Infrastructure Integration and Environmental Preservation in the Amazon

The Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA)—conceived during the 2000 Meeting of South American presidents—is meant to forge links between all South American countries by integrating three strategic economic sectors: transportation, energy, and telecommunications. The full environmental and social impacts of IIRSA investments must be weighed against the need to promote the continent’s economic development and reduce poverty.

On January 16, 2008, the Brazil Institute and the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program (ECSP) co-sponsored a half-day seminar to assess the potential impacts of infrastructure projects planned or underway in the Amazon region. Brazil Institute director Paulo Sotero noted that the Amazonian biome—the most expansive, continuous forest in the world—is spread out across nine different countries, covering over 4.1 million square miles. The future of the rainforest is an issue of global significance. But with over 65 percent of the forest within Brazil’s territorial domain, Brazil bears much of the responsibility for its preservation and sustainable development.

For Thomas Lovejoy, president of The Heinz Center for Science, Economics and
the Environment, this issue “is about a race to the finish line” between two opposing trends to Amazon development: the deforestation that is an “unintended consequence” of infrastructure and development initiatives, and conservation that strives to promote better use of resources, avoiding their depletion as well environmental destruction.

_Gustavo Fonseca_, who serves as team leader of the Natural Resources Division of the Global Environment Facility, stressed that infrastructure schemes could not be looked at on a case-by-case basis. In projecting the long-term impacts of environmental degradation in the Amazon, there must be a way to recognize the future value of the ecosystem; natural resource depletion throughout the world increases the scarcity of commodities, making the largest tropical forest a valuable national resource with major future monetary payoffs.

_Timothy Killeen_ is senior research scientist at the Center for Applied Biodiversity Science at Conservation International and author of the report “A Perfect Storm,” which focuses not only on the challenges of environmental conservation and infrastructure integration but also the underlying need that tropical and developing countries have to promote economic growth and social justice. He noted that in order to fully account for all of the environmental costs of potential infrastructure projects, the Initiative should adopt measures that ensure that the region’s renewable natural resources are conserved and its traditional communities strengthened. “To avoid the end of the Amazon,” Killeen proposed the monetization of carbon markets as a means of developing a lasting revenue source to help defray conservation costs and to provide communities that protect the ecosystem with health and education services.

_Mauro Marcondes_, IIRSA coordinator at the Inter-American Development Bank, explored the “myths and reality about IIRSA.” It is neither a mechanism to finance “mega-infrastructure” projects nor a process for the privatization of public assets. Rather, IIRSA is a forum for regional dialogue among 12 South American countries. IIRSA is built on consensus, with each government responsible for the activities and projects undertaken through the Initiative. Marcondes laid out IIRSA’s strategic vision for the “Amazon Hub,” which includes sustainable and certified forest management; development of bio-industry and bio-commerce; export of new...
Amazonian products through sustainable practices; and the provision of environmental services, which would provide monetary compensation or social and health services provisions in exchange for forest conservation.

Carlos Nobre, director of the Center for Climate Studies and Weather Forecasting and senior scientist at Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research (INPE), projected that the “tipping point” of deforestation in the Amazon, or the threshold at which the composition and ecological characteristics of the Amazon would be irreversibly changed, would be the destruction of approximately 40 percent of the total forest area. To place this tipping point in perspective, he said that 17 percent of the Amazon has already been deforested; if another 23 percent of the forest is destroyed, it may ultimately lead to the “savannization of the Amazon.”

In order to avoid this potentially catastrophic situation, Nobre and other leading experts from Brazil’s National Academy of Sciences proposed a new development paradigm based on “monetizing the value of the heart of the forest.” Given the absence of an economic development model based on the sustainable use of agricultural resources in the tropics, Nobre emphasized the need to “invent a new model of development.” His proposal aims to create a network of five Institutes of Technology for Amazônia (ITAs) in order to advance technological education through graduate degree programs and advanced research in the specific areas of forest and aquatic products, mineral resources, biodiversity, and ecosystem services. The intent, Nobre explained, is to globalize the development capacity of the Amazon by developing high-end technology in the areas of biotechnology, biomimicry and nanosciences; utilize a wider scientific and technical base; expand the region’s entrepreneurial capacity; and utilize a “full production-chain approach” along with appropriate technologies. The five ITAs are projected to cost approximately US$2 billion over ten years.

Pedro Ban, Amazon policy director of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), explained that, as a result of poor law enforcement and lack of economic prospects, there are perverse production incentive that encourage individuals and corporations to engage in deforestation in order to extract economic value from the Amazon. Ban recommended changing land use patterns to increase the productivity of available land and investment in the development of more sustainable products and services within the Amazon.

Mancelo Lessa, senior investment officer of the International Finance Corporation, noted that the reversal of the economic incentives behind deforestation, both legal and illegal, requires governments to implement and enforce product standardization as well as concerted public efforts to pressure producers to utilize environmentally-friendly production methods. Felipe Cruz, coordinator of strategies and programs in sustainable development from Construtora Noberto Odebrecht, contended that discussions of the future of the Amazon need to focus on reality, not on “ideas that don’t work on the ground.” Citing the “biodiversity connector” that is planned for his company’s Interoceanica Sur Highway project, Cruz stated that it is possible to strike a balance between environmental protection and development needs. Principal executive of Analysis and Sectoral Policies at the Andean Development Corporation Francisco J. Wulff argued that collective action is needed to address the problems of the Amazon, noting that the majority of industrial activity in the Amazon that contributes to deforestation is driven by global consumption demands.

The U.S.–Colombia Free Trade Agreement: A Capitol Hill Conversation

Debate over free trade has featured prominently in this U.S. presidential election year. And the U.S.–Colombia FTA has become additionally embroiled in a debate over the protection of labor rights and the Colombian government’s success in prosecuting a range of crimes against trade union activists. On February 27, 2008, the Latin American Program, with support from the U.S.–Colombia
Business Partnership, convened a panel on Capitol Hill to provide Congress and the public with an informed and balanced discussion of the multiple issues surrounding the pending FTA.

In a keynote address, U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab stated that congressional passage of the FTA with Colombia is a top priority of President Bush. She argued that even though Congress has acted to renew unilateral preferences to Colombia through the Andean Trade Preferences Act, the FTA would ensure reciprocity and equal access to U.S. exporters, especially small and medium-sized businesses that now pay 5 to 15 percent—and even as much as 35 percent—tariffs on exports to Colombia. Schwab noted that the administration of President Álvaro Uribe has made great strides in reducing violence in the country and protecting labor union leaders and other vulnerable groups. She argued that the FTA would provide Colombia with a tool for supporting economic growth, development, and stability in a region of critical interest to U.S. national security. She urged a prompt congressional vote on the FTA, stressing that the way it is handled is widely viewed in the region as the proxy for how the United States treats its friends in Latin America.

Andrés Palacio, Colombia’s vice-minister of labor, discussed the Uribe administration’s recent efforts to address issues of violence, social protection, and labor. He noted that Colombia’s unemployment

---

**Amazônia Photography Exposition at the Wilson Center**

The *Amazônia Photography* Exposition, a joint project of the Brazil Institute and *O Estado de S.Paulo*, a Brazilian daily newspaper, seeks to expose an American audience to what is at stake in the struggle to preserve the planet’s largest tropical forest. An art opening held on January 16, 2008, was hosted by director and president of the Woodrow Wilson Center Lee Hamilton, Brazilian Ambassador to the United States Antonio Aguiar Patriota and former U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Anthony Harrington.

The fifty-two photographs presented in this exhibit are the work of four Brazilian photographers: Dida Sampaio, Jonne Roriz, José Luís Conceição and Ed Ferreira. The images were published in a 122-page special report published by *Estado* on November 25, 2007, just days before the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change convened its meeting in Bali, Indonesia. The focus of the report was a clear, yet complex and difficult question: can the Amazon be saved? The answer provided in *Estado‘*s report—produced over three months of intense work by a team of seasoned investigative reporters and photographers—is at the same time hopeful and demanding. Yes, the Amazon can be saved, but first we must come to understand its tragedies and successes. The aim of this exhibit is to focus the public’s attention on and stimulate discussion about the future of Brazil’s biggest environmental resource and challenge.

The *Amazônia Photography* catalog is available for mailing upon request.
rate has been reduced from 17 percent to 9 percent since President Uribe took office in 2002. The government has worked on labor issues with three goals in mind: to guarantee income stability, to create a platform to develop human capital and formal labor, and to take advantage of market expansion and economic growth to improve labor conditions. Palacio discussed improvements in subsidized health regimes, provisions for workers at risk, and subsidies to workers earning below-minimum wage salaries. He also emphasized a reduction in violence against labor union leaders in Colombia, disputing figures produced by the Escuela Nacional Sindical from Medellín and pointing to a large increase in expenditures on the protection of labor union leaders. Palacio acknowledged, however, a six-year backlog of pending cases involving violence against trade unionists.

Greg Farmer of the U.S.–Colombia Business Partnership and NORTEL argued that economic growth in Colombia was the best cure for crime and violence. Like the Peru agreement, the U.S.–Colombia FTA would create jobs in both countries and provide U.S. companies with the same benefits that Colombian exporters receive. He argued that U.S. companies have played a role in the improvement of labor standards in Colombia, noting the multiplier effect of an FTA in developing infrastructure and raising living standards. President Uribe has achieved “remarkable transformations” in the last six years, Farmer said, noting that the appeal of narcotrafficking and paramilitarism would increase if growth were not sustained.

Stanley Gacek, associate director for international affairs, AFL-CIO pointed out that in spite of a reduction in the number of murders of trade unionists (from 72 in 2006 to 40 in 2007), Colombia is still the most dangerous country in the world for trade union leaders. Gacek called the destruction of trade union organization and collective bargaining “systematic, designed, and concerted,” noting that trade union density is at its lowest point in Colombia’s industrial history—a mere 4.6 percent of workers. Crushing unionization no longer requires the murder of trade union leaders and activists, he said, as the union movement is effectively crushed. Gacek took issue with the quality of protection for union leaders, claiming that rates of impunity for the material and intellectual authors of violence against unionists are very high. He noted that since President Uribe took office in 2002, 420 trade union leaders have been murdered in Colombia, while over 8,600 cases of violence against union members were registered between 1986 and 2007.

José Luciano Sanín Vázquez, director of the Escuela Nacional Sindical de Medellín (National Trade Union School in Medellín) elaborated on the state of labor protection and violence against unions in Colombia. Colombia has only limited social protection and other coverage mechanisms for workers, even as most job creation is taking place in the precarious informal sector. New forms of employment (such as associated labor cooperatives) are surfacing in Colombia and, according to Sanín Vázquez, are reducing workers rights. Government practices, judicial paralysis (97 percent of cases involving violence against workers are not prosecuted), and the historic and systematic violence against labor leaders and members make the functioning of trade unions difficult. Without labor rights, Sanín explained, free trade can be catastrophic, noting that when free enterprise went along with freedom to unionize, Colombia could speak of progress.

Juan Pablo Corlazzoli, former director of the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in Bogotá, argued that the human rights situation in Colombia needed to be understood in the context of the internal armed conflict. The most egregious violations, he said, were directly related to that conflict. In 2006–07, the international community had produced four human rights reports on Colombia, all of which noted progress in the respect for human rights. He noted that sectors other than trade unionists faced persecution, pointing to the murder of 33 local politicians and candidates for electoral office. Corlazzoli argued that the Colombian government, through its Ministries of Labor and Justice, could do even more to protect labor rights. But he maintained that an FTA could also be a vehicle for advancing economic rights, including by generating high quality jobs linked to foreign investment. Development and security, he concluded, were dependent on each other as well as on human rights.

A video of the entire event can be found on the Wilson Center’s website, www.wilsoncenter.org/la
U.S.–Mexico Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond

On February 8, 2008, the Mexico Institute hosted a discussion on security cooperation between the United States and Mexico in light of the proposed Mérida Initiative, a $1.4 billion assistance package to Mexico and Central America to fight organized crime and drug trafficking. During this event, which was co-sponsored by the Inter-American Dialogue and George Washington University’s Elliott School, John Bailey of Georgetown University noted that the U.S. response to fighting drug trafficking and its expected role in the Mérida Initiative is to “do more of what we’re doing, add some things, and try to do better.” He characterized the initiative as drug-oriented, border-oriented, and future-oriented, with goals that are purposefully vague in order to garner more support for its broader goal of fighting drugs and terrorism. However, he stated, the specifics of the program will have to become more defined as the American public demands answers on issues such as the balloon effect, arms trafficking, justice reform, and human rights abuses linked to the Mexican army.

Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) professor Jorge Chabat emphasized the Mérida Initiative is critical in that it challenges the pattern of mistrust the United States has had in the Mexican police force while simultaneously attempting to create a regional framework. However, Chabat pointed out, the Initiative faces many challenges such as corruption within Mexican security forces and receiving approval from the U.S. Congress, the Mexican elite, and the public in both countries. Also dangerous, he noted, are exaggerated expectations on both sides of the border of what it can realistically achieve. He also cautioned that success in fighting drug trafficking will be dependent on other factors outside of Mérida such as judicial reforms, control of corruption, and improving Mexican intelligence capabilities. The situation should be seen not as a national security problem, but rather a public security problem, he added. Success will be measured not by metrics, he argued, but instead by a general feeling of safety, in which territory is not controlled by drug-traffickers and people are not being killed in the streets.

