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ICONOCLASM IN THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION: DESTROYING AND PRESERVING THE PAST

Richard Stites

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Blow up
Smash to pieces
The Old World!
In the heat of battle of the Universal Struggle
By the glow of flames
Show
No mercy--
Strangle
The bony body of destiny!

V. D. Alexandrovsky, 1918

Theodot: Will you destroy the past?
Caesar: Aye! And build the future on its ruins.

George Bernard Shaw, Caesar and Cleopatra

By revolutionary iconoclasm, I mean the desire, fed or reinforced by a revolution, to sweep away the memory of the hated past. The word iconoclasm is usually defined as either the destruction of images, idols, or icons; or a deep critique of a given order.[1] I am using it in this essay in a rather broader way, to designate four different features of revolutionary thought and behavior: (1) the so-called mindless vandalism or wanton destruction usually associated with peasants in a rural milieu; (2) the self-conscious effacement of obvious artifacts of the old regime (statues, imperial regalia, etc.); (3) nihilsm, or the repudication of the old culture and art; and (4) anti-intellectualism, critical not only of past culture, but of intellectual elites. I will begin with a brief discussion of the nature of iconoclasm and conclude with an explanation of how these currents were opposed, controlled, and reversed by the Bolshevik authorities.

Iconoclasm has a very useful political, educational, and psychological role in times of violence. Smashing hated images and artifacts of the past can serve as a surrogate for angry violence against human representatives of the old order. It can help erase reminders of previous holders of power and majesty. It makes

way for the fashioning of new symbols and emblems of the revolutionary order. Unlike the medieval Byzantine Iconoclasts who smashed images because all images that depicted Christ were considered evil, revolutionary iconoclasts clear away the signs of the past in order to raise up new ones. Like the defacing of pagan images in Kiev after the conversion of Russia to Orthodox Christianity in the 10th century, revolutionary iconoclasm was a catharsis, a cleansing of the system, and a way to focus intense rage. Revolutionaries, like other kinds of leaders and political figures, knew that surfaces and facades are very important, that it is essential to point the way to reality before one can begin the journey. They knew that signs and symbols--and the very act of revising them--are able to mobilize certain sentiments of devotion and loyalty, and to evoke political and social dreams.[2] They also knew the importance of the tactile and the visual in a land that was still very much illiterate.

Revolutions are a time for destruction, for smashing, for demeaning acts of mockery. In 1643, parliamentary agents broke into the Regalia Chamber of Westminster Abbey and made merry with crowns and coronation robes of England's hallowed monarchs, exposing the "sacred ornaments" to contempt and laughter. When the House of Commons later voted to melt down and sell the silver and gold in the royal regalia, the Puritans spoke of "detestable emblems of kings, their crowns, scepters and heathenish ornaments." A typical blend of contempt, hatred, and practical concerns, and perhaps a ritual of exorcism achieved by profaning the sacred. The successors of Charles I also came into power with dour faces turned against the art, the artifacts, and the frivolous ideas of the old order. In the French Revolution, the literal and the metaphorical sides of iconoclasm unfolded together. After the assassination of Marat, iconoclasm swelled into a tempest of burning and defiling of art, books, religious icons, and regalia; and an anti-art movement proclaimed that art corrupted morals and worked against

republican simplicity and virtue. A law of 1792 announced the "the sacred principles of liberty and equality will not permit the existence of monuments raised to ostentation, prejudice, and tyranny to continue to offend the eyes of the French people...the bronze in these monuments can be converted into cannon for the defence of la patrie." It was during this great upheaval that the word "vandalism" was first coined. Henri Gregoire, an anti-iconoclast at the Ministry of Education used it to indicate willful and ignorant destruction as oppsoed to legitimate political removal of repugnant visual reminders of the old regime.[3]

The Russian Revolution was one of the most iconoclastic of all time. Both iconoclasm and vandalism accompanied the great peasant revolts of the 17th and 18th centuries, the Revolution of 1905-1907, and the Great Revolution of 1917-1921. Old Believers in the 17th century and the intellectual Bakunin in the 19th dreamed of "burning down all Russia"; and the "nihilist" Dmitri Pisarev invited his followers to strike out and hit at random, destroying the worthless, in the process of which the worthwhile would survive the blows. Mystical anarchists around the time of the 1905 revoluiton hoped for a "universal beautiful fire that will consume the old world." One of them put it this way: "All history must be burned." The Revolutions of 1917 opened up new vistas for the destructive impulse--and not only the purely military one, such as the order given by General Khabalov during the February days to bomb Petrograd from the air. In my discussion of vandalism, iconoclasm, nihilism, and anti-intellectualism--categories which often overlap--I shall try to show their relationship to each other, to their antecedents in Russian history, to similar phenomena elsewhere, and to the anti-iconoclastic feelings and policies of those in power. And I shall attempt to expose the complexity of motivations involved in smashing the emblems of the past.[4]

A word or two about a related matter--rituals of reversal and symbolic rebribution. Rituals of reversal in medieval and early modern times were carried out

at designated festivals when men would be ordered about by women, fools would be crowned kings, the low would be elevated to positions of mock reverence. Symbolic retribution occurs when punishment is accompanied by some reminder of the sociological irony of the punishment: jailers jailed, Muslims sewn into pigskins, peasant rebels roasted on a red-hot throne. Many instances and combinations of these occurred during the Russian Revolution--and they were used by both sides: putting mine operators down a mine shaft, wheeling bosses off the premises of a factory yard on a barrow, sending priests to the front with weapon in hand, stuffing the slit bellies of food requisitioners with grain; former servants lecturing to masters about the rules of the revolution; ragged workers standing guard over a work detail of Land Captains, policemen, merchants, and gentry. There were even legends abroad in the early days of the Revolution that it was caused by Jews who wanted to ride Cossack horses and make their former owners walk, or that sailors wanted to ride inside the trams, a practice forbidden by the old order. These myths and episodes, so characteristic of all revolutions, were not so much classical reversal rituals, temporary rejection of normal life permitted in time of carnival; they were tableaux vivants, gestures bathed in revolutionary meaning and pointing towards a permanent new order of things. Those performed by revolutionaries were concrete embodiments of an abstract order--the laws and policies of the Bolshevik regime or of other ephemeral revolutionary governments.[5]

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When Sergei Eisenstein edited the famous sequence in October (Ten Days that Shook the World) where workers in a conscious and mechanical act of urban iconoclasm are dismantling the statue of Alexander III--a monument rich in the imagery of the prerevolutionary order--he cuts away to show the simultaneous rampages of peasants armed with scythes and heading for the nearest manor house.[6] Here he was clearly trying to show the underlying connection between urban revolution and

rural rebellion. But historians, anthropologists, and revolutionaries themselves like to make a clear distinction between conscious iconoclasm and spontaneous vandalism. Is there such a distinction? Peasant vandalism, often called "the Red Cock" or rural rampage, was--like iconoclasm--physical destruction of things, some of which could be seen to have symbolic significance. But it is usually depicted as visceral, irrational, partly Luddite, and unplanned. Did it in fact differ from iconoclasm in motivation, and style? Did urban iconoclasm sometimes resemble rural vandalism? Does the dichotomy have any meaning? Were those who put the torch to the prisons of Petrograd driven by different impulses than those who took the axe to the grand pianos of the manor houses?

