



Woodrow Wilson
International
Center
for Scholars
Africa Program

CHALLENGES AND CHANGE IN UGANDA



*Presentations Made at a
Conference held on June 2, 2005
"Uganda: An African
'Success' Past its Prime?"*

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AFRICA
PROGRAM

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

THE AFRICA PROGRAM

The Africa Program was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 1999 with the generous support of the Ford Foundation. Under the leadership of former Congressman and Presidential Special Envoy Howard Wolpe, the Africa Program serves as one of Washington, D.C.'s leading forums for informed debate about the multiple challenges and opportunities that face Africa, and about American interests in—and policy toward—the continent. The program serves as a bridge for academics, diplomatic practitioners, policymakers, and members of the private sector, from Africa and the United States, who share a common interest in developing informed and effective policy decisions on Africa.

With the support of the World Bank's Post-Conflict Fund, the Africa Program launched a major capacity-building initiative in Burundi, designed to increase the ability of the country's ethnically polarized leadership to work together in consolidating its post-war transition and advancing Burundi's post-war economic reconstruction. The strategies and techniques developed in Burundi are now being adapted to conflict and post-conflict situations worldwide. The "Congressional Staff Forum on Africa" series seeks to respond to increased policymaker interest in the African continent. The Africa Program also oversees the Africanist Doctoral Candidate Summer Fellowship Program, which brings advanced doctoral students who have not yet completed their dissertations to the Center for a three-month residency. Finally, within the Center, the Africa Program supports residential fellows whose research focuses on this important region and works closely with the Center's other projects and programs on cross-regional issues, such as governance, the development of state capacity, crime and corruption, and pressing health and social problems such as the AIDS pandemic.

INTRODUCTION

On June 2, 2005, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Center for Strategic and International Studies hosted a conference entitled, “Uganda: An African ‘Success’ Past its Prime?” Before a full auditorium, Dr. Joel Barkan and Ambassador Johnnie Carson discussed recent political developments in Uganda, and the implications of these developments for long-term Ugandan democratization and stability. The discussion was unusually frank. Barkan and Carson, two of America’s leading East Africa experts, expressed their concerns about current political trends in Uganda, referring particularly to evidence of increasing authoritarianism, rapidly-mounting corruption, and the apparent attempt of President Museveni to set the stage for a constitutional change that would enable him to seek a third term of office. Ugandan Minister of Internal Affairs Ruhakana Rugunda, who traveled from Kampala to be present for the presentations by Barkan and Carson, rose to offer a vigorous challenge to the Barkan-Carson critique, arguing that the criticisms and concerns expressed by his fellow panel members were off-target and misplaced. The interest that the conference generated, within both the American and the Ugandan governments, was immense. In response to this enthusiasm, we decided to publish the present compilation of the three presentations, updated by the authors to take account of more recent political developments in Uganda.

Thanks to the vision and leadership of President Yoweri Museveni, the Uganda of today is a very different Uganda than that of Milton Obote or Idi Amin. A strong and important African partner of the United States, Uganda continues to receive very high marks for its open and vociferous political debate, for its free-market economic reforms, for the progressive economic vision that President Museveni has championed, and for tackling—more effectively than any other African country—the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Yet, in the past few years, growing concerns have been raised, both inside and outside of Uganda, about emerging trends that could undermine or imperil the important progress that Uganda has made over the past two decades.

It is our hope that the points raised in this exchange will further a frank and open assessment by Ugandan leaders of the course of their national development. This kind of critical self-examination is one of democracy’s greatest strengths, and offers the best chance for Uganda to remain one of Africa’s most significant success stories.

Howard Wolpe, Director
Africa Program, WWICS

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A Legacy in Danger

Ambassador Johnnie Carson
Senior Vice President, National Defense University

In talking about the serious social, economic and political challenges that confront Uganda today, it might be useful to begin with some history and perspective—some rather old history and some more recent perspective.

In 1908, the famous British statesman and Prime Minister, Winston Churchill published a small and compact book about his 1907 travels through East Africa and the Sudan. In that book, which he entitled “My African Journey,” Churchill—who had traveled overland from Mombasa—was effusive about what he saw. Churchill said and I quote: Uganda “is a wonderful new world. The scenery is different; the vegetation is different, the climate is different, and most of all, the people are different from anywhere to be seen in the whole range of Africa.” Churchill went on to describe Ugandans as majestic and elegant and Uganda as the “Pearl of Africa”—a name that the government still uses in its current tourist brochures. But Churchill was a man of enormous insight and also remarked that there were “sinister aspects” to Uganda that were not always easy to see.

Although Uganda remains one of the most beautiful countries in Africa, with some of the continent’s most graceful, well-educated and kindhearted people, Uganda’s post-independence era has been marked by extended periods of turbulence, brutality and authoritarian rule by several very sinister leaders.

From 1971 to 1985, Uganda was one of Africa’s most notorious killing fields. In 1971, Uganda’s army chief, the late Idi Amin, seized power from the country’s first elected head of state, Milton Obote. During his eight years in office, Amin unleashed a reign of terror. He started by expelling some 70,000 Asians from Uganda and confiscating all their land and property. As his tyranny gained steam, he turned on his fellow Africans. Under his orders and occasionally under his personal supervision, Amin’s troops killed over eight hundred thousand Ugandans, including some of the country’s most prominent political, academic and intellectual leaders. Among them were the chief justice of the Supreme Court, the vice-chancellor of Makerere University, the foreign minister and dozens of other political leaders and businessmen.

A Tanzanian-led invasion of Uganda in 1978 resulted in the overthrow of Amin’s bloody regime, but it did not usher in a new period of peace and sta-



bility. Backed by Tanzania's president, the late Julius Nyerere, Milton Obote was returned to power. However, instead of instituting much needed economic and political reforms, Obote unleashed a new round of retribution and bloodletting against his previous political adversaries, as well as the remnants of Idi

Amin's army. In three short years, Obote was able to create nearly as much havoc as Amin. Obote's army and political thugs, in a precursor to the type of violence that occurred during the Rwandan genocide of 1994, butchered and massacred nearly six hundred

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thousand people, leaving piles of skulls and decomposing bodies in a part of the country called the Luwero Triangle.

In 1986, under the remarkable and often politically astute leadership of President Museveni, Uganda emerged from this fifteen-year nightmare of unprecedented violence and mayhem. In the last decade, Uganda has become one of Africa's real success stories.

Popular, charismatic and a genuine reformer, President Museveni engineered and guided Uganda's early transformation by accomplishing five strategic objectives:

First, he stopped much of the bloodshed and violence that had wracked most parts of Uganda. Although it took several years, Museveni consolidated his authority over several rival political groups, brought the ethnic killings and violence to an end, and—with the help of the US, Germany and the World Bank—instituted one of the first successful military demobilization programs in Africa. Peace and stability in the south, central and western parts of the country also enhanced President Museveni's popularity and support, despite continued violence in the northern part of the country.

Second, he won the early praise and financial backing of the World Bank and the IMF. Demonstrating remarkable political courage, he reversed Idi Amin's 1971 Asian expulsion order and agreed to return all of the shops, houses, hotels and large agricultural estates to their previous Asian owners—a program that demonstrated Museveni's commitment to property rights, but also one that was strongly advocated and supported by the World Bank. The new Ugandan leader also adopted a major IMF economic reform program, which he skillfully modified and embraced on his own at a time when both the World Bank and IMF were beginning to face stern criticism in many parts of Africa.

Third, he improved the country's tarnished human rights record. In the years before Museveni took over, Uganda's jails were full of journalists, opposition politicians and political prisoners. Museveni turned this around, steadily

releasing those who had been incarcerated by previous regimes and releasing those who had been opposed to his own movement. By the time I completed my tour of duty as ambassador in Uganda, there were no political prisoners in Uganda and American embassy officers and other diplomats were free to visit any of the country's jails.

Fourth, he moved the country toward greater freedom and the first steps toward democratic rule. After assuming power, Museveni empowered a constitutional commission to travel throughout Uganda to collect the ideas of citizens and communities on what type of democratic government they wanted. Eventually a new constitution was drafted, secret ballot elections under international observation were held, and a freely elected and broadly representative government was installed. Although the form of government that emerged was President Museveni's "Movement System," it was a serious first step in the direction of democracy.

And finally, Museveni did what no other African president or leader had ever done before. He recognized the devastating impact of HIV/AIDS on his country and was the first major African leader to publicly speak out about the dangers of AIDS. He mobilized his entire government to combat this threat and he established Africa's first nation-wide prevention efforts. To the acclaim of the international public health community, Uganda became a laboratory for a variety of early HIV/AIDS prevention campaigns and medical therapies—including the now widely used niviriprine for the prevention of mother-child transmissions. Museveni remains a champion in the global fight against HIV/AIDS, and one of the most influential and intelligent leaders on the African continent.

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There is no doubt that Museveni's initial reforms, many of which I personally witnessed, set the stage for Uganda's economic revitalization, its renewed political stability and its early efforts to reestablish democratic institutions. But today, in June 2005, much of what he has accomplished is in serious risk of stalling, faltering and possibly opening the door to another dark and negative period in Uganda's turbulent history.

Uganda's march toward full democracy is on the threshold of becoming unglued as President Museveni and those around him seek to alter the country's constitution to allow him to run for a third or perhaps a fourth presidential term.

Under a new constitution put in place in 1996, President Museveni was limited—along with all future Ugandan leaders—to two terms in office. However, over the last two years, Museveni has shown an increasingly strong desire not to move on when his current term ends in 2006. A strong critic of Uganda's former political leaders, Museveni has also been a frequent critic of

African political parties and a reluctant supporter of a full return to multiparty politics in Uganda.