Alfredo Corchado of the Dallas Morning News gave a first-hand perspective of the harsh reality that exists along the U.S.–Mexico border. He asserted that currently there is a very real threat to freedom of expression. According to Mexico’s Commission on Human Rights, 36 journalists have been killed in the last seven years. He explained that in border towns such as Nuevo Laredo, drug traffickers have systematically taken over the community by co-opting everyone from the police, to the mayor’s office, to local journalists, who fear for their lives if they do not cooperate. Further, since President Felipe Calderón sent the Mexican military into this region to improve security, more than 1300 members have defected to work for the cartels. In places along the border such as Nuevo Laredo, Corchado asserted, the cartels run everything, from what stories are permitted to be printed in the newspaper, to the anti-military agenda of local civil society and human rights groups.

The Inter-American Dialogue’s Peter Hakim argued that although the willingness on both sides of the border to cooperate in this initiative is unprecedented, it does not overcome the historic lack of trust between the two nations. Further, he noted, it is hard to interpret the discussion currently taking place in the U.S. Congress. Although most agree that the plan is good in theory, members are getting stuck on the details, especially with regard to how the initiative will be monitored and how human rights violations will be prevented. He pointed out that because
it is an election year, domestic politics will play an important role, especially because Congress has the tendency to treat the proposal not as a joint initiative, but rather a U.S. program. Andrés Rozental, a Mexico Institute board member, added that in Mexico Plan Mérida is seen as a Mexican-born initiative that is symbolically involving the United States. He noted that Mexico has also made it clear that if the costs of cooperating seem too high (i.e., the United States demands too much), it will withdraw the offer to work collaboratively. Mexico’s goal in proposing the Mérida Initiative was not to secure U.S. funds but rather to promote greater cooperation in facing a shared threat.

Innovation in Brazil: Public Policies and Business Strategies

Over the past year the Brazil Institute and the Program on Science, Technology, America and the Global Economy (STAGE) have jointly sponsored a series of events to advance research and dialogue on critical economic issues, focusing particularly on the roles of innovation and labor.

A conference hosted by the Brazil Institute and STAGE in conjunction with the International Labor Organization (ILO) on September 18, 2007, highlighted the main findings of the independent evaluation, Rights at Work: An Assessment of the Declaration’s Technical Cooperation in Selected Countries. The report assesses the results of programs in Brazil, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Morocco put in place as a result of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted in 1998 by the ILO. The Declaration represents the global consensus on labor standards and establishes rights in the workplace to provide equal opportunities to all workers. It establishes four categories of rights in the workplace: freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of forced and compulsory labor, the abolition of child labor, and the elimination of workplace discrimination.

The first panel introduced the Declaration’s approach and explained its programmatic rationale. Speakers included the executive director of the Standards and Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work Sector of the ILO Kari Täipiöla, deputy under-secretary for international affairs at the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) Charlotte Ponticelli, and Colin Fenwick, the director of the Center for Employment and Labor Relations Law at the University of Melbourne and co-author of Rights at Work. Panelists assessed overall accomplishments in the ten years since the Declaration’s adoption, and reported on the transformative experiences that have come about from the ILO-DOL partnership, focusing particularly on programs in Brazil, Indonesia, Morocco, and Vietnam.

Participants on a second panel represented the Declaration’s tripartite constituency of employers, workers, and government representatives. Helga Ying, director of Worldwide Government Affairs and Public Policy at Levi Strauss, Mércia Consolação Silva of the Instituto Observatório Social (Social Observatory Institute), and Ros Harvey, global program manager for the ILO’s Better Work Program, offered an assessment of the lessons learned from the Declaration’s work elsewhere in the world. In Brazil, they noted, workplace-related challenges often include racial and gender discrimination and forced or compulsory labor.

On questions of innovation, the Brazil Institute sponsored the second of three conferences at the University of São Paulo’s Politécnica engineering school on November 8, 2007.

Fostering innovation is a key challenge for Brazil as it strives to emerge as a global economic force. Whereas in the last century Brazilian scientists and research institutions developed the country’s capacity to produce state-of-the-art knowledge in various fields, innovation—the ability to apply knowledge in the development and production of goods and services—remains largely absent in many sectors of the economy.

Carlos Américo Pacheco, assistant secretary for development of São Paulo, explained that globalization has increased the competitiveness of countries and corporations integrated into the world economy. This, in turn, has sharpened the need for innovation, making it a central pillar of any public policy aimed at economic development and industrialization.
Mexican President Felipe Calderón’s First Year in Office

On January 18, 2008, the Mexico Institute and the Inter-American Dialogue welcomed one of Mexico’s highly regarded political analysts, Denise Dresser, to offer her perspective on the successes and failures of President Felipe Calderón’s first year in office. Dresser called Calderón’s first year a good beginning, and praised his ability to establish the presidential authority he needed after a highly contested election. She acknowledged that his steadfast efforts in building consensus have produced some of the reforms Mexico’s previous administration could not achieve.

By making the issues of public security and fiscal, pension and electoral reform the vanguard of his agenda, Calderón has demonstrated his capabilities to govern effectively in Mexico. Dresser further argued that his political will to tackle drug trafficking and organized crime has propelled him to a unique level of authority that expunges the vision of a paralyzed presidency exemplified by his predecessor. However, she asserted that Calderón’s political impetus must confront Mexico’s systematically dysfunctional democracy, where a deficient political and economic system deepens poverty, fails to create sustained economic growth or competition, and yields disproportionate allocations of wealth to a very few.

Dresser argued that the electoral reform passed by Mexico’s Congress in 2007, with the support of the president, played a major role in decreasing the power of private groups, especially the large media companies that have typically distorted Mexico’s political institutions. Although members of Calderón’s party, the Political Action Party (PAN), feared he was succumbing to pressures from the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), Dresser pointed out that including the PRD in the decision-making process has returned Mexico’s leftist party to institutional channels. Furthermore, she noted, the successful agreement among Mexico’s three powerful parties on the electoral reform is likely to allow for further collaboration in policymaking in the future. This agreement helped make possible, among other things, a necessary fiscal reform. However, Dresser warned that Calderón’s fiscal reforms will not be enough to produce a sustained level of economic growth for all tiers of Mexican society. She commented that while the efforts made in passing the reform were valiant, the new fiscal measures serve only as a springboard for a broader set of changes that are needed.

Dresser pointed out that although Calderón has made progress in passing reforms, he has been forced to make important political concessions, which may have long-term negative consequences for democracy in Mexico. Taking advantage of these concessions, the PRI has actually established itself as the strongest political party in the country and the one indispensable to any political decision. The PRI has used this position to protect some of the least democratic political figures in the country, such as the governor of Puebla. Calderón needs to address the major problems that exist in transportation, telecommunications, energy, and education, but doing this will require challenging entrenched interests. Fighting the root of these problems—monopolistic powers, crony capitalism, and economic disparity—will be Calderón’s biggest challenge.
Cruz, scientific director of the State of São Paulo’s Research Foundation (FAPESP), discussed the continued discrepancy between Brazil’s ability to generate knowledge and its failure to translate that knowledge into tangible products and services. He called on the country to adopt policies that recognize the role firms play in the innovation process. Sérgio Risola, general coordinator of the University of São Paulo’s Technological Enterprises Incubator Center (CIETEC-USP), argued that business incubator centers improve entrepreneurship. They do so by bringing together leading experts and providing them with the necessary resources, technical knowledge, and training to better manage financial resources and the development of new companies and products in an “environment that promotes cross-pollination of ideas.”

Stephen Merrill, executive director of the U. S. National Academy of Science’s Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy (STEP), noted that changes in the United States reflect broader, underlying patterns that are shifting the way innovation works. Merrill explained that the success of the U.S. innovation system can, in part, be linked to the role institutions (public, non-profit and commercial) play in performing research and development (R&D); the availability of capital and the sophistication of financial actors that invest in technology-based start-ups; the robust intellectual property (IP) regime and strict enforcement of IP rights; and business-friendly tax policies as well as the compatibility of technical and regulatory standards. Kent Hughes, director of STAGE, discussed India and China’s growing influence in the field of innovation and projected that both countries will impact the policies and strategies of developed and developing countries alike. Hughes said that globalization has altered the structure of the international economy, bringing about opportunities for emerging economies not only to be niche producers of technology-based goods but also generators of knowledge.

Several business leaders and government officials focused on the business aspects of innovation. Luiz Henrique Braido, professor at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, noted studies that indicate that as much as 50 percent of the disparity in household income around the world can be explained by differences in the use and availability of technology. Fernando Reinach, executive director of Votorantim Novos Negócios (Votorantim New Ventures), assessed the critical role of venture capital in the development of new products and services. He said that the problem with innovation in Brazil is not the inherent risks and costs associated with the process of product development, but rather the added costs resulting from the country’s weak institutional framework and poor legal enforcement.

Alexander Triebnigg, president of Novartis Brasil, evaluated the complex relationship between Brazil and the pharmaceutical industry. For Brazil to boost innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, he argued, the country must aggressively modernize the institutions charged with promoting innovation and strengthen IP laws and patent rights. Other speakers on the third panel included Mauricio Mendonça, chief executive of the Industrial Competitiveness Unit of the National Confederation of Industries; Mauro Assano, executive manager of research for IBM Brasil; Sonia Tuccori, R&D manager for Natura; and Olivio Ávila, executive director of National Association for R&D of Innovative Companies (ANPEI).

Energy and Development in South America

On November 28, 2007, the Latin American Program and the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales in Santiago (FLACSO-Chile) convened a group of experts on energy to discuss the role of energy resources as an instrument of cooperation or conflict in South America. Cynthia Arson, Latin American Program, noted the high levels of interdependence among Latin American countries with respect to fulfilling their energy needs. Arson also highlighted the resurgence of resource nationalism in South America, where left-leaning, populist leaders are seeking to take advantage of high commodity and oil prices to extract a greater share of resource rents.

Francisco Rojas, FLACSO, emphasized that energy is potentially a force for integration and economic growth, but also can serve as the basis for revived historical and geopolitical grievances in the region. He decried the low levels of energy cooperation in the hemisphere, despite the existence of a number of bilateral agreements and
projects. Meeting the region’s long-term demand for energy and enhancing its insertion in the global economy will require massive investment, he said. Thus far, however, the region lacks an overarching vision for energy integration that would balance the needs of both producers and consumers. Rojas called for an academic, hemispheric debate on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, saying that it holds potential for meeting global energy needs and would contribute less to global warming and pollution than hydrocarbon-based fuels.

Secretary-General of the Organization of American States José Miguel Insulza stated that the abundance of resources in Canada, the United States, and Latin America makes energy a truly hemispheric issue. He noted estimates by the Inter-American Development Bank that regional energy needs would increase by 75 percent over the next 25 years, and that providing reliable and affordable energy to meet that demand was a key challenge. Despite its status as a net exporter of energy (the region accounts for 13.8 percent of world oil production but only 8.1 percent of consumption), governments face high pressure to deliver energy to the poorest sectors of their own societies. Price volatility affects producers and consumers of energy in different ways, he said, and that imbalance was a source of instability. Latin American countries must move to integrate in order to compete in world markets, he said, noting that many leaders talk about integration at the same time that they talk about self-sufficiency. Calling those two impulses contradictory, Insulza called for the diversification of energy sources as well as the increased efficiency of both production and consumption.

“Energy is not useful if it is not associated with the services it provides,” according to Brazilian analyst Sergio Trindade of SE2T International. Development and energy are intrinsically linked through services and through the role of energy as a factor of production. While this link encourages the politicization of energy because it is seen as a form of political power, it also allows countries to use their energy infrastructure to increase human capital. Trindade cited Brazil as an example for which the growth of research and knowledge has paralleled the growth of the various industries (including electricity, deep-water drilling, and ethanol), with the result that Brazil took a leading role in energy production. However, he cautioned that 20 million Brazilians are still “off the grid,” and as such, governments must continue to prioritize energy development regardless of the political views of a particular administration.

RoseAnne Franco, PFC Energy, outlined the “energy vision” of Venezuela within the context of the country’s position as a regional leader in oil and natural gas reserves. She noted that Venezuela has historically felt an obligation towards its neighbors, and prioritizes social and industrial development both at home and abroad. This has led to assertions of national sovereignty over the domestic energy industry as well as calls for integration with other countries in the region. According to Franco, Venezuela’s regional integration plan relies on the Orinoco oil belt: if these heavy and extra heavy oil reserves can be fully developed, Venezuela would become the top energy resource holder in the world. Development of the Orinoco belt has provided the Chávez government with the opportunity to forge relationships with national oil companies (NOCs) from the region and around the world. However, it is unclear as to whether these state-run companies have the funding and technical expertise to successfully operate in Venezuela and help spur regional integration. Venezuela’s policy of giving priority to national oil companies is best exemplified by the role its own NOC plays in domestic social development. Between 2003 and 2006, PDVSA’s spending on social programs went from $240 million to $13.36 billion. This has led many experts to fear that social programs are coming at the expense of new exploration and production in Venezuela. Given these conditions and others, Franco questioned whether Venezuela’s regional integration and social development goals can go hand-in-hand.

