opportunities to work in the personal services sector, large real estate companies "intensified central city polarization, transforming the South Zone into an exclusive citadel, fortified by Rio's steep hills and an ominous public and private police presence. The termination of the housing finance system in the 1970s, the reduced income of workers, and upper middle class desires to live in exclusive zones have made elite housing by far the most viable sector of the real estate market" (Ribeiro and Telles, 2000: 86–7).

As these tendencies toward a duality among the population according to socio-economic status and location evolved, a parallel division emerged in the associations maintained by the two groups. Thus, those who have little education and are poor are much more likely to become involved in neighborhood community and religious associations than in unions, professional associations, and political parties. Those with high income and education, by contrast, join unions, professional associations, and cultural and sports associations and play a more active role in formal political parties. The periphery and the favelas are also characterized by what the authors call "the expansion of criminal and perverse forms of sociability" (Ribeiro and Telles, 2000: 93). These social patterns make coherent governance much more difficult to achieve.

São Paulo

São Paulo is another well-documented example of social fragmentation. The municipality of São Paulo, with some 10 million people, is one of the world's largest cities. Greater São Paulo, which includes an additional 38 municipalities in a continuous urban area of 1,500 square kilometers, contains 17.8 million people (United Nations, 2001: 84) and is the second–largest metropolitan area in Latin America (after Mexico City). As was the case in Rio de Janeiro, the growth rate in the City of São Paulo and the greater São Paulo region slowed during the 1980s, to the benefit of smaller municipalities elsewhere in the State of São Paulo as manufacturing firms relocated from the center to the periphery. Total employment grew more rapidly outside the metropolitan region as well, with the exception of the financial services and communications sectors, which grew more rapidly in the City of São Paulo (Santos, 1996: 229). During the 1980s and 1990s, pockets of poverty and rundown housing developments bedeviled the generally well-equipped central areas of the city; at the same time, more and more of the housing in the peripheral areas of the city was classified as "precarious," with low-quality materials, often on marginal land, with little or no infrastructure, and with few social services. Sposati (1996), a professor of social work and currently an elected municipal councillor, developed a series of maps of social inclusion/exclusion in the mid-1990s. In the introduction to her collection of maps (which depict the presence or absence of various facilities and services throughout the city), she makes the following observation (Sposati, 1996: 5):

If the city of São Paulo had eyes and could see itself in a large mirror, it would see the broken and shocking view of its inequalities. However, its two eyes would not be similar either. As in the popular song, maybe while one of them was staring, the other one would be floating. Because everything here seems unequal. The largest city in Latin America, with circa 10 million inhabitants, is famous for the presence of the most advanced forms of technological development and the turnover of finance capital. It houses gardened neighborhoods, lavish mansions, dauntless buildings, excellent teaching centers and first class hospitals. A numerous fleet of luxury and imported cars circulates through its avenues or stops in traffic jams. Nevertheless, São Paulo also lives with the most severe forms of deprivation and human suffering. A deprived and unemployed population seeks refuge in slums and shack houses, or is abandoned on the streets. They are daily victims of violence and do not have access to their rights and justice. They hang on overcrowded buses and trains, and if they get ill, the health service is poor. Their children, when they manage to, attend deteriorated schools, and evasion takes place very soon . . . .

To some writers, this pattern is systemic. Rolnick (1999), a senior planner, argues that the coincidence of precarious housing, low income, and low formal employment that characterizes many peripheral zones of the city actually constitutes a pattern of "territorial exclusion," whereby those groups consigned to live in these areas cannot fully realize the benefits of citizenship and economic growth that are available to people living in other areas of the city. She shows that there is a marked relationship between levels of violence and homicide in the city and levels of basic services available. Using 1991 census statistics showing housing conditions, location, infrastructure availability, and number of rooms per household, she constructs a measure of territorial exclusion for 118 cities within the state, showing an inverse relationship between the ranking on territorial exclusion and homicide rates in both 1991 and 1994. "Territorial exclusion," she explains, "makes daily life insecure and risky. It blocks access to jobs and educational and cultural opportunities, which are concentrated in small and protected enclaves within cities. Since most residences in excluded areas are illegal and mixed use is generally forbidden by municipal land regulations, people are denied the possibility of using assets, such as home ownership, to generate money and create jobs . . . . [In these excluded areas] living in a permanent condition of denial of basic human environmental needs makes inhabitants feel as if their lives are worthless" (Rolnick, 1999: 17).

In particular, the peripheral areas of the city of São Paulo exhibit many of the preconditions for violence, in that resentment and anger build up when infrastructure and services are not easily available. As Cardia (2000) describes the situation, violence in the metropolitan area is significantly greater in the periph-

eral areas, where the population growth rate is the highest. Because of inadequate infrastructure, these populations are cut off from services and public authorities in a variety of ways (Cardia, 2000). While residential segregation and unequal infrastructural development do not in themselves produce violence and crime, these writers clearly believe that such conditions raise the likelihood that a culture of violence will be reinforced.

Another approach to describing this pattern of increasing fragmentation of social groups and neighborhoods is offered by Caldeira (1996: 63), who discusses the development of social and spatial segregation in São Paulo from the early twentieth century to the present. During this period, São Paulo went from being a "concentrated city" (from the early part of the century to the 1930s); to a city with "a rich centre and a poor periphery" (from the 1940s to the 1980s); to its present form in the 1990s (and presumably later), which she describes as "proximity and high walls." Her study of a rapidly growing wealthy suburban neighborhood (Morumbi) shows that fear of violence and crime is a pervasive subject in everyday conversation. However, talk of crime is common throughout all social groups in the city, as "people from all social classes fortify their homes, change their habits, and end up transforming the city and its public areas." The result is a new urban landscape made up essentially of "fortified fragments" from which the poor and marginalized are physically excluded (Caldeira, 1996: 64–5):

> As the spaces for the rich face inwards, the outside space is left for those who cannot afford to go in. In fact, the public is treated as leftover both by the design of the enclaves and by the citizens who create the new private order. The modern public space of the streets is increasingly the area abandoned to the homeless and the street children ... fragmentation enforces separation and expresses not simple differences but irreconcilable inequalities.

Newspaper advertisements appearing between 1985 and 1995 illustrate this trend. These advertisements—aimed at the rich—both reflect and promote an image of security, isolation, racial and class homogeneity, and high levels of services and facilities (Caldeira, 1999: 120).

Manila

A final example of the tendency toward social and institutional fragmentation is the case of Manila, the capital of the Philippines. Metro Manila (or the National Capital Region [NCR]), with a population in 2000 of 10.87 million (United Nations, 2001: 89), is by far the largest city in the country, almost 10 times larger than the next-largest city, Cebu City. Metro Manila incorporates 17 municipalities (or local government units) occupying a territory of 636 square kilometers. According to Laquian (2000: 3), "the urban field of Metro Manila rightfully includes 18 adjacent [local government units] that add another four million people resident

within a territory of 1,681 square kilometers within the so-called Calabarzon region ... as well as the provinces of Bulacan, Zambales and Pampanga in Central Luzon."

In this mega–urban region, the outlying towns have been growing more quickly than the national capital region since the 1960–1970 intercensal period. Some of these towns registered an annual growth rate of over 6 percent during the period 1980–1990 (Ocampo, 1995: 285). In the process of growth, the net movement of migrants within the region has been outward rather than inward, creating major problems of sprawl and ribbon development. Sprawl has put an extreme strain on public utilities and services, extended travel distances for workers living outside the NCR, and "resulted in social disparities and conflicts of various kinds" (Ocampo, 1995: 287).

One knowledgeable writer has described Metro Manila as a "city of villages" in which "autonomous local units... have traditionally resisted efforts to centrally control their activities" (Laquian, 2000: 1). Local resistance to higher-level controls is a result of three elements: a relatively entrenched localism that defines neighborhoods as distinct units within the wider metropolitan area; strong local government units, reinforced by the 1991 Local Government Code; and a strong political culture of particularism that makes coalitions difficult to achieve (Laquian, 2000).

