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SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
THE GRENADA CASE STUDY

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This paper is dedicated to all those Americans who fought inside inter-government circles for the release of the Grenada documents to the American press and academic community, thereby preventing the unnecessary classification of this material.

The murder of Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and his supporters and the subsequent U.S. and East Caribbean security forces invasion of Grenada brought into sharp focus for the American people some of the problems festering in the Caribbean region. The factors and conditions culminating in Maurice Bishop's ascension to power in 1979 and the reasons for his downfall five years later are issues that undoubtedly will concern and occupy researchers and analysts for years to come, for what happened in Grenada was in many ways a reflection of what has taken place in other would-be Leninist countries of the third world. Like U.S. policy toward Cuba, about which there is still no consensus as to whether it has been a limited success or a total failure, the subject of U.S. policy toward Grenada also will be one of unwaning interest for many scholars.

Although compelling from any vantage point, the internal complexities of the Grenadian crisis and the U.S. response are not the topic of this paper. It rather seeks to assess the actions of yet third parties, the Soviet Union and Cuba. Soviet and Cuban strategy in Grenada, but also in the Caribbean basin as a whole, is often overlooked or misinterpreted by those attempting to analyze the Grenadian crisis. The objective here is to see the Grenada episode within the context of the Soviet experience and through Soviet rather than Western conceptual lenses.

Part I deals with Soviet strategic objectives in the Caribbean basin. Part II shows how these objectives were implemented in Grenada. The discussion here is based on open Soviet, Cuban and Grenadian sources available before the invasion. Part III examines the same problem analyzed in Part II from the perspective of the documents captured during and after the U.S. mission in Grenada and from interviews. The arguments and suppositions in Parts I and II were confirmed and greatly fortified by what we found in the documents. Part IV examines the political crisis in the New Jewel

Movement and Soviet-Cuban involvement in the crisis. In conclusion we draw some tentative lessons from the Grenadian case study.

I. SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN

By the 1970s, the Soviet Union and Cuba had formulated a coherent strategy with regard to the third world, including the Caribbean basin. Indeed, the discord that characterized relations between the two countries in the 1960s was followed by a long-term but flexible plan of action designed to achieve specific ideological, political, security and economic objectives.

Ideology

The assumption that the Soviets support revolutionary movements in the Caribbean basin primarily to create Leninist regimes is simplistic. Still, ideology cannot be discounted when assessing Soviet motives and goals. The Cuban trajectory in the 1970s, resulting in Cuba's transformation into a Leninist[1] country and in Soviet recognition of Cuba as a member of the "socialist commonwealth,"[2] is a model the Soviets would like to see emulated by other left-leaning regimes in the region. However, because of numerous bad experiences in the 1960s and 1970s--when many radical governments in the third world were overthrown and others substantially reduced the Soviets' presence and influence--the Soviets feel compelled to exercise caution when making serious commitments to would-be Leninists, however promising their prospects might seem.

With the exception of Cuba, the Soviets in the early 1980s could hardly view the various new radical regimes in the developing world as truly Leninist, in the Soviet sense. At present, they refer to these regimes as "progressive," "anti-imperiliast," and, at most (in the case of Nicaragua and Grenada), as on "the path towards socialist orientation" (being neither Leninist nor even socialist). This cautious terminology reflects the Soviets' guarded expectations, conditioned by Cuba's long and arduous evolution towards authentic Leninist

development, and the desire that there be no confusion as to which regime embodies the most advanced and mature form of socialism--i.e., the Soviet model. Some Soviet analysts went a step further by referring to Nicaragua and pre-invasion Grenada in terms of "novaia narodno-demokraticheskai gosudarstvennost--new popular-democratic statehood"--an expression the Soviets used in the late 1940s to set apart the East European countries which later became Leninist.

Undoubtedly, the Leninist inclination of Nicaragua and Grenada (pre-October 1983) is appreciated by the Soviets who thereby can better justify to their domestic constituencies and allied communist countries the aid extended to these countries. Furthermore, the Soviets recognize the potential in every revolution to promote Soviet ideological interests both abroad and at home. In their view the revolutionary processes in the Caribbean basin and elsewhere in the thrid world are manifestations of the world-wide struggle between capitalism and communism. These conflicts, Soviet officials are accustomed to say, are "tipping" the global balance of power "in favor of the socialist camp."

Politics

The Soviet Union's most important political objective in the Caribbean basin is to support and encourage forces and regimes which pursue the Soviet Union's own "anti-imperialist" policies. Because the Soviets view the region as the strategic rear or internal security zone of the United States, their policy has been cautious, and until recently it respected in action if not in word the Monroe Doctrine. This attitude changed in 1960 when Khrushchev stated that "the Monroe Doctrine has outlived its times" and that the U.S. acceptance of the Cuban Revolution was proof that it had died "a natural death." Soviet officials have repeatedly vocalized this position. Owing to a number of

constraints, however, Soviet tactics continue to be cautious. The choice of tactics is dictated by internal, national conditions, which vary from country to country in the region, and by a number of external factors, the most important of which is the state of Soviet-American relations.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s the Soviets seem to have devised a conceptual framework for dealing with the various countries. Soviet sources of this period suggest that the Soviets conceive of four categories of regimes in the Caribbean: (1) "revolutionary," pro-Soviet, Leninist regimes or regimes following a Leninist course--i.e., Soviet clients; (2) capitalist, yet "progressive," "anti-imperialist" regimes that are basically friendly towards the Soviet Union and are willing to stand up to U.S. "imperialism"; (3) capitalist, "liberal-bourgeois" regimes that depend on the United States; and (4) "reactionary," "right-wing" regimes, generally not liked yet supported by the United States.

(1) Revolutionary regimes. This first class of regimes consists of Soviet clients such as Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada (before October 1983). These regimes are either developing along Leninist lines or, in the case of Cuba, have already achieved a Leninist identity. The Soviets support these regimes by giving political, economic and military aid, and advisory assistance. The Soviet Union's political and economic support and arms transfers to Nicaragua and Grenada (prior to October 1983) were patterned after the Soviets' relationship with Cuba and indicate Soviet optimism regarding the eventual Leninist transformation of these countries.

(2) Progressive regimes. Such countries as Mexico and Panama (particularly under General Omar Torrijos), for a variety of reasons have conducted policies independent of and sometimes contrary to those of the United States. Because of their size, large population, plentiful resources, or strategic location, they are seen as important nations worthy of being courted. The

Soviet Union and Cuba do not support armed insurgency in these countries but rely exclusively on political and, to a lesser degree, economic instruments to maintain cordial relations and gain additional influence. (However, in both Mexico and Panama the Soviets and Cubans coordinate the activities of communist parties and insurgents from other Caribbean basin nations.)

(3) Liberal-bourgeois regimes. In dealing with the democratic regimes of larger countries which have plentiful natural resources and policies independent of the United States (Venezuela), legal means of gaining influence are preferred although revolutionary means, including armed insurgency, are not entirely excluded. Yet, in what the Soviets see as the less significant countries of Costa Rica and Colombia (before 1982) but also such Caribbean island nations as Martinique and Guadeloupe (where Cuban-trained agents were the authors of a terrorist bombing in 1983), the Soviets feel they have little to lose by supporting or at least not opposing Cuban advisory, training and weapons assistance to revolutionary groups. The willingness to permit revolutionary tactics in these countries represents an important readjustment in Soviet thinking from the late 1960s and 1970s when only "right-wing" or "reactionary" regimes were prey to such tactics. In the early 1980s "liberal-bourgeois" regimes having strong ties to the United States or lacking important economic resources also were targeted for violent means of subversion. The fact that Cuba, and not the Soviet Union, appears to be the main coordinator of the insurgency in Costa Rica and Colombia has enabled the Soviets to continue, though in a more limited fashion, diplomatic and economic relations with these countries.

(4) Reactionary regimes. Since the arly 1980s Soviet policy towards traditionally anti-communist, "reactionary" regimes is to actively promote violent revolutionary tactics, including terrorist activities. The regimes of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, which are hostile towards the Soviet

Union and Cuba, should be overthrown. Backed by the Soviets, the Cubans have played a pivotal role in these countries by uniting the various splinter movement and have provided arms and training to the insurgents.