David Mares, University of California-San Diego, echoed the claim that access to energy is vital to development, noting that this access ranges from 95 percent electrification in Argentina to 36 percent in Haiti. Mares highlighted this disparity as a key factor that could be addressed through regional integration. One of the great challenges to integration, however, is maintaining the integrity of institutions in countries where governments are predisposed to corrupt, rent-seeking behavior. Mares pointed to conflicts over the natural gas pipeline between Argentina and Bolivia, the failure of Hugo Chávez’ Gran Gasoducto del Sur, and
Petrobras’ investment freeze in Bolivia as evidence that energy integration is on the decline in South America. Energy-producing countries must examine how best to capitalize on investment, fairly distribute economic rents, find a balance between domestic and export market supply, establish regulatory regimes to mitigate uncertainty, and be cognizant of the economic risks of using energy as a foreign policy tool. According to Mares, this begs the question, “will integration in the region be driven by political agreements or market relationships?”

Thomas O’Keefe of the Mercosur Consulting Group labeled the Argentine government’s intervention in the energy market as a response to political pressures emanating from the political and economic crisis of 2001–02. Former President Néstor Kirchner intervened in the energy sector market—converting end-user rates for natural gas into pesos and freezing prices—despite the inevitable “bottlenecks” that these measures would create in the future. Artificially low prices removed an incentive for private sector firms to invest and meant that consumers had no incentive to conserve their use of energy. According to O’Keefe, the Kirchner government apparently preferred to subsidize the importation of alternative fuels and natural gas (from Bolivia) in times of shortage instead of allowing the market to correct domestic prices. This was further complicated by arbitration cases brought against the Argentine government by private sector actors. As a result of Kirchner’s actions and current shortages, current President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner may face heightened pressure to restore market mechanisms for domestic users of natural gas and electricity.

Bolivia’s history has been full of natural resource-based conflicts, according to Humberto Vacaflor, Siglo 21. Under a plan developed by the government of former President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, Bolivian natural gas was to be exported through a pipeline running across Chile to the Pacific Ocean. Chile would benefit not only from the natural gas it would liquefy, but also from resulting investments in the LNG sector. The public opposition to this plan was tremendous. Protestors took to the streets in demonstrations that contributed to the ouster of Sánchez de Losada. The memory of this conflict currently impedes any type of bilateral energy cooperation with Chile. Oil in Bolivia also has a conflictive past, Vacaflor said. The first oil company to operate in the country was Standard Oil; its corruption and unwillingness to sell oil to Bolivian military planes during the 1930s Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay provoked the first nationalization of the country’s oil industry and the creation of a state-owned oil company, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB). However, YPFB was later privatized under Sánchez de Lozada, and Bolivia is now experiencing the consequences of the failed privatization effort. According to Vacaflor, the current government is unable to find a balance between attracting the investment needed to develop and produce natural gas while simultaneously extracting a portion of the royalties to address issues of inequality in Bolivia.

Oscar Landerretche, Universidad Técnica Federico Santa María, asserted that import-dependent Chile has struggled to develop efficient regulatory frameworks. He suggested that regional energy integration—with a harmonized regulatory and normative framework—would allow for the
correction of these inefficiencies by allowing competition and investment. Chile demands a large amount of energy because of its extensive mining sector. Since it relies on commodity markets for these energy imports, Chile requires stable rules of the game in the international trading system. In order to move forward with integration then, Chile should promote “open regionalism,” which would maintain market-oriented and non-protectionist policies. According to Landarretche, current surges in populism and “exacerbated nationalism” in the region represent a backlash against ill-conceived, market-oriented policies. However, Chile must not over-react to energy shortages or crises by imposing costly measures such as energy rationing. Chile’s long-term interests lie in the diversification of its energy sources, he concluded.

Latin American Immigrants: Civic and Political Participation in the Washington, D.C. Metro Area

On November 1, 2007 community leaders, immigration scholars and elected officials gathered to discuss the civic and political participation of the Washington Metropolitan Area’s largest immigrant group, Latin Americans. Philippa Strum of the Wilson Center’s Division of United States Studies welcomed the panelists to a timely discussion on an issue currently at the top of the U.S. policy agenda: immigrant integration. Mexico Institute director Andrew Selee noted that Washington, D.C. is an especially interesting case because it provides a unique environment where local and national issues come together. This city has seen its identity evolve in the past twenty years with the influx of immigrants from Latin America and around the world. Organizations that formed initially to provide services to immigrants have in recent years turned to advocacy and political activism both locally and nationwide.

Xóchitl Bada of the University of Notre Dame pointed out that the activism we are observing today in the Latin American community, most widely seen in the outpouring of participants during the marches and rallies in the spring of 2006, is in fact a product of a long process of quiet grassroots organizing that has been going on for much longer than the past few years. Leni Gonzalez of LULAC-Virginia emphasized that not only are immigrants learning how to participate, and doing so increasingly, they are learning why it is important for their voices to be heard. However, she noted, often elected officials do not represent their needs.

The Brookings Institution’s Audrey Singer gave a demographic outline of the Latin American population in the D.C.-Metro Area, noting that there has been such rapid growth in recent years that one third of the current Latino immigrant population arrived after the year 2000. She commented that with this growth the population has broadened from a base of professionals who came to work for international organizations to a diverse group from all over the region who took advantage of the increasingly available jobs in the service and construction industries. Singer mentioned that the D.C. region is and has been one of the most diverse immigrant cities in the country, but the largest group of Latin Americans comes from Central America, representing over 60 percent of the Latin American immigrant population. Singer pointed out that the fastest growth has been in the D.C.-Metro suburbs, specifically in Prince William and Fredrick counties. She asserted it is important to utilize new available data documenting the Latin American population in order to accurately frame the discussion surrounding the issue of immigration.

In his presentation of the Migration Policy Institute’s study on taxes paid by immigrants in the D.C.-Metro Area, Michael Fix challenged the common perception that Latin American immigrants do not pay their share of taxes. He noted that the amount of taxes paid by immigrants is roughly proportional to their share of the population. Fix also pointed out that about 80 percent of immigrants in the region are, in fact, here legally. The study showed that the level of taxes paid and household income are directly correlated with the ability to speak English and legal status. Fix argued that providing legal permanent status to immigrants would increase their tax contribution.
Cecilia Muñoz of the National Council of La Raza asserted that the multi-faceted nature of the Latin American population in the D.C. region raises the question of identity: whether people see themselves as separate groups based on nationality or legal status, or part of a larger community with a common goal. She noted that the longer a foreign-born group has lived in its community in the United States the less they focus on their country of origin and the more they develop the infrastructure to address local issues and advocate for change. Muñoz commented that the hostile climate against the general Latino population in the area has been a common enemy that has united the U.S.-born Latino population with the immigrant community, and acted as an impetus for active participation in marches, protests and boycotts.

In response to the question posed by the Washington Post’s Marcela Sánchez about where activism begins, Maryland State Delegate Ana Sol Gutiérrez stated that you simply learn with experience. She emphasized that it is this experience that is lacking in the Latino community, where organizations do not yet have all the political organizing skills necessary to understand the how to work with the government. She cited community commissions as good examples of where people could start out. Mercedes Lemp of the Mayor’s Office on Latino Affairs added that neighborhood associations and school PTAs are other places where it is easy to get involved and gain experience.

Walter Tejada, Arlington County Board Vice Chairman, reiterated that getting involved at the local level is a good way to start out. He suggested his three-pronged strategy to making a difference: offering constructive criticism, suggesting a solution, and then being a part of that solution’s implementation. Pedro Avilés of the National Capital Immigrant Coalition pointed out that motivation for activism often comes from being angry or frustrated. He noted that although the culture of volunteerism in Latin America does not exist as it does in the United States, immigrants here become involved in their communities through the Church, schools and other informal settings in order to address problems on the local level.

Marcela Sánchez asked the panelists to address the challenges to immigrant activism in the D.C.-Metro Area. Gutiérrez emphasized that while actions like the protests and marches that have taken place in Prince William County and other areas in the region are important, they are not enough; sustained political engagement is what will truly make a difference. Avilés mentioned specific factors that prevent activism, including language barriers, lack of resources, lack of time to give, and organization. Lemp pointed out that in the District there is a better climate for activism than in the suburbs, citing the Language Access Act as one example of a District policy that caters to the needs of immigrants. To address the challenges presented, Tejada advocated coalition-building with other communities in the region around common interests such as education and health. He also commented that leadership skills used for local events and fundraisers can and should be translated to broader civic activism. Finally, he called on the community to utilize English language media to change perceptions and spread accurate and positive messages.

The ‘New Left’ and Human Rights, Political Participation and Civil Society-State Relations

The parties and coalitions of the Left and Center-Left that now govern much of Latin America and their relationship to civil society was the focus of an international conference in Buenos Aires on December 5–6, 2007. Co-sponsored by the Latin America Program and two Argentine institutions, the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella and the Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), the conference brought together scholars and public officials from Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela to explore to what extent so-called “New Left” governments were adopting different approaches than their predecessors to questions of human rights and political participation, and whether, if at all, the emergence of new social actors was changing the nature of the relationship between the state and civil society.

The conference on “The ‘New Left’ and Human Rights, Political Participation and Civil Society-State Relations” opened by exploring the processes through which the public in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay was coming to terms with the
human rights crimes committed during the time of the military dictatorship, by advancing programs of reconciliation and/or holding those responsible accountable to justice. CELS president Horacio Verbitsky asserted that civil society organizations have played a decisive role over the last twenty years in generating awareness of human rights violations within society and overcoming the obstacles put in place by governments bent on withholding the truth. While President Néstor Kirchner had played a critical role in creating the political climate for pursuing accountability through the judicial system, his actions have been sustained by a broad social movement active for decades on behalf of human rights.

Elizabeth Lira of the Center for Ethics, Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Chile, sketched the broader political context for the human rights policies of Chile’s post-dictatorship administrations. Initially, Presidents Patricio Aylwin and Eduardo Frei saw human rights as an issue to be settled through a truth commission and reparations to victims, but not trials of military or civilian officials responsible for the repression. The pursuit of legal remedies inside Chile changed with the arrest of General Augusto Pinochet in London in 1998. Lira stressed that with the passage of time, a new generation has come to power in the armed forces and other institutions, and Chile’s last two presidents—Ricardo Lagos and Michele Bachelet—were themselves victims of the repression. As in Argentina, the participation of a complex array of actors in the public sphere—particularly organizations established by the victims’ families—as well as new initiatives in the legal sphere have expanded the boundaries of action. In the case of Uruguay, Juan Faroppa, former undersecretary of the interior, discussed majority public support for the 1986 amnesty law, known as the Ley de Caducidad. Faroppa credited the government of President Tabaré Vázquez with substantive changes in the government’s position regarding accountability; although the Ley de Caducidad has not been repealed, Vázquez and the ruling Frente Amplio coalition have adopted an official policy of allowing investigations to go forward. Groups in civil society have also exerted constant pressure on the question of impunity.

In terms of the current human rights agenda, the main challenge, according to Felipe Michelini, Uruguay’s subsecretary for education and culture, is the endemic violation of human rights represented by poverty, exclusion, child labor, and the vulnerable position of women and ethnic minorities. Oscar Vilhena Vieira of Brazil’s Fundação Getúlio Vargas and Conectas discussed what he called “the paradox of Brazilian democracy”: a generous bill of rights under the 1988 Constitution coexisted with an unreformed judiciary and police. Structural inequalities and subversion of the rule of law have resulted in a society that is much more violent today than it was during the dictatorship. Vilhena credited the Lula administration with important advances in the areas of education, health, and race relations, but said that fragmented political power in Brazil and the autonomy of state governments leave local oligarchies in place that have thwarted more progressive rights policies. Thus, the policymakers of the “New Left” must cooperate with the “Old Right.”

Marcela Ríos Tobar of the United Nations Development Program in Chile argued that the human rights movement in Chile has limited the human rights agenda, as the traditional Left has focused on the repression and political persecution that took place during the dictatorship. Some issues such as gender equality—an important issue for President Bachelet—now figure in the human rights agenda, but there is still a tendency to limit the recognition and expansion of rights to those that can be “justified” as reducing inequality and improving the quality of life for the poorest sectors. Such is the case for indigenous communities: although they have benefited from social and economic programs, their demands for recognition as ethnic groups distinct from the hegemonic culture are largely resisted.

Panelists discussing Bolivia contrasted in their interpretations of the government of President Evo Morales and its implications for democracy. Luis Tapia of Bolivia’s Universidad Mayor de San Andrés said that Morales’ election represented the displacement of Bolivia’s business sector from control of the executive branch, which for the first time contained representatives of civil society, union leaders, and professionals linked to the indigenous movement. Tapia characterized Morales’ party, the Movimiento al Socialismo, as an electoral party that not only had saved the party system in Bolivia at a time that it was greatly discredited, but also acted as the “great mediator” of the representative system.
The MAS maintained corporatist links to various social movements, negotiating bilaterally with each of its fragments and diverse forms of articulation. René Antonio Mayorga of the Centro Boliviano de Estudios Multidisciplinarios said that Bolivian politics were characterized by deep polarization between political, social, and regional forces, engaged in permanent confrontation and contributing to a “catastrophic stalemate” in the political system. He described the Morales government as anti-democratic and hermetic, driven by the anti-government logic of the social movements in whose name it governed. The dynamic of confrontation was accelerating the collapse of political parties and the assertion of regional autonomies, a war of attrition with no end in sight.

**New Directions for the Study of Citizen Security in Latin America**

On January 28, 2008, the Latin American Program convened experts from 12 Latin American countries to participate in a day-long workshop on citizen security. The goal of the meeting was to assess the current trends and challenges for addressing crime and security and identify areas that require further study and attention. Workshop participants represented a diverse group of researchers and practitioners from Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and the United States. Representatives from international organizations based in Washington D.C., including the Inter-American Development Bank, the Organization of American States, the World Bank, and Washington-based NGO representatives also participated in the discussion.

