Creating Community

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Crime, Violence, and Security in the Caribbean

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Introduction

There have long been concerns about rampant crime and violence in the English-speaking Caribbean. A March 2007 report by the World Bank and the United Nations' Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) pointed out that murder rates in the Caribbean are higher than in any other region in the world, and assault rates are significantly above the world average. Drug trafficking has been consistently cited as the underlying cause of much of this criminal activity and has been a major security concern in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) given its social, institutional, and economic ramifications. Recent trends such as the deportation of criminals from émigré communities have created additional pressures on the scarce resources of many English-speaking Caribbean countries, as well as Haiti and other CARICOM members.

Two fundamental problems plague efforts to deal with crime and violence in the Caribbean. The first one is the gap between conceptualizing solutions and putting them into practice. Local experts and authorities have been quite adept at identifying the myriad sources of crime in the Caribbean, even setting up multinational commissions and collaboration initiatives to discuss common solutions (such as the CARICOM Regional Task Force on Crime and Security of 2001.) Yet these efforts seldom result in actual operations. In spite of all the attempts to identify cooperative mechanisms to tackle crime in the Caribbean, a transnational problem that frequently overrides the individual capabilities of such small states, authorities have been unable to articulate a security community in the region, much less build effective links to the non-English-speaking Caribbean, especially the Dominican Republic and Cuba. Such integration is frequently cited as a much-needed step to effectively addressing some of the more obstinate forms of criminal activity in the region.

The second dilemma is the breach between collective expectations about what is required to deal with crime in the Caribbean and the local conditions in which these solutions must be put into practice. In a region as wide and diverse as the Caribbean, these conditions often involve considerable differences in geography, levels of development, institutional capabilities, social complexity, and cultural and historical legacies. A particularly salient case is Haiti, where the fragility of state institutions and traditional sensibilities about national sovereignty make it almost impossible for regional coordination and assistance to find a local counterpart or interlocutor in the implementation of anti-crime programs. Neighboring countries of varying size and ethnic composition, such as Trinidad and Grenada, or Barbados and Guyana, often find themselves at odds in terms of their expectations about what the other one should be doing to address criminal activity that has spilled over national borders. By the same token, some countries feature specific, national problems and circumstances that tend to resist regional solutions, as in Belize, Jamaica, or the Bahamas.

On October 30, the Latin American Program convened a group of specialists and practitioners from regional and multilateral bodies, academic institutions, think-tanks, and civil society organizations to reflect on how crime and violence in the Caribbean have typically been addressed, and to discuss ways in which to devise and implement new approaches to problems of social cohesion, urban crime, and generalized insecurity.

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KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Ambassador Albert Ramdin

Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States

The problems and challenges posed by crime and violence in the Caribbean have been for some time a critical issue for the region's policy makers, and it is noteworthy and not surprising that the international community is taking an increasing interest in the subject.

We all agree that security challenges are posing serious social and economic challenges for the smaller economies of the Caribbean, particularly for those that depend heavily on tourism. And if these security problems are not addressed effectively and timely, the evolving situation can threaten domestic legal and democratic frameworks, but also the regional security.

I, like many others from or concerned with the Caribbean, regard the UNODC/World Bank Report as a major and timely contribution to the development debate in the region and it is a useful point of reference for our discussion today..

As you know, the Report found that high rates of crime and violence in the Caribbean are undermining growth, threatening human welfare and impeding social development. Indeed, the Report argues unambiguously that crime and violence are a development issue, having direct effects on human welfare in the short term and on economic growth and social development in the longer term.

History and geography can be and are usually blamed for many of the ills afflicting the region and rising levels of violent crime are no exception. More and more, it appears that the gains of independence are being undermined by threats to national sovereignty and governance, resulting in the vicious circle some of our countries now find themselves in: stunted or inequitable development, increasing poverty, higher crime rates and growing insecurity, corruption and the undermining of the State, poor governance and around again.

One of the most worrying issues the region has to contend with is its status as a major trans-shipment point for narcotics and its vulnerability to drug trafficking. The UNODC/World Bank Report has established that the drug trade is at the core of violent crime in the Caribbean, where murder rates are higher than in any other region of the world and assault rates are significantly above the world average.