In looking very lightly over various examples of rural destruction in the years 1905 to the end of the Civil War I have discerned no clear pattern of a vandalist mentalite but rather an alloy of envy, hatred, and self-interest. Envy of the visibly larger portions of land and farm equipment, livestock and things of immediate use for the peasants; hatred for the supposed arrogance and indifference encased in the embellishments of the rich; and self-interest in destroying premises and records of the landlord to prevent him from re-establishing himself. During the great pillages of 1905-1907, peasants burned or attempted to burn railroad stations, telegraphic lines, and the local school or teacher's home. Sometimes whole villages helped to destroy orcchrds, houses, and barns of a landowner--suggesting collective responsibility and anonymity. The old, the women, and the more prosperous most often resisted; and young males most often instigated. Outside agitators on horse and bicycle were involved in some of the episodes, in some cases threatening to burn the peasants out if they did not take action against the landlord. In one case where a wineshop was burned, the motive was venegeance for having built it in the first place against local wishes; and here the women were energetic participants. But in 1914, during the mobilization riots, similar things happened with no sign of

a revolutionary situation at hand. Recruits marching cross country got out of control, plundered estates and urged local peasants to join them. Stations, shops, and homes were burned.[7]

In a study of 1917 in Saratov Province, Donald Raleigh finds that essential equipment was seized and divided while fancy furniture, books, art works, and even parks and orchards were vandalized. John Keep's study of the rural revolution tells of how, in Tambov Province, peasants played the harmonica while igniting the mansions of the lord. In Ryazan province, peasants merely emptied a manor house; but when a sailor arrived, he told them to chop it up and burn it down. Keep finds that the great majority of manors were left to rot or turned into schools that were hardly used during the Civl War. In an incident of 1922 in Nizhny Novgorod a soldier poked his bayonet in the parquet floors of an aristocrat's mansion and picked out the eyes of a Japanese carving. Keep and Raleigh use almost identical language in interpreting the events they describe. The former speaks of an archaic joy in destroying "symbols of their former subjection;" Raleigh speaks of the destruction of "the symbolic vestiges of its subordinate economic position." Yet even these few pieces of evidence suggest a cluster of motives, varying in presence and intensity from one place to another.[8]

Let us take one more example--this time of essentially rural people set loose in a city. In January 1918, the Insurgent Army of the Ukrainian peasant anarchist Nestor Makhno entered the city of Ekaterinoslav. In addition to emptying the prisons, dousing them with kerosene and keeping them alit all through the night, they destroyed all archives, records, and libraries--at least according to a hostile witness. But the most spectacular act of destruction took place in the streets adjacent to the railroad station. The shops and bazaars were put to the flame and Makhno himself mounted a three-inch cannon in the middle of the street and fired point blank into the tallest and most beautiful buildings.[9] Was this

playfulness--the warrior ebullience and military macho which takes joy from ejaculating shells into a passive target, the kind so often noted in the Mexican Revolution? Was it a mere act of drunkenness for which the batko was renowned? Was it deep hatred of the city on the part of enraged peasants? Was it a crude example of military tactics? Was it class war and political vengeance against the bourgeoisie? Or was it all of these things?

There are, as I shall point out again presently, very few symbols, images, and icons to be found in the countryside. The pattern of behavior in both revolutions seems to suggest that when peasants rampage, they like most of all to burn barns, pens, sheds, hayricks, stables, mills, and offices of the nearby lord or of the owner of a well-run farm. Much rarer is the burning of the manor house itself, an act found more frequently when town people are in the picture. If we juxtapose this fact with what was said about Makhno above, we have another startling example of the continuing "war between the city and the countryside."[10] When villagers do occupy manor houses, they take what they need and destroy the rest. Is this vandalism, or the "cunning of the peasant" who wants to keep the lord from coming back? The fragmentary evidence hints that there might have been a clear difference between the "looting-consciousness" of local peasants and "burning consciousness" of outsiders, almost invariably townsmen. The case of sacking railroad stations points two ways: It can be a very practical military decision in a land where punitive raids were deployed by rail and horse; or it can be a blow at the obvious link to the hated center whence emanates all the trouble. This is clearly a topic which needs much more thorough and thoughtful investigation before we can speak glibly about the vandalistic mentality of the Rusisan peasant. One need only recall the burning of rental documents in France in 1789 to see that cool reason can ignite the hottest fires of devastation. If this is vandalism, then Bakunin, Trotsky, and Stalin must take their place in the annals of the vandals.[11]

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In one of the few studies of the "crowd" in the Russian Revolution, Teddy Uldricks suggests that "Marxism served not so much to introduce sophisticated concepts of economic and social analysis to the worker and peasant as to create a new set of adversary symbols (e.g., the bourgeoisie, the capitalists, the imperialist powers) as the object of their semi-instinctive class hatred."[12] This seems clear enough, though the exact nature of the relationship between lower classes on the one hand and the objects and symbols of their hatred has never been adequately measured, or even examined. This part of the paper is looking at symbols rather than human beings as objects of revolutionary destructiveness. For purposes of analysis, I have arranged these objects into three categories, partly inspired by the division made a century ago by the American philosopher Charles Peirce:[13] buildings and structures (indicating the presence of someone hostile); ikons (images of hated figures); and symbols (indirect representations of abstract ideas, i.e., of power, equality, repression).

If the Bastille of 1789 seemed to symbolize the entire ancient order in France, then certain kinds of buildings in Russia were also seen as centers and reminders of a detested world, as in the 1921 poster by N. N. Kogout showing a worker blowing up capital and simultaneously destroying the foundations of buildings and churches. When the SR terrorist Mariya Spiridonova was released by the Revolution from her Siberian prison, she had it blown up in the presence of the people. She repeated this performance all along the Trans-Siberian Railroad and when she arrived in Petrograd demanded of the authorities that the Peter Paul fortress by given similar treatment. Prisons would henceforth be unnecessary in revolutionary Russia--and the hated sight of them must be effaced. In a way, this recalled Hebert's demand during the French Revolution that all church steeples in Paris be leveled. During the February days in Petrograd people of the street--leaders mingling with led in an anonymous surge--invaded prisons, courthouses, and arsenals to blow them up or

burn them out. Schlusselburg was gutted, the Lithuanian Castle was demolished, but Peter Paul was left unharmed. The process was repeated in local centers. There was no clear discernible pattern and no element of ritual. Crowds apparently stood quietly and watched the blaze, as they would do in Barcelona in 1936 when hundreds of churches were consumed in the flames. According to one eyewitness, the greater part of the burning in Petrograd during the February Revolution was functional, military, and political rather than symbolic: police stations, and buildings sheltering snipers were the main targets, as well as courts, arsenals, and prisons.[14]

