to Tirana especially for this matter, reported to us in depth on his conversation with comrade Zhou Enlai, on the assessment of the Chinese leadership on Nixon's upcoming visit to China, on the international situation and the domestic conditions in the United States, on the issues raised during the meeting between Zhou Enlai and Kissinger and the position of the Chinese leadership in relation to them.

The ambassador informed us that, according to the information you have supplied, Nixon has been asking to come to China for more than two years, and that a number of contacts at various levels have been established for the purpose of arranging this visit. In your assessment, these talks with Nixon are referred to as an escalation of previous Sino-American talks in Warsaw. The ambassador communicated to us your assessment that the situation in the United States during the last several years has changed significantly, that America is now on the verge of revolutionary storms, and that the Americans are in a difficult situation, that they cannot continue with the war, that they want to alleviate the difficult situation, that they want to withdraw their troops and military bases from foreign countries so that they do not keep fighting on their own, so that they do not provoke new warzones, and so that they can assist their puppets only with money and weapons, so that Asians will be fighting against Asians. Our ambassador communicated to us your opinion that Nixon's visit in China serves and is in line with the diplomatic line of the people, that high-level meetings with the United States serve the connection with the American people and encourage change among them, that the talks with Nixon, whether successful or not, will be in the advantage of China and will not hurt it in anyway.

The leadership of our Party studied this very important problem presented to us with utmost seriousness, because it is being presented to us from a sister Marxist-Leninist party. We are in agreement that this is a matter of great importance, because, as you define it, Nixon's visit to Beijing is part of your great strategic plan.

We trust that you will understand the reason for the delay of our response. This happened because your decision came as a surprise to us and there was no preliminary consultation on this issue between us, which would have granted us the opportunity to express and evaluate opinions, which, we believe, could have been useful, because preliminary consultations between close friends, between determined comrades-in-

arms against imperialism and revisionism, are always useful and necessary and this is especially the case when steps are taken that, in our opinion, attract great international attention.

We base our opinions and assessment on this problem of great importance for the present and the future of the war against American imperialism on the theory and great Marxist-Leninist strategy that has guided and always guides our Party and the glorious Communist Party of China, led by comrade Mao Zedong. This strategy, which makes our parties⁸ unbreakable, consists in the determined, principled, and uncompromising war on two fronts, both against imperialism, led by American imperialism, and against modern revisionism, led by the Soviet kind, in the war against all reactionaries, in support of revolution and the national liberation wars of the peoples, for the triumph of socialism and communism. Our strategy foresees a close alliance with the people engaged in war, with the revolutionaries of the whole world, in a united front against imperialism and social-imperialism, but never an alliance with Soviet social-imperialism supposedly against American imperialism, or never an alliance with American imperialism supposedly against Soviet social-imperialism. The touchstone that distinguishes us, the Marxist-Leninists, from the various anti-Marxists, is harsh and uncompromising class war, tooth for tooth to the very end, on both fronts, against American imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism.

In the course of our war, both of our parties have adopted and will continue to adopt different tactics, but these have always served and must always serve this strategy.

Along this glorious strategic path, both of our parties have earned great victories. Especially the Communist Party of China has achieved great and well-earned authority and admiration among the peoples and revolutionaries of the world in its determined and principled Marxist-Leninist war. China has become an undefeated castle of revolution, the hope and shield of the liberation and revolutionary wars of the people, in opposition to and in open struggle against American imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism. And a situation has developed in the world in which no important international problem can be solved without China. It is clear that both American imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism fear this great strategy, and they try to assault our strategy. Therefore, both of our parties will implement and defend it with courage in any and every situation and circumstance.

⁸ Trans. note—In the official translation in Hoxha's *Selected Works*, the expression "our parties" was changed to "Marxist-Leninist parties."

In this favorable revolutionary situation, the People's Republic of China is a great and powerful state and all together, People's China, socialist Albania, the peoples and the progressive states of the world must have their say, impose their will towards the destruction of the diabolical, war-mongering, and enslaving plans of the imperialist Great Powers, including the Americans, the Soviets, and so on.

It is understandable, and it has always been clear to us, that in the interest of the peoples and the revolution, the great China of Mao Zedong may establish diplomatic relations with different states around the world, including the United States of America.

The relations and friendship between our two parties and our two governments, between China and Albania, have always been and continue to be pure and sincere. Considering the Communist Party of China as a sister party and our closest comrade-in-arms, we have never disguised and will not disguise our views from her. This is why on this matter of great importance communicated to us, we inform you that we deem your decision to host Nixon in Beijing to be incorrect, undesirable. We do not approve it and we do not support it. We believe, moreover, that Nixon's announced visit to China will not be understood and approved by the people, the revolutionaries, and the communists of different countries.

American imperialism is the number one enemy of the peoples. The United States of America, with Nixon at the very top, is now engulfed in a great confrontation with all the peoples, and especially the Vietnamese people, against whom they have initiated a historically unprecedented, barbarous, and savage aggression for the past twelve years. The peoples of the world now are engaged in a life-and-death struggle, with weapons in hand and by employing all means necessary, to wipe out the oppressive and enslaving plans of the greatest enemy of mankind—American imperialism. This great interest of the peoples and their armed struggle has been the foundation of the politics of our two parties and our two governments. They always have this interest at heart in all that they do, especially when it comes to relations with the United States of America and the Soviet revisionists.

It is not difficult to understand why Nixon has repeatedly asked for such a long time for the opportunity to visit China, because this conforms to the suspicious tactic of American imperialism of flaunting both the arrows and the olive branch, in conformity with the aim of disguising the imperialist façade, of deceiving the peoples and subduing China.

In the history of the Communist Movement there are many examples of discussions

at various levels between opponents. Historical parallels cannot be drawn, because such decisions had been made in different conditions, at a different time, and in the interest of different issues. But our great teachers have shown that talks ought to take place when they are truly necessary, when they serve the cause of the revolution and socialism, and that one must clearly keep in mind the aggressive goals of the opponent and correctly evaluate the situation and the opponent.

The talks that you will undertake with Nixon would have been acceptable for the world's progressive public if some conditions were met, if they would surely contribute to the anti-imperialist war, to the revolution in general, and to China in particular.

A *sine qua non* condition for talks at such a high level with the Americans is that they should be conducted on equal footing, which means that the United States should first recognize the government of the People's Republic of China as the only lawful government that represents the Chinese people, that they also remove the obstacles to China's admission into the United Nations, that they withdraw their occupation troops from Taiwan, that they remove the 7th fleet from the Chinese coast, that they terminate their acts of aggression along China's borders. This would be a great defeat for American politics. We think, moreover, that it would have been possible to gradually move forward in the solution of important international problems, which cannot be solved without People's China.

Under these conditions, it would have been possible to undertake steps towards talks with no need, in our opinion, to go directly from a very low level of talks to talks between the highest representatives of the two states, China and the United States of America, merely because Nixon has expressed his wish for such a meeting on numerous occasions. This meeting, in our opinion, cannot be called a simple escalation of talks, but a complicated escalation that will have consequences. Which is to say that it is difficult to understand how talks could be elevated in this fashion and how the desire of the American president could be fulfilled at a time when the United States were dropping massive quantities of bombs all over Vietnam and extending their aggression to Cambodia and Laos; when the war is ongoing and the American attacks are continuing furiously, one after the other, against the peoples of Indochina; when the People's Republic of China, Albania, the heroic people of North and South Vietnam and all the revolutionary peoples are standing strong like granite, fighting and unmasking the aggressive policy of Nixon's government – this enemy of all the peoples of the world. In our opinion and under these circumstances, this is wrong both as a matter of principle and tactics.

It seems to us that it cannot be claimed that the talks with Nixon—whether they prove successful or not—will be equally in China's favor and that they will not cause any harm. On the contrary, regardless of the results of the talks, merely the fact of Nixon's visit to China—a man known as a rabid anti-communist, as an aggressor and murderer of peoples, as the representative of the darkest segment of American reaction—has numerous negatives and will produce many negative consequences for the revolutionary movement and our cause.

There is no way in which Nixon's visit to China and the talks held with him can fail to produce harmful illusions among ordinary people, among the nations, and among the revolutionaries about American imperialism, its strategy, and its policies. It will exert a negative influence on the resistance and struggle of the American people themselves against the policies and aggressive activity of the administration of Nixon, who will seize the opportunity to win reelection. Nixon's visit to China will weaken the wave of revolt against American imperialism everywhere in the world. Thus, in our opinion, American imperialism will be given the possibility to ensure a period of relative calm, which he will try to exploit to consolidate his position, to gather strength, and to prepare for new military adventures.

One can imagine what the Italian workers who clashed with police forces and who demonstrated their contempt for Nixon's recent visit to Italy will think of this, or the Japanese workers who did not even allow Eisenhower to set foot on their land, or the peoples of Latin America who protest and rise against the Rockefellers and all the other Washington envoys. Only the Yugoslav Titoites and the Rumanian revisionists welcomed president Nixon to their capitals with flowers in hand.

The talks with Nixon provide a weapon to the revisionists in diminishing all the struggle and the great polemic exercised by the Communist Party of China in unmasking the Soviet renegades as allies and collaborators of American imperialism, and enabling them to equate China's position vis-à-vis American imperialism with the traitorous line of cooperation pursued by the Soviet revisionists towards it. This enables the Khrushchevite revisionists to wave even more forcefully their bogus anti-imperialist flag and to intensify their demagoguery and lies in order to attract the anti-imperialist forces behind them. Soviet revisionists have already begun to exploit Nixon's visit to China to arouse nationalist and chauvinist sentiments under the pretext that a Sino-American alliance aimed against the Soviet Union is under construction. With this, they aim to strengthen the position of the revisionist cliques in power and weaken China's revolutionary position.

Nixon's visit to China will also encourage the centrist current and supply its partisans with arguments to prove the "correctness" of their opportunist line. The Italian followers of Togliatti and the Romanians are publicly declaring that now new perspectives have opened in connection with the reestablishment of unity in the Communist movement, that the differences between China and the Soviet Union can also be resolved in this fashion. These are the desires of unfailing revisionists and opportunists who have seized the opportunity to present the differences between the Communist Party of China and the revisionist leadership of the Soviet Union not as profound ideological differences over cardinal issues and principles, as they are in reality, but as simple disagreements at the state level, which can be resolved by means of meetings and direct talks between high-level state personalities.

The American president's visit to China cannot fail to arouse questions, indeed misunderstandings, among ordinary people, who might begin to suspect that China is modifying its position towards American imperialism and is joining in the game of the superpowers.

It is not a coincidence that the capitalist and revisionist world has welcomed Nixon's initiative to go to China with such enthusiasm. The imperialist propaganda, as well as the propaganda of the imperialists, the Titoites, the Romanians, and the others, uniformly praises China and America for this opening in relations between them. The modern Soviet, Titoite, and Romanian revisionists, and others like them, attempt to perpetuate the massive lie⁹ that China has changed course on the path of the politics of unprincipled compromises. They seek to extract important political, ideological, and economic benefits from this.

All of this, in our opinion, cannot fail to provoke puzzlement and confusion among the ranks of the revolutionary and anti-imperialist forces, even among the ranks of the Marxist-Leninists, and it cannot fail to encourage the spread of the pacifist spirit and illusions about peaceful means.

We think that these are major negatives. To underestimate these circumstances, which will be brought about by Nixon's visit to Beijing, would be a grave mistake, and we think that these negatives cannot be compensated with some hypothetical results which may be achieved in the meeting with Nixon, who, like the imperialist spawn that he is, acts cunningly.

Permit us to also express some thoughts of ours in connection with certain specific

⁹ In the official translation in Hoxha's *Selected Works*, the expression "attempt to perpetuate the massive lie" has been rendered as "say."

problems related to the international situation, mostly with the aim of making our views more precise on some issues that we deem debatable, while recognizing, at the same time, that your information about the development of international events, and especially about the United States of America, may be more complete.

It is true that American imperialism finds itself in great difficulties at home and abroad. The American people are showing marked signs of wariness from the policy of aggression and international tension pursued by Nixon and his predecessors in the White House. The protests and demonstrations against the war in Vietnam, as well as the revolts of the blacks and students have increased in recent years. The wheels of the American economic machine are creaking under the heavy burden of the war expenditures in Indochina, the arms war, and the bloated military budgets. Inflation shows no sign of stopping, and the army of unemployed keeps on growing. At a time when the contradictions with the capitalist countries of Europe are increasing, American influence and prestige are further declining. The peoples' struggle against American imperialism is mounting and expanding everywhere in the world.

Nevertheless, without overestimating or underestimating the enemy, the picture of today's situation in the United States does not drive us to the same conclusion that you have reached—that America is caught up in a great revolutionary storm.

The large popular protests and demonstrations in the United States aimed at the war being waged in Vietnam, as well as the other mass movements, are a matter of fact, but they are chiefly limited to opposition to discrete acts, against a concrete act of the American government, and which only indirectly affect its whole aggressive line. They do not go any further than this. In terms of the economic situation, the inspiring ideology, the way of life, the customs, the traditions, the ties, and so on, the American people are far from being on the eve of revolution. A lot of water will flow under the bridges over American rivers before such a time comes. We are convinced that it will come, but it will take a great deal of work and a great struggle.

In Western Europe, the movement of the masses, which is rooted in long-standing traditions, is far broader and more powerful than in the United States. Its general political tendentiousness and class character are evident. Still, even here one cannot say that the revolutionary storm is blowing and that the revolution is imminent. To put things any differently is to create harmful illusions, and the revolutionary forces could easily err by falling into extremism, especially of the ultra-leftist kind.

Similarly, we do not deem accurate your assessment that, as a result of the defeats that they have suffered, the Americans would like to alleviate the tense situation,

withdraw their troops and military bases from foreign territories, avoid being involved in fighting themselves and creating other hotbeds of war. If one makes such an assessment, one creates the impression that there is a general retreat of American imperialism on all fronts today, and this only serves to create harmful illusions and the demobilization of the anti-imperialist forces.

American imperialism still exerts enough economic, political, and military power to mount resistance and embark on new aggressive campaigns. The war budget and the race for arms and improved weapons, which constitute the main indicators of its war-mongering and hawkish policy and goals, have anything but diminished, and in fact they keep increasing from year to year at a very high rate. American imperialism will never relinquish its strategic goals of war and aggression. Otherwise it would not be imperialism.

If the US thinks that the puppet governments ought to fight against the peoples on their own, and that America would assist them with money and weapons, then this would be like American imperialism signing its own death warrant, as well as the death warrant of its puppets. There can be no illusions on this front. Even if it suffers defeat and is forced to withdraw from one country or another, this does not mean that American imperialism will not attempt to intervene and mount other aggressive campaigns against other countries.

War, aggression, oppression, and enslavement of the peoples are in the nature of imperialism; they stem from the very core of its exploitative system. It is well known that in order to exist, the United States needs constant economic, political, and military expansion for the purpose of keeping other peoples in captivity and sucking their blood. Otherwise imperialism dies and the path is cleared for revolts, insurrections, and revolutions. For this reason, we think that the United States will never willingly dismantle its military bases in foreign territories and it will not withdraw its troops from deployment abroad. This will only be achieved when it will be forced to do so by the struggle of the peoples.

In our opinion, the task of the Marxist-Leninists and revolutionaries is to incite the peoples in a struggle against imperialism and revisionism, to build up their confidence in their own inexhaustible strength, to make them conscious that in this day and age they are capable of successfully resisting the assaults of the imperialists—both old and new—and that they are capable of defeating their aggressive plans.

We understand and support with all of our strength the struggle and efforts of the People's Republic of China in its determined opposition to the aggressive policy of

American imperialism in the Far East, and especially in Indochina, China's struggle for the liberation of Taiwan, the opposition to Japanese militarism, its constructive attempts to implement peace and security in the Indian subcontinent, and so on.

We have championed and will champion with all of our strength the undeniable right of the People's Republic of China to the liberation of Taiwan. Taiwan is an inseparable and inalienable part of the People's Republic of China. Our government will always resolutely oppose the "two Chinas" theory, the "one China and one Taiwan" theory, the "the independence" of Taiwan, or its "indeterminate status," and so on. As before, the People's Republic of Albania will fight to ensure that People's China occupies the seat that it deserves in the United Nations, and that the usurpers of Chiang Kai-shek are expelled from it.

Our people, like all of the peoples of the world, have admired the unlimited aid directly provided by the People's Republic of China to the Vietnamese people and their heroic war against the American aggressors, as well as its cause in the international arena. With its anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist policies, the People's Republic of China plays and will continue to play an important and decisive role in the liberation of the people of Indochina. To think otherwise would be a mistake.

As far as the war in Vietnam is concerned, our Party's position is familiar to you. We have been and continue to be against the Paris talks. We have also told this openly to the Vietnamese comrades. Regardless of this fact, we have supported and continue to support without reservations the legitimate struggle of the people of Vietnam, whose victory we deem decisive for the whole anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples.

The continuation of the American aggression in Vietnam and all of Indochina is a major issue, which concerns all peoples. The Vietnamese problem can only be solved when the United States puts an end to the war in Vietnam, dismantles all its military bases and withdraws every single soldier from that country. We are convinced that the Vietnamese people will triumph and that victory belongs to the Vietnamese, who are fighting with weapons in hand and are shedding their blood. The last word on any settlement of the Vietnamese problem belongs to the Vietnamese themselves; theirs is the undeniable right to decide their own fate.

The American imperialists and their satellites, as well as the Soviet revisionists, and all their armed forces, which they have deployed along China's border, have tried to establish a ring of fire around China, to threaten its freedom and independence. In this sense, the developing friendship between the Soviet revisionists and the reactionary Sato government is significant. We have always been and continue to

stand by your side in this sacred struggle to oppose and destroy these hostile plans of American imperialism, the Soviet revisionists, and various other reactionaries.

We fully approve your decision not to communicate to Kissinger China's views on the Soviet Union. Yet, we think that we must share opinions about potential political actions that may be undertaken by the Soviet revisionists, at least against China and Albania in the existing circumstances.

The American imperialists' views on the Soviet Union, as laid out by Kissinger in conversations with him, should not have been kept secret from us. Keeping in mind that American imperialism is allied with Soviet social-imperialism, and that they coordinate their actions between them, we deem that these views might have consequences not only for the Far East, but also for Europe. Had we been informed about what Kissinger said about the Soviet Union, we would have been somewhat armed to uncover more thoroughly the American and Soviet moves on the European chessboard.

We support the struggle waged by the People's Republic of China against Japanese militarism and its expansionist policy in Asia, especially in the direction of Korea, Taiwan, and so on. Along with the active support that China grants to the struggle of the Japanese people against the reactionary Sato government, and the Japanese-American alliance, this correct position is an important contribution to building up the revolutionary struggle in Japan, which is especially important in restraining the aggressive plans of American imperialism and Japanese militarism.

American imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism have stepped up their efforts to incite Japanese militarism, Indian reaction, and that of several other countries against China and the free countries of Asia. In this context, we highly appreciate the efforts of People's China in strengthening the united front of the peoples of China, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, as well as its efforts in strengthening and extending contacts and ties with the Japanese, Indian, Pakistani, and other peoples.

We think that the strikes and demonstrations in America are important, but of higher importance is the awakening of the peoples of India, Japan, and all Asia, and their mobilization into revolution. Comrade Mao Zedong's thesis on the encirclement of the city with the village is totally applicable in this regard. The metropolis of American imperialism will be encircled by the rise in armed struggle and revolution of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It is well known, moreover, that Lenin placed great emphasis on the triumph of revolution in large countries such as China, India, and the other countries of the East, for the outcome of world revolution.

