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THE DEFENSE COUNCIL IN SOVIET  
LEADERSHIP DECISIONMAKING

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In 1967, Minister of Defense Grechko addressed the USSR Supreme Soviet on a draft law on military manpower policy. The draft legislation decreased the length of conscript service from three to two years, expanded basic and specialist training programs for pre-draft youth, and decreased educational deferments. The draft that Grechko presented was the result of a lengthy debate on military service. Opponents of the decreased service term for conscripts had argued that the reduced terms would have a detrimental effect on military training and combat readiness. Proponents of the decrease had countered with the argument that improved educational levels of the draft pool, as well as the expansion in pre-draft military training, would offset the reduction in active duty training time. (1a) The formal presentation of the draft at the Supreme Soviet took place well after the real discussion had ended. The Supreme Soviet, a rubber-stamp parliament, merely endorsed a decision which had already been taken elsewhere.

Where are such decisions made in the USSR? Are they made by the Politburo? The CC Secretariat? By a few (i.e., two or three) senior Politburo members meeting informally outside an institutional setting? Do professional military men participate in such deliberations, and if so, as invited experts or as decisionmakers in their own right? Who decides when a particular issue has sufficient political content to warrant determination outside the Defense Ministry proper?

Answers to these and similar questions are crucial to our understanding of the Soviet decisionmaking process. If security decisions are made by a few top political figures with defense-related responsibilities, Politburo members with

non-defense portfolios are effectively isolated from decisions affecting a large proportion of Soviet resources. If this procedure has been institutionalized in a decisionmaking body with constitutional status and statutory regulations, modifying the procedure may well be a difficult and politically sensitive problem. If the professional military represents the sole source of expert advice, then the level of de facto military influence in defense decisions is considerably greater than would be the case if a broader cross-section of officials participated in the policy process.

To a large extent, then, a discussion of Soviet military decisionmaking becomes a study of institutions. The one institution which is perhaps most frequently mentioned in this regard is the USSR Defense Council -- the highest government body which specializes in national security issues. (1b) Determining how defense-related issues are decided is primarily a problem of determining what role the Defense Council plays in this process: what are its status, mission, membership, and decisionmaking procedures, and how does it relate to (and interact with) other state and Party bodies involved in security issues (the Politburo, CC Secretariat and central Party apparatus, Council of Ministers, VPK, Ministry of Defense Collegium, General Staff, service commands, and so on).

The short answer to most of these questions is that we really don't know. The Soviet leadership is incredibly secretive about its decisionmaking process. For decades, regular meetings of the Politburo --the Party's top decisionmaking body -- were not even officially acknowledged in the Soviet media. Indeed, the one indisputable innovation of an extremely non-innovative regime was the

Andropov leadership's decision to publish brief summaries of the weekly Soviet Politburo meetings.

If the Soviets are reticent about publishing material on political decisionmaking, they are even more reluctant to reveal information on the process and procedures involved in deciding military and security issues. Material on the Soviet Defense Council per se is extremely limited. Until 1976, the Soviets did not even openly acknowledge its existence. Over the past eight years, fragmentary bits of information on the Defense Council and its activities have appeared in the press, primarily in the military and administrative law literatures. The Soviets are somewhat more forthcoming concerning the Defense Council's historical antecedents; and some insight into the Council's current operations can be derived from these discussions. Insight into Defense Council activities can also be drawn from an examination of the analogous bodies in other Warsaw Pact countries. The survey that follows draws liberally on all of these sources. It seems prudent, however, to stress the uncertainties involved in piecing together fragmentary bits of information into a coherent picture: there is a great deal we don't know. Much of what we think we know about the Defense Council is based on assumptions of questionable validity or information of dubious reliability. For these reasons, I have tried to be very explicit about the evidence undergirding what are admittedly relatively modest conclusions.

#### HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The Defense Council's earliest historical antecedent is the Council of

Workers' and Peasants' Defense (Soviet rabochey i krestyanskoy oborony.). Often referred to in Soviet sources as simply Soviet oborony (Defense Council), this body was formed by state resolution on 30 November 1918 (1). Contemporary Soviet sources describe it as "an extraordinary, high military-economic organ of the Soviet state." (2) Chaired by Lenin (who was also Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars, the predecessor of the Council of Ministers), the Defense Council was a small body (six to eight members), consisting of representatives (predstavitely) of the various organizations involved in the war effort. The Council was responsible during the Civil War for mobilizing the country's resources (both manpower and material) for defense (3). Defense Council resolutions were mandatory for both central and regional institutions, as well as all citizens (4). The Leninist Defense Council was set up primarily as a committee to coordinate military/economic support to the fledgling Red Army. In the months which followed, it became increasingly involved in operational questions and military organization. (4b)

By the early 1920s, the Red Army had defeated the armies of Kolchak, Denikin and Yuden; and England and France had withdrawn their troops. The United States began troop withdrawal in January 1920. The price of victory and revolution was internal chaos. Steel production stood at 5% of the 1913 level. Gross agricultural production had decreased by 40 to 45% from the 1913 level. Russia stood at the brink of economic collapse. The immediate task facing the Bolshevik regime was economic reconstruction. To this end, the leadership decided to postpone demobilization of the army and channel some military units to economic work. Beginning in January 1920, the Defense Council adopted a series of resolutions transforming selected combat armies to "labor armies." (5)

In connection with these changes, the Defense Council was transformed in April 1920 to the Council of Labor and Defense (Soviet truda i oborony, or STO). The STO's legal status was that of a commission of the Council of People's Deputies (SNK), which also designated its membership. (6). STO's charter was considerably broader than that of the earlier Defense Council, since its mission included economic policy in addition to defense issues per se (i.e., conscription policy). Indeed, of the over 2,500 questions placed before the STO between November 1920 and November 1921, only 3.5% were "military questions." STO's major preoccupation during the period was food and fuel supply, industry, transportation, and construction. (6b) Like the Defense Council, however, STO was not an advisory body; its decisions were mandatory for all central and local state entities. During the thirties, many of STO's missions were gradually assumed by another defense-related committee: the Defense Commission (Komissiya Oborony), which had been set up as a standing body attached to (pri) SNK. Headed by Politburo member and SNK chairman Molotov, the Defense Commission formulated resolutions on defense which were then introduced to STO for confirmation (7).

STO was disbanded on 28 April 1937. Its functions were transferred to the Economic Council attached to (pri) the Council of Peoples' Commissars. At the same time, the old Defense Commission was reorganized into a Defense Committee (Komitet oborony). The mission of this latter body was "the unification of all measures and defense questions of the USSR." (8) The Defense Committee, like the Commission it replaced, was chaired by Politburo member and SNK chairman Molotov. Other members included Stalin and Defense commissar K.Ye. Voroshilov.



The Defense Committee, unlike STO, concerned itself mainly with issues which were directly related to defense -- formation of military districts, mobilization plans, and weapons acquisition programs. (9). Like both STO and the Leninist Defense Council, the KO had decisionmaking authority; that is, it had the right to issue special resolutions which were binding on other government entities. On 31 April 1938, the Central Committee passed a resolution creating a Military Industrial Commission attached to the KO to mobilize and prepare both defense and nondefense industries to implement plans and orders of the KO for production and delivery of weapons to the Red Army and fleet. (10)

The Defense Committee was superceded on 30 June 1941 by the State Defense Committee (Gosudarstvennyy komitet oborony, or GKO). The GKO's mission was to mobilize the country for defense. For the duration of the war, GKO was the highest organ of state administration. Its decisions had the force of law and were binding on all government and Party bodies, as well as social organizations. (11) GKO was disbanded on 4 September 1945 and its functions, as described by a Soviet source, were transferred to the Council of Peoples' Commissars. (12) If this description is valid, then there was no defense council in the immediate post-war period.

Sometime between 1945 and the early sixties, a peacetime version of the Defense Council was resurrected and became the contemporary USSR Defense Council. The existence of the Defense Council was not publicly acknowledged in the Soviet press until 1976, when the Defense Council was mentioned in the Soviet press in connection with Brezhnev's chairmanship of it. The Defense

Council, however, was an open secret prior to this time. Its existence was noted by participants in the SALT talks. In 1983, the Soviets themselves belatedly acknowledged that General Secretary Brezhnev had become chairman of this body in 1964, apparently at the same time he was appointed to the top Party post.

Until 1977, however, the Council operated outside the law, in the sense that it lacked constitutional status. This lacuna was remedied in the 1977 Brezhnev Constitution. The Soviet willingness to incorporate the Defense Council in the Constitution is partly a reflection of the growth in Brezhnev's personal political power (which led to an effort to publicize his personal military status, including his chairmanship of the Defense Council), and partly a result of the growing Soviet concern with observance of official legal procedures. The public recognition of the Defense Council and the series of published references to it which followed were also the result of a growing willingness to discuss the long-standing Soviet concern to insure a smooth transition from peacetime to wartime management.

#### DEFENSE COUNCILS IN EASTERN EUROPE

The USSR Defense Council has institutional counterparts in each of the six Warsaw Pact states. In many cases, these bodies appear to have been organized directly on the Soviet model. Because the East Europeans are, for the most part, more forthcoming than the Soviets in releasing information on their councils, the East European materials are potentially of major importance in helping to understand the Soviet Defense Council. There are several different

sources of data on the East European councils. Some of the councils have been given constitutional status and brief references to them are incorporated into their respective constitutions. Additional information on council activities may be provided in defense and security related laws and decrees: general laws on the organization of defense, military service laws, laws on emergency or crisis situations, civil defense laws, laws or other legal acts on internal security and so on. Most desirable, clearly, are published versions of the defense council's legal statute. The administrative and constitutional law press may contain additional material on the development of the council in question. These materials are available in varying degrees of comprehensiveness for each of the six non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries.