Although he remains popular in many parts of the country, Museveni's desire to remain in power has been opposed by all of Uganda's major opposition parties and some key members in his own Movement organization. A recent public opinion poll in one of Uganda's newspapers asserted that over 63 percent of Ugandans surveyed opposed Museveni's bid to alter the constitution's term limitations. As the public debate has heated up over Museveni's efforts to stay in power, the opposition has accused the president of using the police to intimidate their leaders and to suppress their public demonstrations. Museveni's attempted power grab has also caused a deep rift inside his own political organization. When several of his key cabinet colleagues voiced public opposition to the constitutional amendment extending presidential terms, Museveni abruptly threw them out of his government. Among those dismissed were two of his oldest and closest political allies: Bidandi Ssali and Eriya Kategaya. Kategaya's departure caused the greatest shock. Before his dismissal, Kategaya—who grew up with Museveni and later roomed with him in college—was considered the president's most trusted advisor and had served as First Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Minister of the Interior.

Many observers see Museveni's efforts to amend the constitution as a re-run of a common problem that afflicts many African leaders—an unwillingness to

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follow constitutional norms and to give up political power. Some argue that Museveni's unwillingness to move aside may also be motivated by a desire to protect those around him from charges of corruption. Last year a UN report

on Eastern Congo alleged that two of Museveni's close relatives were involved in smuggling gold and diamonds from the Congo into Uganda.

If President Museveni succeeds in altering his country's constitution, and remains in office, it could spark a political unrest among the opposition, a slowdown in the economy, and a loss of confidence on the part of donors. It could also lead to criticism that Uganda's Movement-style of democracy only works if President Museveni is in charge.

Museveni's continuation in power will also retard the resolution of his other major internal issue—the failure to stomp out the long-running insurgency by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda. The LRA, an ethnically based guerrilla group, has terrorized northern Ugandans for nearly two decades. While the LRA is clearly not a political organization or a

politically motivated force, it continues to survive and to draw local support because of the long standing political and economic grievances among some members of the Langi and Acholi communities toward President Museveni and his NRM government. The economic growth and development that has occurred in the south, central and western parts of Uganda have never made it to the north.

In recent years, Museveni has blamed the Sudanese government of fueling the LRA's senseless violence. This is largely a canard. While there is no doubt the Sudanese have put some money into the LRA's hands, the LRA was a dangerous force long before it received any Sudanese assistance and long before the illusive Joseph Kony became the group's current leader.

The situation in northern Uganda is a complex social, political and economic problem and will not be solved through military means. If the international community is serious about trying to help Uganda, it must take a hard look at the causes of the political strife and ugly brutality occurring in northern Uganda and propose serious solutions for addressing the problem.

Many northerners dislike Museveni and the NRM, and believe that the president has intentionally ignored the serious social and economic conditions that afflict their communities. Unlike most of southern Uganda, there has been virtually no economic growth or development in the northern part of the country since Museveni's rise to power. In fact, social conditions and personal security have worsened in a number of northern communities. Until the Ugandan government is able to build better relations between north and south and to bring development projects and outside investment into the northern communities in the same manner as it has done in the south, the LRA will continue to find the handful of willing recruits to help carry out rape, mutilations, pillaging and burning of villages that continue to devastate that part of the country. As the government steps up its economic development activities, it must also improve the operational effectiveness of its northern military units and end the high level military corruption that encourages some military officers to allow the northern conflict to drag on. For nearly 15 years, the war against the LRA has justified a large army and excessive military expenditures and has been a convenient cash cow for siphoning off scarce government resources into bloated military contracts and private bank accounts.

How President Museveni deals with these issues of presidential term limitations, the expansion of multiparty politics and the LRA violence in the north will depend on what type of legacy he wants to leave behind for himself and for Uganda: one in which economic growth, democratic progress and political stability prevail or a nation that is faced with a new round of destabilizing political challenges and continued civil conflict in the north. Many will suggest that these are national decisions, when in reality the decision is his despite the fact that the outcome will affect all Ugandans and perhaps others as well.

An African “Success” Past its Prime

Joel D. Barkan, Professor of Political Science, University of Iowa

A “Success” that has Peaked

Once hailed as a compelling “success story” of Africa, Uganda today is at risk of becoming another African tragedy. Uganda is not another failed state mired in civil war. Rather, it is a former failed state that succeeded in rebuilding its polity and economy under the leadership of a brilliant president who now risks squandering this legacy of his nation.

The history of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government in Uganda is well known. It came to power in January 1986 and under the leadership of Yoweri Museveni, compiled a remarkable record during its first ten years in power. Museveni and the Movement achieved two fundamental goals, and partially achieved a third.

First, the NRM brought peace and security across most, if not all of Uganda, by reconstituting what had been a broken state. Put simply, it reestablished effective government in all regions of the country except in some areas of the North. Second, it rejuvenated an economy that had atrophied into a near-subsistence economy. With massive support from the international donor community, it launched the economy in an extended period of real economic growth and poverty alleviation. Third, it began—*but has not finished*—the process of democratization, i.e. the establishment of democratic institutions through which Ugandans of all regions, ethnic backgrounds, and political orientations have a meaningful stake in the political system and resolve their differences under democratic rules. It is the failure of the Museveni government to achieve this third goal that now puts the entire record at risk.

Since the early 1990s and continuing until the present, there has been a significant measure of political liberalization in Uganda as evidenced by the emergence of a free media and civil society, though both are largely confined to major urban areas, especially the capital city of Kampala. In 1994, elections were held for a Constitutional Assembly that went on to deliberate and write Uganda’s present constitution promulgated in 1995.



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While the Constitution retained the Movement system of government that banned multiparty elections, it did provide for competitive elections held on a non-partisan basis. The Constitution also guaranteed a variety of basic human rights, including the expression of individual freedom, the right of assembly, etc. The passage of the Constitution was followed in 1996 by the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections that were arguably among the “freest and fairest” held in Africa during the mid-1990s.

Unfortunately, the record of the NRM government during its first ten years in power has not been matched by the record of its second decade, and especially since the last presidential election held in 2001. Although the government has carefully maintained a prudent set of macro-economic policies that have elicited continued aid flows from the donor community, and although these flows have propped up the economy so that Uganda’s annual

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rate of economic growth remains above 5 percent, there are real political and structural risks that threaten to undermine this record.

Moreover, the rate of economic

growth has slowed since the late 1990s while the proportion of the population living in poverty has risen. From 1988 through 1995, the annual rate of economic growth was an impressive 7.3 percent. From 1996 through 2000, the annual rate was 6.3 percent. And from 2001 through 2004 the rate was 5.8 percent. While this slowdown is not alarming, it is questionable whether the present rate could be sustained without aid inflows totaling \$690 million per annum. Aid—in the form of budget support and project support—now provides roughly 51 percent of Uganda’s annual budget, making the country one of the most aid-dependent in Africa. Foreign direct investment appears to be tapering off, or is of poor (i.e. risky) quality.

More disturbing, Uganda’s record of poverty alleviation has not been sustained. After falling from approximately 56 percent of the population to 34 percent between 1992 and 2000, the proportion of the population now living in poverty rose to 38 percent by 2003 and is probably higher today. The proportion of the population living in poverty is also much higher in some areas of the country than in others, suggesting that the process of poverty alleviation has been highly uneven, both geographically and sectorally. Thus, while the proportion of the population living in poverty across the South and in the West is now roughly 27 percent, the percentage across the North is 63 percent, while the percentage in the East is 46. Fifty percent of all agriculturalists, the largest single occupational group that accounts for 74 percent of the population, live in poverty. These figures suggest that Uganda’s economic “miracle” has benefited some ethnic groups far more than others, a fact that sows the seeds of potential conflict along ethno-regional lines.

Equally disturbing, because it poses the greatest threat to Uganda's continued economic growth, are the risks posed by recent political developments in the country. During the last five years, the process of establishing a fledgling democracy has slowed to the point that it is now being reversed. After an extended period of political liberalization which resulted in the strengthening of parliament, the judiciary, watchdog agencies such as the Inspector General of Government (IGG) and a free media, Uganda has slipped back into a period

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of neo-patrimonial, or "big man" rule. Put simply, the Museveni regime of 2005 increasingly resembles the Moi regime in Kenya at the beginning of the 1990s. It is a regime whose authority rests increasingly on a combination of corruption, patronage, and the use of force, and which seeks to perpetuate itself through the manipulation of the transition from single-party to multi-party rule.

It is therefore not surprising that the IMF, in its most recent country report on Uganda, stated that the country is "at a crossroad" and must "launch a second wave of reforms and consolidate peace throughout its territory." It went on to note that in respect to four of the six indicators of "good governance," Uganda's rating now falls below the average for sub-Saharan Africa.¹

This downward trend is also reflected by the ratings of other organizations. Freedom House, in its annual report of political rights and civil liberties indicates that Uganda has fallen in respect to both. On a pair of scales ranging from "7" at the lowest to "1" for the highest, Uganda received a "5" for political rights in 1994 and 1995. Its rating rose to "4" from 1996 through 1999 but dropped back to "5" in 2000, and then to "6" in 2003. Through Uganda's political rights score rose slightly to "5" in 2003 it remains below those for both Kenya ("3") and Tanzania ("4"). A similar picture emerges with respect to civil liberties. Uganda received a "5" from 1994 through 1996. Its score rose to "4" from 1997 through 1999, but dropped back to "5" in 2000, and "6" in 2001. It rose again to "4" from 1997 through 1999, but dropped back to "5" in 2000, and "6" in 2001. It rose again to "4" in 2003, but also remains below the civil liberties scores for Kenya and Tanzania both of which are now rated "3".² Transparency International, in its annual survey of perceptions of corruption reported that Uganda ranked 93 out of 102 countries in 2002 and 113 out of 133 countries ranked in 2003. Although Uganda's ranking has improved somewhat to 102 in 2004, its raw score on the corruption index remained unchanged at 2.6 out of a possible 10.

