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ECONOMY AND FAMILY IN THE USSR

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Socialists are socialists for two reasons. The material reason is that socialism* is thought to be a better way to run an economic system. "Better", in this context, refers to the conventional economic criteria: the level and growth rate of real income (elimination of poverty), stability (no business cycles), security (no unemployment), and equity in income distribution (no exploitation). The spiritual reason is that a socialized economy is thought to lead to a better society. "Better" in this context means that the non-economic institutions of the society produce superior results; the political institutions are more democratic, arts and letters are of a higher quality, the courts of law are more just, the family is based on love rather than oppression. The evaluation of the material case for socialism is the stock in trade of economists, and a vast amount of literature on the subject has accumulated. Since most socialists are spiritualists, however, that literature is rather beside the point. While they would be happy to learn that socialism is more efficient than capitalism, it would not greatly add to their enthusiasm for that system, which rests on higher grounds. Nor would the proof of the opposite diminish their enthusiasm. The stakes are much higher than a mess of porridge.

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* Socialist is taken here to refer only to property relationships; a socialist society is one in which land and capital are characterized by some form of social rather than private ownership.

Socialists are not alone in this respect. The more passionate supporters of capitalism also rest their case primarily on spiritual grounds; above all, on the political liberty and individual freedom that they hold to be inseparable from private property. They too are pleased with the proofs that capitalism is more efficient than socialism. But the proof of the opposite would not diminish their enthusiasm either. Karl Marx would be no less a socialist nor Milton Friedman less a capitalist if their preferred economic systems proved to be less efficient than the other's.

No one doubts that the quality of a society is influenced by its economic arrangements. The precise nature of that influence, however, is not easily specified. There is a long tradition of research on the question with respect to capitalist economies, particularly by Marxist critics but by others as well. There has been rather little study of the question as it applies to socialist economies, however. The present research is intended as a contribution to that subject.

The family was chosen as the social institution to be studied because, more than any other institution, it shapes the character of the people who are the society. Moreover its relationship to the economy has been much less studied than that of the political institutions. The Soviet Union was chosen as the country to be studied because it has so long a history; the longer the history of a socialized economy the less the

influence of presocialist traditions upon family life. As in any case study, however, one must be cautious abut generalizing. The structure of the Soviet economy is but one of many different structural arrangements that socialist economies might adopt. Moreover, the same socialist economic structures affect the family differently if they are conjoined with different political systems, or embedded in different national traditions. A case study can therefore be no more than suggestive regarding the effect of socialist economic structure per se upon the family.

Part I - The Argument

Some parts of the research are near completion but others require a great deal more work. What I should like to present in this colloquium is the sketch of the main argument, and then a discussion of a few parts of that argument that have been completed.

Suppose one were asked to evaluate the family life of some unspecified society. What would one look for in order to carry out that purpose? I have settled upon four characteristics of family life that capture most of what people normally have in mind when they allege that "the family" has been changing. To test my judgement, the reader is invited to set this paper down at this point and ask himself what characteristics he would select for observation in an inquiry of this kind. One rule of this game is that those characteristics must be observable

in some way that is accessible to a social analyst. I should very much like to include the quality of the love or affection among family members as one of those characteristics, but I despair of finding ways of articulating differences between societies in that most important respect.

The first characteristic is the process of family formation. Changes in this process may take such forms as changes in the age at which people marry, the proportion who marry (or form other kinds of consensual union), and--of major interest--the duration of marriages. The second characteristic is the reproduction process, particularly the number of children per family. The third is the socialization process, which in all societies is the major social function performed by the family, although the role of the family relative to other socializing agents varies from society to society. The fourth is role differentiation within the family, the most interesting feature of which is the degree of sex equality in families.

The selection of these four characteristics is in some respects arbitrary, but they do capture most of what one has in mind in an effort to assess the influence of an economic structure upon the family life of a society. Or otherwise put, if the family life of two societies were similar with respect to these four characteristics, one would doubt that such differences as there may be in their economic systems exerted any significant influence on their family life. On the contrary, one would expect that it was those properties of culture and social organization that the two societies has in common that exerted the dominating influence on family life.

To test the extent to which economic system may influence family, Part I examines a set of data on family organization

in the USSR, in one East European socialist country, and in two advanced capitalist countries. Selected data are available on a three of the four characteristics of family life. The question is whether families in the two socialist countries are more like each other than they are like families in the capitalist countries. The major finding is that in regard to some family characteristics the socialist countries cannot be distinguished from the capitalist, but in regard to others the countries do divide along economic-system lines. These results are interpreted to signify that while economic system is not the sole or even the major determinant of family organization, it does nevertheless influence some aspects of family organization.

To examine the nature of that influence, Part III is devoted to an investigation of the Soviet family with respect to the four characteristics of family organization. The principal finding is that for the USSR as a whole, the data on the Soviet family are broadly similar to those found in other countries at a similar level of socioeconomic development. But when the data are disaggregated, it appears that the non-Moslem, urban Soviet family is distinctive, in the following sense: fertility rate are lower and divorce rates are higher than one would expect on the basis of the experience of other countries at similar levels of development. For that major portion of the Soviet population, the trend toward fertility decline

and rising family instability has proceeded further than in most of the highly developed industrial countries. I conclude that some processes are at work in the USSR that have altered Soviet family life to a greater degree than one would expect on the basis of the normal development experience of other countries.

In Part IV I present three features of the Soviet economy that partially account for the distinctive behavior of the Soviet family. The first is the nature of labor-force participation of Soviet women, the pattern of which differs from that in most other countries in certain respects that have a strong influence on family life. The second is the system of centralized economic planning based on planners' preferences, which accounts for the undervaluation of homemaking and child-care goods and services, relative to the valuation of those goods and services by Soviet women. The third is the distinctive role of the workplace, relative to the home, in the social organization of Soviet society.

Part II. Socialism, Capitalism and Family

If economy exerts a strong influence on family, one would expect that families in socialist countries are more like each other than they are like families in capitalist countries. If, on the other hand, the influence of economy is small or negligible, one would expect no such similarity, for

the differences among countries is likely to be dominated by such factors as differences in culture and in level of industrialization and modernization. To explore that question we present in Table I a set of selected data on several aspects of family organization in the USSR and in three other countries, one of which is an East European socialist country and the other two of which are advanced capitalist countries.

Table I. Selected Indicators of Family Organization, Various Countries

	A	B	C	D
I Crude Marriage Rate[1]				
1950-54	9.7	11.6[2]	10.1	10.6
1960	9.4	12.1	8.4	8.9
1970	7.3	9.7	10.5	9.4
1976	6.0	10.1	10.0	9.5
II Crude Divorce Rate[3]				
1950-54	1.1	0.4[2]	2.5	1.2
1960	0.9	1.3	2.2	1.7
1970	1.6	2.6	3.5	2.2
1976	1.8	3.1	5.0[4]	2.6[4]
III Divorce/Marriage Ratio (%)				
1950-54	11	3	24	11
1960	10	12	26	19
1970	22	27	33	23
1976	30	31	50	27
IV Crude Divorce rate, index				
1950-54 = 100				
1950-54	100	100	100	100
1960	82(100)	325(100)	88(100)	42(100)
1970	145(178)	650(200)	140(159)	183(129)
1976	164(200)	775(238)	200(227)	216(152)
V Net Reproduction Rate[5]				
1950-54	.94	1.41[8]	1.55	1.20[9]
1955-59	1.04	1.37[10]	1.73	1.07
1960-64	1.14	1.26	1.62	0.86
1965-69	1.13	1.17	1.24	0.89
1970-74	.81	1.18	1.00	0.93
VI Child Mortality Rate (Ages 1-4)				
1960	1	1	1	2
1978	1	1	1	1

Table I (cont'd.)

