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"DEMOGRAPHY AND SOVIET SOCIETY:
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ASPECTS"

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SOCIAL

At some point before the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress in the spring of 1976, someone in the party leadership must have noticed that many Soviet scholars and government officials had been writing in the press about the negative demographic trends in the country. Although crude birth rates had increased slightly in the preceding decade, the national rate still had not yet recovered to the level of ten years earlier. The decision-makers began to understand the implications for the future composition of the population and for the labor force. During the same period of time, the death rates, by any measure, were showing remarkable increases. By 1975, the crude death rate had increased by 35 percent since 1964, when it was at a low point. Infant mortality increased by over 20 percent in the years between the last Party Congress in 1971 and 1974 when a decision was taken to stop publishing the rates. The sex and age specific mortality rates also showed a phenomenal increase in the disparity between male and female rates, particularly in the prime younger working ages of 20-44 years of age. As a consequence, male life expectancy at age 0 had declined by more than 2 years in only 6 short years between 1965/66 and 1971/72. What to do about these issues might not have been clear at the time given the complexity of the situation, its regional dimensions, and the politically sensitive nationality facets which had to be studied further. Perhaps this is why Brezhnev's statement on this issue at the 1976 Party Congress was limited strictly to the need to work out an

"effective demographic policy" without any elaboration. References to introduction of extended maternity leave and family aid to low-income families were made at the Congress, but only promised for the future. Reaffirmation of the concern over this issue was given only half a year later at the October Plenum of the CP CPSU when Brezhnev noted the "unsatisfactory demographic factors" which in the future would lead to an "acute reduction in the growth of labor resources in the 1980s."

By now, just before the Twenty-Sixth Party Congress scheduled in one week, an enormous amount of consideration seems to have been given to the dimensions of the problem as witnessed by the numerous publications of proposals and contrary views. There is insufficient time and space in this colloquium paper to address all of the demographic issues raised by numerous Soviet scholars and conference participants, as, for example, in the extended comments and recommendations of the All-Union Conference on Labor Resources of April 1978. The precise proposals seem to have been overshadowed by a strong debate over selecting a unified, that is, single demographic policy for all regions regardless of differential rates of births, deaths, migration, labor supply, and so forth, or a policy explicitly differentiated to accommodate these facts. Ranged on the side of a differentiated policy are such leading lights as Urlanis, Kvasha, Perevedentsev, Litvinova, and most importantly, given his official role as head of the Academy of Science's group for population problems, Ryabushkin. On the other side are Manevich, Katkova, and Tatimov. The latter, Tatimov, a Kazakh demographer, has gone so far as to call any differentiated policy, one of discrimination against individual nationalities.

Most of the discussion has been related to fertility issues as the driving force in population growth. Only recently, under the leadership of M. S. Bedniy, has much attention been given to the mortality side of the equation. Labor force issues, which will not be discussed in this colloquium or chapter, have been subject to much discussion at the extremely important conference already cited, by new institutional arrangements made in late 1976, the same year of Brezhnev's statements on the need for effective action, and much subsequent attention leading to the issuance of a key directive in December 1979, which to me presages a growing likelihood of tightening control over the labor market in the Soviet Union.

With the publication of the draft "Basic Guidelines" for the next five-year plan to be affirmed at the Twenty-Sixth Party Congress, we can discern the outlines of the demographic policy which has been chosen by the leadership. The family is to be considered the "most important nucleus of socialist society"; good conditions for women to combine maternity and work are to be created; an improvement is to be made in the state's expenditures for child maintenance and the non-able-bodied population; and presumably related to mortality issues--measures will be taken to extend the length of life and strengthen the health of the population. Finally, an increase in the length of worklife of individuals is to be carried out. Presumably, this last item refers to the drive to increase the number of persons in the pension-aged population so that they will continue or return to work, to offset the drop in the number of young persons entering the labor force especially in the next decade.

Here, we are concerned only with the issues related to family and fertility as noted in the policy issues listed in the Guidelines. I will attempt to avoid presentation of an extensive set of statistics as much as possible, describe the development of specific aspects of family and fertility issues, and speculate on what actions I believe the Soviet Government will take in the future to address these difficult matters.

Total population

The growth rate of the Soviet population has been declining steadily in the postwar period, and will continue to decline until the end of the century. Between the January 1970 and 1979 censuses of population, the average rate of growth for the USSR as a whole was 0.92 percent per year, down from the 1.34 percent average rate of the previous intercensal period of 1959 to 1970. By the end of the century, the rate of growth should drop even further, to about 0.6 percent per year in the last decade. The decline is largely due to overall decreases in the crude birth rate.

As recently as 1976, passenger transportation analysts, among others, were still using the Central Statistical Administration's projection of 340-350 million person population for the year 2000. Projections by Soviet demographers currently hover around 300 million. (This figure is slightly less than the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division's medium projection of about 302 million for the turn of the century. This projection was prepared in March 1980; more recent official statistics on fertility and mortality indicate that the growth rate has continued to decline.) The reduced Soviet projection reflects both recognition of the

declining crude birth rates in most of the USSR's union republics and expectations that this decline will continue. Moreover, as the discussion on mortality will show, the incredible increases in mortality in the last decade or more may also lead to further reductions if they continue.

Again, these are figures for the country as a whole: Major regional differences exist which are not obvious from these statistical averages. The consequences of these differentials represent an essential component of the Soviet population problem.

For instance, at the beginning of 1979, according to the census results, the RSFSR contained 52.4 percent of the Soviet population. During the period 1970 to 1979, however, the republic grew by only two-thirds of the national average, or 0.62 percent per year instead of 0.92 percent. Some of this growth in the RSFSR was a result not of births but of a positive net migration balance beginning in 1975, a significant reversal of 25 years of out-migration. In contrast, the growth rate of Tadzhikistan was 3.05 percent per year, or five times that of the Russian Republic. Consequently, by the beginning of the next century it is projected that the RSFSR will contain only about 46-48 percent of the total population, despite an absolute growth of 12 million persons. The percentage share of Kazakhstan and the four core Central Asian republics--Kirgiziya, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan--will increase dramatically. The population of this group may well double, from 33 million at the beginning of 1970, to 40 million reported at the beginning of 1979, to 64 million by the year 2000. The proportion of the entire Soviet population

in these five republics will thus increase by over half, from 14 to 21 percent. The three Transcaucasian republics of Armenia, Azerbaydzhan, and Georgia will also experience rapid population growth perhaps growing proportionally by as much as 6 percentage points.

Fertility

Fertility and Birth Rates

Soviet crude birth and death rates have undergone dramatic changes since 1950. The national birth rate has dropped by more than 30 percent, whereas the death rate declined until 1964, but has since increased by 40 percent and is now higher than the 1950 level.

The overall crude birth rate was expected to increase from 18.1 births per 1,000 population in 1975 to perhaps 18.5 in 1980 as the relative proportion of women in the prime childbearing ages peaks, and then decrease to about 16.1 by the year 2000. Current trends in overall population growth seem to indicate that the crude birth rate for 1980 may well be lower than the 18.5 projected early in 1980. This in turn would indicate a figure perhaps even lower than 300 million by the year 2000.

Again, the aggregate figures conceal major regional differentials, ranging from a 1977 low of 13.6 per 1,000 population in Latvia, to a slightly higher rate of 15.8 in the RSFSR, to a maximum of 36.5 in Tadzhikistan. While the birth rate in the RSFSR has increased somewhat in recent years very likely because of a major increase in the number of 20-29-year-old females, it can, ceteris paribus, be expected to fall in the future due to

the reduction in the number of women 20-29 as a proportion of the entire female population aged 15 to 49 in the republic. Simultaneously, the corresponding proportion of 20- to 29-year-old women as a percentage of the 15- to 49-year-olds in the Central Asian republics will continue to increase until about 1990. (For the RSFSR, the ratios are: 23.7 percent in 1970, 33.5 in 1980, 29.2 in 1990, and 26.2 in 2000. For Central Asia, the ratios are: 26.4 in 1970, 36.5 in 1980, 38.3 in 1990, and 32.9 in 2000.)

The gross reproduction rate (GRR) is more accurate than crude birth rates measure of a population's fertility patterns. The GRR indicates the number of females that will be born to 100 women during their reproductive lifetimes, assuming that a given set of birth rates by age of mother remains in effect. The GRR has dropped one-quarter nationally from 1958/59 to 1976/77, from 152.3 to 115.5 female infants per 100 women. Over that period, rates in the RSFSR dropped in the same proportion, although from a lower starting level than the national, from 127.6 to 96.0. However, in the high fertility Central Asian republics the GRR has moved in the other direction, increasing by over 50 percent in Tadzhikistan, and by about 10 percent in each of the three other Central Asian republics. In these republics a continued increase in the proportion of females in prime child-bearing ages will perpetuate high crude birth rates. These rates might show an increase if the out-migration of low fertility Slavic peoples in the area persists or increases, a prospect made more likely by manpower shortages for priority projects in the Russian republic.

These trends indicate the beginning of a relative decline, on the one hand, of the Great Russian population to a level below 50 percent of the Soviet population by the year 2000, as indicated earlier, and, on the other hand, an increase in the population of Muslim origin, largely the population of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaydzhan, and certain nationality groups within the Russian Republic itself, on the other. The population of Muslim origin may represent as much as one-quarter of the total Soviet population by the end of the century. The political, social, and economic implications are connected with potential demands by them for more voice in the decision-making councils of Moscow. The "50-percent" problem of Russians as a formal "minority" population brings up the question of their ability to control the mores of society, the lingua franca of the country, the general staff, and so forth.

Age at Marriage

At the same time, Soviet demographers are pleased with some indicators, judging them to be favorable for future Russian national population growth. For example, more women are marrying younger, especially in the RSFSR. However, this indicator may prove to be a false lead. It seems to be more a result of the 1967 law lowering the draft age for males from 19 to 18 (and thus the age of discharge from the military from 21 to 20) than the calculated result of major Soviet efforts to enhance marital prestige and encourage higher fertility rates. Detracting from success in this area are the divorce rates which have been climbing, especially in the non-Muslim republics; the rates are

now running at about one-third the marriage rate, up from about one-quarter in 1970.

Second marriages could compensate for the potential population loss resulting from high divorce rates, though far from all divorced persons remarry and then have children--and by an apparently growing number of illegitimate births. Bernice Madison has found strong evidence for this trend in illegitimate births, specifically for Belorussia but also generally throughout the country. It is now about 400,000 births, or about 8 percent of all births.

Education

Fertility patterns are not dependent exclusively on marriage and divorce rates and age distribution, but also are affected by educational levels, degree of urbanization, availability of housing, pro- or anti-natalist legislation, nationality differences, and so forth. The average number of children is usually inversely related to the level of education: the higher the educational level, the lower the number of children. According to one large-scale survey of some 300,000 women conducted in 1972 by the Soviet Central Statistical Administration, those women with the highest level of education in every category (age, length of marriage, nationality) had a lower expected, ideal, and actual number of children. However, there remain significant differentials among the nationality groups. According to this survey, the number of children expected by women in the higher fertility nationalities--Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Turkmen, Kirgiz, Kazakhs, and Azeris--including those recently married, is twice as high as that among women of lower

fertility nationalities (3.52 and 1.17 children expected, respectively, 1970-72). Thus, while education tends to reduce fertility among the high fertility nationalities, the differential between high and low groups is still great, and increasing levels of education are according to Ota Ata-Mirzayev, head of the Population Laboratory of Tashkent State University, influential for the high fertility local nationalities only in highly urbanized cities.

This must be disappointing to Soviet authorities. They had hoped to use education to significantly reduce fertility rates among the non-Russian peoples both to increase female participation in the Central Asian labor force and to reverse the trends that will soon reduce the Great Russian nationality to a minority of the Soviet population.

Indeed, Ata-Mirzayev observes that in the "Uzbek SSR, education, without taking into account other factors, is not a serious obstacle...to women having many children." In an August 1976 survey of 1,616 women with four or more children, 93.1 percent were of the indigenous Central Asian nationalities, 2.4 percent were Russian and Ukrainian, 3.0 percent were Tatars, and 1.5 percent of other nationalities. Among this group, women with higher education had an average of 5.1 children (5.0 if working, 5.5 if not) and women with only primary education had only one more child on the average, i.e., 6.1 (5.9 if working, 6.2 if not).