We have seen these patterns before, and the scenario is not good. It is not good for Uganda. It is not in the interests of the United States. And it is not in

the interests of Uganda's other development partners who together provide the massive flows of aid on which the regime depends, because these flows are directly and indirectly financing the downward spiral.

Three Issues of Concern

Three interrelated issues dominate Uganda's politics today. They are usually discussed separately, but since each impacts upon the other and reinforces the other, it is essential to discuss them as a group. They are as follows: (1) The transition to multiparty politics and the question of whether President Museveni will stand for a third elected five-year term—what would be his 21st through 25th year in power; (2) The war in Northern Uganda, now in its 19th year; (3) The persistence and spread of grand corruption (including corruption by members of the first family and their associates) to the point that it constitutes a drag on economic growth while undermining the legitimacy of the Museveni regime.

The Transition to Multiparty Politics and the Repeal of Presidential Term Limits ("Project Kisanja")

President Museveni resisted the transition to multiparty politics for many years on the grounds that multiparty politics were the root cause of Uganda's insta-

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bility in the 1960s, and during subsequent attempts at civilian rule. Indeed, the Movement system was viewed by Museveni and his colleagues in the NRM as an alternative to multiparty politics that was ideally suited to Uganda's history and needs. The Movement system was originally conceived as a competitive political system within a "no-party" or "non-partisan framework"—i.e. the NRM was *not* a party in the conventional sense, but rather a "big tent" to which all Ugandans belonged and within which all could compete on the basis of their own "individual merit" rather than on the basis of their party affiliations.

However, since the late 1990s, and especially after the elections of 2001, the Movement has morphed into an old-style one-party state reminiscent of Africa during the 1980s. Some members of the Movement—those loyal and closest to Museveni—were increasingly regarded as "more Movement" than others. The "big tent" became a fusion of party and government dominated by the President seeking to centralize power. The result is that the Movement today [now renamed the National Resistance Movement Organization (NRMO) and registered as a party under the Political Parties and Organization Act] is an organization that revolves around one man and his followers. The NRMO is

Museveni, and Museveni is the NRMO. In the process, institutions that once held out the promise for democratization have been weakened. Parliament, local government, the courts and any organizations that might evolve into meaningful institutions of countervailing power to the executive, have come under varying degrees of pressure to support Museveni.

Notwithstanding these trends, the demand for multiparty politics in Uganda has been persistent and a continuing issue since the return of elected civilian government in 1996. The 1995 Constitution addressed the issue by requiring that a referendum be held one year before the end of the terms of the first president and parliament elected under the Constitution to determine whether Uganda would retain the Movement system or switch to a multiparty system. In the run-up to the referendum held in 2000, President Museveni campaigned hard for the retention of the Movement system, and resorted to the use of strong-armed tactics by his supporters against those who advocated change. The Movement system was retained. Using similar tactics Museveni himself won reelection in 2001 with over 70 percent of the vote. Times, however, had changed. In marked contrast to the elections of 1996, Kizza Besigye, a former Movement stalwart, challenged Museveni from within. Neither Ugandans nor outside observers judged the elections to be “free and fair.” Besigye and his supporters were periodically harassed, denied permits for campaign meetings and subjected to insults and thuggery. To retain public support, Museveni promised to respect the 1995 Constitution by stating that a second elected term would be his last. The referendum of 2000 and the elections of 2001 thus deferred the resolution of the twin issues of whether and when Uganda would move to a multiparty political system, and who would succeed President Museveni.

By March 2003, when the National Resistance Movement held its National Conference followed by the meeting of its National Executive Committee, it was clear that domestic pressures, both inside and outside the NRM, combined with international realities, required that Uganda open up political space, and make the transition to multiparty politics. Moreover, 2003 was not 1993. During the preceding decade all but four of Africa’s 47 countries had held multiparty elections of varying quality. Retention of the Movement system was no longer consistent with African norms. The stage was thus set for another referendum to determine the future of the political system.

It was at this point that Museveni raised the highly controversial prospect of repealing Article 105(2) of the Constitution that limits individual incumbents for the presidency to two elected terms. This has become known as project *kisanja*. Museveni, in essence said, “you can have multiparty politics at the price of my continuation as president.” Although President Museveni has yet to formally declare his intention to run for a third elected term, his government has officially advocated the repeal of term limits for more than two years—in its proposals to the Constitutional Review Commission of Uganda, in its White

Paper on proposed changes to the Constitution and in its proposed constitutional amendment bill that passed the National Assembly after its third reading on August 18, 2005.³ In the meantime, Museveni himself has constantly justified the move on various grounds—that he is still young and vigorous, that there is unfinished work to be done, and that any likely successor will likely “mess up” Uganda and “not listen to me” were he to retire and follow the model for African elder statesmen set by Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela. Stated simply, President Museveni now regards himself and his presidency as indispensable for Uganda’s future well-being.

The fact that several established democracies such as the United Kingdom do not have term limits is also cited as a justification for repealing Article 105(2). What is never mentioned is that at least eight other countries in Africa, including Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria and South Africa, have all adopted presidential term limits while only one, Namibia, has not adhered to the ban. Term limits are becoming the African norm.

The combination of the switch to multiparty politics and the repeal of term limits has split the Movement. Several of Museveni’s oldest and closest colleagues dating back to 1986 and earlier have left government or been forced out, because of their stated unhappiness with the President’s intention to continue in office after two decades in power. Among this group are Bidandi Ssali, the former Minister of Local Government and the architect of Uganda’s famed system of decentralized government; Eryia Kategaya, a former vice-president once touted as Museveni’s likely successor; Augustine Ruzindana, the former head of the Public Accounts Committee in the National Assembly; and Mugisha Muntu, a former commander of the Army. The former and late National Political Commissar of the NRM, James Wapakhabulo, is also reported to have opposed the repeal of term limits. And of course there is Besigye. It is important to note that all of these Movement heavyweights, with the exception of Ssali and Wapakhabulo, come from Museveni’s home area of Mbarara and are ethnic Banyankole. The President has been deserted by his own men.

This group of former “Movementists” strongly believes that Uganda’s future stability and prosperity is contingent on an orderly and democratic transfer of power to a new generation of leaders. They believe that they have had “their turn” and that their generation can best consolidate its accomplishments and advance the process of democratization by letting go. They call for the development of strong institutions, rather than the continuation of one-man rule, and regard *kisanja* as nothing more than a return to dictatorship and trouble. Sadly, their observations are correct on both counts. What is left is a Cabinet of “yes men” of arguably lesser talent and questionable integrity.

Notwithstanding this opposition, President Museveni and the new cohort of secondary leaders that surround him have carried the day. First, the issue of adopting a multiparty system has been accepted by Museveni since he deter-

mined that he could contest the presidency under the new rules. As noted above, the Movement has already registered itself as a political party. Since Museveni's opponents had long called for the return of multiparty politics, it was not surprising that the second referendum on the issue, held on July 28, 2005, endorsed the change despite the disappointingly low voter turnout.⁴

It is the *kisanja* issue that has generated the most controversy, and here too the President is likely to come out on top. Until November 2004, members of the National Assembly who opposed the repeal of term limits thought they had more than enough votes to block it. Their reasoning was simple: the repeal requires a two-thirds vote of the entire membership of the National Assembly—198 of its 302 voting members. A year ago, those opposed were confident that they could block the formation of this super majority. However after November, it became clear that President Museveni had probably lined up the 198 votes through a combination of carrots and sticks. MPs supporting repeal as well as waiverers were each paid five million Uganda shillings (roughly \$3,030), and promised more. Those opposed were threatened with denial of the NRMO nomination and/or well-financed campaigns for their opponents should they seek reelection. In June 2005 Museveni announced that he supported a bill to create a constituency development fund in the amount of 10 million shillings per constituency per year and the equivalent of approximately \$6,060 per year for each MP. The announcement no doubt increased the pressure on MPs to repeal Article 105(2) two months hence.

It is also clear that President Museveni is willing to play “hard ball” with those who oppose him—on *kisanja* and ultimately during the run-up to the elections which must be held by no later than March 12, 2006.⁵ Strong armed tactics have already been used to deny permits, breakup meetings, and otherwise cow MPs who have joined together to create the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC). The FDC, led by former Movement stalwarts, is regarded as the most potent threat to Museveni and the NRMO—far more potent than the Democratic Party (DP) or Uganda People's Congress (UPC), two old holdovers from the 1960s.

If such a scenario unfolds, the prospect for intermittent violence during the run-up to the elections should not be ruled out. Most troubling in this regard is the existence of several local militias or “Arrow Groups” that can be deployed to foment unrest and/or intimidate opponents of the regime. The transformation of the former Presidential Protection Unit (PPU), a force that once numbered only 200 men, into the Presidential Guard Brigade (PGB) is also worrisome. The Brigade, which is reported to have more than 10,000 men, and which is well equipped (including armored vehicles) and whose *de facto* commander is Museveni's son—Muhoozi Kainerugaba—is a classic praetorian guard. Roughly one-fifth the size of the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF), its main purpose is not the defense of Uganda against external aggression, but the defense of the Museveni regime. How and when the PGB will be

deployed during the run-up and aftermath of next year's presidential and parliamentary elections has become the subject of considerable speculation.

Much preparation will also be necessary before the elections can be held in March 2006, but it is not clear whether these preparations can be put in place in time. In addition to the referendum held on July 28th, a series of legal and logistical steps must be still completed. These include the possible reconstitution of the electoral commission, the revision of the Political Parties and Organizations Act, the compilation of a new register of voters, and the possible re-delimitation of constituency boundaries. Yet if these steps are not completed the elections themselves will be flawed. Alternatively, it may become necessary to extend the terms of both the President and members of parliament, itself a highly controversial move that is sure to exacerbate tensions between the regime and its opponents.