#### The State Defense Committee of Bulgaria

The Bulgarian analogue to the USSR Defense Council is the State Defense Committee (Durzhaven Komitet na otbranata). This body was acknowledged in the 1971 Bulgarian Constitution, which noted briefly that the State Council is empowered to (among other things) "appoint and remove from office the members of the State Defense Committee." (13) This reference parallels almost precisely the analogous reference in the 1977 Soviet Constitution. The Bulgarian State Council is the National Assembly's standing body -- in other words, the Bulgarian analogue of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. I have been unable to locate any additional references to the Bulgarian State Defense Committee in official legal sources. Bulgarian jurists, like their Soviet counterparts, mention the State Defense Committee briefly, noting that it exemplifies the principle of command centralization in military affairs. (14) These jurists

also note that while the old Dimitrov Constitution of 1947 did not make reference to the committee, its existence, which was defined in other legal acts, predated the 1971 Constitution. (15) The committee is also said to have been granted authority for direction and management of defense issues in wartime as well as peacetime. (16)

#### The National Defense Council of East Germany

Slightly more is known of the East German National Defense Council. The German council (Der Nationale Verteidigungsrat) was first set up in 1960; its primary mission was "defense of the state." (17) Later legislation specified the Council's role in establishing and implementing military manpower policy. (17b) According to the 1968 Constitution (as amended in 1974), the People's Chamber, a legislative body roughly analogous to the Soviet Supreme Soviet, "lays down the principles governing the activities" of the National Defense Council (as well as other top state bodies). (18) The Peoples' Chamber also elects the Chairman of the National Defense Council. (19) Members of the council are approved by the Council of State (the East German analogue to the USSR Presidium of the Supreme Soviet). (20) The Council of State has been granted extensive constitutional responsibility for "defense and security" of the country. According to the Constitution, it discharges these duties with the help of the National Defense Council. (21)

Additional information on the German National Defense Council is provided in the 1978 defense law. Section 2 charges the council with "the central direction

of defense and security measures." (22) The defense law indicates that the Council consists of its chairman and a minimum of 12 members. (23). Council missions include announcement of general or partial mobilization, implementation of mobilization or a state of defense, and direction over civil defense activities. (24) The Council has also been given broad authority in the area of military manpower and training. For example, the Council determines what service in organizations outside the Army and border troops constitutes performance of military service. (25) The Council also determines procedures for manpower registration and passes regulations on various types of military service (i.e., basic vs career military). (26) The National Defense Council can also suspend regular military discharges in event of a catastrophe or tense international situation (27), and establishes procedures for the performance of military service during mobilization and the state of defense alert. (28) In general, regulations and instructions to implement the GDR military service law must be approved first by the National Defense Council. (29) The Council is also apparently responsible for major weapons deployments. It was the National Defense Council, for example, which announced the countermeasures taken by the GDR to the U.S. deployments of Pershing II intermediate range missiles. (30)

None of the legal materials on the GDR's National Defense Committee provides information on membership. However, Party leader Erick Honecker (who is also chairman of the Council of State, the titular head of state position) is routinely identified as chairman, as was his predecessor as Party leader, Walter Ulbricht. General Fritz Streletz, chief of the General Staff, has been identified as Defense Council Secretary. (30)

## The Defense Council of Hungary

The Hungarian Defense Council is configured somewhat differently. Unlike its Bulgarian and East German counterparts, the Hungarian Defense Council does not have constitutional status. The 1949 Hungarian Constitution (as amended in 1972 and 1975) makes no mention of it. (31) As with the GDR, the main source of information on the council comes from a general law on defense. The law, which was adopted in 1976, states that:

The primary task of the Defense Council is the supreme direction of defense and the effective exploitation of all the country's resources for the defense of the homeland in time of war. (32)

The law also states that the composition of the Defense Council and the election of its President, Secretary, and members is determined by the Presidential Council -- Hungary's analogue to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. (33) The Presidential Council can create "a defense council with extraordinary powers" in time of war." (34) While these provisions may be interpreted to mean that the Defense Council exists only during wartime, there is ample evidence that the Defense Council exists in peacetime. In fact, the decision to formulate a new national defense law was taken by the Defense Council itself. (35)

Information on the membership of the Defense Council is not available. We do not know, for example, whether Party leader Janos Kadar is Defense Council President. The law does state, however, that the President of the Defense Council is the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces and the Armed Services.

(36)

The Hungarian national defense law does not contain a specific list of missions. It does state, however, that "the Defense Council exercises the powers of the Presidential Council delegated to it by the latter and, within the limits laid down by the Presidential Council, the power of the Council of Ministers."

(37) This formulation suggests that Defense Council functions include at least some of the missions assigned to the Presidential Council: proclamation of war, conclusion of internal agreements in the defense arena, and appointment and removal of generals. The Defense Council may also dispense at least some of the missions assigned to the Council of Ministers: framing of regulations on defense issues, coordination of defense-related activities of ministers, approval of defense-related economic plans and of the defense budget, announcement of general or partial mobilization, and other issues related to the preparation for defense. The problem with determining which of these latter missions have been assigned to the Defense Council is the fact that some portions of these missions are fulfilled by yet another body -- the Defense Committee of the Council of Ministers. (38) This latter body has territorial organs at county, district, town and provincial district levels, which operate in time of war as territorial organs of the Defense Council. (39)

#### The National Defense Committee of Poland

The Polish National Defense Committee (Komitet obrony kraju or KOK) was reportedly set up in the early fifties; its existence was acknowledged in

legislation in 1967. (40) Until late 1983, the Polish KOK represented a deviation from most of the other Warsaw Pact defense councils. First, the KOK's legal status was that of a committee of the Council of Ministers for defense matters. (41) Accordingly, the KOK's legally-defined missions were considerably narrower than those of the defense council analogue in the GDR and Hungary. Unlike the GDR National Defense Committee, Poland's committee was charged only with "defense matters," as opposed to "defense and security." (42) Second, the KOK's chairman was the chairman of the Council of Ministers acting in an ex officio capacity. The remaining deputy chairmen, members, and secretary of the KOK were designated by the Council of Ministers, rather than by the legislature or the legislature's standing body as is the case in Bulgaria, GDR, and Hungary. (43) The secretary of the KOK was the Main Inspector of National Defense, rather than the Chief of the General Staff, as is the case in the GDR. (44) The Polish KOK, then, was configured quite differently from most of its Warsaw Pact counterparts.

In November 1983, the Polish Sejm endorsed a revision of the 1967 universal military service law. Under the terms of the new law, the KOK was transformed from a committee of the Council of Ministers to an autonomous body within the system of state administrative bodies. The KOK's mission statement was broadened to include both defense and security. (45)

The most significant of the KOK's new powers pertains to its role with regard to crisis situations. Specifically, the KOK is now empowered to:

propose motions on declaration of a state of emergency, martial law,



announcement of mobilization, and make decisions on a state of war (and) function as an administrator on matters of the State's defense and security during a state of emergency and martial law... (46)

Additional details on the KOK's role with regard to a state of emergency are provided by the 10 December 1983 law on the state of emergency, which specifies that the KOK proposes the declaration of a state of emergency to the State Council. (47) Together, these guidelines endow the KOK with broad authority to administer the state hierarchy during the emergency period. (48)

Also new are the KOK's powers to assign to state bodies tasks relating to defense and military readiness and to supervise the implementation of such tasks. (49) The KOK's coordinating role has also been broadened; it is now charged with coordinating the defense-related activities of both government and economic bodies. (50) The new law also endows the KOK with authority to coordinate defense and security related programs with socio-economic policy. (51) This suggests that the KOK will now take a more active role in integrating defense plans with overall economic plans.

Under the new law, the KOK retains its basic authority to determine the "general assumptions" for defense, i.e., to set general defense policy. (50b) It also has authority to set the "organizational assumptions of the Armed Forces, civil defense, and militarized units." (50c) In other words, overall guidelines for force structure and unit organization are determined by the KOK. Also retained and expanded is the KOK's broad authority in the area of military manpower policy. The KOK, for example, sets procedures for service assignments.

(50d) During a period of mobilization and war, the KOK sets up procedures governing exemptions from active military service. (50e) It also has responsibilities in the area of civil defense (50f) and paramilitary service. (50g) In sum, the expanded missions specified in the new law, together with existing functions, give the KOK virtually unlimited jurisdiction in matters pertaining to "state security," understood in its broadest sense.

The KOK's leadership structure has also been changed. Under the new law, there is no longer a legal link between the KOK chairmanship and the chairman of the Council of Ministers. Now, the KOK Chairman, who is also ex officio Supreme Commander in Chief, is appointed by the Sejm. In late November 1983, the Sejm approved a proposal which appointed General Wojciech Jaruzelski by name as chairman of the KOK. This will allow him to resign the Council of Minister's chairmanship without diminishing his influence over the political military apparatus.

As before, the Minister of National Defense (currently Siwicki) is the ex officio deputy chairman of the KOK for Armed Forces Affairs and strategic-defense planning. However, the remaining deputy chairmen are appointed by the State Council (rather than by the Council of Ministers as was previously the case). KOK members and the secretary are to be chosen according to procedures determined by the State Council. Michael Checinski's discussion of the pre-1983 KOK membership suggests a relatively large body -- an impression consistent with the provision in the November 1983 law which established a Presidium of the KOK.

(52)

Also expanded were the powers of the KOK's regional analogues, the provincial defense committees. (53) The provincial committees, like their national level counterpart, are responsible for coordinating defense needs with overall economic development. Precise mission statements for the provincial committees will be determined by the national level KOK.

#### The Defense Council of Romania

The Romanians, the Warsaw Pact's perennial political mavericks, are considerably more forthcoming about their Defense Council (Consiliul Apararii) than the Poles. A provision on the Romanian Defense Council was incorporated in the 1965 Romanian constitution. (54) Defense Council authority is spelled out in some detail in two major pieces of legislation: the 1969 law on the Defense Council itself (in effect, the Defense Council's statute) and the 1972 law on the organization for national defense. (55)

The Romanian Defense Council, like its GDR, Hungarian, and Polish counterparts, is responsible for both defense and security. Its responsibilities extend to both peace and wartime. (56) Like the Polish KOK, the Romanian Defense Council sets general defense policy and determines force structure. (57) It also approves military training programs, mobilization plans, and troop disposition systems. (58) Like the Polish KOK, the Romanian body is responsible for defense-related aspects of national planning. It also makes proposals to the legislature (and the legislature's standing body) on the proclamation of a state of emergency, partial or general mobilization, as well as a declaration of a state of war. (59)

Romania's Defense Council statute involves the council more closely in operational planning than does available legislation for the GDR, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland. The Romanian Council "adopts the main measures concerning the operational preparation of the country's territory; (and) in case of war, it directly leads the combat operations and mobilization of the entire human and material potential of the country." (60).