Urban-Rural Distribution

Reproductive behavior among women residing in urban areas typically is lower than that of rural residents. This also is true in the Soviet Union, though somewhat modified by ethnic

considerations and migration patterns among certain groups. The current proportion of the population residing in urban places is 62 percent, with some republics at or about the 70 percent mark (Estonia at 70 percent and the RSFSR at 69 percent, at the beginning of 1979). However, while the share of urban population for the country as a whole increased by 6 percentage points in the recent intercensal period, the only Central Asian republic witnessing an increase by as much as 5 percentage points was Uzbekistan, which is nevertheless still more than 20 percentage points less urbanized than the country as a whole. Moreover, in Turkmenistan the urban proportion did not change at all, while in Tadzhikistan, the urban proportion even decreased between census dates--from 37 to 35 percent. This implies continuation of very high rural rates of fertility and, therefore, fewer opportunities for female labor force participation.

These urban-rural shares are by republic and do not necessarily represent the actual distribution of nationalities by place of residence. Thus, according to the 1970 census, some 51 percent of the population of Kazakhstan resided in urban places. However, Kazakhs themselves were split much more sharply between urban and rural residence. The 1970 proportion of 26 percent urban Kazakhs (rather than the figure of 51 percent of all nationalities residing in the republic) also represented only a minor increase from the 24 percent urban Kazakhs in 1959. In contrast, the urban population as a whole grew by 7 percentage points. Therefore, we have to be wary of using the republic urban-rural distribution to represent the urban-rural nationality distribution.

The increase in the urban population is not derived entirely from migration based on specific individual decisions or induced by governmental policy (wages, services, assignment upon graduation, etc.) but may also be the consequence of a statistical reclassification of a populated place once it either reaches a minimum level of population or attains a certain function mixture, e.g., more than 50 percent industrial employment. Thus, it is too early to determine whether the growth of the urban population in Central Asia is composed primarily or entirely of migrants. Moreover, we will not know for several years whether the migrants are natives of the area or come largely from other republics.

To this day, the republic capitals, by far the largest urban areas in the Central Asian republics, represent only a minor part of the population of each republic. The highest proportion of a Central Asian republic living in its capital is found in Frunze, the capital city of Kirgiziya, with 15 percent of the republic's population; the lowest is Alma-Ata, with 6.2 percent of Kazakhstan's population. The other three republic capitals hold between 11 and 13 percent each of their total populations. Since Ata-Mirzayev believes that only a highly urbanized ambience can generate significant changes in demographic behavior, the Soviets have a long way to go in this heavily Muslim region before urbanization with high concentrations of Russians can have an impact upon population trends.

In contrast, in some republics the urbanization policy associated with industrialization has probably succeeded too well. The high level of urbanization of the Russian Republic's population

(69 percent, up from 52 percent in 1959 and 62 percent in 1970) is associated with a drop in the crude birth rate from 23.6 per 1,000 population in 1959 to 14.6 in 1970 but later increased to 15.8 by 1979. The drop in the birth rate also was, of course, a consequence of increased education, urban housing shortages, increased labor force participation of women since 1959, and a large-scale out-migration of young people from rural areas. In the case of the RSFSR, there are reports of up to 17 oblasts in which the rural crude birth rate is lower than the urban rates of the same oblasts. This occurred largely because the number of 20-29-year-olds in rural areas of the RSFSR in the 1959-to-1970 period dropped precipitously, to half the number in the early date. The out-migration not only lowered the population in the prime child-bearing ages, but also affected the extremely important labor force supply for the Non-Black Earth Zone agricultural project. How to compensate for this draw-down in supply or to resupply the area also is part of population policy. The slight increase in the crude birth rate in the republic between 1970 and 1979 is probably due to the lower average age at marriage in the republic during the 1970s and the increase in the absolute number of women aged 20-29, the prime childbearing ages. After 1980 the number of women in these ages will again decline, at least until the end of the century, and the crude birth rates will drop concomitantly.

Factors Affecting Fertility: Importance of Family
Structure and Stability

The social-psychological patterns mentioned above are related to what Urlanis calls the "one-child" philosophy of women and to the overall structure and stability of the family as an institution. Governmental concern about the "one-child" approach to fertility seems especially appropriate in the European part of the USSR, because for a variety of motives, including current consumption, education, career, income or housing problems, the population in this part of the country is not replacing itself. There has not yet been an absolute decline in the population, primarily because of the age structure, but this eventuality is rapidly approaching especially in Latvia and Estonia (if there would be no in-migration). The low gross reproduction rates in the RSFSR and the Ukraine also portend declines in the future if the number of females born per 1,000 women in the childbearing ages does not soon climb. In all the republics whose populations are largely if not mostly composed of Muslim peoples the gross reproduction rates continue at levels many times higher than those of the low fertility republics.

The current discussions and debates addressed to potential implementation of a differentiated population policy are in part aimed at changing this behavior pattern. Evidence from the 1959 and 1970 censuses showed remarkably little change in the crude birth rates by nationality. Thus, while the rate for the entire population of Uzbekistan dropped from 37.0 to 33.5 per 1,000 between 1959 and 1970, the rate for the Uzbeks alone dropped much

less, from 41.7 to 39.2. Simultaneously, the Kazakh, Kirgiz, and Turkmen populations resident in Uzbekistan showed an increase in their birth rates whereas those of the Russians and Ukrainians declined from 23.7 to 19.3 and 26.0 to 23.0, respectively. (But both Slavic population rates are higher than those in their titular republics.) Since the 1979 crude birth rate for Uzbekistan (34.4) is higher than the level for Uzbekistan in 1970 (33.5), one could assume that the rate for the Uzbek nationality population alone has not dropped at all in the intervening years. Indirect evidence from the preliminary results of the 1979 census on Uzbekistan's share in the nationwide natural increase (excess of births over deaths) of the rural population of the USSR between 1970 and 1979 tend to bear out this high fertility pattern. Uzbekistan's share is 29.2 percent of the total increase, despite the republic being only 5.9 percent of the total population of the country. This also limits the potential for migration of the indigenous population to the cities given retention of traditional demographic behavior and lack of adequate housing for large families.

Importance of Family--Marriage and Divorce Rates

The overall pattern of marriage and divorce rates have become another major source of worry for those interested in stimulating fertility because of the low rate of marriages in certain areas, the high rate of divorces in others, and the consequent impact this pattern has on family stability, the prestige of the family, and potential reproductive behavior.

In the past 15 years, the national marriage rate has hovered around 9 to 11 per 1,000 population, with the regional rates, as

represented by the RSFSR, Estonia, and Uzbekistan, slightly higher in the RSFSR and slightly lower in the other two republics. Ever since the law of 1965 easing divorce procedures was adopted, the number of registered divorces at first doubled from 360,000 in 1965 to about 650,000 per annum between 1966 and 1973, and then rose gradually to a point almost three times higher, to 900,000 in 1977 (or, 3.5 per 1,000 population). The comparative U.S. rate for marriage is around 10 per 1,000, and over 5 per 1,000 for divorces, based upon the 12 months ending in August 1979 and three previous years.) In regional terms, the divorce rates in both the RSFSR and Estonia are three times higher than in Uzbekistan. On this basis alone the birth rate in Uzbekistan should be--and is--higher than in the other republics. Newly published data on Kirgiziya, for the capital city and the three component oblasts also show the influence of nationality factors. Thus, in the capital city of Frunze with five times as many Russians as Kirgiz according to the 1970 census, the divorce rate was 4.7 per 1,000 population, but in the Narynskaya Oblast of the Republic where the Russians were less than 5 percent, and the divorce rate was only 0.2 per 1,000. Since low divorce rates, combined with family stability are conducive to larger families, the Soviets have begun to pay much more attention to marriage and family problems.

But not everyone who marries has children. According to the 1970 census results of the 58.7 million families, 12.4 million, or one-fifth had no children, and more than half the families had no more than 1 child. But since it is statistically necessary to

have about 265 children per 100 marital pairs under current Soviet mortality conditions to have simple reproduction, and 300 to have expanded reproduction of the population, the census demonstrated the need for the central authorities to become concerned about the insufficient or inappropriate distribution of families.

Fertility and the Unmarried Woman

In the past when the family was denigrated as a focus or organization of society on the individual level, the rate of illegitimacy was not the type of problem about which the state worried. Now there are demonstrable signs of ambivalence among the demographers who seek to increase fertility regardless of the source and those who look toward more stable formations in a legalized format. In addition, as Davis and I have shown elsewhere, the illegitimacy may contribute to infant mortality because of poor pre- and post-natal care. The illegitimacy rate in the mid- and late 1970s has been variously reported as about 10 percent of all births (400,000 out of 4 million total births). In some regions a figure of 14 appears to prevail. If these rates are correct they indicate an increase compared with the period since 1950. In Belorussia, which is noted to be representative of the entire country, there were 11.5 children born out-of-wedlock per 100 births in 1950 in the republic, 6.9 in 1960, and 7.3 in 1965 and 1970. The rates may go up even further in the future if the recent discussion in the press on single mothers and happiness, the militant bachelors who refuse to get married, and the most recent advocacy of single motherhood by Urlanis in early December 1980 becomes prevalent.

Programs and Policies

The essential data on fertility, the basic numerical dimensions of past, present, and probable future Soviet birth rates have been discussed here. It is necessary to focus on the question of what the Soviets have done thus far to address and correct their unsatisfactory demographic situation with regards to fertility. What new institutions they have decreed, what policies they have discussed, and what alternatives they perceive for the future, are the subject of this section.

Several important dates and events need to be recalled here. First, the 1959 census offered the Soviet government its first comprehensive picture of the demographic damage caused by both the Second World War and prior damage to the Soviet population. Soon thereafter, at the time of the 1961 Party Congress, population problems received some slight attention. In 1962, a series of institutional developments related to demographic research in the university and regional level began to take form. The 1970 census results undoubtedly made it abundantly clear to the leadership that the population's numerical trends by any measure-- age, sex, nationality, family composition, migration, etc.-- demanded the implementation of a more forceful approach towards demographic issues, rather than the continuation of a policy of relatively benign neglect. Thus, we see significant changes in the last decade since the 1970 census in all realms of population policy. For the moment, we will concentrate on the institutions, discussions, innovations, and policies relative to fertility, the subject of this section.

The fertility-related measures ordered by the central authorities represent perhaps the most important field of change within Soviet demographic policy. In the social area, for example, a great deal of effort is devoted to enhancing the family, and its prestige, stability, and reproduction function. After having seen the divorce rate grow sharply since divorces became easier to obtain, and now some 98 percent of all petitions for divorce are granted, the effort to retain stability is weakened. The frequent reluctance of divorced males to enter into a second marriage, which greatly reduces the probability of their having more children, is another reason that Soviet scholars and policy-makers seek to elevate the prestige of the family. Regional differentials in the divorce rate also deflate birth rates, especially in the Slavic and Baltic areas.

In part, the fact that the divorce rate has been exacerbated by the lower prestige of the family is only a reflection of past Soviet philosophical expectations that the family would cease to have a production function and the state would assume all child-bearing responsibilities. This view has become largely obsolete now, and more consideration is given to the family's consumption and upbringing role.

Complementing the decline in family prestige are a number of objective factors inhibiting family stability. According to Ryabushkin, among others, these include "alcoholism, lack of individual apartments, poor demographic upbringing--i.e., training in family, marriage, sexual relations--and the simplification of divorce procedures."

In the 1970s we see a number of measures taken to investigate and to rectify obstacles to family development. A research section of families was established in 1976 in the Soviet Sociological Association; a Commission on Questions of the Work and Personal Services for Women and the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood was formed in October 1976 in each house of the Supreme Soviet; a Scientific Council on Family Problems was created in 1979 in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR; family consultation centers have been organized in Moscow, Leningrad, Riga, and several other cities beginning in 1974; and parental guidance courses, sex education, and so forth, have been formed albeit still in small numbers. The Academy's Council was charged with coordinating research on issues pertaining to the family, to prepare a unified five-year and long-range research program on family problems, to carry out comprehensive analysis of the results of such research, to study the causes of family conflicts and divorces, to articulate means to mitigate these causes, and to provide state agencies with recommendations and materials for strengthening the family. Thus, the council has a very full menu of activities in this area.

