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
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Nuclear Proliferation International History Project

"Is the Possibility of a Third World War Real?"

Researching Nuclear Ukraine in the KGB Archive

By Nate Jones
NPIHP Working Paper #13
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Christian F. Ostermann and Leopoldo Nuti, Series Editors

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"Is the Possibility of a Third World War Real?"

Researching Nuclear Ukraine in the KGB Archive

Nate Jones

The archive of the Ukrainian KGB is open and full of former Soviet nuclear secrets. In this article, Nate Jones presents new evidence drawn from KGB documents and other eastern and western sources to examine Ukrainian and Soviet nuclear history. These new Soviet intelligence documents show the inefficiency of the early Soviet ICBM program; details of the domestic and international intelligence operations of the KGB; descriptions of Soviet decision-making and American manipulation of the KAL 007 civilian aircraft shoot down; documentation of Yuri Andropov's secret announcement of the creation of Operation RYaN, a nuclear intelligence gathering operation based on the theory of preemption; nuclear warning signs known by the KGB preceding the Chernobyl disaster; and provide information for the reevaluation of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and denuclearization of Ukraine in light of Russia's 2014 invasion.

The only declassified data on US nuclear targeting during the Cold War shows that in 1956 the United States had identified 101 potential sites throughout the territory of Ukraine to strike during a nuclear war with the Soviet Union.¹ Despite the irrationality of nuclear war, such a focus upon Ukraine by American's nuclear planners was, in a narrow sense, rational.

Kharkiv's Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology was the preeminent facility for Soviet nuclear research before the Second World War. In 1932, the Institute was the first to reproduce the results of the British experiment which demonstrated the phenomenon of splitting a lithium nucleus by bombarding it with fast protons. Ukrainian physicists played key roles in early Soviet uranium enrichment. Igor Kurchatov, the father of the Soviet atomic project, specifically requested and relied upon the expertise of at least one Ukrainian physicist.²

¹ William Burr, "[U.S. Cold War Nuclear Target Lists Declassified for First Time](#)," *National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book* 538 (December 22, 2015), and, Alex Wellerstein, "[Mapping the US nuclear war plan for 1956](#)," *Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog*, May 9, 2016.

² Oleksandr Cheban, "[Ukraine and Soviet Nuclear History](#)," Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, August 12, 2015. The British experiment was conducted by John Cockcroft and Ernest Walton on April 14, 1932.

In fact, there is evidence that the uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) used to enrich the fissile material for the first Soviet atomic bomb may have been produced by the Prydniprovsky Chemical Plant in Dniprodzerzhynsk, Ukraine.³ Although Kharkiv's nuclear physics program was decimated by Stalin's purges and the Second World War, Ukraine continued to be key to the Soviet nuclear weapons program throughout the Cold War.⁴ Ukrainian mines produced uranium and Ukrainian plants produced the heavy water used to manufacture Soviet nuclear warheads.⁵

Dnipropetrovsk's 1000-acre Yuzhnyi Machine-Building Plant (YUZHMAH) produced at least fourteen of the most fearsome ballistic missiles in the Soviet arsenal ranging from the German V2 clone SS-1 Scunner to the SS-18 Satan and the SS-26 Iskander.⁶ At the Cold War's end, Ukraine stationed 130 six-warheaded SS-19 ICBMs, 46 10-warheaded SS-24s, and 44 nuclear-cable Bear and Blackjack bombers. By 1991, there were an estimated 1,240 strategic nuclear warheads and 1,081 nuclear cruise missiles on Ukrainian soil which would be used to destroy the West in the event of a nuclear war.⁷

The danger of nuclear war was best exemplified in one key question quoted in a newly unearthed 1982 KGB report: "Is the possibility of a third world war real? Will the nuclear conflict between the US and the USSR be prevented? Is their collision inevitable?"⁸

This paper will use newly available documents from the Ukrainian KGB archive, officially known as the State Archives Department of the Security Service of Ukraine (GDA SBU), as well

³ "[Uranium Mining and Processing Industry](#)," Uaton.org, cited in Polina Sinovets and Mariana Budjeryn, "[Interpreting the Bomb: Ownership and Deterrence in Ukraine's Nuclear Discourse](#)," *Nuclear Proliferation International History Project Working Paper 12* (December 2017): 20.

⁴ See "Nuclear Prehistory" in David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939-1956* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) for a discussion of the early years of the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology. Additionally, [eleven volumes of published primary source documents](#) on the Soviet atomic project from 1938 to 1954 and a large selection of Russian language publications on Soviet nuclear history are made available by the Russian state energy company ROSATOM at the website [biblioatom.ru](#).

⁵ Robert S. Norris, "The Soviet Nuclear Archipelago," *Arms Control Today*, January/February 1992, 28-29.

⁶ A declassified [1966 Central Intelligence Agency Photographic Interpretation Report](#) shows that the United States had ample imagery and "collateral information" about the production capabilities of YUZHMAH.

⁷ Nuclear Threat Initiative [overview](#). For an alternative breakdown see William H. Kincade, "Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine: Hollow Threat, Wasting Asset," *Arms Control Today* (July/August 1993), 13-18.

⁸ The document was entitled, "Questions received by] employees of the KGB of the Ukrainian Republic during a lecture on raising the political vigilance of Soviet people," State Archives Department of the Security Service of Ukraine (hereafter GDA SBU), fond (f.) 16, opis (o.) 7, delo (d.), 2, tom (t) 5, p. 207.

as recent scholarship on Ukrainian nuclear history to show that, while nuclear war was not “inevitable,” the risk faced by nuclear Ukraine was high—and tragic. This paper will:

- introduce new evidence on the inefficiency of the early Soviet ICBM program;
- provide operational details of the domestic and international actions of the KGB;
- describe Soviet decision-making and American manipulation of the KAL 007 shoot down;
- document Yuri Andropov’s secret announcement of the creation of Operation RYaN, a nuclear intelligence gathering operation based on the theory of preemption;
- show the warning signs known by the KGB preceding the Chernobyl disaster;
- and will reevaluate the dissolution of the Soviet Union and denuclearization of Ukraine in light of Russia’s 2014 invasion.

Today, the Soviet nuclear archipelago has largely been removed from Ukraine.

Fortunately for historians, many of its remaining vestiges are now more accessible than perhaps anywhere else in the world. As a Nuclear Proliferation International History Research Fellow at the Odessa Center for Nonproliferation, I was able to visit the ICBM base at Pervomaisk, Ukraine where tourists can peer into its bunkers and gaze at decommissioned SS-19 and SS-24 missiles which were once ready to be launched with minutes notice. I was even able to take the rickety Soviet elevator 12 stories underground, past the missileers’ barracks—complete with a military issue samovar—into the missile control room. There myself and my “second” simulated a verification of launch procedure, acquired our nuclear keys, glanced nervously at each other, counted down to zero, turned the keys and ignited our SS-24 rocket. Thankfully, the 176 missiles once on Ukrainian territory could no longer be used to destroy the world.

The Ukrainian archives, filled with former Soviet secrets, are also now largely open. The natural place to begin for scholars researching early Soviet nuclear development is the Kharkiv State Archive which contains records from the Ukrainian Institute for Physics and Technology.⁹

⁹ Iryna Maksymenko and Oleksandr Cheban of The Odessa Center for Nonproliferation at Odessa State University have conducted groundbreaking research there.

The bulk of files relating to Ukraine's nuclear history, however, are found in Kiev. The Central Executive Archive of Ukraine (literally translated as "Central State Archive of the Supreme Organs and Administrations of Ukraine"), referred to by researchers as "TsDAVO," houses the majority of Ukraine's archival records. Though it is no doubt wise to plan ahead, researchers can access the archive without an appointment simply by showing a passport. Additionally, a large quantity of TsDAVO's finding aids are available online and are easily searchable (in Ukrainian).¹⁰ Included in the extremely large collections are the files of the Socialist Republic of Ukraine's Council of Ministers and corpuses from former presidents of Ukraine, Kuchma and Kravchuk.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs also provide researchers access to their historic (generally pre-1991) documents. These institutions are bureaucratically trickier to get into and access must be arranged in advance, but researchers, including Mariana Budjeryn and Polina Sinovets, have shown that it is certainly possible and that the documentary fruits are worth pursuing.¹¹

But the crown jewel of the Ukrainian Archives, at least to this researcher, is the Archive of the Security Services of Ukraine, or simply the KGB Archive. An official invitation must be obtained in order to achieve access to the KGB Archive, but this can be obtained fairly easily by contacting the email address listed on the archive's website.¹² Under the leadership of the archive's director, Andriy Kohut, the Ukrainian security service demonstrates a commitment to openness that the archives of other formerly communist countries would be wise to follow. Historical openness ensures that the dangers of both nuclear weapons development and totalitarianism can be properly studied and documented.¹³

Once inside, researchers have the incredible opportunity to gain an inside view of how the Soviet organs of state operated, both domestically and internationally. Internal security records from Ukraine's incorporation into the Soviet Union until its collapse are preserved. One

¹⁰ See <http://tsdavo.gov.ua/4/stocks/>. Also available online is a substantial and growing [Electronic Archive](#) of Ukrainian Liberation Movement, including a very large collection on the Chernobyl disaster.

¹¹ Sinovets and Budjeryn, "[Interpreting the Bomb](#)."

¹² <https://ssu.gov.ua/ua/pages/98>.

¹³ The KGB archive is beginning a digitization effort with some its files. For the purpose of consistency, this paper uses the traditional citation system of Fond, Opis, Delo, Tom.

typical example of a KGB record is a wary and meticulous reporting of the discovery that youths in Kiev were beginning to enjoy a new type of music named “punk rock.”¹⁴ Many of these millions of pages of domestic surveillance files, however, are much more heartbreaking. They include the investigations, arrests, deportations, and executions of millions of Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

Though not as complete as its collection of files on Soviet citizens living in Ukraine, and certainly less comprehensive than the KGB’s central files controlled in Moscow, the Ukrainian KGB Archive nonetheless presents researchers with an unprecedented window into the KGB and the Soviet Union’s international security operations, foreign policy objectives, and nuclear history.¹⁵ As this article will discuss, fonds 9 (Orders of the KGB), 13 (KGB publications), and 16 (Memoranda between the KGB and Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) provide a chronicled record of Moscow’s security decisions encompassing Soviet and Ukrainian nuclear history.¹⁶ In addition to the translations of key documents at the end of this article, all cited documents from the KGB Archive are available to researchers at the National Security Archive.

Despite Khrushchev’s 1960 pronouncement at the United Nations that in the USSR “rockets [were] coming off the assembly line like sausages from an automatic machine”¹⁷ and Kennedy’s dubious electoral claim that the United States was falling behind the Soviet Union in a “Missile Gap,” documents held in the Ukrainian KGB Archive show in detail that the early Soviet missile program was fraught, teetering, and not infrequently producing missiles that would not hit their targets.¹⁸

¹⁴ GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 7, d. 2, t. 5 pp.177-178.

¹⁵ The Lithuanian Special Archives also provide large scale access to Soviet security service activities.

¹⁶ For more on conducting research in Ukraine, see Nate Jones, “[Unearthing Soviet Secrets in Ukraine’s Archives](#),” *Sources and Methods*, November 13, 2017. For more on conducting research in other Eastern European archives see For an excellent article on research in other Eastern archives, be sure to see Simon Miles, “[Researching Through the Back Door: Field Notes from East of the Iron Curtain](#),” *Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review* 47, no. 1 (April 2016): 39.

¹⁷ Nikita Khrushchev, “Reply on Disarmament,” Speech at the UN General Assembly, October 11, 1960, quoted from *Khrushchev in New York* (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1960).

¹⁸ Much additional information on the Soviet rocket program can be found in the Woodrow Wilson Center History and Public Policy Program’s [Digital Archive](#) and V.I Ivkin and G.A. Sukhina, eds., *Zadacha osoboi gosudarstvennoi*

A February 1962 document sent from the Ukrainian KGB to the Ukrainian Central Committee stated that since 1961, at least three rockets produced in Ukraine had failed readiness tests and contained “serious shortcomings in combat readiness.” According to the report, the phases of one of the missiles “did not properly synchronize.” Two others reportedly passed their tests, but the KGB found out through a source that they had not been properly tested and, contrary to instructions, “were not equipped with fuel or warheads.” The KGB concluded that the reported failures attested “to the unpreparedness of these [weapons] for combat use.”¹⁹

Thanks to U2 overflights, Corona satellite imagery, and information provided to the CIA by the Soviet Military Intelligence officer Oleg Penkovsky, the United States knew by mid-1961 that Khrushchev and the Soviets had been bluffing about their missile quantities and capabilities. By mid-1961, the Soviets in all likelihood had no more than 50 ICBM launchers deployed, not the 100 plus previously stated in US intelligence estimates. The United States had 75. There was no “Missile Gap.”²⁰

Documents in the KGB Archive now corroborate that the Soviet Union was aware and sensitive to the fact that the US was able to uncover previously hidden elements of the Soviet nuclear industry. In June 1962, the KGB sent a memorandum to each of its supervisors in Ukraine. It stated that, “the construction of regime facilities, transportation, and unloading of special equipment occurred without observing the appropriate camouflage and camouflage measures [,]” and that cover stories of these facilities and equipment were “not skillfully implemented, and rarely used,” to conceal the activities of the missile program. The secrecy of these facilities and their products was “completely inadequate” and allowed for “favorable conditions to be created for the enemy to acquire information about the regime’s military facilities and other state secrets.”²¹

vazhnosti: iz istorii sozdaniia raketno-iadernogo oruzhiia i Raketnykh voisk strategicheskogo naznachenii (1945-1959) (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2010).

¹⁹ GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 11, d. 2, t. 1, p. 39.

²⁰ For further analysis see the RAND Study, “Deception in Soviet Strategic Missile Claims,” 1957-1962, Unclassified, Digital National Security Archive; Roy E. Licklider, “The Missile Gap Controversy,” *Political Science Quarterly* 85, no. 4 (Dec. 1970): 600-615.

²¹ GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 11, d. 2, t. 1, p. 139.

The KGB Archive gives an expansive view into the agency's domestic and foreign intelligence operations. Summarized here is just a sampling from the extensive quantity of previously secret revelations that I came across in the Archive. The Ukrainian KGB's most expansive intelligence efforts may have been the monitoring of activities of Ukrainian exile groups, including the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. The KGB was quick to report when a US cabinet member, congressperson, or Canadian parliamentarian met or made complimentary comments to the groups chartered in the West. The KGB also closely monitored the journeys and activities of its leaders. The KGB constantly feared that supporters of the World War Two era nationalist Stepan Bandara would sabotage the Soviet system—especially in Eastern Ukraine. My review of the documents, however, leads me to believe that while there may have been sentiment for the previous era of Ukrainian independence, there was little chance of the nationalists actually threatening the Soviet state. The Soviets in Ukraine had thoroughly decimated them—at least within Ukraine—after the Second World War.²²

As known, the KGB also closely monitored “foreigners from capitalist and emerging countries.” In the segment of the Archive that I focused on (Fond 16 during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s), the records were generally organized as chronological, bi-weekly reports summarizing the security situation in Ukraine and abroad. For example, one representative from July 1982 reported the exact figure of 20,139 “foreigners” present throughout Ukraine and provided a breakdown of how many were diplomats, students, tourists, members of delegations, and others.²³ These bi-weekly reports are interspersed with other documents, including statistical summaries of the KGB's work as well as “breaking” intelligence reports and instructions.²⁴

One representative report showing how omniscient—if out of touch—the Soviet security apparatus was in Ukraine, documents the KGB's concern over a group of seven youths with “a white cloth with a penciled inscription of the word ‘Punk’ in Latin characters.” This display led to an initial investigation and report that found that the youth had a passion for

²² See for example, GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 7, d. 68, t. 4, pp. 126-127; GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 7, d. 68, t. 4, p. 296; and GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 9, d. 13, t. 3, p. 79.

²³ GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 7, d. 2, t. 5, pp. 55-61.

²⁴ See for example, GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 7, d. 2, t. 7, pp. 81-86; GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 7, d. 2, t. 7, pp. 307-312; GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 9, d. 13, t. 1, pp. 164-167; and GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 9, d. 13, t. 4, pp. 311-314.

punk music and periodically gathered in the city Park Kulturi or—ironically as it now reads—at a disco at the Palace of Culture of the Felix Dzerzhinsky metallurgy factory. The KGB reported that the “punks” claimed not to know of “the ideologically harmful direction of punk movement in the West.” Confirming that social class structures did in fact exist in the USSR, the KGB reported that due to their “areas of residence and places of study” they were well-respected citizens. Nevertheless, the KGB reported that it would endeavor to assign an experienced KGB officer to the site, suppress further antisocial activities by “punks,” and “establish the actual motives of this grouping and its possible ‘inspirators.’”²⁵

Another April 1982 report, titled “On the arrest of an anti-Soviet person,” clearly demonstrates the totalitarian nature of the KGB’s mission. The report documents that a Soviet pensioner, former engineer and party member, F. F. Andenko, was arrested for writing “poetry of anti-Soviet character,” and a 2,000 page treatise “which attempted to substantiate the ‘need’ to change the current state of our country” and advocated for the creation of a “new party.” The investigation showed the “criminal activities of his close acquaintance” V.S. Volkov, who had worked with Andenko since 1964 to “write, store, and distribute materials of hostile content, including the evil libel ‘Political Diary.’” According to the report, the KGB arrested Volkov, who then testified against Andenko. The report concludes: “the investigation continues.” The fates of Andenko and Volkov are unknown.²⁶

A previously secret set of documents sent to the Soviet Politburo shows that the “preventative” activities of the KGB were substantially increased, beginning in 1983 with the goal of “strengthening law and order and increasing ideological vigilance of soviet people.” In practice, this meant the wide circulation of a classified order entitled “Regarding Measures To Improve the Preventative Work Conducted By The State Security Services” to all “first secretaries of the Communist Party Committees in all soviet republics, to the party offices in territories and regions, to heads and members of military councils, military commands, military districts, air defense districts, fleets, individual armies, and equivalents, [and offices and

²⁵ GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 7, d. 2, T 5 pp 177-178. In another instance of spying on the arts, the KGB in Ukraine was monitoring the “negative actions” of a Estonian musical group, called “Magnetic Band” as it toured Ukraine in 1983; GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 7, d. 2, t. 6, pp. 254.

²⁶ GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 7, d. 2, t. 4, p. 290.

directorates of the Ministry of Internal Affairs]” instructing them to ramp up their efforts. These nationwide “preventative measures” included: increased surveillance on and reporting of Soviet citizens, the usage of mass media to promote a pro-Soviet viewpoint, the development by the KGB’s F.E. Dzerzhinsky Higher School of a study on “the theory of preventative work,” and the “shield[ing] of the military from subversive activities of the enemy.” The order seemed to tacitly acknowledge that the Soviet Union was losing “the culture war,” stating “We ought to patiently and in a targeted fashion influence those among the artistic intelligentsia and young people, who due to their political immaturity and misconceptions and without any hostile intent, spread views foreign to soviet society.”²⁷

In a secret speech to intelligence officers in 1981, Yuri Andropov, then head of the KGB declared: “Enemy agents, Radzhabov, Kazachkov, Filatov, Nilov, Bumeister, Petrov, Ogorodnik, Kryuchkov, Vagin, Shchedrov and others, have been exposed and neutralized. ...Experience shows that along with already known forms of espionage, the enemy is trying to utilize more sophisticated means of gathering intelligence and performing other surveillance and subversive activities.”²⁸ The Soviet Union’s struggles against western intelligence are also documented in the KGB Archive. A February 1983 document chronicles how the KGB intercepted two letters addressed to the US embassy in Moscow written by a Ukrainian typist at the headquarters of the 8th Air Defense Army, Klavdia Alekandrovna Malinovskaya. In the letters, she provided typewritten documents about the activities of Soviet air defense forces and offered to “tell the right people” more information. According to the KGB report, she also removed other secret material from Air Defense headquarters. “To prevent leakage of military information to the enemy,” she was arrested and prosecuted in early 1983.²⁹

²⁷ See [V. Chebrikov, 'On Measures to Improve Preventive Work Conducted by the State Security Service,' October 3, 1983](#), and its attachments: [V. Chebrikov, 'Order of the Chairman of the State Security Committee of the USSR, Moscow, regarding Measures To Improve The Preventive Work Conducted By The State Security Services,'](#) and ['Letter of the Collegium of the KGB of the USSR, 'Regarding Measures to Improve the Preventive Work conducted by the State Security Services,'](#) all in National Security Archive READD-RADD Collection. Translated by Angela Greenfield.

²⁸ GDA SBU, f. 13, o. 678, pp. 34-51.

²⁹ GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 9, d. 13, t. 1, pp. 177-178. Another KGB document describes how the agency conducted an investigation into another loss of classified military information, including military plans of the Black Sea fleet in 1982. Through a series of postal misdeliveries, and improper disposals, other classified documents ended up as street litter in Sebastopol, GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 7, d. 2, t. 6, p. 134.

Another May 1983 document entitled, “On the arrest of C. V. Kirichenko, who established a criminal relationship with US intelligence,” documents how the KGB found a hidden communications kit given to a Soviet informant by the CIA in November 1982. Inside the kit were instructions on how to communicate with the CIA via encrypted communications. A week later, the KGB intercepted an encrypted letter which included the location of a secret drop location used in Moscow. The KGB watched this location and was able to arrest the “probable agent,” Sergei Vladimirovich Kirichenko, a once well-pedigreed engineering student who had knowledge of the Soviet anti-ballistic missile program. After his arrest and interrogation by the KGB, Kirichenko revealed the nature of his contacts with the CIA. The KGB concluded that Kirichenko collaborated with the CIA due to his “moral decomposition” and “worship of the Western way of life.”³⁰

The most impressive piece of counterintelligence I came across in the archive was a KGB summary of the CIA’s attempts to co-opt a Soviet UN diplomat named Anatoli Dmitrievich Plyushko. According to the KGB account, the CIA began targeting him during his tour in the United States from 1973 to 1979. After his return to the USSR, “influential foreigners, including CIA officials, repeatedly tried to contact him.” After Plyushko rebuffed these contacts, the CIA, according to the KGB, “began making attempts to compromise him.” These included revealing Plyushko’s contacts with foreigners, and depositing and then revealing that he had received a \$7,900 deposit into a Western bank, which was “strictly prohibited” by Soviet law. While the document reads as ambivalent towards Plyushko’s complicity or guilt, it does conclude that a planned trip by Plyushko to the 1983 UN General Assembly “seems impractical.”³¹

The Archive also includes information of the KGB’s foreign assets, including those who helped improve the USSR’s nuclear productions. One July 1982 document reports on the work of the Ukrainian KGB on behalf of an asset codenamed “Michael” who was the vice president of the American manufacturing firm Consark Corporation. As recounted in the document—and later by the American press—a representative from Consark, a New Jersey furnace company,

³⁰ [Memorandum from S.N. Mukha to Comrade V.V. Shcherbitsky, 'On Apprehension of S.V. Kirichenko, who Established a Criminal Connection with the US Clandestine Services,' May 19, 1983, GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 9, d. 13, t. 3, pp. 40-41. Translated by Angela Greenfield.](#)

³¹ GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 9, d. 13, t. 4, pp. 57-58.

met with Soviet representatives about selling the Soviet Union an advanced type of carbon that was used in its furnaces, but also that could improve the efficacy of the re-entry nose cones of intercontinental ballistic missiles.³² The KGB reports that this agent provided 70 samples and other technical details of this specialty material. Then, after the US attempted to block the sale, “Michael” suggested a method to sell it to the Soviet Union anyway, by way of a Scottish subsidiary. The Soviet Union allocated over five million dollars for the purchase of this carbon fiber technology from “Michael.” The samples and knowledge he provided had “cross-sectoral importance” according to the KGB and was shared with various Soviet industries, including those manufacturing intercontinental missiles.³³

The KGB Archive also contains new evidence illuminating the creation of Operation RYaN (*Raketno-Yadernoe Napadenie* or “nuclear missile attack”) and further confirms that the War Scare of 1983 was, as Mikhail Gorbachev described it, “as explosive and, hence, more difficult and unfavorable” than perhaps any time since the Second World War.³⁴

In December of 1983 Reagan’s Soviet expert, Jack Matlock, sent National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane a memorandum warning that since mid-1983, a “fear of war seemed to affect the elite as well as the man on the street.” He attached a copy of a cable describing information from “an American academic with excellent entrée to the Soviet political elite.” The academic warned of “growing paranoia among Soviet officials and sees them literally obsessed by fear of war,” and an expanding “emotionality and even irrationality” among the elite. Matlock’s source warned of “a high degree of paranoia among Soviet officials ... not unlike the atmosphere of thirty years ago.”³⁵

This fear of war from the Soviet elite as well as from “the man on the street” is documented in the KGB’s records from this period. In November 1982 Andropov was elected

³² John T. McQuiston, “Technology Leak to Soviets Found,” *New York Times*, November 9, 1987.

³³ [Memorandum from S.N. Mukha to Comrade V.V. Shcherbitsky, July 5, 1982, GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 7, d. 2, t. 5, pp. 78-79. Translated by Angela Greenfield.](#) An April 1983 report describes the efforts of the KGB to use an agent “Kolos” (ear) with international connections to spy on nationalist Ukrainians living in Romania who supposedly were attempting to rouse anti-Soviet sentiment in Ukraine; f. 16, o. 9, d. 13, t. 2, pp. 201-203.

³⁴ The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, [“The Soviet ‘War Scare,’”](#) February 15, 1990, National Security Archive.

³⁵ [“Subject: American Academic on Soviet Policy,”](#) December 13, 1983, National Security Archive.

the new General Secretary at a special Central Committee plenum. At the meeting, he declared, “We know well...that peace with the imperialists is not for the asking. It can be safeguarded only by relying on the invincible might of the Soviet Armed Forces.”³⁶ As standard procedure, the KGB in Ukraine collected and reported commentary from Soviet citizens back to the party leadership in a classified report. One representative quotation came from a mine worker from the Donetsk region who applauded the “timeliness and importance of the warnings made by Comrade Andropov to the United States and the NATO block that it leads about their unprecedented military preparations, the production of new types of nuclear missile weapons and the aggravation of the international situation to extremely dangerous limits.”³⁷

A year later, relations between the superpowers further diminished. On September 1, 1983, the Soviet Union shot down civilian airliner Korean Air 007, believing it to be a US spy plane, killing all 269 people on board. After a bumbled Soviet response to the catastrophe, President Reagan delivered a vehement televised address in which he played selectively-declassified signal intercepts of Soviet pilots and accused the Soviets of “committing an act of barbarism” and a “crime against humanity.” Newly declassified evidence does not exonerate the Soviets for this unnecessary loss of civilian life, but it does confirm that the Soviet military and Soviet intelligence genuinely believed that the plane was a spy plane. The Reagan administration knew that there actually was a second plane, an Cobra Ball aircraft, in the near vicinity and on a parallel route of KAL-007 that was monitoring a pending SSX-24 missile test. It did not reveal this to the American public at the time, due to its eagerness to “pounce on [it] and squeeze [it] dry of propaganda value.” According to a declassified NSA history, there was “no question” Soviet ground controllers thought they were tracking a second US reconnaissance aircraft. “Given the paranoia that had existed since April [the U.S. had flown simulated bombing runs that had penetrated deeply into Soviet territory], it was unthinkable that such a penetration could be permitted without action.” We now know, thanks to this declassification that, “It was the Reagan people who insisted that the Soviets could not have

³⁶ *Kommunist*, no. 17 (November 1983): 7, originally cited in, Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), 85.

³⁷ GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 7, d. 2, t. 7, pp. 333-336.

mistaken a 747 for a 707. It was their value judgment. It was wrong, but not so wide of the mark that one can impute anything more sinister than righteous wrath. It was the height of the Second Cold War.”³⁸

On September 28, as the tensions worsened, Andropov issued a key formal statement which untruthfully blamed the United States for a “sophisticated provocation organized by the US special services, using a South Korean airplane” as “extreme adventurism in policy.” Andropov’s statement went on to distill the Soviet Union’s view of the present state of confrontation with the United States: that the current US “militarist course [] represents a serious threat to peace;” that “[i]f anyone had any illusions about the possibility of an evolution for the better in the policy of the present American administration, recent events have dispelled them once and for all” and that in the nuclear era, “transferring the confrontation of ideas into a military confrontation would cost all mankind too dearly.”³⁹

Again, the Ukrainian KGB wrote a secret report summarizing public reaction. The consensus of citizens in Ukraine, according to the KGB, was that they hoped to “curb the arms race and preserve peace” and “prevent further slipping towards nuclear war.” Some citizens “compared the current situation with the 1939-1941 period and make conclusions that both countries are currently on the brink of war” Others, including an engineer at the Kiev Institute of Physics and a middle school teacher were wary that “a new round of the nuclear arms race carried out by the United States and its NATO partners will force the Soviet government to increase spending on strengthening its own defense, which will adversely affect the material situation of the workers.”⁴⁰

At the same time that the KAL tragedy marked the nadir of US-Soviet relations, and the fear of war contaminated “the man on the street,” Soviet elites, including its leaders and members of its intelligence services were also fearful of and preparing for nuclear war.