The Romanian law is also much more explicit on membership. (61) The chairman of the Defense Council, who (like the chairman of the Polish KOK) is also supreme commander of the armed forces, is the general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party (currently Ceaucescu). Other members (also acting in an ex-officio capacity) include: the chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of the Armed Forces, the chairman of the State Security Council, the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Chairman of the State Planning Committee. Additional members are approved by the State Council after designation by the Party Central Committee. In 1975, for example, Council membership included (in addition to the ex-officio members) several CC secretaries and several top level military professionals from the Ministry of the Armed Forces (i.e, the deputy for political affairs, the chief of the General Staff). (61b)

The Romanian law also provides information on staff procedures. As with the GDR National Defense Council, the Romanian chief of the General Staff acts as secretary. (62) He is assisted in this capacity "by a secretariat consisting of generals and officers from the Ministry of the Armed Forces and from the State Security Council, and by specialists belonging to other ministries or

central organs." (63) According to the statute, Defense Council decisions are embodied in a protocol. Documents relating to Defense Council activities are maintained within the General Staff. (64)

Additional legislative provisions indicate that much of the preliminary work in Defense Council decisionmaking is done, as could be expected, in the Ministry of the Armed Forces. For example, the ministry prepares proposals for submission to the Defense Council on programs for "improving the organization, equipping and training of the Army, the distribution and redistribution of the troops, the efficient preparation of the territory, as well as the draft plan for the use of the Army in case of war." (65) The draft plan for mobilizing the economy for the first year of war is compiled by the Council of Ministers for submission to the Defense Council. (66) The defense and interior ministries are charged with drafting lists of material reserves for approval by the Defense Council. (67)

Like Poland, Romania set up regional defense councils, at county, municipal, town and commune levels. (68) Like the national level Romanian Defense Council, the country-level defense councils are chaired by the top Party official in the region. (69) Membership includes top officials from the local government, the military commander of the local garrison, the top local official from the Ministry of Interior, plus representatives from local health, communication, and transportation agencies. (70) "Current problems" are handled by the local defense council's standing body, a "bureau" consisting of the top five or six defense council members. (71) According to law, the local defense councils are responsible for implementing security-related Defense Council decisions during

both peace and wartime in the area of civil defense, recruitment and mobilization, disaster relief, economic and mobilization. These bodies are also intended to serve as a coordination center for resistance activities during enemy occupation. (72)

#### The State Defense Council of Czechoslovakia

Like the Romanians, the Czechs adopted a statutory law on the State Defense Council (rada obrany statu) in March 1969. (73) Many of the mission statements are very similar. The Czech State Defense Council, for example, determines general defense policy and approves civil defense measures. (74) It is also charged with preparing proposals on military funding. (75) As in Romania, the Czech State Defense Council is closely involved in operational planning in peace and the conduct of operations in war. (76) The Czech council also is charged with proposing organizational measures necessary to manage the government during wartime. (77) The Czech council is also charged with a role in military-related aspects of foreign policy. (76b) It also has an important mission in safeguarding internal security. (76c) State Defense Council jurisdiction, according to Czech military law specialists, covers "areas which require a conceptual evaluation of professional military matters and in which maximum security is a decisive factor (as well as)... activities which are directly related to warfare. " (76d)

Unlike the Romanian law, the Czech law contains no detailed provisions on membership. The Council is said to consist of a chairman, vice chairman, and four to six additional members, all of whom are named by the President. (78)

This suggests that the Czech council is a much smaller, more streamlined committee than either the Romanian Defense Council or the Polish KOK. In March 1969, when the State Defense Council law was adopted, the following individuals were appointed to the Council: Alexander Dubcek (Party first secretary) as chairman, Oldrich Cernik (Premier) as Vice Chairman; and Gustav Husak (Slovak Party first secretary); Martin Dzur (Minister of National Defense); Lubomir Strougal (Czech Party leader); Stefan Sadovskiy (Slovak premier); Stanislav Razl (Czech premier); Jan Pelnar (Minister of Interior); and Karel Rusov (Chief of the General Staff. (78b) When Husak succeeded Dubcek as national Party chief, he also replaced Cernik as Defense Council chairman (78c). Strougal replaced Cernik as premier in January 1970, but there is no indication that he also assumed Cernik's vice chairmanship. (78d) Peter Colotka assumed Sadovskiy's post as Slovak premier in May 1969 and was also appointed to the State Defense Council. (78e) Josef Kemny succeeded Razl as both Czech premier and State Defense Council member in October 1969. (78f) This is the latest official appointment to the Czech council I know of. After October 1969, the Czechs apparently suspended publication of Defense Council appointments. These early announcements, however, suggest that State Defense Council membership during this period at least was tied to position: the national Party leader, the premier, the top four republic officials, the defense and interior ministers, and the Chief of the General Staff. As in Romania and the GDR, the Czech chief of the General Staff is the ex officio secretary of the National Defense Council. (79) In the Czech case, however, the law specifies in addition that the function of secretariat is performed by the General Staff. (80)

As with Hungary, Poland and Romania, Czechoslovakia has a hierarchy of

regional defense council analogues. Both the Czech and Slovak republics have their own republic defense councils. Members of the two republic defense councils are named by the chairman of the national-level defense council. (81). The republic defense council chairmen, in turn, appoint members of the defense councils at local level. (82)

### THE CONTEMPORARY SOVIET DEFENSE COUNCIL

The material provided above on the historical and East European counterparts to the contemporary USSR Defense Council was provided in what some readers may find excessive detail as a supplement to the fragmentary material on the Defense Council itself. There are, of course, methodological difficulties in attempting to describe and analyze the USSR Defense Council through study of its historical and East European analogues. As demonstrated by the historical survey, the Defense Council's organizational predecessors in the Soviet Union varied widely in legal status, leadership, membership, mission, and staff procedures. Some of these variations are due to shifts in the overall state structure, some to political power arrangements specific to a given period of Soviet history. Whatever the reason, the variety in organizational arrangements evident in this survey of the Defense Council's historical antecedents highlights the difficulties of studying the contemporary Defense Council by reference to them.

Similar comments apply to the East European materials. The East European councils, as is clear from the material presented above, are not configured identically. There are, moreover, differences between the East European states and their Soviet counterpart, differences which affect Party and state structure



and operations. This is particularly true with regard to military issues, since the relationship between the East European states and the Warsaw Pact organization is, of course, different from that between the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. We cannot simplistically assume, therefore, that every provision of the law on the Czech State Defense Committee, for example, is exactly replicated in the analogous document for the USSR Defense Council.

Still, the historical and East European material provides a useful sense of the potential range and scope of Defense Council operations. In Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary and Poland, there are regional-level analogues to the national defense council. What are the possibilities that the Soviets have adopted a similar arrangement? In the USSR, both the Leninist Defense Council and the STO created a series of sub-committees or commissions to handle specific questions. How likely is it that the contemporary USSR Defense Council has done likewise? An examination of the historical and East European counterparts, then, is useful as a way of providing insight into the probable legal status, missions, membership, and staff procedures of the Soviet council.

#### Legal Status

An important issue in assessing the operations of the USSR Defense Council is its legal status. Assessing the Defense Council's role vis a vis other entities in the state and Party hierarchies requires first that we have some notion of the scope of its legal authority over them. Some Western analysts have suggested, for example, that the Defense Council is a Politburo sub-group, sub-set, or sub-committee. (82b) We know that Politburo sub-committees, generally

called kommissii, have existed in the past. From 1948 to 1953, there was a standing Politburo Commission on Foreign Policy Questions. In 1953, and again from 1962 to 1964, there was a standing ideological commission of the Central Committee. From 1958 to 1961, there were standing commissions on ideology, culture, and international Party relations which had regular meetings and which produced formal protocols (meeting records). At various times, there have been standing commissions on military and organizational-Party issues. More common is the formation of temporary commissions to examine and decide individual issues or to prepare proposals. These have included commissions on defense issues, on rural development, on industry, transportation, construction and trade developments. The life cycle of these temporary commissions has depended on the complexity of the missions assigned them; some have lasted for several years. (83) Brezhnev told a visiting group of Western journalists in 1973 that formation of a sub-committee of members was frequently used for issues where no agreement could be reached within the Politburo itself. (84) He was apparently referring to this practice at the 26th Party Congress in 1981, when he explained that the complexity of many issues facing the Politburo was such that a "special commission" might be formed to study the issue. (85)

At least two such Politburo commissions were active during the Andropov era. The Politburo Commission on reform of general educational schools and vocational technical training was established at a Politburo meeting in late June and chaired by now General Secretary Chernenko. (86) Although the commission apparently began meeting during the summer, only two commission meetings were reported in the press, one on 5 September and the other on 14 November. (87) The meeting reports indicate that the commission had subcommissions of its own and

that participation (if not membership) was not limited to Politburo members. CC Secretary Zimyanin, for example, addressed the mid-November meetings. Politburo members Aliyev, Gorbachev, and Grishin also participated but so did CC secretaries Kapitonov and Ryzhkov. (88) The commission's primary mission was to produce a draft of the "Basic Directions" for educational reform, which was later approved by the Politburo in late December and published in the press for nation-wide discussion. (89)

The other Politburo commission whose activities were publicized was a commission chaired by Aliyev to direct organizational work in a complex program for the development for consumer goods and services. Aliyev's commission, like Chernenko's educational commission, involved wide participation by non-Politburo members including deputy Gosplan chiefs Lakhtin and Sitaryan and CC Secretaries Kapitonov and Ryzhkov. (90)

This material indicates that Politburo sub-committees clearly exist. It also suggests that they lack the long-term legal status of both official state bodies and statutory Party bodies, such as the Politburo itself. The greater level of informality and flexibility in both missions and membership for such commissions must surely make change much easier. For example, a General Secretary determined to tip the power balance within the Defense Council in the direction of the professional military might find it easier to engineer a change in membership and procedures under these conditions. While the political role of any institution must surely depend heavily on political power arrangements, sub-committees are likely to be more vulnerable to such influence than an entity whose existence, missions, and operations are embodied in legal statute. More

importantly, Politburo sub-committees are advisory, not decisionmaking bodies. If the Defense Council were, in fact, a Politburo sub-committee, its role would be that of generating advice, in the form of recommendations, to place before the larger Politburo.

Soviet sources have made it abundantly clear, however, that the Defense Council's legal status is not that of a Politburo sub-committee. As with its Bulgarian, GDR, Hungarian, and Romanian counterparts, the USSR Defense Council has constitutional status: it is described in the 1977 Constitution as a body which is "formed" by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which also determines its composition (91). One Soviet source describes the Council as occupying "an important place in the mechanism of state administration" (92). Another describes it as "a collegial, interoffice organ of state administration" (93). Another source indicates that the Defense Council is an organ for "state direction" over the Armed Forces. (94) The USSR Defense Council, like all of its historical and East European counterparts, is unquestionably a state body, in the sense it is part of the government (as opposed to the Party) hierarchy.

Within the state hierarchy, the wording of the constitutional provision suggests that the USSR Defense Council's status is that of a committee of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. This is an important point since such a status would endow the council with sufficient authority to coordinate the activities of lower-level bodies, including the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) -- an entity apparently tasked with mediating the working relationships between the various organizations involved in the development and production of weapons. The VPK's legal status is probably, like the new Agro-Industrial Commission, a

commission of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. (95) This supraministerial status gives the VPK the enhanced authority it needs to deal with the defense industrial ministries whose activities it monitors and coordinates. If the Defense Council's mission involves coordination between the defense, defense industrial, and civilian sectors, it surely gets involved in overseeing VPK activities. The legal status of a Supreme Soviet Presidium Commission should provide the authority needed to dispense such a mission.

Soviet legal sources indicate that the USSR Defense Council, like its East European counterparts, is a collegial body, that is, a committee rather than a one-man-command organization like the Ministry of Defense. (96) This means that the deliberative process is probably considerably more "collective" in nature than would be the case in a one-man command outfit. Collegial bodies may be either advisory or decisionmaking committees. Advisory committees, like the Ministry of Defense Collegium, are generally assigned to a one-man-commander (yedinonachalnik) to advise and assist him. They are designed to counterbalance the authority of the yedinonachalnik and to minimize capricious decisions by making sure that appropriate sub-elements are represented in decisionmaking deliberations. Decisionmaking committees, by contrast, have legal or statutory authority to make decisions independently. Such committees do not depend on a higher body or official to put their policy preferences into force.

