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DIVERSITY IN UNITY: EUROCOMMUNISM AND THE SOVIET UNION

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"Moscow. . . was for a long time a kind of Rome for us. We spoke of the Great October Socialist Revolution as if it were our Christmas. This was the period of our infancy. Today we have grown up. . . [we have come] out of the catacombs."

Santiago Carrillo, Secretary  
General of the Spanish Communist  
Party (1)

Communism in Europe is emerging in a new, historically unknown form. According to its spokesmen, it is truly democratic: It stands for liberty; freedom of choice; pluralism; human rights and civil liberties; religious freedom; peaceful change; non-ideological nature of the state; secret, direct, and proportional ballot; independent trade unions; freedom for scientific research and cultural and artistic endeavor; and open dialogue and cooperation with others, even those of "different political and ideological persuasion," including "those of Christian inspiration." It supports the Common Market and even NATO in Europe and welcomes cooperation with the United States. It challenges Soviet authority and control, "proletarian internationalism," the Soviet model of socialism, any form of dictatorship including the dictatorship of the proletariat, international coercion, ideological orthodoxy and dogma, and the status quo. Instead, it argues for equality, independence, sovereignty, non-intervention, national identity, peaceful change, and free consensus of and for all communist parties.

What kind of communism is this? Is what we see what we get? Concerned outsiders, including the United States and the USSR, are deeply worried because, frankly, they understand neither the meaning nor the import of this change. Their own as well as their allies' interests seem to be profoundly threatened. What is to be done?

In this paper I will examine this new communist trend in Western Europe. First, I will discuss the two events which for the first time openly revealed the current breadth and depth of this development, namely the Twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Conference of the European Communist Parties, both of which took place in the first half of 1976. Then I will take a closer look at the Communist parties which, singly and jointly, have played the most prominent innovative roles. Next, I will focus on the major conflictual issues in the dispute, i.e. the Soviet international communist strategy or "proletarian internationalism" and the Soviet model of building socialism. Finally, I will attempt to evaluate the impact of this development on the Soviet Union.

The Twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of February, 1976, marked the first formal public display of the scope, intensity and rate of the differences and disagreements between Moscow and the West European CPS, principally the Italian and the French-- currently the most influential non-ruling parties-- but also the Spanish, British, Swedish, Belgian and other parties, as well as Yugoslavia and Romania. (The Japanese Communist Party declined the Soviet invitation and did not send a delegation to the Congress.)

The Congress itself was an uninspired, routine, predictable affair. True, Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania and Stane Dolanc of Yugoslavia (President Tito decided not to attend) did both repudiate Soviet superordination in the communist movement and put emphasis on the equality of all parties: Ceausescu called for "the right of every party independently to elaborate its own political life and revolutionary strategy and tactics," while Dolanc stressed "the principles of equality, independence, and

responsibility of each party toward its own working class and people." These appeals were annoying to the Soviet host; but the themes were familiar and only the place and time made them conspicuous. <sup>2</sup>

The Congressional atmosphere changed, however, with the speeches of the West European Communist leaders. For the first time in history, a Soviet Party Congress became an open stage for the public revelation of the deep--and growing--dissension in the ranks. The five thousand Soviet delegates had never heard anything like it before. Here, the Western communist leaders demanded not only "independence," "sovereignty," and "equality and respect for the autonomy of all parties," but also proclaimed their full support for individual and collective freedoms, religious freedom, cultural freedom, pluralistic democracy, national (rather than Soviet or international) socialism, free trade unions, and freedom for research and artistic and scientific activities. Enrico Berlinguer, the leader of the Italian Communist Party; Gaston Plissonier, the third-ranking member of the French Communist Party (Georges Marchais, the Secretary General, like Tito, decided not to come to the Congress); Gordon McLennan, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain; Hans Werner, the leader of the Swedish Communist Party; and even Franz Mahri of the Austrian Communist Party-- they all went to the podium to profess, to subscribe to, to emphasize, and to demand principles, policies and strategies never professed, subscribed to, emphasized or demanded there before. It must have sounded like a conspiracy against the CPSU.

After the Congress, Brezhnev and Berlinguer issued a joint statement pledging "respect for independence" of each other's Party. <sup>3</sup> But two weeks later Mikhail Suslov, the Politburo member charged with the international communist movement, in a major address to the Soviet Academy of Sciences

branded as "enemies of Marxism" those who interpret communist ideology in their own fashion: "They slander real socialism, try to wash out the revolutionary essence of Marxist-Leninist teaching, and substitute bourgeois liberalism for Marxism." <sup>4</sup>

The much-postponed Conference of the European Communist Parties (of the thirty-one European CP's, only the "isolationist" Icelandic and the "intransigent" Albanian CP's, <sup>abstained</sup>) which took place in June, 1976, in East Berlin, was more than just a ratification of the communist parties' dissent expressed at the Congress. Both in form and in content, the Conference proved to be a learning experience for both sides. At the Congress, the West European CP leaders announced publicly their individual differences but did not discuss them. At the Conference, on the other hand, the differences were discussed-- in fact, they were discussed and argued for almost two years in the many meetings preparatory to the Conference. In addition, differences at the Conference were broader and deeper than at the Congress; here they became the focal point ultimately causing the Conference to be postponed for more than a year. The CP leaders talked to each other as well as to the Soviet and East European communists for an extended period of time and about previously unspeakable matters.

The final document of the Conference--a document which, for the first time in history,<sup>5</sup> was arrived at by free consensus of all participants after an extensive free exchange of views, was not critical of any party, was not binding on any of them (the delegates did not even sign the document) <sup>6</sup> -- was unlike any other document of its kind: "Proletarian internationalism" and "single communist strategy" were dropped and replaced by "voluntary cooperation and solidarity" based on both "principles of equality and sovereign independence of each party, non-interference in

internal affairs [as well as] respect for [the parties'] free choice of different roads in the struggle for social change of a progressive nature and for socialism." Peace, democracy and humanism were singled out as the major goals, and cooperation and understanding among all peoples as the means. "A prerequisite and indispensable condition for this is respect for the right of the people of each country to choose and develop its political, economic, social and legal system independently and without outside interference, and to protect and multiply its historical and cultural heritage." Criticism of communist parties' activities and disagreement with their policies should no longer be interpreted simply as "anti-communism." Communist parties' "dialogue and collaboration with democratic forces" should be encouraged. Non-aligned countries should be viewed as "one of the most important factors in world politics." And common strategy was formally rejected when the Soviet proposal that the European parties "function as vanguard forces, pursue identical objectives, and be guided by a common ideology" was dropped from the text. <sup>7</sup>

This, then, was the Conference which, according to President Tito, "must have no past and no future." Or, as Enrico Berlinguer put it, "An international communist body does not, and cannot, exist in any form". <sup>8</sup> The Italian, Spanish, British, Swedish, Dutch, French (and San Marino) communist parties and Yugoslavia and Romania became in East Berlin a successful pressure group and ultimately a winning coalition.

The differences revealed at the Congress and discussed prior to and at the Conference were important not only because they were stated and maintained in open confrontation, face to face. They were also important because they concerned fundamentals-- Soviet moral and political leadership; the legitimacy of Soviet authority and the propriety of its inter-



national direction; and the adequacy of the Soviet model for building socialism. The group of dissident upstarts questioned and challenged all of these-- proletarian internationalism as a strategy and direction of the communist movement, as well as the utility of the Soviet socialist model for others.

### Who Are the Eurocommunists?<sup>9</sup>

The Eurocommunists are an amorphous group in statu nascendi.

While some communist parties in the group appear committed (like the Italian, Spanish, French, and probably the British CPS,) others oscillate from issue to issue (like the Swedish and Belgian CPS), and still others procrastinate (like the Dutch, Austrian and Finnish CPS.) The last two probably do not even belong; and the Spanish CP is an illegal party. The Yugoslavs and the Romanians are highly supportive but they are both ruling parties; neither is dedicated to the democratic parliamentary road to power as yet. And the Japanese Communist Party would qualify if it were not in Asia.<sup>10</sup>

The Italian Communist Party-- because of its history, its size, its electoral gains, its international concerns and its leadership-- is the leading parliamentary CP and the most influential non-ruling CP. In spite of its sustained opposition to the CPSU-- to its international strategy, its model of building socialism, its repressive domestic politics, its policy toward China, its invasion of Czechoslovakia, its censorship, etc.-- the PCI would like to be known best for its cooperative, conciliatory attitudes and activities, and its hopeful role of a broker and mediator in conflicts, not only at home but vis-a-vis the USSR as well.