³⁸ National Security Agency, *American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989, Book IV Cryptologic Rebirth, 1981-1989*, 1999, cited in Nate Jones, ed., *Able Archer 83: The Secret History of the NATO Exercise that Almost Triggered Nuclear War* (New York: The New Press, 2016), 312-313.

³⁹ *Pravda*, September 29, 1983, originally cited in Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), 130.

⁴⁰ GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 9, d. 13, t. 4, pp 193-195.

Documents from the KGB Archive provide new insight into the origins—and corroborate key aspects of previously murky accounts—of Operation RYaN, or “nuclear missile attack.” In 1979, the Institute for Intelligence Problems, coordinated by the KGB’s First Chief Directorate, was tasked to work on “the development of new intelligence concepts” that could provide preliminary warning of Western preparations for a first strike.

At a March 25, 1981, presentation to the KGB members, Yuri Andropov explained how the recently-concluded 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would affect the work of “we the chekists” and introduced the concept of Operation RYaN. After summarizing the domestic and foreign policy positions of the USSR, he then announced a startling new intelligence initiative: “not to miss the military preparations of the enemy...its preparations for a nuclear strike, and not to miss the real risk of the outbreak of war.”

The striking passage that Andropov delivered at the secret meeting reads:

“But I believe never before, starting from the Great Patriotic War and the ‘cold war’ years, [that the exacerbation of the international situation] hasn’t been as acutely apparent as it is now.

The Report [to the 26th Congress] states that the imperialists are waging an arms race on an unprecedented scale, and are expediting the preparations for war. Deep and detailed intelligence operations which the US and their NATO partners are conducting against the USSR and its allies, are an integral part of this.

As you know, one of the crucial elements of a nuclear strategy is to strike in such a way that one strike disables as many vital installations of the enemy as possible. And therefore the one who better knows the objectives, the intent and the whole nature of the military and political preparations of the other side, will gain the advantage long before the missiles hit the target. In this connection, long before the military confrontation comes around, a confrontation of the intelligence services springs to life. Our objective is to win it.

A key role in reaching this objective belongs to the foreign intelligence service of the KGB of the USSR. Our intelligence service has a lot of experience, draws upon glorious traditions, has at its disposal loyal, well-trained personnel, and is armed with up-to-date specialty equipment. It bravely engages the enemy.

But today we have to think about how to further increase the efficiency of the intelligence service in the face of new, more complex tasks. In short, the intelligence service needs to learn to act in a more pointed, more accurate, faster way. Its objective is not to miss the military preparations of the enemy, and of the

most important enemy in the first place, its preparations for a nuclear strike, and not to miss the real risk of the outbreak of war.

Not to miss means to know the details and particulars which comprise these preparations, to be able to visualize the whole picture..."⁴¹

Two months later, at a May 25, 1981 speech to KGB leadership and officers, Andropov further described the impetus of Operation RYaN:

"The main objective of our intelligence service is not to miss the military preparations of the enemy, its preparations for a nuclear strike, and not to miss the real risk of the outbreak of war.

The intelligence service cannot limit itself to reflecting the picture of military preparations of the enemy in general. *It has to provide us concrete information about all important details*, which are the only way to build a comprehensive picture of the enemy's real actions.

We have to look at the issue of analytical work of the intelligence services from a new angle. The First Main Directorate receives an enormous amount of information. The flow of information of little importance has to be minimized to make sure that the multitude of materials containing information "about everything" does not obscure issues of primary importance. We have to direct the intelligence services towards mining specifically the type of information which at that particular moment is the most pertinent.

And one more thing. The information has to be accurate, reliable and timely. If these requirements are not adhered to, this lowers the quality of intelligence work."⁴²

⁴¹ [Report Made at the KGB Party Caucus Meeting by Yu. V. Andropov, 'The Results of 26th Congress of the CPSU and Tasks for the Party Organization of the KGP that Ensur from the CPSU Congress' Decisions and the CPSU Central Committee Report,' March 25, 1981, *Deiatel'nost' Organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR na Sovremennom etape: Sbornik Dokumentov i materialov*, No. 15918, Vypusk 2 \(Moskva: 1983\), in GDA SBU, f. 13, o. 768, pp. 9-27. Translated by Angela Greenfield.](#)

⁴² [Speech by Yu. V. Andropov at the National Consultation Meetings of the Leadership of the Agency and Troops of the KGB of the USSR, 'On the Tasks of the KGB in Light of the Decisions of the 26th Congress of the CPSU,' May 25, 1981, *Deiatel'nost' Organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR na Sovremennom etape: Sbornik Dokumentov i materialov*, No. 15918, Vypusk 2 \(Moskva: 1983\), in GDA SBU, f. 13, o. 768, pp. 34-51. Translated by Angela Greenfield.](#) Emphasis in the original. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky disclosed this speech and stated that Andropov gave it to "the astonishment of his audience" in 1991, but this is the first documentary confirmation of its occurrence. Notably, the text of this and the previously cited speech do not specifically use the term "Operation RYaN," nor do they explicitly reference KGB and GRU cooperation as Andrew and Gordievsky did. But piecing these speeches together with other contemporary Russian, East German, Bulgarian, and Czechoslovak documents—while more research is needed—largely corroborates Andrew's and Gordievsky's account of Operation RYaN. For more on Operation RYaN, see: Nate Jones, [The Soviet Side of the 1983 War Scare](#), *National*

Eventually, Operation RYaN grew to include 292 indicators reported by Soviet and Eastern Bloc intelligence services abroad. Within the KGB, 300 positions were created so that RYaN operatives could implement the real-time “transmission and evaluation” of reported indicators showing the likelihood of a Western first strike, including the creation of a primitive computer system with the goal of using the data to predict the risk of a preemptive western first strike.⁴³

By February 1983, KGB agents abroad received a top secret message from KGB headquarters entitled, “Permanent operational assignment to uncover NATO preparations for a nuclear missile attack on the USSR,” with enclosed instructions on how to report on indicators pointing toward a nuclear sneak attack. “The objective of the assignment is to see that the Residency works systematically to uncover any plans in preparation by the main adversary [USA] for RYaN and to organize continual watch to be kept for indications of a decision being taken to use nuclear weapons against the USSR or immediate preparations being made for a nuclear missile attack.” Attached to the telegram was a list of seven “immediate” and thirteen “prospective” tasks for the agents to complete and report. These included: the collection of data on potential places of evacuation and shelter, an appraisal of the level of blood held in blood banks, observation of places where nuclear decisions were made and where nuclear weapons were stored, observation of key nuclear decision makers, observation of lines of communication, reconnaissance of the heads of churches and banks, and surveillance of security services and military installations.⁴⁴

As KGB agents abroad began to report RYaN indicators, Andropov remained fixated on a potential western bolt from the blue. In July of 1981, during a conversation with East German State Security Minister Erich Mielke, he acknowledged that he believed a western attack was at least a possibility: “The US is preparing for war, but it is not willing to start a war. They are not building factories and palaces in order to destroy them. They are striving for military superiority

Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 647 (November 5, 2018); Bernd Schaefer, Nate Jones, Benjamin B. Fischer, [Forecasting Nuclear War](#), Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, November 13, 2014; and Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1991), 67.

⁴³ Schaefer, Jones, and Fischer, [Forecasting Nuclear War](#).

⁴⁴ Andrew and Gordievsky, *Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions*, 67.

in order to ‘check’ us and then declare ‘checkmate’ against us without starting a war. Maybe I am wrong.”⁴⁵ Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin stated that none of the general secretaries for whom he had served—Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Chernenko nor Gorbachev—“believed an attack could take place unexpectedly at any moment.” Andropov, he wrote, proved the “probable exception” to this. “While still head of the KGB, Andropov did believe that the Reagan administration was actively preparing for war.” Dobrynin recalled a “very private” conversation with Andropov in which he cautioned that “Reagan is unpredictable. You should expect anything from him.”⁴⁶

Andropov also feared nuclear war through miscalculation—a danger which Operation RYaN ironically intensified. At a January 11, 1983, meeting with Hans-Jochen Vogel, the former mayor of West Berlin, Andropov cautioned, “I don’t want to speak such banal truths, but the fact of the matter is that we have an accumulation of dangerous weapons...When it comes to the accumulation of nuclear weapons, it is even more dangerous. After all, at the button that activates the nuclear weapon could be a drunken American sergeant or a drug addict. There were also occasions when the Americans fired rockets at flocks of geese. And if these rockets fell in our territory, it could lead to war.”⁴⁷ In June of 1983, Andropov met US envoy Averell Harriman, a meeting which he described as the “first real meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union since the start of the [Reagan] Administration.” At the meeting, Andropov warned Harriman—who had negotiated with Stalin during the Second World War—of the danger of nuclear war through miscalculation four times. Andropov warned Harriman, “It would seem that awareness of this danger should be precisely the common denominator with which statesmen of both countries would exercise restraint and seek mutual understanding to strengthen confidence, to avoid the irreparable. However, I must say that I do not see it on the part of the current administration and they may be moving toward the dangerous ‘red line.’”⁴⁸

⁴⁵ “[Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and KGB Chairman Andropov](#),” July 11, 1981, BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5382, p. 1-19. Translated by Bernd Schaefer.

⁴⁶ Anatoli Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 522.

⁴⁷ Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI) f. 82, o. 1, d. 37, r. 27-55, pp. 37, cited in Jones, ed., *Able Archer 83*, 29.

⁴⁸ RGANI, f. 82, o. 1, d. 36, r. 27-55, pp. 33-44; Jones, [The 1983 War Scare](#).

This risk of nuclear “conflict through miscalculation” occurred during Able Archer 83, a realistic November 1983 NATO nuclear release exercise which evoked a “unprecedented” Soviet reaction. According to the account of the US intelligence community, the danger of war through miscalculation receded after young American Lieutenant General, Leonard Perroots, observed the Soviet nuclear forces ratcheting up and made the “fortuitous, if ill-informed” instinctual decision not to act in kind, essentially signaling that Able Archer 83 was indeed an exercise and ending the escalation.⁴⁹

A previously confidential February 1984 Soviet General Staff Journal *Voennaya mysl'* [*Military Thought*] article analyzing NATO military exercises including Autumn Forge 83 and Able Archer 83 opens with a public warning from Soviet Politburo member and Minister of Defense Dmitry Ustinov given just after the conclusion of Able Archer 83. Ustinov warned that NATO's military exercises “are becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish from a real deployment of armed forces for aggression.” The *Voennaya mysl'* article later states that, due to the large scale and realistic nature of NATO's military exercises in 1983, “it was difficult to catch the difference between working out training questions and actual preparation of large-scale aggression.”⁵⁰

The most tragic aspect of Ukraine's nuclear history is the world's worst nuclear accident. In the early morning of April 26, 1986, engineers conducted an ill-conceived and poorly executed experiment at reactor four of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant near the small city of Pripyat, 104 kilometers north of Kiev. The objective of the experiment was to test how much energy the reactor could generate as it was powering down. In theory, this energy could possibly be used—instead of slow-starting backup reactors—to keep the machines that

⁴⁹ See Nate Jones, [National Security Archive Sues DIA for Able Archer 83 Document](#), *National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book* 666 (February 28, 2019).

⁵⁰ Colonel L. V. Levadov, “Results of the operational training of the NATO Combined Forces in 1983,” *Voennaya mysl'* [*Military Thought*], no. 2 February 1984, 67 in Nate Jones, [The Soviet Side of the 1983 War Scare](#), *National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book* 647 (November 5, 2018).

operated the reactor running, in the case of an emergency shutdown. In practice, the test led to catastrophe.⁵¹

The primary cause for the Chernobyl disaster was human error. Before the test began, one of the operators of the test read the logbook and was confused because some of the instructions had been crossed out. After inquiring what he should do, he was told, “follow the crossed out instructions.” The test was scheduled to begin on April 25 when the reactor was being shut down for annual maintenance. By 2:00 PM on April 25, the reactor was reduced to half power (from 3,200 megawatts to 1,600) and the emergency core cooling system was disconnected, ostensibly so that it would not interfere with the test. But then, the shutdown and test were postponed after grid operators in Kiev instructed that the reactor must remain operating to fulfill high civilian power consumption. At 11:30 PM the operators lost control of the reactor and the power level of the reactor plummeted below the 700-1,000 megawatts that the test was supposed to be conducted at, dropping to only 30 megawatts. In an attempt to raise the power, the operator withdrew control rods, but he could not get the power level to rise. According to its official instructions, the reactor never should have been operated with fewer than the equivalent of 30 of its 211 rods in its core. But by 1:22 in the morning of April 26, it had just some six to eight rods. Then the experiment began.

It lasted just 40 seconds before a chain reaction began and the reactor suffered a “prompt critical excursion,” or, put more bluntly: “a slow nuclear explosion,” which took a second rather than a nanosecond. The explosion blew the roof off the reactor and spewed radioactive parts, fuel rods, and gasses, into the air. The explosion immediately caused some thirty fires at the site, including the apparent ignition of the graphite core, which burned for ten days.

The first report on the nuclear disaster entitled “Urgent Report, Accident at Chernobyl Atomic Power Station,” has been published by the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project. The document, with Gorbachev’s name handwritten at its top, detailed the damage at Chernobyl, stating that auxiliary machinery, the reactor and its roof “were demolished during

⁵¹ This description of the accident draws from David E. Hoffman, *The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous Legacy* (New York, Doubleday, 2009), 244-253, and Walter C. Patterson, “Chernobyl—The Official Story,” *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (November 1986): 34-36.

the explosion.” Incredibly, the report also stated that “it is not required to take special measures, including the evacuation of the population of the city.”⁵²

This advice could not have been further from the truth. In the immediate aftermath of Chernobyl, 237 people were afflicted by acute radiation sickness and 31—the majority of them fire fighters termed “liquidators”—died within three months. The World Health Organization reports that the death toll from the accident is still growing: “[a]n increased number of cancer deaths can be expected during the lifetime of persons exposed to radiation from the accident,” with those that were exposed by the most radiation [firefighters] at the highest risk.⁵³ Over 900,000 individuals associated with the accident continue to undergo annual medical examinations.⁵⁴

Newly released documents also show that risk of a disaster at Chernobyl was known ahead of time, that there had been previous accidents at Chernobyl before 1986, and that inadequate leadership was shown by those in charge in Ukraine and Moscow. According to a February 1979 report sent from Yuri Andropov, then Chairman of the KGB, entitled “Shortcomings in the construction of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Station,” the KGB had learned of improper construction techniques and “deviations from designs” at the Chernobyl plant that “might lead to failures or accidents.” These errors included improper installation of the roof, damaged waterproofing which could lead “to radioactive contamination of the environment,” cracks in the concrete due to low quality pours, and the “disastrous condition” of the approach route—which would have been used by emergency personnel after the accident. The KGB memorandum named several of the men who oversaw the construction, but provided no recommendations or plans on how to fix these dangerous design flaws.⁵⁵

A report from the KGB in September 1982 reveals that there was an earlier nuclear accident at Chernobyl, a nuclear fuel spill at Chernobyl power plant’s reactor one. This spill led

⁵² [“Urgent Report, Accident at Chernobyl Atomic Power Station,”](#) April 26, 1986, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Dmitrii Antonovich Volkogonov papers, 1887-1995, mm97083838. Translated by Gary Goldberg.

⁵³ [“Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident: An Overview,”](#) World Health Organization, April 2006.

⁵⁴ Kim Hjelmgaard “30 Years Later: Chernobyl Disaster Could Trigger More Cancer, Deaths,” *USA Today*, April 25, 2016.

⁵⁵ [“Andropov Letter, Shortcomings in the Construction of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Station,”](#) February 21, 1979, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Dmitrii Antonovich Volkogonov papers, 1887-1995, mm97083838. Translated by Gary Goldberg.

to an increase in the radiation levels at the reactor. The initial report claimed that radiation 250 meters from the reactor was at a “permissible rate” and recommended that no actions needed to be taken.⁵⁶ Two months later, however, a more thorough KGB investigation contradicted the initial finding that the area was safe. It suggested that further study of radiation in the area was needed, but also instructed that this study should be kept secret from the public to prevent “panic rumors” among those that may have unknowingly been affected by the accident.⁵⁷

In December 1982, Chernobyl’s reactor three was shut down after imprecise manufacturing led to a generator blade snapping and damage to another 20 blades in the reactor.⁵⁸ A month later, in January 1983, Chernobyl’s reactor one had a leak which allowed outside water to enter into the reactor’s control system.⁵⁹ These and other manufacturing errors led to a KGB-orchestrated review of the manufacturing of Soviet reactors which found “certain structural defects and malfunctions.” The KGB’s investigation of these nuclear defects, however, shows that maintaining production schedule was prioritized much more highly than producing safe nuclear reactors.⁶⁰ Despite these nuclear manufacturing errors being known and reported to the higher levels of Soviet power, there remained a belief that a nuclear catastrophe simply could not occur. This belief was so steadfast that Soviet nuclear plants, including Chernobyl—unlike western nuclear power plants—did not even have a steel-reinforced concrete containment roof to limit the spread of radiation in the event of an accident. As David Albright wrote in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, “Before the accident, Soviet engineers proudly proclaimed that such an accident could never happen. But the operation of nuclear reactors is very complicated.” On April 26, 1986, assumptions of nuclear safety proved—not for the last time—to be incorrect.⁶¹

The catastrophe at Chernobyl also had implications for the future of the Soviet nuclear weapons program, and, indeed, the nuclear tragedy contributed to the end of the Cold War. Sergey Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff, stated that Chernobyl provided a concrete,

⁵⁶ GDA SBU f. 16, o. 7, d. 2, t. 6, p. 199.

⁵⁷ GDA SBU f. 16, o. 7, d. 2, t. 7, p. 111.

⁵⁸ GDA SBU f. 16, o. 9, d. 13, t. 1, p. 11.

⁵⁹ GDA SBU f. 16, o. 9, d. 13, t. 1, p. 47.

⁶⁰ GDA SBU f. 16, o. 9, d. 13, t. 1, p. 29.

⁶¹ David Albright, “Chernobyl and the U.S. Nuclear Industry,” *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (November 1986): 38-40.

tangible example of the danger of nuclear war to the Soviet public: “After Chernobyl, the nuclear threat stopped being an abstract notion for our people. It became tangible and concrete. The people began to see all the problems linked with nuclear weapons much differently.”⁶² Chernobyl also sobered Gorbachev. At a Politburo meeting on May 5, he told Soviet leadership that “we felt what a nuclear war is.” During his television address about the disaster, he told the USSR that Chernobyl demonstrated “what an abyss will open if nuclear war befalls mankind. For inherent in the nuclear arsenals stockpiled are thousands upon thousands of disasters far more horrible than the Chernobyl one.” On May 28, he gave a secret speech at the Foreign Ministry in which he instructed diplomats to use all available means to stop the nuclear arms race.⁶³ Six months later, Gorbachev met Reagan at Reykjavik.

On December 8, 1987, Gorbachev and Reagan signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, completely eliminating an entire class of destabilizing, potentially decapitating nuclear weapons which were the primary drive behind Operation RYaN and the Able Archer 83 War Scare.⁶⁴ On June 31, 1991, Gorbachev and President George H.W. Bush signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty which eventually eliminated an estimated 12,000 nuclear warheads (roughly 80 percent of all strategic nuclear warheads in existence).

On August 19, 1991, a self-proclaimed “State Committee on the State of Emergency” lead by KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov attempted to stage a coup against Gorbachev, isolating him at his dacha at Foros, Ukraine. After three days of popular struggle, the hardliner coup was thwarted. Gorbachev returned to Moscow politically destroyed. By the end of December, the Soviet Union had dissolved into 15 independent countries.

⁶² Sergei Akhromeyev and Georgi M. Kornienko, *Glazami Marshala I Diplomata* (Moscow: International Relations, 1992), 98-99, cited in Hoffman, *The Dead Hand*, 252.

⁶³ Mikhail S. Gorbachev, *Gody Trudnykh Reshenii* (Moscow: Alfa-print, 1993), 46-55, cited in Hoffman, *The Dead Hand*, 252.

⁶⁴ Tragically, it appears these dangerous weapons may soon be returning to Europe including, possibly in a non-nuclear variant to Ukraine. See Mariana Budjeryn, “[Without the INF Treaty, Europe could see a new missile power. \(Spoiler: It’s not Russia.\)](#)”, *Washington Post*, February 26, 2019.

As the USSR dissolved, US Department of Defense experts anxiously watched its nuclear arsenal. A recently declassified document entitled, “Control of Soviet Strategic Nuclear Weapons Before, During and After the Coup,” stated that “[d]uring the coup, President Gorbachev’s role in nuclear release authority was apparently revoked [as] coup conspirators removed the suitcase that carries his transmission device. This would indicate that key members of the emergency committee then running the government held nuclear release authority.” The DOD recounted how Yeltsin had ultimately retaken control of nuclear release authority and then predicted that “[i]n the reconfigured union, which probably will emerge in the next year, the reconstituted center probably will retain control over nuclear weapons; however, republic leaders will almost certainly demand some role in the nuclear decision-making process.”⁶⁵

Another recently declassified DOD Special Assessment entitled, “USSR: Soviet Nuclear Weapons Outside the Russian Republic,” gamed out possible scenarios for the weapons on the soil of former Soviet republics including Ukraine, but admitted, “conclusive indicators of weapons withdrawals are very difficult to identify... primarily due to Soviet operational security. Weapons transfers normally occur during hours of darkness or when they are not susceptible to detection... In the past our ability to monitor large scale weapons movements has been largely unsuccessful. For example, no nuclear warhead transfers were detected from storage sites supporting missiles eliminated under the INF agreement. Many of these sites appeared operational...but were found to be empty upon onsite inspection.” The document concluded that, “[g]iven the potential role of nuclear weapons as a political football in a three-way struggle between the central government, Russia, and the non-Russian republics, a clandestine removal of the weapons to Russia would be the most desirable option for the central government... If the central government can withdraw nuclear weapons to the Russian Republic at a gradual pace over an extended period of time, employing standard operational security measures, detection of weapons movements will be very difficult, if not impossible. If the

⁶⁵ Office of the Secretary of Defense Directorate for Research, “[Control of Soviet Strategic Nuclear Weapons Before, During, and After the Coup](#),” Undated, Secret.

government is forced to make a rapid withdrawal because of a deteriorating political situation, then the chances of detection are much greater.”⁶⁶

Ultimately, the republics, including Ukraine, on whose soil the nuclear weapons were maintained, would have much greater agency in their final disposition than the DOD initially predicted. After declaring its independence, Ukraine’s legislature, the Verkhovna Rada, passed a declaration of sovereignty which proclaimed that Ukraine would “become, in the future, a permanently neutral state, which does not participate in military alliances and adheres to three non-nuclear principles: not to receive, manufacture, or acquire nuclear weapons.”⁶⁷ But in the meantime, Ukraine declared that it, not Russia, was the owner of all of the nuclear assets on its soil, some 176 ICBMs, 44 long-range bombers, 1240 strategic nuclear warheads, and an estimated 2,883 tactical nuclear weapons. The Department of Defense was correct in predicting that Russia would do more to secure the tactical nuclear weapons—the easiest deterrent to Russia or other countries and also the easiest to lose control of—first. By May of 1992, Russia had successfully withdrawn all tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine.⁶⁸ The other nuclear assets would not be as easy to move out and led to protracted negotiations.⁶⁹

Several factors pushed Ukraine toward its eventual denuclearization. The horror of Chernobyl was not the least of them. Its public health consequences and the widely-held antipathy towards Moscow’s bungled, secretive response was linked to the Russian leadership’s seemingly-imperial control over the nuclear weapons and nuclear industry on Ukrainian soil. In a 1992 interview, Ukraine’s first president, Leonid Kravchuk, exemplified the Ukrainian view that Chernobyl and the nuclear arsenal were near-synonymous: “Ukraine can become a hostage of its own missiles, they can be more dangerous than Chernobyl.”⁷⁰ In another interview later that year, he stated, “It is enough to launch one of these [conventional] missiles into a nuclear power plant—and . . . catastrophe! What I mean is that today nuclear weapons

⁶⁶ Department of Defense Special Assessment, “[USSR: Soviet Nuclear Weapons Outside the Russian Republic](#),” November 8, 1991, Secret WNINTEL NOFORN.

⁶⁷ Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, [Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine](#), July 16, 1990.

⁶⁸ Sinovets and Budjeryn, “[Interpreting the Bomb](#),” 3-12.

⁶⁹ For a comprehensive discussion of this topic, see Odessa Centre for Non-Proliferation, *20 Years of Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine: Outputs and Outcomes* (Odessa: Astroprint, 2007).

⁷⁰ “Transcript of President Kravchuk’s Interview to Canadian CTV,” December 14, 1992, State Archive of Ukraine, f. 5233, o. 1, d. 2, p. 4, cited in Sinovets and Budjeryn, “[Interpreting the Bomb](#),” 16.

are only psychologically a deterrent factor. In real terms, all of us could be obliterated without nuclear arms. Because there are nuclear power stations. Chernobyl. I think all nuclear weapons must be destroyed.”⁷¹

Other practical reasons also pushed Ukraine toward denuclearization. First, the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory remained under Russian operational command and control. Analysts have predicted that Ukraine could possibly have broken the Russian authorization codes, rearmed the targeting controls of the cruise missiles on the bombers (which the Russians had disabled) and gained control of the weapons in 12 to 18 months. But even then—after likely ruining their relationship with both Russia and the United States—Ukraine would still have had to wrest control of the warheads, which were stored separate from the missiles and bombers under Russian guard. Even if Ukraine overcame these obstacles and seized control over these weapons, most would have only been able to be used to deter the United States, not Russia. For example, the ICBMs had a range of 5,000 to 10,000 km, and could have conceivably been retargeted to hit Russia—but only the Far East, not Moscow. Of course, Ukraine’s relatively small supply of bombers (if their missiles could be successfully retargeted) and improperly targeted missiles would have been no match for a nuclear war with Russia.

Still, Ukraine’s tenure as a nuclear weapons state may not have lasted long. Ukraine depended on Russia for key elements of its nuclear weapons program, including enriched and reprocessed uranium and plutonium, new warheads, and missile testing ranges. Once the weapons’ service life ended, Ukraine would have been hard pressed to replace them.⁷²

Despite these circumstances, and the quick acquiescence of Belarus and Kazakhstan, Ukraine managed to negotiate quite a bit in return for its denuclearization. First, it established itself as a nuclear successor state equal to Russia which *chose* to relinquish its nuclear weapons for fair compensation. This parity was established when it signed the Lisbon Protocol (along

⁷¹ “Transcript of Interview of President Kravchuk to Elsevier,” December 9, 1992, State Archive of Ukraine, f. 5233, o. 1, d. 2, p. 2, cited Sinovets and Budjeryn, “[Interpreting the Bomb](#),” 25.

⁷² Mariana Budjeryn, “[Was Ukraine’s Nuclear Disarmament a Blunder?](#)” *World Affairs* (Summer 2016): 9-20. Despite the difficulties of immediately using the nuclear arsenal on its territory, Ukraine was far ahead of such nuclear aspirants as North Korea, Libya and Iran in terms of the fissile material, manufacturing capability, and nuclear expertise that it possessed; it could have attained its own sustainable rudimentary nuclear weapons at relatively low cost, although this relatively low cost may still have been prohibitively high during Ukraine’s terrible economic circumstances immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union.

with Belarus and Kazakhstan) in 1992 which made Ukraine an equal party to the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty. Russia opposed Ukraine's inclusion in START, but ultimately acquiesced to Ukraine's demands realizing that they would forward the goal of worldwide nuclear reductions. The Lisbon Protocol also required that Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear weapons states, essentially solidifying the status quo favoring gradual world-wide disarmament in the post-Cold-War order. Ukraine's eventual agreement to these terms (it accessioned to the NPT in December 1994) bought it increased aid from the United States, compensation for the tactical weapons already withdrawn to Russia, future compensation for the highly enriched uranium removed from its territory, and assistance in disassembling and transferring the weapons to Russia. Beyond monetary compensation, through its negotiations Ukraine was able to establish itself as a member in good standing in the international and European order.

