

CHANGING CITIES:
Climate, Youth, and Land Markets in Urban Areas

Edited by Lauren E. Herzer

A NEW GENERATION OF IDEAS

Wilson Center

USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

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Introduction

The number of urban slum dwellers worldwide is staggering. In spite of surpassing a Millennium Development Goal to significantly improve the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020, UN-Habitat reports that the number of slum dwellers increased by 55 million between 2000 and 2010, totaling 827.6 million people. By 2020, the world slum population is projected to reach 889 million.[1] Failure to incorporate urban priorities into the global development agenda carries serious implications for human security, global security, and environmental sustainability.

Recognizing a need to strengthen the ties between urban policymaking and scholarly work on urban development, and to disseminate evidence-based development programming, the Woodrow Wilson Center's Comparative Urban Studies Project, USAID's Urban Programs Team, the International Housing Coalition, Cities Alliance, and the World Bank joined in 2010 to co-sponsor an academic paper competition for graduate students studying urban issues. The success of the first competition led the partners to expand the competition in the next year to include the publication of top papers submitted in 2011. This publication marks the third year of the competition, and the second publication in a series entitled "A New Generation of Ideas."

The 2012 paper competition, "Reducing Urban Poverty," focused on three topics: climate change, youth, and land markets and security of tenure. A panel of urban experts representing the sponsoring institutions reviewed over 70 abstract submissions, from which 15 were invited to write full length papers. Of these, eight were selected for this publication.

1 UN-Habitat. 2011. *State of the World's Cities 2010/2011: Bridging the Urban Divide.* Sterling, VA: Earthscan.

CLIMATE CHANGE

Cities are a harbinger of both the challenges posed by climate change and opportunities to implement effective strategies to mitigate and adapt to climate change. How these strategies are developed and implemented can have a significant impact on the urban poor. Yifei Li explores the implications of climate change policies by surveying local strategies of low-carbon development in China. "Low-carbon development represents the growing interest in realizing the 'triple-bottom-line' principle, which places equal emphasis on environmental protection, economic development, and social justice," explains Li. She ascertains two different approaches of low-carbon development across five cities and finds they have different effects on the urban poor. In her chapter on distributed energy innovations, author Allison Bridges focuses on informal settlements, arguing that "it is imperative that the security of energy service provision in low-income areas be incorporated into comprehensive urban planning in order to lessen the deleterious effects of a constrained energy supply."

YOUTH

Research on urban youth and social disorders finds "higher levels of youth exclusion – notably absence of democratic institutions, low economic growth, and low levels of secondary educational attainment – are significantly and robustly associated with increasing levels of urban social disturbance."[2] Each of the chapters in this section highlight the importance of inclusivity and grassroots youth involvement in shaping their political and social future. In her chapter on participatory community involvement of at-risk youth in Argentina, Valerie Stahl argues that "it is not only important to provide young people with the resources they need to further advance their societal status, but it is also imperative to foster a sense of

2 Urdal, H., and Hoelscher, K. 2009. "Urban Youth Bulges and Social Disorder: An Empirical Study of Asian and Sub-Saharan African Cities" (Policy Research Working Paper 5110). Retrieved from The World Bank website: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2009/11/03/000158349_20091103111000/Rendered/PDF/WPS5110.pdf

participatory belonging that will be embedded in their collective memory, sustain them through the present realities of their situation as young people, and continue all the way into a projected hopeful future within their communities."

The chapters written by Maren Larsen and Marika Tsolakis further underscore the impact that innovative social movements and nonformal education can have on urban youth through their inclusive nature. In her chapter on hip-hop and youth movements in Senegal, Larsen traces the roots of social activism in Senegalese hip-hop to illustrate how an innovative movement of artists has evolved to "galvanize people and engage urban youth who do not normally have access to formal training." Drawing from her research on informal English clubs in Senegal, Tsolakis argues that planning for youth education should incorporate existing "perceptions on school, work, and day-to-day realities." She illustrates the English club's role as more than just an opportunity to practice English, but "a forum for a type of debate that encouraged deliberation on key social issues."

LAND MARKETS AND SECURITY OF TENURE

The absence of efficient land and housing markets, and lack of secure tenure for both renters and homeowners, are impediments to urban and economic development and perpetuate the substandard living conditions of the urban poor. In her comparison of two market gardens in Cotonou, Benin, Lindsay Carter finds that beyond the actual level of land security, *perception* of land insecurity "can have tangible implications for producer investment activity and interventions by nongovernmental organizations." Two additional chapters in this section analyze approaches to improving the land markets for the urban poor. Simon Gusah takes up the case of Abuja, Nigeria, outlining a framework that combines the U.S.-based Community Land Trust model of shared equity housing with Nigeria's Land Use Act of 1978 and the historic claims of local communities to counter the proliferation of informal settlements in that city.

Focusing on Kibera, the home of 2.5 million slum dwellers in Nairobi, Kenya, Liza Cirolia's chapter highlights the challenges of applying "Western logics of the law and markets" to the "politics of informality and identity" that are prevalent in informal settlements. She argues that "interventions to

improve the functioning of land markets and address urban poverty should recast the politics of informality and identity as an opportunity for the urban poor to use various forms of capital and association to incrementally and progressively build pathways to urban citizenship."

* * *

We congratulate the graduate students who participated in this competition for their contribution to our understanding of the complex relationship between urbanization and poverty. Their work highlights the new research and innovative thinking of the next generation of urban planners, practitioners, and policymakers. It is our hope that by infusing the dialogue on these issues between the academic and policy worlds with fresh perspectives, we will foster new and innovative strategies to reduce global urban poverty.

Distributed Energy Innovations in Slums and Informal Settlements

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INTRODUCTION

Urban areas in the developing world are likely to suffer most from the debilitating effects of global climate change. Rising sea levels, severe storms, and increased temperatures will challenge the ability of local governments to provide reliable basic services to areas with high population density and vulnerable capital assets. Although the impact of climate change on the energy sector depends on local conditions, such as the energy asset type and the character and severity of the climatic effect, experts warn that energy service providers could face a constrained supply of energy along with financial loss (World Bank 2009). Energy service providers will be expected to quickly and efficiently respond to changes in the supply of energy resources, demand, transportation, and distribution in order to lessen the impact of such changes on end users. Volatile energy prices can challenge the ability of the energy sector in developing countries to effectively manage service provision given the constraints of fiscal resources and institutional capacity.

To manage the effects of such energy challenges on the urban environment, government institutions will need to consider alternatives to conventional grid-based electricity supply, infrastructure investment, land-use regulations, and settlement planning. In projecting future vulnerability based on population growth and geographic location, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development found that the following cities are most

vulnerable to storm activity and sea-level rise: Kolkata, Mumbai, Miami, Dhaka, Guangzhou, Ho Chi Minh City, Shanghai, Bangkok, Rangoon, and Hai Phong. With 11.5 million people living in slums in Kolkata, Mumbai, and Dhaka alone, it is imperative that the security of energy service provision in low-income areas be incorporated into comprehensive urban planning in order to lessen the deleterious effects of a constrained energy supply (UN-Habitat 2003, 195–228; MHUPA 2012; World Bank 2011). This paper explores one such alternative, the incorporation of distributed energy provision in urban areas, and the role it could play in providing a reliable electricity supply to slums and informal settlements in the developing world.

Energy Security and the Urban Poor

The International Energy Agency (IEA 2011c) found that China is the world's largest energy consumer and projects that the country will consume 70 percent more energy than the United States by 2035. Placing further demands on the global energy supply, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and the Middle East are all surpassing China in terms of rates of growth in energy consumption (IEA 2011c). With some areas of the developed world already facing challenges in both the supply of power and the capacity of transmission lines, it is not difficult to imagine a future in which developing countries face incapacitating constraints on the provision of power to swelling urban populations.

The number of people without access to electricity globally is 1.3 billion, or 20 percent of the world's population (IEA 2011b). The rural population without access to electricity, 84 percent of the total, is expected to gradually decline as urban areas continue to grow at a rapid pace (IEA 2011b). This influx of the rural poor, when added to the steadily growing urban population, outpaces the growth of available affordable housing and basic services. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID 2004b) estimates that about 40 percent of the urban poor worldwide lack access to modern energy services. Because electrical service can improve economic opportunity and the quality of life, illegal connections and informal service provision often arise in the absence of legal private or governmental services.

Electricity suppliers have little incentive to electrify slums given that revenue from these areas is low and the cost of provision is high. With the additional complications of tenure disputes and ungraded, hazardous topographies, electricity companies are slow or unwilling to provide service (USAID 2004b). Without a shift in current planning practices, over-

crowded, low-income neighborhoods, often found along steep slopes as well as in low-lying areas and ravines with little to no infrastructure to protect them from flooding or other severe weather, will continue to be vulnerable to changing weather patterns and disruptions in service (Feiden 2011).

Sustainable Urban Energy Planning

The goal of limiting the global mean temperature increase to 2 °C above preindustrial levels is designed to hasten the adoption of climate change mitigation strategies. Many projections, however, indicate that this goal is not attainable in the projected time frame. With the generation of electricity and heat responsible for 41 percent of the world carbon dioxide (CO_2) emissions in 2009, innovations in the energy sector that both curb emissions and allow for greater energy reliability when systems are strained are warranted (IEA 2011a). The IEA (2011c) projects that a $38 trillion (in 2010 dollars) global investment in energy supply infrastructure is required to keep pace with demand between 2011 and 2035. More than 40 percent of this total investment will support transmission and distribution networks.

The tenets of sustainable urban design include attention to efficiency in service provision as well as greater use of renewable low-carbon energy resources. Existing electricity systems generate electricity in centralized locations then transport power from plants over long distances to end users. With 7 to 10 percent of power lost during transmission, locally available distributed generation power sources are an attractive alternative to what is typically thermal base load power.

DISTRIBUTED GENERATION IN INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS AND SLUMS

Distributed Generation

Distributed generation (DG) is the production of power in small facilities that are located in close proximity to end users (Engle 2006).[1] A primary

1 Several terms are used to refer to distributed generation, including "distributed energy," "onsite generation," and "decentralized generation." For the purposes of this paper, DG is used to refer to both hybrid, grid-attached facilities as well as standalone facilities that are small scale and located near end users.

benefit of DG is the reliable and efficient production of energy at a reasonable cost to the consumer. Utility companies also benefit from lower transmission and distribution losses and reduced congestion. DG technology is most often employed far from distribution centers in rural settings where consumption is typically low. However, technical and economic conditions in urban areas—such as swelling peak demand, increasing costs of transmission and distribution, and greater energy reliability from small facilities—make the technology a viable power alternative.

Ranging in size from 5 kilowatts (kW) to 50 megawatts (MW),[2] DG resources include a range of technologies including combined heating and power, diesel generators, small solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, wind, and cogeneration. With the price of solar PV panels falling, and the size of the units being scaled down to 20 to 30 MW, the units are small enough to install on developed urban land (Roberts 2010). With the highest efficiency range of 80 to 90 percent, combined heating and cooling systems, ranging from 2 to 6 kW to more than 100 kW of power, are entering the global market (Engle 2006).

DG can provide continuous power generation, backup power during outages, supplemental power at the household level, or even supply the grid with excess production (USAID 2004a). Combined heating and power distributed energy plants, the most extensively used DG technology, are found globally in government buildings, military bases, universities, and industrial parks. These facilities, which capitalize on efficient production and delivery as well as economies of scale, are employed extensively in Europe and Japan. Wind turbines are also used extensively in some countries such as Denmark, where 50 percent of all energy produced is from DG resources (Engle 2006).

Mini-grid systems using DG resources are decentralized systems that supply power to groups of end users. A decentralized energy system, supplying networked grid-based power from a generator, is usually managed onsite (Petrie, Willis, and Takahashi 2001). Although much of the currently available DG equipment is designed to run on diesel fuel, high greenhouse gas emissions and noise levels have led to experimentation with renewable energy sources that can be combined with a diesel generator. This combined system can offer greater reliability while providing the

2 50MW is considered medium to large scale DG and is less common than small-scale projects.

typically lower operational and maintenance costs of renewable energy. Mini-grid systems, while increasing in number, can be challenging to implement given the limited experience providers have with the technology and the relevant regulatory framework (UNIDO/REEEP 2005).

As mentioned above, rural villages around the world are increasingly using DG plants for electrification. DG providers—seeking to capture a piece of the rural market that spends an estimated $30 billion annually on batteries, heating fuels, and candles—are in turn quickly developing DG technologies that could have applications in urban areas (Petrie, Willis, and Takahashi 2001). Benefits to the power generation provider include decreased transmission and distribution costs, reduced planning and installation time, and ease of maintenance as DG units can be removed and serviced without affecting the rest of the distribution system. From a sustainability perspective, nondiesel technologies produce fewer emissions and can run on more than one type of fuel, allowing for greater flexibility in service provision (Petrie, Willis, and Takahashi 2001).

Reliable Energy Provision in Informal Settlements

With DG manufacturing companies spending resources to develop improved technologies for rural electrification, urban applications are gaining more attention as the technologies mature and high oil prices result in greater cost competitiveness. DG applications benefiting the urban poor have many of the same advantages afforded rural end users: improved quality and reliability of power, lower electricity prices, and the possibility for cogeneration, thereby raising the energy efficiency of the system to 90 percent (Petrie, Willis, and Takahashi 2001).

The physical size of new DG systems ranges from between 0.01 and 59 kW per square meter and has a capital cost ranging from $200 to $6,000 per kW (Petrie, Willis, and Takahashi 2001). With the ability to produce electricity within the range of 3¢ to 20¢ per kWh, DG systems could be competitive with existing grid-based power provision, depending on the given pricing mechanisms and regulatory environment. Nontechnical losses, or theft, in slum settlements represent a 3 to 5 percent loss of potential revenues (USAID 2004b). Through the proper management of community-run DG, such losses could be somewhat mitigated. Regulators often try to recoup such losses through cross-subsidization. As is discussed below, community involvement in DG power projects can

help engender a sense of responsibility and overcome a perceived culture of nonpayment.

Of particular relevance to the possible implementation of DG services in urban informal settlements in the short period required to install the system in comparison with conventional gas- and coal-fired power plants. Additionally, governments reluctant to normalize informal settlements could be more amenable to the modular nature of DG systems that can be removed or expanded in accordance with changes in land use. The ability to quickly service failing units is also imperative given likely future weather-related disruptions. Effects such as increased summer dryness and intense precipitation and flooding due to the ability of a warmer atmosphere to hold water are likely. The effects of such disruptions on urban informal settlements range from disrupted service due to droughts in hydro-dependent nations such as Brazil to disastrous storm events and flooding such as have already been seen in countries such as Myanmar, Bangladesh, Thailand, and Peru.

Although the use of DG technology in urban poor areas is limited, existing and potential projects are discussed in detail in the next section.

DISTRIBUTED GENERATION CASE STUDIES

Solar

With an estimated 404 million people in India without access to electricity, the country faces an enormous challenge to meet demand while steadily increasing low-carbon generation. According to the IEA, supply and demand are projected to increase fivefold between now and 2050 (Remme et al. 2011). Good solar irradiation conditions exist in many parts of India, with an average 300 sunny days per year and an average yearly irradiation of 200 W per square meter (Remme et al. 2011).

Solar Energy Policy in India

Like many countries, the energy sector in India is governed by a complex set of ministries and governmental bodies. States and union territories also have significant influence over the power sector, which has led to considerable variability in electricity reform. Releasing the first National Action Plan on Climate Change in 2008, the Government of India highlighted

the dual imperatives of maintaining high levels of economic growth while addressing climate change (Government of India 2008). One of the eight proposed policies is the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission, which sets for 2022 the targets of 20 GW of grid-connected solar power, 2 GW of off-grid solar applications, 20 million square meters of solar water collectors, and 20 million solar lighting systems (Remme et al. 2011). Also aiming to support and strengthen India's PV manufacturing capability, the plan sets the target of 4 to 5 GW of PV modules by 2020.

As of 2010, India had 10.2 MW of grid-connected PV systems, 2.5 MW of standalone systems, 592,000 solar street and home lighting systems, and 7,300 agricultural pumps driven by PV (Remme et al. 2011). Although dependent on the importing of silicon wafers, many aspects of the PV value chain are locally supported by Indian manufacturing companies that benefit from low-cost labor. Solar DG in urban areas, and particularly in slums and informal settlements, has great potential in the Indian market due to the size and population density of slum areas, the availability of PV systems from local manufacturing companies, an overtaxed central electric system, and a history of strong support for microfinance.

SELCO

SELCO, an energy service company in Bangalore, began fifteen years ago and has grown to twenty-five energy service centers and over 150 employees. The company provides solar lighting to over 100,000 households that are either off grid or are connected to an unreliable source of power (SELCO 2010). By partnering with the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP 2012), SELCO has worked to reduce the financial risk of solar DG projects.

A slum in Manipal, a coastal university town in Karnataka, has drawn and continues to attract migrant construction laborers who provide a cheap workforce for the growing city. Before the SELCO DG PV project, participating families spent approximately $1 per liter on kerosene to fuel basic necessities such as cooking (Ganesh 2011). In need of residential lighting, the laborers discussed the potential for solar DG with SELCO (2010). However, with bank financing only available based on the cash flow of the beneficiaries, which is inconsistent for migrant laborers, the project could not receive funding. The workers lacked formal documents and were living on government land.

On behalf of the beneficiaries, SELCO partnered with Hamsa Cooperative Society, which agreed to finance the systems given a 100 percent guarantee from SELCO for the first five systems. With a price of approximately $222 for each of the five units and a one-year deposit of $1,111 made to the bank, the project was implemented (Ganesh 2011). With the beneficiaries making monthly payments to SELCO roughly equivalent to their previous monthly kerosene cost, the bank received complete repayment within one year. SELCO went on to support additional systems, and the bank continued to provide loans to the residents (Ganesh 2011).

One key aspect of the SELCO story was the flexibility of the DG technology during a time of changing land use and relocation of the beneficiaries. Because the settlement was on government land, the community was ordered to vacate the area and relocate to a designated area 6 kilometers from the original site. Although there was a three-month period in which negotiations took place and residents fought the relocation, the community did move and SELCO technicians reinstalled the systems at the new site. Payment from the beneficiaries was uninterrupted during the move (SELCO 2010). The SELCO case study demonstrates not only that the residents of urban slums can be responsible in paying for electricity services and for protecting locally installed services, but also that the DG technology was able to meet both the electricity requirements of the urban poor in a legal, reliable way and allow for shifting land uses as dictated by the municipal government.

SELCO has noted that such projects are not without their pitfalls as not all residents are reliable, people move, and slums can be demolished and relocated. Each of these factors compromises the financing and upkeep of the facilities. SELCO has continued to launch additional initiatives in Banglore, but it does note that financial literacy is a requirement for project success and can require basic training for the residents in order to underscore the importance of regular, on-time payments (Ganesh 2011).

Wind

With only 15 percent of the population of Kenya having access to electricity, there is increasing interest in wind energy to meet the projected 9 percent annual increase in demand (GTZ 2009). Investment in wind DG along the existing grid is favored as a means for the country to meet its social and

economic goals in providing energy services. Hydropower resources in the country are already producing less power, and this trend is likely to continue. Preliminary wind power potential is estimated to be approximately 350 W per square meter in the regions of Malindi and Turkana and in parts of Kajiado, Lamu, Marsabit, and the Ngong Hills (GTZ 2009).

Wind Policy in Kenya

In addition to the 2006 Energy Act—which sets targets for renewable energy, energy efficiency, and energy conservation—the Ministry of Energy also established feed-in tariffs for generation from wind resources. A maximum power tariff of $0.09 per kWh applies to wind farms with a generation capacity less than 50 MW, but only to the first 150 MW of capacity developed in Kenya (GTZ 2009). From the date of the first commissioning of the wind farm, the tariff remains in place for fifteen years.

The Craftskills Company

The 700-acre Kibera district of Nairobi, one of Africa's largest slums, is home to 1 million inhabitants who have little to no access to running water or electricity. To alleviate this situation, Craftskills, a Kenyan wind power company, developed a generator that can serve both residential and commercial users (Esipisu 2004).

Having installed wind-powered electricity generators in numerous locations since 2001, the Craftskills company offers the technology as a lower-cost alternative to diesel generators. As an additional environmental bonus, Craftskills constructs turbines using waste material such as wood and fiberglass. Using charge controllers, the turbines automatically regulate power during periods of high wind. Batteries store excess power for periods of low wind availability. Producing 3 kW of electricity, one generator is able to serve ten households. The small size of the technology—weighing 30 to 50 pounds, 10 inches in diameter, and constructed using locally available materials—is ideal for dense urban slums and informal settlements (Esipisu 2004).

Biodiesel

A rural pilot project uses a biodiesel DG system to provide electricity, water, and sanitation services in six non-grid-connected villages in Orissa, India (World Bank 2010). Funded by the World Bank Development Marketplace,

the project began in 2004 and was initiated by CTxGreEn, a Canadian nonprofit, and Gram Vikas, a local nongovernmental organization. The project site has served as a biodiesel resource and testing center as well as a technical training site for the local employees.

Vegetable oil, 80 percent of the material costs of the biodiesel production, is extracted from local underutilized seeds, including niger and karanj (Vaidyanathan and Sankaranarayanan 2009). The three area villages, consisting of forty-seven households, use biodiesel, produced by a pedal-driven processor, to generate electricity. A hybrid electrification scheme was introduced in 2009, whereby a biodiesel generator provides one hour of fluorescent lighting through a 220-volt mini-grid as well as charges a battery bank for LED lighting (Vaidyanathan and Sankaranarayanan 2009). Accompanying benefits of the project include entrepreneurial activities such as farming using motorized equipment as well as charging batteries and lights using the biodiesel generator. The biodiesel unit is locally managed and operated by an Electricity Committee responsible for the collection of tariffs, the cultivation and collection of seeds, managing labor, and daily operation of the generator.

Linking to Urban Initiatives

Using a similar model as described above, the generation of biogas from municipal waste could be a potential method of generating biofuel in urban areas. Given the population density and lack of basic services in most urban informal settlements, waste management is an enduring challenge. With an estimated 60 percent of Nairobi's population living in slums, roughly 650 people share each available toilet (Buckminster Fuller Institute 2012). To curb the spread of disease resulting from inadequate sanitation, the Umande Trust, a rights-based organization based in Kenya, developed the BioCenter project in partner ship with GOAL Ireland, an international poverty alleviation nongovernmental organization.

The BioCenter is a latrine block that generates biogas. The facility treats human waste in situ, without requiring sewerage infrastructure, by mixing water and human waste in anaerobic conditions to make biogas (Buckminster Fuller Institute 2012). In addition to reducing methane-related CO_2 emissions, the facility produces biogas that could be used in DG systems using biofuel generators. With the complementary benefits of increasing the number of available bathrooms, improving sanitation, and

encouraging community management, the BioCenter is an ideal project to couple with DG systems in densely crowded urban slums.

Other Biogenic Waste

With coastal cities being the most vulnerable to climate change, vulnerable municipalities must begin to take adaptive changes into consideration when planning for energy provision. Many of the urban poor in coastal cities settle near fisheries and processing plants in order to find employment and available housing. Although the production of energy from biogenic waste is a relatively new technology, its feasibility has been demonstrated in a pilot project in Greenland.

The production process of marine food creates a considerable amount of waste product that is often dumped into the sea or incinerated. A biogenic waste pilot project carried out in Uummannaq, Greenland, has used the biogenic waste from the fishing industry, mixed with household waste, to produce energy (Climate Change Adaptation Resource 2012). Although the handling of waste products in this Artic area is different from the challenges of waste management in slum areas, the solution of localized waste-handling systems that also contribute to local energy needs has been demonstrated.

Challenges to Using Biodiesel DG

Biodiesel is more efficient that petroleum diesel and reduces emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, particulate matter, and sulfates. However, according to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the combustion of B20 (20 percent biodiesel / 80 percent petroleum diesel) can increase nitrous oxide (NOx) emissions by about 2 percent. However, Bickel, Waytulonis, and Zarling (2004) of the University of Minnesota Center for Diesel Research found that B20, when combined with supplemental cooling of the intake air, can result in significant reductions in NOx and particulate matter when used in generators.

CONCLUSION

With the United Nations declaring 2012 the "International Year of Sustainable Energy for All" as well as the 2011 "Energy for All" conference

in Oslo and the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 17) in Durban, it is clear that the international community is prioritizing sustainable development in city, regional, and international planning. The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in June 2012 also echoed the call for increased renewable energy investment.

Other renewable DG technologies not discussed in detail in this paper should also be explored further with regard to their potential use in urban slums and informal settlements. Although some technologies, such as residential scale cogeneration, are still nascent, the potential for such applications to benefit urban slums while reducing emissions can be extrapolated from documented nonslum urban usages in office buildings and industrial parks (IEA 2005).

Developing countries continue to struggle to make utilities economically sustainable. Although the expansion of existing traditional power facilities will continue in response to escalating demand, more emphasis on innovative technologies that can have greater long-term benefits for both the environment, in terms of mitigating climate change, and society, are prudent. Increased incorporation of DG into existing energy service portfolios will help lessen the burden on transmission and distribution assets, reduce energy-sector emissions, and broaden access to electricity in areas lacking a reliable connection to the conventional grid (USAID 2004a).

Barriers to widespread DG use include high capital costs, exorbitant connection fees, and a lengthy approval processes. Policies that promote fossil fuel subsidies often result in price distortions that make DG projects less attractive to developers and governments (USAID 2004a). Other policies, such as electricity buyback, can help stimulate interest in DG. For example, in Japan, the electricity tariff rate is roughly the same as the buyback price for a PV system (Ren 2010).

When considering the application of a DG system in comparison with connection to the traditional grid, environmental justice and climate change considerations must be taken into consideration in addition to system performance and overall cost. With DG projects offering social and environmental benefits in addition to providing much-needed electrification to underserved areas, a cost/benefit analysis may not capture the unquantifiable human and environmental externalities. Additionally, assumptions regarding the change in the cost of fossil fuel over time can make a large difference in making a determination about DG versus traditional grid-

based provision of electricity. Although previous assumptions considered DG only viable when the service area was remote, the number of customers was small, and per capita usage low, the social imperatives of electrical provision in slum areas call for a reevaluation of this policy perspective. With the added benefits of reduced losses, capital deferral, reduced risk, and lower operational and maintenance costs, as well as increased reliability, renewable DG systems should at least be considered in further quantifiable cost/benefit analyses.

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Low-Carbon Development and Poverty in Urban China

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INTRODUCTION

In the last fifty years, China's urban population has grown more than five-fold, from 107 million in 1960 to 586 million in 2009 (McKinsey Global Institute 2009).[1] At the same time, the rapid expansion of the country's urban areas has accelerated its energy consumption and corresponding carbon emissions. To respond to the environmental challenges of rapid urbanization, the country is determined to define and implement low-carbon urbanization. The Chinese leadership's commitment to low-carbon development was made clear at the UN Climate Change Summit in September 2009, when President Hu Jintao promised to "step up effort to develop green economy, low-carbon economy and circular economy, and enhance research, development and dissemination of climate-friendly technologies" (cited by National Development and Reform Commission 2009). In the same year, China pledged to reduce carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic product by 40 to 45 percent in 2020, compared with 2005 levels (United Nations Development Program 2010).

1 I gratefully acknowledge the Institute for Building Efficiency at Johnson Controls Inc. for supporting early stages of the project. Special thanks are due to Gary Green, Victor Lippit, and Haixiao Pan, whose insightful comments and suggestions led to substantial improvement of the analysis. All remaining errors are mine.

Low-carbon development is not just about protecting the natural environment. In both China and elsewhere, low-carbon development has an explicit economic development component that tries to boost some of the low-carbon economic sectors, such as renewable energy. Furthermore, to varying extents, low-carbon development across the world tends also to address the social justice question. Job creation is usually the centerpiece, but other equity issues—such as housing and environmental justice—are not absent. Therefore, low-carbon development represents the growing interest in realizing the "triple-bottom-line" principle, which places equal emphasis on environmental protection, economic development, and social justice. Yet as optimistic as they may seem on paper, such massive policy initiatives warrant close empirical scrutiny.

