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U.S.-SOVIET GLOBAL RIVALRY  
AND WESTERN EUROPE

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## I. Introduction

The loss of military superiority by the United States, especially strategic nuclear superiority, and the simultaneous emergence of the Soviet Union not only as an equal military power, but a global power as well, has introduced new strains and stresses in the Western Alliance, which are fundamentally and qualitatively different from those that previously existed. The growth of Soviet military power, both in range and magnitude, has served first to weaken both U.S. power and responsibility in Europe, undermining European credibility in America's deterrent capabilities in Europe and, second, to increase U.S. responsibility and military burdens in other regions of the world: The Middle East, Central America, East and Southeast Asia, and Africa. The emergence of the Soviet Union as a global power has thus forced a stretching of U.S. capabilities and responsibilities which feed back to seriously affect the military and psychological balance in Europe.

Decreased U.S. military power in Europe and increased responsibility around the globe interact to impel a restructuring of NATO's geographical jurisdiction and a redistribution and redivision of military burdens and functions among the members of the Western Alliance. Now that both European alliance systems are led by global powers with interests, responsibilities and ambitions around the globe, the global rivalry of the two global powers inevitably results in the involvement of their alliance partners in their global activities, which, in turn, is resisted with varying degrees of success by the alliance partners in both instances.

Although there are some similarities in the involvement of the two European alliance systems in global concerns, there are some important differences. Unlike the Warsaw Alliance, which consists of a number of small and medium powers, under the direction of a hegemonial global power, the Western Alliance is more differentiated in the character of its members. At least four members, Britain, France, West Germany and Italy, are substantial powers in their own right, and, until recently, were the Great Powers of the international system. Two, France and Britain, are also separate nuclear powers, with their own national nuclear forces. West Germany is an economic-technological giant, which generates the fourth largest GNP in the world. The other members are relatively small and more closely resemble the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Alliance in size.

Furthermore, all of the Western European members of the Alliance, except for Denmark and Norway, are former colonial powers, some of which still retain residual extra-European interests, and concerns in various parts of the world, stemming from their former colonial power status. In contrast, none of the members of the Warsaw Treaty Alliance have any such separate and independent extra-European interests, and their involvement in global activities is almost entirely a consequence of their association with the Soviet Union.

## II. European Regionalism and American Globalism in Conflict.

The separate and distinct interests and concerns of Western European states, especially France and Britain, in areas outside Europe, does not necessarily render their reinvolved in global power politics as an adjunct to American global competition with



the Soviet Union any easier, but, in fact, may make it even more difficult. European security concerns are concentrated in Europe, particularly security concerns relevant to the alliance as a whole. Individual members of the alliance have separate and discrete isolated interests in other parts of the world, which are of little or no concern to other members of the alliance. The most recent example was the British-Argentine war over the Falkland Islands. Earlier examples would be the French War in Algeria and the Portuguese attempt to retain their African empire. To be sure, the military drain which extra-European wars and interests impose on alliance members is a source of concern, but the substance of their extra-European interests have been of little direct relevance to the NATO Alliance.

Thus, there is a general tendency for Western Europeans to perceive American Global interests as simply an extended variant of the extra-European concerns of a NATO member, albeit, in this case, the leader of the Alliance, which, at the same time, is not a European state in the regional or geographic sense. Although the alliance is based upon a region defined as "North Atlantic," rather than European, Western Europeans have generally tended to regard it as essentially a European Alliance, and the obligation of Western Europe to come to the defense of North America (i.e., Canada and the United States) has never been seriously explored, largely because it was considered unnecessary.

The United States, on the other hand, as a global power, has tended to view NATO as simply another link, the most important, to be sure, in its system of global alliances, designed to deter contain or repel Soviet expansion and power anywhere in the world.

For the United States, especially now, the Soviet challenge is global, and its focus of intensity can shift from one region of the world to another, as opportunities manifest themselves, with Europe being one of the regions, the most important, to be sure. Thus, whereas Europeans tend to define NATO's responsibilities in regional/geographic terms, the United States tends to define NATO's functions in ideological terms. For Europe, NATO's function is to defend its members against the Soviet Union; for the United States, NATO is part of a global apparatus, designed to protect the "free world" from Soviet power. Europeans, however, tend to view this as an attempt by the United States to universalize its interests as a global power and see little relevance for European security in Soviet-American competition in Central America, Southern Africa, Afghanistan or Southeast Asia. Only when the Persian Gulf region is involved do Europeans acknowledge a direct interest, but even here it is assumed that the United States should be more or less exclusively involved in its military dimensions.