Given these realities, all signs point towards a Moi/Mugabe-type election—i.e. an uneven playing field for those who oppose the Movement and the third term, intimidation of the opposition, rising violence, etc. What then, given Uganda's past? In this regard, it is important to remember that in its 43

years of existence as an independent state, Uganda has never had a constitutional and peaceful transfer of power from one elected government to another. Should the President prevail by force or intimidation, it is possible that some elements of the opposition will

"The second critical issue...is the war in Northern Uganda between the Uganda People's Defense Force and the Lord's Resistance Army headed by Joseph Kony. Now in its 19th year, the war has created a desperate situation that rivals Darfur, but which has been largely ignored by the world's press."

go underground and pursue the very option that Museveni himself pursued successfully two decades ago—a guerilla insurgency. The regime already accuses its opponents, and the FDC in particular, of planning this option. It is a recipe for trouble and is likely to be either highly destabilizing or to lead to widespread repression. Should events spin out of control, Uganda's success will indeed be a record of the past.

The War in Northern Uganda

The second critical issue facing Uganda is the war in Northern Uganda between the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) headed by Joseph Kony. Now in its 19th year, the war has created a desperate situation that rivals Darfur, but which has been largely ignored by the world's press. The war has affected 12 of Uganda's 56 administrative districts. Between 60,000 and 70,000 Ugandans, mainly Acholi, have been killed in this conflict. Between 1.2 and 1.5 million people are displaced persons who have fled their homes and reside in special camps.

It is a war of unimaginable atrocities, including the use of child soldiers, abductions of the local population, rape, the disfigurement of victims, etc.

The war is also a complicated conflict involving more than a simple fight between the UPDF and the LRA. In the minds of many Northerners (especially Acholi), and some residents of Southern Uganda, it is a war between the poor and Nilotic speakers of the North versus the more prosperous Bantu speakers of the South. It is also a local civil war that pits one segment of the Acholi population against the majority of the Acholi community. Finally, it has been a war between Uganda and Sudan though this dimension of the conflict has lessened substantially since the peace agreement in Sudan.

The war began in 1986 when remnants of the army of the former Obote-Okello regime retreated into Sudan and were pursued by the UPDF. A negotiated settlement was nearly achieved in 1994 when Betty Bigombe, then Minister for the North, came close to a deal with Kony. A decade later, and after leaving the government and moving to the United States, Bigombe returned to serve as the leading mediator in renewed talks that began during the last quarter of 2004, and which occurred mainly via phone and in the bush near Gulu. Through the heroic efforts of Bigombe, supported by Ruhakana Ruganda, Uganda's Minister of Internal Affairs, they came close to a final settlement during the last three days of 2004. However, fighting resumed on January 1, 2005 when the LRA asked for more time to consider the terms of the agreement and President Museveni refused. Since then, the Government of Uganda communicated a revised proposal to Kony and his number two, Vincent Otti, in February. Bigombe continues in periodic contact by phone with Kony and/or Otti, but the situation has stalled since mid-March. She had no contact from Kony for most of May despite claims by the Government of Uganda that negotiations continue.

The war has persisted for 19 years for a combination of five reasons:

- The period of conflict has been marked by a deep distrust between the two sides, exacerbated at times by a lack of trust between Kony and his own chief negotiators. This level of distrust has been partially bridged by the dogged efforts of Bigombe on the one hand and leaders of Acholi civil society on the other, but they too have at times lost the support of the Museveni government. And while the LRA regards Bigombe as the one person it can talk to on the government side, it does not view her as a neutral mediator, but rather as someone who is deeply committed to peace and who has had the periodic backing of Museveni. Bigombe herself has struck something of a Faustian bargain with the President as he can, and in the past has, withdrawn his support. Thus, while some observers regard Bigombe's continuing efforts as the key to peace, others believe that final negotiations will require an outside mediator, and that such talks will have to take place outside Uganda.

- The prospects for a rapid end to the talks have been hurt in the near term by the break-up of the LRA's negotiating team that met face to face with Bigombe and Rugunda last November and December. Five of the seven members of the team are now dead, while the most prominent member and spokesman, Samuel Kolo, has come out of the bush and is under the protection of the UDPF. He is reported to have had a falling out with Vincent Otti, with the result that the top leadership of the LRA has no interlocutors in direct contact with Bigombe. In short, Kony and Otti must now negotiate for themselves. They are, however, reluctant to settle until they receive meaningful guarantees about their future safety, including guarantees that they will not be turned over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) following their own return to Uganda.
- The fact that Uganda has already referred the atrocities of the LRA to the ICC greatly complicates the search for a settlement. Cases referred by a signatory state to the ICC cannot be withdrawn. The end of the war, however, will require some kind of deal under which Kony, Otti and the remaining soldiers are granted amnesty. One possible way out, and one that the Government of Uganda is currently exploring, is to find a third country that would be willing to house Kony following the end of the war. Other related issues such as the rights of LRA members who return to Uganda, the modalities and sequence of the demobilization, etc., also need to be resolved.
- Meanwhile the LRA fights on, and indeed a fourth major obstacle to a settlement is that as many as one third of its fighters know no other existence. These are soldiers who were recruited over the years through abductions when they were children. Their entire formative years have been spent in the LRA. They have no families to which they can go home. In a bizarre and morbid way, the LRA is their home until they die. It is not clear what will happen to this segment even after a peace deal because they are unlikely to be welcomed back by their former communities.
- Finally, the war has persisted for nearly two decades because it has served President Museveni's political purposes, though this consideration may be changing as the President gears up for the 2006 elections. The war has served Museveni's political purposes in two fundamental ways. First, it has helped him consolidate popular support across Southern Uganda, and particularly among the Baganda, Uganda's most populous (17 percent of the population) and prosperous ethnic group. The Museveni government is the first government since independence that has enjoyed significant support from the Baganda. This is partly due to Museveni's reestablishment of Baganda traditional institutions, especially the Kabaka (i.e. king) and partly on the President's skill at playing on Baganda fears that the war in the North could

spread south if not contained. Second, the war has shored up Museveni's political base within the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF).

It is important to remember that Museveni and the NRM came to power in 1986 as the result of a successful armed insurgency and that the National Resistance Army, rechristened as the UPDF, has always been a pillar of the regime. Museveni's younger brother, former Lt. General Salim Saleh, once headed the force, while his son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, is an important figure within the military establishment. Museveni has long relied on keeping senior and middle echelon officers happy. He has done this by providing these individuals with business and other opportunities, including opportunities for corrupt practices, over the years. Put simply, the UPDF is a critical component of the President's patronage network. By keeping key officers happy, he has insured their loyalty and kept himself in power. The war in the north has wrecked havoc across the region, but it has justified a large defense budget that has been the source of a variety of scams that have enriched some officers and provided a more modest cash flow to others. We will return to this point below.

Notwithstanding the political benefits reaped from prolonging the war, it is also clear that with the 2006 elections approaching,

President Museveni has concluded that it may be in his best interest to end the conflict. This would certainly gain him some, though not broad, support in the north, but reap substantial support across the south. The extent of the President's commitment to a more vigorous prosecution of the war combined with ongoing negotiations, however, is not clear. There are still many soldiers in the north who are not being paid on a regular basis and who, not surprisingly, are not inclined to fight. Corruption within the army continues. At the same time, several thousand troops posted in the north are being transferred to Somalia and Sudan to support the African Union's peacekeeping efforts in those countries. For these multiple reasons, the end of the war is not in sight though international concern about the conflict is arguably at its highest level ever. Expressions of such concern also help the President politically to the extent that Uganda's principal donors are inclined to mute their criticisms of project *kisanja* and the slowing of the democratic transition so long as he and the UPDF are vigorous in prosecuting the war, and/or engaging in serious negotiations with the LRA.

Corruption for the Purposes of Regime Maintenance

Corruption is the third major issue facing Uganda. Though it is very hard to make a quantitative estimate of the extent to which corruption reduces economic growth, especially in the near term, there is no doubt that it eventually

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takes its toll—on both the rate of growth, and the level and quality of domestic and foreign direct investment (FDI) that impact on growth. Moreover, given Uganda’s high dependency on aid for budget support, the donor community directly and indirectly (but unintentionally) finances corrupt practice.

The downside impact of corruption can be seen by the spread of “crony capitalism” among members of the political elite, including various “sweet-heart” deals of dubious value that have been granted to attract foreign investors of questionable integrity (e.g. the recent leasing of the state-owned Dairy Corporation to a Thai investor for \$1 and other deals approved outside official procedures). Corruption in Uganda is pervasive, and appears to involve prominent members of the first family, though not President Museveni himself. Moreover, while some alleged acts of corruption have not resulted in prosecutions or convictions by the courts, these acts would be regarded as clear conflicts of interest in most countries. For example, the fact that a leading public official or his spouse participates in a business that has a contractual relationship with the Government of Uganda is not officially regarded as a corrupt practice so long as neither the official nor the business has violated the law. Such practice, however, even if “lawful,” meets the standard internationally accepted definition of corruption, i.e. the use of public office for private gain.