Participants questioned the popular assertion that crime is generally waning in the region, noting that the evolution of criminal actions in different countries—and even in different cities within the same country—is a cause for concern. Participants agreed that one of these new forms, organized crime, has had a severe impact on the daily lives of citizens and governance not only in the historically violent areas of Colombia, but now in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and in some Caribbean countries. Organized crime is growing in countries such as Venezuela, Peru, Argentina, and Brazil. According to Jeannette Aguilar of the Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas in El Salvador, organized crime and related gang activity have led to particularly cruel and indiscriminate forms of violence in Central America over the past three years. Participants emphasized that future discussions of organized crime must distinguish it from the _mara_ phenomenon, which has plagued both U.S. and Latin American cities.

Former Wilson Center fellows Hugo Frühling (Chile) and Carlos Basombrio (Peru) and current Fellow Lucía Dammert (Chile) emphasized the importance of strong local governments and civil society involvement in addressing crime and violence. Participants lamented, however, the gap between the innovative research being done in the field and its incorporation into public policy. They suggested that more attention be paid to the relative effectiveness of preventative policies, the implications of military involvement in internal security, and the increasing use of private security.
Other participants in the conference included Cynthia Arnson, Woodrow Wilson Center; Catalina Smulovitz, Universidad Torcuato di Tella; Gaston Chille, CELS; Enrique Peruzzotti, Universidad di Tella; Gastavo Maurino, Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia (Argentina); José Natanson, Nueva Sociedad; Ariel Armony, Colby College; Ana María Sanjuán, Universidad Central de Venezuela; Carlos March, Avina, (Argentina); Leonardo Arritzer, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Brasil); Juan Pablo Luna, Universidad Católica de Chile (Uruguay); Isidoro Cheresky, Universidad de Buenos Aires/CONICET; Gonzalo de la Maza, Programa Ciudadanía y Gestión Pública (Chile); Guillermo Alonso, Universidad Nacional de San Martín (Argentina); Cláudio Couto, Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (Brasil); Gustavo de Armas, Universidad de la República (Uruguay); and Rosalía Cortés, FLACSO-Argentina.

A report containing the edited papers from the conference will be published in mid-2008.

New Directions in Brazilian Foreign Relations

Within Brazil, there is significant debate over the direction of the country’s foreign policy: whether Brazil should give priority to relations with its neighbors in the Southern Hemisphere, or use its strengthened economy and technological prowess to project national interests globally. The debate touches on important differences of opinion regarding modernization, the nature of socio-economic challenges, and the future direction of agricultural production and trade.

To better understand the domestic pressures within Brazilian society and its foreign policy establishment regarding policy priorities, the Brazil Institute joined with the Brookings Institution to co-sponsor the September 28, 2007, conference on “New Directions in Brazilian Foreign Policy.”

Carlos Pascual, vice-president and director of foreign policy studies at Brookings, observed that Brazil and the United States can use the issues of global finance, exchange of technology and the development of markets to deepen relations. Brazilian ambassador to the United States Antonio de Aguiar Patriota highlighted Brazil’s priorities and accomplishments in the international arena, including its role in the United Nations, its leadership in efforts to reform the Security Council, its work to establish a strategic partnership with China and the European Union, and a deepening dialogue with the United States. Patriota emphasized that Brazil has “managed to reconcile economic growth while deepening [its] democratic roots and diminishing inequality.”

During the second panel on “The Challenges of Modernization: The Domestic Debate on the Future of Brazilian Foreign Policy,” Mónica Herz, professor and director of the Institute of International Relations, Pontifical University of Rio de Janeiro, suggested that Brazil, along with its partners in the developing world, now had the capacity to adapt established international norms to counter the dominance of the North Atlantic—principally, the United States and the United Kingdom. However, she cautioned against wholesale changes in international legal norms as they have functioned to protect Brazil in the past. Antonio Barros de Castro, chief economist of Brazil’s National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES), provided data on Brazil’s current economic growth and trade, identifying five catalysts for further growth in the 21st century: 1) an end to cycles of domestic and foreign indebtedness; 2) the modernization of industrial plants; 3) the expansion of credit for both industry and individuals; 4) the emergence of a new middle class as a strong consumer; and 5) recognition within Brazil of the value of innovation and technical creativity. Governor Eduardo Campos of the state of Pernambuco stressed that any expansion of foreign policy by developing countries such as Brazil must be guided by domestic socio-economic considerations. He said that Brazil’s growing international influence has depended on the remarkable growth in exports since 2004, the expansion of domestic consumption and acquired purchasing power, the country’s social safety net and distributive policies, access to credit, and growing respect for national assets.

Discussing Brazil’s changing relations within South America, Sergio Amaral, consultant and former minister of industry, commerce and development, noted that both the Lula administration’s first-term policies promoting greater South-South alignment and its confrontation with the United States at the UN, the OAS, and in the Inter-American
Development Bank, were symbolic as well as necessary for domestic political reasons, in order to compensate for the continuation of President Cardoso’s market-oriented economic policies. The South–South focus, however, came under severe criticism from the business community, which exerted pressure for a more pragmatic approach that supported its export goals and did not threaten the country’s economic interests. Amaury de Souza, senior partner at MCM Associated Consultants, Rio, asserted that Brazil lacked the economic and political resources to play a leadership role in the hemisphere. Venezuela’s oil-powered regional influence, as well as increasing flows of illegal immigration and the traffic of goods and arms, meant that Brazil has had to curb its global ambitions in order to better understand the hemisphere and pay closer attention to its neighbors. Riordan Roett, director of Western Hemisphere Studies at The Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, recommended that Brazil seek membership in the G-7, a grouping of world economic powers, rather than the UN Security Council. With the recent decline in U.S. influence, Roett observed that Brazilian foreign policy will have to focus more on the changing hemispheric trends and potential threats to regional stability.

Under the auspices of the Creating Community in the Americas project, a diverse group of scholars from Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Peru met at the Universidad di Tella in Buenos Aires to analyze the domestic foundations of Brazil’s expanding leadership role in South America. The November 27, 2007, symposium focused on four broad areas: party politics and Congress, justice and society, economics and globalization, and foreign policy and regionalism.

The discussion of Brazilian party politics and Congress focused on party fragmentation and discipline; the balance of power between an assertive, domestic-oriented Congress and an activist executive branch; and the consequences of both factors for agenda setting, policymaking, and the overall functioning of the political system. Carlos Ranulfo Félix de Melo of the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais explained that, contrary to traditional perceptions, party fragmentation in Brazil does not mean that Congress is an obstructionist institution. Rather, its large coalitions and lesser party discipline suggest that Congress is a negotiating institution, which means that policy reforms tend to be slow and gradual. Concentration of political power in Congress also means that executive decision-making is subjected to a prolonged period of domestic negotiation.

Turning to foreign economic affairs, Ricardo Sennes of Prospectiva Consultoria de Assuntos Internacionais identified what he called Brazil’s “third transition,” in which multiple actors (government ministries, private sector, state enterprises) operating through a variety of channels (including traditional diplomacy, international acquisitions and investments, and product competitiveness) have given the country a renewed voice and presence in the global economy. Increased presence, however, does not automatically translate into a clear leadership role. Panelists observed that the lack of domestic consensus and sufficient state resources, as well as a lack of policy coherence commensurate with its international projection, may hamper Brazilian leadership in global affairs.

Finally, on the question of Brazilian foreign policy and regionalism, panelists examined the domestic debate over Brazil’s regional role (active vs. passive, nationalist and developmentalist vs. liberal). This debate also involves the mechanisms for exerting Brazilian international leadership—for instance, whether to pursue Brazilian interests through existing international institutional frameworks or through bilateral engagement with key actors like Russia and China. Domestic opinion in Brazil is also divided on issues such as the uses of technology, including Brazil’s nuclear capabilities, and the implications of or threat posed by Venezuela’s activist foreign policy in the region. Participants suggested that misperceptions between Brazil and its South American neighbors abounded, warranting closer consideration by both the policy and scholarly communities, in order to foster better relations in the region.
Energy in Mexico: Oil as a Comparative Advantage and a Strategic Resource?

On July 13, 2007, the Mexico Institute convened a panel to discuss the public and political debate surrounding Mexico’s energy policies, the possibility of obtaining energy reform and the importance of Mexico’s oil for the United States.

Luis de la Calle of De la Calle, Madrazo, Mancera, S.C. began the discussion by stating that oil is a deeply sensitive issue in Mexican politics, in part because it is convoluted by the often conflicting interests of influential stakeholders. In order for Mexico’s energy sector to develop, two critical issues must be addressed. First, Mexico must alter its skeptical attitude towards development. Second, and equally important, it must address and tackle the concerns of four groups: the teachers’ union, nurses and doctors, energy workers—which include Pemex, CFE and Luz y Fuerza—and public employees. While these individuals would be among the principal beneficiaries of the reform, they continue to act as the gatekeepers to achieving it. According to Luis de la Calle, Mexico must undertake structural and pension reform simultaneously if it wished to see progress.

José Luis Alberro of the Law and Economics Consulting Group outlined the four points critical to understanding who needs Mexico’s oil. Mexico must recognize that its reserves and production may continue to decline; Pemex’s execution capabilities must be assessed since it has not yet shown that it can invest in exploration and production in an efficient and transparent manner; due to Mexico’s slow transition to democracy, the current political climate makes energy sector reform unlikely to be successful; and lastly, in the short term, American companies dependent on Mexico’s oil should use contracts with performance clauses—authorized in the North American Free Trade Agreement—in order to allow for more investment without having to change the Mexican constitution.

Pamela Starr of the Eurasia Group noted that while Pemex will continue to face technical challenges, the principal inhibitors of change in the Mexican energy sector are a consequence of Mexico’s current political structure. Starr asserted that the PRD’s unwillingness or inability to negotiate directly with the Calderón government has made obtaining a legislative majority without the PRI’s support virtually impossible. PRI leaders are aware of their political muscle and have actively exploited this political fact to its full extent. Furthermore, she notes, public opinion is a key obstacle to energy reform in Mexico: polls indicate that the Mexican public strongly opposes private investment and specifically private foreign investment in the energy sector. Starr predicted that any reform of the constitution, even a limited one, would be very difficult to implement, even if the PAN wins a significant victory in the 2009 mid-term elections. Echoing President Calderón’s insistence on energy reform, she closed by stating that the best way to advance Mexico’s reform agenda might be to take it one step at a time.

Politics and Elections in Argentina

In October 2007, Argentines headed to the polls in a general election for president, congress, and multiple provincial governorships. Elections took place in the context of important economic and political challenges in the country, including rising inflation and infrastructure bottlenecks, a fragmented and weakened political system, and somewhat predictable electoral results. The Latin American Program held two events to consider these elections in light of Argentina’s political and economic conditions after the 2001 crisis and subsequent recovery, as well as in the context of Latin American elections that have brought about
important changes in the political landscape of the region.

Together with the Inter-American Dialogue and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Latin American Program issued invitations to all three leading presidential candidates to address a Washington audience. Only the second-place candidate, Elisa Carrió of the Coalición Cívica, accepted. In a September 19, 2007, forum, she explained how a historical process of political fragmentation in Argentina has produced a reconfiguration of politics in which political parties have a reduced role. Instead, Argentina is witnessing the emergence of a new type of political configuration, based on a pragmatic coalition of dissenters from traditional parties and non-traditional actors. Carrió said that the Coalición Cívica has emphasized the important role of civic alliances, women, and young people, in an effort to build what she termed “a moral contract” in government, especially to fight against corruption and clientelism. She identified inflation and the inconsistency of economic policy as the two biggest problems for the economy, and outlined proposals to generate a business-friendly climate that would support entrepreneurship and investment while emphasizing the importance of social responsibility and distributional goals.

Turning to foreign affairs, Carrió spoke of policies to strengthen MERCOSUR, forge a strategic alliance with Brazil, open markets, and distance Argentina from Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. She expressed a desire to assist Bolivian President Evo Morales in reconciling deep ethno-political divisions plaguing Bolivia by becoming more like South Africa’s Nelson Mandela than like Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez.

The Latin American Program held an additional symposium on October 18, 2007, with three distinguished Argentine analysts of political and economic affairs: Maria Victoria Murillo, Columbia University; Rosalía Cortés, FLACSO-Argentina and CONYCT; and Graciela Römer, of Graciela Römer y Asociados, a leading polling firm. Murillo noted that, despite similarities with the 1995 election in which an incumbent returned to power, the 2001 crisis and ensuing citizen protests against the government (“¡que se vayan todos!”; “get rid of all of them!”) left an indelible mark on Argentine politics. Since the crisis, none of the figures from the old establishment has been able to return to leadership roles, while party boundaries and ideological identification remain weak. While leaving the Argentine political system in crisis, Peronists’ ability to control social conflict, and their capacity to bring political stability by building alliances through extra-institutional channels, mark an important difference between Argentina and other Latin American countries where party system breakdown has led to caudillismo. Murillo characterized support for Senator (now President) Cristina Kirchner as coming from two broad sectors of the population: traditional Peronist voters (mainly from poorer classes and the greater Buenos Aires area) and an independent middle class that has supported Kirchner on economic and human rights issues, especially given the fragmentation of the non-Peronist opposition.

