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STALINISM VERSUS BOLSHEVISM? A Reconsideration

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A Reconsideration

Although not often openly debated, the issue I propose to address is probably the deepest and most divisive in Soviet studies. There is good ground for Stephen Cohen's characterization of it as a "quintessential historical and interpretive question"[1] because it transcends most of the others and has to do with the whole of Russia's historical development since the Bolshevik Revolution.

He formulates it as the question of the relationship "between Bolshevism and Stalinism." Since the very existence of something properly called Stalinism is at issue here, I prefer a somewhat different mode of formulation.

There are two (and curiously, only two) basically opposed positions on the course of development that Soviet Russia took starting around 1929 when Stalin, having ousted his opponents on the Left and the Right, achieved primacy, although not yet autocratic primacy, within the Soviet regime. The first position, which may be seen as the orthodox one, sees that course of development as the fulfillment, under new conditions, of Lenin's Bolshevism. All the main actions taken by the Soviet regime under Stalin's leadership were, in other words, the fulfillment of what had been prefigured in Leninism (as Lenin's Bolshevism came to be called after Lenin died). So we may call this the fulfillment-of-Leninism school. The opposing position, which has been, in its way, a dissident one, denies that what happened under Stalin was the fulfillment of Leninism and contends

that very much of it involved a fundamental break with Leninism's tenets and tendencies. We may call it the break-with-Leninism school.

The issue is not one of doctrine or ideology only; it is not simply a question of theory. We are viewing Leninism, or Lenin's Bolshevism, as, on the one hand, a body of theoretical ideas or doctrines concerning the policies, the strategy and tactics, that the revolutionary Marxist party should pursue in its quest for power and with the power once it had been achieved by the overthrow of the Provisional Government in October 1917; and, on the other hand, as the patterns of action that were in fact followed, along with clearly indicated action-tendencies. To give an example of an action that reflected an action-tendency, we may mention the attempted Red Army march on Warsaw in 1920, which gave expression to the firmly rooted conviction in the mind of Lenin and other Bolsheviks that it was legitimate and desirable to carry proletarian revolution by force of arms to other countries, especially an advanced country like Germany, should the opportunity arise, as it did in 1920 when a Polish army invaded the Ukraine and then fell back under the Red Army's counter-attack.

When we view Lenin's Bolshevism, as a set of doctrines combined with a set of action-patterns and tendencies, we are, in fact, viewing it as a revolutionary political culture; and the same is true of what came after, in Stalin's time; and so the issue is whether what came after represented the fulfillment of Lenin's Bolshevism as a revolutionary culture or, alternatively, a break with it. Those who take the latter position call what came after Stalinism -- as a way of indicating that it did mark such a break.

A. The Fulfillment-of-Leninism School

Both schools of thought are diverse in composition. Both unite a strange collection of intellectual bedfellows.

A leading figure in the fulfillment-of-Leninism school, its godfather, is Stalin, who in all his political actions was always, as his 1930s posters had it, "Lenin today." All the actions undertaken by the regime under his leadership to transform NEP Russia into a socialist Russia were "Marxism-Leninism in action." Hence, Stalin rejected the proposal of his sycophantic follower Lazar Kaganovich that the term Stalinism be introduced into the Soviet official lexicon (this we have from Khrushchev's later testimony). The mass collectivization of 1929-33, which Stalin's Short Course of party history, published in 1938, called a "revolution from above," along with the super-industrialization drive under the Five-Year Plan, were in fulfillment of Lenin's Bolshevism as a revolutionary culture. The first was the realization of Lenin's plan for the "cooperating of Russia"; the second, his vision of the future socialist Russia as an industrialized one. The party purges of the 1930s were strictly Leninist in character, and the expansion of Communism during and after the Second World War was the fulfillment of Lenin's dream of the further progress of the international Communist revolution.

When Soviet studies emerged as an academic field in the West after the Second World War, it went along with this view of the historical development while reversing the moral plus and minus signs. It did not overlook or minimize the appalling human costs for Russia of what happened in Stalin's time, did not neglect the growth of the concentration camp system in the 1930s and after, from earlier smaller beginnings; did not overlook the Great Terror of the 1930s; did not minimize the huge human costs of mass

collectivization, especially in the Great Famine of 1932-34, which took an estimated 10 to 15 million human lives. Yet, it did not find "Stalinism" responsible for all this. A small but revealing point here: there was no entry under "Stalinism" in Merle Fainsod's classic, How Russia Is Ruled, when it was first published in 1953, the year of Stalin's death; nor did that term or concept play a significant part in a study prepared in the Harvard Russian Research Center just before and after Stalin's death, How the Soviet System Works (1955), by Clyde Kluckohn, Baymond Bauer and Alex Inkeles, although this study did contain an overview of the system's development.

Khrushchev's secret report to the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress in February 1956, removing the shroud somewhat from events of the Great Purge of the later 1930s and revealing hitherto unknown facts about Stalin as a tyrannical personality with clearly marked paranoid tendencies toward the end of his life, dealt a blow to the "fulfillment" school, especially as he accused Stalin of having, in the terror of the later 1930s, violated the "sacred Leninist norms" of party life, the collective-leadership principle. In effect, he accused Stalin of having deviated from Lenin's Bolshevism and Lenin's heritage of taking counsel with his fellow oligarchs in the party by establishing a secret-police-based absolute autocracy, a personal dictatorship over the terrorized party and even the terrorized party Politburo and Central Committee that continued to exist in a state of powerlessness. Subsequently published Soviet materials of the Khrushchev years, and pronouncements in public by Khrushchev and his associates at the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961, reinforced this message; and a continuing flow of historical revelations in samizdat after Khrushchev's fall from power in 1964 deepened the effect.

However, the fulfillment-of-Leninism school acquired a new lease on life by virtue of its vigorous, insistent and seemingly well documented espousal by the ex-Soviet army officer turned dissident, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in his three-volume work, The GULAG Archipelago, and other writings, including a polemical article that appeared in Foreign Affairs in 1980, "Misconceptions About Russia Are a Threat to America." Solzhenitsyn is not alone among emigre and other dissident-minded Russians of our time in espousing the position that all the worst evils of the Stalin era were the supreme expression of what had been the tendency and direction of Lenin's Bolshevism as a revolutionary culture; and in the article just mentioned, Solzhenitsyn dotted the "i," as it were, by repeating Stalin's old slogan about him being "Lenin today," and he stated that no "Stalinism" ever existed in Soviet Russia. A notable contribution of Solzhenitsyn to the historical discussion is his documentation early in The GULAG Archipelago of the view that Lenin was the architect of terror on Bolshevism's part, the one who called for the setting up of concentration camps to confine the new regime's enemies, and the one who boldly justified the revolutionary legitimacy of terror as a policy of the Bolshevik regime. Stalin disappears into the footnotes of the massive trilogy. To Solzhenitsyn, Lenin is the evil genius of the Bolshevik Revolution, from his meeting with Parvus in Zurich down to the present.