The French Communist Party, the second largest non-ruling party, had been traditionally loyal to Moscow. It came, therefore, as a surprise when shortly before and at the PCF Twenty-second Congress in

February, 1976, the Party leaders not only sharply criticized Soviet violations of human rights and Soviet "democracy" in general, but formally rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat doctrine as well. According to Jean Kanapa, member of the PCI Politbureau, "Reflections on Stalinism, and then the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, led the French Communists to develop further the specific national aspects of their policy and thus to define an original perspective." <sup>11</sup> Georges Marchais, the leading advocate of electoral alliance with the Socialist Party, thereupon refused to attend the Twenty-fifth Congress of the CPSU because of the "deep differences" between the two parties.

The Spanish Communist Party has been the most consistent and vocal CP in its opposition to the CPSU. Now considered to be the third largest CP in Western Europe, the PCE was the first illegal party to defy Moscow. It criticized Khrushchev's dismissal in 1964, castigated the USSR for its invasion of Czechoslovakia, berated the CPSU at the 1969 Moscow meeting, and refused Soviet material assistance. It has collaborated closely with non-communist forces.

The British Communist Party condemned the Soviet invasion and the subsequent "normalization" process in Czechoslovakia, proclaimed its support for civil liberties and political pluralism at the 25th CPSU Congress, and collaborated closely with other oppositionist CPS at the European Conference.

The Swedish Communist Party has often played its parliamentary representation into a pivotal vote. It stands for autonomy of all parties

and for parliamentary democracy. In fact, the SKP was the first CP to assert, in 1965, that it could be voted out of power just like any other political party.<sup>12</sup> At the European Conference, the SKP worked prominently with the opposition group.

Although traditionally a pro-Soviet party, the Austrian Communist Party opposed the occupation of Czechoslovakia and, on occasion, has stood for development of "socialism within democracy."

Since 1965, the leaders of the Finnish Communist Party's moderate wing spoke openly of their party's peaceful way to power, civil liberties, and adherence to party plurality. Finland's second-largest political party (now in government), the Finnish CP is still viewed as pro-Soviet.

The Dutch Communist Party introduced its autonomous, independent line in the "new orientation" program in 1964. In it, it proclaimed its primary concern with national electoral politics over the international movement, and its wish for collaboration with socialists, for pluralism, and for the electoral road to power. In 1975 the CPN sought to normalize its relations with the CPSU, but its priorities have not changed.

The Belgian Communist Party has repeatedly advocated alliances and collaboration with non-communist political forces, especially the socialists. Although generally supporting Soviet views, the PCB has at times offered relatively strong criticism of the CPSU, such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Also, the PCB has tended to take a conciliatory attitude toward the Chinese.

Although not a WECP, the Japanese Communist Party should be at least mentioned here. The JCP declined an invitation to attend the

25th CPSU Congress in February, 1976. (It was also the first party to denounce--in January, 1974--the Soviet plan to hold a world communist conference.) It dropped from its platform both the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat and Marxism-Leninism, and introduced "scientific socialism" instead. The CPJ claims to stand for pluralistic, constitutional democracy, civil liberties, and strict independence in the international communist movement--especially from the CPSU but also from the Chinese Communist Party. This strategy brought the JCP success, both in party membership (some 350,000 members) as well as in votes (almost seven million votes and fifty-eight seats in both houses of the Diet in 1974. (In the December, 1976 elections, votes for the JCP remained approximately the same, but several of its seats were lost.) The CPJ condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as an outright aggression and criticized the Polish government's suppression of workers' demands in 1970. The Spanish, Italian, French, and other WECP delegations visit the CPJ often and sign joint communiques which emphasize the Parties' independence as well as their dedication to civil liberties, human dignity, religious freedom, pluralism, and democracy.

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As a consequence of Stalin's clumsiness in forcing the break on them, the Yugoslavs were the earliest dissenters from Soviet international strategy. They were alone. Not a single CP raised its voice in defense of Yugoslavia. There was no criticism, no protest against the Soviet treatment of Yugoslavia. In fact, many CPs denounced "the Yugoslav heresy" in the 1950's. The PCI was the first communist party to approve the Yugoslav defection. Since then, the two became close friends. Because of their commonality of attitudes and interests and because they

have tended to agree on most political and ideological issues affecting them, they have kept in close touch for almost twenty years, and the relationship has grown warmer over time. The Yugoslavs defend their independence and autonomy vigorously, of course; they have also on numerous occasions rejected the Soviet socialist model.<sup>14</sup>

Not so the Romanians. Although at times fiercely outspoken in their criticism of proletarian internationalism since 1964,<sup>15</sup> at other times their stand has been softer than that of the Yugoslavs. The Ceausescu regime is almost Stalinist at home. The occasional Romanian flexibility, cautiousness, and even equivocation suggest a degree of strain, frustration and pressure absent in the Yugoslav position.<sup>16</sup> While Romanian leaders maintain unstrained, warm relations with the Yugoslavs, the PCI and PCE representatives, and other in the Eurocommunist group, the Romanian press still occasionally uses the term "proletarian internationalism" as synonymous with international solidarity.

There are virtually no relations between Eurocommunists and the Chinese. This is no fault of the Eurocommunists; they would like to establish relations with the Chinese Communist Party and have been seeking ways toward a rapprochement, or at least a modus vivendi. The Italian, Spanish and French CPs have been in the forefront of these attempts, both singly and jointly, to no avail. The Chinese have rejected all advances--even the messages of condolence on Mao's death--from the "revisionist" WEC parties. Of the group, only the Romanian Communist Party is in good graces with China. There have been no attempts, as far as I know, to utilize the Romanian connection for Eurocommunist bridge-building with China.<sup>17</sup>

There is as yet no formal Eurocommunist alliance. There have been many sustained bilateral contacts, consultations, visits and communiques among them, but, with the exception of the European Conference, the individual CPs have acted by and large on their own. The European Conference brought the parties together for the first time as a group <sup>but still on an</sup> ad hoc basis. It is true that there have been many West European regional CP meetings in the last twenty years: in Rome in '59, Brussels '65, Vienna '66, Paris '70 and '71, London '71, and several meetings in '73 (Stockholm, Copenhagen, Paris, Rome, Dusseldorf) to prepare a meeting in Brussels in 1974. All West European CPs attended most of these meetings, even the independent Dutch; only the Turks were often absent and the Icelanders usually stayed away. But because most communist parties attended, including the pro-Soviet parties, these meetings did not advance Eurocommunism, at least not directly. Nevertheless, by then (1974) the international communist "unity [had] become as meaningless as it was in the pre-1914 Second International."<sup>18</sup>

The Eurocommunists have thus kept in close touch. In their opposition to the CPSU they have tended to share each other's views, emulate the more successful ones among them, especially the PCI, support each other, devote media coverage to each other's views, and consult on strategies.

The fortunes of the PCI, the original Eurocommunist trend-setter, were followed with intense interest by others critical of Soviet policies since the early 'sixties. The crucial jolt, however, was provided by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia: the Italian, French, Spanish, British, Austrian, Greek, Belgian, Dutch, Swedish, Yugoslav, Romanian and

other communists (including the Japanese and Australian CPs) openly criticized the invasion. This was the strongest censure of the CPSU up to that time. Afterwards, the Eurocommunists began to seek mutual contacts and support in their efforts to gain more independence from the CPSU. Increasingly, they began to use exclusive national strategies to reach national goals. And since cooperation with socialists and other non-communists required greater differentiation and distance from the CPSU, the Eurocommunist direction began to be set.