Another type of institution was created in the national capital. Moscow has a low birth rate, high death rate, high divorce rate, and low in-migration due to housing shortages leading to labor shortages. These facts undoubtedly contributed to the decision to create a family consultation unit in Moscow. In 1978 a formal resolution was adopted to prepare measures for improving the capital's demographic situation and stimulating natural growth in the city. This resolution represents a policy

totally contrary to the history of establishing official ceilings on the size of Moscow's population. It is true that the various ceilings have always been exceeded before the deadline--the 1935 ceiling of 5 million at the most in 1960 was surpassed by 1950; the 1971 ceiling of 7.5 by 1974--but the changes in the official policy represent a significant change in the attitudes of the central authorities. This new stimulus to population growth, therefore, must be more closely related to the aging of the current population and labor shortages in city enterprises. One of the more interesting aspects of this resolution is related to housing priorities for young families. Those families currently living in special dormitories reserved for workers who have children are to be provided at some unspecified point with separate housing, as are higher and specialized secondary school students with young families. According to this resolution, child-care facilities are to receive particular attention in new housing complexes. Large families (not precisely defined) are to be given priority in consumer services, and families with children under three years of age are to enjoy home delivery of milk and other foods under the terms of the Moscow directive. Only one other similar experiment has been located, and that is in Kiev.

Housing continues to be in short supply in all Soviet cities, and housing issues reportedly inspired the earliest studies of family problems as far back as the 1950s. One of the housing problems most seriously affecting family formation and fertility is the small size of Soviet apartments, especially when they are shared. To this date, about 20-25 percent of all urban housing

is shared in one fashion or another. This reality tends to discourage parents with large families such as those in Central Asia from moving into cities. Thus, separate, even if small average-size housing facilities are required in low fertility Slavic and Baltic republics, and larger apartments will be needed in high fertility areas in the foreseeable future. To the degree that resources are or will be available, the Soviet authorities concerned with families and fertility will undoubtedly strive to allocate resources toward the housing sector. The 1979 census results, combined with those of 1970 will provide details on the trends in the average number of members and types of families throughout the country. The fertility question in the 1979 census--the first time such a question was included since the 1926 census--also will assist the decision-makers in dealing with question of housing and family formation.

Both Ryabushkin, head of the Scientific Council on Socio-Economic Problems of the Population of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and L. M. Volodarskiy, the head of the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR, have referred to a "cult of the large family" or "raising the prestige of large families." In part, this would require a change in the social psychology of non-Muslim women who currently would rather be working than raising a family. How this change to a positive attitude toward large families will be effected is not clear, since the protracted national effort to raise female labor force participation rates--virtually an economic necessity--have helped mold a tradition of low reproductive behavior in the European USSR. The pattern in

the low fertility regions of the country of having one or no children is partly related to this issue.

Another factor complicating the fertility question is the continued increase in educational levels among women. The normal inverse correlation between higher levels of education and lower numbers of children applies throughout the USSR, though to a somewhat lower degree in the republics with a population of Muslim origin. Furthermore, no change can be anticipated in the nationwide emphasis on improving women's educational status, since the social, cultural, and political benefits of female educational attainment are far-reaching. Indeed, in Central Asia, state efforts to accelerate the educational level of the young, especially rural women, represent a large part of the campaign to reorient their psychology and weaken the Muslim tradition of having very large families. In the Central Asian arena, at least, a break with the demographic past and its concomitant potential for raising female labor-force participation in urban areas would be economically desirable to the authorities. It is crucial to observe here that these Central Asian demographic objectives contrast sharply with the European goal depicted in the preceding paragraph, i.e., a stated emphasis on "the cult of a large family," despite its potential depression of European female labor force participation rates.

Conflicting Goals

Another social issue which affects fertility, and on which Soviet governmental action may be possible, is the topic of health and of infant mortality in particular. One can view infant deaths

not only as a cause of net decreases in the birth rate, but also as an incentive to perpetuate traditional reproductive behavior among women in high fertility areas who seek to compensate for the extraordinarily high rates of infant mortality in their region. While mortality issues will not be discussed in this colloquium paper, for the present it is important to observe that Soviet authorities and analysts generally have not perceived the link between infant mortality and the effective birth rate, nor related it to the regional aspect. However, we can expect that the effort to reduce mortality when fully implemented will have a payoff in a reduction in birth rates even if the initiators are not aware of the ripple effect.

A forceful obstacle to family formation and hence to increases in the crude birth rate of many cities in the Russian Republic is the existence of a large number of so-called "single-sex" cities. This phenomenon is an outcome of legislation, tradition, and social attitudes. The legislative background results from the prohibition of female employment in hot, heavy, and hazardous occupations. A recent article by a Moscow Correspondent of The Washington Post directly links the renewed effort to forbid women to actually work in these types of occupations to the need to boost fertility. Since women generally could not find employment in heavy industry cities, they leave for other places. A serious repercussion of this female out-migration is a distorted sex ratio in the place of origin, and a consequent erosion of marriage opportunities for the remaining males. Obversely, the phenomenon of single-sex female cities also emerges, particularly in textile and light

industry towns which have an overwhelmingly female employment pattern. In this case, the young males tend to leave because of the structure of industry. The development of single-sex towns has become so pronounced an issue that such areas have become the subject of a number of major surveys, and Gosplan (the State Planning Committee) has been obliged to plan the diversification of industry and other economic activities which might attract persons of the opposite sex to the given location. However, it is doubtful whether this policy has been successful. Central ministries generally favor larger cities with new investment, in part because they already have the infrastructure to complement the new industry. Thus, the small- and medium-sized cities, in which one sex or the other tends to predominate, continue to suffer from the distortion in supply of persons who would offer their services to work in these areas. If this problem could be solved, possibilities for an increase in the birth rate would be greater.

One of the most difficult social tasks before Soviet authorities today is the need to reduce male chauvinism within the family unit. More male participation in household duties is necessary in order to relieve women from the dual burden of work and home activities. If successful, hopefully women would be more willing to have children. Uralnis, Perevedentsev, and others have discussed this sensitive subject in their articles, but no real change in male attitudes has occurred if recent references to lack of change are correct. Perhaps the current expansion of research on the family will embrace this issue and later lead to

a mass media campaign to alter attitudes. More likely, however, if informal sociological observations are correct, any such effort would be resisted even among young people.

From the economic point of view, there are major trade-offs involved in the issue of increasing fertility among the low birth rate populations, especially in the labor-short Slavic and Baltic regions. A real difference exists in the average number of children born to working women, on the one hand, and to housewives, on the other: for the country as a whole, a working woman has 1.96 children on the average, a nonworking woman 2.24. In combination with regionally differentiated labor force participation rates, it is not surprising that the RSFSR with its higher labor force participation rates has lower birth rates than the Central Asian region with distinctly lower female labor force participation rates. In view of strong but conflicting official desires to encourage higher birth rates among Russian women, on the one hand and to supplement the shrinking labor supply with female labor, on the other, the regime is in a quandary given the major decrease in the size of the able-bodied population during the 1980s. In fact, any pro-natalist policy will have a negative effect on the labor supply in the short term. Therefore, the ultimate policy direction will be dependent on whether Soviet policymakers take a short-term or long-term approach to the fertility question. A number of proposals have been raised for discussion and consideration. Among these is an important compromise solution to the fertility/labor trade-off--the provision of opportunities for part-time female employment, either on the

job or at home. Past efforts to introduce part-time work have met with very little success, and have essentially been largely limited to the recruitment of pensioners rather than women of child-bearing ages.

Related to the issue of part-time work for women is the inescapable problem of providing sufficient child-care facilities. Bernice Madison has calculated that current facilities offer perhaps only 40 percent of the capacity needed to meet the potential demand for day care. A weak child-support infrastructure is just one more reason why many working women decide against having children.

Several other current socioeconomic programs are actually exacerbating this lack of child-care possibilities. The drive to funnel pensioners back into the work-force (or retain those reaching pension age) has reduced the number of babushkas (elderly women, or grandmothers) available to care for young children. According to sample survey data, approximately 25 percent of all families use a babushka or other relative to cover their child-care needs. Thus, the presence of a babushka is a significant incentive to childbearing; conversely, the absence may well serve as a disincentive to parenthood. In part, this decline in the availability of such "surrogate mothers" is also due to the increased (albeit still insufficient) number of individual apartments being constructed in cities. As a growing number of "nuclear" families begin to live separately from their respective parents--thereby severing the tradition of the extended (three-generation) family--the government will come under increasing

pressures to provide more child-care facilities, especially if mothers are expected to work in the public sector. Separation from parents also ensues from the drive to settle Siberia and the Far East where young people move without their immediate relatives. Thus, in these regions, additional child-care facilities also have to be built at an accelerated pace to encourage childbearing.

As an alternative to expanding the child-care system, Ryabushkin and others have tentatively proposed that women might be able to stay at home and receive an allowance until their children reach three years of age. Beginning as a two-year period, it was hoped that it would later be extended to three years. A two- or three-year period seemed preferable to some Soviet advocates to one year of maternity leave since it would allow women to assume child-care responsibilities for a longer period; but it also might be objected to on the grounds that "women find it difficult to return" to work after a prolonged interruption and that Soviet women psychologically "would begin to feel oppressed by such long-term family burdens," and Ryabushkin added that it might also be objected to because the taut labor balance anticipated over the next few decades must not be "ignored." Another problematic aspect of Ryabushkin's proposal is that the introduction of prolonged, paid maternity leave might obviate the State child-care system, hastening its deterioration. Clearly opposed to such an eventuality, Kvasha has argued instead that the entire child-care system must be expanded, and the quality of its work improved, since this would be "more consistent with

the character and goals of our society." Furthermore, a state-controlled child-care situation, where official upbringing (indoctrinating) theories could be implemented, appears more desirable to those who side with Kvasha than does family-controlled child-rearing.

The initial recommendation of the Twenty-fifth Party Congress of 1976 that a policy of paid leave for one year be adopted took more than the entire five-year plan period to be initiated. The draft of the Basic Directions for the 1981-85 plan to be adopted in presumably like form next week at the Twenty-sixth Party Congress, opted for a one-year period of partially paid leave, not the longer period advocated by Ryabushkin and others. But most interestingly, without making it precisely clear as to the republic by republic listing and timing, the Basic Guidelines stipulated the introduction of such leave for working women until their child is one year old "by region of the country." Assuming for the moment, given the lack of the republic listing, that it is initiated in the Russian Republic, and is even successful, it still may be too high a price for the national economy to pay in the short run, especially in the face of labor shortages in the low fertility republics and the lack of major gains in labor productivity.

In the economic realm, consideration also is being devoted by Soviet demographers to adjustments of prices and services which affect the expenditures of families with children. Ryabushkin has proposed that either "prices be reduced, or necessary items be provided at no cost." These goods and

services include infant clothing, medicine, infant food, textbooks, school lunches, family trips to rest homes, tax reduction, and so forth. The only item that has been proposed in the new Guidelines is the future introduction of free textbooks to general educational school students.

Legal Measures

Legal measures also offer a wide range of possibilities in the list of factors affecting fertility. The Family and Marriage Code of 1968 is a case in point. This Code regulates the minimum age at marriage, rules of divorce, adoption procedures, and so forth. The 1968 Code stresses the need to raise the "moral" factor in families and marriage and mutual responsibility of both spouses for the stability of marriage. It also called for a month's wait after registration before marriage to ensure that it was a serious event. Simultaneously, however, it codified the simplification of divorce procedures which had been initiated in 1965. In comparison with the ruling of 1944, greater responsibility was ordered for the parents of children born out-of-wedlock and the determination of fatherhood was authorized. Ryabushkin calls for efforts to create families based "on love, mutually esteemed partners and their responsibility of child-raising." The stability of marriage is conducive to raising the birth rate, he concludes, because it reflects a positive evaluation of the future and, it is asserted, women with a positive outlook will desire to have another child.

But stability is based not only on the words but also on the deeds of the Soviet state. As indicated earlier it is much

easier to obtain a divorce since 1965. As a consequence of higher rates of divorce fewer children are born over the course of a woman's potentially fertile period. According to one survey conducted by the Central Statistical Administration in 1960, before the obstacles to obtaining a divorce were slackened, it was found that women who were separated before their 20th birthday bore 25 percent fewer children than others who did not have a divorce, and those who separated during ages 20-24 bore 13 percent fewer. With the instantaneous jump in the number of divorces it would be no wonder if the birth rate has dropped for this reason alone. Divorce in large part is often connected with housing problems and with reportedly frivolous attitudes toward marriage. In addition, and depending on the location, about 40 to 60 percent of all actions for divorce are initiated by women who give alcoholism as the root cause. This issue is one which the government has been addressing albeit insufficiently thus far.