When we turn to icons, the picture changes somewhat. As in 1789, the removal of statues and pictures of the monarch was on the agenda from the outset. But the process was by no means massive or complete. When it became clear to officials in Ekaterinoslav, two weeks after the fall of the monarchy that it would not return, they quietly took down portraits of Nicholas II and hid them in attics in government institutions. The big ensembles of bronze and marble, with massive tsars seated on huge horses did not fall to the fury of a symbolically vengeful mob. When the statue of Alexander III in Moscow was dismantled, a religious legend sprang up at once to the effect that the tsar's cross had disappeared during the "deromanovization." Could such features of royal regalia have played an inhibiting role for some people? The government decree on the dismantling of monuments raised to honor monarchs and their servitors was slow in coming--not published until Lenin's arrival in Moscow in April 1918--and tardy in execution as well. And it was emphatically qualified by exempting monuments which possessed historic or artistic value. Alexander III was the first to go--he was particularly repugnant to revolutionaries (Lenin's brother had been hanged in his reign) and uncomfortably close to Bolshevik offices in the Kremlin. Lenin ordered him taken down and, with a trace of irony, replaced by Tolstoy who had been excommunicated by the Church. But the

authorities were very modest in their campaign to "deromanovize" the cities--Alexander III's equestrian statue on Resurrection Square near the station stayed around for years (it is now in the yard of the Russian Museum); and the world-famous representations of Peter (the Bronze Horseman on Decembrist Square), Catherine (near the Public Library on Nevsky), and Nicholas I (on St. Isaac's Square) are still there to dazzle tourists and provincial Russians.[15]

Statues of tsars and princes and generals--Skobelev's figure was also removed--were virtual embodiments of reaction. But about religious icons, there was considerably more ambiguity. In the past, workers had sometimes struck out at the icons in their barracks at the onset of a strike, and orders were sent out during the Revolution and Civil War to remove them from public places--such as hospitals. But crosses still adorned a conspicuous pinnacle of the Kremlin in 1920 and were still hanging in the Bolshevized Moscow Conservatory of Music in 1922--and probably much later. The problem with icons, crucifixes, and other Christian signs is that they represented someone far outside Russian politics: God, the savior, and the saints. Thus the graphic connection between them and either revolution or counter-revolution--in spite of conflict between Orthodoxy and Bolshevism--was more tenuous. Looting, defacing, and mockery occurred or course, but it was often closely tied to political or even economic acts (taking gold out of churches during the famine of the early 1920s).[16]

Tsarist emblems were more amenable to immediate effacement and exchange in the symbolic war. During the February Revolution at the front, soldiers wore red ribbons on their sleeves, their weapons, and their vehicles and showed much anger at the display of tsarist emblems. Officers were arrested for breaches of symbolic etiquette and for calling the red banners "rags" and "babushka's underwear." At one of the first celebrations of the Revolution, on March 25 at the Mariinsky Theater, all eagles and coats-of-arms were removed; as an added touch, the ushers

wore dirty jackets and the imperial box was filled with recent political prisoners. In Moscow, fire trucks with ladders and crews went round the town with iron hooks to tear off the Romanov eagles. In the capital a veritable hunt was mounted for imperial emblems; crowns and eagles were torn from gates and fences and even blown out with dynamite in some places. Signs were removed from store fronts and tossed onto the ice of the Neva. Eagles at the Alexander Theater were defaced. Piles of imperial arms and regalia for the Court Provenors' shops were made into giant bonfires. After the October Revolution, there were few such devices left to deface or destroy. Counterrevolution found its own symbols: At a performance of Tolstoy's Living Corpse at the Alexander Theater--where privileged audiences still prevailed--a gendarme appeared on stage with full-dress uniforms and the crowd broke into an ovation. During the Civil War, the war of symbols continued: Komsomols pins were stuck through the tongues of Red nurses before they were hanged; Bolsheviks nailed epaulets into the shoulders of captured White officers.[17]

As in previous revolutions, places, things, institutions, and people were renamed to honor new heroes, commemorate dead ones, and eliminate odious associations. Towns were slow in receiving revolutionary appelations, but by May 1, 1924, the ancient map of all the Russias bristled with such places as Ulyanovsk, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Zinovevsk, Trotsk, Stalingrad, Dnepropetrovsk, Luxemburg, Uritsky, and Pervomaisk (May Day). Streets like the Boulevard Ring in Moscow became the Garden ring in order to divest the honest proletarian thoroughfare of association with decadent cafes and cheap novels. Ostap Bender in The Twelve Chairs almost lost himself in the welter of Soviet Streets and Lena Massacre Streets in a small provincial hole. The infection spread everywhere. The Tauride Palace became Uritsky Palace (for a time), factories were rechristened "Republic of Russia" and so on. Officers became commanders; sirs and madames became comrades. Words like governor, governess, lord, heir, prince, lycee, chamber maid, ambassador

(posol), and minister (ministr) were abolished (though the last two were later reintroduced). Some young people in the Revolution thought that criminal argot ought to be the true language of the proletariat.[18]

Nowhere is the irony and pathos apparent in all this instant innovation more apparent than in the renaming of people. Consider this partial list of names inspired by: (1) heroes--Vilen, Vilena, Ninel, Budena, Bukharina, Stalina, Vellington, Zhores, Mara, Marks, Engels, Robesper; (2) ideas--Revolution, February, May, October, Decree, Terror, Barricade, Commune, Shift, Smychka (alliance of peasant and worker), Will, Joy, Spark, Dawn, Vanguard, Alliance, Hero, Idea, Tractor, Electrification; (3) compounds--Vladlen, Remir (revolution and peace), Kim (Communist International of Youth); and (4) error--Vinaigrette, Embryo, and Commentary. Like the French of a hundred years earlier, the Russian revolutionaries sought to reject the mainstream of Russian names which had so many associations with religion and with the imperial family. Unlike the French, they possessed no classical style and ethos to emulate, an ethos that gave France not only the pseudo-classical canvasses of David, and the fake Roman festivals that he composed, but also models of republican virtue--and a pool of names, Brutus, Gracchus, Pericles and all the rest. Though even here there was an analogy, since some Russians adopted, or contrived, antique Slavonic names, seen to be pure and prechristian, and therefore acceptable to the new revolutionary sensibility.[19]

It seems fairly clear--and hardly surprising--that in general there was much more symbolic behavior in the cities than in the countryside. Cities are replete with images: Their horizontal space, transected by geometrically aligned streets, is itself a symbol of abstract order; their vertical space is filled with structures which graphically represent interdependence and inequality, power and alienation. Juxtaposition of contrasting things and persons is dense, speed and action apparent--symbols, signs, and names are everywhere. One hardly needs to take a step in order

to perform a visible act of iconoclasm. Villages are often named for nature or nearby topographical marks, or they are neutral in meaning, and their single street of mud bears no magic name. Symbols, icons (except for religious ones), and centers of power are few--the manor, the station, a barracks, the church--and not so near at hand. They must be marched to and invested in a military maneuver. Peasant hosts seem most wanton and visceral in their urge to demolish when they take a city--we may recall Razin in 17th-century Astrakhan or Makhno in 20th-century Ekaterinoslav. Though the examples I have given are few indeed--a handful of cities and rural places--it seems that in the mix of practical action, emotional drive, and symbolic behavior--present on both kinds of spaces--one finds much more of the last in an urban milieu.