The continuation, scope and intensity of Soviet support in the effort to overthrow various "reactionary" regimes depends on available opportunities and the perceived costs and risks of such a strategy in terms of domestic conditions in these countries and the overall state of Soviet-American relations. Although Cuba apparaently acts autonomously in coordinating and supporting armed insurgency, such activity is not possible without continuous Soviet economic and military aid to Cuba and its new clients in Nicaragua and, before October 1983, in Grenada.

Security

The most important aspect of Soviet policy-making regarding Central America and the Carribean is the security issue. The long-term Soviet objective is to secure access to and maintain naval facilities in the Caribbean basin so as to project Soviet power and undermine that of the United States and its allies. However, these objectives have been hampered by the lack of facilities and logistical support necessary for the permanent deployment of a fleet. To date, the only significant Soviet military presence is in Cuba. Included are modern docks and repair facilities; airport facilities for reconnaissance aircraft; satellite stations; and the most sophisticated intelligence facilities (outside the Soviet Union) for monitoring U.S. satellite and microwave conversations, U.S. ship and air movements, and advanced NATO weapons testing in the Atlantic. Soviet naval activities in the area, which include regular visits by warships, are mainly designed to legitimize the Soviet naval presence. In addition to warships, the Soviets deploy intelligence, merchant, oceanographic, space supporting, salvage and rescue, and fishing vessels.

Undoubtedly, the Soviets would like to upgrade and expand their naval

presence in the Caribbean. This desire is indicated by Soviet plans to make permanent use of the facilities at Cienfuegos--plans which were partly shelved in 1970 because of vociferous U.S. protests. Unfettered, the Soviet Union is likely to establish additional naval and other military facilities in order to create a stronger and more permanent military presence. This trend is suggested by recent Soviet tactics in Nicaragua and Grenada.

The Soviets, however, are proceeding cautiously so as not to provoke the United States. Although high Soviet officials have repeatedly stressed that they support Nicaragua and other Leninist forces in the Caribbean "politically in every way,"[4] they realize their inability to intervene militarily on a large scale. Because of the balance of forces in the region, which weighs heavily on the side of the United States, their only military option at present is diversionary activity closer to the Soviet periphery (in West Berlin or the Persian Gulf). Thus, the Soviets displayed considerable restraint in allowing the U.S. Navy to check the cargo of Soviet ships destined for Nicaragua in August 1983. Soviet restraint was even more apparent in the wake of the allied U.S. and East Caribbean security forces intervention in Grenada. Such passive behavior contrasts sharply with the Soviet pattern of bold aggression close to or above their own territory as was highlighted by the invasion of Afghanistan and the recent South Korean airline incident.

The second long-term Soviet security objective is to develop close military ties with new client regimes through arms transfers and other forms of military cooperation. Chief of the Soviet General Staff and Marshal of the USSR N.I. Ogarkov identified these clients when he said in the spring of 1983, "Over two decades ago there was only Cuba in Latin America; today there are Nicaragua, Grenada, and a serious battle is going on in El Salvador."[5] The Soviet arms transfer to Cuba serves as a model for achieving the second objective. Soviet modernization of Cuba's armed forces with sophisticated weapons has created

the most formidable force in the Caribbean basin, in terms of size and equipment, with the exception of the United States. Although the Cubans do not have sufficient air- and sea-lift or amphibious assault capabilities to conduct their own invasion of any Central American country or large island nation such as Jamaica, they can assist revolutionaries and undermine legitimate governments in such small island nations as Grenada. Obviously, the essentially defensive Cuban navy cannot challenge U.S. naval power in the Caribbean basin. Yet, in case of U.S. confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf or Europe, the Soviets' "aircraft carrier" Cuba[6] could constrain and delay U.S. mobility and capacity to respond.

The Soviet arms transfer to "anti-imperialist" forces in Central America precipitated the arms race which began with the Sandinistas' planned military build-up from 1979 to 1980.[7] (This disproves the popular myth that the Nicaraguan military build-up was merely a response to the Reagan administration's tough policies.) The Soviet-Cuban arms transfer to Nicaragua is the factor that has most destabilized the region. In particular the supply of heavy tanks, which are not included in the inventory of Nicaragua's neighbors Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, has fuelled this race. Meanwhile, in Cuba seventy Soviet MiGs are reportedly waiting the return of Nicaraguan pilots who are receiving flight instruction in Bulgaria. The deliveries of sophisticated weapons to Nicaragua from the Soviet Union and its allies (as well as from France and Algeria) is accompanied by Soviet and Cuban advisory assistance. The Sandinistas' stated goal is to build a 50,000 man army which would be the largest standing army in Central America and would exceed the combined strength of all other Central American countries. The USSR and Cuba also tried to establish a foothold on the minuscule, yet strategically located island of Grenada. Their arms transfer to Grenada followed the Cuban and Nicaraguan model, though, at this early stage, on a much smaller scale.

Finally, Nicaragua and probably Grenada, until October 1983, were intended to serve as important transit centers for guerrilla warfare experts. In Nicaragua dozens of Soviet and several thousand Cuban military and advisers are building an elaborate intelligence service and are conducting advanced training programs for guerrillas from El Salvador and other countries in the region. These operations are more significant than they might appear initially since the guerrilla movement in Central America can be sustained and exported more easily from Nicaragua to the rest of Central America and the Caribbean island and littoral nations than from Cuba. Already between October 1980 and February 1981, Nicaragua was the staging center for a large Cuban effort to coordinate and support a major offensive in El Salvador timed to coincide with U.S. presidential elections.

Economics

Economic objectives play a more minor role in Soviet strategy in the Caribbean basin. As of 1983 Soviet trade, investment and credits were confined to Cuba, Mexico, Costa Rica, and the new clients, Nicaragua and Grenada. Since they generally must pay for imports in hard currency, the Soviets do not view the Caribbean as economically attractive. Most Soviet exports are bound for the South American countries, especially Brazil and Argentina, which purchased 60 per cent of the total of Soviet exports to South America in 1979. Soviet trade with Central America, though minimal, is seen to reinforce Soviet political and security objectives. Although Eastern bloc trade and economic aid to Soviet clients Cuba and Nicaragua is also low, it helps to complement the Soviets' overall strategy in the area.

Lately the presence of vital natural resources, particularly in Mexico and Venezuela, seems to arouse Soviet interest. The Soviets are presently working with the Mexicans on long-term cooperation in oil matters and they may be interested in similar agreements with other oil producers in the region.

Furthermore, Mexico has agreed to supply crude oil to Cuba and, in the future, to assist Cuba's oil exploration efforts. Venezuela also supplies some oil to Cuba.

II. SOVIET-CUBAN TACTICS IN GRENADA: WHAT WE KNEW BEFORE THE INVASION

Although geographic limitations confined their options, the Soviets made a considerable investment in Grenada, in part because of its strategic location close to the oil-producing nations of Venezuela and Trinidad-Tobago. In 1979 Maurice Bishop and members of his New Jewel Movement (NJM), a radical group with Leninist inclinations, conducted a successful coup d'etat in Grenada. Bishop was a close friend and admirer of Fidel Castro and it appears that members of the NJM, who were trained by the Cubans, were aided by a team of black Cuban commandos from the Cuban Directorate of Special Operations. The political importance of Grenada for the Soviets and Cubans became obvious after the electoral defeat of the left-leaning Prime Minister Michael Manley by the Western-oriented Edward Seaga in Jamaica in November 1980. Grenada then became the only Caribbean island under strong Soviet and Cuban influence.

The Soviet and Cuban involvement in Grenada, including military and economic assistance, paralleled the pattern of Soviet-Cuban involvement in Nicaragua, though on a much smaller scale. Obviously, the Soviet commitment to Grenada was less than to the larger and more populous Nicaragua. The Cubans played a pivotal role in both places and the Soviets, favoring "progressive social transformation" and the "political vanguard,"[8] obviously supported them fully. In typical fashion, the Soviets exercised caution in the beginning while the Cubans, from the onset, became vigorously involved in the supply of military and other forms of aid. In december 1979 hundreds of Cuban workers and technicians, using heavy Soviet construction equipment, set to work building

a 9,000 foot runway at Point Saline.* Although an elongated runway of this type could help advance the tourist industry, it could also facilitate Soviet-Cuban military activities in the third world, especially by serving as a refueling station for Cuban transport planes bound for Africa. Meanwhile more than fifty Cuban military advisers were helping to build a new revolutionary army of some 1,500 to 2,000 men in a country of only 110,000 inhabitants. Like Cuba and Nicaragua, Grenada organized a people's militia (also 2,000 men) which conducted periodic maneuvers in preparation for a possible invasion of the island. To equip the militia, Cuba supplied Grenada with several thousand AK-41 rifles and other equipment. Among other Cubans serving in Grenada were several dozen military and civilian advisers and doctors.