Examples of the allegations surrounding the first family are as follows:

- Lt. General (retired) Salim Saleh (a.k.a. Caleb Akandwanaho)—President Museveni’s younger brother and the former head of the UPDF, who retains considerable influence over the army reserve. He owns Caleb International, now inactive, which used to procure equipment for the military, Saracen Ltd., which provides security services in and around Kampala, and several other companies including Efforte which in turn owned a 40 percent stake in Entebbe Handling Services or ENHAS, a major contractor for ground services (passenger check-in, baggage and freight handling) at Entebbe International Airport. Saleh is alleged to have engaged in a number of scams involving the UPDF including the sale of “junk helicopters” to the army and the illegal export of gold, coltan and other minerals from the Congo during UPDF operations there in the late 1990s. His wife, Jovia Akandwanaho is also alleged to have been involved via several front companies that they both own or control. A commission of inquiry into the Congo matter implicated both, but concluded that it did not have supportable evidence to bring formal charges.⁶ However, in June 2005, the United States denied Jovia Akandwanaho a visa to visit the US on the grounds that she had engaged in corrupt acts.
- Muhoozi Kainerugaba—President Museveni’s son, commander of the armored unit of the Presidential Guard Brigade and *de facto* head of the force. Kainerugaba was the former managing director of Caleb International.

- Samuel Kutesa—currently the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a close advisor of the President. Kutesa was censured by the 6th Parliament for alleged conflicts of interest, but was retained in the Cabinet (indeed promoted to his current position) by the President. Kutesa was the co-owner (with Saleh) of the controlling interest of ENHAS and now owns 80 percent of the enterprise after buying Saleh’s share. His late wife was a cousin of Janet Museveni. His close friend, Hope Mwesigye is the Minister for Parliamentary affairs responsible for insuring that MPs supported the repeal of Article 105(2). His daughter is married to Muhoozi Kainerugaba. Another daughter was employed by Hunton and Williams, the London-based law and public relations firm retained by the Government of Uganda, and with an office in Washington.
- James Muhwezi—the Minister of Health. Muhwezi was also censured by the 6th parliament, but has continued in the Cabinet. The decision by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria on August 25th to suspend further disbursements to Uganda as a result of a “serious mismanagement” of its funds has also happened on his watch. His wife Susan is the special advisor to President Museveni on AGOA and a confidant of Janet Museveni. Her brother, Richard Kabonero, is a long-time diplomat at the Uganda Embassy in Washington. Another brother, Robert Kabonero, owns the distributorship that sells mobile phone airtime for Uganda Telecommunications Ltd., a semi-privatized firm in which the government retains a 49 percent share.
- Jackie Mbabazi is the Managing Director of Luwero Industries, a government—owned firm that produces ammunition for the UPDF. Her husband, Amana Mbabazi, is the Minister of Defense. She is also the sister of Hope Mwesigye, close friend of Samuel Kutesa. Mrs. Mbabazi was previously a commissioner at the Uganda Revenue Authority where she was responsible for the collection of customs duties. She was transferred from her post following an investigation of corruption in that body regarding the failure of Danze, a defunct trading company owned by the NRM, that failed to pay duties due.

The list goes on and on. It consists of a group of individuals around the President who have constructed a web of businesses, government contracts, and other schemes. Not surprisingly, they are among the most vocal supporters of the President’s running for a third term. Their schemes not only enrich, but also provide a flow of income and patronage that sustain the regime. It now takes approximately \$50,000 or more to run a credible campaign for the National Assembly. With the 2006 elections approaching many backbenchers are beginning to scramble for cash. It is the perfect time to assist compliant MPs who voted for the repeal of term limits while denying those who did not.

As previously noted, the macroeconomic implications of corruption are unclear. The Government of Uganda, especially the Ministry of Finance and the

Bank of Uganda, try very hard to keep Uganda's macro-economic house in order. They should be commended for their efforts. They know that this program has been the key to the large aid flows, particularly through budget support. But so do those engaged in deals of questionable propriety. Given the magnitude of aid that now approaches three-quarters of a billion dollars a year, combined with

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the opportunities for skimming by Museveni's cronies, the President does not need to order the Bank of Uganda to print money as former president Daniel arap Moi ordered the Bank of Kenya to do in 1992 when that country faced its own transition to multipar-

ty politics. Indeed, there is plenty of money and the official budgets for the Office of the President, the NRM secretariat, and the UPDF, that are not subject to the normal audit practices, or whose audits are not made public.

The IMF has begun to question the sustainability of the current situation. The Uganda Revenue Authority currently collects only 12 percent of GDP, far less than the 24 percent collected by its counterpart in Kenya where aid flows cover only 11 to 12 percent of the country's budget. Put differently, excessively high aid flows, especially when provided as budget support, hold out few incentives for a country like Uganda to balance its budget on its own. This in turn nurtures corrupt practice by allowing tax cheats to continue avoiding their obligations. Low revenue generation combined with high levels of budget support also lay the foundation for a second debt crisis somewhere in the future. But, the bottom line is that this high volume of aid, particularly budget support, is a major financier of a neo-patrimonial regime. The United States does not provide budget support, but its aid program, now running between \$175 and \$185 million per year, is one of the largest in Africa.⁷

Implications for United States Foreign Policy

Barring any surprises, the Museveni presidency has probably seen its best days. Its failure to establish a broad based political system relying on democratic institutions instead of on the rule of one individual has created an unstable situation that threatens the real accomplishments. The present situation in Uganda has several implications for the United States and for the international donor community that have assisted Uganda for 17 years.

First, donors must stop denying the present realities—that Uganda's economic record is beginning to dull; that poverty is rising; that corruption is pervasive and an ingredient of regime maintenance; that an end to the 19-year war in the north is at best uncertain; and finally, that the forthcoming transition to

multiparty politics is flawed and risks being accompanied by rising levels of violence. Having celebrated Uganda's success, the United States and the rest of the donor community should now acknowledge that the Museveni government is an increasingly corrupt and authoritarian regime that has probably overstayed its welcome. It should also be acknowledged that the current volume of aid, through budget support in particular, sustains this situation. While a sharp reduction would have a deleterious effect on the Ugandan economy, a continuation of present aid levels is also unsustainable and nurtures aid dependency.

The challenge is well known here in Washington, in London and in other capitals. The United States embassy in Kampala has been unambiguous in its reporting. The same can be said for the United Kingdom whose outgoing High Commissioner recently stated that the transition to multiparty politics was not going well. The other bilateral donors, namely the World Bank and the IMF, are similarly informed. Yet for the moment there is paralysis—and much hand—ringing as to where Uganda is headed, through little consensus on how best to approach the situation.

The British and the Irish recently announced modest, albeit largely symbolic, cuts in their level of budget support.⁸ Several other donors are likely to follow. But as the experience of both Kenya in the early 1990s and, more recently Zimbabwe, demonstrate that cuts in aid do not necessarily lead to political reform. When a regime is determined to hang on to power at any cost, it will do so. That said, Uganda presents the Bush Administration with the “Africa test” of its announced policy of promoting freedom and democracy around the world. If the Administration cannot pass the test here, where is the policy credible? Uganda is not a “hard case” like Egypt or Pakistan where the United States might tread lightly on an authoritarian regime that is an ally in the war on terror or key player in the Middle East. What then should the Administration do?

It can begin by putting Uganda on its radar screen since the country has received scant attention by either the Africa Bureau at the Department of State or the Senior Director for Africa at the NSC. This would entail, among other things, a full and systematic review of the evolving situation in Uganda, including where Uganda fits within the United States' broader objectives in East Africa and how the United States can best account for the current reality.

Second, the Administration should return to its public declarations of the first term when former Secretary of State Colin Powell, during a visit to Kampala, publicly called on President Museveni to honor term limits and when President

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Bush told Museveni that he was looking forward to life back at his ranch following his administration and that Museveni should as well.

Third, the Administration should be stringent in the application of its criteria for raising Uganda from “threshold” to “eligible” status for assistance under the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The Millennium Challenge Corporation is presently evaluating Uganda. The Corporation is also under heavy pressure to “move the money”, given that it has so far signed only one compact with an African country (Madagascar). However, it would send the wrong signal both about Uganda and about the credibility of the entire MCA process should it give a pass to the country.

Finally, the Administration should engage those members of the international donor community that provide budget support, particularly the Bank and the IMF, to arrive at a common set of criteria regarding the issues of corruption and the transition to multiparty politics. In this way, the US might harmonize its own criteria for project-based aid and MCA with those of the other members of the donor community and *vice versa*. This may be difficult vis-à-vis the multilateral donors that are restricted by their by-laws from employing political criteria as a condition for aid, but it is an effort that should be embraced given that the multilaterals now recognize the importance of “good governance” for economic development, if not for its own sake.

Uganda’s best days appear behind it, but it is important to remember that the country is *not yet* a failed state. Far from it, the challenge here is to consolidate hard won gains, particularly in the economic realm, and to reverse slippage on the political front that threatens consolidation. If the United States and the rest of the donor community cannot face-up to this type of challenge in a country like Uganda, then where will this be possible?

Notes

1. The four indicators are “voice and accountability,” “rule of law,” “political instability” and “control of corruption.”
2. One recent sign of decline of civil liberties in Uganda has been President Museveni’s threatening attacks on the press, including the temporary suspension of Monitor 93.3K FM radio on August 11th followed by the three day detention of Andrew Mwenda, the station’s popular talk show host.
3. The amendment passed by the lopsided margin of 222 to 36 with 46 members either abstaining or not present.
4. Voter turnout was particularly low in those areas of the country that have traditionally supported opposition parties because the opposition called for a boycott of the referendum. The opposition boycotted because it views the President’s support for multipartyism for what it is—a smokescreen to justify a third elected term.
5. Museveni’s current five-year term ends on this date. The five-year term of the National Assembly ends in June. One pending constitutional amendment is to hold the next and subsequent elections for both offices on the same day to avoid holding a second election. This could mean extending the presidential term by up to three months.

6. Republic of Uganda, *Final Report: Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations into Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2001* (May 2001–November 2002). Legal Notice No. 5.
7. Of this sum, approximately \$100 million is used to combat HIV/AIDS, while \$50 million is spent on emergency food relief, mainly in the North. Part of the remainder is spent on military assistance of a non-lethal nature, and for the NUPI, the Northern Uganda Peace Initiative.
8. The United Kingdom announced a cut of 10 million pounds in May. The Irish announced a reduction of 2 million euros.