While Soviet sources do not state explicitly which category the USSR Defense Council falls into, it is probable that the contemporary USSR Defense Council is a decisionmaking, as opposed to an advisory, committee. Most references to the defense ministry's collegial body, the MOD Collegium, explicitly note that its

function is an advisory one. This point is absent from references in Soviet literature to the contemporary Defense Council. More important, both the historical and East European counterparts to the Soviet Defense Council are decisionmaking bodies. That is, they have the legal authority to pass acts which are binding on other state bodies. It seems quite likely, then, that the USSR Defense Council has similar authority.

This does not preclude, however, some activities in which the Defense Council formulates proposals or recommendations, rather than decisions. As with several of the East European councils, it is likely that, on certain nonsensitive issues (particularly those which involve civilian agencies), the USSR Defense Council makes recommendations for Politburo approval, as opposed to decisions. Given the likely membership of the Defense Council, however, it is unlikely that any but the most controversial of such recommendations encounters significant opposition in the larger Politburo.

In sum, all sources of direct and indirect data on the contemporary USSR Defense Council indicate that its status is that of a collegial decisionmaking body within the state hierarchy. That is, it operates as a committee whose chairman has ample opportunity to dominate proceedings within the council but who generally cannot consistently flout the opinions of the membership. The Council probably makes both decisions in its own right (which are binding on lower level state bodies involved in security issues) and recommendations which are then approved at Politburo level. There is no evidence to support the speculation found in Western literature that the Defense Council reports to a "Politburo defense sub-group." (96b)

## Defense Council Missions

The Defense Council's legal status is closely related to its missions. While the Soviets have not published any statutory regulations on the USSR Defense Council, they have published numerous general descriptions of Defense Council missions. These comments can be amplified through an examination of the more detailed East European descriptions. According to the Soviet press, the Defense Council provides top-level coordination for the defense-related activities of government bodies. (97) Soviet descriptions of defense issues implemented by government bodies and subject to coordination by the contemporary USSR Defense Council include: (98)

--the review and decision of all major questions relating to maintaining the security of the country, strengthening its defensive capabilities, and developing its military potential.

--determination of the basic directions of and plans for defense development (including military manpower procurement policy)

--direction and coordination of the work of the entire Soviet state apparatus, making sure that defense interests are considered in deciding all matters of state administration.

Another source indicates that "the Defense Council plays an important role in the development of the army and the fleet." (99)

These comments suggest that the Defense Council reviews both defense development plans and armed forces development plans. (100) It is necessary to

summarize here what is meant by the terms defense development (voyennoye stroitelstvo) and armed forces development (stroitelstvo vooruzhennykh sil). The Soviets make a careful distinction between the kinds of responsibilities embraced by these two terms and between the various Party and government bodies charged with approval or execution of the planning documents associated with each. "Defense development" is the broader term; it includes economic, social-political, and purely military measures taken by a government to enhance its military power. Defense development decisions define the organization and mission of the Armed Forces, basic command structure, and manpower procurement system. (101) As with other aspects of the five year planning process, defense development plans are based on a document embodying overall goals ('basic directions'). In the interwar period, the basic guidelines for the first Five Year Plan for Defense Development (involving a two-year weapons modernization program) were established by a Politburo resolution of 15 July 1929. (102) Given the contemporary descriptions of the Defense Council's role in determining "the basic directions of military development," it is likely that guidelines for contemporary Five Year Plans for Defense Development are reviewed in the Defense Council.

Material on defense planning in the interwar period, as well as information on how the "basic directions" of civilian five year plans are developed, suggests that documents embodying basic directions do not contain detailed blueprints for actual programs. Rather, the guidelines are merely a base for the formulation of the Five Year Plans for Defense Development. For example, basic guidelines for the First Five Year Plan for Defense Development identified general areas in which military technology was to be upgraded (e.g., large



caliber machine guns). These goals were translated into more detailed objectives in the Five Year Plan for Defense Development, which was formulated by the Red Army Staff and approved through a joint Party-state resolution. (103) Given the references in contemporary Soviet descriptions of the Defense Council to its role in determining plans for defense development (as well as the basic directions for those plans), it is likely that the contemporary Defense Council also reviews the military development plan itself. This would also be consistent with Polish descriptions of their defense planning process; even before the KOK's planning authority was expanded by the 1983 legislation, the KOK apparently had the authority to approve what are described in the Polish press as "five-year national defense plans." (103b)

Defense development plans are implemented by a more detailed series of planning documents -- the armed forces development plans. Armed Forces development includes measures relating to the organizational structure of the military, the balance between the various services and branches of service; weapons procurement; manpower procurement procedures; force deployment; and supply. (104) In the interwar period, the goals of the first Five Year Plan for Defense Development were defined in further detail by a parallel Armed Forces Development Plan, drawn up by the Red Army Staff. (105) Contemporary Armed Forces development plans are probably drafted in the General Staff, coordinated throughout MOD headquarters prior to Defense Council review.

In the interwar period, the five year Armed Forces Development Plan was implemented by service-specific development plans; individual programs required by the plan were implemented by joint Party-government resolutions. (106) For

example, joint CC/Council of Ministers' resolutions were also used to authorize individual weapons system development plans. (107) In the interwar period, these service-specific development plans were approved by the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) -- one of the Defense Council's historical antecedents and an entity described by Soviet sources as one of the prototypes of the contemporary Defense Council. (108) It is likely, therefore, that the contemporary Defense Council reviews service development plans, as well as the most important of these implementing resolutions.

Both the historical record and contemporary Soviet descriptions of Defense Council missions, then, suggest that one of the Council's primary tasks is to review planning documents relating to defense. This would argue that the Defense Council plays an important role in the Soviet weapons acquisition process, both in setting overall military technical policy and in approving the most important individual weapons systems designed to implement that policy. If this hypothesis is correct, it would imply that the Defense Council coordinates the activities of officials from the VPK and the defense industrial ministries, as well as those of officials within the defense ministry itself who are involved directly in weapons procurement (e.g., General Staff officials involved in weapons procurement; Shabanov, the deputy minister of defense for armaments; Shabanov's counterparts at service level; and top officials from the MOD's technical directorates).

The Defense Council's participation in defense development, armed forces development and weapons system planning also involves it directly in arms control decisionmaking. Indeed, some of the earliest Western discussions of the

Defense Council focused on its role in arms negotiations decisions. (109b) The Council probably formulates basic arms control positions and negotiating strategies.

Probable Defense Council missions also include setting general policy relating to military manpower issues. This would involve deliberations affecting overall military manpower policy (i.e., conscription policy, military training, officer and career enlisted programs, etc). Major issues affecting premilitary programs in the civilian schools are probably reviewed by the Defense Council. Both the Romanian and GDR defense councils are closely involved in military mobilization planning. Assuming this pattern holds true for the Soviet Defense Council as well, another of the Council's missions is that of coordinating mobilization planning.

Soviet sources indicate further that Defense Council functions extend to direction over those military personnel matters handled in the Main Political Directorate. (110) This would imply that the Defense Council reviews and approves general measures relating to military training, Armed Forces living standards, military readiness, and programs to increase proficiency in the use of military equipment.

Another probable mission of the USSR Defense Council is civil defense. Civil defense planning and programs are included among the missions of the defense councils in Czechoslovakia, Romania, East Germany, and Poland. If this pattern holds true for the Soviet Union, it is likely that the USSR Defense Council reviews key decisions relating to civil defense programs. This would imply that

the contemporary USSR Defense Council is closely involved in developing wartime mobilization plans for industry, as well as programs designed to ensure the continuity of government during war.

The USSR Defense Council's probable involvement in these areas is also in line with the frequent references in the Soviet press to the Council's role as a vehicle to unify the political, economic, and military leadership of the Soviet Union. This unity is an important aspect of the Soviet defense decision system that the Soviets see as an important prerequisite for effective military development. In effect, the Soviets view this concentration of authority as a way of systematizing and legitimizing the priority of military programs and military interests in all aspects of Soviet society. (109) This mechanism is especially important for those aspects of military policy that have a broad impact on the civilian sector.

It is also likely that the USSR Defense Council is closely involved in operational planning. Certainly the statutory authority of the Czech and Romanian defense councils includes an active role in both approval of the operational plan in peacetime and direction of major operations in war. One may also hypothesize, therefore, that the Soviet Defense Council approves the general outline of the Soviet operational plan.

The Defense Council's probable involvement with civil defense and mobilization planning reflects its apparent role in directing defense and security affairs during wartime. Several of the Council's East European counterparts specify that the councils are intended to function in both peace

and wartime. It is not clear, however, whether the council's peacetime charter in these cases will be retained during wartime, or whether missions, authority, and membership will be modified during a state of war. In the Soviet case, while it is possible that the Defense Council would be disbanded for the duration of the war and replaced by a completely new body, the consistent Soviet stress on the need to develop in peacetime those organizations necessary for war suggests strongly that the peacetime Defense Council would continue to function in war as constituted in peacetime, perhaps with an expanded mission statement.

Analogy with the stated functions of East European councils, however, would suggest that the Soviet Defense Council's role goes well beyond military and defense issues per se, and extends to security issues outside of defense. In the Soviet case, this would include direction of the activities of both the KGB and the MVD, and would also extend to important intelligence issues, as well as matters relating to internal security and potential sources of internal dissent.

The Defense Council's apparent involvement in arms control and foreign military relations would also imply at least a tangential involvement with general foreign policy issues. The criticality of arms control for contemporary U.S./Soviet relations, for example, would argue that many aspects of foreign policy decisionmaking affecting East/West affairs come within the Defense Council's purview.

#### Membership of the USSR Defense Council

As in the GDR, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, the chairman of the USSR

Defense Council has been identified as the top Party leader. Brezhnev, as noted above, held the Defense Council chairmanship concurrently with the top Party General Secretary post. However, in most instances, references to the chairman of the Defense Council identified Brezhnev personally in this role, linking his name to all three positions: General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and Chairman of the USSR Defense Council. (111) A 1981 administrative law text, however, states that the Defense Council is headed by "the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet." (112) Given the conservatism of most Soviet administrative lawyers, it is highly unlikely that such a statement would be made unless there had existed at that time a legal provision linking the chairmanship of the Defense Council with that of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. This may help explain why the Soviet leadership has experienced problems in filling the Presidium chairmanship. With no legal link between this post and that of the Defense Council chairman, the Presidium job could be assigned without regard for the Defense Council slot. In other words, the Presidium job could be assigned to someone other than the General Secretary, who would surely insist on retaining the top Defense Council post for himself. If the Presidium job and the Defense Council post are legally linked, then filling the Presidium post becomes a much more thorny issue. A legal link between the Presidium post and the Defense Council chairmanship, then, would naturally increase the pressure to combine all three top posts (Party, titular head of state, and Defense Council chairman) in one person --the Party General Secretary.