Fragmentation at the local level starts with the division of the city into four major types of neighborhoods. First are the *barrios* of the urban poor, often on marginal lands and even huge garbage dumps. Second are the "villages" of the rich, in which the residents lead protected, isolated lives with a full range of public services available for their use. Third are the traditional neighborhoods that house the majority of the population, bound closely by the observance of cultural and religious festivals, and participating in groups such as parent–teacher and neighborhood watch associations. Fourth are the traditional villages on the city's periphery, although these semirural areas are becoming pervaded by pollution and industrial enterprises, and their young are leaving for the city (Laquian, 2000: 1–2).

The fragmentation of neighborhood cultures is reinforced, one author argues, by the control retained by powerful local families in many Manila cities and municipalities. It is further exacerbated by the competitive behavior of certain local units (such as Makati, Quezon City, and Mandaluyong), which vie for large infrastructure investments and buildings that can serve the global economy. One result of this differentiation is that there is a wide disparity in the revenue collection of Metro Manila local governments. In 1997, revenue per capita ranged from 486 pesos in Malabon to 7,656 pesos in Makati, the upscale commercial and financial center (Shatkin, 2000: 2368).

Coordination and planning at the metro level are weak. While there is an upper-tier authority with responsibility for the whole metropolitan area, its powers and even its budget are limited, especially relative to the local government au-

thorities, whose powers were increased under the 1987 Constitution and the 1991 Local Government Code. The power of the metropolitan authority was not enhanced by the fact that Imelda Marcos had been appointed governor at the outset of the authority's life, presiding over the Metro Manila Commission until President Ferdinand Marcos was toppled in 1986. The agency, renamed the Metro Manila Authority in 1990, was assigned a rotating chairman, chosen every 6 months from among the 17 city and municipal mayors of the NCR. In 1995, the Metro Manila Authority became the Metro Manila Development Authority, although it has "remained a weak governance structure" (Laquian, 2000: 8). While NGOs and civil society groups are highly active in Manila as well as throughout the Philippines, these groups have not been able to overcome the innate localism and particularism that obtains at the metropolitan level (Laquian, 2000: 23).

The Security Dimension

Urban security became one of the dominant issues of the 1990s in many developing countries. Since September 11, 2001, an international dimension has been added to the domestic sources of insecurity generated by some of the urban social conditions considered above. We have chosen to discuss this important subject here since it is closely related to issues of social fragmentation and social policy, and because we wish to explore the governance implications of different approaches to dealing with the problem.

There is no question from both macro- and micro-level studies that urban violence has increased in a great many parts of the developing world. At the global level, crime and violence are generally much higher in Africa and Latin America than in Asia. A dataset of the (United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 1998) covering 18 developing-country cities[2] shows that Asia consistently ranks the lowest for all types of crime, while Africa and Latin America share the highest ranking for all types of crime. When the "contact crime" rate (i.e., incidents involving violence), is analyzed separately, Latin American cities outstrip African and Asian cities with regard to sexual assault, with a rate of 5 percent of all types of crime (compared with 2.4 percent in the African cities and 1.6 percent in the Asian cities). For assault with force, African cities show a rate of 3.1 percent, compared with 2.7 percent in Latin America and 0.8 percent in Asia. For robbery, cities in Latin America have a rate of 8.1 percent, compared with 4.2 percent in Africa and 1.4 percent in Asia.

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[2]This dataset, collected through the International Crime Victimization Survey, constitutes the most detailed global dataset on urban violence available. Crime was measured according to five categories: vehicle-related crime, break-and-enter crime, victimization experienced by the respondent personally (including robbery, theft of personal property, assault/threat, and sexual incidents), consumer fraud, and bribery/corruption. Data were collected in the largest city in each of the selected countries. Although not representative of the urban population in each country, this dataset provides a starting point for regional comparisons of urban crime (bearing in mind such issues as underreporting).

TABLE 9-3 Homicide Rates per 100,000 Inhabitants in
Selected Latin American Cities

City	Country	Year	Homicide Rate
Medellín	Colombia	1995	248.0
Cali	Colombia	1995	112.0
Diadema	Brazil	1997	146.1
Belford Roxo	Brazil	1997	76.5
São Paulo	Brazil	1998	55.8
Rio de Janeiro	Brazil	1998	52.8
Lima	Peru	1995	25.0
Ciudad de México	Mexico	1995	19.6
Santiago	Chile	1995	8.0
Buenos Aires	Argentina	1998	6.4
Caracas	Venezuela	1995	76.0
Guatemala City	Guatemala	1996	101.5
San Salvador	El Salvador	1995	95.4

SOURCE: Carneiro (2000).

Aside from the human and sociological effects of crime and violence, there is a significant economic cost to the countries in which rates of crime and violence are high. A groundbreaking study by two Colombians (Londoño and Guerrero, 2000) estimates the cost of violence against people and property in terms of loss of potential urban gross domestic product (GDP). The authors claim that El Salvador, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, and Mexico lose, respectively, 24.9, 24.7, 11.8, 10.5, 5.1, and 12.3 percent of their urban GDP annually as a result of violence (Londoño and Guerrero, 2000: 27). Likewise, a study by the Mexican Health Foundation (Lozano, Hijar, Zurita, Hernández, Avila, Bravo, de Jesús Ramirez, Carrillo, Ayala, and López, 2000), based on statistics for Mexico City collected in the mid-1990s (when the city's violence rates were increasing), suggests that the annual cost of violence in the city (taking both direct and indirect costs into consideration) is a staggering $1.897 billion.

Data on homicide in cities are often cited as the most striking indication that urbanization in the developing world produces a decline in social cohesion and an increase in conflict and insecurity. Table 9-3 summarizes some data on homicide rates for different cities in Latin America, indicating major differences among countries, as well as rather important variations within countries. Rates in Brazil and Colombia, for example, are very high by worldwide standards, while rates in cities such as Santiago and Buenos Aires are relatively low.

Trend data from case studies show a general increase in levels of violence in cities of Latin America over the last two decades, although some cities have also experienced a decrease in recent years. Nevertheless, trends may not be consistent even within a country. In Brazil, for example, the critical period for increases in violence was the second half of the 1980s, coinciding with the reestablishment of

democracy. More recently, however, Rio de Janeiro has seen a decline in the rate of homicides, while this has not been the case in São Paulo. This finding suggests that urban violence has both local and more systemic explanations.

How to respond to the increasing violence is a major challenge at a number of levels—national, local, and social. Given the broad contours of a model that regards violence as a result of the erosion of physical, human, natural, and social capital, it is possible to identify policy options with the potential to restore these community assets. Of the four types of capital, the most amenable to policy intervention at the local level is social capital. In Chapter 2, we defined social capital as "networks and local associations ... that might support collective action, enforce norms, generate expectations or reciprocity, or foster feelings of mutual trust." What is the relation between social capital and urban governance?

Among the reasons social capital is important is that both the size and density of social networks and institutions, as well as the nature of interpersonal interactions, significantly affect the efficiency and sustainability of development processes. Violence erodes social capital when it reduces the trust and cooperation within formal and informal social organizations and among their members that are critical for a society to function (Moser, 1998; Moser and Holland, 1997).

Social capital in formal institutions

In contexts characterized by human rights violations and high impunity rates, violence often erodes faith in the relevance and governability of many formal social institutions. When judicial, educational, health, media, and security institutions are no longer able to function appropriately and transparently, democracy itself is challenged. In some contexts, violence-linked industries associated with drugs, diamonds, or other natural resources can erode the state by corrupting institutions and dividing the population. For instance, drug traffickers' systematic threats and attacks against the communications media effectively suppress the effective and peaceful participation of civil society institutions in political decisions at the community and national levels.

Social capital in informal community-level institutions

The capacity for community-level organizations to function depends on levels of cohesion and the ability to meet locally, which in turn hinge on personal safety issues. Sustained violence creates fear and reduces trust among neighbors and communities. Fear of crime is greater where rates of contact crimes are higher (United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 1998). The response, particularly for women, is frequently to avoid certain places after dark. Such restrictions break down community cohesion.