What Ukraine did not receive for its denuclearization was a credible security guarantee from the United States or other world powers. As Mariana Budjeryn has written, "[t]his was not for the lack of trying on Ukraine's part."⁷³ The United States was simply not willing to extend the type of guarantee to Ukraine which it had extended to its NATO allies and other partners. The "weak tea" assurance that Ukraine ultimately did receive from Russia, the United States and Great Britain was encapsulated in the now-well-cited Budapest Memorandum.⁷⁴ This set of documents, signed December 5, 1994, consisted of six assurances, including the pledge "to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine," and that "none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." Tragically and presciently, Ukraine's President, Leonid Kravchuk, remarked after the signing of the Memorandum, "If tomorrow Russia goes into Crimea, no one will even raise an eyebrow."⁷⁵

On July 31, 1991, in Novo-Ogarevo, General Secretary Gorbachev also prophetically warned President Bush of the ethnic and territorial risks Ukraine would face in the future:

⁷³ Budjeryn, "[Was Ukraine's Nuclear Disarmament a Blunder?](#)," 19.

⁷⁴ France and China also give similar assurances. "[Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](#)," Budapest, December 5 1994.

⁷⁵ "[Kiev Scorns NPT Exchange Deal](#)," *Moscow Times*, December 8, 1994, cited in Budjeryn, "[Was Ukraine's Nuclear Disarmament a Blunder?](#)," 18.

“When western Ukraine started talking about independence, Crimea announced that if this happens it would go to Russia. Moreover, Crimea declared itself autonomous as the result. And residents of the Donets Basin remembered that after the Revolution, a Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic was created there. So they said they may want to restore it. Hungary’s claims to Ukrainian territories also came up. The question is: what will be left of Ukraine? ...That’s how sensitive this subject is... In a word, if we do not keep the issue of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders under control, chaos will break out from which we will never extricate ourselves.”⁷⁶

Gorbachev’s fears have proved correct. In November 2013, the president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich suspended the signing of an association agreement that would have further integrated Ukraine with the European Union. This policy reversal sparked months of Euromaidan protests and eventually violent clashes in Kiev’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti Square between citizens who favored Ukrainian-EU integration and security forces supporting Yanukovich. In February, 2014, Yanukovich and other government officials fled to Russia. After Yanukovich fled, Russian forces entered the Ukrainian territory of Crimea,⁷⁷ effectively took control of the peninsula’s infrastructure, and imposed a referendum whereupon a majority Crimean residents voted to join the Russian federation. In late 2014, Russian forces again entered into Ukrainian territory in the Donbass region and were instrumental in creating two separatist “people’s republics” of Donetsk and Lugansk which are no longer under the control of the government of Ukraine.

“The final lesson of Ukraine’s denuclearization,” as Mariana Budjeryn and Polina Sinovets have written, “might be that future such deals will come at a much higher cost and will require more robust security commitments of the part of nuclear states.”⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Record of the Main Content of Conversation between Bush and Gorbachev, Novo-Ogarevo, July 31, 1991, in Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton, *The Last Superpower Summits: Gorbachev Reagan, and Bush Conversations that Ended the Cold War* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2016), p 901.

⁷⁷ For a summary of the history of the contested peninsula of Crimea, see Mark Kramer, “[Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago?](#),” *Cold War International History Project e-Dossier* 47, March 19, 2014.

⁷⁸ Mariana Budjeryn and Polina Sinovets, “[Denuclearization Again? Lessons from Ukraine’s Decision to Disarm](#),” *War on the Rocks*, April 19, 2018.

Despite the fact that Crimea and the Donbass are mired in conflict with Russia, my experience researching in Odessa, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, and other cities as a NPIHP nuclear research fellow has made clear to me that the rest of Ukraine is liberalizing, and often thriving. As this paper has shown, this is especially true at the Ukrainian Archives, including the KGB Archive—a fact that should be noticed by liberal countries with much more closed, inaccessible security service archives.⁷⁹

This incredible collection of intelligence documents—of which my research has just scratched the surface—has provided important new evidence and insight into several important aspects of Ukrainian, Cold War, and worldwide nuclear history. We now know more about the origins of the Soviet nuclear program, born in Kharkiv. We have further insight about the Soviet nuclear archipelago, including the knowledge that the USSR's nuclear endeavors were often haphazard and unsafe, most tragically demonstrated at Chernobyl. We can read documents about how the USSR used spies, including the Ukrainian asset “Michael,” to obtain Western technology used to produce nuclear weapons.

We have learned the toll that the risk of nuclear war took on all Ukrainian and Soviet citizens, forcing them to ask “Is the possibility of a third world war real?” We can now access key documents showing that fear of nuclear war had spread to the elite by reading Yuri Andropov's secret speech to the KGB justifying the creation of Operation RYaN—*literally* “Operation Nuclear Missile Attack,”⁸⁰ a strangelovian endeavor to detect (and possibly preempt) a decapitating nuclear first strike that the West had no plans of launching.

And finally, as the US and Russia foolishly make plans to reintroduce the destabilizing intermediate range nuclear weapons back into Europe,⁸¹ we can study an opportunity missed. Ukraine is now denuclearized and finally moving toward its “common European home;”⁸² but

⁷⁹ In the United States, the public is legally barred from researching *any* Central Intelligence Agency Operational File. Nate Jones, [“‘There’s Classified, and Then There’s Classified’: Tangible Steps to Fix the Classification and Declassification System,”](#) Public Interest Declassification Board, December 6, 2016.

⁸⁰ Also called Operation VRYaN, “Operation Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack.”

⁸¹ Andrew E. Kramer, [“Gorbachev Calls Trump’s Nuclear Treaty Withdrawal ‘Not the Work of a Great Mind,’”](#) *New York Times*, October 21, 2018. For the possibility of non-nuclear intermediate range missiles being introduced to Ukraine, see Mariana Budjeryn, [“Without the INF Treaty, Europe could see a new missile power. \(Spoiler: It’s not Russia.\)”](#), *Washington Post*, February 26, 2019.

⁸² Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton, [“NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard,”](#) National Security Archive.

we cannot say the same for the former Soviet Republic of Russia, which controls the world's largest nuclear stockpile.

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Document Appendix

Document No. 1

Report Made at the KGB Party Caucus Meeting by Yu. V. Andropov, 'The Results of 26th Congress of the CPSU and Tasks for the Party Organization of the KGP that Ensur from the CPSU Congress' Decisions and the CPSU Central Committee Report,' March 25, 1981

[Source: Deiatel'nost' Organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR na Sovremennom etape: Sbornik Dokumentov i materialov, No. 15918, Vypusk 2 (Moskva: 1983), in GDA SBU, f. 13, o. 768, pp. 9-27. Obtained by Nate Jones and translated by Angela Greenfield.]

THE RESULTS OF 26th CONGRESS OF THE CPSU AND TASKS FOR THE PARTY ORGANIZATION OF THE KGB THAT ENSUE FROM THE CPSU CONGRESS' DECISIONS AND THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S REPORT

REPORT MADE AT THE KGB PARTY CAUCUS MEETING BY THE MEMBER OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S POLITBURO, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY OF THE USSR (KGB), COMRAD Yu.V.ANDROPOV

March 25, 1981

Comrades,

It has been three weeks since the conclusion of the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The Supreme Forum of the CPSU worked for eight days discussing not only the most pressing issues in the life of the Party and the country, but also issues that are acknowledged as important and pressing worldwide, even in the country of most ardent adversaries of socialism.

The 26th Congress of the party once again demonstrated the triumph of Marxist-Leninist ideas in the specific actions of the soviet people. In these ideas, the party finds accurate answers to all questions posed by life, and uses them as a basis for determining reliable paths for achieving the target objectives.

The CPSU Central Committee's Report to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union represents an example of the creative evolution of Marxism-Leninism. This document contains an amalgam of theory and practice, revolutionary impulse and sound judgment, adherence to high standards and optimism.

Using V.I.Lenin's words, the party brought to its congress "thought through and carefully, by joint labor and joint efforts of all members of the party, *processed practical experience* of economic development."^[1] The Report, as well as other documents of the Congress, weigh in on the experience of building communism, analyze pressing issues of current development, and set forth concrete tasks in every aspect of domestic and foreign policies.

When charting the future objectives, the party makes the following two interconnected objectives the corner stone of [its plan]: the people's prosperity and the enduring peace. Such was the mandate from the communists to the congress delegates. This mandate has been implemented in the

comprehensive program of economic and social development of the country, as well as in the new foreign policy initiatives directed at maintaining and strengthening peace.

The noteworthy characteristic of the congress' atmosphere in general was the sense of confidence in the historical correctness of our cause. This confidence is based in the strict scientificity of the course we follow, on the increased strength of the country, and on the truly limitless creative potential of the soviet people.

I would also like to mention one other aspect of the congress' work – I am referring to the international resonance of its decisions. The revolutionary forces of the modern day see them as a powerful advance of socialism, as a manifestation of the commitment to the principles of proletarian internationalism.

The times are long in the past when the West expressed its disbelief in the realness of our plans. They are now carefully studying the new five-year plans. Business circles in their own merchant's way are calculating what they can get in our country and what they can sell.

In the capitals of capitalist countries they are meticulously analyzing the foreign policy course set forth by the congress. And this fact is the confirmation of the great role that our country plays in the world arena, of the influence that the Soviet Union exercises over the hearts and minds of people around the world.

Life has proven correct the conclusion of the 25th Congress of the CPSU, that in the stage of developed socialism the role of the party in society would grow. The whole work of the congress, the horizons that it opens up, convincingly demonstrates that the party is at the top of its historic mission.

The communist party is developing alongside the Soviet society. It is growing, gaining strength and becoming more mature. It currently unites 17 million 480 thousand of the best representatives of the nation. Among the new members who have joined its ranks in the years after the previous congress, 59 percent are workers. This is a very important and noteworthy fact. The CPSU, having become the party of the whole nation, hasn't lost its class nature. In its essence it has always been and remains the party of the working class.

The Report is filled with concern over the continuous reinforcement of the party ranks, over the perfecting of the style and methods of party leadership, over the support of new and progressive things, over the development of criticism and self-criticism, over the improvement of the ideological and political education.

Since V.I.Lenin's times there always has been an unbreakable rule for the party to combine the development of theory with practical activities. Important theoretical provisions concerning the consistent patterns of the current stage of our development and the development of the world, included in the Report, show the correctness of this tradition. With this respect the decision of the congress about amending and restating the CPSU Program is of primary importance.

The faithfulness of our party to Lenin's mandate – to cherish our unity as the apple of one's eye – has manifested itself most prominently at the congress. The congress with a massive, convincing force showed the cohesion of the party around its Central Committee. It manifested itself in the unanimous votes of the congress for its decisions, in the speeches of the delegates and of the foreign guests

attending the congress, who spoke fondly and wholeheartedly of the work of the Central Committee and its Politburo.

We, the *chekists*^[2], cannot but express our feeling of passionate gratitude for the constant attention which the Central Committee of the CPSU pays to improving the work of the state security agencies in accordance with the requirements of the present development stage of the soviet society and the class struggle on the international arena.

Comrades! When I talk about the issues which were discussed at the congress, I would like in the first place to bring to your attention the economic policy of the party. I am not going to site the numbers of the results of the previous five-year plan and the economic development of the country as a whole in the '70's, because you are very familiar with those. I am going to stress the main conclusion – life has proven that the economic strategy and policy developed by the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses was correct. By following this course the working people of the country have achieved a considerable increase in national wealth, growth in industrial, technical and scientific potential, as well as improvements in the level of education and prosperity of the nation. The defense capability of our Homeland has strengthened.

The completed five-year plan was the tenth in order. Each one of them took its glorious place in the history of building socialism. Ten five-year plans represent years of audacious labor of the soviet people which transformed the economic and social image of the country.

When one thinks about the data characterizing our economic development during that period, one can't help but be astonished with the enormous changes which took place in the economy of our country.

According to the data provided by the Central Statistics Office of the USSR, compared with 1928, in 1980 industrial production increased 136 times and agricultural production – 3.2 times. Prior to the first five-year plan the country produced 5 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, but at the end of the tenth five-year plan – 1 trillion 295 billion kilowatt-hours. During the same period oil production increased from 11.6 million tons to 603 million tons, coal – from 35.2 million tons to 653 million tons, and steel – from 4.3 million tons to 148 million tons. Grain production increased more than 2.5 times.

The significance of these results is even more impressive when you compare them with the development results of the capitalist world countries for the same time period. Let's take for example such a classic capitalist country as England. Electricity production in the USSR increased 259 times, in England – 17 times, steel – 35 times and 1.3 times respectively, cement – 68 times and 3.7 times [respectively].

These numbers show both our social superiority and our increased economic abilities. The eleventh five-year plan takes into account and encompasses all of the achievements of the tenth and earlier five-year plans. Productive forces of our society have now reached a whole new level at which the objective of the intensification of the economy has been put into forefront.

Those present here today may have noticed with which acuity the Report was talking about the unsolved problems, about shortcomings in the planning and management areas, about the reasons that cause some of the sectors of the national economy to fall behind. The main reason is that the inertia of

the past practices, whereas quantity and not so much quality was the main focus, has not been fully overcome.

The historic conditions were so that we started building in the environment of economic backwardness, destruction, blockade and absence of necessary human resources. In order for us to withstand the fierce fight with world capitalism, we had to create our own industrial base within a very short time frame. The objective of comprehensive increase of production across the board was put into the forefront. What we currently have is a developed economy and highly qualified human resources. Our country is also rich in natural resources. But even the most lucrative natural resources are not limitless. The economic development predetermined the necessity to decisively address the issues of efficiency and quality. The current objective is not to produce at any cost, but at the least possible cost, both in terms of material and labor.

“The main objective of the eleventh five-year plan, as it is stated in the Main Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990, is to ensure further growth of the prosperity of the soviet people based on the sustainable, forward-moving development of the economy and the accelerated scientific and technological advance, and to transition the economy onto the path of intensive development, more efficient use of the industrial potential of the country, and conservation by all means possible of all types of resources as well as improving the quality of work.”[\[3\]](#)

What, and how it, needs to be done in order to complete the transition to the path of intensive economy development was the recurring theme in comrade L.I.Brezhnev’s and comrade N.A.Tikhonov’s speeches, as well as in the speeches of the delegates at the congress. The discussion of measures aimed at accelerating scientific and technological advance, improving the quality of work, maximizing the use of existing major production resources and internal reserves, improving productivity, decreasing costs, and saving material resources was characterized by remarkably deep theoretical analysis as well as specificity.

So that you can better picture yourself how massive the role is of intensification and cost savings in production, I will provide a few examples.

Until recently less than half of the oil was extracted from the well. The other half remained underground. Introduction of new technologies that have now been developed allows an increase in the oil production at oilfields and receives an additional 36 million tons of oil per year.

Experts calculated that improvement of the technical characteristics of engines will allow us to save up to 7 million tons of fuel per year.

Improvements in metal rolling technology, where currently 25 million tons per year go to scrap, promise large metal savings.

The significance of the 26th congress’ decisions on the issue of the intensification of the economy, as well as on socio-economic issues in general, is in fact that they do not only encompass the eleventh five-year plan, but also the prospects for up to 1990. This approach allows us to better tie the current objectives with the long-term objectives, and to see more clearly the general perspective of the building of communism.

The congress laid out a comprehensive program for improving the prosperity of the nation. A special accent is made on improving the supply of the population with food products and industrial commodities. Having paid unremitting attention to the development of the key industry sectors, the congress at the same time envisions that the branches of type-B industry group will develop at a faster rate than the branches of type-A industry group.

A new and very important aspect of our economic construction, which you without doubt have noticed when familiarizing yourselves with the decisions of the congress, is the development of the Food Program. Its objective is to utilize the integrated development of agriculture and industrial sectors that serve it, in order to increase the food production and to achieve within a short time the task of consistent supply of the population with food products.

The term “agro-industrial complex” has become a staple in our everyday speech. It denominates a new occurrence in the economic life related to the expansion of public production and amplification of the complexity of its interrelations. The *Main Guidelines* have a special section dedicated to the agro-industrial complex. This section contains a comprehensive program of actions aimed at further development of agriculture and sectors of industry that deal with storage and processing of agricultural products. It is not enough to produce this or that product, one has to also be able to store it and to deliver it to the consumer. In the last five-year plan, despite the fact that three out of the five years had unfavorable growing conditions, the average annual grain production rate reached 205 million tons. The current five-year plan envisions that its average annual production will reach 238-243 million tons. It is planned that meat production will increase from 15.1 million tons in 1980 to 18.2 million tons in 1985. A considerable increase is planned with respect to the production of other types of agricultural products. The Central Committee points out that the solution for the food problem encompasses not only the increase in production of agricultural products but also the efforts of cutting losses during harvesting, storage and processing. This is our sizable reserve.

The Report stresses, “With respect to agriculture as a whole, it has the same primary issue that other sectors of public economy have, i.e. increasing efficacy and quality. We will continue to allocate large financial and material resources for the rural areas, and will proceed with the systematic shift of agriculture to the industrial base. But the center of gravity now (and this is a hallmark feature of the agricultural policy of the '80s) has shifted towards the return on capital, increase of productivity in agricultural sector, and deepening and improving its connections with all of the agro-business sectors.”[\[4\]](#)

It is self-evident that the achievement of the objectives set by the party in the area of economic development, of improving its effectiveness and the quality of work, requires a high-level organization of production, improvement of planning and management in public economy, as well as strengthening of workplace discipline. The higher the level of the production forces and of the economic intensification, the higher the impact of various interruptions and disruptions of normal production rhythm on the economic results, irrespective of who is responsible for them, be it higher-level planning or supply organizations or members of the production team themselves. That is why the Report pays such great attention to the issues of improving management of the economy, strengthening of the workplace discipline, and increasing the responsibility for fulfilling government plans.

Starting in the first years after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government have placed, and are placing, special emphasis on resolving social issues. Strictly speaking, the October Revolution came to be because of the objective

necessity to resolve social antagonisms stemming from the entire course of social development and induced by capitalism. Its historic mission was, specifically, to destroy the form of government based on exploitation and social inequality, and to reform all aspects of social life in accordance with socialist principles. As V.I.Lenin pointed out, the October Revolution opened the path for “building new forms of social connections between people.”[\[5\]](#)

Since then our country has advanced far ahead on the path of social progress. Communists and all of the soviet people have done a great job in this respect. They did what no one has done before them. When today we see that the new forms of social connections between people which V.I.Lenin spoke about became the reality in the society of developed socialism, we can’t help but feel proud.

In the Report, the issues of socio-political and intellectual development of the society are segregated into a special section. It analyzes in great detail the changes in the social and class structures of the society. They are characterized by converging of all classes and social groups, by strengthening of the union between workers, farmers and intelligentsia, with the working class at the vanguard, by the strengthening of the brotherly friendship between all of the national groups of our Homeland.

The Congress mapped out large-scale efforts in the area of equalizing cultural and social conditions of life of the working people in different regions of the country, of influencing the demographic processes, and improving care for families, women, war veterans and veterans of labor. In this five-year-plan the public consumption funds will significantly increase. Funding of public education and public health will be increased. Residential housing, cultural and social construction [projects] will continue on a large scale.

The Congress emphasized that at the source of national wealth and its growth is the honest and conscientious laborer, which in our socialist conditions serves as a criterion for measuring both the person’s position in the society and the benefits that this person receives from the society. The Congress also pointed out the importance of strict and consistent application of this principle, the need for increasing the control over measuring of labor and consumption.

The Congress documents reveal the party’s efforts towards forming a new man; they highly praise the development of literature and art, and their major role in the spiritual life of the people. [The documents] emphasize the significance of the principle of national identity and party values, the need for evaluating literary works and art from the class position. Due to the crucial nature of this directive and the importance of following it in our *chekist* work, I will cite an excerpt from the Report: “... lack of ideological content, unscrupulous beliefs, departure from distinctly class-specific evaluation of some of the historic events and figures, are capable of causing harm to the creativity of even gifted people. Our critics, literary journals, artistic unions and, in the first place, the party organizations [that they belong to], have to be able to correct those who are carried away in one direction or another. And, of course, very vocally and unequivocally speak out against those works of art that besmirch our soviet reality. In these cases we have to be uncompromising. The Party has never been and will not be indifferent to the ideological orientation of our art.”[\[6\]](#)

Comrades that are present in this auditorium know better than anyone else that even today we still have people who commit anti-social acts and who impede our forward movement. The incompatibility of these incidents and actions with the principles of our social life is particularly stark against the backdrop of the heroic work of soviet people who are selflessly building the new world. It is for this reason that the Report mentions that the further strengthening of material and intellectual

foundations of the social way of life is inseparable with the overcoming of everything that contradicts it. The Report points out the need for the resolute combatant of infringements on socialist property, social parasitism, alcohol abuse, bribery, and manipulations with short-supply commodities. All members of the workforce, all non-government organizations and all communists have to take part in this battle.

At the 26th Congress of the CPSU the role of law enforcement agencies was specifically emphasized. The Soviet people have the right to demand that they work with maximum efficiency, that each crime gets properly investigated and those responsible receive the punishment they deserve.

The most substantial changes in the life of our society are reflected in the new Constitution of the USSR. The Congress documents determine objectives of the development of the political system in our society, and stress the significance of improving socialist democracy. The objectives set by the Congress for the development of the soviet political system envision every possible effort for ensuring a wider participation of the workers in the administration of the government and society. The program of economic and social development planned by the 26th Congress of the CPSU from the beginning to the end reflects the interests of the people. It is for this reason that it won the hearts and minds of the soviet people who are full of resolve to implement it and to conquer new frontiers on the road to communism.

Comrades! It is well-known that with respect to international relations this reporting period was a difficult and tumultuous time. It was signified in the first place by the intensive struggle between the two directions in world politics – the course for harnessing the military arms race, strengthening of peace and promoting detente, protecting of sovereign rights and freedoms of the nations, on one side, and the course for undermining détente, escalating of the arms race, the politics of threats and interference into the business of others, suppressing of liberation struggle.

Our foreign policy has consistently maintained, and is maintaining, a very principled, class-specific character. It is directed at the strengthening of the positions of socialism, at supporting national liberation groups and promoting social progress, and ensuring peace and security of the nations.

When we talk about foreign policy, in the first place we naturally turn to our relations with brotherly socialist countries. This is due to the commonality of our class interests, the ideological unity and the common objectives of building socialism and communism. Our cooperation was vital at the time when the nations of brotherly countries were rising to fight against destruction and embarked on the path of crucial socio-economic transformations. It was also indispensable when imperialism waged a “cold war” on us.

This cooperation is especially important nowadays. The need to defend détente and to withstand the underhanded plotting of imperialism, the new large-scale objectives in the economic and social areas – all of this imposes an even higher demand [on us] to strengthen the unity and cohesion of brotherly socialist countries.

It was pointed out at the congress that on every issue of priority with respect to the socio-economic development and foreign policy, we reached a crucial unity of opinions. The main sentiment in the relations between the socialist countries is the desire to pursue even further cooperation, and to use its possibilities to [achieve] comprehensive progress both in each of the socialist countries and in the [socialist] community as a whole.

The deep understanding of the commonality of the key interests of the socialist countries, genuine interest in seeing each other succeed can be seen in the concern of the socialist countries over the situation that is taking place in Poland.

The situation there, to tell you the truth, is quite complicated. The dangerous duality of power which, as even our Polish comrades admit, have developed in the country cannot continue for long. Historical experiences show that threats to socialist gains call for resolute actions. Unfortunately we have yet to see such resolute actions.

During a recent Soviet-Polish meeting the leaders of the People's Republic of Poland stated that they were taking actions to overcome a serious imminent threat to the socialist gains of the Polish people.

As to our position, it is very clearly stated. The USSR along with other brotherly countries have always provided and will continue to provide the necessary assistance to socialist Poland and Polish communists, and will support their strenuous efforts to improve the situation in the country. This approach received full support at the 26th Congress of the CPSU and is shared by the Soviet communists and by all Soviet people.

A short note on China. The processes that take place there are complex and sometimes contradictory. In the effort of looking for ways of overcoming difficulties in economic, social and cultural areas, the Chinese leadership was forced to deviate from many Maoist postulates dating back to the "cultural revolution" time period. But by rejecting the "ultra-leftist" leaning characteristic of Mao, the current Chinese leaders are quite obviously leaning to the right. Such course doesn't bring to the Chinese workers either the expected improvement of life conditions or the revival of democratic rights and freedoms. The dissatisfaction of the working class is growing. Young people spontaneously come out to rallies and demand work and ability to study.

In these conditions the Chinese leadership resorts to the old trick of their ancient feudal rulers – they are trying to distract the people by invoking an external enemy. In this case it's the Soviet Union. Peking's foreign policy is aimed at exacerbating the international situation as they are leaning towards imperialism based on their anti-Soviet sentiments, and at undermining of the unity of the communist and labor movements.

Time will show to what extent China will be able to succeed in overcoming the pernicious Maoist legacy. As to the Soviet Union, it's not looking for a confrontation with China. We are following the course laid out by the 24th and 25th congresses of our party.

Comrades! You are aware that in the past few years we have had to work on the objectives of building [socialism] in increasingly difficult conditions. The aggressiveness of the imperialist policies, American in the first place, has drastically increased. The policy of the most extremist imperialist forces caused a considerable rise in the international tensions.

What is the cause of it? We would need to look for an answer in the class-specific composition of the capitalist countries' policies.

By exacerbating international tensions, imperialism is looking to release its deep-rooted internal conflicts, and is trying to slow down the advanced movement of the forces of socialism, of national liberation and social progress.

At one point, the leading circles of the West tried to use détente to obtain the most benefits [for themselves]. They were counting on creating greater opportunities to undermine socialism from within through ideological influence, through propagation of dissidence, through spreading ideological porousness in the soviet society. Furthermore, they were of the opinion that we, along with other socialist countries, would turn a blind eye to the fact that our society was permeated with enemy ideology, [they thought] that we would ignore the activities of the anti-social and anti-socialist elements who they call “dissidents”. The soviet people did not give imperialism this type of a discretionary right, and they never will since socio-political and ideological cohesiveness of our society is at stake.

During the years of détente certain events took place in a number of countries around the world as a result of which imperialism lost its position there. The liberated countries and Non-Aligned Movement have now positioned themselves as an important factor in international policy. The union between world socialism and the national liberation movement has grown stronger.

The ranks of the world communist movement widened even further, and the influence of communist and working class parties grew at the grassroots level. They achieved new successes in their struggle against the capitalist oppression and for the social rights of working people. The communist movement is showing a tendency to unify. Communists emerge as the most active advocates for peace and security of nations.

In these conditions the most reactionary circles of the West, having encountered the failure of their plans to gain unilateral advantages, have yet again resorted to the policy “from the position of strength.” They brought to the forefront an ardent anti-communist – the American president R. Reagan, and an ardent anti-Sovietist – the English prime-minister M. Thatcher. But as the Report states, these forces have an agenda to achieve the unachievable – to put a barrier on the path of progressive changes in the world, to regain their role as masters of the destinies of nations.

The world has changed. The times have passed when imperialism could decide on issues of war and peace as it pleased. The furtherance of peace is now a cause supported by all progressive forces around the world because they understand that it is the most important issue of our time. That is why there is so much interest towards soviet initiatives which will largely predetermine whether international development will follow the path of strengthening peace and security of nations or whether it will follow the path of the increase of the nuclear war threat. The new soviet initiatives put forward in the Report represent an organic continuation and, at the same time, development of the Peace Program relevant to the current situation at the international arena.

The workers of the socialist countries welcome the decisions of the congress. They were received with the sense of deep approval by the nations of newly liberated states, and by national liberation fighters. The workers of capitalist countries saw in it the expression of class solidarity and support. All progressive people around the globe consider the congress’ decisions a factor of great importance in the struggle for peace and social progress.

As to the ruling circles of the bourgeois states, we obviously cannot expect that they would be applauding the successes of socialism. The class sentiments of the bourgeoisie were expressed through

a new paroxysm of anti-Sovietism and anti-communism. Sentiments aside, the reality such that even the most ardent haters of socialism have to consider it. This is true both with respect to the progress in every aspect of our internal life and with respect to the effectiveness of our foreign policy initiatives.

It has been widely accepted – whether voluntarily or reluctantly, directly or indirectly – that the congress and the decisions taken by the congress will have the most crucial impact on the development of international relations as whole throughout the '80's.

Washington finds itself in a complicated situation. It is forced to make statements that soviet proposals require “serious consideration”. At the same time, contrary to the common sense, it is trying to “tie” the Soviet-American dialogue and détente to either the situation in Afghanistan or to the situation in Poland, in this way trying to hamper the real solution to current international problems.

Their blatant, cynical attempts to put an equal sign between the justified struggle of nations for their national and social liberation and “international terrorism” supposedly instigated by Moscow, sparked genuine indignation and outrage around the world.

We can only wonder how such political ignorance can still be present in capitals of western countries. Ideologists of imperialism under no circumstances will acknowledge that revolutionary, national liberation movements come to existence due to objective patterns of social development, based on the nation's volition and not because of the “directives from Moscow”.