Past research has shown that, since China's reform started in 1978, environmental governance has exhibited a localizing trend. Several typologies have been advanced by scholars trying to explain different local regimes of environmental governance. Given the existing theoretical knowledge and the new empirical phenomenon of low-carbon development, this paper seeks to examine how different styles of local environmental management manifest themselves through low-carbon development, and how different local strategies affect disadvantaged groups. In other words, the present analysis addresses two research questions: *What are the different local strategies of low-carbon development in China? How do these strategies affect the urban poor?*

The next section offers a brief review of the literature on local environmental governance in China, followed by an overview of the arguments about the triple bottom line. Notes about the research design constitute the next section. Then I focus the empirical discussion on five Chinese cities where low-carbon development projects have been introduced and implemented. Comparing the five cites, the analysis finds two strategies of low-carbon development, one focused and the other comprehensive. The focused approach has helped the urban poor to get jobs and to receive higher wages, whereas the comprehensive approach does not appear to have significantly increased the material well-being of the urban poor.

LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN CHINA

One of the key foci of contemporary China studies is the notion of *transition* from a centrally planned economy to statist capitalism, and the study of China's environmental policies is no exception. In fact, the country's escalating environmental protection efforts in the past decades have been viewed as an integral part of its multidimensional transitions, also known as the post-1978 reforms (Foot 2001). By comparing and contrasting China's approaches to environmental management before and during the transition era, scholars have found several key trends of environmental policymaking.[2] Lester Ross investigated China's environmental policy since the very beginning of China's transition era. Ross (1984) identified three ways of implementing environmental policy in China: bureaucratic, market, and exhortational campaigns. Each of the three types corresponds to different set of tools that were used by Chinese officials to implement environmental policies. Writing at a time when reform had merely started in China, Ross concluded that implementation through the market was the least politically acceptable. It is important to note that the analysis given by Ross (1984, 1988) takes a homogenizing view of environmental policymaking in China, ignoring intricacies at each local scale, which perhaps is due to the relative insufficiency of empirical data at that time.

Recent research has found new patterns. Muldavin (2000) argues that China's environmental policy during the transition era is caught in a paradox between marketization and the parallel process of decollectivization. On the one hand, in the spirit of transition to a market economy, China increasingly relies on the market as a mechanism to allocate natural resources. On the other hand, marketization has resulted in the demise of collective institutions throughout the country that were responsible for land-use and environmental preservation decisions. Furthermore, in the absence of local collective institutions, local governments have garnered more power both politically and economically. Consequently, this process increases local

2 In referencing the contrasts between the pre-reform and the reform eras, I have chosen to focus more on the literature that attends to the latter, for the sake of space. In terms of discussions about China's pre-reform environmental governance, Shapiro (2001) investigates China under Mao, and Elvin (1998) outlines some of the key aspects of environmental governance in Imperial China.

"particularism [that] allows for appropriate adaptation of policies across complex geographies" (Muldavin 2000, 266).

Even though Muldavin's analysis is based on rural China, his observation is not irrelevant in the urban context. Chan and colleagues (1995) found that despite uniform environmental protection objectives defined by the central government, urban governments have found substantial leeway in defining their own strategies to reach the objectives. Furthermore, Tang and colleagues (1997) attempted to understand the causal mechanism behind the mixed styles of urban environmental governance in China after reforms. They found that widespread competition between local governments has resulted in each city's consolidation of its comparatively advantageous sectors, which in turn has shaped environmental regulations that are preferential to certain sectors. Furthermore, comparative studies of environmental governance in China and Europe (Mol and Carter 2006; Mol 2009) have found similar results of increasing the local diversification of environmental governance.

To summarize, the literature on China's environmental policy has reached a general consensus that the transition and reform era witnesses a rapid expansion and reorganization of political institutions serving environmental protection functions in the country. One of the crucial characteristics of the transition is the growing autonomy afforded by local governments in environmental decisionmaking. Scholars are starting to understand different styles of local environmental governance. To contribute to this intellectual enterprise, this paper analyzes different local strategies of low-carbon development, which is the most nascent form of environmental governance, seeking to contrast and compare various environmental policy approaches at the local level.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND POVERTY: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE

Increasingly, environmental policies are being viewed not as an isolated domain of policymaking; thus, a growing literature advocates the potential to integrate economic, environmental, and equity objectives in public policymaking. In one of the earliest texts in this literature, Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins (1999) envisioned a self-correcting transition of modern capitalism to

reinvest surplus values into protecting and conserving the natural environment. According to these authors, firms gain higher profits by investing in "natural capital," which is defined as "the sum total of the ecological systems that support life" (Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins 1999, 151), because a sound natural environment fosters smoother interactions within the social systems. Furthermore, according to the authors, in tandem with the reinvestment in natural capital, businesses will pay more attention to labor—that is, human capital. They argue that a sound natural environment and social equity are the fundamental bases for a viable business future. These ideas are further articulated by Hawken (2002), as he discusses many concrete aspects of modern economic life and how they can be realistically refashioned to promote sustainability. Similarly, McKibben (2007) highlights the escalating issues of resource depletion and inequality in modern capitalism. He argues that sustainable economy can be achieved through close communities that are more equitable and environmentally responsible. These ideas are formalized as the notion of the *triple bottom line*, with separate but interrelated concerns of the economic, social, and ecological dimensions (Elkington 1998). The fundamental argument is that society can gain on all three fronts simultaneously. In terms of concrete policies, Jones (2008) extends this perspective to argue that green-collar job creation manifests the triple bottom line in that it generates economic momentum, lessens environmental degradation, and provides decent jobs for the local poor.

However, discussions about the triple bottom line have been more normative than empirical.[3] It has, therefore, been difficult to assess the sets of claims for or against the triple bottom line thesis.[4] And thus it seems imperative to closely examine whether and how the three aspects may be intertwined in public policy. Most crucially, as Norman and MacDonald (2004) have rightly pointed out, the social equity dimension is the most ambiguous among the three. The present analysis seeks to unpack the social dimension

3 Miller, Buys, and Summerville (2007) proposed an empirical framework to quantify the triple bottom line, but actual empirical inquiries using the framework are yet to be seen. The empirical literature is only beginning to form; Birkin et al. (2009) conducted the first empirical study of the triple bottom line in China. Through a study of twenty firms in southern China, they found little adherence to the triple-bottom-line principles.

4 Debates about the triple bottom line have been inconclusive. For the details, see Norman and MacDonald (2004), Pava (2007), and MacDonald and Norman (2007).

using Fainstein's (2010) urban justice framework, which is explained in the next section.

The triple bottom line was first recognized by the Chinese central state as one of its strategic objectives in 2001 (Liu and Zhu 2009). China's recent five-year plans have also shown escalating efforts to pursue sustainability and equity without jeopardizing economic prosperity. In this context, low-carbon development is framed as an opportunity for China to simultaneously pursue environmental, economic, and equity objectives (Wang et al. 2010). Therefore, low-carbon development is an ideal empirical object that enables one to inquire into the triple bottom line in the Chinese contest. To that end, the empirical analysis here focuses on the impact of low-carbon development on the urban poor.

Thus, using low-carbon development as an anchoring point, this paper seeks to empirically address two unresolved issues in the literature: *What are the different local strategies of low-carbon development in China? How do these strategies affect the urban poor?*

DATA AND METHODS

Evidence is drawn from five Chinese cities—Shanghai, Hangzhou, Tianjin, Chongqing, and Baoding—which were selected from the universe of 276 Chinese cities that have included low-carbon development in their official planning documents (Chinese Society for Urban Studies 2011). These five were among the first Chinese cities to embark on low-carbon development. Shanghai and Tianjin are home to two of the most widely discussed low-carbon city projects, and the other three are among the eight cities designated by the National Development and Reform Commission in China's Twelfth Five-Year Plan as national pilots for low-carbon development. These five cities have been purposefully selected to represent a variety of geographies, levels of economic development, and climate conditions. Granted, observations from these five cities are not necessarily generalizable to urban China as a whole. This is an acceptable limitation because the key interest of the present analysis lies in understanding different local patterns, instead of the overall condition. Furthermore, data collection about these five cases follows the "variation-finding" method, which, according to Robinson (2011), is especially suited to studying governance, because of the inherent focus on

local differences. In other words, the analysis seeks to unpack the differing paths toward a common goal of carbon emissions reductions.

There is no doubt that low-carbon development policies are highly complex, encompassing a wide range of multisectoral activities. To remain analytically focused, I follow Susan Fainstein's (2010) urban justice framework for collecting and presenting the evidence. Specifically, I examine the extent to which low-carbon development policies affect the urban poor in terms of (1) housing condition, (2) access to open space, and (3) employment. These three areas are most consistently examined and compared across the cases, though other relevant information is also discussed wherever appropriate. Past studies of urban justice have consistently highlighted the importance of these three components (Mitchell 2003; Zukin 2010).

Evidence is collected primarily by way of interviews with planning bureau officials, urban design professionals, involved nongovernmental organizations, academics, and private-sector individuals familiar with the matter.[5] Furthermore, to ensure accuracy and credibility, evidence from interviews is triangulated with other available sources, including public documents, newspaper and journal articles, comprehensive plans, and internal communication documents retrieved from government agencies. Noninterview sources of evidence are referenced where appropriate.

LOW-CARBON DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN POVERTY IN FIVE CHINESE CITIES

A general definition of what constitutes a low-carbon city is lacking.[6] China's Ministry of Environmental Protection and Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development have both developed standards for "ecocities." Several provinces have also created standards for "garden cities," "green cities," and other similar designations. All these standards vary in

5 Due to sensitivity of planning information in China, all interviews were conducted on the condition of anonymity.

6 The discussions of the cities are ordered according to their levels of postindustrialization, with Shanghai being the highest and Baoding the lowest among the five. For a more detailed analysis of the levels of postindustrialization in these five cites, and the effect on low-carbon development, see Li (2012).

terms of rigidity and scope. Some large cities have pockets in the urban area under low-carbon development, whereas low-carbon goals in smaller cities typically reach into all areas in the jurisdiction. These differences preclude an overarching definition of a low-carbon city in China.

Despite this lack of a standardized definition of what constitutes a low-carbon city, the majority of Chinese cities have set low-carbon goals. According to a study by the Chinese Society for Urban Studies (2011), among the 287 cities in China with municipality status, 276 have proposed low-carbon or ecocity goals. Of these, more than half have begun construction projects in an effort to fulfill these goals, while more than a quarter have specific plans for action in the near future (Yu 2011). According to China's Twelfth Five-Year Plan, by 2015 the country will establish 100 model cities, 200 model counties, 1,000 model districts, and 10,000 model towns with a green and new energy theme to showcase its achievements in low-carbon development. The five cases selected for analysis in this paper represent some of the most widely discussed low-carbon development projects in China.

The Shanghai Post-Expo Area

The Shanghai Post-Expo Area (SPEA) is located in metropolitan Shanghai, 6 kilometers (3.73 miles) south of People's Square, the center of the city. SPEA covers a total land area of 6.68 square kilometers (2.58 square miles), containing residential, commercial, entertainment, and public zones. The Post-Expo Area was the site of the 2010 World Expo, which attracted 70 million visitors. Shanghai has taken the Expo's theme of "Better City, Better Life" as a guiding principle for its urban planning since late 2000s. Low-carbon concepts, tools, technologies, and practices were a common thread among the Expo's exhibitions, and the city is determined to use the Expo's legacy to promote further reductions in carbon emissions in the local economy. SPEA is the city's pilot area for the introduction of these low-carbon technologies.

SPEA is oriented toward three major uses: conventions and exhibitions, a corporate headquarter zone, and ecotourism, the first two of which are viewed as opportunities to drive Shanghai's strategic ascendance into the network of global cities. To that end, top-notch office buildings are being constructed in an effort to attract global capital investments. Its claim of carbon emission reductions materializes in the form of cutting-edge green

building technologies, including distributed heating systems, geothermal heat pumps, and water source heat pumps. In fact, these buildings will showcase the latest innovations in energy efficiency and are intended to serve as extensions of the Expo's promise to create a better urban life for its residents. To promote ecotourism, the project features three parks, Houtan Wetland Park, Expo Park, and Bailianjing Eco-Park. Visitors to these parks, which now form a large green space within SPEA, are exposed to low-carbon technologies, such as a water purification and recycling system that generates significant quantities of potable water.

The case of Shanghai typifies a comprehensive strategy of low-carbon development where the objective is to create and support a self-contained community that showcases many possible means of low-carbon technologies and concepts, with multiple sectoral inputs and involvements. Local government officials view this approach as advantageous because of its capability to reduce carbon emissions from a variety of sources, and for demonstrating a whole new way of urban life that suggests a future trend.

However, its impact on the urban poor seems less hopeful. In terms of housing conditions, the SPEA plan explicitly stated that a part of the area is tailored to the high-end housing market. According to government statistics, the 2010 Shanghai Expo displaced a total of 18,000 local households, who are least likely to be able to afford residential properties in SPEA. In fact, a predominant majority of these displaced residents now live in neighborhoods far to the south of the SPEA site. In terms of employment opportunities, local residents who used to work in the hundreds of factories in the area (now also displaced) are unlikely to have the skills and credentials required by the multinational corporations that will soon occupy the area. Though the demand for service jobs will likely increase with the arrival of large corporations, these jobs tend to offer low, if not minimum, wages (Sassen 2012), and thereby will be unlikely to significantly alter the conditions of the urban poor. Finally, the three parks, though principally open to everyone, appear to benefit tourists more than local residents. In fact, the public transit routes have been designed such that the parks are well connected to popular tourist destinations.

Hangzhou's Six-in-One Strategy

Hangzhou is the capital of Eastern China's Zhejiang Province, and one of the earliest in China to have placed the natural environment at the center

of its development strategy. According to Hangzhou's Twelfth Five-Year Plan, the city's comprehensive low-carbon plan comprises the economy, buildings, transportation, lifestyles, the environment, and society. This is what the city calls its "six-in-one" strategy, in which these six key elements of low-carbon development together create a multifaceted whole. Some of the elements of the six-in-one strategy are worth elaborating. The economic component of Hangzhou's strategy is exemplified by its industrial park project, for which the city formed a partnership with a Singaporean clean-technology company. The industrial park will be tailored to clean energy and renewable energy businesses, taking advantage of the clustering effect of low-carbon industries.

Green transportation programs in Hangzhou are among the most advanced in the nation. Public transit is responsible for more than half of the total traffic volume. In 2008, the city introduced a public bicycle program covering most urban areas in its jurisdiction. The local government supplies some 50,000 bicycles, which are available at no or very low cost, depending on usage. The city now has 2,150 bicycle rental and return service points, which are used by an average of approximately 172,000 people per day (Hangzhou Municipal Government 2011).

Another element in Hangzhou's low-carbon development strategy is ecotourism. Hangzhou has historically been known as a city of natural beauty. Its most famous tourist attraction is West Lake, located in the center of the city. The vast number of tourists attracted to West Lake has made it difficult to conserve the lake. The government addressed this challenge by developing a number of other tourist attractions in order to absorb tourism demand and direct tourist flows away from the lake. These new attractions are scattered across the metropolitan area, and most make a feature of the city's ecological integrity. This strategy is meant to ensure the sustainability of tourism in Hangzhou while providing more attractions for visitors.

Similar to the case of Shanghai, Hangzhou's low-carbon development encompasses a wide range of areas. The engagement of multiple sectors will likely further consolidate Hangzhou's fame as the city of natural beauty in China. However, the policies' effect on urban poverty is somewhat mixed. For example, one of the renewable energy programs, "Sunny Rooftop," is limited to high-end, low-height residential units. Furthermore, the low-carbon plan has stepped up efforts to segregate poor neighborhoods, under the pretext of "functional specialization." Specifically, the city has designated

several districts as hosts of "global low-carbon lifestyle" demonstration projects, which feature financial services, high-technology incubators, renewable energy innovation, and green building technologies. At the same time, other districts have been designated as hosts of recycling factories, wastewater treatment facilities, and the like. Undoubtedly, the gradual implementation of the six-in-one strategy will create more jobs across the board, but a bifurcated labor force is also in the making, with the poor becoming relatively poorer. In terms of open space, like Shanghai, Hangzhou has been focused only on satisfying the demands of tourists. Finally, the city's widely publicized bicycle program has clearly benefited people of low income, but it is not to be neglected that an initiative has also been started to sell hybrid cars to some of its richest residents.

Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City

Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City (SSTEC), an international cooperative project of China and Singapore, is located in the northern part of Tianjin's Binhai New Area, a newly established development zone 45 kilometers (28 miles) from the city center and 150 kilometers (93 miles) from Beijing. SSTEC covers a total land area of 30 square kilometers (11.58 square miles), and targets a total population of 350,000. Construction of SSTEC started in September 2009, and is planned to be completed by 2019. In December 2011, some hundreds of the first residents moved in to their new homes.

The SSTEC project has received significant attention because of its aim to become a "model eco- and low-carbon city replicable by other cities in China" (World Bank 2009). The project receives consistent support from the highest levels of leadership in China and Singapore. One thing to note about SSTEC is that it is a completely new development on a piece of land that was previously unoccupied. It is also somewhat far away from downtown Tianjin, making it a de facto new city, though it geographically lies within the jurisdiction of Tianjin. The development process of SSTEC, however, has many similarities with those of Shanghai and Hangzhou.

A stellar feature of SSTEC is its use of a complex set of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) based on existing ecocity standards in China to monitor and track progress. This innovative system will measure the sustainability of the natural environment, the built environment, infrastructure, and management, thereby enabling an objective and systematic assessment of the project. Evidently, SSTEC's route of low-carbon development is also

determinately a comprehensive one, attending to the environmental consequences of nearly every aspect of the development process.

In terms of the project's impact on the urban poor, this case appears promising at first glance. One of the KPIs expects that at least half the residents of SSTEC will work within the project's boundary. During the actual sales of the residential units in SSTEC, in order to meet this expectation, potential buyers are required to secure a job position in one of the companies in SSTEC before they are permitted to buy some of the most cost-efficient units. In other words, individuals who do not have a job in SSTEC are only entitled to buy condominiums that are relatively more expensive. However, employment opportunities in the area appear highly elitist. SSTEC is tailored to companies in the fields of environmental engineering, green building technology innovation, financial services, and several other green sectors, which are more likely to hire individuals with advanced degrees. In fact, the local government estimated that at least 20 percent of the residents in SSTEC have a college degree or higher, whereas fewer than 8.9 percent of the total population in China has achieved the same (National Bureau of Statistics 2011).[7] At the absence of measures to the contrary, it appears that SSTEC will soon become a gentrified neighborhood.

Given these observations, it becomes evident that SSTEC caters to middle-class residents in Tianjin. With the graduate flight of these residents from downtown Tianjian to SSTEC, the inner city will foreseeably be turned into an area with a higher rate of poverty. In other words, though the SSTEC project does not directly affect the urban poor in Tianjin, it nonetheless contributes to the spatial segregation of the poor.

Liangjiang New Area, Chongqing

Liangjiang New Area is located in Chongqing in Southwestern China, covering a geographical area of 1,200 square kilometers (463 square miles), although 650 square kilometers (251 square miles) are uninhabitable mountainous areas. Liangjiang, whose name means "Two Rivers," is located where the Yangtze River and Jialing River converge. The establishment of Liangjiang New Area marks a step by China's central government to de-

7 The National Bureau of Statistics reported that 8.9 percent of the population has a degree higher than technical colleges. It thus can be inferred that the percentage of population with a college degree or higher is lower.

velop the country's western provinces, which remain relatively poor despite the economic boom of Eastern China.

Chongqing was one of China's major industrial centers during the twentieth century. Even today, industry and construction are two of the biggest drivers of the city's economic growth. Chongqing's history may make it seem like an unlikely case for low-carbon development, but the project in Liangjiang represents a notable opportunity for implementing change in industrial cities. The city's leadership views the establishment of Liangjiang New Area as an opportunity for change, and its focus is not only on creating a sheer high volume of economic activities but also on maintaining the "quality" of economic activities. If the projects demonstrate favorable results, these strategies may be applied to the rest of Chongqing and beyond.

Currently, industrial energy efficiency and renewable energy are the two focused areas of low-carbon development in Liangjiang. In terms of the former, Liangjiang has the largest concentration of the region's steel and cement manufacturers, whose technological improvements have not only achieved substantial emissions reductions but have also greatly facilitated the growth and expansion of these factories in an increasingly competitive market (Zou 2010). In terms of the latter, the area's climate, existing industries, and macroeconomic conditions have led the city to determine that water source heat pump technology should be the primary solution for energy efficiency in buildings. Branches of both the Yangtze River and Jialing River flow through many parts of the city, creating a huge potential for water source heat technology.

Here, low-carbon initiatives have created substantial employment opportunities for the urban poor. The expansion of several waste-to-energy plants and wind turbine and solar panel manufacturers has been especially effective in bringing the local poor back into the labor force. Furthermore, the city has revised the building code for public housing projects, specifying energy efficiency criteria and encouraging renewable energy usage by public housing residents. Though low-carbon development in Liangjiang does not have clear implications for open space provision, the urban poor certainly benefit from increased employment and housing availability.

Baoding's Evolving Low-Carbon Goals

Baoding is the largest city in Northern China's Hebei Province by population. It is an early champion of low-carbon development. In 2006,

during the city's Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–10), Baoding proposed a plan to become China's "Electricity Valley," specializing in alternative means of power generation, including wind and solar power. Baoding is now home to more than 170 new energy companies. These companies contribute 10.2 percent of the local gross domestic product, making new energy one of the city's "pillar industries," and this share is expected to reach 40 percent by 2050. In addition to Electricity Valley, in 2007 the city announced plans to become a "City of Solar Energy." Specifically, it will promote the use of photovoltaic lighting equipment in public buildings, major roads, and selected communities. Billboards, road signs, traffic lights, and other types of public infrastructure will also be reliant on solar energy. In less than a decade, as investments in renewable energy in Baoding by the central state and foreign investors have increased, the city has been able to develop its niche in the area.

Baoding's success in harnessing the solar energy sector is also manifested through its capacity to create jobs. Estimates of the exact number of jobs in the solar energy sector in Baoding are not available, but according to China's official news agency, Xinhua (2009), one particular solar photovoltaic project in a Baoding-based company is estimated to employ 5,000 full-time workers from the local area. Local officials estimate that the new energy sector employs more workers than any other sector in the local economy, and most of the jobs are offered to individuals with short-term training in local technical colleges. In terms of public space, unlike Shanghai and Hangzhou, Baoding's low-carbon development strategy does not include plans to add additional parks for public use. However, the city's park management authority saw the opportunity to install energy saving lighting systems in its parks, and decided to redesign many of the major walking paths in its parks utilizing locally innovated lighting systems. It is reported that retrofitted walking paths are more scenic and walkable than before (Li and Shen 2010). Evidently, as a "side effect" of its successful low-carbon development, Baoding's public space has been significantly improved. Finally, there is little evidence that low-carbon development affects housing conditions for the poor, whether positively or negatively.

CONCLUSION

As Mol and Carter (2006) have pointed out, the effect of China's environmental governance on inequalities within the county deserves more scholarly analysis. It is hoped that this paper contributes to the scholarly discussions in this vein. Two different approaches of low-carbon development have been identified. In Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Tianjin, a comprehensive approach of low-carbon development has been adopted. This approach translates low-carbon development into action plans in a variety of sectors, including business development, technological innovation, transportation, and ecotourism, to name a few. From the perspective of carbon emissions reductions, this comprehensive approach is indeed advantageous, having the potential to reduce emissions in many sectors of the economy. Conversely, in Chongqing and Baoding, a focused approach of low-carbon development is in place. These cities target one or two sectors, such as renewable energy or energy efficiency, and seek to pursue low-carbon development by excelling in the targeted sector(s). These two strategies have both successfully achieved emissions reductions.

These two strategies have differing effects on the urban poor. In cities where a comprehensive approach is adopted, the poor are further marginalized by low-carbon development, which fails to offer them employment opportunities and equitable housing. In cities where a focused approach is followed, however, the poor have evidently gained increasing access to employment. In some cases, they have also gained better access to public space and improved housing options. It would be erroneous, however, to conclude that differing low-carbon development strategies "caused" urban poverty. Instead, the findings here offer insights into the different political cultures in these places. Shanghai, Tianjin, and Hangzhou are widely acclaimed as postindustrial cities that have prioritized economic growth more than anything else since the late 1980s. Chongqing and Baoding, though typically referred to as falling behind the coastal megacities, are actually creating more equitable developmental outcomes.

This pattern is likely due to several contributing factors. First of all, as cities such as Shanghai and Tianjin quickly ascend into the global network, municipal governments, and to some extent the national government, spare little effort to create their own versions of a global city, in both the physical and demographic senses. In this process, local policymaking is dominated

by despotic desires to attract foreign direct investment, to lure international tourists, and to attract the headquarters of large corporations. In these cities, local politics are hardly local in scope. Urban politics seem tied more closely to global capital flows than to local residents (see Sassen 2012). It is therefore no surprise that low-carbon development in some of the most expensive parcels of land in Shanghai failed to consider those who were there, while targeting exclusively those who might come in the future, presumably bringing with them enormous amounts of financial capital. The pursuit of growth became so aggressive that it outweighed other considerations in the local political agenda (see Logan and Molotch 1987).

In addition, in terms of historical trajectories, China's national strategies of uneven regional development have effectively shaped different political cultures within the nation (Zhao and Tong 2000). Since the mid-1980s, when China determined to rapidly develop coastal regions in the East, regional disparities have been on the rise. In terms of specific policy agendas, the relatively poor western and northern regions have been the focus of national poverty reduction programs, whereas the coastal regions have been the showcase for rapid wealth accumulation. The contrast is so striking that it would now seem odd to even talk about poverty in coastal regions, and no less strange to talk about public policy in western and northern regions without mentioning poverty reduction. In other words, the "natural" association of poverty with certain parts of China, and the corresponding disassociation of poverty from certain other parts, have led to dramatically different political agendas across China, which the five cases evidently reflect.

Furthermore, recent trends of internal migration have also shaped different realities in Chinese cities. As young residents migrate to large cities such as Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Tianjin, the country's second- and third-tier cities find themselves urgently needing to retain the local youth population (Fan 2002). In fact, in my interviews, several officials in Baoding citied undisclosed statistics showing the return migration of local youths after the city's successful development of renewable energy sectors. In other words, to avoid "brain drain" as a consequence of out-migration (Welch and Zhen 2008), local authorities in less-developed Chinese cities have determined to create more employment opportunities as a measure to keep the local area competitive. Evidently, migrant-recipient cities lack such incentives to seek employment opportunities for their populaces.

Finally, the finding has important policy implications. In 2010, the Baoding authorities confirmed a master plan for low-carbon city development, whereby the government proposed to embark on comprehensive low-carbon development beyond renewable energy. In China, there is a growing sentiment among local governments to copy successful policies from coastal cities such as Shanghai. But this research has also demonstrated that, at least on the equity front, officials in coastal cities also have much to learn from their inland colleagues. A serious concern for social justice, which seems to have gained a solid foothold in Baoding and Chongqing, has yet to make its way in some of China's most economically developed cities.

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Xool nu bu baax: Hip-Hop, Youth Movements, and Change in Senegal

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INTRODUCTION

The victory of Macky Sall ousting the octogenarian incumbent Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal's recent presidential election is being hailed as a triumph for democracy on the African continent.[1] Many onlookers have already begun to attribute the Benno Bokk Yakaar coalition leader's successful election to the large youth constituency,[2] mobilized through several indigenous forces and popular movements—one of the most interesting to Western media being hip-hop. The existence of a relationship between hip-hop and Senegalese politics is, however, not a new phenomenon and should not come as such a surprising platform for political expression. Since its inception and reappropriation by urban youth in the streets of Dakar, hip-hop culture has always contained a political dimension and has been used to protest, raise political awareness, and even help elect or dispose of presidents. What is more fascinating about what is going on in the Senegalese hip-hop scene however, are the strategies taken up by members of the movement to increase hip-hop's capacity to turn words into action and position themselves in such a way as to create economic development and social advancement out of an urban, artistic "subculture."

The demands and claims made through hip-hop music not only seek to empower youth politically and get them to the polls but can also be used as

1 "Take a good look at us" (Wolof). Lyric from Y'en a Marre's song "Faux! Pas Forcé!"