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How is all of this related to "nihilism" which Berdyaev once defined as a secular version of religious asceticism which reviles art, thought, and religion as luxury? The word iconoclasm, as I have indicated, has both a concrete and an abstract meaning: The latter has to do with a fundamental critique of a cultural order. 1860s nihilism was destructive, generationally rebellious, materialist, ascetic, populist, elitist, utopian, and ambivalent. Pisarev's provocative invitation to smash the old has already been mentioned. Radicals debated in the 1870s about whether all culture would be rooted out after the revolution. Much has been written about Bazarov, the fathers and the children, and the generational revolt--it was still going on in the 1920s in remote villages where young militants harried old moderates. It hardly needs to be repeated that those identified as nihilist writers made a virtual cult of science and material progress; but its scientism was directed against soft culture and art--considered elitist; it was not the smug materialism of the West. The clerics' sons and the clerks--so despised by some historians--shunned luxury and wrapped themselves in a self-denying cult of sacrifice.

Nihilists, even the earlier nonradical ones, hoped to spread the fruits of scientific progress to the masses, but were elitist in their ways oif doing so. Their utopianism, dimly felt, caused painful ambivalence and feelings of guilt.[20]

The Futurist movement and the avant-garde in general on the one hand and the proletarian culture movement--Proletkult--were, in their different ways heirs to this tradition. Soviet historians nowadays praise the cultural and organizational work of Proletcult during the Civil War but assert that some of their misguided leaders "took a nihilist" position toward the old culture. Lebedev-Polansky spoke of accepting the rich legacy of the past--but critically and not in slavish obedience; and the critic Sanin was willing to accept selectively some older plays provided they were edited and purified for revolutionary purposes. But even these concessions were grudging and double-edged. A proletcult speaker in December 1917 explained that old culture, "though sometimes valuable in form, was nevertheless for the most part vulgar and provocative in content and criminal in origin." Bessalko went further and announced that the proletariat did not need the past. In Tambov Province in 1919, local proletcultists planned to burn all the books in the libraries in the belief that the shelves would be filled on the first of the new year with proletarian works! The generational struggle was clearly discernible in the movement as well, as when Bessalko said that the workers do not need "older brothers" such as Chekhov, Leskov, and Korolenko. Reverence for science was apparent in the machine-worship aspects of the movement and in the statement of the Tambov Proletcult speaker who warned his comrades against destroying works on such useful and venerable subjects as astronomy.[21]

Like those 19th-century nihilists who became radicals and "went to the people," the proletcultists had a populist impulse: Their mission was to smash old culture, build a new one--and take it out to the people. And they tried to do so in some very original and striking ways. But they often fell victim to elitism: When the

Proletcult official who spoke of the virtues of astronomy heard of the book-burning plans of his comrades, he warned that "local people could not really understand the nature of the broad implications of the problem." Resolutions often affirmed the leadership role of a proletarian cultural vanguard analogous to the Party leadership--a chosen and "conscious" few who would have to lead and point the way. There was far more illusion--even utopianism--in the visions of organized iconoclasts, the proletkult, than in the acts of the physical icnoclasts who merely broke images and put up new ones: for they aspired to create among the workers and by the workers a whole new collective, machinery-oriented culture with little or no help from past traditions. And the fact that the Petrograd Proletcult set up shop in the opulent mansion that had recently sheltered the Hall of the Nobility while simultaneously proclaiming the criminality of past artistic affluence ought to remind us of Bazarov, the cultural vandal, breathing nihilistic fire as he roamed through the elegant parks of the Kirsanovs, partaking of fine cuisine, browsing in the library, and lingering in the salons of a country gentleman's estate.[22]

The artistic Left--Futurists and other elements of the avant-garde--were also cultural iconoclasts. Tretyakov captured the mood retrospectively in 1927:

> All for combat!
> Force is best.
> A bullet in the brain
> Of Basil the Blest.
> Smash all the icons
> And the signs They have made.
> Explode the Iverskaya
> With a hand grenade.[23]

The rhetoric of the Futurists was more outrageous than that of Proletcult. Maykovsky loved to shout down "bourgeois" speakers; he wanted to level "Comrade Mauser" at the orators of the past, to put Raphael and Rastrelli "against the wall"; to stop the useless museum work of "preserving junk"; He and his colleagues rejoiced in mocking the culture of the past--and not just anathematizing it. Meyerhold was

"possessed by the spirit of iconoclasm"; and Fedor Kommizzarshevsky facetiously suggested that the Bolshoi be blown up by a bomb. The archetypical iconoclastic act of the Futurists during the Revolution was painting the trees near the Moscow Kremlin in glowing colors. Like their cousins and rivals, the Proletcultists, the Futurists expressed generational revolt, a worship of the machine, elitism combined with populism, and an elaborate dream of a new culture.[24]

But the differences in their iconoclastic impulse were also distinct. They differed as to what could be preserved from the past. Doctrinally, Futurists tended to be vague and rhetorical, proletcultists more specific and prosaic. The Futurists' outrageous style of iconoclasm contrasted starkly with the pious and didactic style of Proletcult. Proletarian culture wanted to communicate its messages among the working class and needed "realistic" content and form, whereas Futurists loved the arcane language of modernism and absurdism--and this of course reflected the social bases of the two groups, as well as their relative closeness to European cultural movements. For although the notion of a "proletarian culture" was also a European import from German Social Democracy, it had in its Bolshevik way become thoroughly Russianized. In terms of psychology, the Futurists were far more self-confident, "Western," and modish than the clearly cramped, insecure, and ascetic members of the proeltarian culture. It is not wise to speak sweepingly of the arrogance and fanaticism of revolutionary iconoclasm as some single and homogeneous phenomenon. Idols--and, metaphorically the culture of the past--can be smashed with hammer blows, burned, torn apart by hating hands, carefully sawed into pieces or melted down, ridiculed,--or as we shall see in the conclusion, carefully put away for other uses. The emotional insurgency of these small but influential movements in the Russian Revolution show dramatically to what extent the whole of Russian cultrual world had become an icon.[25]

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I would like to add one more piece to the mosaic of an iconoclastic moment in the Russian Revolution: anti-intellectualism. One of the poignant aspects of the history of the Russian intelligentsia was its isolation, alienated from the masses and despised by the government, and often arrayed against itself. Lower-class anti-intellectualism is the hardest to talk about, although we know it was there. Peasants were bewildered by efforts of fine folk to "save" them and to labor, "like the sun," without pay on behalf of an ideal. Even the radical among the proletariat have told of their uneasiness in the presence of "real" intellectuals, their resentment of verbal facility, and endless theorizing. The worker who aspired to replace the intelligent with a worker-intelligent could not but help feel the tension of upward mobility and loss of contact with former comrades. This is reflected both in memoirs and in popular tales about workers in the cheap press of the prerevolutionary period. The tsarist government's animosity to "intellectuals" as such--unless engaged in some acceptable service--expressed itself in many ways, the movement of police socialism of the last tsarist decades being one of the most famous.[26]