British imperialism created splits and antagonisms among the peoples of India and Pakistan and we Marxist-Leninists must oppose the exploitative and aggressive goals of the American imperialists and the Soviet social-imperialists, who continue to incite the peoples of these two countries against each other. India and Pakistan are ruled by the reactionary bourgeoisie, which is hardly as powerful as American imperialism. They constitute a weak link.

Our two Marxist-Leninist parties never for a moment forget that the struggle against American imperialism must be waged harshly, not only in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but also in Europe. We have emphasized that People's China, together with its true Marxist-Leninist friends, ought to play a bigger role in Europe. You are familiar with our policy on Europe, which supports revolution, but opposes NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, the new Soviet-West German treaty, and the revisionist plans over European security. We think that the policy of American imperialism in Europe is very complicated. Despite the contradictions with its partners, the United States' traditional ties to Britain and France must always be taken into account.

We agree with you that in order to establish contacts with the peoples the people's diplomacy must be exercised. This is the open and sincere kind of diplomacy, which serves socialism, the peoples' liberation struggle, and the expansion and growth of the revolutionary upsurge of the masses in the capitalist countries.

But just as diplomatic relations are not the only means to establish ties with the people, so too contacts with the people are not necessarily established through meetings with the leaders. The influence of socialist countries is exerted, first of all, through the policies which they pursue, the anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist struggle they wage, the consistent, principled positions they maintain towards the vital problems which preoccupy the world, and the solidarity and unreserved support they show to the peoples' revolutionary and liberation struggle.

Until recent times, the People's Republic of China has not had diplomatic relations and direct contacts with many capitalist countries, but this has not hindered it from exerting a great influence on the revolutionary and liberation movement in the world, just as it has not hindered the peoples of different continents from admiring, supporting, and defending China, from embracing the ideas of Mao Zedong.

Not only does Vietnam not have diplomatic relations with the United States of America, but has been at war with it for a very long time. Nevertheless, precisely today, thanks to its just war, the sympathy of the peoples of the world and of the American people for the Vietnamese people is greater than ever. More than anything

else, it is the bravery and the vigorous stand of Vietnam what helps radicalize the masses of the American people who come out in the streets holding the national flag of Vietnam and the portraits of Ho Chi Minh.

The most that can be achieved in meetings and talks with the chiefs of capitalist countries is the solution of specific problems. But they can never be turned into a factor the influence of which increases the revolutionary upsurge of the masses, especially when the masses are disgruntled and have been set in motion against the policy and actions of their rulers. On the contrary, in such cases, meetings and talks might create illusions among the people about the imperialist or revisionist leaders and they might create an atmosphere in which the masses are put on hold and the struggle of the masses is weakened.

The establishment of diplomatic relations is not always useful to this struggle either. For example, we do not accept to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet revisionists because, as is known, they have committed grave crimes and they have mounted furious attacks against Marxism-Leninism, and especially the People's Republic of Albania, and they broke off diplomatic relations with us on their own initiative. Our Party has demanded that they perform public self-criticism over everything they have done against Marxism-Leninism and against our country. If they did not do this, it would seem as if we assume – at least in part, if not entirely – the blame for the breach of relations and we would provide the Soviet revisionist leaders with arguments to justify in the eyes of the Soviet peoples the hostile positions and actions they have taken up until this point against Marxism-Leninism and Albania. At the present time this would not be in the interest of the Soviet peoples and their anti-revisionist struggle, and in fact it would help the Brezhnev clique consolidate its position.

Or, let us consider the example of our relations with Yugoslavia. Our two countries have diplomatic and trade relations, as to a certain extent some cultural exchanges. These relations are carried out at a time when we not only do not have contacts with the Titoite leaders, but, indeed, at a time when we are wage a principled ideological struggle against them. The polemics and the ideological struggle against Titoism, which is reflected fully and comprehensively in the materials and documents published continually by our Party, continue without interruption. But this has not prevented us from declaring, at this present time when Yugoslavia is threatened by Soviet social-imperialism, that in case of an act of aggression we shall stand beside the peoples of Yugoslavia. In this way we have strengthened our contacts with the peoples

of Yugoslavia.

Dear comrades,

These were our views on the information that you communicated to us through our ambassador in Beijing.

Both of our parties, our two governments, and our two peoples have held the same line, at the forefront, and they have mounted a determined and principled struggle against imperialism, with the American kind above all, against modern revisionism, with the Soviet kind above all, and against the international reaction. In this war, great successes of major historical importance have been achieved. The position, authority, and the role played by our countries have been strengthened, and the Marxist-Leninist, revolutionary, and liberation movement in the world has been strengthened and expanded.

Numerous enemies have furiously assaulted our parties and countries. By means of pressure, various maneuvers, and numerous stratagems, they have tried to drive us off the right course; they have tried to divide us. But they have been unmasked and they have failed. Our unity has stood all these tests. In the common struggle for our common goals and ideals, this unity has been increasingly tempered it has always achieved a higher level.

Our party, our government, and our people have, at all times, without any other considerations, and during every storm, stood arm to arm with the Chinese comrades and brothers, by defending their just cause, which is our common cause.

Our party, our government, and our people have sincerely greeted and have wholeheartedly supported the Great Cultural Proletarian Revolution, fired up and led personally by Chairman Mao Zedong, which completely disintegrated the hopes of the imperialists and the revisionists to take over China from within. At a time when various enemies daydreamed and rubbed their hands together in anticipation, and at a time when many others, who called themselves revolutionaries and communists, wavered and became confused, our faith in the victory of the proletarian revolutionary line and the ideas of Mao Zedong never wavered for a single moment.

Now that the Great Cultural Proletarian Revolution has completely triumphed in all areas, when the opportunistic counter-revolutionary line of the renegade Liu Shaoqi has been completely destroyed, and when China has exited from the waves of this revolution – the most robust of them all – enemies have started to smile, the false friends have started to act like true friends, and the treacherous revisionists, who have long served American imperialism and who only have circumstantial differences

with the Soviet revisionists, have started to act like friends of China, like enemies of the Soviets and the Americans, like determined supporters of the Third World. All of them speak about peaceful coexistence and many states rush to recognize China and Albania.

We must exploit to our advantage and to the advantage of our revolution at every opportunity these favorable circumstances, which arose not as a function of the desires of our enemies, but as a consequence of our correct line and our determined struggle, by safeguarding at all times the principles and dignity of our socialist states.

We are fully convinced that People's China, under the leadership of its glorious Communist Party and the great Marxist-Leninist comrade Mao Zedong, will always stand at the forefront of the anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist struggle—an undefeated fortress of revolution and socialism—and that it will not steer away for a single moment from the principles. In fact, let us express our opinion that we are equally convinced that this Marxist-Leninist position of yours—the logical one, the true one—will contradict the decision to accept Nixon's visit to China.

For our part, we want to assure you that the line and positions of our Party of Labor of Albania will always remain principled, consequent, unaltered. We will fight against American imperialism and Soviet revisionism without any compromises and consequently. It may happen that these enemies undertake adventurous acts of aggression against us, whether individually or together, or by inciting their allies and lackeys. We will fight back without wavering, until the very end, until victory is achieved.

Our party will go on fighting determined to constantly strengthen the friendship and alliance with the great China of Mao Zedong and its glorious Communist Party. Our friendship is not based on conjuncture, but it is a friendship based on the life-giving lessons of Marxism-Leninism, a friendship tampered in war against the imperialist and revisionist enemies. Our friendship is sincere. As comrade Mao Zedong has said: "We are your true friends and comrades. And you are ours. You are not like those false friends and double-dealers who have 'honey on their lips and murder in their hearts,' and neither are we." Therefore, we are convinced that you consider in a friendly manner and understand correctly our criticisms, which we extend to a sister party—the dearest and most beloved for us.

Of course, enemies will take notice of the fact that we do not approve and do not support Nixon's visit to China. They will speak about this, and they will exaggerate things, and they will try to create conflicts between us, to arouse suspicions about

our great friendship. But we are convinced that the friendship between our Marxist-Leninist parties and our fraternal peoples will not only resist against the intrigues of enemies, but it will grow further, it will strengthen, it will be tempered in the common struggle against imperialist and revisionist enemies, for the good of our peoples and the cause of revolution and communism in the world.

Communist greetings,
For the Central Committee of the PLA
First Secretary
Enver Hoxha
Tirana, 6 August 1971

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DOCUMENT NO. 42

THE INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP AND CONCLUSIONS FOR THE PRACTICE OF THE GDR'S RELATIONS WITH THE PR CHINA, JANUARY 1972

[Source: Political Archive of the [German] Foreign Office (PA AA), C 6563. Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]

GDR Foreign Ministry
Far Eastern Department
Berlin, January 1972

The International Activities of the Chinese Leadership and Conclusions for the Practice of the GDR's Relations with the PR China

I. International Activities of the Chinese Leadership and the Tactics Applied

1. Foreign policy activities of the Maoist leadership confirm how the latter continues to maintain the foreign policy strategy outlined at the IX CCP Party Congress [1969]. The leadership is making efforts towards practical

implementation and further expansion of this strategy.

The “theoretical” basis of foreign policy by the current Chinese leadership consists in the so-called four great contradictions as stated in the report to the IX CCP Party Congress. They are based on an anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist platform (“between subjugated nations and imperialism and social-imperialism, between proletariat and bourgeoisie in the capitalist and revisionist countries, between imperialist states and the social-imperialist state as well as between the imperialist states, between socialist states and imperialism and social-imperialism”).

The “four great contradictions” are expression of a long-term conceptual foreign policy of global character. The strategic aim of the Mao Group consists in realizing its plans for world domination with nationalistic and anti-socialist policies.

In 1971 there was an escalation of conflicts within the Chinese leadership resulting in the elimination of Lin Biao and the strengthening of Zhou Enlai’s position, and thus in an even greater concentration of power in the hands of the Mao Group. As a result, a further aggravation of anti-Sovietism in domestic and foreign policy, and a still broader collaboration with imperialism is noteworthy.

At the same time, those conflicts have again revealed the instability of the Mao Regime. They are a reflection of latent contradictions between policy of the Mao Group dictated by subjectivist great power ambition and the objective requirements of social and historical developments.

2. The extremist, militant, and adventurist methods in foreign policy, as on display during the “Cultural Revolution”, have failed. The Mao Group suffered a fiasco when it attempted to split the communist world movement. The balance of forces has shifted towards world socialism. The tendency towards unity and cohesion among the forces of world socialism is increasing further.

This balance of forces revealed the Mao policy’s limitations. It induced the Chinese leadership to apply corrections to its tactical line and seek refuge in various demagogic maneuvers. Recently, the Mao Group also increasingly used economic means in its foreign relations.

This policy resulted in a reactivation of PRC international relations (for

instance, establishment respective re-establishment of diplomatic relations with 21 states since October 1970, among them five NATO member states; reinstatement of the PR China in its rights within the United Nations; development of relations with the DPRK, Romania, and Yugoslavia; rapprochement, as well as improvement of relations, with the United States).

3. The Chinese leadership is attempting, with a certain taking into account of the balance of forces, to create more favorable conditions to accomplish its international objectives. Means and methods applied in this regard are manifold, flexible, and differentiated. They reach from regular diplomatic activities all the way to interference in internal affairs.

Major efforts are undertaken in particular in political-ideological regards. Here the Mao Group is again eager to exploit nationalistic, as well as rightist and leftist opportunism, in order to penetrate the ranks of the international communist movement. This way they intend to undermine from within the unity and cohesion of the international communist movement, and especially the rallying around the CPSU and the Soviet Union. Those activities of the Mao Group are met by sharp rebukes from the Marxist-Leninist parties by ways of a principled political-ideological struggle.

On the international level, we can now normally observe a mostly correct, more businesslike attitude by PRC representatives in terms of form and protocol. The Chinese leadership was able to expand its international reach primarily in the Afro-Asian region through, among else, the pretension to develop relations with all states according to the principles of peaceful coexistence. However, at the same time the increasingly open collusion with imperialism, in particular American imperialism, is also limiting this reach and its effectiveness. Examples for that are statements made by PRC representatives in the United Nations on issues like disarmament and the Indian-Pakistani conflict.

Also, the Chinese leadership substantially increased its activities in economic, as well as in cultural and scientific areas.

4. The USSR persistently undertook in 1971 as well steps in its efforts towards a normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations. It made the known proposals, which were however rejected by the Chinese leadership. In fact, the Chinese leadership

did not show any interest in the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations, not even on secondary issues. To the contrary, the political struggle of the Maoists against the Soviet Union became aggravated further. The main reason for this is the fact that anti-Sovietism and hegemonism has still remained the core of the Mao Group's domestic and foreign policy.

This policy of the Chinese leadership is in particular on display at the border negotiations. Intentionally the Chinese leadership is delaying those negotiations. At the same time, it wants to maintain tensions along the border. Currently, the Chinese leadership is not interested in a final and complete agreement with the Soviet Union on border issues.

Towards the socialist countries the Mao Group is implementing a broad range of differentiation policy with anti-Soviet objectives. As everywhere else in the world, the Chinese leadership also attempts within the socialist world system to establish "bases" with anti-Soviet bias in order to undermine unity and cohesion of the socialist countries. In the course of these efforts, the Chinese leadership has made certain gains (DPRK, Romania, Yugoslavia).

5. The Chinese leadership attempts to further expand its influence vis-a-vis the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and to push back against the growing influence of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Here it uses especially the "superpower thesis" in order to win the confidence of the small countries (China will never become a superpower) and play up the role of a "representative" for those countries.
6. The invitation of President Nixon to the PR China, as well as the swiftly proceeding advance preparations, are testament to the great interest on both sides to achieve a rapprochement and development of relations.

In their steps towards the development of mutual relations, the PC China and the United States are guided by their global interests. They are directing this policy against world socialism, and in particular against the Soviet Union.

The Chinese policy of continuous expansion of trade with Japan and the increase of political pressure are beginning to show ever more effects. The number of Japanese companies willing to comply with political conditions set by the PRC is growing and growing. The Chinese-American rapprochement and

domestic pressure will induce the Sato government to further modify its policies vis-a-vis the PRC and Taiwan.

7. Western Europe is growing to gain in importance for the Mao Group's foreign policy. Accordingly, the PR China has determinedly activated its policy towards the European capitalist countries (in particular France, Italy, England, Austria). Currently the PRC has diplomatic relations with 10 NATO member states.

Concerning its policy towards Europe, last year [1971] the Mao Group devoted greater attention to the European Economic Community.

Besides France, the FRG [West Germany] is a matter of special interest for the Mao Group's policy in Western Europe (confrontation between FRG and the socialist community of states, relationship between GDR and FRG, economic potential). However, due to other priorities in their respective policies both sides have recently not undertaken major activities to develop their bilateral relations.

Still, the FRG government is paying close attention to steps taken by the United States, Japan, and other imperialist states to develop relations with the PRC in order to be able to undertake similar steps where appropriate. The reactionary forces in the FRG are openly advocating a rapid establishment of diplomatic relations with the PR China.

The Mao Group's strategic line is also on concrete display through the rejection of the convening of a European security conference. All efforts towards detente in Europe and respective successes achieved (treaties of the Soviet Union and Poland with the FRG, Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin) were either negated or harshly condemned [by the PRC]. At the same time, such was linked with explicit slander directed against the USSR, and implicitly so against the GDR and other socialist states.

With the reactivation of the Chinese foreign policy there also occurred a reevaluation of international organizations by the Chinese leadership. This was most pronounced in the Mao Group's changed attitude towards the United Nations. The reinstatement of the PR China's rights in the United Nations will increase the destructive impacts and options of the Mao Group. As the first appearance of the Chinese delegation at the XXVI United Nations General

Assembly demonstrated, the Chinese leadership attempts to use the stage of international organizations in particular for harsh slander of the Soviet Union and other progressive states. In the United Nations, the PR China exhibits its collusion with U.S. imperialism - what is so despicable as well as dangerous, both for the socialist countries and the anti-imperialist struggle.

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DOCUMENT NO. 43

TELEGRAM FROM THE DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT II TO THE AMBASSADOR IN BEIJING REGARDING THE CONVERSATION WITH CHINESE DIPLOMATS IN MOSCOW, 15 APRIL 1972

[Source: Włodzimierz Borodziej, ed., *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1972* (Polish Diplomatic Documents, 1972) (Warszawa: Polski Inst. Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2005), 215-216. Translated for CWIHP by Margaret K. Gnoinska.]

**15 of April, a telegram from the Director of Department II to the
ambassador in Beijing regarding the conversation with Chinese diplomats
in Moscow.**

Warsaw, 15 April 1972

Secret

Telegram No. 2880

[Ambassador Franciszek] STACHOWIAK – BEIJING

[This information is based on] the conversation between our and Chinese diplomats in Moscow [that took place] (on the Chinese initiative):

1. [The Chinese] expressed interest in [expanding] contacts with us and exchanging the views on international issues. They declared that, despite the existing [ideological] differences, the PRC continues to be interested in developing relations with Poland based on the tradition of our friendship which "previously used to bind both of our nations." They emphasized the good

relations they had with the Hungarians.

2. They were interested in European issues, especially the treaties with the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] and the CSCE [European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]. They were also asking about Poland's position within the context of [Leonid] Brezhnev's statements at the XV Congress of Labor Unions.¹⁰
3. [The Chinese] declared that the PRC was interested in détente in Europe. They positively assess the tendencies towards integration in Western Europe [which they view] as a willingness to become independent from the US. They [said that China] has good relations with Western Europe.
4. The situation in Asia, according to them [the Chinese], is very complex: the influences of the US, Japan, and the USSR are being crisscrossed [in the region] while smaller and medium-size countries are trying to free themselves from those influences. The PRC wishes to normalize relations with Japan, but Taiwan is the obstacle in this process. They are noticing that Indonesia is becoming interested in normalizing relations with the PRC, but according to them [our Chinese interlocutors], this will require time. They are not going to recognize Bengal [Bangladesh], because they think that at the time of the conflict's outbreak this was Pakistan's domestic issue, and the current situation should be resolved among the three interested parties.
5. According to our assessment, the conversation [with the Chinese diplomats] showed, among other things, the following:
 - a) China's increasing interest in European issues.
 - b) The Chinese are not giving up their differentiation policy towards us.

Wasilewski

Source: AMSZ ZD 25/78, w. 317, t. 1400

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¹⁰ The XV Congress of the Labor Unions in the USSR took place in Moscow on 20-24 March, [1972] and Brezhnev made a speech on the first day of the proceedings.

DOCUMENT NO. 44**NOTE FROM STATE SECRETARY FREIHERR VON BRAUN,
“MEETING OF MP DR. SCHRÖDER WITH MR. FOREIGN
MINISTER IN HINTERTHAL ON JULY 30, 1972” 2 AUGUST 1972**

[Source: Institut für Zeitgeschichte, ed., Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: 1. Juni bis 30. September 1972 (München: Oldenbourg, 2003). Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]

Note from State Secretary Freiherr von Braun

St.S. 323/72 confidential

August 2, 1972¹¹

Subject: China

here: Meeting of MP Dr. [Gerhard] Schröder with Mr. Foreign Minister in Hinterthal on July 30, 1972

Mr. Dr. Schröder has brought a document along from Beijing¹² he showed to Mr. Foreign Minister. It is a short paper signed by himself and the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister¹³ (in German and Chinese) which has the following content (text from memory)¹⁴:

1. The member of the German parliament Dr. Gerhard Schröder, who visited the People's Republic of China in the time from ... until ..., has informed the Chinese government about the desire of the government of the Federal Republic

¹¹ Submitted to VLR I Schönfeld on August 7, 1972 who noted in handwriting for VLR Hallier: "Federal Chancellery has asked for briefing before next cabinet meeting." Submitted to the secretary [female] of Foreign Minister Scheel, Frohn, who noted in handwriting: "Photocopy made for Federal Chancellery."

