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Soviet Policies on Dissent and Emigration: The Radical Change of Course Since 1979

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The dissent discussed in this paper can be defined as activity of a public and dissident nature by a group or individual, which is conducted independently of official control. The main broad categories are political, social, humanitarian, nationalist, religious, and cultural.

To express the wish to emigrate from the Soviet Union is usually viewed by the authorities as a generalized act of dissent. For this reason official policies on dissent and emigration tend, as this paper will show, to be closely related.

Between the late 1950's and 1979, dissent in the USSR (as here defined) emerged, spread and diversified in manifold ways. From 1971 to 1981 emigration was permitted on a considerable scale.[1] Since 1979 dissent has been systematically suppressed (though with less than complete success), and since 1981 emigration has been virtually stopped.

The central aim of this paper is to enquire into the reasons for, and extent of, these radical changes of policy, and to make a few remarks about the policy process involved. In some ways the paper is a sequel to my article "Policy Towards Dissent Since Khrushchev", written in 1979,[2] although it may be noted that it revises some of the judgments made in that article. The present paper is a working draft, with a limited number of footnotes, which will eventually serve as the basis for a monograph on dissent and emigration policy since Stalin.

Ideology, Law and Policy Statements Regarding Dissent

By way of introduction, it may be useful to make some broad comments on ideology, law and policy statements regarding dissent. Soviet ideology holds, in effect, that bona fide dissent and opposition no longer exist in the Soviet Union: the dictatorship of the proletariat has successfully smashed the

exploiting classes, and the people are ever more closely united behind the party. Khrushchev developed a theory which equated opposition with mental illness, declaring: "We can say that now, too, there are people who struggle against communism . . . but clearly the mental state of such people is not normal."3 His successors have not abandoned this view, but see a second extraneous and more traditional source of disloyalty in bribery by foreign intelligence services and subversive organizations.

Soviet law is more ambiguous than the ideology. The Constitution proclaims freedom of conscience, and a political article of the Criminal Code which is frequently applied, no. 190-1, requires that the defendant must have (a) disseminated "fabrications" (defaming the Soviet system), and (b) done so knowing them to be untrue. Thus from a strictly legal point of view dissent based on true facts is permissible, and the dissenters have, of course, repeatedly pressed this point.4

We should note, however, two things: first, as we shall see later, a plethora of new laws have been promulgated (since 1966) to make prosecution of dissidents easier; and second, the new Constitution of 1977 - a stong ideological as well as legal document - brings "the law" (if not individual laws) closer into line with ideology. It is, in fact, considerably more "totalitarian" than its predecessor, and in effect puts most dissenters and religious people outside the law.5

For example, citizens who are critical of the state cannot exercise freedom of conscience in this regard, as "A citizen of the USSR is obliged to safeguard the interests of the Soviet state and to help strengthen its might and prestige" (article 62).

The same article seriously affects religious people who hold, as most do (along with Soviet ideologists and the CPSU in its current "Rules" and

"Programme"), that religion on the one hand, and Soviet socialism and communism on the other, are incompatible. For now "The supreme goal of the Soviet state (not just of the CPSU, as previously - P.R.) is the building of a classless communist (i.e. atheist - P.R.) society", and the USSR is "a socialist state of all the people" (article 1). Clearly religious people of the sort just described cannot, as most would like, bring up their children in their own faith without sabotaging "the supreme goal of the Soviet state" (a state to which they are defined as belonging) and thus violating the Constitution. Article 66 makes this more explicit by laying down that "Citizens of the USSR are obliged . . . to rear worthy members of a socialist society".

Policy statements by Soviet leaders usually express the position of ideology ("everyone supports the party"), but sometimes, when directly or indirectly acknowledging the existence of dissent, they move some way towards reflecting the ambiguities of the law. Leonid Ilichyov did not move very far, perhaps, when he told restive intellectuals in 1962: "We have complete freedom to struggle for communism. We do not have, and cannot have, freedom to struggle against communism."[6]

In 1975 Yury Andropov, the chairman of the KGB, made the same point a little less bluntly: "Any citizen of the Soviet Union whose interests coincide with the interests of society enjoys the whole range of our democratic freedoms. It is another matter if the interests in certain instances do not coincide. Here we say straight out: priority must be given to the interests of society as a whole, of all working people."[7]

In a speech in 1977 Mr. Brezhnev expounded a familiar variation of this line, welcoming constructive criticism, but castigating anti-Soviet elements and saying that "our people demand" that these individuals be severely dealt with.[8]

A more ambiguous, but characteristic attitude shows in the above-quoted speech by Andropov, who complains that: "the West keeps smuggling bourgeois ideas into our country, and trying to introduce capitalist habits and morals into our midst". This is "one of the capitalist world's insidious methods of struggle against socialism". None of this matters, however, because "our public rebuffs attempts of this kind with such resolution and unanimity".

Here the word "insidious", echoing as it does the Soviet press's defensive concern, indeed obsession with foreign subversion, suggests that this official concern is a more important input into the policy-making process than Brezhnev's "popular demand". It also makes Andropov's self-satisfied conclusion - reached via an unacknowledged "U-turn" - seem artificial.

The closely interrelated ideological, legal and policy positions sketched above are never treated at any length by Soviet politicians. But more detail can be found in numerous articles and books by official commentators and propagandists.[9] In these publications Andropov's "the West" is made more specific: the intelligence services of NATO powers, "world Zionism", fanatical religious centres, Ukrainian and other nationalist organizations, as well as specifically anti-Soviet groups like the NTS (People's Labour Alliance). These organizations are often presented as working together, sometimes in unlikely combinations such as Zionists and Nazis. But they are united by their common hatred of Soviet communism.

Naturally the pernicious ideas of these groups influence only a few ideologically unstable Soviet citizens, whose services can then be bought. Such individuals feature in the literature as "traitors" (izmenniki) and "renegades" (otshchepentsy), often with their real names attached.

Pre-history

The history of official policy in the 1953-64 period, which saw the quick abandonment of Stalin's mass terror, is summed up illuminatingly and probably quite frankly by Khrushchev in the memoirs which he tape-recorded while in enforced retirement: "On the one hand we really did allow an easing . . . and relaxed our controls, and the people started to express themselves more freely both in conversation and in the press . . . But there were two views on this: it reflected our inner feelings and we wanted it; on the other hand, there were people who did not want this thaw. They even uttered rebukes and said - look, if Stalin were alive, he wouldn't have allowed this. . . . We were consciously rather afraid of this thaw, for fear that it might produce a flood which would inundate everything and which would be difficult to deal with . . . For this reason we, as it were, restrained the thaw . . . Things that were undesirable to the leadership would have overflowed the restraining barriers, and such a tide would have started to run that it would have swept away the obstacles in its path. The fear was that . . . the leadership . . . would not be able to lead and direct into Soviet channels the creative forces which would be let loose, nor to ensure that the output of these creative forces would serve to strengthen socialism. This concern was good, a good instinct, but perhaps a bit cowardly."[10]

The fact that Khrushchev is much less explicit here than in most of his memoirs, using euphemistic (if graphic) imagery about floods and barriers, only serves to underline the sensitivity of dissent as a topic, and the inbuilt caution with which even an impulsive and relatively frank politician like him felt he could discuss it in the comparative freedom of retirement. But the above passage is nonetheless revealing about the Soviet leaders' perception of the potential dangers of dissent. This perception is not, of course, necessarily

accurate, but it helps us in our attempt to understand policy formation.

Organized public dissent did not emerge in the major Russian cities on any scale until 1965. The Jewish emigration movement took shape in 1968-69, soon to be followed by parallel movements among the Soviet Germans and then the Armenians. By 1979 the number of major groups or movements concerned with dissent or emigration had climbed to about 30.

From the beginning, the instinctive response of tbe authorities to these alarming developments appears to have been to try to suppress them, but to do so quietly. For a variety of reasons, however, notably their fear of jeopardizing the economic and political fruits of detente, the measures they took in 1968-73 were not decisive enough to achieve their aim.[11] Moreover, in 1971 they felt themselves compelled to yield to the mounting pressure of Soviet Jews and their foreign and domestic supporters, and to allow some emigration. When they undercut this concession by imposing a steep education tax on emigrants, they soon gave in to the resulting storm of criticism, and stopped collecting the tax. Then they proceeded, reluctantly but firmly, to accomodate to the Jackson-Vanik amendment of the U.S. Congress, an amendment which, contrary to a widespread Western myth, greatly assisted Jewish emigration from 1972, when it was first framed, until the collapse of detente in 1979-80.[12]

One of the political fruits of detente was the "Final Act" of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) signed by 35 governments in August 1975. This had been a major goal of Soviet diplomacy for several years, and the Western insistence, during the long negotiations over the text, on inserting provisions to promote human rights, clearly played an important role in moderating the Soviet suppression of dissidents during the preceeding year and a half. (Other factors were the threat of America's National Academy of Sciences that scientific exchanges with the USSR would come to an end if

Dr. Sakharov were arrested, and the first strong criticisms by Western psychiatric bodies of Soviet political abuse of psychiatry.) Once the Final Act had been signed, moreover, the prospect of a follow-up, "monitoring" conference in Belgrade in two years' time strengthened Soviet inhibitions still more, and reduced arrests to by far the lowest level since the freak year of 1965.