These currents were often churned up by storms of self-hatred among the intelligentsia itself. Nechaev, a would-be intellectual, wrote that "he who learns of the revolutionary cause in books will always be a revolutionary do-nothing." Richard Wortman has studied in The Crisis of Russian Populism the prominent strain of disillusionment among populists, their exaltation of the people, abasement of self, and desire to immerse that self in the midst of the common folk. Feeling, a primitive impulse, was now seen as superior to thought. When the Revolution broke out, Alexander Blok, who saw his own kind as parents and the proletariat as children, said: "If I were they I'd hang the whole lot of us." Gorky predicted that "the intelligentsia, the creator of spiritual sustenance," would be swallowed up by the peasantry who would absorb from them all that was useful to it. The Revolution brought about in some ways a fusion of the separate currents of popular, governmental, and the intellectuals' own anti-intellectualism.[27]

The makhaevshchina--the "anti-intellectual" teaching of Jan Waclaw Machajski--was an expressions of this is the period of Marxist hegmony over the left, and it owes its origin to political traditions in neighboring Poland. Long before Mannheim and Michels, Machajski applied a sociology of knowledge to Social Democracy and pronounced it the self-interested ideology of the intelligentsia. His critique was therefore directed not at ideas or culture as such, but at the political uses of knowledge and against a coming elite of bureaucrats, scientists, privileged technocrats, and sacerdotal ideologues with a monopoly of knowledge, kept by means of inequality. Though Machjski's direct following was small, his distrust of the intelligentsia found sympathetic vibrations in the Russian labor movement and among certain anarchist groups (though he had opposed them too). There is also a note of violence in Machajski who warned that "the intelligentsia would perish not under the tsarist bullets but under the knife of the ragged tramp."[28] Some of his Russian followers extended his critique to culture and ideas in general. "All evil can be traced to ideology and to ideals," wrote one of them in 1906.[29] Another applied it to the entire history of the radical revolutionary intelligentsia, attributing the "deeds" of Zhelyabov and Perovskaya to hypocrisy and egoism.[30]

In the Russian Revolutions of 1917, these currents merged in a roaring stream of anti-intellectual statements and actions, some directed against people of ideas and skills, and some against ideas, words, and culture. Much of this flowed together with Proletkult, as in an article in The Coming World, "The Essence of the Intelligentsia," which defined that group as a "bourgeois concept that must vanish along with the bourgeois class." The anarchist Ge stated that specialists could be permitted to serve the state only as a weapon pointed at them; and Shlyapnikov--later a Left Communist--accused the party of pampering the specialists, people "from another world." Everywhere specialists not sufficiently protected by the Bolsheviks were harassed--some were murdered or driven to suicide up into the early 1920s. Nonspecialist intellectuals who possessed no particular patronage from the

regime as did engineers, artists, or officers were simply lumped together with the "burzhui," priests, landowners, and merchants and relocated from their homes, forced into work details, and in many ways demeaned and mistreated, if not imprisoned or shot. Rural teachers became a special target of abuse during the Civil War, and not only for their frequent sympathy with the enemies of Bolshevism. The whole surge of egalitarianism, fused with iconoclasm and hatred of authority figures of the past, worked to make life very difficult for the intellectual community who chose to remain in Russia after the Revolution.[31]

Anti-intellectualism was one of the things that divided the far left from the Left in the Russian Revolution. Anarchists and Left Bolsheviks and others seemed to share the view of the 17th-century radical English leveler Gerard Winstanley who noticed that "there are but few who act for freedom, and the actors are oppressed by the talkers and verbal professors of freedom."[32] Proletarian poets made mockery of the old intelligentsia in feuilletons, tales, and poems. The whole radical and experimental school movement often revealed a distrust for skill-mastery and pure learning: In one such school, Sheila Fitzpatrick tells us, everyone used a prompter in school plays because "it was considered shameful to know the part."[33] Anarchists outdid all others in their hostility to "words" and "talk": "When will you leave off writing and passing resolutions?" asked Anna Vladimirova in September, 1917. "When will this endless stream of words and documents cease at last?"[34] Burevestnik in January, 1918, went further: "Uneducated ones! Destroy that loathesome culture which divides men into 'ignorant' and 'learned'? They are keeping you in the dark."[35] The intimate link between iconoclasm and anti-intellectualism found its expression in the same issue:

> Destroy the churches, those nests of gentry lies;
> Destroy the university, that nest of bourgeois lies.
> Drive away the priests, drive away the scientists!
> Destroy the false gentry and bourgeois heavens.
> Smash these Peruns, gods, and idols.[36]

*

Vandalism, iconoclasm, nihilism, and anti-intellectualism--characteristic currents in the Russian Revolution and closely linked in their nature, their upward surge and their decline. At various points in time and place, they possessed peasants and workers, soldiers and sailors, journalists and poets who longed to assault the Old. Sovdepia--as the Whites contemptuously called the Bolshevik ruled territory in the Civil War--was swathed in red, a new universe largely denuded of the old symbols and adorned with the new. After the war, the double-headed eagle vanished from Russian life except in the emigre centers stretching from Harbin to Paris. Whole classes were enveloped and vanished into the debris. The remaining purveyors of old values, the men and women who had lived only on ideas, were beset by the menace of an anti-intellectual storm. Why did the storm which built up a ferocious power in the early revolutionary years not blow away all traces of the old culture and its makers? Why does the modern tourist on a typical city excursion of Leningrad take in the Nevsky Prospect (once called Avenue of October 25th), the Peter Paul Fortress, the Winter Palace, the St. Isaac's Cathedral, the Gold Room, the university, the Russian Museum, the Philharmonia, and the operas of Tchaikovsky at the Kirov Theater? What happened to revolutionary iconoclasm?

On November 6 through 8, 1918, in connection with the celebration of the first anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin participated in the festivities in a way that illustrated in capsule form his views of destruction and preservaiton. He left the Kremlin, a complex of architecture which he insisted on preserving but from whose premises he had had the statue of Alexander III removed. He went into Red Square to attend the unveiling of the newly erected revolutionary monuments. His festive mood was marred by the sight of provocative and abstract decorations of the Futurist participants and by a "frightening" statue of Bakunin by B. D. Korolev. In this revealing vignette, one finds displayed Lenin's fundamental intentions to (1) pull down the more repugnant vestiges of the tsarist past; (2) retain those which

had artistic and historic interest, as defined by the regime; (3) create a new world of symbols, glorifying the political counterculture of the past; (4) frown upon the "decadent" side of innovation.[37]

It is significant that the decree on preserving monuments of historical and artistic interest preceded that on the removal of those without such interest by more than four months. Though the latter was considered barbarous by some and though it certainly resulted in a rash of statue-breaking at the local level, its importance was far overshadowed by the other decree on protection and preservation. As in most revolutions, popular looting was curbed quickly and replaced by cultural "order." During the Provisional Government, scholars had urged turning palaces like the Catherine Palace of Tsarskoe Selo into museums for the people. In Petrograd after the coup, authorities refused even to locate wounded and sick refugees in buildings of historic value. Mansions of grand dukes and aristocrats were visited by teams from the newly formed Commissarat of the Property of the Republic who counted, catalogued, and remanded valuables to government bureaus. The buildings were then locked and guarded. Theaters were labeled "seats of culture of the Russian people." An analogous commission in the Moscow Kremlin gathered up works of art, designated certain buildings national property, and began restoration of edifices damaged during the November fighting. At Klin, local occupiers were chased out of Tchaikovsky's home by the Moscow Soviet because it was "a historically valuable property." The process was repeated in other centers. Bolsheviks even presented a monastery to a group of Tolstoyans to save it from local ravishment. In the villages, Bolshevik authorities tried to prevent destruction of manor houses in order to use them as schools. By the end of 1918, there were 87 museums operating (compared to 30 before the Revolution; by the end of 1920, 550 old mansions had been registered and 1,000 private collections of art.[38]