Not only is alcoholism disruptive of family life but it also reduces life expectancy, increases the risk of infant mortality, increases the male age-specific mortality rates, and reduces labor productivity. Article 42 of the new (October 1977) Constitution stresses the need for resolution of health problems and could also be applicable to this issue of divorce due to alcoholism. A reduction in the recent increases or--better yet--an actual decline in the rate of growth of alcoholism also could ameliorate the Soviet fertility situation in a different fashion. Minister of Health Boris Petrovskiy in an article acknowledged alcoholism to be "illness number three" among women in the USSR.

The negative consequences of female alcoholism on the health of the fetus and the newborn child have been noted throughout the world. The higher incidence of birth anomalies or physical defects among children born even to women who drink only socially during pregnancy confirms these warnings and also leads to a less healthy cohort. One-third of the children born to mothers in Moscow who were chronic alcoholics were mentally retarded. Some indication of negative genetic effects also are being referred to in the Soviet literature. Presumably Soviet medical researchers are fully aware of the world literature on the linkage between drink and birth deformities but it was not until recently that a significant effort under the leadership of M. S. Bedniy was begun. Bedniy opened a series of articles in the April 1977 issue of the health journal of the Russian Republic on the creation of a new field of study, medical demography. A report on a recent seminar held in the Soviet Union indicates that the work on a new "Complex Long-Term Program for Development of the Population of the USSR" includes a section on improving the health of the population and protection of motherhood and childhood.

Alcoholism among women is even more complex when one considers the inevitable regional differentiation ensuing from traditional Muslim laws against drinking. Most women of Muslim origin, probably with the exception of liberated, highly urbanized and educated women, do not drink. Thus, as Treml and Segal have noted, alcoholism is more concentrated among the Slavic and Baltic women, just those women with lower fertility rates and who it is hoped will increase their births. It is therefore reasonable to

expect that a major effort will be made to reduce alcoholism. How successful it will be is moot.

The past history of divorce legislation enables us to track changes in pro-natalist policy and perhaps obtain some insight into future legislation. In 1918 it became possible to obtain a divorce without any limitations imposed by a third person for reasons of nationality, religion, or class. In addition, illegitimate children were considered to have rights equal to those born to married couples. The 1926 Code on Marriage, Family and Guardianship made divorce as well as marriage even easier by doing away with obligatory registration of either civil act. Common-law marriages were recognized, and many analysts, Soviet and otherwise, concluded that this decree was designed to enable if not encourage the withering away of families under communism; the institution of marriage was no longer endorsed per se. However, within 10 years this policy was completely abandoned, on June 27, 1936, when divorce was made costly and difficult, and the penalties for nonsupport could lead to imprisonment for a period of up to two years. Perhaps the date of this decree is related to the hope to increase fertility to make up for population losses due to collectivization and famine in the early part of the 1930s. Nonetheless, it was not until the law of July 8, 1944, which decreed that only registered marriages were considered legal, that even more stringent procedures were imposed on those seeking divorce. A notice of intent had to be placed in a newspaper, a filing fee of 10 rubles paid, and if a first divorce trial denied the suit and an appeal was made to a higher court,

the filing fee could be anywhere from 50 up to 200 rubles (in present-day rubles), an enormous fee for that time. On September 16, 1949, the Supreme Court of the USSR ruled that the thrust of the 1944 decree was to encourage reconciliation, not divorce. Marriages still needed to be registered, and unmarried women lost the right to file paternity or alimony suits. In 1965, the costs were reduced, the procedures simplified, and the probability of a divorce being granted increased. In 1967, the payment of alimony became voluntary, with nonpayment punishable only by notation in the individual's internal passport. Finally, the 1968 Marriage and Family Code restored the right of women to file paternity suits, gave illegitimate children rights equal to legitimate ones, the right they had lost in 1944, and declared that pregnant wives could not be divorced for twelve months after giving birth. Thus, while the trend has been to ease divorces, an undercurrent of pro-natalist policy can be seen in the latest set of laws. Given the Soviets' expanded concern for the family, for lost potential births among the divorced, the regional pattern of divorces, a reassertion of more stringent rules toward divorces can be expected. However, it is not clear why the government delayed so long in reimposing tighter rules.

One way to encourage marriage, or obversely to discourage divorce, is to increase the tax on single and childless citizens. For example, on November 21, 1941, in a specifically pro-natalist sanction against bachelors, a tax of 3-5 percent of earnings was imposed on single male workers and employees between the ages of 20-49 and on single females 20-44 years of age. In the same

July 8, 1944, decree referred to earlier, the tax for persons without children was increased to 6 percent, those with one or two children, to 1 and 1.5 percent, respectively. In 1968, the tax on single persons was reduced by one-quarter for those with earnings of 60-80 rubles per month, much closer to the average monthly wages and salaries of the time. By now, however, many fewer people would be covered by this rule as average salaries have increased. According to the tax table, the current bachelor tax rate is graduated from 0.3 percent of those earning 71 rubles per month up to 6 percent for those earning 91 rubles or higher. However, there is also a long list of full and partial exemptions of the tax. I expect that the tax rate will be increased in the near future to 7 percent or higher. Whether or not that happens it is at such a low level that it is undoubtedly a nuisance tax rather than a major disincentive to those who choose to remain single, or who choose to have a small family. Only a significant increase in its level could have a decidedly pro-nuptial, and through this, a pro-natalist effect.

Legal action also could be and has been taken to extend the period of maternity leave. The current allowable paid leave amounts to 56 days before the expected birth and 56 after, unless multiple or abnormal births occur, for which it is extendable to 70 days. It had only been as recently as 1965 that leave of this length had been granted to collective farmer mothers, but they had a longer employment minimum that was required for pregnant women workers and employees. In 1969, collective farm female chairpersons, specialists, and machinery operators were granted the same rights as workers and employees. Since 1970, all women

were permitted an additional year of unpaid leave if they chose, and it was not counted as interrupting the period of continuous worktime. By 1973, the benefit amount (that is, the level of pay during the maternity leave period) was no longer determined by whether one was a member of a trade union or by the prior length of employment. Currently, full pay is granted. At the XXVth Party Congress in the spring of 1976, reference was made to the decision to grant a full year of maternity leave with full pay. Last December (1980), the draft Basic Guidelines for the next five-year plan period of 1981-85 was announced in preparation for the Twenty-sixth Party congress to be held next week (beginning February 23). This set of guidelines included reference to the introduction of partially (not fully) paid maternity leave for one year for all working women. Also it will not be universally introduced, as noted earlier, but will be applied in different regions at different times. The text does not indicate that it might not be introduced in the high fertility regions but neither does it preclude this differentiated policy. The regional aspect, with an undoubted emphasis on low-fertility regions, and the partial payment aspect (again, it is not clear if the first 56 days will still be at full pay for all mothers) might be limited by the cost in total amount of rubles and foregone production by women who would withdraw from the labor force during this period of one year. Of course, one trade-off for this period or even more so if a longer period of three years were authorized as in Hungary, is the need to spend less capital and labor for child-care facilities. Much criticism of these facilities leads us to

conclude that a lower quality of care is afforded than at home-- if the mother could remain at home--and the health of many children is worse as indicated by reports that their illness rate is significantly higher. Another possibility, among others practiced by East European countries, is the adoption of the Bulgarian practice which differentiates by parity order, i.e., 120 days of leave are given at the time of the first birth, 150 for the second, and 180 for the third. Again the trade-off between the dual role of women's reproductive and economic functions makes the decision more complicated. One alternative is to strengthen the application of existing laws or issue new ones directed to establishing part-time work for women with young children. Because it encourages child-bearing and simultaneously does not lead to a full withdrawal from the labor force, this is a very viable possibility.

In order to encourage births the June 27, 1936, decree authorized annual cash payments for mothers who give birth to their seventh or higher parity child. These lump sums were paid until the children reached their fifth birthday. According to the 1944 legislation, this type of payment was modified to payment at the time of the third child and higher order of birth, and a series of monthly payments were also to begin at age one (until age 5) in addition to lump sum grants. Such monthly payments were made to 2.3 million mothers in 1978, down by over one million since 1960. The lump sums ranged from 20 rubles for the third child and 250 for the eleventh and higher order birth; the monthly sums ranged from 4 rubles per month for the fourth child and 15 rubles per month for the eleventh and higher order. In 1978, 297,000

mothers received one-time payments. However, a decree of November 28, 1947, cut all benefits in half beginning on January 1, 1948, a distinctly anti-natalist policy. Turning around, the 1971 Party Congress recommended a pro-natalist regulation, which was finally passed on September 12, 1974. This new regulation stated that effective November 1, 1974, families whose total per capita income (from all sources, including private plots as well as state enterprises or collective farms) was less than 50 rubles per family member, would be granted 12 rubles per month for each child up to 8 years of age. This program supplements other family allowance payments. Presumably residents of rural areas, especially in high fertility regions of the country, "earn" a disproportionately higher share compared to other, low fertility parts of the country, especially cities of European Russia. There is some discussion going on among Soviet demographers and legal experts that perhaps it would be better to adopt the East European practice of peak payments for the third child, reducing its level for higher parities. This would also be an indirect means for differentiation of demographic policy since it would encourage births in the lower fertility republics without explicit discrimination against the higher fertility republics.

A very similar approach toward differentiation by number of children in lower versus higher fertility republics is advocated for legal differentiation in the minimum pension age. Uralnis appears to have been the first to advocate this principle, albeit in a slightly different form. He noted that the then current

legislation (writing in 1974) called for a reduction by five years in pension age from 55 to 50 years of age for women who bore and brought up five children or more. Why should they not inversely impose a higher age for pension eligibility for women who bore one or no children, even though the number of children born on the average to worker and employee families is around 1. Omitting questions about punishment of those women with both primary and secondary infertility, Urlanis wants a higher pension age level for those with one or no children and a reduced level--presumably not as much as 5 years--for women with three or four children. At the same time, Urlanis also advocated a differentiation among women who lived in better or worse living conditions, perhaps divided between urban-rural or European-Central Asian localities; this would parallel the regional wage differential schema which compensates for varying living conditions.

Acharkan, the head of the Social Security Department of the State Committee on Labor and Social Problem's Labor Research Institute, proposes a differentiation in favor of low birth rate republics or locations such as the "central and northern regions where it is a rare phenomenon" to have families with five or more children. The differentiation stipulates that women who bear three children should have the same reduced pension age advantage as those who bear five children in high fertility republics. While it would not be surprising to see this type of program implemented, it is hard to see how the Soviets could enact this as nationwide legislation. Very likely it will be adopted in individual republics of the Baltic and Slavic areas but not in

Tadzhikistan or Uzbekistan. Its enactment will undoubtedly be rationalized in terms of concern about labor shortages in the long run rather than other more pejorative rationalizations referring to the "quality" of the population.

Another attempt to stimulate births was the creation in July 1944 of a system of medals and awards for bearing large numbers of children. The Motherhood Medal is given for five or six children, the Maternal Glory medal for seven, eight, or nine, and Mother Heroine for ten. The latter has been awarded to 283,000 women between the date of authorization and 1978. A bit less than one-quarter of the Mother Heroine medals have been awarded to women in Uzbekistan alone. This is not surprising given data on the average size of families from the last three censuses. Thus, the award system may have had a contrary regional effect than that currently desired by the Central authorities. If awards are certified in the Russian Republic they undoubtedly go overwhelmingly to residents of Muslim origin such as the Bashkirs and Tatars (even if their fertility rates have relatively declined compared with the past).

Abortion policy likewise can serve as a birth stimulus--or depressant. Changes in laws regulating abortions in the Soviet Union have been brought about for a variety of reasons. The November 8, 1920, law legalizing abortions performed in hospitals was apparently health-oriented, rather than pro-natalist as such. Under the tsars and in the USSR before this decree, all abortions were prohibited. Even after this decree, however, W. Parker Mauldin of The Population Council has determined that up to half

of all abortions resulted in infections, and that in 4 percent of the total abortions performed the women died. By 1935, policy changed direction. Abortions for women pregnant for the first time were prohibited. In 1936, all abortions except those needed to save the mother's life were once again banned.