All this shows up clearly in the charts and tables in the appendix. These quantify the rates of arrest over the years for the main dissent and emigration movements, with "global" figures in chart No. 1 and Table No. 39B. So though this statistical material needs to be interpreted with caution, it provides, I believe, very useful insights into the evolving patterns of official policies vis-a-vis different groups. Inevitably, the limited scope of this paper will only permit the development of a small proportion of these insights.

Arrests are a sensitive indicator of policy because they arouse sharp resentment in the victim's community. This is why the KGB's standing orders clearly include the instruction to exhaust all milder, alternative measures before seeking the Party's sanction to make an arrest.[13] Thus, to state the obvious, the resolute arrest of, say twenty members of a group indicates a much sharper turn in official policy than the arrest of only half a dozen.

A few general points should be made about the statistical material. First, the 3,650 political arrests which are its raw data constitute an unknown proportion of all the political arrests made in the USSR between 1953 and the present. The data become less incomplete from 1968 on, with the development in that year of systematic collection of information by the human rights movement. But whether the figure of 3,650 represents 20, 40, 60 or 80 per cent of the arrests since 1968, or some other proportion, is impossible to say.

It is also important to note that the figures for arrests from about 1979-80 to the present are sure to rise quite significantly in the next few years, as further information trickles out to the West with delay. Most of all, this applies to the figures for the first half of 1984, which must here be heavily understated. This sort of delay has always occurred. One might estimate that roughly 20% of, say, the 1972 arrests we now know about did not become known in the West until around 1976 or later. But on top of this normal sort of delay, the regime's severe assault since 1979 on the human rights movement and other types of dissent has clearly exacerbated the delays. It has probably also created a situation in which, for the foreseeable future, a smaller percentage of all the political arrests in the years after 1979 will become known about abroad than has been the case for the period 1968-79. In other words, some sorts of arrest which would have become known about in the West (sometimes with delay) if they had occurred in 1968-79, may now, occurring since 1979, not become known about for the indefinite future.

Second, not included at all in the tables and graphs are (a) arrests for which the year is not known (b) arrests for actions committed many years earlier, prior to 1953, and (c) all brief, administrative detentions of 10-15 days, which have a much less intimidating effect than a full-scale arrest, the latter normally being followed by anything from 1 to 15 years in prison. And third, one should bear in mind that the figures for 1971-81 are, in a sense, artificially low, in that in those years an average of perhaps a dozen or two people a year emigrated (or were pushed into emigration) who would otherwise, probably, have been imprisoned.

To return to the pre-history, this last point affects in only a minor way a comparison between the overall rates of arrest in 1968-73 and 1975-78 (omitting the transitional year of 1974). As Table 36 indicates, and Chart 1 puts in

graphic form, the contrast is striking. The average number of known arrests for the years 1968-73 is 185 per annum, as against a mere 87 for 1975-78. This switch represents a change of policy which is all the more noteworthy, as the policy of 1968-73, i.e. one of wearing the dissident groups down by a fairly high and steady rate of arrest, had as yet achieved only a few of its goals. By abandoning that policy in mid-stream - because of the higher priority given to important foreign policy aims which would be jeopardized by it - the Politbureau must presumably have realized that the consequence would be the need to tolerate what quickly developed: a rising level of increasingly diversified dissent.

When, however, part of this development proved to be the formation, from May 1976 onwards, of independent groups concerned to monitor Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and vigorously publicize the numerous instances of non-compliance, partly for the benefit of the 1977 Belgrade review conference, the Politbureau was forced to reassess its policy. Interestingly enough, it decided to harden its line not just on dissent, but also, simultaneously (for reasons to be discussed later) on emigration. The new policy, which began to be implemented at the end of 1976, was outlined in a closed, high-level briefing for editors, a summary of which was leaked to the dissident Chronicle of Current Events.[14] On dissent, the official spokesman reported:

> The editors of newspapers and journals receive numerous demands from Soviet people that, at last, firmness be shown and the dissidents silenced. It has been decided to imprison the 50 most active dissidents (probably mainly Helsinki monitors - P.R.) and deal severely with their associates. It is time to show strength and not pay attention to the West.

On emigration, the spokesman said:

> The Soviet Union showed its good will by signing the Helsinki Agreement. We know that in reality no reunification of families is taking place. Young people are using emigration for selfish purposes. Let those who challenge authority go, rather, and build the Baikal-Amul Railwayline.

Just at this moment, however, in January 1977, President Jimmy Carter came into office in the USA, committing himself to a strong global policy on human rights. While the coincidental timing of this and the new Soviet clamp-down was pure chance, Carter naturally could not fail to respond to what was a clear if not deliberate challenge to his stand. So when his forthright statements found a strong echo among the governments and publics of many U.S. allies, the Politbureau was soon forced into reverse.[15] Despite the well-publicized arrest and heavy sentencing of figures like Yury Orlov and Anatoly Shcharansky in 1977-78, the total numbers of known arrests in 1977 was a mere 82 (most of them unknown dissidents, not Helsinki monitors), i.e. the lowest figure since 1965,[16] and this rose only to 94 in 1978. Jewish emigration, moreover, rose by nearly 20% in 1977, and then by about 70% in 1978 and about 80% in 1979 (to a level of 51,320 emigrants in that year).

Thus the Politbureau clearly decided that the harsher policies on dissent and emigration which it had opted for in late 1976 were (like the similar, pre-1974 policy on dissent and the pre-1971 policy on emigration) incompatible with what it wanted to get out of detente, and therefore had to be quickly dropped. Also, SALT-II - later signed by Carter and Brezhnev at their summit meeting of summer 1979 - should not be jeopardized. And perhaps the MFN status and high level of cheap American trade credits which had slipped throught the Politbureau's fingers in 1974 could yet be obtained by allowing Jewish emigration to rise, as it did in 1979, to record levels. To sweeten the diplomatic atmosphere and thus facilitate the achievement of these goals, in April 1979 two batches of political prisoners (ten men in all) were released from prison early, after negotiations with the U.S. government, and sent abroad.[17] This was a larger-scale use of dissidents for such purposes than has occured either before or since 1979.

The Radical Policy Change of 1979 - The Main Reasons

As 1979 proceeded, however, the landscape of Soviet politics began to change in ways more significant than at any time since 1964-65, and especially since 1971. After many years of stable political leadership and a broadly consistent foreign policy, disruption and uncertainty began to affect both the leadership and its foreign policy.

The sharp change in dissent and emigration policies occurred - for those on the receiving end - in November 1979, with the arrest of some key dissidents who had previously seemed to enjoy a certain immunity,[18] and with new curbs being imposed on emigration. Some Jewish would-be emigrants had their permission to leave revoked at the last minute and the OVIR offices responsible for emigration announced that henceforth applications would be accepted only from people possessing invitations from immediate (not distant) relatives abroad.[19]

Before describing the new policies, though, and showing how they have developed in ways that go far beyond the policies of 1968-73 and the quickly aborted ones of 1976-77, let us devote some pages to informed speculation about the factors that lay behind the changes.

An important, perhaps central part of the picture is the fact that, at least from 1978 onwards, Brezhnev's health showed clear signs of decline. The logic of Kremlin politics demanded at this point that his colleagues should lessen their loyalty to him and start discreetly maneuvering for new alignments, each building up his strength through informal alliances and the tentative pushing of new policies, so as to be in a good position to strike, should Brezhnev either stumble politically or fail seriously in health.

In foreign policy, Brezhnev was vulnerable because his policy's centre-piece, detente, was not proving very productive or resilient. The U.S., for example, had not yet been persuaded to grant the USSR either MFN status or cheap trade credits. And it had been sufficiently annoyed by what it regarded as Soviet "cheating" in Cuba and the Third World, especially in Angola, that it had, in late 1978, elevated its relations with China to a status which looked like a latent anti-Soviet alliance. In the fall of 1979, moreover, the Congress was showing reluctance to ratify the SALT-II treaty, thus encouraging the Kremlin to think, in its semi-paranoid way, that perhaps Carter had never been sincere about wanting a treaty in the first place. This thought followed quite easily from its early dislike of him for, among other things, "waging the ideological struggle" against it with too much zeal for its comfort.

All this meant that to undermine detente - whether by suppressing dissent and stopping emigration, or by invading Afghanistan - was both to pursue policies acceptable to most colleagues, and also to undermine Brezhnev (even if, gritting his teeth, Brezhnev went along with such actions in the hope of mitigating their consequences for himself).

Internally, Brezhnev was vulnerable mainly because of the indifferent performance of the economy and the social developments which were seen to be a major contributing factor. These developments were: a rapid growth of official corruption (closely linked to Brezhnev's "stability of cadres" policy), a loss of morale and discipline among working people, poor law and order generally, and spreading political disaffection, with dissent and emigration as its clearest manifestations. Thus to maneuver for policies aimed at ending dissent and emigration, attacking corruption, and restoring law and order through tough leadership - this, too, was both to pursue policies acceptable to most colleagues, and also to undermine Brezhnev (even, again, if he tried to "take over" the

policies himself and thus head off consequences dangerous to himself).