VII Uses of Time (minutes per day[11])				
Work[12]				
Employed fathers	384	449	446	532
Employed mothers	226	393	310	436
Female/male ratio	.59	.88	.70	.81
Housekeeping[13]				
Employed fathers	21	34	26	31
Employed mothers	303	213	213	249
Female/male ratio	14.43	6.26	8.19	8.03
Child Care[14]				
Employed fathers	17	44	15	31
Employed mothers	71	55	46	50
Child care	4.18	1.25	3.07	1.61

Notes:
1. Legal marriages per thousand population
2. 1950
3. Legal divorces per thousand population
4. Provisional
5. The number of surviving daughters who would be born to each woman if her fertility rate during her lifetime were the same as the current age-specific fertility rates of the society, and if current mortality rates prevailed.
6. Number of deaths of children aged 1-4 per thousand children in that age range
7. Including travel to and from work
8. 1954-55
9. 1952-54
10. 1957-59
11. Includes workdays and non-work days, i.e. to obtain minutes per week, multiply by 7.
12. Main job, other jobs and travel to work.
13. Cooking, home chores, laundry and marketing.
14. Child care, help on homework, talk to children, playing.

Sources:

Crude marriage Rate: W. Germany, U.S.A. Hungary; UN, Demographic Yearbook, 1976, Table 24. USSR; TsSU, Narodnoe Khoziaistno SSSR v 1979g., p. 35.

Crude Divorce Rate: W.Germany, USA, Hungary: 1950 - 1970, UN, Demographic Yearbook 1976, Table 34; 1976, UN, Demographic Yearbook 1977, Table 25. USSR: TsSU Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1979 g. p. 35.
Net Reproduction Rate: Population Index, v.45:2, April 1979, pp 350-362.

Child Death Rate: The World Bank, World Development Report, 1980 Washington, D.C., August 1980, Table 21.

On casual inspection, crude marriage rates show no striking differences among countries. On closer examination, however, certain distinctions may be made. Country A is the only one in which the rate declines uniformly throughout the postwar period, and in three of the four periods it is the lowest of the four countries. C and D are quite similar and fall between A and B. Thus the four countries may be divided into three groups: A, B, and C D. The differences are small enough, however, that they may not be attributable to differences in social or economic conditions but may merely reflect differences in the age structures of the populations.

The variation among crude divorce rates, however, is strikingly large; countries in general are evidently more like each other in their marriage patterns than in their divorce patterns. Country C stand out sharply with divorce rates well above the others. A, at the other extreme, shows the lowest divorce rates in all periods except the earliest, when the divorce rate in B was so low that one suspects that unusual circumstances were at work. B and D are quite similar except for the outlier in the case of B. The groups in this case are then A, BD, and C.

The variation in crude divorce rates is so large that the influence of differences in age structure is likely to be relatively small. For example the number of divorces per

thousand married couples (instead of per thousand population) was 5.1 for country A in 1970 and 14.9 in country C. The difference between them is not very different from the difference in the crude divorce rates in panel II. The effect of difference in age structure can also be partly offset by considering the ratio of divorces to marriages, since both refer to the adult population. By that measure (panel III) country C is again quite distinctive, but the difference between A and the others becomes very small. By this measure the countries fall into two groups: C and ABD.

The foregoing deals with divorce levels. Looking at time trends (panel IV), the picture changes. The number of divorces per thousand population increased almost eightfold in B since 1950-54, while in the other it only doubled. A,C and D thus fall into one group and B in another. (This classification is heavily influenced by the extremely low divorce rate in B in 1950-54. The pattern since 1960 is rather different. A,B and C increase at about the same rates but D is now distinctive in its slower rate of increase in divorce).

Net reproduction rates have been highest in C but since 1970 they have fallen below B. Both of those countries, however, have been larger than A and C for the entire postwar period. The classification that suggests itself is B and C in one group and A and D in the other. The time trends have been rather

different, however. A and B are typical of the much-discussed "great fertility swing" of the postwar period, i.e., the unexpected increase in fertility after the war followed by a resumption of a prewar decline. D, on the other hand, follows the opposite time path; a sharp decline in the postwar years followed by a rise. B shows no such cyclical pattern but declines uniformly until the mid-sixties when it appears to have levelled off. The appropriate groups are thus AC, D, and B.

Child mortality was uniformly low in all countries in 1978 but D was somewhat slower than the others in getting there. In recent years there is probably no significant difference among families in the four countries in their expectations or experience of child deaths. Infant mortality will be discussed later.

Finally, panel VII reports the results of an unusual standardized international survey on the uses of time, conducted in 1965 by research teams in a variety of countries employing a common questionnaire and common field procedures. The samples consisted of 1500-2000 respondents randomly selected. The data offer some insights into two aspects of family life, the sexual division of labor in the family and the time devoted to the care of children.

In the world of work outside the home, country A is distinctive in that both mothers and fathers devote less time to work than in any of the others. D, at the other extreme, is the

hardest-working country for both mothers and fathers. The fathers in B and C are almost identical, so that the appropriate classification for fathers is A, BC and D. The mothers in B, however, work significantly more than mothers in C, so that the classification for mothers is A, BD, and C. The sexual division of labor is also largest in A, where the hours per week that mothers devote to outside employment is only 59% that of fathers. B is the most equal country in this respect. C and D fall between these two, but D is rather closer to B. The most reasonable classification appears to be a threefold one: A, BD and C.

In time devoted to housework, fathers in A and C do the least while B and D contribute the most. Mothers in A are in a class by themselves. One is tempted to imagine that theirs must be the cleanest homes of all, occupying almost an hour's more mother's time per day than the nearest rival. It should be noted, however, that the category "housekeeping" includes not only home chores and laundry but also cooking and marketing. Mothers in A, moreover, devote less time to work outside the home -- over an hour's less than the nearest rival. Mothers in B and C devote the least time to housework, while those in D fall in between. The most reasonable grouping is A, D, and BC. The sex difference is again largest in A and smallest in B. C and D may be grouped together, though they are closer to the egalitarian B than to the inegalitarian A.

Child care is the most crucial of the family activities. Fathers in C devote the least time to that activity, but fathers in A are only barely more diligent. At the other extreme, fathers in B are outstandingly devoted to this activity, spending almost three times as much time with children as those in C. D is in an intermediate class of its own. It is in A, however, that the mothers' attention to children is distinctively high. The other three are quite similar. The grouping of mothers is A, and BCD. Country A lead again in the degree of sex differentiation in child care, while B again exhibits the least sex differentiation. Of the remaining two C clearly is in a different class from A and B. D is difficult to categorize but it is sufficiently close to B to suggest that it be grouped with B. The grouping is then A, C, and BD.

Before proceeding to summarize, it should be noted that while we have searched for differences among the four countries, from the perspective of world as a whole they are highly similar. Fo example, the divorce/marriage ratio in 1970 in Costa Rica, Mexico, Venezuela and Japan varied from 2% to 7%; in our four countries it varied in that year from 22% to 33% (panel III). Moreover the divorce rate barely rose in all in the low-divorce countries between 1960 and 1970. Net reproduction rates in the first three of those countries in 1960-64 varied from 2.49 to 2.95; in our four countries the rates varied from 0.86 to 1.62.

In Japan, however, that most unusual country, it was at the level of 0.91. Child mortality rates, which in our sample were at the level of 1 or 2 per thousand, averaged 18 in 1960 and 10 in 1978 for the fifty-one countries classified as "middle income" by the World Bank (World Development Report, 1980, Table 21). Hence in regard to such central matters as the duration of marriage, the expected number of births, and the likelihood of the death of a child, our four countries are a fairly homogeneous group when observed from a broad comparative perspective.

The foregoing is a sanguine reminder that the dominating forces influencing family organization are the large macrosocial conditions associated with such processes as modernization and industrialization.* It is primarily the level of income and the ways in which that income is produced, rather than whether the economy is socialist or capitalist, that determines the kind of family that will prevail.

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*The Japanese data also suggest that cultural traditions may greatly modify the effects of modernization for an extended period of time. Both divorce rates and net reproduction rates are considerably lower than one would expect for a country at that level of socioeconomic development.

If economic structure and policy are not the major part of the story, they are nevertheless a part of the story, and the part with which this study is concerned. In the foregoing review of the data in Table 1, we have found that each pair of countries is similar in some respects but different in others. The question is, which pairs bear the greatest similarity to each other. In reviewing the data so many individual judgements were made that it is convenient to employ some mechanical accounting device to keep the score. Table 2 presents such a device. It is a summary of all the individual judgments made above grouping each country with one or two others or classifying it as distinctive. A record of those judgements is contained in Appendix Table A (p. 49). Since the judgements have now all been made, in proper ignorance of the identity of the countries, their names may be unveiled without loss of objectivity of judgement. They are: West Germany (A), USSR (B), US (C) and Hungary (D).