Some 20 years later, on November 23, 1955, policy changed again, and the prohibition of abortions was repealed for the same reason as that given for the enactment at the time of the 1920 law: The health risks involved in illegal abortions were too great. Until 1955, the number of non-hospital abortions increased enormously. It seems that after 1955, even the total number of abortions must have increased. Estimates taking a base year of 1954 equals 100 before the regulation changed and when abortions were illegal, peg the number of non-hospital or illegal abortions in 1960 at 420. While between 1955 and 1956 the crude birth rate hardly changed (25.7 and 25.2 per 1,000 population, respectively), between 1956 and 1966, the rate dropped by over one-quarter, to 18.2. Abortions are not exclusively responsible for this drop, yet they must have contributed significantly, since abortions are considered to be the primary means of birth control in the Soviet Union.

After reviewing the data on Romania after the law changed in 1966, Soviet policymakers may hesitate to institute a ban on abortions. The year after the almost total ban was placed on abortions in Romania, the crude birth rate virtually doubled! Soon after, however, the rates started to decline to a point only slightly above the rates prior to the change. In addition, the

large cohort of 1967 put many strains on the child-care and educational facilities in later years. These same educational facilities had to be readjusted for excess capacity when the rates declined.

On the other hand, the Soviets may want to reinstitute the ban on abortions when they examine regional differences in abortion behavior in context of their approach to rationalizing the "quality" of the population.

The national average number of abortions per woman in 1965/66--i.e., the average number of abortions which a Soviet woman could expect to undergo throughout her reproductive years--was 6 (compared with 0.5 in the United States). The national average, as indicated, varies widely by region, since women of Muslim origin, especially those in rural areas, tend to have very few abortions, if any. An expanding body of information on the incidence of abortion among these indigenous Central Asian women affirms the relative rarity, even if it does occur more frequently than in the past. For example, for the country as a whole, I have calculated that the rate of abortions may be between 22.5 and 27.3 times greater than the rate among Uzbeks. A survey of the abortion behavior of women who had a fourth child (born in 1971-72), in two cities of Uzbekistan (in which both spouses were of Uzbek nationality), and revealed that there were 46.1 abortions out of 456.1 pregnancies for every 1,000 marital years. In other words, these women had one abortion for every 9 births. This is in marked contrast with the 1965 rate for the country as a whole of 2.5-3.0 abortions for every live birth, or as shown

above, 22.5-27.3 times greater than the Uzbek experience. Thus, the prohibition of abortion would make very little difference in Central Asia (assuming the Uzbek pattern is typical), but might have an impact among the Russian and other low fertility nationalities. Among the lower fertility populations, data for Georgian women demonstrate the range of possibilities. In 1960, only 4 years after reinstatement of legalized abortions, according to oft-cited statistics, the average 45-49-year-old woman in Tbilisi had had 12 pregnancies, of which 3 had ended in live births, 1 in a spontaneous abortion (i.e., miscarriage), and 8 in induced abortions. More recently, in the August 1971 issue of a Riga magazine, a 24-year-old woman appealed for help because she already had 4 abortions in addition to having 2 children.

Most significantly, there is a worrisome positive correlation to Soviet analysts between secondary infertility and repeated induced abortions. A history of frequent abortions also heightens the probability of giving birth in subsequent pregnancies to a premature child. Premature children defined as those born weighing less than 2,500 grams, die more than 20 times more frequently in the first year of life than full-term infants.

Previous public statements at international forums regarding the right of women to choose may well be sacrificed to encourage births. Perhaps the February 1979 article in a Russian-language Latvian journal, entitled "The Number of Children--Is it a Personal Family Matter?" appears to be the harbinger of attempts to encourage births more directly. The author supports use of media propaganda to create a pro-natalist social-psychological atmosphere, as well

as the usual rhetoric about improving the conditions of women in work and home and increasing parental education. These would provide the basis for "overcoming the contemporary demographic situation."

Only two months ago, Urlanis wrote an article on abortions and population policy which was published in Nedelya, the Sunday edition of Izvestiya. In this article, he flatly advocates discouraging abortions for all women, especially unmarried women. He does not concern himself with the rate of illegitimacy (as most demographers did in the past), but rather all that counts is the birth of a child, even better a second. "They do a great thing--a citizen grows." With arguments such as this, abolishing or at the minimum restricting abortions seems to be in the wind given the authority of Urlanis as a scholar in the field of demography in the USSR and the publication of this article in the central government's newspaper.

Briefly, in sum, all of the demographic, economic, and social factors on family and fertility reviewed in this paper indicate that there is a large undercurrent of concern and activity taking place in the Soviet Union in regards to the demographic situation now and in the future. Brezhnev's 1976 speech calling for an effective demographic policy has been officially spelled out in the new "Basic Directions" for next week's Party Congress. More research in the Soviet Union on the various facets of their demographic trends should be done, and the publication of the results should help us to understand the current and future situation even better.

CULTURE

The ramifications of current population trends for the nationality composition of the Soviet Union are great. During the 1959-70 intercensal period, Uralis has estimated that the crude birth rate differentials between the various nationalities differ by a factor of four, from 12.3 among Estonians and Latvians, to 19 for the Great Russians, to 45 or more among a number of the Central Asian nationalities. We do not yet know the birth rates for the period between 1970 and 1979. However, it would be reasonable to guess that the range has closed slightly, but much less than Soviet central authorities would have liked. As a result of these differentials, one Kazakh demographer has estimated that by the turn of the century the population of the Slavic nationalities will have increased by merely 16 million over the preceding three decades, to 195 million, while the Muslims of Central Asia will have grown by 31 million over that time, to 51 million in all. In the face of such drastic changes in the proportion of various nationalities in the total population, it is no wonder that the central authorities are concerned with the impact of demographic behavior. Language policy is one tool used by the Soviet government to modify this behavior. Adaptation by individual groups of more generalized [Russian] behavior patterns rather than indigenous traditions reflected primarily in the symbols of language and religion is the goal of this policy. For this colloquium, however, the policies toward religion will not be discussed.

The remainder of this paper will describe the variety and range of activities to attain bilingualism, to enact related legislative authority, to hold conferences at appropriate junctures, to issue new methodological journals for teachers of the Russian language and literature, to expand the quantity of Russian-language training before, during, and after school, and to link these to the drive to make Russian a state language--whether the word as such is used or not--and through this effort to change the demographic configuration of Soviet society.

These areas of concern also must be understood within the framework of the drive to enhance the Sovietization of the population, to develop a socialist way of life (sotsialisticheskiy obraz zhizni), to have a proper Communist upbringing (kommunisticheskoye vospitaniye), to possess a correct world outlook (mirovozreniye), to be integrated into a unified Soviet people (yedinyy Sovetskiy narod), and so forth. All of these are facets of the same effort to consciously affect the outlook and behavior of the non-Russian population to become like their "elder brothers," the Russians. It must be noted that we are not referring here to the cultural traditions of a nation of immigrants as that of the United States, but to a much stronger set of beliefs and traditions held by whole nations which were incorporated into the Russian and Soviet empire. Last year, for example, the Uzbeks celebrated the 1,000th anniversary of Avicenna, a great poet, philosopher, and doctor. Shorter periods of time also serve to remind individual groups of their past; it is only four decades that the Balts have become incorporated into the Soviet Union.

Academician Yulyan Bromley, the head of the Institute of Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences USSR and the head of its Scientific Council on Nationality Problems, introduces a quote from Brezhnev on nationality issues as follows:

Nationality factors play, and in the foreseeable future will [continue to] play a leading role in our life, and it is not accidental (ne sluchayno) that their analysis, first of all, is given so much substantive attention in the program documents of the CPSU, and at Party congresses.

Brezhnev, speaking in 1972 at the time of the 50th anniversary of the formation of the Soviet Union fully expressed the leadership's concern now and in the future when he indicated that:

Even in the period of a society of mature socialism (zrelogo sotsializma), nationality relations are a continuously developing reality which brings forth new problems and tasks.

How to blend a nominal flourishing (rastvet) of a given nationality while simultaneously developing a rapprochement (sblizheniye) of the nationalities into one Soviet people is the goal of Soviet nationality policy. Obviously, language policy is one very important aspect of the overall strategy.

In an English-language booklet prepared for the VIIIth World Congress of Sociology held in Toronto, Canada, in August of 1974, S. I. Bruk, the senior ethnographer of the Soviet Union, and M. N. Guboglo, the scientific secretary of the Scientific Council on Nationality Problems of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, made abundantly clear the link between demographic trends and language policy as part of the cultural transformation of the multinationality population of the USSR into a homogenous Soviet population. The title of the article "Ethnodemographic and Ethnolinguistic Processes in the USSR" is quickly followed by an

explication of the direction of Soviet policy and its impact on the distribution of different nationality groups and even on their population size:

There exists a strong, but unfortunately, as yet inadequately studied connection between ethnodemographic and ethnolinguistic processes. Its essence is that the numerical growth or diminution of a people has a certain effect on the development of language--first of all its functional development. Still deeper are the foundations of a reverse influence though no one has ever doubted that the mastering by individual population groups of another people's language and its constant use in diverse spheres of industrial, social, cultural and domestic activities, as well as a profound attachment to this language, right down to a psychological identification with it as with one's native tongue, lays the grounds for transition to another ethnic community; this eventually leads to changes in the numerical strength of the two interacting ethnic communities concerned.

Moreover, the census data are not just statistics for statistics' sake; they are the basic source of information for the analysis of ethnodemographic and ethnolinguistic processes. Thus, Bruk and Guboglo distinguish Soviet census data from those of the rest of the world. In the Soviet Union, they claim, it has operational meaning. Thus,

In distinction from the majority of foreign countries where population censuses are regarded mainly as a means of collecting information, in the USSR--almost since its very birth--another extremely important aspect has been attached to them: data collected during a census are used not only in solving the country's economic problems, but also in solving the problem of ethnic relations within the multinational Soviet state.

The distribution, or dispersal of the population of various ethnic groups through migration between regions or between rural and urban places are expected by these analysts to cause profound changes not only because of the physical movement of the population, but also because of language changes. Thus,

These processes [of migration combined with the scientific-technical revolution, industrialization, and urbanization] cause profound changes in the ethnodemographic structure and ethnolinguistic situation in the various parts of the country, changes that are greatly influenced by diverse factors, most important among which are the following: the specific features of the natural increase among the peoples of the USSR (birth and death rates) and ethnic processes (consolidation and assimilation).

Thus, language change through adaption of another language and therefore of the demographic attributes of the population whose language is being adopted, in this case that of the Russians with their lower birth rate, intense migration patterns, higher labor force participation rates, and so forth, would lead to reduction of the differentials in various demographic magnitudes and also to the integration into a single Soviet nationality group. Migration to a more mixed-nationality work and life situation, as opposed to one of compact, similar nationality populations, also leads to a higher percentage of the population knowing Russian. For example, according to the 1970 census, only 7 percent of the rural Uzbek population affirmed that they could freely command the Russian language, but more than 35 percent of the rural Moldavians could do so, in part because the population included more Russians. Knowledge of the dominant group's language (i.e., Russian) also allows for movement of young non-Russian specialists to other regions, otherwise he or she "can only work in their own republic," or limits them to study only those specialties offered in the higher educational institutions of their republic. This apparently is a worry in Estonia because only last June, K. G. Vayno, the First Secretary of the area, was compelled to discount the hypothesis that "some people believe

that the appeal to study Russian is detrimental to the Estonian language and is almost damaging to the national dignity." He added that "it is just the opposite: a person who does not know the Russian language feels that he is limited particularly during this travel beyond the limits of the republic, during his service in the army, and in other instances." Of particular interest is the reference to the use of Russian as the lingua franca of the military and the implied importance to the State that the individual have a good knowledge of the Russian language. That the knowledge of Russian is not only significant in the civilian sector as underscored by Bruk and Guboglo earlier, but also in the military sector is absolutely clear from the report of R. A. Abuzyarov, the Head of the Problem Laboratory of the Scientific Research Institute for the Teaching of the Russian Language in a Nationality School. (A nationality school is a school for non-Russians in which the medium of instruction is a language other than Russian. Schools in the Georgian republic, for example, use six languages as a medium of instruction. In terms of numbers of schools, not student body whose distribution usually differs from the number of schools, 71.6 percent of the full-time schools teach in the Georgian language, 7.0 percent in Russian, 5.5 percent in Armenian, 4.4 percent in Azeri, 2.4 percent in Ossetian, 1.5 percent in Abkhazian. Moreover, instruction is given in two languages in a single school in 5.7 percent of the schools, in three languages in 1.7 percent, and four or more in 0.1 percent.) Abuzyarov, whose laboratory is attached to the Urals Pedagogical Institute, reported in the January, 1980,

issue of Russian Language and Literature in the Uzbek School on the importance of Russian-language training for premilitary training. The method of teaching students of all nationality schools was given a "high evaluation" at the All-Union Meeting on the Problem of Teaching Pre-Military Training in a Nationality School" held in Dushanbe in 1979. He notes, in summary, that

"The Problem of teaching Russian speech to non-Russian students, i.e., their language preparation for service in the ranks of the Soviet Army, is a problem of great state importance and responsibility for its resolution lies in great measure on the specialists on methods of teaching the Russian language, on the teacher of Russian language and literature...."