Extending NATO responsibilities beyond Europe has been an issue which has surfaced from time to time in the past, but never at the level of global involvements. It assumes this form now primarily because the growth of Soviet power, both in Europe and elsewhere, has been such that the United States, by itself, is no longer capable of sustaining the existing burden of defending Europe and devoting greater attention and effort to the Soviet challenge elsewhere. Hence, pressures upon the Europeans from the United States assume two forms: (1) That Europe assume a larger share of the costs and burdens of their own defense; (2) that Europe assume a greater role and responsibility in U.S. global rivalry with the Soviet Union in other parts of the world.

Europeans are reluctant to do either for a number of reasons and, as a consequence, cleavages and fissures have developed, not only between the United States and Europe, but between individual members of the alliance, and even between different political parties and constituencies in individual member states. Europeans resist the "globalization" of the NATO Alliance and resent what they perceive as an American threat to decouple its security interests from those of Western Europe, unless Western Europe couples its security interests with American global responsibilities, which, in turn would transform Soviet/American global rivalry into a Soviet/Western global competition. Europeans, in general, do not want the risk of war in Europe to be increased because of confrontations elsewhere; Soviet-American confrontations alone, over Afghanistan and Central America, already create considerable uneasiness, since they could feed back to involve Europe because of the American connection. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan resulted in the first explicit and systematic attempt by the United States to pressure Western Europe to participate in sanctions against the Soviet Union over an issue considered to be remote and peripheral to European security interests and inimical to European economic, cultural and other interests involving the Soviet Union. Furthermore, each Western European country had its own discrete interests in not complicating its relations with Moscow over an issue that was perceived as insubstantial.

Western Europeans, furthermore, differed with the United States with respect to the Polish events and, once again, resisted involvement in American designed sanctions against both Warsaw and Moscow. The reluctance of Europeans to become involved was

viewed by many quarters in the U.S. as latent manifestations of "Finlandization," or excessive European parochialism in the definition of their interests, whereas many Europeans viewed American behavior as simply another attempt by the U.S. to involve Western Europe in American global activities.

### III. U.S. Globalism and West European Security

Europeans perceive the defense of Western Europe essentially as an isolated and separable issue from Soviet ambitions elsewhere and are not predisposed to perceive the expansion of Soviet power and influence elsewhere as necessarily inimical to Western European security. Deterring the expansion of Soviet power in inner Asia or Southern Africa is not viewed as directly linked to deterring Soviet expansion in Europe. The United States, on the other hand, generally takes the view that the intrusion of Soviet power must be deterred everywhere, or it will be deterred nowhere. Refusal to respond to Soviet expansion in the Middle East or Central America, will undermine the credibility of resisting the threat of Soviet aggression in Europe. Essentially, many Europeans share with Moscow the view that detente and the relaxation of tensions in Europe can be isolated from confrontations and tensions elsewhere in contrast to the general American position that a "linkage" exists between detente in Europe and Soviet "misbehavior" elsewhere. Naturally, Moscow has seized upon this shared perception and emphasizes the isolation<sup>of</sup> European issues from general global issues. It perceives the cleavages and fissures that have developed in the Western Alliance and the increasing anxiety in some European quarters that the coupling of American and West European security increases the danger for Western Europe, rather than diminishes it.

The degrading of American nuclear power as an instrument of deterrence into one of defense, because of the changes in the global and European nuclear balance, is also a source of considerable anxiety to many Europeans and an opportunity for Moscow to exploit.

IV. In Search of Alternative Western Security Arrangements

Although the deployment of American Pershing IIs in West Germany and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMS) in Britain, Italy and West Germany has determined, for the short run at least, that Western Europe will continue to rely upon American nuclear power to deter a Soviet military move westwards and thus shield Western Europe from intimidation and political submission, the problem of defending Europe militarily if deterrence fails remains uncertain. West Europeans have made it quite clear that they do not wish to be defended against Soviet military assault with nuclear weapons, whose function has been perceived to deter war, not win it. With the achievement of strategic military parity by the Soviet Union and possibly regional nuclear superiority in Europe with the deployment of the SS-20s, many Europeans were becoming convinced that the United States would not put its own cities and populations at risk by responding to a Soviet attack in Europe with nuclear weapons launched from the United States.

The NATO two track decision adopted in 1979 was designed first to deter further Soviet deployment of intermediate range missiles (SS-20s) and indeed to persuade Moscow to dismantle them through negotiation. If negotiations failed, NATO would proceed to counter the Soviet deployment with a force of American intermediate range missiles, made up of 108

Pershing II's (based in West Germany) and 464 cruise missiles based in West Germany, Italy, Britain, Netherlands, and Belgium.

