SOVIET POLICY TOWARD SYRIA, 1976-1986:
FACTIONALISM AND THE LIMITS OF INFLUENCE

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States are composites of rival parties or factions, with rival programs being advanced sometimes even by alternative "tendency groupings" within the same party. Because politics is fluid, the particular outcomes of policy struggles shift and change over time. Foreign policy is no exception to this phenomenon. But despite the fact that essentially all foreign policy is formulated and executed in a factionalized environment, most studies of bilateral international relations continue to be written as if each side were guided by a rational calculation of its fundamental interests and the means necessary to attain them—that is to say, they are inspired by assumptions associated with what is generally known as the "rational actor" approach.

Though this approach is often associated with conservative realism, it is equally applicable both to liberal realists who portray Soviet policymaking as "opportunistic" and to those favoring class analysis. The former seem to escape the dilemma by urging that the Soviets are best understood in "reactive" terms. Typically, liberal realists stress geopolitical considerations as the prime motivation underlying Soviet behavior in the developing world. Yet this indicates that the rational actor model has in fact been retained.

Class analysis offers to make an advance over this position by positing conflict among rival classes, but ultimately the result is the same. Decisions are made on the basis of calculated interests, and policies are the handmaiden of dominant interests, not the outcome of factional infighting. Class analysis allows for conflict, not between factions or institutions but rather between economic interests, with all other forms of rivalry seen as spurious or unimportant. It presumes that all participants act not merely rationally, but in accordance with what Marxists think is rational for a
particular economic group. Once the existence of factionalism is admitted to, it is only a short step to abandon the view that foreign policy is reducible to rational calculation. Intuition, irrational ambitions, jealousy, bureaucratic inertia, and absorption with what are sometimes falsely considered the lessons of the past must all be factored in.

The literature on factionalism in Soviet foreign policy is growing, and the existence and relevance of factionalism in Soviet policymaking is no longer open to serious doubt. The Soviet-Syrian relationship provides an interesting case study in factionalism in bilateral relations. In particular, a close examination of the evidence indicates that while there has been a broad consensus on each side that the relationship is useful, there have been factional differences arising from subsidiary issues such as relations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), or from disagreements over the appropriate response to be taken toward the initiatives of the other side.

This study is concerned with Soviet policy toward Syria since 1976, and accordingly focuses on Soviet factionalism. Despite the presence of discord within the Soviet and the Syrian policymaking elites, interstate relations are institutionalized in such a way that each side is constrained to treat the other as a unit. Because of this, one would expect there to be limits on the ability of factions—or of consensus groupings—to exploit the factional divisions of another state in order to exert leverage. This is one reason why the amount of tangible influence exerted by either state is rather slight. Both the presence of factions, or tendency groupings, and the limits of influence are thrown into relief in periods of crisis.
The Soviet Presence in Syria

The Soviet-Syrian relationship is a remarkable one. In terms of credits, military cooperation, and economic-technical assistance, Syria clearly ranks high among Soviet client states in the developing world. Indeed, in many ways, Syria has become the centerpiece of the Soviet presence in the Middle East in the 1980s, just as Soviet assistance has long been the cornerstone of Syrian defensive and offensive preparedness.

For the past 20 years, Syria has obtained the overwhelming majority of its military hardware from the USSR. The purchase of Soviet arms has contributed to a growing Soviet military presence in Syria, as first weapons instructors and military training personnel, and then missile battery operators and combat troops have been dispatched. As of 1978, the Soviet bloc had more military personnel in Syria than in any other single developing country. In fact, the Syrian contingent accounted for almost 20 percent of the total Soviet and East European deployment in lesser developed countries.6 By mid-1984, there were 13,000 Soviet bloc advisers in Syria, of whom at least 7,000 were Soviet. This figure embraced 4,000 economic advisers (about 1,000 were Soviet, and the rest were mostly Czech, East German, and Romanian, but the total included a small number of Bulgarians and Poles); about 7,000 Soviet and Bulgarian military advisers and troops; 500 East German intelligence and security advisers; about 1,000 Soviet and East European advisers linked to the KGB or other security services, some of whom were involved in intelligence-gathering; and perhaps as many as 500 Cuban troops.7 Beginning in mid-1985, some of these personnel were withdrawn. As of early 1986, the number of Soviet military advisers was estimated at 2,000-2,500.8
Conscious of the very concrete advantages that it derives from its Syrian deployments, the Soviet military has repeatedly emphasized the linkage between a forward presence in the eastern Mediterranean and the defense of the USSR. It seems to have been the first institutional actor in the Soviet policymaking establishment to shift its emphasis from Egypt to Syria in 1972.9

A State Within a State

The Soviet-Syrian relationship, now some 30 years old, has developed into a complex, mutually beneficial connection. Syria's economic gains from this relationship are tangible, but for the Soviet Union, trade with Syria is of negligible importance. The heart of Syria's utility is neither economic nor a matter of susceptibility to influence. It derives above all from the fact that the Syrian connection gives the USSR entrée into the Middle East game. The Soviet bloc's military and intelligence presence, with its covert and illicit dimensions, serves to promote both Soviet and Syrian interests. Although the number of Soviet and Eastern bloc personnel has risen to the point that their presence is quite obvious to visitors, they have tried to minimize their contacts with the local population. At times, they have refused to release the fuses for surface-to-air missile systems to Syrian officers. In other ways, they have guarded their operations from the Syrians, and in 1975 the former Syrian foreign minister, Abd al-Halim Khaddam, complained that Soviet advisers behaved like "a state within a state."10

One of the ways in which Syria has been useful to the Kremlin lies in the maintenance of guerrilla and terrorist camps where Turkish, Armenian, Palestinian and other terrorists receive training. Training and supervisory
personnel at these camps include Soviets and Bulgarians.\textsuperscript{11} Syria has cooperated in other ways, no doubt for reasons of its own. Syria has transferred weaponry to the PLO, and Moscow has allegedly sent some arms to terrorists in Africa and distant parts of Asia through Syrian and Palestinian channels.\textsuperscript{12}