These general points may help us to understand why a politically weakened Brezhnev went along with the law-and-order and anti-corruption campaigns, the drive against dissent and emigration, the steady raising of the prestige of the KGB, and the invasion of Afghanistan, all of which policies (except one) date from the second half of pivotal year of 1979.

Even the one exception here - raising the KGB's prestige - is only a partial exception. For although the process should perhaps be dated from July 1978, when the KGB was given the full status of a State Committee[20], it really gathered momentum from the award to KGB head Andropov, in August 1979, of the Order of the October Revolution. This was notable mainly because there was no precedent (in a political system hypersensitive about precedents) for awards to be made on a 65th birthday, as this one was, and also because, in addition, Brezhnev honoured Andropov with a lavish encomium.[21]

Later, at the 26th Party Congress in February-March 1981, Brezhnev praised the KGB more fulsomely than at the previous congress, in tune with the simultaneous increase in the KGB's tally of full members of the Central Committee from one to four. Three months later he made the rare and significant move of attending a KGB meeting called to discuss the KGB's tasks arising out of his congress speech. While it is hard to guess at all his motives for doing this, which may have been in part defensive vis-a-vis the potential threat to him from Andropov, he certainly wanted to be closely identified with the KGB in the eyes of the political elite, at a time when the KGB was involved in a determined assault on the dissent and emigration movements.

The main reason why he may by 1981 have been defensive vis-a-vis Andropov, and therefore busy promoting his protege Chernenko, will become clearer as we

turn to a few remarks about the law and order and anti-corruption campaigns. Curiously enough, although these campaigns have clearly had an exceptional importance in Soviet politics since they were launched, I have not as yet been able to find a single solid study of them by a Western scholar. So the comments which follow should be taken for what they are - the fruits of my as yet limited and unsystematic research on the subject, immature fruits which are even more subject to questioning and revision than other portions of this paper.

At least one of the roots of the anti-corruption campaign goes back to 1978 or beyond. For it was in September 1978 that Deputy Fishing Industry Minister Rytov was dismissed in disgrace for his key role in what became known as "the fish case" or "the caviar case."[23] This enormous scandal, involving several hundred suspects and witnesses, must have been handled from an early stage by Andropov's KGB, both because, as a long-term caviar racket, it involved economic crime on a grand scale, and also because it had international dimensions. It seems likely that Andropov persistently, over several years, pushed the case through to a number of convictions, because he knew that some of the threads led to an associate of Brezhnev's, V. Medunov, the first party secretary of the Krasnodar Territory.

It also seems plausible that Andropov used his no doubt massive documentation on the caviar case to press for what was achieved in August 1979, namely the adoption by the Central Committee of a lengthy decree on the need to strengthen law and order.[24] This broadly conceived decree was the essential foundation for what quickly followed - "derivative" campaigns against particularly serious disrupters of law and order, namely official corruption, and dissent and emigration. Regarding the former campaign, convictions of small fry in the caviar case soon began, and as for the latter, we have already noted its launching in November 1979.

By embracing the anti-corruption campaign himself, Brezhnev managed to protect Medunov from its toils for four years. When, however, Rytov's trial and execution were reported to the Soviet people[25] and Brezhnev's political strength was rapidly ebbing, Medunov was demoted. A few months later, as soon as Brezhnev died, he was disgraced, dismissed from the Central Committee, and reported, via officially inspired rumours, to be likely to stand trial.

The second main target of the law and order campaign was, without doubt, N. Shchelokov. An old associate and reported friend of Brezhnev's, he had headed the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) for many years. The MVD was now, with the Procuracy, the organization most heavily criticized in the law and order decree. In the following years it was probably subject to more intense and protracted humiliation by the Party, the KGB and the official media than any other ministry in the history of the USSR. To take but one example out of hundreds, the press reported in 1983 that in the Chelyabinsk region alone 1,800 people, including 500 Party members, had been drafted into the MVD to replace the personnel who had been dismissed or prosecuted, and to bring the organization under tight Party control.[25]

Once again, Brezhnev wasjust able to protect Shchelokov from dismissal in his life-time, though not from the humiliation of a lengthy public self-criticism.[26] But on his death, the MVD head suffered exactly the same instant disgrace that Medunov underwent. The two men had been carefully chosen for their fate by Brezhnev's enemies. They were Brezhnev's associates, they were involved in corruption on a probably larger than average scale, and as they were not in the Politbureau or Secretariat, to maneuver against them could not be denounced as impermissible factionalism.

As for the KGB, its prestige was further enhanced when, as the anti-corruption drive developed, it remained the only major institution of the regime which was untainted, above reproach, and an object of public glorification. This was helpful to Andropov, even though he took care, as always, to present himself primarily as a Party leader and only secondarily as head of the KGB. The exceptional importance of the KGB's campaign against dissent and emigration was reflected by the promotion during the campaign of the head of the 5th directorate (charged with implementing it), F. Bobkov, to the rank of a KGB deputy-chairman.[27]

The purpose of the above discussion has been to show how easily the new policies on dissent and emigration fit into the political trends of 1979. They may indeed have been the least questioned of all the new policies, given the fact that they had, in most essentials, been agreed on by the Politbureau twice before, in 1968 and 1976, and been dropped before their goals were achieved only because higher priorities of foreign policy demanded this. This fact produced the accumulated frustration reflected, already, in the 1977 briefing by the official quoted earlier. Certainly, though more searching lies ahead, I have yet to find solid evidence of any high-level resistance to the policies launched in autumn 1979, either prior to or during their application. Worth noting, however, is an intriguing passage in an article of Chernenko's published in September 1981, when he was vying with Andropov for the succession to Brezhnev. The article, which reads rather like a disguised personal election manifesto, says at one point that the task of determining the correct political line requires above all "taking account of the unique interests of each class and each stratum of Soviet society", and the ability to meld these with the national interest and communist principles. "If this is not done, a policy risks depriving itself of a firm social base and the support of the masses . . . We are firmly convinced

that an incomplete or delayed analysis of society's interests, neglect of the interests of any class or group, and an inability to find the socially necessary 'solution' for melding them, are pregnant with the danger of social tension and a political and socio-economic crisis."[28] Whether this was just Chernenko "playing the liberal" in the opportunistic and not very sincere way to which he has been prone, or whether conceivably there is more behind the passage - possibly a link to the sharp but temporary dip in the rate of arrest in the second half of 1981 - requires further research.

Let us now be more specific and try to reconstruct - again with informed speculation - the sort of briefing-paper the KGB may have written in summer 1979 in response to a request from a Politbureau set on reassessing the old policies. And let us imagine that the report was divided into three sections.

On dissent, it would presumably have pointed out that as a result of the low ceiling imposed on the level of arrests over the previous five years, dissenting groups had been spreading geographically, diversifying the issues they took up, and increasing their mutual cooperation. A growing amount of dissent was simply going unpunished. In that period, the following groups (a selective list) had come into existence: five Helsinki monitoring groups in different parts of the country, a group to combat the political abuse of psychiatry, a political prisoners aid fund, groups to defend the rights of (a) the disabled and (b) religious believers, and two free trades union groups. Only the latter and two of the Helsinki groups were proving weak enough for their destruction to be actually or potentially achievable. The rest were thriving. As for mutual cooperation, for the first time members of six church denominations had signed a joint protest about oppression of religion; for the first time, members of the three Baltic nationalist movements in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, 45 people in all, had signed a joint political appeal (calling

for the annulment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact); the prisoners aid fund was helping the families of all political and religious prisoners; and the human rights movement had developed with almost all dissident groups such extensive networks for the two-way funnelling of information that its Chronicle of Current Events was an accurate, up-to-date and nearly complete mirror of the whole dissenting scene.[29]

On emigration, the KGB report might have started by pointing out that when emigration was first allowed on any scale in 1971, the official hope was that a relatively small number of Jewish and German malcontents would leave, and the whole process would soon be completed. However, it had not turned out like that. Already a quarter of a million people had left in eight years, and the flow of applicants showed no sign of abating. Moreover, Armenians, Pentecostals, and even Ukrainians and Russians had started demanding "equal rights" on the issue.

Second, it was proving impossible to bar the emigration of a considerable number of economically valuable people, e.g. scientists, and also of people possessing information which was of use to the West. Politically speaking, moreover, the emigrants' influence was decidedly harmful. They wrote anti-Soviet books and articles, gave interviews to the mass media, testified at international Jewish conferences or Sakharov Hearings, and lobbied Western governments - almost always in ways harmful to Soviet interests.

And third, the sight, at the local domestic level, of emigration movements organizing themselves, circulating literature, telephoning abroad, appealing to the West, demonstrating in public places, and all with a large element of impunity - this was disorienting and demoralizing to local political leaders and local populations alike.

So - the KGB report may have concluded on emigration - you in the Politbureau should perhaps weigh up whether or not all these negative factors outweigh such

positive ones as using the emigrants as bartering assets in politicl and economic dealings with the West, and planting KGB agents disguised as disaffected emigrants in foreign countries.