Panel A (Table 2) presents the frequency of groupings for the data on family formation in Table 1; i.e., marriage, divorce and reproduction. Panel B presents the data on time-use.

Table 2. Frequency of Country Pairings

A Pairings by Family Functions

	P1	P4	Totals
I	Germany (A))) = 1 USSR (B))	US (C))) = 2 Hungary(D))	3
	P2	P5	
II	Germany (A))) = 2 US (C))	USSR (B))) = 2 Hungary(D))	4
	P3	P6	
III	Germany(A))) = 3 Hungary(D))	USSR (B))) = 1 US (C))	4

IV Classified as DISTINCTIVE:

Germany = 2	US = 2
USSR = 3	Hungary = 1

B. Pairings by Family Time Use

	P 1	P 4	Totals
I	Germany (A)))= 0 USSR (B))	US (C)))= 2 Hungary(D))	2
	P 2	P 5	
II	Germany(A)))= 2 US (C))	USSR (B)))= 5 Hungary(D))	7
	P 3	P 6	
III	Germany (A)))= 0 Hungary (D))	USSR (B)))= 3 US (C))	3

IV Classified as DISTINCTIVE:

Germany = 7	US = 3
USSR = 2	Hungary = 3

The four countries are arranged in six pairs, designated as P1 through P6. The six pairs in turn, are arranged in three combinations: I, Germany/USSR and US/Hungary; II, Germany/US and USSR/Hungary; and III, Germany/Hungary and USSR/US. Panel A reports the frequency with which each country was paired with one or two others to which it has been judged to be similar in some aspect of marriage, divorce or reproductive patterns. The countries judged to be alike most often were Germany and Hungary (P3), which were paired in three instances. The countries that were least often paired were Germany and the USSR (P1) and the USSR and the US (P6). The totals of the three combinations are so close to each other that one must conclude that none of them can be regarded as the "natural" grouping in Table 1. In particular, the combination that divides the four along capitalist/socialist lines (II), occurs no more often than the Germany/Hungary - USSR/US combination (III), and barely more often than the third. The USSR may be regarded as the most distinctive of the four, having been paired with no other in three instances. But Germany and the US were very close, having been so classified twice each. In view of the impressistic and tentative nature of the classifying judgements, the data in panel A suggests that, with respect to family functions, there is little to distinguish families in socialist countries from those in capitalist.

The time use data tell a different story, however. One pairing clearly dominates the others- the USSR and Hungary (P5); it occurs five times. The second most frequent pairing, interestingly enough, is the USSR and the US (P6)- three times. Germany is the decisively distinctive country here. On seven occasions it was judged to be in a class of its own, and on no occasion was it paired with either the USSR or Hungary. The combination that dominates the others is therefore, the capitalist/socialist combination II, which occurs a total of seven times, far more than the other two combinations. In the family use of time, therefore, the capitalist families do appear to be different from the socialist families.

One can only guess whether these results would be sustained if the analysis were pursued more thoroughly: if the number of countries was much larger than the four studied here; if the judgements about pairings were made in some more systematic manner; and if a greater abundance of family data were assembled than are presented in Table 1. My own guess is that while the specific results may well differ, the general result would be, as here, that in some respects socialists families are barely distinguishable from those in other capitalist countries, while in other respects they may differ substantially. Economy, therefore, may well influence family. The task is to determine which aspects of family organization are most influenced by the economy and in what ways that influence is exerted. For this purpose we turn to a more detailed examination of the USSR.

Part III The Soviet Family

The Soviet family, we have found, is similar to that in other countries in some respects and different in others. The data in Table 1, however, may understate the differences, for two reasons. First, the USSR is a multi-national society, and the national data in Table 1 average out some large differences in the family bwhavior of different national groups. Second, family behavior in all societies varies with a variety of socioeconomic conditions such as level of urbanization which, if ignored, masks certain significant differences. Our purpose in this Part is to assess the extent to which the Soviet family is distinctive when such factors are taken into account.

1. Fertility

Table 3 presents a set of data on human fertility in a variety of countries, along with two other characteristics of their socioeconomic levels: agricultural output as a percentage of total output, and the death rate of children between the ages of 1 and 4. Child mortality is used rather than infant mortality because data on the latter were not available for all the countries. The two characteristics are reflective of differences in levels of socioeconomic development, and both are known to exert a direct influence on fertility. The source is the World Development Report, 1980, published by The World Bank, which tabulates a variety of data for 125 countries.

Table 3 - Fertility, Agricultural Production and Child Mortality, Various Countries, 1978

Country	Agricultural Production (% of GDP)	Child Mortality (Ages 1-4)	Total Fertility(1)
	I. USSR and Hungary		
USSR	17	1	2.4
Hungary	15	1	2.3
	II. Middle-Income Countries (2) with Low Child Mortality		
Greece	17	1	2.3
Yugoslavia	16	2	2.2
Portugal	13	2	2.5
Uruguay	14	3	2.9
Argentina	13	3	2.9
	III Middle-Income Countries (2) with High Child Mortality		
Equador	21	10	5.3
Dominican Republic	21	10	5.3
Syria	20	14	7.4
Tunisia	18	15	4.6
Peru	14	16	5.6
Morocco	18	17	6.5
Bolivia	17	22	6.5
Zambia	17	23	6.9
Congo	13	27	6.0

Table 3 - Fertility, Agricultural Production and Child Mortality, Various Countries, 1978 (Cont'd.)

IV Some Industrialized Countries Country	Child Production (% of GDP)	Total Mortality (Ages 1-4)	Fertility
Agricultural			
USA	3	1	1.8
West Germany	3	1	1.4
Sweden	4	1	1.7
Austria	5	1	1.7
Italy	7	1	1.9
Industrialized Countries Average	4	1	1.8

Source: The World Bank. World Development Report, 1980 (Wash. D.C. Aug. 1980), Table 3, 18, 151

Notes:

(1) Total fetility rate is defined as "the number of children that would be born per woman, if she were to live to the end of her child-bearing years and bear children at each age in accord with the prevailing age-specific fertility rates. (p. 163)

(2) Excludes oil-exporting and centrally planned economies. Includes all middle-income countries in which agricultural production accounts for 12-22% of GDP.

The first panel presents the data for the USSR and Hungary; the data for the other East European economies are similar for all three characteristics. The second and third panels list all the countries that are (a) classified as "middle income" in the source, and (b) in which agricultural production falls between 12% and 22% of total output; that is, within 5 percentage points of the figure of 17% for the USSR. These countries are divided into two groups according to whether the child mortality rate is smaller or larger than 5 deaths per thousand. Since we shall refer to these two groups of countries repeatedly, it is convenient to refer to them as the "middle-income-low-fertility" and the "middle-income-high-fertility" countries respectively. The fourth panel contains a sample of advanced capitalist industrial countries.

Soviet fertility is at roughly the same level as that in other countries at the same level of agricultural production and child mortality; i.e. the middle-income-low-fertility countries in panel II. The effect of child mortality on reproductive behavior is apparent in the somewhat higher fertility in Uruguay and Argentina, which have both the highest child mortality and the highest fertility in the group. The countries in panel III all fall within five percentage points of the agricultural production level of the USSR, but are all characterized by significantly higher levels of child mortality. Their fertility rates are correspondingly, two or more times that of

the USSR. Finally, the countries in panel IV are all more industrialized than the USSR but have roughly the same levels of child mortality, and their fertility levels are about two-thirds that of the USSR. The conclusion is that when level of industrialization and child mortality are taken into account, Soviet fertility behavior is quite consistent with that of other countries at roughly the same socioeconomic level. The data provide no evidence that the distinctive features of the Soviet economic system have had any significant effect on its fertility behavior. The dominating forces influencing fertility in the USSR appear to be the same as those in other countries, predominantly the level of modernization and health services.