When there were indications that the revolution was taking hold, the Soviets decided to make a formal ideological commitment to Grenada during the visit of Premier Bishop to the Soviet Union in July 1982. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the NJM agreed to cooperate along lines similar to those pursued by the Soviets with the Sandinistas. Subsequently the Soviet Union decided to establish its first diplomatic mission in Grenada** and signed a number of economic, scientific, cultural, and technological agreements as well as a five-year trade agreement with Bishop. Military assistance might have been discussed as well during this visit. The Soviets also gave Grenada a $1.4 million grant to buy 500 tons of steel and has donated 400 tons of flour while pledging $7.7 million in credits over a ten-year period to purchase needed equipment.[9] As in Nicaragua, the Soviets were helping to build and promote a fishing industry in Grenada (for which the

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*Grenada also received aid for the airport from Libya, Syria, Algeria, Iraq and the European Economic Community.

**It was agreed to establish official diplomatic relations already in November 1981.

Cubans supplied six trawlers in the past two years). This aid, as Bishop explained, was intended to help Grenada "disengage" from the capitalist world. The pro-Soviet orientation of Grenada was evident before this when Grenada supported the Soviet Union at the United Nations by voting against condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980. (Even Nicaragua abstained from this vote.)

III. SOVIET-CUBAN TACTICS IN GRENADA: WHAT THE DOCUMENTS TELL US

The documents captured in Grenada clearly show that the Soviet involvement in Grenada was significant and in some areas went far beyond what was indicated in published Soviet, Cuban and Grenadian sources. Soviet ties with Grenada coincided with the four Soviet strategic objectives alread discussed: ideology, politics, security and economics.

Ideology and Politics

Since the important agreement of July 27, 1982, Soviet-Grenadian relations have been conducted on a party-to-party basis. The very fact that the CPSU concluded an inter-party cooperation agreement with the NJM suggests clearly that Grenada, like several other revolutionary countries in the third world (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola and Nicaragua), was classified by Soviet officials as "anti-imperialist," "socialist-oriented" and potentially Leninist. The agreement provided for the "extension" and "deepening" of cooperation "at all levels" between the CPSU and the NJM; for the "exchange [of] experience in party work and party guidance" of the social, economic and cultural development of the respective countries, "including [the] regular exchange of information;" and for "consultation and exchanges of opinion on international matters."[10]

According to six of seven main points in the agreement, Soviet relations with Grenada would be handled mainly through party channels, although the

agreement also provided in item number six for the "all around development of inter-state relations." The rapid growth of political-ideological ties between Grenada and the Soviet Union and her allies was illustrated by the large number of diplomats from Soviet allied countries found in Grenada at the time of the U.S. and Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) rescue mission, about fifty in all. This is a large number considering that official diplomatic relations between the USSR and Grenada were established only in November 1981.

According to the CPSU-NJM accord, both parties agreed to cooperate in "training party and government cadres" and to develop contacts between the party presses and other mass media. With Soviet and Cuban assistance the NJM built a number of social organizations similar to those found in Soviet bloc countries such as the National Youth Movement. As part of the agreement the Soviets assisted with the building of a party headquarters, supplied equipment and cars for the use of Grenadian party headquarters, provided a number of scholarships for Grenadian party officials (15 in 1982 alone), and hosted other NJM officials "with a higher cultural level," presumably those who were more educated, were selected to study at the Soviet Party (CPSU) Leninist International School with colleagues from other revolutionary parties in the third world. Several others were indoctrinated in Cuba* (where the course work included religion, propaganda and foreign affairs, particularly vis-a-vis other Caribbean nations) or at the GDR Higher Party School. Some party members received flight training in the USSR.

As suggested by the work plan and guidelines of the NJM's propaganda department, the propaganda departments of the USSR and other communist

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*Those selected for ideological training represented a small fraction of the 400 Grenadians who were studying in Cuba at the time of the U.S.-East Caribbean security forces invasion.

countries began to distribute "progressive material" in Grenada with the purpose of "deepening the internationalist spirit and socialist consciousness of the Grenadian masses." This was aimed, among other things, at exposing "the evil of imperialism," promoting "the life of people under socialism" and "highlighting activities of progressive and revolutionary parties" in the Caribbean region.[12]

The Soviets established other organizational ties with the NJM through the newly established Grenada Peace Council, which became an integral part of the World Peace Council (WPC)--an organization supervised by the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In 1982-83 Grenada Peace Council representatives participated in a number of WPC meetings, including the meetings of the International Preparatory Committee of the World Assembly for Peace and Life [and] against Nuclear War, and the preparations for "A Week in Solidarity with Nicaragua" which was celebrated in December 1982. Though the Soviet Peace Fund subsidized the travel of Grenadian officials on Soviet Aeroflot and the Cuban airline Cubana, the Soviets insisted that the leg of travel between Grenada and Havana be paid by the Grenadian government.[13] The NJM's sometimes poor participation in the activities of the WPC thus was affected by Grenada's geographic remoteness and continuous financial difficulties. To be sure, the Grenadian Peace Council was criticized at the WPC meeting which occurred on November 6, 1982 in Lisbon for insufficient "flow of information" and a continuously low level of activity. WPC officials such as the Panamanian Hill Arboleda made the point that because of the paucity of information emanating from Grenada, the WPC control media was not yet able to publish an article on the Grenadian revolution.

The NJM participated in other "anti-imperialist" projects with the officials of the Communist Party of Cuba such as the bizarre General Congress

of the World Center for Resistance against Imperialism, Zionism, Racism and Reaction in Libya. At this congress--a pet project of Libya--Grenada was made a member of the Secretariat.*

Security

The captured Soviet and Grenadian documents demonstrate that Soviet military aid to the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces of Grenada (via Cuba) preceded the establishment of diplomatic relations with Grenada and the ideological recognition of the NJM.** Moreover, the documents illustrate that major Soviet military assistance began before the U.S. presidential election of 1980 which brought Ronald Reagan to the White House. This takes care of the argument that the military build-up in Grenada was purely a defensive response to the aggressive policies of the Reagan administration. The U.S. and Eastern Caribbean security forces found a long list of "material means" received from foreign countries in 1979-81. According to the list, the Soviet Union and Cuba provided 1000 automatic rifles and Nicaragua provided a large number of uniforms. Moreover, the first top-secret agreement between the USSR and Grenada for the period of 1980-81 provided for deliveries of "special and other equipment, free of charge" in the amount of 4 million rubles. This agreement was signed in Havana on October 27, 1980, a few months after Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard's visit to Moscow (May-June 1980) and a few weeks before U.S. presidential elections. It is important that Cuba, according to

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*It is not surprising that a number of disagreements arose among the disparate membership at the congress consisting of representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Southwest African People's Organization, Nicaragua, Cuba, Grenada, Ghana, Libya, Polisario, the Salvadoran guerrilla movement and their likes. It is interesting that the Libyan representatives in attendance were concerned about the behavior of the Latin Americans at the Congress and suggested "outside pressure" from the USSR through Cuba on the Latin American representatives.

**The Cuban ship Matanzas reportedly arrived in Grenada with a large cargo of Soviet made weapons three days after the successful coup d'etat by the NJM. The voyage normally would have required seven days.

the agreement, was to act as proxy in the Soviet arms transfer. The Soviets were to deliver their ware by sea to Cuban ports from whence they were to be transported by Cuban ships to Grenada, the Cubans being responsible for the second portion of the transaction. Once on the island the arms were carried by the darkness of night to hidden depots around the island.

The "special material" listed in this first agreement included twelve 82-mm used and reconditioned mortars (not what the Soviets might sell to a more prized ally), twenty RPG-7V anti-tank hand grenade launchers, fifty-four 6,72-mm PKM machine guns, one thousand AK submachine guns (also used and reconditioned); eighteen 23-mm ZU-23 anti-aircraft mounts and other weapons, communication means, ammunition, logistics equipment and spare parts.