Rosalía Cortés examined the evolution of social policy in Argentina after the economic collapse of 2001. The Plan de Jefes y Jefas de Hogar (Head of Household Program), implemented in 2002, managed to reach 24 percent of poor households and 35 percent of indigents. The program played an important role in the 2003 elections that brought Néstor Kirchner to power. The year 2004 saw an important a shift in Argentine social policy, from targeted, compensatory policies directed towards the poor, to labor-based policies geared towards organized labor. Distributive mechanisms such as wage hikes, increases in social security, and tax rebates are aimed at middle-income wage earners for the purpose of garnering their political support. Left out are the large number of workers in the informal sector. The cementing of relationships with trade unions means that social policy is not working to structurally integrate the poor into the mainstream.

Graciela Römer highlighted the lack of popular enthusiasm, empty political campaigns, the absence of uncertainty about outcomes—an essential feature of a functioning democracy—and the lack of viable political alternatives to the Kirchner ticket as the distinguishing features of the 2007 electoral contest. Römer argued the presidential elections
Noticias consisted primarily of a contest for second place in the final vote tally, thereby enabling the runner-up party to assume the role of principal opposition to the Kirchner government. Although the outcome was predictable, she said, the winner in the elections would have to face a set of complicated issues, including public insecurity, energy bottlenecks, and galloping inflation. Voters paradoxically supported a continuation of the Kirchner government while most opinion polls indicated widespread support for political change. Römer argued that exhaustion of popular support for President Néstor Kirchner’s policies has been most evident in public expectations regarding the credibility of public officials, and in a rejection of the confrontational style with which his government has approached traditional sources of power and influence in Argentine politics.

Brazil and the United States: Trade Agendas and Challenges to the Bilateral Relationship

On October 16, 2007, the Brazil Institute organized a conference to discuss the regional and global challenges for Brazil’s trade policy, the trade outlook after the 2008 U.S elections, and the present and future dynamics of Brazilian–U.S. economic relations. Featuring speakers from the Brazilian and U.S. governments and private sectors, participants discussed trade-related challenges between the United States and Brazil in light of the stalled Doha Round and a lame duck administration in Washington. While the future of the Brazilian–U.S. trade agenda may largely depend on the next administration, several trade experts countered that it will take more than a party shift in the Oval Office to advance the bilateral relationship between the two most populous countries in the Americas.

President of the Brazilian section of the U.S.–Brazil Business Council and member of the Brazil Institute’s Advisory Council Henrique Rzezinski argued it is imperative that both countries shift their political trade agendas to develop a more strategic vision of bilateral trade policies. The two countries should have realistic expectations of each other—focusing more on areas of convergence rather than the inevitable differences. Pedro da Motta Veiga, director of the Center for Integraton and Development Studies (CINDES), warned against Brazil’s “political hyper-activism,” which, he contended, is taking a toll on its trade policy. Trade policies under Lula, which prioritize South–South relations over increased engagement with the European Union and the United States, have yielded “very timid results.” Rather than increasing Brazil’s bargaining power, Motta Veiga asserted that developing country coalitions have constrained Brazil in pursuit of its own interests—such as greater market access to American and European agriculture markets—in the World Trade Organization.

Mauricio Mesquita Moreira, senior trade and integration economist at the Inter-American Development Bank, stated that in order to increase its share in global trade, Brazil has to diminish its own protectionist trade barriers, lower the country’s exorbitant transportation costs (arguably a more significant barrier), and seek greater market access abroad. Jeff Hornbeck, a specialist in the trade division of the Congressional Research Service (CRS), argued that Brazil is unlikely to overhaul its trade policies, as the country has remained insulated from other economic opportunities by its “Mercosur shell,” which has blinded the country to other economic opportunities.

Trade counsel of the House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means Jason Kearns stressed that a new Republican or Democratic administration will not have much impact on the U.S. approach to trade policy because, in the past three years, neither party has been actively advancing the U.S. trade agenda. I.M. Destler, visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, argued that trade will likely not be a priority for the next administration, citing Hillary Clinton’s call to undertake a thorough review of all trade agreements concluded in the last five years. Yet, he added, trade can be an important issue on the next president’s agenda if he or she can advance a “new domestic bargain” in which a range of social issues such as pension reform, labor union recognition, and income inequality are addressed alongside trade policies.

Principal with the International Department of Miller & Chevalier Jon Huenemann contended that the United States and Brazil can advance bilateral trade by absorbing costs in some areas to maximize
benefits in others. For example, the United States should be willing to cut agricultural subsidies as a means of finalizing a free trade agreement with Brazil. Similarly, Brazil must be willing to change its position on services, market access, and intellectual property issues.

Kellie Meiman, managing director of McLarty Associates, and Paulo Sotero, director of the Brazil Institute, said it is necessary to look beyond the ethanol initiative launched by President Bush and President Lula in March 2007 in order to properly evaluate the Brazilian–U.S. trade relationship. While American companies have historically been the ones investing in Brazil, Brazilian companies are now increasingly investing abroad, particularly in the United States. These recent developments have renewed interest and pressures from the business communities in both countries, among other things, to negotiate a tax treaty. Brazil’s ability to expand its trade horizons, however, will not depend on the private sector as much as it will on Brasília’s policies.

The Brazil Institute continued its focus on trade matters through a February 1, 2008, conference co-hosted with the Brazilian International Trade Scholars, Inc. (ABCI). The IV Symposium on International Trade featured three panels focusing on the issues of “Unlocking the Doha Round: Perspectives for 2008,” “Global Warming and Environmental Preservation: What Options International Trade Law Has To Offer?,” and “Revisiting the Possibility of a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) Between the United States and Brazil.”

Brazilian Ambassador to the United States Antonio Patriota introduced the first session by observing that the Brazilian–U.S. bilateral relationship has been advancing “rapidly and practically, in all areas,” constituting “a moment of great promise” for both countries. Jeffrey Schott, senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, argued that the window of opportunity to conclude the Doha Round talks in 2008 is closed. This is a result of countries’ singular focus on agriculture, which curbs discussion over other vital issues such as service and infrastructure development. Many developing countries, he continued, are less engaged in the process because they are turning to preferential trade arrangements instead of relying on multilateral negotiations. José Raúl Perales, senior program associate of the Latin American Program, compared developments in the Uruguay Round with the Doha Round. He noted how different the economic and political environments in the United States and Latin America’s are today than they were in 1994. Latin American countries are less engaged in the discussions this time around because they are giving more importance to preferential trade agreements on a bilateral and regional basis; meanwhile, in the United States there has been significant public and political pushback against trade agreements, as many openly question their economic benefit.

Ambassador Roberto Carvalho de Azevedo, undersecretary for Economic and Technological Affairs of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations, contended that high expectations are becoming the greatest impediment to a conclusion of the Doha Round. In order to move beyond the current impasse, governments must be willing to expend the political capital necessary to move the debate beyond the current “zero-sum game” mentality that is stalling Doha. Jon Huenemann concurred with the argument that there are many obstacles to concluding the Round in 2008. He observed, however, that as a result of today’s rapidly-evolving global economy, it is imperative that all countries strive to conclude negotiations quickly, or else risk the Doha Round becoming irrelevant.

Other participants debated various market structures and policy alternatives to tackle the issue of climate change through international trade law, as well as the potential impact Bilateral Investment
Treaties (BIT) may have on promoting trade between the United States and Brazil. Panelists included Aluisio de Lima-Campos, chairman of the ABCI Institute; Thomas B. Felsberg, a partner at Felsberg & Associados; Andrew W. Shoyer, a partner at Sidley Austin LLP; Gawain Kripke, senior policy adviser at Oxfam America; Lynn Fischer Fox, counsel for Thompson Hine LLP; Gary Horlick, a partner at Wilmerhale LLP; Nicole Biwens Collinson, vice president of trade negotiations and legislative affairs at Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.; Jean E. Kalicki, partner at Arnold & Porter LLP; Minister Ronaldo Costa Filho, head of the Division of Services on Investment and Financial Issues at Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations; Christine Bliss, assistant of the USTR for services and investment; Arif Hyder Ali, partner at Crowell & Moring LLP; and Melida Hodgson, counsel for Miller & Chevalier.

To further Brazilian understanding of U.S. politics and the 2008 presidential elections, the Brazil Institute co-organized an October 22, 2007, seminar held at the São Paulo campus of the Armando Alvares Penteado Foundation (FAAP).

The American president to be elected on November 4, 2008, will likely redefine U.S. foreign policy, with important potential implications for U.S–Brazilian relations. Rubens Ricupero, director of the School of Economics at FAAP and host of the event, observed that the U.S. role in Latin America has changed over the years as Brazil and other countries have matured both politically and economically; countries no longer hope or expect that the United States will play a defining role in their country. Paulo Sotero, director of the Brazil Institute, portrayed the 2008 presidential election as a historic moment for the United States; it is the first election since 1952 in which no incumbent president or vice president is on either party’s ticket. Samuel Wells, associate director of the Woodrow Wilson Center, asserted that the war in Iraq and homeland security will continue to be high priorities for the next president. Such policies will not change significantly, he said, despite a potential party shift in the White House. Latin American Program director Cynthia J. Arnson noted a considerable shift in the tone of U.S. policy toward Latin America in early 2007, with a new focus on issues of importance to the region, such as social justice, poverty, and inequality. But, she said, the shift in tone was not matched by a shift in substance. In light of domestic U.S. opinion, she doubted that immigration policy would undergo substantial change, regardless of who won the White House.

Security Sector Reforms in Latin America: Impact of Irregular Threats

On September 10, 2007, the Latin American Program and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) convened a panel of regional experts to discuss security sector reforms in Latin America in light of the increasingly unconventional and transnational nature of the threats affecting the region. In furtherance of the goals of the Latin American Program’s project on Creating Community, panelists examined security scenarios in their respective countries, pending agendas of security sector reform, and the relationship of both to traditional approaches to security and defense. Much of the discussion focused on the appropriateness of the armed forces playing a role in combating surging rates of crime and violence.

Oscar Bonilla, president of El Salvador’s National Public Security Council (Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública) reviewed security sector reform in the context of the peace process in El Salvador. While separating the armed forces from the national police led to a clear distinction between public security and national security, Bonilla argued that the latest threat from the Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, a Central American gang now regarded by many as a new...
insurgent force with transnational dimensions, has raised new and profound challenges for the country. The armed forces have participated in joint operations with the national police, but always under police authority. Bonilla argued that the problems caused by gangs, including small arms trafficking, narco-trafficking, and other forms of organized crime, cannot be solved by force alone. Rather, a solution requires an integrated effort that engages civilian institutions, the penal system, and the police.

Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, former secretary for peace and former vice-minister of foreign relations of Guatemala, indicated that the Northern Triangle composed of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras is the most violent region of Latin America and one of the most violent regions in the world. In Guatemala, these levels of violence undermine the efforts to construct a culture of peace; they also revive authoritarian tendencies within the state as well as the population at large. For example, Guatemala has the highest rate of lynchings of any country in Latin America. Transnational organized crime, he said, has penetrated the state at the national and local level, infiltrating political parties, the National Police, as well as the attorney general’s office. Rather than engaging in prevention, the security policies of the state have relied on force and repression.

Invoking legal scholar Paul Chevigny’s term, the “populism of fear,” security analyst and consultant to the Dominican government Lilian Bobea argued that popular demands for security in the Dominican Republic have led to a militarization of the police force. This process has interfered with the reform of both the military and the national police, and has led to a jurisdictional contest, particularly with regard to fighting the narcotics trade. Moreover, according to Bobea, the use of the military in public security duties has legitimized the use of force as the most appropriate response to public insecurity, contributing to the undermining of the Dominican Republic’s fragile democratic order.

According to former Ecuadorian defense minister Oswaldo Jarrín, the reform of the armed forces in Ecuador is part of a larger initiative of state modernization that was first launched under the administration of President Álvaro Noboa. The primary goal of military reform has been to professionalize the Ecuadorean military, while at the same time allowing the armed forces to achieve greater bureaucratic efficiency.

Analyzing the Mexican case, Raúl Benítez Manaut of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) asserted that the Mexican military is one of the most autonomous armed forces in Latin America. This autonomy is based on a tacit understanding with the Mexican state in which the military accepts its subordination to civilian authority in exchange for civilian authorities’ not interfering in military affairs. Within the Mexican armed forces, Benítez Manaut argued, there is a widespread perception that military reform is unnecessary given the lack of external threats to national security, the military’s absence as a key player in the country’s democratic transition, and the absence of a tradition of coups against civilian governments. Internal missions—the war against drugs, support to public security forces, the fight against organized crime, etc.—define the organization and deployment of the armed forces, Benítez argued. Meanwhile, the disintegration and decentralization of Mexico’s system of public and national security provide an opening to common and organized crime.

Former Peruvian vice-minister of the interior Carlos Basombrío reflected on the longstanding political role of the armed forces in Peru, most recently during the government of Alberto Fujimori. The military’s close association with the authoritarian government led to a serious process of de-institutionalization, de-professionalization, and internal corruption. The collapse of the Fujimori regime led to a loss of internal legitimacy, which resulted in an intense process of military reform. Due to what Basombrío called the “trauma of Fujimorismo,” the armed forces are reluctant to assume roles beyond those defined in the Constitution. Basombrío argued, however, that Peru’s armed forces are in danger of becoming ineffective in the fight against narcotics trafficking and a resurgent Shining Path. In spite of a widespread perception of insecurity in Peru, Basombrío noted that there is little pressure to involve the armed forces in anti-narcotics or other crime-fighting efforts in the country.