Although the two track decision was designed to reassure West Europeans that a European based American INF capability would be more effective in deterring the Soviet Union, many West Europeans increasingly felt that it increased the possibility of nuclear war if deterrence failed, since the United States might use its European nuclear force to localize a nuclear conflict in Europe. Imperceptibly, American strategy shifted from the concept of nuclear deterrence to nuclear defense, which came to a head during the early months of the Reagan Administration when high American spokesmen, including the President himself, publicly ruminated about the possibility of limiting a nuclear conflict to Europe in the event deterrence failed. Anti-nuclear sentiment and movements accelerated in Europe, especially in West Germany and Britain, where they gained the support of the Social Democrats and the Labour Party. The Labour Party actually adopted a platform of denuclearizing Britain completely, and the German Social Democratic Party reversed itself by voting overwhelmingly in the German Parliament against the deployment of American missiles in West Germany.

Michael Howard has persuasively argued that the American umbrella was designed primarily to provide Western Europe with reassurance that its power would be sufficient to deter a Soviet military attack, not to defend it with nuclear weapons. The reassurance which American nuclear weapons provided was the guarantee that their existence would prevent nuclear war, not unleash it. As long as the United States was perceived as possessing overwhelming nuclear superiority, the magic of deterrence in Europe continued to function; but once the Soviet Union achieved global parity and European superiority in nuclear

weapons the American nuclear umbrella was perceived as increasingly promising not deterrence but either an American retreat or a nuclear war with the Soviet Union on European soil in the event deterrence failed, a prospect that hardly served to reassure large sectors of West European publics and indeed a substantial share of American sentiment as well.

If negotiations with the Soviet Union fail to resolve the Euro-missile issue and American deployment of Pershing IIs and Cruise Missiles continues on schedule the credibility of even an American INF force in Europe may erode in the face of growing protests as the issue increasingly becomes one of avoiding nuclear war altogether. This has, of course, created grist for the Soviet propaganda mill, but at the same time has stimulated a search for other safer and more reassuring Western nuclear and non-nuclear options. Non-nuclear options, in turn, presuppose that, if the West refrains from using nuclear weapons, the Soviet side will reciprocate. But as long as nuclear weapons exist, their use is possible, and no amount of unilateral self-restraint can guarantee their non-use by the other side. Thus, a non-nuclear deterrent must be sufficient to simultaneously threaten a level of punishment that renders any Soviet military move unprofitable, or if such a deterrent fails, to be sufficient to repulse a Soviet military assault without provoking the Soviet use of nuclear weapons to prevent defeat. This is indeed a tall order.

Alternative deterrent strategies could cover a wide spectrum of choices, which could expand the geographical area of response, or restrict response to Europe; enhance European participation in joint U.S./European strategies, decouple European security from dependence upon American nuclear power, recouple it to American global strategies, in which Soviet assets around the globe would be subject to retaliation for Soviet military actions in Europe, and finally strategies which could be nuclear or non-nuclear in nature.

Aside from existing strategies which rely for the most part upon U.S. strategic forces, at least seven other possible options can be considered, four of which are nuclear and three are non-nuclear:

1. U.S. INF Force (in progress).
2. Enhanced British/French Nuclear Forces Protecting NATO members.
3. All-NATO Nuclear Force:
4. Independent National Nuclear Forces, including a West German National Nuclear Force;

5. Enhanced NATO Conventional Defense Force
6. NATO Conventional Retaliatory Force
7. Enhanced European Territorial Defense Forces (Partisan-type Guerrilla Warfare Capability).

Some of these alternatives would serve to decouple Europe from the American strategic forces altogether, thus insulating Europe from Soviet American rivalry elsewhere and allow Europe to make the ultimate decisions concerning its fate. These alternatives would give up the assurance of American involvement, but from the Soviet perspective might be viewed as more effective and credible than strategies involving risking American cities. Lessened assurance of American involvement would be traded off for greater reassurance for Europeans--reassurance that Soviet American global confrontation will not provoke a nuclear war in Europe. Other alternatives would continue to rely upon the American strategic force as a reserve for escalation control.

Although the Soviet Union's most valuable assets are in Europe, the Soviet Union is no longer a simple, extended territorial empire, but is now a global power with allied and client states in various parts of the world distant from the Soviet Union. Although Europeans have become almost obsessively concerned about being involved in Soviet-American global rivalries, the global character of the Soviet imperial system inevitably involves it in activities that can seriously affect the interests of Western Europe. To date, the Western Europeans have been content to allow the United States to protect their interests in other parts of the world against Soviet encroachment while resisting involvement. A purely American defense of Western European interests around the globe is increasingly becoming as difficult as a purely American nuclear deterrent in Europe.