Soviet International Communist Strategy: Proletarian Internationalism

The communists have no theory linking the communist parties together. The closest they come to a theory is a mental construct called proletarian internationalism, a concept of considerable historical significance dating back to the Communist Manifesto and the programmatic postulate of Marx, "Workers of the world, unite," now almost 130 years old. Defined variously as an intermediary international unity of communist and progressive forces based on their common struggle against imperialism and for peace, proletarian internationalism has been historically juxtaposed as an antithesis to bourgeois, capitalist nationalism, eventually to culminate in a synthesis of the stateless communist world.<sup>19</sup>

In the process of its development and application, proletarian internationalism has acquired connotations and characteristics which are specifically Soviet. This is not surprising. The Soviet Union has been the original organizer of the communist movement. Its problem was--and has remained--how to construct and maintain a rational international organization which would produce a minimum of undesirable side effects but

bring a maximum satisfaction compatible with the aims of the organizer. In spite of the monumental Soviet effort which has gone into its organizational and strategic development, however, proletarian internationalism still remains little more than an assortment of stochastic, normative and hortatory postulates.

With the remarkable growth of the communist movement since the Bolshevik revolution; with the elevation of over a dozen communist parties into ruling parties; and with the impressive electoral successes of several other parties, it is no wonder that Soviet management, direction and control of the communist movement via proletarian internationalism could not keep pace. This simple strategic concept could not accommodate complex developmental relations among individuals--both party members and non-party progressives; among parties--large and small, developing and developed, revolutionary and reformist, conformist and neutral, dependent, semi-dependent, and independent; and among states (here proletarian internationalism is called socialist internationalism, but the difference is purely symbolic)--some friendly, some neutral, and some hostile. Coercion may have been successfully applied in specific historical periods or against small or weak parties and neighbors, but as an overall organizing device it became inadequate, useless, and even dangerous. Proletarian internationalism, now perceived by many within the movement as a mechanistic continuation of an established habit of Soviet strategic control over other parties, has been increasingly under severe attack.

Despite Soviet attempts under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, Yugoslavia, expelled in 1948, never came back to the fold. The final Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the shabby Soviet



treatment of its East European clients contributed to the sharp questioning of proletarian internationalism within the movement.

But there was more. The shock of de-Stalinization, a real blow to Soviet legitimacy in the eyes of many; the obvious and increasingly incongruous Soviet identification of proletarian internationalism with Soviet state interests, which the Yugoslavs criticized;<sup>21</sup> and the "forced exterior uniformity" that Palmiro Togliatti singled out in his political testament,<sup>22</sup> made, in the Chinese view, "a mess of the splendid Socialist camp."<sup>23</sup> Soviet "great-power chauvinism and national egoism" eroded the relations among ruling parties and spread among the non-ruling parties, adversely affected their allegiance and participation.

Insistence on national roads to socialism may not mean much. It depends on the context. "Full and effective autonomy" may mean "full and effective solidarity with the USSR." When Maurice Thorez said in 1946 that the French Communists should follow a road other than that of the Russian Bolsheviks,<sup>24</sup> for example, he did not say much. Or when a document printed in Moscow in 1945 emphasized a "German road to socialism;" or when the Swedish Communist Party began to discuss in 1946 a "Swedish road to socialism,"<sup>25</sup> no challenge to the CPSU was intended or implied. In fact, even the CPSU itself claims that it "invariably opposed the mechanical imposition of some parties' experience on others." True, "the Party believes that it would be a grave mistake to disregard and underestimate--citing national, particular features--the truly tremendous experience accumulated by the world revolutionary movement and the experience of real socialism." But "owing to specific historical conditions, the role of individual parties in the international communist movement and their

responsibility for it are not identical." Still, it must be admitted that in the past "the leading detachment of the international working class has been the Soviet working class and its vanguard--the CPSU." After all, it was the CPSU that has made "the really significant contribution" to "the change of the correlation of forces in the world arena in favor of socialism;" it was the CPSU that has borne the principal burden of "curbing the aggressive imperialist forces;" and it is the CPSU which has the power "to assist the international working class in its struggle against imperialism."<sup>26</sup>

Similarly, in his opening speech at the Conference of the European Communist Parties, Leonid Brezhnev, while speaking of proletarian internationalism, was subdued:

"sometimes one hears the question: Is proletarian internationalism as urgent as it once was or has it become obsolete? And some people are apprehensive: Do not calls for strengthening of the international bonds that unify Communists signify a desire to recreate some kind of organizational center?

These are strange apprehensions. As far as is known no one, nowhere, is proposing the idea of creating such a center. As far as proletarian internationalism is concerned, i.e., the solidarity of the working class and the communists of all countries in the struggle for common goals, their solidarity in the peoples' struggle for national liberation and social progress, and the voluntary cooperation of the fraternal parties while strictly observing the equality and independence of each of them-- we believe that this comradely solidarity, whose standard-bearer the Communists have been for more than 100 years, fully retains all its great importance in our time as well. It has been and remains a mighty and tested weapon of the Communist Parties and of the workers' movement in general."<sup>27</sup>

Proletarian internationalism was omitted from the Final Document of the Conference. This must have been a painful concession on the part of the CPSU delegation, but it was a price they had to pay if they wanted

to hold the Conference at all. After the Conference, the CBSU spokesman and writers returned to the theme. A number of articles and essays appeared in the Soviet press discussing the meaning of proletarian internationalism in the light of the Eurocommunist objections. One of the more interesting was a piece by Vadim Zagladin, deputy of Boris Ponomarev, Head of the International Department of the Central Committee. In an essay, Zagladin talked of "a dialectical interdependence:" "The independence and self-dependence of the fraternal parties is a precondition for the development of equal cooperation among them." But, he cited Nicolae Ceausescu(sic!) "...one must not for a moment forget the natural laws and truths of universal significance by which every Party must be guided in order to fulfill successfully its historic mission." And, he reaffirmed, "one of these natural laws of universal significance" is proletarian internationalism.<sup>28</sup>

Zagladin thus further softened the impact without retreating any steps. Judging from subsequent reactions from Eurocommunists, however, this interpretation was not acceptable either. In particular, they rejected the view that the independence of each communist party can be best preserved by international solidarity. To them, common goals facing the movement cannot take precedence over their own independence, autonomy, and equality; and democratic socialism is neither a distorted form of the new society nor a camouflaged form of the old.<sup>29</sup>

Moscow may now interpret "monolithic unity" as "unity in diversity" and "discipline" as "coordination without subordination." It may profess "respect for the equality and independence" of communist parties while denying any "desire to recreate some kind of organizational center."

And it may even approve of and actively support diversity as a necessary dialectic step to the future, more perfect union.<sup>30</sup> But its credibility is at a very low ebb. Underdeveloped, abused and exploited, Soviet proletarian internationalism, on the defensive, has been steadily losing ground. In fact, the critics have complained, both the old, simple "internationalism" as well as the glorified "proletariat" lost their meaning a long time ago: "The hypothesis that the nation would begin to wither away when capitalism, the bourgeoisie, and the proletariat disappear" was tested and disproved by social reality. Moreover, in many African countries "the apparatus of the political and state bureaucracy has created new nations. This process of birth is going on before our very eyes; and even in highly developed societies one can observe the birth if not of nations, then at least of ethnic groups." Is this bourgeois nationalism? In fact, "every attack on national independence within the context of the international relation ... is nothing but an opening of the road toward an extension of hegemony."<sup>31</sup>

Similarly, "the mystique" of the proletariat is a thing of the past: "Have not the workers in the United States been one of the major pillars of American policy? Was it not the German working class which fought in the uniform of the Wehrmacht?... To imagine that [the proletariat] had always been a priori progressive would mean closing one's eyes to plain facts... It is evidence of error, ignorance or manipulation if one sticks firmly to the thesis that one social stratum is always and in all situations revolutionary while another social stratum is always reactionary."<sup>32</sup>

In addition, an ideology of one country cannot serve as the ideology of an international movement: "Ideology is a reflection of the socio-

economic structure of a country, of its views and interests. [Therefore,] arbitrariness in such a situation cannot but turn into enforced monolithism, [and] the striving for monolithism leads necessarily toward a center which, arbitrarily, interprets such an ideology. [This is why] a united ideology no longer exists...<sup>33</sup> It cannot exist simply because "to attribute to certain nations the characteristic of being permanently revolutionary," or to claim that "there are nations that are invariably revolutionary...<sup>34</sup> is only a step toward racism."