At least one researcher considers it very likely that the Soviets have penetrated Syrian security in various ways.\textsuperscript{13} Certainly, the Soviet intelligence presence in Syria and Lebanon was tangibly strengthened in the spring of 1980. One key addition was the Mongolian ambassador to Damascus, Manakal Tchapin Dash, who appeared in April "with the reputation of being one of the toughmen of the KGB and a specialist in handling complex problems."\textsuperscript{14}

The Soviets have not neglected the Syrian army, which has become the target of Soviet penetration efforts. In 1980, Vladimir Joachin, then the Soviet ambassador in Damascus and a senior military intelligence officer for the GRU, was assigned to supervise this penetration operation. Working closely with him was Aleksandr Soldatov, the Soviet ambassador in Beirut and a veteran KGB officer.\textsuperscript{15} In the summer of 1983, there were reports that the Soviets were trying to recruit agents in the Syrian Air Force. These rumors seemed to be confirmed when Assad suddenly ordered a number of Soviet officers to return to the USSR.\textsuperscript{16} The closeness of Soviet-Syrian military ties can be gauged by the fact that exchanges extend to cooperation between the political directorates of the two armies in the sphere of political education.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{Kto Kogo in Policymaking}

While the basic policy issues in Soviet policymaking are discussed only
by the two dozen full and candidate members of the Soviet Politburo, and are
decided by the full members of this body.\textsuperscript{18} The daily monitoring and execution
of foreign policy is the responsibility--jointly but separately--of the
International Department of the Central Committee (IDCC) and the Foreign
Ministry. In addition to these bodies, the Soviet military enjoys privileged
access to the Politburo, and at times its news organ, Krasnaia zvezda, has
placed its emphases in different places.

In addition to these institutional actors, there are 250 research
institutes under the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, most of which specialize
in political and military issues.\textsuperscript{19} The most important of these institutes
are the Institute of the USA and Canada, and the Institute of World Economy
and International Relations. During the past 20 years, these institutes have
become arenas for wide-ranging debates about Third World issues. These
debates have extended to differences of opinion about the role of Islam and
the relationship between the "non-capitalist path," said to be pursued in
Syria, and the transition to socialism or communism.\textsuperscript{20} One finds writers of a
very orthodox bent in these institutes. They tend to see the world in highly
polarized terms and view the multiplicity of structural forms in the Third
World as a diversity of paths to the same end--i.e., Leninism. Other Soviet
writers see the world in less bipolar and antagonistic terms, and see current
trends in the developing world as more open-ended.\textsuperscript{21}

This study is largely based on a comparative analysis of reportage in
the news organs of the USSR. In the period under study, Pravda and Izvestiia
correspond to a point of view identified by Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier as
"forward-looking globalism." Krasnaia zvezda reflects a more cautious
position. Sovetskaia rossia reflects the viewpoint of those she calls
"conservative, tradition-bound ideologues," who argue in general terms that Soviet interests and the interests of developing countries are inherently congruent.\textsuperscript{22} These perspectives are reinforced by the existence of similar currents of opinion in Soviet research institutes.

The Syrian Intervention in Lebanon and its Aftermath

As Carl W. Backman noted in 1970, crises in relationships—whether interpersonal or international—frequently provide an impetus to redefine the relationship, often through "formalized codes" or agreements.\textsuperscript{23} Syria's intervention in Lebanon seriously shook the Moscow-Damascus relationship, principally by showing Moscow the limits of its influence in Syria. It led directly to Soviet demands for greater military coordination and prior consultation before either party would undertake unilateral action of a military nature.

Lebanon was collapsing into civil strife as of early 1976. In Moscow, the Politburo decided that an escalation of the situation had to be avoided. The Soviet premier, Aleksei Kosygin, was dispatched to Damascus to dissuade President Hafez al-Assad from sending Syrian troops into Lebanon. Meanwhile, Assad, who had already intervened in Lebanon in order to try to restore order, was meeting with his top advisers. On the eve of Kosygin's arrival, he sent 4,000 Syrian troops and 250 tanks into Lebanon on June 1, 1976. This intervention presented Moscow with a dilemma insofar as Syrian troops were used to push back the Palestinian resistance. The intervention pitted one Soviet client against another.

Despite Kosygin's embarrassment, initial comments from Moscow were mixed.
For several days, there was no clear line emanating from the Kremlin. Such a delay usually signifies that the Kremlin has not resolved the issue--i.e., that there are some differences of opinion. In this context, the military, which had already developed considerable links with Syria, could be expected to have argued for a low-key approach in order to avoid escalating the crisis and alienating the Syrians. The IDCC might have argued that Syria was very isolated in the Arab world, and that failure to take a clear stand in support of the PLO would not only risk scarring the Soviet-PLO relationship permanently, but would also present an unnecessarily "opportunist" picture of the Soviet Union. Galia Golan speculates that the Soviets specifically might have wanted to oppose the Syrians, who had openly rebuffed Kosygin and who were obviously not particularly interested in Soviet views about Lebanon. 24 Decisionmaking at this level scarcely can be described as "rational" or "calculating." "Human" seems a better term. Faced with a clear conflict between goals and the absence of an "optimal" policy choice, Soviet decisionmakers had to choose a strategy of "satisficing."

By June 9, the Kremlin had reached a consensus and TASS issued a statement declaring that Syria's intervention was contributing to the bloodshed. On July 16, Prawda said that Syria was plunging "a knife into the back" of the Palestinian movement. 25 By mid-July, there were 15,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon and Leftist-Palestinian forces were suffering heavy casualties. From July 5-9, Foreign Minister Khaddam visited Moscow for talks with Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister. Their views were so divergent that no joint communiqué was issued. Instead, TASS bleakly reported on July 7 that "Talks were completed today between Andrei Gromyko ... minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, and Abd al-Halim Khaddam ... minister of
foreign affairs of Syria. There was an exchange of views on the situation in the Middle East as well as on other international problems of mutual concern. Two days later, the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee declared that "the involvement of Syrian military units in Lebanon has further aggravated the situation." On July 11, in another effort to influence Syrian policy, General Secretary Brezhnev sent a letter to Assad in which he reportedly wrote:

The Soviet Union feels disquiet over the position taken by Syria [in Lebanon] .... We insist that the Syrian leadership should take all possible measures to end its military operations against the [Palestinian] Resistance and the Lebanese National Movement. There must be an immediate cease-fire in Lebanon. You can contribute to this by withdrawing your troops from Lebanon .... We are convinced that such moves correspond with Syria's own interests .... [because otherwise] the imperialists and their collaborators will be able to bring the Arab people and the area's progressive movements under their control.