Thus, the effort in this military as well as demographic direction only reinforces the meaning of the expanded drive which is described and analyzed here.

Movement to mixed nationality urban areas also facilitates ethnic intermarriage which also might accelerate cultural assimilation of these non-Russian nationality populations. How religion reinforces retention of ethnic identity either as a separate instrumentality or through its link to the language of the nationality group is beyond the time and scope of this colloquium paper. The Soviet authorities are well aware of the symbolism of religion (as well as language) which allegedly renders "great harm to inter-nationality solidarity (internatsional'nomu splocheniyu)," especially in Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

The lengthy quotes from Bruk, Guboglo, and Abuzyarov establish the background for the drive to make Russian not only the

lingua franca for the government, economy, military, and society, but also the vehicle for acculturation and merging of the population into a "Soviet" people, i.e., "Russian" people. This current endeavor is not the only one to have been undertaken in the Soviet Union. Earlier efforts and various aspects of the current drive have been analyzed by such Western scholars as Aspaturian, Azrael, Carrere d'Encausse, Pipes, Rakowska-Harmstone, Silver, and others, but the scale of the past is nothing as compared to the endeavor now under way.

In the Soviet Union a large-scale and extremely serious campaign has been instituted in the 1970s to enhance the population's knowledge of the Russian language. After the 1970 census results became available to the leadership, as well as data on the numbers of students in 1972 compared to 1965 studying in their native tongue increased in all the non-Slavic republics, and in Russian even declined in two republics (Uzbekistan and Azerbaydzhan), many initiatives have been taken, including the creation of new Russian-language institutes and departments, and new specialized journals, conferences held, decrees promulgated, and so forth. Nonetheless, while Russian is by far the most widely known second language, as the three postwar censuses have shown, there remains an enormous language barrier to overcome. The amount of attention given to making Russian the lingua franca of the Soviet Union reflects the depth and seriousness of this enormous campaign. An earlier important step to spread knowledge of Russian is the March, 1938, decree ordering the utilization of the cyrillic alphabet for all languages, except Georgian, Armenian,

Abkhazian, and Yiddish, and making Russian-language study mandatory for all students in all schools, not just those where Russian already was the medium of instruction. The impact of this program, however, may have been disrupted by World War II. The 1958 school reform's Thesis 19 nominally made the choice of Russian and all other languages optional, i.e., that all children had the right to study in their own language. Yaroslav Bilinskiy's penetrating analysis of this decree demonstrates that, despite individual group opposition, the national government's choice of Russian came to be clearly the "preferred" choice.

Russian is not only the vehicle of Soviet nationality integration; it also facilitates one's career pattern within the Soviet system. It also is now touted as the means for inter-nationality discourse (internatsional'noye obshcheniye). The Russian language is hailed as:

....the language of the great people, which possess the richest democratic and revolutionary traditions, and the highest culture. This is the language of the builders of a new society, of which the best minds of humanity have dreamed.

Or alternatively, in an even more florid mode, in August of last year, Sharif Rashidov, the First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, and the point man for discussions of Russian-language training at all-union conferences, is quoted to have said that:

The Russian people generated their own great culture and they created the powerful Russian language--a language as vivid as the rainbow after a spring shower, as true as an arrow, melodious and rich and gentle like a song carried over linen.

It is also easier for the State, using Russian, to imbue the non-Russian peoples with Soviet culture, in essence a "Great Russian" culture. The government also encourages the spread of Russian because it makes the population more mobile, which is especially desirable in light of the needs of labor deficit areas of the Russian Republic to which non-Russian-speaking peoples presently do not readily move.

The language situation in the USSR is one of the most complex in the world. At the time of the 1970 census, 104 nationalities were enumerated, and officials and scholars are often quoted as saying that 130 languages are spoken today. These spoken languages belong to a variety of language families. Besides Slavic and other Indo-European languages, at least one million people natively speak languages belonging to four other unrelated families: Altaic (including the Turkic group); Uralic (including Estonian); South Caucasian (including Georgian); and North Caucasian (including Chechen). Today radio programs are broadcast in 67 different languages, school textbooks are printed in 52, journals in 42, theaters give performances in 47, and works of fiction are printed in 76 different languages.

Soviet scholars are quick to assert that no language in the USSR has any privileges over the other. Both languages and peoples, they point out, have absolutely equal rights, embedded in the Program of the CPSU, which M. I. Isayev, a leading Soviet sociolinguist, quotes from:

....to continue promoting the free development of the languages of the peoples of the USSR and the complete freedom for every citizen of the USSR to speak, and to bring up and

educate his children, in any language, ruling out all privileges, restrictions, or compulsions in the use of this or that language.

But reality has caused some movement away from the ringing tone of the Party Program.

Lenin is often quoted as criticizing those advocates who wished to have the Russian language adopted as the official language:

What we do not want is the element of coercion. We do not want to have people driven into paradise with a cudgel; for no matter how many fine phrases about 'culture' you may utter, a compulsory official language involves coercion, the use of a cudgel.

But Lenin also said:

To advocate a state language is disgraceful. That would be police-state bureaucracy. But there is not a hint of police-state bureaucracy in propagating the Russian language among the small nations (narody). Surely you can see the difference between a police night-stick and teaching a free man? It is striking.

It is within this realm that the 15 republic nationalities officially have the right to schooling in their native languages, at least in their titular republics. How cutbacks have been made in the nationality schools at sub-republic levels has been fully and well analyzed by Brian Silver. Russian remains primus inter pares, if not yet the sole language as truly desired.

The ultimate goal of establishing Russian as the main language, or, at least, the "second native language," is a matter of conscious policy pursued through administrative changes in educational laws and an increasing campaign for the more efficient teaching and widespread use of Russian.

However, according to Jonathan Pool, even in fairly simple situations, the possibility of language planning, or systematic

policies aimed at maintaining or changing existing language situations is limited. These limits may be imposed by traditional beliefs that attribute to language a property which is not to be tampered with. There are limits to how fast a people can adjust to language changes and innovations when they are imposed, and there are numerous costs and by-products of such programs. Brian Silver and Jonathan Pool have shown that language planning in any country can become bogged down with strong conflict and efforts mounted against the language planners. In the unique case of the Soviet Union, the campaign for teaching Russian is inexorably linked with the term "Russification," which is strongly avoided in the writings of Soviet academicians and sociolinguists. It is common to see articles such as the one written by Rashidov, with the clear intention of refuting the "intentional distortions by [western] Sovietologists," who often warn of the danger of "denationalization" of the local languages by the spread of Russian as the lingua franca.

In spite of the difficulties experienced in the past, and despite the enormity and complexity of the situation of the USSR, the Soviet leadership has nevertheless launched a campaign aimed at achieving a policy of bilingualism.

The position of nationality languages in the Soviet Union is constantly the subject of books and articles, a topic that is much debated and discussed in the Soviet press. Basing himself on "Marxist-Leninist theory of the laws of progress of spiritual life," Academician Khanazarov, in his book The Solution of the Nationality Language Problem in the USSR, claims that national languages in a

socialist society are historically necessary. The mission of socialism, he states, is not in ignoring the nationality languages, nor in forcing a transition to a single language, but in the "free" development of all nationality languages. This stance also is taken in part as a result of the criticism levelled at the Soviet Union's language policies, both from within its own borders and by various western scholars. It is also part of a language policy with a dual approach. By advocating the simultaneous studying of one's native language and of Russian, the goal of attaining fluency in Russian is supposedly accomplished with relative ease. Rashidov asserts that this policy is one which allows the nationality language to flourish and become enriched, while Russian becomes more widespread. This progress, Bagamov noted, is not a contradiction at all, but a "dialectical, mutual process."

The Soviet government would probably like to simply eradicate all the nationality languages and have all Soviet citizens adopt Russian. The paper by Yu. V. Bromley, chairman of the Scientific Council for Nationality Problems of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and also Director of the Institute of Ethnography of the Academy, for the same 1974 World Sociological Congress, as the Bruk and Guboglo paper, noted that language change constitutes one of the main types of unifying ethnic processes. He stated that "The linguistic sphere is liable to change much more rapidly and abruptly; first, as a rule, there arises bilingualism, and only later is one of the languages completely phased out." But this would be a very complicated issue, if not politically impossible. The Georgians and Armenians have retained their alphabets

even today; these ancient and deep-rooted cultures predate Christian times. Today only 26 percent of all Georgians speak Russian, one of the lowest figures for all republics. That the issue of nationality or native language retention is a real and current issue was shown in March 1978, when the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaydzhan republic constitutions were published, at first dropping articles which had given official status to the local languages, and in turn substituting the phrase guaranteeing "the possibility of using their native language and the language of other peoples of the USSR," obviously the preference for the latter being the Russian language. The ensuing demonstrations in Tbilisi, and apparently in Yerevan, affirmed the importance of their language to these people, and testified to language issues' ability to kindle a nationalistic spark. The status of these nationality languages (and that in Azerbaydzhan) was immediately reinstated, but this adjustment is a compromise since most of the pro-Russian clauses remain in the final version. The fact that the final wording was identical certainly suggests that Moscow controlled the accepted version.

The precise level of Russian-language knowledge and ability is open to dispute. Bruk and Guboglo assert that the level is much higher than shown in the census. The census results show that the proportion of the total population, including Russians, which reported its own nationality language to be its native tongue declined from 94.3 percent in 1959 to 93.9 in 1970 and to 93.1 in 1979; correspondingly, the non-Russian population figures changed from 87.6 to 87.0 to 85.6 in 1959, 1970, and 1979, respectively.

But these latter figures also are deceptive. The number of non-Russians who listed Russian as their first language increased from 13.0 million in 1970 to 16.3 million in 1979, and the number of non-Russians who listed (i.e., indicated to the census enumerator) that they are fluent in Russian as a second language increased from 41.8 million to 61.1 million in the period 1970 to 1979. Bruk, and particularly Guboglo in a variety of books and articles, argue that ethnolinguistic surveys show that the actual numbers of non-Russians who command the Russian language is much greater. Thus, instead of the 1970 census figures of 34.5 percent of the urban and 7.8 percent of the rural Uzbeks who stated that they freely command Russian (as a second language), the "correct" numbers are 76.4 and 56.7 percent, respectively. Large differentials between census and survey data also have been noted regarding Moldavians. (Elsewhere, however, I have referred to Pool's citation of Estonian materials which indicate that the census numbers are too high!)

On the basis of the census figures alone, the proportions of the non-Slavic population (excluding Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Russians) who cited the language of their own nationality to be their native tongue did not change at all over the intercensal period. Thus, on the basis of the census data, I have calculated that these shares "changed" from 88.05 percent in 1959 to 88.83 percent in 1970 to 88.81 percent in 1979. Convergence to a Russian-language culture still seems far from realization among the non-Slavic population regardless of all the past efforts. Perhaps the lack of any change helps explain the depth and extent of the current campaign.