2 "One Shared Hope" (Wolof).

a vehicle to advance several social initiatives and policies that have a more direct, on-the-ground impact on urban populations than a national power shift. Hip-hop culture, while it has been repurposed for both state propaganda and political opposition, has maintained a strong sense of social consciousness in Senegal. Although American hip-hop artists today are criticized as having traded messages of social consciousness for lyrics and rhymes that reinforce a capitalistic and often misogynistic ideology, Senegalese hip-hop continues to inscribe itself within the broader struggle for economic and social justice—the very catalyst that gave birth to the American movement during the Bush and Reagan administrations (Bynoe 2004). There are certainly groups and artists who have followed the American trend and have achieved personal success, but the social awareness on which hip-hop in Senegal was founded, I argue, remains the dynamic capable of driving the movement forward and reducing urban poverty.

"Hip-hop," as referred to in this paper, encompasses a variety of artistic expressions in the realms of dance (breaking, popping, and locking), music (hip-hop genre, rap, DJing), and graphic art (graffiti and design), among others, that are constantly being produced and/or reinvented. It is often associated with the notion of "subculture," which should be understood as a definition in relation to other cultural forces and institutions (Bazin 2012). Subculture, in this context, is used as a descriptive term referring to a culture within a culture that projects an understanding of its relationship to a parent culture through various styles and imagery (Crow 1997). The parent culture in this case is the global hip-hop movement as well as Senegalese musical griot culture. At the same time as it acts as an urban subculture and movement, hip-hop at its most elementary level is a form of artistic expression with a certain accessibility that provides youth in urban settings with a mode of reflection and reconciliation with their situation, environment, society, and with themselves. Its growing popularity in Senegal since 1997 has also configured it into what constitutes popular music, a genre that tends to act as an immediate lever on the functioning of society and culture due to its mass appeal (Reboul 1992).

To be able to inscribe hip-hop into the discourses of economic and social development and, more directly, the reduction of urban poverty, one must encompass an understanding of hip-hop as a movement into its more classical definition as an urban subculture or musical genre. Hip-hop as a culture contains inherently reactionary stylistic elements that, by one

definition of culture, structure the living and the inanimate world, the family, social relations, space, time, and language (Engelhard, Seck, and Ben Abdallah 1988). The particular nature of the structures of social relations, space, and especially language that Senegalese hip-hop set forth greatly increase its capacity to transform its energy into a veritable social movement. Hip-hop crews, associations, and political collectives in Dakar today increasingly adhere to Charles Tilly's archetypal model of what constitutes a social movement. Collectives like Y'en a Marre, for instance, exhibit the idioms of *WUNC displays* (worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment), organize *campaigns* such as NTS (Nouvelle Type de Senegalais), and expand their performances from strict artistic expressions to a more varied *social movement repertoire* (Tilly and Wood 2009; italics in the original). The following pages seek to outline, in detail, the fulfillment of this combination of elements as well as highlight how Senegalese hip-hop fulfills the four conditions for a movement as outlined by the French sociologist Hugues Bazin: situation, form, awareness, and innovation (Bazin 2012). To adhere to Tilly's classic explanation of a social movement, this paper will highlight the ways in which hip-hop in Senegal depends on collective actions and makes collective claims to improve not only the lives of the youth who engage in the movement but also the life of society as a whole (Wieviorka 2010). Although hip-hop in academic literature has been consistently looked at as a political force at various points in time and in various cities around the world, hip-hop in Dakar and urban Senegal today also needs to be viewed through the lens of a social and, to some extent, economic movement to be able to offer opportunities for youth and urban populations to increase their socioeconomic standing and emancipate themselves from urban poverty.

SITUATION

Approximately 42 percent of Senegal's population was urban in 2011, with an annual reported growth rate of 3.2 percent (United Nations 2011). Furthermore, Senegal finds itself on a continent made up mainly of people under thirty years old (UNECA 2011). In Senegal, that majority youth population translates into an estimated 65 percent of the nearly 13 million people in Senegal under the age of thirty (Mbodj 2012). When discussing

the prospects of Senegalese and African youth to emancipate themselves from the poverty they experience today, the future is said to depend on strategies that will increase employment and cultural and social integration, with education being the key factor in improving employability (Essé 2009). As access to education and employment can be scarce today, Senegal faces an alarming problem of clandestine immigration to Europe. Several thousands of Senegalese risk their lives every year by boarding a *gaal* in attempts to reach Europe and find work.[3] Of the 32,000 registered migrants entering the Canary Islands through unauthorized channels in 2006, over half of them were said to be Senegalese (Fall, Carretaro, and Sarr 2010; BBC, 2006). The majority of these illegal immigrants happen to be young men between the ages of eighteen to thirty-five years, the same profile that more or less defines Senegal's hip-hop generation, underlining just how precarious life in this demographic is.

The year 1984 serves as a sort of reference for Senegalese hip-hop stakeholders to mark when the urban aesthetic and musical genre began to take root in West Africa through the transmission of American and French albums passed from the diaspora to young Senegalese in Dakar (Fall Ba 2012; Pindra and Keyti, 2008). Hip-hop on the African continent was developing at a time in Senegalese history marked by an acute economic crisis causing increased unemployment; permanent political tensions with the Socialist Party, which had been in power since independence; and a loss of faith in the educational system that had been plagued by strikes, resulting in an *année blanche* in 1988 (Pindra and Keyti 2008).[4] The contested reelection of Abdou Diouf as head of state that same year gave impetus to nationwide, youth-led riots. Diouf's own experience and observation of the postelectoral political and social climate led him to accuse the young people of the country of *jeunesse malsaine* (Diallo 1992).[5] The contextualization of hip-hop in the late 1980s should not forget to take into account the collective hysteria launched by Senegal's elimination from the African Cup of Nations in 1986, and the border conflict with Mauritania, which both served to heighten social anxiety and prepare the terrain upon which hip-hop would come into force.

3 A *gaal* is a wooden dugout canoe (Wolof).

4 An *année blanche* is a "lost" or incomplete academic year (French).

5 A *jeunesse malsaine* is an unhealthy youth (French).

FORM

The deteriorating political, economic, and social situation in Senegal in the 1980s provided several dilemmas to which hip-hop could react in creating a sort of lyrical response. To understand the basis of hip-hop as an alternative to poverty, unemployment, or even emigration, one needs to draw a clear distinction between Senegalese hip-hop and its American predecessor and counterpart. Although the culture critic Yvonne Bynoe attests that America's hip-hop movement and its associated rappers have failed to associate or effect change at a national level under a united front, the 2012 electoral season in Senegal proves that the nature of the movement in West Africa is quite different (Bynoe 2004). Bynoe anchors her argument in the fact that the members of the hip-hop generation in America lack national, organizational bodies through which they can stake their claims. Senegalese youth in the hip-hop or *Boul Falé* generation,[6] however, have recently increased their efforts to federate under a united front and create urban and nationwide movements such as Y'en a Marre,[7] which received wide media coverage for shaking up the preelectoral environment in Dakar.

Since its inception in the impoverished quarters and suburbs of Dakar, the lyrics and nature of the musical hip-hop genre have recuperated and reappropriated the reactionary and socially conscious spirit of early American rap of artists such as KRS-One and Public Enemy (Bynoe 2004). The first album, *Boul Falé*, by the pioneer hip-hop group Positive Black Soul (PBS) contained tracks with highly conscious and engaged lyrics. A 2008 documentary produced by rapper Keyti and African Hip-Hop Awards founder Safouane Pindra interviewed Duggy Tee of PBS, who asserted, "We had messages! And already our first tracks were conscious and engaged. They were about unity but also about denouncing corruption, unemployment, everything that was happening here and everything Senegalese were going through" (Pindra and Keyti 2008). The subculture was not only marked by subversive music and lyrics but also by a total redefinition of what is and can be considered as insurrectionary. From new forms of greetings to mannerisms of walking and talking, rappers, dancers, and hip-hoppers have

6 Herson describes the "Bul Faale generation" as being a sort of Senegalese equivalent to the term "Generation X" in American culture (Herson 2000, 26).

7 "Y'en a Marre" means "We're angry / We're fed up" (French).

constantly been pushing against "traditions" that are seen as being part of the larger power structure that is oppressing them, and redefining what is traditional through their own internalization of what hip-hop culture should represent and promote (Herson 2000).

One characteristic and strength of the form hip-hop has taken in Senegal is the attachment to the lingua franca of Senegal—Wolof (Fall Ba 2012). A total of 90 percent of Senegalese hip-hop is produced in Wolof, clarifying the audience for which it is intended and increasing its accessibility among those who were not able to acquire formal French educational instruction. Despite its early engagement to accessibility, hip-hop did not begin to draw mass appeal until 1994 with PBS's opening performance for French hip-hop artist MC Solaar (Pindra and Keyti 2008). Historically, the magnitude of rap's importance as a social and political movement was cemented in the elections of 2000, which brought the Sopi Party leader Abdoulaye Wade into power after forty years of Socialist Party rule (Diouf 1996; Fall Ba 2012). Wade publicly thanked the rappers for their role in his election, though the rappers apparently had less of an intention of getting Wade elected than they did of disposing Diouf and the social and economic conditions that accompanied his rule (Herson 2000). Again, in the buildup to the 2012 elections, rappers constantly promoted Wade's disappearance from the presidential palace while specifically avoiding the promotion of a new candidate or party. Popular tracks released before the election contain lyrics directly imploring Wade to step down, highlighting the depth of the problems facing Senegalese youth, and comparing the current situation with the promises Wade made in 2000.[8] The most pertinent example of the latter message comes across in the refrain of a single released by rapper Xuman and Mauritanian singer Cee Pee in January 2012:

> Li lu mu doon, fii ñepp sonn
> Seen goor gu bon moo tax réew mi xiibon
> Du li nga digeewoon, du li ngeen fi waxoon

8 See the following artists and tracks for examples: Niagass's "Gorgui," Xuman and Cee Pee's "Li lumu doon," Awadi's "Dégage" and "Mame Boye," Keurgui Crew's "Coup 2 Guele," Red Black's "Na Dem," Cannabasse's "Khar mou jot," and Y'en a Marre's "Faux! Pas force!"

Aie aie aie, ana sunu kom kom?[9] (Xuman Feat and Cee Pee)

This attempt at reconciling with the current situation as an indirect call to change the leadership of the country is as much engaged in politics as it is in raising social awareness about what has become of the country since Wade's regime took power twelve years ago. Since Macky Sall's victory in late September 2012, the members of Y'en a Marre (the self-defined "citizen initiative" led by rappers and journalists) expressed that they will continue to play a sentinel role and hold the new government accountable to the people (Y'en a Marre 2012; Drame 2012). Though cultural expressions of hip-hop tend to become politicized during tense elections, the root of rap music's awareness efforts is to be found in discussing the underlying social problems.

AWARENESS

One of the key words used when discussing the content of hip-hop music in Senegal is *sensibilisation*, or raising awareness. In fact, the true strength of the now global hip-hop movement is its vehicular capacity to diffuse a message—one that, in all contexts and cultures, seeks to challenge the status quo (Chang 2007). Early tracks, particularly by PBS, tried to shed light on what was going on in politics. Through its evolution, however, the messages expanded and began to include broader issues, notably of health, immigration, and others directly linked to the poverty and suffering of urban youth.

Health plays a central role in the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, figuring into three of the eight objectives aimed at ending poverty: reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; and combating HIV, malaria, and other diseases (United Nations 2012). The agenda of the Millennium Development Goals attests to the fact that improving health is crucial to reducing poverty, and Senegalese hip-hoppers understand the stakes as well.

The world of popular music (hip-hop included) has made a rather vast commitment to goal 6 of the Millennium Development Goals: organiz-

9 This verse can be translated as "What is this? Everybody here is tired of it. These bad men (politicians) are the reason the country is so sickly. This is not what you promised. This is not what you told us. Where is our economy?" (Wolof).

ing concerts, campaigns, and festivals around themes addressing the fight against HIV/AIDS and malaria. Most notably, mbalax star Youssou Ndour has put his name on what has become a national multisectoral campaign called Xeex Sibbiru within Malaria No More's Senegal Surround Sound program (Ndiaye 2011).[10] Since 2009, Senegal Surround Sound has incorporated the influence of all sectors of society—including entertainment, faith, government, business, and sports—to spread awareness about the disease and its prevention (Ndiaye 2011). One project in particular, the Concours de Chant, or song competition, has attracted large audiences and engaged musicians from all over the country in the fight against malaria, and has increasingly integrated the influence of rappers. The 2011 finals, which were held in Rufisque, drew a crowd of over 25,000 spectators, and among the nine finalists, three groups/artists defined their music as "hip-hop." Contestants were all required to pass a quiz about malaria, spend three days with health workers learning about the disease, and submit an original song to qualify in the regional semifinals of the competition. The hip-hop group representing Saint-Louis at the finale performed its original track containing a direct, clear message in the lyrical refrain:

> Xeex sibbiru, xeex lii koy joxee
> Bey ci say wéeyu tànk laa koy doré
> Nu ñepp joxee loxo nu boolé sunu doolé
> Xeex sibbiru xeex lii koy joxee
> Na ko tambaali sa biir kër, nu dox daaje
> Jëlé ci ndox bu bon ak bu salté
> Xeex sibbiru xeex lii koy joxee[11] (Saint-Louis Soldiers 2011)

The inclusion of hip-hop artists in these types of festivals and national initiatives serves to engage a population that directly relates to the lifestyle represented by the culture and spreads a message of healthy living through voices of people to whom disadvantaged urban youth tend to

10 "Xeex Sibbiru" means "Fight Malaria" (Wolof).

11 This verse can be translated as "Fight malaria. Fight its causes. The movement starts with you. Everyone should lend a hand for the movement to gain strength. Fight malaria. Fight its causes. We can all start within our own households and meet in the middle. Start by getting rid of bad and dirty water. Fight malaria. Fight its causes" (Wolof).

relate. Ndour's competition, though crowning only one winner who will record with Ndour and open for him at his annual Bercy concert in Paris, serves to engage a much larger population of artists who are then capable of promoting the message they have written into lyrics and educating their local communities about the disease.

Graffiti artists are also at the forefront of eradicating disease through their aesthetic principles conveying messages about getting tested for HIV and educating people about the disease. Simple slogans and images can be a powerful tool in reaching the illiterate population and especially in invoking the curiosity of young people, especially when the designs and ideas are locally produced. Groups such as "Miserables Tag" and "Doxandem Squad" have participated actively in the Graff and Santé initiative, which organizes a graffiti session next to a mobile health care unit to bridge the gap between disadvantaged local populations and health care professionals. Founded in 2008 by the pioneer graffiti artist Docta, the campaign succeeds by provoking conversation about the art being created in the public space and immediately offering the resources to get tested and learn more. Last October in Bountou Pikine, an impoverished suburb of Dakar, more than 100 people were tested in only a few hours (Diagne 2011).

Hip-hop gained early popularity at a time when several, parallel youth-driven initiatives sought to change the mentality of youth society and provide new avenues to establishing a better future with projects based in public health, but also, and especially, in reimagining public space. The phenomenon of the Set/Setal movement launched,[12] in part once again by Youssou Ndour with the release of his song "Set" in 1990, was a major turning point for understanding how youth sought to maintain their autonomy from political parties and integration into the state through institutional means while still mobilizing en masse for social change (Diouf 1996; Diallo 1992). The moral imperative that was at the heart of Set/Setal and that has inspired smaller Set/Setal projects across the country to this day is the same moral imperative that has been able to sustain the hip-hop movement. What Mamadou Diouf describes as an "absolute obligation" in the Set/Setal movement to "find a way out" and "to express new concepts in a new language, in this struggle for life" equally applies to the way socially conscious hip-hop sees itself altering the urban landscape (Diouf 1996).

12 "Set/Setal" means "clean and make clean" (Wolof).

The question then turns to how to make those new concepts and new languages intelligible to local business and institutional mechanisms that can help turn words and messages into actions and results while simultaneously maintaining a distance from this subversive subculture that defines itself by its very resistance to such institutions.

INNOVATION

In what has been a long quest to be taken seriously, hip-hop is beginning to configure itself more prominently into the politics and social projects of the city. In the summer of 2011, the City of Dakar chose 2 hip-hop projects out of 227 cultural project applications to receive supporting funds from the Ministry of Culture. Projects were chosen within seven cultural categories: theatre, cinema, dance, music, arts and plastics, fashion, and photography. Seventeen projects were chosen to share CFA 50 million in funding. The second edition of the Hip-Hop Discover underground festival, spearheaded by the active Y'en a Marre participant Simon Kouka, received CFA 3 million, while Africulturban secured CFA 3 million for the third edition of the Urban Nation B-Boy Festival (Comité des arts de la Ville de Dakar, n.d.). This investment in hip-hop culture by the local government can be viewed as a step toward a legitimation of the culture's practices and messages, and as a sign of its acceptance and integration into Senegal's cultural patrimony. A deeper look at the origins and mission of Africulturban reveals a striking example of the type of social development to which individual hip-hop success and the promotion of hip-hop culture can potentially lead.

THE CASE OF AFRICULTURBAN

Africulturban is a sociocultural organization, housed in the Complexe Culturel Léopold Sédar Senghor de Pikine, which organizes workshops, festivals, and formal courses in various urban arts with the goal of making information about the culture and its practices accessible to the impoverished youth of Dakar's peripheral districts. The Senegalese rapper Matador (Babacar Niang), Africulturban's founder, was inspired by the Belgian organism "Lezarts Urbain" while visiting Brussels and brought the concept

back to Dakar, only to run into funding and sponsorship issues (Fall Ba 2012). In a recent interview with Walf Fadjri, Niang described the beginning of his endeavor as the most difficult. Convincing people that the hip-hop movement needed structure and that a sort of federation was a prerequisite to keeping the movement alive (Sene 2012). After a failed attempt to organize a concert for the residents forced from their homes in the flooding of 2005, Niang finally found someone willing to orientate his project in Amadou Diarra, the former mayor of Pikine Nord and current deputy. It was through Diarra that Niang was able to find a locale for the association, a crucial, and often difficult step to achieve (Fall Ba 2012; McIlvaine, 2012). As Africulturban demonstrates, if organizations are able to carve out a physical space in which to carry out their activities, their capacity to make room for themselves in society and diffuse their messages greatly increases.

Niang's personal upbringing in the Dakar suburb of Thiaroye and role in the community as a member of Wa BMG 44 (one of the largest groups from the Dakar suburbs) has been his motivation for reinvestment in the community, using the networks and contacts he has accumulated throughout his career. In an interview for Pindra and Keyti's hip-hop documentary, Niang lamented that Thiaroye lacked the basic infrastructure or space for young people to gather or even collect funds among themselves to invest in sports or culture. He credits hip-hop with providing him and the youth of Thiaroye with an alternative culture and network into which they could integrate (Pindra and Keyti 2008). Instead of getting caught up in drug dealing and theft, youth could get caught up in hip-hop and canalize the same anguish that had driven others in their community to turn to illegal and often violent networks into art.

The goals that the organization has for urban artists and youth in the Dakar suburbs—including professionalization, training and education, and raising awareness through performance—can be translated into a broader goal of increasing the living standards of not only the adherents of the movement but also the community as a whole. One of the most concrete examples is the choice of a social theme that accompanies the annual Festa2H hip-hop festival sponsored by Africulturban. Past themes have addressed pertinent social issues that need to be combated in the fight to reduce urban poverty, including HIV/AIDS and illegal immigration to Europe. The free festival, which moves around Dakar and its suburbs to further assure accessibility and attendance, also gives space to the various stakeholders and

initiatives associated with the annual theme to present their projects to the local populations (Fall Ba 2012).

Along with Festa2H, Africulturban undertakes an educational project providing solid evidence of the ways in which hip-hop can be molded to engage youth in acquiring skills and gaining employment. The Hip-Hop Akademy was born on October 2, 2011, and provides training in a variety of forms of cultural expression linked to hip-hop, including DJing, graphic design, video production, communication, marketing, and management. These training sessions are formalized, co-curricular activities accessible to motivated youth from middle school to post–high school age interested in learning more about a certain profession using hip-hop concepts and aesthetics. These *formations* have the explicit goal of helping youth to learn to depend on their own craftsmanship to make a living (Sall 2012). Alongside the formal professional trainings taking place from 3 to 7 p.m. three days a week, Hip-Hop Akademy currently intervenes in four middle and high schools in Pikine and Guédiawaye on Saturdays, offering workshops in all forms of hip-hop cultural expression and engaging actors in a debate on a developmental theme (Sall 2012). Several success stories have already begun to emerge in the six short months of the program's existence. A video course offered by the socially conscious, global media enterprise Nomadic Wax already saw one of its students secure an internship, and several young slammers, graffers, DJs, and rappers who have taken courses at the Hip-Hop Akademy now have their own proper projects on which they can depend for their livelihood (Herson 2012; Sall 2012). Furthermore, the students increase the sustainability of Africulturban by offering their newly acquired skills to the functioning of the organization, reinforcing the endogenous growth potential of the organization and the wider hip-hop movement.

The fact that Africulturban went from getting little response from public bodies and potential supporters in 2006 to gaining proper funding from the City of Dakar in 2012 shows a rather dramatic shift in perceptions about the hip-hop movement's potential for change. Hip-hop has clearly taken on a more socially conscious tone without losing its political vigor, and thus has proven that it can, and should, be considered a serious cultural movement that can be incorporated into a plethora of social movements. As Moustapha Sall of Hip-Hop Akademy clearly states, however, "We're not asking for politicians or institutions to integrate us, what we want is recognition" (Sall 2012).

CONCLUSION

"The key to the future of Senegalese rap is organization—period," claims rapper Xuman in a documentary interview (Pindra and Keyti 2008). Members of the directional team of Africulturban, as well as several Senegalese rappers, lament that hip-hop music does not pay in Senegal and that there is still no sign of a veritable hip-hop business, but none flatly reject that there cannot be one (Fall Ba 2012; Pindra and Keyti 2008). Despite an industry that began to take shape in 2007 with a diversification of languages, styles, and varying levels of commercialism (Herson 2012), I do not intend to argue that developing the hip-hop industry in Senegal is going to lead to poverty reduction by advancing economic growth in any way. Rather, this paper has attempted to trace the deep roots of social activism in Senegalese hip-hop and to show the various ways in which the movement has begun to organize. The various shapes and structures being produced within the movement serve to increase its capacity to galvanize people and engage urban youth who do not normally have access to formal training in acquiring professional skills using the aesthetics and lifestyle of hip-hop.

To be able to see the potential of hip-hop in reducing urban poverty, one needs to see the movement as one not only associated with a history of revolution and rebellion but also exhibiting a trend toward transformation (Fall Ba 2012; Chang 2007). Hip-hop has proven that it can nourish a society, and what is happening in Senegal's hip-hop scene today is essentially an experiment in ways of taking advantage of this nourishment to strengthen and educate urban youth. Cultural associations that promote hip-hop such as Africulturban are able to reach the most at-risk youth and give them a relatable culture through which they can get involved in matters that concern their generation.

Senegal's experience and localization of this global movement serve as an exemplar for creating new and innovative ways to use an artistic subculture to advance social change and reduce urban poverty. If one "takes a good look" at where hip-hop in Senegal is coming from and where it is going, one can see much more than political engagement; one sees a youth movement bringing about social change. The election of Macky Sall in March has proven, to some extent, that hip-hop artists are capable of translating the subversive language of their culture into a politically intelligible urban movement that has been able to impose itself on a national scale. If it

can continue to fight for the recognition it deserves through initiatives such as Hip-Hop Akademy, Festa2H, Xeex Sibbiru, and the various social campaigns and causes to which individual artists attach themselves, not only will local institutions be forced to acknowledge the culture but the culture will also continue to enrich itself and play an increasingly important role in development. If we continue to support the types of initiatives created by the *Boul Falé* generation within the cultural realm of hip-hop, we are bound to see quantifiable, and positive social change.

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Entitlements and Capabilities of Young "Citizens": Participatory Community Involvement of At-Risk Youth in Argentine Cities

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, I consider how Argentine urban youth become contributing members of their respective spaces, developing the importance of forging collective identities as a means to produce a current and future sentiment of citizenship among young people. First, I establish what makes youth a particularly vulnerable group in urban areas in Latin America at large, and, subsequently, in Argentine cities. Then, I evaluate the problematic nature of focusing solely on schooling systems as the predominant tool for fostering a sense of citizenship for youth in Argentina. Ultimately, by analyzing the added value of participatory planning processes geared toward youth—citing specific case studies from the cities of Rosario and Buenos Aires—I strive to gain a better understanding of the policy "entitlements" that contribute to an engaged youth citizenry, while also considering youths' own "capabilities" to strengthen their communities and cities from the inside out.

INTRODUCTION: YOUTH AS MEMBERS AND PRODUCERS OF THEIR SPACES

Although young people are becoming an increasingly dominant subset of the population in Latin American cities, they often lack resilience in spite of their numbers, surfacing as an indelibly vulnerable group within urban areas. Due to their inability to vote and lack of individual voice outside the context of the adults surrounding them, they have very few venues to contribute to the spaces where they reside, yielding their marginal stakeholder status within their respective communities. In turn, this manifests itself as confounded notions of belonging among youth, which for the purpose of this paper I term "citizenship."

Lawy and Biesta define citizenship among youth as "a social practice that is embedded within the day-to-day reality of (young) people's lives, instead of a fixed outcome of a linear socialization trajectory," while De Visscher and Bouverne–De Bie further assert that "citizenship-as-practice suggests that young people learn to be citizens as a consequence of their participation in the actual practices that make up their lives" (cited by Hardoy et al. 2010, 379). Considering these two definitions, we establish citizenship among youth as a highly active process, one in which day-to-day interactions, high levels of engagement in their communities, and strong structural and intrapersonal relationships are extremely critical to their success as citizens. This not only establishes the importance of continuity in building citizenship for young people but also shows how *present*-day contexts and policy measures can have profound effects on the *future* of youth as contributing adult members in their community.

To better comprehend the importance of youth community involvement in low-income areas writ large, throughout the paper, I build the discourse around the following questions: Do policy measures or programs that ultimately build a more comprehensive meaning of citizenship for youth in urban areas of Argentina aid in decreasing deviance and violence among such groups? Do subsequent outcomes represent larger strides toward improving the general livelihoods of young people within their respective communities? Monetary and infrastructural resources can be provided, but at what point can we empower youth and foster a sense of belonging that generates the same sentiments—and, as a result, stake and responsibility—that come along with citizenship?

While examining outcomes from policies and programs that work toward inclusive measures for at-risk youth in Argentina, one needs to bear in mind the critical interplay between entitlements and capabilities when crafting policies for the urban poor, as developed by the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen (1987). This is a particularly useful theoretical framework to consider when discussing youth citizenship because belonging to a community not only involves granting entitlements (the publicly administered tools and resources that sustain livelihoods) to tie individuals to their places but also heavily relies on the accumulated capabilities of a concerned public to contribute and continually improve upon collective spaces, ranging from citizens of neighborhoods to citizens of nations.

In the first section of the paper, I explain why youth are such a vulnerable group in Latin America, and, more specifically, in Argentina. Then I outline the problematic importance of Argentine educational institutions as the main arena to advance citizenship among young people. I go on to explore the benefits of participatory planning for youth, first generally, and then citing specific examples from a greater Buenos Aires squatter settlement and a comprehensive youth engagement program in Rosario. Ultimately, I develop and stress the need to espouse interactive policies that breed a lasting sense of belonging among youth in their communities as a function of reducing deviant behavior and creating opportunities for education and mobility, and thus improving the quality of life for the majority of urban residents.

URBAN YOUTH IN LATIN AMERICA AND ARGENTINA

To comprehend the relevance of examining youth policy in urban environments, we must first understand the demographic and cultural makeup of this expanding subset of the population—first in Latin America, and then, more specifically, in urban areas of Argentina. First of all, those under the age of twenty-five years constitute about half the population in nearly every Latin American nation (Wolseth and Babb 2008). Thus their sheer numbers give us cause to consider policies that could lower their risk factors and facilitate avenues for their achievements. Second, while the rise of globalized production modes in cities has had a profound effect on economies worldwide, policymakers often overlook the specific ramifications of the new workforce formation for younger populations.

Nonetheless, there is substantial reason to consider youth when discussing the reverberating outcomes of increasingly global and neoliberal economic policy. When parents engage in out-migration for the sake of finding work in more advanced economies, they are often leaving behind families, rendering more and more youth lacking stability in their basic socialization structure—the traditional family unit. In fact, averaged data from a World Bank study (Justesen 2008) of four Argentine urban areas show that only 25 percent of female and 28 percent of male youth (ages fifteen to twenty-four years) live in dual-parent households (see table 1).