In the past two successions, we have seen development in precisely this direction. General Secretary Andropov was identified officially as Chairman of

the Defense Council by Defense Minister Ustinov in May. (113) In June, Andropov assumed the chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. (114) The official recognition of Andropov's status within the Defense Council (which typically took place in a military setting) was followed by a series of references to Andropov as Defense Council Chairman. (115)

Andropov's death in February 1984 raises the chairmanship issue anew. At a reception marking Army-Navy day, two weeks after Konstantin Chernenko was appointed to the top Party post, he was reportedly identified as Defense Council Chairman by Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov. (116) It is interesting to note, however, that this identification was not mentioned in any of the published materials surrounding the Army-Navy Day festivities. The fate of the titular head of state post will probably be announced at the April Supreme Soviet convocation. It seems likely that Chernenko will be assigned the post. In this case, official recognition of his role as Defense Council Chairman will probably occur rather quickly; the May Day celebrations may be used as a convenient setting for such an announcement.

Other than Chernenko, no other members of the Defense Council (past or present) have been publicly identified, either officially or unofficially. Even the size of the Soviet Defense Council is a mystery. It may be a relatively compact body, like the eight-man Czechoslovak National Defense Committee, or by contrast a larger committee, like the Romanian Defense Council and the Polish KOK. Given the consistent emphasis in Soviet literature on the link between committee efficiency and the size of the committee, it is likely that the contemporary USSR Defense Council is a relatively streamlined body, e.g., no

larger than ten or eleven members. A committee of this size would allow a relatively broad cross-section of representatives from the various state and Party entities involved in security-related affairs, without sacrificing the efficiency of a small committee.

With virtually no direct data on Defense Council membership outside of the chairman, we are forced to derive membership estimates from several different sorts of indirect information. One method is to examine membership patterns for the Defense Council's historical analogues. Lenin's Civil War Defense Council included Lenin himself (who was the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars); Stalin (representing the Central Executive Committee --the standing body of the All-Russian Congress); Trotsky (the Chairman of the Revoyensoviet); Nevskiy (the people's commissar for transportation); Bryukov (the people's commissar of food supply); and Krasin (the Chairman of the Extraordinary Commission for Red Army Supply Production). Later, Melnichansky (from the trade union apparatus) and Milyutin (a VSNKh representative) and Sanilov (a representative from the State Labor Committee) were added. (117) Only three (Lenin, Stalin, and Trotsky) of the total nine members were Politburo members. Members of Lenin's Defense Council were in legal theory and actual practice "representatives" of their agencies. When the press of wartime activities took a member away from the capital, his agency was represented in the Defense Council by a pre-designated alternate. (117b)

The Defense Council's successor, the STO, included the chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars, and the people's commissars for military affairs, transportation, land, food, and labor, plus the head of the



inspectorate. In 1922, representatives of the commissars of foreign trade and finance were added. (117c)

The Defense Council's wartime counterpart, the GKO, began as a very small body headed by Stalin. It included, in addition, Molotov (the commissar for foreign affairs, who also served as GKO vice chairman); Voroshilov; Beria (the head of the Soviet secret police); and Malenkov. In February 1942, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and Voznesenskiy were added. Late in the war (November 1944), Voroshilov was replaced by Bulganin (the deputy commissar of defense). In September 1943, the following division of labor was adopted: tank production (Molotov); production of weapons and military equipment (Beria); aircraft and aircraft motor production (Malenkov); food, fuel, and clothing supply (Mikoyan). (118) Five out of the total nine members were full Politburo members; three of the four remaining members were candidate Politburo members during their GKO tenure.

This survey of the membership patterns of the Defense Council's historical predecessors suggests that Politburo membership has not been, in the past at least, a prerequisite for membership. It also suggests that the current Defense Council membership may include state and Party officials whose major responsibility lies outside security but within an area closely affecting the armed forces. A final conclusion which may be drawn from the historical material is the extent to which the Soviets have favored relatively small, streamlined committees. The historical record, however, is not very helpful in identifying precisely which officials are on the contemporary Defense Council. The contemporary political arrangements are so different from those in which the

Defense Council's historical predecessors operated that any attempt to estimate membership by direct analogy with historical data would be fruitless.

There are, however, alternative methods through which to deduce Defense Council membership. One is to estimate Defense Council members from analysis of obituary signatures. The most systematic work in this area is that of Harriet Fast Scott. Scott's compilation of military obituaries suggests a Council membership that includes: the General Secretary, the Defense Minister, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and two or three senior CC secretaries involved in defense, foreign policy and security-related issues (Ustinov prior to his MOD appointment, Ryabov in the late 1970s, Kirilenko until sometime in 1981, Chernenko from 1980 to Brezhnev's death, Andropov in his capacity as CC secretary from May to November 1982). (119)

The major shortcoming of this approach (as readily acknowledged by analysts who have made use of it) is that the results depend on the choice of obituaries. If the obituaries included in the analysis are limited to those of uniformed military officials that appear in Red Star, the analysis produces one estimate. If, by contrast, obituaries of individuals outside the defense ministry are used (e.g., those of weapons designers, defense industrial officials, and officials in security or foreign affairs posts), the analysis produces a different estimate. In effect, the results of the analysis hinge on how one defines a "Defense Council obituary." In addition, analysis of military obituary signatures, of course, provides no clues as to which of the dozen or so military officials who generally sign military obituaries are also members of the Defense Council. In short, the military obituaries provide important Kremlinological

clues as to which non-Ministry of Defense officials are involved in security-related jobs, but they cannot be used directly to generate a comprehensive list of probable Council members.

Another Kremlinological approach is to analyze public appearances. In October 1982, then General Secretary Brezhnev addressed a conference of "military leaders" in the Kremlin. He was joined on the presidium by CC secretaries Andropov and Chernenko, chairman of the Council of Ministers Tikhonov, Defense Minister Ustinov, and Foreign Minister Gromyko, as well as the four top military officials -- Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov, Warsaw Pact chief Kulikov, first deputy defense minister Sokolov, and MPA chief Yepishev. (120) One might hypothesize that these individuals constituted the Defense Council membership at that time. It is interesting to note that the roster of political attendees at the meeting (with the exception of Foreign Minister Gromyko) is identical to Scotts' late 1982 list of Defense Council members.

Examination of known members of East European councils provides a third approach to Defense Council membership. Both the Romanian and Polish defense ministers are members of their respective councils. In Poland, the Minister of National Defense serves as the Deputy Chairman of the KOK for Armed Forces Affairs and Strategic Defense Planning. The Romanian Defense Council, according to statute, includes some ex officio members -- that is, members whose participation is based on their state and Party posts (the Council of Ministers Chairman, the Minister of the Armed Forces, the Chairman of the State Security Council, the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Chairman of the State Planning Committee), plus individuals appointed by

name without direct legal reference to their full-time posts (ie. CC secretaries, top military officials). The Czech law, by contrast, provides considerably more flexibility in membership, since no ex officio members are specified in the statute. Press identification of State Defense Council members indicates that the premier, the Minister of National Defense, the interior minister, several Party and state leaders from the republics, and the Chief of the General Staff were members in 1970.

This discussion suggests that membership in Warsaw Pact defense councils typically includes (in addition to the chairman) the head of the state administration (the chairman of the Council of Ministers), the head of the top security agency, one or more CC secretaries with security-related portfolios, plus two or more top officials of the defense ministry (e.g., the minister and the chief of the General Staff). Typical membership patterns, therefore, include some individuals with full time jobs in the state hierarchy and some with full time jobs in the Party hierarchy. Some, but not all, known members of the defense councils in Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia are members of the top Party decisionmaking body (counterpart to the Politburo) of that country. In other words, council membership is not necessarily limited to a sub-set of the larger Politburo membership.

A fourth approach to estimating membership of the USSR Defense Council is to identify those officials whose full-time responsibilities coincide with Defense Council missions. The USSR Defense Council's clear focus on national security issues would argue strongly for inclusion of the Minister of Defense, the Foreign Minister, the head of the KGB, and those CC secretaries with national

security and foreign policy duties. The problem with this approach is that while it identifies individuals (ie, the Defense Minister) who, by virtue of their positions, are almost surely members, it provides no clues as to how far down the Defense Ministry hierarchy, for instance, membership extends.

Each of these four approaches provides some insight into the probable nature of Defense Council membership. Evidence from all four points to the inclusion of the Soviet Defense Minister, currently Ustinov. Given the Polish precedent, it is possible that Ustinov has been designated as Vice Chairman of the Defense Council for Armed Forces Affairs. Virtually all four approaches point to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. They also suggest that those CC secretaries with national security responsibilities are also members. This would include the CC secretary charged with monitoring defense industry (a post probably being filled at this time by Romanov) and the senior CC secretary charged with overall responsibilities for economic strategy and foreign policy. At present, this role seems to be filled by Gorbachev. At 53 the youngest Politburo member, Gorbachev reportedly mounted an unsuccessful bid to succeed Andropov as General Secretary in February; he is currently serving as General Secretary Chernenko's top deputy. The appearance of Gorbachev's signature on several military obituaries underlines his growing responsibilities in security-related issues -- responsibilities which probably involve Defense Council membership as well. (121)

Another strong possibility is Foreign Minister Gromyko. The foreign minister of Romania is an ex officio member of that defense council; at least one of the Defense Council's historical analogues included the foreign minister. Gromyko's

status as a senior Politburo member, as well as the close connection between foreign and military issues in arms control matters, would argue for his inclusion. This hypothesis is also supported by his appearance at the 27 October 1982 meeting of military leaders.

Similar comments apply to Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov. His counterparts in both Czechoslovakia and Romania are on their respective defense councils. There is no evidence from the historical record, however, to support Ogarkov's membership on the contemporary council. He may well be a non-member who has the status of "secretary." KGB chief Chebrikov, who was named a candidate Politburo member in December 1983, may also be a member. Several of Chebrikov's historical and East European counterparts were members of their respective councils.

Another possibility is the Chairman of Gosplan, currently Baybakov. Baybakov's counterpart in Romania is a member of his Council. Baybakov, however, is not even a candidate Politburo member. His relatively low level of personal political power might suggest that he is a frequent participant, but not necessarily a member of the USSR Defense Council. Countering these considerations is the importance of the top planning organization for many Defense Council issues. The vast majority of agenda items placed before the Defense Council have direct implications for planning and resource allocation. From this standpoint, including Baybaykov as a Council member makes a great deal of sense.

Less likely possibilities include the head of the VPK (Smirnov), the two

other deputy defense ministers (Sokolov and Kulikov), and the head of the MPA. Smirnov's membership cannot be evaluated from the East European perspective since he has no direct counterpart in the other Warsaw Pact countries. Inclusion of Sokolov, Kulikov and Yepishev on the Defense Council seems unlikely because the known memberships of East European councils do not contain such a large number of uniformed military men.

The evidence from the East European councils raises the possibility that one or more regional leaders may be Defense Council members. However, the structure of the defense establishment is more highly centralized in the Soviet Union. This would argue against inclusion of republic representatives on the national level Defense Council.