In the third section of our hypothetical report the KGB may have documented a further dimension to the whole problem, namely the growing level of foreign support for the dissenters and would-be emigrants. President Carter had (as mentioned earlier) given a strong boost to this support, as had the whole "Helsinki process" of conferences to review implementation of the Final Act. The American, West German and Israeli governments could be expected to maintain their pressures in favour of emigration. Professional groups such as physicists and psychiatrists were becoming increasingly critical of, respectively, the treatment of Orlov and Sakharov, and the political abuse of psychiatry.[30] Religious groups were starting to exert pressures for greater freedom of religion in the USSR. Humanitarian bodies like Amnesty International were exploiting the information collected by the human rights movement to generate widespread Western criticism of Soviet legal and penal practices. And even the International Labour Organization was showing an undesirable concern about freedom of association for trades unionists in the USSR.

The "bottom line" of this last section might well have been similar to the conclusions of the first two sections, namely that the problem was getting worse rather than better, and there was no sign as yet of a future respite.

The general line of thought running through the last section can, in fact, be indirectly documented. From late 1979 on, dissenters and would-be emigrants or "refuseniks" (<u>otkazniki</u>) were often warned by officials to fall silent because their activities were, the officials said, harming the USSR's international prestige, or - a reference to the Stevenson and Jackson-Vanik amendments - its economic interests. And V. Fedorchuk, when head of the KGB in the Ukraine,

made a transparent reference to the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and its associates when he mentioned "forty Ukrainian nationalists" in a speech. "In order," he said, "to avoid unnecessary international friction, some of them have recently been put away on criminal charges."[31] Internal party briefings clearly encouraged disrespect (in practice if not in word) for the Helsinki Final Act. In 1980, for example, a paraty official let slip this admission in front of a dissident: "We signed the Helsinki accords, but morally we are against them."[32]

The timing of the introduction of the new policy on dissent - in November 1979 - can doubtless be broadly explained as it has been above. It followed logically, and after a short interval, the adoption of its "parent resolution" on strengthening law and order. But a further factor which may have determined the precise timing was the imminence of the Olympic Games in Moscow and four other Soviet cities eight months later. Certainly some sort of Olympic purge of dissidents would have occurred, even if the Games had fallen in the liberal years of 1975-78, and eight months was a lead-time similar to that between the purge begun at the end of 1976 (but quickly aborted) and the Belgrade CSCE review conference of summer 1977. Also, numerous official comments to dissidents in the pre-Olympic period made clear the KGB's preoccupation with ensuring the Games were not marred by demonstrations or press conferences or distribution of literature by dissidents.

But probably the new policy would have run a similar course even without the Olympics. In any case, if there were any initial doubts about how far to take it, most of these must have been dispelled in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. With the USSR firmly in the dog-house of world opinion and the object of embargoes, boycots, and humiliation at the United Nations, the international price to be paid for suppressing dissent and not just reducing, but in the wake of the Olympics, stopping

emigration went sharply down. The political, economic and scientific benefits of detente were now mostly lost, because the invasion had sunk detente. Not much more could be lost by way of reprisal for domestic repression.

This calculation was to prove largely correct. As the Afghan and then the Polish issue dominated Western perceptions of the Soviet Union, protests about domestic repression faded into the background. This of course encouraged the Politbureau to "follow through" on repression, with the result that by autumn 1981 a First Deputy Chairman of the KGB, S. Tsvigun, could claim without too much exaggeration that most dissident groups had been destroyed or "rendered harmless." As his article is the most authoritative detailed exposition (for public consumption) of the regime's interpretation of post-1979 developments, it may be worth quoting from here:

> Until recently imperialism's special services, in organizing their subversive work within our country, built their main calculations on seeking out from among Soviet citizens of hostile inclination one or more "leaders" who could embark on the path of active confrontation with Soviet power and lead anti-social and anti-Soviet elements into organized struggle against the socialist system. As a result of measures taken by the KGB, implemented in strict accordance with the law and under the leadership of Party organs, the anti-social elements, despite the West's considerable material and moral support, did not succeed in achieving organized cohesion on the platform of anti-Sovietism. Their calls for the revision of our political and ideological principles and institutions not only failed to acquire any support, but met with angry denunciation among the Soviet public. The antisocial elements' illegal activity was stopped and the most active were charged with criminal offenses. At the same time relevant preventive work is being performed with respect to deluded people. Here the state security organs constantly rely on the aid of the broad Soviet public and expand and strengthen their links with the masses.
>
> The imperialist special services and anti-Soviet centers, having been convinced that the antisocial elements concealed under such labels as "defenders of rights" and "champions of democracy" have been exposed and rendered harmless, have embarked on a frenzied search for new subversive ways and means. For instance . . . actions to spur emigration have recently been expanded considerably not only among the Jewish, German and Armenian populations, but also among religious believers. The ringleaders of Ukrainian nationalist organizations abroad are clamoring increasingly impudently about Ukrainians' "right to emigrate" from the USSR. Actions to support illegal Uniate groupings and to encourage extremism in certain representatives of the Catholic clergy have

acquired a more blatant anti-Soviet orientation.

> Reactionary foreign Islamic organizations and centers of ideological subversion have galvanized their propaganda, speculating on the events in Iran and around Afghanistan. Attempts have been noted recently to create in our country groups of a religious, mystical leaning such as abound in the West (the "Church of the Prophets," the "White Brothe hood," the "Society for Krishna Consciousness" and so forth).33

The Main Features of the New Policies

Now we turn to a summary presentation of the main features of the new policies, grouping them under three somewhat arbitrary headings - punishment of individuals, anti-emigration policy, and restrictions on communication.

(A) Punishment of Individuals

As Table 36 and Chart 1 indicate, the rate of arrest for all dissidents and refuseniks rose sharply in 1979-80, and then stayed at roughly the 1980 level, until starting to decline in 1983. The totals for 1980-82 - 268, 205 and 241 - quite easily surpassed the highest totals in previous years (196 in 1972 and 198 in 1969), and are also bound to be revised upward in the next few years, as additional information filters through to the West. But the most important comparison is between the average level in the later detente years of 1975-78, which we noted earlier to be 87, and that in 1980 - 82, which is nearly three times higher at 238 (the transitional, pivotal year of 1979 standing at 145). The collapse of detente in the mountains of Afghanistan and the labyrinths of the Kremlin power-struggle, the Politbureau's clear understanding that the fruits of detente were now "blown" and prolonging the soft line of dissent and emigration could not possibly restore them - all this led straight to a radical reversal of policy.

As can be seen from the charts and tables, the regime's attack was - to a degree considerably greater than in 1968-73 - a simultaneous one across the board. Leaders and key individuals in all groups and movements were arrested (or otherwise disposed of), and when replacements for them appeared, they too went to jail. Unlike in the past, virtually no exceptions were made for any individual's social position or international status. Dr. Sakharov, for example, was exiled to Gorky in January 1980 (the worldwide scandal of a trial being avoided by the simple but illegal device of using an apparently legislative decree), the only concession being the fact that the penalty was exile, not, say, 12 years of prison camp and exile. In 1984 this concession was effectively withdrawn when he was arrested and held incommunicado, while the Procuracy initiated criminal proceedings against his wife.

The arrests continued against each group until it stopped its open, public activity and fell silent. The time period required for this varied widely, depending on each group's social base, foreign support, resourcefulness, and determination. When some groups went underground and continued much of their activity, e.g. circulating materials as previously, but with the authors' names withheld, the KGB's task became barder, but it did not relent.

Officials often made clear to dissidents the policy they were implementing. In August 1981 one declared: "Previously we brought people to trial only for their actions. But now we will try them for preparing to act, and for assisting others."[34] A month later another said: "I'm telling you straight: by the summer [of 1982] there won't be a single democrat or [Jewish] nationalist left in Moscow."[35] Nine months later another explained: "We've got a new leader now (Fedorchuk), and we're eliminating all samizdat and all the places where anti-Soviet literature is kept."[36]

Regarding the post-arrest phase, the average length of sentences went up from 1979-80 onwards, and dissidents who refused, as their terms drew to an end, to promise to be socially passive after their release, were now commonly re-sentenced on various pretexts and not released. In September 1983 a new law (article 188-3) was passed to make this process simpler than before, and to try to reduce the smuggling of documents out of camps by further intimidating the inmates.[37] 1983 also saw the first deliberate use of physical torture on well-known dissidents[38] (previously it had been used only on lesser-known ones in the provinces, and quite rarely). The immediate aim here was to try to obtain full-scale recantations from leading figures, who would "admit" that a close link existed between dissidents and the C.I.A. (In these cases the aim was not achieved, but "confessions" were extracted from a few lesser figures.) The more general aim was probably to ensure that the message reached a wide dissident audience that the regime was returning to this intimidating Stalinist practice. An analogous development was an increased incidence of physical thuggery against dissidents, with occasional murders, these phenomena occurring both in and out of captivity.[39]

(b)Anti-Emigration Policies

To turn now to emigration, simple administrative measures led to Jewish emigration coming down from the record figure of 51,320 in 1979, to 21,471 in 1980, to 9,400 in 1981, to 2,700 in 1982, and to 1,315 (i.e. a mere 2 1/2% of the record figure) in 1983. The official explanation, propagated for example by an anti-Zionist committee set up by the authorities in 1983, was the claim that the process of reuniting divided families had now been completed, and so no-one now wanted to leave. (This transparent claim was belied by the tens of thousands of invitations sent from Israel to Soviet Jews at their request, the

recipients of which have not been allowed to emigrate). Some Jews who have had no connection with secret work have been told orally that they will never be allowed to leave. The authorities' aim is clearly to induce a spirit of hopelessness and submission in Soviet Jews.