Table 1. Parents Present in Households with Argentine Youth, 2005

	Female Youth			Male Youth		
	None	One	Both	None	One	Both
15 years	3.4	72.7	23.9	4.8	58.7	36.5
16 years	13.2	57.1	29.7	10.3	65.4	24.4
17 years	7.4	70.4	22.2	7.7	47.4	44.9
18 years	10.8	52.3	36.9	11.7	60.0	28.3
19 years	19.7	54.9	25.4	8.1	66.2	25.7
20 years	30.6	51.4	18.1	21.3	49.0	29.8
21 years	28.8	42.4	28.8	14.6	60.4	25.0
22 years	37.5	41.1	21.4	20.4	59.2	20.4
23 years	35.0	40.4	24.6	27.9	44.2	27.9
24 years	49.2	30.2	20.6	31.3	46.9	21.9

Source: Justesen (2008).

This is not to say that the erosion of the "nuclear" family composition is always a detriment to the socialization of youth. But much of the research indicates that one-parent households breed less child monitoring that can yield "deviant" behaviors (see Kim, Hetherington, and Rice 1999).

Moreover, single-parent households in Latin America spur a heightened need for youth to contribute to the family's income, most often through

finding low-wage, predominantly informal jobs. In Latin America at large, 30 million young people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four years are informally employed, which equates to more than half of employed youth in the region (Wolseth and Babb 2008). Worse yet, in Argentina, 60 percent of unemployed individuals are under the age of thirty (Hardoy et al. 2010). Therefore, many children must turn to informal street activity in order to generate marginal income that will help provide basic needs for their families. The effects that surface become somewhat cyclical; due to an increased number of youth working for the general livelihood of themselves and their families, young people become occupied during schooling hours, are forced to forgo an adequate education, and are unable to eventually advance into the realm of formal-sector employment. Due to a lack of entitlements granted for low-income communities in Latin American cities, youth play to their capability to sustain their livelihoods, which thus traps them in a continual state of informality that hinders their social advancement through traditional educative means.

Nonetheless, government youth policies in Latin America often stress the need for education without providing the concrete means to attain it, thus readily ignoring the consequences that globalization has had on a young workforce. As education policy scholars Carlos Torres and Adriana Puiggrós write in an article for the *Comparative Education* (1995, 17-18):

> Globalization also explains the heterogeneity of production, which in turn, increases inequalities of income distribution.… The situation can be illustrated by a tour around the numerous cafés and bars in the city of Buenos Aires, which in recent years have been filled by a population of begging children, the so-called street children. Although they cannot read, since they have either dropped out or never attended school, they understand the rules of city life and can look after themselves.… They love and hate schools, that privileged place they have been excluded from.

Such sentiments provide valuable insight into certain youths' attitudes toward educational processes in Latin America. At 66 percent (see figure 1), the majority of both male and female youth in urban areas in Argentina attend school. This leaves an overwhelming 34 percent of those ranging from fifteen to twenty-four subject to idleness, unemployment, and work.

For the lowest-classes of youth, sustaining their livelihoods in the streets of cities like Buenos Aires, schools are more viewed as places of elitism that the young urban poor strive to access while simultaneously disregarding them as socioeconomically segregated places of exclusion.

Figure 1. Primary Activity for Youth in Argentina, 2005



Source: Justesen (2008).

Closely tied to factors upon which I elaborate below, the 34 percent of Argentine youth not attending school clearly correlates with lower socioeconomic statuses, and, in turn, fewer preventive forces keeping them out of trouble. Hence, socially disadvantaged young people, who have complex attachments to the public schooling system—the institution on which policymakers focus the majority of their energies and efforts when crafting policies geared toward youth—have little opportunity to reap the benefit of such efforts that strive to generate a sense of inclusion and belonging for them within normative Argentine society. In the next section of the paper, I examine the Argentine case of youth interaction and policy in a more specific manner, considering what constitutes "at-risk" youth, how the school system attempts to forge a vision of citizenship among young people, and how this in turn excludes those most at-risk for deviance, fostering an even stronger sense of exclusion among already peripheral members of young society.

ARGENTINE SCHOOLS AS SIMULTANEOUS SPACES OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND EXCLUSION

In a study of just over 2,000 youth ages fifteen to twenty-four in Buenos Aires and three other large Argentine cities, Justesen (2008) establishes how variables such as family relations, health, education, family income, substance abuse, and violence are useful in showing what generates risk or, contrarily, serve as preventive forces against deviant behaviors for young people. Through his study, which was administered by the World Bank, he brings to light that almost half of Argentine youth are living at what he terms as an "elevated risk level."

Evident protective factors such as family and parental guidance, adequate health care, financial support, neighborhood security, educational opportunities, and job/life training exist for many Argentine youth. But Justesen highlights how for even such seemingly privileged young individuals, heightened risk factors, such as neighborhood risk and community violence, produce almost equal opportunities to engage in negative and detrimental behaviors, swiftly eclipsing the protective factors (figure 2).

Figure 2. Correlation between Protective/Risk Factors and Behaviors/Consequences



Note: Size of bubbles indicates cluster size.
Source: Justesen (2008).

Above all, many scholars present the lack of adequate schooling for the most at-risk youth as at the forefront of such sources of harm. As Justesen (2008, 22) continues, "For out of school youth, unemployment and idleness are risk factors, because they may reduce self-esteem by the feeling of marginalization or lead to skill degradation." In this passage, Justesen not only equates an absence of schooling with a lack of proper skill development that contributes to unemployment and idleness, but he also makes a point to acknowledge that such an absence will have enduring effects on the self-esteem and individual worth of young people. This, consequently, contributes to a sense of marginalization that further detracts from an overt sense of citizenship for youth in Argentine urban environments. Ultimately Justesen establishes the seemingly simple solution to reduce risk factors while simultaneously increasing positive protective factors for youth. In so doing, he plays to Sen's (1987) theory of entitlements versus capabilities, calling for measures to help youth through the provision of vital resources, while also building networks and bettering disadvantaged neighborhoods in order to forge a sustainable support system for adolescents in the present day and beyond.

Despite this appeal for community-based mechanisms to improve the lives of youth, Justesen still concludes that in urban areas in Argentina, the government should implement a policy that strives to inform an active and engaged citizenry *within* the schooling system. Therefore, the reader is left with the impression that though alternative means for engaging youth within communities are clearly necessary and recommended in order to improve the status of those already out of school, the ultimate solution goes back to educative means. Again, with 34 percent of fifteen- to twenty-four-year-olds outside the school system, this is neither an accessible nor sustainable forum for aiding those in the most danger of deviance, further eroding youths' capacity to project a future out of poverty through any realistic means other than schooling.

Looking at the Argentine school system curriculum's approach to civic engagement further exemplifies the reality of decreased citizenship among "socially deviant" youth and overasserts the importance of schooling without developing strategies for an inclusive academic environment for all socioeconomic classes. In Article 6 of the Argentine Constitution, the role of education is developed as such:

> The Argentine education system will promote men and women's comprehensive and continuous education; [an education] that will foster national identity under regional, continental and universal worldviews.… [Education will allow men and women] to develop the capacities for elaborating their own life project that [is a] result of existential decisions; [an education that will help to develop men and women as] responsible citizens, critical protagonists, creators and change-makers of society, [and] defenders of democratic institutions and the environment. (cited by Astiz and Mendez 2006, 183)

This clause shows the importance of school for fostering a "national identity" among Argentine youth, with the ultimate goal of the education system in Argentina serving to develop their men and women not only as "responsible citizens" of the future but also as instigators of change within their society.

This ideology presents two main sources of harm. First, it makes it seem as if educational institutions are the sole way to foster a coherent sense of belonging and identity, which inherently excludes the large portion of youth who are either employed, idle, or unemployed. Second, even for those youth who are in school, the curriculum focuses on generating citizens for the *future* of Argentina. This can deny youth the capacity to be engaged members of civil society in the *present* (Del Felice and Wisler 2007). By underestimating young people's abilities to be informed and active citizens for today as a societal group, this discourse instead projects the importance of commitment to their national identity and its values and ideals into the future. By not giving youth the desire to be immediate stakeholders, it intrinsically devalues their importance as young citizens today. Additionally, for those living in disadvantaged areas that have fewer visible markers or examples of what a successfully engaged and integrated adult citizenry resembles, a feeling of discouragement and hopelessness for their future as citizens pervades, as I explain below when looking at youths' self-perception in Barrio San Jorge in Buenos Aires.

Astiz and Mendez (2006), two scholars focusing on education as a pathway to citizenship in Argentina, illustrate the existing positive correlation between social interactions and the social development of citizenship and the overall functionality of political institutions. This points to the importance of inclusive notions of citizenship for not only the youth that

such policies may target, but also for the betterment of the entire political system. Nonetheless, they acknowledge the viable concern that citizenship in Argentina is almost singularly fostered in schools. "To say that the curriculum exclusively determines students' civic development to the exclusion of other influences is problematic," Astiz and Mendez (2006, 194), write: "There are a multitude of non-schooling forces at play that might influence students' knowledge and skills." This also aids in establishing the importance of external knowledge acquired outside the school system, while highlighting the added value of such informal educative pathways to civic development. In the next section of the paper, I discuss ways to engage youth as citizens outside the educational environment, so as to later be able to develop and compare such methods to the case studies in Rosario and Buenos Aires.

PARTICIPATORY PLANNING: TOOLS TO ENGAGE YOUTH OUT OF VIOLENT OR RISKY BEHAVIOR

We now look at mechanisms that support youth outside school as a way to forge identities for both their present and future. It is beneficial to approach community building for youth as not only a means to create safer neighborhoods and ensure the well-being of their residents but also as a way to forge identities that youth can equate to a sense of inclusion that eventually breeds a lasting sentiment of citizenship. This is so critical because, by encouraging a sense of belonging that can shape youth identity in a space, youth inevitably become more invested in their communities and the upgrading process becomes a sustainable process. This aligns with McWhirter and McWhirter's (2008) deduction that in policies geared toward at-risk youth, it is critical to generate a constructive vision of a projected future that lends hope and optimism to potential policy outcomes.

McWhirter and McWhirter further define hope as combining *agency* (creating goal-oriented plans) with *pathways* (planning ways to achieve said goals). In distressed Argentine urban areas, even by constructing this "imaginary" of hope for social advancement, policy constrained by budgeting can still generate small markers for future successes for youth, also promising the eventual betterment of the community itself. In using the term "imaginary of hope," it is important to note that even in falsified or

exaggerated visions of a positive future, youth can be motivated to decrease at-risk behaviors and take steps toward personal betterment. Though it is evidently much more beneficial to provide concrete and realistic plans that can be achieved, sometimes simply providing hope through agency can be a catalyst for youth to better their respective positions independently, or, more important, work with their peers to collaboratively invest more in their communities. Ideally, similarly to how entitlements must be skillfully paired with the identified capabilities of urban poor, combining agency and pathways in generating policy in distressed urban areas will yield the most successful outcomes for youth and their communities.

Hence, what are the best current strategies to include youth in the betterment of urban areas, and how can we combine agency and pathways to foster hope among young people in desolate neighborhoods? First and foremost, we cannot underestimate the importance of youths' voices in the planning process. Knowles-Yánez (2005, 5) stresses the need for youth to have an active role in urban planning within the public spaces they utilize most. Referencing the urban planner Shirl Buss, she writes,

> Buss (1994) described children as "capable co-researchers who can, and should be involved in negotiations about urban space" (p. 573).… For Buss, involving children in planning activities served to inform planners of the complex, not always predictable, perspective of children; empowered children; and helped to make the built environment safer for children and more capable of nourishing their development.

This approach surfaces youths' capabilities of articulating naïveté, simplicity, and functionality in specific spaces, which forces planners to consider an otherwise overlooked point of view that could result in a valuable policy approach, yielding positive results for communities as a whole.

Buss and Yanez therefore present the concept of involving children in the planning process as mutually beneficial to both adults and youth. Looking at urban development through a child's eyes lends unpredictable insights that adults have lost over time. For children, it contributes to a sense of ownership of their communities that they may not have felt before, making a shift from traditional means of "protection and provision" policies (Chawla 2002) to one of participation and active engagement. Simply

put, children have the longest future ahead of them of any societal group, and they are often the biggest users of outdoor public spaces. Participating in planning processes, from the mapping of parks to determining how funding for youth programs should be utilized, can allow children to learn the formal skills of democratic citizenship, assess their own needs in their local environment, and establish lifelong habits of interest in and care for their communities.

Still, it is important to not only invest capital entitlements in the community spaces dominated by children but to also contribute to the human resources that surround them in order to successfully implement effective means of participation in creating such spaces. Before committing to a participatory project, the adults involved need to "plan for the plan" by reviewing goals, limits, opportunities, and human capital; by considering the temporality of resources; by arranging for coordination between valuable and interested stakeholders; and by targeting the young people who will most benefit from involvement (Chawla 2002).

In considering the role of adult actors in participatory processes, one also must be very intentional about the nature of the interaction in order to avoid the development of patronizing relationships between young people and project implementers. In an article arguing for youth inclusion in peace building, Del Felice and Wisler (2007, 26) expand upon how activities that are administered peer to peer can have greater success rates than adult-implemented programs. They write that "the key to success is allowing youth the space, time and trust to take up the initiative," highlighting the importance of interpersonal and intrapersonal relationships both among youth and with the project implementers.

Del Felice and Wisler discuss how children and youth are often considered victims or perpetrators of violence within their communities, and are seldom-included actors with critical perspective into peace-building mechanisms. They even go so far to say that the lack of youth participation in decision-making processes in various governance forums is a form of structural violence in itself. Although this is an exaggerated viewpoint in terms of the ramifications of excluding youth from participatory planning exercises, it still allows us to enter a modality of thought in which children's perspectives are deemed incredibly decisive for building sustainable triumphs in reducing urban violence and improving upon the lives of urban poor at large.

Though youth participatory planning is a fairly new policy phenomenon, in the final section of the paper, I briefly discuss the benefits of such an approach for fostering ideals of citizenship among young people in the municipality of Rosario. I then highlight the recent successes and failures of policies geared toward engaging youth in Barrio San Jorge, a neighborhood of greater Buenos Aires, considering the potential for program implementers to administer participatory forms of policy to yield greater success in a visibly deteriorating neighborhood.

FROM PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN ROSARIO TO INCLUSIVE PROGRAMMING IN BUENOS AIRES

Participatory budgeting is a policy trend that began in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in the late 1980s, has since swept throughout a number of Latin American cities, and is now even being piloted everywhere from New York to Toronto. Its benefits for adult participants are being heralded far and wide as a pure, as well as successful, form of democratic engagement. For instance, by conducting in-depth interviews with forty men and women involved with participatory budgeting in Rosario, an Argentine city of more than 1 million, Lerner and Schugurensky (2005, 1) stress the extreme significance of such policies in creating more educated and better citizens. They emphasize how "[their] findings indicate that participatory budgeting is an informal educative space that provides powerful learning experiences in citizenship and democracy. Participants become more knowledgeable, skilled, democratic, engaged, and caring, which demonstrates that participatory budgeting serves as an innovative 'school of citizenship.'"

Although this passage is referring to participatory methods for adults, it brings to light the importance for both policymakers and community organizers of facilitating informal spaces of education for individuals to enable them to become more engaged citizens of their municipality. One must consider why such inclusive planning processes are seldom used when targeted to youth. One could make the case that the school itself is the sole "school of citizenship" for youth, serving as the pervading forum to inform young people of the benefits of getting involved in their local communities. However, as was deduced above, the most at-risk youth do not always have access to a sound and high-quality education, and as more young

Argentines turn their back on the school system in order to instead sustain livelihoods, informal spaces for formulating similar sentiments of citizenship are necessary.

Nonetheless, even among contributors to the participatory budget process, formal educational institutions still had profound ties to an all-encompassing form of citizenship. For some survey participants, the informal context of partaking in the city budgeting process had reverberating effects on their own educational desires. For instance, one woman interviewed stated that "[participatory budgeting] convinced me to go back to get my high school degree, to learn what we didn't know" (Lerner and Schugurensky 2005, 1). Although this positively reflects how participatory processes cultivate a stronger aspiration for members to become more involved citizens and explore more "traditional" means of civic socialization, it simultaneously negates the importance of the innovative method that initially spurred the desires for engagement. It is thus important to consider a project like participatory budgeting not as an entitlement that can put citizens on the traditional path to forging citizenship, but instead consider it as a way to play to the capabilities of urban residents to make decisions and hold higher stakes in their communities.

I further argue that if governing institutions promoted such possibilities for community involvement from an early age, this could yield positive outcomes with regard to producing a stronger sentiment of engagement among young people both in and outside the classroom. In Rosario, a municipality-run youth center called the PYB attempted to do just that. Beyond offering a number of significant social services to help with employment, education, and health, the center also "aims to develop the recognition of the rights of young people; to simulate their participation in community life" (Del Felice and Wisler 2007, 17).

Although this simulation may be typically found in other community-based youth organizations, the PYB is innovative in that

> (a) most of the spaces of ways of communication and participation. (b) Often, youth public policies define an asymmetric power relationship between adults and youth, youth are beneficiaries of projects. In the PYB, youth are protagonists and partners of the local government in the design and implementation of the projects. (c) Often, youth are considered the "future," in the PYB young

> people have to make decisions and implement projects in the present. They become actors here and now. And (d) the PYB aims at integrating a youth perspective into all public policies (Del Felice and Wisler 2007, 18).

Though we have yet to see the long-term effects of such highly inclusive policies, the project in Rosario is clearly innovative in that youth are considered citizens in the here and now, which will make it more likely for them to stay engaged community members for the future. The adults who orchestrate the PYB fully realize the capabilities of young people to lend a valuable perspective to many different forms of social policies within the center, and as Del Felice and Wisler (2007, 19) conclude, "Youth are not manipulated, they are consulted and mobilized, but most importantly they are in charge and participate meaningfully and exercise their citizenship rights. In this way, youth public policy promotes spaces where social conflicts become opportunities for constructive change." Such change inexorably benefits whole communities by ensuring that youth become stakeholders in such spaces through alternative means than schooling. In so doing, the adults that foster the programs help spark a desire among youth to effect change in their communities and become true citizens of the spaces they inhabit.

I now keep in mind the successes of the municipality of Rosario while turning my focus to youth policy within the Barrio San Jorge in Buenos Aires. Barrio San Jorge is a squatter settlement developed in the 1960s on the periphery of the city center as a resettlement from flood-prone areas. As a study from the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) conducted in the late 1980s establishes, the neighborhood suffered from low health and living standards, and residents had very low educational levels, with only roughly half the population having completed primary school (Hardoy, Hardoy, and Schusterman 1991).

Such disparate conditions resulted in community members taking action when state and municipal forces failed to provide the necessary entitlements to keep the area safe and livable. In 1987, residents and members of a local parish decided to build a mother and child center in the barrio, with a focus on nutrition and health services for children, advancing economic development and yielding employment opportunities for women in the barrio, and providing child care during working hours for mothers. The IIED initially financed the project, which

resulted in building a community library and meeting space and paving streets by creatively mixing waste from a nearby factory with cement (Hardoy, Hardoy, and Schusterman 1991).

Although such self-generated policies revolved around the mother and child center, youth involvement was not a relevant component of the organizational approach. In a follow-up study conducted in 2010, the IIED gathered youth perceptions of life in the barrio. Though not quantitatively robust, highlighting youth perceptions nearly a generation after the policies were implemented lends valuable qualitative insight to the successes and failures of the youth-focused policies. It is important to note that the study was aligned with the IIED's efforts to aid in launching a subprogram titled "Promeba Joven," which aims at targeting youth needs through involvement in activities both inside and outside the barrio (Hardoy et al. 2010).

Considering the impact of the study, while some youth expressed contentment with the physical state of the neighborhood and saw small markers of progress develop throughout their childhood, many still feel as if the barrio is not salvageable and community projects are entirely futile. As one young man said in an interview with the IIED researchers, "Today, with everything broken, it's difficult to keep hopes up and work for the *barrio*, you get demoralized.… Some believe in the work being done, others don't" (Hardoy et al. 2010, 379).

The authors of the IIED study specifically point out that visible physical advancements do not target issues of youth violence, under/unemployment, education, or access to health services—factors that, as Justesen established, are at the forefront of youth deviance or success. Additionally, collective youth memory does not appear to revolve around large infrastructural changes in the neighborhood, but instead around targeted youth programs like soccer teams and community gardening (Hardoy et al. 2010). One must consider that such activities are not merely ways for youth to pass their time but also become so important in the barrio partly because of their strongly inclusive nature, allowing young people to be connected to their place through the peers and leaders that share these activities, as opposed to having to face the reality of the physical deterioration of the neighborhood. Such participatory processes, similar to what we saw in the youth center in Rosario, can generate intentional and vested interest among youth in the neighborhood, along with a sense of ownership that does not exist in the purely adult-oriented means of planning.

Despite such halfhearted attempts to commit youth to their neighborhood—barring another failed attempt to connect youth with volunteer architects to design public plazas in 2006—in Barrio San Jorge, such participatory methods were generally lackluster, and consequently so was young people's sense of belonging and interest in the community. Hence, their behavioral patterns become self-reinforcing; if at all able, young people from the barrio express a desire to leave the neighborhood as a path toward social mobility, leaving behind the tattered remains of a life they would prefer to forget (Hardoy et al. 2010).

Looking forward, the new IIED-administered outreach programs call for the integration of youth into the community, as well as promoting support for and the individuality of young people in the neighborhood (Hardoy et al. 2010). Exploring policies such as participatory budgeting, community planning, and peer-to-peer learning could be extremely valuable policy tools to ensure that the youth of Barrio San Jorge can not only project a future outside the neighborhood but also generate a desire to improve upon, take pride in, and build upon their current community. For the time being, as demonstrated through the consolidated sentiments of youth from Barrio San Jorge, youth policies seldom recognize the unique perspective of young people. This leaves their capabilities, including their wide breadth of knowledge about their community, entirely underused and devalued.

CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF PARTICIPATORY BELONGING

As I have developed the theme throughout this paper, when working with youth, particularly in Latin American cities, it is not only important to provide young people with the resources they need to further advance their societal status, but it is also imperative to foster a sense of participatory belonging that will be embedded in their collective memory, sustain them through the present realities of their situation as young people, and continue all the way into a projected hopeful future within their communities.

As was exemplified in the cases of Rosario and Barrio Jorge in Buenos Aires, promoting participatory belonging means allowing for youth who cannot feel a sense of belonging in relation to their physical space due to a lack of visible positive representations of success to help foster place-based

connections through connections to people and ideologies promoted in their communities. However, it is important to keep in mind that it is not necessarily purely the participatory aspect that yields successes for the project itself, and it is crucial to note that local knowledge without any form of expertise can be detrimental to a community. Participatory planning should not be seen as a way to fill the void of entitlements provided by state or local governing entities, but instead as a complementary process that produces positive outcomes and higher instances of civic engagement from the neighborhood level up. Nonetheless, one can place a high value on the innate sense of belonging to a community that such methods generate, most specifically among youth.

Ultimately, though the results of participatory forms of democracy for youth are not the only solution to urban poverty and the lack of access to social services for youth populations, through tight financial times, one must stress the importance of finding innovative policies that breed a sense of enduring belonging to youth in their respective communities. In doing so, one establishes youth as valuable members of society, thus allowing for them to envision a productive future where they not only have the resources but also the individual capabilities to function as connected citizens.

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Grassroots English Clubs as Sites of Learning and Democratic Debate in Urban Senegal

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INTRODUCTION

African urban youth constitute the demographic majority of the world's fastest-growing and poorest continent (United Nations 2012; UNECA 2011), and thus they are viewed as a substantial bank of human capital in the eyes of many international agencies and governments. Yet in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), where nearly two-thirds of youth are out of school (UNESCO 2011), the cohort continues to slip between the cracks in terms of educational planning and development. Contrasting starkly with the global rally for universal primary education stemming from the World Declaration on Education for All (Mundy 2006), secondary education receives the lowest proportion of donor funding within education (UNESCO 2011) and has failed to keep up with the rising numbers of basic education completers. Even nonformal education, which has often been considered essential to achieving Education for All in SSA (UNESCO 2011), concentrates on primary and adult learners (Hoppers 2009; Sommers 2007). In recent years, youth have made their most substantial appearance in educational planning through efforts to expand vocational training and labor force insertion (see UNESCO 2012; UNECA 2011; Adams 2011; Johanson and Adams 2004), which may indicate that, in terms of policy, youth education becomes prioritized when viewed as a tool to accelerate economic growth and boost workforce productivity.

The limited quantity and type of educational opportunities for urban SSA youth and the preferential promotion of skills-based training raises important questions about the aims and objectives of education for the urban poor in Africa. By instrumentalizing youth education for work force insertion, policy risks taking a simplistic stance on poverty whereby elevated earnings directly equate with decreased impoverishment. However, urban poverty is multidimensional and includes the deprivation not only of money but also of freedoms and well-being, a concept reflected in the human development agenda now used by many international agencies (Fukuda-Parr 2003; Haq and Kidar 1988). For instance, according to the World Bank's poverty reduction strategy (Baharoglu and Kessides 2002), education forms one of five dimensions of urban poverty—urban poverty prevents youth from fully accessing a high-quality education, yet education also mitigates the effects of urban poverty's other four dimensions, health, income, security, and empowerment. Education's spillover effects have been lauded by both economists (Appiah and McMahon 2002) and scholars (Sommers 2007; Nussbaum 2006; Sen 1999b) and include civic engagement, democratization, and environmental sustainability. Therefore, while job attainment and financial security remain essential to diminishing urban poverty for youth and undoubtedly remain a motivating factor for youth to seek educational opportunities (Sommers 2007), education's role cannot be limited to workforce preparation.

This paper argues that in order to conceptualize and plan for education as a dimension of urban poverty, educators and policymakers must understand the learning needs and objectives of urban youth, especially in relation to freedom and well-being in local, and often harsh, environments. Urban sociogeographic realities demand a diverse set of skills, including basic literacy and numeracy and vocational skills, but extending to areas that may not be taught within current formal and nonformal structures. For this reason, youths' perceptions on school, work, and day-to-day realities should inform educational planning. Furthermore, when youth have a role in designing and leading educational programs, learning occurs in an organic and culturally relevant way, as opposed to foreign models transposed on SSA settings (Reagan 2000; Antal and Easton 2009), and also increases the learners' ownership in learning processes (Sommers 2007). Because planning for youth education has until now remained relatively limited, planners have the exciting opportunity to innovate and pilot new

forms of learning and have the opportunity to learn from existing youth educational efforts in SSA.

This research describes one such small-scale, youth-led learning system that has arisen in the midst of urban poverty and that illustrates the learning processes and outcomes that could inform future policy. In urban Senegal, many youth engage in nonformal, participatory circles of learning called English clubs (ECs), which are organized and led at a grassroots level. Using the narratives of youth participants in Dakar and other urban centers, I expose a type of learning whose outcomes include the acquisition of skills and capabilities that the learners deemed important, including the English language and peer relationships. Furthermore, the ECs functioned as a forum for a type of debate that encouraged deliberation on key social issues, raising several questions about how these clubs may actually contribute to the creation and maintenance of a democratic and just society.

To evaluate processes and outcomes of the ECs, I employ Amartya Sen's (1980, 1999b) concept of human capabilities, the theoretical framework underpinning the human development agenda. With his capability approach (CA), Sen (1999b) envisions development as human freedom and views education as a means of developing necessary skills for full participation in society. Of particular importance to this study is Sen's concept of constructive democracy, which posits that through debating and deliberating, citizens can consensually reform and reevaluate values, norms, and processes to work toward a more democratic and just society. ECs display many of the qualities of education required to achieve human development in the eyes of CA theorists. However, CA does not recommend a pedagogical model to achieve its desired outcomes (Walker and Unterhalter 2007); therefore, this research evaluates EC peer learning through Wenger's (1998) theory of social learning and communities of practice (CoP). Thus in addition to describing innovative, urban grassroots nonformal education (NFE), this paper also proposes the synthesis of a pedagogical and a theoretical framework to further the future of policy and planning.

The use of theoretical and pedagogical frameworks also transforms this small-scale, qualitative study into translatable results and provides an example of how planners can seek within to find solutions to including urban youth in education. To frame my research, I first give a brief description of urbanization, education, youth, and language in Senegal and then outline the tenets of CA and CoP as they relate to this study. Then after a

discussion of methodologies of field research, I describe and discuss findings collected in Dakar. The study shows that participation in ECs is transformative, largely due to the peer-based learning techniques and the spaces provided to debate socially relevant issues. In fact, learning English became secondary to the development of other capabilities such as social awareness, empowerment, and interpeer relationships. This paper suggests that education and development programs and policies concerned with urban youth can plan for and evaluate student learning by attempting to explain what processes and subjects are relevant and engaging.