B. The Break-With-Leninism School

The opposing position has been espoused by a possibly even more motley collection of people, ranging from Trotsky and other Bolshevik oppositionists on the Left, who coined the term Stalinism in the later 1920s and developed a theory of it in the 1930s, to some academic scholars in

Western Soviet studies in the later 1950s and after, including the aforementioned Stephen Cohen and the present writer, and to some free-thinking intellectuals inside Russia, most notably the dissident historian, Roy A. Medvedev, whose capital work, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism, is a sort of 900-page extension and development of the indictment of Stalin by Khrushchev in his secret speech of 1956. For Medvedev in this book (he has since somewhat modified his view, both in private conversation and in his more recent short book, The October Revolution) "Stalinism" was in utter antithesis to "Leninism."

As in the case of the orthodox school, we have to do here with diversity within unity. Various writers share the view that there was a "Stalinism" which represented a break with Lenin's Bolshevism as a revolutionary culture. But they differ in their views as to the nature of this break and on other points of their interpretations of Soviet historical development.

Thus Trotsky, whose writings in exile made the word Stalinism familiar as a term for a set of deviations from Lenin's Bolshevism, went so far in his book The Revolution Betrayed (1937) as to treat this Stalinism as a counter-revolutionary phenomenon, characterized it as a "variety" of Bonapartism, which he saw as the "Caesarism" of the bourgeois period, and said further: "Stalinism and fascism in spite of deep differences in social foundations, are symmetrical phenomena. In many of their features they show a deadly similarity."[2] But Trotsky, it should be noted, did not see Stalin the person as an important factor in this development. The counter-revolutionary degeneration into "Bonapartism" was the work of a "Thermidorian bureaucracy" of which Stalin himself was nothing, Trotsky wrote, but a "personification."[3]

An academic spinoff of Trotsky's interpretation, which pictured Stalinism as being in "retreat" from many of the Revolution's goals and principles, was the book The Great Retreat (1946), by the Harvard sociologist, Nicholas Timashieff. Its subtitle was The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia. The decline was dated from 1934, when conservative tendencies with respect to the family, school and church, together with a growth of Soviet Russian nationalism, became salient. It's true that Timashieff depicted the Stalin policies of the Five-Year Plan period, 1928-1933, as a "Second Socialist Offensive" and hence as a revival of classical Bolshevism. The "partial return to normalcy under the Great Retreat" was undertaken, he proposed, "on the basis of military considerations."[4] Whether under Trotsky's influence or not, Stalin as a political personality was not accorded special attention by Timashieff. Also, there was no entry under "Stalinism" in his index. He did see a break with classical Bolshevism starting around 1934, but Stalinism was not his term for it.

When we turn to other academic scholars who have argued for a Stalinism that represented a break with Lenin's Bolshevism, we see much more emphasis on Stalin's personal role as leader in the 1930s and after, on his virtual extermination of the Lenin-era Bolshevik party, or its survivors, in the Great Terror of 1934-39, and the establishment of an absolute autocracy on the ruins of party rule, as evidence of the break.[5] On this point, the academic view is in agreement with Trotsky, who in his pamphlet Stalinism and Bolshevism (1937) had written that Stalin's purge had, by then, caused a "river of blood" to run between the two.[6] However, this academic view was linked with a view of Stalin as a personality which made him a crucially important factor in the transformation of the regime by terror into an autocracy.[7] Emphasis on the role of the personality was

characteristic too of Medvedev's work, as it had been earlier, of Khrushchev's secret speech.

But it is not alone the Great Terror and the transformation of the ruling party in that crucible into a submissive instrument of a tyrant that forms the argumentation of the break-with-Leninism school. There are also earlier events under Stalin's leadership, especially the use of terror for a revolutionarily rough and swift collectivization of the peasantry in 1929-33, which this school has seen as a gross violation of the later Lenin's vision, in his last articles, of a slow, gradual, reformist, generation-long effort to achieve the "cooperating of Russia," the bringing of the peasant population into farming cooperatives, by persuasion and a "cultural revolution" starting with the overcoming of widespread illiteracy. The brutalities of Stalin's collectivizing were in fact appalling to many Old Bolsheviks at the time as well as others in the intelligentsia and city population of Soviet Russia. Nor did Stalin's declaration in the midst of widespread national poverty in the wake of the industrialization and collectivization drives and the Great Famine that "socialism" had now been achieved in the main carry weight with many of these people, in whose minds (as in Lenin's) socialism connoted, among other things, a society of relative abundance and of greater equality as distinct from the privation and greater inequality that resulted from Stalin's policies in the early 1930s.

C. The Stymied Debate and a Way Out

Here then, in brief summary, is the situation: a deep division of opinion among scholars and others on both sides, with Trotsky (and even, in some sense, Khrushchev), arrayed against Stalin, Medvedev against

Solzhenitsyn, and some Western scholars against others, on the interpretation of Soviet Russia's historical development in Stalin's time.

It is, strangely, a division without a debate. There is very little back-and-forth between proponents of the opposed positions. Each side tends to state its own position and the evidence in favor of it and not to take account of the other's arguments and the evidence in their favor. Perhaps this anomalous situation of a division without a debate results from the fact that each side is, up to a point, right in the sense that it does have evidence in support of its position; and neither deigns to take serious account of the other side's strong points. So they argue past each other.

How shall we adjudicate the issue? First, I suggest that we recognize that as a revolutionary culture Lenin's Bolshevism was complex; that it was a conglomerate of elements that evolved over time, from the start of the century when he wrote What Is To Be Done? to his actions, articles, and speeches of the revolutionary and Civil War period and finally his statements and actions of his last years, under the NEP, when he set out guidelines for party policy in transforming "NEP Russia" into a "socialist Russia." Lenin's Bolshevism was a composite of disparate and even conflicting elements evolved over a long period of years and in response to changing circumstances. Even in his own mind it formed at best an uneasy synthesis, with certain basic themes recurring.