As a consequence, there are today

"two completely different approaches from which emerge two different, even contradictory, strategic, political, international and other consequences. [The dissident CPs'] concept runs directly counter to the approach that imposes a common strategy and common tactics, and consequently a unique center that decides and controls them, a common "general staff" that sends the troops into battle. Whenever and wherever this [proletarian internationalism] concept has become standard in relations among the communist and workers' parties...and there are many historical examples...their policies were inevitably subordinated to a single policy, and this has never ensured success. On the contrary, on the basis of the so-called unity and compactness of monolithism, conflicts, sometimes very sharp, have arisen. And not one of them has ever been resolved on such a basis ..."<sup>35</sup>

Like all political parties, the parliamentary communist parties are responsive to electoral outcomes. Victories do mean success, and defeat does mean failure--for the membership as well as the leadership. The responsiveness of communist parties to elections has been growing simply because greater responsiveness has meant more votes. The lesson of the PCI has not been lost on its neighbors and friends. The electorate seems to have demanded--among other things and increasingly--national independent communist parties offering policies and strategies based on domestic needs. Moreover, electoral success has meant easier and greater

access to resources--money, offices, respectability, local influence-- thereby untying the strings attached to Soviet aid. Thus, between their own policy needs and the incongruent strategic demands of the Soviet Union, the Eurocommunists had to choose. They opted <sup>no</sup> longer to give in to the CPSU without fight.

Since the early 'sixties the West European communist parties have begun to develop international strategies suitable to their own electoral profiles. The harsh Soviet insistence on proletarian internationalism had often created sharp tensions within the CPS in the past. These tensions were progressively relieved-- by peaceful coexistence after 1956 and by detente from the mid-seventies. But peaceful coexistence and detente, while encouraging the cooperation of communist parties with other political parties and forces and vice versa, created in turn, progressively, new tensions with the USSR. The CPS would no doubt have preferred to adopt electorally winning foreign policies which would not clash with Soviet interests. The zig-zag stands of communist parties on the Common Market and especially on NATO illustrate this reluctance well. But while the electoral push was hard to resist, the fate of Chile was not lost on the CPS of Western Europe. This reinforced the Soviet - CP disagreement on China; the communist parties could not go along with the Soviet ex-communication of China and the possible further loss of their autonomy related to that break. The European Conference showed this stance well.

Proletarian internationalism, the Soviet international communist strategy, another "dominion [which] cloaked itself in a legitimacy derived from the will of its subjects," <sup>36</sup> has lost another group of legitimizing supporters. After the schismatics (China and Albania), the independents

(such as Yugoslavia and the CPS of Mexico, Iceland, Netherlands, Reunion), the neutrals (such as Romania, Vietnam, North Korea, Laos, the CP of Malaysia), and the split parties (such as in Canada, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay), came the heretics. They are not willful, just circumstantial; they profit from objective conditions. They further weakened what was left of Soviet communist stature, authority, standing, and legitimacy. When Enrico Berlinguer said in West Berlin that "an international communist body does not exist, and cannot exist, in any form on a European or world level, " he was stating a fact.<sup>37</sup> Proletarian internationalism has failed. Communist unity is dead.

The leaders of the CPSU, to borrow their language, have failed to develop Marxist-Leninist teaching on internationalism in keeping with the conditions of the time, the relations among communist parties, and the developments in the communist movement.

The Soviet Model of Socialism

The Leninist Bolshevik party links political underdevelopment with revolution. In backward Russia, as in other backward societies such as China, "where the peasant [was] the primary class of the masses, where the task of struggle pending solution [lay] in the fight against the remnants of medievalism, but not in the fight against capitalism..."<sup>38</sup> the Leninist party proved to be the right organization with the right strategy at the right time. Communism, an urban theory, did well when implanted in a rural setting. In developed societies where capitalism (and democracy) have advanced in satisfying the masses, however, Leninist parties with revolutionary strategies have proved to be out of place. They ceased to be effective. As Jean Kanapa put it, "There is ultimately another guarantee that the policy the French Communist Party follows will be a truly democratic one, relying in every case on the free choice of the people: this guarantee is that there is no other possible way to effect the social changes necessary. France of 1977 is not Russia of 1917..."<sup>39</sup>

Indeed, in backward, developing states, communist parties have tended to follow the Leninist Bolshevik model of dynamic revolutionary forces in societies not yet integrated and often not politicized. They became the socializers toward modernity, mobilizing members for the rapid transformation of their societies. In developed states, where there was no legitimate function for a revolutionary party, communist parties had three alternatives: either to follow the Leninist prescription and persist, and, if outlawed, to go underground; or to protest,



defend, and articulate the negative interests and dissatisfaction of isolated and alienated segments of the population not integrated into their social and political systems; or, finally, to give in, to adapt, to conform to the national political model, and to become electoral parties. In the first two instances of revolutionary or protest parties, the national environment -- party relations tended to be hostile while the party-Soviet relations tended to be friendly. In the third instance, the national environment-electoral party relations tended to be friendly while the party-Soviet relations tended to be less friendly -- principally because of the lack of understanding caused by diametrically different political environments. In terms of influence, a party's deviation from the Bolshevik model and its replacement by a fitting local model tended to lead to success in national politics and, moreover, it tended to make the deviant party more influential in the communist movement. The trade-off, therefore, became attractive to some parties.

Time, it seems, has been on the side of non-revolutionary, non-deviant, non-exclusive, national communist parties. Overall, they have either gained in membership or remained the same. Because they ceased to challenge the national political process but, for all practical purposes, accepted it, conformed to it, participated in it, and played according to the rules of the political game, they ceased to be viewed as national adversaries. Revolutionary or protest parties, on the other hand, have been subject to powerful adversities. A few have won and became ruling parties. The rest faced hostile governments which circumscribed or even outlawed them. Some turned into amorphous movements and

became victims of "objective conditions." Others were pushed out on a limb by the new radical left. And the growing dissension and conflict orientation of the ruling parties have produced strains, pulls, and pressures within the non-ruling parties. Some have even split into two or more factions. Deprivation, isolation, and the struggle to remain alive have not proved conducive to the maintenance, let alone growth, of the revolutionary communist parties.

Communist parties which aspire to function as electoral parties must compete for votes with other political parties. To be successful they have to alter their structure to accommodate their new function. The Leninist model ceases to be applicable or useful. A small, elitist, tightly-knit, well-disciplined, dictatorial party is not suited for vote-getting. For this purpose, a broadly-based, open, conciliatory, pragmatic, non-heretic, flexible, cooperative national party is preferable to a militant, centralist, closed, ideological, orthodox, exclusive, dogmatic, international party. The direction toward which the electoral parties move seems to be established. They are not all in line as yet, but the revolutionary-to-electoral trend persists.

In 1961 the members of the Central Committee of the PCI called for analyzing the causes of corruption of Soviet democracy, and in 1962 Togliatti was speculating whether the classical class struggle made sense in advanced countries. In 1963 Thorez said that "the theory of the single party in a socialist regime was an error of Stalin"; in 1966, adherence to a plurality of parties in a socialist state became a part of the PCF platform; the Danish Communist Party said the same thing in 1968; and the Spanish Communist Party announced that one-party rule was

a deformation of Marxism not suitable for advanced countries.<sup>40</sup> The invasion of Czechoslovakia "helped to crystallize the [dissenting] parties' determination that every party should have the right to construct its own socialist system independently."<sup>41</sup> The "dictatorship of the proletariat" phrase disappeared from the vocabulary of electoral communist parties -- only to be explicitly abandoned in the 'seventies. When the French Communist Party "very logically" decided to go against the dictatorship of the proletariat formula, "this was not a question of mere change in terminology but in an entire political approach."<sup>42</sup>

To view Lenin's theory on the dictatorship of the proletariat as completion of the theory set forth by Marx and Engels, or even worse, as a dogma and to regard Leninism as a law, was a mistake, argued Tetsuzo Fuwa, the Head of the Central Committee Secretariat of the Japanese Communist Party. "In adopting the basic tenets of scientific socialism, the Japanese Communist Party is working to bring about the creative development of its own ideas and theories."<sup>43</sup>

Marx and Engels envisaged a peaceful transition from capitalism to communism. Lenin did not. Revolution was inevitable: "Soviet republics in more developed countries, where the proletariat has greater weight and influence, have every chance of surpassing Russia once they take the path of the dictatorship of the proletariat."<sup>44</sup> Lenin's revisionism of Marx and Engels made for this crucial distinction.