SENEGAL, URBAN YOUTH, AND EDUCATION

The greater Dakar area houses more than a quarter of the nation's population but constitutes only 0.3 percent of its landmass (Ndiaye 2000). Senegal's urbanization dates back to the 1970s, when crop failures and drought forced many farmers into cities, and particularly to the Dakar metropolitan area (Ndiaye 1985). Along with external migrants, urban redevelopment in the 1960s and 1970s relocated inner-city habitants to the undeveloped suburbs (Baller 2007; Vernière 1973) and contributed to the present-day high rates of urban inequality. Whereas central Dakar now houses luxury shopping centers, elite schools, and housing developments, suburbs such as Pikine and Guediawaye continue to be associated with high rates of social problems such as drugs, violence, and risky sexual behavior (Werner 1993) and lack adequate public facilities such as roads, hospitals, and schools. Though Senegalese gross domestic product has steadily increased during the past decade, this does not correlate positively with urban poverty: in 1990, 46 percent of Dakar residents were living on less than $2 per day, as compared with 64 percent in 2004 (Sarr 2004). Household surveys also show that although poverty is less prevalent in urban areas, rates of inequality are much higher than in rural milieus (World Bank 2006).

In terms of education, Senegal has made strides to attaining universal primary education, reporting a gross enrollment rate for primary schools of 83.5 percent and a net enrollment rate of 75.2 percent. However, the secondary net enrollment rate drops to only 25.1 percent and the youth literacy rate is only 50 percent (UNESCO 2011). Urban children and youth in Senegal have inarguably better access to schools than their rural counter-

parts, but urban poverty has a marked effect on children and youths' ability to access education; three-fourth of children in the wealthiest urban quintile are predicted to attain four or more grades of primary school, as opposed to half the children in the poorest quintile (Montgomery and Hewett 2005, 8). As for youth, the government has committed to improving "qualifying education" opportunities in its sectorwide strategic plan and prioritizes job readiness (République du Senegal 2003).

In addition to formal education, the Senegalese government operates a substantial NFE system and contracts with nongovernmental organizations and bilateral and multilateral agencies for program design and implementation (Diop 2005; Diouf, Mbaye, and Nachtmann 2001). Though most NFEs target primary learners (Clemons and Yerende 2009; Klaas and Trudell 2010) and adults (Kuenzi 2011; Hoppers 2005; Sall 2005; Diop 2005), grassroots youth NFE has been well documented in urban areas (Tsolakis 2011; Baller 2007; Diouf 2005). In addition to skills acquisition, NFE participants are also found to have higher levels of civic and community engagement (Keunzi 2011; Clemons and Yerende 2009). Though NFE is often hailed for being more relevant (Hoppers 2009; Rogers 2005), even within NFE, "relevance" is contested. For example, many development agencies print books on themes like health, environment, or other development-related topics for newly literate populations. However, in a study of youth and adult literacy NFE in Dakar, Shiohata (2009) found that new readers used their abilities to enjoy novels and magazines for pleasure, imagination, and escapism. Shiohata (2009, 71) argues that within education, relevancy is "ambiguous" and that "confining the scope [of the curriculum] to livelihood and development is unduly restrictive." This underscores how the motives of learners can be extremely different than those imagined by development and education planners and serves as a reminder that students' own learning goals ultimately shape modes of participation and should be considered in program and policy design.

Relevancy and motivation both factor prominently in this study, because this research describes how urban youth in Senegal are avid consumers of English, a language of little national importance. However, McLaughlin (2001) and Mbaya (2005) note that the English language plays an important role in the formation and performance of Dakarois' youth identity and that several English words have entered the urban Wolof dialect. Interestingly, English is not viewed as an *imposed* colonial language, as it has been written

of in Anglophone Africa (Musau 2003; Omoniyi 2003; Bamgbose 1991; wa Thiong'o 1986), though some would argue that the popularity of English in Senegal results from linguistic imperialism (Phillipson 1992). Pondering its potential role in francophone Africa, Kamwangamalu (2010) postulates that English will further marginalize local languages and also reproduce systems of inequality, whereby those educated in French, generally the urban population, will be the most likely to access English and thus benefit from the opportunities afforded by acquisition. Whether this will be true in Senegal remains unclear. As of now, English occupies a privileged place within the national curriculum and theoretically reaches all school-going youth, starting in the lower secondary cycle (Diallo 2009; Fall 2009). However, many youth who leave school before the secondary level still express a desire to learn and speak English.

This research does not advocate for the increased presence of English in Senegal or other Francophone countries; it does, however, underscore the potential for young people to use a variety of languages, both local and global, for different purposes and personal outcomes. Multilingualism is both a reality and a capability for many urban African youth (Wolff 2011), and languages are rarely used or taught in isolation (Risager 2006). Thus, there are reasons and room to explore how English is being learned and used in a multilingual and francophone country such as Senegal. Furthermore, this research maintains that a learner's social identity cannot be separated from his or her investment in the process of language learning and calls for an examination of the personal and intrinsic benefits than can be garnered through the language acquisition experience (Engholm 1965; Mutaka and Attia 2008).

PEDAGOGICAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS: COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE AND THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH

Senegalese ECs embody many elements of Etienne Wenger's (1998) social learning theory and the concept of a community of practice. First conceived of by Lave and Wenger (1991), who studied apprentice systems around the world, CoPs provide a framework to analyze the learning that happens within "groups of people who share a concern or a passion for something they do and learn how to do it better as they interact regularly" (Wenger 2006, 1). For urban youth in SSA, this type of learning, which often occurs

outside formal schools, may be a primary source of knowledge and skills transfer, and apprenticeship systems have been well documented (Antal and Easton 2009; Diouf, Sheckley, and Kehrhahn 2000). Within these social transfers of knowledge, Wenger (1998) lends significance to identity and the negotiation of meaning and how learners can influence the entire community. The focus on identity also allows for educators to consider how individual experiences and attributes, such as sociogeographic location, can shape one's learning trajectory, as evidenced by the multilayered challenges facing urban youth. In a CoP, Wenger (1998) explains that learning occurs through legitimate peripheral participation, whereby the individual learns by doing and with greater expertise moves from the periphery to the center of the community. This process is shaped by a duality of participation and reification. Participation is defined as the act of engagement with other practitioners and with the practice itself, which enhances abilities and also potentially alters the practice and the CoP. Reification, the "process and product" of participation (Wenger 1998, 60), is represented by the words, traditions, dress, tools, or objects used for and created by the CoP or the greater landscape of practice. Using these terminologies allows educators and policymakers to categorize and legitimize the forms and processes of learning that occur in grassroots settings.

By envisioning education as a transformative and learner-centered activity, CoP also moves away from a purely instrumental vision of education. Wenger (1998, 266) argues that learning should ultimately change the way a person is able to do or be by changing one's "ability to participate, to belong, to negotiate meaning"—or, rather, that education has intrinsic benefits related to communal and societal life. The activities of ECs provide an example of how even the act of learning a specific subject such as English can prepare one with a broader range of social and cultural abilities. This study focuses particularly on how youth practice civic engagement through ECs, a notion supported by Biesta, Lawy, and Kelly (2009, 8), who argue that "young people actually learn democratic citizenship through their participation in the communities and practices that make up their everyday lives." Thus, educational planners concerned with the overall benefits of education must seek to understand how learning occurs outside traditional classrooms and within everyday spaces where youth operate.

Although CoP provides the necessary pedagogical lens for analyzing urban ECs, the capabilities approach provides the relevant normative

framework for assessing education's aims and outcomes within human-centered development (Deneulin and Alkire 2009; Walker and Unterhalter 2007; Robeyns 2005). CA is founded on Amartya Sen's (1980) proposal for a type of development that extends beyond economic growth to factor in quality of life and in which human freedoms serve as both the means and the end. Education factors heavily into CA as a way of expanding one's capabilities, or freedoms, to achieve valued doings and beings that Sen calls functionings; both Sen (1999b) and Nussbaum (2006), the leading CA theorists, have expressed the view that skills commonly associated with formal education—such as learning to read, write, and do basic mathematics—contribute to the achievement of agency, or one's ability to achieve functionings and well-being. CA also recognizes the importance of less concrete skills or capabilities, such as reasoning and intellectual abilities, that learners may have reason to value (Vaughan 2007) and moves educational discourse and policy away from an exclusive focus on science and technology, often seen as elements of economic growth, and toward an education that fosters critical thinking, global engagement, and imagination (Nussbaum 2006).

CA has also been used to assess both multidimensional poverty and the differentiated needs of learners. This is of utmost importance in any discussion about urban youth, who are often seen as better off in terms of material goods and access to education than their rural counterparts but who face an altogether different range of challenges. In this case, CA provides the analytical space to consider the process and opportunity freedoms that can enable or inhibit an individual's ability to make certain choices (Sen 1999b). For example, in an urban setting with a higher concentration of schools, youth may not have the agency freedoms to pursue education due to fees, fears for personal safety while traveling to or from school, or a cultural obligation to work. For those students who are in school, the quality and content of education and the classroom environment can inhibit learning and achievement, and the topics of instruction may not correspond to learners' needs and interests. Thus urban social, cultural, and political milieus may actually limit freedoms and opportunities to pursue a high-quality education, potentially diminishing the individual's ability to convert capabilities to functionings (Sen 2005). However, CA can also account for alternative avenues of learning and ways in which capability sets are widened outside formal school settings and in informal or nonformal venues.

CA also serves as a basis for evaluating the outcomes of ECs that result from debate. Sen (1999a, 1999b) deems open debate as central to the empowerment process because it allows for critiques of cultural and societal norms and practices. When operated in a communicative way, sites of language learning can provide an important forum for self-expression and discussion of social and political topics (Mutaka and Attia 2008). Furthermore, West African cultures highly value oral tradition and public debate in the transmission of norms, values, and knowledge (Avoseh 2001). However, discussion is often hierarchical and unequal, and it tends to revere the voices of elders and discount or silence those of youth, women, and marginalized groups (Auriol and Demonsant 2011). Learning that happens within youth-centered but still culturally relevant structures may provide a space for more democratic and open discussion of how youth view society and their own capabilities and allow for the type of constructive democracy that Sen (1999a) views as important in the shaping of a society's norms and values.

Methodologies

The findings presented in this paper are the product of fieldwork conducted in Senegal from June to August 2011. These findings are qualitative in nature—highlighting the aims, expectations, and experiences of the learners themselves—and thus are relevant to the nature of this study and the selected pedagogical and theoretical frameworks. Research involving CoP requires the examination of context-specific, interpersonal relationships and calls for extensive participant observation (Meyerhoff 2005). Similarly, many CA studies concerned with understanding what individuals and groups have reason to value and whether or not they can achieve functionings also benefit from qualitative analysis because they provide the necessary cultural and contextual lens, which can then be employed in the design larger, quantitative CA research (Alkire 2008). In addition to significant participant and nonparticipant observations, I conducted a series of three semistructured interviews with four different informants who were purposively sampled for the study. I also observed a total of seven different clubs on fifteen different occasions and conducted informal interviews with government officials, teachers, and nonparticipants.

The four informants, whose interview data color the following section, encompass a wide range of social, ethnic, and educational backgrounds that

are highly representational of Senegalese urban youth (who, for the purposes of this study, are defined as fifteen to thirty years of age). Of the two females, Khadija was an eighteen-year-old high school graduate and Amina was a twenty-eight-year-old master's student at a private business school. Of the two males, Jean, twenty-four, was an English student at the public university; and Amadou, twenty-one, had no formal education except for learning English. Amadou, Jean, and Amina lived in Dakar's urban agglomeration and were all urban migrants from different regions. The fourth participant, Khadija, lived in a large town of about 30,000 people located roughly three hours from Dakar, which was a regional center and highlights the importance of urban sites outside the capital. Amadou, Jean, and Amina represented different ethnic minority groups and spoke multiple national languages, whereas Khadija belonged to the Wolof majority and spoke Wolof and French. Because Amadou never attended formal school and grew up in a village with little exposure to French, he was unable to speak French, a rarity for young urban dwellers today. Amadou attended a total of seven ECs, Jean attended three, Amina attended two, and Khadija attended one.

As a researcher, I constantly acknowledged how my status as a racial, religious, and linguistic outsider both facilitated and impeded access to certain spaces (Kvale 2007). Language barriers also challenged the assurance of high-quality data because interviews occurred in either French or English, with a fair degree of code-switching that also involved Wolof. My high-level of French and Wolof, along with rigorous data triangulation, enabled me to clarify misunderstandings.

Learning in Senegalese ECs

The youth interviewed for this study demonstrated many of the characteristics of urban African youth, though their personal trajectories reflected the sociogeographic realities of urban Senegal. Unemployed and seeking education for future job placement, all the participants expressed fears for the future and saw English as increasing their possibility of securing a high-paying job. They also saw English as a critical tool for engaging globally and used the language as a means of self-identification from other youth. Khadija and Jean both felt that knowing English made them "special" and set them apart from peers that only knew a national language or French. For all participants, learning English was an important capability, which

they felt expanded their capabilities and future functionings, especially in relation to travel and work. Interestingly, Jean, who was the member of the smallest minority group, expressed the opinion that while local majority languages were oppressive to his smaller language, learning English actually allowed him the important capability of sharing his culture and traditions with a larger, global audience.

ECs, which number about 400 nationally and 120 within Dakar, displayed uniformities and shared repertoires that Wenger (1998) indicates as separating a CoP from other types of communities or groups. This research found that English learning was present in both formal and nonformal settings and that ECs engaged learners who were both in and outside of the formal system. Many EC meetings were conducted within the walls of formal schools (mostly high schools, private English schools, or tertiary institutions), although attendance was not limited to the students of those schools and generally brought in members from diverse areas of Dakar. Neighborhood-based clubs, generally comprised of residents of a specific geographic area, were particularly prevalent in poorer suburbs as a way of promoting unity and advocating for social change, and they met in spaces such as community centers or members' homes. With the exception of one EC, I was always the only native speaker and Euro-American, indicating that contact with native speakers was not a motivation for participation. Also, clubs ran on minimal resources and fund-raised by selling membership cards, generally for FCFA 500 or $1, though this was never required for entry, and club members often made small contributions for parties, outings, or T-shirts. Meetings drew in fifteen to forty people and participants, whose ages ranged from fifteen to thirty, included high school and university students, school leavers, and both unemployed and employed individuals. Aside from neighborhood-based clubs, EC members traversed great distances and left their own urban neighborhoods to attend the particular ECs to which they belonged or enjoyed. Members usually found their club through word of mouth, friends and relatives, and Facebook pages.

Learning Processes

ECs were identified as an important space for learning English, and in particular for improving oral skills. Many EC participants described how the informal settings of the clubs are conducive to a talk-friendly environment because fears of the teacher, of making mistakes, or of being mocked often

make the classroom constraining or inhibitive. Amina also felt more relaxed in her EC because there was no pressure to pass exams or undergo evaluations. Furthermore, because ECs were free, she experienced less anxiety about disappointing her parents or wasting precious familial resources, whereas "when you pay your money, you're required to pass." Participants generally felt that fellow club members did not judge them because, as Amina stated, "they were all there to improve their speaking." The shared goals and objectives perhaps made the environment supportive instead of competitive.

Although the ECs were described as places to practice speaking, most meetings also included a learning element, such as a short grammar course, listening activity, or corrections of oral mistakes. Different members were often delegated or voluntarily took on the task of organizing these educational activities. The intentional effort to improve practice demonstrates mutual engagement, an element that distinguishes CoPs from a group of friends who happen to like English (Wenger 1998). At Amina's English School EC, which I attended three times, the meetings were highly structured, and the president or vice president was usually charged with planning and leading a learning activity, such as vocabulary-building games, fill-in-the-blank listening, and peer corrections. In her club, there seemed to be defined roles of learners and teachers based on a general hierarchy of those who were "better" at English. Nonetheless, she had a positive attitude toward this arrangement and did not view herself as sufficiently competent in English to teach a lesson.

In contrast, Khadija described a more open, multidirectional learning process that occurred in her high school EC. She explained that the club met twice a week and that a large component of these gatherings was a type of homework help session. However, she linked the quality of the learning directly to the personal relationships that had developed in the club, reflecting the importance of mutual engagement and connectivity in CoPs. When I asked what she enjoyed most, learning the language or being in the group, she responded:

> [I enjoy] Being in the group and learning the language too. At the same time. Because this year's English club ended up becoming a big family. Because we helped one another, supported each other. When we got close to a test… all three classes [tenth through twelfth grades] had the same test. So we helped each other prepare

> for the test. We did practice exercises and everything. It was like that, we were a family. (Khadija)

It seems that separating the dimensions of learning and of group interaction proved nearly impossible for Khadija. Furthermore, she identified the group's most distinguishing characteristic as "solidarity," which revealed that her esteem for the group stemmed more from the relational nature than from being the best at English or another practice-related skill. This could indicate that the capabilities she gains through participating, such as relationships or group identity, could actually carry more importance for her than learning or speaking English. This may also reflect the cultural appropriateness of CoP learning for Senegal, a culture that intensely values interpersonal relationships and in which learning traditions have often been communally and orally transferred (Kuenzi 2011; Antal and Easton 2009; Avoseh 2001). Another theme that comes through in Khadija's narrative is hierarchy and the absence of a defined teacher; rather, everyone had the right to ask and to answer questions regardless of grade in school or leadership role within the club. Sometimes a younger student would help an older student, or vice versa. This level of fluidity demonstrates the ways in which hierarchy within a CoP may be flexible, changing, and dependent on the constant negotiation of meaning.

Amadou, who had never been to formal school, also explained how he benefited from sympathetic listening and strong personal relationships. At his favorite EC, most participants were aware of his lack of French education, and he felt more supported because fellow members would "take their time," modifying their English vocabulary to rely less upon cognates that speakers with a high level of French would generally understand. This allowed him to better comprehend, participate, and learn. These supportive relationships allow for the learner to speak freely and without inhibitions that they may feel in a more formal or competitive setting or amongst a group of strangers. Therefore, the relationships played an instrumental role in Amadou's achievement of learning English, a valued capability. This notion is supported by Krashen's (1985) affective filter theory, which emphasizes the importance of personal comfort for language learning and lends further significance to the conductivity of the CoP's relational setting.

Though ECs included members of varying speaking levels, universal participation was an element that most members valued. For example, I

observed an extremely shy young man's first meeting where he knew none of the members present and had comparatively lower abilities than the group. He initially resisted speaking, but the members pressed him to introduce himself and then continuously encouraged him to participate in the debate activity. When he struggled, several members jumped in to assist him and seemed genuinely happy to have done so. This attitude was reflected in Jean's narratives; he described how the pleasure of speaking in EC was not to say the most but to listen to and learn from others. The noncompetitiveness fostered an assistive environment and indicated that the ability to help and teach others is an important capability achieved through clubs. Again, the use of CA and CoP highlights some of the tensions and challenges as to how we evaluate learning in an Education for All context that seeks quality: indirect benefits—such as the well-being gained by helping others, not just improving one's own English—may be overlooked in standard youth program evaluations.

Debating and Engaging

As described above, speaking is one of the central elements of EC activity and occurs almost continuously throughout each club's meetings. Although every EC has its own culture and methodology, I found that two activities that were nearly universal: "hot chair" and debate. Hot chair is a game where a member is selected or volunteers to sit in the middle of the room and the group interrogates him or her. Though frequently used as a getting-to-know-you activity for new members, even long-standing EC participants enjoyed the activity. Amadou, who proclaimed that hot chair was his favorite EC activity, also described the game as being adaptable to Senegalese culture because "Senegalese people… really like to ask. They like questions." As a reification, or product and process of group participation, participants described hot chair as a tool to improve practice, relieve members of shyness, and encourage greater self-expression not only in English but also in other languages and areas of their lives. At the same time, hot chair constituted a reification in the sense that it strengthened the group's identity and unification by deepening personal relationships but also served as a tool for improving practice.

This increased ease in speaking aided the members in partaking in debate, the most central and regular component of EC activities. In a two-hour EC meeting, one could expect debate to last one and a half

hours. The weekly topic of debate was either collectively decided upon or chosen by a member who would then present the subject and moderate the debate. Although these debates occurred in English, they almost unvaryingly dealt with subjects touching upon their daily lives or the state of Senegal and Africa:

> Because, when we debate, we talk about subjects,… about life in general. For example, about women. About violence. What's happening in the world. Racism, and other stuff. (Khadija)

> My favorite subject is, for example, when we talking about Africa, yeah, I like that. How we do, how can we do to, to developing Africa. How can we do to know who we are. Where we come from. Why we here in the world, first. Why we here in Africa. Why we here in Senegal also. (Amadou)

The debate portion of the EC was sometimes referred to as le Palabre or Palaver Tree. Across Senegal and West Africa, the palaver tree serves as the village public forum where individuals or groups can voice their concerns or resolve conflicts. Whereas the palaver tree was often a space dominated by elders or community leaders, its appropriation in youth-oriented spaces demonstrates how certain elements of culture can be reused or modified for educational and democratic processes (Johnson 2008). An understanding of cultural practices and values plays a key role in planning for education in development programs, even when the subject matter seems foreign or separate from local culture. CA and CoP can be used to identify these strategies and create learning spaces.

The flow of the debates and the ways in which participants reflected upon and challenged common practices, ideas, and behaviors was as important as the subjects that they chose. Khadija describes this process of group reflection and negotiation:

> It's a place where everyone is free to speak. It's freedom of expression. You say what you feel. I mean, you give your opinion, and we see if it's good, bad. We discuss and afterward we categorize. It's like that. (Khadija)

This type of public discussion seems to characterize Sen's (1999b, 7) concept of constructive democracy, wherein "public discussion and exchange of information, views, and analyses" allow a society to "form its values and priorities." Democracies foster free speech, which in turn allows for citizens to reflect on and collectively decide how to improve their society. The following account of a high school meeting serves as an excellent example: An eighteen-year-old-boy presented the topic of debate, "What must be the learnings and teachings about the values left by our ancestors?" The youth first addressed their concerns about the decline in traditional values and then considered how globalization had affected behaviors, especially the growing popularity of European attire in Dakar. Then, other members questioned if traditions and values could be judged by exterior manifestations like clothing or whether it was something interior, "in the heart." Acutely sensing the cultural hegemony of Western countries, a few wondered why Senegalese wanted to imitate other cultures, whereas the other cultures were staying the same. Then, questions were raised as to why people wanted transformation in the first place. Someone asked "What makes the world change?" To which the response was "People want a better living condition." Another participant chimed in that in an era of globalization, "you can't only focus on our own values, you also have to focus on the world. We need to maintain our values but open up to the world." As the debate moved along, they examined the problem from various angles: analyzing its sources, reflecting on its manifestations, and proposing solutions. Whether this actually contributed to a larger change in society is undeterminable, but it does illustrate the value of having a space to reflect on important social issues, especially when, as in Senegal, the formal school system does not always provide similar opportunities and social norms restrict youth voices.

The power of speaking, debating, and participating in a group-learning environment may best be described by Jean, who eloquently captures how the processes of the club sparked a change not only in his ability to speak English but also in his broader perceptions about the value of associations and groups. For Jean, "everything changed" when he joined the EC. Before, he thought that organized groups were useless, especially when he could learn with his dictionary or at school. But when he began attending ECs, he realized he was "lost" and subsequently changed his mindset. Jean's participation in a CoP helped him to value social learning as a way of acquiring English, a highly valued capability for him, and increased his

agency and opportunity freedoms by providing the choice to learn English outside school or home.

Jean's transformation and the heightened value of organizations and social learning could have powerful implications in terms of CA and the creation of youth education for development. Extensive studies from Senegal reveal that NFE participants are more likely to express democratic ideals and join community associations (Kuenzi 2011); as CoPs, ECs represent a youth-led initiative which operates independently from schools but can also function as a supplement to formal learning. In urban settings, youth are polarized into groups of school leavers or school goers at an early age, yet these divisions mask the many similar social and learning needs that both may have. Spaces that can incorporate youth with different life experiences can contribute to better youth relations in urban areas and lessen feelings of marginalization (Sommers 2007).

CONCLUSION

This study has shown that Senegalese ECs provide a distinctive and relevant form of learning for youth that has developed and operates within the context of urban poverty. Beyond preparing youth with skills for specific jobs, the capability to attend ECs increases participants' agency freedoms and well-being by allowing them to achieve education in a subject area that they value and also leads to achievement of capabilities, such as helping others and developing personal relationships. Furthermore, many aspects inherent in CoP learning, such as negotiating meaning and relationships, also allow for the achievement of capabilities through participation, such as the ability to reason and debate issues of importance. These debates were encouraged within a culturally relevant, learner-led space that eliminated cultural barriers to speech that can occur between elders and youth or within restrictive classrooms. Debating also embodied the constructive element of democracy, which Sen (1999a, 1999b) sees as providing citizens with the opportunity to deliberate and decide which values, traditions, and ideals are meaningful and which ones may be preventing the achievement of a just society.

Learning forms such as ECs will probably not be found in many discussions of youth and skills in Africa. Though these youth perceived the acquisition of English as an important prerequisite for attaining a

high-paying job and this certainly influenced their motives to join, EC participation rarely equated with skills needed for a specific occupation, unlike the majority of education programs now targeting youth. However, participation in a youth-led educational initiative proved to impart an abundance of capabilities and skills that urban youth require to flourish and survive, beyond the acquisition of English. The power to speak, to debate, and to create supportive social circles can address aspects of multidimensional poverty—including health, income, security, and empowerment—and thus can serve as an example of education within human-centered development.

Through this small scale study of Senegalese ECs, I have shown how CA and CoP supplement each other and provide a functional synthesis between a pedagogical model and a normative framework that can be used to analyze urban educational sites. Learning forms such as ECs exist in urban areas throughout Africa and the developing world, and they should be considered in the processes of educational planning. By employing such frameworks, planners can begin to understand youth learning and translate its aims and outcomes for use in policy and programs. Youth are already engaged in their own educations and are committed to creating better futures. As policymakers and educators, it is our responsibility to validate these grassroots sites of learning and utilize them.

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Exploring the Effectiveness of Urban Agriculture Producer Organizations in Securing Land Tenure: Two Case Studies from Cotonou, Benin

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ABSTRACT

Securing land tenure is one of the central constraints to productivity that urban agricultural producers face. The formation of urban producer organizations (UPOs) is viewed as a potential method to overcome these constraints. Through a comparison of two market gardens in Cotonou, Benin, this paper finds that UPOs have limited success in securing legal land tenure, but external factors and characteristics can inform perceived land security, such as geographical location and history of establishment. Furthermore, the paper finds that perceived land insecurity can have tangible implications for producer investment activity and interventions by nongovernmental organizations. UPOs alone are not effective in securing land tenure, but require broader land reform by local governments to promote urban agriculture.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), many local and national governments fail to recognize urban agriculture (UA) as a legitimate urban land-use activity. This is despite the important role that UA can have in improving

urban food security and creating employment opportunities. In response to an absence of pro-UA policies and numerous productivity constraints associated with UA, many producers have formed groups, commonly known as "urban producer organizations" (Ruggieri 2007, 1). Securing access to vacant land for UA is one of the most significant constraints that producers must overcome, especially when faced with strong competition from other land-use activities, including construction. Advocates of UA support the strengthening of UPOs as a means to increase the legitimacy of UA as a land-use activity and securing of land tenure through collective action. However, it is unclear just how successful this development strategy may be.

The purpose of this paper is to explain the effectiveness of UPOs in securing land tenure for their members. I compare two case studies of UPOs from Cotonou, Benin, that portray two distinctly different levels of effectiveness. By comparing and contrasting these two narratives, I hope to (1) uncover the factors and characteristics of the UPOs that informed their effectiveness; and (2) explain the implications of land security, actual and perceived, for urban producers and their productivity. The paper concludes with a summary of the limitations of UPOs for securing land tenure and potential policy implications.