Because of this, Lenin's Bolshevism was not going to be transmissible to his followers en toto; the synthesis was bound to break down as different individuals and groups among his followers struck out on their own after he died; and no matter what they said about the necessity of "following the path of Lenin," they were going to strike out along

different paths, and choose different elements of Lenin's Bolshevism to stress, and add some new elements of their own to Bolshevism, because they were, despite all they shared of Bolshevism as a culture, political men of differing disposition, with conflicting interests and conflicting ideas about the policies to be followed by the ruling party in response to ever changing circumstances of the post-Lenin period. There was bound to be a breakdown of the Leninist revolutionary culture.

Recognition of this opens the way toward a solution of our problem. It points to the need to reopen the question of what happened in Bolshevism, its politics and its political culture, between Lenin and Stalin, in the time after Lenin died in 1924 and before Stalin achieved supremacy in 1929; and to seek in this way, in the disintegrating revolutionary culture, the early beginnings of the Stalin phenomenon.

D. Between Lenin and Stalin

No period of Soviet political history is so revealed in published documents and memoirs and so open to documented study as the post-Lenin 1920s, and none is the subject of so voluminous an historical scholarly literature. Yet, I venture to say that we do not yet have an adequate analysis of the divisions that appeared then in the party leadership.

In part this is due to the fact that scholarship has concentrated its attention to such an extent on the power contest, the struggle for the Lenin succession. Analysis of differences over policy has taken a distinct second place. Secondly, insofar as these have been discussed, scholarship has been unduly influenced by the view of the one Bolshevik leader who was deeply involved in the intra-party politics of the 1920s and later free to write about them in exile: Trotsky.

1. The Two-Dimensional Analysis

Trotsky's account distinguished three factions in the post-Lenin party leadership: the party Left (or Left opposition), the party Right led by Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky, and the party Center, led by Stalin and Molotov. But this analysis was two-dimensional. There were three factions, but only two policy lines, those of the Left and the Right.

The Left wanted rapid industrialization at a rate exceeding the six percent annual growth rate of Russian capitalism before the war by two, three or more times. The Right stood for "economic minimalism" (in Trotsky's phrase) or "tortoise-pace" industrialization (in Bukharin's).[8]

The third faction, which Trotsky called bureaucratic centrism, had no line of its own. Stalin was an "empirical," opportunist power politician, devoid of original ideas, incapable of abstract thinking, the party's "outstanding mediocrity." In tactical alliance with the Rights, he adopted their pro-peasant orientation during the polemic against the Left opposition. When the latter was defeated in late 1927, that rightist zigzag gave way to an "ultraleft zigzag" in industrializing and an "adventurist collectivization."[9]

Trotsky's two-dimensional analysis entered into our historiography. Thus, Isaac Deutscher wrote in the 1960s that Trotsky's view of Stalin as a centrist acting under alternate pressures from Right and Left "properly described Stalin's place in the inner party alignments of the nineteen-twenties, but fitted the realities of later years less well."[10]

The inadequacy of the view that Stalin had no policy orientation of his own in the 1920s becomes clear in the light of the difficulty Trotsky had in interpreting the policies Stalin began to follow as soon as he was in a position in 1929 to act on his own. Having misread Stalin as a

"centrist" with no policy ideas of his own, Trotsky in 1930 saw his revolution of collectivization from above as a "leftist paroxysm of Stalinist policy."[11] But how leftist was this "paroxysm"? It didn't belong to the mental world of Trotskyist leftism in party policy. Nothing like it, Trotsky himself pointed out, had been proposed or even adumbrated in the Left Communists' dissident platform of 1927. "Abolition of the NEP in the countryside -- could such a thing have entered the minds of any of us, even in the heat of controversy?," he asked.[12] "The practical possibilities of collectivization," he explained, "are determined by the presence of technological productive resources for large-scale agriculture and the peasantry's degree of readiness to shift over from individual to collective farming."[13]

Deutscher was very nearly right in saying that Trotsky, "like all Bolsheviks," had envisaged collectivization "as a gradual process. . ." and that therefore Stalin's brand of collectivizing was, to him, "a malignant and sanguinary travesty of all that Marxism and Leninism had stood for. . .".[14] The inaccuracy was contained in his words "like all Bolsheviks." Although a Bolshevik, Stalin was not one of the vast majority who conceived collectivization as a gradual process.

Because his two-dimensional analysis of party policy in the 1920s found no place for the incipient Stalin phenomenon in Bolshevism, save as bureaucratic centrism or a "Thermidorian" tendency, Trotsky was later at a loss. He had to give up his view of Stalin as a centrist. Then he went on to develop his later interpretation of Stalinism as a post-Thermidorian regime of Soviet Bonapartism.

All this shows the need for an improved conceptualization of the divisions in post-Lenin Bolshevism. To achieve this, we might try

proceeding in the manner suggested earlier here. We might treat Lenin's Bolshevism as a composite revolutionary culture whose various component elements formed, at best, an uneasy synthesis in Lenin's mind and policy and then came apart in the factional fights of the 1920s.

2. Right and Left Bolshevism: A Politico-Cultural Analysis

When a revolutionary party comes to power in a land peopled largely with men and women who are more or less comfortable in the established culture, even though many have supported the revolutionaries in their bid for power, these revolutionaries-in-power have a great problem of propagating their revolutionary culture. They may seek to do so by educational devices, as Lenin proposed in his plan for a long-range cultural revolution in Russia. But the old culture is bound to be resistant to change. For culture is a matter of habit, and habit, as Lenin said, is a very great force.

What will happen in such a situation is that some of the revolutionaries will, for political reasons, including reasons of political self-interest, seek a compromise with the old culture or some parts of it; they will adapt policy to one or another older institution of the society, "going national" to that extent; whereas others, less inclined to adapt, will be more purist in their adherence to the revolutionary culture. The former will come up with some sort of blend of new and old. The latter will remain more culturally revolutionary although they may recognize the need to use peaceful, gradualist means to change the entrenched cultural ways of the nation. Just such a rift came about in post-Lenin Bolshevism.

(a) The National Bolshevism of the Rights

The Rights gravitated to a "national Bolshevism" which recognized, first of all, that Lenin had banked in vain on the early spread of

proletarian revolution to some advanced European countries. Hence they accepted the project of building socialism "in one country," an idea whose parentage has been traced to the Rights' leader, Alexei Rykov.[15] This meant downplaying world revolutionary politics even though eventual world-wide Communist revolution was not given up as an ideological precept.