Communist parties, like other social organizations, contain the seeds of their own transformation. They are not exempt from the laws of history. They change with conditions of time. This has been true in developed as well as in developing countries. In fact, electoral

CPs in a few developing countries, though small, have been out-performing electoral parties in developed countries in percentages of total votes cast (and sometimes in ratios of party members to electoral votes as well), such as the CPs of Cyprus (40 per cent of the electoral vote), Guadeloupe (39 percent), Guiana (37 percent), Reunion (23 percent), Martinique (17 percent), Chile (even before the 1970 presidential victory of Allende -- 16 percent), and even India (9 percent). These CPs compare quite favorably with such CPs in developed countries as Italy (37 percent), France (20 percent), Iceland (18 percent), Finland (17 percent), Luxembourg (15 percent), Japan (7 percent), and Sweden (5 percent).<sup>45</sup>

For this reason, I am not persuaded by those studies based on aggregate data which purport that only developed countries with parliamentary, democratic forms are hospitable to electoral communist parties.<sup>46</sup> It is true that since developed countries (those with absolutely higher per capita real incomes) do not suffer from a scarcity of resources as much as developing countries, many, rather than a few, can gain in the allocation of values that goes on through the political process. The political game tends to be non zero-sum: some groups can do well without other groups doing poorly. Even the relatively more deprived benefit from the capacity of developed states to satisfy them. Those in the majority or plurality can afford to benefit those in the minority: the richer they are, the more they can satisfy their own wants and still have resources left to satisfy the minority. And since such sharing costs relatively little and is of less high value priority and of less marginal utility, the majorities are likely to pay the price for stability and legitimacy. If there are no constant majorities, political parties can get more of

what they want without giving up the interests of the non-deviant communist party (whom they may need as a coalition partner). And since legitimacy and stability, in addition to resources and values satisfaction, are prerequisites of the parliamentary communist parties for their willingness to play by democratic rules, communist parties tend to be valued and satisfied in developed polities.<sup>47</sup>

This argument, unfortunately, excludes from consideration electoral communist parties in developing parliamentary democracies on the basis of scarcity of resources. But the electoral parties are there! They have the same local role options open to them -- to persist as revolutionary parties, to defend alienated groups, or to conform to the parliamentary, democratic form, if such exists. And if they opt for the third alternative, the local democratic sets of interests, whether in majority or not, are still likely to pay the price for stability and legitimacy, however scarce the resources, by making side payments to the more deprived electoral communist parties. Since the size of the pie is smaller, the communist parties get less than in developed countries but obviously enough to satisfy them to play the parliamentary game. True, electoral communist parties in developed countries are more visible, more potent, and more influential. Their socio-political environment has more material incentives to offer and the rewards for success are relatively greater. But the political process is the same in both sets. The stimulus-response paradigm is operative equally in developed and developing countries. The choices are there, and so is the accommodation by parliamentary, democratic systems. They have less to offer in developing countries, but the relative advantage for non-deviant parties is there as well.

Just as some communist parties adapt better to their political environments than other communist parties, so some political systems accommodate better their adaptive communist parties than other systems. In other words, electoral communist parties do better in some democratic political systems than in others. They do well in what Giovanni Sartori calls "polarized pluralist" systems where the spectrum of political opinion is highly polarized: cleavages are deep, consensus is low, and the legitimacy of the system is questioned (e.g. Italy and France). They do almost equally well in "moderate pluralist" systems, where the ideological distance among parties is smaller, the coalitional configuration is bipolar, and the competition is centripetal (e.g. Sweden, Iceland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Holland, Ireland, Switzerland). And they do poorly in the classic two-party systems -- the United States, England, Canada, Australia and New Zealand -- where, because of their single-member district system, relative majorities turn into absolute majorities.<sup>48</sup>

To put it differently, there is a difference in hospitality toward communist parties in continental and Anglo-American types of democracy. The continental or rational type considers electoral techniques of supreme significance for democracy, "so preponderant that it totally obscures the other side of the problem, that is, leadership and efficient government. This is shown by the fact that all the continental democracies have adopted proportional representation..."<sup>49</sup> The Anglo-Saxon or empirical type, on the other hand, focuses "attention on the practical devices by which democracy is realized (parties) and on the most delicate procedural aspect of the democratic way of governing (respect for the opposition)." While both types, the continental and the rational,

exclude extreme or anti-system parties (those which "undermine the legitimacy of the regime") from governing,<sup>50</sup> the continental type is more tolerant and accommodative of the political activities of such parties. Should they turn into pro-system parties (whether on the surface or in fact) and attract a substantive vote, their past carries no political handicap. They are rewarded by the system just as any other party.

According to Neil McInnes, the "dynamic" structure of Western European communist parties, (which he differentiates from the "formal" or "static" structure), consists of three complex distinct faces in "stable equilibrium": (1) the party bureaucracy, the beneficiary of the electoral road to power; (2) the Leninist party structure and the utopian workers, a minority of the party membership who are the legitimizers of the Soviet rule fighting "a variety of social democracy"; and (3) the Soviet influence, the traditional Soviet direction and control of communist parties. These three forces are at war, and "their shifting relations explain the evolution of the Western parties."<sup>51</sup>

This is the major theme of McInnes' penetrating study. In my opinion, the three forces are neither in "stable equilibrium" nor "shifting"; they have shifted, gradually and irrevocably, in favor of the party bureaucracy. This is where, in my view, lies increasingly the center of gravity of electoral communist parties. To accommodate a profound change in party function, the communist parties had to change their structures. Otherwise, they could not adequately play the parliamentary game and compete with other parties for votes.

A communist party which gives up revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat for the electoral road must win votes. To get into

office, it must win a majority of votes. Since it cannot do it alone, it needs electoral allies. To secure such alliances, it must reassure its allies -- by playing down its major liabilities, namely its militants and its loyalty to the USSR. And once in the alliance, the communist party, to be credible, must prove its support of the alliance through thick and thin, however harsh such a posture may be -- as many communist parties have found out the hard way -- (such as the Finnish, the French, or now the Italian communist parties) by keeping the contract.

To justify the change in the CP function and structure, the alliance must be a winning, or at least a successful, coalition. The more successful it is the more jobs there are to be filled by the CP. The more jobs, the more influential are those who fill those jobs, the party bureaucracy -- and the less influential are those who stay out in the cold, the utopians. Since the party bureaucrats, in order to stay in office, must vest their interest in national strategies, the Soviet connection gets less attention. The militants and the Soviet influence do not necessarily become the dead weight in the party -- they just become gradually displaced to reduce the risks.

#### The Impact of Eurocommunism

The Eurocommunists have learned that their opposition to the USSR on fundamentals may bring votes at election times at home; but they have also learned that up to now their opposition abroad, vis-a-vis the USSR itself, is only marginally effective. Their most notable success was the European Party Conference. Their other criticisms and protests, whether in public or in private, sharp or diplomatic, single or sustained, at low or high levels, in concert or alone, brought only limited results --



as, for example, the altered Soviet view on the Common Market. They have been constantly and sharply rebuked by the USSR when criticizing either Soviet and East European domestic policies -- political repression, human rights violations, oppressive measures against dissidents, the content of Soviet-type "socialist democracy," censorship, subjugation of trade unions, etc. -- or Soviet oppressive policies in Eastern Europe such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It is precisely here that the dissenting communist parties have become threatening to the USSR. Calling for their independence and autonomy from the USSR is one thing; it is irritating, to be sure, because it decreases their utility to the USSR in the Sino-Soviet dispute, in Eastern Europe and for Soviet foreign policy generally. But by attacking Soviet domestic politics and Soviet policies in Eastern Europe, they touch the nerve; Soviet power and prestige is at stake, and so is the legitimacy of the CPSU.

Eurocommunism offers an alternative model to Soviet communism. For obvious reasons, it is less of a menace to the USSR proper. But because of its emphasis on national independence and individual roads to socialism, and in view of its historical ties with East European parties, geographical proximity, close association with Yugoslavia and Romania, and growing influence, it is a model fraught with danger in Eastern Europe. This is where it poses the most serious threat to the USSR.