The Soviet Union reportedly suspended deliveries of military equipment and spare parts to Syria, and delayed the signing of new arms contracts.

By July, the initial uncertainty within the leadership had given way to a common policy posture. The result was that the various Soviet news organs adopted a uniform policy line, for example, with Krasnaia zvezda running TASS dispatches verbatim. The general line was a low-key pro-PLO position in which Syrian and Palestinian fighting was described as "real 'manna from heaven' for all those interested in prolonging the Lebanese crisis." When Syria and the PLO sat down for talks in August, Pravda optimistically speculated that "the natural state of affairs is being restored and that recognition of the lasting importance of relations between Syria and the Palestinian movement has proven stronger than all the artificial, extraneous matters and complications that have arisen during the events in Lebanon." Even in October, a newspaper report of a meeting between Politburo member
Mikhail Suslov, Boris Ponomarev, chief of the IDCC, and Khaled Bakdash, the Syrian Communist Party leader, avoided criticizing Syria by name.\textsuperscript{33} Pravda, without comment, quoted Assad as saying:

> We went into Lebanon in order to restore peace and order in that country and also to thwart conspiracies against our people and the Arab nation. Unfortunately, some Palestinian leaders fell into a trap. However, guided by confidence in the purity and justice of our aims, we shall restore a normal situation.\textsuperscript{34}

In a statement issued at the end of September, even the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee restricted itself to the rather bland comment that it was "particularly alarming" that Syrian troops in Lebanon were still being used against the PLO.\textsuperscript{35}

It is not surprising that the Soviet Union was chastened by both sides of the conflict. PLO leader Yasir Arafat believed that Moscow's stance was too cautious. His forces were being routed by the Syrian army, and Moscow did nothing to save the situation. As a result, Arafat declined an invitation to visit Moscow that year.\textsuperscript{36} On the other hand, Assad retaliated against Soviet obstruction of arms deliveries by ordering a reduction in the Soviet military presence in Syria. In the space of a few months, several thousand Soviet military advisers were sent home. The number of Soviet advisers in Syria quickly fell from 3,000-5,000 to about 1,800. Syria also halted its program of sending military personnel to the USSR for training, and is said to have considered terminating Soviet naval privileges at Latakia and Baniyas.\textsuperscript{37}

In January 1977, Syria in fact asked the Soviet Union to remove its submarines and support craft from Tartus.\textsuperscript{38} Syria was unable to exert effective influence over Soviet behavior during this crisis, but neither was it influenced by Soviet recriminations and appeals. In September 1976, Assad commented that "We have a different point of view [from the Soviets] which is
not subject to compromise because it is based on our firm national principles
and interest."  

The second Syrian intervention in Lebanon, insofar as it was directed
against the PLO, encouraged American officials to hope for a "moderation" of
Syrian foreign policy. As a result, the United States extended additional
credits to the Damascus government. This period represented a low point in
Soviet-Syrian relations, and it was not until a temporary settlement in
Lebanon was arranged and the PLO and Syria began talking to each other that
Soviet-Syrian relations began to return to normal.  

By the end of 1977, after various visits and further arms agreements, the Soviets and Syrians
affected a rapprochement (see Table 1). One token of this improved climate
was Moscow's agreement in January 1978 to increase deliveries of military
hardware to Syria. The Syrian army chief-of-staff, Major General Hikmat al-
Shihabi, was in Moscow at the end of February to head a military delegation,
obviously to spell out Syria's arms needs and to work out the details of the
expected arms transfusion. Syria received 12 MiG-27s from the Soviet Union
during 1978, to be paid for by Libya in hard currency.  

The aftermath of the Syrian intervention in Lebanon was a period of
Soviet soul-searching. In the late 1970s, Moscow suddenly began omitting
Syria from lists of "countries of socialist orientation," and it joined the
Syrian Communist Party in criticizing "unprogressive" developments in Syrian
domestic policy.  

The Politburo reached the consensus that Soviet-Syrian
relations had to be redefined, preferably through some formal mechanism, and
began to press Damascus, ever more urgently, to conclude a Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation. When Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Damascus in
March 1979, he stressed the importance of strengthening bilateral cooperation,
especially in the political sphere. The joint communiqué that was issued adopted this terminology by underlining the importance of "political consultations."43

In the meantime, the Kremlin also tried to lock Syria into an arrangement for some form of military coordination. The occasion came in November 1978, when General al-Shihabi returned to Moscow. The Kremlin was evidently encouraged by signs of rapprochement between Syria and Iraq, and had decided to exploit the opportunity by trying to push the two clients into a tight embrace. A secret meeting was convened on November 23 in the Soviet Ministry of Defense. Attending the meeting were Dmitri Ustinov, the Soviet defense minister; Nikolai Ogarkov, the Soviet chief-of-staff; General Adnan Khayrallah, the Iraqi defense minister; and General Shihabi. The Soviets proposed "trilateral coordination" between the USSR, Syria, and Iraq on political positions and arms placement. The Soviets cited the "national covenant for joint work" that Syria and Iraq signed on October 26, and announced that it had become "convinced" that arms shipments to the two countries should be coordinated along lines adopted for the Warsaw Pact. Finally, the Soviets expressed concern that the placement of additional MiG-27s in Syria would expose them to surprise Israeli raids, and suggested that they should be based on Iraqi soil instead.44 This was completely unacceptable to Syria, and Shihabi left Moscow in a huff two days ahead of schedule.

The joint coordination proposed by Moscow might well have been designed as a substitute for the friendship and cooperation treaty that Syria still refused to sign, although it clearly involved much closer coordination than would arise within the framework of a friendship treaty alone. However, from
the Syrian point of view, it shared the chief debility of a friendship treaty, for it threatened to reduce Syria's freedom of action.