One ought not to make too much of the famous story about how Lenin laughed at Lunacharsky's grief on hearing of the shelling of St. Basil's Cathedral. Lenin also wished to preserve the great historical and artistic monuments of the past. Even those intimately and graphically tied to the name of Romanov. Lenin was a traditionalist in artistic taste and a political realist. He thought it was essential "to grasp all the culture which capitalism has left and build socialism from it." Proletarian culture, he taught, could not grow out of the brains of a few self-styled proletcultists but had to evolve organically out of the past and the present. Lenin opposed indiscriminate smashing of those artifacts of the Russian past just as he opposed intellectual baiting. Had he lived, he would probably have opposed the epidemic of renaming which threatened to turn every other town into a "Lenin" or every theater into "October." The dilemma posed by the desire to "deromanovize" Russia graphically and to save the esthetic treasures of that dynasty was solved neatly and simply by the same mechanism used in the French Revolution of 1789: the museum. By placing crowns, thrones, and imperial regalia in a people's museum, the regime depoliticized them, neutralized their former symbolic power, and offered them as a gift to the masses who--by means of guides and rituals--were to view these artifacts as emblems both of a national genius and of an exploitative order which had used these works for private luxury or symbolic power. Bolshevik iconoclasm turned out to be the iconoclasm of transformation, demythologizing, and antiquarianism.[39]

Tombs of dead monarchs could be preserved and displayed--but imposing statuary--with few exceptions--could not. These were to be replaced, in Lenin's plan for monumental propaganda, with statues to revolutionary and humanistic heroes of the past. The plan was simple: Take down the old; put up the new; and invest the process of unveiling with elements of didactic ritual. School children were to be taken to the monuments and told by guides of the exploits of the revered martyrs. And there was one more element in the plan: the appropriateness and accessibility

of monuments should be checked first before unveiling them! The new monuments of 1918 celebrated three kinds of figures: European revolutionaries like Marx, Danton, Garibaldi, Blanqui, Fourier; Russian radicals like Radishchev, Herzen, Bakunin, Perovskaya, Chernyshevsky; and cultural figures thought to be "progressive" like Beethoven, Musorgsky, Chaikovsky, Chopin (!). Except for the statue of Bakunin, these monuments were executed in the traditional style and were thus "accessible" to the masses. Ironically most of these early monuments were later taken away or simply deterioriated since they were made in haste and usually constructed out of nondurable materials like gypsum. The new symbols that sprang up around the revolution were almost identical in motif to those of 1789: broken chains to evoke liberation; the harmony of exploited classes (smychka); fortresses stormed; the hydra of counterrevolution; daybreak, announcing a better world; the forge to fashion a new order; the New Man of toughness and honesty; the New Woman--grim mannish, plain and armed--and so on. Rituals, monuments, festive commemorations, funerals, and national emblems provided a new set of symbols to replace those of the past.[40]

Lenin's Russia showed its relationship to earlier revolutionary psychology by its preference for simplicity, strength, realism, heroism, piety, didacticism, and even sentimentality--and hostility to the surreal individualism of the Futurists. Proletarian iconography would be defined not by Proletcult or by the avant-garde of art but by Bolshevik leaders and cultural advisers of a cautious bent with an admiring eye to the past, a frown of concern about excessive negation of that past, and a sense of what kind of imagery could be rapidly assimilated by the untutored masses of the revolutionary state. The signs of an effete aristocracy could be banished to the museum; the excesses of ego-asserting Futurists could be toned down or curbed; and the "new" signs of Revolutionary order could be fashioned out of elements of the old. Iconoclasm seems so very Russian. But so does anti-iconoclasm.

During the reign of Nicholas I, a man was put in a madhouse for hacking at the bust of the Emperor.[41]

Lenin's attitude to cultural nihilism and anti-intellectualism were, in a way, broader expressions of his view of symbols new and old. The story of the struggles between these currents and the government has been told many times; it is a story of sharp zig-zags in policy and emphasis ending in the Stalin solution.[42] Without raising the vexing and perennial question about the relationship between the Leninist beginnings and the Stalinist end, it can at least be said that Lenin and his major supporters saw from the very beginning the value of tradition in state building. What needs to be done some time is to trace the origins of Soviet cultural policy back into the 19th century. Only this would put iconoclasm and cultural revolution in their proper perspective. "The breaking up, the smashing of something or other in general," wrote the philosopher Rozanov in 1911, "is the first step toward culture."[43] In the Russian Revolution, it did not take long for that first step to be superseded by the other kinds of steps--toward preservation, restoration, and the making of a revolutionary synthesis of the new and the old. In his craving for legitimacy and its signs, his desire to establish the new, his fear of an anarchic nonculture, Lenin may have given weight to the Freudian notion of the anthropologist Geza Roheim that culture is composed of psychic defense systems against anxiety.[44] What better way to justify mass destruction of the evils of a system than to preserve its goods?

NOTES

1. V. K. Myuller, Anglo-russkii slovar, 7 ed. (Moscow, 1960).

2. R. Firth, Symbols--Public and Private (Ithaca, 1973) 341.

3. B. Barker, The Symbols of Sovreignty (Totowa, 1979) 53; S. Idzerda, "Iconoclasm During the French Revolution," American Historical Review, LX/1 (October 1954) 16, 25, passim.

4. See J. Billington, The Icon and the Axe (New York, 1966) for the 'fire' and 'axe' motifs in Russian history; R. Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime (New York 1974), 236, 271; B. Rosenthal, "Mystical Anarchism and the Revolution of 1905," Slavic Review ( ), ; A. Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army (Princeton 1980) 149.

5. N. Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France (Stanford 1975); H. Cox, The Feast of Fools (Cambridge, Mass., 1969); R. Stites, "Utopia and Experiment in the Russian Revolution," Occasional Paper, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies; D. Bron, Doomsday, 1917: the Destruction of the Russian Ruling Class (London, 1975) 95; A. V. Krasnikova, My novyi mir postroim! (Leningrad 1967) 105-6; J. Marabini, La vie quotidienne en Russie sous la Revolution d'Octobre (Paris 1965) 52-64.

6. R. Taylor, Film Propaganda: Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany (London 1979) 94.

7. Agrarnoe divizhenie v Rossii v 1905-1906 gg. [Trudy Imperatorskago Volnago Ekonomicheskago Obshchestva, Number 3, 1908] St. Petersburg, 1908, 49, 52, passim; S. Dubrovskii and B. Grave, 1905: agrarnoe divizhenie v 1906-1907 g.g., I (Moscow, 1925) 44, 59, 74-5, 127-8, 134, 141-2, 144, 149, 151-4, 156, 166, 172, and passim; Wildman, End, 78.