To compound matters, fighting drug trafficking and narco-related crime diverts criminal justice resources needed for other important activities; and at the same time, increases and embeds more violence, undermines social cohesion and contributes to the widespread availability of firearms.

And worse yet, the drugs are not just passing through the region, as the Caribbean is increasingly becoming a market for illegal drugs, targeted particularly at youth. In addition to the social, psychological and health consequences, which mean an additional cost to society that needs to be financed with already stretched resources.

It is a truism that crime has a negative impact on legitimate business and investment. As crime increases, access to financing declines, spending on formal and informal security measures increases, and worker productivity declines.

Moreover, fighting crime diverts limited economic resources from other critical human development sectors such as health and education. This is, unfortunately, all

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The Latin American Program's Project on Creating Community in the Americas seeks to establish an effective security community for the countries of the region and to foment strategic debate over matters of human, national, regional, and hemispheric security. The project helps to facilitate a coherent response to the radical changes in the region's security situation that have occurred since the end of the Cold War and the accelerating advance of globalization. We are grateful to The Ford Foundation for its generous support of this initiative.

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too true in the Caribbean, where, for example, estimates suggest that reducing the homicide rate by one third from its current level could more than double the region's rate of per capita economic growth.

Transcending National and Regional Boundaries

Many of the challenges facing the Caribbean transcend national and regional boundaries.

Demand for drugs emanates from Europe and the United States. On the other hand, the supply of hard drugs like cocaine emanates from Latin America and flows northward via the under-manned, porous borders and open waters of the region.

I therefore support the view that interdiction in the Caribbean needs to be complemented by other strategies outside the region: principally demand reduction in consumer countries and eradication and/or alternative development in producer countries.

Likewise, many weapons that are trafficked in the region are brought from the United States, contributing significantly to a worsening gun culture, the escalation and perpetuation of violence and the undermining of stability. Policies should, inter alia, focus on limiting the availability of legal firearms, and addressing interdiction at source and at destination, with accompanying education and meaningful alternatives for youth.

Then there is the problem of deportees. Many of them with no social or emotional relationship with the country where they were born and many armed with "postgraduate" qualifications in crime and access to sophisticated criminal networks, are sent back from the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada to the region, where inadequate social services cannot re-integrate them into society and resource-challenged police forces cannot deter them from putting their knowledge and skills to dangerous effect.

I am pleased to note that it was announced last week by the CARICOM Secretariat that the US State Department has taken steps towards a special resettlement program for deportees from the US, which will afford them job training and placement. The resettlement program, which is an extension of a pilot project in Haiti, will be conducted by USAID and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), working with governments and other local partners, including NGOs, in The Bahamas, Guyana and Jamaica.

This initiative is, I am also pleased to note, a direct result of strong representation made by CARICOM leading up to and during the Conference on the Caribbean, held in Washington, last June.

I believe that all deporting countries should contribute to the cost of re-integration programs. Otherwise, crime and instability will simply be re-exported to those very countries.

All of the above also contributes to the growth of trans-national organized crime, supported by increased access to sophisticated weaponry, greater mobility of persons and state-of-the-art communications.

The emergence of terror networks and the linkages between criminal gangs and terrorists are also cause for serious concern. In this regard I consider the increase of organized gangs in certain Caribbean countries alarming; this development needs to be addressed effectively with the highest priority.

Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Caribbean countries have had to invest heavily in counter-terrorism measures. Such investments have also meant a dramatic shift in capital resources and obligations away from critical social and economic infrastructure projects. Keep in mind that the resources applied by the Department of Homeland Security for counter-terrorism activities exceed the combined GDP of several Caribbean countries.

And we have not even taken into account economic dislocations and natural disasters that devastate not only economic infrastructure but also security and capacity and create a breeding ground for poverty, marginalization and crime.

I am therefore convinced that the phenomenon of violent crime and insecurity therefore requires a coordinated regional and international response that transcends national and regional boundaries.

OAS Action

For the OAS, contributing to the establishment of peaceful societies and prosperous economies is of critical importance. Security challenges are clearly counterproductive to these objectives.