Moving Toward a Friendship Pact, 1979-1980

Soviet-Syrian frictions over the issue of coordination with Iraq—whom Syria's relations soured after Saddam Hussein assumed full power in Baghdad in July 1979—were more than outweighed by their common opposition to the Camp David accords and their common fears of the waxing Israeli role in buttressing the Lebanese Phalangists. In January, Defense Minister Tlas was in Moscow, and the Soviets agreed to satisfy Syria's arms requirements. By the beginning of April, Syria obtained the arms it had requested. By October 1979, after an earlier postponement, Assad was once again in Moscow for talks with Kosygin, Gromyko, Ustinov, and Ponomarev. Western observers reported seeing at least 70 modern T-72 tanks unloaded at Tartus in early August. Moscow agreed to ship more MiG-27s, a squadron of Sukhoi-22 ground attack aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles, long-range Frog missiles, and anti-aircraft jamming equipment. Moscow sweetened the deal by writing off 25 percent of Syria's estimated $2 billion military debt. Meanwhile, more Cuban troops arrived, complementing the more than 230 Cuban military advisers already in Syria.

The ultimate failure of the tentative rapprochement between Syria and the United States in 1976-77 and the deepening imbroglio in Lebanon contributed to Syria's appreciation of its Moscow connection and an unwillingness to compromise it for the sake of extraregional causes. Hence, when the Soviet army moved into Afghanistan in force and removed the headstrong dictator...
Hafizullah Amin in late December 1979, Syria was unruffled. Foreign Minister Khaddam commented, "The question of the defense of Islam is being decided not in Afghanistan but in Palestine, Jerusalem and Lebanon, where they are destroying Muslims with U.S. arms and U.S. aircraft." Accordingly, when the United Nations considered a resolution to condemn the Soviet intervention, Syria joined Algeria, Libya, and North Yemen in abstaining from the vote.

Meanwhile, with Egypt neutralized, Iraq alienated, and Lebanon disintegrating, Assad was coming to the conclusion that a formal pact with the Soviet Union might be useful as a kind of insurance policy, both against Israel and in the Lebanese imbroglio. In August 1980, the 75-member Central Committee of the Syrian Ba'ath Party resolved to make a "qualitative" change in Syria's relations with its "loyal friend," the USSR. Soon thereafter, Syria restored diplomatic relations with Ethiopia. Together with all other Arab states except South Yemen, Syria had broken relations with Ethiopia out of solidarity with the Muslim Eritrean secessionist movement. Syria was going out of its way to accommodate the Soviet Union.

The Friendship Treaty

After resisting Soviet requests for a friendship treaty for at least eight years, Assad went to Moscow on an official visit from October 8-10, 1980, to sign a formal Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which obviously had been in preparation for at least two months. The treaty's duration is 20 years, with automatic five-year extensions unless one of the signatory parties terminates the agreement. The key sections of the document are articles 5, 6, and 10.
Article 5 says that "The high contracting parties will develop and expand the practice of the mutual exchange of opinions and regular consultations on questions of bilateral relations and on international problems of interests to both parties, above all on problems of the Middle East. Consultations and exchanges of opinions will be held at various levels, first of all through meetings between the two parties' leading statesmen."

Article 6 stipulates that "In the event that a situation arises that threatens the peace or security of one of the parties or that creates a threat to peace or disturbs peace and security the world over, the high contracting parties will immediately contact each other with a view to coordinating their positions and cooperating in eliminating the threat that has arisen and restoring peace."

And article 10 states that "The high contracting parties will continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them in the interests of strengthening their defense capability."52

The Soviet-Syrian friendship treaty largely follows the model of other Soviet friendship treaties. It is unique, however, in several respects. First, it is the only such treaty to omit the modifier "inviolable" in describing Moscow's friendship with the contracting Third World state. Second, it is unique in mentioning military cooperation twice (in articles 1 and 10). And third, it stands alone in calling for actual cooperation in dealing with threats to peace (article 6). Until the signing of the friendship treaty with North Yemen in late 1984, it was also the only such treaty to incorporate a reference to the need to struggle against "Zionism." Whether or not a secret military protocol is attached to the treaty cannot be
established. However, in the September 26, 1980, issue of al-Moustaqbal, an Arab newspaper published in Paris, the Syrian minister of information, Ahmed Iskandar, said that the friendship treaty would provide for the dispatch of Soviet troops to Syria if needed.53

The signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation had a direct impact on factionalism in Soviet policymaking. First, military cooperation developed apace, with an increase in the number of Soviet-Syrian exchanges and consultations, increased weapons deliveries, and joint military exercises in 1981. Combined with the enhanced influence enjoyed by the military in Soviet policymaking in the late Brezhnev and Andropov periods,54 this suggests that the Soviet military's influence in the formulation of policy vis-à-vis Syria was probably enhanced. Second, insofar as Soviet-Syrian treaty led to the promotion of interparty ties between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Syrian Ba'th Party,55 the treaty might have produced a greater role for the IDCC in this area. Third, judging from the equanimity with which the Syrian government has been able to harass and arrest Syrian communists without having to fear any repercussions in its relationship with the USSR,56 it would seem that the Syrian Communist Party, whose influence in the Kremlin was slight prior to 1980, enjoys even less influence today. In more general terms, the Politburo might well have concluded that the mutual consultation clause would free it from having to worry about unpleasantries such as those that occurred in June 1976, though the Syrian falling out with the PLO in 1983 was precisely such an unpleasantry.