Rut Diamint of the Universidad Torcuato di Tella in Argentina expressed deep concern over the growing tendency to militarize the public
security agenda in Latin America. According to Diamint, the region’s armed forces have not yet reached a point of complete subordination to civilian control. Rather, given their current independence, the armed forces “spill over” into civilian matters as well as internal and citizen security affairs. One explanation for this problem, suggested Diamint, is the absence of a proper separation of security and defense, a distinction Diamint claimed is fundamental for the proper functioning of Latin American democracy. She also noted how influences from the outside have played a role in blurring these boundaries, pointing to the U.S. Southern Command’s recent technical and cooperation agreements with Latin American agencies of civilian security.

Given the strong public security crisis in Brazil’s two largest cities (Rio and São Paulo), Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira of the Universidad Estadual de Campinas observed that Brazilians compare the way in which their government has expended resources to reduce crime and violence in Haiti with the seeming absence of human and financial resources to improve the police and reduce urban violence in Brazilian cities. This comparison has fueled the public’s demand for military intervention in domestic security. Rizzo de Oliveira further claimed that Brazil’s fragmented and ineffective public security structure, composed of 54 police forces throughout the country, has led to an increasing militarization of the public security agenda.

Chile lacks the magnitude of crime and insecurity of other countries in the region; according to Lucia Dammert of FLACSO-Chile and a Woodrow Wilson Center fellow. The country’s police forces are very popular and one of the most highly regarded institutions in Chilean society. However, like many of its neighbors, Chile has not yet achieved civilian control of the military. The Ministry of Defense, with authority over both the armed forces and the police (Carabineros), enjoys considerable institutional autonomy. Moreover, Dammert noted, in spite of important reforms to the intelligence services, their professionalization is far from complete. Meanwhile, the judicial system is lauded for the guarantees and balance it affords the accused, but has also been widely criticized for being “soft on criminals.”

The State of Rights in Mexico

The Mexico Institute hosted two conferences to discuss the state of rights in Mexico. The first event highlighted the results of the Right to Know Reforms while the second addressed the current status of human rights.

On October 25, 2007, the editors of Mexico's Right to Know Reforms: Civil Society Perspectives gathered at the Woodrow Wilson Center with experts on transparency and accountability issues for the book’s English version launch. Jonathan Fox of the University of California, Santa Cruz commented that purpose of the book, also published in Spanish as Derecho a Saber: Balance y perspectivas cívicas, was to provide readers with a balanced assessment of the achievements and limitations of Mexico’s Federal Law for Transparency and Access to Information through focusing on the law’s capacity within a wide-range of issue areas. Using evidence-based examples and the perspectives of civil society organizations, the publication exposes a broader framework for the “Right to Know” reforms.

Tania Sánchez-Andrade of Fundar, Center for Analysis and Research asserted that the transparency law is changing the relationship between civil society and the state, as civil society organizations, which have been principal users of the Right to Know, are increasingly demanding government accountability. She noted, however, that the law has limitations. It has been deficient in addressing poverty and inequality-related issues due to the fact that the ability to access public information
requires technical tools that are not available to all sectors of the population. **Helena Hofbauer** of The International Budget Project-Mexico remarked that the difficulties in attempting to obtain information from government agencies stem from prolonged bureaucratic processes in which government agencies demand so much precision in the information requested, that if a search does not include an exact document title it can be found to be “non-existent.” Having information does not help a non-functioning and corrupt system in which there is an excess of information but no access to it, she added.

**Priscila Rodríguez Bribiesca** of the Mexican Center for Environmental Law (CEMDA) discussed the role of access to information in the environmental realm, where the government’s decision to withhold information can lead to irreparable environmental mistakes. Rodríguez Bribiesca noted concern with civil society’s ability to consolidate its demands and hold the state accountable, and considered the lack of overall knowledge of available information as one of the greatest limitations in the exercise of the Right to Know reforms.

**Juan Pablo Guerrero Amparán**, a commissioner of the Federal Institute for Access to Information (IFAI), reemphasized that the effectiveness of Mexico’s Right to Know reforms rests on a civil society that makes use of the law. He argued that much of the general population is unaware of the existence of the Right to Know reforms; thus lessening their value. **Jorge Romero León**, Fundar’s executive director, asserted that budget accountability has been one of the greatest challenges to transparency in Mexico. He pointed out that despite efforts to make federal funds public, Mexico’s Ministry of Finance releases only limited information about budgetary allocations, and has actually regressed in the level of its transparency since the implementation of the law.

Acknowledging the growing presence of transparency agencies, **Libby Haight** of the University of California, Santa Cruz suggested that more needs to be done hold those agencies as equally accountable as others. She cited the example of the Special Prosecutor of Electoral Crimes (FEPADE), noting that although more transparency is needed on the part of the agency, it also faces significant challenges in its capacity to fight electoral crime.

**Kate Doyle** of George Washington University’s National Security Archive used its study of the first three years of the law’s implementation to analyze the process of accessing information by looking at requests made to several government agencies through the Federal Institute for Access to Information website. While the study revealed compliance by certain agencies, it found that some refused to provide requesters with any documents. She identified Mexico’s government agencies, in particular Mexico’s Ministry of Defense, as the largest obstacle to the expansion of transparency in Mexico due to their overwhelming reluctance to share information.

On August 23, 2007, **Alejandro Anaya**, professor and director of the Department of International Studies at the Universidad Iberoamericana, and **Jorge Hernández-Díaz**, professor at the Universidad Autónoma “Benito Juárez” de Oaxaca, presented their research from their two-month term in
residence at the Woodrow Wilson Center as public policy scholars. For the past three years the Mexico Institute and Mexican Council on Foreign Relations have sponsored the public policy scholars program. Aurora Adame, director of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations, highlighted the importance of academic exchange by stating that scholars are interpreters and translators of US–Mexico realities.

Alejandro Anaya focused his research on the factors that prevent change in the current situation of human rights abuses in Mexico. His findings demonstrate that in order to deter human rights abuses two key elements are necessary: pressure on the government to change its behavior and a method of argumentation. Both are lacking in Mexico. Pressure may arise from shaming diplomacy, but argumentation is often more elusive. Anaya concluded that the presence of rhetorical action, such as that shown by governments in Europe, is insufficient if it is not accompanied by a process for argumentation.

Democratic Deficits: Addressing Challenges to Sustainability and Consolidation

On September 18, 2007, the Research Triangle Institute (RTI) and the Latin American Program cosponsored a policy forum, “Democratic Deficits: Addressing Challenges to Sustainability and Consolidation Around the World.” The forum explored comparatively the obstacles countries face in sustaining and consolidating democratic systems. In a keynote address, Philippe C. Schmitter of the European University Institute in Florence, Italy, criticized “an ever-expanding set of criteria” for evaluating the quality of democracy, arguing instead for a relative assessment that compared cases across the same cultural or geopolitical areas. The use of diminutives such as “low-intensity,” “illiberal,” “delegative,” and “defective” in describing new democracies obscures the fact that the “neo-democracies” that have emerged since 1974 have actually made great progress, particularly in Latin America. Schmitter argued that the quality of a particular democracy should be measured relative to its potential, not according to the standards of more established democracies that took centuries to develop.

A panel on “Social Deficits, Poverty, and Inequality” considered the governance challenges faced by new democracies as they seek to improve the quality of life for broad segments of the population. Evelyne Huber of the University of North Carolina outlined the partial successes achieved by some Latin American and African democracies in addressing poverty and inequality and improving social services.

To explore how weak or ineffective national and local institutions continue to plague democratically-elected governments, Luis A. Chirinos of Participa Perú and RTI International discussed the challenges of accountability and civil society in Peru. Other panelists examined questions of weak or ineffective public sector institutions, both national and local, and the challenge of curbing corruption. A final panel on “Limitations and Threats to Democracy” explored the development of democratic governance in the most difficult environments, including post-conflict settings. Former Wilson Center fellow Brooke Larson, Stonybrook University, and 2008 Wilson Center public policy scholar Rami G. Khouri, American University, Beirut, were among those discussing the challenges facing the democratic process in addressing deep societal cleavages, both ethnic and religious, in Bolivia, Lebanon, the Balkans, and Afghanistan.

A publication based on the event is in preparation. Meanwhile, a video of the event as well as papers from conference participants can be found on the Wilson Center’s website, www.wilsoncenter.org/lap
According to Jorge Hernández-Díaz, indigenous movements in Mexico have not been as visible or steadfast as those occurring elsewhere in Latin America. While the constitutional amendments of 1992 and 2001 acknowledged the mixed culture of the Mexican state, specifically allowing for rights to indigenous languages and to practice indigenous common law, indigenous common law is still seen as secondary to Mexican laws. For progress to take place, he argued, existing laws must be enforced and mechanisms must be established that allow for a synchronization of national and indigenous interests.

Mariclaire Acosta of the Organization of American States noted that the two papers highlight the main obstacles facing rule of law and human rights in Mexico. She commented that since the election of Vicente Fox there has been very little systematic research about the implications of the transition to democracy for human rights abuses. While there is a growing constituency that cares about human rights, powerful interests must be dislodged before we are able to see visible progress. Joy Olson of the Washington Office on Latin America added that while shaming diplomacy and argumentation are important tools for improving human rights conditions, an equally important domestic component must be present. Human rights need to be resolved at the federal, state, local and municipal levels.

Crime, Violence, and Security in the Caribbean

Concerns about rampant crime and violence have long dominated the security agenda of Caribbean countries. A 2007 report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the World Bank claims that the Caribbean has the highest murder rate than any region in the world and an assault rate well above the global average. Gaps between planned solutions and crime fighting activities, as well as differences between collective expectations about what is required to deal with crime, are the source of important challenges to security in the region. To discuss these challenges, the Latin American Program convened an international panel of officials, analysts, and representatives of civil society, to examine the current state of crime fighting efforts in the Caribbean, and how can these efforts be improved.

In a keynote address, Ambassador Albert Ramdin, assistant secretary general of the Organization of American States, described the complicated security scenario of the Caribbean, its consequences for the socioeconomic health of the region, and its importance for the rest of the Western hemisphere. Citing statistical evidence that a one-third reduction in the region’s homicide rate would double the Caribbean’s per-capita economic growth, he described the complicated task of dealing with drug trafficking, small arms trade, and counter-terrorism with the limited financial and human resources of the small states of the region. Ramdin emphasized the importance of European and U.S. cooperation in promoting alternative development policies and other measures to curtail drug trafficking and the illicit arms trade, as well as ensuring that advanced industrial country policies regarding the deportation of criminals do not pose additional burdens on an already complicated scenario for Caribbean authorities.

Conflicts between regional expectations and national priorities have been an obstacle in collective Caribbean Community (CARICOM) crime fighting efforts, according to Francis Forbes, CEO of IMPACS, CARICOM’s security agency. While regional security has been given a “fourth pillar” status among the organization’s institutional goals, Forbes explained how resource capability challenges, problems in intelligence sharing and standardizing of criminal records, the lack of political support from authorities, and inward-oriented rather than region-oriented mentalities, among other difficulties, have hampered collective efforts to fight crime in the Caribbean.
In contrast to the English-speaking Caribbean, Lilian Bobea, FLACSO-Dominican Republic, reflected on the experience of the Dominican Republic and the Democratic Security Plan launched by President Leonel Fernández. Coercive crime fighting tactics do not help advance towards long term goals like establishing the rule of law. The Democratic Security Plan capitalized on quantitative and qualitative information regarding public perceptions of crime in the Dominican Republic to build a plan that boosted communal participation and unity in the fight against crime. Results seem to confirm that this approach worked: in the Santo Domingo pilot neighborhood where the plan was first implemented, violent deaths dropped 63 percent.

John Rapley of the Caribbean Policy Research Institute explained how state failure in the developing world, combined with the transnationalization of criminal activity and networks, has led to new forms of governance in gang-run localities that create a contest between the official state and emerging sub-state actors with autonomous resource bases. This “new medievalism” thrives in places such as Jamaica, where the state has been unable to provide the services required by its citizens, and the resulting vacuums are filled by criminals involved in illicit activities. Criminal networks thus become politically legitimate structures of governance for a population that feels excluded from the global economy. Rapley concluded that a strategy for dealing with crime must involve the political structures which provide the space for such actors. Conversely, in her analysis of guns and arms trading from a civil society perspective, Folade Mutota of the Women’s Institute for Alternative Development explored how male socialization in Trinidad has led to a militarized identity among young men that links the use of arms to a validation of masculinity, especially when these men face widespread unemployment and illiteracy. The answer to violence, according to Mutota, lies in the search for alternative social identities wherein masculine conceptions are de-linked from the use of firearms.

Reflecting on U.S. policy towards the Caribbean, Johanna Mendelson-Forman, Center for Strategic and International Studies, emphasized the importance for the United States of creating a partnership with Caribbean countries, while highlighting the role the region plays as the “third border” of the United States, similar to Canada and Mexico. Previous policies towards the Caribbean, such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Third Border Initiative, must be expanded to handle the essentially “borderless” phenomena confronting the region: crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, health crises, climate change, and immigration. Solutions to these problems, according to Mendelson-Forman, require U.S. leadership together with multilateral collaboration, as well as strengthening local institutions and reforming and reinforcing the security sectors of Caribbean states.