URBAN AGRICULTURE

Rapid rates of urbanization have become increasingly common across SSA, as large volumes of the rural population have migrated into the continent's cities. It is estimated that by 2030, 53 percent of Africans will live in urban settings (Cohen 2006, 70). Many cities in SSA are struggling to accommodate their growing populations, which has resulted in a proliferation of informal housing, chronic unemployment, and rising levels of urban poverty. With an estimated 72 percent of the urban population in SSA living in slums, the "urbanization of the poor" phenomenon is clear (UNFPA 2007, 16). Furthermore, rising food prices and stagnant real wages have led to increased concerns about food security as low- and middle-income urban households struggle to access an affordable diet. Urban and peri-urban agriculture has been advocated as a legitimate poverty alleviation strategy for combating food insecurity and unemployment in urban settings.

Definitions and History

Urban and peri-urban agriculture is broadly defined as "the production of food and nonfood plant and tree crops and animal husbandry (livestock, fowl, fish, and so forth), both within (intra-) and fringing (peri-) built-up urban areas" (Mougeot 1994, 1). This definition successfully captures the wide range of activities that could be considered as urban and peri-urban agriculture.[1] Mougeot's (1994) definition also includes some degree of post-harvest processing or production to be taken into account, rendering the term "producer" (or "urban producer") to be more accommodating than the narrower definition of "farmer" (or "urban farmer").

The practice of agricultural production in built-up areas has a long history. Evidence of urban agricultural production (including food crops, utilitarian ornamental and medicinal plants, and livestock production) has been found in the advanced urban settlements of Ancient Egypt and Rome (Mougeot 1994). Although the history of large cities in SSA is much shorter, there are clear indications that UA has been a part of the urban fabric from the beginning (Bryld 2003).

In a 1996 report titled *Urban Agriculture: Food, Jobs, and Sustainable Cities*, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 1996, 12) estimated that 800 million people worldwide are "involved" in UA. In SSA, UA became popular as a livelihood survival strategy in the 1980s, coinciding with the widespread implementation of dramatic neoliberal economic policies through structural adjustment programs (Bryld 2003; Beuchler, Mekala, and Keraita 2006).[2] The number of urban households involved in UA in SSA is estimated to have risen from 10 to 25 percent in the late 1970s to approximately 75 percent by the mid-1990s (Bryld 2003, 79). Given the most recent food price increases, alongside larger city populations, it is fair to estimate that this percentage would be even higher

1 The terms "urban agriculture" (UA) and "urban and peri-urban agriculture" are often used interchangeably, despite their distinctly different definitions in the areas of the city they include. As each of the case studies in this paper could be characterized as "intra-" (urban center) agriculture, I will continue to use the term UA exclusively.

2 Structural adjustment programs were introduced to countries in SSA by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. In exchange for financial assistance in the form of loans, national governments had to adopt a framework of neoliberal economic policies, of which rising food prices and stagnant real wages were a negative side effect.

today. The informal nature of UA makes measuring the exact number of people or households involved difficult, and there is an overall lack of empirical data on UA (Zezza and Tasciotti 2010).

The location and characteristics of UA are dependent upon local factors and geography. Although past studies indicate that a large proportion of household cultivation takes place close to home in backyard areas or adjacent open plots, UA has also been found to occupy open public land, community spaces, vacant private land, airfields, riverbanks, floodplains, and space beside roads and other rights-of-way. Though some producers may own the land on which they farm, many have also accessed land though formal or informal rental agreements with private landowners, occupying the land with permission from the landowner, or "squatting" without permission. UA is practiced in cities around the globe, and practices can differ dramatically between continents in terms of characteristics and location. However, my research deals solely with UA activities and land tenure in SSA.

Benefits of Urban Agriculture

UA can improve the food security and livelihoods of low-income (and increasingly middle-income) households by directly supplementing household consumption and as a source of employment or additional income. Often, households will choose to grow fresh vegetables to supplement their consumption, which allows them to improve both the quality and quantity of their diet, leading to an improvement in the household's nutritional status. Zezza and Tasciotti (2010) found a small, but significant, positive correlation between households engaged in UA and improved dietary calorie intake and nutritional diversity, supporting the hypothesis that subsistence agriculture performed by households improves the food security status of those households.

Of the 800 million people cited by the UNDP (1996) as being engaged in UA, approximately 200 million are considered to be market-oriented producers (Nyapendi et al. 2010).[3] As African cities struggle to provide employment for their growing population, "market-oriented" (or "commercial") UA has become an important source of full-time or part-time employment in the informal sector. With UA focusing on the intensive cultivation of a relatively small plot of land (often less than 1 hectare), many

3 A total of 150 million of the market-oriented producers are employed in UA full time.

market-oriented producers have found success in high-value produce, such as exotic vegetables and flowers, for affluent consumers.[4] In his study of market vegetable producers in Addis Ababa, Egziabher (1994, 96) identified the importance of UA as a source of income when, at a time when manufacturing wages were frozen, urban producers had an average household income above "50 percent of the total population of Addis Ababa."

Further, data collected from across SSA cities by the Consultative Group for International Agriculture Research's Urban Harvest Initiative also found that producers earn an average of 50 percent above the minimum wage of their respective countries, with many earning more (Prain and Lee-Smith 2010, 20). In addition, the informal UA market sector also provides income and employment opportunities for other participants in the supply chain, such as food processors and vendors. It is the organization of these market-oriented producers into "urban producer organizations" that is the focus of this paper.

In addition to providing benefits to producers directly engaged in UA, there are indirect benefits for the urban population as a whole. First, the practice of UA will increase the urban food supply and shorten the supply chains for fresh produce, both of which help to keep sales prices low and reduce transportation costs. Second, the green infrastructure associated with UA can contribute significant environmental benefits in terms of improved urban drainage, reductions in air pollution, and a cooling effect on the built-up environment, providing a healthier and more pleasant city environment (UNDP 1996, 180).

Constraints in Urban Agriculture: Secure Land Tenure

Across SSA, urban producers often face numerous constraints that relate to their urban location, in addition to many of the same constraints to productivity as their rural counterparts. The nature of the constraints differs from place to place, with certain constraints being dependent upon the local and national economic, political, social, and institutional environment. Securing regular access to vacant land for agricultural production constrains the activities of many urban producers, with many operating under the looming threat of eviction.

4 Within SSA, "exotic vegetables" typically refer to lettuce, carrots, cabbage, and green peppers, which are all cultivated through a labor-intensive, irrigated agricultural system.

The sociocultural bias of agriculture as an exclusively rural activity has resulted in many local city governments in SSA failing to incorporate agricultural land use into their urban planning processes. In extreme cases, local authorities have recognized the UA as illegal, such as in Kampala in the early 1990s (Maxwell 1994). A lack of institutional support, combined with often complicated and inconsistent land-tenure systems, dramatically constrain the ability of producers to secure land titles and ensure their own land security. Increasing pressure to develop scarce vacant land and increasing land-rent prices have resulted in many urban producers seeing their claim to vacant land lose out to other urban land uses. The constant threat of eviction that many producers face threatens their economic livelihoods and discourages producers from making the investments in their land that would increase their productivity.

Urban Producer Organizations

UA advocates claim that collaboration among producers is necessary to overcome common constraints associated with agricultural production in an urban setting, including the securing of land tenure. As Schmidt (2011, 6) summarizes, "local [producer] organizations are essential in mobilizing [producers], providing assistance, securing resources, providing inputs and local knowledge, and even participating in urban agriculture campaigns." The development strategy of strengthening the capacity of existing UPOs was the subject of an entire issue of *Urban Agriculture Magazine* (February 2012), titled "Strengthening Urban Producers' Organizations."[5]

UPOs are broadly defined as any group of urban producers that are involved to some degree in a collective action organized around a common purpose (sharing agricultural inputs, production, land and water resources, credit services, information and training, etc.). This definition is broad enough to include the diversity of groups worldwide that operate as UPOs, which differ in size, structure, common purpose, and appearance. "Cooperatives" (Egziabher 1994; Schmidt 2011), "low-income producer organizations" (IDRC/FAO 2007), and "farmer associations" (UNDP 1996) are other terms that have been used to describe the same phenomenon, which narrows down the character of the groups and cannot be used

5 It is from the articles in this issue that I chose to matriculate the term "urban producers organization" (UPO), a broad definition that covers the diversity of groups.

interchangeably. However, Wilbers, Van Veenhuizen, and Castro (2007) advocate that each of these diverse types can be captured under the term "UPO." The heterogeneity has required most characterizations of UPOs to be "strategic and flexible."

The formation of UPOs improves the visibility of producers and provides them with a stronger presence in their local environment. UPOs that formally register as organizations with the local government will also improve the legitimacy of UA activities and producers. As argued by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, "a lack of organization deprives urban and peri-urban low-income small-scale producers of the organizational means for bargaining and negotiating with the authorities and other groups in society" (IDRC/FAO 2007, 15). By becoming organized as a group with a common voice, urban producers can improve their connections with important external agencies, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private actors, which can advocate for land tenure reform and the legitimacy of UA on the producers' behalf. UPOs can play an important role in advocating for the changing of official attitudes in government toward UA and critical policy changes that will ensure the sustainability of UA activities.

Although UA supporters advocate the strengthening of UPOs as a means to increase productivity and build their capacity to overcome key constraints, such as secure land tenure, there is little understanding of how this development strategy should be focused or what policy reform needs to take place. The overall objective of this paper is to uncover the characteristics and factors that contribute to a UPO's effectiveness in securing land tenure. In the next section, I compare two distinctly different case studies of "market garden" sites in Cotonou, Benin, and their experiences in securing land tenure.

COTONOU, BENIN

Cotonou is the economic capital of the Republic of Benin and its largest city, with an estimated population of 1 million, one-ninth of Benin's total population of 9.05 million (2010) (U.S. Department of State 2012). According to Benin's National Statistics and Economics Institute, Cotonou's population in 2006 was 761,137, which translates into an

86 percent population increase during the past 20 years (Dossou and Gléhouenou-Dossou 2007, 66). As seen in figure 1, this coastal city is located on a strip of land bound by the Gulf of Guinea to the south and Lake Nokoué to the north, occupying an area of 79 square kilometers, which is divided into twelve *arrondissements* (districts). As a result of these natural barriers to expansion, the rapid increases in population have translated into a rapid increase in urban density within Cotonou and have created metropolitan sprawl to the east and west beyond the municipality's boundaries. Rapid population increases, combined with a limited supply of available land, has led to dramatic escalations in the price of city land, traffic congestion, and air, water, and land pollution.

Figure 1. Municipal Map of Cotonou



Source: l'Institute Géographique National, 1999.

In response to the rapid urbanization of Cotonou, the Beninese government authorized the mayor of Cotonou's Planning Department to implement the Plan Directeur d'Urbanisme (PDU, Urban Master Plan), a planning tool to direct land-use in the city. The threefold objective of the PDU is to (1) strengthen urban functions, (2) plan for spatial growth, and (3) plan and maintain the urban infrastructure (Kakai, Kakai, and Touhouegnon 2010). At present, urban and peri-urban agricultural activities, both subsistence or commercial, are not recognized by the PDU as a legitimate land-use activity.

UA in Cotonou "developed in the context of a quasi-absent land-use policy" (Kakai, Kakai, and Touhouegnon 2010, 3) with many of the UA sites being former rural agriculture areas that the city surrounded. The remaining UA plots have managed to avoid development as a result of either being situated in areas that are not available for construction (e.g., certain parts of the airfield) or are not conducive to construction (e.g., floodplains). Constrained by the complex and expensive process for obtaining land titles and the extremely high value of land, many of the urban producers do not hold land titles and many squat on land or have an informal agreement with the landowner.

Within Cotonou, there are approximately nine urban "market garden" sites of varying sizes that produce an estimated 70 percent of the high-value vegetables sold in the city's markets (Hounkpodoté and Tossou 2001). In a 2001 study, Hounkpodoté and Tossou (2001) estimated that urban producers were able to generate up to FCFA 16.395 million of revenue per hectare (approximately $32,000), making market gardening a highly lucrative activity. At each of these market gardens, exotic vegetables such as lettuce, carrots, peppers, and spinach are grown and sold year-round. Irrigation is used to maintain production levels during the dry season (November to April). For the majority of producers, UA is their only source of income.

My research focuses on two market garden sites, Houeyiho and Cocotiers, in the affluent neighborhood of Haie Vive within in the Twelfth Arrondissement (figure 2). Beside Benin's only international airport (Cadjehoun Airport), Haie Vive is a popular residential and commercial area with expatriates and serves as the location for many international NGO offices, government ministries, and foreign embassies. The proximity to local markets and an affluent consumer base make the open spaces in Haie Vive very popular with market-oriented vegetable producers, who are referred to as *maraîchers* ("gardeners"). However, the increased pressure of urbanization has made UA difficult, and there is a recent history of market garden evictions without compensation, including the most recent case of the Gbenokpo site in July 2011.

I chose the Houeyiho and Cocotiers sites (figure 2) for this study for their accessibility and fundamental similarities, but distinctly difference narratives. Although both sites are located on land owned by the same

agency and operate with a similar UPO structure,[6] they vary dramatically in size (both the area occupied and number of people employed), nature (history, level of establishment, irrigation development), and land security.

Figure 2. Aerial View of Study Sites in Haie Vive

Source: Google Earth, Carter (2012).

The data that form these case studies were collected over a period of six weeks during the summer of 2011, primarily through structured interviews, focus groups, and systematic field observations. Five sets of structured interviews were conducted with groups of executive board officers from three separate UPOs (two at Houeyiho, one at Cocotiers), and further comments were collected from *maraîchers* found on the sites. Further information was collected from interviews with academics and NGO employees who have worked extensively in UA in Cotonou. Information collected through these

6 Both areas of land are owned by the Agence pour la Sécurité de la Navigation Aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar (ASECNA, the Aerial Navigation Safety Agency for Africa and Madagascar).

interviews and observations was triangulated with the limited published research on UA in Benin. Respecting the anonymity of my interviewees, I do not reveal any personal names or descriptions of their positions within the UPOs.

Site 1: Houeyiho

Context. The Houeyiho site is the longest-established and largest market garden operating in Cotonou. The entirety of the 26 hectare site is located northeast of Cadjehoun Airport, surrounded by a solid 10 foot wall topped with barbed wire (figure 3). The main entrance is situated along the western wall, facing the main road, and the site is accessible to the general public. The land occupied by the Houeyiho market garden belongs to the Agence pour la Sécurité de la Navigation Aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar (ASECNA, the Aerial Navigation Safety Agency for Africa and Madagascar), which manages the airport and surrounding properties. The Houeyiho site is the located on the runway's "clearway," where the aircraft landing lights are located and the land is required to be unoccupied by "permanent structures" according to international aviation safety standards (ICAO 2009). According to one *maraîcher* at Houeyiho, the producer groups have an informal agreement with ASECNA that allows them to farm the land for free in exchange for the producers "maintaining the land."

Figure 3. View of the Houeyiho Site

Source: Carter (2012).

Vegetable producers first came to occupy the site in 1971 after migrating from Ouando, a rural community in eastern Benin. Originally, the site covered 30 hectares, but it was reduced to 26 hectares in 1995 after an urban encroachment on its southern boundary. Since then, a wall has been built around the entire site and the area has remained largely unchanged (Deguenon 2006). Although few interview sources could agree on a single number, it was estimated that 330 *maraîchers* are currently working full time at the Houeyiho site, the majority of whom are male (approximately 80 percent). Most of the *maraîchers* are involved in cultivating high-value exotic vegetables to be sold by vendors at the Saint-Michel, Dantokpa, and Ganvie food markets, but there is also some production of bananas and a medium-sized pig enclosure to rear 50 pigs to maturity.[7] During the dry season, groundwater for irrigation is accessed through "forage holes" (dug an average of 6 feet deep) that are spaced out every 50 feet on the site. An increasing number of *maraîchers* are using gasoline pumps and sprinkler systems to alleviate the "drudgery" of hand-watering, a term frequently used by *maraîchers*.

Description of the UPOs. At present, five separate UPOs occupy the site, each approximately the same size in terms of membership and land occupied.[8] The number of UPOs has expanded over time, with the first being formed by the first *maraîchers* at Houeyiho in 1971. New UPOs were formed by either *maraîchers* entering the site from elsewhere and establishing themselves, or a few members of existing UPOs choosing to establish their own group. Day to day, the five UPOs tend to operate independently from one another, with their own individual membership, and most interactions between the five groups are friendly.

The general organizational structures of the five UPOs at Houeyiho are largely the same. The members of each group democratically elect an Executive Board of officers, which includes a president, secretary, treasurer, organizer, head of security, and two account officers. Any member of the UPO has the freedom to stand for any position and vote. Elections are held

7 The pigs are sold live, and there is no local slaughtering facility.

8 The five primary UPOs are called Grâce de Dieu, Guagenon, Kposahaus, Semevo, and Wangmima. Each occupies approximately 5 hectares and has a membership of around sixty-five persons.

every three years, and an officer may hold the same position for a maximum of two terms. The guidelines for elections, the officers' responsibilities, and other rules for governing the UPO are laid out in their Statut de Réglement Interior (Interior Regulations Statute). Most of the UPOs hold meetings onsite every one or two weeks with the whole membership, who also then pay a small amount of dues—usually FCFA 500 (or $1) a week.

Within each UPO's designated area, members cultivate their own individual plots and are responsible for selling their own produce. According to numerous *maraîchers*, gaining access to a plot of land within the Houeyiho site is "impossible" without first becoming a member of one of the five UPOs. There are currently no available plots of land at Houeyiho, meaning that none of the UPOs are currently accepting new members and that plots of land only change hands when one family member takes over from another. However, the UPO Executive Board has the authority to insist that each new *maraîcher* has a minimum level of agricultural knowledge, which can be obtained through working on the family plot. When UPOs have accepted new members in the past, they have required candidates to demonstrate a background in irrigated vegetable production. Many UPO Executive Board officers have emphasized the importance of technical knowledge and experience in their members for ensuring the success of the group as a whole. There have been past cases when UPOs at Houeyiho have accepted *maraîchers* who were displaced by the eviction of previous market garden sites in Cotonou.

Collectively, the five primary UPOs at the Houeyiho site are all members of the Cooperatives de Maraîchers de Houeyiho group (CMH; Houeyiho Vegetable Gardener's Cooperatives), whose leadership is made up of the presidents from the five UPOs. As an Executive Board officer elaborated in an interview, the main responsibilities of the CMH leadership are to cultivate external relationships and govern any projects that involve the whole Houeyiho site. In particular, one member of the CMH leadership is the liaison between the *maraîchers* and ASECNA, the landowner.

Secure land tenure rights. The UPOs at Houeyiho do not have legally bound secure land tenure, and none of the UPOs' activities include campaigning for land tenure rights. Despite these facts, many *maraîchers* at Houeyiho do not perceive an imminent threat of eviction. In the opinion of one Executive Board officer, "We have our agreement with ASECNA, we keep good relations with them, and we know that eviction will only come

if the airport moves." The threat of eviction may not be imminent, but the rising demand for open land in the Twelfth Arrondissement has limited the ability of Cadjehoun Airport to expand. To cope with the rising volume of flights arriving at Cotonou and the need to modernize the airport, there is increased speculation that the airport may be relocated to another area outside the municipal boundaries within the next ten or fifteen years. If this is the case, the UPOs at the Houeyiho site may have difficulty securing their land in the long term.

The perceived land security of Houeyiho among *maraîchers* is the result of geographical circumstances and established history, rather than any particular action of the UPOs toward securing land rights or improving the legitimacy of UA activity with Cotonou authorities. Given Houeyiho's long history, this market garden is now a Cotonou landmark, and the *maraîchers* benefit from the international ICAO standards that require ASECNA to keep the runway's clearway free of permanent structures. This perception of land security has allowed producers to make importance investments in their plots, as clearly shown by the increasing numbers of *maraîchers* using irrigation systems (pumps and sprinklers). Furthermore, NGOs have partnered with the UPOs to construct a series of six latrines and a composting facility on the site, all for the use of the *maraîchers.* These projects also play a role in reinforcing the perception of Houeyiho as an established site and the legitimacy of UA.

Site 2: Cocotiers

Context. The market garden at Cocotiers is substantially smaller than at Houeyiho, both in terms of land area and number of *maraîchers*. The 4 hectare plot is located to the southeast of Cadjehoun Airport on vacant land that is also owned by ASECNA but—unlike the Houeyiho site—is not being used directly for airport operations (see figure 2 above). At present, the *maraîchers* at the Cocotiers plot have an informal agreement with ASECNA that allows them to farm the land for free in exchange for "maintaining the land" and keeping it free of vegetation overgrowth. Unlike Houeyiho, the Cocotiers triangular land is open, with no wall or fence separating the agricultural plots from the adjacent roads and sidewalks (figure 4).

Figure 4. Maraîcher hoeing at Cocotiers

Source: Carter (2012)

The Cooperative des Maraîchers de Cocotiers (CMC; Cocotiers Vegetable Gardeners' Cooperative) is the only UPO that occupies the site, and the high demand for vacant land for urban development in Haie Vive has required the group to relocate multiple times (figure 5). Although the exact year is not known, an Executive Board officer estimated that CMC was originally formed in the late 1970s at the 8 hectare plot currently occupied by the Marina Hotel Complex (formerly the Sheraton). In 1981, construction began on the Sheraton, and CMC was forced to relocate. During this time, CMC's membership had expanded from twenty-four growers to thirty-five, who occupied the new 9 hectare plot (in figure 5, illustrated by the orange and yellow plots together), all of which was owned by ASECNA. Over the past ten years, land south of Cadjehoun Airport has become increasingly built up with affluent commercial and residential developments. In 2006, ASECNA sold 5 of the 9 hectares that CMC was occupying to such a developer (the orange plot in figure 5). CMC members only received

three months' notice of the pending eviction and were forced to consolidate all members onto their remaining 4 hectares of land (the yellow plot in figure 5). After this second eviction, fourteen *maraîchers* chose to leave UA for other professions, reducing the current size of CMC's membership to twenty-one. Just as at Houeyiho, the *maraîchers* at Cocotiers are overwhelmingly male and growers cultivate high-value vegetables. During the dry season, the vegetables are manually irrigated with groundwater taken from six forage holes placed around the site.

Figure 5. History of Land Evictions of the Cocotiers Cooperative



Source: Google Earth; Carter (2012).

Description of UPOs. CMC operates under the same democratic organizational structures as the UPOs at Houeyiho. The Executive Board of officers includes a president, vice president, treasurer, and secretary. Any member may be elected to an officer position, but there are set term limits. All the regulations for elections and operating the UPO have been established in the group's Statut de Réglement Interior (Interior Regulations Statute). At the time of study, the president had died unexpectedly a few

months earlier, and the group was planning to have elections in December 2011. In the interim, the vice president had been serving as acting president and the members had continued to attend regular biweekly meetings. However, a CMC Executive Board officer commented that the untimely death of the president, combined with the fluctuations in membership numbers, has made it difficult to form a "tight community [of *maraîchers*]." The characterization of the group as disorganized and fragmented has been supported in the comments of an NGO worker familiar with the UPO.

Secure land tenure rights. When asked directly, many of the CMC members expressed concern over the group's ability to defend another land eviction. Since the group has been at its current 4 hectare site, the *maraîchers* have seen affluent commercial and residential developments surround them. Their triangular open plot is one of the few remaining open areas feasible for construction in the area. According to an Executive Board officer, ASECNA is willing to let the group continue farming the land "*until* they sell it for development" (emphasis added). Unlike the Houeyiho site, ASECNA is not obligated by international guidelines to maintain ownership of the Cocotiers site or keep the land vacant. CMC does not have any recognized right to the land, and any eviction will take place without compensation. An NGO worker commented that CMC is unlikely to be successful in opposing the eviction given the high demand for development land and CMC's lack of strong connections with powerful external players that would advocate on its behalf.

The nature of the site's location, weak internal structure, and isolation from external stakeholders all place CMC in a vulnerable position. Unlike Houeyiho, the Cocotiers site is located in the path of urban development, and the UPO does not have the legitimacy or legal standing to oppose an eviction. The reduction in size of the market garden and the pending encroachment has fostered the perception of CMC being very vulnerable to eviction, which has made it increasingly difficult for the group to establish legitimacy or invest in its plots. In comparison with Houeyiho, the *maraîchers* at Cocotiers have invested in water pumps to ease the extraction of groundwater, but there are no established sprinkler systems. There is also no evidence of any NGO interventions at the site. Just from preliminary observations, the relative differences in perceived land security have led to dramatic differences in the levels of agricultural investments between the two sites.

CONCLUSION

Neither of these two case studies from Cotonou were successful in securing legally bound land tenure for urban producers, but they did demonstrate two different perceptions of land security and the implications. At the Houeyiho site, we saw that producers were not cognizant of any threat of eviction, which was in direct contrast to the feelings of land insecurity surrounding the Cocotiers site. My research indicates three central characteristics that informed this difference between the two sites. First, the site's location is critical in relation to urbanization and pressure to develop. Houeyiho benefited from being located in the runway's clearway, while the Cocotiers site was directly in the pathway of development. Second, the history of the site is important. For example, Houeyiho has remained in the same space for over forty years and has become a recognized location. In contrast, the producers at Cocotiers have experienced a number of evictions and their establishment is not recognized by external actors. And third, the internal organization of the UPOs at each site plays a role, with a stronger organization for collective action allowing producers to project legitimacy and form connections with important external actors.

My comparison of the Houeyiho and Cocotiers sites also shows the implications of different perceptions of land security, regardless of the law. The research uncovered two key implications related to perceptions of land security. First, producers operating at a site with a higher perception of land security are more likely to invest in their plots. This was clearly illustrated by the proliferation of water pump and sprinkler irrigation systems at Houeyiho, compared with very few at Cocotiers. Second, NGOs appear to be far more likely to intervene at sites that radiate a higher perception of land security and establishment. This was seen at Houeyiho, where producers had access to NGO-built latrines and a compost facility. By contrast, NGO workers regarded the Cocotiers plot as temporary and thus as not worth establishing an NGO project there. In turn, both these implications of seeming high land security go on to further establish a site and support the perception of land security. For example, the construction of NGO projects and high level of development at the Houeyiho site positively reinforce UA productivity and work toward legitimizing the practice.

Both these case studies indicate that UPOs themselves are not effective actors in securing land tenure. Instead, Houeyiho and Cocotiers show that characteristics and factors that are often out of the UPOs' control, such as location and relative pressure from urbanization, have the most substantial impact on perceived land security, which is a reinforcing perception. Therefore, one must conclude that broader land reform is necessary to allow urban producers to overcome the land security constraint. Municipal governments' planning authorities are best positioned to implement a range of important pro-UA land reforms to improve access to land. First, the municipal government needs to establish an environment that encourages UA. Additional land reforms may go so far as to set aside urban land for agricultural production or simply enact policies that recognize agricultural production as a legitimate urban land-use activity and enable producers to purchase land. Urban producers should certainly play a participatory role in formulating land reforms as key actors in the economic vitality and sustainable food systems of Cotonou, Benin.

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Recasting the Development Agenda for Informal Land and Housing Markets in Nairobi: A Critical Examination of Actors, Claims, and Urban Governance in Kibera

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ABSTRACT

Across Africa, the urban poor forge and secure access to urban land and housing through distorted, "extralegal," and complex property markets. In the case of Nairobi, this process manifests as sprawling slums and overcrowded illegal tenement buildings where the urban poor experience insecurity and substandard shelter. The workings of these markets are poorly understood by policymakers, often leading to ill-fitting interventions and the devalorization of the urban practices of the poor. This paper explores the complexity of extralegal practices and actors in the urban political economy of housing in Kibera, one of Africa's largest informal settlements.

This research on Kibera and Nairobi is based on the existing literature, a policy review, and interviews with relevant stakeholders undertaken in Nairobi in 2011. Drawing upon the emerging "Southern perspective" on African urbanism, this paper argues that, in the absence of sufficient financial capital, the urban poor rely on the politics of informality and identity to forge access to land and housing markets. Thus, it is precisely the flexibility, informality, and

insecurity that interventions based on Western logics of the law and markets attempt to eliminate that enable the urban poor to be role players in extralegal markets. Rather than streamlining and universalizing the way claims are made, interventions to improve the functioning of land markets and address urban poverty should recast the politics of informality and identity as an opportunity for the urban poor to use various forms of capital and association to incrementally and progressively build pathways to urban citizenship. In this process, one should seek to develop tools that support locally contingent negotiation processes and diverse modalities of rights-claiming as a means by which to build more inclusive markets.