As noted earlier, fear increases urban fragmentation, resulting in a new urban landscape made up essentially of fortified areas from which the poor and

marginalized are excluded. Rodriguez and Winchester (2001) discuss how feelings of insecurity in Santiago, Chile, have led to reduced interaction across social class levels, resulting in neighborhoods more homogeneous in income level and reduced social mobility. Agbola (1997) describes a crime prevention strategy in Lagos, Nigeria, based on environmental design, whereby the physical environment is 'manipulated' to deter crime more effectively through the installment of fences, residential enclaves, and other segregational measures. As discussed earlier, fear of crime in São Paulo has led middle- and upper income citizens to segregate themselves spatially from the rest of the city (Caldeira, 1996).

In some contexts, violence both contributes to and is the result of the creation of "perverse" social capital.[3] A primary example of perverse social capital is gang involvement, whereby young people bereft of strong family and community support form mutually reinforcing groups. In many poor neighborhoods, gangs form the main nexus of socialization for children, who join as young as age 12 or 13. Often gangs may be at war with rival groups involved in robbery, theft, drug distribution or consumption, and assaults. In some communities, gangs protect their neighbors, committing crimes elsewhere; in others they prey on their neighbors, creating a climate of fear (Moser and McIlwaine, 2000b; Rodgers, 1999).

In Nicaragua, for example, almost half of all crimes and delinquent acts are attributable to youth gangs. Rodgers (1999) highlights five key factors linked to youth gangs in Latin America: their context is generally that of urban poverty; their behavioral patterns and formation are highly localized; their relationship with the local community may be protective or violent; when involved in drug trafficking, they tend to be more violent; and postwar migration and deportation of illegal immigrants are affecting their formation.

Social capital in household relations

Violence erodes beneficial household relations when it reduces the households' capacity to function effectively as a unit. High levels of stress in conflict zones, for instance, where many men join illegal guerrilla or paramilitary groups, seriously disrupt family life. In poor urban communities, many women identify a direct linkage among male unemployment, alcohol abuse, and increased domestic violence, which may result in increases in female-headed households. In Guayaquil and Budapest, for example, domestic violence was found to be the single most important cause of household restructuring (Moser, 1998; Moser and McIlwaine, 1999).

Family members—both male and female—are put in a vulnerable position when communities are displaced by violence. Women are often more vulnerable

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[3] A useful distinction can be made between productive and perverse institutions. While productive institutions aim to provide benefits in order to improve the well-being of the community, perverse institutions benefit their members but are usually detrimental to the community or society at large (Rubio, 1997; Moser and McIlwaine, 2000a: 78).

than men at the moment of eviction, when they are exposed to the risks of flight and separation from their homes. While men appear better equipped to cope at such times, the reverse is true when displaced households restructure their lives; then the impact is greater for men, who become unemployed and experience a loss of status as breadwinners and a shattering of their sense of masculine identity. Women appear better equipped to develop support networks so they can continue the routines of daily survival and find new ways of earning an income, creating social capital not with other women originating from the same area, but with those sharing the same history of displacement (Meertens and Segura-Escobar, 1996).

There are many initiatives under way to deal with urban violence. Currently in many cities, one of the biggest constraints is not the absence of interventions but the lack of a coordinated approach to reducing violence. The impact of impressive menus of initiatives—implemented by government, private entities, and NGOs—is often limited by fragmented approaches involving narrowly focused, independent programs. If informed policy decisions regarding the relative fiscal returns of different programs are to be made, one of the most important priorities is the development of a cohesive policy that integrates and combines different objectives and instruments for reducing violence, and encompasses monitoring of key indicators as well as rigorous evaluations. This is largely a governance issue.

Ultimately, the debate on preventing urban crime in the developing world cannot be separated from broader issues of improving urban governance and management. This linkage implies closer integration of crime prevention and reduction imperatives within the context of more general city planning and management strategies. In some contexts, coordinated initiatives to respond to the increasing problem of violence have emerged at the city level. The role of local government in reducing violence and crime is increasingly recognized as a practical and effective solution (South Africa, 1998):

> Local government, the level of government which is closest to the citizenry, is uniquely placed to actively participate in social crime prevention initiatives and to redirect the provision of services to facilitate crime prevention.

Local municipal government tends to represent the lowest level at which planning can take into account the needs of local communities and their particular crime problems, and can therefore create effective linkages among locally elected officials, municipal departments, and the national police service (Shaw, 1998). Nevertheless, budget constraints and a lack of capacity often characterize developing-country municipal governments, and the consolidation of local government structures presents an opportunity to integrate crime prevention into the line functions of municipal departments (Shaw, 1998).

Along with government, civil society and local communities have an important role to play. Cohen and Swift (1993), for instance, advocate a public health approach that prioritizes coalition building and the development of networks of

service providers. Thus, for example, one local health prevention program encourages family violence services, alcohol abuse agencies, child abuse prevention agencies, rape crisis services, conflict resolution services, drug abuse agencies, and suicide intervention services to form a network of support to coordinate comprehensive prevention services:

> Coalitions can accomplish a broad range of goals that reach far beyond the capacity of any individual member organization. The work of an active coalition can range from information-sharing and coordination of services to advocacy for major environmental or regulatory changes. (Cohen and Swift, 1993: 62)

Finally, the community can play an important role in reducing violence by creating its own authorities or groups to tackle the problem. Guha (1998) cites the example of the "peace committees" that are frequently formed in Indian communities after riots. These committees often include members from both conflicting communities, considered to be "respectable citizens" who work to reduce the conflict. The approach was found to be particularly effective in Calcutta for avoiding and containing many incidents that had the potential to escalate into major riots (Guha, 1998). However, since the causes and manifestations of violence are context specific, the details of integrated intervention frameworks need to be tailored to the requirements of different situations.

The Authority Dimension

The basic parameters of urban governance in many developing countries have undergone a major transformation over the last decade and a half. Contributing to this transformation have been the relentless demographic growth of cities, with associated economic and geographic expansion of the urban base; the worldwide trend toward devolution of both power and financial resources from the national to the local level in most developing and transitional countries (as discussed earlier); the spread of powerful local movements, such as social and environmental movements in Latin America, the "people's power" movement in the Philippines, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, and the workers' movement in Poland; and the powerful trend toward democratization and political pluralism, along with the emergence of robust civil society institutions (such as NGOs) at both the local and international levels (United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 1996: Chapter 5). These driving forces have been reinforced by specific institutional reforms in particular countries, such as the constitutional reforms in Brazil, India, and South Africa discussed above; the *Ley de Participación Popular* in Bolivia; the Local Government Code of 1991 in the Philippines; the extension of communal status to towns and cities, small towns, and all rural settlements in Côte d'Ivoire in 1980, 1985, and 1996, respectively (Crook and Manor, 1998: 141); and a host of

other reforms, well documented in the literature on Mexico, Colombia, Uganda, Indonesia, Thailand, and China.

The particular governance structure currently in place in individual countries and cities is a result of the intersection of the decentralization process; the level of democratic reforms expressed through municipal restructuring; and local circumstance, including leadership and the general involvement of civil society groups. Overall, urban governance appears most advanced in Latin America with regard to finding new modalities to manage and relate to growth, followed by Asia and then Africa (at least outside a few selected leaders in urban governance reform, such as South Africa and Côte d'Ivoire). While the focus of this chapter is on large metropolitan regions, the governance structure in these regions is invariably influenced by the overall approach to decentralization and local government in the country as a whole. Some examples follow.

Decentralization—in the sense of genuine devolution of power and financial resources (or the ability to raise finances) from the national to the local level—has had a rather limited trajectory in Africa. One of the reasons for this is certainly the legacy of the centralized, statist bureaucratic regimes of colonial powers that did not cede independence until the 1960s and even later (whereas formal decolonization took place 20 years earlier in South Asia and Indonesia, and a century earlier in Latin America). Another reason is that most postindependence regimes in Africa were ruled initially by powerful leaders and single parties who relinquished little ground to autonomous social formations or localities.

By the 1980s, this picture had begun to change across the continent, and by 1991, only 8 of 54 countries for which reliable data were available could be considered clearly "authoritarian," with 3 more being governed by a system that could best be described as "directed democracy." In addition, 8 countries were "democratic," while 35 were said to be in various stages of "transition" to more democratic forms of government (Africa Demos, 1991: Vol. 1, No. 4).