Between 1981 and early 1983, Syria became steadily more involved in Lebanon. With the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon on June 6, 1982, creating the danger of a broader Middle East war, the Soviets found themselves
being led by the nose by their Syrian client. In May 1981, for example, the Syrian journal *al-Ba’th* asserted that any Israeli attack on Syrian surface-to-air missile batteries in Lebanon would have to reckon with Soviet-Syrian friendship. The Soviet ambassador to Lebanon, Aleksandr Soldatov, promptly distanced his country from the Syrian claim, declaring that developments in Lebanon were "unrelated to the Soviet-Syrian treaty."57 All the same, the Soviet helicopter carrier *Moskva* was brought close to the coast of Lebanon, and in early July the Soviets and Syrians conducted joint naval maneuvers off the Syrian coast in what was unmistakably a demonstration of a Soviet commitment to Syria’s defense.58

In the period from June 1982 to April 1983, the military cornucopia flowing into Syria included some 800 T-72 tanks, 200 armored personnel carriers, 600-800 trucks, 160 fighter aircraft, as well as SAM-5, SAM-6, SAM-9, and SS-21 missile systems.59 But this assistance seems to have given the Kremlin only minimal leverage over Syrian military decisions. For example, after Israel’s strike into southern Lebanon, the USSR called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, including Syrian troops. By September 1983, the USSR no longer publicly spoke of a Syrian withdrawal. Privately, Soviet officials expressed exasperation with Syria’s involvement in Lebanon,60 but there was little they could do about it without risking a rupture in relations.

The Struggle for the PLO

The fissure of the PLO in 1983, during which Syria ultimately backed the revolt within al-Fatah that broke out in May, was generally disconcerting to
the Soviets, and specifically nocuous from the standpoint of continuing the propagandistic fiction of the "unity of progressive forces," maintaining open channels with both the PLO and Syria, and conserving the Soviet military presence in Syria. In consonance with their usual practice, Soviet news organs either denied, minimized, or simply ignored both the revolt and PLO-Syrian frictions as long as possible. Certain variations within the Soviet press, however, suggest that there might have been more going on beneath the surface.

The Palestine Liberation Organization is bound to be vulnerable to external manipulation and pressure in that it is actually a confederation of eight guerrilla organizations. Some are Marxist; some are dominated by Arab countries such as Iraq, Libya, Syria; and some have become factionalized in recent years. Yasir Arafat's organization, al-Fatah, has long been preeminent by virtue of the fact that it commanded 80 percent of the PLO's total membership.\textsuperscript{61} Within such a structure, it is inevitable that differences of political opinion will flare up, and the possibility that these differences could inflame organizational infighting has long existed. Part of the reason the PLO has never been entirely clear as to its final goal is that there is wide disagreement within its ranks over what those goals should be.

When Arafat started to mend fences with King Hussein of Jordan in late 1982 and began to entertain the possibility of achieving a "Palestinian homeland" as an autonomous district linked with Jordan--a plan favored by President Reagan--radicals within the PLO became discontented. After a meeting in Tripoli, Libya, in January 1983, five PLO factions came out against the Reagan initiative and an Arab peace plan suggested in Fez, Morocco, in September 1982. They denounced both plans as "capitulationist schemes," and
underlined their conviction that "armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine."62

In February, there was another meeting of the Palestine National Council, this time in Algiers. The leader of the pro-Syrian faction, Ahmed Jabril, denounced Arafat for being too ready to compromise. But despite some superficial demonstrations of unity--sarcastically derided by one outspoken participant as "a unity of kisses"--the meeting ended inconclusively.63

Arafat continued to think in terms of a diplomatic path to a West Bank-Gaza Strip state, but radicals within the PLO continued to think in terms of armed struggle to wipe Israel off the map.

For the first five months of 1983, the Soviet press studiously avoided any reference to differences within Fatah or between Fatah and Syria.64 The first public hint that there were problems came in February, but Pravda's oblique reference to attempts by "the Palestinian people's enemies ... to use the imperialists' old 'divide and conquer' principle to undermine the Palestinians' own struggle" seemed to suggest that the only source of problems was the United States and Israel.65 More frequently, the Soviet media either denied that there was any discord within the PLO, or vaguely noted the importance of unity. Meanwhile, General Secretary Andropov urged Arafat to privately mend his relations with Assad.66 The Soviet leadership thus preferred to take a passive attitude toward the discord and hoped it would fade away independently.

In May 1983, the Soviet leadership was forced to assume a more active posture when pro-Syrian elements within Fatah led by Abu Nimir Saleh and Colonel Said Musa (Abu Musa) broke into revolt. Saleh is said to be the leading pro-Soviet leftist within Fatah.67 This only further complicates the
picture for the Kremlin. The ostensible catalysts of the rebellion were disputes over certain Arafat command appointments and the existence of corruption within the PLO. The real issues underlying the revolt were, first, whether the PLO should retain its diplomatic strategy or revert to an armed strategy toward minimalist goals, and second, whether the PLO could continue to be an independent actor or would come under Syrian domination.

Adeed Dawisha has argued that Syria engineered the revolt against Arafat—a revolt that was viewed with grave misgivings in Moscow. Whether it did so or not, Syria was quick to support the rebels, sending tanks and other equipment to Abu Musa. Libya also endorsed the rebels, and both the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and the Syrian-controlled organization al-Sa'iqa joined the rebels. In addition, Damascus put heavy pressure on Naif Hawatmeh's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Georges Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine to defect to the rebels.

As late as June 15, TASS issued a statement quoting Arafat to the effect that "the differences on separate questions in the Fatah organization had been overcome." However, with Abu Musa's revolt showing tenacity, a shift in the Soviet Union's handling of the issue took place. On June 26, Pravda published a reasonably candid account of Abu Musa's rebellion, appending a short report noting that Arafat had been expelled from Syria because his continued presence was considered "undesirable." This was probably intended as a mild rebuke to Assad. A Moscow television broadcast the same evening clarified the Kremlin's sympathy for Arafat.

The emerging Soviet policy line—an attempt to maintain good relations with both Arafat and Assad while working for their reconciliation and leaving
open the possibility of a confederal union between a prospective Palestinian state and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan—was reflected in Pravda, Izvestiia, TASS dispatches, and occasional articles in Komsomolskaia pravda. By contrast, there were some differences in the reportage in Krasnaia zvezda, the Soviet army news organ, and Sovetskaia rossia, said to be a mouthpiece for Russian nationalist and neo-Stalinist sentiments. These newspapers took harder, if divergent, lines and seemed to show less interest in a confederation.