Article 3 of the agreement called for the training of Grenadian servicemen in the USSR (without their families) to ensure their mastering the equipment provided for under the agreement. Grenadian servicemen were to be deputized at Soviet expense, including travel to the USSR to undertake training. Importantly, the Grenadians acquiesced to the USSR's stipulation that Grenada not sell or transfer the delivered arms to third parties without Soviet consent. The agreement further obliged Grenada to preserve the secrecy of the terms and implementation of the accord.

Soviet military aid to Grenada was augmented on February 9, 1981, in a protocol to the October 27, 1980 agreement, to include what was again described in a roundabout fashion as deliveries of "special and other equipment" for 1981-83. (This was rather unusual since the agreement, which was designed for the eyes of Soviet and Grenadian officials, specifically listed the weapons in the appendices.) It is significant that this agreement, which provided for an increase of 5 million rubles in military aid, was concluded shortly after Reagan's inauguration as president. Like the previous agreement, it was drawn up in Havana, Cuba. The arms transfer to Grenada was

to be upgraded probably because of the announced Caribbean basin policies of the new administration. Accordingly, the agreement provided for the delivery of eight BTR60PB armored personnel vehicles, 2 BDRM-2 armored reconnaissance and patrol vehicles, one thousand 7-62 mm AK submachine guns (also used and reconditioned), and a variety of other armaments and munitions; engineering equipment; communications equipment; transport means; special vehicles and workshops; logistics materials; uniform articles and clothing; etc. (The last provisions included about 12,600 complete sets of uniforms and helmets apparently designed for an army of 6,300 men.) Included also were spare parts and training and auxilliary equipment in the amount of .9 million rubles.[15]

Yet another top secret arms transfer and aid agreement was concluded between the USSR and Grenada on July 27, 1982 for the period between 1982 and 1985. In the veiled language of a cover operation already noted, the contents of the deliveries were described this time as "special and civil equipment" totalling 10 million rubles.[16] Like the one preceding it, this agreement was intended to significantly upgrade the quality and price amount of the arms transfer to Grenada by providing the Grenadian army with an additional fifty BTR-152V1 armored personnel carriers (used and repaired), sixty 82mm BM mortars (used and repaired), thirty 76mm ZIS-3 guns (used and repaired), thirty 57mm ZIS-2 anti-tank guns (used and repaired), fifty "grade P" portable launchers, fifty RPG-JV light anti-tank grenade launchers, two thousand AK submachine guns (used and repaired) and many other small arms, communications means, engineering material and workshops, and other small arms and equipment.

The agreement of July 27, 1982 likewise provided special "civilian" equipment which is the word typically used (here for the first time) when referring to the growing Ministry of the Interior of Grenada. This ministry

was increasingly modeled on similar institutions in the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries. Interior Ministry officials and the People's Militia, were to receive twenty light anti-tank rocket launchers RPG-7V, fifty 7,62 submachine guns AK, but also "special instruments" such as infrared viewers, videotape recorders, tape recorders, cameras, "PTU-47" television systems, and other equipment designed for a future force of several hundred Leninist spooks. The accounts of surveillance and mistreatment of political opponents leave no doubt as to the intended use of special "civilian" equipment. Indeed, with Soviet and Cuban assistance, officials at the Grenadian Ministry of the Interior had begun to sort out the population of various parishes of the island, designating them as either "our forces" or "enemy forces", the latter grouping being subdivided into "very dangerous," "dangerous," "less dangerous," and "petty bourgeois." They also assessed "past and present counter-revolutionary activities" of the populace. These analyses were conducted presumably so as to assess the correlation of forces in future emergency contingencies such as a civil war.

Yet another new feature of the July 27, 1982 agreement was that it provided not only for the training of Grenadian servicemen at Soviet military educational establishments (still without families) but also, in Article 3, for the training of Grenadian servicemen in Grenada by Soviet military and security "specialists and interpreters." According to the agreement, the government of Grenada was to provide Soviet personnel with "comfortable living accomodations," "all municipal utilities, medical services and transport facilities for the execution of their duties." The agreement also prescribed that Soviet military personnel be assured of "meals at reasonable prices at the places of their residence." Moreover, Soviet advisors were not to be levied "any taxes and duties." Since the same privileges were not accorded Grenadian military personnel in the USSR (provisions for comfortable furnished

living accomodations and meals at the place of residence), clearly the Soviets were getting preferential treatment over their fraternal brothers.

Future plans for greater Soviet military involvement in Grenada are suggested by Article 4 of the new agreement. According to this article the USSR would periodically send a group of Soviet military advisors to Grenada to determine the expediency, opportunity and scope of rendering technical assistance in the creation of a stationary repair shop for equipment and transport, command staff trainer school and training facilities for the Grenadian armed forces, and deliveries of construction materials.

In accordance with the agreement for 1980-83 a few dozen Grenadian officers were sent through military training in the USSR, primarily at Vystrel Academy where they were taught to be tactical commanders of motorized infantry. Some members of the Ministry of the Interior were also trained in the USSR in counter-intelligence and intelligence. The decision to so train the latter resulted after a discussion which took place between Vladimir Klimentov, the Sovit KGB chief in residence in St. Georges, and General Huston Austin. This was followed by Austin's request to then KGB chairman the late Yurii Andropov.[17] Austin at the time was a member of the NJM Politburo and at different times held positions as Secretary of Defense, Commander of the Armed Forces, and Minister of Communication and Construction. Austin, who had close ties with Soviet and Cuban military and security officials, led the first high-level Grenadian delegation to the USSR in November 1981 and at least twice requested the speedy delivery of weapons, ahead of schedule. A thug without loyalty (although allied with Coard's faction), Austin figured prominently in the high-level communications and consultations with the Soviets prior to the murder of Bishop in October 1983. Three other leading officials of Grenada's Department of Defense were trained at military schools in the Soviet Union where they developed contacts with their Soviet counterparts.

Two of them, Lt. Col. Liam James and Lt. Col. Ewart Layne, who wielded the real power in the army, would be the key players in the anti-Bishop conspiracy.

The Soviets, Cubans, Czechoslovaks, East Germans, Bulgarians and North Koreans worked together to facilitate and implement military and security aid to Grenada. As in Central America, the pivotal role was played by the Cubans. According to a secret treaty, Cuba was to maintain 27 permanent military advisors, led by the chief of Cuban military specialists (who would function within the Grenadian Ministry of Defense and have access to communications facilities) and twelve to thirteen advisors for short terms of two to four months. To be fair to the Cubans, in the agreement with Grenada, they did not insist on "comfortable living accomodations" or "meals at reasonable prices at the places of their residence." They specified only "fresh foodstuffs," "necessary transport means," "means of personal hygiene," and "a small stipend for each advisor of up to $30." Like the USSR, Cuba granted scholarships to Grenadian military personnel to be trained in Cuba (twelve for 1982, for example). Besides a small contingent of military advisors, a number of overt and covert agents and 750 paramilitary construction workers (engaged in building the airstrip at Point Salines) and many civilian advisors were among the Cubans residing in Grenada.

As is customary, there was a division of labor. The Cubans, like in Africa, provided the manpower; the East Germans special technical and military equipment and highly qualified technicians; and the Czechoslovaks explosives, small quantities of ammunition (warhead, rockets), and 3,000 7,62 automatic rifles. The East Germans also provided equipment for the security forces, upgraded Grenada's telephone system, and made available advisors for the NJM youth organization. North Korea agreed to send a quantify of arms worth $12 million (including thousands of rifles and 50 RPG-7 launchers), two coast guard boats, and uniforms. (The boats had not been delivered by the time of

the U.S.-O.E.C.S. mission.) There was also a military agreement with Bulgaria and even Vietnam concluded an agreement with Grenada for training twenty military students in 1981. However, the departing Grenadian students had to wait until September 1982 since the agreement did not provide for transportation and the Grenadian government was so broke that it could not afford to send them in May of 1982 as agreed.

The Soviet and allied military aid to Grenada had a clear purpose: to build a sizable Grenadian armed forces consisting of four regular battalions and fourteen reservist battalions and supporting units by 1985. Since much of the arms transfer was to be effected throughout 1986, the U.S. and Caribbean forces recovered fewer arms than indicated on the total shopping list included in the agreement. The weapons recovered in Grenada, however, were sufficient to equip two infantry battalions (about 10,800 men). The main objective of this build-up was defensive in nature, yet it had long-term offensive implications for Grenada's neighbors since it was going to exceed the reasonable defense needs of Grenada.