The picture changes sharply, however, when account is taken of the differences in the fertility behavior of the nationalities within the USSR (Table 4). Fertility in the Republic of Uzbekistan is about two-and-a-half times that of the Russian Republic (rows 2 and 4, Table 3). Uzbekistan thus falls in the range between the two middle-income groups of countries in Table 3, while the Russian Republic is slightly above the level of the industrialized countries.

But the republics themselves are heterogeneous with respect to nationality. The USSR does not publish data on fertility by nationality, but I have attempted to approximate it by means of age-distribution data that have been published by nationality in the 1970 Census. The ratio of children (ages 0-10) to adults (ages 20-49) in the USSR as a whole was 0.621. The corresponding ratio for Russians only was 0.420. Thus the child/adult ratio among Russians was .676 of the USSR average. Assuming that the Russian fertility rate is to the national fertility rate as the Russian child/adult ratio is to the national child/adult ratio, the Russian fertility rate would be 1.545 (row 3). Similarly, the Uzbek child/adult ratio was 1.387, or 2.234 times the national average. If the same assumption holds as in the case of the Russians, the Uzbek fertility rate would be 5.105.

Fertility differences among nationalities occur in other countries as well. As a benchmark, we examined the data on whites and non-whites in the U.S. The differences are clear, but they are much less marked than in the USSR.

Table 4 - Total Fertility Rates USA and USSR

	Total Fertility Rates	
	Country-wide	Sub-Group
1. USSR, 1978-79	2.285	
2. Russian Republic		2.058
3. Russian (estimate)(1)		1.545
4. Uzbek Republic		5.096
5. Uzbeks (estimate)(1)		5.105
6. Ukranians (estimate) (1)		1.467
7. Latvians (estimate) (1)		1.435
8. USA, 1974 (2)	1.808	
9. Whites		1.716
10. All others		2.336

Sources: Rows 1,2,4 = Vestnik statistiki, 1980, No. 11.
Rows 3,5,6,7: 1970 Census, Vol. II p. 12, vol. IV, pp.360-361
Rows 8,9,10: US Vital Statistics, 1980 Table 1-4

Notes:

(1) Based on child (0-9)/adult (20-49) ratios in 1970 for USSR, Russians and Uzbeks. The assumption was that the ratio of the 1978-79 fertility rate of Russians (Uzbeks) to that of the USSR as a whole was the same as the 1970 relationship between the child/adult ratios for Russians (Uzbeks) and for the USSR as a whole.

(2) The source gives the gross reproduction rate, as .904. The figure here is twice that number, which differs from the total fertility rate only by the amount of the small difference between the numbers of boys and girls born.

If the estimated Russian fertility rate of 1.545 is correct then the fertility behavior of Russians must be regarded as distinctive. It is lower than the average rate of 1.8 for all industrialized countries (Table 3), and close to the bottom of that range. Even the figure of 2.058 for the Russian Republic, which must be higher than the figure for people of Russian nationality alone, falls below that of the middle-income countries in Table 3 although it is somewhat higher than that of the industrialized countries.

Child mortality among Russians is unlikely to be lower than in the industrialized countries, so that the low Russian fertility rate cannot be due to that cause. Infant mortality, on the contrary, is higher in the USSR and is probably higher for the Russians as well, so that one would expect Russian fertility to be higher rather than lower for that reason. Hence child health conditions do not explain the low Russian fertility rate. Similarly the level of urbanization of Russians is also lower than that of the industrialized countries, so that the low Russian fertility rate cannot be explained by that factor either. The conclusion must be that Russian fertility has fallen to a level substantially lower than one would expect on the basis of the level of child mortality and urbanization.

The conclusion is based on the assumption that the underlying data are comparable across countries. In fact the

quality of the social statistics available must vary considerably among the countries listed in Table 3. Fertility statistics, however, probably rank fairly high among those in which reasonable international standardization has been achieved; due in large measure to the longstanding concern by international organizations with population issues. Child mortality statistics are probably less comparable in quality, and the production statistics even less. Our purpose, however, is not quantitative precision but broad judgements about relative magnitudes. Moreover, the severity of the problem of comparability is greater, the greater the differences in the levels of development of the countries being compared. The difference in this respect between the quality of the social statistics of the USSR and the advanced industrial countries, the comparision with which we are primarily concerned, is likely to be relatively small.

2. Marital Stability

The marriage and divorce data in Table 1 revealed only one case in which the USSR (Country B) was far out of line with the others. That was the extremely low crude divorce rate in 1950-54. In those years the Soviet family still lived under the severe restrictions on divorce introduced during World War II. After Stalin's death those restrictions were relaxed and divorce rates returned to levels more reflective of the underlying social relations. After 1960 the growth rate of divorce was about the

same as that in the US (country C). By 1976 the crude divorce rate in the USSR was higher than in Germany or Hungary, but lower than in the US.

To pursue the inquiry in a broader comparative perspective, I have assembled in Table 5 a set of data on crude marriage and divorce rates reported in the U.N. Demographic Yearbook for 1978. The countries are arranged in the same order as in Table 3, but we have included only those countries are included for which both marriage and divorce rates are reported by the UN. Reported marriage and divorce rates can be regarded as only the roughest measure of comparative family stability. For one thing, the variation in the quality of these data among countries is probably greater than in the case of fertility data; although again, as in the case of fertility, we may expect that the difference between the USSR and the industrialized countries is not very large. More serious perhaps are differences in the extent of non-traditional unions; marriages that are not registered and the dissolution of which are not registered. There are probably differences as well in the number of registered marriages that are subsequently dissolved but not reported as registered divorces. It is not unreasonable to assume, however, that in most societies the overwhelming proportion of families form and dissolve in the conventional manner. I shall proceed therefore as if the data do shed some light on comparative family stability, though mindful that the results must be regarded as very crude indeed.

Table 5 Crude Marriage and Divorce Rates, Various Countries, 1976

(Divorce per thousand people)

Country	Marriage Rate (2)	Divorce Rate (1)	Divorce/ Marriage Ratio (3)
I. USSR and Hungary			
USSR	3.25	10.1	.33
Hungary	2.55	9.1	.28
II. Middle Income Countries w/Low Child Mortality			
Greece	.41	8.0[4]	.05
Yugoslavia	1.11	8.3[4]	.13
Portugal	.16[1]	10.5	.02
Uruguay	1.22	8.7[1]	.14
III Middle Income Countries w/High Child Mortality			
Equador	.30[3]	5.9[3]	.06
Dominecan Republic	1.98[1]	4.7	.42
Syria	.49[3]	10.5[3]	.05
Tunisia	1.06[2,3]	8.4[3]	.14
IV Some Industrialized Countries			
USA	5.02[3,4]	10.9[1]	.46
West Germany	1.76	5.8	.30
Sweden	2.64[9]	4.9[4]	.54
Austria	1.49	6.0[3]	.25
Italy	.22	6.4	.03

Source:

United Nations, Demographic Yearbook 1978, New York, 1979 Tables 23 and 25.

1 1975

2 1974

3 Data from civil registers which are incomplete or of unknown completeness.

4 Provisional

Several generalizations may be made about the data in Table 5. First, the marriage rates exhibit much less variation that the divorce rates. Countries tend to be more alike in marriage practices than in divorce practices. Indeed the degree of similarity in marriage rates is rather understated in the table because it is measured as the number of marriages per thousand population, and the proportions of the population in the marriage years varies from country to country. If marriage rates were measured in terms of the number of people in the marriage ages, the rates for the middle-income-high-fertility countries in Group III would be higher and the variation among countries would be even smaller.

Second, the marriage rate in the USSR falls within the range of the middle-income-low-fertility countries in Group II, as it did in the case of fertility, discussed earlier. Hence neither the marital nor the fertility behavior in the USSR as a whole is distinctive from other countries at the same level of socioeconomic development. It is rather the U.S. that is distinctive in its marital behavior; its marriage rate is almost twice that of comparable industrialized countries, and is at about the same level as that of the USSR.