#### Decisionmaking Procedures and Staff Support

Soviet descriptions of their contemporary Defense Council provide no information on how Council decisions and recommendations are formulated. We can, however, draw upon the documentary and secondary materials available on the operations of the Defense Council's historical counterparts and on the legal provisions governing the operations of the Council's East European counterparts. Both sources of information suggest that Defense Council operations conform in general terms to the agenda and meeting procedures observed in less sensitive collegial bodies in the Soviet Union. (121b) These procedures, as will be clear from the discussion below, involve a great deal of pre-meeting staff work, first in developing the meeting plan and agendas for individual meetings, and second in the coordination and review process for decision drafts (a process

which precedes the actual meeting). This characteristic of committee decisionmaking means that committee staffs -- and those individuals who control them -- tend to exercise a great deal of de facto influence. In effect, key staff members function as political gatekeepers, using their bureaucratic roles to shape both the agenda and the decisions in ways consistent with their own personal and institutional preferences.

For this reason, the identity of the Defense Council's staff is of great importance in assessing the nature of its operations. Both of the USSR Defense Council's earliest predecessors (Lenin's Defense Council and STO) used the apparatus of the Council of Peoples' Commissars for staff support. (121c) In two of the East European states (Czechoslovakia and Romania), the Chief of the General Staff is, by statute, the secretary of the defense council. In addition, the GDR press has identified the Chief of the General Staff as secretary. This pattern would suggest that the most likely secretary of the USSR Defense Council is the Soviet Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov. It is, of course, not inconceivable that the Defense Council might have its own dedicated secretariat, composed (in a manner analogous to the Romanian Defense Council secretariat) of officers from the MOD, the KGB, and other security-related agencies. There is, however, a strong argument in favor of a secretariat located in the General Staff: the sensitivity of the information and documents associated with Defense Council proceedings requires a high level of security. This would argue that the secretariat function is performed by the General Staff.

The frequency of Defense Council meetings is not known. The Defense Council's



historical predecessors met frequently. Between 1 December 1918 and 1 December 1920, Lenin's Defense Council met 170 times, for an average of 1.6 meetings per week. (121d) STO met twice a week, generally holding an administrative meeting on Wednesday and a plenary meeting on Thursday. (122e) Most working committees in the contemporary Soviet state and Party hierarchy, meet at least once or twice a month. Committees that meet only two or three times per year tend not to exercise a great deal of real decisionmaking power. These considerations would suggest that the contemporary USSR Defense Council probably meets at least once a month, perhaps as frequently as once a week.

USSR Defense Council meetings probably follow a monthly and quarterly (or yearly) meeting plan. Some agenda items on the plan probably come up for review on a regular basis (i.e., review of the Five Year Military Development Plan). Others are generated from orders from above, i.e., a Politburo decision on the need to improve Russian-language training for non-Russian minorities might require a Defense Council decision on a program to implement this policy within the Armed Forces. The balance of the meeting plan apparently consists of agenda items originating from the ministries and agencies involved in security issues (i.e., the MOD, KGB, VPK). Agenda items generated in this latter fashion probably go through a multi-stage review in which "interested" officials (officials whose agencies are affected by the issues) are involved in preliminary discussions of the agenda item. The meeting plan and (for individual meetings) the draft agenda are probably compiled by the Defense Council's secretariat.

While the agenda building system described above is intended to prevent

overload of the committee agenda, this does not necessarily mean that the Defense Council has been able to limit its agenda effectively to a small number of issues that can each be discussed in depth. Historical evidence from Lenin's Defense Council indicates that large agendas were common. In the 110 meetings of the Civil War Defense Council held between 1 December 1918 and the end of March 1920, no less than 2300 issues were examined, for an average of over twenty items per meeting. (122) STO's meeting agendas were similarly crowded. Between 1921 and 1922, an average of 22 separate items were discussed at each meeting. (122b) It would not be surprising, then, if the contemporary USSR Defense Council, like its nonmilitary counterparts, suffers from the same kind of agenda overload.

The large number of issues on a typical Soviet committee agenda means that preliminary coordination of draft decisions is particularly important. Historical evidence from the Civil War period suggests that the Leninist Defense Council relied on a series of strategies for preliminary preparation of draft decisions. Drafts were distributed for approval to representatives of "interested" agencies prior to submission to Defense Council members and to the membership acting as a committee. (123) The Civil War Defense Council also relied heavily on a series of sub-committees (commissions) to handle preliminary drafting of decisions. (124) For example, on 16 March 1920, the Defense Council set up a special commission on transportation of fuel consisting of representatives from the rail ministry, the presidium of VSNKh, the Main Petroleum Committee, and the war office. (125) If sub-committee members could not come to an agreement on a decision draft, the issue was placed before the general meeting for a simple majority vote. For urgent issues, a telephone poll

was taken of Council members. However, the issue would generally be submitted for confirmation at the next Council meeting. (125b) STO also relied a great deal on sub-committees. In 1922, for instance, STO created a special commission to prepare materials for the upcoming session of the legislature. (125c) As noted above, the contemporary Politburo also relies heavily on the sub-committee as a vehicle for preparation of decision drafts.

Both the preliminary circulation of decision drafts and the use of subcommittees are typical strategies of contemporary Soviet committees in both the state and Party hierarchies. It would not be surprising if the contemporary defense councils in the Warsaw Pact relied on similar procedures. Indeed, Jan Sejna, a former Czech general intimately involved in the military decision process in Czechoslovakia, provides several case studies of decisionmaking in the Czech National Defense Council which indicate that this is indeed the case. (126) There is little reason to doubt that such procedures form an important part of the deliberative process in the case of the USSR Defense Council.

Procedures followed during Defense Council meetings themselves probably parallel meeting procedures in other collegial forums. (126b) Most Soviet committee meetings open with approval of the agenda. Then each agenda item is considered. In the Leninist Defense Council, there were strict time limits for each speaker -- ten minutes for the individual giving the report on the item and three-to-five minutes for other speakers. Agenda items which encountered significant opposition during the meeting were removed from considerations and re-introduced at a later meeting after the draft had been re-worked by the warring parties. (126c)

Virtually all sources suggest that participation in Defense Council meetings is far broader than the membership itself. Statutory legislation for both Romanian and Czechoslovakia indicate that Defense Council sessions may be attended by guests (without voting rights), generally as invited experts tasked with providing background reports for individual agenda items. Historical evidence from Lenin's Civil War Defense Council indicates that it followed a similar practice. The level of outside participation in Defense Council meetings was considerably lower than in SNK meetings -- an understandable difference given the greater sensitivity of many of the issues discussed within the Defense Council. It seems reasonable to conclude that the contemporary USSR Defense Council is attended by a relatively broad circle of participants, many of whom are surely involved in formulation and coordination of pre-meeting decision drafts. While the scope of outside participation may be narrower than is the case for the Politburo and Secretariat, it is nonetheless far broader than the membership itself.

Among the most important of the Defense Council's outside participants are staff members from the CC Secretariat. The CC staff, organized into functional departments, provides much of the staff work for both the Politburo and the Secretariat. Its missions include personnel assignment, preparing of decision drafts, verification of decision implementation (kontrol), and direction of lower-level Party bodies. For most ministries (or group of related ministries or state committees), there is a single CC department which is that ministry's counterpart. For the Ministry of Construction and the State Committee for Construction Affairs, for example, the CC counterpart is the Construction Department. The Ministry of Defense, one of the primary state agencies charged

with implementing Party military policy, has no direct CC counterpart. In theory, its counterpart is the Main Political Administration, which is supposed to provide CC oversight over Defense Ministry activities, acting "with the rights of a department of the Central Committee." (127) In practice, the MPA operates less as a CC monitor over the MOD and more as a component of the MOD itself, serving as a focal point for personnel, ideological, Party and Komsomol affairs within the defense ministry.

The component of the CC which, in practice, comes closest to functioning as the MOD's CC monitor is the Administrative Organs Department. This department coordinates selected aspects of the activities of the military, the regular and secret policy, and the civic/patriotic organizations, such as DOSAAF. The AOD operates, then, as the MOD's primary contact with the CC staff. The Defense Industry Department coordinates the activities of state organizations involved in R&D and/or production of defense-related items, including the eight or nine ministries which specialize in defense products as well as the VPK. The International Department and Liaison Department provide staff support to the foreign policy activities of the Politburo and the Secretariat. The International Information Department coordinates the manner in which Soviet foreign policy (including arms control decisions) are presented in the media. (128) Regardless of whether or not the Defense Council's secretariat is located exclusively in the General Staff, officials from these CC departments almost surely have a role in the decision process, from participation in the decision drafting process to mediating disagreements if two or more of the institutions involved cannot come to an amicable compromise.

## CONCLUSIONS

This examination of the operations of the USSR Defense Council highlights both similarities and differences between defense and nondefense decisionmaking in the Soviet Union. As with nondefense decisions, decisions on issues relating to national security are made in a collegial forum; that is, they are made by a committee, not an individual. Under certain conditions, the distinction between a one-man-commander and a committee might not matter very much. After all, a determined and powerful committee chairman can, in practice, so thoroughly dominate the committee that the outcome of the deliberative process might differ very little from the individual preferences of the chairman. Throughout much of the last three decades, however, no single individual, even the General Secretary, has obtained the level of political power needed to by-pass or subvert the collective authority of his peers. This has been particularly true in the past three or four years, starting with the waning years of the Brezhnev regime. If security-related decisions are made -- as virtually all evidence suggests that they are -- within a collegial forum, then the outputs of that process (the decision to invade Afghanistan, the decision not to intervene militarily in Poland, the more recent decision on what strategy to adopt to counter Nato force modernization programs in Europe) are consensus decisions. This helps explain the high level of continuity in Soviet defense policy: the identity of the General Secretary has changed three times in less than two years, but little seems to have changed in policy. One possible (but, I would argue, not plausible) explanation is that all of the key players were in complete agreement with the policies sponsored by Brezhnev. The more reasonable explanation is that such policies represented a compromise

between competing institutional points of view. The environmental and bureaucratic constraints that produced the policy consensus in the first place have not been significantly altered by the deaths of Brezhnev and Andropov.

The material summarized above also highlights the extent to which both the participants and the procedures used in reaching collegial decisions have been institutionalized, both in the Soviet Union and in many of the neighboring East European states. In the USSR, incorporation of a reference to the Defense Council into the 1977 Brezhnev Constitution provided the Defense Council with a constitutional mandate that it had previously lacked. The contemporary USSR Defense Council is not an informal Politburo sub-committee, but a formal body with constitutional status. This status endows it with a far greater degree of continuity and legitimacy. Even if the Defense Council itself had originally developed out of an informal procedure in which the top Politburo members met with key officials charged with implementing Party military policy, the formalization of that process into a legal body and the incorporation of that entity into the Constitution means that change has now become more difficult. A determined and powerful General Secretary could still conceivably muster the authority to subvert the Defense Council's mission; but this task is now immeasurably more difficult. In legally recognizing and officially systematizing the existence and role of the Defense Council, the Soviet leadership has contributed greatly to its perpetuation.