A Changing Uganda: A Government Perspective

Ruhakana Rugunda, Minister of Internal Affairs, Uganda

Introduction

First, on behalf of the government of Uganda let me extend thanks to the Woodrow Wilson International Center and the organizers of this event. The answer to the question of whether Uganda's success is past its prime, is that the success story continues to be consolidated through the visionary leadership of the Movement government. We have created both political and economic stability to allow the success story to continue.



In order to understand this success, let us look at the brief history of Uganda. The National Resistance Movement (NRM), government that came into power in 1986, inherited a dilapidated economy: inflation was at 240 percent and poverty levels at 56 percent; there were price controls in the commodity sector and foreign exchange controls in place; road infrastructure was poor; no more than 10 percent of the population had access to clean water; there were only 26,000 telephone lines throughout the country. The infant mortality rate was at 120/1000, the maternal mortality rate at 700/100,000, the immunization rate at 30 percent, and the AIDS prevalence rate at 30 percent. Only 1/3 of school-aged children were enrolled in schools; the rest had no dream of ever entering a classroom. On the political side, the right to vote was a thing of the past: Ugandans had last voted in a free election in 1962, since the 1980 elections were massively rigged. Before the Movement came to power, there was no rule of law, and the freedom of expression, the rights of the media and the right to life were neither legally respected nor protected. It is estimated that under Idi Amin, 500,000 Ugandans were killed by state agents, and during the dictatorship of Milton Obote a similar number of Ugandans from the West Nile region were exiled to present-day Congo and Sudan.

"Before the Movement came to power, there was no rule of law, and the freedom of expression, the rights of the media and the right to life were neither legally respected nor protected."

Achievements

The government of President Yoweri Museveni has made giant strides in restoring sanity in Uganda since the Museveni-led struggle captured power in

1986 from the dictatorial regimes. We introduced universal primary education, where primary school enrollment rose from 2.5 million to 7.4 million; secondary school enrollment rose from 196,010 to 500,000, and university enrollment rose from 4,900 to 57,000. On health, President Museveni started a campaign against the spread of AIDS. This was done by simply talking about the disease and advising the population to avoid behavior leading to its spread. He traversed the country, promoting abstinence among children and unmarried adults, encouraging monogamy among spouses and condom use among those who could neither abstain nor be faithful. This approach—commonly known as ABC (Abstinence, Be faithful and Condom)—has reduced AIDS prevalence from 30 percent in the early 1990s to about 6 percent today. An immunization promotion campaign targeting parents has improved immunization from 30 percent in 1986 to 86 percent today. This has reduced many illnesses among children and consequently reduced the infant mortality ratio from 120/1,000 to 80/1,000. Because of immunization, it is now common to find children's wards in hospitals without sick children. We have built hospitals in each electoral constituency to improve access to health services. This has been especially important for women who normally suffer walking long distances to take children to hospital or to access antenatal care. The expansion has improved access to health services within a radius of 5 km from 30 percent in 1986 to 70 percent today. In the water sector, we have improved access to clean water from 10 percent to 60 percent.

On the economic front, we privatized and liberalized the economy because we believe in private sector-led growth as an engine of development. We have reduced inflation to less than 10 percent. Tarmac roads have increased from 300 motorable kilometres in 1986 to 6,000 km today. Telephone lines have increased from 26,000 in 1986 to about 1,000,000 lines. There has been an expansion of real estate construction in all the towns of Uganda. Industrial growth in 1986 was 0.6 percent, less than 1 percent. By 2002, the industrial rate of growth increased to 7.1 percent per annum. Industries as a percentage of GDP were 6.8 percent in 1986 and 18.4 percent in 2002. This is remarkable because in the first two 5-year planning periods following independence the target share of industry in the GDP was set at 9 percent. That was never attained until our time and the share of industry is now 18.4 percent. We reduced poverty from 56 percent in the 1990s to 34 percent. About two years ago, poverty levels rose to 38 percent due to unforeseen circumstances in the world market. The leadership of the Movement has correctly and consistently illuminated the path forward at every stage of our struggle.

Good Governance

Coming to the questions of governance, our government helped lift our people out of cyclic misery and out of the pit of tyranny and dehumanization. The people of West Nile who had been exiled en masse to Congo and Sudan have

since come back. We also ended the shameful sectarianism promoted by colonialism that undermined the creation of horizontal linkages in our country. The councils that we introduced brought unity in our society. People who had been divided along sectarian lines of the old political parties started working together under these councils. Apart from restoring the vote to the disenfranchised people of Uganda, we have empowered, in a very special way, the women, the youth, the disabled and the workers.

We have decentralized power down to the village level. This is a most democratic system that brought unity to our people by ending unprincipled frictions

in the villages. We condemn in the strongest terms possible all acts by government agents who act outside the law. Such people should be identified and punished; indeed, when we identify such characters we punish them harshly. There is no need to coerce a free Ugandan to agree with you. If somebody does not agree with you or is skeptical about your position, then that is his or her right. You have no right to be resentful or to be violent. Such attitudes are a negation of the freedom that is a product of the NRM Revolution. However, we must condemn those of the opposition that have been hobknobbing with terrorism.

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Corruption

On corruption when the Movement government came to power there were about nine different forms of corruption: extrajudicial killings, extraction of money at roadblocks, looting personal property by the army, poaching in national parks by the army, bribery, air supply, embezzlement, over-invoicing, and abuse of office. The overt forms of corruption—extrajudicial killings, looting, poaching, extortion at roadblocks—have been eliminated because this only required taming the army and having the political will to do so.

What is remaining in the fight against corruption are embezzlement, bribery, over-invoicing, etc. This is covert, it is not seen on the surface, and it requires a new type of cadreship and institutions. We introduced the Inspectorate of Government to guard against corruption. In the constitutional amendments we are proposing the creation of a special court to deal with corruption cases expeditiously. We are also proposing that the central government's Public Service Commission should have disciplinary powers over public officers in the decentralized districts. This will strengthen the Inspectorate of Government, given that in many cases the Inspector General of Government (IGG) investigates cases of corruption and recommends action but the district service commissions do not actively follow-up on its recommendations. We are also improving police investigations through training—

one of the measures being taken to fight corruption. The problem with some people is that they look at corruption only in terms of how many people have been arrested, instead of looking holistically at the legal and structural elements involved in the fight against corruption.

We have also undertaken the following legislative measures:

- The Government established a Directorate of Ethics and Integrity, headed by a minister directly under the President's Office in 1998.
- The Government enacted the Inspectorate of Government Act in 2002, establishing the Office of the Inspector General of Government.
- A Public Finance Act was enacted in 2003 to provide the Parliament with greater control over public resources and to ensure that the Executive is fully accountable to Parliament and to the people of Uganda.
- Uganda ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the African Union Convention on Combating Corruption.
- Specific cases have been investigated by Commissions of Inquiry. Commissions for specific cases have been appointed and have completed their work.

Other anti-corruption interventions underway include:

- *Commission of Inquiry into the Police Force - 1999–2000*
The government produced a White Paper to implement the results. A new Inspector General of Police and a Deputy were appointed along with a new chief of the Criminal Investigations Directorate (CID). The employment contracts of many officers participating in corruption were terminated. The police force implemented over 80 percent of its assigned investigations, improving its image. In some cases, prosecution was not possible because of a lack of sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
- *Commission of Inquiry into the Purchase of UPDF Helicopters - 2001*
The Commission of Inquiry into Helicopter Purchases by the Ministry of Defense was completed. The Cabinet adopted the recommendations in the White Paper and directed relevant institutions to implement them. The CID carried out further investigations since it was noted that the recommendations contained in the report were not sufficient to file criminal charges and secure possible prosecutions. The investigations took a considerable amount of time, due to various technical requirements. However, the DPP handled the matter and finally found sufficient evidence to prosecute Mr. Kato, who has since been

charged accordingly. There was no evidence to warrant prosecution of other persons mentioned in the report, including Lt. General Salim Saleh, who is a state witness in the Kato case. It is important to note that Salim Saleh is the person who blew the whistle.

- *Commission of Inquiry into the Alleged Exploitation of the DRC's Natural Resources - 2001*

The Commission of Inquiry into the Alleged Exploitation of the DRC's Natural Resources was completed. The Cabinet adopted the recommendations in a White Paper and directed their implementation.

In this matter, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) found no sufficient evidence to warrant criminal proceedings against the persons mentioned in the report. However, the Ministry of Defense has reported that administrative action against the Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF) officers mentioned in this inquiry has commenced.

- *The Leadership Code Amendment Bill*, to strengthen the Leadership Code established in the Constitution.
- *The Amendment to the Prevention of Corruption Act*, which gives the Inspector General of Government an independent authority, including the authority to arrest government officials.
- *The enactment of the Freedom of Access of Information Bill*
- *The enactment of the Whistle Blower/ Qui Tam Bill.*

Return to Multipartyism

We are currently in a constitutional review exercise. Two years ago, the Movement leadership passed a resolution recommending a return to multiparty democracy from the current movement system. This was recommended after it was decided that despite the stability that the Movement has brought about, divisions of the population along sectarian lines of religion and tribe could not go on. We believe that we can have parties based on principles devoid of the sectarianism of the past. Let me remind you that we are talking about a *return* to multipartyism. We had parties before, which had been formed on sectarian lines and brought misery to our country. The Movement leadership liberated the country and introduced a system that has stabilized the nation.