8. D. Raleigh, The Revolutions of 1917 in Saratov (Ph.D. Thesis, Bloomington, 1979), 50, 107n, 103, 351 (quote); J. Keep, The Russian Revolution (New York, 197) 210, 212, 214 (quote), 399; R. Mackenzie, Russia Before Dawn (London, 1923) 274.

9. Z. Arbatov, "Ekaterinoslav, 1917-1922 gg.," Arkhiv russkoi revolyutsii, XII (1923) 85-86, 97, 101.

10. See the interesting essay by J. Meijer, "Town and Country in the Civil War," in R. Pipes, ed., Revolutionary Russia (New York, 1969) 331-54.

11. See the comment by R. Pethybridge in Social Prelude to Stalinism (London, 1974) 280, on Bakunin and Trotsky.

12. Teddy Uldricks, "The 'Crowd' in the Russian Revolution," Politics and Society, 4/3 (1974) 397-413.

13. Firth, Symbols, 61.

14. V. L. Andrianova and S. G. Rutenburg, "Antireligioznyi plakat pervykh let sovietskoi vlasti," Ezhegodnik muzei istorii religii i ateizma, V (1961) 203-4; I. Steinberg, Spiridonova (New York 1935) 158; E. Henderson, Symbol and Satire in the French Revolution (New York, 1912) 411; N. Morozov, "Kammennyi grob (Shlisselburgskaya krepost)," Argus (April 1917) 7-17; Raleigh, Revolutions, 126; A. Tarasov-Rodionov, February 1917 (New York 1931), passim.

15. Arbatov, "Ekaterinoslav," 84; Marabini, Vie, 202; V. Voinov, "Zhivopis," in Oktyabr v iskusstve i literature, 1917-1927 (Leningrad 1928) 59-73; V. D. Bonch-Bruevich, Izbrannye ateisticheskie proizvedeniya (Moscow 1973) 65-68; S. Fitzpatrick, Commissariat of Enlightenment (Cambridge, Eng., 1970) 115; Vestnik Russkago Natsionalnogo Komiteta (Paris), 8 (December 1923) 25, on the insulted but still standing statue of Alexander III. The SRs also blew up statues: After they killed Volodarsky, the Bolsheviks erected a monument to him; SR terror squads dynamited it (Mackenzie, Russia, 49). For comparisons, see D. Dowd, Pageant-Master of the Republic: Jacques-Louis David and the French Revolution (Lincoln, 1948).

16. V. F. Shishkin, "Propaganda russkikh sotial-demokratami proletarskoi morali v kontse XIX-nachale XX v.," Ezhegodnik muzei ist. relig. i ateizma, VII (1964) 25-35; H. G. Wells, Russia in the Shadows (London, 1920) 149; Yu. V. Keldysh,

100 let moskovskoi konservatorii (Moscow 1966) 104; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Babine Papers, Section I (1917-1919), Box 1; for more on defamation and revolutionary blasphemy, see Stites, "Soviet Atheists in the 1920s," an unpublished paper.

17. Wildman, End, 223-5, 242; Brown, Doomsday, 88; Dlya narodnago uchitelya (Moscow), 9 (1917) 16; Marabini, Vie, 74-5; C. Anet [pseud. of J. Schopfer], Through the Russian Revolution (London 1917) 56, 64; A. L. Fraiman, Forpost sotialisticheskoi revolyutsii; Petrograd v pervye mesyatsy sovetskoi vlasti (Leningrad 1969) 351.

18. A. M. Selishchev, Yazyk revolyutsionnoi epokhi: iz nablyudenii nad russkim yazykom poslednykh let (1917-1926), Moscow 1928, 15, 69, 74, 189, 193, and passim; B. Comrie and G. Stone, The Russian Language Since the Revolution (Oxford, 1978) 1, 21, 142, 156, and passim. See also Ilf and Petrov, The Twelve Chairs (New York), 35; P. Dukes, Red Dusk and the Morrow (New York 1922) 290; J. Riordan, Sport in Soviet Society (Cambridge, Eng., 1977) 137; and V. Shklovskii, "Lenin, kak dekanonizator," Lef, 5 (1924) 53-6.

19. Selishchev, Yazyk, 190; Comrie, Russ. Lang., 187-91.

20. N. Berdyaev, The Origins of Russian Communism (Ann Arbor, 1960), 45; D. Brower, Training the Nihilists (Ithaca 1975) 15, 31, 27; A. Gleason, Young Russia (New York 1970) 72. For echoes in the 1920s, see the interesting chapter, "The Last of the Hamlets" in M. Hindus, Broken Earth (New York 1926) 248-71.

21. Sovetskaya intelligentsiya (Moscow 1977) 45. On proletcult, see: G. S. Ignatev, Moskva v pervyi god proletarskoi diktatury (Moscow 1975) 328-33; Sanin, "Teatr dlya rabochikh," Vestnik truda, 4-5 (April-May 1921) 81-84; discussion and documents in L. Kleberg, Teatern som Handling; Sovjetisk avantgarde-estetik 1917-27 (Stockholm 1980) 5-51; P. Gorsen and E. Knödler-Bunte, Proletkult, 2 vols. (Stuttgart 1974-5); Fraiman, Forpost, 344-53; Yu. I. Ovtsin, Bolsheviki i kultura

proshlogo (Moscow 1969) 81-94; Fitzpatrick, Commissariat, 70, 92, 239. The Tambov episode in: II Tambov Conference of Proletkult and Cultural-Educational Organizations, December 1, 1919, from TsGIAL, 1230-1-1519; this reference courtesy of Bengt Jangfeldt of the University of Stockholm.

22. Ignatev, Moskva, 334; M. Grishin, "Proletarskaya kultura," Gryadushchee, 1 (191) 11, 20; Sanin, "O rabochem teatre," 52-64; Fraiman, Forpost, 344.

23. Novyi Lef, 10 (October 1927) 3.

24. E. Brown, Mayakovsky (Princeton 1973) passim; Fitzpatrick, Commissariat, 124-8, 149; I. Ehrenburg, First Years of the Revolution, 1918-21 (London 1962); B. Schwartz, Music and Musical Life in Soviet Russia 1917-1970 (New York 1972) 27; A. Kopp, Changer la vie--changer la ville (Paris 1975) 142-4. Cf. Lef, 4 (August-December 1924) 16-21 on alleged "utopianism" of the artistic left.

25. In addition to the above, see: B. V. Pavlovskii, V. I. Lenin i izobrazhitelnoe iskusstvo (Leningrad 1974) 55-62; L. Kleinbort, "Rukopisnye zhurnaly rabochikh," Vestnik Evropy, 7-8 (July-August 1917) 292; and the excellent discussion by B. Jangfeldt, "The Futurists and Proletkult," in his Majakovskij and Futurism 1917-1921 (Stockholm 1977) 72-91.