Through the next decade, the full democratization of South Africa in 1994 and the return to democracy of Nigeria in 1998 were the major events, even though a number of transitional countries became politically unstable. At the end of the decade, the respected NGO Freedom House reported that of 53 countries evaluated, 8 were "free" (i.e., full electoral democracies), 21 were "partly free," and 23 were "not free" (i.e., authoritarian systems) (Karatnycky, 1999). Overall, there was little change over the decade.

Abidjan

A former French colony, Côte d'Ivoire has always had one of the highest levels of urban development and most elaborate urban policy systems of any francophone country (Cohen, 1974). As of 2000, its largest city, Abidjan, had a population estimated at 3.3 million (United Nations, 2001: 86) over a land area of 627 square kilometers (Attahi, 2000: 10). This coastal metropolis, often referred to as "the

pearl of the lagoons," represents some 40 percent of the country's total urban population and about 75 percent of its formal employment (Attahi, 2000: 10).

Like other major cities in the West African francophone region, and in spite of its relative affluence in comparison with other cities of the region, Abidjan suffers from insufficient housing and infrastructure (20 percent of its population lives in irregular or "spontaneous" housing in unserviced neighborhoods), struggles to remove ever-increasing amounts of household and industrial refuse, and cannot build enough roads to keep up with the increasing number of motor vehicles. Even though importations of cars and trucks were restricted in 1998 to vehicles no more than 7 years old, the number of these vehicles has been growing at a rate of 9 percent per year (Attahi, 2000: 16)—several times higher than the rate of population growth, estimated at 3.16 percent per annum for the period 2000–2005 (United Nations, 2001: 97). Abidjan's fabled high-quality infrastructure and large formal employment base have been deteriorating since the late 1980s, as population growth has fallen from a high in the 11 percent per annum range up to the late 1970s to a figure closer to 3 percent today, a level lower than that of middle-sized towns in the region (Dubresson, 1997: 266).

Like other ex-colonial states in Africa, Côte d'Ivoire emerged after independence (in 1960) as a relatively centralized country. Then, beginning in 1978, a decentralization process directed by the President saw, in succession, the restoration of "commune" (or municipal) status to the major cities in the country, including 10 communes in Abidjan; the amalgamation of the 10 Abidjan communes into a second-tier government known as the City of Abidjan; and the extension of communal status to 98 smaller towns (in 1985). Finally, 3 years after the death of President Houphouët in 1993, his successor extended municipal status to the remaining rural areas of the country, increasing the total number of local government units from 136 to 196 (Crook and Manor, 1998: 141). In terms of the fastidious details of its planning, as well as the follow-up of support to local councils, the Ivoirian decentralization exercise stands as one of the most thoroughgoing and successful in Africa.

Two aspects of this exercise are worthy of mention here. First, beginning in 1990, the Ivoirian government loosened control over the political system, permitting parties other than the government party to contest both local and national elections. As a result, independents and opposition parties (based on a list system) won 9 of the 135 communes in the 1990 communal elections; in the 1996 elections, the proportion grew to 27 of 196 communes (Crook and Manor, 1998: 149). The real possibility of opposition parties winning local elections and administering local councils clearly enhanced the legitimacy of local government in many parts of the country.

Second, while it decentralized, the government also strengthened its advisory and central administrative systems, so that local councils could receive administrative and technical support as needed. The Department of Local Government

(within the Ministry of the Interior) grew impressively, its professional staff reaching 108 in 1995 (Attahi, 1996: 122).

The governance of the Abidjan metropolitan area consists formally of a two-tier structure: at the lower tier are the 10 communes, of differing size and wealth, each having elected councillors and an elected mayor; at the second tier is the City of Abidjan, consisting of the mayors of the 10 constituent communes, plus four more councillors from each commune. The mayor of the City of Abidjan is elected by the mayors of the 10 communes at the first meeting of the collective legislative body, called the "grand council." After his election, he resigns from his communal position, handing the position over to his "assistant mayors" at the local level.

The major functions of the upper-tier government are waste disposal and management; public lighting; sanitation; traffic regulation; maintenance of roads, parks, and cemeteries; and town planning. The communes administer markets, allocate plots for public purposes, deal with the maintenance of primary schools and clinics (but not school or health policy, let alone the supervision and payment of professionals, which are national responsibilities), operate social centers, and share functions with other levels of government with respect to pollution and hygiene. Major services, such as waste removal, electricity, and water, are in the hands of private companies, albeit under some level of surveillance from either the local or national government.

Problems with revenue exist at all levels, even in relatively affluent Abidjan, where the differences among communes are sharp. In the early 1990s, for example, the 3 wealthiest of the 10 communes of the City of Abidjan spent, per resident, an average of 49 times the amount spent by the 3 poorest communes on recurrent expenditures and 6 times the amount for capital expenditures (Dubresson, 1997: 285).

Although the metropolitan system has been functioning for 20 years, observers identify a number of problems. For example, the national government has been less than fully cooperative in permitting the City of Abidjan to exercise some of the functions for which it has a legal mandate. These include the inspection of construction sites, the issuing of drivers' licenses, and the control of firefighting and rescue operations. Since the main source of the City's revenues, the property tax, is collected by the national government and then remitted to the communes (which then pay a fixed proportion to the City), the City has little direct influence over its finances. Major service operations are controlled by private corporations that cannot easily be controlled by the City. Furthermore, since the mayor of the City is not elected at large but chosen by the mayors of the constituent communes, he does not have an independent political base from which to promote metropolitan-wide policies. Already the mayor of the wealthiest commune has resigned from the grand council on the grounds that the obligatory funds (40 percent of revenues) paid to the City could be used more effectively locally. On a more positive note, a number of communes have set up neighborhood man-

agement committees and endowed them with an administrative budget. These initiatives have taken place without higher-level support.

In the 1996 local elections, 1 of the 10 municipalities in the Abidjan area— Adjamé—returned a mayor, Marcel Amondji, who was a member of one of the opposition parties. This mayor has since set up 19 neighborhood management councils to involve citizens in local affairs. Each has an annual budget equivalent to US$4,500 to cover the costs of the local office. According to a *New York Times* observer (French, 1998: 4), Adjamé

> has been all but transformed. Once trash-filled streets are now kept
> clean by broom-wielding city workers [a program called "extreme hy-
> giene"]. A multistory African-style market is rising to replace a war-
> ren of cluttered and dangerous side streets that served as the neigh-
> borhood's informal bazaar. And white-smocked inspectors regularly
> make the rounds of the community's innumerable cafés ensuring that
> food served to the working class population is not only cheap, but
> sanitary.

The mayor attributes these changes, at least in part, to the competitive electoral system. "What is being done here," he says, "represents a night and day change from the past, when elections were formalities and the office of mayor was largely an honorific title. We have managed to triple our budget by raising local taxes, and nobody has complained because they see that local government is giving them valuable services for the first time." (Amondji quoted in French, 1998.) In Abid-jan, as throughout the country, decentralization has been a relative success, but local resources are still very limited, and the level of activity of civil society is barely perceptible.

Mexico City

Our second example is one of the largest metropolitan areas in the world—Mexico City. For many years, Mexico City's massive, expansive growth was regarded as virtually inexorable. In 1991, for example, the population of the agglomeration was predicted to reach 25–27 million by the year 2000 (Rowland and Gordon, 1996: 173), although that prediction was scaled down considerably when the 1990 census figures were released. The notion of an urban "leviathan" somehow out of control was reinforced by the city's fabled scarcity of water, its high levels of air pollution and other toxic chemicals, its extreme traffic congestion, and the strug-gles of its poor citizens to obtain decent and affordable housing and accessible infrastructure.

While the city's service and infrastructure problems remain severe, many well-documented studies cited in earlier chapters show a decrease in its population growth during the 1980s and 1990s, a dispersion of its population from the cen-ter to the peripheral areas of the metropolitan region and beyond, and a gradual

reduction in the pattern of socioeconomic differentiation among its major areas. Paradoxically, although there appears to have been a decline in social disparities in the city if one takes *delegaciones* as the unit of analysis (Rubalcava and Schteingart, 1987, 2000), at the very local level (Ward, 1999: 30),

> the segmentation, separation, and dividing line (barriers) between rich and working class neighborhoods is probably increasing. Mexico City, like many Latin American cities, has seen a dramatic rise in violence levels in the 1990s. Private security firms are increasingly hired to secure the perimeters of upper and middle income residential neighborhoods, making them effective no-entry zones for working class and outsider populations. Moreover as a growing number of urban services are contracted out to private operators, this serves to segment still further the transactional separation of rich and poor.