Third, with respect to divorce rates both the USSR and the US are distinctive. The US figure is roughly double that of comparable industrialized countries. The USSR, whose fertility and marriage rates are in line with those of the comparable

countries in Group II, in this instance falls among the industrialized countries. That is to say, its divorce rate is not at the level one would expect on the basis of the experience of comparable countries, but is at the higher level experienced by the more industrialized countries. Indeed, the Soviet divorce rate is higher than that of all thirty-two European countries listed in the Demographic Yearbook. It is, in fact, fourth from the highest among all the 103 countries in the world list in the Yearbook. The only three that are higher form an interesting group: they are the U.S. (5.02), American Samoa (4.54) and Puerto Rico (3.83). It is evident that something unusual is at work in American social processes, but these are not the present concern.

I have thus far considered only the average divorce rate in the USSR. As in the case of the fertility data, however, one would expect that the national average obscures some large differences among subgroups of the population. It is widely reported, for example, that the divorce rate among urban people is higher than among rural (Chuiko, pp. 133-137) and that divorce among the Moslem peoples is quite rare. Precise data on the size of these differences are not available, but we may gauge the magnitude by making certain assumptions about what the sizes may be. The estimates below are based on the following assumptions: (1) the divorce rate among the rural European population is half that of the urban European population, (2) the urban Moslem

divorce rate is half that of the rural European, and (3) the divorce rate among rural Moslems is one-quarter that of the urban Moslems. On the basis of those assumptions the following are the estimated crude divorce rates per thousand people:

European Urban	5.0
European Rural	2.5
Moslem Urban	1.3
Moslem Rural	.3
USSR average	3.4

These estimates of the Soviet Moslem divorce rates are not out of line with those of the two Moslem countries listed in Table 5: Syria (.49), and Tunisia (1.06). If the estimates are even roughly correct, it signifies that the divorce rates among the urban European population are about equal to the average in the United States. In the United States, however, the divorce rates of the white majority are lower than those of other races. In 1978 the number of divorced persons per thousand married persons in the United States was 71 for all races and 65 for whites (Social Indicators III, p. 52). Applying that white/total ratio of .92 to the United States average, the crude divorce rate for whites in the United States would be 4.62, compared to the national rate of 5.02. I have found no data on urban/rural differences in the United States. Crude divorce rates by states, however, are lower in the more industrialized states. The 1975 rate for the Middle-Atlantic states was 3.0,

for example, compared to 5.5 in the East South Central states (Vital Statistics of the U.S. 1975, v. III, p. 2-6). If urban divorce rates are in fact lower than rural in the United States, then the rate for urban whites would be lower than the estimated rate of 4.62 - perhaps about 4.5. If the order of magnitude of these estimates is correct, it implies that the crude divorce rate among the urban Soviet majority European population (5.0) is higher than the rate for the urban American majority white population (4.5).

There is an additional reason to suggest that the Soviet urban divorce rate may understate the rate of family dissolution because of one special feature of the society - the difficulty of obtaining housing. One reads about husbands and wives who are for all purposes divorced from each other but have not registered that act and continue to live in the same residence because of the impossibility of obtaining separate housing accommodations. The extent of that practice is not known, but the implication is that, under comparable conditions of housing availability, the margin of difference between the Soviet and US urban divorce rates would be larger than estimated above.*

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*The point should not be pushed too far, however, for if crowded housing conditins in fact contribute to the frequency of divorce, as some Soviet analysts allege, the margin of difference might be smaller under comparable housing conditions.

I conclude that, even more than fertility behavior, divorce behavior in the USSR differs from that which one would expect on the basis of the level of socioeconomic development of the country. Particularly in the urban European population, marriages terminate with a frequency that exceeds that in the United States and countries closely related to it, and the American divorce rate itself is larger than that of all other industrialized countries.

Both the crude marriage and crude divorce rate data are deficient because the denominator is the total population rather than that part of the population that is of marriage age. That deficiency is somewhat diminished by considering the ratio of divorces to marriages, presented in column 3 of Table 5. According to that measure, the difference between the two groups of middle-income countries becomes very small; with the exception of the Dominican Republic, the number of divorces in 1976 was 15% or fewer than the number of marriages. In the industrialized countries, with the exception of Italy, the number of divorces ranges from 25% to 54% of the number of marriages. Sweden now ranks at the top of the list, reflecting the combination of its high divorce rate and its low marriage rate. The USSR, with a divorce rate equal to one-third of the marriage rate falls neatly within the range of the industrialized countries. If the estimated divorce rate for urban non-Moslems of 5.0 per thousand population is employed, the ratio of divorces to marriages for

that group would be about 50%. Hence by this measure too, the USSR stands near the top of the industrialized countries. It somewhat exceeds the US but falls short of Sweden. Thus the divorce/marriage ratio modifies the conclusion of the preceding analysis in the case of the US; the US is not as different from comparable countries as the divorce rate data alone indicated. But the conclusion in the case of the USSR is substantially unchanged; the divorce marriage ratio is substantially above that of comparable countries and toward the upper range of the industrialized countries.

3. Child Socialization

How successfully a society manages the socialization of its children is perhaps the most important question that can be asked about it. The notion of the "success" of the socialization process is not easy to define. For one thing, it is so heavily invested with values; the characteristics that describe what are thought to be those of a well-brought up person differ from culture to culture and from class to class within the society. Nor can the judgement of an older generation about the younger serve as guide to the quality of the socialization process. Judged by that standard, mankind would appear to having being going steadily downhill since its first descent from the trees.

But while it is difficult to be precise about the characteristics of successful socialization, there would be much less disagreement about the signs that would indicate a weakening of that process. The question may be put this way. Suppose it were asserted that certain changes in a society were in fact leading to a decline in the investment of time, effort and emotion in the raising of children, with deleterious consequences for their socialization. What would one look for in order to detect whether such a thing were indeed happening? I propose five indictors at which one ought to look:

a. Physical health. A decline in the family's care and attention to children is likely to lead to a decline in their health, particularly in the case of infants and young children.

b. Education. A variety of family activities are known to contribute to the cognitive development of children; reading and talking to them, telling stories, transmitting information of all kinds. Success in schooling is also affected by the quality of the bonds between parents and children. Hence a decline in the quality of socialization within the family may be expected to show up in a decline in educational attainment.

c. Mental health. The family contributes in great measure to the development of those psychological properties that are required for living a productive and satisfying life in any society. The social conditions of life may overtax the strongest

personalities, but one may imagine nevertheless a "stock" of mental health produced in the growing generation, one of the major "inputs" into which is the family circumstances primarily in the early years.

d. Moral training. In this matter, which concerns the appropriate values to be instilled into the new generation, there is a wider range of disagreement. Nevertheless it is in the family that the value formation process takes place, although values change in the course of a lifetime in response to experience. Attitudes toward authorities of various kinds, values assigned to such qualities as honesty, violence, power, material acquisitions, marriage and family itself, are among those heavily influenced by early family life. Changes in the process of socialization within the family can have a significant effect on these and other values absorbed by the young generation.

e. Social behavior. The preceding four characteristics are properties of body and mind, and perhaps of soul. Changes in such characteristics of a generation are bound to lead to changes in behavior as well. One major form of the behavior that one would expect as a consequence of a decline in the quality of socialization is a rise in destructive behavior, both personal and social. Juvenile crime is the most widely studied aspect of such behavior.

It goes without saying that changes in these characteristics are neither necessary nor sufficient evidence of changes in the socialization process. The physical health of a generation may decline for reasons entirely unrelated to any change in the socialization process, and a decline in the quality of that process may have no effect on the physical health of children; or if it does, that effect may be offset by an improvement in the public health system or by other types of social change. Other evidence than the pure fact of a decline in health must be adduced in order to establish a relation between that decline and a change in the socialization process. Nevertheless the family is so central a social institution that a substantial change in one or more of these characteristics may be regarded as presumptive if not decisive evidence of a change in the family socialization process. This section is devoted to an examination of the evidence on the state of Soviet society with respect to these characteristics.

a. Physical Health

Ideally we would wish to have data on the health levels and on the morbidity and mortality statistics of children of various ages over the span of several generations and of a variety of countries. Such data are not published in great abundance in the USSR. We do have published data on infant mortality, however, which is a good indictor of at least one

major aspect of the socialization process. Other things equal, an improvement in the family's care of its children should be expected to show up in a decline in infant mortality, although the lower the rate of infant mortality, -- that is, as the rate approaches the minimum expected in terms of the best medical technology of the day -- the less likely that a further improvement in child care will show up in the form of further declining infant mortality. On the other hand, a decline in the quality of family child care may be expected to show up in a rise in infant mortality. All this of course falls within the caution noted above that such tendencies may be offset by changes in the non-family factors that affect child health.