The benchmark decrees of 1938 and 1958 noted earlier as part of the legislative history on language policy are joined by another major decree issued in 1978. But before we can discuss the content and import of the latter, some of the history regarding Russian-language instruction and the interim legislative acts in the period 1958 to 1978 have to be addressed. Much of our information for the early part of this period relates to the nationality schools of the RSFSR because there was no Ministry of Education of the USSR as yet. The RSFSR Ministry is in the forefront of all republic ministries, and it is in the RSFSR where we have to begin. Between 1958 and 1972 as first described and analyzed in 1974 by Brian Silver, there was a major decline in the number of nationality schools of sub-republic level ethnic groups in the RSFSR which offered schooling in their native tongue. In many cases there was a reduction in the number of years in which the native language was used for instruction purposes. In many others it was eliminated entirely or only offered at the pre-school level. (These schools would no longer be classified as nationality schools.) The fact was known, but the underlying policy instruments had not been made available or understood. It now appears, with hindsight, that the roots lay in the XXIst Party Congress and Khrushchev's statements at the time. Jacob Ornstein quotes Khrushchev's language policy statements of the time. "...the obliteration of national distinctions, and especially of language distinctions, is a considerably longer process than the obliteration of class distinctions." Fine so far, but then Khrushchev immediately added:

The Party approaches all questions of nationality relationships arising in the course of Communist construction from the standpoint of proletarian internationalism and firm pursuance of the Leninist nationality policy. The Party neither ignores nor exaggerates national characteristics.

Then a statement that all are equal:

The Party will continue promoting the free development of the languages of the peoples of the USSR, and the complete freedom for every citizen of the USSR to speak, educate, and teach his children in any language, with no special privileges, restrictions, or compulsions in the use of this or that language."

But then comes the key:

The voluntary study of Russian, in addition to the native language, is of positive significance, since it facilitates reciprocal exchange of experience and access of every nation and nationality to the cultural accomplishments of all the other peoples of the USSR and to world culture. The Russian language has, in effect, become the common medium of intercourse and cooperation between all the peoples of the USSR.

From the Party Program of 1961, it is an easy step for individual republics and their ministries to respond to the guidance of the Program.

Very soon thereafter, the RSFSR Ministry of Education issued a circular to the ASSR-level ministries in the republic which, in effect, directed that there should be a shift to Russian as a medium of instruction. This circular of June 15, 1962, ordered that instruction could be given in the native tongue of the student in the first grade if the student's parents had expressed the wish to shift to Russian-language schools; however, this permission was granted only if the pupil's Russian skills were weak or if they did not know Russian at all. At the same time, intensive Russian language training was advised for the student and instruction in Russian only should be offered as soon as possible.

Another signal of a growing interest in Russian-language training came several years later when on August 1, 1966, a union-republic Ministry of Education of the USSR was formed on the basis of the RSFSR Ministry, and several days later Izvestia noted that the former RSFSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences was converted into a USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. Only a few weeks later, Pravda of August 24 contained an article by R. Nishanov, an Uzbek Central Committee Secretary, who made it clear that there was no universal country-wide procedure for teaching Russian and that the lack of such standards make it difficult for graduates of nationality schools to enter (Russian-language) higher educational institutions. Then in 1970, the relatively new Academy of Pedagogical Sciences itself was expanded to organize a Scientific Research Institute for Teaching the Russian Language in a Nationality School. It was designated as the head institute of all republic "scientific collectives" working on this topic.

At some unknown point between 1971 and 1975, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a directive on the improvement of Russian-language training in nationality schools. In 1972 Russian-language training did not commence until the third grade in five republics. By 1974, according to Isabelle Kreindler, no nationality schools in any republic began that late, but in 8 of the 15, training began in the second grade. By December 1975, M. A. Prokof'yev, the USSR Minister of Education stated that there were still 6 republics which did not teach Russian in the first grade. Either in the

1976/77 and 1977/78 school year (the source is not clear), all republics were to initiate Russian-language training (in union republic nationality schools) in the first grade and in preparatory classes in the majority of republics.

The next major indication of high-level concern about the Russian-language capability of all students was revealed in March, 1977. Publication of the instructions of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences to its subordinate institutes and the resolution of the Council on Questions of the General Secondary Educational Schools "On Measures for the Further Improvement in the Teaching of the Russian Language in General Educational Schools with Instruction in a non-Russian Language," issued only three days before the key October 13, 1978, decree, show the development of this issue. These directives presaged the major directive of October 1978 and the recommendations of the May 1979 Tashkent conference. Thus, the Institute of Russian Languages of the Academy, under F. P. Filin's directorship, together with the Scientific Research Institute of Teaching the Russian Languages in Nationality Schools of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, was ordered to provide recommendations for the improvement in Russian language training in nationality schools and in higher educational institutions. (This is the first mention of vuz'y since the 1964 order (prikaz) that compulsory Russian-language study be given to non-Russians in higher, as well as specialized secondary educational institutions, instead of a foreign language.) Given the later emphasis on just such training, the prikaz may not have been fully or successfully implemented. In addition, the Presidium

required submission of detailed proposals for upgrading the training of Russian-language teachers. These tasks were scheduled for completion in 1977-1978 and undoubtedly were an input into the benchmark decree of October 13, 1978, issued by the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

The October 13, 1978, decree, among many specific important actions, called for: (1) a new standard Russian-language curriculum for all educational institutions where Russian is not the primary language of instruction to be developed by 1980; (2) gradually expand Russian-language study down to the first grade in all nationality schools and to grades IV-X (XI) in urban non-Russian language schools; (3) split classes of over 25 students into two subgroups from Russian-language study; (4) introduction of intensive Russian-language instruction for non-Russian students at the expense of classroom time for other subjects; (5) wide dissemination of the experiences of some higher educational institutions of various union and autonomous republics where "special" disciplines are taught in Russian; (6) special classrooms for teaching Russian with appropriate voice and audiovisual equipment; and (7) a series of measures for training and retraining Russian language teachers.

To make certain that the plans and measures of this decree and the corresponding resolutions of the Council for Questions of the General Secondary Educational Schools (of the Ministry of Education of the USSR) be applied, the Ministry of Education of the RSFSR only two weeks later, on November 2, 1978, issued a

detailed listing of 22 specific actions pertaining to the nationality schools of the republic, the institutions and agencies responsible, and the schedule for performance or reporting. One month later, on December 6, 1978, the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education of the USSR issued a detailed order to its subordinate educational institutions to pay special attention to the republic-by-republic need for teachers with the specialty of "Russian Language and Literature in the Nationality School," to give annually no less than one-fifth of all Russian-language teachers time to improve their skills, that strict compliance be given to the requirement that not more than 12-15 students be in each Russian-language study group in higher educational institutions, beginning with the 1979/80 school year to give intensive Russian-language study to non-Russians instead of optional courses and disciplines, and so forth. Immediately thereafter, on December 25, the Komsomol Central Committee Secretariat issued a directive that all local units of the organization "conduct concrete organizational and propaganda work directed toward strengthening their role in improving Russian language study." The next step was a major conference in Tashkent, the location for which was definitely ne sluchayno (not accidental).

But before we discuss this particular conference, it is important to review the history of such conferences and to see how the pace has picked up in the accelerated drive to compensate for demographic realities through the medium of language training.

CONFERENCES

In the beginning there were very few, but after the Baku meeting in 1969, one could very easily become a "conference bum" on the topic of Russian-language training in the Soviet Union. As far as I can track down the history of these conferences, the first meeting in the postwar period was held in 1956, and noted as the "I Interrepublic Scientific-Practical Conference," apparently held in Tashkent. The next was in Kiev in 1961, and then in November, 1962, in Alma-Ata. This latter conference was designated as the "All-Union Conference on the Principles of the Development of the Literary Languages of the Peoples of the USSR." In 1968, Ornstein analyzed the 1962 conference and other materials and correctly predicted that another "phase of language policy may be in the offing, with an abrupt elevation of the status of Russian. The regime may feel that after half a century of rule it can afford to reduce linguistic diversity and drive harder toward the goal of 'Soviet nationality'." He was totally correct as the floodgates opened for scores of decrees and conferences very soon thereafter, especially after the census materials provided documentary evidence to the leadership that if they wanted to use ethnolinguistic instruments to change ethnodemographic trends, the time was at hand.

Then, after a hiatus of 7 years, in 1969 Ashkhabad hosted the first conference on Soviet (otechestvennom) linguistics under the rubric of "All-Union Scientific Conference on the Problem of Bilingualism and Multi-languages." The conference was organized by the Scientific Council on Patterns of Development of Nationality Languages in Connection With the Development of Socialist Nations,"

of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Also in the same year, Baku hosted an All-Union Conference in October of 1969 to discuss the problem of shortages of qualified Russian-language teachers (a theme oft-repeated in the decade following). Apparently, no meeting was held in 1970, but there has been at least one major meeting each year thereafter: in 1971 in Groznyi; in 1972 in Kishinev; in 1973 in Alma-Ata and Ordzhonikidze; in 1974 in Yerevan, Simferopol', Maykop, and Karaganda; in 1975, another important meeting in Tashkent, as well as in Minsk; in 1976 in Moscow, Yerevan, Tallin, Odessa, and Nal'chik; in 1977 in Taganrog and Dushanbe; in 1978 in Frunze; and in 1979, at least 4 meetings, more or less directly related to language training. Thus, on 21-24 May (simultaneously with the Tashkent meeting, an "All-Union School-Seminar of Ethnosociology" was held in Kiev, and included a report by Guboglo on ethnolinguistics. On 22-24 May, the already cited Tashkent conference designated as "All-Union Scientific-Theoretical Conference 'Russian Language--The Language of Friendship and Cooperation of the Peoples of the USSR'." Then if the participants wished, they could also attend another conference in Tashkent, held one week later, on 29-31 May, and designated as the "II All-Union Scientific-Practical Conference Dealing with Problems on Teaching the Russian Language in a Nationality School." And then the last meeting in 1979 was held in Ashkhabad on 9-12 October, entitled the "Linguistic Principles of Russian-Language Instruction of Students of Nationality Groups in Nonlinguistic Higher Educational Institutions," being the Third Regional Scientific Methods Conference. But we cannot stop to analyze the

contents of these meetings, and must concentrate on the May 22-24, 1979, conference as the culmination of the massive effort undertaken in the 1970s and the harbinger for the future.

On the first day the 1,000 conference delegates, including 450 from outside Uzbekistan, heard reports from many high-ranking officials, including the ubiquitous Rashidov, leading off not only as the main non-Russian nationality spokesman in this field, but also as head of the host republic; M. A. Prokof'yev, the USSR Minister of Education; V. N. Stoletov, the President of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences; F. P. Filin, Director of the Institute of Russian Languages of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR; and P. N. Fedoseyev, Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

On the second day, the conference split into seven sections, four covering different spheres and levels of schooling: preschool institutions, general educational nationality schools, vocational-technical schools, and higher and specialized secondary educational institutions; the other three sections covered teacher training and retraining, textbooks and other teaching aids, and the role of the mass media. Not surprisingly, the participants unanimously adopted recommendations to achieve an "all-around improvement" in the study and teaching of Russian since, among other inadequacies, "As an analysis of the status of teaching and the quality of knowledge of students demonstrates, the level of practical command of spoken Russian among a significant portion of young students still does not meet necessary requirements."

The recommendations followed the structure of the sections organized by the conference. First, at the preschool level, ministries of education of all republics were informed that starting in 1979 they must organize the teaching of the Russian language to all children five years of age and older in all preschool institutions, with emphasis on conversational Russian. This recommendation included such activities as bilingual games, extracurricular activities, sports holidays in Russian, etc. A call was made for the preparation of a standard program and guidelines for teaching these preschoolers, desk games, audio-visual aids, and other equipment. It was also suggested that a new journal, entitled Voprosy doshkol'nogo vospitaniya (Questions of Preschool Education), be issued. In addition, it was recommended that an All-Union Scientific Practical Conference on the Problem of Improving Russian-Language Training in the Nationality Kindergartens" is to be convened during 1981 or 1982.

Second, at the general educational nationality school level, the conference recommended an increase in the number of Russian-language courses; more opportunities for Russian-language oral practice; encouraged participation in Pioneer and Komsomol Russian-language activities after school; raising the role of inter-nationality friendship clubs in propagandizing and studying Russian; systematically convene school, inter-school, rayon, city, republic, and zonal (multi-republic) Russian Weeks, days, and Olympiads; greater utilization of language laboratories; and necessary Russian literature for individual libraries. Again a call was made for a student study manual and a standard program

and teaching manual for teachers of Russian from first grade through tenth.