The same may well be true of the Soviet Germans, although the decline in their emigration - from the record level of 9,704 in 1976 to 1,447 in 1983 (i.e. 15% of the 1976 figure) - has been somewhat less drastic. The Armenian decline has been nearly as steep as that of the Jews.

It is important to note here in passing that the Pentecostal Christians, who have had a strong emigration movement since 1973, have been almost totally barred from emigration.[40] In addition to their not having an obvious state abroad to "go home to", the authorities seem to be influenced also by trading considerations. As a KGB Colonel told one Pentecostal group in 1980: "Don't you compare yourselves with the Jews. They fetch a good price. But we get very little for you."[41]

(c) Restriction on Communication

In the highly important sphere of communications with the outside world, a formidable succession of carefully planned measures has been implemented. First, in the wake of Solidarity's rise in Poland in the summer of 1980, the radio jamming which had been stopped in late 1973 as a "sweetener" for the negotiations on CSCE was resumed on a large scale. This affected the broadcasts of VOA, BBC, Deutsche Welle and other stations (Radio Liberty had remained jammed after 1973) in languages of the Soviet Union. It seemed to be aimed above all at preventing news about Solidarity from reaching the Soviet workers and peasants, and perhaps stimulating them to build on the fragile, pioneering efforts since 1977 of the Klebanov and "SMOT" groups of free trades unionists.

But it also struck hard at the major means of communication between all types of dissenting group and their fellow-citizens, namely the broadcasting from the West of dissident documents smuggled out of the USSR.

This was followed by a sharp reduction of two thirds in the number of phone circuits linked to the West, and an end to the recently introduced system of East-West direct dialling. Then came a tightening of restrictions on the mail service. Increasingly, letters to and from dissidents' families were confiscated en route, and a lengthening list of families were simply told, orally, that in future no parcels of any sort would be delivered to them from abroad. (When Western governments appealed through the World Postal Union for an end to such practices, the USSR refused to discuss the matter).[42]

Additional measures were aimed at preventing or "neutralizing" personal contacts between foreigners and dissidents or refuseniks inside the Soviet Union. Foreigners suspected of such contacts were increasingly denied visas to enter the country. Inside, foreign journalists, tourists, diplomats and academic exchange visitors were warned away from such contacts through police questioning and occasional detentions or expulsions.[43] Even a former president of Israel was not immune from such treatment. Symmetrically, dissidents were warned to avoid such contacts, and disobedient ones were subject to various forms of house arrest.

To discourage the giving of presents by foreigners to dissidents, a new provision was added in January 1984 to the Criminal Code. This punishes "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" with up to 15 years of imprisonment and exile, if it is conducted "with the use of money or material valuables received from foreign organizations or from persons acting in the interests of these organizations."[44]

To discourage still more than previously the passing abroad of information

not approved by the censorship, another new law was introduced in January 1984 which penalizes with up to eight years of imprisonment the publishing of material which, while not marked "secret", nonetheless constitutes a "work-related secret."[45]

Finally, in May 1984, a new decree was introduced forbidding Soviet citizens from - without special permission - having a foreigner spend a night in their home or giving him a ride in their car. The maximum penalty is a fine of 100 roubles.

Have the New Policies been Successful?

The radical post-1979 policies on dissent and emigration sketched out above constitute, in my view, a logical and consistent package. Their aim - part of a wider aim pursued through other policies as well - is to re-create as efficient a system as possible whereby the party-state can both fence off citizens from influences which encourage dissidence, and also effectively neutralize, if not destroy, any dissidents or would-be emigrants who nonetheless appear, and also prevent uncensored information from reaching the West. These goals clearly require an end to emigration as well as public dissent. The adoption of the policies at a time when the regime is (a) faced by growing internal and external problems, which (b) coincide with the worst succession crisis in its history, does not seem to me surprising. It is predictable behaviour for a Russian leadership in a Time of Troubles (or smutnoe vremya).

Clearly, in their own narrow (and in my view shortsighted) terms, the policies have chalked up considerable successes. But I will not repeat here the assessment I have made elsewhere of how and why some groups are surviving the KGB's assault well, and others badly, while yet other have at least temporarily succumbed,[47] because the assessment has not significantly changed.

It is worth adding here, however, a few comments on an unusual form of

dissent which has not been subject to much in the way of suppression. This is the rise since about 1980 of an uonofficial neo-Nazi movement, mostly in a dozen or so Russian cities, including Moscow and Leningrad, but also in Estonia and the Ukraine. The young people involved have formed their groups under the cover of sports clubs, and conducted a series of street demonstrations on successive anniversaries of Hitler's birth. Dressed in brown shirts, with swastikas on the arms, they have shouted the slogan "Heil Hitler!" The movement appears to be a spontaneous reaction to the surrounding political and economic corruption and social degeneration. But the authorities have treated it with kid gloves, detaining few demonstrators, and some political leaders may have tried to manipulate it to strengthen their case for harsh social discipline, especially during the 1982 power struggle in the Politbureau. In that year there was also a counter-demonstration in the form of a protest march through the middle of Moscow by 30 to 50 people, among them army reservists who had served in Afghanistan. Their slogan was "Down with the fascists! Long live military dictatorship!" All this has some relation to the exceptionally complex matter of Russian nationalist dissent, which has a wide political spectrum from Solzhenitsyn to neo-Nazism. Although official policy towards this dissent is a matter of considerable importance, there is not enough space to discuss it here, and also, more research is needed before a reliable picture can be obtained.

The Policy Process

Before concluding, a few general remarks about the policy process may be of interest. They will be brief, because I have not yet located any recent defector or emigrant with first-hand experience of the policy process in this area of policy, and have not yet taken my study of official Soviet publications far enough to see whether, just possibly, these can shed light on the matter.

Nonetheless, the defectors I have so far interviewed, including three ex-KGB officers who were concerned with KGB work abroad but had colleagues in the domestic branch, have presented a unanimous view on certain aspects of the policy process. They have all said that the KGB is a highly centralized organization which is wholly subordinate to the Party. It faithfully works to implement the Party's policy, and ordinary officers make no significiant input into that policy. Friends of one interviewee had expressed frustration to him over the soft-line dissent policy of the mid-1970's, but had not considered pressing for a change of policy. What KGB input there is into policy, comes from the highest level, where the leadership is almost wholly made up of drafted-in Party officials like Andropov and Chebrikov. Andropov remained aloof from all but his senior aides, and rarely appeared at KGB functions. As mentioned earlier, he preferred to present himself as a Party Politbureau member rather than KGB leader.

This held true, we may note, even when he presided over a rare meeting between high officials and a delegation of exiled Crimean Tatars from Central Asia, who were lobbying for the right to return to the Crimea. One of the Tatars present reported him as saying: "All of us are members of the government and deputies of the Supreme Soviet, and we are receiving you in this capacity as well as on the instructions of the Politbureau." He went on to say that the latter was divided on whether to grant the Tatars' request, though it was agreed on exculpating them from Stalin's false charges of mass treason. At tbe end, he promised to report back to the Politbureau (not to the government or the Supreme Soviet).[50] The outcome - the Tatars' exculpation but not their repatriation - suggests that the Politbureau remained divided on repatriation and therefore, without the necessary consensus[51], shelved the issue.

All the above confirms my generalized impressions from reading large quantities of material from dissent sources. This material, too, projects an image of the KGB as a reliable and disciplined instrument of the Party. It adheres closely to Party guidelines and before having anyone arrested, it takes care to obtain the Party's permission.[52]

In short, my research to date suggests that the Politbureau takes all the important decisions on dissent and emigration, often no doubt rubber-stamping draft decisions prepared by the Secretariat, and that, under Brezhnev at least, it had, despite his primacy, some definitely oligarchial characteristics. The words of praise bestowed on Menzhinsky in a book of memoirs do, I imagine, apply just as well to Andropov, who assumed his position forty years later: "Menzhinsky always put state and party interests above departmental ones."[53]

Conclusion

In conclusion, we may perhaps sum up by saying that the Politbureau has favoured a moderate policy on dissent and emigration in the years 1975-78 and a tough one in the years since 1979. Depending on the circumstances, each policy has looked attractive.