As to our assistance to the countries who are fighting for their national independence, including military assistance, it is conducted based on these countries' governments' requests. This is a response to the attempts of exporting counter-revolution, in the first place. This is exactly the case with Afghanistan.

“Our foreign policy program, - as was stressed at the congress, - is the program of furtherance and deepening of détente, the program of struggle against the arms race.”^[7] The congress enthusiastically confirmed that the Soviet Union has both the desire and the will to fight for its implementation, to do everything possible for achieving sustainable peace on earth.

Comrades! It is quite obvious that when at our caucus meetings we discuss the main directions of internal and external policy of the CPSU determined by the 26th Congress of the CPSU, we have to, in the first place, be fully aware of the objectives the congress put forth for the state security agencies, and we have to think of how to conduct our work so that to better meet the party requirements.

The *Report to the 26th Congress of the CPSU* reads, “The fierceness of class struggle on the international arena poses high demands on the operations of the state security agencies, on the party loyalty, knowledge and working style of our *chekists*. The State Security Committee of the USSR^[8] works very proactively, and highly professionally, strictly adhering to the provisions of the Constitution and soviet laws. The *chekists* are always vigilant and watchful against the imperialist intelligence agencies' schemes. They very decisively stop actions of those who choose the path of anti-state, hostile activities, who plots against the rights of soviet people, against the interests of the soviet society. And this work deserves deep gratitude on the part of the party and all of the soviet people.”^[9]

These warm words make us happy and inspire us. But they don't only contain praise. In fact they contain the viewpoint of the Central Committee on the main aspects of work of the state security agencies in modern conditions.

What type of conclusions should we, the *chekists*, make from the international situation analysis provided at the congress? What practical actions should we undertake based on the political objectives set forth for the state security agencies by the 26th Congress of the CPSU?

The general conclusion is that the exacerbation of the international situation requires increased watchfulness, decisiveness and proactiveness in every area of *chekist* work in order to fully complete the objective of ensuring security of the country and our socialist society.

The nature of *chekists'* work, as you know, is that they are always at the forefront of the class struggle, that they don't have down time. But I believe never before, starting from the Great Patriotic War and the "cold war" years, it hasn't been as acutely apparent as it is now.

The Report states that the imperialists are waging an arms race on an unprecedented scale, and are expediting the preparations for war. Deep and detailed intelligence operations which the US and their NATO partners are conducting against the USSR and its allies, are an integral part of this.

As you know, one of the crucial elements of a nuclear strategy is to strike in such a way that one strike disables as many vital installations of the enemy as possible. And therefore the one who better knows the objectives, the intent and the whole nature of the military and political preparations of the other side, will gain the advantage long before the missiles hit the target. In this connection, long before the military confrontation comes around, a confrontation of the intelligence services springs to life. Our objective is to win it.

A key role in reaching this objective belongs to the foreign intelligence service of the KGB of the USSR. Our intelligence service has a lot of experience, draws upon glorious traditions, has at its disposal loyal, well-trained personnel, and is armed with up-to-date specialty equipment. It bravely engages the enemy.

But today we have to think about how to further increase the efficiency of the intelligence service in the face of new, more complex tasks. In short, the intelligence service needs to learn to act in a more pointed, more accurate, faster way. Its objective is not to miss the military preparations of the enemy, and of the most important enemy in the first place, its preparations for a nuclear strike, and not to miss the real risk of the outbreak of war.

Not to miss means to know the details and particulars which comprise these preparations, to be able to visualize the whole picture. We must know about the brewing military schemes of the United States, its NATO allies and Peking hegemonists, in detail, ahead of time and at the earliest possible stages.

It is equally important not to miss the possibility of an enemy breakthrough in the military and military technology areas, which may allow the enemy to disrupt the established strategic parity and to gain advantage over us.

Let's not turn a blind eye to the fact that occasionally we don't get from our intelligence the necessary concrete data about certain impending crisis situations. Occasionally, we face unexpected situations when the political situation suddenly gets tense and the counter-intelligence regime in this or that country becomes tighter.

In view of that, we need the 1st Chief Directorate and our other subdivisions who deal with mining and analysis of intelligence information, to look at their cases from a new angle and to search for additional reserves. [We need] less information of secondary importance, more important intelligence data of military, political, scientific and technological nature.

And one more thing – we need more action on main avenues related to disrupting enemy plots and preventing their subversive activities. We have to better organize operations and mobilize people, and to arm them with deep understanding of the internal dynamics of the political situation in the world, of its complexity and volatility. This is what the Report was talking about.

It is well known that a well-established intelligence service can be of no little importance to any state in achieving its foreign policy objectives. If we take the foreign policy of our socialist country, it is aimed at achieving the most honorable, most humanistic goals. It has the social justice for all working people on its side. This gives our intelligence service a special nature and a manifold increase in its power. It has to do everything possible to use its specific resources in its specific field in order to even more actively assist in carrying out the party's cause aimed at staving off the threat of war, defending détente and providing peaceful living conditions for our people, for building communism.

I have already mentioned that as part of the military preparations, our enemy is striving to learn as much detail as possible about everything around our country and in our country. Fending-off these attempts of the enemy is the job of state security agencies as a whole, but the most important role in achieving this objective belongs, quite understandably, to the counterintelligence units. Counterintelligence units can be credited with quite a number of successfully executed operations. They hold a leading position in this area. But today even counterintelligence agents have to assess their work from the point of view of increased requirements posed by the Congress' decisions, and they have to make appropriate conclusions.

Clearly in its fight against socialism the enemy will even more actively use its intelligence agencies, trying to pry into our political, military, economic, science and technical secrets. As it has happened on more than one occasion in history, an aggravated international situation and increasing military preparations of the imperialists, even now, are accompanied by stepped-up surveillance and subversive operations by the enemy intelligence agencies. Stopping the enemy is, in the first place, the job of the personnel working in the second and third lines.

In our daily work, we very clearly see that the enemy becomes more and more obnoxious in their methods of gathering information, that they become more and more brazen in conducting their surveillance and subversive operations. This increases the danger of their actions. But due to the peculiarities of the current situation, they are rushing to realize their plans. And that makes them vulnerable. This has been very skillfully used by our counterintelligence agencies on many occasions.

The increased enemy onslaught is evident from the expanded and stepped-up activity of intelligence professionals, diplomats, journalists, persons visiting the Soviet Union as tourists. They are using more sophisticated methods of spying and other intelligence and subversive activities. In these

circumstances, along with using the proven methods to combat them, we have to come up with other methods which would allow us to uncover not only the classic moves of the enemy, but all of their newest subterfuges. Counterintelligence professionals have a lot to think about with this respect, to think and to take steps to further improve the tactics of combating the enemy taking into account the new elements in the political environment and operating conditions. That being said, primary importance has to be given to tracking down their activities at an early stage, when possible, and not allowing them to get to the sites and secrets that they are interested in.

Special importance in the current situation is given to what we call security procedures, i.e. measures that are put in place to protect classified information at enterprises and organizations, as well as to regulate foreign nationals visiting our country. I cannot say that we are always displaying proper organization in this area. Why should we lie to ourselves? Some foreign journalists have lately become “naughty”, so to say. They started behaving disrespectfully towards our laws and traditions, shamelessly abusing our hospitality. Some tourists and foreign nationals who come on private business or to study, too, started behaving quite unceremoniously. We should not put up with this, especially in the current conditions.

Unfortunately, occasionally there are people in our midst who incorrectly understand the nature of some of the steps that we have taken pursuant to the Helsinki Accords. They mistakenly perceive these agreements as the weakening of the class struggle. They do not realize that the enemy is trying to use this faulty perception in order to increase their subversive activities.

The objective of the counterintelligence community is to fully engage its capabilities, and to more effectively coordinate its efforts with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, *Intourist*, management of enterprises and organizations, in order to ensure that foreign nationals strictly comply with the regulations governing their stay in our country. We have to make sure that soviet citizens who have access to state secrets, strictly comply with applicable requirements, and conduct themselves in an appropriate manner.

While I am talking about the objectives of the counterintelligence community, I would like to touch upon one more issue. The instances of industrial and railway accidents have recently spiked. For most of these incidents we have come to the conclusion that they were a result of procedural violations, safety breaches or workplace discipline violations. However, I believe that you should not be placated by that, since such incidents quite often result in fatalities, economic losses, and damage the national defense capability of our country. We shouldn't forget that these instances negatively affect people's attitudes, and can cause undesirable effects. That is why we say to the head of the regional or city KGB office that, after he makes sure that the explosion or the accident are not a result of enemy actions, he should not consider his mission accomplished and “wash off his hands”. Even if it is not an act of sabotage, it is still a serious enough reason for the *chekists* to review this incident from the point of view of its possible impact on political sentiments of the people, and to pose necessary questions to the appropriate government authorities.

I would also like to turn your attention to the following moment. Of course, an explosion or an accident are always unexpected. But blatant safety breaches, procedural violations or workplace discipline violations, which result in an accident or an explosion are not something unexpected. Our personnel should not, and moreover have no right to, ignore such violations. Taking appropriate measures to prevent emergency situations is our responsibility, too.

The Report says that in current conditions "... the activity of propaganda outlets of our class enemies has increased, their attempts to exercise corrosive influence over the minds of the soviet people have intensified."^[10] Enemy intelligence agencies in their struggle against socialism have resorted, on an even wider scale, and with even more impudence, to using the most boorish and insidious methods of ideological sabotage.

chekists have done a lot in the area of combating ideological sabotage. But the situation doesn't change. The new element in the subversive actions of the enemy has to be taken into account by our comrades who work in the fifth line; their goal now is not to ideologically brainwash loners of anti-social background, but whole groups of the population. In order to undermine the social, political and ideological unity of our society, the enemy instigates and utilizes manifestations of nationalism, chauvinism and religious prejudices. It tries to capitalize on such issues as, for example, deficiencies in healthcare and difficulties in provision of certain food products.

Of course different agencies are dealing with these issues within the limits of their authority. However, each one of these issues needs to become a focus of our attention if we see that it may result in negative consequences for state security.

In the current situation, when in accordance with the decisions that the Congress' ideological and educational work in the masses is expanding, we take a broader view of certain aspects of the preventive measures which are currently being conducted by the KGB and are aimed at preventing highly dangerous crimes against the state. We have accumulated significant experience in conducting preventive operations against certain individuals. We have to replicate [this experience] even further. At the same time we have to pay more attention to preempting negative political processes. Preventive measures need to, in the first place, preempt the emergence of these processes and committing of unlawful actions. State security agencies by virtue of the forms and methods that they use, are capable of getting to the source of these anti-social manifestations.

When we talk about the new objectives for the *chekists*, we obviously mean the activity of the agency and the troops of the KGB as a whole. In order to successfully achieve these objectives, to struggle and to win, we have to improve the quality of work and combat readiness of the operations units, border security troops, investigative divisions, as well as specialized technical and administrative services.

We need to have a well-organized service, flexible tactics, and appropriate newest, cutting-edge equipment.

The Report to the 26th Congress dedicates a lot of attention to the challenges of governance. All that has been said with respect to this issue is in every way applicable to the state security agencies and to the managers at all levels. Due to the nature of the *chekist* work, we have to deal with large cohorts of people who decide on operations' issues in a wide variety of areas. Here, even more than anywhere else, we need particular precision, speed and accuracy in fulfilling orders, as well as teamwork and camaraderie in the subdivisions.

In light of these requirements, if we assess the situation we have [in our agency], then we would have to concede that we are far from having it in order. We haven't outgrown such flaws as unnecessary paperwork, lax supervision over execution of decisions taken, and unjustified delays in fulfilling important orders and directives. I want to once again stress with urgency that in our work we cannot put

up with such a flaw as parochialism. Leaders of some subdivisions, concerned only with their own needs, do not take into account interests of other subdivisions and the KGB as whole. And it is even more unbecoming of our comrades to attempt to resolve this or that “uncomfortable” issue at someone else’s expense.

Our common goal is to create an environment in the *chekist* community where everything is subordinated to the main objective – the successful completion of tasks given to the state security agencies. As it was stressed at the Congress, we need to continue to maintain the spirit of self-criticism, and uncompromising attitude towards shortcomings. We need to display more initiative and more integrity.

I have already in the past talked about how the party and the soviet people see the *chekists*. I won’t repeat myself. I just want to stress that in light of the Congress’ decisions such requirements to the *chekists* as the deep belief in the justness of the party’s cause and unconditional loyalty to the soviet people, high professionalism, and law-abidance, become of even higher importance. A chekist must not only absorb and adopt Marxist-Leninist theory, but also be able to apply it in the struggle. We had incidents, when certain agents, when they came face-to-face with seasoned political demagoguery, so-called “dissidents”, couldn’t counter them with solid Marxist-Leninist arguments, though such arguments obviously exist.

Studying and propagating of the decisions of the 26th Congress of the party is now posed as one of the most important tasks for all party organizations. This is fully applicable to the party organization of our KGB. Its work should be even tighter connected with solving practical issues in the area of ensuring state security.

It is important today that the mobilizing influence of the party increases in every area of the agency’s operations. A truly combat-ready party organization has to unlock in every communist-*chekist* his best features, his best qualities and put them to work for our cause.

There is room for improvement in this area for party organizations, personnel departments, and heads of subdivisions.

Comrades! In the time that lapsed since the Congress, all political and work life of the country convincingly proves that the communists and all soviet people are taking the decisions and tasks given to them as their life cause. The unity between the party and the people, and the leadership role of the CPSU in our society, are reflected in this with their full force. The Report says, “The power of the party is in the unity with the people! The power of the people is in the unity with the Party and in its leadership!”^[11]

Please allow me, on behalf of the communists-*chekists*, on your behalf, to report to the Central Committee of the CPSU and to the Politburo of the Central Committee that all personnel of the agency and the troops of the KGB of the USSR wholeheartedly approve the decisions of the 26th Congress of Lenin’s Party, and will do everything possible to honorably fulfill the task of securing our Socialist Homeland!

^[1] V.I.Lenin. Complete Works, vol.40, p.142

^[2] Translator’s note: nickname for members of the KGB

[3] Materials of the 26th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, *Politizdat* Publishing House, 1981, p.139.

[4] Materials of the 26th Congress of the CPSU, p.46

[5] V.I.Lenin. Complete Works, vol.40, p.316.

[6] Materials of the 26th Congress of the CPSU, p.62

[7] Materials of the 26th Congress of the CPSU, p.219

[8] Translator's note: KGB

[9] Materials of the 26th Congress of the CPSU, p.65

[10] Materials of the 26th Congress of the CPSU, p.75

[11] Materials of the 26th Congress of the CPSU, p.219

Document No. 2

Speech by Yu. V. Andropov at the National Consultation Meetings of the Leadership of the Agency and Troops of the KGB of the USSR, 'On the Tasks of the KGB in Light of the Decisions of the 26th Congress of the CPSU,' May 25, 1981

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ON THE TASKS OF THE KGB IN LIGHT OF THE DECISIONS OF THE 26TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU

SPEECH OF THE MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREAU of the CPSU's CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY OF THE USSR (KGB), COMRAD Yu.V.ANDROPOV AT THE NATIONAL CONSULTATION MEETINGS OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE AGENCY AND TROOPS OF THE KGB OF THE USSR

May 25, 1981

Comrades!

Today will be an unforgettable day in the life of everyone who is present in this audience, and in the lives of all *chekists* of our country. It will go down in the history of state security agencies as a bright and convincing proof of the party's nurturing attitude towards its combat unit, its tool in the struggle against the class enemy. The party wants to make sure that we are always at our best when performing challenging tasks, that we are loyal to the party's and people's cause.

The fact that the General Secretary of the CPSU's Central Committee, L.I.Brezhnev, is participating in our meeting with his warm and moving words, represent to us his approval of the role and place of the state security agencies in the political system of the developed socialist society, and provide a specific program for our work.

Six years have passed since the 1975 National Consultation Meetings of the Leadership of the Agency and Troops of The KGB of the USSR. In this time big and important accomplishments have happened in the lives of the party and the country. The Soviet people successfully completed the 10th five-year-plan. Economy, culture and national wealth achieved a new level of development. The new Constitution, which reflects historic achievements of the developed socialist society, has become an integral part of our lives. Socio-political and ideological cohesion of the society has strengthened even further, the Soviet family of peoples has become even closer.

The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has become a historic milestone in the lives of the party and the country. It demonstrated the gloriousness of the Soviet people's achievements, the real-life incorporation of Lenin's ideas about transformation of the society based on new, communist values. With the party and its Central Committee at the helm, our country is on the infallible Leninist course.

The unanimous approval by the workers of the Congress' decision, the countrywide labor and political enthusiasm of which, are the proof of the inviolable union between the party and the people. This union represents the most important feature of our social life. It has been and still is the source of enormous power of our soviet society.

As to the Soviet state's international position during these years: these years have been the years of confrontation between the two types of forces. On one side, the forces who advocate the harnessing of the military arms race and the strengthening of peace and détente, and, on the other side, the forces that are ardently attacking détente, adopting the policy of the arms race and undermining peace, who are prepared to gamble with the vital interests of humankind for their personal gain. The policy of aggressive imperialist forces has resulted in a considerable increase in international tensions and all the dangerous consequences that ensue from it.

Washington and its NATO partners more and more often resort in international relations to the policy of blackmail and crude pressure. They try to impudently force their will on other countries and nations. Imperialist bigwigs put forward adventurist doctrines of either a "limited" nuclear war or a war with the use of only conventional, non-nuclear weapons.

The military threat is exacerbated by the fact that imperialism and Peking are growing closer together. Peking is practicing anti-Soviet policy and is stepping up military preparations hurting the country's economy and the vital interests of the Chinese people.

The question comes to mind: what is the reason behind the growing aggressiveness of imperialism (American imperialism in the first place)?

The starting point for answering this question should be an accurate, Marxist outlook on the nature and the source of wars and international conflicts, and hence of international tensions, and the understanding that wars and international conflicts are a product of imperialism.

The reason behind the current rise in international tension is the attempt of the imperialists to change the course of events in the international arena for their benefit and to stop the forward movement of history.

The de-escalation of international tension and its current exacerbated state are links of the same chain – the chain of events in the historic confrontation between socialism and capitalism which started the very day the Soviet state was born.

Imperialists agreed to détente not because they suddenly became "kinder." They agreed to it in the first place because the Soviet Union's defense capabilities and the power of the countries of the socialist camp grew unfathomably high. The colonial system crumbled. Heightened activity of the

working masses who protested against the aggressive policy of imperialism and the fiasco of the dirty war in Vietnam also played a role..

Détente became possible, also, because the states representing two opposing systems, at a certain point, acquired parallel interests, so to say, the [common] desire to avoid a nuclear catastrophe, to more fully utilize the benefits of the international division of labor, and to solve vital global issues.

At the same time, the position of imperialists towards détente, by virtue of their nature, has always been and will always be inconsistent. This inconsistency to large extent explains the oscillations and zigzags which are characteristic of the American ruling circles' foreign policy. The most reactionary imperialist forces, owners of the military-industrial complex, in the first place, are now revisiting their views towards détente. Emergence on the political stage of such an odious person as Reagan is not at all a coincidence. In attempts to find a way out of growing difficulties imperialists are electing, specifically, such arch-reactionists to serve as their front men.

But it's not that easy to do away with détente. It put down deep roots. Today the USA don't have the same freedom of its foreign policy manipulations. There is a number of factors which slow down and hold back the current negative trends in the Washington Administration's policy. Within the US ruling class there are circles that are aware of the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear war. They find it necessary to reach a certain level of accord with the USSR.

The position of a number of Western European countries creates a restraining influence over the aggressive forces in the USA who are trying to further aggravate Soviet-American relations. These countries more acutely feel the threat and realize the possible consequences of a nuclear war on the European continent. They display interest in the continuation of détente and in the development of cooperation with the Soviet Union in many areas.

A wide public response that the new Soviet peace initiatives, stated in the CPSU Central Committee's Report to the 26th Congress of the Party, have stirred in political and social circles around the world, confirms the correctness of the foreign policy course of our party and the Soviet State. Unfortunately, Washington and NATO do not wish to abandon their attempts to talk to us "from the position of force" and they continue the arms race. This was reflected in the latest Roman session of the NATO Council.

In the face of the increased aggression of imperialism, the party urges increased vigilance. This is the duty of every communist, of every Soviet person. And even more so, it is the duty of *chekists* who are assigned to the first line of defense against the enemy.

The Report to the 26th Congress of the CPSU says, "The acuity of the class struggle on the international arena poses high requirements on the activities of the **state security agencies**, and on the ideological conditioning, knowledge and work style of our *chekists*. The State Security Committee of the USSR works expeditiously, at a very high professional level, with strict conformance to the Constitution and Soviet law provisions. Watchfully and vigilantly, the *chekists* track the nefarious activities of imperialist intelligence agencies. They decisively thwart the actions of those who step on the path of anti-state, hostile activities, who encroach on the rights of the Soviet people and on the interests of the Soviet society." [\[1\]](#)

These warm words bring joy and inspire us. Nevertheless they contain not only a high evaluation of the *chekist's* work, but also reflect the opinion of the Central Committee on primary aspects of state security agencies' work in the current conditions of the atmosphere of heightened international tension.

The issues of improvement of *chekists'* work are the subject of our constant attention. We discussed them at the previous meetings, and the directives that were produced then are still relevant today. The present report only touches upon the most pressing issues which result from the most recent state of operations.

What challenges do the *chekists* face in the face of increased international tension? What practical measures need to be undertaken based on the political mission placed by the Party Congress on state security agencies?

The political situation in our country is good. This has a crucial influence on the operational environment. Overall the [operational environment] is favorable for us. At the same time, it is not possible to ignore that the operational environment, being more fluid than the political situation, has become more complicated in a number of areas, and in selected areas it occasionally acquires aggravated nature.

As you know, the operating environment represents a combination of such conditions as the activity of the enemy, our own abilities, and common ground for both sides' social and natural environments. It includes such important components as the objects of the enemy's aspirations and the groups of people that the enemy is counting on in its covert and subversive operations.

Analysis of the data received recently as a result of counterintelligence operations allows us to make the following conclusions about certain peculiarities of the current operating environment in this country.

First of all, the work of the party and the conditions of moral and ideological cohesiveness of the soviet nation, increased political activity and vigilance of the soviet people, have created the most favorable premises for the work of state security agencies.

At the same time, the aggravation of international tensions, accompanied by the widening scope and increased onslaught of enemy covert and subversive operations, requires from the *chekist* agencies maximum utilization of these favorable conditions in the interest of ensuring the security of the Soviet State.

The enemy operates with the ever-greater impudence and cynicism. It resorts to such extreme forms of subversive activities as terrorism and sabotage. It more and more actively combines collection of intelligence by agents with technical reconnaissance.

The United States and other capitalist countries gather intelligence with the wider use of legal positions, i.e. with the use of diplomats, journalists, and tourists whose flow [into the country] has increased in the recent years. The enemy is trying to gain access to the political, economic and military secrets of the Soviet Union, to our scientific and technical advances, especially to those in the key areas which largely determine the general balance of power between the USSR and the USA, the Warsaw Convention and NATO.

As to the ideological area, the enemy, having confirmed for itself the fruitlessness of the activities of individual anti-social elements, is now trying to influence wider groups of population with the objective to create so-called “pockets of social agitation” in order to ultimately achieve the “ideological erosion” of the soviet society.

I would like to talk about one more distinctive characteristic of the operating environment. I mean the enemy’s subversive activities in the economic area. They manifest themselves in attempts to create difficulties in our country’s national economy, to hamper the industry development rates, and to conceal from us the most important results of the scientific and technological revolution. The US government’s decision to impose an embargo on the grain trade and on the trade of some types of modern equipment with the Soviet Union is the most obvious proof of this.

These are the most important features of the current operating environment which we need to take into account when looking at the objectives that the state security agencies have, and specifically the objectives of intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies. I would like to talk more in depth about the work and objectives of specifically these two types of agencies.

Intelligence

Our intelligence service has a lot of experience, draws upon glorious traditions, has at its disposal loyal, well-trained personnel, and is armed with modern technology. It bravely engages the enemy and in a number of areas achieves reasonably good results. But today, we have to think about how to further increase the efficiency of the intelligence service in the face of new, more complex tasks.

The main objective of our intelligence service is not to miss the military preparations of the enemy, its preparations for a nuclear strike, and the real risk of the outbreak of war.

The intelligence service cannot limit itself to reflecting the picture of military preparations of the enemy in general. *It has to provide us concrete information about all important details*, which are the only way to build a comprehensive picture of the enemy’s real actions.

We have to look at the issue of analytical work of the intelligence services from a new angle. The First Main Directorate receives an enormous amount of information. The flow of information of little importance has to be minimized to make sure that the multitude of materials containing information “about everything” does not obscure issues of primary importance. We have to direct the intelligence services towards mining specifically the type of information which at that particular moment is the most pertinent.

And one more thing, the information has to be accurate, reliable and timely. If these requirements are not adhered to, this lowers the quality of intelligence work.

Gaining access to truly important military and political secrets is impossible without acquiring access to new agent networks and building new trusted connections among people who are directly connected to these secrets. In other words, we have to not just select and recruit agents but select those who could lead us to the targets and sites we are interested in.

Recruiting of a foreigner is a complicated process. It requires high levels of professionalism, the ability to utilize the whole arsenal of *chekists’* methods, and it is absolutely imperative that our

personnel possess [strong] ideological convictions. It takes brave, persistent and, most importantly, unconditional loyal intelligence agents to complete these tasks.

The current situation poses a special and urgent requirement in working with each of the agents. We need to instill in him the ability to correctly orient himself in the ongoing events and be prepared to take justified risks, to develop in him personal qualities requisite for an intelligence agent and even, to a certain degree, professionalism.

Activities of our intelligence services are directed at achieving the most honorable, humane objectives. On its side is the truth of Marxist-Leninist teachings. This gives our intelligence service a manifold increase in its power and provides it with a powerful ideological weapon in its struggle with the enemy.

This factor also creates a favorable atmosphere for establishing contacts and necessary connections and gaining trust of a foreigner and mutual understanding with him. It is important to utilize these advantages to the fullest extent.

Today, in a situation of heightened international tension and increased political aggressiveness of imperialist states and Peking hegemonists, we say that the intelligence service needs to act in a more pointed, more accurate and faster way. This is the only way it will be able to fulfill its duty.

Counter-intelligence

Counter-intelligence has to reliably protect the security of our country, its defense and economic potential, to take decisive steps against the enemy's intelligence penetration of state and military secrets. This requires constant improvement of the tactical techniques and methods of combating the enemy's agent network, their technical reconnaissance and legal intelligence networks, coming up with the most effective ways and methods which would allow us to timely uncover not only the classic moves of the enemy, but all of their newest subterfuges.

It is from these vantage points that we should approach the evaluation of the counter-intelligence activities and identify specific measures for fulfilling the requirements that are contained in the decisions of the 26th Congress of the CPSU.

Life has shown that by implementing directives of the previous consultation meeting, counter-intelligence agents to some extent, increased the level of their work in the key area of combating espionage. Enemy agents, Radzhabov, Kazachkov, Filatov, Nilov, Bumeister, Petrov, Ogorodnik, Kryuchkov, Vagin, Shchedrov and others, have been exposed and neutralized. Personnel of the Second Main Directorate, of the Third and Seventh Directorates, *chekists* from Leningrad, Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Moscow and the Moscow region, have done a great job in this respect.

Experience shows that along with already known forms of espionage, the enemy is trying to utilize more sophisticated means of gathering intelligence and performing other surveillance and subversive activities. Counterintelligence professionals have a lot to think about with this respect, to think and to take steps to further improve the methods of combating the enemy. That being said, primary importance has to be given to tracking down their activities at an early stage, when possible, and not allowing them to get to the sites and secrets that they are interested in. We have to learn to see the enemy, figuratively speaking, at the horizon, and maybe even farther out – behind the horizon.

Can we really say that today our counter-intelligence offices are prepared to solve the tasks before them at the required level that we discussed above? We would lie to ourselves if we said that everything is one hundred percent in order.

Evaluation of a number of counter-intelligence operations showed that along with certain positive results in the work of *chekist* agencies, there are serious errors in judgment. Not all agencies have taken a proactive attitude in the search for the enemy's spies and agents. There are quite a number of heads of counter-intelligence units who are counting on lucky coincidence or on good luck, in their struggle against espionage. This passive attitude, unacceptable at any time, is particularly untenable in current conditions.