For this reason, the emerging Czechoslovak "socialism with a human face," a Eurocommunist variant, was suppressed so brutally: it was indeed perceived as contagious. For the same reason it was supported by Eurocommunists. They have not accepted the Soviet occupation. They disagreed with the wisdom of Soviet armed intervention and kept bringing up the

issue in public. The Soviet invasion has aroused and solidified the Eurocommunist stand and its opposition to the USSR more than any other issue. The Spanish CP has been the most outspoken and eloquent in its denunciation of the Soviet action; in fact, the two parties broke relations over the incident. The Italian CP condemned, repeatedly and publicly, the invasion; deplored the subsequent purges and trials; morally, financially and politically supported Czechoslovak communist exiles; published letters from pre-invasion Czechoslovak leaders and other dissidents in Czechoslovakia; and urged withdrawal of Soviet troops from and liberalization in Czechoslovakia ever since.<sup>52</sup> The French CP was at first less vociferous than the French socialists in expressing support for anti-occupation sentiments and forces. Since then, however, the PCF position has hardened because, the party claims, the Soviet intervention has contributed to the democratization of the PCF itself.<sup>53</sup> The British and Australian CPs, highly critical of the occupation, published letters and messages from Czechoslovak dissidents. The Yugoslavs and Romanians sympathized with the deposed Czechoslovak regime. The Austrian, Greek, Belgian, Dutch, Swedish, and Japanese communists censured the invasion.

Similarly, when Gomulka and his associates took severe punitive measures against workers who were striking and rioting over prices and wages in Polish cities in 1970, several CPs, including the Italian and Japanese, protested the Polish government's stern measures.

In 1976, responding to Polish historian Jacek Kuron's open letter to Enrico Berlinguer, the Central Committee of the PCI voiced its concern for the Polish workers tried in connection with the disturbances of June 25, 1976, and expressed its "hope that measures showing moderation

and clemency may be adopted and publicized."<sup>54</sup>

Examples of a dialogue between communist East and West Europe were an article in the World Marxist Review by Deszo Nemes, member of the Hungarian Party Politburo, and an article in France Nouvelle by Jean Kanapa on the dictatorship of the proletariat. Can socialism be attained without the dictatorship of the proletariat? No, argued Nemes, because "events [in socialist states] refuted the idea." Yes, replied Kanapa, because it would mean "banning opposition parties, establishing censorship, forbidding freedom of expression, association, demonstration, etc. ... This is not necessary for the construction of socialism in France during our era. We do not want it."<sup>55</sup>

The Yugoslav international conference on Socialism in the Contemporary World included participants from the West, Africa, Asia, Latin America, as well as from the USSR, Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. In "a spirit of free discussion," apparently a "confrontation of ideas" took place. Different roads to socialism; dictatorship of the proletariat; Eurocommunism (sometimes called "Eurosectarianism"); state ownership; strategy of social forces; and similar disputed topics were openly discussed.<sup>56</sup>

When Czechoslovak authorities arrested leading dissidents in a continuing crackdown on signatories of a manifesto for civil rights guaranteed by the Helsinki agreement, "The Charter '77," published in West European newspapers, L'Unità wrote that "the virulence ...leaves no doubt as to the spirit and methods with which the Czechoslovak authorities intend to confront the problems posed by Charter '77," and condemned the Czechoslovak government.<sup>57</sup> Similarly, Rinascita said that "the question of the realization of democratic socialism in Czechoslovakia remains

unanswered."<sup>58</sup> A PCE spokesman in Madrid was reported to have called "particularly scandalous... the lack of freedom of expression in socialist states."<sup>59</sup>

The relationship between Eurocommunists and dissidents in socialist states are mutually reinforcing. Eurocommunists monitor events in Eastern Europe and in the USSR, and new trends and developments in West European CPs are not lost on the East Europeans and the Russians. The dissidents appeal to Eurocommunists for moral support, and the Eurocommunists criticize the socialist states for their excesses. True, censorship is still a potent barrier. But enough filters through to suggest that, at least in Eastern Europe, "critical socialists" not only know what is going on but feel less isolated and deserted. For example, in an open "Letter to the PCI from the Supporters of the Czechoslovak 'New Course,'" the dissident writers in Czechoslovakia praised the PCI's "authentic democracy": "Your position constitutes an important component of the effort to give the cause of socialism in the advanced countries of Europe a new impulse and ensure its progress. It also provides support for the efforts of all those within the socialist countries who are convinced that the further progress of socialist society is the condition for overcoming the deformations that still exist."<sup>60</sup>

Similarly, when the East German popular poet, singer, and political critic Wolf Bierman, while on tour in West Germany, was stripped of his citizenship and forbidden to return, he claimed that Eurocommunists, particularly the French, Italian, and Spanish CPs, had encouraged dissidents in East Germany to become "more daring, less embarrassed, more courageous, and more clear-sighted."<sup>61</sup> In turn, the French, Italian, Spanish, Belgian, and Swedish CPs defended Bierman's right to travel

and his cultural freedom (while the Austrian Communist Party denounced the singer for serving anti-communist interests).<sup>62</sup>

The Eurocommunists like to win votes; but they want to be right. One of the few rewards available to a minority is the feeling of righteousness associated with being for the right cause. Such a minority has no reason to compromise as there is little justice -- or benefit -- in compromise. Moreover, given the fairly rapid growth of Eurocommunism and the sustained fragmentation of the communist movement, the dissident CPs think that time is on their side, not on the side of the CPSU. They know from their own experience that if the CPSU fails to meet the rising expectations of its associates and supporters, then its legitimacy will be further undermined and its intrinsic value to all further depreciated. The Eurocommunists' verbal interventions and meddling in the USSR and East Europe, however ineffective in the short run, appears to be potentially significant, especially in East Europe.

#### Conclusion

Have the Eurocommunists "really changed"? I think they have. Their new, historically unknown form of communism may go against the grain of communism as we have known it since its split with social democracy, but it is here to stay. The major West European parties have sought in a variety of ways to produce a setting in which they could carry out more adequately their electoral, parliamentary function. They adapted their party structures, their political direction, their alliances, their daily political activities, and their party mentality to this function. They cannot go back even if they should want to.

Their political organization would tear at the seams. They are captives of their own progressive democratization and political integration.

"A party that puts its finger in the parliamentary machine to the extent that the major Western parties have is unlikely ever to overturn society..."<sup>63</sup>

Relations between the communist parties and the Soviet Union used to be a two-way street: "The Soviet rulers needed the ideological endorsement of Marxists in capitalist lands as much as Western communists needed the prestige of the proletarian state that 'expropriated the expropriators.'"<sup>64</sup> The CPs historically shared the feeling that by themselves, through their own power, they could not attain their goals. They therefore willingly bestowed the legitimacy of leadership and authority on the CPSU and obeyed its commands. The CPSU, in turn, interested in the contribution of the CPs to the maintenance and growth of the communist movement, which the CPSU organized and led, tried to motivate the CPs to remain committed to the Soviet "common strategy" and "common model of socialism."

Since then, the street has become narrow; it is no longer two-way. The trade-off is no longer what it used to be. The "rally 'round the flag" mentality of earlier years is gone. It is not only that the CPs have changed, that they can do better, given their political arrangements and values, if they are more independent and autonomous. And neither is it simply that domestication brings votes and votes bring power. It is also the cumulative effect of Soviet behavior over the years, perceived as oppressive and exploitative deprivation of others, which brings into question the legitimacy of Soviet authority. Has not the CPSU, the socializer of norms, so internationalized the relational

ties with CPs that historical changes could no longer cope with the prevailing rigidities? And, last but not least, men do seek more than satisfactory and profitable relationships; they seek just ones. There seems to be a scarcity of those in the CPs' relations with the CPSU.

Exchange theory tells us that the more an activity is valued, the more it will be rewarded. Since the CPSU needs the CPs more than the CPs need the CPSU, one would expect concessions and benefits to flow to the CPs on the theory that the degree of renewed solidarity is a function of the value and frequency of benefits bestowed.

I doubt that this would work. It may retard the alienation, but it will not stop it. The CPSU may negotiate itself out of the deadlock but not back into a movement. Neither does it seem probable that the Eurocommunists would attempt to gain influence by forming a coalition to change the CPSU to the degree the coalition can agree on. The odds against the latter, I think, are fairly high.