26. For some features of proletarian attitudes, see: R. Zelnik, "Russian Bebels" pt. II in Russian Review, 35/4 (October 1976) 424, 429-30, 433; A. Wildman, The Making of a Workers' Revolution (Chicago 1967); G. Brooks, 'The Kopek Novels of Early Twentieth Century Russia," Journal of Popular Culture, XIII/1 (Summer 1979) 85-97; and M. Gorky, Revolyutsiya i kultura (Berlin, n.d.--after 1917) 77.

27. Gleason, Young Russia, 359; P. Pomper, Sergei Nechaev (New Brunswick, 1979); R. Wortman, Crisis of Russian Populism (Cambridge 1967) passim; A. Pyman, The Life of Aleksandr Blok, II (Oxford 1980), 257n. 4, 343; Gorky, O russkom krestyanstve (Berlin 1922) 42-44.

28. Machajski quoted in R. V. Ivanov-Razumnik, Chto takoe 'makhaevshchina'? (St. Petersburg 1908) 87. This is a very influential, but by no means fair,

treatment of Machajski's ideas. Machajski's Russian followers tended to be more anti-intellectual as such than he.

29. Quoted from Buntar (December 1906) in I. I. Genkin, "Sredi preemnikov Bakunina," Krasnaya Letopis, 1(22), 1927, 187-8. There is a big literature on this subject. See J. W. Machajski [A. Ch. Volskii], Umstvennyi rabochii (St. Petersburg 1906). Two good commentaries, with references: P. Avrich, "What is 'Makhaevism'?" Soviet Studies, XVII (July 1965) 66-75; and A. D'Agostino, "Intelligentsia Socialism and the 'Workers' Revolution": the Views of J. W. Machajski," International Review of Social History, XIV/1 (1969) 54-89.

30. E. Lozinskii, Chto zhe takoe, nakonets, intelligentsiya? (St. Petersburg 1907) 88-96. The sentiments in this little-known literature were far more hostile and vicious towards the intelligentsia than those expressed in the Vekhi campaign a few years later--and from a wholly different perspective.

31. Gryadushchaya kultura, 1 (1918) 20; KPSS v glave kulturnoi revolyutsii v SSSR (Moscow, 1972) 46; S. A. Fedyukin, Velikii Oktyabr i Intelligentsiya (Moscow 1972) 82; K. Bailes, Technology and Society Under Lenin and Stalin (Princeton 1978) 59-60; J. Fedotoff White, The Growth of the Red Army (Princeton 1944) 107-8; S. Fitzpatrick, "The 'Soft' Line on Culture and Its Enemies: Soviet Cultural Policy, 1922-1927," Slavic Review XXXIII/2 (June 1974) 274-8; Bulletin of the Russian Liberation Committee 40 (November 22, 1919) 2 (on teachers).

32. Quoted in V. Haynes and O. Semyonova, eds., Workers Against the Gulag (London 1979) 4.

33. Fitzpatrick, Commisariat, 53.

34. Quoted in Avrich, Anarchists in the Russian Revoltuion (Ithaca 1973) 95.

35. Ibid., 48.

36. Ibid. See also Proletarskie poety pervykh let Sovetskoi epokhi (Leningrad 1959) 106, 208-9, 244-5.

37. See Ignatev, Moskva, 320 and the notes below.

38. Muzykalnaya zhizn Moskvy v pervye gody posle Oktyabrya (Moscow 1972) 62; Istoriko-revolyutsionnye pamyatniki SSSR (Moscow 1972) 4-6; Iz istorii stroitelstva Sovetskoi kultury: Moskva, 1917-1918 gg. (Moscow 1964), passim; V. Kurbatov in Argus (April 1917) 85-90; Fraiman, Forpost, 337-49; idem., Revolyutsionnaya zashchita Petrograda v Fevrale-Marte, 1918 g. (Moscow 1964) 173-7; Marabini, Vie, 145, 177; Petrogradskii Voenno-Revolyutsionnyi Komitet: dokumenty i materialy, 3 vols. (Moscow 1966-7) I, 205; Ignatev, Moskva, 283, 319-28; K. Petrus, Religious Communes in the U.S.S.R. (in Russian) New York, 1953, 62; Iu. S. Kulyshev and V. I. Nosach, Partiinaya organizatsiya i rabochie Petrograda v gody grazhdanskoi voiny (1918-1920 gg.), Leningrad, 1971, 298 ; Ovtsin, Bolsheviki, 64-71; Vestnik Oblastnogo Kommissariata Vnutrennikh Del, 1 (September 1918) 174--on the struggle for preservation in the rural areas; Pavlovskii, V. I. Lenin, 49; KPSS vo glave, 39.

39. Fitzpatrick, Commissariat, 13-14; N. S. Khrushchev tells his version in Novyi mir, 3 (March, 1963) 19; Pavlovskii, V. I. Lenin, 1-33, 47--on Lenin's cultural tastes in the formative years; Ovtsin, Bolsheviki; Bailes, Technology, 52; Ignatev, Moskva, 317-181 Shklovskii, "Lenin," 53; Idzerda, "Iconoclasm."

40. Pavlovskii, V. I. Lenin, 14-15, 51-3; Iz. ist. stroitelstva, 15; M. German [Guerman] Art of the October Revolution (New York 1979) 15-16, 177-91; Kulyshev, Partiinaya, 298; Muz. zhizn Moskvy, 71; Kopp, Changer, 156 n. 1; Voinov, "Zhivopis," 64; Henderson, Symbol, 46-7, 53, 66, 74, 77, 81, 84-5, 114, 115 (these illustrations may be instructively compared with those in any standard collection of Soviet posters, art, and symbols in the early years, such as the Guerman book cited above or B. S. Butnik-Siverskii, Sovietskii plakat epokhi grazhdanskoi voiny, 1918-1921 (Moscow 1960). See also Dowd, Pageant Master.

Perhaps the most revealing episode of Lenin's handling of the monuments question was his treatment of the obelisk raised to honor the Romanovs on the Tercentenary

celebrations of 1913 in the Alexander Gardens adjoining the Kremlin. On hearing of plans to demolish the obelisk, Lenin ordered that it be retained, the offensive double-headed eagle to be taken from the pinnacle, and the names of the tsars replaced by the names of More, Campanella, Winstanley, Fourier, Chernyshevsky and other thinkers and revolutionaries (Istoriko-revol. pam., 15-16, with picture).

41. For some interesting remarks on the relationship betwen cultural taste and social-political values, see Dowd, Pageant Master, 2, 22, 130-5; and C. Donakowski, A Muse for the Masses: Ritual and Music in an Age of Democratic Revolution, 1770-1870 (Chicago, 1977) 190. The bust incident is related in A. Herzen, My Past and Thoughts (New York,) 81, n. 4.

42. For the further development of these two themes, see Bailes, Technology and Fitzpatrick's "The 'Soft' Line" and her Education and Social Mobility in Soviet Russia 1921-1934 (Cambridge, Eng. 1980).

43. Rozanov, People of the Moonlight (1911) in Four Faces of Rozanov: Christianity, Sex, Jews, and the Russian Revolution, tr. S. Roberts (New York 1977).

44. Firth, Symbols, 152. See also 341 and 364-7.