Moderation is indicated by (1) the regime's desire to project at home and abroad an image of a contented, harmonious society in which the KGB's domestic role is primarily that of the kindly if sometimes stern uncle; (2) the regime's desire not to damage unnecessarily the level of morale in politically and economically important sections of society, e.g., scientists and writers, and thus increase the number of such people who contemplate or carry out damaging acts like emigration or defection; (3) the regime's fears that in some situations (where dissent has a strong social base, e.g., Lithuania, Georgia, Estonia) excessive repression will lead to highly undersirable demonstrations,

riots or strikes, and, if maintained, will force dissent into the underground and then, as in the 19th century, towards terrorism (all these fears can already be shown by concrete examples to have some justification); (4) the regime's desire not seriously to jeopardize its access to important economic resources abroad, notably grain, advanced technology and credits; (5) its desire not to provoke unnecessary damage to its politically and economically important international prestige by being regularly pilloried in, e.g., UN bodies, scientific fora, the I.L.O., etc.; and ultimately (6) its natural self-interest in avoiding any risk of the KGB gaining some independence of action and thus perhaps escaping again, as under Stalin, from the party leadership's collective control, with potentially very serious consequences.

On the other hand, the need for tough controls is suggested by (1) the fear that dissent may, as in the 19th century, be the seed-bed for a future political opposition which could threaten the USSR's physical unity, and directly or indirectly challenge Party rule; (2) the belief that a liberal approach to scientists, writers, etc., will gradually undermine the regime's whole system of ideological control, and could also lead to the gravest single danger - chronic disunity within the political elite itself; (3) the view that relaxlng controls over workers, e.g., tolerating strikes or free trades unions, would lead to another serious political danger - the development of links (at present almost non-existent) between the working-class and educated dissenters, as well as to the serious economic consequences of labour indiscipline; (4) tbe fear that the sight of unpunished or lightly punished dissent being conducted by existing groups will encourage the population at large to start thinking that tbe regime has "lost its nerve", and will thus tend to aggravate social indiscipline generally; and (5) the belief that partially free emigration contributes to this indiscipline and also enables the West to discover

too much about Soviet society. All these fears, too, can be shown to have some degree of justification.

When the present Time of Troubles eventually ends, it will be surprising to me if the pendulum does not swing back again towards a moderate policy. But prediction, as I have discovered to my cost, is a dangerous game. So I shall end.

NOTES

1. The best and most comprehensive single volume on the post-Stalin history of dissent and emigration is Ludmila Alexeyeva, Istoriya inakomysliya v USSR: Noveishii period, Khronika Press, Benson, Vermont, 1984. This excellent book will be published in translation, in up-dated form, by Wesleyan University Press in 1985.
2. Published as Chapter 9 of T.H. Rigby, Archie Brown and Peter Reddaway, eds., Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR: Essays Dedicated to Leonard Schapiro, Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1983. Additional points are made in my article "Dissent in the Soviet Union", Problems of Communism, No. 6 (November-December), 1983.
3. Pravda, 24 May 1959
4. See many of the hundreds of reports on trials of dissenters included in the typescript journal A Chronicle of Current Events, which has appeared in Moscow since 1968. Issues 1 to 11 of the journal have been published in translation in P. Reddaway, Uncensored Russia: The Human Rights Movement in the Soviet Union, Cape, London, 1972; and issues 12 to 64, published by Amnesty International Publications, can be obtained through Routledge Journals (9 Park St., Boston, MA 02108). Nos. 28-64 have been published in the Russian original by Khronika Press, New York.
5. See Patrick O'Brien, "Constitutional Totalitarianism", Survey, No. 104, 1978.
6. Pravda, p.22, December, 1962.
7. Izvestia, 10 June 1975
8. Pravda, 22 March 1977.
9. For a small sampling see the items listed in note 3 to the chapter referred to above (note 2).

10. N. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Chalidze Publications, New York, 1979, p.274-6.

11. See detailed discussion of this point in my article referred to in note 2 above.

12. See the painstakingly argued demonstration of this in William Korey, "Jackson-Vanik and Soviet Jewry," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1984, pp. 116-128.

13. On this see Rigby et al., op. cit., pp. 160-1.

14. No. 44 (1973), p. 185 (See note 4 above). All Chronicle references, here and below, are to the English translation.

15. For more detail see my chapter in A.H. Brown and M. Kaser, eds., The Soviet Union since the Fall of Khrushchev, London, 1978, pp. 133-5, 148-50, and also Rigby et al., op. cit. pp. 173-4.

16. But note that 1975 also had 82 arrests. See table 36.

17. The first batch consisted of the Jews Butman, Altman, Penson, Khnokh and V. Zalmanson, and the second of their fellow-Jews Dymshits and Kuznetsov, and also the Baptist Vins, the Ukrainian nationalist Moroz, and the human rights activist and Helsinki monitor Ginzburg. See USSR News Brief: Human Rights, 1979, No. 8, items 3 and 4. This uniquely valuable fortnightly publication, which appeared until 1984 in Brussells, can now be obtained from Schellingstr. 48, 8 Munich 40, Germany.

18. See the section "1 November" in A Chronicle of Current Events No. 54 (1979).

19. See ibid. Nos. 55 (1980), p. 42, and No. 63 (1981), item on M. Mikhlik.

20. See Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1978, No. 28.

21. Pravda, 31 August 1979.

22. Pravda, 27 May 1981.

23. Sobranie postanovlenii Pravitelstva SSSR, 1978, No. 22 (15 September)

24. See text in Pravda, 11 September 1979.

25. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 17 April 1983.

26. Kommunist, 1980, No. 17 (November)

27. This occurred not later than February 1983. See Sotsialisticheskaya Zakonnost, 1983, No. 4, p. 73.

28. Kommunist, 1981, No. 13, pp. 10-11.

29. For extensive materials on all the developments listed in this paragraph see the Chronicle of Current Events Nos. 35 (1974) to 54 (1979).

30. The books by S. Bloch and myself, Psychiatric Terror, Basic Books, New York, 1977, and its sequel Soviet Psychiatric Abuse: The Shadow over World Psychiatry, Gollancz, Londoo, 1984, constitute one of the few case studies yet made of the prolonged interaction of Soviet dissenters, Western supporters and Soviet regime on a dissent issue.

31. Arkhiv samizdata, Munich, Radio Liberty, document 4532. This is an unofficial, samizdat report.

32. A Chronicle of Current Events, No. 60 (1980), p. 77.

33. The article appears in full in Kommunist, 1981, No. 14 (September), pp. 88-99 (this quotation on p. 98) and in translated extracts in A Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR, New York, No. 44, Oct. - Dec. 1981, pp. 30-34. Another authoritative but somewhat earlier assessment can be found in K.U. Chernenko, The CPSU and Human Rights, Progress Publishinghouse, Moscow, 1981.

34. A Chronicle of Current Events No. 63 (1981) p. 58.

35. Ibid p. 74.

36. USSR News Brief: Human Rights, 1982, No. 22 (November), item 20.

37. U.S. Department of State, New Soviet Legislation Restricts Rights, Strengthens Internal Security (Foreign Affairs Note), July 1984. p. 3.

38. See P. Reddaway's article in The Washington Post, 21 November 1983, which

discusses the cases of A. Koryagin, A. Smirnov, and S. Khodorovich.

39. On the death in a car "accident" of Father B. Laurinavicius, a member of the Lithuanian Helsinki group, and of Dr. Juri Kukk, a leading Estonian dissident, in a camp, see A Chronicle of Current Events Nos. 63 (1981) and 62 (1981) respectively.

40. Almost the only exception has been the families of "the Siberian Seven", Pentecostalists who refused to leave the US Moscow embassy from 1978 until the authorities allowed them to emigrate in June 1983 in a move designed to improve the atmosphere at the INF talks in Geneva.

41. Alexeyeva, op. cit. (note 1), p. 199.

42. The Times, London, 27 July 1984. For background and details of a U.S. Congress House of Representatives hearing on this subject on 19 October 1983, see article 388/83 by Julia Wishnevsky in Radio Liberty's Research Bulletin, Munich (October 1983).

43. For recent examples of expulsions see The New York Times, 5 November 1983 and 23 February 1984.

44. US Department of State, op. cit., p. 2.

45. Ibid., loc. cit.

46. Ibid., loc. cit.

47. See the article referred to in note 2, pp. 10-15.

48. See USSR News Brief: Human Rights, Nos. 8 (item 23), 18 (item 3), and 19 (item 39), 1982, and No. 4 (item 44), 1984. See also the perceptive analysis of these trends by an anonymous Moscow observer in Strana i mir (Schellingstr. 48, 8 Munich 40), 1984, No. 1.

49. USSR News Brief: Human Rights, No. 22 (item 33), 1982.

50. Jonathan Steele and Eric Abraham, Andropov in Power, Robertson, Oxford, 1983, pp. 100-101.

51. On Brezhnev's concern for consensus see Archie Brown's chapter in T.H. Rigby et al., op. cit., pp. 147-8.

52. See, for example, P. Kampov's interesting report in A Chronicle of Current Events, No. 63 (1981), p. 67.

53. Rasskazy o Menzhinskom (no editor), Moscow, 1969, p. 136.

Appendix

For most of the hard work in collecting the data used in this appendix, placing them on some 4,000 index cards, and processing them, I am indebted to my industrious research assistant Ellen Gordon. Still more research will doubtless turn up documentation on further arrests not included here, but I feel fairly confident that the figures presented here represent over 95% of what can be found in currently available sources.
Some comments on the graphs and tables (additional to the comments on pp. 7-8) will be helpful.