¹² The CDU Member of Parliament [Gerhard] Schröder visited the People's Republic of China from July 14 to 28, 1972 upon invitation by the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs. There he had meetings with, among others, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, the Deputy Foreign Ministers Qiao Guanhua and Zhang Wenjin, and with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Li Chiang. See [Gerhard] Schröder, Mission [ohne Auftrag: Die Vorbereitung der diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen Bonn und Peking, [[Mission without Orders: The Preparation of Diplomatic Relations between Bonn and Beijing]] Bergisch Gladbach: G. Lübbe, 1988], p. 40-44 and p. 49ff.

¹³ Qiao Guanhua.

¹⁴ For exact wording see Schröder, Mission, p. 55.

of Germany to normalize relations between both states and establish diplomatic relations. The Chinese government notes this desire with interest and shares it for its part. It should be envisaged to resume soon talks about the normalization of relations at a third location.

Signed Schröder

Signed Deputy Foreign Minister

During the return flight, Mr. Dr. Schröder has shown a photocopy of this document to me as well, and he asked me to immediately forget about its content and existence.

2. Mr. Foreign Minister [Walter] Scheel has asked Mr. Dr. Schröder not to use this document, unusual both in its form and content, in public. Instead the two gentlemen have agreed [on this version]: Mr. Dr. Schröder has recognized in Beijing that there exists the common opinion of the Chinese and the West German government that relations should be established soon.¹⁵ [The foreign minister] has asked Dr. Schröder to express himself that way also during the press conference scheduled for Monday, July 31.¹⁶
3. Dr. Schröder said it is better to hold the agreed talks in London. The Chinese representative in London¹⁷ was pointed out to him as a better partner for talks. He also thinks the German representative in London¹⁸ as a higher-ranking ambassador would be a more suitable intermediary. On the return flight Dr. Schröder had repeated that [suggestion], but added he can also understand if we

¹⁵ It was reported in the press on July 20, 1972 that CDU deputy Schröder stated a day ago before a meeting with Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in Beijing that "he has the impression that 'both sides want close relations'. He responded with a clear 'no' to the question whether in his opinion the Chinese would set preconditions to the resumption of a recognition dialogue." See the article "Schröder met Zhou Enlai twice", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 20, 1972, p. 1.

¹⁶ On July 31, 1972, CDU deputy Schröder summarized at a press conference the course of his visit to the People's Republic of China between July 14 and 28, 1972. He stated on his talks with Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua: "Obviously we have discussed with special thoroughness status and development of German-Chinese relations. Both sides came in Beijing to the joint conclusion that there exist no obstacles to a soon-to-be establishment of diplomatic relations. These positions were put in writing and signed." See Schröder, *Mission*, p. 57f.

¹⁷ P'ei Chien-tsang.

¹⁸ Karl-Günther von Hase.

want to continue the apparently initiated talks in Paris at that location.

4. Dr. Schröder recommends the immediate resumption of talks. He talked about “in the coming days”. In any case, the subject should be finalized before the dissolution of the Federal Parliament¹⁹ [in Bonn] in order to avoid it becoming an issue during the electoral campaign.
5. Dr. Schröder informed that Prime Minister Zhou Enlai is willing to invite Foreign Minister Scheel to Beijing soon after the matter of establishing relations is settled.²⁰

Otherwise I want to note the following from the travel report of Mr. Dr. Schröder:

6. Anti-Soviet sentiments were identifiable from talks of the Chinese in a more implicit way, for instance: because of the difficult neighbor situation in the

¹⁹ On the announcement by Federal Chancellor [Willy] Brandt of June 25, 1972 to hold early parliamentary elections in November see document 186, footnote 6.

²⁰ State Secretary Freiherr von Braun noted on August 2, 1972: “I note the following from the phone conversation between Mr. Foreign Minister and myself: The problem of a resumption of relations with China has to be treated with extreme caution. The Chinese have to make a move, not us. We have to take very much into consideration that no damage is done by a hasty establishment of relations. Not just the Soviets but also our Western friends are very sensitive. [Austrian] Foreign Minister [Rudolf] Kirchschläger has warned before all too quick actions and referred to the very problematic Romanian experiences. Pakistani President [Ali Zulfikar] Bhutto has not had the experiences he hoped for with the Chinese. It would be a major Chinese objective in Europe, though, to create trouble and disputes on the European continent.” See VS-Bd. 9878 (I B 5); B 150, File Copies 1972.

At the same day, State Secretary [Paul] Frank instructed [FRG] Ambassador Ruete in Paris to look up “immediately” Chinese Ambassador Huang Chen and declare the following: “The Federal Republic has issued a request on ... (enter current date in Paris) to the government of the People's Republic of China through its diplomatic representative in Paris, whether it can agree to hold talks about the establishment of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the FRG. The FRG Government has not yet received a response from government to government. In the meantime, the Chairman of the FRG parliament's Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Dr. Schröder, has informed the FRG government about his talks in Beijing. In this context the willingness of the People's Republic of China government to establish relations with the FRG without preconditions was mentioned. Insofar as (dans le mesure ou) the FRG government can assume that the message sent to Dr. Schröder in Beijing resembles the message supposed to be directed to the FRG government, the latter is proposing to hold necessary talks in Paris at a point in time convenient to the government of the People's Republic of China.” See wire instruction Nr. 1030; VS-Bd. 9878 (I B 5); B 150, File Copies 1972.

West, China has now also established relations with the United States²¹ and wants to expand them.

7. Overall the atmosphere was characterized by sovereign calmness, no hectic neither in conversations nor in the program. Zhou was amazingly well informed about Germany. The fact that he lived one year in Berlin, Kantstraße, as a student in 1922 (and, by the way, not in Göttingen) had still a very good impact on his understanding for the German problems.
8. The industrial sites he [Schröder] was shown were surprisingly modern (a plant in Anshan with eleven furnaces – Rheinhausen [in the West German Ruhr District] has [only] six-); a petrochemical factory near Beijing was presented to him as one of the most modern worldwide; the bridge in Nanjing is a masterpiece, boat traffic in Shanghai was very intensive.
9. A special impression on him left the spiritual state of the army. Its triptych goes like this: Fatherland, Work, Modesty. It would be the ambition of all male youth to serve in the army.

Herewith to Mr. Dpol.²²

von Braun

VS-Bd. 10099 (Office of the Minister)

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 45

TELEX FROM DEPARTMENT HEAD VAN WELL, "CHINA VISIT BY MR. FOREIGN MINISTER," 13 OCTOBER 1972

[Source: Institut für Zeitgeschichte, ed., Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: 1972. 3, 1. Oktober bis 31. Dezember 1972 (München: Oldenbourg, 2003), 1532-1534. Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]

²¹ President Nixon visited the People's Republic of China from February 21 to 28, 1972. See [AAPD] document 47, footnotes 6 and 7.

²² Submitted to Department Head von Staden on August 3, 1972 who instructed to forward it to VLR I Berendonck "eyes only". Submitted to Berendonck on August 3, 1972.

Department Head van Well, currently Beijing, to Foreign Office

Z B 6-1-15262/72 confidential

Telex Nr. 130

Citissime

Sent: October 13, 1972, 17:35 hours²³

Subject: China Visit by Mr. Foreign Minister²⁴

here: talks with Zhou Enlai (October 12, 1972)

Reference: Telex No. 119 from October 12, 1972, File Number: 313 (I B 5)-
82.92.08 Strictly Confidential²⁵

1. On the afternoon of October 12 the Foreign Minister and the entire delegation were invited on short notice to a two-hour meeting with Zhou Enlai in the Great Hall of the People. Participants from the Chinese side were Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei, Minister Assistant Chang Wen-ding, and Department Head Wang Tung.

Zhou turned out as an alert, sovereign politician. Only his way of speaking told of his age (74 years). Although the conversation was not structured systematically, due to Zhou's vivid argumentation it left a lasting impression with all participants.

2. Germany – China:
 - a) Most important result: Zhou assured that China will support our proposal for accession to the United Nations if we will submit it. Prior to that, our Foreign Minister remarked both German states can become members at the same time only. Zhou took note of this without objections.
 - b) Zhou pointedly asked about the Moscow visit by State Secretary [Egon]

²³ Submitted to Division Heads Simon and Diesel as well as Ambassador Roth on October 16, 1972. Submitted to Counselor Heimsoeth on October 17, 1972. Submitted to Department Head von Staden on October 18, 1972. Submitted to VLR I Bleck and VLR Meyer-Landrut,

²⁴ Foreign Minister Scheel visited the People's Republic of China from October 10 to 14, 1972. See on this also [AAPD] documents 329 and 333.

²⁵ See also document 328.

Bahr²⁶ and thus probably criticized indirectly its coinciding with the Foreign Minister's visit to Beijing. Zhou asked with interest about our negotiations with the GDR and asked which issues are still causing problems. When the Foreign Minister talked about the two parts of one nation, Zhou said one probably²⁷ talks about two states. Some even talk about two states and two nations²⁸ as well; he does not understand that. China is not in favor of splitting up nations. Classes would rather disappear than nations. He agreed with the remark of our Foreign Minister that unification of the divided German nation would probably only occur during the course of a longer process. The tendency of the superpowers to divide nations, as a consequence of their policy of influence spheres (he mentioned Korea, Vietnam, China, Cambodia, Laos, Pakistan, Malaya, Palestine), would always create only new harm. With regard to terminological problems during the Bonn pre-talks²⁹, it was interesting that Zhou corrected himself upon a mentioning of "Westberlin" and added: "'Berlin (West)', if you so will." Remarkable was also a hint by Zhou concerning a certain correlation between the Ussuri incident in early March 1969³⁰ and the tensions around the [FRG] Federal President's election in Berlin.³¹ After the Ussuri clash, the situation around Berlin would have calmed down.

²⁶ State Secretary Bahr from the Federal Chancellery held talks in Moscow on October 9 and 10, 1972 with Soviet Foreign Minister [Andrey] Gromyko and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, [Leonid] Brezhnev. See on this documents 317 and 320.

²⁷ This term was added later upon instruction by Department Head van Well. Deleted got instead: "not" ["nicht"]. See document 333.

²⁸ The phrase "some even talk ... two nations" was added later upon instruction by Department Head van Well. Deleted got instead: "Some even talk about states and two nations." See document 333.

²⁹ From August 21 to September 29, 1972 Department Head von Staden held talks with Chinese journalist [and Bonn Xinhua bureau chief] Wang Shu about the establishment of diplomatic relations between West Germany and the People's Republic of China. On problems regarding the terminology for Berlin (West) see especially documents 254 and 283.

³⁰ In the night of March 2, 1969 Chinese forces occupied Damansky Island situated in the Ussuri border river. See AAPD 1969, I, document 96.

³¹ On March 5, 1969 the West German Federal Assembly elected in Berlin (West) Gustav Heinemann as Federal President. On Soviet efforts to prevent the Federal President Election in Berlin (West) see AAPD 1969, I, documents 16 and 58.

- c) Taiwan: On this subject Zhou remarked only in passing that the Federal Republic has no diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The Foreign Minister specified that we have no official relations.³²

3. European

Zhou asked in detail about the state of European unification and in particular about Europe's defense readiness. The transfer of military sovereignty to the European Community would probably constitute the most difficult problem. Following a remark by the Foreign Minister that for a balanced security structure in Europe the presence of American forces is currently indispensable, Zhou stated: the Federal Republic of Germany as well as Japan probably still continue to need a nuclear umbrella; Gromyko's demand for the ban of all nuclear weapons³³ he qualified as hypocritical.

4. Soviet Union

Zhou as well displayed insurmountable mistrust against the Soviet Union, though he nuanced Chinese statements heard so far: China wants to solve border problems through negotiations, not by force (Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei had yesterday denounced any agreement with the Soviet Union as a "scrap of paper").³⁴ However, he would not make any territorial claims because of

³² On the relationship between West Germany and the Republic of China (Taiwan) see document 312.

³³ On September 26, 1972 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko declared before the U.N. General Assembly: "Our country believes that it is possible to eliminate or, at least, to reduce drastically the danger of a conflict between states provoking a nuclear catastrophe. That can be done if renunciation of the use of force in international relations is elevated to the level of international law and of at the same time – I repeat, at the same time – the use of nuclear weapons is prohibited. [...] For those reasons, and because it is aware of its responsibility as a permanent member of the Security Council, the Soviet Union has submitted for consideration at the twenty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly the item entitled "Non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons". See UN General Assembly, 27th Session, Plenary Meeting, 2040th meeting, p. 7. For a German transcript of the speech see Europa Archiv 1972, D 600-606 (excerpt).

³⁴ See statements by the Chinese Foreign Minister from October 12, 1972; document 329, footnote 5.

the unequal treaties.³⁵ China would not think about provocations, though it continues with its defense preparations.

5. On the program for the visit

Zhou conveyed greetings from Mao and apologized that he cannot receive our Foreign Minister.

[signed] van Well

Section I B 5, Vol. 660 A

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 46

**LETTER FROM THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF THE GDR COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS TO COMRADE HERMANN AXEN, 18 JULY 1973**

*[Source: Political Archive of the [German] Foreign Office (PA AA), C 6610. Translated for CWIHP
by Bernd Schaefer.]*

GDR Council of Ministers
GDR Foreign Ministry
Deputy Minister
Berlin, 18. July 1973

Member of the Politburo and
Secretary of the SED Central Committee
Comrade Hermann Axen

³⁵ With the Treaties of Aigan and Tientsin (1858), as well as with the Trade Agreement of Beijing (1860), borders between Russia and China were settled this way that territories north of the Amur and east of the Ussuri fell to Russia. In dispute was especially the only partially agreed border line from the Treaty of Ili respectively St. Petersburg (1881) pertaining to the area of Xinkiang and Turkestan. While the Chinese government insisted on viewing the treaties as "unequal" and therefore in need of renegotiation, the USSR referred to the validity of the treaties and was of the opinion that an open border question does not exist. See on this issue the memorandum by LR I [Erwin] Wickert from March 20, 1963; Sector II A 3, Vol. 62.

Berlin

Dear Comrade Axen!

As we have learned from reports in the FRG and West Berlin press, after his accreditation the Ambassador of the PR China to the FRG has sent his business card to the Mayor of West Berlin and to the Minister Presidents of the states of the FRG. Other press reports talked about the intention of the PRC to open a representation in West Berlin under the authority of the [Chinese] embassy in Bonn.

For that reason, we deem it necessary to convey in verbal form the position of the GDR on this subject to the Counselor of the Embassy of the PR China to the GDR.

I am attaching a draft for the statement.

I am asking for your approval.

With socialist greetings

[signed]

Oskar Fischer

Appendix

[Handwritten comment]

Comrade Fischer

Comrade Florin

Please review content and text again with [Foreign Minister] Comrade [Otto] Winzer.

See [my] comments.

Axen, 19 July

Text of a Statement to be Read Out to the Counselor of the Embassy of the PR China to the GDR

Due to current events, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic deems it necessary to outline the position of the German Democratic Republic concerning the status of West Berlin and to explain some issues directly connected with it.

1. The following basic facts are to be considered when it comes to assess the status of West Berlin:

At no point, West Berlin was a part of the Federal Republic of Germany. The three allied Western powers had to take this factual situation into account from the very beginning. Repeatedly they had to confirm officially that West Berlin is not a part of the FRG, and is not governed by her.

The Quadripartite Agreement from 3 September 1971 again reconfirms as binding international law that “those [Western] sectors [of Berlin] continue to be not a part of the Federal Republic of Germany, and continue not to be governed by her”. Simultaneously it gets emphasized that those articles of the BRD’s Basic Law [constitution] contradicting these facts do remain suspended.

From those facts it derives that the FRG does not have any sovereign rights with regard to West Berlin. Only in light of those basic facts, as outlined above, certain links between Berlin’s Western sectors and the FRG can be maintained and developed.

2. In the past the People’s Republic of China adhered to the position that West Berlin is not a part of the FRG and may not be governed by her. The German Democratic Republic has always welcomed this position as held by the PR China.

Recently, the Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China in the Federal Republic of Germany has forwarded his business card to the Governing Mayor of West Berlin as well as to the Minister Presidents of the states of the FRG. This way the Mayor of West Berlin was treated by the official representative of the PR China in the FRG like the Minister Presidents of the FRG states. The latter are under the authority of the federal government in Bonn which exercises its sovereign rights according to the provision of the Basic Law of the FRG.

Such an action must be viewed as an indication of change in the position of the PR China with regard to the status of West Berlin.

[handwritten comment by Axen on the margins: “Is this smart [to state explicitly]?”]

This official step represents a support of FRG efforts to integrate, in contradiction of the Quadripartite Agreement, West Berlin into the political and societal system of the BRD and to treat West Berlin like a state of the FRG.

The GDR Ministry for Foreign Affairs expresses its bewilderment over this step by the Ambassador of the PR China in the FRG who engaged in official diplomatic activities vis-a-vis West Berlin. The Ministry regrets that this way legitimate interests of the GDR become damaged and FRG efforts to undermine the Quadripartite Agreement are encouraged.

The GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses its hope that the Chinese side will accept the viewpoint of the GDR and ceases to conduct activities vis-a-vis West Berlin through the Embassy of the PR China in the FRG.

3. Recently some socialist states have applied with respective authorities of the United States, Great Britain, and France to open General Consulates in West Berlin. In case the Chinese side harbors similar intentions, the GDR expects that, in

realization of such plans, the PRC will also abide by the facts according to which West Berlin does not constitute a part of the FRG and is not governed by her.

This implies in particular:

[handwritten comment by Axen on the margins: “Do we have to say all that in combination? Should not the entire 3rd paragraph be conveyed through our embassy in Beijing?”]

The establishment of a [Chinese] representation in West Berlin cannot by any means be accomplished on the basis, and in the context, of relations between the PR China and the FRG;

an autonomous representation of the PR China should fall under direct authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR China, and not under the authority embassy of the PR China in the FRG;

the application to establish such a representation should be filed with the three allied Western powers, and not via the embassies of these states in the FRG.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR would welcome if, in its future policy concerning West Berlin, the PR China will comply with the status of West Berlin as defined in the Quadripartite Agreement and take into account the legitimate interests of the GDR.

I ask you to convey this standpoint of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR China.

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 47

Cable from Ambassador Pauls to the Foreign Office, “China – Federal Republic,” 14 June 1974

[Source: Institut für Zeitgeschichte, ed., *Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: 1974 1. Januar bis 30. Juni 1974*. (München: Oldenbourg, 2005). Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]

Ambassador Pauls, Beijing, to Foreign Office
114-12489/74 strictly confidential

Telex Nr. 269

Sent: June 14, 1974, 08:55 hours

Received: June 14, 1974, 10:47 hours

RE: China – Federal Republic [of Germany]

here: Telex report No. 206 of May 15, 1974 - POL 320.10 CHN³⁶

Telex report No. 213 of May 17, 1974 - POL 322.00 CHN³⁷

I. 1) On the Chinese side, China's relationship with us is embedded in a political world view determined by [both] ideology and pragmatic considerations. With regard to the relationship with the Federal Republic, the latter are supposedly given priority. For the Chinese, good bilateral relations with the Federal Republic have no absolute intrinsic value.