Currently, the population of Mexico City—which includes both the Federal District (with 16 *delegaciones*) and 41 municipalities to the north, east, and west in the states of México and Hildago—is estimated at 18.13 million (United Nations, 2001: 88), with an annual growth rate that has been shrinking for many years. Rates of both annual natural increase and inmigration have been declining since the middle of the past century. From a high of 6.7 percent in the 1940s (Ward, 1998: 48), the overall population growth rate for the metropolitan area has declined to an estimated 1.81 percent, and it is projected to fall to as low as .35 percent over the next 5 years (United Nations, 2001: 99).

The reasons for this reversal in trends are discussed elsewhere in this volume, but Mexico City remains a relatively poor city with serious problems in both production and distribution of public goods and services. Its current highly limited metropolitan governance system is a product of both the country's history of decentralization and democratization and the unwieldy nature of a jurisdictional division between the Federal Capital district on the one hand and the adjacent municipalities of the State of México on the other.

For decades, governance of the Mexico City metropolitan area was a relatively low-key affair, involving a presidentially appointed *regente* of the Federal District and the mayors and administrations of the adjacent (but much less developed) towns and settlements of the periphery. Because of the importance of the capital city, the *regente* position was a cabinet-level post in the federal government. Given the highly centralized and even personal nature of the Mexican political system until recently, ultimate control of the capital city was in effect vested in the President of the country.

In practice, what planning and coordination existed between the two jurisdictions occurred often through the involvement of federal government ministries in both the State of México and the Federal Republic, reinforced politically by the relationship between the governor of the state and the *regente*, the latter being, until the 1990s, from the same governing party (although the *regente* was a much

more senior position in terms of protocol). During the 1970s and 1980s, planning initiatives and institutions tended to operate either at the national level (for the whole country), or in one or the other of the Federal District or the State of México. Metropolitan institutions, such as a Conurbation Commission, a secretariat for planning and budgeting, and a Council for the Metropolitan Area, came and went according to the political inclinations of different *regentes*. But with little or no public participation in planning and a multiplicity of competing and overlapping jurisdictions, the economic and social forces inherent in the growth of the city took their own paths, with little guidance from planners (Ward, 1998: Chapter 5).

Aside from the appointed *regente* and his staff, the city was further subdivided into 16 *delegaciones* (municipalities before 1928), whose administrative directors (*delegados*) were in turn appointed by the *regente*. During the 1970s and 1980s, various local and neighborhood councils were set up to give residents a say in local matters, but these groups had at best a consultative role relative to the senior appointed administrators (Ward, 1998: 118–9). In 1994, an effort was made by the dominant party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), to introduce "citizen advisers" as elected, paid officers at the level of the *delegacion*, mandated to assist with local community service requests. Without explaining its action, however, the government discontinued this reform 3 years after its initiation (Eckstein, 2000: 192). The arbitrary nature of local government in the capital city, at least until nearly the end of the decade, led the author of a textbook on local government in Latin America to state that "few major cities in the world have less local democracy than Mexico City" (Nickson, 1995: 199).

Traditionally, cities had little status in the Mexican system of government and politics. Article 115 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution gave states power over local government but spoke of the *municipio libre* as the cornerstone of territorial administration. It was not until 1983 that a new phase in intergovernmental relations began with a number of amendments and additions to Article 115. In proposing these changes, the President, Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988), suggested a major "sea change" was in the offing. As one commentator observed of de la Madrid's campaign for the Presidency, the candidate made clear in public meetings throughout the country that (as cited in Rodríguez, 1997: 69)

> his purpose is to eliminate, or at least minimize ... excessive central
> bureaucracy and population concentration, tardiness and inefficiency
> in some sectors of the federal government, dependency and financial
> weakness of the municipalities, and so forth. The time has come to
> "federalize" the "National Life." Each and every aspect of the state's
> activities which before were forced to centralize, are now obliged to
> decentralize.

Although de la Madrid went on to establish a system that was increasingly decentralized in administrative terms while remaining highly centralized politically,

the changes to Article 115 were the beginning of an altered political environment for the municipalities. The new article approved by Congress in February 1983, to take effect on January 1, 1984, specified the public services for which municipalities had prime responsibility and suggested that the municipalities should be governed according to organic laws passed at the state level. The municipalities were also guaranteed their own sources of revenue, in particular a property tax. For many years thereafter, municipalities still relied largely on transfers from the federal government for the bulk of their revenues, but the potential existed to expand their own-revenue accounts. After the reform was passed, the President set up a National Center for Municipal Studies to serve as an information and research center for reform-related issues.

The most recent constitutional reform relevant to Mexican cities (and to Mexico City) is a revision of Article 115 passed by the Mexican Congress in June 1999. This revision, a result of negotiations among the three major political parties, recognizes local government as an essential level of Mexican government. It not only states that local governments (*municipios*) are to be governed by elected councils consisting of *regidores* and *syndicos*, but also specifies a list of functions and powers that are under their exclusive jurisdiction. Such functions cannot henceforth be limited by the state governments. They include the provision of drinking water and all related services, public lighting, cleaning and waste disposal, markets, police, streets and gardens, planning and land regulation, and other services the municipalities judge to be within their capacity to administer. The municipalities are further empowered to set tax rates and to collect the revenues necessary to carry out the above functions (Guerrero Amparán and López, 2000).

While Mexicans have traditionally elected their mayors and councillors (except in the Federal District), the elections had little meaning for many years as long as the PRI controlled the selection of all candidates. But political pluralism (albeit constrained at first) began to erode this situation as, beginning in 1983, a significant number of municipal elections began to be won by opposition parties. While some of these victories were orchestrated by the PRI itself and some resulted from splits within the dominant party, others (such as those in Durango, Ciudad Juárez, and Chihuahua) reflected genuine support for the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) (Rodríguez, 1997: 53).

The story of opposition politics at the subnational level in subsequent years is one of conflict between emerging opposition sentiment and (often) PRI tactics to discredit or undermine the local victories of opposition candidates (Rodríguez, 1998: 174–83). By 1996 the PRI controlled 1,551 of the 2,412 municipalities in the country (or 64 percent); the PAN controlled 225 (or 9 percent); the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) controlled 181 (or 8 percent); and "others" controlled the rest (19 percent), including Oaxaca state, where indigenous groups elected their civic leaders in 413 municipalities (Rodríguez, 1998: 177). At this point, most major cities were under opposition control, with PAN mayors being significant in the more-developed north and the PRD more important in the area

around Mexico City and in the south. Rodríguez (1998) argues that the advent of more competitive politics has brought more scrutiny of candidates by voters. This in turn means that more competent individuals are selected and that the quality of governance is enhanced by greater transparency (Rodríguez, 1998: 183). On the other hand, many municipalities—especially smaller, poorer towns and towns in the less industrial and developed areas of the country—are not competitive.

Did the new political pluralism make a difference in urban management? A comparison of three cities with opposition regimes in the 1990s—Tijuana and Córdoba under the PAN and Nezahualcóyotl under the PRD—shows that during the decade, the new regimes were far from fully successful in implementing their campaign promises of administrative rationalization, greater efficiency, and improved citizen participation. Setting aside the case of Nezahualcóyotl, whose municipal council had been elected only a short time before the research commenced, the other two municipalities had been able to improve the delivery of public services to their citizens (in comparison with the previous PRI regimes), and efforts were at least under way to modernize the management of the municipal enterprise. While they did not observe regression, the researchers are far from categorically enthusiastic about the changes that have ensued (Duhau and Schteingart, 1997). And a historical analysis of the politics and policies of various mayors of Mexico City since the 1950s (Davis, 2002) reveals that different mayors have exercised considerable autonomy in developing their own signature policies in spite of the fact that they were not elected until recently, and that this autonomy has been based at least in part on the fact that Mexico City as a political constituency of the national political elite must be heard and responded to (Davis, 2002).