Still, little attention is paid to the agent network which plays a crucial role in the operations of the second and third lines. Still, there are a number of operatives, particularly at the leadership level, who avoid direct involvement in the agent selection and recruiting activities. Moreover, there are situations when, due to the creation of district and city offices, some local KGB offices de facto delegate working with agents to them. It is possible, that these comrades do not realize that without daily, direct communication with the sources of intelligence, they can turn from *chekists* into clerks or paper pushers. Unfortunately, it has become common when young, capable operatives get promoted to leadership positions that they don't retain the connection with even a part of their agents, but pass them on, so to say, to their heirs. This is what happens: the higher such comrade moves up the career ladder, the more distant he becomes from his work with the agents. This is inadmissible.

At previous meetings the issue of developing a systematic approach in combating the enemy's intelligence agents was raised. I have to say that when it was just conceived, this method looked very promising and not without merit. However, as life has shown, not all offices and units were prepared to adopt this system, and they sometimes implemented it without taking into consideration the specific operating environment, and therefore did not achieve the expected outcomes. This also happened due to the fact that the implementation of the new system of counter-intelligence measures was not very well planned. The units of the central directorate were late switching from promoting the systematic approach to providing practical assistance to the local offices in applying it in each specific area of operations.

By analyzing the enemy's actions we come to the conclusion that it is stepping up its espionage activities and widening its "geography". But occasionally, even having information about the enemy's aspirations, we can't track its agent network, especially its underground agents.

Why is this the case? Why in some areas of our counter-intelligence activities for many years have we not received any concrete results? We should look for the reason in the first place: the fact that **we haven't yet learned to conduct active search** and often operate the old-fashioned way.

Active search means artful forecasting of the changes in the operating environment, training and education of agents, training them not to passively wait but to act purposefully. We have to widely use new capabilities of surveillance, direction finders, audio monitoring, radio communications intercept, scientific and technological research and expertise. In a word, utilize all means for exposing spies. This is what searching actively means.

Finally, active search means improving the work of both counter-intelligence and intelligence in the area of embedding agents in the enemy intelligence services and enemy sabotage training centers. This requires comprehensive use of personnel and technology in a targeted, large-scale operation in which many units and offices would be involved. We have to use information and analytical systems wider, and most importantly to plan the work in a comprehensive way both along specific lines and in the state security system as a whole.

We've talked a lot about security procedures. Nevertheless this issue requires further discussion today. Why?

We all know that security procedures that are put in place in the interest of safeguarding [classified information] at enterprises and organizations, quite often stir feelings of protest, just like any other restrictive measure would. Let's say a person wants to have a phone conversation, but the topic of the conversation is sensitive and it is not supposed to be discussed over the phone. But the person, in violation of the protocol, starts to talk in, what he thinks, a roundabout way, making hints that are not quite understandable on the other end of the call, and therefore [the listener] suggests to "hint in a more direct way." As a result, classified information gets divulged which causes harm to our state.

Not so long ago we obtained a document from one of the western intelligence services which contained transcripts of phone calls made from home phones, pay phones and car phones. I am deeply convinced that if this document was shown to the participants of these conversations, many of them would exclaim in a genuinely surprised way, "Are we really such babblers?"

Another example. At one of Leningrad factories one of the design engineers had an inspiration, so to say, and so he decided to work after hours. As you know, classified documents are supposed to be returned to the classified information department. But this is again a sort of a "security inconvenience." And, therefore, the documents didn't end up being returned for safekeeping. As a result, one of the employees of the factory who was in contact with the local CIA station, stole classified materials related to the development of communication technologies, including those in the Armed Forces of the country. To the Leningrad counter-intelligence agents' credit, I have to say that they very timely intercepted this enemy action.

I could give you a multitude of examples when security procedures were breached.

In our time, when the enemy displays a particular interest in obtaining information related to defense secrets, violating security procedures almost amounts to treason, since cut-and-dry requirements of a security manual are based on specific counter-intelligence barriers.

Some of our comrade-*chekists* insist that ensuring security is the obligation of the management of the enterprises and of the Federal Technical and Export Control Service ("*GosTechComissiya*"), and that the *chekists* don't need to actively participate in implementing security procedures because it distracts them from working with the agent network. It is well-known that nowadays the enemy obtains information with the use of technical equipment placed in space, by intercepting communication systems, and by detecting radiation from specialized products. Working with the agent network by itself won't be much help. Strict compliance with security procedures which the management of enterprises and organizations, as well as the command of military units are responsible for in the first place, is absolutely necessary. But the *chekist* offices are not absolved of the responsibility to exercise control

over compliance with the security procedures. That is why we have our personnel at many classified facilities.

In the initial, post-Helsinki, period we have lived through the pressure from the West who was trying to use the agreements in order to pursue its own agenda. We didn't budge on the crucial issues, but we have loosened the regime in some areas, including that for the diplomats, journalists and tourists visiting from western countries. At that time it was justified and necessary, since the West tied these issues with the general bulk of Helsinki agreements.

Now the situation has changed. We can and we will make certain adjustments to our counter-intelligence activities on this front.

Lately some of the employees of military attaché offices, diplomats and journalists have started displaying disrespect towards our laws and traditions, shamelessly abusing our hospitality. Some tourists and foreign nationals who come on private business or to study, too, have started behaving quite unceremoniously.

Unfortunately, we still occasionally encounter in our society people who incorrectly understand the nature of some of the steps that we have taken pursuant to the Helsinki Accords. They mistakenly perceive these agreements as the weakening of the class struggle. They do not realize that the enemy is trying to use this faulty perception in order to increase their subversive activities.

We should not put up with all of this. The objective of the counter-intelligence community is to fully engage its own capabilities, as well as the capabilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, *Intourist*, and management of enterprises and organizations, in order to ensure that foreign nationals strictly comply with the regulations governing their stay in our country. We have to make sure that Soviet citizens who have access to state secrets, strictly comply with applicable requirements and conduct themselves in an appropriate manner when traveling abroad.

Operatives who work in the area of ensuring compliance with security procedures and safeguarding classified information, have to always remember that their work is not secondary in nature. In essence, it represents preventive combating of espionage and other types of clandestine activity. That is why it is so important and significant.

Along with ensuring reliable protection of state secrets, counter-intelligence services have to use their resources to support in every possible way the implementation of the economic development program of our country.

With respect to this, I would like to point out certain aspects that require focused attention on the part of the *chekists*. In the recent years there were a number of accidents, crashes and other emergency situations at industrial and transport facilities. Investigations of these accidents show that in many cases they were a result of procedural violations, safety breaches or workplace discipline violations. Understandably the *chekists* are interested in the first place in whether this emergency situation was a result of a hostile plot, i.e. whether it is a result of enemy sabotage. This kind of question is quite justified. But it is not enough today. We cannot indifferently look at violations of traffic rules on railways or at how safety requirements are breached in the mining industry. There may not be a hostile plot in any of this, but its result is still a catastrophe. Then why should we wait for it to happen instead of taking steps to timely avert the threat of this happening?

We have to take into account that railway crashes, collapses of mines and other accidents which result in fatalities, negatively affect the attitudes of population and that, in turn, affects the state security interests.

Our comrades in the field very accurately report specific instances of collective anti-social sentiments, and they are right in doing that. But now I would like to talk about something different. Any sort of a collective anti-social sentiment does not just come about overnight on its own. There are always ringleaders and instigators of such actions. They often conduct the inflammatory campaign for a long time. Then why do our agents, our field offices not detect such processes at the inception, when they can still be averted? It is imperative that we do this, especially now, when the enemy's subversive "voices" systematically broadcast their corrupting programs in our country. Here I would like to make a side note right away – this issue is so important that we can't approach it from the narrowly departmental position, we can't get into an argument over what agents and which lines are responsible for reporting fermenting of such processes. Any information on this issue is important and valuable, but it becomes doubly valuable when it allows to prevent, and not report after the fact, manifestations of anti-social behavior.

In modern conditions the role of the Armed Forces in protecting our state increases considerably. In this connection the enemy's motives related to the Soviet Army and the NAVY are understandable. The goal of counter-intelligence as a whole is to hamper these attempts and to ensure the safety of the Armed Forces.

In the current conditions it is important to increase the level of our work, and to take a new, necessary step towards increasing mobilization and operating preparedness of state security agencies.

We are confronted by an experienced, technically well-equipped enemy, who is acting pro-actively and in a calculated manner, protecting itself from failure, camouflaging its actions, and striving to be inconspicuous. The dynamics of the developments in the operating environment requires that counter-intelligence services are able to sense changes in the actions of the enemy, that they cherish and nurture the seedlings of change in their work, that they see ahead. Our counter-intelligence service has to counter the actions of the enemy with its own pro-active approach, its logic, and its willpower.

The Congress' decisions force us to look in a new way at some of the more **crucial aspects of the work of the fifth line**. The Congress pointed out the stepped-up activity of propaganda outlets of our class enemy, and their increased attempts to exercise corrosive influence over the minds of the soviet people. Ideological subversion conducted from overseas become the main means of the enemy's subversive activities within the Soviet society.

You Comrades obviously noticed that the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Congress treats the issues of state security and security of the soviet society as a single goal. This is understandable. In the conditions of developed socialism the interests of the state and the interests of the society are inseparable. But the work of protecting the state interests and the interests of the society requires a specific approach.

Ensuring state security means using resources of state security agencies to fight foreign intelligence agencies as well as other foreign anti-Soviet centers. This work includes shutting down the

activities of spies, saboteurs and enemy agents. As can be seen, in this particular instance, this work has a very pronounced counter-intelligence nature.

When we approach the issues of protecting society, we face several other, more multi-faceted, tasks. We have to neutralize the actions of foreign ideological centers and of all sorts of other subversive centers; we have to fight their emissaries and agents. For these purposes we also use counter-intelligence resources. However, we must take into account that the said counter-intelligence operations in the fifth line are organized in the interests of society, and therefore in the interests of the people who live in this society. Here we also utilize the *chekist* methods, but they are not only counter-intelligence measures. They are prophylaxis and prevention of negative trends, drawing the attention of the public to such facts, i.e. the state security services have to actively participate in the educational function of the Soviet State.

The Party, the unions, and other public and government organizations relentlessly strengthen the social and political cohesiveness of the Soviet society and fight against the hostile influence of the West. Our objective is to clearly see our role in this important work. When the conventional education methods are not enough, we have to influence certain Soviet citizens from our positions, and if the laws are broken, then we should take enforcement actions utilizing the wide range of resources from the *chekist* arsenal.

Currently, there is no social basis in our country for the fermenting and spreading of anti-Soviet and other sort of anti-social moods. Nevertheless, based on what was said above about the international and operating environment, we can imagine that in some places, occasionally, negative moods do come to existence. These moods should not be mixed up with expressions of dissatisfaction towards poor supply, substandard living conditions, bureaucracy and so forth. But both in the former and in the latter cases, one has to assume that the enemy will try to use the said moods in order to damage the soviet regime as a whole.

Lately the imperialist intelligence services and foreign anti-Soviet centers have clearly changed their tactics in their work against the Soviet Union. While they continue supporting selected individuals from the so-called "dissatisfied intelligentsia", nationalists and religious zealots, they are trying to target larger sections of the population. Poland's negative experience stirs the appetites of western ideologists who are now trying to create, what they call, "pockets of social agitation" in other socialist countries, including the Soviet Union.

It is more noticeable that subversive centers are striving to use the church and the most fanatical part of its believers in order to fuel nationalistic, separatist and other negative moods. In order to destabilize the situation in the republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia, the enemy stepped up its Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist propaganda using the events in Iran and Afghanistan for this purpose.

We have detected attempts of the enemy to propagate through its emissaries and to transplant into our society the idea of making fashionable in the West sects and societies of religious and cabalistic nature activities of which are ultimately aimed at lowering the socio-political activity of an individual and at developing social parasitism.

The desire of the enemy to poison the working class with their libelous fabrications about the so-called "erosion of workers' rights," "social inequality of women," and "ignorance of the vital interests and needs of people with disabilities" is becoming more noticeable.

The enemy is stepping up its attempts to fuel emigration sentiment among the Jewish, German and Armenian population. Additionally, they are trying to use not only nationalistic sentiments, but also religious grounds, encouraging believers of different nationalities to leave the USSR. The ringleaders of Ukrainian, Estonian and other nationalistic organizations overseas are very loudly exploiting the topic of “the right to immigrate”.

When summarizing all of the above, one can’t help but come to the conclusion that in the area of ideological sabotage the enemy has started acting not only actively, but also in a more selective and insidious way, trying to tap into new opportunities. In these conditions the *chekists* are obliged to find new resources that would allow us to successfully prevent subversive actions of the enemy.

The workers of the fifth line have done a lot in the area of combating ideological subversive activities of the enemy. They neutralized and exposed all of the enemy’s attempts to create on the territory of our country an anti-Soviet underground and to organize legal opposition. This has helped the local party organizations to foster no-tolerance attitudes towards all sorts of negative sentiments.

Notable contribution in this work was made by the *chekists* of Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Armenia, Georgia, and Yakutia, including the Moscow City and Moscow Region Directorate of the KGB, KGB Directorate for the Leningrad Region, KGB Directorate for the Gorky Region, KGB Directorate for the Vladimir Region, KGB Directorate for the Sverdlovsk Region and KGB Directorate for the Krasnodar Region.

The new conditions, the new tasks in the area of protecting the security of the soviet society posed by the party require improvement of the *chekist* work in the fifth line.

We have to step up counter-intelligence efforts against the emissaries of subversive centers and against other ideological infiltrators. We have to strive to detect their hostile activities not in Moscow or Kiev, but over there, across the border. The KGB agency has to use the immigrant community in various countries to create favorable positions for themselves.

Inside the country we should more decisively infiltrate various illegal anti-Soviet groups, especially at the stage of their inception, and energetically work towards their disintegration and the isolation of their most active members.

The conditions of developed socialism require a different approach by the *chekists* to the soviet people who fall victims to ideological sabotage. When dealing with such people, we have to see not only the bad, the harm in what they did after getting an earful of the *Voice of America* and other enemy “voices.” It is important to be aware, in each specific case, who is in front of us – a rampant turncoat and consummate enemy, or a “lost soul” whose negative sentiment grew as a result of his inadequate ideological stability or due to some random factors like grievance, illness, and discontent with real deficiencies in our life.

This condition has always been important for *chekists*, but it has acquired a special meaning nowadays in light of the introduction of the new Constitution. If there is an enemy in front of us, we have to act ruthlessly, we have to expose and isolate it. But, if we are dealing with a human being who misstepped, who got trapped in the artfully cast nets of the enemy, then we should try to save him for the society, save him as a Soviet citizen.

That is why the chekists have long adopted such humane methods as prevention. We also have no right to forget the fact that temporary isolation of individuals who have committed crimes will not solve all of their problems without the appropriate educational intervention.

We have discussed the issue of prevention multiple times and we continue to discuss it in the *chekist* community. Some comrades view preventive work as a conversation with an individual who committed unlawful acts. If we take an individual who took the unlawful path for the first time, then such measure could be justified. Others believe that prevention has to look like a sum of chekist operations with respect to such individuals. They are probably right, too. It all depends on the level of danger to society that the committed acts represent.

The new objectives related to insulating the soviet society from the subversive activities of the enemy, have triggered the need for new methods in our work in this area. Today we talk about not only preventively working with certain individuals, but also with the processes which may affect the mindset of people and cause negative sentiments in our society.

Any anti-social sentiment, as a rule, starts within a small group of people who are initially united, not by convictions, but by attitudes, and at first do not even conceal their negative beliefs. If we manage to timely detect such groupings of people and to forestall them from growing wide and deep, then they very quickly disintegrate. To do this means to prevent, i.e. to forestall a negative event.

But if we don't react in a timely manner, then a small group may become a bigger group, the attitudes will turn into convictions and then into actions. Realizing the illegal nature of their behavior, people in these situations start to conceal their views and to introduce elements of secrecy when committing acts harmful to the society. In other words they switch to what is called semi-legal or illegal activities. Quite a number of such groups were exposed, and this has, to a great extent, disrupted the enemy's plans to create a Soviet underground.

It is known that some young people end up in the anti-Soviet crowd having started their "friendship" through crime figures or by committing criminally punishable acts themselves. Today it could be black marketeering, fencing contraband goods, or pornography trading. Tomorrow it may transform into suspicious contacts with foreigners who may provide anti-Soviet literature "for review," but in the end it leads to anti-Soviet activities.

The interlocking of subversive characters with the criminal world, and bringing political color into its activities creates favorable environment for hostile anti-social manifestations. It is because of this that chekists have to pay more attention to audacious crimes, to everything that may terrorize the population and disturb the peace of soviet citizens.

Obviously, I do not mean that we have to fully take over detection and prevention of such manifestations. This task will have to be achieved jointly by the party and Soviet organizations, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, by public organizations and others.

We operate on the premise that the protection of the interests of society is a joint area of operations for all of the party, public, and administrative agencies. *chekists* cannot carve out for themselves some sort of a very narrow professional area and say, "This belongs to us, and the rest is

none of our business.” Everything negative, foreign from our society, and that can cause unwanted incidents has to stay within our sight.

Everything I said about the operations of the fifth line is within the scope of our new objectives, our new directions of work. But this doesn’t mean at all that the previous directions of *chekist* work will be removed from the agenda. Work with emigrants and emigration centers, combating terrorism, thwarting subversive activities of the bourgeois nationalists, Zionists and other elements, will still continue to be relevant.

Our advantage is in the fact that in these areas we possess a well-functioning and proven, by our vast experience, system. However, the enemy maneuvers and widens the battle ground, and we in our work need to devise and take our own measures against these enemy actions.

With respect to the protection of the interests of Soviet citizens and the careful consideration of unlawful actions committed by them, I would like to praise the work of the investigative agencies. They are an important link in exposing and thwarting criminal activity. At the same time, they, like a mirror, reflect all strengths and weaknesses of the information gathered by the KGB and presented to law enforcement. It is specifically investigative agencies who assist the operations units and who give an unbiased evaluation of the evidence collected in the case.

In light of everything said above, this area of our work is becoming increasingly important. Therefore, everyone who works in this area has a special responsibility.

Border Security Troops

At the previous meetings, I had a sense that border security work was to some extent underestimated. Some comrades argued that now, when our country is flooded by tourists, including specialists and representatives of capitalist companies, when spies and emissaries are hiding in their midst, and when intelligence operatives, as a rule, hide behind diplomatic passports, border protection loses its original meaning.

Life has shown the groundlessness of such arguments. The situation at the border did not become “carefree,” but, on the contrary, became even more intense. This happened every time the enemies of socialism were making aggressive preparations against our socialist Homeland. This is what is happening now. In the last year alone, at different sections of the border, we have intercepted 1,200 violators. Among them there are individuals who belong to enemy intelligence services. We discovered and confiscated a large amount of ideologically harmful materials, contraband goods and foreign currency.

The Command of Border Security Troops and the leadership of the KGB have conducted significant work to correct the organizational misalignment in the area of border protection. Based on experience, as well as on suggestions that came from party organizations of a number of republics and border zones, we made a decision to put an outpost, a checkpoint, or a ship at the core of the border security service. We have reinstated, though not in full scope, border command posts. The measures taken have increased border security, and put border security personnel closer to the frontiers, i.e. directly where the issues of border protection should be resolved.

In recent years, in accordance with the decisions of the Central Committee to strengthen the border at the Far East, new border districts, border security task forces and border security units have been created. Troops received first-class weapons, as well as specialized and engineering equipment. The Coast Guard has undergone qualitative changes. New ships are capable of accomplishing the most serious military and operating tasks. They carry powerful weapons and are comfortable for the work and life of their crews.

Due to the increasing interest of the enemy towards the Arctic, we are taking important measures to increase border security in the Arctic Sector, including on the most remote northern islands.

Border security agents of the Central Asian and Eastern districts have undergone a rigorous test of their moral, political and combat characteristics. They have taken part in the international assistance to Afghanistan. In difficult conditions in the Hindu Kush and Pamir mountains they are fighting counter-revolutionary gangs who are armed with American, English and Chinese weapons and are trained by foreign instructors. They have proven that they are truly first-class, well-trained troops. Let all of the border security agents be worthy of such high military honor!

Comrades! Never since the Great Patriotic War and the tense “cold war” periods, was our confrontation with the enemy’s intelligence services as intense as it is now. The challenging tasks posed in front of *chekists* require organization and active participation of all of the personnel of the agency and troops of the KGB. This is what the party and ideological work should be directed at right now throughout the agency and in the troops.

We have to work and fight like we are in the frontlines, and follow the tough rules which the current situation dictates. This means that everyone should be fully engaged, and should put their full effort into their work. This is specifically what our party requires from the *chekists*. These requirements stem from the decisions of the 26th Congress of the CPSU.

The most important factor of successful work of state security services is the leadership of our Communist Party. This leadership has always been, is, and will always be the highest guidepost for the KGB’s work. The Central Committee and the Politburo of the CPSU’s Central Committee show everyday care about the *chekists*. They pay a lot of attention to the organization of their work, and they continuously monitor and guide it.

The participants of this meeting would like to assure the Central Committee of our Leninist Party, and the Soviet Government that the *chekists* will give everything in order to fulfill the task of providing security for our socialist Homeland.

[1] Materials of the 26th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, *Politizdat* Publishing House, 1981, p.65

Document No. 3

[Memorandum from S.N. Mukha to Comrade V.V. Shcherbitsky, July 5, 1982](#)

[Source: GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 7, d. 2, t. 5, pp. 78-79. Obtained by Nate Jones and translated by Angela Greenfield.]

State Security Committee (KGB) of the Ukrainian SSR

State Security Committee (KGB) Of the Ukrainian SSR

July 5, 1982

City of Kiev

No.190

~~Classified~~Declassified[1]

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Private and Confidential

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE
to Comrade V.V.Shcherbitsky

Memorandum

In 1978 the State Security Committee of Ukraine, to obtain intelligence in the area of science and technology, recruited a citizen of the US, the Vice-President of an American company *Consarc*. The agent's code name is "Michael."

During the term of the cooperation the source gathered and transferred around 70 specimens of technical and technological information related to specialized materials science. All of the information obtained from him is pertinent to the objectives of the Military-Industrial Commission of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Main Objectives of the science and technology intelligence services. It received positive evaluation from the KGB of the USSR and from the defense industry.

Considering the many years of "Michael's" practical work in the area of specialized materials science, his knowledge of the trends in science and technology development in the US and his knowledge of the nuances of many technological processes, at the end of 1981 Center decided to use the agent as an unofficial consultant of the Ministry of the Defense Industry of the USSR on issues surrounding the technology of the production of carbon-carbon composite materials used for thermal protection in missile and space equipment. The respective directives task the Ministry to master, by the end of 1984, a commercial production technique for producing specialized products using these materials.

Starting December 1981 through June 1982, on the territory of the USSR, under the seal of secrecy and without unmasking the identities of the participants, there were five meetings conducted between "Michael" and the experts of the Ministry of the Defense Industry of the USSR. As a result, the source turned over a set of drawings of vacuum induction furnaces used for manufacturing products from carbon-carbon composite materials, as well as information shedding light on many of the specific details and nuances of the production technology, which allowed the Ministry to determine which production equipment the industry needs to complete the program of retrofitting the domestically produced intercontinental ballistic missiles with the new thermal protection materials. The information, both oral and written, transferred by "Michael" was found valuable by the Ministry of the Defense Industry of the USSR.

Based on the obtained information, the Ministry of the Defense Industry of the USSR decided in May 1982 to purchase from the agent production equipment in order to manufacture products from these materials. Due to the fact that the necessary equipment was placed, by the US Administration, on the embargo list, "Michael" suggested that he will deliver the equipment to the USSR by employing certain subterfuges through a subsidiary company in Scotland. The Ministry allocated 5 million US dollars for the trial order of the equipment. Simultaneously, through the Military-Industrial Commission of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the agent was issued 40 thousand rubles in hard currency equivalent as a payment for the provided information.

Information obtained from "Michael" is of cross-sectoral importance, i.e. apart from the Ministry of the Defense Industry of the USSR it is also going to be disseminated through the KGB information service to the Ministry of Mechanical Engineering and the Ministry of Medium Machine Building[2].

The efforts to use the source as a consultant for the defense industry with respect to specialized materials are currently underway in close cooperation and under the leadership of the KGB of the USSR.

We are going to continue reporting on the progress of further work with "Michael."

Chairman of the State Security Committee
Of the Ukrainian SSR,
[signature] S.N.Mukha

[1] Translator's note: Handwritten note in Ukrainian states: "Declassified on 08/30/2013"

[2] Translator's note: The Ministry of Medium Machine-Building of the USSR was the ministry which supervised the Soviet nuclear industry, including production of nuclear warheads. It was established on June 26, 1953. On September 11, 1989 the Ministry of Medium Machine Building was renamed into the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry of the USSR.

Document No. 4

V.M. Chebrikov, 'On the Results of the November 1982 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee and the Tasks of the Party Chapter of the KGB of the USSR that follow from the Plenary Meeting's Decision and from the Speech of the General Secretary,' January 13, 1983

[Source: 'Deiatel'nost' Organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR na Sovremennom etape: Sbornik Dokumentov i materialov,' No. 15918, Vypusk 2 (Moskva: 1983), in GDA SBU, f. 13, o. 768, pp. 117-134. Obtained by Nate Jones and translated by Angela Greenfield.]

ON THE RESULTS OF THE NOVEMBER 1982 PLENARY MEETING OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE TASKS OF THE PARTY CHAPTER OF THE KGB OF THE USSR THAT FOLLOW FROM THE PLENARY MEETING'S DECISIONS AND FROM THE SPEECH OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE COMRAD Yu.V.ANDROPOV

**SPEECH OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE SECURITY COMMITTEE OF THE USSR (KGB), COMRADE V.M.CHEBRIKOV AT THE MEETING OF THE KGB CAUCUS OF THE PARTY
January 12, 1983**

Comrades!

We are here today to discuss the results of the November 1982 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee and the tasks of the KGB party chapter in light of its decisions.

These days soviet people live in an atmosphere of political and labor uplift caused by the decisions of the Plenary Meeting and the notable anniversary – the 60-year anniversary – of the USSR. The communists and all Soviet people are taking as guidance the provisions and the conclusions of the speech of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, delivered at the Plenary Meeting.

Today, in this audience, there are comrades which, just like myself, had the opportunity to work alongside Yuri Vladimirovich, who for fifteen years was head of the State Security Committee. Comrade Yu.V.Andropov gained high standing and deep respect of the communists, of all of the Soviet people, and is regarded as a talented and unconditionally loyal to communist ideals, party member and statesperson, who firmly follows Lenin's legacy. He is a man of high culture, broad outlook on the world, and outstanding professional and personal qualities. Yuri Vladimirovich united and inspired us, in the first place, with his personal example. Every day he displayed examples of selfless dedication to work, self-discipline, humility, and sensitivity. From him we learned, and continue to learn, to act with skill and decisiveness on the frontlines of the class struggle between socialism and imperialism and to direct our efforts towards the successful implementation of domestic and foreign policy of the party.

Under the leadership of comrade Yu.V.Andropov the state security service successfully achieved the objective of reliably protecting the Soviet State and society from the nefarious activities of imperialistic clandestine agencies, and decisively put a stop to the activities of those who took a path of anti-government, hostile actions, who threatened the interests of our Homeland. And today, having contributed to the glorious traditions of the VCheKa^[1] and KGB, officers of the state security service spare no effort, and their lives when needed, to honorably fulfill their duty before the party and the people. They work in difficult and sometimes critical situations. But no matter where they are, the chekists act bravely, displaying courage and heroism, and they do everything possible to successfully complete the tasks assigned to them.

It won't be an exaggeration to say that the modern generation of state security agents is made up of the *chekists* who were schooled under Andropov.

Comrades! The work of the November Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee, the joint ceremonial meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, Supreme Council of the USSR and the Supreme Council of the RSFSR have convincingly demonstrated the monolithic cohesion of the party, with the communists and all soviet people tightly united around the Leninist Central Committee and the Politburo of the Central Committee. The decisions of the Plenary Meeting gained whole-hearted and unanimous support of all soviet people.

A number of issues addressed at the Plenary Meeting have crucial importance for the development of our economy. I will touch upon only the most important issues which are currently at the center of attention of the Central Committee and of our whole party.

I am referring, in the first place, to the fact that the party and the people have to direct all of their efforts towards implementing the most important task posed by the 26th CPSU Congress, the task of greater intensifying the production of public goods as well as increasing the efficiency of the public

economy. The Central Committee of the CPSU demands an increase in the efforts to further streamline planning and management of the economy and improve the style and methods of economic management. The decision was taken to maximize the utilization of the available capabilities in order to improve the management of the economy, boost scientific and technological progress, increase productivity, and increase the production volume and quality of goods. The Plenary Meeting raised the issue of the pressing need for strengthening public compliance, work-place discipline and implementation standards at every stage of production and management. Special attention is dedicated by the party to the improvement of the situation in the transport industry, iron and steel industry, and capital projects. Key importance is given to the saving of fuel, raw materials, and metal and other materials, as well as financial assets. We have to ensure the utmost efficiency of the use of labor resources.