Just as Soviet strengths have proliferated globally, so have its vulnerabilities. Accordingly, the defense of Western Europe may conceivably be more effectively enhanced by threatening assets outside Europe, which may be both valuable and vulnerable in contrast to Europe itself, where Soviet assets are indeed valuable but also considerably less vulnerable, and hence more dangerous to threaten.



Of course, the military balance as perceived by the Soviet leaders serves to determine not only the value of the assets to be protected, exchanged or surrendered, but also to shape the mode and circumstances of their disposition.

V. Soviet Perceptions of the Effectiveness of Western Deterrent Options

In evaluating the relative and comparative effectiveness of various Western deterrent strategies for Europe, the most important factor in the equation is an accurate assessment of what Soviet leaders perceive as the most effective deterrent strategy. As in many similar instances, this involves the extremely difficult and intricate business of making perceptions about perceptions, i.e., a perception of what the Soviet leaders perceive to be the most effective deterrent. One need not be enveloped more deeply in the almost limitless conceptual and cognitive problems that are involved in the process of analyzing perceptions about perceptions, except to say, ultimately, one must also delve into the problem of Soviet perceptions of Western perceptions of their perceptions, and so on ad infinitum. Recognizing the problem does not solve it, but simply alerts us to the methodological fragility and provisionality of any assessment, which finally rests upon a combination of informed and intuitive judgment rather than absolute empirical proof.

The first issue to be tackled is to determine what is being deterred in Europe, and whether Western perceptions of what is being deterred

and Soviet perceptions of what is being deterred correlate with Soviet intentions, or are based upon an assessment of Soviet military capabilities from which a range of possible intentions are inferred or imputed. This is not always an easy matter and misperceptions are always a hazard as a consequence. Granted, it is frequently easier to measure military capabilities and deduce a range of possible options than to decipher intentions, and most often strategies are developed to cope with a range of military options which capabilities will support rather than settle upon a single intent.

Western military deterrent strategies generally focus on deterring a Soviet military invasion of Western Europe. This is usually determined by assessing whether Soviet capabilities are in fact sufficient to execute such an invasion successfully. And as long as Soviet capabilities are of such magnitude to carry out an invasion, that option must be deterred, even if that may not be Soviet intent.

Many observers seriously question whether the Soviet Union has ever contemplated a pure, direct military invasion and conquest of Western Europe. Rather, the view is that Soviet military capabilities are developed primarily for national defense, the preservation of its control over Eastern Europe, and to deter, nullify, or repel any attempt to employ force or the threat of force to prevent the Soviet Union from carrying out its foreign policy and ideological objectives by non-military means or a combination of political, social and military means.

Such an imputation of Soviet intent does not presuppose a purely defensive or benign posture, but assumes that Soviet behavior will be assertive, expansionist but not always necessarily aggressive. Such a view assumes that Soviet military capabilities at various levels

and in different regions are for the purpose of primarily providing a protective umbrella over its policies throughout the globe, in order to deter or repel any attempt to contain or limit its expansion by military means. This means that the use of Soviet military power as a direct means of conquest is likely to be considerably lower than its use as an auxiliary, reserve or supplementary force in conjunction with other means. Its employment is more apt to be indirect than direct: in the first place to nullify any attempt to contain its expansion and in the second place to discourage U.S. and Western efforts to use military force to thwart or reverse what Soviet leaders refer to as "the social processes of history."

But what are "the social processes of history," which the Soviet leaders wish to unleash and protect in Western Europe? The evolution of Eurocommunism in Western Europe, particularly in Italy and Spain, and the unattractiveness of the Soviet model of progress or the pursuit of progress through revolution in Western Europe, would appear to contravene Soviet presuppositions of latent "social processes of history," which are exploitable in Western European countries. But, if the views of some revisionist and Marxist American historians of the "Cold War" are a guide--and they are--the Soviet leaders may be persuaded that American military power in Europe since World War II was designed precisely to demoralize, dampen and eventually force the distortions of historical processes in Western Europe. The primary function of NATO from the Soviet point of view was neither to repel a Soviet invasion or even to prepare an attack upon Soviet positions in Eastern Europe (in spite of its propaganda), but has been from the very beginning to preserve the social and political status quo in

Western Europe and to encourage the resurgence of counter-revolution ferment in Eastern Europe, to which it might extend "assistance."