Brazil Institute Breakfast Discussion Series

In an effort to provide Brazilian leaders with greater exposure to the Washington policy community and advance understanding of Brazilian issues in the United States, the Brazil Institute continued its breakfast discussion series with two high-level Brazilian officials, Jaques Wagner, governor of Bahia, and Arlindo Chinaglia, speaker of Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies. Governor Wagner, a former union leader, congressman, cabinet member, and a co-founder of the Workers Party (PT), is one Brazil’s most respected and influential governors, whose election in October 2006 was seen as the end of an era in a state historically dominated by an entrenched political oligarchy. Speaker Chinaglia, a professional medical doctor, is also a founding member of the PT and is currently serving his fourth-term as a congressman for the state of São Paulo.

On September 11, 2007, Governor Wagner assessed the challenge facing the Lula government to transform the president’s immense popularity into effective measures to advance a stalled policy agenda during the final three years of the Lula presidency. Despite the frequency of political scandals that have gripped the country, the ability of Brazil’s “Teflon” president to remain popular as well as the resurgence of the PT rest on the success of their
social agenda. Governor Wagner cautioned against viewing the ‘new left’ governments throughout Latin America through a unitary lens. Rather, the region’s leaders were elected through legitimate democratic processes, and the underlying dynamics that influenced the electoral outcomes must be understood. Not all countries are repudiating the market reforms of the 1990s and adopting more populist economic policies, he said.

Wagner noted that Bahia is not only an important electoral base for the PT, but also a regional economic force, accounting for roughly 35 percent of the Northeast’s GDP and nearly 60 percent of the region’s exports. Wagner stressed the important role the state must play in the country’s economic development, citing Bahia’s Desenvolve program (Industrial Development and Economic Integration Program) as an example of one such government initiative. The program targets agro-industry and energy firms, as well as metallurgical, chemical and beverage companies, and seeks to balance economic and social development with environmental preservation. It aims to attract new industries and expand existing enterprises by offering business investors financial incentives, tax reductions and loan subsidies. Although the government can do more to advance economic opportunities for its citizens by promoting business development, Wagner emphasized that entrepreneurs also “bear a responsibility” to channel more revenue back into social programs. He said business leaders are gradually coming to the understanding that economic development is hindered by inequality; the country’s growth depends on improving social conditions—and the private sector, not only government, must play a role.

The Brazil Institute hosted Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Arlindo Chinaglia on January 24, 2008. His visit was aimed at improving relations with the United States and included a meeting with his American counterpart, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. The Wilson Center discussion focused on Brazil’s future potential as a significant oil exporter, the dynamics of Brazil’s bureaucratic system, and pending and upcoming legislative initiatives.

Speaker Chinaglia dismissed concerns that Brazil’s recent discovery of the Tupi oil field—located in the offshore Santos Basin—will “poison” the country’s maturing democracy and provoke political instability. Unlike Venezuela and other OPEC countries, where oil revenue is used to achieve political ends, Chinaglia asserted that because Petrobras operates independently, the oil company is better equipped to manage the political pressures associated with windfall profits. Addressing the challenges of Brazil’s political system, Chinaglia raised concerns about the executive branch’s exercise of authority. The Lula administration, he asserted, has too often used “provisional measures” to advance legislation.

Notwithstanding the frequency of political scandals in Brazil, Chinaglia asserted that the congressional agenda has not been disrupted. In fact, the Chamber of Deputies has held more special sessions than regular ones; it has, along with the Senate, approved funding bills for primary education; and amended the Constitution to require municipal, state and federal governments to contribute to the universal healthcare system.

In contrast to the foreign policy oversight the U.S. Constitution affords the Congress, the Brazilian Congress is given little control over the country’s foreign relations. Nonetheless, Chinaglia maintained, his Congress will hold a plenary session to vote on Venezuela’s accession to Mercosur—a move he favors because it will increase Brazilian access to Venezuela’s oil, natural gas, and water supplies.
How NAFTA, Migration, and Government Policy Affect Mexico’s Poor

On January 30, 2008, the Mexico Institute, the George Washington University, and the Inter-American Dialogue hosted a discussion of the effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on reducing poverty and economic inequality in Mexico.

Gerardo Esquivel, professor of economics at El Colegio de México, presented data showing that levels of inequality and poverty have decreased in

Fujimori: Neo-liberalism, Neo-sultanism, and Corruption

On November 16, 2007, the Latin American Program hosted a seminar featuring the work of Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar Javier Diez Canseco, a former Peruvian member of Congress and chair of a congressional commission investigating corruption during the administration of former President Alberto Fujimori. During his stay at the Wilson Center, Diez Canseco conducted research on the ways that neo-liberal economic reforms in Peru in the 1990s gave rise to systematic corruption that gutted Peruvian democracy.

According to Diez Canseco, economic reforms in Peru transferred enormous volumes of capital from the state to private hands through programs of privatization. This economic process, which was common all over the world, gave rise to widespread corruption that lasted for the entire decade. Unlike in the past, the Fujimori government was not infiltrated by a mafia; rather, corruption took possession of the state itself, linking the president and “de-facto powers,” including military, political and business elites, in a vast web of conspiracy.

Fujimori was arrested in Chile during an attempt to return to Peru several years after his government collapsed in 2000. In September 2007, the Chilean Supreme Court accepted the Peruvian government’s request to extradite Fujimori to face criminal charges, including two counts of human rights abuse and five counts of corruption. Diez Canseco stressed the importance of adjudicating such crimes as a tangible expression of change in Latin American and Peruvian politics with respect to the impunity of those in power. Diez Canseco indicated that the trial of Fujimori will create complex judicial and political conditions as the nation grapples with and seeks to overcome Fujimori’s legacy. Diez Canseco also challenged the widely-held view of Fujimori as an outsider to Peru’s political system, highlighting his relationships with the military and intelligence communities, technocrats, and members of the business community.

Peruvian Ambassador to the United States Felipe Ortiz de Zevallos agreed that Peru was in a state of “national collapse” when Fujimori was elected in 1990 but suggested that the situation was more complex than Diez Canseco had indicated. Indeed, one-third of Peruvians supported and continued to support the policies and actions taken by Fujimori. De Zevallos further claimed that the corruption charges against Fujimori were significantly inflated, so much so that in 2000, at the end of Fujimori’s presidency, Transparency International rated Peru as the fourth least-corrupt country in Latin America.

Anthropologist Deborah Poole, director of Latin American Studies at The Johns Hopkins University, explained how corruption can affect society at all levels, producing certain types of authoritarian power and leading to the dismantling and erosion of communities. She noted that in such circumstances the predominance of corruption actually replaces more commonly accepted understandings and practices of governance. Poole concluded that Fujimori’s trial itself is a test of democracy in Peru and in the region as a whole, and that the past must be confronted openly and honestly.

A Working Paper by Javier Diez Canseco will be published by the Latin American Program in the late Spring of 2008.
Mexico steadily after the initial jump that followed the financial crisis of 1994–95. However, looking at the data within the context of the last 50 years, it is impossible to discern whether the decrease following the implementation of NAFTA was a direct result of the trade agreement. Nevertheless, both he and Luis Felipe López Calva, the United Nations Development Program’s chief economist for Latin America, asserted that Mexico’s poverty and inequality index would be worse without trade liberalization.

Panelists agreed that a concrete effect of NAFTA has been the widening gap between Mexico’s industrialized north and the largely rural south. Empirical evidence presented by Esquivel showed that NAFTA heightened preexisting disparities. He noted that the industrialized north—given its proximity to the United States—has been able to capitalize on the benefits of the trade agreement, while the south was left ill prepared to compete due to the widespread lack of adequate infrastructure. In this sense, NAFTA has increased the north-south economic divide within Mexico.

John Scott, an economics professor at Mexico’s Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), emphasized this fact by acknowledging that while twelve percent of the population in the north lives below the poverty line, 47 percent lives below the poverty line in the south. Scott also presented evidence that suggests that NAFTA has had differing effects on income inequality, widening the divide in the south and diminishing income inequality in the north. Scott noted that social policy in Mexico, including health care and education, has become less regressive, but still overwhelmingly favors more affluent and middle class citizens over the poorest. Luis Felipe López Calva closed by stating that inequality must be addressed if Mexico is committed to limiting northward migration.

Book Launch: Requiem or Revival? The Promise of North American Integration

On November 5, 2007, the Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute and the Canada Institute hosted a panel discussion on Requiem or Revival? The Promise of North American Integration, co-edited by Carol Wise of the University of Southern California and a former Wilson Center public policy scholar, and Isabel Studer of the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The compilation examines how the early promise of the agreement has faded, while progress towards further integration on other pressing issues, including energy and migration, remain unresolved.

The signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992 heralded what many hoped would be a new era of North American economic integration and cooperation. Noting the uneven pattern of economic convergence between Canada, the United States, and Mexico, Sidney Weintraub of the Center for Strategic and International Studies argued that Mexico’s economic development since implementing NAFTA is a mixed story. Although Mexico’s foreign direct investment and exports to Canada and the United States have increased substantially since the implementation of NAFTA, Weintraub pointed out that these achievements were offset by the failure of former Mexican President Vicente Fox to carry out critical structural reforms in such areas as taxes, education, labor, and energy. Mexico, he said, had squandered possibilities.

Weintraub emphasized that Mexico must overcome the looming challenges facing its energy sector. Failure to do so could result in oil scarcity in as little as ten years if no further oil reserves are found and developed. While the panelists agreed that energy, and petroleum in particular, remains a pressing issue for Mexico, there was also discussion of other areas in the energy sector in which the three countries could work together on a cooperative basis. Gary Hufbauer of the Peterson Institute for International Economics called attention to a number of such promising areas, listing nuclear power, liquefied natural gas, bio-
fuels, and the reduction of carbon emissions, as prominent examples.

Carol Wise suggested that Mexico's uneven growth since the implementation of NAFTA could also be explained by the country's heavy reliance on its geographical proximity to the United States as a competitive advantage. Wise also noted that the development of NAFTA remains clouded by the issue of migration and the lack of a coherent U.S. immigration policy. Comparing Canadian and U.S. immigration policies, she pointed out that while Canadian policy has set incentives to capture scarce human capital, U.S. policy remains outdated and unresponsive to ongoing demographic changes, and has opted instead to simply “close the border.”

The panelists discussed what lies ahead for NAFTA. Despite possible economic benefits for the three NAFTA countries, the panel felt that expansion to a wider free-trade area remains an unlikely premise, through either ongoing talks for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), or harmonization of existing free trade agreements in the Americas, because of continuing disagreements between Brazil and the United States. The panel discussion highlighted the growing number of pressing issues facing NAFTA that need to be addressed in order for the agreement to remain relevant.

**Indigenous Participation and Social Fragmentation in Bolivia**

On September 12, 2007, the Latin American Program hosted a group of Bolivian scholars to discuss the root causes of social fragmentation in the country and to analyze the consequences of increased participation of the country’s indigenous majority in politics. Bolivian Ambassador to the United States Gustavo Guzmán characterized the transformation taking place in Bolivia as a broad and intense struggle for the redistribution of power, in which the central protagonist is the indigenous campesino movement. The struggle to forge a new democratic pact at the institutional level is being played out in the democratically-elected Constituent Assembly.

---

**Book Launch: Walking the Forest with Chico Mendes by Gomercindo Rodrigues**

*Gomercindo Rodrigues*, a lawyer and activist, began his work as a labor organizer in the state of Acre in the 1980s with the slain rubber tapper and pioneer of the Brazilian environmental movement, Chico Mendes. In his book, *Walking the Forest with Chico Mendes*, Rodrigues provides a rare and personal account of the events that defined Mendes’ life as he struggled to promote environmental protection and social justice in the Amazon. This important work comes at a time when growing concern about the impacts of global climate change has sharpened debate about the future of the Amazon rainforest.

The Brazilian government, which has long struggled to balance environmental protection with development, is under increasing pressure, both domestic and international, to proactively manage and curb deforestation in the Amazon. As expanding agricultural exports and growing energy needs further complicate the country’s environmental policy, there is compelling evidence and increasing recognition that immediate action is necessary. To highlight this pressing debate and consider Brazil’s policy choices, the Brazil Institute convened a discussion on September 12, 2007, featuring Rodrigues and biologist *Thomas E. Lovejoy*, president of The Heinz Center, member of the Brazil Institute’s Advisory Council, and a pioneering scholar on Amazon biodiversity.
Maria Eugenia Choque, Center for Aymara Studies in La Paz, situated the recent upheaval in Bolivia as part of a wider process of reaffirming indigenous rights and identity throughout Latin America and the world. While a primary aim of the indigenous movement in Bolivia is to defend the right to land, increasingly indigenous peoples are asserting their identity in urban areas, where they represent up to 35 percent of the population. The indigenous movement is also beginning to address gender issues in Bolivia: despite the mandated quota of 30 percent female participation in local government and strong female activism in social movements, women have remained invisible.

According to Mamerto Pérez, Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (CEDLA) in La Paz, the issue of indigenous identity lies at the heart of the concerns that have overtaken the country. Bolivia is a majority indigenous country, with the 2001 census demonstrating that 62 percent of the population self-identifies as belonging to an indigenous group. This census also demonstrated that a growing number of urban dwellers identify themselves as indigenous. Pérez argued that Bolivia’s crisis arises from the fact that indigenous movements with indigenous leadership are now questioning their access to power, all against a backdrop of systematic racism in the country.