The November Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee discussed measures for accelerating the fulfillment of the USSR Food Program which, as we all know, occupies the central place in our plans and is of primary importance for the growth and prosperity of the soviet people.

It is of primary importance that the decisions of the Plenary Meeting are already being translated into concrete and meaningful measures for the increased accountability of the assigned tasks at every level.

The shared understanding and businesslike atmosphere, which characterized the work of the Plenary Meeting, the depth and the principled nature of the discussion of vital issues, the measured, scientific approach to solutions, the consistent commitment to state-wide and nation-wide interests, the cause chosen by the Central Committee to decisively and uncompromisingly eradicate any sort of negative manifestations in our society, all of which is evidence of the unalterable resolve of the party to follow the legacy of the Great Lenin every time and in everything!

The discussion of the November Plenary Meeting documents which took place in all party chapters of the KGB Central Apparatus show that the Soviet *chekists* wholeheartedly approve the results of the Plenary Meeting. The decisions of the Plenary Meeting are accepted as a basis for all organizational, ideological, and political work aimed at mobilizing the communists and all members of the personnel to fulfill difficult and demanding tasks that the state security service is facing. Today we have to check our work against those high requirements that the Party Central Committee has posed us, and narrow down our goals.

As the November Plenary Meeting pointed out, the primary concern of the CPSU and the Soviet State has always been, and still is, the elimination of the nuclear war threat hanging over humankind. Universal peace, friendship and cooperation between nations – these are our goals.

The policy of peace conducted by the Soviet Union, along with other socialist countries, is confronted by the aggressive course of imperialist reactionaries, who dangerously escalate the international situation. The tone of the politics of the United States and their NATO partners, today, is set by the most adventurist and militant groups whose class hatred towards socialism overrides their common sense. Judging by the words and actions of some politicians in the West who have lost touch with reality, American imperialism and other international reactionary forces are striving to use any available means to fight the real socialism by any means in order to stop the losses that the capitalist system sustained in the '70's.

The class enemy is directing their efforts towards undermining and weakening the military and economic potential and the social and political system of the Soviet Union – the main stronghold of the socialist block and progressive forces around the globe.

All of this poses to the state security services difficult and challenging tasks. It requires that they develop and implement effective measures to disrupt enemy's plots.

Comrades! The main tactical and strategical directions of state security services' work at the present stage were determined in accordance with the directives of the CPSU Central Committee at the May 1981 National Consultation Meetings of the Leadership of the Agency and Troops of the KGB of the USSR.

In his report at this meeting Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov gave clear and articulate directions in every area of the *chekists'* work.

The substance of these directions, as we all know, is that in the atmosphere of heightened international tensions caused by aggressive attempts and subversive activities of the imperialist reactionaries, the state security services, when confronting the enemy, have to act more decisively and in a more offensive mode.

We are called to, in the first place, not miss the preparations of the enemy for a nuclear strike and not miss the real threat of the outbreak of a war. We are called upon to secure the safety of our state, to protect the interests of our society from any type of encroachment on the part of the enemies of socialism, and to decisively crack down on any attempts by the enemy to hurt the defense and economic potential of our country.

The conclusions and directions of the May 1981 National Consultation Meetings are fully relevant to this day. Moving forward, we will continue to strictly adhere to the directions provided at this meeting, with an adjustment for the changes that are taking place in the political and operating environment now.

So what are the characteristic features of the current operating environment?

Following the general aggressive and adventurist course of US leading circles and their NATO allies, the clandestine services of imperialist states, centers for ideological sabotage, and foreign anti-communist organizations have significantly increased their subversive activities. The enemy is now acting in a more brazen, sophisticated manner. They now resort to all sorts of shady schemes and provocations.

The leading role in organizing and conducting subversive activities against us belongs to the government and clandestine services of the USA. The American Administration has undertaken a number of steps aimed at an even greater involvement of clandestine services in furthering the American imperialist plans. The mandate of the CIA to conduct "clandestine operations" against socialist countries has been broadened. Directive No.4 signed by Reagan contains instructions to the US clandestine services to closely cooperate with each other in achieving their set goals. It stresses that the government of the US intends to spend "as much money as needed to obtain intelligence information."

Under pressure from the US government, the clandestine services of the FRG, England, Japan, Israel and some other imperialistic states have noticeably stepped up their espionage and subversive activities.

In a situation where the leading circles of American imperialism are trying to violate the established balance of power in the world and ensure their military and strategic superiority, the subversive activities against our country have acquired an all-out character. In order to obtain intelligence, along with recruiting agents and infiltrating us with spies, they increasingly use space, state-of-the-art developments in radio and electronic technologies, and other areas of science and technology.

Clandestine services of imperialist states have increased their efforts to obtain information about the defense and economic might of the Soviet Union and other countries of The Warsaw Treaty and about the foreign policy activities planned in the USSR and other socialist block countries. They have heightened their interest towards information about socio-political situations in our country and about the relations between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Western clandestine services strive to infiltrate ministries, government agencies, science research centers, defense, military and other facilities identified as targets for their espionage efforts in the Soviet Union and in other countries of the socialist block. They pay special attention to grooming and turning some of the soviet citizens who are staying abroad.

The enemy constantly creates obstructions to the normal work of diplomatic, trade and other representations of socialist states in the Western countries, conducts all sorts of provocations against them, and ratchets up the atmosphere of spy mania. They instigate campaigns to accuse socialist countries of supporting international terrorism. They undertake attempts to insinuate their involvement in some terrorist attacks that stirred a wide public response, as we can see from the made-up stories spread by the West about the attempted assassination of the Pope.

Apart from intelligence officers of imperialist states, the espionage work is performed by diplomats, reporters, representatives of commercial and production companies, and tourists who are sent by the enemy as its agents to the USSR and other socialist countries.

Striving to undermine the socialist system from within, the enemy is using every possible means to broaden and organizationally improve the mechanism of ideological sabotage, and to improve its technological base. The work of this mechanism is directed and coordinated at the government level.

In the summer of 1982, during his speech at the opening ceremony of the so-called "captive nations week," US President Reagan stated that "conducting an ideological war may become the cheapest and most effective weapon to achieve the objectives that the administration set with respect to the socialist countries."

In accordance with the directives of the American Administration, the direction and the tone of the subversive propaganda has noticeably changed, it has acquired an all-out character and essentially turned into a "psychological war." Its main components, in addition to blatant anti-Sovietism, are open incitement of subversive activities, open calls for fighting against the existing form of government in the USSR, and specific recommendations to the anti-Soviet and anti-social individuals on how to organize underground activities.

The enemy is looking for like-minded people, trying to strike relationships with hostile elements on the territory of the USSR, to step up their activity, to create on this basis so-called “pockets of social agitation,” and to ultimately create political opposition to the Soviet system. Striving to achieve this goal, they use various subversive methods and increase their hostile activity from illegal positions. The trend towards illegal clandestine activities can currently be traced in directives of almost all foreign subversive centers.

For instance, one of the documents of a foreign anti-Soviet organization, the “People's Labor Union,” closely connected with the CIA, contains a call for organizing “underground groups of like-minded people” at production factories in the Soviet Union. This document directly states that “we need to strive to create a wide, invisible organization. Local groups are its foundation... These groups have to establish connections between each other which should be securely protected from security services... They have to systematically and energetically penetrate and infiltrate the current government structure and management, the party, state and economic agencies, and any government organizations... The activity of invisible organizations have to be developed in three directions: gathering of information... spreading of information... organization of political actions.”

As they say, comments in this regard are superfluous.

While orienting the hostile elements towards illegal activities, the enemy is striving, at the same time, to use any opportunity to conduct subversive activities from legal positions, too. It is indicative that seven years ago they attempted to use the Helsinki Accords for this purpose. This manifested in the creation of so-called “Helsinki Groups,” or rather chain-links in an anti-Soviet organization, the unification of which, in accordance with the enemy scheme, could have led to the advent of legal opposition in the USSR. Currently the enemy is striving to create a similar anti-Soviet formation under the flag of “fighting for peace”. They instigated the creation of the so-called “Trust Group.” The emergence of this group is evidence that there is an active search underway to develop new forms of subversive activities against our country.

Clandestine services of imperialist countries have stepped up their efforts to undermine the economy of the USSR. The enemy continuously finds new ways to conduct economic sabotage, going to any lengths to complicate and slow down the implementation of the development plans of our national economy. Yet again, just like during the “cold war” years, they are using against us a full arsenal of clandestine and subversive tools. A particular attention is being paid by the imperialist states and their clandestine services to the development of operations aimed at impeding the fulfillment of our Food Program and complicating the situation in transportation and other vital areas of our economy.

The enemy doesn't stop short of employing such extreme forms of fighting as terrorism. Clandestine services of imperialist states conduct terrorist attacks against Soviet agencies and citizens abroad. We have information that some foreign anti-Soviet organizations commenced the training of terrorists with the purpose of committing criminal acts on the territory of our country.

Comrades! The decisions of the Central Committee's November Plenary Meeting, as well as the guidelines and conclusions contained in Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov's speech at the Plenary Meeting, require that we raise to a new, higher level of the quality of work and professionalism in the KGB agency and troops in order to ensure the security of the Soviet state and society. We have to decisively and timely thwart any enemy attempts aimed at complicating the internal political situation in the country

and at impeding the implementation of the CPSU foreign policy course. We are obligated to use our specialized tools to facilitate the unconditional fulfillment of the November Plenary Meeting's decisions.

An important role in achieving these objectives belongs to the party chapters. They have to direct all of their attention to the qualitative improvement of work ethics at all branches of the *chekist* agency, to increasing the effectiveness of control and compliance audits at every level of operational activities, and to become an example of the fighting spirit and commitment to principles, initiative and tenacity.

All organizational and ideological work of the communist managers, party committees and party bureaus, of the party caucus, of the Komsomol and workers' unions have to be directed at the unconditional fulfillment of the decisions of the 26th Congress of the CPSU, directives of the May 1981 National Consultation Meetings decisions of the Panel of the KGB with respect to the improvement of operational activities, and increasing combat and mobilization readiness of the agency and troops of the KGB of the USSR. These are the most important things, Comrades!

In accordance with the decisions of the November Plenary Meeting, we have to concentrate our operational efforts and resources in the most crucial, key areas and sectors of the confrontation with the enemies of socialism. For this purpose we need:

First, to conduct a broad organizational effort to study and interpret the Plenary Meeting's decisions as they relate to the specific areas of the *chekist* work;

Second, to identify and put to work unused reserves in order to improve our work overall.

Third, to strive to get to the point where each operative has a good understanding of how our successes depend on his personal contribution to the common cause of securing the state, how conscientiously he follows the party line, and carries out his official duties.

Now let me touch upon some of the issues in operating activities which have the most crucial importance in light of the November Plenary Meeting's decisions.

As it was mentioned at the Plenary Meeting, "the aggressive schemes of imperialists force us, along with the brotherly socialist states, to take care, and serious care at that, of maintaining our defense capabilities at the appropriate level." [2] And, therefore, it is of crucial importance that our foreign intelligence provides timely and accurate information about political and military plans and plots of the imperialists, about real threats of a war breaking out, and, first of all, about the enemy's preparations for a sudden nuclear strike.

We need to know what issues the enemy is working on in the area of improvement of their strategic weapons and creating fundamentally new warfare.

Intelligence services need to be more persistent in getting information which could be used to further advance science and technology and to develop the economic and military potential of the country. The responsibilities of the First Chief Directorate and other KGB subdivisions with respect to ensuring the security of soviet installations and people overseas, are growing. *chekists* need to act courageously and purposefully and subordinate everything to the achievement of the set goals.

Our intelligence service has always had to work in tough, difficult conditions, but today they stand their critical watch far away from their Homeland in a very complicated environment.

I am convinced that the leadership of the First Chief Directorate takes this into account and does everything necessary to ensure that even in the current environment the tasks posed in front of the intelligence service are completed successfully.

In light of the decisions taken at the November Plenary Meeting and other party directives, counter-intelligence has to mobilize all of its capabilities in order to ensure the timely detection and thwarting of any attempts to cause harm to the economic and defense might of our country, and to securely protect state and military secrets.

It is necessary to continue to comprehensively improve counter-intelligence measures, and pay special attention to increasing the effectiveness of fighting espionage conducted from legal and illegal positions.

Counter-intelligence activities have to have a purposeful and creative nature. We have to actively search for western clandestine agents, and more effectively expose their espionage activities on the territory of our country. It is imperative that we step-up our activities in the international exchange sphere. We have to timely detect, expose and compromise any attempts of the enemy to use for their hostile purposes something that is meant to strengthen international cooperation and promote the development of détente. We have to try our best to make them lose their taste for such activities.

The counter-intelligence *chekists* are obliged to improve the system of counter-intelligence measures in order to combat the enemy's technical reconnaissance. An important task of counter-intelligence units is, to the maximum extent possible, to utilize existing capabilities in order to obtain intelligence on political, defense, science, technology and economic issues, the application of which may assist in the foreign policy course of the party, in strengthening the defense capabilities of the country, and enhance scientific and technological advancement.

In today's complicated international environment Army and NAVY *chekists* have to constantly improve counter-intelligence support of the Soviet Military Forces, and, by effectively utilizing all available operating capabilities, to make every effort to assist in increasing their combat readiness and their ability to deal a devastating blow to the aggressor no matter under what conditions it sets off a war. Military counter-intelligence officers have to fully apply themselves to ensure the security of strategic missile forces, of the fleet deployed in the World Ocean and of the strike groups located at primary strategic theaters, as well as the units and formations who are in a constant state of combat-readiness. We have to pay more attention to the protection of the military economy, the Military Forces' system of combat and materiel supply.

As you know, ideological sabotage is the main means of subversive activities that the enemy uses inside Soviet society at the current stage. In order to successfully combat ideological sabotage we have to know the operative environment well, and specifically, the environment which is the target of the enemy's subversive activities. In addition to carefully checking on all of the leads about the planned hostile actions, this will allow us to achieve the main objective – to prevent anti-Soviet and anti-social manifestations on the territory of our country. Ultimately, the criteria for evaluation of the success of the *chekist* operations should be, as Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov pointed out, their ability to prevent unwanted manifestations or criminal acts.

We have to raise the quality of work in identifying and documenting criminal activities of hostile elements, in order to have the ability to timely and decisively thwart them and apply to the enemies of our form of government the principle of inevitability of punishment for the committed criminal offenses. In this work we ought to strictly follow the Soviet laws.

It is important to be able to see the changes in the enemy's tactics. Right now they are betting on the instigation of nationalistic attitudes by undermining the greatest achievement of the Soviet state – the friendship of the peoples. It is known, that inter-ethnic issues in our country, which were left behind for us by the exploitative regime, have been resolved once and for all. Of course, at the same time, we need to remember, as comrade Yu.V.Andropov stressed in his speech called "Sixty Year Anniversary of the USSR," that in the cultural heritage, in the traditions, in everyday life of each ethnic group there is not only good, but also bad, obsolete. We still encounter manifestations of national cockiness, of arrogance, of tendencies towards segregation and disrespectful treatment of other nations and nationalities. It is those negative manifestations that the clandestine services and ideological subversive centers of the enemy, as well as nationalistic elements, are trying to instigate and use in their subversive activities.

It is worth pointing out that we were successful in disrupting the enemy attempts to implement their hostile plans. Our agents acquired specific operational skills in combating nationalistic manifestations, and they achieved reasonable results. However, taking into account that the enemy bets on nationalism as the means for undermining the cohesiveness of the Soviet multi-national state, we have to continue to improve our tactics, and meticulously monitor the situation in nationalistic circles, and take necessary measures in a timely manner.

I feel like today it is particularly necessary to touch upon the issues of *chekist* work in the area of transportation. First of all, it is because the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee is concerned about the state of affairs in the transportation sphere. This was also very candidly discussed at the November Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee.

What is the central point of the issue? The central point is, in fact, that transportation, which plays a vital role in the state, is still not able to satisfy the increased demand for transportation services in the country. This creates serious complications for the development of the whole economy, including our defense industry. Therefore the November Plenary Meeting defined as a task of primary importance, the closing of the gap between transportation supply and the demand of the soviet economy.

In principle, the *chekist* work in the transportation sphere is not a new activity for us. Back in the first years of the Soviet rule, on a direct order from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission^[3] helped the party to ensure the uninterrupted work of railways in the country. Lenin viewed this problem as crucial for building the foundation for the socialist economy.

In current conditions it has again become necessary to use the resources of the state security services in order to assist transportation agencies to ensure uninterrupted work of the transportation network of the country. On the initiative of Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, and in accordance with the decision of the CPSU Central Committee, in September 1981 the Fourth Directorate and respective local subdivisions were created within the State Security Committee in order to conduct *chekist* work in the sphere of transportation.

The directorate has its own personnel and clearly defined objectives. The relevant subdivisions commenced work at line maintenance facilities, and this work is already showing tangible results.

At this time the most important thing is to raise the quality of this work to the level required by the party.

Within the scope of our work we have to concentrate our efforts on the following primary areas:

- on protecting our transport from the subversive actions of the enemy clandestine services;
- on preventing any emergency situations;
- on providing any possible assistance to the party, government, and commercial entities in improving order and organization on main traffic arteries.

I'll go even further – we have to treat this important assignment given to us by the party as one of the top-priority tasks which we have to fulfill as soon as possible.

The November Plenary Meeting, with urgency, brought up an issue of pressing necessity to considerably raise the efficiency of our economy. The Party assigned state security agencies challenging tasks related to protecting the country's economy. We have to use the directives of the May 1981 National Meetings as guidance in this work.

The *chekists* have to, first of all, protect the soviet economy from any subversive attempts of the imperialist clandestine services. For this we need to do everything possible to improve our work in the area of thwarting the attempts by enemy spy agencies to penetrate, through their agents, our defense facilities, industrial production facilities, transportation facilities and communications facilities, as well as science, technology and design centers and enterprises. We have a challenging task in front of us – to provide reliable protection of defense, science, technology and economic secrets. We have to timely expose the enemy's attempts to hurt our economy using international trade and economic relations channels. Of no less importance is to use *chekist* resources to prevent various violations and malfeasances in the economy which may lead to adverse political and social developments. We are obliged to react with urgency to the alerts about the formation of preconditions for emergency situations, which may cause fatalities and serious financial losses.

In October 1982 the CPSU Central Committee made a decision to create within the State Security Committee of the USSR^[4] an autonomous Sixth Directorate with the respective local subdivisions in the regional KGB offices, which were tasked with conducting counter-intelligence activities to protect the country's economy from the subversive activities of the enemy. Based on the directives of the CPSU Central Committee, the KGB Panel determined the objectives for the state security services in this important area of *chekist* activities. When working towards achieving them, we have to take into account that the work in this area requires a creative, thought-through and well-grounded approach.

The KGB Panel pays special attention to the fact that all intelligence subdivisions – Second and Third Chief Directorates, Fourth, Fifth and Six Directorates of the KGB of the USSR, and respective local subdivisions, have to work in the closest possible cooperation, in a coordinated and purpose-driven manner, and in an atmosphere of mutual understanding. Only under this condition counter-intelligence service will be able to effectively fulfill the challenging tasks posed upon it.

At the head of our counter-intelligence subdivisions there are experienced *chekists* and proven leaders. There is no doubt that they take into consideration new tendencies in the enemy's activities, when they organize work towards improving the methods that have already paid off, as well as look for new methods which would allow our counter-intelligence to confidently and timely expose the most sophisticated ruses of the enemy clandestine services.

Our border security personnel stand watch in cooperation with the counter-intelligence subdivisions. They successfully complete tasks assigned to them, and they carry out, with honor, their international duty to help the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan protect its young state from the aggressive actions of imperialism. In current conditions border security troops are obliged to increase the level of protection of the frontiers of our Homeland, and to push back on those who have the audacity to attempt to entrench upon the sovereignty of our border. The Command and the Military Council of the Border Security Troops of the KGB need to do everything necessary, so that on March 1, 1983 Border Security Troops can seamlessly, in an orderly fashion, bring their work into full compliance with the new Law on the State Border of the USSR.

All activities of the State Security Committee – one of the most crucial elements of the government apparatus of our country, have to be conducted in strict conformance with the current legislation. A communist in a leadership position, no matter what this position is, is obliged, when taking any decision, to base it on the law and on other regulatory acts. This is not a new requirement. However it doesn't hurt to be reminded about it again. There were no incidents in the KGB when someone acted outside of the law or in violation of the law. However, we can't allow the emergence of even the smallest antecedents which may lead to the violations of the law. Hurried, not thought-through and not passed through the appropriate approval process, decisions may cause serious harm and disorient the employees. It is especially dangerous when it concerns the decisions or directives which are related to the foundations of the state security services' work. We have to always remember that the authority and the rights of the State Security Committee are clearly defined, that we are trusted with harsh specialized tools, but we can and should only use them for the purpose of ensuring state security and for no other purpose.

The well-known directives of the May 1981 National Consultation Meetings which contain the requirement to improve intelligence activities simultaneously with consistent and unwavering strengthening of socialist law-abiding, are gaining even greater importance in the current situation. I am talking about the special responsibility of our personnel for the quick and full detection of dangerous attempts on the state interests and the interests of society. This is fully relevant for the personnel in both operative and investigative branches. The work of the Investigative Department of the State Security Committee complies with these requirements. The objective of the department's leadership and all of its officers is to continue paying the closest attention to the improvement of investigative work and strengthening its cooperation with the operative units both on the issues of investigations and on the issues of conducting preventive measures.

Successful achievement of objectives posed in front of the state security services depends on the efforts of all *chekist* communities, irrespective of whether they conduct operative and investigative work or deal with technology, scientific research, production or business activities.

When we talk about the work of the technical surveillance branch and specialized services of the State Security Committee, we have to stress that their primary objectives flow out of the intelligence

and counter-intelligence objectives. In recent years these branches and services have increased the quality of their work, and their capabilities have noticeably grown. Today, they are performing very important and complicated functions, and they make significant contributions to the cause of ensuring the state security of our Homeland. The KGB Panel will continue to pay a lot of attention to the work of these branches and services, and will make sure that their role in the successful achievement of our objectives continues to grow.

The objectives of the administrative, construction and financial branches lie in satisfying the needs and requirements of the operative and technical surveillance branches in a timely and quality manner.

I would like to turn your attention to the fact that in their work these branches have to fully comply with the directives that were voiced at the Plenary Meeting in connection with the acceleration of the implementation of state-of-the-art technologies, the intensification and increase of the efficiency of production, the economizing and rational use of resources, and identifying new, not previously used reserves.

We have to continue to increase the role of the central apparatus of the State Security Committee in organizing operative activities in the local KGB offices. For this purpose, we need to increase control over the fulfillment of the decisions made by the Panel, as well as of the orders and directives issued by the leadership of the State Security Committee. The Chief Directorates, autonomous directorates and branches of the KGB of the USSR have to be better informed about the status of the affairs at local offices and have to provide better assistance to local branches. Furthermore, special attention needs to be paid to the *chekist* work in such areas of the country where there is a possibility of formation of a highly charged operative environment and where there is a threat of hostile and politically adverse manifestations.

The organizational role of the central apparatus in establishing smooth cooperation and coordination between all KGB agencies and troops is growing rapidly in modern conditions. Based on the decisions of the November Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee, we have to be more assertive in eliminating any manifestations of institutional narrow-mindedness and parochialism which hamper our ability to act jointly in achieving common objectives. We have to deepen military cooperation and liaising with the state security agencies of brotherly socialist countries, who act as a united front in protecting their positions on the global arena. We are obligated to do so by our international duty, by our understanding of the international significance of the work of state security agencies and of their military cooperation. We know very well that by dealing a blow to one socialist country, the enemy means to cause harm to the whole socialist community, of which Polish experience is very indicative. And therefore we have to make it our objective to assist state security agencies of brotherly countries by any means possible in defending the gains of socialism. In this very important issue, we have to use the party as our role model, to follow its directives and its political course. The meetings and discussions of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu.V.Andropov, with the leaders of brotherly parties, as well as the recent meetings of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Pact that took place in Prague all prove the preparedness of the member states to defend socialist gains against the machinations of imperialism, to strengthen our unity, our economic and defense potential, and to actively fight for strengthening peace and détente.

Comrades!

The November Plenary Meeting urgently posed the question about strengthening discipline at every stage of production and every area of management. In his speech at the Plenary Meeting, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov stressed that “we should start a more aggressive fight against any sort of violations of the party, state and workplace discipline.”^[5]

It is well-known that Vladimir Ilyich Lenin attached great importance to the improvement of workplace discipline. He used to say that this work needs to be maintained and pushed forward with every possible effort, since “the success of socialism is inconceivable without the attainment of the proletariat’s conscious commitment to discipline.”^[6]

It is entirely obvious that without the proper discipline it is not possible to effectively perform work in any organization. Activities of state security services without a high level of commitment to discipline are inconceivable altogether. Discipline for a *chekist* is not so much a mandatory subordination to order, directions or rules. Discipline for a *chekist* is, in the first place, a strict compliance with the party behavioral norms, an unconditional observance of Soviet laws and regulations, and precise and deeply thought-through compliance with the KGB orders and directions of immediate superiors, combined with a creative approach to work with reasonable initiative.

We don’t need superficial discipline, discipline in the form only. We need internal discipline, deeply thought-through discipline, discipline that is based on creativity and initiative on the part of the executor, and on the executor’s focus on the end result. The basis of *chekist* discipline should always be our deep conviction in the justness of our cause, unconditional loyalty to the party and to the people, and a high level of awareness of our professional duty and our duty to the party.

The activities of the state security services combine efforts of many groups of people who achieve their objectives across a wide range of responsibilities. Disruption in even one, small link of our system may cause large harm to the state security interests and may cause considerable damage to the political prestige and the economic and defense potential of the country.

This is exactly why the *chekists* are required to possess special precision, speed and diligence in fulfilling the orders, and display robust cooperation, team spirit, and shared concern for the good of the cause.

This is exactly why the atmosphere in the *chekist* community has to be pure. We have to maintain the spirit of self-criticism and commitment to principles. Our common objective is to achieve the climate in the community where everything would be subordinated to the main thing – to the successful achievement of the tasks assigned to the state security services.

Using the directives of the CPSU Central Committee as guidance, the KGB party chapters conduct significant work in training *chekist* personnel. The effectiveness of the party influence on every aspect of the KGB personnel’s activities has grown. But life doesn’t stand still. It poses new, more complex requirements, gives us more challenging tasks.

The November Plenary Meeting’s decisions force us once again to very closely look at issues of personnel’s attitude towards performing their direct job duties. It’s no secret that even in well-functioning work teams there may be people with a passive attitude towards the assigned task, pencil pushers who use the numbers and all sorts of statistics to hide their ineffective and devoid of creativity work. We haven’t yet eradicated such flaws as unnecessary paperwork, lax supervision over the

execution of decisions taken, and unjustified delays in fulfilling important orders and directives. There are also instances of people letting down their guard, of delayed and untimely reactions to the incoming alerts, and of unscrupulous attitude towards their work.

We have to do everything possible to ensure that the work ethic of communists-*chekists* corresponds to the highest standards. This is the direct responsibility of communists in leadership positions. They have to know their subordinates well, know their professional and personal qualities, and be responsible for their behavior not only at work, but also when they are off the job. Their direct duty is to skillfully organize the work of the team that they are leading, to ensure its high efficiency, discover in every member of the personnel his best characteristics and best qualities, and to put them to use for the good of the cause. They have to become an example of diligent, self-motivated attitude towards their duty. Direct supervisors are obliged to constantly ensure that the contribution of each individual into common results is accurately evaluated, and to actively use all available incentive methods to reward those who deserve it, as well as to strictly demand their subordinates to perform at a high level of standards. However, we shouldn't forget that strictness doesn't have anything in common with rudeness, arrogance, and degrading human dignity. It is well-known that if the unit works well, that means that it has a good leader, and when the leader is good then the unit will be good, too.

Strengthening discipline and cultivating the heightened sense of responsibility for assigned tasks among the personnel, maintaining in the *chekist* teams the environment of high performance standards and organization, the atmosphere of collaboration and supportiveness, and ensuring strict compliance by all of the employees to the norms of communist morale both at work and off the job have to constantly be at the center of your attention. There is quite a number of things that can be improved here, both by the party chapters and by the office of personnel management.

Working with personnel, performing its selection and placement, have always been key issues in the organization of *chekist* agencies. The party has constantly paid close attention to this, and even in the first years of the existence of *chekist* agencies, it recruited to work in these agencies "the most resilient and seasoned party members." Nowadays the requirements in the selection process of the *chekist* personnel have grown considerably, but still the political criteria remain of primary significance: the unfettered dedication to the communist cause, loyalty to the party and to the people. Furthermore, when we talk about loyalty, we mean loyalty not just in words, not just in representations, but loyalty proven by actions, loyalty displayed in specific difficult, crisis situations.