In 2002, the OAS General Assembly adopted in Bridgetown, Barbados, a multidimensional approach to hemispheric security, which entailed an expanded definition of security in the Americas that moved beyond unilateral territorial protection to encompass a complex combination of political, economic, environmental and human security threats. With multidimensional security as one of the pillars of the Organization, the OAS has established a policy framework and institutional mechanisms to deal with major security challenges:

- CICAD, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, deals with drug trafficking, interdiction, and prevention of drug consumption. The adoption of the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) to assess the efforts of Member States in combating illegal drug trafficking is one of the many success stories in this regard.

- The Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacture of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related

Materials (CIFTA) is the first binding regional agreement that explicitly addresses small arms, light weapons, and explosives.

- The Inter-American Committee on Terrorism (CICTE) has programs of technical assistance and specialized training that target six areas: border controls, financial controls, critical infrastructure protection, counter-terrorism legislative assistance, terrorism crisis management exercises, and policy development and coordination. In the past two years, CICTE has spent over $2 million in security training for Caribbean countries, funded to a large extent by the United States.

- The OAS Department of Public Security covers Trafficking in Persons, Trans-national Organized Crime, Gangs, Small Arms and Light Weapons, Humanitarian De-mining, and the Concerns of Small Island States (including natural disasters). In 2008, the Department will host an Anti-trafficking in Persons Awareness-Raising Seminar, in which 13 Caribbean nations will be participating. Among the several objectives, the OAS will be addressing the importance of developing comprehensive legal frameworks to combat Trafficking in Persons.

The OAS Department for Legal Assistance and Cooperation is also providing technical assistance and training to member states to facilitate the development and modernization of legislation and legislative frameworks that can meaningfully contribute to an improvement of the security environment.

On the whole, the OAS is working closely with regional governments, as well as with other international, regional, sub-regional organizations and security agencies within and outside the Western Hemisphere, with the ultimate objective of creating and strengthening partnerships to confront the challenges of security in the Caribbean and across the Americas.

Conclusion

In my view, multidimensional security threats require multidimensional, multidisciplinary and innovative responses. I firmly believe that a holistic, integrated approach to security and crime prevention must address development, good governance and the rule of law, as well as crime prevention. In this regard I think that Caribbean leaders should, in the context of the sub-regional integration process, translate this approach in their domestic and regional policies.

There is a need to continue to strengthen law enforcement through increased training and technical assistance. I believe that the richer countries in the Americas could play a meaningful role in support of the small economies in the Caribbean (and also in Central America).

We must promote greater cooperation in intelligence sharing with regard to threat detection and deterrence. All countries have to recognize that national threats can have regional implications, therefore necessitating a multilateral approach, such as that being pursued through the existing OAS institutional arrangements, to strengthen crime prevention and criminal justice systems.

All need to acknowledge that consultation on strategic and tactical responses to cross-border security issues is necessary and does not pose a threat to national sovereignty.

I believe that the United States can develop concrete programs of cooperation, at both the federal and state levels, especially between US states on the Eastern Seaboard and Caribbean countries, to unite the so-called Third Border.

I consider the Third Border Initiative (TBI) as an example of and opportunity for developing this approach. As you know, the TBI was developed to focus US-Caribbean engagement through targeted programs of new and ongoing activities designed to enhance cooperation. It is an explicit recognition that the security and development issues of neighboring states have the potential to have a direct impact on security in the United States and vice versa. Proximity always leads to issues of mutual interest, which can only be resolved or addressed in an environment of mutual respect, thorough understanding of the needs of each other and a friendly climate of engagement.

Ultimately, I believe that while an immediate response is necessary to address some of these urgent problems, a more structural solution will only be achieved through a strategic approach addressing the underlying causes of insecurity and instability.

I therefore urge governments to invest more in economic, social, education and prevention policies that can help to combat the challenges of drugs, guns and gangs, through, for example, poverty eradication and youth development programs.

In closing, I believe that the OAS is on the right track. By leveraging the strengths of Member States to work together in developing their capacity, we are building a mechanism for sustainable security, one which not only addresses the short term impact, but also the underlying causes of conflict and insecurity in society.

I am convinced that the key to our success in combating security challenges will be to reconcile the relationship between security and development, and to move forward with an integrated, multidimensional approach that emphasizes greater cooperation and partnership to confront common challenges.