Thus, the Soviet perception of the role of American power in Europe and NATO is the mirror image of the role of Soviet military power and the Warsaw Alliance: to preserve the social and political status quo in Eastern Europe and to encourage the development of domestic revolutionary and progressive tendencies in Western Europe, to which it might extend "assistance." The difference, from the Soviet point of view, is that NATO and American power are employed to thwart and reverse history, whereas Soviet power is designed to unfetter history so that it might pursue its inevitable processes, which allegedly are in congruence with Soviet political and ideological objectives. Soviet military forces must remain free to perform the "international duty." That is why Soviet leaders have tended to find mutual deterrence tolerable if not precisely preferable, whereas they reject the concept of equal or symmetrical deterrence as an acceptable Soviet normative objective. Most Western observers tend to stress the mutuality of deterrence and neglect the condition of equality, or assume that equality is encompassed by the concept of mutuality. For the Soviets mutual and symmetrical deterrence would mean accepting the status quo, to which they have repeatedly stated they are opposed. Indeed, the U.S.S.R. explicitly seeks to change the status quo and its spokesmen ruminate periodically about the need to restructure the international system and consistently reiterate their commitment to a universal socialist order. To accept mutual and symmetrical (i.e., equal) deterrence, from the Soviet point of view, would be tantamount to accepting "self-containment." On more than one occasion, and in the presence of Western leaders, Soviet leaders from Brezhnev and Andropov on down have insisted that history has ordained the imperative of change in a certain pre-determined direction and that neither detente nor peaceful co-existence can or should be interpreted as a Soviet commitment to refrain from encouraging revolution to say nothing of opposing it.

This ideological imperative have been increasingly linked to 14  
Soviet conceptions of defense and security and is defined as a military  
obligation. Thus, in 1974, the former Soviet Defense Minister,  
Marshal A. A. Grechko, said:

At the present stage, the historic function of the Soviet Armed Forces is not restricted to their function in defending our Motherland and the other socialist countries. In its foreign policy activity the Soviet state purposefully opposes the export of counter revolution and the policy of oppression, supports the national liberation struggle, and resolutely resists imperialists' aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear.

Thus, the Soviet leadership perceives as part of its defense function the deterrence of the "export of counter revolution," while it seeks to preserve the unilateral right to avoid the deterrence of its support for "national liberation movements" (i.e., the "export of revolution"), which under any rubric is a demand for an asymmetrical deterrence in its favor.

These obligations have now been enshrined in the new 1977 Constitution and thus have been converted from ideological commitments into state obligations. In an entirely new Chapter on Foreign Policy, the 1977 Soviet Constitution, under Article 28, defines the goals of Soviet foreign policy as follows:

The foreign policy of the USSR is aimed at ensuring international conditions favorable for building communism in the USSR, safeguarding the state interests of the Soviet Union, consolidating the positions of world socialism, supporting the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social progress, preventing wars of aggression, achieving universal and complete disarmament, and consistently implementing the principle of peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems.

It would be reasonable to assume that the seven distinct goals of Soviet foreign policy as enumerated in Article 28 are listed in order of priority and precedence, in which case the support of national liberation movements has a conspicuously higher priority than either arms control or peaceful co-existence, a matter of no small importance that has serious implications in terms of defining

the parameters of future arms control agreements that are acceptable to the Soviet Union.

And more recently the links between ideology, prestige, great power status, and security were articulated in even more graphic language. In an interview with Joseph Kraft, the influential Soviet journalist, Alexander Bovin, in response to a Kraft query as to whether Russia would collapse if Poland were allowed a greater latitude of internal political autonomy, gave a concrete meaning to the words "consolidating the positions of world socialism:"

It is not a matter of our physical security...It is a matter of relations between a great power and smaller states that are socialist states. Not only security is at stake but ideology as well. For example, if Lech Walesa became leader of Poland, Poland would leave the Warsaw Pact. That would not be a threat to our physical security, but it would be a terrible loss of prestige. It would be like what happened to you in Iran. When the United States was thrown out of Iran, the United States lost prestige everywhere.

The Soviet leadership has tended to accept mutual deterrence at the strategic level, since the likely alternative is a mutually catastrophic nuclear war. There is little question but that the Soviet leadership has as one of its highest priorities the avoidance of nuclear war, but not at the expense of abandoning Soviet ideological and system expansion if at all possible. Thus, Moscow continues to resist mutual deterrence at levels below the strategic, and insists upon asymmetrical deterrence whereby it seeks to deter at these levels without being deterred in turn. This explains why the Soviet leaders have consistently rejected "linkage," which they read to mean a unilateral American attempt to impose upon the Soviet Union mutual deterrence at sub-strategic levels in return for an American acceptance of mutual deterrence at the strategic level.