In light of the decisions of the Plenary Meeting, we are obliged to do everything in order to ensure that selection and placement of personnel is conducted in full compliance with the Lenin's principles. The main thing here is to make sure that in the key, most sensitive areas of our work the enemy is confronted by the best *chekists*, politically experienced, ideologically seasoned, professionally well-prepared, able to work creatively, and possessing a sense for new things.

This is what Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov constantly advocates for. We know very well how he fought for the purity of the *chekist* ranks, armed with high party standards and commitment to principles. Under his leadership, Lenin's principles for *chekist* agencies' activities were fully reinstated and became an integral part of their work. The efficiency of their work grew substantially. The work of state security agencies gained well-deserved respect and support of the soviet people. It was highly praised by our party congresses. And today we can say with confidence that the personnel of the State Security Committee is a seasoned, time-tested, and infinitely dedicated to the communist cause unit of our party. The party fully trusts *chekists* and can rely on them in everything.

This, comrades, gives me the reason on your behalf, and on behalf of all soviet *chekists*, to assure the CPSU Central Committee and the Politbureau that the personnel of the state security agencies will continue to always do their best to perform at the highest standards imposed by the party, and to provide reliable security for our socialist Homeland.

[1] Translator's not: The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, VCheKa, was the predecessor of the KGB.

[2] Yu.V.Andropov. Selected Speeches and Articles. 2nd Edition, Moscow, Politizdat Publishing House, 1983, p.215

[3] Translator's note: "VCheKa" or "CheKa" in Russian

[4] Translator's note: The KGB

[5] Yu.V.Andropov. Selected Speeches and Articles, p.210

[6] V.I.Lenin. Complete Works, vol.36, p.189

Document No. 5

Memorandum from S.N. Mukha to Comrade V.V. Shcherbitsky, 'On Apprehension of S.V. Kirichenko, who Established a Criminal Connection with the US Clandestine Services,' May 19, 1983

[Source: GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 9, d. 13, t. 3, pp. 40-41. Obtained by Nate Jones and translated by Angela Greenfield.]

State Security Committee (KGB) of the Ukrainian SSR

State Security Committee (KGB) of the Ukrainian SSR

May 19, 1983

City of Kiev

No.121

~~Classified~~-Declassified[1]

Copy No.1

24/2-3341

08/ 30/13

[Handwritten notes on the left side of the page][2]

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE
to Comrade V.V.Shcherbitsky

Special report

On apprehension of S.V.Kirichenko,
Who established a criminal connection
with the US clandestine services

On November 12, 1982 a dead drop with espionage paraphernalia was discovered in Moscow. The container contained: an adapter for receiving secret radio communications, cipher pads, instructions on how to get in touch with the clandestine services, and letters and assignments for the agent. Based on the contents of the instructions we were able to infer that the agent transferred to the US clandestine services information related to the ballistic missile defense system of the country.

On November 23, 1982 the KGB of the USSR discovered a letter, sent from Moscow to Tula with a label “hold for pickup” and addressed to Sergey Vladimirovich Kirichenko. Inside the letter we discovered an encrypted text that contained the location of the dead drop in Moscow.

As a result of a manhunt conducted jointly with the KGB of the USSR in December 1982 we identified and detained for inquiry as a possible enemy agent, Sergey Vladimirovich Kirichenko, born in 1959 in Leningrad, Ukrainian, no party affiliation. While studying in the 5th year of the Zhitomir Higher Red Banner Military School of Radio Electronics for Air Defense, in May of 1982 he left the unit without leave. The military prosecutor’s office of the military unit No.77757 filed criminal charges against Kirichenko under Article 241, paragraph “a” of the Criminal Code of the UkrSSR (“desertion”). On November 6, 1982 the charges were dismissed based on the findings that he was unfit for peacetime military service and that his actions posed no threat to society.

Since February 1983 Kirichenko has been working in the Scientific Research Institute of Otolaryngology of the Ministry of Health of the UkrSSR. He has been residing in Kiev with his parents: father – Vladimir Semyonovich Kirichenko, born in 1921 in Rostov-on-Don, Ukrainian, member of the CPSU, colonel in the Soviet Army Reserves, employed at the lab in Kiev Polytechnic Institute, and mother – Nina Georgievna Kirichenko, born in 1925 in Volgograd, Russian, no party affiliation, medical doctor at the maternity hospital No.1.

During the investigation of Mr. Kirichenko it was established that he was fully aware of the espionage letters sent to Tula for him by the American clandestine services, and that he indeed was the enemy agent who the authorities were looking for. During the period of his study at the military school and internship at classified military facilities he had access to information about missile defense systems and was noticed making libelous and biased statements towards the Soviet reality.

Taking into account grounded suspicions about espionage connections of Kirichenko with the US clandestine services, on May 11 of this year, with the sanction of the Chief Military Prosecutor of the USSR and based on Article 64, part 1 of the Criminal Code of the UkrSSR, he was arrested and on May 12 of this year was transferred to Moscow for further investigation by the KGB of the USSR. During his first interrogation Kirichenko provided a statement about his connection with the American clandestine services which he established on his own initiative.

Kirichenko stepped on the path of treason against his Homeland as a result of his moral decay and worship of the western way of life.

This information is being reported to you for information purposes only.

Chairman of the State Security Committee
Of the Ukrainian SSR,
[signature] S.N.Mukha

[\[1\]](#) Translator’s note: Handwritten note in Ukrainian states: “Declassified on 08/30/2013”

[\[2\]](#) Translator’s note: Handwritten notes contain signatures of people who were shown this document under the seal of secrecy and dates when they viewed the document

Memorandum from S.N. Mukha to Comrade V.V. Shcherbitsky, 'On the Reaction to the Speech of the Secretary General of the CPSU CC, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR, Yu. V. Andropov,' September 1983

[Source: GDA SBU, f. 16, o. 7, d. 13, t. 4, pp. 193-194. Obtained by Nate Jones and translated by Angela Greenfield.]

135

193

September 1983

No.238

24/2-3352

08/ 20/13

~~Classified~~ Declassified[1]

Copy No.3

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE
to Comrade V.V.Shcherbitsky

Memorandum

On the reaction to the speech
of the Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee,
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR,
Yu.V.Andropov

Information we are receiving at the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR evidences that the speech of the Secretary General Of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR, Yu.V.Andropov, which he made in response to the militaristic course of the US and the intensifying anti-Soviet psychosis in the West, was received by the republic with a lot of interest and approval.

In their statements workers, farmers, students and representatives of artistic intelligentsia are pointing out, with particular satisfaction, that the Head of the Soviet State has exposed the rampant anti-communist course of the current US administration and presented well-grounded evidence of the peaceful foreign policy of the USSR. Many of them express confidence that the firm and consistent course of the Soviet government to harness the arms race and to preserve peace, will help prevent any further sliding towards nuclear war and will ensure the fulfillment of current objectives aimed at strengthening the economic might of our country.

The statement of I.A.Kayel, a mill-worker at *Zaporozhstal Still Mill*, a member of the CPSU born in 1928, is very characteristic in this respect. He pointed out in his conversation with a group of workers, "This speech is genuine and full of care about universal peace. It exposes the aggressive policy of American imperialists. It deals a serious blow to the totalitarian political course of the Reagan Administration."

Multiple statements of workers point out the confident, contained, and, at the same time, firm tone of Yu.V.Andropov's speech, which in their opinion should have a restraining effect on the Reagan Administration. They also point out the timeliness and relevance of this document (V.A.Kononenko, an

engineer at *Kiev Polytechnic Institute*, born in 1934, member of the CPSU; V.P.Vasiliev, a professor at *Simferopol State University*, born in 1937, member of the CPSU; S.K.Yefimov, a manager at the *Kharkov Sickle and Hammer Factory* ("Serp i Molot" Factory), born in 1961, no party affiliation; A.N.Chaban, a student at the *Odessa Polytechnic Institute*, born in 1960, no party affiliation, and many others).

A number of statements, along with the whole-hearted approval of the efforts of the Soviet Government in preventing the threat of a new world war and in maintaining peace, sharply condemn the adventurist policy of the Reagan Administration and the NATO partners of the US and their intent to change the strategic military balance between the USSR and the USA and to ensure their dominating position in the world. This was expressed by A.N.Tsukov, an engineer at *Kiev Institute of Physics*, born in 1945, no party affiliation; by Yu.A.Bugaichuk, a teacher at *Sumy Secondary School*, born in 1931, member of the CPSU, and many others).

Some soviet citizens believe that a new round of nuclear arms racing, carried out by the US and their NATO partners, will force the Soviet Government to increase spending on improving the defense capabilities of the USSR, which will negatively impact the economic situation of the workers. This opinion is being shared by V.A.Lakhminsky, a worker at the *Haivoron Locomotive Repair Factory*, born in 1950, no party affiliation; A.P.Danchuk, an engineer at *Ivano-Frankivsk Reinforcing Plant*, born in 1938, no party affiliation, and many others.)

Some individuals express their concern that the exchange of statements at the heads-of-state level in the USSR and the USA proves that ideological antagonism has been transposed into the sphere of international relations, and that it would lead to the return of the cold war. Furthermore, they compare the current situation to the 1939-1941 period and make conclusions that both countries are currently on the brink of war.

At the same time negative statements have been noted on the part of some anti-Soviet-inclined individuals (whose identities are mostly known to the KGB). In particular, D.P.Oberemok, formerly convicted for aiding and abetting Nazi occupants, born in 1913, resident of *Zaporizhia Oblast*, stated that he has always been, and will always be, unhappy about the foreign policy of the CPSU. "Everything Reagan-style is closer to me than Soviet-style," Oberemok stressed.

We have received information that the statement of Yu.V.Andropov has been positively received by some of the foreign nationals visiting our republic from developing states (Ajavon Lavoie, a student at *Kiev State University*, citizen of Togo, born in 1953; Vahgi Naser, a graduate student at the *Kiev Medical University*, citizen of Jordan, born in 1955; Camarra Joseph from Sierra-Leone, a student at *Kherson Maritime College of the Ministry of Fisheries*, born in 1956, and many others).

The UkrSSR KGB Service is undertaking necessary measures to timely detect and suppress any possible hostile and anti-social manifestations on the part of the anti-Soviet individuals.

[The contents of this memorandum] have been relayed to the KGB of the USSR.

[The contents of this memorandum] are being reported to you for information purposes only.

Signed for Chairman of the State Security Committee of the Ukrainian SSR
S.Mukha

By the Head of the [illegible] Fifth Directorate Major Manzhola [signature]

[1] Translator's note: Handwritten note in Ukrainian states: "Declassified on 08/20/2013"

Document No. 7.1

**V. Chebrikov, 'On Measures to Improve Preventive Work Conducted by the State Security Service,'
October 3, 1983**

[Source: National Security Archive READD-RADD Collection. Translated by Angela Greenfield.]

To the Members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU,
To the Politburo member candidates
As well as Secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee
Comrades Savitskiy, Ligachyov, I.F. Dmitriev, A.Lukyanov
October 3, 1983

Classified

Central Committee of the CPSU
STATE SECURITY COMMITTEE OF THE USSR
October 3, 1983 No.2181-4
City of Moscow

On Measures to Improve Preventive Work Conducted by the State Security Service

Using as guidance the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the November 1982 and June 1983 Plenary Meetings of the CPSU Central Committee, and directives of the General Secretary of the CPSU, The Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR, Comrade Yu.V.Andropov concerning the provision of reliable state security in the Soviet Union, the KGB of the USSR is constantly improving its measures to protect the Soviet form of government and social order against subversive activities of the clandestine services of imperialistic states, as well as foreign anti-Soviet centers and hostile elements inside the country.

While achieving this objective, a lot of attention is being paid to the issue of improving preventive work aimed at thwarting state crimes and negative political manifestations, as well as to the participation of *checkist* apparatuses in the efforts organized by the party and the government aimed at strengthening law and order and increasing ideological vigilance of Soviet people.

Various measures taken by the state security service in the past few years, in many cases, have allowed us to prevent leaks of classified information, to timely thwart a number of emergencies at military, defense and other important industrial and transportation facilities, to localize certain politically negative processes, to disrupt multiple hostile actions of the enemy, and to prevent a considerable amount of individuals who became susceptible to ideologically foreign influences from stepping on the path of crime. Using its specialized tools and resources, the state security service provides comprehensive assistance to the party and government entities and to the management of defense facilities and those pertaining to the national economy in the successful realization of the economic policy of the CPSU and in preventing anti-social manifestations.

In the atmosphere of a sharp increase of international tensions and the ever-increasing clandestine and subversive activities of the enemy, the preventive work of the state security services acquires even higher importance, as it is one of the effective methods to protect our state and society from the encroachment of forces who are hostile towards socialism. In this connection, the Collegium of the State Security Committee of the USSR found it feasible to address the leadership and operatives of the KGB in the letter called "On Measures to Improve Preventive Work Conducted by the State Security Service."

This document contains an evaluation of the preventive work, defines its role and importance in the work of the state security service, envisions measures to introduce relevant corrections in the content of this work and to improve the level of professional training, as well as the conduction of preventive activities in every area of combating espionage and subversive actions of the clandestine services and ideological subversion centers of the enemy.

Simultaneously, based on the Leninist principle of the inevitability of punishment for committing crimes against the state, attention is being directed at the necessity of taking decisive steps against the real enemies of the Soviet State.

The document underscores the importance of strict compliance by the operative personnel of the state security services with the provisions of the Constitution of the USSR and Soviet law when conducting preventive activities, as well as improving the cooperation in this work with the heads of ministries, state committees, agencies, establishments, enterprises, public organizations, and military command, as well as strengthening relations with the workforce.

The contents of this letter from the Collegium of the State Security Committee of the USSR will be communicated to all first secretaries of the Communist Party Committees in all Soviet republics, territories and regions.

The draft order of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR and the letter of the Collegium of the KGB of the USSR "On Measures to Improve Preventive Work Conducted by the State Security Service" are attached herewith.

Please advise acceptance.

Chairman of the Committee
[signature]
V. Chebrikov

[Handwritten notes read "Acceptance by" and contain illegible names and signatures of KGB officials]

Document No. 7.2

V. Chebrikov, 'Order of the Chairman of the State Security Committee of the USSR, Moscow, regarding Measures To Improve The Preventive Work Conducted By The State Security Services'

[Source: National Security Archive READD-RADD Collection. Translated by Angela Greenfield.]

Classified

ORDER

Of the Chairman of the State Security Committee of the USSR
Moscow

Regarding Measures To Improve The Preventive Work Conducted By The State Security Services

I am forwarding the letter of the Collegium of the KGB of the USSR "On Measures to Improve Preventive Work Conducted by the State Security Service" and

I HEREBY ORDER:

1. Based on the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee, the Constitution of the USSR and Soviet law, and in accordance with this letter of the Collegium, as well as orders and directives of the KGB of the USSR, all management and operative personnel of the central apparatus of the KGB of the USSR, as well as of KGB local offices, command personnel and officers of the intelligence units of the border protection troops of the KGB of the USSR are to take additional measures to continue the improvement of preventive work, which is an integral part of operative work and is an important means to achieving the objective, posed upon the agency and the KGB troops, of protecting the Soviet State and society from subversive activities of the enemy as well as hostile elements inside the country.

When conducting preventive work, to ensure observance of socialist law, to disallow unjustified usage of preventive measures against soviet citizens, as well as the use of preventive measures with respect to persons who should be criminally charged for committed crimes.

2. Heads of subdivisions at the central apparatus, local KGB branches as well as heads of the border protection troops of the KGB are to discuss the practical conclusions that stem from the letter of the Collegium of the KGB of the USSR at the collegium meetings, heads of KGB directorates' councils, military councils of border districts and daily briefings of the relevant subdivisions, as well as determine specific steps towards increasing the efficiency of preventive work.

3. Heads of local KGB branches are to communicate the contents of the letter of the Collegium of the KGB to first secretaries of Central Committees of the Communist Party of the Soviet republics, to the party offices in territories and regions, to heads and members of military councils, military commands, military districts, air defense district, fleets, individual armies and equivalents, heads of political offices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)^[1], Main Directorate of Internal Affairs, Directorates of Internal Affairs, as well as directorates of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' troops.

4. To report on a regular basis on the status and results of preventive work to the respective [communist] party offices, military councils, command and political offices of the army and the navy, internal troops, as well as to the leadership and political offices of the MVD , Main Directorate of Internal Affairs and Directorates of Internal Affairs.

5. To authorize the following officials of the operative units of the central apparatus, as well as of the KGB and its troops, to make decisions with respect to conducting preventive activities:

a) With respect to conducting preventive measures based on operative and investigative information that involves usage of mass media, as well as with respect to Soviet citizens who are an object of monitoring and are registered in the operative database, or with respect to whom a tip was received, including when discussing their misconduct with the participation of the public at their work

place, as well as in subdivisions of the MVD, the Army and the Navy, as well as when it involves giving an official warning – decisions shall be made by chairmen of the KGB of the Soviet and Soviet autonomous republics, heads of KGB directorates in territories and regions, heads of directorates of special operations as well as heads of special operations departments in different military branches, districts, fleets, individual armies and equivalents, commanders of border protection troops in border districts, heads of main directorates, independent directorates and departments of the KGB of the USSR, and their respective deputies;

b) With respect to conducting preventive measures against Soviet citizens who are registered in the operative database without involving the public [in discussion of their misconduct] and without giving the official warning – decisions shall be made by officials at the local KGB branches, border protection troops, and subdivisions of the central apparatus of the KGB of the USSR, who are authorized to make decisions pertaining to initiating and closing respective monitoring cases.

c) With respect to conducting preventive measures against Soviet citizens with respect to whom a tip was received, and when the public is not involved [in the discussion of their misconduct] and the official warning was not given:

- At the Central Apparatus of the KGB of the USSR – decisions shall be made by heads of the operative departments of the main and autonomous directorates, heads of operative departments of directorates and services that are part of the main directorates, and their respective deputies;

- In territorial branches of the KGB – decisions shall be made by heads of autonomous operative departments, as well as operative departments that are part of the KGB directorates of the Soviet republics, heads of operative departments of the KGB of autonomous republics, heads of operative departments and departments that are part of the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth services of the KGB directorates in the territories and regions, heads of city departments and branches of the KGB and KGB directorates, and their respective deputies;

- In the military counterintelligence services – decisions shall be made by heads of special operations departments of the KGB of the USSR in divisions, brigades, and their equivalents, and their respective deputies;

- In the border protection troops – decisions shall be made by heads of the border protection units, of the individual checkpoints, as well as their deputies who are responsible for reconnaissance.

4. To introduce the following record-keeping procedures for the preventive activities and persons with respect to whom preventive measures are applied:

- a) In all instances of conducting preventive measures against persons with respect to whom there is an open operative monitoring case or an initial tip was received, a well-grounded statement needs to be prepared that should contain the nature of the misconduct as well as justification of the feasibility of the use of specific preventive measures against the person who committed the misconduct. The statement needs to be approved by a respective official, who is authorized to give permission to use preventive measures based on clause 3 of this order. Preventive measures against members and candidates for membership in the CPSU have to be conducted in coordination with the city and regional party committees, with, equal to them, party committees of ministries, state committees, agencies,

institutions, enterprises and organizations, political offices of the military where these individuals are registered as members, and when needed, with the supervising [communist] party offices;

b) An operative shall compile a report based on the results of the completed preventive action and submit it to the official who authorized it. The report should state when, where, and in what form the preventive action was taken, what was the behavior of the subject of the preventive action; whether his written statement was taken; and whether there is any need in the subsequent monitoring of him;

c) Registration of individuals against whom preventive measures were taken shall be done in the tenth departments, divisions and groups of the KGB, and KGB directorates in conformity with Para.54 of the Operative Record-Keeping Manual approved at the Council of Ministers of the USSR by the order of the chairman of the KGB No.0076, dated July 12, 1977.

5. Be it resolved that statistic reports about preventive work in the KGB directorates, as well as in military counterintelligence agencies shall be prepared by the operative record-keeping offices in conjunction with the counterintelligence units in the form set forth by the order of the chairman of the KGB No.0150 dated March 20, 1973 and approved by the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The reports shall be submitted to the Tenth Department of the KGB of the USSR on an annual basis no later than January 10 of the year following the reporting year without any accompanying explanation notes.

6. The First, Second and Third main directorates, Fourth, Fifth, Six and Seventh directorates, Investigative Department, and Intelligence Branch of the Border Protection Troops of the KGB of the USSR, are to consolidate on a regular basis, along their respective lines, preventive work practices of the agencies and intelligence services of the border protection troops of the KGB; based on the results of the consolidated reports to constantly take steps towards improving the effectiveness of the work.

The Inspectorate, in conjunction with the interested sub-divisions of the central apparatus of the KGB of the USSR, as well as The F.E. Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB are to prepare and publish reviews of the preventive work conducted by the state security agency and the intelligence branches of the border protection troops, and publish these materials in the KGB Digest.

7. The Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB in conjunction with the operative subdivisions of the KGB central apparatus and of the local KGB branches, are to improve the development of the theory of the preventive work of the KGB and to prepare and publish in 1984 a study guide on this topic.

8. To repeal the orders of the Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR No.0177-1964, and No.0280-1966, sub-clause "c" of clause 1 of the KGB order No.0072-1972, paragraph 2 of clause 10 of the Decision of the KGB Collegium under the Council of Ministers of the USSR announced by the Order of the Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR No.0038-1977; clause 3 of Addendum No.2 to the Order of the Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR No.0076-1977; sub-clause "b" of clause 5 of the Order of the Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR No.0019-1978 and clause 13 of the Addendum for the same order; clause 6 of Addendum No.2 to the Order of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR No.0323-1982, as well as clause 8 of Addendum No.2 to the Order of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR No.0412-1983.

Paragraph 3 of the Instruction Manual approved by the order of the Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR No.0150-1973 shall be amended to read as follows:

“3. The authority to decide on the issue of whether to use the official warning shall be given to the KGB chairmen of the Soviet and Soviet autonomous republics, heads of KGB directorates in territories and regions, heads of directorates of special operations as well as heads of special operations departments in different military branches, districts, fleets, individual armies and equivalents, commanders of border protection troops in border districts, heads of main directorates, independent directorates and departments of the KGB of the USSR, and their respective deputies.”

9. To communicate this order and the letter of the Collegium to the leadership and operative personnel of the state security agency, commanders and officers of intelligence branches of border districts, units and border checkpoints, faculty of the specialized departments in the KGB educational institutions.

Chairman of the Committee
V. Chebrikov
[signature]

^[1] Translator’s note: “MVD” is a Russian acronym for the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Document No. 7.3

[Letter of the Collegium of the KGB of the USSR, 'Regarding Measures to Improve the Preventive Work conducted by the State Security Services'](#)

[Source: National Security Archive READD-RADD Collection. Translated by Angela Greenfield.]

Classified
Addendum
To the Order of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR
Dated “__” _____ 1983

LETTER OF THE COLLEGIUM OF THE KGB OF THE USSR

Regarding measures to improve
the preventive work conducted
by the state security services

The Great October Socialist Revolution for the first time in the history of humankind created a state free from exploitation of human beings, a state of which a working man became the true master. The new base where the working class owns the means of production, and the right to own land is given to those who works on it, has created new relationships between humans – the relationships of friendship and brotherhood.

Socialism as a political and economic, as well as social and government system, has become a reality, and the country entered a historic stage of transitioning to communism. In the course of building the new society the substance of socialist democracy has been enriched.

“Soviet democracy,” as Yu.V. Andropov used to point out, “having met an especially fierce resistance of counter-revolution forces, both internal and external, entered life honestly, without

concealing its class character, and legitimized without any hesitation the privileges of working people vis-à-vis representatives of exploiting classes who were fighting the new government.”^[1]

The Constitution of the USSR recognized the most important qualitative transformation of Soviet governance – the transformation from the dictatorship of the proletariat to the state of the people. The process of the continuous development and broadening of democracy in Soviet society and the refining of the developed socialism posed in front of the party the most important task – to form a new person as the pre-condition for building communism.

The Communist Party throughout the whole period of the formation and development of the socialist state has paid, and continues to pay, a lot of attention to the issues of the upbringing of the Soviet people in the spirit of high patriotism and unconditional loyalty to the Motherland. The ideological and political unity of Soviet society is the biggest achievement of our social system. As comrade Yu.V. Andropov said, “The Party insists that a human being is brought up here not only as the carrier of a certain amount of knowledge, but in the first place as a member of a socialist society, an active builder of communism with all of the attribute ideological values, morals and interests, high work culture and ethical conduct.”^[2]

This process is taking place in the environment of irreconcilable confrontation between two ideologies. There is an uncompromising struggle for the hearts and minds of billions of people on the planet. Imperialism is trying to discredit the real socialism on the world arena, to erode ideological convictions, and the belief of the Soviet people in the righteousness of the great cause of building communism.

Subversive activities against the USSR encompass all areas of social life. They are conducted with the use of all resources and means available to the enemy, and all sophisticated and insidious techniques and methods. The enemy is placing their bet on conducting pre-planned political and economic subversive acts against the USSR; they are trying to discredit the economic policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, as well as the economic mechanism of the country. They are trying to use international economic, science and technology, cultural, and other relations with the USSR as a method of espionage penetration of our country.

The enemy conducts ideological subversive activities with particular viciousness and undisguised cynicism. Clandestine services and ideological subversive centers are striving to penetrate different layers of Soviet society, placing their bet on the negatively-inclined people, infected with ideas of revisionism, bourgeois nationalism and Zionism, as well as on reactionary elements among the clergy and members of sects, and on individuals susceptible to hostile ideology due to their insufficient ideological maturity and ideological and moral instability. They are actively seeking all sorts of outcasts, mercantile people and gold-diggers, hoping to entice them to cooperate in order to get access to state secrets, collect slanderous and biased information, incite anti-Soviet attitudes and organized anti-social activities, and ultimately to weaken economic and defense potential of our country, and to cause political, ideological and moral harm to it. For these purposes and on the basis of anti-communist and anti-Soviet attitudes the enemy consolidates forces and movements that are hostile to the Soviet Union irrespective of their political orientations. They are organizing overseas various “committees”, “groups” and “leagues” that operate on the premise of protecting democratic freedoms and human rights in the Soviet Union, but in reality are a tool of the clandestine services of the enemy, and of the anti-Soviet and reactionary forces.

All attempts of the enemy to undermine socialism in our country are pointless in their essence and are bound to fail. They are countered by the monolith unity of the Soviet society, high political vigilance of the people, and their infinite loyalty to the ideals of communism, as well as their readiness to give a decisive pushback to any enemy schemes.

At the same time we should take into account that in a socialist environment, irrespective of the absence of social and class causes that could give rise to anti-Soviet activity, some individuals may form opinions and beliefs that are foreign to the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Occasionally, as a result of political misconceptions and insufficient ideological training, religious fanaticism and nationalistic anachronisms, moral decay and life difficulties, they step on the path of politically harmful actions. Underestimating these manifestations may lead to a situation where at some point they transform into crimes against the state.

While working towards the goal of the communist education of the Soviet people, the CPSU and the Soviet Government constantly care about strengthening the socialist order by directing their primary efforts to preventing and timely thwarting crimes against the state, and politically harmful manifestations. The Party requires that combating crime in our country is conducted in an uncompromising, radical and proactive manner, using the most effective means and methods.

Using the Party's directions as guidance while fulfilling the most important task of ensuring security of our Motherland, the KGB and its border protection troops focus their efforts on resolutely thwarting espionage and subversive activities of clandestine services and centers of ideological subversion of the enemy and on preventing crimes against the state.

Crimes which the KGB is fighting pose heightened danger for the Soviet system of the government and social system, and therefore preventing treason, a terrorist act or sabotage, a mass unrest and other type of attack on the security of our state is a feat by far more important than reporting on these events after the fact, when individuals involved already have been punished or are subject to punishment under criminal law for their actions.

The Collegium of the State Security Committee of the USSR points out that an important role in thwarting crimes against the state is given to preventive work. Being one of the effective means of achieving the tasks posed in front of the state security services, preventive measures are an integral part of the party-wide efforts to provide communist education to the Soviet people. Preventive work with the use of specialized checkist methods is one of the important ways the KGB takes part in the educational function of the socialist state. It represents a direct continuation of the operative work of the KGB and organically flows out of it.

Review of the KGB's preventive work shows that positive results are, in the first place, attained by branches and units that achieve a high level of operative work in the main areas and directions of the *checkist* activities, which allows them not only to receive timely tips about negative manifestations, but also to prevent their emergence.

Preventive measures conducted by the KGB allowed us to disrupt a number of serious political actions of the enemy against our country, prevent anti-social manifestations of the anti-Soviet elements and emergencies at production, transportation and communications facilities, as well as to prevent some Soviet citizens from stepping on the path of crime.