Table 6 presents a set of data on infant and child mortality for the USSR and for those countries listed in earlier tables for which 1960 and 1978 data were available. The USSR reported data for 1960 and 1971 are the official Soviet statistics. During that period of time infant mortality declined steadily in the USSR as it did in most of the countries of the world. In 1972, however, the reported rate rose slightly, and continued to rise during the next two years until it reached a level of 27.9 in 1974. Thereafter the USSR ceased to report on infant mortality. Davis and Feshbach, using indirect evidence and employing the Soviet definition, have estimated the 1976 rate at 31. Reliable estimates of the

infant mortality rate since 1976 are not available, but the continued failure of the Soviet government to publish the figures encourages the supposition that it continues to be higher than earlier. In any event, the rise in infant mortality between 1971 and 1976 is quite exceptional among developed countries.

Table 6 Infant and Child Mortality Rates, Various Countries

Country	Infant Mortality Rate[4] (Ages 0-1)			Child Mortality Rate[5] (Ages 1-4)	
I USSR and Hungary	1960	1971	1978	1960	1978
USSR Reported	35	23	(31[2,7])	1	1
USSR Adjusted	40	26	36[2]		
Hungary	48	35	24	2	1
II Middle Income Low Child Mortality					
Greece	40	27	19	2	1
Yugoslavia	88	50	34	4	2
Portugal	98	50	39	7	2
Uruguay	na	40	46	4	3
Argentina	55	59[3]	na	6	3
III Middle-Income High Child Mortality					
Equador	140	79	66	23	10
Dominican Republic	na	49	37	23	10
Tunisia	148	75	123	29	15
Bolivia	na	na	158	36	22
IV Industrialized Countries					
U.S.	26	19	14	1	1
West Germany	34	23	15	1	1
Sweden	17	11	8	1	1
Austria	38	26	15	1	1
Italy	44	29	18	2	1
Industrialized Countries Average[6]	29	na	13	1	1

Sources:
USSR, Infant Mortality: Christopher Davis and Murray Feshbach, "Rising Infant Mortality in the USSR in the 1970's", U.S. Bureau of the Census, Series P-95, No. 74, Sept. 1980, p. 6.
Other Infant Mortality, 1971; U.N. Demographic Yearbook, 1974, Table 20,
Other data: World Bank, World Development Report, 1980, Wash. D.C., Aug. 1980, Table 21

Notes:
1. Estimate after adjustment for comparability with WHO definition used by other countries
2. 1976
3. 1970
4. Number of infants who die before reaching one year of age, per thousand live births in a given year.
5. Number of deaths of children aged 1-4 per thousand children in the same age group in the given year.
6. Weighted average of 18 countries.
7. Davis-Feshbach estimate.

With respect to the level of infant mortality, as distinct from the trend, account must be taken of the fact that Soviet statisticians define infant mortality in a more restricted way that in countries that follow the U.N. definition. Specifically, the Soviets exclude the births and deaths of certain categories of live-born infants that are classified as cases of infant mortality under the U.N. definition. The second line of the table presents the estimates by Davis and Feshbach of the reported Soviet rates adjusted to conform to the U.N. definition employed by the other countries. The adjustment raises the officially reported level by about 15%.

In 1960 Soviet infant mortality fell within the range of overlap between the industrialized and middle-income-low-fertility countries. It fell at the lower range of the latter, and at the upper range of the former. In the subsequent decade the Soviet rated declined somewhat more rapidly than in the other countries, so that by 1971 its relative position had improved. Both the reported and the adjusted rates fall well within the middle range of the industrialized countries; at the levels of West Germany and Austria. The Soviet performance is therefore superior to what one would expect on the basis of the experience of the middle-income-low-fertility countries we have considered to be at a comparable level of socioeconomic development.
In view of the close relationship between infant (and child)

mortality and human fertility generally, the superior Soviet performance in reducing infant mortality in that period may be part of the explanation of the sharp decline in fertility discussed above.

The most distinctive feature of comparative Soviet performance, however, follows from the reversal in 1971, during a period when the decline in other countries continued. The relative position of the USSR changed sharply, and by 1978 the level of infant mortality in the USSR was about 2 1/2 times the average of the industrialized countries. Its level was at about the middle of the range of the middle-income-low-fertility countries, along with Yugoslavia and Portugal. Child mortality, however, continued at the low level of the industrialized countries.

The conclusions are not affected when urban-rural differences are taken into account, for those differences are small. In 1974, for example, urban and rural infant mortality rates in the USSR were 27.7 and 28.2 (Davis-Feshbach, p. 7). The corresponding rates in the US in 1969 were 21.9 and 19.3 (U.N. Demographic Yearbook, 1974, Table 20). Ethnic differences are large however. Infant mortality rates by ethnic group are not published by the USSR but they may be approximated by means of data for the republics. Republic data have not been published since the mid-seventies, but in 1973 data were published for the three largest Slavic republics (RSFSR, Ukraine, Belorussia) and for the three Baltic republics. The weighted

average infant mortality rate for what may be called the Balto-Slavic republics was 20.5, or 79% of the national rate of 26.4. The rate for the remaining republics was 39.2, or 151% of the national average.* For comparative purposes, the infant mortality rates for Whites in the US in 1974 was 14.8, or 88% of the national average of 16.7. The rate for "all others" was 24.9, or 149% of the national average (Social Indicators III, p. 99). Applying those relationships to the 1978 data in Table 6, we may approximate the differences between what may be called the "majority" and "minority" populations in 1973-74 as follows:

	National	Majority	Minority
USSR, Reported	31	25	47
USSR, Adjusted	36	28	54
U.S.	14	12	21

Thus in 1978 the estimated infant mortality rate of the majority population of the USSR (28) was something over twice the average level of the industrialized countries (13) and of the majority population in the US (12). It fell within the range of the middle-income-low-fertility countries, though at the lower end of that range. Hence the Soviet majority infant mortality rate is at the level one would expect on the basis of the experience of comparable countries. What is distinctive

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* The republic data are reported in Davis and Feshbach, p. 3. The weights were calculated from the data on numbers of births by republic in Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR, 1973, pp. 9, 37.

about Soviet performance then is not the current level of infant mortality, which is quite in line with the experience of comparable countries, but the fact that its exceptionally good performance of a decade ago, that had promoted it into the range of the industrialized countries, had not been sustained and it has fallen back to the level of comparable countries.

The infant mortality rates of the Soviet minority, population, (54), however, is somewhat poorer than that in the comparable countries, although among minority populations in such countries as Yugoslavia and Uruguay the rates are also probably considerably above their national average. The Soviet rate may be regarded either as among the highest rates in comparable countries or among the lower rates in the middle-income-highfertility countries. In this case too the distinctive feature of the Soviet minority experience is not in the present level but the loss of the exceptional status of a decade ago.

The matter is quite different with respect to child mortality. By 1960 the USSR had already matched the performance of the industrialized countries and it has remained there since. Its performance is decidedly better than one would expect on the basis of the experience of comparable countries. Evidently the factors that influence infant mortality are different in some respects from those that influence child mortality.

b. Education

c. Mental Health

d. Moral Training

e. Social Behavior

4. Sex Role Differentiation

(These sections, which have not been completed, conclude Part III).

Appendix Table A Grouping of Countries by Family Organization Characteristics

	GROUPINGS		
1. Crude marriage rate	A	B	CD
2. Crude divorce rate	A	BD	C
3. Divorce/marriage rate	ABD	C	
4. Crude divorce rate, trend	ACD	B	
5. Net reproduction rate	AC	BC	
6. Net reproduction rate trend	AC	B	D
7. Work time, fathers	A	BC	D
8. Work time, mothers	A	BD	C
9. Work time, ratio	A	BD	C
10. Housekeeping, fathers	AC	BD	
11. Housekeeping, mothers	A	BC	D
12. Housekeeping, ratio	A	B	CD
13. Child care, fathers	AC	B	D
14. Child care, mothers	A	BCD	
15. Child care, ratio	A	BD	C

Part IV. The Soviet Economy

The preceding discussion has established that the Soviet family is distinctive in a number of respects, notably in regard to fertility, marital stability, and infant mortality. It remains to be established whether and to what extent those characteristics of family organization can be ascribed to the economic system. In this part I present three features of the economic system that account in some measure for the distinctive features of the Soviet family. For the sake of brevity I present only a sketch of the argument.