Francis Forbes, CEO of the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security Liaison Office, CARICOM, discussed recent efforts in the regional body to tackle the growing problem of crime in the Caribbean. He explained

how gaps between collective CARICOM solutions and implementation at the national level, as well as regional expectations versus national priorities, have hampered the effectiveness of crime fighting efforts in the region. Noting how crime and violence were becoming national security concerns, in 2001 CARICOM created a regional Task Force on Crime and Security, whose work extended until 2005, after which it became the Implementation Agency on Crime and Security (IMPACS), a full CARICOM body. The Task Force made 113 critical recommendations, ranging from preparation and implementation of national anticrime master plans to the strengthening of border control measures, information, and intelligence exchange; gun control; and critical reviews of drug policies. An entire operational and administrative structure for security was created, reporting directly to the Council of Ministers of CARICOM. In 2007, security became the fourth pillar upon which the work of the Community would be based.

According to Mr. Forbes, results from these efforts have been mixed. A coordinating information management authority that was proposed among the original Task Force recommendations is still lacking a director who can get the effort moving, in great measure due to unsuccessful background security checks and outright candidate refusal to engage in some of the required duties of the post. There have been visible improvements in informational exchange and digitalization. Until very recently there was no communication among CARICOM members with regards to the criminal records of individuals, a big problem as the region moves towards a single market and economy (the CSME project). This was in large part due to the use of paper-based recording systems. While support at operational levels is not always as it should be, and intelligence sharing has always been a challenge, a new regional information and intelligence sharing system, implemented on the occasion of the Cricket World Cup that took place in the Caribbean in 2007, has solved these problems.

Forbes also noted that lack of political support, especially at the domestic level of member states, has been an important obstacle to implementing the recommendations from the task force. Political constraints on decision making have led to the rejection of some initiatives, such as amnesties for illegal arms and ammunition, and lack of action taken on others, like the exchange of prisoners between CARICOM states. This is compounded by regional coordination problems. In some cases, there is a lack of formal cooperation agreements; in others, members seek bilateral agreements with outside countries that enable them to look for resources (such as training and capacity building) outside the Caribbean region.

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> —ASG Ambassador Albert Ramdin, OAS

Finally, Forbes concluded by noting that while CARICOM is now much more organized and focused on the issues of crime and security at a regional level, lack of financial, technical, and operational capacity as well as differences in the national security priorities of its members continue to represent serious challenges for the Community.. In many cases these priorities are influenced by economic considerations, such as effects on tourism, and the interests of outside powers like the United States.

Lilian Bobea (FLACSO Dominican Republic) discussed the *Plan de Seguridad Democrática* (Democratic Security Plan) in the Dominican Republic as a case study of the gap between the diagnosis of crime and violence problems in the Caribbean and the implementation of solutions. She placed the Dominican experience in the context of a broader problem of how the approach to dealing with crime in Caribbean countries has impeded the formation of a security community in the region. In her view, the political salience of crime has led many governments to emphasize coercive measures that target specific neighborhoods, rather than build comprehensive national strategies based on cooperative security. The use of force as a strategy for dealing with crime has not been seen as weakening democracy and has led to the formation of what Bobea called violent plural democratic societies. The widespread use of violence by both state and non-state actors has made the use of coercive force an integral element in the configuration of security institutions in these countries.

According to Bobea, this recourse to force must be continuously maintained in order to validate the effectiveness of the security apparatus, thus institutionalizing the role of violence as a strategy for dealing with crime. This strategy has not only meant a spiraling of crime and violence in Caribbean societies, as evidenced in data compiled by the United Nations and the World Bank, but also the entrapment of people in the neighborhoods most affected by crime and poverty. On the one hand, residents need to support the police to escape victimization; on the other, they are victims of police violence and do not trust the police or the security apparatus. This mistrust complicates efforts to implement communal strategies to fight crime, and hinders the participation of other actors and organizations in these communities, where the police have maintained a disproportionately powerful position.