Military counterintelligence services have begun to more actively uncover and thwart attempts of the enemy to gain access to military secrets, prevent violations of information security procedures, and uncover negative manifestations and their causes in the Army and the Navy. Preventive efforts aimed at improving countermeasures to ideological subversions of the enemy in the military, conducted by the special operations departments in conjunction with military councils, commands and political offices help to shield the Soviet Military from subversive activities of the enemy, and to prevent the instances of betraying the Motherland and other grave crimes against the state, as well as to prevent the emergence of conditions and environment which may negatively impact combat readiness and combat ability of the troops.

Border protection troops in cooperation with the KGB are conducting a large amount of preventive work aimed at preventing illegal border crossings and violations of border regulations, smuggling across the border enemy [reading materials] and other ideologically harmful literature and materials, copying equipment, weapons, explosives, and other means of conducting subversive acts, as well as contraband.

Successful achievement of the objectives in the area of combating ideological subversive activities of the enemy was promoted by the *checkist* preventive measures at the facilities where counterintelligence activities are conducted and in the communities of interest for the KGB, as well as by timely actions against some politically immature and misguided Soviet citizens. All this combined with other operative and penal measures allowed us to completely disrupt the plans of the enemy to create in our country a so-called "legal opposition" and to launch under its guise an organized anti-Soviet underground, to prevent ideological subversive actions of the imperialist clandestine services and foreign ideological subversive centers, as well as forays of hostile elements.

Giving positive evaluation to the preventive work of the KGB and its border protection troops, the Collegium, at the same time, is of the opinion that in this important work there are significant shortcomings and deficiencies, which to a certain extent decrease the effectiveness of many preventive activities. Not everywhere and every time [operatives] take into account the fact that preventive measures, as a rule, reverberate through the workplaces and through various layers of society. Therefore they have to be effective and reach the educational goal, as well as be widely understood by the working people.

Some operatives reduce preventive work to one-off measures against certain people who commit acts that hurt or may hurt the interests of state security. Not always do they create necessary conditions for properly influencing the person with respect to whom the preventive action is taken, not always do they succeed in getting him to understand his misconceptions and mistakes, as well as get a thought-through renunciation of them. Such an approach towards preventive work which does not take into account the necessity of reinforcing the effects of preventive measures by utilizing open and covert capabilities, lowers the importance and the educational role of preventive work. As a result, occasional repeat offenses on the part of such persons do happen.

We have noted cases when some KGB branches determine preventive measures without taking into account the political and operational feasibility. Sometimes they display harmful tendencies towards quantitative indicators and as a result make decisions to conduct preventive measures in cases of low importance and sometimes even in cases that have nothing to do with the KGB area of responsibility. We have noted instances when as a result of rush decisions to conduct preventive

activities a thorough check of the received tips and materials was not conducted, which didn't allow for full discovery of anti-Social actions of persons who have become a subject of the KGB's focus.

We can't consider as correct the practice when subjects of operative monitoring after the preventive measures against them have been completed, including when an official warning was issued, are left without proper operative monitoring. In some state security branches there are inadmissible cases when preventive measures are taken against persons who have committed acts dangerous to society, which qualify as crimes and need to be criminally prosecuted.

Many shortcomings in the preventive work of the KGB are, in the first place, due to insufficient deep knowledge of the environment, untimeliness in identifying trends towards politically harmful manifestations, weak work with agents and co-optees, as well as the absence of necessary contacts with the public and administrative personnel of organizations, enterprises, institutions, and military command.

The Collegium requires that the preventive measures carried out by the KGB and border protection troops are directed at the elimination of reasons and causes of the crimes and thus promote the increase in the effectiveness of the *checkist* work as a whole. For this, we need to use all of the operative, organizational, administrative, political, educational, penal and other measures. When conducting preventive activities, the state security agency should not allow any sort of disparagement of soviet citizens. We have to fight for every Soviet person when that person makes a mistake, and help him find the right way.

We have to always remember that conducting preventive activities based on unverified and biased information is a violation of law, and it also causes emotional harm to a Soviet person, at the same time discrediting and undermining the authority of the state security agency among the Soviet people.

It is imperative that preventive measures of the KGB, in all areas of their work, are justified, timely and effective. This poses a requirement on the leadership and operatives to know well, and accurately and objectively evaluate the operative environment, to quickly react to emerging negative processes which can cause harm to the security of the soviet state and society, and to take measures to neutralize them.

At the same time, we have to proceed from an assumption that every instance of non-prevention of particularly dangerous subversive acts, as well as group anti-social manifestations, which cause political and economic harm to the state, represents a consequence of a specific misjudgment in our work. The effectiveness of preventive work has to be evaluated based on its specific results, depending on whether the action taken reached its planned goal. Therefore, we have to continue working with individuals with respect to whom the preventive action was taken and take into account that the preventive action against a specific person is a lengthy process which requires great efforts.

When combating state crimes the agency and the border protection troops of the KGB have to constantly care about broadening and strengthening the connection with the workplaces and the public, to promote an increase in the participation of the Soviet people in the state security of the country. In practical work we have to pay more attention to conducting various preventive activities aimed at strengthening the security of the soviet society, as well as to having an educational impact on the politically and morally unstable people who may enter the path of state crimes.

The KGB's preventive measures have to be aimed at the comprehensive increase in the vigilance of the Soviet people, which would make it more difficult for the enemy agents to penetrate facilities that are under the operative supervision, as well as into the environment that the enemy is interested in; it would prevent the leaks of state secrets, promote the timely uncovering of incidents that may cause emergency situations (explosions, fires, accidents, catastrophes, etc.), and would eliminate the possibility of the emergence of any sort of anti-Soviet and anti-social manifestations of politically harmful nature.

Military counterintelligence services have to more actively assist military councils, commands and political offices of the Armed Forces in developing and conducting preventive measures aimed at educating the servicemen in the spirit of high political vigilance, shield them from subversive acts of imperialist clandestine services, foreign anti-Soviet centers and hostile elements; create conditions which will promote the increase of combat readiness and combat ability of the armed forces.

Border Protection Troops need to improve the preventive measures aimed at illegal crossings of the USSR border, step up the cooperation with the local KGB branches and special departments in conducting educational work among the servicemen, as well as the residents in the border areas, and actively engage them in helping protect the state border.

In accordance with the directions of the May 1981 National Consultation Meeting of the leadership of the KGB and its troops, on the issue of raising the level of operative work in the area of preventing negative processes, the efforts of the KGB have still to be directed at timely uncovering and thwarting hostile and negative manifestations incited by the enemy and anti-Soviet elements, as well as at countering all forms of ideological sabotage. With this purpose we have to actively use all available, and create new, operative resources to uncover and thwart the plots of clandestine services of imperialist states and foreign anti-Soviet centers and organizations, aimed at undermining the Soviet society from within.

It is necessary to conduct preventive measures with the purpose of preventing repeat offenses among individuals who served terms for state crimes, to continuously influence in a politically advantageous way those who are harboring thoughts of emigration, as well as anti-social elements who are being catered to by the enemy in order to timely prevent the attempts of spreading among the Soviet people ideas and beliefs foreign to our society.

We ought to patiently, and in a targeted fashion, influence those among the artistic intelligentsia and young people, who due to their political immaturity and misconceptions and without any hostile intent spread views foreign to Soviet society. We have to seriously, and in depth, deal with everyone who found themselves under the influence of enemy propaganda, deal with them in a personalized way, and find such traits in their character and behavior which can be influenced in a positive way.

In preventive activities it is better to use the mass media capabilities—press, cinema, radio, TV, and to engage writers' and other artistic unions in creating documentaries and feature films that would depict vigilance of the soviet people in successful unmasking of espionage and subversive activities of clandestine services of imperialist states, their agents, ideological saboteurs, and other enemies of our state. Skillfully use the court case files of state treason cases as an important educational tool of preventive quality. We have to make sure that these propaganda activities of the *checkist* services in

accordance with the requirements of the CPSU's Central Committee are conducted at a high quality level, have effective character, are used in creative ways, and take into account the existing environment and the higher level of education of the soviet people, as well as the needs of various social groups among the population.

The Collegium of the KGB stresses the importance of and need for active involvement of the agency and the KGB troops in the party's activities aimed at raising political vigilance of the soviet people. With this purpose we should more broadly rely on the party, Komsomol and professional unions of the ministries, state committees, agencies, institutions, enterprises and organizations, subdivisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Soviet Army and the Navy, as well as on the veterans of party and labor.

We should considerably raise the level and quality of information communicated to the party branches about the forms and methods of subversive activities of the enemy clandestine services, ideological subversive centers and hostile elements, and timely report negative manifestations and facts related to slacking of political vigilance, and violations of information security regulations at defense and production facilities, transportation and communications facilities, situation in the border areas, as well as negative attitudes of some groups of population, and other issues related to the provision of state security.

Important roles in conducting operative and investigative activities should be given to studying the causes of crimes and anti-social manifestations, as well as conditions promoting their commitment. In line with the established procedures, we have to inform these issues to the heads of respective party and public organizations, institutions, enterprises, commands and political offices.

We should approach reviewing files and making decisions about preventive measures against specific individuals with great care. Their legal evaluation should not be exclusively formal. When needed, investigators may be engaged in reviewing the materials. Specific characteristics of an individual should be taken into account, as well as his moral qualities. We have to thoughtfully analyze the motives behind his undesired manifestations and the attitude towards him in his closest circle.

Particular care needs to be taken when deciding on whether to take preventive action against persons who allow themselves to make statements of terrorist, sabotage or treasonous nature. The decision on whether to take preventive actions with respect to such individuals should be taken only when there is verifiable information that there are no indicators of them preparing to commit terrorist acts or acts of sabotage.

KGB leadership, as well as command of the KGB troops, need to personally participate in preparation and carrying out preventive actions against Soviet citizens when engaging the public at their workplace in the prevention process. The misconduct should be put up for discussion among the employees at the workplace only in those cases when such discussions will have an educational impact, not only on the person with respect to whom the preventive action is being taken, but also on other members of employee group. These events need to be meticulously prepared and carried out under the supervision of the party and political offices, and every precaution has to be taken not to divulge the *checkist* methods of work during these events, as well as classified government or military information.

Preventive activities, with the participation of the public, have to be assigned to experienced officers capable of properly organizing them and ensuring the maximum educational impact on the person with respect to whom the preventive action is being taken and on their immediate circle.

We have to pay special attention to the justification and correctness of application of official warning as a preventive measure, which is stipulated by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR dated December 25, 1972. Official warning is a sharp form of preventive intervention and it should be used in correlation with the specific negative manifestations of the individual, as well as when there is a good chance that the warning will serve as a deterrent for the [future] unlawful activities on the part of the person who has gone astray.

The Collegium of the KGB of the USSR sees a need of continued increase of the use of agents and co-optees in the preventive work of the KGB and its border protection troops. We have to be more proactive in working with those agents and co-optees who based on their personal qualities are capable of having positive influence on misguided and politically immature citizens, shield them from enemy influences, especially in the initial stages of forming politically-harmful beliefs and opinions. The decision about using agent network and co-optees in preventive activities has to be made based on detailed study and knowledge of personality traits of the person with respect to whom the preventive action is taken, and this work has to be conducted under the daily supervision of the operative over the actions of the agent and the co-optee.

We should always take into account that the effectiveness of preventive work is directly correlated with the professional skills of the leadership and operative personnel, their ability to use resources and capabilities that the state security agency has to offer, and correctly evaluate changes in operative environments and immediately react to them, to perform their work in a proactive and offensive manner.

Preventive work requires that members of the KGB personnel are highly ideologically prepared, have deep legal knowledge, are able to tell people very well (are able to tell a masked enemy from a confused, politically immature person). When working on achieving objectives of shielding the Soviet society from nefarious activities of imperialist clandestine services, every *checkist* has to obey the law, display impeccable personal conduct, be deeply loyal to the cause of the party and the people, strictly fulfill the requirements of the Communist party with respect to the reliable provision of state security of our motherland, strictly follow Soviet laws in their work, as well as orders, directives and directions of the leadership of the KGB of the USSR; to constantly improve the forms of communication with the masses, educate the Soviet people in the spirit of uncompromising attitude towards violations of the law and other negative manifestations that hurt the interests of the Soviet state.

The Collegium of the State Security Committee would like to express its confidence that the Soviet *checkists*, when performing the party assignments which were developed at the party congress and plenary meetings of the CPSU's Central Committee, as well as the directives of the National Consultation Meetings of the Leadership and Troops of the KGB, will do everything necessary in order to further improve and increase the quality of preventive work which is an integral part of the work of the KGB and border protection troops in providing state security of the Union of Soviet Socialist republics.

Collegium of the State Security Committee of the USSR.
1983

[illegible signature]

- [1] Yu.V. Andropov, Selected Speeches and Articles, Moscow, *Politizdat* Publishing House, 1983, p.242
[2] Yu.V. Andropov, Selected Speeches and Articles, Moscow, *Politizdat* Publishing House, 1983, p.293

Document No. 8

'To Proudly Bear the Title of the Soviet Checkist, to Increase the Ideological Vigilance, to Strengthen the Discipline and Organization: Letter of the Collegium of the State Security Committee of the USSR Made Public by the Order of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR,' September 10, 1984

[Source: 'Deiatel'nost' Organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR na Sovremennom etape: Sbornik Dokumentov i materialov,' No. 17342, Vypusk 3 (Moskva: 1986), in GDA SBU, f. 13, o. 691, pp. 135-142. Obtained by Nate Jones and translated by Angela Greenfield.]

TO PROUDLY BEAR THE TITLE OF THE SOVIET CHEKIST^[1], TO INCREASE THE IDEOLOGICAL VIGILANCE, TO STRENGTHEN THE DISCIPLINE AND ORGANIZATION

LETTER OF THE COLLEGIUM OF THE STATE SECURITY COMMITTEE OF THE USSR MADE PUBLIC BY THE ORDER OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE KGB OF THE USSR

September 10, 1984

Dear Comrades!

The Collegium of the State Security Committee of the USSR is addressing this letter to the personnel of the agency, troops, educational institutions and subdivisions of the central apparatus of the KGB of the USSR. The necessity of this letter is dictated by the directives of the Communist Party on the issues of strengthening order and discipline, as well as improving organization [in the KGB]. It is also dictated by the urgency and complicated nature of the current international situation, the scale and the challenges of the tasks related to the protection of the Soviet State and society from subversive activities of the class enemy, as well as by the increased requirements of the party towards the work of the *chekist* service.

Heading towards the 27th Congress of the CPSU, the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee are doing everything in their power to preserve and strengthen peace, and increase the economic and defense might of our Homeland. Great attention is being paid to the comprehensive improvement of developed socialism. Clear objectives for this work will be provided in the revised CPSU Program.

The process of achieving such complicated objectives places more and more at the forefront the issue of forming communist convictions, as well as increasing ideological vigilance, responsibility, and labor enthusiasm in each Soviet person.

The high requirements of the party towards the ideological, political, professional, and moral qualities of the Soviet people are, to even greater degree, applicable to the *chekist* personnel who are in the forefront of the struggle with the class enemy.

The objective of the *chekists* is to provide reliable security for the soviet Homeland by structuring their work in accordance with the requirements of socialist democracy, based on the laws of

our state of the whole people and taking into consideration the foreign policy situation. This work has to be conducted based on the inviolable foundation of Leninist principles and in the spirit of outstanding *chekist* traditions.

Tightly united around our dear Communist Party, soviet *chekists* fully approve and support its Leninist course and actively assist in implementing its domestic and foreign policy in the conditions of intense class struggle on the international arena of a noticeably increased threat of war. They take necessary steps to provide reliable protection for the Soviet State and society against foreign encroachments.

State security agency personnel and troops of the KGB of the USSR work selflessly and hard to achieve further increases in the quality of operations, and tirelessly implement the decisions of the 26th Congress of the CPSU, the subsequent Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, as well as provisions of the May 1981 National Consultation Meetings of the Leadership of the Agency and Troops of the KGB of the USSR. The positive results in combating subversive activities of imperialist clandestine services and foreign anti-Soviet centers are quite obvious. We increased the effectiveness of protective measures for state secrets, of efforts for uncovering and thwarting the enemy's attempts to hurt the economy and the defense capability of our Homeland, as well as the interests of the soviet people. These successes have been achieved thanks to the teamwork and cooperation of all of the subdivisions of the KGB of the USSR.

The state security service personnel always remembers and observes in their work Lenin's commandment to "be in a constant state of alertness."

This commandment has become even more crucial in our time, when the intensifying struggle between capitalism and socialism comes amid increased efforts by the US clandestine services and their allies to undermine the political and economic foundations, as well as the defense capabilities of the Soviet Union and the socialist block as a whole. Subversive activities of the enemy are marked by the active use of agent networks, the use of technologies with a wide variety of capabilities, as well as the employment of sophisticated and dangerous forms and methods. Combating subversive acts of the enemy in political, economic, ideological and military areas has now acquired a particularly intense nature and requires the state security personnel to step up their work along every line and in every direction. **The most important thing is to step up the offensive mode and targeted character of all *chekist* efforts, and to not miss the real threat of a nuclear strike.**

The cornerstone of the state security service's work is the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Each one of us should remember that a *chekist* is, in the first place, the Party's political soldier. Lenin's postulate, that *chekists* are required to be decisive, quick, and, most importantly, loyal, has a special meaning today. This loyalty is proven and checked in everyday work, in all things big and small. Understanding your duty before the Homeland, your communist conviction, based on deep knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory, [your] active efforts to implement the party's policies, readiness to give everything you have to offer, and even life if needed, to its cause – without all of this there is no, and there can be no, such thing as a *chekist*!

The complexity of the struggle with the enemy obligates all of us to bring all of our knowledge and skills to the level of the highest professionalism, to perform work creatively, and to love our work. *chekists* are required to possess constant high combat and mobilization readiness, the ability to act covertly, the ability to independently, competently, and without delay, take measures to prevent and

thwart a dangerous developing situation, and the ability to withstand high emotional and physical strain. We cannot be satisfied with the obvious facts lying on the surface. We have to be able to look at things from the class standpoint and uncover the substance of events to be able to give them correct evaluation.

Today, each of us has to clearly understand the urgency of the current international situation, to be informed of the most important political, economic, and other issues and objectives that are being accomplished in the country, in the republic, in the territory, in the region, in the city, in the district, as well as at the specific facility where we conduct operations. A close-knit connection with workers, which has always been the source of strength of the Soviet state security service, is the most crucial condition of our successful work.

chekists have to inherently possess a deep knowledge of soviet laws and understand their letter and spirit. We have to lead by example in compliance with law, and be law-abiding. To act differently means to commit a grave mistake and to cause irreversible harm to the work of the state security service.

To increase ideological vigilance, to strengthen discipline and organization! This motto is not just a 'motto of the day' for the state security personnel. It is a daily necessity dictated by the complexity of the task of protecting the Soviet State and society.

Each member of the personnel has to have a deep appreciation of the particular importance that steel-hard discipline of our troops, their high level of performance, exemplary attitude, and impeccable personal conduct have today!

The work of the KGB service is unconscionable without a high level of commitment to discipline based on the deep belief in the justness of the party's and the people's cause and loyalty to their interests and ideals. *chekists* can't just possess "outward" discipline, treated as a formality. And this means that KGB operatives are required to not only strictly comply with all of the rules, but to display a constant Bolshevik ardor that manifests itself in the proactive and result-oriented attitude, initiative, and full commitment to their work. It is specifically this type of discipline, multiplied by the ideological superiority over the enemy, that gives us the advantage which will lead us to victory in the difficult confrontation with the enemy.

In all of their actions the personnel of the state security agency and the troops of the KGB of the USSR have to adhere to the norms of communist ethics, and to decisively fight everything that is foreign to the socialist way of life. Attempts to abuse power, misuse one's official position and the authority of the KGB office for personal gain, excessive vanity and immoral conduct outside of the office – all of this is incompatible with the title of the *chekist*.

The vast majority of the personnel of the state security service fulfill their duty towards their Homeland impeccably and in their actions live up to their high calling – to provide reliable state security for their socialist Homeland. A considerable number of operatives in the agency and the troops of the KGB of the USSR received awards and commendations for their courage, heroism, exemplary performance of government assignments, and achievement of high results in their operative work.

At the same time, some operatives do not fully measure up in their personal conduct to today's requirements, they perform their duties without the requisite initiative, they let down their guard, allow

themselves to be negligent, have formal attitude to work, and violate professional and military discipline. And though such incidents are few compared to the general trend of the selfless work of the *chekists*, nevertheless in some agencies, subdivisions and military units they negatively impact the quality of operations and military service.

Every member of the state security service and KGB troops has to deeply appreciate that he is the bearer of our common standing in the society. The *chekists*' work and the *chekists* themselves are constantly in the spotlight of the soviet people. Placing the *chekists* in the forefront of the struggle against the class enemy requires that their conduct is so impeccable that it sets the standard for the Soviet people. They have to be highly competent, cultured, display erudition, breadth of knowledge and tactfulness not only when performing official duties, but outside of the job as well. **Each one of us is what the common folk form their opinion on about the personnel of the State Security Committee as a whole, and this places special responsibility on the *chekists*.**

Comrades!

Having stressed the utmost importance of party's increasing requirements, **the Collegium of the KGB of the USSR would like to draw the attention of the leadership** to the necessity of diligently developing high ideological and professional qualities in each serviceman, worker, and operative of the state security service and conducting ideological and political education work in accordance with the directives of the CPSU, with the tasks at hand, as well as with the current political and operational conditions.

With this respect, personnel development is of primary importance. We have to form in them intolerance towards deficiencies [in work] and a heightened feeling of responsibility for their professional and party duties.

Each manager has to skillfully lead their staff, constantly improve his work style, and lead his subordinates by personal example of the unity of word and deed, moral purity, and selflessness. [He has] to increase the effectiveness of control and oversight over the implementation, and study in depth personal qualities of staff members, and their conduct at work and outside of work.

The most crucial tool for strengthening discipline is working with individuals. Knowing your subordinates and showing constant care and attention to their needs and requests, combined with insistence that they adhere to high standards – this is the primary responsibility of the most numerous class of managers – the heads of subdivisions, project managers, shift managers, group leaders, commanders of military outposts, ship captains, squadron commanders and such.

All managers have to establish transparency and objectivity in evaluating personnel, improve morale boosting techniques and financial incentives, as well as disciplinary practices and personnel assessment policies. We need to eliminate instances when personnel assessments do not reflect deficiencies in work and personal conduct, and occasionally even violations of discipline.

Treating *chekist* offices as education centers, the Collegium of the KGB of the USSR encourages management personnel to heed the opinions [of the *chekists*], to timely notice and support innovation, and to develop initiative. In the interest of our work we have to more fully utilize the educational potential of the offices, and maintain within them a spirit of organization, perfectionism and responsibility for assigned tasks. It is important that the [*chekist*] offices use their climate of healthy

morale to favorably influence all staff members, without any exclusions, to help everyone achieve high results in their service or work as well as exemplary conduct.

We have to be realistic and understand that today we cannot expect success in the *chekist* work without the joint efforts of various branches – be it a directorate, a department, a division, a military unit, a border guard outpost, a squadron or a production team. Therefore, it is of utmost importance for us to have well-organized cooperation, teamwork, common concern for the interests of the cause, as well as a particular precision, speed and diligence in fulfilling orders.

Addressing the troops of the KGB, the Collegium would like to stress that all servicemen who are given the honor to guard the state border of the USSR and to fulfill challenging special operations are required to display great skill, perseverance and courage, stamina and cool composure, as well as unconditional loyalty to the Homeland. Each serviceman has to realize that service in the troops of the KGB of the USSR is his school of courage, military training, and exemplary order. They have to strengthen military camaraderie and serve as an example of organization and discipline for everyone.

Commanders and political officers, as well as commissioned staff, sergeants and petty officers of military commands, subdivisions and units are obliged to decisively implement the requirements of Soviet laws, the military oath and military code of conduct, as well as military regulations. We have to uncompromisingly fight against the completely intolerable facts of bullying and harassment among the servicemen, as well as against the violations of the chain of command, which quite often become the cause of other serious incidents.

Increased requirements are posed on the personnel development departments today to strengthen discipline and organization. They have to improve their work in the area of personnel selection, personnel placement, ideological and professional training, as well as study the morale and psychological climate and environment in offices, and react with heightened urgency to the slightest negative manifestations.

Important contributions to achieving the challenging objectives posed on the *chekists* are made by the educational institutions of the KGB of the USSR. The primary objective of their management and faculty members is to train ideologically seasoned political soldiers who are infinitely loyal to the Communist Party and Socialist Homeland and possess high professional skills and instill in them communist morality and uncompromising attitude towards the class enemy.

Success in the area of [personnel] conditioning and achieving strict order is in many ways dependent on the proactive attitude and enthusiasm of party organizations. **The Collegium of the KGB of the USSR is calling on the political branches, party organizations and bureaus, grassroots organizations and shop-level party branches and groups** to ensure the vanguard role of communists in achieving operational objectives. In light of the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee, [we have to] constantly improve all forms of party education and propaganda outreach, and structure our work in such a way that every member of the workforce stays within the party's field of vision. Strengthening the ideological, military and morale conditioning of the *chekist* personnel, and their class-specific conditioning are the most important objectives of party organizations. It is important that the party is effective in its leadership over the *Komsomol* organizations and workers' unions, and that it is efficient in its work in the area of communist conditioning of the personnel.

The Collegium of the KGB of the USSR is calling upon local unions and *Komsomol* organizations to tirelessly improve the forms and methods of their activities, to develop a pro-active outlook in the members of *Komsomol*, young people and union members, to ensure diligent attitude at work and outside of the office, to develop socialist competition for the unconditional and thorough completion of plans and tasks.

Only well-coordinated activities of the top managers at every level, of personnel development offices, of educational institutions, of the party, unions and *Komsomol* organizations, as well as a combination of large-scale and individualized approaches will ensure superior ideological and professional conditioning and high morale. Furthermore we should take into account the workers' educational background, the specifics of their work, and the working conditions and environment outside of work – all of which influence the choice of the most effective forms and methods of ideological education work.

Special attention needs to be paid to developing personnel in the glorious *chekist* and military traditions of the *VCheka*-KGB^[2] agency and troops, which were started by V.I.Lenin and F.E.Dzerzhinsky, and maintained and developed thanks to the invaluable contributions by Yu.V.Andropov. Our sacred duty is to carefully safeguard the rich legacy left behind by them and to creatively develop it and put it to practice.

Our veterans, and first and foremost, those who are currently working at the agency and in the troops of the KGB of the USSR, play a major role in personnel development. They serve as role models of selfless work and exceptional attitude to their professional and party duties. Their primary responsibility is to generously share their experience with the younger generation, help them sharpen their professionalism, and master the art of fighting the enemy and conducting *chekist* operations.

A great responsibility for ensuring state security is placed upon young *chekists*. Young age does not mean lower standards and is not the reason to lower requirements. In order to meet current political and professional criteria, young operatives are obliged to persistently study the *chekist* art of victory, to master professional skills in the shortest possible time, and from the very beginning to have a responsible and diligent attitude towards their assignments.

Comrades!

Today the word “*chekist*” embodies that original purity which V.I.Lenin and F.E.Dzerzhinsky have placed in it. This word is pronounced with respect by every honest person and is hated by the enemies. A Soviet *chekist* is the embodiment of party ideology, infinite loyalty and integrity, unbendable will and readiness to selflessly fight for the interests of our Homeland.

In the tough fight with the class enemy the agency and the troops of the KGB constantly feel the attention and care on the part of the Communist Party, its Central Committee, and they possess everything necessary to organize successful work in every area of operations. The Soviet *chekists* are expressing their deep gratitude to the Central Committee and to the Politburo of the Central Committee for their high level of trust and daily attention. The [*chekists*] will continue to dedicate their efforts and knowledge to the tasks of providing security for their beloved Homeland and of reliably protecting its sacred frontiers.

The Collegium of the State Security Committee of the USSR expresses its firm belief that raised in this letter, the issues of personnel development, strengthening of discipline, organization and order, which are the foundation of high combat and mobilization readiness, will become a focus of constant and close attention of the collegiums and councils of the heads of the KGB directorates, military councils, all leadership, political offices and party organizations; that this effort will acquire a long-term, programmatic character.

We are also sure that every member of the state security agency, every serviceman of its troops, as well as every worker and employee will perceive this letter as directed at them personally and will do everything within their power to continue honorably and with dignity bear the title of a Soviet *chekist*.

[1] Translator's note: The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, VCheKa (or just CheKa), was the predecessor of the KGB. The nickname "chekist" comes from this acronym.

[2] Translator's note: VCheKa (or just CheKa) is the acronym for The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, which was the predecessor of the KGB.