Because the internationally isolated Soviet Russia was a backward peasant land, the building process would have to be very gradual and slow. So, the Rights put heavy emphasis on the later Lenin's envisagement of a generation-long effort, via cultural revolution, to achieve the "cooperating of Russia." This element of Lenin's Bolshevism was foremost in their thinking and politics. There was a traditional Russian institution, the village commune or mir, still present in the Russia of the 1920s, on which they could rely as a basis for their "agrarian-cooperative socialism," as Bukharin called it. Rykov told his American journalist friend, Reswick,

> . . .if we, a backward people, stop playing at world revolution and organize our national life on the pattern of our traditional rural mir, the capitalist world will have no cause to fear us. On the contrary, it will be to their interest to supply Russia with arms, or even to join us if we are attacked by Japan or Germany.[16]

(b) The Revolutionary Internationalism of the Lefts

The left opposition was, as its leaders claimed when they styled themselves "Bolshevik-Leninists," truer to the revolutionary culture, less adaptable in their thinking and their politics. In particular, they clung to Lenin's revolutionary internationalism in their refusal to detach the internal Russian developmental process from the further course of international Communist revolution. Here they kept faith with Lenin's view that Russia's revolution could never have final success without support by socialist revolution in "one or several advanced countries."[17]

They were not opposed, meanwhile, to efforts toward socialism's construction in Russia, but did not take so sanguine a view of the peasantry as the Rights did and argued for more rapid industrialization through the imposition of a tax on the well-to-do minority of the farm population and encouraging the peasant poor to form collectives. But it never occurred to them, as we have noted, to crush peasant resistance to collectives by brute coercion in a blitzkrieg collectivization from above, driving an unwilling peasant majority into collective farms before productive resources were developed for large-scale farming.

Historical accuracy compels us to note, however, that earlier on, in 1920 as the Civil War ended, Trotsky had at least briefly advocated, in relation to the workers rather than the peasants, a draconian policy of militarized labor and coercion to work. It was impossible, he wrote in his pamphlet Terrorism and Communism (1920), to advance to socialist economy from bourgeois anarchy "without compulsory forms of economic organization." Further: "Repression for the attainment of economic ends is a necessary weapon of the socialist dictatorship."[18]

He and other supporters of such a policy line moved away from it under the ensuing NEP. But his little book may have had an appreciative reader in the party rival who was to become his nemesis and hound him to death in Mexico in 1940.

(c) The Stalin Phenomenon and Bolshevism

Divided as they were, both the Right and Left positions in post-Lenin Bolshevism were within the movement's mainstream. They both accused the other of atrocious deviation from Lenin's guidelines for future development, but neither deserved the other's indictment. The differences between them were, ultimately, significant differences of emphasis. The

Lefts wanted a faster tempo of economic development, partly because they were more inclined to see war as immiment, hence the time span for building a socialist economy as more limited.[19] But these supposed "super-industrializers" never imagined Stalinist collectivizing. Preobrazhensky, Trotsky's economist colleague, was reportedly aghast in 1930 at the ruthlessness being applied,[20] and later confessed: "Collectivization--this is the crux of the matter! Did I have this prognosis of the collectivization? I did not."[21]

What, then, of the Stalin phenomenon? Are we led back to the theory of a break with Bolshevism? I used to think so, but no longer. For Stalin, although no mainstreamer, was and remained a peculiar kind of Bolshevik revolutionary. He was at the very edge, he represented a fringe phenomenon of Bolshevism, but a fringe that grew dominant under his leadership at the close of the 1920s and did away with the mainstream people, along with millions of others, in the bloody terror of the later 1930s.

E. Stalin's Russian National Bolshevism

If the Rights represented a moderate form of national Bolshevism, in particular an adaptation of party policy to so traditional a Russian institution as the village mir, to peasant culture, Stalin stood for Russian national Bolshevism in a radical form: he represented the radical right, a blend of Bolshevik revolutionism with aggressive Great Russian nationalism, characterized by an arrogant pride in the Russian nation and its world destiny. What made Stalin a fringe phenomenon was precisely this Great Russian nationalism, something that had no place in Lenin's Bolshevism. Indeed, it so appalled Lenin, when he discovered it in Stalin in 1921-22, that he made preparations to expel Stalin from his position of power as the

party's general secretary at the forthcoming Twelfth Congress in early 1923; and it was probably only the stroke Lenin suffered in mid-March of that year which prevented him from carrying out his plan.[22] In "Notes on the Nationalities," dictated at the close of 1922, Lenin found Stalin to be one of those "Russified minority representatives" (Dzerzhinsky and Ordzhonikidze were others) who tended to "overdo it on the side of true-Russianism." Stalin, in particular, was a "rude Great Russian Derzhimorda," said Lenin in the notes. Lenin's Bolshevism had no place for such a man in the leadership of the party.

Yet, Stalin had a constituency in the party among those whom a delegate from the Ukraine, V.P. Zatonsky, speaking to the Tenth Party Congress in 1921 called "Russian Red patriots" -- Bolsheviks imbued with aggressive nationalist tendencies similar to those Lenin shortly afterwards found in Stalin.

In the sequel, Stalin developed his blend of Bolshevism and Great Russian nationalism into a policy orientation on a revolution from above in Soviet Russia. In the process he kept faith with the Leninist revolutionary culture while parting company with it in certain significant ways in the direction of old Russian culture. But the old Russian culture to which he made adaptation was not, as with the Rights, the culture of the village mir; it was the statist culture of Russian tsarism with its patterns of bureaucracy, autocracy, official nationalism, and revolutionism from above as exemplified by Tsar Peter in the early 18th century. One such pattern was serfdom, which Stalin restored in the 1930s in the frame of the kolkhoz.

All this shows just how very "fringe" a phenomenon Stalin and his policy orientation were from the standpoint of Lenin's Bolshevism. Still, there was much to which Stalin could and did appeal in Lenin's Bolshevism

as ideological warranty for the policies he pursued. One element of Leninist revolutionary culture in its development in 1917-18 was revolutionary statism, the use of state power as a club against the revolution's enemies and the resort to terror as one of the main means of such exercise of state power. Stalin placed great stress on Lenin's revolutionary statism, in theory and in practice, during the revolution from above; and there were plenty of passages from published and unpublished Lenin writings of the revolutionary years to which he could and did refer effectively in his claim to be acting according to the guidelines of Lenin's Bolshevism.