Turning to the case of the Dominican Republic, Bobea explained how the implementation of the *Plan de Seguridad Democrática* launched under President Fernandez' administration has addressed these problems. In order to assess the gravity of crime in Dominican urban

areas, researchers conducted a diagnostic study and pilot program in one of the most crime-ridden neighborhoods in Santo Domingo. They found inadequate law enforcement strategies, severe lack of resources, an indiscriminate use of force, limited room for communal participation and engagement in crime-fighting efforts, and a generalized fear of the police. To address these problems, the *Plan* began by establishing specific goals in various areas: police sector reform, the re-establishment of state presence beyond the security apparatus, stimulating the participation of neighborhood organization in communal security efforts, and the creation of a citizen volunteer program. A year after the program was implemented, some freedom of movement and tranquility had returned to the residents of the generally disregarded areas that had served as pilot locations for the program. In the pilot neighborhood of Capotillo, murder rates during this period dropped by 63 percent.

The pilot program offered important lessons about the effectiveness of crime-fighting strategies and efforts. Political will is fundamental for the success of these efforts, but such will has not been consistent in the Dominican Republic. Constructing state capacity is a particularly difficult challenge. According to Bobea, leadership should be grounded in an institutional basis and must not rest solely on an individual's traits. In this sense, security must be a transversal public policy that reaches into everything a government does over an extended period of time beyond the political cycle, rather than the purview of a single ministry or agency within any given administration or political period. Civil society involvement can help in this task; indeed, Bobea claimed it is the only way to ensure the long-term sustainability of any security plan. Similarly, improving police-citizen relations has a positive impact on reducing perceptions of insecurity, thus reducing the pernicious effect of fear as a determinant of public security policies. Bobea explained that people increasingly associate crime with the loss of social control and social fragmentation, especially in the Dominican Republic. In this sense, such perceptions, and the responses they elicit, are a reminder that delinquency and public insecurity pose a bigger challenge for policy makers in the context of democratic rule than in authoritarian systems.

John Rapley, from the Caribbean Policy Research Institute (CaPRI) in Jamaica, reflected on the relationship between organized crime, violence, and urban governance. The tenacity of gangs, their territoriality and autonomous resource bases, and the social embeddedness of these groups, led Rapley to conclude that a new form of extra-legal governance is emerging in cities like Kingston, and indeed in other parts of the developing world. Governmental incapacity to provide security and other types of services has led to a genuine policy and physical vacuum in which the state is perceived as not functioning for important segments of the population. According to Rapley, criminal barons have stepped in to provide a variety of services the state has not provided, in particular, welfare and, paradoxically, security. Indeed, some of the safest communities in Kingston, Rapley noted, are those controlled by gangs. In this sense, violence is not the result of state failure or gang control, but rather of multiple, overlapping authorities—a contest between the official state and sub-state units with autonomous resource bases built on transnational crime.

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> —John Rapley, CaPRI, Jamaica

The resulting scenario is what Rapley has called the "new medievalism," involving a relationship between the "barons" (gangs) and the "king" (the state), in which the barons provide certain services to the king that justify their existence, including political mobilization and the provision of justice. There is no language of rights to accompany the authority of the baron; in fact, the baron's power is completely arbitrary and exclusive. A crime such as rape, according to Rapley, would become an offense not because it is a violation of a woman's rights, but because it is a violation of the baron's rights and authority. In this sense, a new culture of violence is emerging in cities throughout the developing world that justifies the authority of the gang leader, and is founded on this leader's ability to marshal violence. The resource base that feeds this structure is built on transnational crime, largely drug and human trafficking, but also on a "secondary" tax structure paid by businesses in the neighborhoods where the gangs operate.

Rapley contended that the tenacity of gangs is the result of a faster expansion of the forces underpinning the "new medievalism" than the ones underpinning the official state in developing countries, including the Caribbean. The rapid spread of urbanization, as well as financial and other types of globalization, lead to greater economic integration and increased flows of goods and services, but increased spatial segregation for labor. Growing demands for services supersede the capacity of the state to provide services in many communities in the developing world. In this sense, the problem of gangs and violence is one that goes far beyond crime, but rather encompasses a turf struggle between the state and gangs, as well as among gangs themselves—it is a fight for resources and territories. To the extent that crime-fighting efforts focus on individuals, Rapley contended, the political structures the gangs have developed, and the resource bases that sustain them, are not being targeted.