As Malcolm Mackintosh observed several years ago, the Soviet military tends to be conservative in the sense that it eschews any policy it considers "risky" and regularly argues for "a full evaluation of all the risks involved" in policy choices. It is probably also conservative in that it places more stress on relations with established governments than on relations with guerrilla movements. This policy follows logically from the fact that guerrilla movements such as the PLO enjoy contacts above all with the IDCC, or in unusual cases—when they achieve international recognition, as in the case of the PLO—with the Foreign Ministry and members of the Politburo. For training purposes, guerrilla movements are more likely to be working with KGB trainers or foreign contractors, such as Cubans or Bulgarians, than with Soviet military personnel. By contrast, Soviet military contacts with Syrian military personnel have been extensive at all levels.

Krasnaia zvezda's reportage seems to confirm these more general expectations. First, Krasnaia zvezda seems to devote more space to Syria than to the PLO relative to other Soviet newspapers. Second, its reportage has seemed to reflect concern about the Syrian connection. While it admitted some soul-searching for new tactics on the part of the PLO, Krasnaia zvezda
underlined that the PLO continued to aim at a fully independent state.77

Coverage by Sovetskaia rossia differed both the Pravda-Izvestiia-TASS grouping and Krasnaia zvezda in its heavier emphasis on the PLO. Between 1983 and 1984, Sovetskaia rossia ran several exclusive interviews with Rami ash-Sha'ir, the PLO representative in Moscow.78 There was no comparable series of articles featuring Syrian spokesmen.

Sovetskaia rossia also sounded a different note in January 1983 by quoting Arafat to the effect that Soviet peace proposals are "essentially identical" to the Arab plan worked out in Fez.79 This was a stronger claim than Pravda's description of Soviet proposals as being "in accord" with the Fez plan.80 Two months after most of the Soviet media openly began to report about the discord within Fatah, Sovetskaia rossia published an article adhering to the pre-June line. For example, it presented the 16th Session of the Palestine National Council, which had taken place in February 1983, as having laid to rest notions of a split within the PLO. It spoke of the Palestinians' "complete rejection of the so-called Reagan initiative."81 This occurred a month after an astonishing admission by commentator Igor Belyayev in Literaturnaia gazeta that some elements in the PLO had favored the Reagan plan.82 Literaturnaia gazeta implicitly acknowledged that Fatah was "going through an almost irreversible political crisis unprecedented in its history," and no longer blamed the discord on either Western "lies" or Western manipulation.83 TASS also admitted that Fatah's differences sprang from within the ranks of Fatah. By contrast, Izvestiia struck a more confrontational note, arguing that:

Israel and its transatlantic patrons also need to undermine pan-Arab unity in order to isolate the PLO politically, to demolish that organization by exploiting the differences which have been
exacerbated in its ranks, and then to eliminate the Palestinian problem altogether.84

The Politburo eschewed the appearance of preferring one party over the other, and the Soviet ambassador in Damascus soon let senior Syrian officials know that Moscow was displeased with Palestinian infighting.85 In a message to President Assad, Andropov said that "Safeguarding the unity of the PLO is a basic and inalienable policy of the Soviet Union. A continuation of fighting threatens both Syrian interests and the accomplishments of the Palestinian people."86 Abu Iyad, Arafat's second-in-command, traveled to Moscow in the first week of June, and was assured of Soviet support for Arafat's leadership.

When Foreign Minister Khaddam went to Moscow in November 1983, Gromyko told him it was "extremely important and urgent" that Syria do its part to bring an end to the infighting and patch up its feud with Arafat.87 Instead, Syrian-supported insurgents drove Arafat's forces out of two Palestinian camps shortly after the visit.

Despite Arafat's occasional flirtation with the West, his position regarding a future Palestinian state limited to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is closer to the Soviet view than the position of the more radical rebels. Moreover, according to a senior Western diplomat, Moscow "would not like to see a PLO leader who owed his loyalty directly to Syria."88

The Soviets tried hard to heal the rifts between Arafat and Assad and within Fatah by sending a high-level delegation to Damascus in August 1983. The delegation had discussions with Abu Musa and his aides in the presence of Arafat's representative, Diyab al-Atrash.89 This and other efforts bore little fruit. Moscow's apparently verbatim broadcast of an extract from a Syrian newspaper assailing Arafat for capitulationism probably should be seen as a mild reproof to Damascus.90
A government message to President Assad, sent jointly by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in April 1984, served as a vehicle for stating the lowest common denominator among the Kremlin's tendency groupings. In this message, Syrian "anti-imperialism" was praised, U.S. advocacy of "separate deals" was condemned, and Syria was promised Soviet support for continued efforts to pursue "progressive social and economic development."\textsuperscript{91}

However, behind this "lowest common denominator," some differences continued among the leading news organs of the Soviet Union. \textit{Sovetskaia rossija} amplified images of a military threat. It warned of Israeli "political blackmail" against Syria, and claimed to find the situation "highly reminiscent of the hysteria which the 'strategic allies' [the United States and Israel] usually fuel on the eve of a large-scale adventure." These dangers, \textit{Sovetskaia rossija} fretted, were directly associated with "the current U.S. Administration's foreign policy--a simplistic 'black and white' approach to political problems."\textsuperscript{92}

One of Syria's biggest advocates within the Politburo as of 1983 was General Secretary Yuri Andropov. Convinced of Syria's strategic importance, Andropov repeatedly reassured Assad of Soviet military support and tried to overcome the reservations of Defense Minister Ustinov and Foreign Minister Gromyko.\textsuperscript{93} Andropov wanted to obtain a consensus in the Kremlin "that Soviet arms could be rushed to Syria 'in time,' "in the event of a Syrian-Israeli war."\textsuperscript{94} It is possible that Andropov might also have been receptive to the idea of upgrading the Soviet Union's military relationship with Syria.

The dangers of "world imperialism" and "Zionism" are constant themes in the Soviet press, but they can be nuanced to induce different assessments.
Krasnaia zvezda, for example, relied on balancing threatening and reassuring images to shift emphasis to the positive side of events. In its issue of May 22, 1984, an article by 'International Observer V. Vinogradov' followed this formula in saying that:

The Lebanese government, despite all efforts to normalize the situation, is still failing to finally get the situation under control. Nonetheless, there are signs of positive changes in the life of the country. Efforts are being made with the help of Syrian and the other Arab states to end the bloody civil war.