A major reform in Mexico City in particular was the decision by the Mexican government to permit elections in the Federal District, first at the level of the whole district and then at the level of the constituent *delegaciones*. In 1997 for the first time ever, the post of "head of government" of the *Departmento del Distrito Federal* was made an elective one, to be supplemented by elections throughout the city for positions in a new Representative Assembly. Of the 40 elective positions in the assembly, 2 were won by the PAN and the other 38 by the PRD. The new head of government or mayor, who won by an overwhelming margin, was 63-year-old Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, himself a former candidate for President and the son of a revered former President. At the same time that the PRD won the local government elections, it also captured 28 of the 30 single-member Mexico City congressional district seats in the national elections. A careful interpretation of the vote shows that the main supporters of the PRD were working-class voters who were strongly antagonistic toward the ruling party. Many switched their intended votes during the campaign to align with the party that best expressed their antigovernment sentiments. As in other elections, the Mexico City elections showed that "the prototypical PRI voter was a housewife with limited education; the classic PAN supporter an educated Catholic; and the paradigmatic PRD voter a politically engaged member of the working class" (Lawson, 1999: 151).

Among the watchwords of the new administration were the cleaning up of corruption and crime, efficiency in service delivery, and popular participation. Because the national government did not support, in terms of either resources or policies, the opposition PRD government in the Federal District, the mayor could achieve success in these particular objectives without calling on assistance from the center (Davis, 2002: 251). Nevertheless, Mayor Cárdenas left his position to run (unsuccessfully) for the presidency in 2000. The fact that the mayor had early on demonstrated his interest in national political issues (such as the situation in Chiapas) may have contributed to the widespread feeling among poorer people in Mexico City that, although electoral democratization was important, parties still operated as "clans" and did not represent them. "Residents had learned the hard way to be cynical about political change" (Eckstein, 2000: 194).

Change, however, continued. In 2000, not only did the Federal District mayor stand for general election (won again by the PRD candidate, garnering 1.7 million of a total of 4.3 million votes cast) (Gómez Tagle, 2000: 661), but so, too, did the councillors within individual *delegaciones* (Rodríguez Araujo, 2000: 657). Despite the new, more democratic system in the Federal District, however, no new structures of *metropolitan* governance have been instituted, and the larger metropolitan region is still almost totally bereft of a framework for planning.

Local participation in Chinese cities

Although Western-style pluralist electoral politics is absent in China, major changes in the governance of Chinese cities have been proceeding since the late 1980s. These changes have taken place at the local level of the urban community in Chinese cities and, according to one estimate, affect 200–300 million of its citizens (Choate, 1998: 6). While these changes are complex, they can be discussed from two vantage points: the formal structure of urban government and the operation of the local residents' committees that have become so prominent in the larger cities since the mid-1990s.

During the period of centralized planning and administration in postwar China (roughly 1949–1978), the nation's municipal administrative and political structure was characterized by the penetration of local communist party structures into all levels of urban administration. The secretary of the Communist Party's city committee, representing the party, was the most powerful individual, notwithstanding the fact that he had no position in the city government. The mayor, as the head of the city administrative bureaucracy, was second in importance, but at the same time was usually the party committee's deputy secretary. Decisions were normally initiated by the party and then carried out by the city government. The city government had control over land and construction, but many functions related to urban services (such as health care, housing, and primary education) were under the control of the work unit, or *danwei*, which could be a large government office or an industrial plant.

Beneath the level of the city government, cities were divided into districts (of which the largest cities had up to 14), subdistricts (or street offices), and neighborhood (or residents') committees. In this system of tight vertical control, only individuals who were formally working for a government-approved *danwei* were permitted to live in the city. Rural-to-urban migration was tightly circumscribed, and only those with a resident's permit had access to housing, rationed commodities (including staple grains and oils, meat and fish, cotton cloth, and most consumer durables) and social services. "The government managed not only urban development, but also urban residents' lives" (Zhang, 2001: 187).

With the introduction of market-oriented reforms beginning in 1978, local governments (as discussed above) were given more freedom to raise and distribute financial resources, responsibilities were transferred from the national to the local level, and the government stopped managing every detail of urban citizens' lives. The formal structure of municipal government at the city level (including the relationship between government and party leaders) did not change; around 1985–1986, however, the government began to place much more emphasis on the structure and functioning of submunicipal government, in particular urban residents' committees (Choate, 1998: 10). Behind this decision were a number of important factors: massive movement of rural migrants into the cities, a rapid increase in urban under- and unemployment caused by enterprise restructuring, and a withdrawal of the social safety-net functions formerly provided by large urban work-based units.

From 1989 to 1993, a number of laws reorganizing residents' committees were passed, and a 1992 joint policy paper and a 1994 major government circular laid the groundwork for a more elaborate and stronger role for the local committees. By the late 1990s, these residents' committees (which catered to modal populations of some 2,000 each) were systematically involved in some or all of the following services: information and record keeping; public safety and security; mediation of local civil and family disputes; public health and family planning; environment and sanitation; legal education of the public; provision of "convenience" services, such as fast food restaurants, public transport, and public telephones; social welfare (especially for young children and the elderly), and employment placement (Choate, 1998: 16–25). According to observers, the average age of committee members is declining, and the committees are hiring more educated, experienced, and professional staff; paying more attention to the needs of the people through social surveys and feedback mechanisms; and connecting with newly formed associations, such as volunteer social service groups, proprietor and land development associations, and cultural organizations (Choate, 1998; Read, 2000; Ying, 2000; Zhang, 2001). By the end of the 1990s, there were some 119,000 of these local committees throughout urban China. In Beijing and its suburbs in 1997, for example, there were 10 districts, 118 street offices, and 5,026 neighborhood committtees (Read, 2000: 807–8).

In many of their local initiatives, committees organize to collect fees and develop local projects. Ying (2000: 8–9) gives a good example of the new local management style in Shanghai, a style that often involves city residents actively reporting their complaints to the residents' committee office, which follows up with energetic—and probably financially advantageous—measures:

The Quxi Road Market for Agricultural and Non-staple Products under the jurisdiction of the Wuliqiao Subdistrict [Street Office] in Shanghai [is a good] example. In 1997 the market was still dirty, chaotic and jammed with traffic. In addition, it was a market without effective management where some small private retailers ran rampant, gave short weight and beat up administrators. The local 2,000 households or more reported all this to the subdistrict office for action. Cadres of the office immediately held a meeting to discuss the matter and took measures. They cut the number of stands in the market from over 300 to 144. They also invested 260,000 yuan in building unified, standard permanent stands. They also organized an all-weather six-member sanitation team which worked on two shifts a day. The law enforcement team also entered the market to exercise supervision and strict management at regular intervals, thus reducing the number of problems. In 1998 the market was elected an advanced exchange at the city level, and acclaimed by local residents. Finding problems through letters and calls and helping the people allay their worries and tide over their difficulties have become a distinctive feature of the Wuliqiao Subdistrict Office in its effort to offer good community service. According to statistics, in 1998 the office processed 253 letters from the people and received over 4,000 calls. These changes were not present in or before the early 1990s. They are also unprecedented in the development history of Chinese cities, so they are of great historical and practical significance.

While not all local committees may be as effective as this particular example, Choate (1998: 28) reports that, based on his observations and interviews in 14 cities over a 3-year period, "it appears as though the work of residents committees is reasonably well-regarded by the relevant populations themselves." Perhaps as a result, many cities are developing full-service community centers at the street office and district levels. They are assisted by citizen "boards" or "management committees" consisting of representatives of major mass organizations and the party (Choate, 1998: 29–31). While these groups are not elected, they constitute an interesting local solution to the challenge of representing a range of opinions and professional skills in an increasingly complex social and economic environment.

IS THERE A "BEST" MODEL OF URBAN GOVERNANCE?

In this chapter we have attempted a limited review of some of the more notable changes in urban governance in very large cities in the developing regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This review, while far from comprehensive and systematic (inasmuch as more extensive case studies and comparative data do not yet exist in the research literature), indicates that new institutional forms are emerging in municipalities across the developing world. Common to most if not all of these new institutional approaches are three main elements: greater involvement of NGOs and community groups in local governance, often through a more plural and democratic electoral system; greater transparency and accountability in both the planning and implementation of local policy; and the devolution of more legal and constitutional responsibility for urban affairs from the state or national level to the local level. From the election of mayors and local councillors across Latin America, to the increasing pluralism of the political process in Africa, to the incorporation of massive numbers of new actors in the Indian and Philippine municipal systems, to the involvement of nonstate actors in service and infrastructure provision in China, a massive opening of political space is taking place at the urban level.