Manuel de la Fuente, Universidad de San Simón in Cochabamba, described two opposing visions for the future of Bolivia—departmental autonomy, demanded by the Santa Cruz region, and indigenous autonomy supported by the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) coalition led by President Evo Morales. The Constituent Assembly is negotiating the new mandates of the national and regional governments within the context of this autonomy debate. While the central government is currently directing the redistribution of land and the management of natural resources, the Assembly has also considered proposals to recognize the autonomy of Bolivia’s 36 indigenous groups through indigenous districts, and establish a unitary, plurinational, communitarian state.

Javier Hurtado Mercado, previously of the Organic Food Exporters Association in La Paz and recently appointed Minister of Production and Small Businesses, argued that the single most important crisis affecting Bolivia is environmental degradation. Bolivia has a relative advantage in fostering sustainable economic development while protecting the country’s immense ecological diversity, preserved by the indigenous population for centuries. However, balancing development and environmental preservation will also require new private sector strategies. Hurtado called on all potential allies, including North America and the European Union, to recognize that Bolivia is open to collaboratively advancing democratic and environmentally sustainable solutions in developing its markets.

Ximena Soruco Sologuren of Fundación Tierra in La Paz emphasized that the traditional Santa Cruz elites have contributed to social fragmentation in Bolivia by pursuing their own particular interests at the expense of those with an historic and legitimate claim to land ownership. Soruco pointed to the rubber boom of 1880–1915, the engagement of the hacienda elite in the international market, and the U.S.-supported establishment of an agro-industrial bourgeoisie as key points along the path to the elites’ economic colonization of the eastern lowlands. In addition, these elites actively encouraged European immigration to offset the more numerous indigenous masses. In light of this history, Bolivia’s indigenous groups face great challenges as they find their political voice and seek to construct a unified vision of the country’s future.

U.S.–Mexico Education Exchange: Challenges for Cooperation

Although Mexico and the United States are intrinsically linked in many ways, particularly economically, this interdependent relationship is
not reflected as strongly in educational exchange. While the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had a notable impact on bilateral education exchange, increasing the number of Mexican students in U.S. universities, Mexican enrollment has remained almost flat since 2003–04. On November 15, 2007, the Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute and the Mexican–U.S. Commission for Educational and Cultural Exchange (Comexus) brought together a binational group of academics, specialists, government officials and diplomats to analyze this issue. Participants agreed that Mexico is failing to use its geographic proximity and intense bilateral relationship with the United States as an advantage for increasing the number of its students in American universities.

Mexico Institute director Andrew Selee emphasized the importance of educational exchange as a means for developing a common language to address the many pressing issues the United States and Mexico share. Educational exchange, he said, is a critical link that is not often taken into consideration in policy making. Comexus executive director Arturo Borja noted that individuals with international experience become important instruments for cementing and furthering the bilateral relationship by building understanding between the two countries. The Department of State’s principal deputy assistant secretary for Western hemisphere affairs, Ambassador Craig Kelly, added that educational exchanges act as the day to day de facto integration that is occurring between the two countries. Mexican Ambassador Arturo Sarukhan emphasized that over the past decade, the increased interest in academic circles and within the educational establishment on both sides of the border has led to the emergence of new think tanks and the restructuring of school syllabi, which has allowed new generations of Mexicans and Americans to grow up with a better understanding of their neighbor.

In the first panel, “Public Policies to Support Educational Cooperation and Cultural Exchange,” participants included general director for cultural affairs of Mexico’s Secretary of Foreign Relations, Alberto Fierro; Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) director for international studies, Rafael Fernández de Castro; American University’s dean of the School of International Service, Louis Goodman; Nattie Golubov of la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México’s Research Center on North America, and senior advisor to the deputy secretary of state, Robert Earle.

Louis Goodman reported that currently only five Mexican elite institutions have written agreements on student exchange with their U.S. counterparts: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), el Colegio de México (Colmex), ITAM, the Tecnológico de Monterrey, and the Universidad de las Américas-Puebla (UDLAP). He pointed out that although his school sends between 400 and 500 students abroad every year, Mexico is not a top choice because it is viewed as being too close to home and not exotic enough. Nattie Golubov attributed the fact that less than one percent of Mexican undergraduate and postgraduate students study abroad to the severe lack of information provided to students about programs offering funding and other resources. This lack of knowledge prevents them from taking full advantage of available exchange programs and scholarships. Rafael Fernández de Castro stressed the role institutions play in meeting the challenges of cooperation and said that one of the problems with NAFTA was its inability to create more bilateral institutions. He proposed that Mexico and the United States seek to negotiate a bilateral initiative to significantly increase the number of Mexicans in U.S. graduate programs and the number of Americans in Mexican higher education institutions.

The second panel, “Educational Exchange: What More Can We Do?” included participation from Cynthia Wolloch, chief of the Fulbright Program for the Western Hemisphere; University of Arizona’s
executive director for North American Higher Education Collaboration, Francisco Marmolejo; Juan Carlos Silas of the University of Monterrey; and University of Texas-El Paso’s Center for Inter-American and Border Studies Executive Director, Ricardo Blázquez.

Francisco Marmolejo noted that as the world becomes more global, we are witnessing increasingly aggressive recruitment processes from foreign institutions in Latin America. However, Juan Carlos Silas noted, some American students do not feel welcome in Mexico and perceive disrespect, and others do not feel that attending Mexican institutions is important for their job prospects. Ricardo Blázquez described the University of Texas-El Paso’s model of binational education in which students from Mexican border communities study “abroad” at UTEP but the university also works closely to develop the capacity of other educational institutions on the Mexican side of the border, often in partnership with the private sector. Panelists from both panels noted that other obstacles that Mexican students from public universities face when deciding to study in the United States include the lack of adequate financial resources, a lack of English skills, and post 9/11 immigration policies that make it more difficult to get student visas. Participants expressed further concern about the negative impact that the immigration debate, with its anti-Mexican undertones, is having in almost all aspects of U.S.–Mexican relations.

Addressing Security Challenges in Colombia

On January 24, 2008, the Latin American Program, the Inter-American Dialogue, and the Hunt Alternatives Fund Initiative for Inclusive Security hosted a discussion on the current security environment in Colombia, highlighting the role of women in the formation and implementation of security and peace policies in Colombia.

Nancy Patricia Gutiérrez, president of the Colombian Senate, noted that the history of violence and insecurity that has defined Colombia during the last forty years can only be confronted with strict security policies and greater participation of women. Former Colombian defense minister and current senator Marta Lucía Ramírez observed that if the state had been stronger and more efficient in providing not only security but also education, health services, and access to justice, the situation in Colombia would be different than it is today. It was necessary to continue and deepen the advances in public security, as well as consolidate an “integral state” throughout the country’s territory. Gutiérrez and Ramírez agreed that fighting inequality meant providing greater protections and access to opportunity for women, including elevating the role of women in policy debates on security matters.

Colombia’s deputy minister of the interior, María Isabel Nieto, highlighted the need for a broad vision of security linked not just to its military and police dimensions but also to democratic governance and access to public services for all Colombians. To achieve this, she argued, the government and civil society must support and guarantee public order at the regional and local levels. Nieto emphasized the need to transform women who had been victims of violence into important actors in the design of security policies.

Universidad de los Andes professor and member of the Historical Memory Commission María Emma Wills observed that levels of polarization in Colombian society restrict the spaces and possibilities for joint action. Nonetheless, members of the Commission from different political parties had been able to agree on a common set of recommendations and carry out their work. Women are no more peaceful and conciliatory than men, she argued, but a concern for equal rights meant that their role in security initiatives and peacemaking needed to increase. Rape, for example, had been systematic in some regions of the country, but paramilitary leaders offering their confessions to the Historical Memory Commission had not mentioned what she called a crime against humanity.

All four Colombian participants were highly critical of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s role in brokering the release of civilian hostages held by the FARC. In their view, Chávez’s lack of neutrality and disrespect for Colombian governmental institutions, as well as his use of the word “hostages” to describe FARC prisoners held by the Colombian government, disqualified him as an honest broker in a humanitarian accord. The FARC’s disregard for international humanitarian law and its involvement in drug trafficking made a mockery of Chávez’s intimation that they deserved belligerent status.
Book Launch: Mexico: A Traveler’s Literary Companion

On September 17, 2007 the Mexico Institute welcomed author and literary translator C.M. Mayo to discuss her widely-lauded anthology, Mexico: A Traveler’s Literary Companion, a collection of fiction and literary prose. C.M. Mayo noted that it is surprising that there are so few translations of Mexican literary work, especially considering the proximity of the two countries and the many cultural linkages that exist between them. It was precisely the lack of access to Mexican literary work in the English speaking market that motivated Mayo to translate and publish Mexican literature.

Mayo introduced the publication by highlighting that it is not a guidebook, but rather it is a compilation of twenty-four writers and seventeen translators that allow the reader to travel throughout Mexico’s diverse literary and geographic landscape. In creating Mexico: A Traveler’s Literary Companion, Mayo looked beyond the literary circles of Mexico City in order to obtain a sampling of Mexican writing that was representative of Mexico’s diverse society. She wanted to reflect the richness and the complexity of the Mexican literary scene by strategically incorporating both well-known and lesser known authors as well as authors that portrayed Mexican characters that lie outside the popular image of Mexican culture. Juan Villoro’s depiction of the niños bien in “One-Way Street,” for example, highlighted the punk rock lifestyle of upper middle class teenagers in Mexico City’s exclusive Pedregal neighborhood. According to Mayo, the incorporation of such stories drew some controversy because the storyline and the characters defied some deeply imbedded stereotypes of what Mexico is. She went on to state that many foreign readers do not realize that Mexico is actually very ethnically diverse. Her work strives to expose an international audience to the richness of Mexican fiction and literary prose.

Staff Notes

Interns

The Latin American Program has been fortunate to have had the assistance of several very capable interns. We thank the following interns for their energy, hard work, and willingness to share their talents and skills with us:

**FALL 2007**
- Sheree Adams, Georgetown University
- Gabriela Baca, Georgetown University
- Marisha Peña, George Washington University
- Priscilla Yeon, George Washington University

**SPRING 2008**
- Gabriela Baca, Georgetown University
- Angela Granum, Georgetown University
- Jonathan Karver, George Washington University
- Priscilla Yeon, George Washington University
Recent Publications

Most publications are available for download on the Latin American Program website at www.wilsoncenter.org/lap

Annual Reports
Annual Report, Mexico Institute, December 2007.

Conference Reports

The Brookings Institution and Brazil Institute, New Directions in Brazilian Foreign Relations / Novos Rumos nas Relações Exteriores Brasileiras, January 2008.

Cynthia Arnson and Philippa Strum, eds. with Adam Stubits, Legal Standards and the Interrogation of Prisoners in the War on Terror, December 2007.


Special Reports


Alan M. Wright and Priscilla Yeon, eds., “Infrastructure Integration and Environmental Preservation in the Amazon,” Brazil Institute, Environmental Change and Security Program (ECSP), and the Latin American Program, April 2008.


Forthcoming Publications


The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

The Center is the living memorial of the United States of America to the nation’s twenty-eighth president, Woodrow Wilson. Congress established the Woodrow Wilson Center in 1968 as an international institute for advanced study, “symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relationship between the world of learning and the world of public affairs.” The Center opened in 1970 under its own board of trustees.

In all its activities the Woodrow Wilson Center is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization, supported financially by annual appropriations from Congress, and by the contributions of foundations, corporations, and individuals. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Center publications and programs are those of the authors and speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center staff, fellows, trustees, advisory groups, or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to the Center.

Lee H. Hamilton, President and Director

Joseph B. Gildenhorn, Chair
David A. Metzner, Vice Chair.

Board of Trustees
Public Members: James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress; John W. Carlin, Archivist of the United States; Bruce Cole, Chair, National Endowment for the Humanities; Margaret Spellings, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education; Condoleezza Rice, Secretary, U.S. Department of State; G. Wayne Clough, Secretary, Smithsonian Institution; Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Private Citizen Members: Robin Cook, Donald E. Garcia, Bruce S. Gelb, Sander R. Gerber, Charles L. Glazer, Susan Hutchison, Ignacio E. Sanchez.

Wilson Council
Sam Donaldson, President

**The Latin American Program**

The Latin American Program serves as a bridge between the United States and Latin America, encouraging a free flow of information and dialogue between the two regions. The Program also provides a nonpartisan forum for discussing Latin American and Caribbean issues in Washington, D.C., and for bringing these issues to the attention of opinion leaders and policy makers throughout the Western hemisphere. The Program sponsors major initiatives on Democratic Governance, the Politics of Trade, Comparative Peace Processes, Creating Community in the Americas, U.S.-Brazilian relations and U.S.-Mexican relations.

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington DC 20004-3027

Tel: (202) 691-4030 lap@wilsoncenter.org
Fax: (202) 691-4076 http://www.wilsoncenter.org/lat

**Latin American Program Staff**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cynthia J. Arnson</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Selee</td>
<td>Director, Mexico Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo Sotero</td>
<td>Director, Brazil Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kate Brick</td>
<td>Program Associate, Mexico Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Raúl Perales</td>
<td>Senior Program Associate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diana Rodriguez</td>
<td>Program Assistant, Mexico Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Stubits</td>
<td>Program Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jessica Várat</td>
<td>Program Associate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan Wright</td>
<td>Program Assistant, Brazil Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luis Bitencourt</td>
<td>Senior Scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph S. Tulchin</td>
<td>Senior Scholar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>