Economics

Like security relations, Soviet-Grenadian economic cooperation progressed between 1979 and 1983, yet not as significantly as military-security and ideological-political exchanges. True, Grenadian officials consulted frequently with Soviet Gosplan officials on various aspects of economic cooperation and began planning long-term trade with CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) countries. Soviet economic intercourse with Grenada, however, never reached significant proportions. As noted, the Soviets, Bulgarians and Czechs granted Grenada several million dollars worth of machinery and other donations and upgraded Radio Grenada from a one kilowatt station to a seventy-five kilowatt station. However, the Soviets did not provide funding sources for the Point Salines airport complex. Likewise,

Soviet specialists helped discover a source of water in the city of Carriacou, but apparently the Soviets were not willing to donate the diesel pumps necessary to extract the water, leaving the Grenadians to buy them. The Soviet Gosplan offered an eight week course to several NJM officials to learn more about socialist planning, but was unable and unwilling to help transform Grenada into a socialist tourist paradise in the Caribbean.

The NJM leadership talked about the socialist transformation of the island. However, the meetings of the committee of economic ministers were spent haggling about the scarcity of money and the need for securing short-term loans from OPEC banks, donations from Canada and future uncertain economic offers from the equally broke North Korea.[19] The nationalization of the island fisheries and cocoa industries was hampered by the need to keep Grenada financially afloat from month to month and perhaps by Bishop's gradual approach to socialism which allowed 60 percent of Grenada's economy to stay in hands of the private sector. The severity of Grenada's financial situation was suggested by Grenada's inabilty to pay for the international travel of NJM middle level officials. Facing overall liquidity problems, Maurice Bishop seriously proposed that Grenada use the Cuban and Surinam experience "in keeping two sets of records in the banks for this purpose." Subsequently the Grenadian Politburo decided to invite Cuban and Nicaraguan experts to assist "in the readjustment of the books."[20]

IV. LIMITS OF SOVIET POWER: THE "AFGHAN" LINE OF OCTOBER 1983

The Soviets and Cubans must have foreseen the approaching crisis in Grenada already by the summer of 1983. The minutes of an extraordinary Central Committee meeting of the NJM held in August 1983 concluded that the revolution in Grenada was facing the "worst and most dangerous crisis ever."[21] The mood of the masses was characterized at best as one of "serious demoralization"

and at worst as one of "open dissatisfaction and cynicism." There was "persistent ideological backwardness" among the working class and an emerging "split" in the politburo. A majority of the politburo believed the party was going to disintegrate within six to eight months and that the revolutionary regime was going to be overthrown if solutions were not found to the growing dissension.

The documents of the Grenadian Politburo captured by U.S. forces suggest some interesting similarities between Afghanistan (1979) and Grenada. In both countries, the ruling circle of the Leninist party was divided. In Afghanistan, following the 1978 coup against President Muhammed Daoud by Leninist forces, the civil war was accompanied by a struggle between the populist Hafizullah Amin and his followers and the Parcham faction led by the more gradualist and definitely more pro-Soviet party apparatchik Babrak Karmal. Defeated politically and sent into virtual exile in Eastern Europe, Karmal returned with 100,000 Soviet troops on December 26, 1979 to lead the bloody coup against Amin. Amin died while receiving what the Soviets euphemistically describe as "fraternal aid," and Karmal took power with Soviet help.

Less noticed by foreign observers was the two-stage revolution in Grenada. First, in March 1979, the joint forces of the Leninist-oriented New Jewel Movement led by Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard seized power from the "bourgeois" Prime Minister Eric Gairy. Because of the ongoing systemic crisis, however, in a few years there developed a dual personal and ideological struggle between the faction led by the doctrinaire organizer Coard and his supporters and the populist, power-hungry Bishop and his following. To be sure, on one level the Bishop-Coard power conflict was a conflict of personalities: that of the charismatic, spontaneous, charming and very attractive Bishop (who in many ways resembled a younger Fidel Castro) versus the less appealing, colder and more calculating bespeckled intellectual Coard. Coard, in obvious reference to Bishop would speak about Politburo members coming

to the meeting "hands and minds swinging." While Coard was able to impress Soviet and NJM bureaucrats and some visiting American scholars, Bishop was able to sway segments of the Grenadian masses (in spite of the mounting crisis). Unlike Coard's speeches which contained an alien rhetoric of working class struggle, Bishop spoke a more familiar language, stressing the importance of women, youth and peasants. Bishop, who was living with Minister of Education, Youth and Social Affairs Jacqueline Creft, also appealed to many women, including the wifes of other NJM members. This remarkable ability was a factor which eventually cost him his life.

On another level, the power struggle in the NJM movement was of an ideological and political nature. Here it is instructive to draw a few parallels between Amin and Bishop. Both men were viewed as preferring "spontaneity" to "ideological clarity" and the pragmatic task of Leninist party organizational work. Moreover, like Amin, Bishop refused to share power in a collective leadership.

The minutes of the Grenadian Central Committee's unusually long and crucial sessions on September 14-17, 1983 show that the anti-Bishop coalition--actually a majority of the Politburo--had accused Bishop of vacillating between "petit bourgeois-opportunist" and Leninist policies, charges similar to those levied against Amin after his death. At this meeting all Politburo members agreed that there was a deep crisis in the party, although they disagreed sharply about how to resolve the crisis. However, the session rapidly turned into an anti-Bishop conspiracy which showed signs of having been carefully planned. The major role was played openly by Grenadian officials responsible for the armed forces and by security and ideological watchdogs like Lt. Col. Layne, a political supervisor of the armed forces who had studied in the USSR; Lt. Col. James, Minister of the Interior in charge of the police and intelligence operations, who also studied in the USSR; and Major Leon Cornwall, former

ambassador to Cuba who belonged to Coard's secret cell Organization for Educational Development and who had just returned to Grenada from his post in Cuba; Selwyn Strachan, Minister of National Mobilization and head of Grenadian Agitrop; and Coard's Jamaican born wife Phyllis, who was in it for personal reasons. Cornwall's return from Cuba and his subsequent appointment as chief of the Political and Academic Department of the armed forces (a key military appointment held by Epishev in the Soviet Union) was an integral part of the anti-Bishop plot. The appointment was made following the Central Committee session of September 19 but it was announced by Austin only on October 6.

Like the Soviet-supported anti-Dubcek coup attempt in Czechoslovakia just prior to the Soviet invasion of that country, the attack on Bishop began with Lt. Col. James' proposal to change the agenda proposed by Bishop beforehand. As the agenda of the meeting was changed to focus on the "present state of the party and revolution," Layne orchestrated a carefully prepared attack on Bishop and his policy which was strongly supported by Cornwall, James, Strachan and a few others. The basic charges aimed against Bishop were similar to those fired at Dubcek by pro-Soviet members of his leadership: (1) "right opportunism," responsibility for party's deterioration into a "social democratic" party, and inability to fashion the party into a "Marxist-Leninist vanguard." (As Layne put it, "we do not have a Leninist central committee.") and (2) inability to "tighten" Grenadian relations "with the World Socialist Movement, especially Cuba, the USSR, and the GDR." Layne, who perhaps knew something that Bishop did not know, argued that Grenada's relations with these countries were "becoming more and more complex."[23] Cornwall, who as former ambassador to Cuba must have known more, was more specific. According to him, the NJM had to explain its internal problems to "fraternal parties" because, as he put it,

"they [the fraternal parties] already know the problems that we experience now; if [we do] not [explain internal problems] they will see us a jokers."[24] (This admission, however, is at variance with Castro's later claim that he did not know about the internal problems of the NJM.)