A. Female Labor Force Participation

One of the best-established generalizations about human fertility in modern societies is that there is an inverse relalationship between female labor force participation and fertility. One should therefore expect to find that if a country's female participation rate differs considerably from that of other countries its fertility level should differ as well.

Table 7. Female Labor Force Participation by Age, Various Countries

Age	USSR (1959)	USSR (1970)	U.S. (1970)	W. Germ. (1970)	Hung. (1970)	Sweden (1970)	Italy (1971)
15-19*	71.0	47.8	29.2	64.4	49.1	29.3	36.7
20-24)			56.1	67.1	66.2	53.3	44.7
)	80.4	86.3					
25-29)			45.4	51.5	65.3	49.0	36.2
30-34)			( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
)	77.7	92.7	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
35-39)			(48.3)	(46.3)	(69.7)	(49.8)	(30.5)
			( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
40-44)			( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
)	75.4	90.6					
45-49)			53.0	48.4	64.0	55.0	29.7
50-54	67.7	77.3	52.0	43.0	56.6	50.3	26.3

Sources:

USSR: Stephen Rapawy, "Estimates and Projections of the Labor Force and Civilian Employment in the USSR 1950-1990, "Foreign Economic Report. No. 10, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureua of Economic Analysis Sept. 1976, p. 15.

Others: ILO, Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1975, Table 1.

* 1-19 for the USSR

Table 7 presents a set of data on female participation rates for the USSR and several other countries. The USSR is strikingly different from the other countries in two respects. First, at all ages except the youngest Soviet women participate in the labor force to a greater degree than any of the others. Second, in all the market economies in 1970 the participation rate peaks during the ages 20-24, then declines during the child-bearing years. In the USSR in the 1970, however, it rises during the child-bearing years and peaks during ages 30-39.

On the basis of the experience of other industrial countries, one may regard the high Soviet female participation rate as a major factor in the explanation of the low fertility rate. The question of whether it can be regarded as a "cause" of the low fertility rate requires some elaboration. The neo-classical economic theory of fertility holds that neither fertility nor female labor participation ought to be regarded as determined by the other; they ought rather be regarded as jointly determined by other factors that influence the costs of children relative to other commodities that the family desires. Chief among the factors that influence the relative costs of children is the mother's market wage rate. The mother whose wage rate is high will <u>both</u> (a) participate in the labor force for a longer proportion of her working lifetime, <u>and</u> (b) have fewer children. Similarly low-wage mothers will have more children and participate less in the labor force.

This neoclassical process does probably explain some portion of Soviet family behavior. I do not have time-series data on female wage rates, but women's educational attainment did increase rapidly, relative to men, during the postwar period. The sharp drop in the female labor participation of women aged 16-19 between 1959 and 1970 is very likely to be explained by increased school enrollemnt of younger women. Since wage rates tend to increase with education level, the data suggest that women's wage rates were rising during the period, and to that extent have contributed to both higher participation rates and lower fertility.

The rise in female participation between 1959 and 1970, however, is so large that it is difficult to believe that it is fully explained by the rise in women's wage rates alone. The evidence is clear, moreover, that it was deliberate state policy to increase the participation rate following the census of 1959. That census, the first conducted in the USSR since 1939, disclosed that about 12 million women were not engaged in "social production". Coming at the time of a decline of new entrants into the labor force because of the wartime birth decline, the discovery of that large number of women who could be mobilized into the regular labor force was a boon to the economic planners. A massive campaign was then launched to attract these women into the labor force.

How that massive social change was managed is not yet fully understood. The chief policy instruments evidently were first, a large-scale expansion of public child-care facilities, and second an intensification of social pressure upon women who were full-time housewives or at home tending the family garden plot. Perhaps those two measures tell the whole story, but the increase in the particpation rate seems to me to be too large to be fully accounted for by those actions. It should be noted that even in 1959 Soviet participation rates were already the highest in the world--higher indeed than in the other socialist countries. The two policy measures do not seem to be so potent as to explain how that a social patttern, already extreme by world standards, was pushed so much further in a decade.

Whatever the full explanation of the rise in the female participation rate, it is evident that it was primarily the result of state economic policy, and only to a minor extent does it represent a neoclassical family response to rising women's wage rates. It is in this sense that the low fertility rate may be regarded as a consequence, undoubtedly unintended, of state economic policy regarding the female participation rate.

The discussion thus far has concentrated on the effect of the high level of the female participation rate. More remarkable perhaps is the second feature of the Soviet participation pattern --the maintenance of its high level throughout the childbearing

years. To some extent that may reflect the effect of both (a) a decline in the age at which mothers bear their first child, and (b) the increased prevalence of the one-child family. With both of those forces at work one would expect to see a growing proportion of women returning to the labor force by age thirty, when their only child has begun full-time schooling. In any case the data reflect a society in which the female participation rate is close to the demographic maximum throughout the childbearing years.*

The high participation rates during the child-bearing years must be expected to have some effect on the child socialization process. In the case of the one aspect of that process that has been examined above--child health--Davis and Feshbach have documented the contribution of a variety of factors to the rise in infant mortality; substitution of formula feeding for breast feeding, the higher incidence of illness under institutional child care than under home care, and reduced parental care of sick children. All of these factors tend to be present to a greater extent in the case of mothers employed outside the home. Hence it is very likely that the participation rate has had a negative effect on child and infant health.**

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* The male labor force participation rate in 1970 was 89.7% for ages 20-29 and 97.6% for ages 30-39. The corresponding figures for women are 86.3% and 92.7%. Rapawy, p. 15

** Davis and Feshbach caution that the rise in infant mortality cannot be directly associated with the female participation rate since the latter had reached its virtual limit by 1970 and did not grow thereafter (p.12). One can imagine, however, that the infant mortality rate in 1970 had not yet begun to respond to the change in child care conditions during the sixties. The rise since 1971 in that rate may reflect a gradual move to a new equilibrium level of infant mortality corresponding to the higher participation rates established since 1970.

The effect of female labor participation on another feature of child socialization--social behavior--is not well established. One of the widely accepted generalizations of the western experience is that the effect depends on the quality of the alternative child care arrangements; when they are satisfactory, there are no evident negative effects on children with both parents working. That broad generalization may reasonably be expected to hold for the USSR as well. Soviet child development scholars, however, have expressed growing concern about the negative effects of institutional child care on young children, both with respect to their health as well as their psychological development.* It is conceivable in principle that a society in which virtually all mothers work outside the home during the years in which the children are growing up may manage to avoid any ill effects on the process of child socialization, but it is doubtful that that could be the case in an actual society like the USSR.

Finally, the high female participation rate has contributed in some degree to the rise in family instability. At the least, it has provided women with a greater degree of financial independence from men than is the case in other countries, and thereby reduced the cost of divorce for both women and men. The fact that most divorces are now initiated by women** suggests that the benefit has been greater for women than for men. One might conclude that the result is simply an increase in the welfare

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* Lapidus, p. 308 and passim

** Chuiko, pp. 139-140

of women at the expense of that of men; the latter have increasingly lost the power to compel their wives to put up with their grosser peculiarities. By the standards of most people's judgements, however, there is a net social gain in the great equality of husbands and wives in the marriage relationship.

On the other hand, to the extent that the female participation rate has been "forced" by state policy to a level higher than would have emerged from an unbiased family choice of its preferred levels of female participation and fertility, the divorce rate may be regarded as excessive; that is, yielding a lower level of social welfare than would have ensued had the state taken a neutral position toward female labor force participation. In that sense state economic policy may be regarded as having contributed to an excessive rate of marital instability.