Bringing a civil society perspective on crime and violence in the region, **Folade Mutota** of the Women's Institute for Alternative Development in Trinidad and Tobago, discussed the need to move security discussions in the Caribbean away from traditional thinking and approaches to national security that emphasize repression and coercion. Focusing on the problem of small arms trade and violence in Trinidad, Mutota described how certain forms of socialization among young males on the island, coupled with access to firearms, have led to a dramatic increase in violent crimes and murder rates. She pointed out that for many men the question of self defense is their main reason for being armed, which in itself is built on a notion of weaponry as a symbol of masculinity. Guns are part of the dominant masculine code and the basis of a militarized identity that is lethally connected to gender in such a way that gun ownership becomes a symbol of male affluence. These values and social practices become institutions at the core of the gun culture, and they increasingly breed a sense of belonging to the family of the criminal gang among the youth in Trinidad. In a social context of widespread unemployment and illiteracy, Mutota noted, the fight against violent crime must also involve creating new social identities that de-link masculinity from firearms. Women in the Caribbean are poised to become agents of change in this process.

Mutota emphasized the important role of narcotics trafficking and the illegal arms trade in the entrenchment of crime and violence in the Caribbean. As a force for globalization, transnational crime promotes linkages across cultures and organizations. These activities place a toll on national budgets in resource-scarce developing countries with pressing needs. In Trinidad, for instance, national security is second only to education in the allocation it receives from the national budget. But this has a toll on people-centered policies; in fact, Mutota explained that her organization is beginning to look at the economic costs of violence in terms of the public health sector. It is an effort she believes will help in assessing the effectiveness of existing social programs that respond to the problem of violent crime in the country.

Johanna Mendelson-Forman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) examined the role of the United States in addressing questions of crime and violence in the Caribbean. While the idea of a "third border" has been frequently used in reference to the Caribbean, neither the region nor the United States have come up with coherent policy responses to address a variety of problems, including natural disasters and environmental security, that bear upon both sides' security concerns.

Mendelson explained that, while the Caribbean Basin Initiative made an effort to address the Caribbean through a project that fostered economic development and integration, subsequent policies have narrowly focused on single issues such as counter-narcotics (prior to September 11) and homeland security (most notably after September 11 through the Third Border Initiative.) These approaches reflect U.S. national interests in a way that is contrary to the sense of partnership that experts and leaders in the Caribbean seem to be advocating, Mendelson observed.

Yet this partnership must address transnational problems that are in fact borderless, particularly organized crime, immigration and deportees, money laundering, failed states, and HIV/AIDS. Other emerging challenges in the region, in particular, climate change and energy insecurity, will also affect how the United States and other countries relate to the Caribbean. Addressing these transnational issues, Mendelson argued, requires a combination of U.S. leadership, multilateral collaboration, and regional leadership. Rhetorical U.S. leadership has been hobbled by inadequate resources and the peripheral position of the Caribbean within the U.S. government. With the exception of international drugs and narcotics, Mendelson noted that most of the U.S. outreach to the region comes from the U.S. Southern Command and Department of Defense budgets. While necessary, this approach fails to correspond to the sociopolitical nature of these problems as explained by Caribbean panelists in the conference.

Mendelson discussed some important obstacles in dealing with the crime and security challenges of the Caribbean. Among these, she mentioned asymmetric resource allocation to a region-wide area and the lack of an integrated approach by the U.S. government. She also highlighted the need for preventive action and policy-making in areas such as disaster relief. The mismanagement of immigration and natural disaster problems now, for instance, will be compounded by the effects of natural phenomena and environmental migration, and will become a major homeland security problem for the United States. Additionally, Mendelson addressed the need for security sector reform in the Caribbean, involving the reinforcement of local security institutions, the strengthening of the police, and the increased effectiveness of judicial systems. She also restated the importance of regional integration and coordination in crime-fighting efforts in order to build a true partnership with the United States, Canada, and Mexico, in a way that actually deals with the multiple security challenges the entire region is facing.

Mendelson concluded by stating that a genuine third border initiative in the Caribbean means simultaneously tackling three broad areas: a diplomatic effort that brings the United States' neighbors into the discussion; economic implementation to address some of the disproportionate burden Caribbean countries are facing due to high energy prices; and a socio-political effect, which means taking seriously the threats caused by transnational issues from environment to HIV/AIDS, in order to find solutions that help countries with smaller economies and great pressures to address these problems locally.

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