Parliament has already passed a resolution requesting the Electoral Commission to hold a referendum for Ugandans to approve a return to a multiparty system. The Movement leadership, including the President, is going to convince the population to return to multipartyism. After the referendum that will be held in July, we will pass legislation that allows the free working of polit-

ical parties. These will include amendments to the Police Act, Political Parties and Organizations Act, Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Act, and Local Governments Act. Since we will have changed the political system, the legislation will also suspend some of the activities allowed under the Movement Act.

Term Limits

The other constitutional amendment that has generated national debate is the removal of presidential term limits. It is important to note that when the Constituent Assembly was debating the constitution in 1994, those who

“When limits are removed from the constitution and multipartyism is reintroduced, each party will select its presidential candidates in accordance with the party constitution and the population will select a president from among them.”

wanted multipartyism and those against term limitation did not muster enough support to gain a majority on either issue. Now the majority seems to favor the minority position of 1994: a

change to multipartyism and the removal of term limits. Some people wrongly think that this is an extension of President Museveni’s authority. We proposed the removal of term limits as a principle and not for president Museveni. When limits are removed from the constitution and multipartyism is reintroduced, each party will select its presidential candidates in accordance with the party constitution, and the population will select a president from among them.

There are those who worry that a dictator like Idi Amin might emerge in the absence of term limitations. First of all, dictators do not follow the rule of law and constitutionalism. So if a dictator were to emerge, no term limitation would stop him. The idea that term limits prevent dictators presupposes that it is okay for someone to be a dictator because after two terms of five years each, he or she would be removed. That is a defeatist position. Through an ongoing constitutional review, we should ensure that a dictator does not lead Uganda for even a day let alone allowing him or her two terms and removing him or her thereafter as the proponents of term limit indirectly suggest.

How can a dictator be prevented from using the no term limit system to stay in power? In view of the other National Conference recommendation to open up political space, we are making a shift from individual to group competition under political parties and organizations duly registered in accordance with Article 72 of the constitution. Therefore, for anyone to be a presidential candidate, he or she will have to be elected by the supreme organ of his party or organization. Ugandans watched international television where they saw each of the American major parties electing presidential candidates, in the last elections here in the US. The party or organization in the primaries scrutinizes its members and elects from among them someone as its presidential candidate. The party convention or conference would ensure that the person elected as its candidate

is someone who can bring victory to the party or organization. It is like choosing a team in the World Cup. Each coach chooses the best players in his team and unless the best marksman has an injury, the coach will field his “Ronaldo” in the shooting position. And no team can accept the opposing team or spectators, their support notwithstanding, to decide for it the best eleven.

The most important point here is the people’s democratic choice in a free and fair election. No party or organisation wants to field a person whose democratic credentials are questionable—if it does so, then the people will reject him or her in a general election. In this exercise of Constitutional

Review, we need to ensure that the electoral process is free of any manipulation and vote rigging so that the people’s will is reflect-

“If the people are empowered politically, then any bad leader can be removed from power in a democratic election.”

ed in the election results. Although we hoped to introduce computerized registers with voters’ photographs and fingerprints during the last presidential elections, the Electoral Commission was unable to do so, the Government’s political commitment and budgetary allocation in this exercise notwithstanding. This time around, the Commission will use registers with voters’ photographs. The use of computerized registers is being added to other electoral reforms that we have introduced, including the counting of votes immediately after the close of voting and in the presence of voters, putting ballot boxes in the open as opposed to hiding them in a room, using one ballot box for all the candidates, etc.

In a democratic electoral process, the people can remove a dictator. Examples in this regard are many. The late Kamuzu Banda, who was a hero of independence in Malawi but went on to become a symbol of brutal dictatorship and eccentric autocracy, was voted out in the 1994 democratic election. He could not use his position as sitting president against the will of the people. In Benin, President Mathieu Kerekou who ruled the country on Marxist principles lost in the democratic elections of 1991, but was re-elected in 1996 and 2001. In Kenya, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) was voted out in the elections of 2002, having been in power for almost forty years. This emphasizes the fact that if the people are empowered politically, then any bad leader can be removed from power in a democratic election.

There is then the need for us to ensure that the electoral process is devoid of manipulation, with or without term limits. In the case of open terms, the democratic process will remove an unpopular leader. Open terms will not be only confined to Uganda, as there are many democracies in the world, such as Britain, that do not have term limits. These countries are not known for having bred bad leaders or dictators, nor are they sliding backwards because of a lack of term limits. If no term limits bring good governance in Britain, where Prime Minister Tony Blair has just been elected to a third term, why

should it bring chaos in Uganda? Even in America where there are term limits, you were ruled without term limits until 1952 when a term limit was established by amendment to the constitution. This was done after president Franklin D. Roosevelt had been elected for four terms.

People normally want a leader to stay in power because of his good policies. Those who want to remove such a leader should propose better policies instead of hiding behind term limits. People are forgetting that even when there are term limits, a leader may be elected for only one term. This happened to President H. W. Bush. On the other hand, a leader who knows that he is in his last term and cannot be reelected, may not have the urgency to perform better since he knows that he or she is serving the last term.

What Uganda needs now, in order to bring about the transformation of its economy, is a visionary leadership such as that of Mr. Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore. This is a way of enhancing democracy through the economic empowerment of the people. When we have attained a “one-world” outlook, then who leads the country would not be an issue because every leader would

“The principal problem of Uganda, then and even now, has not been to ‘distribute’ wealth but to ‘generate’ it.”

implement the same way forward. This is what is happening in the West. It does not matter which party is in leadership because the

visions of your countries are generally agreed upon. In Uganda you hear of tendencies of people who still have hangovers of a centrally planned economy or those who do not appreciate the importance of private capital. The fear of many Ugandans is that if the current success is not maintained by the same visionary leadership, then there may be a reversal of those gains that we have achieved.

Past Mistakes

The biggest failure of the African leaders in the 1960s and 1970s was the failure to appreciate the decisive role of the private sector in stimulating growth. Recall the Nkivubu Announcement of 1970 through which Obote confiscated shares of private companies for the state in order to “distribute” wealth. The principal problem of Uganda, then and even now, has not been to “distribute” wealth but to “generate” it. In 1972, Idi Amin continued the onslaught on the private sector by uprooting the Asian Community. Although the NRM has been more supportive of the private sector, elements in the political and bureaucratic classes still act against the interests of the private sector through harassment, delays, lack of financial support, etc. This combined with the lack of access to lucrative foreign markets is crippling African development, separating Uganda and other African countries facing similar challenges from the Asian Tigers.

However, the greatest obstacle to Africa’s development is the protectionism of the EU, USA, Canada and Japan. Why are coffee bean prices always going down? One of the causes is the crowding by many Third World countries into

the production of coffee because they have no market access for other raw materials or food products. There are trade barriers to African exports of wheat, sugar, beef, dairy products, corn, cotton, etc., and intermediate products such as steel. The only remaining export windows are, therefore, those provided by coffee, tea and rice, commodities that temperate developed countries cannot produce. Third World countries, therefore, crowd into those few windows and drive the prices down.

Since 1970, Sub-Saharan Africa has lost \$2,080 billion in trade opportunities while it has only received between \$160–165 billion in aid on account of these inequitable arrangements. This is explained in a World Bank report thusly:

“Over the last three decades, Africa has been marginalized from world trade. Africa’s share of world exports has dropped by nearly 60 percent from 3.5 percent in 1970 to 1.5 percent by the end of the 1990s. This dramatic decline in Africa’s export market share represents a staggering income loss of US \$70 billion annually, an amount equivalent to 21 percent of the region’s GDP and to more than *five times* the \$13 billion in annual aid flows to Africa.”

The Way Forward

In order to consolidate the Ugandan success story, the Movement will support the following:

Private Sector-led Growth

African countries have been independent for the last 40 years. Not one of the black African countries has transitioned from the Third World to the First World, in the way that Singapore, for example, has done. Yet in 1965, Uganda was more economically advanced than Singapore. One of the reasons for the stagnation across the African continent is the interference by the state in the private sector during the 1960s and 1970s. Out of a philosophical misperception already pointed out above, our leaders failed to correctly answer the question: What stimulus can successfully encourage people to produce wealth? Who, indeed, can produce wealth? Can state agencies reliably produce wealth? The answer to these questions has two parts. The state cannot produce wealth because bureaucrats have no vested interest in the success of the enterprises. It is only the private sector, because of their vested interests, that can produce wealth in a reliable and sustainable way.

In many African countries there is no strong tradition of public service. There used to be loyalty to the kings, enhancing a strong sense of public service, but those traditions died during colonialism. Where there was a strong tradition of serving kings until recent times, as in Ethiopia, there is a stronger commitment by state officials in securing the interests of public enterprises. This is why the Ethiopian Airlines has always been a roaring success whether

under the Emperor Haile Selassie, Mengistu Haile Mariam, or the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). However, as a general rule, it is safer to acknowledge the reality of the selfishness of state officials, concentrate on developing the committed state officials one has, on doing regulatory work and keeping the state out of directly producing wealth at the microeconomic level.

Who, then, should produce wealth at the enterprise levels? The private sector and the traditional sector. Since it is producing for its own interest or for the interest of its shareholders (and since the latter are closely supervising the Board and the Board in turn is closely supervising the Management), private sector organizations are better suited to produce wealth. The countries in South East Asia that developed their private sectors (Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand) have transitioned from being Third World to First World countries while those whose governments specialized in interfering and stifling the private sector stagnated (Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana, etc). Even the

"Since the markets of the individual African countries are small, we must ensure that we integrate the African market as part of our struggle to create stimuli for growth."

ones that were, theoretically, capitalist-oriented, such as Nigeria, ended up, in reality, interfering with the private sector.