The defense decision process, however, does appear to be far more centralized than that for nondefense issues. To be sure, the high level of centralization in defense decisionmaking has probably been overdrawn by Western observers, who

often depict a policy process involving a very compact group of decisionmakers, i.e., a small subgroup of Politburo members. (130) Certainly, there is nothing in either the historical record or the known memberships of the USSR Defense Council's East European counterparts which would suggest that Defense Council membership is necessarily limited to Politburo members. Moreover, everything that we know about staff support for committee decisionmaking would indicate that the preliminary drafting of decisions which precedes submission of a decision draft at the committee table -- preliminary work that must surely involve officials from both Party and government hierarchies -- is often of critical importance in determining outcome. Still, the level of centralization for national security decisionmaking is considerably higher than that for nondefense areas. Statistical evidence from Lenin's Defense Council highlights the extent to which participation in the Defense Council was relatively more limited than that in other state bodies. Security constraints must surely continue to operate, as they did in Lenin's time, to limit levels of participation for many security-related issues.

Another major difference between defense and nondefense issues is the absence of a direct CC monitor for the Ministry of Defense. This, plus the General Staff's probable role as the Defense Council's official secretariat, means that security related decisions are probably more effectively dominated by the primary entity charged with implementing them (the Defense Minister) than is the case with many nondefense issues. The professional military may not monopolize the flow of information to the Defense Council as completely as has sometimes been suggested by Western observers, but its unique role vis a vis the Defense Council ensures it a dominating (if not monopolizing) role.



In sum, the evidence examined above suggests that the USSR Defense Council performs both peacetime and wartime functions. In peacetime, it provides a mechanism to systematize and legitimize the military's claim on human and material resources. The Defense Council also plays a crucial role in preparing the country for war. Soviet military theorists, pointing to the increased need for a smooth transition between the peacetime and wartime command system in the nuclear era, have stressed that the peacetime command system must be capable of being rapidly transformed into a wartime decisionmaking body. The Defense Council fulfills this requirement because it provides a peacetime core of political, military and economic leaders. It provides an in-place peacetime body that the Soviets clearly hope will facilitate the organizational adjustments necessary in the next war, enhancing their ability to respond rapidly and effectively to a crisis situation.

## Notes

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1b. Western discussions of the Soviet Defense Council are available in John McDonnell, "The Organization of Soviet Defense and Military Policy Making," in Michael McGwire and John McDonnell (Eds.), Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 61-106; Rose E. Gottemoeller, "Decisionmaking for Arms Limitation in the Soviet Union," in Hans Guenter Brauch and Duncan L. Clarke (Eds.), Decisionmaking for Arms Limitation. Assessments and Prospects (Cambridge University: Ballinger Publishing Company, 19??), pp. 53- 80; Raymond L. Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military," Problems of Communism, January-February 1975, pp. 21-37; Douglas F. Garthoff, "The Soviet Military and Arms Control, " Survival, Volume XIX, Number 6, November/December 1977, pp. 242-250; Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, ??), pp. 57-58; Marshall D. Shulman, "SALT and the Soviet Union," in Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelanders (Eds.), SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond (New York: The Free Press, 1974), pp. 101-121; Thomas W. Wolfe, The Military Dimension in the Making of Soviet Foreign and Defense Policy, RAND P-6024, October 1977, pp. 15-16; Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience: Its Impact on U.S. and Soviet Strategic Arms Decisions (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 51-53; and Malcolm MacKintosh, "The Soviet Military's Influence on Foreign Policy, " in Michael McGwire, Ken Booth, and John McDonnell (Eds.), Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints (New York: Praeger Publishers, ??), pp. 23-39.

1. Dekrety sovetskoy vlasti, Volume IV, p. 94. (Hereafter cited as DSV) See also "Sovet rabochey i krestyanskoy oborony," Grazhdanskaya vojna i voyennaya interventsia v SSSR. Entsiklopediya (Moscow: Sovetskaya Enstiklopediya, 1983), p. 547.

2. "Soviet rabochey i krestyanskoy oborony," Voyenny entsiklopedicheskiy slovar (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1983), p. 684.

3. M.P. Iroshnikov, Predsedatel sovarkhoma i soveta oborony (Leningrad: Leningradskoye Otdeleniye, 1980), pp. 34-35; and S.V. Lipitskiy, Leninskoye rukovodstvo oborony strany (Moscow: Politizdat, 1979), pp. 121-122. See also 50 let vooruzhennykh sil SSSR (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), p. 56.

4. DSV, Volume IV, p. 94. See also "Soviet rabochey i krestyanskoy oborony," BSE, Volume 24 (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1976), p. 18.

4b. Iroshnikov, pp. 47-56.

5. 50 let, pp. 110-111.

6. A.L. Kublanov, Sovet rabochey i krestyanskoy oborony (Noyabr 1918 - Mart 1920) (Leningrad: Izdatelstvo Leningradskogo Universiteta, 1975), pp. 7-9; and "Sovet truda i oborony," SVE, Volume 7, p. 410.

6b. E.B. Genkina, Lenin - predsedatel sovnrarkhoma i STO (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1960), p. 25.

7. 50 let, pp. 198-199.
8. "O sozdanii komiteta oborony SSR," 27 April 1937, in KPSS o vooruzhennykh silakh sovetskogo soyuza. Dokumenty 1917-1981 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1981), p. 268.
9. 50 let, p. 199; and B.G. Drobot, "Komitet oborony pri SNK SSSR," SVE, Volume 4, p. 266.
10. "O sozdanii voyenno-promyshlennoy komissii pri komitete oborony," 31 January 1938, KPSS o, pp. 268-269.
11. M.G. Zhdanov, "Gosudarstvennyy komitet oborony," BSE, Volume 7, (Moscow, 1972), p. 171.
12. "Gosudarstvennyy komitet oborony," BSE, Volume 12, 2nd Edition (Moscow: Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1952), pp. 317-318.
13. Article 93, point 10, in "Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria of 18 May 1971," translated by Ivan Sipkov in William B. Simons (Ed.), The Constitutions of the Communist World (Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1980), pp. 37-67.
14. Administrativno pravo na NRD (Sofia: Ministerstvo na Vutrennite Raboti, 1973), pp. 343-344.
15. Kostadinov, p. 346.
16. Administrativno pravo, p. 185.
17. "Law on the Creation of the National Defense Council of the DDR," Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Part 1, No. 8, 1960, p. 89.
- 17b. "Law ??," Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Party 1, No. ?, 1960, pp. ??.
18. Article 49, item 3, "Constitution of the German Democratic Republic," translated by Joseph J. Darby, in Simons, op cit, pp. 164-187.
19. Ibid, article 50.
20. Ibid, article 73, pt 2.
21. Ibid, article 73, pt 1.
22. "Law on the National Defense of the GDR of 13 October 1978," Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 19 October 1978, Part 1, number 35, pp. 377-380.
23. Ibid, section 2, part 2.
24. Ibid, sections 4 and 5. See also Neues Deutschland, 14-15 October 1978, p. 3.

25. Ibid, section 3, part 1.
26. Paragraph 16, items 2 and 5 and Paragraph 18, item 2, "Law on Military Service in the GDR,": Neues Deutschland, 27/28 March 1982, pp. 9-10. (??)
27. Ibid, paragraph 39.
28. Ibid, paragraph 41.
29. Ibid, paragraph 45.
30. Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 October 1983, p. 3.
31. See, for example, Neues Deutschland, 4 October 1983, No. 234, pp. 1,2.
- 31b. "Constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic," translated by William Solyom-Fekete in Simon, op cit, pp. 196-213.
32. Paragraph 9, point 1, "Act of Parliament No. 1 of 1976 on defense," Magyar Kozlony, No. 25, 31 March 1976, translated in Press Summary, No. 101, 30 April 1976. The term "war" is used in this legislation to cover both war itself and "a state of grave danger to the security of the state."
33. Ibid, paragraph 9, point 3.
34. Ibid, paragraph 8, point 1b.
35. A Hungarian discussion of the 1976 law notes that "the National Defense Council exercises the supreme direction of national defense and effectively utilizes the entire resources of the country for the defense of the fatherland," implying that these missions are fulfilled in both peace and wartime. Jozsef Somos, "Creating the Defense Law -- The Result of Working Together," Nephadsereg, 1 May 1976, pp. 8-9, translated in JPRS 67489.
36. Act of Parliament, paragraph 9, item 4.
37. Act of Parliament, paragraph 9, item 1
38. Ibid, paragraph 10, item 2.
39. Ibid, paragraph 12.
40. The 1959 military service law makes no mention of the KOK. Its existence and missions, however, were noted in the 1967 version of the law. "Public Responsibility for Defense of Poland," Dziennik Ustaw, No. 44, 29 November 1969, pp. 339-358. Translated in JPRS 44359, article 5.1. According to former Polish official Michael Checinski, the KOK had been in existence seventeen years prior to 1967. Michael Cheninski, A Comparison of the Polish and Soviet Armaments Decisionmaking Systems, RAND, January 1981, R-2662-AF, p. 7
41. "Law on 21 November 1967 on Universal Military Service of the Polish People's Republic," Dziennik Ustaw, No. 18, 6 August 1979, pp. 245-276. See also Jerzy Muszynski, "The Armed Forces in the Political System of PRL," Wojsko Ludowe, No. 5, May 1983, pp. 41-46.

42. "Law of 21 November 1967," Article 5.1.
43. Ibid, paragraph 6.2.
44. General Tadeuz Tuczapski was identified in this role in Zolnierz Wolnosci, 11 October 1983, p. 5
45. "Text of the law of 21 November 1983," Dziennik Ustaw, No. 61, 22 November 1983, pp. 805-808.
46. Ibid, Article 5.2, points 3 and 4.
47. "Law of 5 December 1983 Concerning the State of Emergency," Dziennik Ustaw, No. 66, 10 December 1983, pp. 847-850.
48. Ibid, article 26.
49. Ibid, article 5.2, points 6 and 8.
50. Ibid, article 5.2, point 7.
- 50b. Ibid, article 5.2, point 1.
- 50c. Ibid, article 5.2, point 5.
- 50d. Ibid, article 60a.2.
- 50e. Ibid, article 116,2.
- 50f. Ibid, articles 115.5; 157.2; 181.2; 182.
- 50g. Ibid, articles 183,1; 183.4; 190; 194.2; 196.2
51. Ibid, article 5.2, point 2.
52. Ibid, article 8.1.; and Checinski, p. 10.
53. 5 December law, article 14.
54. Article 77, point 8, "Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Romania of 21 August 1965 (As Amended)," translated by Simone-Marie Vrabiescu Kleckner in Simon, op cit, pp. 318-342.
55. "Law on the creation, organization and functioning of the Socialist Republic of Romania," Buletinul oficial al republicii socialiste romania, Part 1, No. 32, 14 March 1969, pp. 238-239 (hereafter cited as 1969 law); and "Law Concerning the Organization of the Defense of the Socialist Republic of Romania," Scinteia, 29 December 1972, pp. 4-7. Translated in JPRS 58017. Hereafter cited as 1972 law. A good survey of the organizations involved in security-related issues at national and regional levels is provided by Ioan Stoica, Indrumar juridic privind apararea nationala (Editure militara, 1973), pp. 20-32.
56. 1969 law, article 1.