The Federal Republic has a quite exactly circumscribed significance in the Chinese

³⁶ Ambassador Pauls, Beijing, outlined the domestic situation of the People's Republic of China: "The current domestic political movement in Beijing has so far not adopted a 'new cultural revolution' according to the 'model' of the 1960s. [...] This does not mean, however, that the domestic situation in China is stable. Without doubt, it even has lost some stability during the course of the campaign. In my opinion, the decisive cause behind this movement is the fact that Mao and his close circle just do not let things settle down in this country. The domestic slow-down since about 1969 must again have appeared as a 'slouching' towards a 'revisionist state' in the eyes of the old revolutionary and his entire political group. The latter primarily defines itself through ideological considerations. For that reason, there is this new mass campaign to criticize Confucius and Lin Biao. As it always gets emphasized by the Chinese, also in private, this was initiated by Mao himself." See Section 313, Vol. 100091.

³⁷ Ambassador Pauls, Beijing, analyzed the baseline of Chinese foreign policy. He noted that the People's Republic of China has grown into a dimension which might "dictate her a course on the global political stage. This dimension is characterized by China's antagonism vis-a-vis both 'superpowers'. In addition, there are the specific relations with the Third World and – this sequence is of importance – a rather ambivalent attitude towards the Western industrial nations (except for the United States). There can be no doubt that the People's Republic of China, which first had entered global politics as a junior partner of the Soviet Union, is focussing all her energies today to steer an independent course between the two real big ones." It would bear resulting political, economic, and military burdens, "because one is fully aware of the significant global political situation. For the first time in centuries, with China a country outside the European cultural sphere has risen to the level where the contest for global hegemony takes place." At the same time, the Chinese government is eager "to define itself as a country of the Third World. In particular Mao is viewing global political events as a global class struggle. Therefore the Chinese leadership is time and again tempted to apply those recipes to foreign policy that helped her to be successful in domestic policy. [...] As rather ambivalent appears [...] China's relationship with those industrial states who are no longer playing, given their political, economic, and military potential, at a level that would allow them to join the really big game for power in the world. Here the Chinese see a far-reaching congruence of interests. China needs scientific and technological impulses for its development. Those are obtained best through partial and sectoral collaboration with those countries the Chinese subsume under the term 'Second World'." See Section 313, Vol. 100100.

world view. The Federal Republic is relevant to China as an important link of a uniting Europe, and as a barrier against expansionary efforts of the Soviet Union in Western Europe. At the same time, the Federal Republic looks especially endangered in Chinese eyes. Currently, this is to be the case [from the Chinese perspective] less so by a military attack from the Soviets, but rather by revolutionary-subversive forces who -as the Chinese see it- could take advantage of the unresolved German Question for their own purposes. The Chinese are convinced that the German Question will be resolved some day. One has told us here repeatedly that one views the division of the nation as artificial. In long-term perspective, the Chinese ask themselves only under what auspices this reunification will occur some day.

2) The Chinese demonstrate understanding for our foreign policy, its necessity, and its priorities. They welcome the Federal Republic's alliance and Western European policy. They are convinced of the imperative of NATO and a further deployment of U.S. forces in Europe. They want European unification to make rapid progress. As it showed recently very clearly during Pompidou's visit in Beijing³⁸, regarding the unification issue China is not toeing the same line France did propagate previously.

On the Chinese side there even exists to certain extent an "understanding" [Verständnis]³⁹ for the German Ostpolitik. One is not against any bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union as such. Even the Chinese are also

³⁸ [French] President [Georges] Pompidou visited the People's Republic of China from September 11 to 13, 1973.

³⁹ Corrected from "communication" [Verständigung].

negotiating with her.⁴⁰ However, this happens with delaying tactics. The Chinese are afraid to again agree on “unequal treaties”⁴¹ if they attempt to settle on a compromise with the large neighbor in the North already by today - this is from a state of inferiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in terms of power politics. For that reason, the border negotiations with the Soviet Union are conducted in a delaying mode; and one is unwilling to accept an Asian collective security system⁴².

⁴⁰ At a meeting on September 11, 1969 at Beijing Airport, Prime Ministers [Alexey] Kosygin and Zhou Enlai agreed about the resumption of talks to settle differences in opinion about the boundary lines in the Amur and Ussuri region. The talks began in October 1969 and were interrupted in July of 1973. On December 20, 1973 [FRG] Ambassador [Ulrich] Sahm transmitted this information by the Chinese embassy in Moscow regarding the status of negotiations: “During the entire period until today there would not have been made any progress. Each side insisted on its positions. Actual border negotiations would not even have started. [...] The Chinese would be ready to recognize the ‘unequal treaties’. They would maintain the position, however, that the borders were much further changed on the Russian-Soviet side than stipulated in the treaties. This way the Soviets held Chinese territories in their possession on a scale of ‘many million square kilometers’.” See the written report; Section 313, Vol. 100101.

On June 25, 1974 the leader of the Soviet negotiation delegation, Ilychev, again arrived in Beijing for talks, which were subsequently adjourned without result in August 16, 1974. Ambassador Pauls, Beijing, reported on this: “As we have heard from the Soviet embassy here, the Soviets have again offered to the Chinese to negotiate about the boundary lines from the Mongolian border to Vladivostok. The border was supposed to be drawn in essence along the navigable channels of the Amur and Ussuri rivers, by which the Chinese would come into possession of a couple of islands. As a procedure, the Soviet side would have proposed a general agreement with subsequent determination of boundaries, section by section, through a border commission. The Chinese would have rejected the Soviet proposal and demanded an agreement about the entire boundaries (even west of Mongolia). Before that, the Chinese would have demanded the Soviet Union has to withdraw its forces from the border unilaterally. The latter demand would be unacceptable to the Soviet side and non-negotiable, unlike the first demand. [...] This round of border negotiations as well has not led to any rapprochement between respective positions. However, the negotiations were not aborted but just postponed again. A soon-to-be agreement is unlikely, since there are no indications that the Chinese will modify their current position,” See telex No. 342 from August 21, 1974; Section 313, Vol. 100101.

⁴¹ The borders between Russia and China were regulated in the Treaties of Aigun and Tianjin (1858) and the Trade Agreement of Beijing (1860). Territories north of the Amur and south of the Ussuri rivers fell to Moscow. In dispute remained in particular the borderline in the region of Xinjiang/Turkestan which was only partially regulated by the Treaty of Ili respectively St. Petersburg (1881). While the Chinese government insisted on considering the treaties as “unequal” and therefore in need of re-negotiation, the USSR referred to the validity of the treaties and held the position that an open border question does not exist. See on this the memorandum by LR I [Erwin] Wickert from March 20, 1963; Section II A 3, Vol. 62.

⁴² See on this proposals by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, [Leonid] Brezhnev, to establish a collective security system in Asia; [AAPD] document 45, footnote 12.

Under similar auspices, the Chinese are critically viewing the currently ongoing large-scale multilateral negotiations in Europe, CSCE and MBFR. However, if Western Europe wants to negotiate with the Soviet Union already today, then only -in Chinese opinion- with utmost vigilance.

The new federal government [in Bonn] will be judged from Beijing by this yardstick.

3) As a highly developed country of the Second World, the Federal Republic can in Chinese opinion help the “developing country” of China to make up its technological and scientific gaps. German products and achievements are held in high regard here. An evidence behind this fact is our excellent rank (No. 4) we occupy in the Chinese balance of trade. In 1973 alone, the volume of trade increased by 50 percent.⁴³ Apparently Beijing also wants to avoid to become too dependent on Japan concerning its imports. Therefore we see this “diversification” in trade, from which especially Western Europe, and here primarily the Federal Republic, is benefitting.

II. 1) For us, the future relevance of the China factor in global policy cannot be assessed with absolute certainty. It is quite possible that the country will face inner turbulences after the end of the Mao Zedong era. There is only one thing hardly to expect: That China will again voluntarily depart from the foreign policy course that has moved it within close reach of parity in global policy with the two “big ones”. This way China has, within the framework of global policy, not just become relevant to the foreign policy of any other country. Furthermore, the People’s Republic of China is a power of the first order to be factored in any assessment of global political developments.

2) China is situated at the other end of the Eurasian continental land mass and thus in the back of the continental hegemon, the Soviet Union. Today it is already tying down significant military resources of the Soviets: one million soldiers, more than one quarter of the Soviet armed forces. There exists no contradiction in the fact that until today the Soviet Union did not have to withdraw any forces from the “European front” in order to build up its overall, still defensive potential along the borders with China.

⁴³ With a trade volume of 286 million dollar in 1972 the Federal Republic was ranked fourth in Chinese foreign trade after Japan, Hong Kong, and Canada. In 1973 the overall volume increased to 460 million dollar and the Federal Republic was again ranked fourth in the People’s Republic of China’s foreign trade with Western industrial states, after Japan, the United States, and Hong Kong. See written report No. 372 by Consul General Breuer, Hong Kong, from April 9, 1974; Section 313, Vol. 100103. See also the note by Section 313 from August 1974; Section 313, Vol. 100104.

Europe should “take into consideration, when defining its common foreign policy, the antagonisms between the two great powers of the communist world and maintain in its relations a balance vis-a-vis both powers” (joint report by the chiefs of mission from the EC states in Beijing from February 14, 1974).

This is also supposed to apply to the foreign policy of the Federal Republic, and also to outlining a common China policy of the European Community – which needs to be done.

3) From this situation derived the need for dialogue with the Chinese. We should increase political contacts on all levels. So far there has been an imbalance in mutual diplomatic visits. Chinese officials with cabinet rank have so far not yet come to the Federal Republic. We should not turn this into a matter of prestige, and especially not refrain because of that from increasing contacts with the Chinese leadership from our side. The situation in China is just the way it is, and thus different. Currently the domestic situation here is even difficult. Obviously high-ranking officials cannot afford to be absent from the theater of domestic events. In addition, during this hardly transparent period of “late Maoism” there might exist the concern to become personally too much identified with a certain political line of thought. It is a different matter in this context when it comes to visits here. The sequence of Western European politicians, who were guests here in recent years, has undoubtedly contributed towards the affirmation of Zhou Enlai’s foreign policy. The “moderate” forces of China are behind this foreign policy. I have no doubt that within the government – maybe even in the Army – there do exist circles that grant major consideration to the cooperation

with Western Europe, and thus with us as well.⁴⁴

4) China is for Europe, and thus for the Federal Republic, not a dangerous partner. Civilizations and social systems are completely different. According to statements by its leading officials, China will be primarily concerned with its own development for still at least 30 to 50 years. The realization is growing that the Chinese revolutionary model is not an export article. The so-called “Maoists” in Europe are not recognized. For a considerable time still, this country will be unable in operative terms to conduct a truly “global” policy. The focus of Chinese foreign policy clearly is on the Asian-Pacific region. Conflicts of interests with Europe are hardly possible.

5) Thus overall the development of political relations between the Federal Republic and China appears to be even more important than the economic ones. We also should try to avoid the impression that we are primarily interested in business. This would only play into the hands of “ideologues” here who have their pre-fabricated thoughts about the “capitalist” world. We also have to take into account that currently there still is a generation in power here that has not had the best of experiences with the Europeans. A high esteem of the latter does not exist.

Thus it is even more important to correct those impressions. This can only succeed if we have a clear foreign policy concept that makes an impression on the Chinese.

⁴⁴ Ambassador Pauls, Beijing, reported on June 15, 1974 about a conversation with Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua on European policy and bilateral relations: “I made clear that European policy of unification has gained new impulses from events of recent weeks. Also, there exist good prospects for overcoming the problems of the relationship between the EC and the United States. All that was noted with satisfaction by my Chinese interlocutor. When talking about the bilateral German-Chinese relationship, the Deputy Foreign Minister agreed that relations are developing satisfactorily in the areas of economy, culture, science, and technology. Yet he was of the opinion that there exist further opportunities to expand the bilateral relationship, specifically in the political area. I used this opportunity to indicate that the Federal Chancellor, who had been already invited by the Chinese side in his previous capacity as the Minister of Finance, would still like to visit China some time. Qiao noted this with visible interest and asked whether we already have concrete thoughts about the timing. It would be important for the Chinese leadership to know, especially with regard to domestic obligations of the Chinese leadership. After my reply that a visit of the Federal Chancellor to China could come in late 1974 at the earliest, Qiao stated I just had given a very important information. He will report to his government immediately, and one would still have to coordinate with regard to a specific date. I remarked we would obviously like, before a visit by the Federal Chancellor to China, to see visits of the Chinese friends to the Federal Republic. Particularly welcome would be Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei and he, the Deputy Foreign Minister, himself. The Deputy Foreign Minister reacted with a friendly laughter and said they are aware to be ‘deeply indebted to the Germans’. They will very thoroughly examine whether such a visit will be possible after all.” See telex No. 274; VS-Bd. 9914 (312); B 150, File Copies 1974.

[signed] Pauls
VS-Bd. 9914 (312)

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 48

LETTER TO THE GDR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, “INFORMATION ABOUT RECENT ISSUES OF PRC DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY – DIRECTIVES FOR THE CODE OF CONDUCT OF GDR REPRESENTATIVES TOWARDS THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PR CHINA,” 10 SEPTEMBER 1975

[Source: Political Archive of the [German] Foreign Office (PA AA), C 295/73. Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]

GDR Council of Ministers
GDR Foreign Ministry
Deputy Minister
Berlin, 10 September 1975

Dear Comrade

As an attachment I am sending you an “Information about Recent Issues of PRC Domestic and Foreign Policy – Directives for the Code of Conduct of GDR Representatives towards the Representatives of the PR China”.

The material contains information about the current domestic situation in the PR China. It provides an assessment of the Chinese leaders’ foreign policy, in combination with a general orientation for the struggle against Maoism, as well as specific guidelines for the future development of relations between the GDR and the PR China.

The entire material is to serve as working directives with mandatory character for all GDR representations abroad. It is our objective to guarantee this way a uniform

appearance of all comrades and [Foreign Ministry] employees towards the PR China and its representatives.

With strict observation of confidentiality, I am asking you to make the comrades of your representation familiar with the main content of these directives and explain to them [comrades] the tasks resulting from those directives.

Also, continue to send regular reports in the future about the policy of Chinese leaders vis-a-vis their respective host country, activities by the Chinese representatives, as well as about the positions and policies of their host countries vis-a-vis the PR China.

As far as your decisions on these issues are concerned, please also coordinate in the future with the Soviet comrades and the comrades of the other closely allied fraternal countries in order to guarantee this way a uniform and coordinated process of our countries.

With socialist greetings

[signed]

[Ewald] Moldt

Attachment

Information about Recent Issues of PRC Domestic and Foreign Policy

Directives for the Code of Conduct of GDR Representatives towards the Representatives of the PR China

1. The situation in the People's Republic of China is characterized by the further development and deepening of the anti-socialist process. As a result of decisions by the X CCP Party Congress (August 1973) and the adoption of the PRC constitution (January 1975), the PR China is moving ever further away from socialism. Now Mao Zedong's anti-socialist policy is not only part of the CCP statutes, but it is now also legally enshrined in the PR China's constitution. Notwithstanding the existing antagonisms in Chinese society, and the crises and contradictions of the current course, the Maoist regime is consolidating. This regime is based on the Maoist doctrine prepared in the PR China for decades already. The Marxist-Leninist theory gets replaced by the social-chauvinistic "Thoughts of Mao Zedong" that were declared to be the only ideology of the nation. They have been anchored on all levels of party and state. Currently, a political campaign is conducted in China ("Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius")

and the study of the “Theory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat”). This campaign is directed towards the violent implementation of the military system of societal construction and the unconditional submission of the PR China’s population under the top leadership and its hostile policy against the people.

Currently China is not ruled by a socialist state authority but by the military-bureaucratic dictatorship of the group around Mao Zedong. There are reasons for talking about a new phase of the Maoist regime. Its most important aspect is the solidification of the regime’s positions in party and state. The following elements testify to that:

- Although China lost in its economic development up to two Five-Year-Plans, the economic potential of the country is further growing. According to assessments, the value of gross production in industry and agriculture grew in the PR China in 1974 by approximately 5 percent. Steel production reached 21 million tons, oil production amounted to 63 million tons (in 1973 it was at 25 million tons).

- The departure by the Maoist leadership from comprehensive economic cooperation with the socialist countries gets to a certain degree compensated through expansion of trade and economic relations with the developed capitalist countries. In those countries the PR China has ordered equipments for approximately 90 modern factories.

- The Maoist regime is guaranteeing the basic needs of the largest part of the population. For that reason it has certain societal support with the most backward but quantitatively largest part of the population, especially among the peasants.

- The manipulation of the country’s population in the spirit of “Mao Thought” has increased. A major focus lies on Sino-centric, racist prejudices. The repressive apparatus, targeting with oppression all of Mao Zedong’s opponents, got significantly expanded.

- There exists a lack of organized opposition against the Maoist regime due to the ideological disorientation of Chinese society, the camouflaging of Maoism with Marxism, the growth of repression, and the policy of incitement of certain groups of workers against each other. Singular actions by workers were in the

past, and still are presently, localized and repressed.

With special concern one has to observe the growing total preparation for a war. Mao's thesis about the "Preparation for a War" has been elevated to official policy of party and state. The Chinese leaders are undertaking major efforts to strengthen their missile and nuclear weapons potential, in part with the support from developed capitalist countries. Almost half of all ground forces in the Chinese army (more than 60 divisions) and the major part of missile forces and the air force are concentrated in areas close to the PR China's borders with the Soviet Union and Mongolia. The campaign for mass relocation of young people from other parts of China to the country's border region in the North is continuing. The number of trained members of the "People's Militia" alone has reached 20 to 40 million people. During the last fifteen years, an entire generation of Chinese in the PR China got educated in a strongly chauvinist, anti-Soviet spirit.

In light of specific Chinese conditions and a strong repressive apparatus, we currently see this way a solidification of the Mao Group's regime of military-bureaucratic dictatorship. The latter originated during the counterrevolutionary coup and got completed during the course of the "cultural revolution". It would be unrealistic to expect an immediate and automatic collapse of the current regime and substantial changes in its domestic and foreign policy just because of Mao Zedong's departure from the political stage, or as a result of one of two crises phenomena. The political crisis in the PR China is of permanent character.

2. According to the will of the group around Mao Zedong, the PR China follows in its foreign policy increasingly a course of breaking with the socialist countries and struggling against them. The Chinese are on a path of collusion, and of forming a bloc, with the most aggressive forces of the world's reactionaries. The Maoist leadership is pursuing a course aimed at provoking a world war. It is attempting to undermine the confidence of states into the socialist countries. It is inciting the most aggressive forces of imperialism to struggle against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. It is raising territorial claims towards its neighbors.

On all important issues of global policy the Chinese leaders have openly

moved toward positions held by the most reactionary representatives of imperialism. This finds respective expressions

- in the anti-socialist tendency of Maoism's foreign policy concepts that align themselves with the imperialist doctrines;
- in the support for the imperialist military-political blocs (NATO and others) and for the policy of the extreme right wing of monopolist bourgeoisie;
- in attempts to undermine the policy of international detente, and to disrupt the implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different societal systems, the inviolability of borders, and the final consolidation of the results of World War II and post-war developments in the interest of peace and socialism;
- in efforts to antagonize the countries of the "Third World" vis-a-vis the socialist community of states and to undermine the anti-imperialist character of the Non-Aligned Movement;
- in the policy of the PR China aimed at rearranging international economic relations to the detriment of positions of the socialist community; and in attempts to use the closed economic groupings from the capitalist states for those purposes.

All that testifies to the fact that Beijing's foreign policy activities have as well entered a new stage. Among the peculiarities of this new stage is a broad campaign against all concrete steps to reduce international tensions. The Maoists not only advocate revisions of their own borders shared with neighbors but also the overall revision of World War II results, as well as the revision of territorial solutions achieved by the post-1945 order. They raise claims to the territory of the entire Mongolian People's Republic, towards the USSR (1.5 million square kilometers), Japan (Senkaku Island and others), towards Vietnam (islands of the Spratly and Paracel groups, and to some other Vietnamese territories on the mainland near the Chinese border). At the same time, the Chinese leadership demagogically acts as "defenders" of territorial claims raised by the most reckless revanchists from Japan and the FRG [West Germany.]