Of the twenty-three West European CPs, one is in government (the Finnish CP); twelve are in parliaments (the Italian, French, Icelandic, Luxembourgian, Swedish, Dutch, Danish, Belgian, Portuguese, San Marinese, Swiss and Spanish CPs); three are illegal (Greek, Turkish and Spanish CPs); and seven are moderately active (in West Berlin, Austria, Norway, West Germany, Great Britain, and Ireland). If the Eurocommunists do as well as they expect, others will almost certainly emulate them, thus further increasing the pressure on the Soviet Union. And that might -- do I dare say it? -- influence Soviet policy in East Europe and, perhaps, at home as well. Heretics can contaminate the orthodox better than can the schismatics, the independents, or the neutrals...

Given the considerable changes in West European communism and in view of what was said above, it is not surprising that Soviet pronouncements have changed as well. It is now Moscow that advocates diversity, equality, and individual initiative:

Monolithic unity is understood not as the unity of identical elements but as unity in diversity; and discipline is understood as the definitely coordinated activity of all socialist countries without any kind of subordination of some to others, but with broad individual initiative on the part of each country in the interests of carrying out its own and the common tasks...

One cannot be a good Communist by giving commands in international relations or blindly obeying even the best orders and slavishly copying what others are doing.<sup>65</sup>

Change in verbal behavior is comparatively easy. But can the CPSU "really change"? Can it come up with alternative lines of policy which would bring satisfaction compatible with the Soviet aims to Eurocommunists while producing a minimum of undesirable side effects to the CPSU? I do not think so. The Eurocommunists have learned that they can live -- and prosper -- without Soviet legitimation. Their aims and Soviet aims are only marginally compatible, and the marginality expands and contracts from issue to issue. The impact of their dissent may produce results in Eastern Europe only to Soviet detriment. The collision course is not yet set, but compatibility has been decreasing. To arrest this trend, cosmetic changes such as the Soviet statement cited above, virtually an instant reflex defensive mechanism, are no longer relevant.



## FOOTNOTES

1. Cited in Kevin Devlin, "The International Communist Movement. The Pan-European Conference," Radio Free Europe RESEARCH, RAD Background Report #171, August 5, 1976, p. 13. Useful materials not cited in this paper include the following:  
William Ascher and Sidney Tarrow, "The Stability of Communist Electorates," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Vol. XIX. No. 3, Aug., 1976, pp. 475 - 499; Donald M. Blackmer and Annie Kriegel, THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF ITALY AND FRANCE, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975); Donald M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, COMMUNISM IN ITALY AND FRANCE, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Guido Carli, "Italy's Malaise," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol. 54, No. 4, July 1976, pp. 708-718; "Concerning a United Ideological Front of the World's Communists," WORLD MARXIST REVIEW, Vol. 19, No. 2, February, 1976, pp. 47-60; Gastone Gensini, "Component of Unity: Communists in the Struggle for Unity of All Anti-Imperialist Forces," WORLD MARXIST REVIEW, Vol. 17, No. 5, May, 1974, pp. 85-87; W. Lacquer, "Eurocommunism and Its Friends," COMMENTARY, Vol. 62, No.2, Aug., 1976, pp. 25 - 30; Peter Lange "What Is to Be Done--About Italian Communism?" FOREIGN POLICY, No. 21, Winter, 1975, pp. 224 - 240; Luigi Longo, "A Powerful Force for Change," WORLD MARXIST REVIEW, Vol. 19, No. 4, April, 1976, pp. 12-20; Neil McInnes, "World Communism in Fragments," PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, Vol. 24, No. 6, November, 1976, pp. 43-46; Peter Nichols, "On the Italian Crisis," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol.54, No. 3, April, 1976, pp. 511-526; Richard Pipes, "Liberal Communism in Western Europe?" ORBIS, Vol. 20, No. 3, Fall, 1976, pp. 595-601;

Alceste Santini, "From Dialogue to Joint Action," *WORLD MARXIST REVIEW*, Vol. 19, No. 4, April, 1976, pp. 116 - 123; Simon Serfaty "An International Anomaly: The U.S. and the Communist Parties in France and Italy," *STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM*, Vol. 8, Nos. 1 and 2, Spring/Summer, 1975, pp. 123 - 149; John Barth Urban, "Contemporary Soviet Perspectives on Revolution in the West," *ORBIS*, Vol. XIX, No. 4, Winter, 1976, pp. 1359 - 1402; Dale Vree, "Coalition Politics on the Left in France and Italy," *THE REVIEW OF POLITICS*, Vol. 37, No. 3, July, 1975, pp. 340 - 356.

2. This account of the 25th Congress of the CPSU is based on Jan F. Triska, "The 25th Congress of the CPSU: Communist States and Parties," *ASSESSMENT AND CONTEXT*, in Alexander Dallin, ed., *THE 25TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press), forthcoming.
3. PRAVDA, March 1, 1976.
4. PRAVDA, March 18, 1976.
5. Compared with the previous meetings and conferences of CPs, the European Conference stands out as a watershed; the influence began to flow unmistakably in the opposite direction. And yet, on closer examination, the growing conflictual trend may be traced over time even here. In the 1960 Communist Parties Conference, all the CP's toed the Moscow line, at least on the surface. The 1967 Karlovy Vary Conference was still an organizationally streamlined meeting which only the Yugoslav and Romanian leaders failed to attend. At the 1969 Moscow Conference, on the other hand, not only speeches critical of the Soviet position were delivered (and published in PRAVDA) but 14 of the 75 parties made reservations to or stated disapproval of the final document, which already contained mild Soviet concessions.
6. Stane Dolanc, "Confirmation of Democratic Cooperation and Solidarity"

SOCIALIST THOUGHT AND PRACTICE, Belgrade, Vol. 14, No. 7 - 8, July - August, 1976, p. 22.

7. FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, "Conference of European Communist Parties," Soviet Union, Nos. 126 - 133, 1976. See also NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, June 30 and July 1, 1976; PRAVDA, June 30 and July 1, 1976; and Kevin Devlin, supra.
8. Kevin Devlin, pp. 13 and 14.
9. Like Jean Kanapa, member of the Politburo of the French CP, I do not much care for the term "Eurocommunism." It is imprecise, fluid, exclusive, and at times too suggestive. But like M. Kanapa, I use it because it is a convenient shorthand for "several communist parties in industrialized capitalist countries [which], though in quite different situations, have had the feeling of being confronted with fundamentally common problems, so that they have come up with similar answers, thereby outlining a socialist perspective which is strongly marked by a common concern for democracy." "A 'New Policy' of the French Communists?" FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol. 55, No. 2, 1977, p.284.
10. For more information on and background of the CP's discussed in this section, consult YEARBOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AFFAIRS: 1966 - 1976, Richard F. Staar, ed. (Stanford University: Hoover Institution Press).
11. Kanapa, p. 283. Italics added.
12. Neil McInnes, THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF WESTERN EUROPE, (London: Oxford U. Press, 1975), p. 178.
13. Hong N. Kim, "Deradicalization of the Japanese Communist Party under Kenji Miyamoyo," WORLD POLITICS, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1976, pp. 273 - 299; ASAHI EVENING NEWS, May 12, 1976; BULLETIN. Information for Abroad. Central Committee of the CP, No. 356 (July, 1976).