The article describes the role played by Israel, but then reassuringly adds:

Yet things in southern Lebanon are not going the way the Israeli aggressors would like. The scale of the people's armed struggle is growing there every day. Israeli troops are incurring losses ....

Consistent in its relative equanimity, Krasnaia zvezda concludes by citing a public statement by Mustafa Tias, the Syrian defense minister, who claimed that "The Syrian Arab Republic has everything it needs to repulse sudden aggression."

After Andropov's death in February 1984 and his replacement by Konstantin Chernenko, the more cautious line represented by the Soviet military establishment and Foreign Minister Gromyko became dominant in the Kremlin. Despite the shipment of a number of SS-21 missiles to Syria in early 1984--when Assad's brother, Rifaat, visited Moscow in May 1984--his host at the formal luncheon and candidate Politburo member Vasili Kuznetsov stressed the Politburo's consensus that "the Arabs possess all necessary means for foiling the schemes of U.S. imperialism and its Israeli partners."

Syria seemed not to have been satisfied, and when President Assad visited Moscow in October 1984, he again raised the question of Soviet military assistance. The joint communiqué notes vaguely that "in the course of the talks, questions of the Soviet Union's granting further assistance to Syria in
strengthening its defense capability were discussed, and corresponding decisions adopted.\textsuperscript{98} Later it was reported that Assad was trying to obtain an agreement on "strategic cooperation" with the USSR.\textsuperscript{99} It was probably with this in mind that he accepted the Chernenko peace plan, at least declaratively, despite its inclusion of a guarantee of the independence of Israel.\textsuperscript{100} Assad also conceded "the need to preserve the unity of the Palestinian resistance movement,"\textsuperscript{101} which he had been trying to undermine.

By March 1985, Chernenko was dead and the new Soviet general secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, began to organize a policymaking team that would reflect a new Politburo consensus. Gorbachev forced Grigori Romanov, the candidate of Russian nationalists and neo-Stalinists to resign from the Politburo,\textsuperscript{102} and seven months later he edged Viktor Grishin, the Moscow party boss, into retirement. Grishin had supported Chernenko's candidacy in 1984 and was probably associated with tendencies characteristic of Sovetskaia rossiia.\textsuperscript{103} Between June 1985 and May 1986, Gorbachev replaced Foreign Minister Gromyko with Eduard Shevardnadze, replaced all party secretaries dealing with foreign affairs, changed most senior officials in the Foreign Ministry, and changed more than 30 key ambassadors around the world.\textsuperscript{104}

The emergent Gorbachev grouping carried out a thorough reassessment of Soviet policies in the developing world. Gorbachev's address to the 27th Party Congress of the CPSU in February 1986 paid little attention to Soviet clients in the developing world and failed to accord a special status to countries of the once-favored category, "countries of socialist orientation."\textsuperscript{105} The Gorbachev grouping was frustrated with Syria's continued support of Iran because the Soviet Union had shifted toward favoring Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. It was also disturbed at Syria's close linkage with
Shi'ite groups in Lebanon,\(^{106}\) and disappointed that Soviet efforts to mediate the Syrian-PLO dispute had failed.

In the spring of 1985 and later in 1986, therefore, the Gorbachev leadership renewed pressure on Damascus to negotiate with Arafat's Fatah. Assad's brief visit to Moscow on May 28, 1985, did not produce any dramatic results, but shortly thereafter the Soviets withdrew a number of their SAM-5 technicians, turning the missiles over to Syrian control. While accounts differ as to who ordered the withdrawal, the fact that several thousand advisers were involved suggests at least some strains. All the same, by May 1986 Vice President Khaddam enthusiastically described Soviet-Syrian relations as "superb."\(^{107}\) One June 9, 1985, however, a TASS release reprimanded Arab governments who "turned their backs on the Palestinians and upon the other forces threatened by Israeli expansionism."\(^{108}\) A subsequent meeting between Assad and Gorbachev in July 1985 was said to have been "marred by their different approaches to the Middle East."\(^{109}\) The intractability of these differences was revealed by the omission of any of Assad's remarks about the future of the PLO in Soviet press accounts of his luncheon address.\(^{110}\)

The Soviets renewed their efforts to mediate Syrian-PLO differences in early 1986.\(^{111}\) But the most the Kremlin can claim is that it has remained on good terms with both sides, which is not an inconsequential achievement.

Conclusion

Interfactional discord over Soviet policy toward Syria was sharper and more visible during periods of crisis in the relationship, such as from 1976 to 1978 and from 1982 to 1985, and less visible during periods of relative
tranquility, such as from 1978 to 1982. In addition, shifts in the interfactional balance of power have always had the potential to lead to shifts in policy vis-à-vis specific client states. In general terms, Brezhnev and Chernenko belonged to a group of "forward-looking globalists" propounding an active posture in the Third World, though under the ineffectual Chernenko, Soviet foreign policy continued to drift hesitantly along the path set by Andropov. For most of the period from 1976-85, this point of view was articulated by Pravda and Izvestiia.

The Andropov interlude was in some ways marked by a "reduced emphasis on Soviet commitments to the Third World." Andropov seems to have adhered in many ways to the general line articulated by Krasnaia zvezda. Accordingly, during his tenure as general secretary, "the Soviet leadership seemed to have set upon a course of restraint and caution in their policy toward the Third World."\(^{112}\) The Middle East--and in particular, Syria--was an exception to the rule. In this area, Andropov not only continued Brezhnev's policy, but even took it further.

Gorbachev's defeated rival, Grigori Romanov, was associated with the more "tradition-bound" Russian nationalist grouping identified with Sovetskaia rossitia. Gorbachev's policy represents a triumph of the Krasnaia zvezda line of 1976 to 1984. Soviet-Syrian relations under Gorbachev are therefore being reconstituted on a new basis.