This way they declare their solidarity with the most reactionary and even neofascist forces in the FRG in their attempt to disrupt the process of growing

international reputation of the GDR.

The Maoist leadership has moved from political and ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community towards a bilateral, global confrontation and a struggle in every direction while applying any possible methods against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. The Maoists have shed any responsibility towards world socialism and have thus built themselves a “moral justification” for any kind of actions against socialism.

The Chinese leaders are continuing their efforts of differentiation towards the socialist countries. They are unrelenting in their divisive efforts towards the fraternal countries solidly standing their ground on Marxism-Leninism and internationalism. They continue in their efforts to divide the countries of the socialist community of states and contrast them with each other. For that purpose they are not only exploiting political and ideological methods, but also commercial, economic and scientific-technological channels.

Currently the Maoist leadership is eager to minimize the historic importance of the victory of the Vietnamese people and to thwart the formation of a united and strong Vietnam.

The Mongolian People's Republic is exposed to an unrelenting and continuously growing pressure by the Maoists through various channels.

The expansionism and adventurism of the Maoist leaders represents a particular danger for the PR China's neighboring states. In this context especially the Southeast Asian region is growing in importance. The Chinese chauvinists have always viewed this region as their sphere of influence.

The foreign policy activities of the current Chinese leaders after the X CCP Party Congress and the 1st session of the 4th National People's Congress have to be viewed as a new stage in the Maoists' struggle for hegemony and the undermining of socialism's international positions. It must be seen as the completion of the evolution towards renegade status, as well as a shift to positions of the alliance with the most reactionary circles of imperialism. Beijing's leaders have now moved from objective collusion with imperialism to an open political bloc with the imperialist and any kind of reactionary and nationalist forces. They hope to utilize those for the struggle against peace and

socialism.

3. Maoist China represents a dangerous adversary of the socialist states for a quite extended period of time. In addition, this adversary is growing in relative strength and continues its adventurist and militant course. The anti-socialist process is deepening in the People's Republic of China. It does not allow to hope for an improvement of relations with China, as long as it is ruled by the Maoist regime.

Giving those conditions, our tasks consist in

- protecting the interests of the socialist community of states also in the future;
- being continuously prepared for unexpected events caused by the Maoists;
- decisively thwarting any attacks on the cause of socialism and peace.

At the same time it is advisable to continue with keeping open options for a positive development of bilateral relations with the PR China. All activities towards the PR China have to be coordinated with other fraternal countries and a bilateral relationship with China must be used as a form of struggle against the policy and ideology of Maoism.

In the interest of an efficient struggle against the anti-socialist ideology of Maoism, and the unmasking of the Chinese leadership's hostile policy against detente and peace, it is necessary to strictly comply with the tasks as mandated by the [GDR] Foreign Ministry directive from 10 July 1974 (Confidential Document FO -186/74). Considering also the new aspects in the Chinese leaders' domestic and foreign policy, these tasks include in particular the following measures:

- On all practical matters of bilateral relations between GDR and PR China, the requirement continues to remain in effect to coordinate all actions with the Soviet Union and the socialist fraternal countries. We have to follow the principle of reciprocity vis-a-vis the Chinese side, whenever the measures intended conform in content and extent to those of the closely allied fraternal countries. This also especially applies to concrete steps in the fields of foreign trade and scientific and technological relations.

- We have to rebut decisively provocative attacks by the Chinese leadership against cooperation of the fraternal countries in the context of the Council for Economic Cooperation and the Warsaw Treaty organization. Here we have to unmask the Maoists' efforts to exploit these slanders for undermining the unity of the fraternal countries, as well as for creating a "smokescreen" to camouflage the increasing rapprochement of China with imperialism.

- Special consideration must be given to attempts by the Chinese leaders to "fill the vacuum" created by the withdrawal of the United States from Indochina. By any means support has to be provided to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to solidify its national independence and to increase its authority in Indochina and the world.

- In preparation and organization of the 5th Conference of the non-aligned states 1976 in Colombo we have to implement measures that were collaboratively agreed on. They are supposed to increase the influence of the socialist world system on the Non-Aligned Movement and to strengthen the latter as an anti-imperialist force. They have to counter Beijing's attempts to penetrate this movement and exploit it for its own great power objectives.

- In international organizations, including the United Nations, and in societal movements, there has to be a principled and convincing rejection of the hostile statements launched by Chinese representatives against the socialist states. The Beijing leaders' policy has to be actively unmasked in international organizations. Representatives from developing countries ought to be encouraged to criticize the destructive and anti-socialist positions held by Beijing

- We have to unmask, and actively explain, the perniciousness of the Maoists' policy towards the developing countries as well as towards capitalist countries. The main focus has to lie on unmasking Maoist chauvinism, the hostility against foreigners incited in China, the expansionism of Maoist policy, the war preparations, and on Beijing's subversive efforts against its neighboring states. The points must be emphasized that Maoist China is dangerous for all states regardless of their societal systems, and that Maoism represents a danger of war.

- Those steps of Maoism need to be unmasked that are leading towards the gradual formation of a military-political alliance between China and leading

imperialist powers, featuring anti-socialist and anti-Soviet objectives. Also to be unmasked are intentions and objectives behind the establishment of official relations between the PR China and the European Economic Community, as well as behind [Chinese] contacts with NATO. Further to unmask are China's activities in the context of preparations for a Chinese-Japanese treaty.

- We have to demonstrate to the developing countries the danger of Chinese policies for their national interests, as well as the actual objective behind this Chinese policy directed against the economic, social, and cultural progress of those countries. The speculative character of the PR China's economic aid has to be demonstrated (China is fulfilling its obligations to 35 and 40 percent only). Objectives of the Chinese leaders to gain the leadership of the "Third World" in order to turn the latter into an instrument of its hegemonist plans must be explained. We have to unmask Beijing's complicity with neocolonialism and the damage caused by the Maoists' attempts to disrupt the collaboration of the developing countries with the socialist world.

Reporting duties:

In order to work out according guidelines for our argumentation, it is required that all [GDR] state organs which are in contact with Chinese representatives continuously report about their contacts to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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DOCUMENT NO. 49

CONVERSATION BETWEEN FEDERAL CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE POLITBURO OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, MAO ZEDONG, IN BEIJING, 30 OCTOBER 1975

[Source: Institut für Zeitgeschichte, ed., Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: 1975. 1. Juli bis 31. Dezember 1975 (München: Oldenbourg, 2006), 1495-1500. Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]

Conversation

between Federal Chancellor Schmidt and the Chairman of the Central Committee and the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, in Beijing

October 30, 1975⁴⁵

German participants: Federal Minister [for Transportation, Post and Telecommunications Kurt] Gscheidle, Ambassador Dr. [Rolf] Pauls, Department Head Dr. Sanne.

Chinese participants: Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping, Ambassador Wang Shu, Deputy Minister [female] Wang Hai-jung, Department Head Europe Hsü Wie-chin, Department Head [female] Tang Wen-sheng, Mao's personal secretary.

I. The conversation was held by the Federal Chancellor in English. Mao's statements were translated into English.

While intellectually fully present, Mao was physically very weak. He could stand and sit, but not get up or sit down on his own. He said that speaking is hard for him and his legs are not well. Until almost the end he was relaxed, vivid, and humorous.

The three women sitting around him had major difficulties to understand him. Often they discussed what he could have meant and asked him when they could not agree among themselves. He then tried to repeat words or reached for the notepad. There he wrote quickly and legibly what he wanted to say. All this happened without any embarrassment, often interrupted by laughter. One never had the impression the interpreter [female] said something that did not convey his intentions.

Apparently Mao's thinking has a fixation on the period after the break with the Soviet Union.⁴⁶ Current events of global policy he either does not notice, or only to the extent they fit into his perspective. On the other hand he enjoys without any

⁴⁵ Copy. The memorandum of conversation was drafted by Department Head Sanne, Federal Chancellery, on October 31, 1975.

⁴⁶ Among else, because of the economic program of the "Great Leap Forward" initiated in China without consultations with the CPSU tensions arose between the USSR and the People's Republic of China from 1958. They became more aggravated in late 1962. The Soviet government was especially accused for its position during the Sino-Indian border dispute and its withdrawal during the Cuba conflict. See on this *Ost-Probleme* 1963, No. 3, p. 81. On June 14, 1963 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party rejected in a "Open Letter" a leading role of the CPSU in the communist movement. It criticized in particular the policy of coexistence with the Western states. In response, the CPSU argued in a "Open Letter" on July 14, 1963 against the course demanded by the Chinese side. For the text of those letters see *Europa-Archiv* 1964, D 73-138. During the following years the ideological confrontation continued; in March 1966 relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the CPSU were terminated.

doubt full authority in this regard: Deputy Prime Minister Deng deviated in his statements the next day⁴⁷ not even in nuances from the line drawn by Mao.

II. In the context of initial welcoming words, *Mao* declared the Germans are good. After a short break, he added this to a sentence: The West Germans are good!

The *Federal Chancellor* referred to his talk with the Deputy Prime Minister.⁴⁸ In the Federal Republic of Germany there exists enormous respect for the achievements of the Chinese people under Mao's leadership during the past 25 years.

Ms. Parliamentary State Secretary [Marie] Schlei, who has a special fondness for Mao's poems, has given him a volume of these poems in preparation for his visit to Beijing.

Mao said the achievements reached would have been too small. Besides, he cannot write poems. However, he knows how to conduct and to win wars.

The *Federal Chancellor* said Mao could do both, and in addition he would be a leader of his people.

Mao replied: No, we have to learn from you!

After a remark referring to Ambassador Wang Shu [former Xinhua Bureau Chief in Bonn, BS], Mao explained he had been a journalist himself and studied at Beijing University. Therefore there would be two correspondents in this room.

The *Federal Chancellor* reminded that temporarily he had also dealt with reporting. He would have written two books that deal at least half with strategy towards the Soviet Union.⁴⁹ The Chinese communists have special experiences and their own specific judgment of this subject. Here they can learn nothing from us. However, a comparison of positions would be interesting to the German side.

Mao interjected, this would be interesting indeed.

The *Federal Chancellor* explained that, according to his impression, during the last 15 years one would have to differentiate between what the Soviets write or say, and what they actually do. In their conduct of foreign affairs since the Khrushchev era

⁴⁷ For the meeting of Federal Chancellor Schmidt with Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping on October 31, 1975 in Beijing see document 326.

⁴⁸ For the meeting of Federal Chancellor Schmidt with Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping on October 29, 1975 in Beijing see document 322.

⁴⁹ See Helmut Schmidt, *Verteidigung oder Vergeltung: Ein deutscher Beitrag zum strategischen Problem der NATO* [Defense or Retaliation: A German Contribution to NATO's Strategic Problem], Stuttgart 1961. See also Helmut Schmidt, *Strategie des Gleichgewichts: Deutsche Friedenspolitik und die Weltmächte* [Strategy of Balance: German Peaceful Policy and the World Powers], Stuttgart 1969.

there is much more caution than in their statements. The last adventurist act occurred 13 years ago when missiles were sent to Cuba.⁵⁰

This does not exclude that the Soviets can behave badly, if you allow a favorable situation to them to occur. Then it might very well happen that they apply their overwhelming power.

However, one must not be afraid of this but rather maintain an acceptable balance of power. As long as you are doing this, the Soviet will not overstep their boundaries. However, if somebody would become weak in its defenses, it might be possible that they act accordingly.

The most important European states in NATO, as well as the United States, would not offer any openings that invite attacks. One has indeed listened to the warnings of the Chinese leaders and took them into serious consideration. Still, one is not afraid of a potential attack because one has a sufficiently strong defense to turn any policy of pressure, or even an attack, into an enormous risk for the Soviet Union.

Mao interjected this would be all nice and good, but the situation will change in the next ten to twenty years.

The *Federal Chancellor* replied changes are happening constantly and everywhere.

Mao commented on this: Your policy is based on a hypothetical situation.

The *Federal Chancellor* said he would call the joint ability of defense and deterrence by no means hypothetical. It would be highly effective and an actual ability. We build the other half of our policy on this: to have enough freedom of action vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and its allies in order to arrive at good and friendly neighborly relations with them.

Our own situation would be more difficult than the situation of other European peoples. Our country is divided, and the old Reich capital is surrounded by the territory of a state that is under Soviet pressure. This cannot be changed now. We do not surrender hope, however, to overcome the current situation some day with the objective that the Germans can live again together under one roof. In the meantime, we undertake efforts to create a more friendly atmosphere. Nobody knows how the

⁵⁰ On October 16, 1962 the United States noted during surveillance flights over Cuba that launching pads had been built and missiles of Soviet origin deployed on the island. On October 22 the United States imposed a naval blockade. After an exchange of letters between Prime Minister Khrushchev and President Kennedy, the USSR declared on October 27, 1962 its willingness to withdraw the missiles, and it began doing so on November 9, 1962. In return, the United States began to withdraw its missiles of type "Jupiter" from Turkey. See here FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XI, especially p. 235-241, p. 268f., p. 279-283, p. 285f., and p. 564.

Soviet Union will turn out within the next twenty years.

Mao said, he does know it: there will be war! The Federal Chancellor seems to him to be a disciple of [German philosopher Immanuel] Kant.

The *Federal Chancellor* interjected there would be something to that.

Mao said, he would be a disciple of Marx who had learned from [German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel. Hegel would be good, idealism not so. [German military theorist Carl von] Clausewitz has put it correctly. He [Mao] would be interested in Hegel, [German biologist and philosopher Ernst] Haeckel, and [German philosopher Ludwig] Feuerbach.

The *Federal Chancellor* said Clausewitz was a genius, one of the few German military officers with a political talent. Marx, Engels, and Lenin would have used the Clausewitz dictum that war is the continuation of policy [Politik] by other means.⁵¹ Yet there also is a second lesson to be learned from Clausewitz: in war the political leadership has command over the military. From this second lesson, he [Schmidt] would draw the personal conclusion that the ability to conduct a war is only one of the alternatives available to those with political responsibilities. One must not stare at war as the only option.

Mao countered, a defensive war is better since the attacker usually suffers defeat. You can look at the American attack on Vietnam, the attack of [German Kaiser] Wilhelm II on France, and also on Hitler's attack against Europe. The result was always that the defenders won. It was the same with Jiang Jieshi who was the attacker.

The Americans would be afraid that their people get killed. They had sent 500,000 men to Vietnam. Of those, 50,000 are dead and more than 100,000 are wounded; and they have made great clamor about this.

The *Federal Chancellor* asked for the Chairman's opinions on the development of the powers China, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

Mao repeated, there will be war. Eternal peaceful coexistence is unthinkable. Europe is too soft and divided, and also full of deadly fear about war. As examples he would name the Danes, the Belgians and the Dutch, and also the United States. The Germans and Yugoslavs in comparison are somewhat better. If Europe will still remain unable during the next ten years to unite politically, economically, and militarily,

⁵¹ The Prussian General von Clausewitz stated: "So we see that war is not just a political act but a true political instrument, a continuation of political conduct, its implementation by other means". See Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege* [About War], ed. Werner Hahlweg, Bonn, 19th edition 1980, Reprint 1991, p. 210.

it will suffer. The Europeans have to learn to rely on themselves. Would it not be possible that the sixty million of West Germans can achieve the same as the North Vietnamese?

The *Federal Chancellor* expressed his conviction that in case of an emergency the Germans will defend themselves. The German military belongs to the best trained and equipped armed forces in the world. This also holds true when it comes to their spirit.

He now wants to ask what kind of experience did change the Chairman's opinion of the Soviet Union. Today it is fundamentally different from the one 20 or 30 years ago. What is the reason for this change in judgment over the course of a life?

Mao explained it is the Soviet Union that changed. You no longer have to deal with men like Stalin, but with the Khrushchevs and Brezhnevs who are traitors to Lenin.

The *Federal Chancellor* continued, *Mao* seems to want to say that the process is dependent on the men at the top. However, Khrushchev has already resigned and also Brezhnev will not stay forever. Does the Chairman exclude that future generations in Moscow can return to the principles of Lenin? For example, he [Schmidt] only wants to mention the treatment of minorities in its own area, or the principles through which the politicians can remain superior to the bureaucracy?

Mao exclaimed: No, they will not [return to Lenin], no, no, no!

To the question from the *Federal Chancellor*, why not, he responded: Because they possess too many nuclear weapons.

The *Federal Chancellor* interjected that the Soviets are afraid of these weapons.

Mao said, the Russians are afraid of them, but on the other hand they are not. In any event, they have four million soldiers.

The *Federal Chancellor* remarked that we have half a million soldiers, but we are only a small country. *Mao* retorted here: You are not small. You have 60 million people, in one word: Europe is divided in too many countries, and it is too soft.

The *Federal Chancellor* indicated there have been numerous countries in Europa for one and a half millennia. It would be an immense task to unite them under one roof. This is a task for at least one, if not two generations.

One fact is often overlooked: The nine members of the European Community follow different strategic concepts. He wants to mention Great Britain and France who possess nuclear weapons. Under de Gaulle, but still so today, France has refused to enter these arms into the integrated military organization. Even more important, France's fundamental strategic positions are very different from those of the other Western Europeans. France is almost as much interested in independence from the

United States, as it is interested in its own defense against the Soviet Union.

If from time to time French visitors come to Mao, it would not be bad if he provides them with the same insights into his philosophy he gave the Federal Chancellor. *Mao* remarked, the French do not listen to him, just as a little as the Americans.

The *Federal Chancellor* said this is not quite true. Besides, there exists a saying: Constant dropping wears the stone.

Mao remarked here, one is debating these issues but he has not enough water to wear the stone. You have to rely here on the water of the Federal Chancellor.

The *Federal Chancellor* repeated that the Chairman should not underestimate the importance his thoughts have for most of the political leaders in this world. He [Schmidt] has come to exchange opinions, and judgments and analyses; some have come before him, and some will come after him. All this also bestows responsibility on the one who is asked for advice. People then begin to think and compare their impressions. For him at least, there would be no doubt that the statements of the Chairman are a very precious stone in the mosaic of opinion about the global situation that he, the Federal Chancellor, would have.

If we assume for now, Europe will unite much faster than we expect, then it will project the impression of great strength. Could this not be a reason for the Soviet Union to direct its pressure away from Europe on Central Asia and ultimately also on the Far East?

Mao said this is possible. This is why one has to gear up against their coming.

The *Federal Chancellor* asked about the role of Japan.

Mao replied Japan will be unable to achieve anything. It neither has enough oil, nor coal, nor iron, nor enough food.

The *Federal Chancellor* interjected, it has 120 million people. *Mao* replied that the sheer number of people is not a reliable force.

The *Federal Chancellor* remarked that Japan then needs a strong alliance with the United States and American forces must thus operate from Japanese territory.

Mao confirmed that this is the current situation. Right now Japan is relying on the United States, but the U.S. tries to extend its protection everywhere, to Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, India, Australia, New Zealand, indirectly also to Thailand, to the Middle East, to Europe, to America, and to Canada. In his view this is not going to work.

The *Federal Chancellor* said, it his impression that the United States are preparing

for a review of their situation; and that they come to the conclusion to have overstretched their commitments.

Mao remarked they try to hold down ten fleas with ten fingers.

He continued: You [Helmut Schmidt] will have to rely on your own strength. Counting on somebody else can only be a second rate option!

The *Federal Chancellor* thanked the Chairman for the profound conversation.