In the Soviet view, the presence of American military power has been the primary reason for the frustration, enervation, demoralization and paralysis of the revolutionary forces in Western Europe, even to the point of creating the conditions which deformed and pathologized Western European Communist Parties into revolutionary cripples and defectives, i.e., into Eurocommunist Parties. Since there is little possibility that American military power can be <sup>possibly</sup> removed from Western Europe without the risk of nuclear war, Soviet strategy has been directed towards its nullification by developing an overwhelming Soviet military presence in Europe, which would deter the employment of American military power to thwart the latent "historical social processes" that would resurface under the protective umbrella of countervailing Soviet military power. This is the general Soviet theory, and one need not go into the details of precisely what the Soviet conception of "historical social processes" may be, except to note that from the

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Soviet point of view internal shifts in the British Labour Party and the German Social Democratic Party, the emergence of the "Green Party" in West Germany, the "peace movement," etc., represent the latent repressed revolutionary and progressive tendencies in Western Europe that have been fettered by American military power, and are now being released by growing Soviet military power.

The Soviet <sup>hope</sup> ~~view~~ represents, in effect, the mirror image of the Western view that the Soviet military build-up is designed to create conditions which would impel Western Europe toward "Finlandization" or "Euro-neutralism." Thus, the aim of Soviet power in Europe is of a piece with its overall global military power, to provide a protective umbrella over "revolutionary and historical social processes" against the use of American military power to prevent, contain or even reverse them. The American intervention in Grenada is a good illustration from the Soviet point of view of using American military power to reverse "historical processes." In this connection it is interesting to note that, according to documents acquired during the Grenada episode, Marshal Ogarkov attempted to reassure a worried Grenadian military representative that the United States would not be able to reverse the "historical processes" in Grenada.

The Soviet response to "thwarting" historical processes is thus to "free" them, but the Soviet counterpart to "reversing" historical processes is to "assist" their forward movement, and it is at this point where the Soviet role moves from the passive to the active, or what may be interpreted by others, as the aggressive mode. The invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, as well as various forms of military assistance to Cuba, Grenada, Angola, and Ethiopia, are



all empirical manifestations of the seemingly benign term "fraternal assistance." And there is no reason to assume that under appropriate conditions the Soviet Union will not be ready and eager to provide such assistance in Western Europe.

Does all this make a difference in the choice of a deterrent strategy in Europe? Indeed it does. First the overall Soviet military build-up must be placed in discrete perspective by distinguishing between the role of Soviet nuclear forces and conventional military forces in Europe and distinguishing between Soviet political and military goals, as well as perceiving the interconnections between nuclear and military forces and between political goals and military means.

The role of Soviet conventional forces in Europe has always envisaged the possibility of providing "fraternal assistance" to unspecified solicitants in Western Europe, particularly West Germany, at some unspecified time in the future. Whereas the role of Soviet nuclear forces is to undermine American power as an instrument of maintaining the socio-political status quo in Western Europe and to deter the "export of counter-revolution" and "foreign intervention" (i.e., U.S. efforts to suppress or reverse radical socio-economic changes), the role of Soviet conventional forces is to repel internal attempts at "counter-revolution" and outside assistance, by coming to the aid of the "forces of social progress" upon "invitation."

Soviet conventional forces in Europe have been envisaged as means to extend "fraternal assistance" to Western Europe since the very end of World War II, similar to the assistance provided in Eastern Europe. One need only to re-examine the exchange of messages between Moscow

and Belgrade to recognize the line of continuity in Soviet conceptions of "fraternal assistance" beginning in the postwar period and culminating in the tortured Soviet justifications of their invasion of Afghanistan. There is more than a simple coincidence between what Stalin told Tito in 1948 and what the Soviet Ambassador to Paris told an audience in 1980. In 1948, Stalin forcefully reminded Tito that:

It is also necessary to emphasize that the services of the French and Italian CPS were not less but greater than those of Yugoslavia. Even though the French and Italian CPS have so far achieved less success than the CPY, this is not due to any special qualities of the CPY, but mainly because...the Soviet army came to the aid of the Yugoslav people... and in this way created the conditions which were necessary for the CPY to achieve power. Unfortunately the Soviet army did not and could not render such assistance to the French and Italian CPs.

And, in April 1980, the Soviet Ambassador to France, S. C. Chervonenko, warned a French audience that the Soviet Union "would not permit another Chile" and further stated that any country in any region, anywhere on the globe "has the full right to choose its friends and allies, and if it becomes necessary, to repel with them the threat of counter-revolution." Since Chervonenko was the Soviet Ambassador to Prague who staged and orchestrated the massive invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, he was well-suited to give a universal application to the "Brezhnev Doctrine," which heretofore was limited only to the Socialist Commonwealth.