(1) The Criterion for assigning each arrest to a particular category has been: what is known or believed to have been the main motivation of the authorities in making the arrest, e.g. to harass a religious group, or an emigration movement, or a group with socio-political concerns, etc. When a dissident has been active in two categories of dissent at once, and the authorities have apparently wanted to strike at both categories by arresting him or her, then I have assigned "half an arrest" to each category. Having said all this, it should be stressed that assigning arrests to categories is often difficult and somewhat arbitrary. Specially notable problems arise in cases like the members of the Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Georgian and Armenian "Helsinki monitoring groups." Most of them can be labelled in some degree nationalist (in the western, not Soviet sense of the word), but most of them have also had the broad human rights concerns which would suggest their assignment to the category "socio-political dissent". As, however, these groups in some sense acted as spokesmen for their nations, and were seen by the KGB as such, I have tended to label them simply as nationalists.

(2) The Category "Socio-political dissent" is very broad, and could be broken down into many sub-categories - political, humanitarian, trades unionist, feminist, rights of the disabled, etc. But many tough problems regarding correct assignments would then arise.

(3) The Categories "Illegal exit" and "Emigration": people in the latter category have merely asked, or peacefully campaigned, to emigrate; people in the former have either tried to leave the USSR illegally, or have returned to the USSR (voluntarily or iovoluntarily) after leaving illegally. The category "Illegal exit" is, we should note, an "odd-one-out" among all the categories, in that the changing rate of arrest does not, here, reflect (in any large degree) changes in official policy, but rather the changing level among the population of the aspirations just mentioned. Very rarely, changes in official policy may have been reflected to some degree, as for example when Soviet border controls were tightened with much fanfare in 1983.

(4) When the date of arrest could not be pin-pointed more closely than by the year of its occurrence, that one arrest has been divided up equally between the sub-divisions of that year which have been used in each particular table and graph. Hence the appearance of fractions in the tables.

TABLE 1

Emigration: Total

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	3
B	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	4	6.5
C	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	.5	11	4	4
D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	.5	7	4.5	3.5

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
A	2.5	5	3	0	3	2	4	7	5	5	3	3
B	1	3	4	2	1	3	1	5.5	6.5	6	3	4
C	5	2	2	2	0	3	3	7.5	7	2.5	3	
D	6	3	1	1.5	2	1	7	2.5	6.5	8.5	4	

A=Jan.-March; B=April-June; C=July-Sept.; D=Oct.-Dec.

TABLE 2

Emigration: Jewish*

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	2	6.5
C	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	11	3	3
D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	7	4.5	2.5

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
A	2.5	1	2	0	2	1	4	4	2	0	2	1
B	1	1	4	0	0	2	1	2.5	4	1	1	2
C	0	0	2	1	0	1	1	4	4	.5	2	
D	2	1	0	0	2	0	4	1	1	1	4	

A=Jan. - March; B=April - June; C=July - Sept.; D=Oct. - Dec.

*This category includes some individuals whose motivation has been at least partly religious, but as in most cases it is impossible to separate this motivation from the desire to emigrate, no attempt at separation has been made.

TABLE 3

Emigration: German

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
A	1	0	0	6	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	5
B	0	0	6	1	0	1	0	0	2	3	6	5

	1983	1984
A	3	2
B	0	0

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 4

Emigration: Armenian

	1972	1973	1974
A	0	0	0
B	2	0	1

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 5

Emigration: Others

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
A	1	0	0	0	0	0	.25	0	0	0	0	5
B	1	0	0	0	0	0	.25	0	1	1	0	1

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
A	1	.5	1	1	0	2	2.25	.25	6	3.5	5	1
B	0	3.5	2	1	1.5	0	3.75	3.25	2	2.5	4.5	1

	1984
A	2

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 7

Cultural:

	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
A	.5	.25	0	.5	0	.25	.5	1.5	0	1	2	.5
B	0	.25	0	0	1.5	.75	.5	0	2	0	0	1.5

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
A	1.5	.75	1.5	2	.5	0	0	0	.5	.5	1	.5
B	.5	.25	1	1	2	1.5	.5	0	0	.5	0	1.5

	1981	1982	1983
A	.5	1	1
B	1.5	2	

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 8

Religion: Total

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
A	0	10.4	10	7	9.8	.2	4.3	16.3	10.1	8.7	6.2	12.3
B	0	13.4	10	11	5.8	.2	14.3	11.3	15.1	17.7	12.2	5.3
C	0	10.4	10	9	5.8	.2	68.3	14.3	6.1	9.7	1.2	12.3
D	2	8.4	13	12	5.8	1.2	31.3	14.3	12.1	8.7	16.2	9.3
E	2	15.4	11	11	8.8	1.2	57.3	6.3	20.1	13.7	11.2	8.3
F	0	7.4	12	11	7.8	2.2	18.3	2.3	23.1	13.7	7.2	10.3
	4	65.4	66	61	43.8	5.2	193.8	64.8	86.6	72.2	54.2	57.8

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
A	9.7	21.5	8.2	2.2	1.5	2.7	1	9	20	18.9	32.3	11
B	5.7	22.5	5.2	1.2	3.5	6.7	11	8	9	24.9	38.3	15
C	20.7	10.5	10.2	3.2	1.5	3.7	7	11	28	15.9	5.3	16
D	18.7	6.5	8.2	2.2	7.5	2.7	10	10	33	15.9	21.3	24
E	8.7	10.5	11.2	.2	3.5	1.7	10	5	11	9.9	11.3	14
F	15.7	2.5	1.2	1.2	1.5	12.2	5	4	12	18.9	11.3	.3
	79.2	74.0	44.2	10.2	19.0	29.7	44	47	113	104.4	119.8	80.3

	1984
A	11
B	11
C	1
	23

A=Jan.-Feb.; B=March-April; C=May-June; D=July-Aug.; E=Sept.-Oct.; F=Nov.-Dec.

TABLE 9 Religion: Baptists

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
A	6.4	9.5	7	5.8	.2	3.3	16.3	10.1	7.7	6.2	12.3	8.2
B	6.4	9.5	11	5.8	.2	14.3	10.3	15.1	15.7	10.2	5.3	4.2
C	6.4	9.5	9	5.8	.2	68.3	14.3	6.1	8.7	.2	12.3	16.2
D	6.4	9.5	11	5.8	1.2	30.3	14.3	12.1	7.7	16.2	9.3	8.2
E	8.4	8.5	11	7.8	1.2	58.3	6.3	20.1	12.7	11.2	8.3	6.2
F	6.4	11.5	9	5.8	2.2	18.3	2.3	23.1	12.7	7.2	10.3	14.2

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
A	15.5	4.2	1.2	1	2.7	1	2	13	7.2	31.3	8	7
B	20.5	4.2	1.2	1	5.7	1	3	5	14.2	28.3	9	10
C	8.5	5.2	2.2	0	2.7	2	2	23	9.2	3.3	15	1
D	3.5	5.2	2.2	6	1.7	5	6	14	11.2	12.3	13	
E	10.5	8.2	.2	1	.7	5	4	6	6.2	8.3	11	
F	1.5	.2	1.2	1	11.7	1	3	6	17.2	7.3	7	

A=Jan.-Feb.; B=March-April; C=May-June; D=July-Aug.; E=Sept.-Oct.; F=Nov.-Dec.

TABLE 10

Religion: Russian Orthodox

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
A	8	1	0	4	0	1	1	0	1	2	1	1
B	10	6	3	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	.5	9

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
A	1.5	1	0	0	0	1.5	4.5	5	2	6	2	2
B	.5	0	0	2	1	1.5	4	0	0	1	0	

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 11

Religion: Pentecostalist

	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
A	0	0	0	5.5	1	0	0	.5	0	0	0	2
B	1	0	2	.5	0	0	0	.5	0	0	0	0

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
A	0	0	.5	5	1	1	0	0	2	1	0	10
B	0	0	.5	2	2	1	0	2	0	4	4	7

	1982	1983	1984
A	2	4	1
B	4	15	

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 12

Religion: Uniate

	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
A	1.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5
B	.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
A	1	0	0	0	1	3.5	1	1.5	0	0	0	0
B	0	0	0	0	0	2.5	0	1.5	0	0	0	1

	1981	1982
A	2	0
B	0	1

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 13

Religion: Jehova's Witness

	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
A	.5	1	0	.5	.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5
B	.5	0	0	.5	.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
A	.5	.5	9	0	2	0	1	0	1.5	3	2	1.5
B	.5	.5	9	1	0	1	0	0	3.5	0	1	.5

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 14

Religion: 7 Day Adventists

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
A	0	0	0	0	6	1	5	8	0	.25	1
B	0	0	0	0	6	12	2	5	0	.25	
C	2	0	0	2	5	3	19	2	0	.25	
D	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	4	0	1.25	

A=Jan.-March; B=April-June; C=July-Sept.; D=Oct.-Dec.