INTRODUCTION: THE EMERGING AFRICAN CITY

> What does the apparent ungovernability, yet on-going survival, of cities like Lagos and Kinshasa… say about the future of urban governance? Here, what we may know conventionally as legality and illegality…. The formal and the informal and movement and home are brought into proximity and produce a highly ambiguous sense of space. These ambiguities do occasion intense struggles over which identities have legitimate access to and rights over specific resources and place.
>
> —AbdouMaliq Simone, *For the City Yet to Come*

With nearly half of the world population residing in cities, we have undeniably become an urban species. The "everyday practice" and lived experience of urbanism produce new modalities of social, economic, and political interaction, which work to reconfigure and reconstruct the physical space and urban institutions (Pieterse 2006). However, urbanization processes and their material manifestations in African cities challenge the dominant theories of planning, economics, sociology, and other disciplines concerned with urban development (Myers 2011). Although urbanization processes around the world create dependency on urban markets in order to meet the basic need of human settlement, for the majority of urban Africans,

the land and housing markets through which they seek opportunities for settlement are informal and the housing supplied is "substandard" by most development criteria (UN-Habitat 2010). In the case of the city of Nairobi, this reality manifests as an impressive informal rental market offering opportunities to be accommodated in sprawling shack settlements and illegally built tenement high-rises (Huchzermeyer 2007).

This paper presents a case study on the functioning of the informal property market in Kibera, which is often referred to as one of the largest slums in Africa (AHI 2005). The paper sets forth a selective history of the development of the city of Nairobi, highlighting the distinct processes that shaped the characteristics of Kibera's property market. Kibera's unique history is subsequently unpacked, demonstrating how dominant actors have used identity and association to leverage "extralegal" claims for urban rights over land and decisionmaking processes. Finally, the current actors operating in the market for housing are analyzed and the sites of power through which they make claims in the market are described. The empirical contribution of this work involves analyzing the different actors engaged with the market and framing these power-laden engagements within the broader history of the city and the settlement. This demonstrates that the informal housing markets are "socially constructed" rather than economic inevitabilities, and that such markets are rooted in the politics of informality and identity, allowing for the urban poor to use various forms of capital to engage and transact. The impetus for an in-depth study of Kibera's market is a general consensus that there is insufficient empirical knowledge of how informal markets actually work and that policies promulgated to improve the functioning of land markets should seek to better understand the multiple scales through which market processes are realized.

This research draws upon land and planning policy, secondary information on Nairobi and Kibera, and primary research undertaken in Nairobi in 2011. The primary research included "life history interviews" (Marx 2007) with Kibera's residents and semistructured interviews with political representatives, nongovernmental organizations, local researcher groups and urban specialists, churches, gang members, and health workers, as well as an in-depth review of current and historical policy documents. In conclusion, the findings are posed in conversation with an emerging "Southern perspective" on urbanism and urban development challenges that seeks to valorize and appreciate the practices of the urban poor. Through this lens,

I argue for the development of more locally contingent interventions and tools. These instruments should acknowledge and confront the contestation arising from the complex positionality of different actors and the plurality of just claims that exist in these markets.

FRAMING THE DEBATES: MARKETS, RIGHTS, AND THE INFORMAL CITY

African cities consistently fall short in meeting Western development and poverty criteria in terms of income, health, governance, safety, and many other indicators (Myers 2011). The failure of African cities to create functional land markets is one such area of contested debate; often, both formal and informal land markets are highly distorted and dysfunctional. In attempting to improve urban land and housing markets, many development discourses define "markets" as economic systems for the allocation of goods among competing claims. Additionally, "market transactions" entail the exchange of "rights," as "just" or "legitimate" claims, over physical space and property. In order to create efficiency, these discourses advocate strengthening property rights by creating consensual and state-backed agreements regarding whose property is whose (Bowles and Gintis 1993). Hernando DeSoto revived the popularity of the property rights imperative for addressing urban poverty in his highly praised and critiqued book, *The Mystery of Capital* (Blomley 1994; Otto 2003). Here, DeSoto argues that the key to addressing poverty and unlocking the potential of urban capital rests in legalizing and formalizing rights over urban land. Having been permeated by Greek philosophers, the Western legal discourses that De Soto and other practitioners draw upon often assume that the law and the state work together to produce a system of order reflective of uniform principles of justice. Furthermore, this uniformity can be consistently applied to rights claims in order to judge their legitimacy (Newton 1973, 308). Therefore, in theory, enshrining strong and clear property rights in the law should make for both efficient and just land markets.

Because the cornerstone of discourses on market efficiency rests on the need for strongly defined and agreed-upon property rights (Bowles and Gintis 1993), there is a need to frame the concepts of both a "right" and a "market." Although markets *are* allocation systems, Ha-Joon Chang

contradicts the libertarian view of markets as solely economic tools by stating that markets are "defined by a range of formal and informal institutions that embody certain rights and obligations, whose legitimacy (and therefore contestability) is ultimately determined in the realm of politics" (Chang 2003, 54). In this alternative narrative, rather than being viewed as an economic inevitability, markets are posited as dynamic and socially constructed frameworks for transactions. Rights are presented as inherently political claims that are made through such an apparatus; thus, the justness of any claim is relational and contingent. Rather than being static and exclusive, they are seen as sites of incommensurability and perpetual struggle that respond to an evolving political and social sphere (Bowles and Gintis 1993, 85; Attoh 2011). Viewing claims to land through this lens allows for a deeper exploration of how the state and political spheres become active participants in the construction of informal land markets. This shifts the question from whether the state *should* intervene in informal land markets to *how* it can and should rework its engagement. Furthermore, this understanding of both rights and markets is of particular importance because it recasts each market, in each African city, as a unique and contextually specific site for the exchange of rights. Urban theorists operating from more "Southern perspectives"—such as those of Holston (1998), Swilling (2011), and Bayat (2000)—have grappled with alternative interpretations of urban land access and informal markets. These authors highlight the often "extralegal" (i.e., neither distinctly legal nor illegal) nature of land acquisition. They demonstrate that the law itself often embodies inconsistencies and pluralities of legitimate claims. This plurality makes claims to "property" and concepts of "the state" site-specific and negotiated rather than static or objective (Razzaz 1993). They describe the messy and creative ways in which poor people forge access to the city as *slum urbanism* (Swilling 2011, 98), *quiet encroachment* (Bayat 2000), and *insurgent citizenship* (Holston 1998). Urban Landmark further explains that within extralegal markets, "the key categories for understanding informal transactions are people's social *identities*, the *social networks* to which they belong and the types of *claims* they can make on the use, value or products of the land" (Marx 2007, i.). Thus, understanding informal markets must go beyond simple discourses of legalization and seek to uncover the underlying values, capital, and models of association that may be creating alternative forms of inclusion and exclusion.

The emerging body of work on Southern urbanism seeks to validate these practices of what Myers (2011) refers to as the "(in)formal city." Beyond simply studying the "African crisis," this work attempts to reframe the knowledge and rationality of urban practice in African cities as a valuable contribution to addressing the practical issues of urban development in African and beyond the continent (Myers 2011). Nairobi's and Kibera's interlocked histories give texture to these debates and allow for a deeper empirical exploration of issues that arise from the practices of marginality and domination that construct the lived reality of urban poverty.

A SELECTIVE HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAIROBI

The functioning and characteristics of property markets in informal settlements in Nairobi cannot be understood without an exploration of the city's broader development. Nairobi is often portrayed as a city of slums, urban banditry, and predatory accumulation (Katumanga 2005). From the *matatu* cartels to the illegal construction of whole tenement buildings, actors and capital are in fast flight around the city to meet people's needs—at a price. With population estimates between 2 and 4 million and a contribution of more than 40 percent of the country's gross domestic product, approximately 60 percent of the population resides in slums and informal settlements, most of which are rental units (Saga, Medulla, and Karirah-Gitau 2001, 8). The drivers of this complex and highly political reality of constrained land access and distribution are part of the broader history of the development of power and markets at the scale of the city.

The historic development of Nairobi as a racially segregated and heavily compartmentalized city is part of a colonial legacy, whereby the labor value of the poor was extracted by granting limited, gender-biased, and discriminatory rights to access and residence in the city; Kenyans could not own property or settle in the cities, and thus they were forced to squat illegally and erect makeshift structures (Medard 2010, 25). The 1902 Crown Lands Ordinance declared all "empty land" (often the sites of burgeoning informal settlement camps) to be owned by the king (Saga, Medulla, and Karirah-Gitau 2001, 67). With the flourishing of such settlements, the colonial administration undertook an eradication policy with inconsistent vigor. The Vagrancy Act and the Public Health Act were legal tools used to validate the destruction of

selected slum areas or to justify a refusal to provide basic municipal services. However, some slums—generally those built on less desirable land or where the dwellers were able to physically and violently resist—were systematically ignored (Saga, Medulla, and Karirah-Gitau 2001, 33). Throughout both the colonial and postcolonial periods, the negotiability and selective enforcement of the law gave way to cracks in state power, creating rising sites of urban resistance across and beyond the city.

Independence in 1963 forced the new Kenyan state to legitimate claims to the cities through a relaxation of influx controls. In less than thirty years, Nairobi more than doubled in population, creating an exacerbated demand for access to shelter and leading to a skyrocketing of the value of land (Amis 1984, 9). With the growth of the city, its boundaries came to include many outlying and unplanned areas surrounding it. However, the Nairobi City Council denied its responsibility to provide municipal services to these unplanned areas and cited their noncompliance with archaic planning regulations to legitimate removals, according to a study done by the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE 2006, 19). In many of the informal settlements ignored by the city, a practical framework for management nonetheless emerged, governed by local elites, real estate speculators, and civil society and faith-based groups (Medard 2010; Dafe 2009).

On the political front, even with decolonization, most of the land and planning ordinances of the colonial state were retained verbatim, with little effort being made to address the underlying disparity in land distribution or lack of democratic procedures (Syagga 2001). Thus, existing but clearly unjust land claims became further entrenched in the law. Likewise, the colonial political structure of the Native Administration Ordinances, which historically controlled black populations, was transformed into the Provincial Administration (PA) and run through the government's executive branch. With tiered representation from the president scaling down to the level of the neighborhood, appointed administrators exercised jurisdiction parallel to the elected local government representatives. The PA chiefs played active and violent roles in evictions of those squatting on the privatized land and controlled the Administrative Police Force, the only public law enforcement agency that had guns (COHRE 2006, 21).

The process of "Africanization" pursued under Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, rather than helping to spread wealth and opportunities, created an "African elite" able to utilize misunderstood legal systems, tribal

affinities, and fragilely articulated policies to further consolidate the country's resources. Through bribery and patronage, the members of Kenyatta's tribe, the Kikuyu, acquired vested control over land and business in Nairobi (Task Force on Devolved Government 2011, 14). As the Task Force on Devolved Government points out, the "centralisation of power was pursued by the ruling party KANU with zeal for the next thirty years, resulting in a highly centralised and personalised rule" (p. 13). This produced a consistent increase in the responsibility of the PA exercising authority over both land and security matters (p. 13). This authority trickled down to the settlement level, where land distribution and the enforcement of transaction agreements in places such as Kibera became the primary function of the PA chiefs who governed through extralegal authority (Medard 2010). This political and legal history set the stage for Nairobi's infamous "land grabbing"—the acquisition of state-owned land by politicians and political elites at prices under market value or in exchange for political favors. Through the 1980s and 1990s, this resulted in a decreased supply of available urban land for housing the poor and other public interests (Klopp 2000; Dafe 2009, 17).

This history highlights three processes that frame the informal property markets in the city. First, while the PA routinely gained power far beyond its legal mandate, the elected branches of the city's government systematically lost decisionmaking and law enforcement power (Task Force on Devolved Government 2011; Medard 2010; Ringera 2007; Crow and Odaba 2009). Second, the high demand for shelter, low supply of public and low cost of land, and high standards of archaic and colonial planning legislation, make formal land access an impossibility for the majority of the urban poor (Huchzermeyer 2007). And third, the "tribalization" of urban land politics at the scale of the city trickled down to local informal settlements, where tribal constructions of identity emerged as vital to the process of engagement in the extralegal and highly commercial housing market.

THE "EXTRALEGAL" HISTORY OF KIBERA

Informal settlements are often presented as narratives of land invasion and autoconstruction in the literature on land use in African cities (Amis 1984). Kibera, not unlike many other settlements that have been termed

"informal," is better described as a dynamic site of negotiated extralegality. Moreover, rather than being a homogenous space (and therefore reducible to one housing market), Kibera is a settlement with thirteen villages, a sloped topography, varied densities and living conditions, a geotribal landscape, and a deep and contested history in the city of Nairobi (Omenya and Huchzermeyer 2006; UN-Habitat 2003).

In 1904, Kibera was a remote and forested military training ground sparsely settled by Sudanese ex-soldiers of the British Crown. Kibera was seen as a repository for the unfit or unneeded *detribalized natives* and later *tenants of the Crown* to whom they owed some form of accommodation (COHRE 2006, 22). By 1912, the King's African Rifles officially sanctioned the residency of the soldiers in what became known as the King's African Rifles *shambas* and granted them temporary occupation of Kibera, distributing passes that gave former soldiers and their families the right to erect temporary structures (Parsons 1997, 90). The terms and intent of this agreement were not clear and became progressively vaguer. The soldiers believed that such allocation was a permanent right in return for their service (and was thus transferable to their children); however, the administration believed that accommodation was only owed to those who had directly served in the army and that when the people died, Kibera could be reclaimed (de Smedt 2011, 10).

Military law governed Kibera for some time, allowing the area to maintain "extramunicipal status"; however, this victory was partial as the colonial administration refused to develop the area, fearing that it would attract more settlers (Parson 1997, 107). Ironically, the military authority controlled migration into the settlement while allowing the deregulation of activities (e.g., brewing and prostitution) within it. However, in the shift to civil law in 1928, Kibera emerged as an ungovernable and administrative "gray area" because it lacked both "direct European administration and any form of traditional authority through which the government could rule indirectly"; in this way, the settlement expanded rapidly (Parson 1997, 92). What had previously been sanctioned now became illegal; however, through various bouts of collective action and resistance and violence, the residents fought for their right to continue the livelihoods that depended on the local markets for rental accommodations and gin (de Smedt 2011b, 11).

Perhaps, in addition to that of negotiation and resistance, Kibera's history tells a more nuanced story of the contingent nature of legal enforcement

on the legal tools, capacity, and will of the local state and the identities that form to leverage and capitalize on the fractures and disjunctures arising out of fragmented urban governance. For example, when the validity of temporary occupation passes instituted under military authority were rejected under the civil administration as having been granted outside the legal mandate, the administration found that the "African Settlement (Kibera Settlement Area) Rules of 1949," which were intended to grant the authority to evict, had no teeth for enforcement (Parsons 1997, 116). And further attempts to evict non-Sudanese dwellers were in vain because the Sudanese adopted or claimed to hire their tenants as domestic workers in order to protect their renters' rights to live in Kibera (Parsons 1997).

With looming independence, the Sudanese pressured the regime to extend formal rights to Kibera. However, the British had lost interest in the plight of the settlers, partly due to broader concern with the pending loss of the colonial stronghold and partly due to the shared consensus that the Sudanese were a tribe of questionable character and integrity (de Smedt 2009a). Although the postcolonial government failed to have equal sympathy for the rights granted under the colonial state, it also had little success in removing people from Kibera and, after failed attempts to convince structure owners in Kibera to be compensated for tearing down their shacks, the government finally agreed to tolerate the settlement. A new form of temporary occupancy license was granted in Kibera, however; and these licenses were again handed out as political patronage to those associated with the ruling party (Amis 1984).

The unique urban importance of the tribe, as both a colonial and African construct for social grouping and identification, became increasingly pertinent throughout the development of Kibera (de Smedt 2011). Despite their allegiance to the British, the Sudanese (in post-independence to be classified as the "Nubian tribe," in an effort to be seen as rightfully Kenyan) are often seen as the first and most legitimate claimants to Kibera. Although the Kikuyus are often seen as the second generation of Kibera settlers, their own legacy dates back to the 1920s, when they first entered Kibera as renters——only to be chased out during the Mau Mau Uprising in the late 1950s (de Smedt 2009b; Dafe 2009). However, from the time of independence, the Kikuyu population aggressively sought licenses and actively constructed large structures for rental, shifting the historically Nubian-dominated demographic composition of Kibera. Additional groups

of Kikuyu were relocated to Kibera in the early 1970s, when their peri-urban land was needed by the government to build formal estates (Dafe 2009). They were also offered licenses to erect temporary structures by the ruling chiefs who believed the Nubians to be less Kenyan than their counterparts. Other groups also came to Kibera in its early years fleeing ethnic rivalries elsewhere in the country. The majority settled as tenants, renting from Nubian and Kikuyu structure owners, who had already staked (or been granted) claims to the available spaces and erected large structures in the settlement (COHRE 2006, 22).

Although Kibera still flourishes—despite nearly one hundred years of attempted eradication—the development of local property markets has not been without contestation. The infamous 2007 violence in Kibera, following highly contested election results, brought heightened awareness of the rising controversy regarding land claims, rents, and rights in the settlement (Medard 2010; COHRE 2006, 22). Ostensibly understood as a battle of the tribes (the Luo tenants formed a strong support base for candidate Odinga, the declared loser of the competitive race), the tensions between tenants and structure owners erupted through identity politics where unique alliances, such as that between the Kikuyu and Nubian landlords and the Luhya and Luo tenants, were formed (de Smedt 2009b). To quell the violence, a national coalition government was created, with both candidates sharing power.

However, this was not the first time violence had erupted in Kibera. In 1992, violence broke out when Raila Odinga, the son of Kenya's first vice president, ran for Parliament as Kibera's representative. During his campaign, he was accused of moving Luo supporters into Kibera—these accusations angered Luo renters, and Kikuyu and Nubian structure owners were chased out of Kibera in the riots that followed (de Smedt, 2009b). The 2001 upheavals, resulting from the local member of Parliament publicly discouraging tenants to pay rent at a fund-raiser for Odingo, led to the formation of urban gangs used for hired protection. Although first called upon by the structure owners to protect their physical property, counter gangs soon emerged to protect the rights of tenants (Medard 2010).

The explosive and recurrent conflict in Kibera, hinging on disagreements over rental rates and ownership rights but often manifesting as pointed attacks against Nubian and Kikuyu structure owners, has therefore shaped patterns of urban authority, security of property, and power in both the local property markets and across the nation. The settlement's

history as a site of resistance, violence, commercialization, and patronage is demonstrative of the struggle to define, articulate, and enforce the rights and responsibilities of urban dwellers and the state in the city of Nairobi. More than one hundred years after its establishment and despite many attempts at its eradication, Kibera's continuing existence is a testament to the fragmented apparatus of authority and the violent and negotiated nature of urban access in Nairobi.

KEY ACTORS AND NETWORKS IN KIBERA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HOUSING

Throughout the complex history of Kibera and Nairobi, distinct actors with functional roles have come to be active participants in the formation of the market. They weave in and out of economic market logics and discourses, creating opportunities whereby power is exercised and capital (both social and economic) is leveraged in simultaneously constructive and destructive ways. This section looks at the current stakeholders that actively claim rights over land or decisionmaking processes in Kibera. It explores how these actors work to define, defend, and expand the rights they hold and how their tools, associations, and identity constructions are used in this process.

The land on which Kibera developed is legally owned by the National Government of Kenya. To date, no title deeds have been granted over state-owned land. Although the state is in the processes of outlining an administration process for government-owned land, this right is currently outlined in the Government Lands Act (directly adapted from the Crown Lands Ordinance) (Kenya Ministry of Land and Housing 2004, 14). Though the rhetoric of Kiberans' "temporary rights to occupy" prevails in the official pronouncements of Ministry of Land officials and local chiefs (who cite zoning, endangered environmental value, and public health concerns), Kibera's residents report fear of eviction over that of removal by the state. Therefore, though in theory the state may legally own the land, this right is highly constrained in practice by other sets of rights that support residents and structure owners (i.e., the new Constitution, which includes the right to housing and basic services).

Chiefs and subchiefs represent the executive branch of the national government in Kibera and are granted power through the Chief's Authority

Act in conjunction with other pieces of legislation. They are appointed, rather than elected. Due, in part, to the inability of the City Council to mandate over unplanned areas, the extension of the chief's authority to the management of informal settlements and their property markets is generally accepted. The *headsmen* and *subheadsmen* are the "eyes and the ears" of the chief and subchief in each housing cluster, allowing for the chief to be aware at all times of what is happening in the settlement. As the chief's term is only two years per location, he works in cahoots with *village elders*, who better understand the local context, to make decisions. Through this process, village elders come to hold both vested social capital and also political and social positions in Kibera.

The collective roles of the chief and his support team include plot allocation, witness to structure ownership sales and transfer, dispute negotiation, management of the Administrative Police (whom they advise to tear down structures and evict tenants when necessary), assurance that nothing that resembles a permanent structure is built in Kibera, and approval and oversight of all structure improvements and maintenance requests lodged by structure owners. The chief's duties regarding rental disputes between tenants and structure owners are also supported by the members of local churches, rental tribunals, and gangs who work to mediate and resolve issues. Chiefs and gangs are reportedly willing to take bribes in exchange for support in a dispute or for approval of small construction projects. Thus, power in Kibera is exercised through an extremely flexible, through historically embedded, mode of governance where those with money are able to steer decisionmaking in their favor.

Structure owners are people who own physical structures in Kibera and rent them on a temporary basis to tenants. Some owners are relatively wealthy and often are politically affiliated (having been granted structures by past chiefs). Others, though few in number, use petty landlordism as a form of basic livelihood. Most of the structures are large and fit many households, thus lowering maintenance costs. They are made out of a combination of mud, some with cement floors or additional corrugated iron reinforcement. Although residents report that they struggle to convince owners to improve the physical structures, structure owners counter this argument by listing the various informal taxes and tariff they pay to the chief, gangs, and other protection groups as a rationale for the poor maintenance. The majority of structure owners in Kibera are *absentee owners*; they

do not live on the premises or close by the structure. Generally, their only presence is during the time of rent collection and some (particularly those with political affiliations) send others to collect rent or manage disputes on their behalf. This dislocation from and impersonal relationship with Kibera enables structure owners to shirk the responsibility of addressing the needs of tenants.

Structure owners often own multiple structures on one area and use a combination of coercive tactics to ensure that rent is paid on a regular basis. The majority of structure owners and local business owners are from the Kikuyu tribe and are seen as being business-minded people. A rapid assessment of Kibera's rental market undertaken by UN-Habitat suggests that the high profitability of structure ownership and the low levels of liquidity in the market make it difficult for other groups to gain access to own structures (Saga, Medulla, and Karirah-Gitau 2002). The most notable times where structure owners sell their rights to structures is during or directly after violent upheavals in the settlement.

Tenants rent structures in Kibera on a monthly basis and form part of a much larger pool that makes up the demand for affordable housing in the city. Tenants are seen as disposable in Kibera, as the limited commodity of housing gives the majority of the bargaining power to the structure owners. Kibera, being centrally located, is one of the more expensive places to live in the city, and its residents pay large portions of their income to landlords. Some tenants live in Kibera to access the city, while others live there to access the markets within Kibera for commodities and labor; head hunters, for example, often live in Kibera in order to quickly source construction workers. Likewise, many young men come to Kibera to act as casual laborers and source daily work. Therefore, for tenants living in Kibera, it is worth the premium paid for rent because it offers an opportunity to be instantly connected to a range of urban circuits that function both within and beyond the porous boundaries the settlement.

Tenants can often secure their monthly rights to use and inhabit structures by paying rent punctually; rarely would a structure owner violently evict a paying tenant. However, if the justness of an eviction or rent hike is questioned, some tenants can fight for their rights with the support of coercive rights-jargoning and often tribe-based local youth groups. These groups, developed to combat the more mercenary like groups that formed out of the 2001 violence, often use discourses of social justice to territo-

rialize and protect portions of Kibera. In some parts of Kibera, groups of young tenants have taken over large structures as a form of rebellion and resistance; this is often viewed unfavorably by tenants and structure owners alike, who see the accompanying violence as disruptive to the general functioning of the market and their own personal safety.

Although many tenants reported having homes elsewhere in the country to where they plan to retire, many also noted that they travel infrequently to their rural homes and often cannot afford to visit family and friends. Home, referred to as "up country" by non-Nubian residents, is an important concept for most of Kibera's dwellers, and it often serves as a continued point of reference for social and tribal networks. However, fewer people than expected move back to rural areas once they have settled and formed lives in urban Nairobi. This is echoed by UN-Habitat which found that, contrary to the common narrative of Kibera as a hostel for rural migrants, the mean length of time for inhabitancy is ten years, with many residents reporting that Kibera was their main or only residence (UN-Habitat 2003, 14). However, residents use their ties to home to access and secure spaces in Kibera; many tenants live in ethnic enclaves within Kibera, citing both friendship networks and safety from tribal violence as the leading causes of this clustering (Saga, Medulla, and Karirah-Gitau 2002, 13).

In the market for housing in Kibera, other actors play more subtle yet important roles. Gangs (known as "youth groups") are often made up of tenants and provide protection, organize social justice and arts events, and can be hired to uphold the rights of both tenants and structure owners. Although gangs are often seen as having fickle loyalties, there are many youth groups, each with different agendas. Some work directly for profit, while others function through networks of social capital. Many tenants have argued that if their rights to occupy were unfairly questioned, they would be upheld by these gangs rather than the formal police force or rental tribunals.

The extralegal nature of Kibera opens a space for other actors to emerge. Water vendors sell water to residents who do not have access to taps; most tenants report that paying for water is one of their primary expenses. Crow and Odaba (2009) refer to the water-vending structure as a "disorganized cartel," which vends water at prices above market value. In addition, other private security forces exist in Kibera. The "Masai" (named deceptively for their perceived origin as tribal warriors), offer safety for shop owners and residents walking through the dark alleys at nights and can be hired on a per-use

basis if necessary. All these actors contribute to the making of Kibera's property markets (which are far more complex than just the selling and buying of structures) and the material and lived experiences of urban dwellers.

This empirical exploration offers two key findings. The first is that people "construct" or highlight identities within the market as a tool by which to negotiate claims. Depending on the question asked, people can identify themselves as tenants and structure owners (e.g., those described above) call upon other simultaneous and often uniquely urban identities (e.g., tribe, gender, collective rural imaginary, personal or community relationship to "landed" history, language, and socioeconomic status) as tools and leverage in claim-making processes. As Kibera is often people's first and only entry point into the city, the construct of these identities are often integrally related to their lived experience of urbanism in Kibera. Second, vested power has accumulated in the market, and specific actors, identities, and roles are marginalized in this process. However, though Kibera's market may not be working well, it is supplying a vast amount of housing to many people in the city. Although tenants are highly disadvantaged in their ability to bargain and negotiate, most report that the affordability of Kibera outweighs its more negative features. Both these findings should be considered when designing interventions to improve the functioning of land markets and conditions in the settlement.

ADDRESSING THE DYSFUNCTIONAL LAND MARKETS IN KIBERA

Although Kibera undoubtedly supplies housing to thousands of people and offers an entry point to the city for thousands more, in no way does this presuppose that intervention is unnecessary. As the research demonstrates, the state has always played an active role in Kibera's markets, not only through the day-to-day functions of local chiefs and councilors but also through the history of constructed advantage and the vesting of interest at the scale of the city and the settlement. Reconstructing engagement is a perpetual process of testing strategies of urban governance.

As one begins to envision more exactly *how* this new engagement should be configured, AbdouMaliqu Simone reminds us that "African cities—simultaneously demonstrating marked development and decline—–constitute particular kinds of frontiers that operate as a gravitational force

and as a space of experimentation for new social relations" (Simone 2004, 380). Myers (2011) echoes this sentiment and argues that beyond the "crisis narrative" of Africa's destitution, alternative visions of theory and practice must articulate a valorization of the urban practices of the poor and our understanding of the potential of African cities. By seeking to diverge from understandings of the African city that overlay European ideals of the law and markets onto this complex reality, Kibera offers the opportunity to consider more inclusive approaches and consider more creative interventions.

In addressing the dysfunction of Kibera's housing market, local processes and practices cannot be isolated from citywide development. Attempts to address inequality, poverty, and dysfunction at the scale of the city are under way. Kenya's new Constitution of 2010 outlines the "modern expansive bill of rights" including the right to housing and basic services and allows for the Provincial Administration to be entirely redesigned into a more democratic and accountable structure (Task Force on Devolved Government 2011, 10). New frameworks for land administration and the revocation of illegally grabbed land are also prominent features in the policy landscape (Kenya Ministry of Land and Housing 2004).