Behind this enhancement of the municipal political role are multiple and complex structural changes: the emergence and more active participation of civil society at the local level (often together with or as an offshoot of other social movements, such as those involving human rights, environmentalism, and indigenous rights); the connection of municipalities and their activists with networks of other municipalities and elected officials; the decentralization of powers and functions from national to local government units; and the new power and influence that cities—especially large cities—are assuming in a competitive and globalizing world.

Given the diversity of the new institutional arrangements coming into active use, as well as the fact that each country has its own historical and political circumstances that vest local governance with a special logic and legitimacy, can common elements be discerned? This question is particularly pertinent since cities and their surrounding regions increasingly see themselves as being in competition with other cities and regions around the world (Scott, 2001). At stake are potentially large investments on the part of multinational institutions (both private and public) that can make a major contribution to the employment prospects, and thus the economic welfare, of any city. Since the overall quality of governance is regarded as contributing to a city's ability to manage its infrastructure and services and maintain a certain quality of life for its citizens, alternative models of good governance frequently figure in discussions of ways to improve the competitive position of cities.

Reforms in local governance and the technical support needed by developing municipalities to put these reforms into practice effectively in their constrained

economic circumstances have been the object of significant program assistance from international agencies. These agencies include the Urban Management Program of UN Habitat (formerly UNCHS); the World Bank; a number of international municipal and local government associations; and various bilateral aid agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development and Germany's Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Technische Zusamnenarbeit (GTZ). In 1999, Dinesh Mehta, current director of the Urban Management Program, compiled three lists of "good governance" criteria to be incorporated in advice proffered by international agencies: (1) a Habitat II list (including accountability, transparency, participation, the rule of law, and predictability); (2) a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) list (including participation, the rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, and strategic vision); and (3) a list compiled by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung for the "Better Cities Network of East and South-East Asian Cities" (including accountability, responsiveness, management innovation, public–private partnerships, local government–citizen interaction, decentralized management, networking, and human resource management) (Mehta, 1999).

Of course, each program has developed explanatory text as to how these criteria might be applied, and there are many other lists. Virtually no research of which we are aware has been done on the relative effectiveness of different elements of these lists in either controlled or comparative situations. What is clear from these lists is that an idealized liberal–democratic model of urban governance (in which well-informed citizens protected by legal institutions make periodic democratic choices of teams of politicians and professional bureaucrats to manage and develop their local space) is the suggested institutional format. While improving governance is important in smaller and intermediate-sized cities, the analysis of governance models most commonly involves the largest cities, which have the most at stake in the new economic dispensation.

By common agreement, achieving good governance in the largest metropolitan regions is more difficult than in smaller cities. Populations are larger and more diverse than in smaller cities, the level of resources necessary to institute and maintain services and infrastructure is much higher on an aggregate basis, civil society groups are more organized, and the range of functions for which the city is responsible makes the organization and logistics of urban management much more complex. As an element of his widely discussed argument that much of the world is moving from order toward anarchy, Kaplan (2001: 55) singles out urbanization:

> The 21st century is going to be the first century in world history when more than half of humanity will live in cities. Even sub-Saharan Africa is almost 50 percent urban. Urban societies are much more challenging to govern than rural societies. In rural societies people can grow their own food, so they are less susceptible to price increases

for basic commodities. Rural societies don't require the complex infrastructure of sewage, potable water, electricity, and other things that urban societies have. Urbanization widens the scope of error for leaders in the developing world while simultaneously narrowing the scope for success. It is harder to satisfy an urban population than a rural population, especially when that population is growing in such leaps and bounds that governing institutions simply cannot keep pace.

As we have seen, very large cities do indeed present complex problems of urban management, but there is little or no evidence that they are sliding into anarchy. What we can conclude, which is also consistent (but not coterminous) with Kaplan's argument, is that the largest metropolitan areas will be more likely to house a highly diverse range of active civil society groups. Along with this organizational diversity, large cities will harbor important movements of political opposition to the party or regime in power at the center. This tendency is most likely a function of both social and economic diversity and the pervasive presence of global ties among the population. Thus in Kenya, the municipal elections of 1992 and 1997 reflected a largely antiregime sentiment, and both elections in Nairobi (the largest city) produced a majority of councillors representing opposition parties. In Mexico City, as we have seen, the left-wing PDR carried the municipal election in 2000. In Brazil, the most recent municipal elections, in October 2000, produced left-wing majorities (as against the center–left position of the ruling party) in the three largest cities—São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, and Rio de Janeiro. Political opposition may be one reason central governments are notoriously reluctant to agree to municipal reform packages involving greater autonomy for their largest cities.

One major issue arising in the design of governance systems for large metropolitan areas is that of coordination. Aside from the question of scale and size, the physical expansion of large cities in almost all cases extends the population and the rural (or rural/urban) hinterland over which the city holds sway to include a large number of separate and even independent political jurisdictions. Coordinating these jurisdictions is both a political and an organizational challenge, particularly given the tendency of the effectively urbanized area to spread over an ever-larger territory. In one of the classic works on this subject, Jones (1942) argue that growing cities in the United States (including central cities and their suburbs) were increasingly being fragmented into a multiplicity of inadequately coordinated units. "This fragmentation ensured competitive behavior between local governments, an inability to solve regional problems, an uneven distribution of tax resources, a lack of citizen control of local government, and the unequal distribution of services, especially pertaining to mass transit, sewerage and garbage, water supply, public health, law enforcement, and firefighting" (Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000: 40). To solve these problems, Jones argues, new arrangements to ensure metropolitan political integration should be undertaken.

Since the time of Jones's study, a considerable literature has addressed this problem in both Europe and North America. Yet as metropolitan areas grow in both size and number around the world, we are no closer to finding suitable comprehensive solutions. In an overview of four major metropolitan areas in Canada and five in the United States in 1995–1996, Rothblatt (1999) shows that the average metropolitan area in Canada contains 40 municipalities, while that in the United States contains 157 municipalities and counties. This difference in North American cities reflects the American tendency to localized, individualistic solutions as compared with greater acceptance in Canada of a coordinating role for higher levels of government (Goldberg and Mercer, 1986). Nevertheless, there are exceptions to the trend in both countries, and there is today a disturbing tendency toward greater social polarization and fragmentation in both American and Canadian cities. This trend appears on the surface to be positively related to political fragmentation (which permits the separation of groups by income and race), but the relationship cannot be clearly demonstrated. (For the American literature, see National Research Council, 1999:Chapter 3.)

As large cities in developing countries spread outward, the jurisdictional mosaic becomes larger and more complex. As we have seen in the case of Mexico City, the capital region now includes some 41 municipalities in two states, a Federal District, and 16 subunits within that district that are equivalent to municipalities. The metropolitan area of São Paulo consists of 39 separate municipalities, while Greater Santiago is made up of 34 separate communes. Rio de Janeiro has 17 separate municipalities and Buenos Aires 20 local government units. In Africa, Abidjan consists of 10 communes and a second-tier government, but one must also include a number of privatized service agencies and central government ministries that administer important functions in the city region. In South Africa, there is currently a trend toward consolidation, but in the period immediately after democratization (in the early to mid-1990s), Cape Town was made up of 39 local government units and Durban as many as 69. The pattern extends to Asia as well, where, as we have seen, Bangkok consists of a Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (divided into 50 districts) plus 5 adjacent provinces (which themselves include as many as 2,000 small local governments), while the greater Manila area includes 17 municipalities and up to 18 additional local government units in the surrounding, mega–urban region.