Most important, as Cornwall revealed, the fraternal parties were already "accusing [the NJM leadership] of instability." Coard's wife, [sister] Phyllis, phrased the problem in Leninist jargon: "The international support of the working class is lessening." She also criticized Bishop's "idealism" and "volunteerism." The solution proposed by Cornwall was that the Grenadian Party should be built by "drawing [on] the experience of other [communist] countries." Among other things, the Grenadians should "start working on a party constitution" and, like other communist parties, "develop commissions for different areas of work." In particular he stressed the importance of the commission entrusted with studying the experience of the Soviet Union and Cuba in building socialism and its recommendations. Strachan supported the anti-Bishop arguments of James and Layne by arguing for the need of transforming the NJM along Leninist lines and by pinpointing "ideological development as key to the development of the party." James added that the Central Committee and the whole party must study the work of K. Brutens, a leading Soviet theoretician on socialism in the third world and a deputy head of the International Department responsible for Soviet relations with communist and revolutionary parties. This proposal was strongly seconded by Mrs. Coard and likewise by Layne who further felt that the Ethiopian example of party building was relevant for the NJM.

There came a turning point in the meeting when James restructured the agenda for a second time by proposing to create a joint collective leadership. Accordingly Bishop's current functions would be divided,with Bishop continuing his work among the masses (production and propaganda) and in foreign affairs

and Coard taking responsibility for party organizational work, strategy and tactics (including chairing the Politburo). This was of course an old trick that James must have learned from his Soviet contacts and the study of Soviet and East European politics, where usually the division of responsibilities of the number one man in control precede his demotion, the best known example being the case of Czechoslovak First Secretary and President Antonin Novotny in January 1968. Novotny was first deprived of his responsibilities as First Secretary of the Party and several months later his duties as president were taken away. The plan in Grenada was for a slow erosion of Bishop's power.

The members of the conspiracy quickly added their support to James' position on the nature of the NJM leadership. Strachan offered the example of Fidel Castro as unique and inimitable since Castro "is always reflecting and thinking." The strong implication, of course, was that Bishop was lacking in these qualities. To strengthen his proposal, James in turn exalted the example of the collective leadership of the Nicaraguan junta. Cornwall used the same example. Layne also supported the proposal and referred to the GDR example of 1946 when two parties (presumably the communists and social democrats) merged, under Soviet tutelage, in the United Socialist Party (SED). A poor example, indeed, but nobody protested. Later on Layne evoked yet another example in support of the argument for the switch to a "scientifically divided leadership." Also based on the experience of other communist countries, his argument derived from the concept of the political commissars and military leaders in the USSR. According to Layne, this system has worked and has helped to defeat "counterrevolution." As noted previously, Layne, like James, had studied the Soviet example while being a student in the USSR. Given his ready recourse to Soviet terminology and historical data, it is

possible that he reviewed the Soviet experience with his Soviet and East European contacts prior to the meeting. James pointedly warned that failure to implement the proposed plan for dividing the functional responsibilities between Coard and Bishop would amount to guilt of "right opportunism."

By this stage of the meeting a few politburo members had heard enough charges of "right opportunism" leveled against Bishop. Bishop's Minister of Agriculture George Louison, also accused by the anti-Bishop conspirators for "disturbing" the proceedings of the meeting for "opportunistic reasons," characterized Layne's argument about Bishop's "right opportunism" as "shit."[25] Louison failed to see how joint leadership could benefit the NJM. Indeed, he correctly argued that in other communist parties in which one person heads the government and another directs the party, the head of state is subordinate to the party chief. The clear implication is that the proposed collective leadership was a ruse designed to subordinate Bishop to Coard. Another politburo member, Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Land and Forestry Unison Whiteman also disagreed with the joint leadership model and proposed a compromise whereby Coard would become Bishop's deputy leader. Bishop, in response to his critics, evoked the example of the Soviet party, but drew a different lesson, reminding his colleagues that they must be careful in applying ideological lables too quickly. He warned about disunity and asked his colleagues for sufficient time to reflect on the operational aspects of the proposed joint leadership (and perhaps also to devise some countermeasures). When it came time to vote Bishop abstained along with Whiteman and Bain, Louison voted againstthe proposal, and the remaining members voted in favor. Subsequently Coard was asked to join the leadership. Bishop was in the minority like Khrushchev during the Soviet crisis of June 1957. The only question now remaining was whether, like Khrushchev, Bishop could outmaneuver his opponents at the central committee level and succeed in transforming a hostile majority into what Khrushchev called "an arithmetic majority."

As masters of factional politics, the Soviets must have been aware of the rivalry between Bishop and Coard. Judging from the minutes available, they were probably involved in some advisory capacity. In fact, the demands raised by Coard's supporters that Coard and Bishop rule jointly sound surprisingly like the Soviet demand often addressed to leaders of Leninist regimes at the Soviet periphery. The simple truth is that the Soviets do not like to deal with powerful individual leaders such as Tito, Hoxha, Mao, Amin, and Bishop, but rather with various cliques in a collective leadership. Oftentimes Soviet control is maintained by playing these groups against one another or by keeping them at one another's throats. Competing groups can be better manipulated to Soviet advantage than a monolith, particularly during crisis situations such as occurred in Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia in 1968, Hungary in 1956 and Poland in 1980-81.

Moreover, the Soviets very likely shared Coard and his supporters' attitude toward "right opportunistic" trends in the NJM and faulted Bishop for not steering the NJM along a Leninist as opposed to "social democratic" course. Though Coard, it was rumored, was to visit Moscow in the summer of 1983 and Bishop's visit to the USSR in October was conspicuously cancelled, there is no evidence that the Soviets or Cubans were directly involved in killing Bishop.

It is very plausible, however, that the Soviets, more so than the Cubans, had become displeased with Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop during the past several months and were worried about their considerable investment in his government. The turning point was Bishop's visit to the United States in June of 1983 when, as Bishop admitted later in Czechoslovakia, he had "tried to convince some Washington officials of the need to normalize diplomatic and inter-state relations" with the United States. This and Bishop's efforts to conduct a dialogue with neighboring capitalist Caribbean states were very

likely interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of weakness on the part of Bishop. Given their experience with past "betrayals" (Tito, Mao Tse-tung, Hafizullah Amin) and Bishop's evolving moderation, which was applauded by Grenada's neighbors, it is hardly surprising that the Soviet leadership lost at least some confidence in him and perhaps even began to plot his downfall with the first usual step of dividing the functional responsibilities of the leadership.

Bishop's actual removal from power was prepared most likely in early October when he and his two closest supporters Louison and Whiteman were in Hungary and Czechoslovakia negotiating economic aid. (To leave the country while the power struggle was unresolved was a crucial tactical error on the part of Bishop.) While in Eastern Europe Bishop was able to negotiate three electric generators and a hydroelectric power station from Czechoslovakia and moderate agricultural aid from Hungary. However, he was not able to regain the confidence of the Soviets. That the Soviets knew about and perhaps actively encouraged the conspiracy is suggested by the USSR's unexpected cancellation of Bishop's visit to Moscow in early September, originally scheduled in conjunction with his trip to Eastern Europe. According to Prime Minister Edward Seaga of Jamaica, leftist politicians from Jamaica were also involved in consultations with the Soviets and Cubans before the coup. During the visit to Hungary, Bishop did not attend some meetings (presumably with Hungarian officials) because of his expressed desire to reflect on the new arrangement in Grenada. Surely this did not go unnoticed by the Soviets. Bishop visited Castro before his return to Grenada and later Cuban Vice President Carlos Rodriguez admitted that the Cubans had known about the differences in the Grenadian leadership. While reflecting during his trip, where he was undoubtedly under the strong influence of Louison (who was "poinsoning his mind" according to Coard's faction), Bishop came to the conclusion that the proposal for joint leadership was indeed part of a conspiracy and plot.

At this time Bishop's supporters began to worry about the party's "mood for blood,"[25] and a possible repetition of the "Afghan line." This is ironic since Bishop's regime in 1980 voted against the United Nation's condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

While Bishop was out of the country the conspiracy continued with Coard's active participation. Like before, Coard and his supporters argued for much closer ideological and political cooperation with the USSR and Cuba. Meanwhile the central committee adopted a resolution for restructuring the party leadership.

When Bishop returned he lost the second round in the fray by unsuccessfully arguing his case at the central committee meeting on October 12. Unlike Khrushchev in 1957, Bishop was unable to reverse the politburo decision to dismiss him by manipulating key central committee bureaucrats. Furthermore, his opponents accused him of showing contempt for the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. Layne quoted a long passage from an ideological pamphlet on democracy and centralism to illustrate that Lenin would disapprove of Bishop's behavior. Citing Bishop's continuous defiance of his opponents, James led a new attack on Bishop, proposing that he be disarmed and confined indefinitely without telephone service. Some of Bishop's supporters were also confined. This was followed by Strachan's announcement that Coard would succeed Bishop as prime minister.