Helmut Schmidt Archive, 1/HSAA 006600

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DOCUMENT NO. 50

CONVERSATION BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND CHINESE AMBASSADOR WANG SHU, 26 AUGUST 1976

[Source: Institut für Zeitgeschichte, ed., Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: 1975. 1. Juli bis 31. Dezember 1976 (München: Oldenbourg, 2007), 504-509. Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]

Conversation between Foreign Minister Genscher and Chinese Ambassador Wang Shu

April 26, 1976⁵²

**Transcript of meeting with the Chinese Ambassador on April 26, 1976;
Participants: VLR Wegner, Chief Protocol⁵³, Chinese interpreter.**

The *Foreign Minister* asked the Chinese ambassador for his assessment of the international situation.

Ambassador: Danger of war is growing due to armament superiority of the Soviet

⁵² The transcript was prepared by VLR Waller on April 26, 1976. Was submitted to Section Head Kinkel on April 27, 1976.

⁵³ Franz Joachim Schoeller.

Union.⁵⁴ Angola is testimony to the interference of the Soviet Union, and it cannot be excluded that there also will be other Angolas, and just not in Africa (Middle East, Southern Flank of Europe).

In the United States there currently exists a sentiment of appeasement – comparable in a way to Munich 1938. The Chinese side has critically mentioned this to American interlocutors in Beijing. This is why there exists a major interest in Beijing in a united Western Europe; there are hopes for an accelerated process of unification, in order for Europe to become capable to rely first on itself and only second on others.

The *Foreign Minister* asked twice what people do represent this American sentiment, and the *Ambassador* replied with the remark, the Chinese side told Foreign Minister Kissinger during his China visit in 1975 critically⁵⁵ that the Americans attempt to undertake a policy “of smashing ten flies with ten fingers”. The United States would not have any strategic focus while, in contrast, the strategic focus for the Soviet Union is clearly Europe.

⁵⁴ On April 29, 1975 Ambassador [Rolf] Pauls, Beijing, reported about a meeting in the Chinese Ministry of Defense on April 23, 1975 about the Chinese proposition “a war in Europe is inevitable”. The Chinese Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Li Ta, would have explained the following: “Both superpowers are striving for global hegemony, and the ever growing rivalry will lead to a war the more intense the rivalry becomes. War would be nothing more than the continuation of politics; with this the Chinese present themselves almost as the last remaining supporters of the Clausewitz theory. Military balance would be threatened for the reason that, in contrast to the past, the United States are no longer superior to the Soviet Union. In particular, the Soviet Union has achieved superiority faster than the U.S. in the decisive area, namely in Europe. As a result of its focused armament build-up program in Europe on the ground and in the air, and around Europe on the sea, the Soviet Union is rapidly increasing its strength. The U.S. Secretary of Defense [James] Schlesinger has recognized this, and he is eager to reinforce the American forces in Europe. [...] On the other hand, due to its growing superiority, it becomes ever more easier for the Soviet Union to threaten war or even make war. China’s threat from the Soviet Union is a sideshow, you could even call it a diversion.” See Telex No. 170; Section 213, Vol. 112769.

⁵⁵ U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger visited the People’s Republic of China from October 19 to 23, 1975. On October 27, 1975 Ambassador [Berndt] von Staden, Washington, reported the U.S. State Department had provided the following information on this visit: “The Chinese repeated their criticism of Western detente policy with arguments already known: double-crossing by the Soviet Union in order to lull the West with a false sense of security, especially through the CSCE. They again emphasized their thesis that a new world war, caused by the Soviet Union, is inevitable due to the rivalry of the superpowers. The Americans have the impression this is a thesis by Mao himself that all other interlocutors adopt. The Chinese implicitly indicated their major concern would not lie with their own security but primarily with the Western states and Japan. [...] Beijing is afraid in this context that the United States has been weakened by the outcome of the Indochina War, mostly however by American domestic controversies (Watergate, frictions between Congress and administration on foreign policy issues).” See Telex No. 3197, Section 303, Vol.101543.

The question by the Foreign Minister, whether the [Soviet] strategic focus would not rather lie in Eastern Europe, was answered by the ambassador in the negative; and just with a reference to the military balance of forces in Europe. If the Soviet Union wants to dominate the world, it first has to take Europe as a necessary step. Still, despite all that the Chinese cannot rest comfortably.

The *Foreign Minister* asked about the Chinese opinion on developments in Africa.

Ambassador: Chinese policy does support African independence economically and politically. Beijing is in favor of starting a dialogue with the Third World.

Foreign Minister: The federal [West German] government is concerned about the enormous armament efforts by the Soviet Union. They are exceeding what the Soviet Union does need for its own security. This is why he demands a high efficiency of NATO as a basis for our own security. Also, he is concerned about the different economic situations in various EC countries, as those are both causes of political instability and resulting limitations to freedom of action by the European governments.

The Foreign Minister then asked about the Chinese assessment of the current situation in Italy. He specified his question whether the ambassador considers the Italian Communist Party (PCI) as independent from Moscow in the long run.

The *Ambassador* called the PCI Italian revisionists. The situation will get more complicated if the PCI will be allowed to join an Italian government. On the other hand, a PCI participation in government would not yet represent a serious concern. On the Chinese side, the level of dependence of the PCI and the other Western European communist parties has not yet been thought through completely. The question is here, whether the PCI or other Western European communist parties will adopt a position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union like Yugoslavia. In this respect, a PCI participation in government would not be that dangerous. To the question, what other communist parties in Western Europe are revisionists from the Chinese perspective, the ambassador replied: "almost all of them". The additional question about the DKP [West German Communist Party] did not warrant a response by the Ambassador due the party's lack of actual political influence.

The *Ambassador* asked the Foreign Minister for his assessment of the Soviet Union after the Party Congress⁵⁶, and whether there will be a change in Soviet foreign policy. *Foreign Minister:* Party Congress reconfirmed Soviet foreign policy. We are witnessing

⁵⁶ On the XXV CPSU Party Congress between February 24 and March 5, 1976 in Moscow see [AAPD] document 69.

a period of expansive Soviet foreign policy that now attempts to create spheres of influence or expand existing ones. This is why we [West Germany] want to strengthen the European Community in addition to strengthening the NATO alliance. Not all democratic leaders in Western Europe have recognized how much time is of the essence. Our concerns are not less when it comes to Africa. We categorically stand on the side of African independence.

Referral to the February Declaration by the nine EC Foreign Ministers.⁵⁷

He, the Foreign Minister, has always been very much in support of Secretary of State Kissinger's visit to Africa.⁵⁸ We take our Africa policy especially serious since Africa is actually a region that neighbors Europe. The discussion in the West about its interests in Southern Africa differs with regard to the short-term and long-term objectives: Proponents of short-term interests advocate a strengthening of South Africa; the others wish for African majority governments in Southern Africa in order to counter the strive of the Soviet Union for new spheres of influence.

Here we have a major task for the People's Republic of China to define the true interests of the Africans.

He, the Foreign Minister, and after him much more scathing the Chinese representative⁵⁹, would have stressed before the 7th Special [United Nations] Session of the General Assembly that the socialist states do not sufficiently meet their

⁵⁷ For the Africa Declaration from the Foreign Ministers of the EC member in the context of the European Political Cooperation meeting on February 23, 1976 see document 62.

⁵⁸ U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger visited between April 24 and May 2, 1976 Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, Liberia, and Senegal. In the aftermath, he stayed from May 3 to 7, 1976 in Nairobi for the opening of the IV UNCTAD [United Nations Conference for Trade and Development] Conference.

⁵⁹ Huang Hua.

obligations to bridge the gap between developing and industrial countries.⁶⁰

The *Ambassador* asked whether American policy will change emphasis after the elections.⁶¹ The *Foreign Minister* replied, a different emphasis has already occurred as of today since in part developments are being reviewed more critically. Just Kissinger's visit to Africa comes in this vein.

The Foreign Minister expressed his satisfaction about the progress of developments in the Middle East over the past two years. The Federal Government does especially welcome the policy of [Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat. With great satisfaction, the Federal Government thus took note of the Chinese-Egyptian agreement.⁶² A strong Egypt is an important guarantor of stability in the Middle East. Egypt under the leadership of Sadat has demonstrated how Third World states can embark on an independent course. Sadat first evaded Western and later Soviet influence; both, and not just the former, is important.

The *Ambassador* emphasized in agreeing that the Third World has not yet had sufficient experiences in how to deal with the Soviet Union. Before Egypt, the People's Republic of China has actually made the same experiences.

⁶⁰ The 7th Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on development and international cooperation was held from September 1 to 16, 1976 in New York. See AAPD 1975, II, document 270.

On September 2, 1975 Foreign Minister Genscher declared before the 7th Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly in New York: "The opening of markets of the industrial countries is supposed to guarantee the developing countries an increasing share of world trade. The [West German] Federal Government therefore supports a reduction in tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. In the framework of the European Community, it is undertaking efforts during the ongoing GATT negotiations to further improve the access of developing countries to the import markets of industrial countries. I want to emphasize in this context that my country is among the top of market economy countries with regard to per capita imports from the developing countries. These imports amount to ten times as much as the per capita imports of the state-trading [= socialist, BS] countries." See Bulletin 1975, p. 1059f.

⁶¹ On November 2, 1976 presidential and congressional elections were held in the United States.

⁶² Egyptian Vice President [Hosni] Mubarak visited the People's Republic of China from April 18 to 25, 1976. Concerning outcomes of this visit, Embassy Counselor I. Class Strenziok, Cairo, noted on April 28, 1976: "The only tangible outcome so far is the protocol on military cooperation signed in Beijing on April 21, 1976 by the Egyptian Minister for the Armament Industry and the Chinese Deputy Chief of the General Staff. So far no reliable information about its content are to be obtained here in Cairo. China's military support for Egypt so far is limited to the delivery of pods for Soviet MIG 17, agreed already by the end of last year. Newer Chinese commitments also seem to concern mostly contributions towards maintenance of this type of aircraft. It remains to be seen whether, in addition to that, China is willing and capable to deliver MIG 21 spare parts from its own production, and whether to provide Egypt with efficient support based on its own [Chinese] experiences for the build-up of an own [Egyptian] armament industry." See written report No. 737; Section 310, Vol. 108718.

For his part, the *Foreign Minister* then asked about Chinese assessments on domestic and foreign policy outcomes of the Soviet party congress.

The *Ambassador* repeated in part his statements from the beginning of the conversation. He referred to contradictions in Soviet statements that on the one hand affirm a policy of detente and on the other support liberation movements in Africa and socialist revolutions in the West.

The *Foreign Minister* then moved to developments in China. He called it a good sign when we are interested in events in China, as well as calling it positive when China is following the situation here in our country.

The Foreign Minister welcomed the statement made to Mr. [Uwe] Ronneburger in Beijing⁶³, according to which the People's Republic of China welcomes German unification in the same way, no matter whether it occurs under capitalist or socialist auspices. Positions of other countries towards our national question are important for our attitudes towards those countries.

Ambassador replied to the question of the Foreign Minister: Currently there is a movement underway in China called "Wind against the Wind of Rightist Deviationists" [Criticize Rightist Deviationism]⁶⁴. This is about a continuation and consolidation of the Cultural Revolution.

The correct path pointed out by Mao must be followed, in order to avoid also in China the path of revisionist deviation, as pursued among others by Khrushchev.

It would be difficult for foreigners to understand the events in China correctly.

This would not result in a change of Chinese foreign policy. The latter is determined by the facts in the world and thorough analysis by Mao himself.

There will be no reason to change foreign policy as long as the path outlined by Mao continues to be followed.

⁶³ The Chairman of the FDP [Free Democratic Party] in [the West German State of] Schleswig-Holstein, [Uwe] Ronneburger, visited the PRC from March 31 to April 19, 1976.

⁶⁴ On April 7, 1976 Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping was removed from all his state and party functions following a decision by the CCP Politburo. On April 20, 1976 Ambassador Pauls, Beijing, reported: "The orchestrated popular acclamation to the removal of Deng and the appointment of Hua is continuing in the entire country. Apparently it is intended to present the -in due time upcoming- Central Committee plenum and subsequent sessions of state organs with a fait accompli. [...] The Rightist Deviationism campaign focused on Deng is already called in part "Criticize Deng Movement" by the Chinese media. However, the assessment of Deng is still not yet uniform. According to the apparently official version, he is a bourgeois democrat whose socialist awareness lagged behind. The radicals, however, who continue to have permission to publish what they want, vilify Deng in the same breath as Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, and the darkest reaction." See Telex No. 160, Section 303, Vol. 103171.

To the question raised by the *Foreign Minister* on relations with the Soviet Union, the *Ambassador* responded only to the extent that he called the Chinese-Soviet disputes fundamental. An end to those disputes he only viewed as possible, if the social-imperialist systems in the Soviet Union will change and the Soviet Union ends its social-imperialist policy.

The *Foreign Minister* asked whether the statement made to Mr. Ronneburger represents official Chinese policy. The *Ambassador* said yes.

The Chinese side has already told CDU Deputies [Werner] Marx and [Alfred] Dregger⁶⁵ that a reunified Germany does not represent any danger. One does talk the same way also to Western Europeans. The Soviet Union is the big threat.

In conclusion, the *Foreign Minister* emphasized his interest in a visit by the Chinese Foreign Minister⁶⁶ to Germany.

Section 010, Vol. 178660

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DOCUMENT NO. 51

CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR WICKERT TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE, "BENEFITS OF RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA FOR THE ALLIANCE," 29 NOVEMBER 1976

[Source: Institut für Zeitgeschichte, ed., Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: 1975. 1. Juli bis 31. Dezember 1976 (München: Oldenbourg, 2007), 1553-1556. Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]

Ambassador Wickert, Beijing, to Foreign Office

114-17096/76 strictly confidential

Telex Nr. 535

⁶⁵ On the visit by CDU parliamentary Deputies Marx and Dregger to the People's Republic of China see document 61.

⁶⁶ Qiao Guanhua.

Sent: November 29, 1976, 07:25 hours⁶⁷

Received: November 29, 1976, 07:34 hours

RE: Benefits of Relationship with China for the Alliance [NATO]

here: Telex report No. 5168 of November 11, 1976 -303-363.00-1892/76 strictly confidential⁶⁸

For Your Information

I. The Chinese leadership has continued its anti-Soviet course after Mao's death.⁶⁹ It has not responded to conciliatory gestures and statements from Moscow and the Warsaw Pact states but instead rejected them poignantly.⁷⁰ Western reports that already wanted to see in Chinese statements -like for instance in congratulatory or thank you messages- a more accommodating attitude on Beijing's side were wrong in every regard and a result of imperfect analyses. Rather, the Chinese leadership left nothing undone to make clear that it will continue in its anti-Soviet course.

This course is indisputable in China. The Chinese leadership, which has to deal with a whole range of serious and controversial domestic issues, can have

⁶⁷ Submitted to Section Head Pfeffer on December 1, 1976 who noted in handwriting for section 201: "Please, as discussed, comments as soon as possible."

Was submitted to Ambassador Roth on December 2, 1976 who instructed to forward it to KLR I Ruth. Was submitted to Ruth on December 2, 1976. Was submitted to section head Meyer-Landrut. Was submitted to VLR Wentker and Kuhna on December 2 respectively 4, 1976. Was submitted to VLR Metternich.

⁶⁸ VLR I Hellbeck reported: "On November 10 there was extensive discussion in the NATO council about developments in China and consequences for the Alliance. Largely a consensus was reached that the Sino-Soviet conflict, notwithstanding tactically motivated reconciliation efforts, will continue in its substance and further determine global policy. Probably the [NATO] Ministers' Council will have to deal with the issue what benefits the Alliance can reap in the future from relations with China." See VS-Bd. 10045 (303); B 150, File Copies 1976.

⁶⁹ On the death of Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee and Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, on September 9, 1976 see document 281.

⁷⁰ Counselor Berendonck, Beijing, reported in October 29, 1976: "The Warsaw Pact countries have congratulated Hua Guofeng to the party chairmanship with congratulatory telegrams. From what we hear, senders were the Eastern European party leaders themselves, among them Brezhnev. Beijing has rejected those telegrams for the reason they are unacceptable because no party-to-party relations exist. So China repeated the same reaction it had in case of the letters of condolence sent by the communist parties from Moscow's camp at the occasion of Mao's death. The Chinese gestures are supposed to demonstrate that the new leadership will continue to pursue policy vis-a-vis Moscow as determined by Mao Zedong. The same purpose is served through polemical attacks Beijing is continuing in order to criticize Moscow at international meetings and in the Chinese media." See telex report No. 481; Section 213, Vol. 112769.

no interest in opening debate on another issue everybody is agreeing about. A Chinese leadership can only afford a modification of its relationship with the Soviet Union when it is firmly established in power and commands undisputed authority. Yet this has not been the case yet, and this situation can last for a long time. However, in the long run a more moderate propaganda and a more sober bilateral relationship is very well possible. Still, the Sino-Soviet conflict will continue to remain in its fundamentals for a foreseeable time, due to reasons outlined already earlier.

Although the Chinese military forces are far inferior to the Soviet forces in terms of equipment, according to Chinese estimates they tie down about one million Soviet forces in Siberia.⁷¹ The currently relatively small, but quantitatively and qualitatively growing Chinese nuclear potential will cause increasing concerns for the Soviet Union. A military threat to Western Europe from the Chinese side will not exist for the foreseeable future.

It is in the interest of the [NATO] Alliance that this situation persists. An increase of Chinese military potential would even be desirable in order to tie down even more Soviet forces in Asia. China's military leadership is demanding a modernization of its forces. In the current domestic situation, this leadership can expect its requests to receive priority treatment. It appears logical that those NATO members capable of doing so could support this development financially or materially. However, there are major arguments to be made against a significant and visible arms supply to China:

- A modern and better armed China would indeed tie down more Soviet forces, but on the other hand it would be viewed as a threat by Japan and other states in East and Southeast Asia. Arms deliveries by NATO to China would

⁷¹ Ambassador Wickert, Beijing, reported on September 29, 1976 from a conversation with the Chinese Deputy Chief of the General Staff Wu Hsiu-chuan concerning the situation at the Soviet-Chinese border: "Since the border incidents in 1969 on Zhenbao Island no special events would have occurred in the North. Though there exists permanent tension in the border regions, since 1969 there occurred only small, overall insignificant incidents. In 1969 the Soviet Union had attempted an attack with heavy weaponry, but it could not make territorial gains despite the Chinese forces being equipped weaker. To the contrary, back then the Soviet forces were said to have been repelled with heavy casualties. Now the Soviets would know they cannot play with the Chinese army and the Chinese people. The Soviet Union has deployed one million men along the Chinese border. Those number of forces, however, would be insufficient for a war of aggression against China." See telex No. 416, Section 303, Vol. 103177.

lead to protests from these states. Especially the United States have to take this into consideration.

- The Soviet Union would view comprehensive arms supplies by NATO to China as an attempt towards encirclement and react accordingly sensitive.

- II. The People's Republic of China is not just a benefit to NATO for its tying down of Soviet forces. Though foreign trade is small in proportion to the Chinese gross domestic product⁷²; and politically China is mostly concerned with itself and, despite its seat in the U.N. Security Council, less active in terms of foreign policy than, say, Romania. Still, China's political weight is extraordinary in Asia and other countries of the Third World, much larger than China's quantifiable potential would actually be correspond to.

There are various reasons for this: The large population (about one third of mankind), the size of the country (matches the size of Europe), and the resulting opportunities inspire the imagination. The Chinese program of development is based on agriculture and successful in many regards. For many countries of the Third World it is more attractive than a Soviet or a Western model. Moreover, China is portraying itself as a developing country and a protagonist in the fight against the Soviet Union. As China is turning primarily against the Soviet Union, this aspect is also beneficial to us and the [NATO] Alliance.