57. Ibid, article 3, points A and B.
58. Ibid, article 3, points B,C,D; and 1972 law, articles 22 and 23.
59. 1969 law, article 3, point I.
60. Ibid, article 3, points E and K.
61. Ibid, article 4.
- 61b. Buletinul oficial, Part 1, No. 102, 24 December 1983, p. 5.
62. 1969 law, article 4, point C.
63. Ibid, article 10.
64. Ibid, articles 8 and 11.
65. 1972 law, article 10, point a.
66. 1972 law, articles 131 and 132.
67. 1972 law, article 137 and 138.
68. 1972 law, article 15.
69. 1972 law, article 16.
70. Ibid.
71. 1972 law, article 20.
72. 1972 law, article 18.
73. "Law on the State Defense Council," in Jiri Grospic (Ed.), Ceskoslovenska federace. Zakony ob federativnim usporadani CSSR (Praha: Orbis, 1972) pp. 307-313. The Czech State Defense Council, however, does not appear to have been incorporated in the Constitution. See "Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic," translated by Th. J. Vondracek, in Simon, op cit, pp. 140-158.
74. State Defense Council Law, section 3, points 1a and 1b.
75. Ibid, section 3, point 1c.
- 76b. Ibid, section 3, point 1f.
- 76c. "Law on Internal Order and Security," in Pusobnost ustrednich organu statí spravy ceskoslovenske socialistické republiky (Prague, 1971), pp. 170-172.
- 76d. Obrana Lidu, 1 March 1969, pp. 1,4.
76. State Defense Council Law, section 3, points 1d and 1h.

77. Ibid, section 3, point 1e.
78. Ibid, section 5.
- 78b. Rude pravo, 3 March 1969, p. 1.
- 78c. Rude pravo, 19 April 1969, p. 2.
- 78d. Prague Domestic Service, 29 January 1970, translated in FBIS East Europe, 2 February 1970, pp. D34-D35.
- 78e. Rude Pravo, 21 May 1969, p. 1.
- 78f. Rude pravo, 15 October 1969, p. 2
79. Ibid, section 7, part 2.
80. Ibid, section 7, point 2.
81. Ibid, section 9.
82. Ibid, section 10.
- 82b. Garthoff, 1977; and McDonnell, op cit.
83. N.A. Petrovichev, et al Partiynoye stroitelstvo. Uchebnoye posobiye, Sixth Edition (Moscow: Politizdat, 1982), pp. 172-173.
84. New York Times, 15 June 1973, p. 3.
85. Materialy XXVI S'yezda KPSS, p. 69.
86. Pravda, 25 June 1983, p. 1.
87. Komsomolskaya Pravda, 7 September 1983, p. 1; and Pravda, 15 November 1983, p. 3.
88. Pravda, 15 November 1983, p. 3.
89. Izvestiya, 24 December 1983, p. 1
90. Izvestiya, 21 November 1983, p. 2.
91. Konstitutsiya soyuza sovetskikh sotsialisticheskikh respublik (Moscow: Politizdat, 1977), pp. 42-43. The relevant article in number 119. See also A.A. Yepishev, "Mighty Shield of the Socialist Fatherland," Krasnaya Zvezda, 1 November 1977, pp. 1,3; and Shkadov, "Sacred Duty," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 23, December 1977, pp. 15-23. (Hereafter cited as KVS); and "L.I. Brezhnev," SVE, Volume 1, pp. 586-589.
92. A.Kostin and I. Snahlo, "Armed Forces of the Multinational State," Krasnaya Zvezda, August 1977, pp. 2,3.
93. Sovetskoye administrativnoye pravo (Moscow: Yuridlit, 1981), p. 375; and

S.A. Tyushkevich, Sovetskiye vooruzhennyye sily (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1978), p. 464.

94. Voyennoye zakonodatelstvo i pravovoye vospitaniye voynov (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1983), p. 33.

95. Georgiy Titov, the first deputy chairman of Gosplan from 1974 until his death in 1980, was identified as "first deputy chairman of a Commission of the Council of Ministers" from 1958 to 1974. Titov's strong association with defense industry makes it likely that the commission in question is the VPK. Pravda, 21 October 1980, p. 2. Further insight into the VPK's activities is provided by the statute of the Agro-Industrial Commission, which was apparently created to do for agriculture and the food industry what the VPK does for defense industry. See Sobraniye postanovleniy pravitelstva SSSR, Part 1, No. 28, 1982, pp. 536-540.

96. On committee vs one-man-command entities in the USSR, see Ellen Jones, "Committee Decisionmaking in the Soviet Union," World Politics, Volume XXXVI, January 1984, No. 2, pp. 165-188.

96b. Wolfe, 1979, pp. 50-53; Wolfe, 1975, pp. 26-28; and Wolfe, 1977, pp. 8-10.

97. S.S. Maksimov, Osnovy sovetskogo voyennogo zakonodatelstva (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1978), pp. 50-51; and Kozlov, 1979, p. 36. See also M.G. Sobolev and I.S. Mareyev (Eds.), Partiyno-politicheskaya rabota v sovetskoy armii i flote (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979), p. 13.

98. P.I. Romanov and V.G. Belyavskiy, Konstitutsiya SSSR i Zashchita otechestva (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979), p. 52; and KVS, No. 15, 1979, pp. 69-77.

99. "Concern of the Communist Party for the Security of the Socialist Fatherland," VIZh, No. 12, 1981, pp. 5-12; and B.S. Telpukhovskiy, KPSS v glave stroitelstva vooruzhennykh sil SSSR. Oktyabr 1917-1982 g. Istoricheskiy Ocherk (Moscow: Politizdat, 1983), p. 244.

100. See for example D. Volkogonov, "Actual Questions of Soviet Military Development in Light of the Decisions of the 24th Party Congress," KVS, No. 11, 1972, pp. 10-20; and M. Zakharov, "The Communist Party and the Technical Rearmament of the Army and Navy in the Years of the Pre-war Five Year Plans," VIZh, No. 2, 1971, pp. 3-12.

101. M.G. Sobolev, (Ed.), Partiyno-politicheskaya rabota v sovetskikh vooruzhennykh silakh (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974), pp. 101-102; and V.I. Oskin, "Voyennoye stroitelstvo," SVE, Volume 2, p. 219.

102. "O sostoyanii oborony SSSR," (from the Central Committee Resolution of 15 July 1929), excerpted in N.I. Savinkin and K.M. Bogolyubov, (Eds.), KPSS o vooruzhennykh silakh sovetskogo soyuza. Dokumenty 1917-1981 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1981), pp. 258-260; Tyushkevich, 1978, pp. 180-195; KPSS i stroitelstvo sovetskikh vooruzhennykh sil (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1967), pp. 170-172; and M.V. Zakharov (Ed.), 50 let vooruzhennykh sil SSSR (1918-1968) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), p. 196.



103. Tyushkevich, 1978, p. 185.
- 103b. Wacław Stankiewicz, Planowanie obronne, Studium postaw teoretycznych (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1977), pp. 168-169.
104. A.A. Babakov, "Stroitelstvo Vooruzhennykh sil," SVE, Volume 7, p. 580.
105. Nikitin and Kanevskiy, op cit, and Zakharov, 1971.
106. KPSS i stroitelstvo, pp. 195-197 and Voyennyy voprosy v dokumentakh KPSS i sovetskogo gosudarstva (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1980), pp. 211-212.
107. Ibid, pp. 183-184.
108. "Sovet oborony," VES, p. 684.
109. Maksimov, p. 52.
- 109b. Garthoff, 1975, 1977; Wolfe, 1979, pp. 57-58; Shulman, 1974, and Gottemoeller.
110. V.G. Sredin, "Politicheskiye organy," SVE, Volume 6, pp. 420-422.
111. See for example, Pravda, 10 May 1981, p. 1; and Krasnaya Zvezda, 27 November 1981, p. 2.
112. Sovetskoye administrativnoye pravo, 1981, p. 375.
113. D.F. Ustinov, "The Immortal Feat," Pravda, 9 May 1983, p. 2.
114. Pravda, 17 June 1983, p. 1.
115. See for example, Leningradskaya Pravda, 9 July 1983, p. 4; and Pravda, 6 December 1983, p. 4.
116. Wall Street Journal, 28 February 1984, p. 1; Washington Post, 28 February 1984, p. A10; and The Christian Science Monitor, 28 February 1984, p. 2.
117. Iroshnikov, pp. 35-36.
- 117b. Kublanov, pp. 37-38.
- 117c. Genkina, p. 29.
118. "Gosudarstvenniy komitet oborony," BSE, 1952, pp. 317-318.
119. Harriet Fast Scott, "Possible Members of the Council of Defense Derived from Obituaries," Paper presented at the Brookings Institution, April 1983. See also Tommy L. Whitton, "The Defense Council and Military Obituaries: A Working Hypothesis," AF/INES Newsletter, 83-4.
120. Pravda, 27 October 1982, p. 1.

121. Krasnaya zvezda, 13 April 1983, p. 3; and Pravda, 19 February 1984, p. 3.
- 121b. Jones, op cit.
- 121c. Lipitskiy, p. 123 and Genkina, p. 41.
122. Iroshnikov, pp. 60-61.
- 122b. Genkina, p. 28.
- 122d. Lipitskiy, p. 123.
- 122e. Genkina, p. 31. For examples of administrative meetings (which were not always chaired or attended by Lenin), see Vladimir Ilich Lenin, Biograficheskaya Khronika, Volume 9, (Moscow: Politizdat), pp. 630, 666-667. For examples of plenary sessions, see op cit, pp. 7-8, 640.
123. Iroshnikov, pp. 70-71.
124. Ibid, pp. 66-68. See also "Sovet rabochey i krestyanskoy oborony, " Grazhdanskaya voyna, p. 547.
125. Iroshnikov, pp. 77-78.
- 125b. Lipitskiy, p. 123-124.
- 125c. Genkina, pp. 42-43, 81. An example of sub-committee activity is Biokhronika, Volume 9, p. 661.
126. Jan Sejna (with Joseph Douglass), "Czech and Soviet Decision Process," unpub. (Arlington, VA, September 1, 1980), pp. 14-24.
- 126b. Jones, op cit.
- 126c. Lipitsky, p. 124; and Yu.S. Kukushkin, Soviet oborony (1918-1920) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1969, p. 10.
127. Iroshnikov, pp. 40-42.
128. Rose E. Gottemoeller, "Decisionmaking for Arms Limitation in the Soviet Union," in Hans Guenter Brauch and Duncan L. Clarke, Decisionmaking for Arms Limitations. Assessments and Prospects (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 19??), pp. 53-80.
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130. Gottemoeller, op cit; McDonnell, op cit, Warner, op cit, and Gallagher and Spielman, op cit.