Thus, from the Soviet point of view, Soviet conventional military forces are prepared to provide assistance to deter the threat of counter-revolution or foreign intervention, but not to "export revolution," which would be the Soviet counterpart to a military invasion. Since a Soviet military intervention or invasion of Western Europe appears to be contingent upon domestic developments in Western European countries and would involve an internal constituency of some sort to which "fraternal assistance" could be extended, a Western preoccupation

with deterring a Soviet direct military invasion may serve to deflect attention from the domestic developments upon which a Soviet military move would hinge.

On the other hand, the Soviet leaders always reserve the right to make their own definitions of an appropriate situation or condition, and past experience has demonstrated that they are far from precise or fastidious in their distinctions. What might be perceived as "fraternal assistance," i.e., Soviet military support to repel counter-revolution by the Soviet leaders may be indistinguishable to Western leaders and NATO planners from a Soviet conventional military attack or invasion of a West European country, a la Afghanistan.

An effective Western deterrent, whether it be to deter and successfully repel a Soviet military offensive or a Soviet military intervention to assist a domestic insurrection or internal coup in a Western European country, must take into consideration the political and social variables which the Soviet leaders calculate into their strategy. First and foremost must be an effective deterrent dealing with the situation in West Germany as a special case within the Western Alliance. West Germany constitutes a buffer and cushion to all of Western Europe, none of which borders on a Warsaw Pact country. Except for Norway, Greece and Turkey, for Soviet troops to move into any NATO country, they must first move across West Germany.

The Federal Republic also constitutes a special political and social target. It is the only NATO country susceptible to a Communist defined civil war strategy, because Germany is divided into Western and Communist states, each of which can lay claim to the other. Although, up to now, the civil-war strategy employed by Communists

in East Asia (Korea, Vietnam and China), has not been even hinted at by Moscow, it remains a potential strategy, whose activation will be determined by the course of internal political developments in West Germany. Any substantial alienation in West Germany with respect to either its membership in the Western Alliance or to its existing socio-political structure, can create an opening for Moscow, with East Germany as its wedge.

Furthermore, the latent force of German nationalism and growing sentiment for the reconciliation, if not reunification, of the two Germanies, can debilitatingly compete with West Germany's loyalty to the Western Alliance and polarize public sentiment. It should be noted that the East German state, in spite of its advanced developmental status, is defined neither as a "People's Republic" nor a "Socialist Republic," but as a "Democratic Republic," which is uniform with the nomenclature defining North Korea and North Vietnam before the unification of the two Vietnams. The concept "Democratic Republic" is a code term denoting simultaneously national fragmentation and provisionality of its state structure. There is little question that at least one future role for the German Democratic Republic is to play a role in the German arena, similar to that of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Vietnam, just as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea plays the same role on the Korean peninsula.

Given the geographical location of other Western countries, Soviet intervention elsewhere, whether political or military, would be difficult to execute without a prior change in the status of West Germany. Even the French under President Mitterand are beginning to recognize that West Germany stands as the only geographical barrier between France

and the Soviet army, and that the maintenance of West Germany in the Atlantic Alliance and its defense against Soviet intervention constitutes the first line of defense for France. It may soon be difficult for France to sustain its current ambiguity concerning French participation in the defense of West Germany and, increasingly, Paris may recognize that the French military frontier is no longer on the Rhine but on the Elbe, and furthermore that the French nuclear force may have to be extended to explicitly include the protection of West Germany. As will be developed below, this may create the conditions for yet another Western deterrent strategy in place of those already suggested.

In reviewing the various deterrent strategies which are hypothetically possible, whether they be nuclear or non-nuclear, American-dependent or independent of the United States, it would be useful to evaluate Soviet perceptions of their credibility and effectiveness. Ultimately the success of a Western deterrent strategy will depend upon Soviet perceptions, not alliance or individual country perceptions of credibility or effectiveness. Although a given Western deterrent strategy may simultaneously deter the Soviet Union while undermining the reassurance of individual alliance members, the latter determines only whether the deterrent will be established or can be sustained, but it is the Soviet perceptions of its credibility and effectiveness that will be decisive, as long as the deterrent is in place. That is why, even though West Europeans may have increasingly less assurance that the United States will risk its own cities and populations by maintaining its nuclear umbrella over Western Europe even under conditions of nuclear parity, no matter what the loss of West European credibility may be, deterrence will hinge on Soviet perceptions of credibility,

not European.

The loss of European reassurance thus does not threaten the credibility of the American deterrent as long as it is in place, but threatens the deterrent itself. Without the deterrent, obviously, there can be no credibility. That is why an alternative deterrent strategy that would revive reassurance, while sustaining credibility, is so crucial.