- III. Opposition against the Soviet Union is the determining factor of Chinese foreign and defense policy. However, it is not possible to nail the Chinese down here. Plans about an alliance or a "quasi alliance", as sometimes dreamed up by prominent Western visitors to China, are impracticable; and just for the reason alone that China will not make itself dependent on such an alliance. The trauma after the failure of the pact with the Soviet Union will continue to have a long-lasting effect. Even to the smallest extent, the Chinese leadership wants to avoid any political, economic, and military dependency. It will make use of only selective and targeted foreign support for its agricultural, industrial,

⁷² On September 21, 1976 Ambassador Wickert, Beijing, informed: "The foreign trade volume of the People's Republic of China amounted in 1975 to around 15 billion U.S. dollars. The share of the Federal Republic of Germany in Chinese foreign trade was about 760 million dollars, the one of the GDR about 220 million dollars. Overall, the share of the Eastern bloc is estimated at somewhat more than 2 billion dollars." See appendix to written report No. 1181; Section 303, Vol. 103170.

technological, and scientific development.

Thus the Chinese are rejecting credits and development programs. They also never made efforts to receive comprehensive arms support. As long as they follow their principle of “everything by our own means”, it is questionable whether they would accept anything from the West at all.

However, the transfer of technological know-how, and the delivery of products for dual military and civilian use, is something different; just look at the purchase of computers in the United States⁷³, aircraft engines in Great Britain, and large helicopters in France.⁷⁴

We propose to review what further opportunities exist in those and related fields. Within NATO we might propose a relaxation of CoCom rules for China. Bilaterally we should intensify collaboration in various technological areas that are of interest to China. However, we cannot expect that those measures will reap political dividends just for us or the Alliance. Even bigger material incentives would not achieve that.

It is important to strengthen in first place the willingness of the Chinese to cooperate with us and to see through an actual exchange of political and military information. This will not be not easy and achievable from one day to the next; since in all times political interest of the Chinese had been directed towards their own country.

⁷³ vsome speculation here the United States had abandoned the principle of balanced export of potentially strategic material to the Soviet Union and China. [...] Meanwhile the *New York Times* felt compelled to correct its report that the administration had abandoned balance in favor of China: A similar system was approved for export to the Soviet Union as well.” See telex report No. 3512; Section 303, Vol. 103176.

⁷⁴ On April 27, 1976 Counselor Hansen, Washington, referred to an article in the *New York Times* claiming “the American government silently tolerates supplies of strategic material to the People’s Republic of China by France and Great Britain without involving CoCom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls].” The newspaper report stated: “The only significant case thus far has been the multi-million dollar British sale of the powerful Rolls-Royce Spey engine to China in December. Officials said that after the British had informed the Ford administration that they would not seek allied approval for the sale, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger let them know that he would not make an issue of it. The official also cited the 1974 sale of Super Frelon Helicopters to China by Aerospatiale of France as an instance where CoCom approval could have been sought by France though Paris was not pressed to do so by the administration.” See telex report No. 1368; Section 303, Vol. 103165.

Thus it is necessary to win and deepen the trust of the Chinese and to convince them of the benefits coming from continuous cooperation with us. Even though it gets rarely expressed, the mistrust of the Chinese towards the West is clearly noticeable. Suspicions are especially harbored about SALT, MBFR, and the CSCE. They are afraid of the possibility of collusion or a general understanding between the NATO powers, in particular the United States, and the Soviet Union. In this regard they are not different from those kind of Western observers who are suffering from the nightmare of an anti-Western alliance between Moscow and Beijing.

The Chinese leadership is quite aware of NATO's weaknesses, the critical economic and domestic situation in some of the member states, and the delusional thoughts widespread within some countries and political parties concerning opportunities of detente [with the Soviet Union]. It will not only become necessary to convince the Chinese of the Alliance's willingness to stand up against Soviet pressure or expansion, but also to convince them that NATO is actually capable of doing so in political, economic, and military terms. Otherwise Beijing might be tempted to scale down avoidable tensions in its relations with Moscow without giving up fundamental positions. If such would occur with regard to the border question, it certainly would have an effect on the tying down of Soviet forces in Siberia.

It will be protracted and arduous to persuade the Chinese leadership to have confidence in Western policy and to cooperate. This will only succeed if we have frank conversations, do not raise expectations we cannot meet later on, and if we show understanding for Chinese sensitivities, peculiarities, and domestic pressures. Yet we have to make this arduous effort, especially in a moment when China is at the crossroads of its future development. And all this will certainly pay off. If domestic conditions would consolidate and the leadership's pragmatic economic ideas prevail, the country could experience, in the coming decade already, a boom that would exceed all our imaginations and increase China's political weight considerably.

[signed] Wickert
VS-Bd. 8652 (201)

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DOCUMENT NO. 52**MEMORIAL TO THE POLITICAL BUREAU ON THE RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC AND THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 6 MARCH 1979**

[Source: Source: Hungarian National Archives, M-KS 288. f. 5/767. őe. (1979.03.06). Obtained by Péter Vámos, translated by Balázs Szalontai.]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Strictly Confidential!

0035/3/PF/1979.

Registration No.: H/266

**Memorial to the Political Bureau on the relations between the Hungarian
People's Republic and the People's Republic of China**
(Discussed by the Political Bureau at the session held on 6 March 1979)

The last time the Political Bureau of the HSWP passed a resolution on the tasks related to the development of Sino-Hungarian inter-state relations was in May 1970. The changes that have occurred in the domestic and foreign policies of the People's Republic of China since then necessitate a re-definition of our tasks.

I.

The domestic and foreign policy of the People's Republic of China

Since the early 1970s, China's domestic development has been shaped by the sharp power struggle rooted in the policies of the "Cultural Revolution," while its international activities were determined by [the leadership's] big-power aspirations and its efforts to achieve hegemony. To attain these aims, the Chinese leadership reinforced the anti-Soviet aspects of its policy and its efforts to achieve a closer political and

economic cooperation with the developed capitalist countries.

Following the death of Mao Zedong and the elimination of the so-called Gang of Four, the 11th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in 1977, upheld the ideological system of Maoism, without any critical evaluation. A pragmatist “updating” of Maoism is in progress in political practices, but this is occurring under the aegis of growing nationalism and chauvinism, rather than by moving toward Marxism-Leninism.

Despite the institutionalization of power and its relative stabilization – which was achieved by means of compromises –, the power struggle within the highest party and state leadership has not come to an end yet, and due to the unclarified status of the fundamental ideological and political questions and the accumulated economic and social tension, the antagonisms will be necessarily reproduced.

The program aimed at modernizing industry, agriculture, science, and national defense, which intends to elevate China to the rank of the world’s leading powers by the end of the 20th century, is of a voluntarist character and it is accompanied by the increasing capitalist orientation of [China’s] external economic relations. Due to the absence of the [necessary] internal and external conditions, the attainability of these aims is questionable, but even a partial fulfillment of these plans might result in a substantial increase in China’s economy and particularly in its military potential. The fulfillment of big-power ambitions and of the economic development plans that are subordinated to an armament drive of increasing pace increases the danger of an extreme distortion of the socialist characteristics and factors that are present in Chinese society.

[The Chinese leadership, anxious as it is to attain its nationalist big-power diplomatic aims in a more successful way, openly collaborates with the forces of imperialism. In this qualitatively new phase, its cooperation with the United States and other NATO members, which is also extended to the military sphere, plays a decisive role. Since the Chinese leadership’s standpoint on every important international issue coincides with the position of imperialism, its policy threatens not only the socialist countries and the progressive movements but peace, security, and détente in general.

Hegemonism and an anti-Soviet attitude are also key elements of China’s policy toward the developing countries. China strives to disrupt the unity of the Non-Aligned Movement, isolate its progressive core, and turn it against the socialist community.

The hegemonist nature of Chinese policy manifests itself in the sharpest form in the region of Southeast Asia. It conducts open military aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, but it also poses a direct threat to the independence and socialist construction of the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Kampuchea, and to regional peace and security in general.

As a consequence of this open and crude manifestation of the expansionist big-power aspirations of the Chinese leadership, it is becoming increasingly clear to the socialist countries, the Communist movement, and the liberation movement that the Chinese leadership, during its struggle against the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, and the forces of socialism and progress in general, has become an actual ally of imperialism.

On the long run, one can also expect that the conflicts of interest between the Chinese leadership and the imperialist powers might increase. The imperialist circles feel insecure with regard to China's domestic developments, they strive to hinder its excessively greedy expansionist efforts, and their economic expectations are not completely fulfilled, either. The Sino-Japanese cooperation might lead to conflicts of interest in the economic sphere.

The Chinese leadership regards the Soviet Union as its main enemy. Despite the Soviet readiness and initiatives, it is unwilling to normalize relations. It is planning to unilaterally abrogate the treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance between the two countries. It seeks to gain the support of the United States, Japan, and other capitalist countries to its anti-Soviet policy. For the time being, the capitalist countries respond to these initiatives in a cautious manner, and they emphasize the importance of their relations with the Soviet Union. They would rather prefer to use the "Chinese card" to wring political concessions from the Soviet Union.

Similarly to the imperialists, the Chinese leadership pursues divisive tactics vis-à-vis the countries of the socialist community. By fanning the flames of anti-Soviet feelings and nationalism, it strives to disrupt the ideological and political unity and the political, economic, and military cooperation of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. To achieve its aims, it takes maximum advantage of the opportunities provided by the separate standpoint of the Korean, Romanian, and Yugoslav party and state leadership.

Sino-Hungarian relations

Since the start of the "Cultural Revolution," the Chinese leadership extended its

ideological opposition to the socialist community to the sphere of politics, too. Therefore, the Chinese policies, which were in opposition to our struggle for security, détente, and disarmament and inimical to our international interests, also hindered the development of Sino-Hungarian inter-state relations.

Due to the international significance of the question and in accordance with the May 1970 resolution of the Political Bureau, we conducted our activities toward China on the basis of a regular coordination with the fraternal socialist countries, above all the Soviet Union.

Since 1966, the stipulations of the treaty of friendship and cooperation, which had been signed on 6 May 1959, have not been implemented.]

In 1966, the contacts between our parties and mass organizations were disrupted. The Chinese leadership continues to regard the HSWP as a revisionist party. In 1978, they made an initiative to invite our trade union delegation, which was travelling to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, for a visit in China, to which we gave an evasive reply. They did not make a similar proposal to any other fraternal country.

No high-level visits have occurred. At the ministerial level – as a unique case among the closely cooperating socialist countries – Minister of Foreign Trade József Bíró had a transit trip through Beijing in February 1977, and conducted negotiations with his Chinese counterpart about the possibilities of developing our trade relations. These negotiations also failed to bring any substantial change in our economic relations.

Our trade relations are conducted on the basis of annual records of goods exchange and payment. Since 1970, the volume of our trade has gradually increased. The volume planned for 1979 – 270 million Swiss francs – is about 20 percent higher than the amount planned for 1978. The Chinese side did not want to record a higher increase in volume. The amount of such Chinese goods that are acceptable to us, too, has decreased, presumably due to the considerably increasing volume of [Chinese] trade with the capitalist countries. Thus we must take it into account that in case of a substantially increased volume, it will be probably not possible to maintain the present composition of imports – which has been hitherto advantageous to us – on the long run. The bulk of our exports is composed of machines and finished products, in exchange of which we mainly import raw materials and consumer goods as substitutes for imports from the capitalist countries; however, in our planned imports for 1979, the percentage of raw materials and semi-processed goods has already decreased from last year's 17 percent to 13.7 percent.

Due to the unilateral Chinese abrogation of the previously valid ruble-based

clearing agreement, from 1970 our exchange of goods has been accounted for in clearing Swiss francs, whereas non-commercial payments have been accounted for, from 1 January 1979, in convertible currencies. Due to our persisting deficit, the convertible accounting of non-commercial payments is disadvantageous to us. In the field of foreign trade, our interests lie in maintaining the current clearing accounting.

In 1972, we renewed our technical and scientific cooperation, which had ceased in 1966, and since then the Sino-Hungarian Commission of Technical and Scientific Cooperation has been operating on the basis of annually signed records. We specify the volume of cooperation in accordance with our interests, and this is proportionate to the activities of the cooperating socialist countries.

In the future, the further development of our contacts in this field will be hindered by the fact that due to the Chinese abrogation of clearing accounting, we must expect higher expenses.

Our contractual contacts in the fields of culture, science, sports, tourism, and the exchange of sponsored students were disrupted. Under non-contractual conditions and in limited numbers, on the basis of invitations, there is still an ongoing exchange of experts between the sports organs and the academies of sciences. In 1978, the Chinese side showed increasing interest in the various scholarly conferences held in our country. We rendered their participation possible only in the case of international programs.

In diplomatic contacts, the Chinese representatives refrain from any provocative acts vis-a-vis us. They occasionally emphasize their intention to develop their contacts, but this occurs almost exclusively in such fields and subjects of which they could take advantage in their propaganda that is aimed at creating divisions among the socialist countries. Our contacts with the Chinese representatives are regulated by the directives that are regularly issued for our diplomatic representations.

Since 1970, the Chinese embassy in Budapest is again headed by an ambassador. In recent times, the embassy has increased its efforts to establish contacts with our official organs, and it has broadened its social contacts as well. Similarly to the other fraternal countries, the abilities of our embassy in Beijing to establish contacts are still limited, but no discrimination is used specifically against us.

Trade offices, offices of military attachés, and correspondents of news agencies operate both in Budapest and Beijing.

[Those materials of the Chinese propaganda aimed at creating divisions between the socialist countries that are related to Hungary seek to achieve their objectives

by disparaging the Soviet Union and the collective organizations of the socialist countries, and this is how they try to foment anti-Soviet and nationalist feelings in our country. To increase the effectiveness of their propaganda, in 1976 Radio Beijing started to beam programs in Hungarian, too.

China's aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam – and its firm condemnation by the government of the Hungarian People's Republic – constitutes a qualitatively new factor in our bilateral relations, whose impact cannot be fully gauged for the time being. In the coming period, we cannot expect favorable changes in the policy of the People's Republic of China. This is what determines the possibilities of developing our relations with the People's Republic of China.

Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee

Resolution

The Political Bureau takes notice of the report on Sino-Hungarian inter-state relations, and passes the following resolutions:

1. The Hungarian People's Republic's standpoint on the most important issues of international life is, both in principle and practice, in opposition to the standpoint of the People's Republic of China. At the international forums, the efforts of the socialist countries, including that of our country, collide with the nationalist, big-power policy of the Chinese leaders.

In continuation of the policy we have hitherto pursued, we should take a firm stand against the Chinese policies that threaten international détente, peace, and security, are aimed at disrupting the unity and cooperation of the countries of the socialist community and creating divisions within the international Communist and workers' movement and the liberation movement[s], and inflict harm to the cause of socialism and social progress and to the national and international interests of our country.

2. It was appropriate and necessary to firmly condemn China's aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. On the basis of our principled policy and in accordance with the concrete situation and the established practice., it will be also necessary to firmly condemn any possible future aggressive act of the

- Chinese leadership, and express our standpoint.
3. In the field of inter-state cooperation, we should continue to strive to maintain correct relations, with a strict adherence to our principled standpoint. Foreign trade and technical-scientific cooperation should be conducted in accordance with the possibilities and conditions. In certain cases, the new Chinese initiatives should be carefully examined, and decisions should be made in accordance with our principles and interests.
 4. Taking the international significance and importance of this question into consideration, in the field of conducting relations with China we should continue to coordinate our activity with the cooperating socialist countries. At the appropriate level, we should have consultations about the prospective and topical questions of our relations with China. Among others, one can expect that in the world movement of trade unions, such Chinese steps to which it is necessary to respond on the basis of a common principled standpoint might be taken as soon as the near future.
 5. For the sake of the faithful implementation of the measures regulating our relations with China, it is necessary that those organs, institutions, and enterprises which maintain direct relations...⁷⁵

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DOCUMENT NO. 53

INFORMATION FOR THE POLITBURO OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SED, "VISIT BY TWO OFFICIALS FROM THE CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE GDR (16 JULY TO 23 AUGUST 1981)," AUGUST 1981

[Source: Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), Central Archive (ZA), Main Department (HA) II, File 38917. Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]

⁷⁵ Trans. note— The last sentence or sentences are missing in the DigitArchiv version of the final text; no such sentences can be found in the draft resolution.

[SED Central Committee]
 [Department of International Relations]
 Internal Party Material
 43 copies with 8 pages
 9 copies with 8 pages

Information for the Politburo of the Central Committee of the SED
[Socialist Unity Party of Germany]

RE: Visit by two officials from the CCP Central Committee to the GDR (16 July to 23 August 1981)

[signed]
 [Günter] Sieber
 [Head of Department of International Relations]

CC:

1st to 30th copy: Politburo
 31st to 43rd copy: [Department of] International Relations
 [44th to 53rd copy: Ministry for State Security]

From 16 July to 23 August 1981 Chen Dexing, Deputy Head of the Sector USSR and Eastern European Countries in the Department of International Relations of the CCP Central Committee, and Du Kening, official in the same department, visited the GDR. They came upon invitation by the Ambassador of the PR China in the GDR. Several weeks before the arrival of the officials from the CCP Central Committee, the embassy of the PR China had announced their visit to the Foreign Ministry of the GDR. The embassy forwarded to the Foreign Ministry requests to arrange for consultations and excursions of those two “guests of the ambassador”.

The Foreign Ministry was tasked by the [SED] party leadership to prepare a program according to the requests made by the embassy of the PR China. All costs were paid by the Embassy of the PR China in the GDR.

The stay by the two officials from the CCP Central Committee was the first visit to the GDR by CCP party officials formally reported to a GDR agency since the midst of the 1960s.

The arranged information, consultation, and visitor program was implemented according to the requests made by the Chinese guests. They had extensive exchanges

at the City Administration of Berlin (Comrade [female] Mensch, Comrade Grenz), the Central Institute for Socialist Economic Guidance at the SED Central Committee (Comrade Professor Dr. Friedrich), the Academy of Educational Sciences (Vice President Comrade Professor Dr. Kaiser), the Academy for State and Law (Comrade Professor Dr. Klett), the Office for Youth Issues, the District Council of Gera, and the City Councils of Gera and Jena. The guests did visit the State Combine KWO [“Kabelwerk Oberspree”, cable products and electric equipment] in Berlin, the [Optics] Combine Carl Zeiss in Jena, three Agricultural Production Collectives, the city district of Marzahn in Berlin, new residential developing areas in Gera, the Iskra Memorial Site and the [Georgi] Dimitrov Museum in Leipzig, as well as cultural, historical, and recreational sites and areas in Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig and during the excursion to the District of Gera. This way the Chinese guests were exposed to a wide range of GDR reality.

According to their requests, the officials from the CCP Central Committee were extensively briefed about basic questions of the SED’s economic policy. The briefings covered in particular the functioning of combines (process of their genesis, achievements and experiences, advantages in management structures, problems); the system of central, local, industrial branch, and factory planning; questions of economization, intensification, the economic use of material, the effective use of basic resources; and the role played by science and technology. The [Chinese] were made familiar with Gera’s development as an industrial district with intensive agriculture.

An additional focus of information concerned questions of socialist democracy. Addressed were structures and functioning of the state apparatus; the procedures in effect for people’s assemblies; the cooperation between party, state organs, and mass organizations; the role of competition; and the relationship between the party and masses.

The guests were also treated to consultations on issues of selection of cadres; the system of education, vocational training, and adult education; the uniform socialist education system; and on the party’s political and ideological work, as well as on training of its party cadres.