The governance of large (metropolitan) urban areas is currently a central issue in a number of Latin American countries as they try to reconcile a resurgent local democratic culture with the need to manage complex local functions efficiently so as to safeguard the economic benefits accruing to their city-regions. There are two parallel arguments in the literature on metropolitan governance—a literature that, until recently, was based almost entirely on European and North American evidence. One argument addresses the question of whether there should be a unitary organization of government dealing with the entirety of the built-up metropolitan area. Assuming the answer to this question is positive, a second line of argu-

ment has to do with whether there should be a single-tier or two-tier metropolitan government (Sharpe, 1995). In principle, there are three possible organizational models arising from these options: (1) a loosely organized collaborative system involving relatively autonomous local governments that cover the metropolitan area; (2) a relatively unitary form of government incorporating the whole of the built-up area; and (3) a two-tier system of government covering the metropolitan area, with lower-level municipalities undertaking certain defined local functions and a higher-level council or metropolitan government dealing with functions of a regional nature. The first of these models parallels the *fragmented* model discussed earlier in this chapter, while the second and third are variants of what we have called the *comprehensive* model.

While the two-tier model was considered the most desirable system in principle for many years, it has been coming under attack for practical, political, and theoretical reasons (Sharpe, 1995: Chapter 2). Among the practical problems are the difficulty involved in keeping up with the de facto extension of the boundaries of the metropolitan area, the problem of reaching agreement on exactly where the regional government begins and local municipal functions stop, and the distribution of revenue both horizontally and vertically in large areas that are becoming fragmented and differentiated. There are, in addition, two major political problems, one local and one intergovernmental. At the local, metropolitan level, those attempting to coordinate area-wide structures, whatever their democratic credentials (which are, in any case, usually limited) have great difficulty capturing the loyalties and attachments of their citizens. Tasks are too technical, and localized political attachments to one's own commune or municipality tend to prevail. Area-wide sentiment, which the metropolitan structure could tap as a political resource, is in short supply; rather, tensions and conflicts among different local structures and communities within the overall metropolitan region appear increasingly common. At the intergovernmental level, there is almost always tension between a large and powerful local (metropolitan) government and a higher level of government—such as a state, province, or central government—that must decentralize functions and allocate revenue to another unit with which it may very well be in political competition.

Some would argue that the fragmented model is theoretically superior to the comprehensive model. An argument can be made, based on public-choice principles, that a number of small local jurisdictions is superior to a single overarching government. Since a variety of small local government units can offer different baskets of services and taxes, the whole local area can operate as a quasi-market, supporting greater efficiency through a kind of competition among jurisdictions based on the choices of citizens about where to live (Tiebout, 1956; Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, 1961).[4]

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[4] Virtually all these arguments came into play in Toronto when, in 1997, the provincial government of Ontario removed the well-known and much-admired second-tier government and its six second-tier

It appears clear that, whatever the challenges to governance in large urban regions in the developing world, no single or even dominant model of metropolitan governance is likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. This has not happened in Europe and North America (Lefèvre, 1998) and is unlikely to happen in developing countries, which are even more differentiated in history, geography, and culture. More effective structures for coordination need to be developed, but each solution will have to respond to a myriad of complex political, financial, and technical problems.

What can be said is that more participatory local solutions will be attempted for the myriad of challenges entailed in assessing and collecting taxes; improving transparency and justice in the allocation of capital funding; and involving communities in such local services as health care, primary education, and even the construction of basic infrastructure. As these cities grow (albeit more slowly than smaller, intermediate-sized cities), their professional staff will become more proficient and their elected officials more experienced, and the new powers and responsibilities devolved to them will be consolidated. One can only hope that all cities will see the value of democracy, the rule of law, and honest and efficient local administration, as well as the importance of supporting strong civil society organizations. However they are eventually constructed, cities must draw on the legitimacy of an emerging localism and commitment to democracy, and they must find nontechnical means to engage the imagination and energies of civil society.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The emergence of large urban regions, spread over many jurisdictions, presents acute problems of governance. Partly as a response, important institutional reforms have taken place over the last decade. One way of characterizing these trends is to see them as a movement from "local government" to "local governance." The term "urban governance" implies a greater diversity in the organization of services, a greater variety of actors and stakeholders, and a greater flexibility in the relationship between municipalities and their citizens.

These trends in institutional reform can be illustrated by the example of the Bangkok Metropolitan Region. From this analysis the question may be asked: Is there a preferred governance model that best fits such a mega–urban region? There are four types of mega–urban governance in actual use around the world: the fragmented model, the mixed model, the centralized model, and the comprehensive governance model. The first and last are the most widespread. The comprehensive model exists to some degree in Côte d'Ivoire, is emerging in South Africa with the "unicity," and is in effect practiced (albeit without local structures of democratic political representation) in four of the largest Chinese cities. In dis-

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governments and replaced them with a single municipal government covering one-half of the municipal area.

cussing some of these variations on an overall theme of mega–urban governance, we looked in this chapter at some of the key challenges faced by all large urban areas: the capacity dimension (involving services), the financial dimension (with a focus on the generation of local revenues), the diversity dimension (where issues of fragmentation and inequality are central), the security dimension, and the authority dimension (looking at the distribution and allocation of power).

As a result of decentralization reforms in many countries, local governments have been given more functions, as well as—after an initial time lag—more power to raise revenues. The range of these reforms is truly vast. Unfortunately, comparative statistics are very incomplete, but what figures we do have show that municipal expenditure levels are slowly rising as a proportion of national government expenditure, although the level is still low.

Local tax collection and revenue generation may be as much a governance issue as a technical finance issue, if we take into account some examples from China and Brazil. In the case of China, reforms since the late 1970s have decentralized decision making from the center to localities and have allowed local governments to enjoy the benefits of substantial "off-budget" revenues. With citizens' involvement, these revenues are a major source of infrastructural investment. In Brazil, many municipalities have adopted various versions of a "participatory budgeting" system, whereby cities are divided into regions or districts, and citizens in those areas participate in a process of determining the shape of the investment budget for each financial year.

Security is an increasingly important dimension of urban governance. During the 1990s and beyond, urban security has become one of the dominant issues. As for policy responses to violence, the emphasis in a myriad of programs throughout the world focuses on strengthening local social capital. Violence erodes social capital when it reduces trust and cooperation within formal and informal social organizations; conversely, when social capital is strong, development processes are supported.

Since the late 1980s, major decentralization initiatives that have strengthened municipal governance have taken place in a large number of countries. Examples such as Abidjan in Côte d'Ivoire, Mexico City, and some of the larger coastal cities in China illustrate a wide variety of institutional reforms that have been taking place at the local level around the developing world. Common to most of these reforms are greater involvement of NGOs and community groups, greater openness and accountability, and the disposition of more legal and financial responsibility for urban affairs at the local rather than at the state or national level.

The issue of coordination of multiple jurisdictions is central to the governance challenge in large city-regions. The literature on metropolitan governance focuses on the fragmented situation typically found in almost all North American metropolitan areas. But developing countries exhibit high levels of jurisdictional incoherence as well. Here there are two competing arguments: one suggesting that a wide variety of jurisdictions and local agencies can be beneficial to citizens

since it permits local choice in services and living environments; and another promoting more coherent metropolitan-wide administrative and political solutions. These correspond, respectively, to the "fragmented" model and the "comprehensive" model of governance. As yet, no single model holds sway around the world, but discussions and analyses of competing visions are taking place almost everywhere.

Recommendations

The field of comparative urban governance is relatively new. But to improve our ability to explain and analyze urban governance reforms and policy options, we recommend more comparative studies and better interdisciplinary tools. This will involve, at a minimum:

- Paying more attention comparatively to the local dynamics of policy reform, both among cities within individual countries and across national boundaries. As urban populations increase to staggering dimensions in some cities, and as decentralization devolves substantial powers to municipal governments in the areas of health care, education, social assistance, and urban development, we need to incorporate information on and analysis of local governance into our development and policy discussions in a much more central fashion. Municipal development is real development for a large part of the population and must be treated as such in the research literature. Just as we have good cross-national information on GDP, demographic change, and even income inequality, we need to disaggregate as much of this information as possible to the urban level for comparative purposes.

- Incorporating local governance into our models and analyses of urban change. Until now, research on urbanization has focused primarily on the disciplines (such as sociology and geography) that deas with social and physical change in the urban environment. This was understandable as long as local governments had few powers and little ability to effect changes in the urban situation. But issues of metropolitan reform are on the table in many countries and need to be addressed using analytical approaches that link politics, administrative reform, and the other social sciences in the same discussion.