Lenin, had he been alive and free, would have objected: revolutionary statism and terror as its instrument, including concentration camps, were for use against class enemies of the revolution, not the mass constituency among the workers and peasants; for "kulaks" yes, but not for the mass of the middle peasantry against which Stalin was wielding the club of state power in collectivization. That was a large and important difference -- and would have ensured for Lenin a special cell in the Lubianka had he failed in his effort to unseat Stalin in 1923. But Stalin was still paying lip service to Lenin's view by claiming, falsely, that only "kulaks" were opposed to mass collectivization. The truth was that most of the peasant population was opposed to it, and saw in it the resurrected form of serfdom that it was. But was not Lenin, although a lawyer by training, responsible in large part for Stalin's capacity to twist the truth in this way? For he had made the concept of "enemy," or "enemy of the people," a dangerously flexible one which could easily be expanded because there were no clear criteria for its application. The legal culture of Lenin the lawyer found little if any place in the revolutionary culture of Lenin the Bolshevik.

What about Stalin's relation to Lenin's commitment to the international Communist revolution? Left Communism, we noted, kept faith with that strain in the revolutionary culture, whereas Right Communism faltered in its fidelity to world revolution. Stalin had a special position of his own. He showed already in his way of preaching the doctrine of "socialism in one country" in the mid-1920s that he was not, really, one of the Rights. For he kept insisting that while it was possible to construct a fully socialist society in an internationally isolated Soviet Russia, such a victory of socialism could not be "final," i.e., fully secure, unless revolutions occurred in some other countries. This telegraphed his commitment to the further spread of Communist revolution. But there was a large difference between his Bolshevism and Lenin's in this regard. Whereas Lenin's Bolshevism cast "advanced" countries in the role of revolutionary ones, Stalin's Russian national Bolshevism found neighboring ones, few of which would be so classed, as the candidates. It equated the further progress of the international Communist revolution with the aggrandizement of the Soviet Russian state. Stalin showed the seriousness of his commitment to this element of his blend of Bolshevik revolutionism with Great Russian nationalism by the foreign policy that he followed in Eastern Europe and elsewhere after World War II.

Where, then, do we stand on the issue: Stalinism versus Bolshevism? We arrive at the view that what has been called Stalinism is rightly seen as one of two post-Lenin varieties of Russian national Bolshevism. It fused elements of Lenin's Bolshevism with elements of Russian political culture out of the Tsarist tradition. Stalin's rule may therefore be described as marginally Bolshevik. It was not the fulfillment of Leninism that Stalin and others have claimed, but neither was it the

total break with Bolshevism that Trotsky and others have thought. Lenin himself would have certainly not have seen it as a fulfillment of his Bolshevism. He would have been right -- but also wrong because certain important elements of the revolutionary culture that he helped to father were emphasized, and indeed developed to grotesque lengths, under Stalin, who duly cited them as ideological warranty for actions undertaken by his regime. Where he would have been right is in excluding the aggressive Great Russian nationalism as outside the pale of his Bolshevism, and with it the fusion of Bolshevik revolutionism with Tsarist revolutionism from above. That amalgam was original with Stalin, so original that the Stalin phenomenon was no more than on the fringe of Bolshevism.

There were in the 1920s three Bolshevisms, not two. There were three directions of development. Only two were salient. The third, Stalin's orientation, was still latent and in its time of gestation within the movement. Its leader, however, won the succession struggle. And the nationalistically wayward Bolshevism that he carried within him became the Bolshevism that asserted itself in the Stalin era.

It should not surprise us that there were three forms of Bolshevism, not two. For does not the old Russian proverb remind us that Bog troitsu liubit -- God loves a trinity? Here, as in other cases, folk wisdom has truth on its side.

NOTES

[1]Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation, (ed.) R. C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), 3.

[2]L. Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1945), 244-48.

[3]Ibid., 277.

[4]N.Timashieff, The Great Retreat: The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1946), 348.

[5]R. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), 179-81.

[6]Biulleten' oppozitsii, no. 58-59, (Sept.-Oct. 1937), 11.

[7]The Soviet Political Mind, chapters 1, 2, 3, and 8.

[8]"A Test of the Three Factions," Writings of Leon Trotsky: 1932-33, (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972), 85.

[9]Ibid., 85.

[10]The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky: 1929-1940 (New York: Oxford University Press,), 93.

[11]Biulleten' oppozitsii, no. 15-16, (Sept.-Oct. 1930), 18.

[12]Ibid., no. 3-4, (Sept. 1929), 28.

[13]Ibid., no. 14, (August 1930), 27.

[14]Deutscher, op. cit., 96.

[15]N. Valentinov, Doktrina pravogo kommunizma (Munich, 1960), 16.

[16]William Reswick, I Dreamt Revolution (Chicago: Regnery, 1952) 255.

[17]Tenth Party Congress Speech, (March, 1921).

[18]cited in Baruch Knei-Paz, The Social and Political Thought of Trotsky, 266-67.

[19]A. Erlich, The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 37.

[20]Ibid., 178.

[21]Ibid., 177.

[22]cf. Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary (New York: W.W. Norton, 1973), chapter 7.

Comments by Peter Reddaway

I feel somewhat diffident about commenting on Robert Tucker's paper, as he knows much more about the subject and the period than I do. Having said that, let me add that I agree with about 80% of his paper, and won't spend time enthusing about his many perceptive points. I will, rather, present some doubts that I have about the remaining 20%. Hopefully most of these questions can be resolved during the discussion period so that at least broad agreement may be reached.

Bob stated that there have been "two and only two" broad positions on the nature of post-Lenin developments in the USSR, and later he says why he himself is now moving from one of these two positions to a third position, between the two that he has sketched out. I would like to suggest, first, that in fact most scholars occupy a position in this third area (which has a wide spectrum), and secondly that in fact the two other positions are occupied almost exclusively by people with very definite political axes to grind, who are not primarily scholars, and whose views are not therefore worth very much as regards broad theoretical debates of the sort that Bob is engaging in. I am not suggesting here, for a minute, that the writings of Soviet politicians are without value. On the contrary, especially when these writings are uncensored, they can be of enormous, unique value, precisely because the inner workings of the Soviet political system are normally so hidden from view. But the biases of these authors, as politicians, make them unsuitable for the delicate and difficult task of trying to make

theoretical judgements about history and politics.