Third, at the vocational-technical-school level, the conference suggested that the curricula be redistributed in order to devote more hours to Russian-language study.

Fourth, at the higher and specialized secondary school level, the conference recommended that the recent Kirgiz, Uzbek, and Moldavian experiments in the Russian-language teaching of social sciences, general educational and special disciplines begin with the second and third years of study. Students of these schools are to be encouraged in every way to write all term papers, theses, etc., in Russian, and special emphasis put on increasing the quality of the teaching at this level.

Fifth, because of poor quality of Russian-language teachers in the past, new personnel are to be chosen from among the best university-educated teachers. All ministries of higher and specialized secondary education are invited to organize regional contests on best student papers on Russian linguistics and literature, and to broaden student admissions from the non-Slavic republics into the philological faculties of the higher educational institutions of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia. Lengthy recommendations are addressed to the problem of upgrading the training and skills of teachers, a problem that persists in many schools, especially in rural areas. The Conference required an increase in the quality of the teachers' knowledge of both spoken and written Russian. The teacher training institutes are to be held responsible for strengthening their resources by setting up

Russian-language rooms (with modern audiovisual and voice equipment), making future teachers become thoroughly familiar with new programs, techniques, etc.; and making teachers participate in regional conferences and research projects. Since the quality of Russian-language teaching varies considerably, the Conference recommended that teachers regularly take courses as a mandatory form of "skill qualification upgrading," especially those who cannot pass the certification test.

The foregoing is only a selection of salient points from among the 8-page listing of recommendations, but it highlights the scope, coverage, and seriousness of the Conference's concerns. These recommendations did not die in a conference report. Shortly after the conference, many of its recommendations were implemented at the ministerial and class level.

Less than one month later, on June 15, 1979, the USSR Ministry of Education approved a set of related measures for preschool and general education school levels. New commissions were created, new dictionaries planned, training programs designed to upgrade Russian-language teacher skills authorized, and so forth. Three days later, a supplementary order was issued regarding preschool and preparatory classes for general educational school Russian-language study to the effect that beginning in the (September) 1979/1980 school year in the preparatory classes of the general educational schools, and on September 1, 1980 (the 1980/81 school year) Russian-language training would be offered for those children who do not command Russian. Two months later, the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences forwarded a draft model program for Russian-

language preparatory classes to the Ministry of Education of the USSR.

The Russian-language study plan for the 1980/81 Azerbaydzhani school year shows a marked increase in the preparatory class and grades 1--5, and a surprising decrease in grades 6--10. In fact, the decrease of 170 hours of classroom study in the later grades is 4 hours more than the increase at all prior pre-school and first five grades. It is still too early to fully determine the impact of the Conference, but it is obvious that action has been taken at many levels and in many directions. Whether success will ensue either in the purely academic sense and/or in the demographic sense as hoped by the ethnolinguists and the policymakers remains moot.

One of the more interesting facets of the many-decade effort to improve Russian-language teaching and knowledge is the publication pattern of methodological journals for the teachers of the Russian language and literature. I can determine no sense at all from the choice of nationality schools and dates, except that after large gaps in time there is a grouping around the time of the 1958 decree and another around the time of the 1978 decree, give or take a few years. Thus, the first Russian-language journal began publication in Moscow in 1939, entitled Russkiy yazyk v shkole (Russian Language in School). In 1943, the title was changed to Russkiy yazyk i literatura v shkole (Russian Language and Literature in School).

In 1948, the first journal for non-Russian language schools, the journal Russkiy yazyk v nerusskoy shkole was begun in Baku (the capital of Azerbaydzhani; its title was changed in 1970 to

direct reference to the republic, becoming Russkiy yazyk i literatura v Azerbaydzhanskoy shkole (Russian Language and Literature in the Azerbaydzhan School). Then after a gap of 9 years, in 1957, two journals were issued. Russkiy yazyk v natsional'noy shkole (Russian Language in the Nationality School), the national journal upon which the others model their contents. Its original institutional sponsor was the RSFSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, later upgraded to the USSR level. Also in 1957, the Armenian equivalent also began publication under one of the two standard titles, Russkiy yazyk v Armyanskoy shkole. (Why some titles include "literature" in them and others do not, despite relatively the same contents, is not clear.) The republics of Kirgiziya and Uzbekistan were the next to publish a local journal commencing in 1958. Then came three more new journals, including the only one for a sub-republic level, the Chechen and Ingush schools (in 1961), for Kazakh schools (in 1962), and for Georgian schools (several years later, in 1966).

In 1970, as noted earlier, the Azerbaydzhan journal changed its title. The very same year the All-Union census of population was taken revealing that 58 million persons, or one-quarter of the Soviet population, still could not speak Russian. For some reason it took seven years for the next batch of journals to appear, five in all. Beginning in 1977, the Tadzhikistan and Lithuanian journals appeared and in 1979 the Ukrainian (very surprising that this had not been initiated previously given the well-known Russification drive of many years in the republic). The Moldavian journal appeared also in 1979. This area is an

interesting case of competition with the Romanians, even including an attempt to find Slavic roots for the putative Wallachian ancestors of Moldavians. An Estonian journal was scheduled to begin this year. Thus, only the Belorussian, Latvian, and Turkmen educators had not been exposed to a journal of this type. Why they have not been "privileged" to have their own journal also is not clear. The expansion of publication in this realm, however, does demonstrate the comprehensive approach now being taken by the authorities.

The revival of activity around the beginning of the 1970s in terms of conferences, discussions, new journals, and new legislation was accompanied by a number of institutional developments that parallel, support, or correspond to these other activities.

In a direct link to the 1970 census information that 58 million Soviet citizens could not speak Russian, Academician Filin, the Director of the Institute of Russian Language of the Soviet Academy, described the formation of two units devoted to related issues brought up (1) by the dimension of this figure and (2) its meaning to those who sought to make Russian universal in use. The well-known sociolinguist Yu. D. Desheriyev was appointed to head the new Sector of Socio-Linguistics in the Institute of Linguistics of the central Academy, to perform and coordinate research on the interaction between the Russian language and the other languages of the peoples of the USSR. At the same time, his Institute created a new Section for the Study of Russian-Language Teaching in the Nationality (i.e., non-Russian) Republics and Oblasts, under the leadership of V. V. Ivanov.

Ivanov's section was charged with preparing recommendations on expanding the role of the Russian language in the Soviet Union and improving its teaching. By 1974, together with other interested organizations, it had prepared a set of appropriate recommendations related to the status of Russian-language teaching at all levels of schooling, on the training and retraining of the teaching staff, and on textbooks. By 1979, Filin also reported that they had prepared a 10-year program of work.

This section also was charged with overseeing the formation of similar groups in all republics. Up to that time, only one such special department or group existed, and that was in the Ukrainian Academy's Institute of Linguistics. However, after February of 1977, when the Uzbek Academy formed a similar unit in its A. S. Pushkin Institute of Languages and Literature many others were created. This Russian Language Department and the others that followed in order of apparent date of formation are: Belorussia, Moldavia, Armenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia (in the Institute of Psychology?!), Kirgiziya, Tadzhikistan, Azerbaydzhan, and Kazakhstan. In 1977, the Department of Social Sciences of the Estonian Academy had organized a "Council for the Coordination of Scientific Work on Problems Related to the Russian Language in the Estonian SSR." Why there is no unit in Turkmenistan as of the date of Filin's report to the 34th Session of the Council on Coordination of the Scientific Activity of the Academies of Sciences of the Union Republics and to the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR is not referred to at all.

However, Filin also admitted that having set-up institutions does not necessarily solve the problem of scientific work in the field. In the same report to the Presidium and to the Coordination Council, he stated:

However, all this is just a start. Most of the specialists in Russian philology in the nationality [i.e., non-Russian] academic institutions are inadequately trained still, and there are few of them. There are fewer than 200 specialists in Russian philology of higher qualification--doctors of science--in our country. One-fourth of them work in the Institute of Russian Languages of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, more than half live in Moscow and Leningrad, and more than five-sixths of them live in the cities of the RSFSR. At the same time, for example, in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan there is still not one specialist in Russian philology with a doctor of sciences degree; in the other republics, there is one each.

It is not clear quite how the "Scientific Council of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR on Complex Problems of the Pattern of Development of the Nationality Languages In Connection with the Development of Socialist Nations," and the "Problem Council on the Interaction of the Languages of the Peoples of the USSR" interact with each other and other institutions, but they are referred to as cosponsors of various conferences and publications. The roles of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the USSR and its Scientific Research Institute for the Teaching of the Russian Language in the Nationality School continue to be major as attested to by their full participation in conferences and in publications. The Scientific Methods Council on the Russian Language of the Ministry of Education is similar to the Institute, but less formally organized.

This chapter has endeavored to refer only to the language policy realm of Soviet nationality policy, rather than the full

scope of political, socioeconomic, legal, and even demographic facets of nationality issues, except insofar as the latter is the cause and effect of Soviet language policy. However, the work of the Institute of Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences cannot be omitted. Only part of the work on the major project conducted during 1970 to 1976 by the central Institute together with the institutes of Estonia, Moldavia, Georgia, Uzbekistan, and the units of the central Institute under Yu. V. Arutyunyan researching parts of the RSFSR, relates to language policy and the knowledge of Russian among the non-Russian nationalities. Nonetheless, the results of this research under the overall project title "Optimization of Social and Cultural Conditions for the Development and Rapprochement of the Nations of the USSR," provide statistical materials for other actions related to the number and language capabilities of the non-Russian populations. The work of Arutyunyan on the Uzbeks and the Tatars, Guboglo on the Moldavians, and Kakhk on the Estonians are particularly noteworthy for their scholarly approach. In short, it should be underscored that the timing of this massive research effort totally overlaps the latest period of expansion of concern about the nationality populations. The completion of the research phase and its analysis must have been an integral part of the decisions underlying the October 1978 decree and the May 1979 conference. However, some brief reference must be given to the Scientific Council on Nationality Problems of the Academy of Sciences USSR. Formed in June 1969 as the successor organization to a Commission on Problems of Nationality Relations attached to

the Social Sciences Section of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, which (Commission) was formed only shortly before in 1966, its role has expanded sharply since 1975. It has become the initiator of much research on language and nationality issues. Two other related institutions, newly formed, also must be mentioned. On August 10, 1979, very shortly after the May 1979 Tashkent conference, it was announced that a new "Commission on Questions of the Development, Rapprochement, and Mutual Enrichment on the Cultures of the Peoples of the USSR," was formed within the Ministry of Culture under the leadership of a First Deputy Minister (Yu. Barabash). The Commission is expected to "analyze and generalize" from the theory and practice of their own and the republic ministries of culture on the questions referred to in the title of the Commission. Second, a new "Scientific Council on Problems of Rapprochement and Development of Socialist Nations" has been formed in Armenia, according to the September 30, 1980, issue of Kommunist published in Yerevan). With a staff of "more than 20 scientists" it will have a fully developed work plan, will publish as appropriate, and will deal with the solution of the nationality question in the USSR (allegedly solved), other issues, and last but not least, "criticism of bourgeois, revisionist falsifications of the historical experience of solving the nationality question in the USSR."

Although the range of Russian-language oriented activities promoting bilingualism, the thrust of the new decrees, the timing and content of numerous conferences, the issuance of new publications, and the formation of new institutions designed to promote

the Russian language is impressive, we also find full and frank admission of problems related to the knowledge and teaching of the Russian language. The lack of qualified teachers of the Russian language and literature, especially in rural areas where 80 percent of the nationality schools are found, the lack of migration to cities or to other regions by many nationality groups allays the intermingling of the populations and absorption of the culture of the dominant (Russian) group; and the outspoken concern of the Ukrainians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Georgians, and Armenians, in particular, about the pressures on their native languages is well known. Nonetheless, the Soviet regime is pushing ahead at full speed. It is hoping that the young will adapt to a Russian culture more readily than their elders who have not. It now appears to me that the goal of the Soviet leadership is to have a very firm foundation for the Russian-language training and its knowledge by the nationality groups by 1985. How soon this will also have an impact on the traditional sets of beliefs, ways of life, and demographic behavior of individual nationality groups is uncertain. But undoubtedly from a demographic, and especially manpower point of view its impact will not be felt until the next century. By that time the numbers make it even more difficult for the Russian leadership.