Furthermore, they received information on basic principles of youth policy, the main focus and objectives of youth legislation, the role of the [mass organization] Free German Youth [FDJ], and the perspectives of the youth.

All opportunities were used to make the Chinese officials familiar with the SED’s social policy and its achievements.

Without exception, statements by representatives of GDR institutions were characterized by a high level of political awareness and respective professionalism. The Chinese guests and the accompanying employees of the Chinese embassy took extensive notes throughout.

In order to deepen the information provided in the meetings, the officials from the CCP Central Committee received published material and documentations, information brochures, as well as textbooks.

The Chinese guests used their stay at institutions mentioned above to pose extensive and detailed questions. Their questions referred to the following specifics:

- in the field of the economy:

- background for the formation of combines, type of combines, actual advantages in management through combines;

- rules for construction with investments, what is meant by the refinement of raw materials; by measures to overcome differences in development of production and within the GDR territory; by responsibilities of industry guided from the district level;

- attitudes towards the private sector in economy and trade; distribution of profits made by factories; implementation of economic accounting methods;

- interrelation between industrial and agricultural production; proportion between wages in industry and agriculture; calculation of working units; regulations for private economic activities by members of collective agricultural farms; questions of fluctuation.

- on the subjects of work of the party and the state apparatus, as well as the activities of the mass organizations:

- how is party work implemented in state organs of the medium and lower level; what are experiences with the development of socialist democracy; the implementation of legislation regarding petitions; the struggle against bureaucratic red tape and the enforcement of the socialist legal order; questions of individual and collective responsibility; the work of the trade unions.

- in the field of working with cadres: criteria for selection, education, and training of state officials; making use of experiences from the old cadres; application of revolutionary traditions in the process of education; are there occurrences of competition between old and young cadres; explanation of the [SED] terms “reservoir

of cadres”, “cadre talent pool”, “cadre reserves”, and “cadre nomenklatura”.

- on issues of social policy:

regulations for building private homes; calculation of bonuses at the end of the year; general questions regarding implementation of the principle of material incentives; questions of environmental protection in large cities.

- concerning political and ideological issues:

ideological education in schools and universities; concrete details about the one-year party course; defense against ideological subversion from the West; crime activities among the youth.

The issues and subjects the Chinese guests inquired about were almost exclusively related to problems with current relevance to the actual situation of the CCP and the PR China. Foreign policy matters were hardly addressed. There only were some questions concerning developments in the People’s Republic of Poland, coupled with the advice one should learn from the mistakes made in the PR Poland.

The Chinese guests did not talk about issues of relations between GDR and PR China. However, they repeatedly expressed their interests to become familiar with the actual situation in the GDR and expertise acquired by the GDR.

Unofficially Chen and Du were invited to a meal by two members of the Department of International Relations of the GDR Central Committee, Helmut Ettinger and Horst Siebeck. They [Chen and Du] accepted the invitation. However, during the conversation they avoided any remarks on relations between SED and CCP (see attachment).

Attachment

Note on a Conversation with the Deputy Sector Head from the Department of International Relations of the CCP Central Committee, Chen Dexing, and another Official from the Department, Du Kening,
on 31 July 1981

The two officials from the Department of International Relations of the CCP Central Committee, who stayed in the GDR as guests of the Ambassador of the PR China, were invited to a meal in the palace restaurant of the Palace of the Republic by

Comrades Horst Siebeck and Helmut Ettinger, political assistants in the Department of International Relations of the SED Central Committee. They [Siebeck and Ettinger] were assigned with obtaining further information [from the Chinese] about the objectives of their visit to the GDR.

The Chinese official introduced themselves as officials from the Sector Soviet Union and Eastern European Countries [in the CCP Central Committee]. They acted friendly but reserved. They adopted a passive attitude and showed only minor initiative in keeping the conversation going. They expressed their satisfaction about the opportunity to establish contacts. They emphasized the need of talking to each other and become familiar with mutual positions through direct exchange.

The purpose of their visit would consist in obtaining information about developments in the GDR through seeing them with their own eyes. Experiences acquired by the GDR in various fields have to be viewed firsthand. They hinted implicitly that the work of the [PRC] embassy cannot sufficiently meet this purpose. They expressed their satisfaction about the meetings, conversations, and visits arranged for them.

During the course of our conversation, there existed the opportunity to explain positions of the SED on various issues, like for example on the struggle for peace and on developments in the PR Poland. Although certain [of our] explanations stood in contrast to the official Chinese position (for instance regarding the counterrevolutionary threat in the PR Poland), they did not react to them. They also ignored critical remarks about the Chinese position on such issues.

No explicit statements were made by the Chinese representatives on the questions of party to party relations. Hope was expressed [by the GDR representatives] for further meetings of this kind.

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DOCUMENT NO. 54

**REPORT TO THE POLITICAL BUREAU ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 6 MARCH 1979 RESOLUTION ON
SINO-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS; PROPOSAL FOR TOPICAL
TASKS, 26 OCTOBER 1982**

[Source: Source: Hungarian National Archives, M-KS 288. f. 5/865. őe. (1982.10.26). Obtained by Péter Vámos, translated by Balázs Szalontai.]

Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
Strictly Confidential!
Central Committee
Registration No.: H/176/1982
Department of International Liaisons

Report to the Political Bureau on the implementation of the 6 March 1979 resolution on Sino-Hungarian relations; proposal for topical tasks
(Discussed by the Political Bureau on 26 October 1982)

On 6 March 1979, the Political Bureau reviewed the important developments of the domestic and foreign policies of the People's Republic of China and the development of Sino-Hungarian inter-state relations. The changes that have occurred in Chinese domestic and foreign policies since then necessitate the definition of topical tasks.

The domestic and foreign policies of the People's Republic of China

During the recent period of nearly four years, as a result of the political and power struggle that occurred in China, a new compromise has been achieved at the highest level of the leadership. The influence of the so-called pragmatist line, headed by Deng Xiaoping, has gradually grown stronger and become decisive. At the same time, the group of leaders around Chen Yun – who, largely rehabilitated persons as they are, evaluate the historical experiences and lessons in a more sober way and who are also aware of current realities – has also become stronger. Hua Guofeng and the representatives of the ultra-“leftist” Maoist line have been removed from the key positions of power.

Due to the pressure of economic and social tension, they introduced a policy of “stabilization and correction,” which modified the original program of the “four modernizations,” and set the aim of gradually implementing the reform of economic management which had been started earlier. These measures, though they also express many internal contradictions, essentially facilitate economic stabilization.

For the sake of restoring order and increasing efficiency, they have carried out

structural reorganizations at the central levels of party and government work. They separated party and government functions, established new central organs and abolished old ones. They took measures to reinforce legality, and decided to reshuffle cadres. They prepared a draft of a new constitution, and released it for public debate.

They attempted to eliminate the ideological chaos, and re-evaluated the historical experiences of the party and the PRC, and the thoughts and political legacy of Mao Zedong. They rejected the most extremist manifestations of Maoism and the cult of personality, the “Great Leap Forward” and the “Cultural Revolution.” They made efforts to restore the organizational and ideological-political unity of the party. They revised the program and organizational rules of the party, and decided to revise party membership and launch a campaign aimed to improve work style.

[In the recent years, there have been controversial tendencies in the foreign policy of the Chinese leadership.

The Chinese leaders expressed the necessity of cooperation with the countries of the capitalist world against the Soviet Union, which would be based on “identical and parallel interests, respectively.” Accordingly, they continued their strong efforts to establish contacts with the United States, Japan, and the West European states.

They continued to adopt a hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union, the Indochinese socialist countries, Mongolia, and Cuba. They reinforced their ties with Romania, Yugoslavia, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. China pursued a policy of cautiously drawing near the other socialist countries – including our country –, which was motivated, apart from their obvious efforts to divide the socialist community, by their interest in the experiences we had gained in socialist construction and by the intention to benefit from the mutual advantages of such relations.

In the late 1970s, the Chinese leadership, in a differentiated way, started to re-establish its relations with certain Communist parties of the capitalist world. It normalized its relationship with the Spanish, Italian, Swedish, and most recently the French Communist Party.

In the last one or one and half years, the negative international effects of its aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the tensions which occurred in Sino-American relations because of Taiwan, the difficulties which emerged in the Sino-Japanese relationship, Western Europe’s reserved attitude, its gradual isolation within the developing world, and the coordinated actions of the countries of the socialist community have produced an essentially moderating effect on Chinese foreign policy.

The 12th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in this September, summarized the aforesaid changes in domestic and foreign policies.

The congress created such an ideological platform and line that expresses a desire to overcome the political chaos and socio-economic crisis that had persisted for a period of over two decades. The compromise-oriented nature of this line, in spite of its obvious contradictions, reflects an effort to find a socialist answer and solution to China's economic and social problems. They defined the task of building "socialism with Chinese characteristics." In essence, the domestic political line of the congress, which also includes numerous positive and realistic elements, might be suitable to guarantee political stability and economic progress in China.

The congress affirmed the nationalist big-power line in foreign policy, albeit in a more nuanced form than before. In contrast with their earlier adventurist views about the inevitability of the [Third] World War, it declared China's interest in preserving world peace. Concerning the Soviet Union, it omitted the terms "social imperialist" and "main enemy" as well as the slogan calling for "the broadest united international front" against the Soviet Union, but it maintained the charge of hegemonism. It emphasized that China was interested in maintaining a good relationship with the United States, but it did not exclude the possibility of normalizing Sino-Soviet relations. It seems that China is increasingly adopting a position of keeping a distance from both the United States and the Soviet Union, and of tactical maneuvering.

At the congress, it was proclaimed that China's international relations are based on the principles of peaceful co-existence, which it also applies to the socialist countries. This indicates that China is still unwilling to identify itself, in an ideological and political sense, with the socialist countries, but it raises the possibility that it might adopt a more open attitude toward the socialist countries.

The highest forum of the Chinese party declared that China is a socialist country that belong to the developing world. This indicates that it seeks to regain the trust and support of the developing countries by adopting the position of an independent force and using the slogan of simultaneous struggle against the "superpowers."

The congress stressed that the Chinese Communist Party intends to develop its relations with the Communist and workers' parties in accordance with the principles of Marxism, independence, fully equal status, mutual respect, and non-interference. These statements are not incompatible with the principles accepted in the movement, and they indicate that the CCP is interested in broadening its international relations, but at the same time they also enable it to treat the parties in a differentiated way.]

Sino-Hungarian relations

During the recent period of nearly four years, there has not been any qualitative change in the character and content of Sino-Hungarian relations.

The contacts between our parties and mass organizations – which broke in the mid-1960s – have not been restored.

The Sino-Hungarian treaty of friendship, which was signed in 1959, is formally in force, but its regulations are not implemented. Due to the Chinese efforts, there are imbalanced and controversial tendencies in our inter-state relations.

Political contacts of a routine characters are continuing. The Chinese embassy in Budapest has been vigorously active in establishing contacts, and the working conditions of our embassy in Beijing have also improved.

The volume of our trade, mainly due to the import restrictions related to the Chinese “corrections,” has undergone a substantial decrease in the recent three years, to an extent that was even greater than the one affecting the other socialist countries, and in 1981, it was merely 88 million Swiss francs. The agreement for this year earmarks 100 million Swiss francs, which is less than half of the maximal amount in 1979. This year, the composition of goods has again undergone a change favorable to us. The volume of trade might be increased by deals to be made in free currencies and barter deals. In recent times, the Chinese side has shown understanding, in a verbal form, of that the Hungarian side is interested primarily in the development of economic and commercial relations. In contrast with the earlier situation, they do not press for accounting in free currencies and for the elimination of clearings.

We continue our technical and scientific cooperation in accordance with our foreign trade interests. On average we exchange technical experts, or provide technical and scientific documents, in 6-8 fields per annum. The Chinese side is in favor of dynamic development, because this is more advantageous to them [than to our side].

In the field of relations in culture, education, science, sports, and tourism, our relations are not specified by agreements. In limited numbers and on the basis of individual invitations, there is an exchange of experts between our academies of sciences. There were cases of mutual visits by social scientists and economists, and a visit of a Hungary literary scholar in China. Occasionally, journalists made reporting trips, and in 1981, the two federations of journalists reached an agreement on the mutual visits of a few journalists. Steps were taken in the field of culture, too. In China, there were commemorations of the Liszt and Bartók anniversaries in 1981,

and of the Kodály centenary of this year. We rendered it possible for a ten-member Chinese folklore ensemble to perform in Budapest and in the countryside in this October. Cooperation is about to start in the field of book publishing, in the exchange of films, radio and television programs, athletes, and sponsored students, and in tourism.

In recent years, we noticed that in China, special attention is paid to the achievements and methods of our work of socialist construction, and investigate the possibilities of utilizing them. They refrain from criticizing our policies, and seek to establish contacts with the representatives of our country. They strive to develop a wide range of contacts, and make a lot of initiative. Some of these [steps] are suitable for creating difficulties between us and other socialist countries. They seek to sound out if it would be possible to restore the contacts between our parties and mass organizations, for which the conditions are not ripe yet.

On our side, we strive to maintain correct and balanced inter-state relations. At the same time, we took a stand against those manifestations of Chinese policy which were harmful to the national and international interests of our country. In our mass media, we presented the Chinese situation in an objective way, and criticized the Chinese policies that threatened peace and security, and caused harm to the cause of the socialist community, the international Communist and workers' movement, socialism and social progress. We refrained from "butting" in the development of Chinese domestic conditions, for such an act would have opened a new front of dispute. In our public criticism, we unmasked primarily those manifestations of Chinese foreign policy which were related to the Chinese intention to cooperate with international imperialism and were aimed at creating a "strategic front" against the Soviet Union.

[In the recent years, the party and state organs of the socialist countries continued to regularly coordinate their activities within the established framework. With the participation of the representatives of the Departments of Agitation and Propaganda, consultations of the deputy heads of the International Liaison Departments of the fraternal parties and discussions of the deputy ministers of foreign trade and of the leaders of the organs supervising technical and scientific cooperation were held on an annual basis. There are frequent bilateral consultations between the competent main departments of the Hungarian and Soviet foreign ministries. The embassies that the countries of the socialist community operate in Beijing are also in good cooperation with each other.

Concerning the further course of Sino-Hungarian relations, our starting point is

that the People's Republic of China is a socialist country, and apart from the mutual benefits of bilateral relations, the normalization of our relations is also an issue of outstanding international significance. At the same time, this question requires a firm and principled conduct, political awareness, and concord with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community. We must keep in mind that Sino-Soviet relations are of a decisive importance.

In case of a further strengthening of realist attitudes in Chinese foreign policy, we must, by means of a careful analysis, search for opportunities to bring China closer to the socialist countries. On the basis of the identical nature of our social systems and of our common interest in preserving peace, in certain questions of world politics there might even be an opportunity for some common anti-imperialist action.

In our bilateral relations, we can expect that Chinese readiness for improving relations will continue, and, in accordance with our interests, it would be expedient to take advantage of this by pursuing an active policy.]

Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee

Resolution

The Political Bureau takes notice of the report on Sino-Hungarian relations, and passes the following resolutions:

1. It states that in the recent years, changes have occurred in the domestic and foreign policies of the People's Republic of China, which are also reflected in the resolutions of the 12th Congress of the CCP.

There has been no fundamental change in the ideological platform and political line of the Chinese leadership, but its adaptation to the domestic and international realities has led to remarkable attitudinal and tactical modifications in the essential elements of domestic and foreign policy. There is a lot of contradiction and inconsistency in these changes, but it is important that they are trying to find solutions of a socialist character for the economic and social problems of the country.

They have affirmed their adherence to the thoughts of Mao Zedong, but omitted the latter's crudest excesses. In foreign policy, they maintain their

peculiar line of Chinese big-power nationalism, but in a more nuanced and more tolerant style. They no longer emphasize their earlier standpoint on the question of war and peace, the slogan of an united international front against the Soviet Union, and [the claim that] the Soviet Union is the main enemy, but they maintain the charge of hegemonist aspirations and the differentiated treatment of the socialist countries. China stresses that its international relations are based on the principles of peaceful co-existence in the case of the socialist countries, too.

Concerning the issue of contacts with the parties of the international Communist and workers' movement, they advocate such principles that are formally compatible with the practice accepted in the movement, and thus enable the CCP to increase its activities and treat the parties in a differentiated way.

The consolidation of Chinese domestic policy, the more flexible foreign policy, and the proposed norms for inter-party relations might result in that the Chinese leadership and the Chinese Communist Party becomes a partner that is more acceptable to both the developing world and the international Communist and workers' movement than before.

All this, and China's conduct toward the socialist community and our country, seems to indicate that the conditions of the development of Sino-Hungarian relations might undergo a modification.

2. It considers it imperative that in continuation of the policy we have hitherto pursued and in accordance with our national and international interests, we should actively participate in the implementation of the initiative policy aimed at normalizing our inter-state relations. In accordance with the concrete situation, we should make a circumspect analysis so as to investigate the possibilities of developing those contacts that are advantageous to us, and to strive [to take advantage of] the social, international, and political antagonisms between China and the imperialist forces. [At the same time, we should continue to take a stand against those Chinese efforts which threaten peace and security and collaborate with imperialism; we should contribute to the defense of the interests of the socialist community and the international Communist and workers' movement against the hegemonist and divisive maneuvers of the

Chinese leadership.

3. In our inter-state relations, we should continue to strive to maintain a correct cooperation. We should carefully examine the Chinese initiatives, and we should make decisions on how to deal with them on a case-by-case basis. Whenever it is expedient, we should also make initiatives.

Our interests still lie primarily in the development of commercial and economic relations. In accordance with this, we should continue the technical and scientific cooperation. On the basis of the hitherto followed principles and practice, our foreign trade organs should develop our business relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong as well.

In the field of scientific, cultural, media, educational, tourism, sports, and other contacts, we should continue the cooperation by pondering our interests on a case-by-case basis. In those cases when the conditions have become ripe, we should render it possible that the cooperation be continued on a contractual basis. In an appropriate form, we should satisfy the Chinese interest in becoming familiar with the Hungarian experiences of building socialism.

Taking the possible emergence of [favorable] conditions into consideration, we should also get prepared for the establishment of parliamentary, mass organization, and other contacts with China.

Our ideological and propaganda work and media activity with regard to China should remain to be based on the defense of our Marxist-Leninist class standpoint and internationalist policy. We should continue informing our public opinion in an objective way, in which our starting point should be the socialist nature of China; we should point out the controversial evolution of Chinese development, and criticize the Chinese behavior that weakens the anti-imperialist actions of the progressive forces. The mass media should present those facts and events which prove that we intend to maintain normal inter-state relations with China. They should pay attention to those phenomena that indicate the practical implementation of the nuanced and pragmatic line that was proclaimed at the 12th congress of the CCP.

4. Taking into consideration the steps China hitherto made, and the likely growth of its international activity, one can expect that it would return to numerous

democratic international organizations, including the World Federation of Trade Unions. In this field, we should act together with our allies, on the basis of a coordinated standpoint.

5. The enforcement of the interests of the countries of the socialist community with regard to our relations with China requires a comprehensively studied standpoint, a common principled line, and coordinated activity. The developments of Chinese domestic and foreign policy, and the most effective forms of the coordination aimed at furthering our common interests and aims, should be examined on a continuous basis.
6. We should continue the practice that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continuously coordinates the activities of those Hungarian organs and institutions which maintain contacts with their Chinese counterparts.

Budapest, 18 October 1982.

Mátyás Szűrös

Clause

The resolution is to be received by:

The secretaries of the Central Committee

The members of the Council of Ministers

The departmental heads of the Central Committee

The First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CUY [Communist Union of Youth].

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