Let us first look at the "break with Leninism" school, especially at the members of this school discussed by Bob. If we take Trotsky and his followers, the political motivation behind his theory of a break with Leninism is too clear and obvious for me to have to dwell on it. In any case, the theory is extremely unconvincing, as Bob shows in his paper, and as Stephen Cohen and others have shown at great length. As for Khrushchev, the political motivation behind his theory of a break is likewise extremely clear. His purpose in 1956 and subsequently was to discredit Stalin and the many surviving Stalinists, but at the same time to preserve the purity of Lenin and Leninism as models and legitimation for Khrushchev's own current policies. If one none-the-less examines Khrushchev'stheory of a break at face value, then his almost exclusive emphasis on Stalin's personality constitutes a naively monocausal explanation for Stalinism.

A third representative of the "break with Leninism" school discussed by Bob is the Moscow historian Roy Medvedev. Medvedev has undoubtedly performed great services for historians by collecting the rich materials assembled in his book Let History Judge. Nevertheless, the more theoretical parts of that book constitute, in my opinion, a quasi-scholarly, if less simplistic version of Khrushchev's theory. Medvedev's motivation in writing his book in the way he did also strikes me as being similar to Khrushchev's motivation. Bob reports that in his latest book Medvedev modifies his position, and it may thus be that this modification takes him to the borders of the "break with Leninism" school, or even over them -- into the third or middle position.

Fourth, Bob discussed Professor Timasheff's book of 1946, but here we have to remember that Timasheff died a long time ago and he might well have reconsidered his opinions in light of subsequent evidence, and might, as a result, have defected from the "break with Leninism" school, in the same way that Bob himself has now done.

Finally, Bob refers several times to Stephen Cohen, and I have reread for these remarks his stimulating and provocative essay on the same subject as Bob's paper, an essay published in the volume Stalinism, edited by Bob and published in 1977. Cohen uses a slightly broader formulation than Bob, discussing whether Stalinism was something qualitatively different from Bolshevism (not just from Leninism), and concluding that it definitely was. But although Cohen's argument is polemical and rather one-sided--concentrating mainly on the contrast between Stalin's policies after 1929 and those of both right and left in the preceding years--he does acknowledge statist elements in Bolshevik rule after 1917, and he also acknowledges that Stalin had a political base within the communist party, if not within its top leadership, for his policies of 1929 to 1933. To make this last, important point clear, let me quote a couple of sentences from Cohen's article which can easily be overlooked. "NEP had originated as an ignoble retreat in 1921, and resentment of NEP economics, politics, and culture continued throughout the 1920's. It was perpetuated in the heroic Bolshevik tradition of October and the Civil War, and probably strongest among cadres formed by the warfare experience of 1918 to 1920, and the younger party generation. Stalin would tap these real sentiments for his Civil War re-enactment of 1929 to 1933." Cohen might have phrased this passage more strongly had he

been in the position to read, in the mid 1970's, such later published memoirs as those of Lev Kopelev and General Grigorenko, both by nature humane and compassionate men, who, however, when young, were enthusiastic supporters of Stalin and his policies of 1929 to 1933. In any case, there are diverse enough elements in Cohen's view to suggest that he can hardly be assigned to the "break with Leninism" school without significant reservations.

To sum it up, therefore, this school appears to have few wholly committed adherents among scholars any more.

Let us turn now, then, to looking at the "fulfillment of Leninism" school. First, the political motivation of Stalin for plugging the line of this school is crystal clear and needs no elaboration from me. As for Alexander Solzhenitsyn, I think that his ideological and political motivation for doing the same thing, if in a completely different way, is also clear enough. In his view, the principles of Orthodox Christianity ought to be the basis of Russia's social and political order in the future. As the present regime's ideology of Marxism-Leninism is much too antithetical to Christianity to be revised, it must be wholly discarded. So Lenin, as the main authority behind Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet regime as a whole, must be discredited as the source of all the evils of the regime.

Now we come to the most interesting group of writers, namely those academics who wrote on the subject, mostly in the 1950's and 1960's. Bob mentions Merle Fainsod, also Kluckhohn and his co-authors, and Cohen lists many others, adding brief quotations from them. The charges against this diverse group of scholars are spelled out much more by

Cohen than by Bob, and consist of the sins of seeing history as a staight line, of historical determinism, of ignoring policy debates and policy alternatives premised on them, of putting inordinate stress on the allegedly decisive influence of ideology, of putting undue stress on the allegedly decisive influence of the principles of party organization, etc., etc. In doing all of this, Cohen does indeed document a considerable number of loose, overly deterministic phrases in the works of quite a few authors, and this is helpful. But does he sometimes quote these phrases somewhat out of context? Are the arguments of these authors really as deterministic as he implies? I don't think so. The clear implication is that these authors see in Leninism sufficient conditions for the later development of Stalin's rule, whereas, in fact, in my view, they are mostly simply pointing to some of the necessary conditions for his type of rule. In my opinion, these authors differ widely in what they regard these necessary conditions to have been, and also over what further conditions they regard as making up sufficient conditions for the emergence of Stalinism. Obvious examples of the latter are the persistence of Russian traditions of backwardness, Stalin's personality, etc. Many of these authors put particular stress on this last causal factor, Stalin's personality, and this fact, in itself, virtually removes them in my view from any straightforward assignment to the "fufilment of Leninism" school.

I might illustrate some of the foregoing points by taking as an example Leonard Schapiro, whose work I have recently been

rereading. Bob quoted Schapiro (in a recent talk here, not in today's paper) on the subject of Lenin's decisions of 1921 to establish a communist party monopoly of power and to ban factionalism within the party. Bob quoted Schapiro from his book The Origin of The Communist Autocracy, 1917-1922: "From his (Lenin's) fateful decision in the spring of 1921 flowed all the consequences of the one-party dictatorship which became apparent in the subsequent years of Soviet history." Bob criticizes this formulation, reasonably enough, as apparently implying a straight line of progression from Leninism to Stalinism. When, however, Schapiro wrote a book a little later, published in 1960, about these "subsequent years," namely his highly influential Communist Party of the Soviet Union, we do not find an exposition or an argument which implies a straight line of progression.

Writing the preface to this book on 1959, Schapiro said: "So much of what has happened to, and in, the party during Stalin's lifetime was in such large measure due to the personal characteristics of this one powerful man, that what I believe to be the essential features of this form of party government were at times eclipsed or obscured. The events of the last six years have, at any rate, given us some indication of those features which seem to belong to the essential quality of the party and are part of its tradition (the fact that it is above the law, for example) and of those which are apparently more bound up with the idiosyncrasies of the particular man, for example, the use of mass terror."

To sum it up, then, I see Schapiro and many other scholars as occupying a third area between the two sketched by Bob, a third

broad area in which Bob has now joined them.