The winning anti-Bishop coalition decided to formally advise the USSR and Cuba about the depth of the crisis which, in their opinion, called for "Bolshevqk staunchness," "cold bloodedness," and the casting of "all emotions aside," in other words violence if necessary. In this way it became clear what Coard's followers meant when they talked of the need to learn from the fraternal parties in dealing with "rightists" and "counter-revolutionaries." A very pointed analogy was drawn by General Austin who saw the struggle

against the "right" in the NJM as paralleling other struggles when communist forces fought and defeated the "right" in 1903-1924 in Russia, 1921 in Mongolia, 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia and 1980-81 in Poland.[26] Austin forgot to mention the recent Afghan example most feared by Bishop.

While the majority of the central committee and politburo turned against Bishop, the masses did not and Bishop must have known that his only hope lay in mobilizing the populace. On October 19, which became known as "Bloody Wednesday," large crowds of about 10,000 people, led by Bishop's loyal friend Unison Whiteman, liberated Bishop and a few of his supporters. This action in turn led to a clash with the Grenadian armed forces, supervised by Austin, Cornwall, James and Layne. Bishop and his politburo minority, Whiteman and Bain, were killed following an attack by the armed forces using two BTR-60PB armored personnel carriers. Fraternal Soviet assistance provided the tanks and weaponry that in the end became the ultimate destabilizing factor in the Grenadian power equation.

In the new leadership a prominent role was played by the armed forces conspirators Austin, Cornwall, James and Layne. Though they appeared to have the tactical support of the Soviet Ambassador to Grenada Gennadii Sashev, there was no word from Moscow and they were anxious to find out the official Soviet position.

It appears that what was intended to be the gradual political demotion of Bishop got out of hand and instead of Coard, General Austin, who meanwhile edged Coard aside, took over. Chance played a significant part in developments both after Bishop's confinement and after his release. With the new, unexpected developments there appeared to be some tactical differences between the Soviets and Cubans about how to handle the crisis and this could have contributed to the general confusion which resulted in Bishop's death. While the Soviet Politburo, immobilized with a gravely ill Andropov, was sorting out the facts

(as suggested by the silence of the Soviet press after Bishop's death), the Cubans made up their minds quickly. Castro, who was a close friend of Bishop, viewed the conflict mainly as a clash of personalities. He quickly lamented his death and described Bishop and his group as "honest and dignified leaders." The Cubans, as one of Austin's supporters suggested, did not take time out to learn the facts about what took place. As he put it, they took "a personal and not a class approach" and their position created "an atmosphere for speedy imperialist intervention."[27]

True, Castro's mistrust of the new leaders may have been one reason for Cuba's military non-intervention in Grenada following Bishop's death. However, another even more compelling reason was Castro's knowledge about the diversion of the U.S. task force, originally destined for Lebanon. The diversion to Grenada was reported by the U.S. media and Cuban intelligence must have known about it. This is sustained by Castro's own public admission that he had advised Austin and Layne about the diversion verbally through Cuban personnel in Grenada, informing them that the Cuban presence on the island "was too small to be taken as a factor of military importance in the face of a large-scale invasion." In Grenada, as opposed to Angola and Ethiopia, Castro concluded that the idea of sending reinforcements was "unthinkable" because "the U.S. squadrons and aircraft carrierswere moving" and Cuba had "no means of transportation to send reinforcements." Furthermore, the Soviets obviously were unwilling to repeat the airlift of Cuban troops they had staged previously in Angola and Ethiopia because of the superior U.S. naval task force and U.S. proximity. As Castro explained, "no matter how many reinforcements we send they could not compare to the naval and air forces deployed by the United States."[28]

The apparent objective of the coup in Grenada, like in Afghanistan in 1979, was to remove an unreliable leader and replace him with a more conformist

successor better able to keep events under control. Bishop in Grenada and Amin in Afghanistan were overthrown, killed under mysterious circumstances and later declared "counter-revolutionaries" by their successors. Here the analogy ends. Before the invasion Castro sent the Cuban Colonel Pedro Tortolo Comas to command the symbolic resistance of the Cubans stationed in Grenada while the Cuban ship Vietnam Heroico remained stationed for a week outside St. Georges Harbor where it served as a communications link as it had previouly in Angola. Although the Cubans in Grenada received orders to resist the U.S. and East Caribbean security forces, the Soviets were in no position to back up this resistance, as they did in Angola, or uphold the coup, as they did in Afghanistan. The United States and the Eastern Caribbean states, favored by geography, military preponderance and the unfortunate but helpful diversion in Lebanon, moved swiftly to prevent the consolidation of a more pro-Soviet Leninist regime.

V. LESSONS OF GRENADA

Contrary to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Soviet-Cuban involvement in Grenada did not present an unambiguous or immediate threat to U.S. national interests in the Caribbean. Nor is there conclusive evidence to the effect that Grenada had become the depot for large concentrations of Soviet arms or that the arms discovered were clearly designed for future use in Central America, as suggested by some government spokesmen.

Nevertheless, in the years ahead all of these potential conditions could have become reality, at which time it would have been difficult to effect a reversal. Furthermore, our research demonstrates that actual Soviet and Cuban activities in Grenada were not negligible as argued by many administration critics. Indeed, developments in Grenada corresponded to what the Soviets and Cubans would have liked to see happen in the long run throughout the Caribbean basin. The Soviets made a significant, though guarded commitment

to Grenada and they dealt with Grenada like they have dealt with Nicaragua, according both countries a special revolutionary status. They also sent a considerable amount of arms, though some were used or of old vintage, to strengthen the NJM against internal and external counter-revolutionaries, excluding, of course, a large invasion force against which such arms were not expected to be effective.

In spite of these limitations, the growing strength of the Grenadian armed forces was increasingly becoming a factor to be reckoned with in the calm West Indian environment. Unimpeded, Grenadian armed forces under Austin could have threatened Grenada's small neighbors. About this there was an overwhelming consensus among the members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. Some of Grenada's neighbors have no armed forces at all while others have armies of less than a few hundred. Even Jamaica, with a population twenty times larger than that of Grenada, has a smaller armed forces than Grenada. Furthermore, one cannot entirely exclude the possibility that Grenada could have become an integral component in Soviet military planning as Cuba has become in the last quarter century. In spite of Grenada's size, the Soviets obviously were planning to upgrade their military involvement there, as suggested by the top secret agreements on military aid to Grenada. Given the occasional unpredictability of Soviet politics, one cannot entirely rule out the long-run possibility that one of Andropov's successors might have decided to make Grenada the seat of Soviet naval or air force facilities in the Caribbean, a move which surely would precipitate the kind of Soviet-American crisis which occurred in 1962 over Cuba.

Due to the geographic proximity of the Caribbean nations, the United States has vital security interests in the area which form the backdrop for U.S. Caribbean basin policy. Such a policy was first inaugurated, not by James Monroe as is often thought, but rather by then retired President Thomas

Jefferson who eloquently argued in a letter to Monroe in 1923 that the object of the American security system should be "to introduce and establish the American system of keeping out of our land all foreign powers, of never permitting those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations." Also of considerable interest is Jefferson's candid confession that he had "ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of states. The control which, with Florida Point, this island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico and the countries and isthmus bordering on it, as well as all those whose water flow into it, would fill up the measure of our political well being." Jefferson, however, was sensible enough to understand that the acquisition of Cuba could not be achieved but by war. Since he viewed Cuba's independence from European powers as the United States' "second interest," he expressed "no hesitation in abandoning" his first wish to secure the independence of Cuba (and of the other states in the basin, for that matter), and to accept their independence, so long as they never became allied with foreign powers. He proposed a declaration (later known as the Monroe Doctrine) whereby the United States would "oppose with all . . . means, the forcible interposition of any other power, as auxiliary, stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext and most expecially, their transfer to any power by conquest, session or acquisition in any other way." This has since been the fundamental basis for U.S. foreign policy in the Caribbean and as such it contributed to the rationale for U.S. entry into two world wars.