14. Yugoslavia is the only East European country which accepts "without qualification two significant political principles: the legitimacy of special interests and the autonomy of social organizations."  
Andrew C. Janos in Huntington and Moore, *AUTHORITARIAN POLITICS IN MODERN SOCIETIES*, p. 444.
15. Jan F. Triska, "The Socialist World System in Search of a Theory," in Dan N. Jacobs, ed., *THE NEW COMMUNISMS*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1969) p. 29 ff.
16. Thus, for example, in a speech to a Congress of Socialist Culture in Bucharest, Nicolae Ceausescu, while praising the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 because "a leading center was no longer necessary" and while defining internationalism as mutual support and not an excuse to meddle into internal affairs of others ("internationalism cannot be synonymous with sacrificing the interests of any people for the so-called general interests"), he reaffirmed, with reservations, Romanis's adherence to the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. *SCIENTEIA*, June 3, 1976. Similarly, Stefan Nastasescu, former Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, in answer to the Soviet articles on proletarian internationalism which appeared after the European Party Conference, took the soft stand. He attacked both "limited" and "absolute" sovereignty, the former because it disregards rights of others and the latter because it "justifies unleashing of aggression against independent states." Still, Nastasescu emphasized international reciprocity and "the replacement of unilateral dependencies by multilateral interdependence among all states as equal and self-supporting entities in international society": Only "a sovereign entity can renounce some of its

- sovereignty." Sovereignty, Security, and International Cooperation," ERA SOCIALISTA, No. 17, September, 1976. See also DIE WELT, September 18, 1976.
17. L'HUMANITE, Sept. 10, 1976; L'UNITA, Aug. 11, 1976; VOLKSTIMME, August 11, 1976. See also Silvio F. Senigalia, "The PCI and China," NEW LEADER, Oct. 25, 1976, pp. 3 - 4.
  18. McInnes, p. 156.
  19. Triska, "The Socialist World System", p. 18 ff.
  20. Yugoslavia was condemned and expelled from the Cominform because the Comintern practices "of censuring and even disowning communist parties" were extended to state relations "rendering their consequences the more serious." For almost seven years President Tito protested such treatment in vain. Then the Chinese leaders accused the CPSU of having "arbitrarily infringed upon the sovereignty of fraternal countries, interfered in their internal affairs, carried on subversive activities and tried in every way to control fraternal countries." In fact, "the leaders of the CPSU have themselves undermined the basis of the unity of the international Communist movement and created the present grave danger of a split by betraying Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. . ." The Romanians, for their part, pointed out that there should be no "parent" and "son" parties - parties that are superior or inferior - but only equal parties. They should not interfere in each other's business and should respect each other. Triska, ibid, pp. 35 - 41.
  21. Jovan Raicevic, "From Dogmatism to Ideological Monopoly," SOCIALIZAM, May, 1976; POLITIKA, Oct. 24, 1976; Aleksander Grlickov in BORBA, Nov. 28 - 30, 1976.

22. THE NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 5, 1964, p. 2.
23. Triska, "The Socialist World System", p. 41.
24. Kanapa, p. 282.
25. McInnes, p. 145.
26. KRASNAIA ZVEZDA, August 5, 1976; see also MEZHDUNARODNAIA ZHIZN, No. 9, August, 1976.
27. PRAVDA, June 30, 1976; IZVESTIIA, June 30, 1976.
28. "Important Contribution to Peace and Progress," MIROVAIA EDONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIIA, August, 1976, pp. 4 - 27. See also G. Shakhnazarov, "The Socialist Future of Mankind," PRAVDA, July 23, 1976; IZVESTIIA, June 30, 1976; KOMMUNIST, July, 1976 (Boris Ponomarev, "International Meaning of Berlin Conference," pp. 11 - 25); Yu Ogazis' jan in <sup>RABOCHII</sup> KLAS I SOVREMENNYI MIR, July - August, 1976.
- 29.
30. THE WORLD SOCIALIST SYSTEM AND ANTI-COMMUNISM (Moscow: Progress Publishers, ), pp. 110 - 122.
31. Dusan Bilandzic, "The International Policy and Practice of the LCY in Light of the Development of Marxism and Socialism," roundtable discussion, BORBA, August 21 - Sept. 13, 1976. Slobodan Stankovic, "Party Theoreticians Reject Soviet Supremacy," RFE RESEARCH, RAD Background Report #199, September 22, 1976.
32. Ibid.
33. Drago Buvac, "Reaching the Center Through a Detour," NEDELNE INFORM-ATIVNE NOVINE, May 2, 1976. "The trouble is that," in spite of

this fragmentation, "tendencies exist whose supporters would like to achieve 'unity' by forbidding all differences and by imposing a single view of one center. . . "EKONOMSKA POLITIKA, May 31, 1976.

34. Bilandzic in Stankovic, p. 6.
35. Editorial in POLITIKA, Oct. 24, 1976. Italics added.
36. Max Weber, PAIDEIA: THE IDEALS OF GREEK CULTURE, (New York), Vol. 1, 1945, p. 326.
37. Devlin, p. 13.
38. Lenin, SOCHINENIJA (Moscow, 1932) Vol. 24, pp. 542 - 551, in Lucian Pye, GUERRILLA COMMUNISM IN MALAYA, (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1956), p. 26.
39. Kanapa, p.284. Italics added.
40. McInnis, p. 175.
41. Z. Priklmajer-Tomanosic, "The Internationalist Policy and Practice of the LCY in Light of the Development of Marxism and Socialism," a round table discussion, BORBA, 21, Aug. - 13 Sept., 1976; in Stankovic, p. 8.
42. Kanapa, p. 282.
43. "Scientific Socialism and the Problem of Dictatorship," ERA SOCIALISTA, No. 16, August, 1976. See also Central Committee CPJ BULLETIN, Tokyo, No. 356, July '76, ("Draft Resolution of the 13th Extraordinary Party Congress")' RFE RESEARCH, Romania #29, August 26, 1976, p. 8.
44. SELECTED WORKS, Vol. 29, p. 174, in THE WORLD SOCIALIST SYSTEM AND ANTI-COMMUNISM, P. 120. Italics added.
45. 1976 YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AFFAIRS, pp. XV - XX.

46. Seymour Lipset, "Economic Development and Democracy," in POLITICAL MEN (New York: Doubleday, 1959), pp. 45 - 76; Dean E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, December, 1967, pp. 1002 - 1009; Bruce M. Russett, et al., WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 293 - 303; Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPING AREAS (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1960), pp. 541 - 542; Roger W. Benjamin and John H. Kautsky, "Communism and Economic Development," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 62, 1968, pp. 110 - 121.
47. Sidney R. Waldman, FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL ACTION: AN EXCHANGE THEORY OF POLITICS (Boston: Little Brown, 1972), pp. 179 - 180.
48. PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), Ch. 6.
49. Giovanni Sartori, DEMOCRATIC THEORY (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 235.
50. PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS, p. 133.
51. THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF WESTERN EUROPE, pp. 140 - 156 and 204.
52. As Berlinguer reminded the European Communist Parties' Conference in East Berlin on June 30, "we have more than once expressed critical judgments on certain events and situations, for example, with regard to Czechoslovakia." FINAL DOCUMENT, FBIS, above.  
Jan F. Triska, "Messages from Czechoslovakia," PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, Vol. 24, No. 6, pp. 25 - 42.



53. Kanapa, p. 283. See also Georges Marchais, LA POLITIQUE DU PARTI COMMUNISTE FRANCAISE (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1974). Compare with Jacques Fauvet, HISTOIRE DU PCF 1939 - 1965, (Paris: Fayard 1965).
54. L'UNITA, July 20, 1976. The Italian Metalworkers' Union also protested against the severe sentences passed on Polish workers after the Radom-Ursus riots, L'UNITA, Nov. 17, 1976.
55. "Lessons of the Class Struggle for Power in Hungary," WORLD MARXIST REVIEW, Sept. '76, pp. 11 - 14; and "Socialism: The Past Has Not the Answer for Everything," FRANCE NOUVELLE, October 2, 1976; in Kevin Devlin, "Hungarian - PCF Polemic: Kanapa Counterattacks," RFE RESEARCH, RAD Background Report #209, Oct. 6, 1976.
56. Slobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslav Symposium Affirms Validity of Ideological Differences," RFE RESEARCH, RAD Background Report #212, Oct. 7, 1976.
57. January 12, 1977.
58. Jan. 14, 1977
59. "Communists in Western Europe Criticize Prague Authorities," FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Jan. 15, 1977.
60. L'UNITA, June 18, 1976.
61. LE MONDE, Nov. 21 - 22, 1976.
62. L'UNITA, Nov. 20, 1976; L'HUMANITE, Nov. 17 and 19, 1976; LE DRAPEAU ROUGE, Nov. 23, 1976; NY DAG, Nov. 22, 1976; VOLKSTIMME, Nov.20,1976.

63. McInnes, p. 181. Could a communist government be voted out of power? We do not really know. Since World War II communists in Europe participated in governments in France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Greece, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Iceland, but never by themselves. Only in Czechoslovakia did the CP take over the government by coup d'etat. The sample of one is too small for any generalization.
64. Ibid., p. 15.
65. THE WORLD SOCIALIST SYSTEM AND ANTI-COMMUNISM, p. 121.