None of this means that I do not agree with Bob that there is not enough research and debate in this whole rich field. Such debate is, happily, sure to be stimulated in the near future by Bob's forthcoming book on Stalin between 1929 and 1939, which will explore the role of Stalin's personality more thoroughly and no doubt more imaginatively than has ever been done before.

To lead me into the last section of my remarks, let me quote again from Schapiro, as Bob did in a recent talk here, taking a passage from Schapiro's introduction to the volume which he and I edited in 1967 called, Lenin: The Man, the Theorist, the Leader. Schapiro writes that while the consequences of Lenin's actions at the tenth congress were disastrous for the USSR, "it is also true that he probably never foresaw, let alone intended them; and it is virtually certain that, had he lived, he would have followed a very different course from Stalin." Personally, I do not regard speculation of that rather definite sort as very helpful or even academically justifiable. To put it another way, it is an intriguing intellectual game, but no more-- justifiable only as a provocative throw-away line. Yet Bob gives us an even more definite and even more dubious (in my view) piece of speculation on the last page of today's paper. Here he writes that Lenin would never have considered in the late 1920's "the fusion of Bolshevik revolutionism with Tsarist revolution from above." Such fusion, and also "aggressive Great Russian nationalism," would have been regarded by Lenin as "outside the pale of his Bolshevism." Bob's speculation about Russian

nationalism seems plausible enough to me, although its relevance to Stalin's fateful decisions of 1929 seems minimal, as Russian Nationalism was not mobilized in a decisive way until a little later. But was the "fusion of Bolshevik revolutionism with tsarist revolutionism from above" really beyond the pale for Lenin?

What was the building up by Lenin of the centralized hierarchies of the party and the state but the creation of a centrally controlled apparatus of political control which was at least as efficient as the tsarist one? What was the organizing of a highly centralized and highly hierarchical Red Army but the creation of an analogue to the most powerful instrument of the tsarist government? What was the Red Army's invasion of Poland but an attempt to export revolution by the force of the state? What was War Communism but the calculated and brutal use of state power against the peasantry, and by no means only (as Bob seems to imply) the kulaks? What was the physical crushing of the Tambov peasant uprising and the Kronstadt sailors' revolt but a similar use of state power? What were the introduction of one-man management into the factories and the subordination of the trade unions to the state but the imposition of a considerably tighter state control over the working class than the tsarist regime ever achieved, or even aspired to? And so on....

Bob acknowledges some of these points in his paper, so I am all the more puzzled by his generalization quoted above.

My own generalizing point, though, is this: Lenin's instincts and genius lay in gaining, then preserving the Bolshevik party's monopolistic

power and in doing this by bold and flexible means. The political situation was becoming increasingly difficult for the Bolsheviks in the late 1920's. The status quo was increasingly uncomfortable and unviable. The revolution was running out of steam and momentum. Further retreat, along the lines of NEP, was out of the question; but how to advance? How can we possibly know what policies Lenin would have gone for in such circumstances? We cannot. But we can hardly exclude the possibility of his using some sort of "fusion of Bolshevik revolutionism with tsarist revolutionism from above" to try to regenerate essential revolutionary momentum.

Some of my points about Bob's most interesting paper probably derive from my not having fully understood certain of his points. But most of these can, hopefully, be resolved in the discussion.

A Comment on Peter Reddaway's Comments

Robert C. Tucker

Reading Peter's comments now, some time after I heard him deliver them aloud during the Kennan Institute colloquium of January 1984 in which I presented my paper, I wonder about his initial statement that he is in agreement with about 80% of the paper and has doubts with the remaining 20%. I fear that his characteristic kindness and courtesy toward a colleague led him to say this and that the real ratio of agreement and doubt might roughly be the reverse of the figures given.

Peter contests a basic thesis of the paper: that opinion on the developments under Stalin generally divides into two opposed positions: the fulfillment-of-Leninism school and the break-with-Leninism school. He does so on two grounds. One is that "most scholars occupy a position in the third area..." His evidence for this view, apart from the suggestion that Timasheff, had he lived longer, might have reconsidered his opinions, consists of references to statements by Stephen Cohen, whom my paper classifies as a leading scholarly representative of the break-with-Leninism school, and with Leonard Shapiro, who, although unmentioned in the paper, is taken by Peter to be among the scholars whom I would place in the fulfillment-of-Leninism school.

I do not find this evidence persuasive. First, if "most scholars" take a position in the third area, in which I nowadays stake out my own, I miss at least a sentence listing the names of several more of them. Such a listing would have been all the more appropriate in view of the questionable use of Cohen as an example of a third-position scholar. For the essay containing the statements by Cohen which Peter cites is perhaps the most forceful, eloquent, and fully documented attack in the scholarly literature on what Cohen calls the

"continuity" thesis and I the "fulfillment-of-Leninism" school; and to take those two qualifying sentences by Cohen as evidence of his being a third-position scholar seems unwarranted. As for Schapiro, the statements by him that Peter cites show him to have come, later in his scholarly life, to a questioning of the "fulfillment-of-Leninism" position, but not really to the formulation of a new third position. Hence, I do not see that Peter has made a strong case for his view about where "most scholars" stand.

His second ground for differing with the paper's basic thesis is that the two opposing positions are not taken by scholars but "almost exclusively by people with very definite political axes to grind," i.e., by people such as Stalin, Khrushchev, Trotsky, Solzhenitsyn and Medvedev, all of whom are mentioned in the paper. The implicit suggestion is that a scholar is dispassionate, not emotionally involved in the political events under consideration in his scholarly work. Scholarship and fanaticism, I agree, do not go well together. But having agreed with Peter to that degree, I also differ with him in that I don't believe that even an intense emotional involvement in one's subject need exclude the objectivity required for real scholarship, especially if one is aware of the feelings in question. Roy Medvedev's strong political feelings against Stalin didn't stand in the way of his making very valuable contributions to scholarship in Let History Judge, nor did Trotsky's hatred of what he called "Stalinism" prevent him from producing an analysis of the Stalinist phenomenon in The Revolution Betrayed which, whether one takes it as adequate or not (and I happen not to) remains even now of interest to the scholarly historian. To cap the argument, I would cite the case of Peter Reddaway, whose invaluable Uncensored Russia and (with Sidney Bloch) Psychiatric Terror: How Soviet Psychiatry is Used to Suppress Dissent are not one whit lessened in their

scholarly significance by the fact that Peter--and in this he can serve as a model for us all--is involved in every emotional fiber of his being with a serious political concern: the fate of freedom in Russia.