This policy shifted dramatically when the United States acquiesced to a Soviet military presence in Cuba in 1962. The realities of the nuclear age surely affected this change in policy. Although the Soviets were forced to remove their missiles from Cuba in 1962, they were willing to go to the brink

in their commitment to Cuba and this helped to preserve and strengthen the Leninist regime there which gradually became a staunch Soviet ally.

Jefferson's words about U.S. security requirements in the Caribbean are even more appropriate as the twentieth century nears the end. Today the basin constitutes a key passage zone for oil and other vital raw materials from Guatemala, Venezuela and the Caribbean islands to the United States, as well as for all sea-going vessels using the Panama Canal. About 1.1 billion tons of cargo pass through the Caribbean annually, of which almost half originates in ports of the U.S. Gulf Coast. Doubtless the region would assume crucial strategic importance if the United States were engaged in an overseas conventional war. A growing Soviet-Cuban military presence in the basin could eventually endanger logistical support for U.S. allies in Europe and the delivery of oil and other strategic materials to the United States. The United States does have military options in the Caribbean basin; however, its present military involvement in the basin (including Central America) has already placed a burden on U.S. resources and strained both U.S. domestic policies and international connections.

Obviously, the Soviet and East European arms transfer to the Grenadian armed forces did not pose the same direct national security threat as did the Soviet missile deployment in Cuba. However, a permanent and growing Soviet military presence in the basin, even of a conventional type, or naval facilities cannot be ignored. U.S. toleration of a growing Soviet military presence in Grenada or Nicaragua could facilitate a similar build-up elsewhere in the area. If the phenomenon is accepted in one locale, it will become difficult to oppose in others. The spread of Soviet military facilities in geographic proximity to the United States could make a significant difference in wartime by tying up U.S. forces needed in other theatres. As in the past, U.S. security depends on the ability to prevent the military involvement of

extra-hemispheric powers in countries on its southern flank. The United States cannot condone such involvement and must be prepared to use force to prevent hostile military alliances at its periphery. New Leninist regimes like Cuba and possibly Nicaragua, which have strong military ties with the USSR, must be considered a potential security threat to the United States. The political crisis in Grenada and its bloody resolution, combined with the ensuing unpredictability of events, provided an irresistable challenge and opportunity for U.S. policymakers to cope with this remote but very possible security threat, while incurring limited damages and costs.

Soviet-Cuban activities in Grenada, however, do illustrate another lesson beyond the necessity of realpolitik. One cannot ignore the fact that Soviet and Cuban aid helped build an increasingly oppressive leftist regime which was despised by a majority of the Grenadian people. To students of international politics, the U.S. action in Grenada was an invasion or an intervention; to most of the Grenadian people it meant liberation from a mounting tyranny. The NJM crisis of October 1983 resulted from systemic problems, that is, difficulties inherent in a Leninist, authoritarian type of government. Like in some of the countries of Eastern Europe and in Afghanistan, the Creole Leninist bureaucracy introduced in Grenada was a poor fit for local conditions. Soviet-Cuban military, political-ideological and modest economic ties were unable to prevent a deep systemic crisis and the subsequent power struggle. On the contrary, the arms arsenal supplied by the USSR and other communist countries became a destabilizing factor, serving not to defend the revolution and its leaders but rather to destroy them.

The Grenadian episode also illustrates that third world leaders dependent upon the USSR, like leaders of communist countries on the Soviet periphery, cannot be assured of continuing Soviet support and friendship. Deviation or perceived offense can be the pretext for their Soviet generated or supported

removal, as happened in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Afghanistan, and now Grenada. The ominous implications should be clear to the Sandinista leadership but also to Cuba and all clients of the USSR.

The Grenada events further show that Soviet power at the U.S. periphery is very limited. Unlike at their own periphery, in the U.S. backyard the Soviets are much less able and willing to support "healthy forces"--pro-Soviet regimes. This is particularly true at times when the United States is willing to protect its interest by the assertive use of military force.

The most important lesson of Grenada, however, is that "left" totalitarian Leninist regimes, with their emphasis on military build-up, ideological mobilization, democratic centralism and "Bolshevik staunchness," tend to produce the kind of violence and bloodshed we witnessed in Grenada and continue to see in Afghanistan. So do the authoritarian regimes of the right. The clear solution for countries of Latin America and the Caribbean basin is not to follow the Cuban example, but rather to strive, as Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa put it, "to break the cycle of dictatorships (be they of the right or the left), overcoming the "lack of understanding . . . of totalitarian countries that wish to annex us to their sphere of influence." If nothing else, careful study of the Grenadian documents may help enlighten those who still do not understand. The well-known weaknesses of democracy notwithstanding, democratic governments at least provide constitutional guarantees against the "Afghan line" which results in the betrayal of revolutionaries consumed by the revolutions they ardently espouse.

NOTES

1. Cuba's formal status outside the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) is unimportant. The country's military alliance and cooperation with the USSR is even closer and more perfectly integrated than that of some WTO members like Romania. In the Soviets' view Cuba is more reliable than, for example, Czechoslovakia or Poland.

2. Here we deliberately use the term Leninist, not Marxist-Leninist. The Cuban and Nicaraguan regimes are certainly not Marxist-Leninist. Rather, given their specific political cultures, they are Machistas-Leninistas. These regimes are little concerned with Marx's notions of humanism and revolution. To call these regimes Marxist neglects not only this point but also the fact that Marx actually favored the United States in the war against Mexico in 1848 (an issue which causes Cuban officials to squirm in public debates). Cuba did not copy the Marxist model of communism (for Marx had none), but rather the Leninist political system. Lenin was the one who developed the concepts of the dictatorship of the proletariat and democratic centralism. Although Leninist forces call themselves Marxist, Westerners need not make the same error.

3. A.I. Stroganov, Latinskaia Amerika, No. 5, May 1983, p. 134.

4. Yurii Fokin, a high official in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview on Radio Havana, August 13, 1983 (FBIS, Latin America, August 5, 1983).

5. Memorandum of conversation between Soviet Army Chief of General Staff Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov and Grenadian Army Chief of Staff Einstein Louison, who at the time was in the Soviet Union for training, March 10, 1983.

6. Victor Belenko, in John Barron, MiG Pilot: Final Escape of Lieutenant Belenko (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1980), p. 65.

7. Washington Post transcript of the interview with former high official of the Nicaraguan Ministry of the Interior Miguel Balanos Hunter at the Heritage Foundation, June 16-17, 1983.

8. K. Khochaturov, "Changes on the Island of Spices," Pravda (Moscow), August 17, 1981.

9. CANA (Bridgetown), July 28, 1982 (FBIS-Latin America, July 28, 1982).

10. Agreement on Cooperation between the New Jewel Movement of Grenada and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, July 27, 1982.

11. Work Plan and Guidelines for the NJM's Propaganda Department.

12. Minutes of Organizing Committee, April 18, 1983 and other unidentified minutes.

13. A memo from Bernard Bourne, Minister-Counselor of Grenadian Embassy in the USSR to the Grenadian Peace Council, November 6, 1982.

14. Agreement between the Government of Grenada and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on deliveries from the USSR to Grenada of special and other equipment, Havana, October 27, 1980.

15. Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of Grenada and the Government of the USSR of October 27, 1980 on deliveries from the USSR to Grenada of special and other equipment, Havana, February 9, 1981.

16. Agreement between the Government of Grenada and the Government of the USSR on deliveries from the USSR to Grenada of special and other equipment, Havana, July 27, 1982.

17. A memo from the General of the Army Hudson Austin to "Commander" Andropov, February 17, 1982.

18. Protocol of the Military Collaboration between the Government of the Republic of Cuba and the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada (no date).

19. Minutes of a meeting of the Committee of Economic Ministers of Grenada, May 9, 1983.

20. Minutes of the Political Economic Bureau, August 3, 1983.

21. The NJM document of September 25, 1983 about the Extraordinary Central Committee meeting of August 26, 1983.

22. An interview with a high official in the Jamaican Socialist Party.

23. Extraordinalry Meeting of the Central Committee of the NJM, September 16, 1983, p. 4.

24. Ibid, p. 29.

25. Ibid, p. 33.

26. Report on meeting of Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the NJM, October 12, 1983 (hand written report, some of it illegible).

27. Hand written note of a Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the NJM.

28. Press conference of an unusually subdued Fidel Castro, Havana Television Service, October 26, 1981 (FBIS-Latin America, October 26, 1983).