B. Planners' Sovereignty

In a market economy with consumers' sovereignty, rising wage rates increase the opportunity cost of the time mothers devote to the raising of children. Families adjust by decreasing the proportion of the wife's time devoted to children and to the home, and increasing the proportion devoted to earning income in the workplace. Hence the number of children and the time devoted to children declines while the consumption of market-purchased goods and services increases.

That is the adjustment that is central to the neoclassical explanation of the decline in fertility. There is a secondary adjustment process, however, that follows upon the rising labor force participation of women. As the proportion of women in the labor force rises, the consumption pattern of the family changes. In particular, there is an increase in the demand for goods and services that substitute for the time and effort required for home care and child care. These include consumer durables like vacuum cleaners, washing machines and dryers, refrigerators, and home freezers. They include services like launderies and cleaners, home cleaning services, and food and other delivery services. They include prepared foods, ranging from prepared breakfast cereals and canned and frozen foods to pre-cooked warm foods and frozen dinners. They include restaurants and dining-out facilities like fast-food establishments as well as repair services like clothing repair and sewing. They include various child care services, delivery services, and quick service in shopping and marketing as in super-markets.

There are a number of complementarities among these goods and services. Increased use of frozen foods, for example, requires increased availability of freezing equipment, either as freezing chests in refrigerators or in the form of home freezers. The increased opportunity cost of shopping time creates a demand for larger stocks of foods and other consumer goods which together with the increased stock of consumer durables, creates an

increased demand for more housing space; although that increase is somewhat offset by the decline in the number of children.

This change in the demand pattern reflects in part the value of such goods and services in facilitating the participation of the wife in the labor force, and for that reason would reflect the preferences of both husband and wife. But it also reflects the increase in the weight of the wife's preferences in the bargaining that occurs in the distribution of the family income, since the wife's power in family decisions presumably increases as her share in the family's income increases.

In a market economy governed by consumer preferences, production would respond to this changing pattern of demand. The increased availability of these goods and services decreases the cost to the family of the mothers' labor force participation. The reduction in cost partially offsets the reduced time available for child and home care. The consequence is that the fertility-diminishing effect of mothers' labor participation is reduced, or partially offset. Imagine, for example, that the supply of these products was inelastic, so that the same fixed quantity were produced regardless of the demand. In that case an increase in participation would be followed by a sharp decline in fertility because of the high cost in time and effort of home and child care. Now assume that the supply of these goods and services is highly responsive to the demand. Some portion of the mother's income, originally spent entirely on other goods, is now redirected to the purchase

of these goods. There is a considerable decrease in the time rquired for child care and home care, and an increase in leisure. Under these circumstances families would be inclined to a fertility level somewhere between the pre-participation level and the inelastic-supply level.

In the Soviet centrally planned economy, however, the structure of output is determined not by consumer preferences but by planners' preferences. The planners may, and to some degree do, take the preferences of consumers into account in deciding upon the output mix. but the goals of State are sufficiently different from those of individual families that the optimal structure of output from the planners' perspective differs from that of the individual family. The value of an extra bedroom or of an hour's less queueing time counts for less in the calculus of the planners than in the calculus of the family, as does the opportunity cost of providing them. Nor is it entirely beside the point that the decisions are made by men; a female Politburo might look differently upon such matters. It is also very likely that policy makers in general do not take into account the social consequences of economic policy. This is due in part to a quite normal ignorance of the nature of such consequences, but it is also due to an excessive confidence in the stablity of social mores and behavior. People like to believe that such fundamental institutions as the family are strongly founded in love, religion and morals; that people do not decide how many children to have in the same

manner as they decide how much meat to buy for the night's supper. The planners do not therefore imagine that when the have established the five-year-plan target for housing and for retail services, they have at the same time decreed that a certain number of Soviet babies will not be born.

Hence, the distinctive features of Soviet family organization are the consequence of state economic policy in two senses. In the first instance, by driving the female participation rate to exceptionally high levels, economic policy has contributed to the decline in fertility and to the other effects discussed above. And in the second instance, by failing to provide the consumer goods and services in quantitites that would have cushioned those social effects, economic policy contributed further to those consequences.

C. Predominance of the Work Place

Ideas, like things and institutions, have their history, and their form in any time reflects their origins. The idea of socialism originated in class-based societies, and modern socialism in particular originated under capitalist class relations. The idea that the political form of a socialist society is that of a Worker's State represents an image of a brighter future hatched in a period of class antagonism. With private ownership of the means of production abolished, the class basis of society is forever eliminated, according to the Marxian version, and the

only source of people's incomes thereafter is their work. The notion of the Workers' State conveys the idea that the fundamental class basis of conflict is gone.

With that heavy intellectural load borne by the idea of the role of the worker, it is not accidental that in socialist societies the point of depature for policy is the importance of the worker role and the work place. One of its consequences is that, to an extent that would be quite unacceptable in an advanced capitalist country, the role of worker and the work place occupies a central position in socialist societies.

It is all rather paradoxical from one point of view. A quite plausible alternative way of looking at things is to regard the centrality of the worker role as the special character of capitalism; perhaps even an indictment of capitalism because it induces so heavy a bias on the production role of a person, at the expense of other roles. From this perspective, one might have regarded the task of socialism as one of ending the dominance of that role, and of freeing man's consciousness from its dependence on his work status. Something of that sort is implicit in the young Marx's image of the unalienated man, a person whose consciousness is freed from its tie to his manner of earning a living and is rather the expression of other and nobler facets of himself expressed in other types of activities like sport, art, and interpersonal relations. In that free world the least important fact about a person is the kind of job he occupies; where he works and of what his job consists.

The paradox of socialism is that the contrary has happened. One's job and one's workplace affects one's life and consciousness to a degree that would be unthinkable in contemporary capitalist societies. And in that same process, the economy influences the family in ways that one does not find under capitalism.

One major implication of the celebration of the Worker is that it has crowded out what might otherwise have been a rethinking of the appropriate relationship between the roles of Citizens-as-Workers and Citizens-as-Consumers. One can see in the process of Soviet economic development so one-sided a preoccupation with the Worker role that the Consumer role was relegated to a quite secondary position. Two aspects of this neglect of the consumer role have certain immplications for the family. One is the policy of job security. The second is the policy of the concentrating social life around the work place.

The policy of job security, as it is implemented in the USSR, is costly to the society. It leads to overstaffing and to "hidden unemployment", to the erosion of labor discipline, and to the retardation of technological progress (which often crates redundancy of labor and obsolescence of technical skills). But it also has had a benign effect on the family. This can be judged from the evidence of the ill effects of unemployment on the family in the United States, which has been amply documented.

The second effect of the celebration of the Worker is the high degree of concentration of social life around the work place. The factory has taken on the role of organizer of social activities for its workers, far beyond the activities directly related to the work of production. The factory organizes sports clubs, chess clubs, and other leisure activities. Many of the major theatrical groups are organized by Ministries. Factories often operate consumer goods retail shops, and run training programs similar to those run in all industrial countries but tied in to the general education system in ways that capitalist countries would often like to match but find it difficult to accomplish.

The general effect of this concentration of social and other activities around the work place is to give to the workplace a saliency in the lives of Soviet people that is greater than in capitalist countries (although there are manifestations of a similar concentration in some parts of the capitalist economy, like factory towns, and perhaps the lives of business executives). Most of these activities, however, do not deflect from what would otherwise be family activities; they would otherwise be conducted as community activities, or neighborhood activities, or friendship groups. Such activities, however, involve people from different factories, and thus reduce the centrality of the "work collective" in the individual's life.

When all these activities are conducted in the factory, however, with the same people with whom one works, the factory becomes a very large competitor to the family for the attachements of its members.

One factory activity that has had a particularly disturbing effect is the organization of vacations. Admission tickets to resort hotels, rest homes and other vacation spots are normally assigned to the factory. Hence spouses generally vacation separately, and children vacation separately at summer camps also run primarily by factories. The absence of facilities for family vacations has been pointed to by Soviet sociologists as contributing to the weakening of the family and to the incidence of divorce.

The centrality of production, of the factory, and of the worker role is not a necessary feature of a centrally planned socialist society. One can readily imagine such a society in which social activities are less concentrated, and in which the family organizes a larger proportion of those activities. Under present Soviet policy, however, the centrality of the factory contributes to the weakening of the family and to a higher level of family instability.

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