All of the deterrent strategies, with the exception of the NATO Conventional Retaliatory Force, have a high deterrent value from the Soviet perspective. The reason for the low deterrent value of the NCRF is that the Soviet planners are better able to contain and repel or nullify such a force and thus the Soviet perception of its effectiveness is low. This is true even though Soviet writers have evinced an enhanced interest not only in U.S. plans to enhance NATO conventional forces, but also the strategy of waging the conventional conflict on the territory of the Warsaw Pact states. Thus, one Soviet commentary observes:

The Pentagon has latterly been sharply increasing the potential of conventional arms....The latest conventional arms are to supplement the potential of nuclear weapons. The aim remains the same--to achieve military superiority over the socialist countries. While former plans envisaged operations between the Elbe and the Rhine, now--in any war, nuclear or non-nuclear--it is intended to conduct them on the territory of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The Atlanticists hold that this will reduce destruction and losses among the civilian population in the NATO countries to the minimum [i.e., enhance reassurance].

It is evident from this commentary that the Soviet leaders do not

view U.S. and NATO military plans in unidimensional terms, but in multi-dimensional contexts. Nuclear and non-nuclear forces are perceived as not mutually exclusive, but mutually re-enforcing, and the strategy of carrying the war to the territory of the Warsaw Pact states is not defined in terms of a limited and focused retaliatory action, but as part of an integrated nuclear-conventional force offensive. It is, of course, this type of multi-dimensional offensive deterrent strategy which the Soviet leaders fear most and would find the most effective as a deterrent, but which they view as a non-deterrent offensive strategy as well. Of course, it is precisely this type of capability that the West Europeans would refuse to pay for, and a multi-dimensional nuclear/conventional offensive capability, while the most effective in deterring Moscow, would simultaneously be the most politically controversial and destabilizing in both Western Europe and the United States. It is precisely the type of strategy and capability which democratic societies, even less an alliance of democratic societies, would find the most difficult to deploy and sustain.

But, it is also the type of strategy and capability which the Soviet leaders would like to develop, since it would be the most functional and effective for their purposes.

From the Soviet standpoint, any deterrent strategy involving nuclear weapons, irrespective of the level of credibility, as long as it is above zero, has a high deterrent value, because its effectiveness would be high in terms of nullifying or repelling Soviet military action. Any Soviet military initiative, under existing conditions, that might trigger the use of nuclear weapons by the West would be considered unacceptable because of the inconclusiveness of the outcome and the

certainty of vast destruction and massive carnage. That is why it is still imperative that the West not adopt a "no first use of nuclear weapons," policy in the absence of powerful countervailing conventional force<sup>5</sup>. The adoption of such a policy would in effect deprive the West of any effective deterrent strategy, since the two non-nuclear options which have a high deterrent value, the Enhanced NATO Conventional Force and the Enhanced Territorial Defense Force, are far from operational, and their likelihood of acceptance by Western Europe is not high. It is important to note that while West European perceptions of deterrent strategies are important for morale and allied relations, there is little or no correlation between West European and Soviet perceptions of credibility, effectiveness or deterrent value. Thus, although the U.S. Strategic Deterrent strategy has low credibility and reassurance in West European calculations, what impresses Moscow is that it is a force in existence and whose effectiveness if employed is very high and hence whose deterrent value is also high. These high values together with the <sup>enormous possible</sup> horizontal and vertical scale of the escalation are sufficient to countervail against the relatively low Soviet perception of its likelihood to be employed.

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In terms of effectiveness and deterrent value, an independent West German nuclear force would rate extremely high. Moscow would be certain that West Germany would use its own nuclear force in its own defense, but it is also aware that such a deterrent strategy would have high West European credibility and a very low reassurance quotient, which renders it almost as unacceptable to Western Europe as to the Soviet Union. This also serves to explain why the Soviet rating of the effectiveness of the U.S. INF nuclear deterrent is very high. Not



only is it a deterrent strategy in the process of actual deployment, but from the Soviet perspective, it is the closest approximation to a West German nuclear force, and indeed can easily be converted into one if the United States decides to turn over control of the 108 Pershing IIs and an equal number of Ground Launched Cruise Missiles to West Germany. Overnight, West Germany could become the second most potent nuclear power on the continent of Europe.

Nevertheless, in summary, it should be emphasized that the most effective practical deterrent strategy for the West remains, not a simple, comprehensive unidimensional deterrent, but a combination of deterrent capabilities and strategies, with the capacity to respond to a variety of situations, in which nuclear weapons continue to play a critical re-enforcing, if not always a reassuring, role.