It should be pointed out that Burma and Philippines are also in South East Asia, yet, they have not transitioned like the other Asian countries in the area. Burma has been a pseudosocialist state since 1955 when General Ne Win took power. Burma has stagnated in spite of the fact that she, in terms of natural resources, is much richer than the Asian tigers. Philippines is also a rich country in terms of natural resources. However, the corruption of the Marco years interfered with the growth of the private sector. Even the huge economy of India, on account of the pseudosocialism of the postindependence years in that country, stagnated quite a lot. Consequently, even with the recent liberalization of India, the comparative GDP size of that country is about the same as that of tiny South Korea. Here are the figures: India's GDP is \$2.66 trillion and South Korea's GDP is \$931 billion.

This is why the Movement, after being in power for one year, after exhaustive discussions at all levels of the central government, opted to go wholly for private sector-led growth and refined Point Ten of the Movement Ten Point Programme. This point set out our economic system as that of a "mixed economy," combining private sector development and control by the state of the "commanding heights" of the economy such as banks, etc. Eventually, we abandoned the idea of "commanding heights" and went for a wholly private sector-led growth strategy.

Much of our economy, however, is not in the private sector. It is in the traditional sector. Most of the peasants will, therefore, not effectively respond to macroeconomic stimuli (controlling inflation, building new tarmac roads, lib-

eralizing marketing, etc.) because of the considerable obstacles in gathering information. The peasants will not know that the interest rates in the banks have come down and that it is time to borrow money and to invest. Therefore, political leaders need to take advantage of the macroeconomic stability that the Movement has maintained for all these years and to help the traditional sector, in their respective areas, to convert to the commercial sector (i.e. private sector) yet.

Integrated African Market

Sustainable production is impossible without a large market. The more buyers the better. There are what we call fixed costs and variable costs. You incur fixed costs in order to acquire fixed assets (building, machinery, installing electricity, water and telephones, etc.). Suppose you use \$10 million to build a stadium, that stadium is now your fixed asset. Whether you have one sporting activity in that stadium in a month or you have three sporting activities per day, you have already spent the \$10 million, which you must earn back. The more paying sporting activities you have in that stadium, the better for your cash flow. That business arithmetic runs throughout all business permutations.

The Road-Master factory started making bicycles in Uganda in 1995. If they are selling about 80,000 bicycles a year, they will make a handsome profit. Uganda consumes about 150,000 bicycles a year. It is this demand, in big quantities, that stimulates large-scale expansion at the factory or business level. It is these large markets that stimulated phenomenal growth in American companies. Even before they dominated the world markets, they used the huge American market to grow (e.g., General Motors, etc.) In Uganda, milk per capita consumption is 40 liters and beef per capita consumption is 3.6 kilograms. Yet the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended levels are: 210 liters of milk per annum; 50 kilograms of white meat and 30 kilograms of red meat per annum. On account of this under-consumption, Uganda currently has a big problem with milk overproduction.

Since the markets of the individual African countries are small, we must ensure that we integrate the African market as part of our struggle to create stimuli for growth. We emphatically support the formation of the East African Community. The East African area, including Rwanda and Burundi, has a combined population of about 104 million. This is not a very big market. It is, however, better than what we have now.

Access to International Markets

Finally, on the question of markets and integration, we must fight for access to international markets. As already pointed out, these markets, as of now, are much bigger than the African market. Currently, the size of the American market is \$11 trillion. Yet the American population is about 290 million people. Africa's population is 800 million (almost three times that of the USA); yet our purchas-

ing power is still only \$500 billion. This means that the USA's purchasing power is twenty-two times greater than that of the entire African continent, notwithstanding the fact that the American population is only a third of ours.

Why is this so? It is because Africans have low incomes. They have low incomes because, most of them, have no jobs. They have no jobs because there is little investment as far as adding value to the raw materials is concerned. Consequently, there is a massive loss of value from Africa to the developed world. The total coffee business in the world is \$71 billion, but the coffee producing countries only receive \$5 billion.

Access to international markets is vital for our transformation. It is those markets that transformed South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia. We should take advantage of the internal and regional markets. However, the latter two cannot transform a society as quickly as the international market. Access to global markets has been a *sine qua non* for growth in the last 500 years.

Value Addition

In order to take advantage of the international markets, we must stop exporting raw materials. We should instead add value to our products and export them as finished products. Let us look at cotton. There are six activity levels involving cotton: growing, ginning (removing the seeds), spinning, weaving, finishing (printing colours) and tailoring. According to present-day prices, we get \$1.20 per kg of lint cotton (after ginning). If we spin the cotton into yarn, our earnings will triple to \$3.60. If we weave the yarn into fabric, our earnings will go up to six times the price of lint cotton or \$7.20. If we make garments, our earnings will go up to ten times the price of lint cotton or \$12.00. Moreover, when we export lint cotton, as we do in Uganda, all these job levels are exported: spinning, weaving, finishing and tailoring.

This export of raw materials is, therefore, the curse of Africa. By exporting all these jobs, it means that the African purchasing power remains very low. If you have no job, you do not earn income. If you have no income, you cannot buy. Therefore, a country of jobless people is a country of a miniscule market. Since the Africans have been busy exporting jobs and money on every kilogram of raw material they export, they are in-effect "donors" in ignorance. They donate to others unknowingly and unacknowledged. They do not demand a "Donors' Conference." They just donate. Last year Uganda exported 3 percent of the world's coffee and earned only \$115 million. If we had exported this coffee as a finished product, we would have earned \$2.25 billion! So we donate all the would-be earnings from coffee by selling it in a raw form.

Pan-Africanism

Our government supports the need to go beyond the common market and to form a political union for East Africa. This is very important for strategic and trade reasons. On the side of strategic reasons, we need to create a capac-

ity to defend ourselves against colonial predators from outside. The gap between Europeans and Asians, on the one hand, and the Africans, on the other hand, is growing. This is very dangerous. How can it be that the whole of the African race is organized in mini-states? Even a country like South Africa is not big enough in terms of natural resources to become a super-power compared to the USA, Canada, China, Russia or India.

It is true that there are some small but prosperous European countries such as Denmark, Switzerland, Belgium, etc. All these little countries, however, have survived and prospered under the umbrella of the USA and, in the case of the Second World War, the Soviet Union. Twice in the last century the USA saved Europe from enslavement by fascist forces (First and Second World Wars). The USA backed Western Europe to stand against and, eventually, vanquish communism.

Infrastructure

Visions for development cannot be actualized without requisite infrastructure elements: roads, rail, power, telephones, piped water, etc. Once you believe in market access as a stimulus for growth, you need a road to link you with that market; you need power to process and transform into intermediate or finished goods what you produce. You need piped water for everything from production to hygiene. You need social infrastructure—health units and schools. Now that we have export markets, we need the railway system to link us with Mombasa; we need a railway line to link East Africa with Ethiopia; we need a railway system to link East Africa with the Democratic Republic of Congo. We need a similar connection to Southern Africa so that the wagons can be pulled all the way to Durban without transshipment.

Human Resources

Modernization and transformation are not possible without developing human resources through education and health for all. We must, therefore, alphabetize, intellectualize and equip with skills the whole society. They should be in good health. On top of immunization, we should ensure hygiene, sanitation and more advanced medical care. On the side of education, we should ensure, in addition to UPE, universal secondary education, more technical schools and wider university enrolment.

African Culture

In Matthew 4:4 Jesus is reported to have said that “man cannot live by bread alone....” Jesus meant that man needs a soul as well. Although here Jesus was talking about the soul in the spiritual sense, the NRM could also talk about the soul in a cultural sense. Are we going to be Black Europeans or are we going to maintain our dignity and our heritage? The culture of the Africans is very advanced. The languages are very advanced in a number of cases. These

cultures, these languages, need to be preserved, and utilized. Apart from the tribal dialects, we should promote Swahili so that it becomes our lingua franca in East Africa and Congo.

In conclusion, the constitutional review exercise currently going on in Uganda will not reverse the gains the country has achieved in the last nineteen years. We are consolidating our defense forces to guard against those who would want to use unconstitutional means. We have diagnosed the challenges facing the country and the continent in general and, with our visionary leadership, we shall overcome them.

BIOGRAPHIES

JOHNNIE CARSON was U.S. Ambassador to Uganda from 1991 to 1994, and is currently Senior Vice President of the National Defense University. Over the course of his distinguished career in the Foreign Service, he has also served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, as Ambassador to Kenya from 1999 to 2003, Ambassador to Zimbabwe from 1995 to 1997, and as Deputy Chief of Mission in Mozambique and Botswana. In addition, he served as Staff Director of the Africa Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee for five years.

JOEL D. BARKAN is professor of political science at the University of Iowa, and a distinguished specialist on the politics of East Africa where he served as the first regional democracy and governance advisor for USAID from 1992 to 1994. Since that experience he has straddled the worlds of academe and the policy community by consulting periodically for USAID, the World Bank, UNDP, etc. on a variety of issues pertaining to democratization and governance across Anglophone Africa. From 2001 to 2002, Barkan was a visiting fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He has also been a visiting fellow at the United States Institute of Peace (1997 to 1998) and at the National Endowment for Democracy (2000) to which he returns this fall as a Reagan-Fascell Fellow (2005 to 2006). Barkan has written extensively on African politics. His most recent article is “Kenya After Moi,” which appeared in the January-February (2004) issue of *Foreign Affairs*.

RUHAKANA RUGUNDA is Minister of Internal Affairs of Uganda, a position he has held since 2003. Prior to his nomination to his current post, Dr. Rugunda served in numerous other cabinet positions, including terms as Minister of Health, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Information, Minister of Works, Transport and Communication. He also served in the Office of the President, as the Commissioner for Animal Industry, Game and Fisheries, and as a member of Parliament representing Kabale Municipality. He is currently Chairman of the National Resistance Movement. Dr. Rugunda holds a degree in medicine from the University of Zambia, and a Masters in Public Health from the University of California at Berkeley.

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