This analysis of Soviet policymaking vis-à-vis Syria is founded on the supposition that, rather than being reducible to cool rational calculation, policy decisions represent the intersection of institutional and national interest, factional rivalry, rational and nonrational images, and the need to "satisfice" in the face of conflicts between goals, time pressures, and sundry
other factors. Despite the Kremlin's frustrating lack of leverage over Syrian foreign policy, and despite some hints of factional differences within the Soviet policymaking elite, the attractions of the Syrian nexus are considerable and the alternatives to present policies are quite unattractive to the Politburo consensus.

What Moscow enjoys with Syria--and for that matter with the PLO--is not so much influence as open channels of communication. These channels are undeniably useful, but they are no guarantee of influence. Indeed, as Alvin Z. Rubinstein once remarked, "What seems to be influence often turns out instead to be [merely the] joint interests of the two parties." As a byproduct of bilateral relations, influence in fact tends to be issue-specific or situation-specific, short-lived, and without clear cost boundaries.

It is also clear that the different agencies of the Soviet establishment interact with different sectors of the Syrian political landscape for different purposes and in different contexts. This in turn means that there are institutional interests on the Soviet side as well as on the Syrian side that derive different benefits from the Soviet-Syrian relationship. Hence, when the relationship is hit by a crisis, these institutions are apt to have different perceptions of its importance and proper solution.

The Soviets have not obtained tangible influence over Syrian foreign policy, although the Syrians have enjoyed a measure of influence over Soviet policy in the Middle East environment when that influence has not been offset by countervailing PLO influence or the Kremlin's autonomous considerations.

Soviet influence over Syria is distinctly limited. The Soviets were unable to dissuade Syria from intervening in Lebanon in 1976, unable to prevent Syrian-Palestinian feuding in 1983 and 1984, and unable to persuade
Damascus in the spring of 1984 to improve its relations with Baghdad and reopen the 1.2 million barrel per day pipeline that pumps Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{114} The Soviets also could not prevent Syrian authorities from confiscating Soviet weaponry sent to the PLO through Syria in 1983.\textsuperscript{115}

The terms of the Soviet-Syrian relationship are typical of such patron-client relationships. The Soviets provide Syria with assistance necessary for it to pursue an effective regional policy, and in exchange the Soviets obtain a presence in Syria as well as Syrian endorsement of Soviet actions in areas lying outside Syria's zone of interest, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As a global power with global concerns, the Soviet Union is interested in encouraging stability in the relationship. Therefore, for reasons of \textit{Realpolitik}, the Soviets have preferred to encourage the development of Syria's state sector rather than watch the private sector grow. They have feared the possibility that while the state sector would remain a natural customer for East bloc administrative skills, the private sector would be apt to develop commercial ties with private sectors in the West.

Thus, when Soviet writers speak of Syria or other Third World nations as having embarked on a "non-capitalist path"—or when they speak of the principles of the Soviet New Economic Policy of the early 1920s as being better suited to Third World conditions than the revolutionary model of orthodox Leninism-Stalinism or a pluralist system of the Western mold\textsuperscript{116}—it is profoundly wrong to think this attitude entails a total indifference to institutional forms, and therefore to interagency contacts and bilateral relations. Advisory, administrative, support, and training contacts are dimensions of institutional needs and instruments of \textit{Realpolitik}, to which the Soviets are anything but indifferent.\textsuperscript{117}
Table 1

Syrian Arms Imports, 1972-1982

(millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Current dollars</th>
<th>Constant 1981 dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>2,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>1,396</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>590</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
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<td>901</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>900</td>
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<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,382</td>
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<td>2,700</td>
<td>2,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>2,169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes


2. For a class analysis of Syrian foreign policy, see Fred H. Lawson, "Syria's Intervention in the Lebanese Civil War, 1976: A Domestic Conflict Explanation," International Organisation 38, no. 3 (Summer 1984).


5. On the Syrian side, one could begin by noting the special interests and perspectives of the army and both factions of the Syrian Communist Party, the hints of rivalry among Hafez Assad's most likely successors (Chief of Staff Hikmat as-Shihabi, Chief of Special Forces Ali Haidar, and Assad's brother, Rifaat), and the impact of the opposition, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, on the decisionmakers.


13. Interview with Paul B. Henze (see note 4).


30. See Krasnaia zvezda, July 1-11, 1976.


46. Archiv der Gegenwart, August 29, 1979, p. 22845; confirmed in New


48. Pravda, February 17, 1980, summarized in USSR & Third World 11, nos. 2-3 (February 1-May 31, 1980), p. 55. In the spring of 1980, Foreign Minister Khaddam told the West German magazine Der Spiegel in the course of an interview, "We have studied the situation and have come to the conclusion that the fuss about Afghanistan is meaningless theatrics, designed to reshuffle the cards in the Arab region, to end Sadat's isolation, and to assist in bringing success to the Camp David agreements. For us it was quite clear that the U.S. did not really mean to make a direct confrontation with the USSR." Der Spiegel, April 28, 1980, p. 163.

49. Actually, the Libyan delegate was absent when the vote was taken. South Yemen was alone among Arab states in voting against the resolution.

50. The Economist, August 30, 1980, p. 29.

51. Politika (Belgrade), September 10, 1980; and Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), October 10, 1980.

52. Pravda, October 9, 1980, trans. in CDSP 32, no. 41 (November 12, 1980), p. 6. An English translation of the treaty can also be found in Middle East Review 14, nos. 1-2 (Fall/Winter 1981-82), pp. 74-75.


70. Seattle Times, November 10, 1983.


87. Seattle Times, November 13, 1983. See also Frankfurter Allgemeine, December 1, 1983.

88. Seattle Times, November 12, 1983.


106. Arabia, August 1985, p. 34.


112. The Soviet Union in the Third World, pp. 31-32.


114. As Aliev tried during his March 1984 visit to Damascus. See Washington Post (May 18, 1984).

115. So Arafat charged in interview with the Kuwait newspaper, Al-Anba. It is unlikely such that he could have stood to gain from concocting such a complaint. See KUNA (Kuwait), November 29, 1983, trans. in FBIS, Daily Report (Soviet Union), November 29, 1983, p. H1.