However, the practical and site-specific implications of these policies are contentious. Material intervention to improve the functioning of the housing market has often had devastating effects on the urban poor. Examples exist throughout the history of Kibera of where top-down approaches, which have attempted to make uniform and clarify rights using the formal market as the ideal, have often resulted in the poor losing rather than gaining access. Examples of such attempts to align the formal and informal markets include "tenant purchase schemes" plagued by corruption in the allocation of flats; site-and-services models that often became victims of market downraiding; and the most recent Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme, which is currently blocked by a court battle between structure owners and administrators. Overall, these interventions have not resulted in the poor gaining more inclusive access, higher degrees of tenure security, or heightened bargaining power in the market (Saga, Medulla, and Karirah-Gitau 2001; Omenya and Huchzermeyer 2006). This suggests that efficient markets and inclusive markets may not go hand in hand and that top-down approaches can only be taken so far. Therefore, the inability of Nairobi's past housing programs and policies to correct market distortions and provide access to adequate shelter perhaps point to the need for more multi-scaled and less episodic approaches

that do not attempt to decrease the flexibility or dynamism of urban land market practice (Huchzermeyer 2007).

In validating the practices of the urban poor, new approaches should accept rather than avoid contestation and should not attempt to interject property rights into a highly distorted market. The ability of the urban poor to use various forms of capital and identity politics to negotiate in the market should be recast, not as a hindrance to efficiency but as an opportunity for more creative inclusivity. This is not intended to glorify the contestation and resistance that arise through these markets, but rather to highlight the potential value of informality and urban practice for creating a space where the urban poor are able to engage and forge access to the city and urban opportunities. The injustice evident in the market—most notably in the spaces of rental disputes regarding evictions, fair rents, physical conditions, and maintenance responsibilities—points to the need for locally embedded tools for conflict negotiation, urban management, and decisionmaking. To improve the actual outcomes of such transactions, intervention at the interface of negotiation, through the creation of participatory tools and platforms, could be a starting point for addressing the problematic nature of Kibera's housing market.

CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to reframe and recast the agenda for improving the functioning and material outcomes of informal urban housing markets in Africa, showing that at both the scales of the city and the settlement, the market for housing is politically and socially constructed. The emergence of powerful actors in these markets can be traced through the histories of the settlement and city, wherein active state engagement opened spaces for vested social, financial, and political power to accumulate. The many actors that form part of this housing complex capitalize on various associations and identities, some of which align with their market and legal roles and others of which do not, whereby they claim rights in this market.

Kibera can be seen as an emerging site for testing and experimenting with new and unique modalities for participation and governance, which are not reflective of the Western ideals of the law and land and housing markets that historically and continually discriminate against the poor. By

allowing and supporting these diverse modalities and processes of rights claiming, the urban poor can become more active participants in these markets. Thus, if the goal is to broaden the grounds for activation, then one must also begin to consider the politics of informality and identity not as enemies of the market but as crucial levers in this process whereby the poor are able to use various forms of capital and association to incrementally and progressively build pathways to urban citizenship.

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Community Land Trusts: A Model for Integrating Abuja's Urban Villages within the City Master Plan

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ABSTRACT

Nigeria's Federal Capital City (FCC), Abuja, is unarguably the nation's best example of a planned city. Yet despite largely adhering to the 1979 Master Plan by International Planning Associates, a number of informal settlements persist within the city, such as Garki Village, Old Karu Village, Mabushi Village, and other communities that predate the establishment of Abuja as the nation's capital city. These settlements have defied several policy initiatives of the Nigerian government over the last thirty years. Initially, compensation and complete resettlement of all preexisting communities was proposed (in order to provide an unoccupied, unencumbered blank canvas upon which the new city would be laid out); subsequently, "integration" of the communities was attempted; and later still, a hybrid of resettlement and integration was tried. No approach has been successful in fully resolving the conflicting interests of government policy objectives and indigenous land rights. The standoff has resulted in an unwritten policy of neglect of these numerous pockets of community-held land, which today constitute "islands of poverty" surrounded by some of the best infrastructure and most expensive real estate in Nigeria. These "slums" are nonetheless an important source of affordable housing for the city of Abuja, and without them many lower-earning workers

would not be able to live close to the city center—in other words, close to jobs and economic opportunity.

This paper sets out a conceptual framework for adopting a Community Land Trust (CLT) model, based on the shared equity housing approach of the same name that evolved in the United States starting in the late 1960s. The primary policy goal of this framework is to proffer a compromise between Nigeria's very blunt primary land policy instrument, the Land Use Act of 1978 (LUA), which vests ownership of all land under the state governor, and the traditional, historic claims of local communities, such as those in Abuja FCC, which in turn provide the city with its most affordable housing.

The paper is based on research and interviews conducted in Abuja and sets out comparative case studies of three urban villages—Jiwa, Mabushi, and Old Karu—that have been affected by the expanding city in different ways but all face the same underlying issues. They are not considered to be part of the Abuja Master Plan and therefore have not been fully acknowledged by the planning authorities.

The CLT framework suggests a more collaborative, nuanced approach to land tenure and markets than that provided by the LUA, which is very much a top-down product of its time (having been promulgated during Nigeria's period of military government). The paper also argues that the inflexibility and lack of sophistication of Nigeria's land-use law and policy is a significant contributory factor to the proliferation of informal settlements (slums), subsistence urbanization, and persistent urban poverty that characterize Nigeria's cities.

INTRODUCTION

Abuja, Nigeria's capital city, was established in law in 1976 by the military government of General Murtala Mohammed as an answer to the congestion and potential security challenges of Lagos, which was then the capital. Billed as Nigeria's "center of unity," the city was conceived of as an inclusive national center that all Nigerians could claim as their own, with no one particular ethnic group having primordial or "indigeneship" claims to the land. The original, somewhat idealistic, intention was to resettle, relocate, and compensate all the area's original inhabitants outside the Federal Capital Territory. However, financial constraints meant that this relocation was instead undertaken in a piecemeal manner as the city expanded (Jibril 2006) and was limited to lands required for city building.

Figure 1: Map of Abuja



In 1978, the military government of General Olusegun Obasanjo promulgated the Land Use Decree, which later passed into law as the Land Use Act of 1978 (LUA). The key features of this law included the following provisions:

1. Ownership of all lands is vested in the government, and land allocation and the issuance of title documents is to be by the authority of the state governor, under the advice of the appointed Land Allocation Committee.

2. Compensation for lands compulsorily acquired by the government would only cover the value of agricultural trees with economic value and improvements above ground and not the value of the land itself, as determined by the market or otherwise.

These two policy actions of Nigeria's past military governments serve to highlight the unresolved tension that exists between traditional, ethnic, and indigenous landownership rights and the notion of a modern sense of nationality, vested in the power of the state. Abuja was idealized as a blank canvas upon which a new city could be laid out, after the relocation of "a few" indigenes. However, it became apparent that the government had underestimated both the number of people who would need to be compensated and relocated and the cost of doing so, along with the depth of the sense of connection and ownership between the people and their traditional land. Speaking on condition of anonymity recently, a local Gbagyi chief described the standoff situation between official land policy and the rights of indigenous people as being "like a pregnant woman—anything can happen any time, either in our time, or in the future."[1] The sense one gets speaking with community leaders is that the Gbagyi people feel they have given enough of their land legacy away—and now they are standing their ground over the few remaining pockets still under their control.

What this paper describes as "urban villages" in Abuja FCC are the remaining indigenous settlements,[2] which have survived and persisted after over three decades of compulsory acquisition, resettlement, demolition exercises, and trading of land on the open market.[3] There are a number of these communities, some overtaken by the expanding city and others lying just beyond the edges; they include Old Karu, Jiwa, Mabushi, Jabi, Aleta, Chika, Pyakasa, and Garki Village, among others. This paper focuses on the first three and attempts to analyze their differing contexts, which highlight the need for a new approach to land administration, and resettlement in particular, in Abuja.

1 Author's field notes, 2012.

2 The Federal Capital City, which covers 250 square kilometers, is not to be confused with the Abuja Federal Capital Territory, which covers 8,000 square kilometers.

3 Abuja's demolition exercises have been well documented; see http://www.serac.org/Publications/AbujaReportFinal.pdf.

The need for a new approach is underscored by the state of development limbo and poverty in which these villages currently exist—neither enjoying recognized legal status by the government nor being accessible to the land market. As a result of this, they suffer from official neglect, undeveloped infrastructure and urban services, a lack of investment, and the other squalid characteristics of urban informal settlements. Yet all this is occurring in the context of Nigeria's most modern, planned city.

The approach being proposed is based on the Community Land Trust (CLT) model, which has been formally developed in the United States since the 1960s (but traces its conceptual roots as far back as Ebenezer Howard's "Garden Cities" model), and which has today spread to the United Kingdom, Australia, and beyond. The CLT model has a number of features that provide a conceptual point of departure for a policy framework that would suit Abuja's urban villages, including:

1. The notion of land *stewardship* as opposed to outright *ownership*, which appears to be closer at heart to the African traditional value of land as a shared legacy and resource;

2. Protecting land and housing from open market forces (and land speculators), thereby creating a sustainable platform for affordable housing and access to housing by lower-income urban dwellers; and

3. Providing a more nuanced, less blunt approach to land administration than that currently provided by the LUA.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This literature review focuses on *The Community Land Trust Reader* (2010), edited by John Emmeus Davis and published by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and its predecessor volumes. *The Reader* is a collection of relevant historical writings and policy analysis about the CLT model spanning over a century, from Ebenezer Howard in 1902 to more contemporary writing.

Historical Origins and Evolution of the Community Land Trust Model

Early work on the CLT model revolves round Henry George, Ebenezer Howard, Ralph Borsodi, and Arthur Morgan. More refined practical work on the CLT was done much later by Bob Swann and Slater King, much of which culminated in the 1972 book titled *The Community Land Trust*, published by Bob Swann, Shimon Gottschalk, Eric Hansch, and Ted Webster. This would be the first published work on the CLT, which was derived from practical experiences from the United States and study visits to the Israeli kibbutzim and moshim agricultural communities. In 1982, an embodiment of lessons learned from many more practical experiences with CLTs titled *The Community Land Trust Handbook* was published by the Rodale Press. The book drew on experiences of newer CLTs in Cincinnati, Maine, and East Tennessee. Unlike the earlier book published in 1972, the *CLT Handbook* introduced key organizational and operational touches to the overall model that clearly distinguished it from its previous conception. As Davis (2010) asserts, there was a new emphasis on urban problems, especially the preservation of affordable housing and the revitalization of residential neighborhoods. There was also a new emphasis on building the social and political base for a new CLT through grassroots organizing, and a higher priority on serving disadvantaged individuals and communities, accompanied by a moral responsibility for helping lower-income leaseholders to succeed as first-time homeowners. Open membership was defined in terms of leaseholder members and community members, each of whom was assigned responsibility for electing one-third of the governing board. Furthermore, the permanent affordability of owner-occupied housing enforced through a preemptive option-and-resale formula embedded in the ground lease was made a defining feature of the CLT.

The first documented attempt to create a CLT was made in the United States in 1969 with the establishment of "New Communities Inc." as a response to the land (and housing) problems facing African Americans at the height of racial segregation. Registered as a not-for-profit organization, it was simply designed to hold land in perpetual trust for the permanent use of rural communities. By 2010, over 240 CLTs in forty-five U.S. states had been built, with others founded in parts of Europe, Asia, and Australia. The CLT model is deeply rooted in a mix of theoretical ideas, political movements, and social experiments spanning decades.

The crux of the CLT model is distinguishable by three main clusters of characteristics—ownership, organization, and operation—appearing at different times through its course of "evolution," each shaped by a different set of influences. It is useful to briefly examine each cluster.

Ownership

According to the CLT theory, "ownership" is structured in four ways. First, land is common heritage, not an individual possession. Title to land is held by a nonprofit "owner" that manages the land on behalf of a particular community, for both the present and the future. Secondly, land is permanently removed from the market, never to be sold by nonprofit owner. It is thus shielded from market forces. Third, structural improvements on land are owned independent of the land, which is mainly leased. And finally, exclusive rights are granted to use land on which structures are developed, thus satisfying personal interests while protecting those of the larger community.

CLT sees land as part of a "shared heritage" for the common good, as against "individual property" that is ideal for speculation; the "shared heritage" notion applies the ethic of "stewardship" where acquisition is based on "need," as against "accumulation" based on private enrichment. The Jewish National Fund adopted, somewhat, the CLT theory, resulting in the establishment of kibbutzim and moshim farming communities in Israel from lands acquired in Palestine.

Organization

According to the CLT theory, organization is in the context of integrating "communities" in the entire land-lease arrangement, hence a CLT. CLT membership became open to anyone living within the region of influence of the CLT, not necessarily on the land. This "open membership" aspect was part of a model designed by Bob Swann and written in to the 1972 CLT manual. According to J.E. Davis, quoting the International Independence Institute's charter, the entire idea of the organization is built around the need "to promote a world-wide social reformation to be based upon the theory that priority must be given… to the development of agriculture, local arts, local crafts, local enterprises and local industries, and that the development of these basic social institutions should not be sacrificed to promote urbanism and industrialism" (Davis 2010, 15).

Operation

The entire experimentations on CLTs described so far had embedded in them two of the three elements (ownership and organization) of modern CLTs. Until 1978, there was no operational framework to incorporate "the land-leased structure of ownership" and "the community-based structure of organization" envisioned by Swann.

The purpose of the operational framework of CLTs was to harmonize landownership and the organizational relationship that characterized modern CLTs. For instance, a driving operational idea, as envisioned by the various CLT proponents, includes the empowerment of the low-income or poor members of society who are excluded from the economic and political mainstream.

The first inner-city CLT started up in 1980. Previous CLTs were rural. The focus had been on empowerment and price control of structures on CLT land, and a need to bring "development without displacement" to rural and agricultural communities.

The urban CLT was a product of grassroots organizing and became a vehicle for community empowerment—and thus a means for controlling the development and fate of an impoverished inner-city neighborhood while involving the neighborhood's residents in the CLT's activities and governance. It also became a vehicle for controlling the resale prices of any homes developed through the CLT. Perhaps the key incentive learned over the years and through the adoption of CLTs in urban environments is to encourage development without displacement.

The City-CLT Partnership: Municipal Support for Community Land Trusts

According to Davis and Jacobus (2008), the city-CLT partnership offers municipal support for CLTs. Previously, cities were mere "supporters" of CLT projects. There was, however, a shift from this status to the city playing the part of main instigator, spearheading CLT development. This is exemplified in the active roles recently played by municipalities in several parts of the world in a bid to make housing affordable, echoing the overall objective of CLTs. Municipalities, however, tend to focus more on housing provision, neglecting or ignoring the community development and empowerment components key to a viable CLT.

Whilst it is useful for a CLT to have friends in City Hall, this is not without risk. Having invested funds for the start-up process, it becomes

difficult to persuade governments to relinquish control of CLTs. This may compromise the communitarian ideals upon which the CLTs are founded, suggesting the need, perhaps, for a "Municipal Land Trust" model.

METHODOLOGY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THREE URBAN VILLAGES IN ABUJA

Figure 2. Image of Old Karu Village

Source: Google Earth.

Old Karu Urban Village is located just beyond the eastern limits of the FCC and is therefore considered to be a "satellite town" to the city (figure 2). Administratively, it falls under the purview of the Abuja Municipal Area Council (a local government structure), rather than the Federal Capital Territory Administration, which administers the FCC.[4] However, given its geographical location, less than 10 minutes drive from

4 The Federal Capital Territory Administration is the federal government structure headed by the minister for the Abuja Federal Capital Territory.

the city center (traffic permitting), it feels like a part of the city and is a very attractive affordable housing district because of its locational advantages. Old Karu covers approximately 50 hectares and has a population of more than 20,000—a very dense 400 persons per hectare.

The village is itself evidence of the flip-flopping of government policy with respect to resettlement as it was supposed to have been vacated since 1981 (Jibril 2009). However, a combination of factors, including unpaid compensation and a lack of enforcement, meant that many people did not relocate across the state line to Plateau State (present-day Nasarawa State), although the chief and many citizens did make the move and formed what is known today as the adjoining New Karu Township. After a decade and a half in administrative limbo, Old Karu was once again formally recognized as being part of the Federal Capital Territory, and a new second-class chief was appointed in 1997.

Despite re-appointing a chief for Old Karu (i.e., the *Sakaruyi* of Karu), the land itself is still in ownership limbo, and the occupants do not have recognized land title. As such they cannot participate in the land market, nor use their land as security to access development loans and other mortgage facilities. The government's policy is therefore contradictory, on the one hand appointing and recognizing a distinct chiefdom, but on the other hand denying formal, titled recognition to traditional landowners.

Figure 3. Image of Mabushi Urban Village

Source: Google Earth.

Mabushi Urban Village is a settlement of approximately 5,000 people occupying about 10 hectares of land in the Mabushi District of the FCC, making this the only of the three case studies to be centrally located in Abuja city (figure 3). The village is represented by a district head and is supposed to have been fully compensated and relocated or resettled in 1979. However, again, a combination of nonenforcement and the determination of the community's residents to stand their ground to claim their traditional land rights has brought about a standoff between the formal, legal land administration system and the traditional landowners' perceived rights of occupation and ownership. Although the land where the village is located has been allocated to new owners (on paper, at least), they have not been allowed to exercise these ownership rights by the original inhabitants of the land.

Therefore, Mabushi Village also remains in limbo—undeveloped and neglected, although located in a fully developed neighborhood, it is an inner-city "slum" that, ironically, shares a boundary fence with the Federal Ministry of Works and the Federal Ministry of Lands and Housing.

Figure 4. Image of Jiwa Urban Village

Source: Google Earth.

Jiwa Urban Village is located in Phase IV of the FCC, covering approximately 100 hectares and home to about 30,000 people, living in mostly cement-block walled buildings with zinc roofs (figure 4). Unlike Old Karu and Mabushi, Jiwa's indigenous population is not from Abuja's predominant Gbagyi ethnic group. Jiwans historically trace their roots further north. They are of Hausa ethnic stock, tracing their ancestry to the Zazzau (Zaria) Emirate in the nineteenth century, from where they migrated southward.

According to a household survey by the Women Environmental Programme, 75 percent of the population of Jiwa are "settler" tenants, living in compounds owned by community indigenes, and landlordism is the main occupation of the community's property owners.

Current Policy Impacts

Interviews with community leaders in the urban villages studied reveal a common underlying pattern despite the quite different circumstances in which each settlement finds itself. Geographically, they are located in significantly different positions with respect to the FCC, which has a direct bearing on the security of their tenure. Old Karu is outside the FCC, and therefore of less interest to the city planning authorities. Jiwa is in Abuja FCC Phase IV, beyond the current reach of the city's developed margin and thus may have breathing space for now. And Mabushi is surrounded by the FCC and was compensated/resettled, only to have returned; therefore, its residents live with a considerable amount of apprehension and in constant fear of eviction. What is clear in all three cases is that policy inconsistencies over the years have run up against a growing sense of indigenous rights over traditional lands. Plans and policies initially proposed during the military government era are all but unenforceable today in a democratic context.

Today, the Gbagyi people and other ethnic groups have democratically elected leaders who are duty-bound to support their people's (constituents') rights and their aspiration to remain on their ancestral lands, and to participate in the development of Abuja city, which is taking place all around them.

The official policy position of the government, which is based on the LUA and the decree empowering the formation of Abuja as Nigeria's capital, is equally strident in its assertion that ownership of all land is vested in the government alone. These two equally forceful arguments from the people and from the government have produced something of a stalemate

whereby formalized land administration and development, as well as land market activities, carry on around the urban villages but stop at a mutually recognized, notional, force-field-like "boundary" around the settlements.

The end result of this conflict of interests is official neglect of the villages and their inability to effectively participate in the land and property market and other economic activity. Roads and drainage systems are left unbuilt, garbage is uncollected, and housing within the villages is built to a bare-minimum standard, due to the lack of tenure and investment security. When discussing this situation with community leaders, they are quick to point out, however, that they recognize they are better off negotiating with the government than being left at the mercy of the open land market. As one leader said, "Communities that have sold their land have sold their rights. Those that sold land to individuals have no way forward."[5] The government, although powerful and impersonal, is seen as an entity that can be negotiated with over time, even after agreements are made and compensations paid. The government remains (at least notionally) committed to the welfare of citizens and can be called to account for this reason. However, once a piece of land is bought by an individual on the open market and ownership is transferred, there is no comeback for the community. That sold piece of land is gone forever, an outright loss to the community.

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS IN ABUJA

The main difficulty in proposing a CLT model in Abuja is the need to avoid challenging the 1978 LUA head-on, which would require significant legislative changes at the national level and would unleash a fundamental shift in land tenure law. There is currently a national committee appointed to address the reform of Nigerian land tenure law, but how far and how fast this work will progress is difficult to ascertain.

A more pragmatic way to approach the issue may be to work within the limits of the current law and seek to create a CLT model that fits within the *existing* legal framework, much as initially occurred in the United States,

5 Author's field notes, 2012.

where CLTs operated informally for two decades before the law caught-up with the "movement" and codified regulations were then developed—a bottom-up process.

Introducing CLTs Using Current Land Administration Provisions

CLTs Created under "Mass Housing" Policy Provisions

One policy vehicle that could be used to introduce CLTs without the need to change the land laws would be the current "mass housing" provisions. Currently, in Abuja title documents are being issued to developers, permitting them to undertake mass housing estate development. Often this involves the allocation of large tracts of land (some well over 100 hectares), which are then subdivided into plots for sale and development. Although the entire estate usually has a single certificate of occupancy (land title document), the owners of the individual plots within the estate are issued deeds of assignment tied to the main certificate of occupancy. These deeds are bankable, legally recognized records of property ownership in their own right, which may be used to securitize financial instruments such as loans and mortgages.

Using similar provisions, CLTs could be created, based on the lands currently occupied by urban villages. This would involve the boundary of the villages being formally surveyed and delineated and the land enclosure being accurately marked and entered in to public records. In a similar manner to the mass housing estates, the entire CLT would have a single certificate of occupancy, while individual property owners within the community would have deeds of assignment for their respective portions of land and property. These demarcated CLT lands could then be streamlined and integrated in to the Abuja Master Plan, fully, formally—and finally.

Certificates of Occupancy Issued to a Nonprofit Entity

In keeping with the traditional concept of the communitarian ownership of land, the title documentation for the CLT would not be issued in the names of individuals but in the name of the community as a whole, as a trust on behalf of all the landowning individuals. For this purpose, the community would be required to register a nonprofit organization (or community-based organization), which would represent the "voice" and interests of the community's members. This legal entity would have a Board of Trustees,

standing as the legal representatives or custodians, and a Management Committee, to deal with the day-to-day administration of the CLT.

As a legal/corporate entity, the community-based organization (or a company limited by guarantee, perhaps) would be in a position to enter into contractual arrangements, including development partnership agreements, take out loans and conduct other financial transactions, for the purposes of developing affordable housing and the provision of services within the community.

CLTs Regulate Property and Land Market

The legal and regulatory basis by which the CLT would be enabled to regulate the internal property and land market within the community would be based on the same legal powers exercise by mass housing estate owners to impose and collect service charges and other compulsory payments from estate property owners. A CLT covenant, binding the community members, would need to be negotiated, agreed to, and signed by all as part of the process of creating the CLT as a legal entity.

On the basis of the agreement entered into by the community members and through the agreed-on operating processes, meetings, and working committees, the CLT covenant would make provision for embedding the principles and practices of CLTs (price controls, shared equity, stewardship and sales restrictions, etc.), suitably adjusted to meet local cultural, social, and economic expectations.

Planning Controls Exercised by the FCDA

The Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) would still exercise its full control over development standards of property within the CLT. In the same manner as it retains development control rights over a mass housing estate, the situation would be no different for a CLT operating under the ambit of similar legal provision.

This implies that just as a mass housing developer is required to submit plans and layouts for approval, which must meet the planning standards of the FCDA, this would be the same for the CLT. The creation of CLTs would also be an opportunity to develop new standards and regulations more suited to the lower-income housing market, new standards for sustainability, and other timely innovations.

CLT Challenges

The introduction of CLTs in Abuja would not be without its challenges, and like any policy initiative these would need to be worked through after thorough research and planning. However, if viewed and embraced by all as an opportunity to make a clean break with ineffective past policies that have left urban villages isolated and unable to effectively participate in the development going on around them, it should be possible to work through these challenges with all the stakeholders.

Internal Community Disagreement

There is no guarantee that every member of every urban village community will be equally willing to sign up to the CLT proposal at first. However, these are villages with a high degree of social and ethnic cohesion, which is the basis for day-to-day village life at present, so it is not a stretch to imagine the community members being able to come together to agree on the terms of a plan that has the potential to transform their lives for the better. Again, that is not to say that the undertaking will be easy or straightforward—but it should not be impossible. For example, this process will require all landowners to sign the binding covenant document for the creation of the CLT; and the process of drafting the document and seeking input and ownership will need to be a participative and transparent one, in order to win the assent of all community members.

Capped Prices: A Financial Disincentive?

There is the possibility that the capped prices of property and land within the CLT will prove to be a financial disincentive for investors and development finance institutions. Even the current Nigerian open mortgage and property finance market is limited in its volume and short term in outlook, so it is easy to envision a level of reluctance for the private sector to engage in this new plan initially.

Government financial support may be needed in the early stages of setting up the CLT model; for the state to support and subsidize an affordable housing initiative would not be unusual. The downside of government investment and subsidy has been noted in the review of literature above; where the state invests money, it expects to exercise control and influence. This may imply a slight loss of autonomy to the CLT. However, until CLTs are established independently in law, this

loss may be unavoidable in the pilot stage and is better perceived as a *partnership* with government.

Unraveling Resettlement Policy

The danger to government in particular is that the CLT policy initiative will need to be worked through and introduced cautiously, lest it lead to the unraveling of existing resettlement policy. As was noted above, resettlement and compensation policy in Abuja has historically been less than consistent or transparent. The danger of a CLT policy being similarly poorly handled is a very real one, so a careful, staged introduction of the policy would be essential.

CONCLUSION

The approach set out in this paper is based on a view of housing generally, but affordable housing in particular, as a *merit good*, rather than as a mere *market object*. Housing is viewed primarily as a right and obligation, rather than something whose provision is left to the vagaries of the profit motive and the open market. If there is anything to be learned—the one lesson that the urban villages of Abuja teach us, in several ways—it is that the open market is limited in its ability to meet the needs of lower-income populations and is indifferent to cultural notions of place, belonging, and legacy. These latter qualities are the intangible values that extend well beyond the bricks-and-mortar aspect of urban housing, and CLTs are an ideal platform for promoting such cultural and social sustainability issues.

The CLT model addresses the issue of stewardship, legacy, and belonging, as opposed to mere ownership and market value. In Nigeria's current democratic era, as ethnic peoples across the country are beginning to assert themselves and express their expectations of the state and the role of the law in supporting their lives, rather than merely defining their boundaries, this model seems appropriate, and indeed timely.

The Abuja housing and land market is distorted by many factors—including land speculation; an arbitrary, elitist land allocation system; and the political cycles of government. The CLT model may represent an opportunity to tilt the balance of opportunity back in the direction that Abuja's original master planners had in mind, toward an inclusive administrative

center with mixed, well-serviced neighborhoods—a center for socioeconomic, as well as ethnic, unity.

Further research is required on the CLT model specifically, but also on the pressing issue of affordable housing in Abuja more generally. A detailed enumeration of Abuja's urban villages is needed, as well as their urban economic profile, through household surveys. This information is an essential component of any future planning activity, whether CLT related or not.

Additionally, the entire concept of CLTs needs to be explored with planners, policymakers, and communities, in order to test the possibility (and *plausibility*) of developing a local version of the model for Abuja and possibly even Nigeria as a whole.

Abuja needs affordable housing that is close to the city center, where the critical population of lower-paid workers and service providers can live and contribute *to* the city's economy, even as they build their own lives *from* the city's economy. Abuja's urban villages are providing an opportunity to create these pockets of housing affordability, and the CLT model may be a sustainable means of achieving this:

> In these urban spaces social identities collide, collude and accommodate each other.… Struggles for survival and power are played out in physical spaces and built environments are spatial and organisational expressions of social relations and contesting realities.
>
> —Jo Beall, *A City for All*, 1997

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