The last section of Peter's remarks, in which he contends that, given his ruthless use of the state in the revolutionary period, Lenin might well have gone Stalin's way in fusing "Bolshevik revolutionism with Tsarist revolution from above" had he lived and stayed in power into the late 1920s, suggests to my mind that, underneath, Peter's sympathies lie with the fulfillment-of-Leninism school. For this is an argument for the continuity of Stalin's policies in the 1930s with Leninism. Since the paper itself makes my position clear on that issue (I hope), I won't repeat the argument here except to add the following.

Such a fusion would have been impossible for Lenin because the Great Russian nationalism which made it natural for Stalin to go in that direction was utterly foreign to Lenin's political makeup. That Lenin was no democrat and stood for a strong, authoritarian, one-party Bolshevik state is beyond doubt. But a Bolshevik party dictatorship is one thing, and the Stalin-led Soviet state that carried through the mass-collectivization by terror in 1929-1933, which Stalin proudly styled a revolution "from above" in his 1938 Short Course of party history, is something else again--as shown, inter-alia, by the revulsion that many still surviving Old Bolsheviks of Lenin's stripe felt toward the terrorizing of the peasantry. If Lenin took seriously what he wrote in his last articles about the need for a generation-long peaceful cultural revolution to prepare the peasantry for cooperatives in the country-side, and I believe that he did and that nothing in the Soviet situation of the late 1920s would have changed his mind on that, then he could not and would not have acted, as party leader, in the way that Stalin did. He would not have fused his Bolshevik revolutionism with Tsarist revolution from above.

Peter Reddaway's Final Comments

Three last comments (for my part) will, I hope, clarify my position regarding this interesting discussion:

1. I agree with Bob's remarks about the usefulness for scholars of the writings of some politically engagé writers.

2. Exhaustive research into which scholars have seen Stalinism as a break with Leninism, which as a fulfillment of it, and which as a mixture of the two, would constitute a large project. I have now examined the writings of a further dozen, in addition to those mentioned in my earlier comments. Of this dozen, only Moshe Lewin, it seems, can be assigned to the break-with-Leninism school (where I also locate Stephen Cohen, if with slight reservations). And only Adam Ulam and Theodore von Laue appear to be assignable to the fulfillment school.

The remaining nine strike me as standing, with Schapiro, in various positions between these two ends of the spectrum. They are, with selective references: Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (1982, pp. 153-56); Jerry Hough in Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed (1979, p. 107); Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (1963, pp. 147-48, 160); Bertram Wolfe, Communist Totalitarianism (1961, pp. XII, 278); Roger Pethybridge, The Social Prelude to Stalinism (1974, pp. 310-317); Georg von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia (1957, pp. 190, 428); Robert Conquest, V. I. Lenin (1972, pp. 122-23, 129, 132, 142-43); Louis Fischer, The Life of Lenin (1964, p. 657); and George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," in his American Diplomacy (1951, p. 110).

I am not saying that all these scholars deploy elaborate positions on the issue at hand, but, rather, that for a variety of reasons they cannot be assigned to either of the clear-cut schools. On a highly hypothetical question

they see--explicitly or implicitly--conflicting evidence, ambiguities and uncertainties.

3. Jerry Hough (with whom I do not agree on many issues) conveys all this well in a passage which is worth quoting at length. My broad agreement with its argument will, I hope, answer Bob's last point and convince him that my sympathies do not in fact lie in any committed way with the fulfillment school. While I incline in that direction, I ultimately remain agnostic. Hough writes:

> "If we are to engage in speculation--and the temptation is always overwhelming--then the basic conclusion of the third edition of this book (How the Soviet Union is Governed) on this point will not differ greatly from that of earlier editions (i.e., M. Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, 1953 and 1963). The continuing debate within the leadership and even within the party press at the end of Lenin's life, as well as Lenin's continuing reluctance to deal harshly with party dissidents, is a fact, but it must be balanced against the trend in policy toward opposition. It is extremely difficult to imagine that Lenin would have followed Stalin's policy of mass executions, but the imminent debates on the pattern of industrialization provided ample opportunity for major disagreements within the party and the party leadership. It is easy to imagine that Lenin would have characterized persistent opponents on these questions as "oppositions," as "factions," and that he would have dealt with them as he did with the Workers' Opposition.
>
> "It is also quite possible that Lenin would have felt compelled to take strong action against the well-to-do peasants if he were faced with the same dilemmas, the same posing of the question, with which his successors had to grapple shortly after his death. In the abstract, NEP could be seen as a natural, long-term road to socialism, but in the short-run, it led not to the disappearance of classes in the countryside, but to a strengthening of the position of the efficient (and, therefore, relatively better-off) peasant vis-á-vis the inefficient (and, therefore, poorer) one. In 1923, Lenin wrote about the peasantry in general, but as the class consequences of policy became clearer, he might have reacted more negatively--as, indeed, did his widow. Moreover, in his last articles Lenin also showed much concern about the international position of the Soviet Union, and, as we shall see, such a concern was to be a powerful justification for drastic rates of industrialization." (p. 107)

Reply to Peter Reddaway's Final Comments

In closing the exchange, I take satisfaction in noting that the gap between Peter Reddaway and me has grown smaller. Now a further move toward reduction is in order on my part.

The one significant issue remaining has to do with classifying positions. My paper holds that opinions on Russia's development under Stalin divide sharply between the continuity school and the discontinuity one. Peter's final comments and the sources he cites do not disprove to my satisfaction that such a duality characterizes the literature.

They do, though, strengthen the case for the view that my paper draws the antithesis between the schools too sharply, or fails to make a necessary qualification to the effect that some writers show discomfort with the antithesis because, as Peter says, they see "conflicting evidence, ambiguities and uncertainties." In Hough's case, which Peter cites, the question whether Lenin would have gone Stalin's way is left open, with a slight suggestion that he might have done so due to circumstances. Fitzpatrick, while mentioning evidence for discontinuity, comes down in The Russian Revolution on the other side ("For historians, however, there is still a great deal to be said for emphasizing continuity," p. 154). Peter's conclusion is that while these and other writers do not necessarily "deploy elaborate positions" on the continuity/discontinuity issue, neither can they be assigned to "either of the clear-cut schools".

One reason why this or that writer may not be assignable to one or another position is that he or she does not take a position on the issue but only raises it as a question. Hence, the evidence to