TABLE 16

Religion: Penitents

	1980	1981	1982
A	1	0	.5
B	0	0	.5

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 17

Religion: Catholic (excluding Lithuanians, Uniates)

	1980	1981	1982	1983
A	0	0	0	0
B	1	0	0	1

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 18

Religion: Muslim (includes nationalists)

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
A	.5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5	1	0	0
B	.5	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	.5	1	0	0

	1980	1981	1982
A	0	0	1.5
B	0	0	5.5

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 20

Religion: Hare Krishna

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
A	0	0	0	0	0	.5	2	2
B	0	0	0	0	0	.5	3	6

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 21

Religion: Truly Orthodox Church

	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
A	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	.5	0
B	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5	0

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
A	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	.5	0	0	0	1
B	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 22

Religion: Jewish

1961
1

Religion: Lutheran

1980
1

Religion: Methodist

	1980	1981
A	1	0
B	1	1

Religion: Buddhist

	1972
A	3
B	2

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 23

Religion: Others

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
A	2	0	.5	0	0	.5	0	0	0	0	1.5	0
B	.5	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	.5	1	0	0

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
A	0	0	1	1.5	0	1.5
B	1	1	.5	.5	1	

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 24

Nationalist: Total

	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
A	1	0	0	1	3.5	4.5	0	0	0	1	17	4.5
B	0	0	1	1	2	9.5	0	1	0	2	14	16
C	0	0	0	1	3	4.5	1	0	0	1	4	7
D	0	1	0	1	19	3.5	0	0	18	2	8	11
E	0	0	0	1	0	3.5	0	0	7	22	10	12
F	2	7	0	1	0	3.5	0	0	0	0	2	4
	3	8	1	6	27.5	29.0	1	1	25	28	55	54.5

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
A	2	2	1	16	5	8.5	2.5	2	4	3	7	13.5
B	3	5	5	6	13	3	5	1	4.5	1	6	17
C	4	8.5	3	14	3.5	8	3	7	0	2	3	15.5
D	2	3	4	5.5	3	1	2	3	1	0	4	3.5
E	4	0	2	4	2	4	0	1.5	2	2	7	11.5
F	10	2	3	2	15	4	1.5	4	10.5	1	7	6.5
	25	20.5	18	47.5	41.5	28.5	14.0	18.5	22.0	9	34	67.5

	1981	1982	1983	1984
A	10	1	6	2
B	6	3	5	
C	8	4	2	
D	1.5	3	9.5	
E	6	4	6	
F	0	3	1	
	31.5	18	29.5	2

A=Jan.-Feb.; B=March-April; C=May-June; D=July-Aug.; E=Sept.-Oct.; F=Nov.-Dec.

TABLE 25

Nationalist: Armenian

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
A	1.5	0	0	0	.5	4.5	1	3	0	2.5	9	0
B	1.5	0	0	0	7.5	1.5	0	0	0	5.5	1	0

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
A	0	0	0	0	8	4	1
B	0	5	1	1	1	0	2.5

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 26

Nationalist: Georgian

	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5
B	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	2	0	1.5	0
B	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	.5	0	0	2.5	

	1982	1983	1984
A	0	1	1
B	0	9.5	0

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 27

Nationalist: Estonian

	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
A	.5	0	0	0	0	0	.5	0	0	0	0	0
B	.5	0	1	0	0	0	.5	0	0	0	0	0

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
A	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1.5	0	0	0	1.5
B	0	6	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	3.5

	1980	1981	1982	1983
A	6.5	10	5	3
B	7	5	2	3

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 28

Nationalist: Latvian

	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
A	.5	0	.5	1.5	8	.5	1	0	0	0	0	1
B	.5	0	.5	1.5	1	.5	1	0	0	0	0	3

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2.5
B	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	2	3.5

	1982	1983
A	0	4
B	2	2

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 29

Nationalist: Lithuanian

	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
A	1	1.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	0	.5	0	0
B	2	1.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	0	.5	0	0

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
A	1	2	0	11	8	3	2.25	2.5	2	1	1	16
B	1	1.5	3	2	8	3	.25	6.5	3	0	3	2

	1981	1982	1983	1984
A	4	1	3	1
B	1	2	0	

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

*Although this category includes many individuals whose motivation has been partly or wholly either religious (i.e. Catholic) or nationalist, in most cases it is impossible to separate the two motivations in any definite way. Therefore the category has not been divided into two groups.

TABLE 30

Nationalist: Meshketians

	1970	1971
A	0	0
B	2	2

Nationalist: Moldavian

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
A	1	0	0	0	0	.5	0	0	1
B	0	0	0	1	0	.5	0	0	3

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 31

Nationalist: Russian

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
A	17	4	0	1	0	0	0	.5	3	0	0	0
B	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1.5	0	0	0

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
A	0	1	0	1	1
B	0	0	.5	0	0

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 32

Nationalist: Crimean Tatar

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
A	2	1	0	0	0	2	7	18.5	3	5	2.25	4.5
B	0	0	1	0	4	23	13	15.5	4	0	.25	3.5

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
A	1	7.5	2	8	0	4	9	0	0	0	1
B	6	2.5	0	13	0	0	1	2	0	2	1

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 33

Nationalist: Ukrainian

	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
A	.5	.5	1.5	2.5	2	1	4	9	11	1.5	.5	1.5
B	.5	.5	2.5	2.5	10	0	4	19.5	11	.5	1.5	22.5

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
A	2	11.5	6	2.5	9.5	4	23	14.75	5	.5	.5	5
B	1	3.5	4.5	3.5	4.5	4	8.5	5.25	2	1.5	2.5	3

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
A	.5	5	14.5	4.5	0	0
B	.5	10	6	5.5	4	1

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 34

Illegal Exit

	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
A	.5	2	1	1	.25	1.75	.5	4.75	0	1	1.5	4.5
B	.5	1	2	2	.25	4.75	.5	3.75	0	1	1.5	4.5

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
A	3	2.75	6.5	6.5	5	2	3.75	1.25	3	3.5	0	.75
B	2	5.75	4.5	6.5	8	3	4.75	5.25	2	3	1	2.75

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
A	7	2	.5	1	0	3
B	3	3.5	5	14.5	0	

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

TABLE 35

Socio-Political Dissent

	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
A	.5	.5	2.7	1	2.7	1.4	1	1.7	1	2	0	2
B	.5	.5	3.2	1	.7	1.4	.5	1.7	2	0	0	3
C	.5	.5	2.7	2	.7	1.4	.5	1.7	2	7	8	1
D	.5	.5	11.7	1	.7	2.4	1	3.2	2	0	3	2
E	.5	2.5	2.7	7	1.7	1.4	4	2.7	3	1	1	2
F	.5	5.5	3.7	3	.7	1.4	.5	1.7	2	0	5	1

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
A	10	3.5	9.5	8.3	6.3	10.5	10.5	3.8	6	4	2.5	4
B	3	3	10.5	8.8	22.3	6	6	4.3	6.5	6	4.5	2
C	2	3	21	13.3	5.3	7.5	5.5	5.3	4.5	5	4	5.5
D	3	15.5	25.5	8.8	7.3	5.5	4.5	4.3	4.5	6	2	2
E	1	5	9	7.8	6.8	7.5	5	2.3	2.5	10	4	8
F	1	4	18.5	3.8	6.3	7	7	6.8	5.5	11.5	5	6

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
A	5.4	10	9	8.5	9	3
B	6.9	11	9	16	7.5	2
C	1.4	12	4	12.5	6	2
D	7.4	9.5	5.5	7	6	1
E	7.4	3.5	4.5	5.5	1	0
F	9.9	11	4.5	13.5	3	0

A=Jan.-Feb.; B=March-April; C=May-June; D=July-Aug.; E=Sept.-Oct.; F=Nov.-Dec.

TABLE 36

All Dissidents

	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
A	2	3.5	11.1	5.25	5.85	9.45	46.2	59.1	33.5	34.9	10.1	102.4
B	2	9.5	22.1	21.25	3.85	16.95	57.27	59.1	41.5	25.4	42.1	140.4

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
A	97.9	72.05	94.1	90.25	89.8	109.6	107.3	66.25	55.1
B	61.5	117.55	104.1	85.25	75.3	86.1	74.65	55.35	26.1

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
A	37.5	37.1	42.75	70.7	141	118.2	133.9	84.5	42
B	55.5	44.1	51.25	74.7	116.5	86.7	107.4	81.8	1

A=Jan.-June; B=July-Dec.

CHART No. 1

All Dissidents & Refuseniks



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
Socio-Political Dissent
(861 arrests)
NUMBER OF ARRESTS
27
24
21
18
15
12
9
6
3
0
'57 '58 '59 '60 '61 '62 '63 '64 '65 '66 '67 '68 '69 '70 '71 '72 '73 '74 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84
YEAR

ALL RELIGIONS CHART No.3

(1664 arrests)




NATIONALIST: UKRAINIAN
(291 arrests)
Number of Arrests
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
'54
'56
'58
'60
'62
'64
'66
'68
'70
'72
'74
'76
'78
'80
'82
'84
YEAR

CHART No. 5


NUMBER OF ARRESTS
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Emigration — Jewish
(137 arrests)
'60 '61 '62 '63 '64 '65 '66 '67 '68 '69 '70 '71 '72 '73 '74 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84
YEAR


NUMBER OF ARRESTS
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Emigration — Total
(238 arrests)
'60 '61 '62 '63 '64 '65 '66 '67 '68 '69 '70 '71 '72 '73 '74 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84
YEAR