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On September 21-23, 1987, the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies and the International Security Studies program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars cosponsored a conference on the Dynamics of Soviet Defense Policy. The following report summarizes the proceedings of that conference. This report examines the evolution and context of Soviet defense policy, surveys Soviet military doctrine—including views on theater war in Europe and world war, and on the use of military power in the Third World—and concludes with a discussion of the USSR's nuclear and conventional arms control policies.

"Soviet Defense Policy: A Conference Report" synthesizes the views of academicians and government specialists prior to the fall of 1987. No attempt has been made to update this report in order to analyze recent developments. Speakers in each section are identified at the outset, and unless noted otherwise, the views throughout the section belong to the original speaker or speakers.

The papers presented at the conference will be published as a volume under the auspices of the Kennan Institute. The volume will be edited by Bruce Parrott, Director of Soviet Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. A list of all the conference papers appears at the end of this report.

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Theodore Taranovski
Acting Secretary
March 1989
1.

THE EVOLUTION AND CONTEXT

The study of Soviet defense policy involves not only consideration of the specific military policies that the Soviet leadership pursues at a given time, but it must also take into account a variety of factors contributing to the environment in which that policy is made. This environment is at least as important to an understanding of Soviet policy as are actual decisions on force posture and strategy, and is frequently easier to observe and to analyze. The context of Soviet defense policy has varied with time, reflecting changes in Soviet evaluations of the level of the external threat, the views of the political leadership on the utility of military power, the priority of domestic concerns, and the state of relations between civilian and military actors in the USSR.

According to Lawrence Caldwell, Soviet policy at any given time reflects the extent to which the leadership perceives the state to be vulnerable to direct military threat. Closely related to this consideration is the priority that the leadership attaches to domestic affairs. In addition, Soviet strategy takes account of the prospects for revolution abroad, with respect to which it is necessary to distinguish prospects in the First World and prospects in the Third World. Another category of Soviet geopolitical thinking is the nature of Soviet relations with the developed capitalist countries and the appropriate approach to these relations. Finally, Soviet strategy reflects the Soviet assessment of the balance of military power, or more broadly, the correlation of forces between capitalism and socialism. These factors have acted upon one another to influence the overall Soviet foreign and military policy, which has changed over time.

The Khrushchev Period

Dr. Caldwell asserted that under Khrushchev the international threat was seen as having greatly diminished since Stalin's time. The Khrushchev leadership sought to pursue domestic economic development and was willing to reduce military costs in order to promote such development. Khrushchev felt that the prospects for revolution in the Third World were very high, while those in the developed world were rather low. The preferred means of dealing with capitalist states was through a policy of peaceful coexistence, at least in part because the Soviets assessed the military balance to be one in which the USSR was at a disadvantage, although this was changing.

Khrushchev believed that nuclear weapons would be the decisive factor in a future war, and that this factor made possible a cheaper defense policy, which relied heavily upon strategic nuclear forces as opposed to costlier conventional ones. While a cheaper defense policy allowed greater concentration on economic issues, it also caused strains in Khrushchev's relations with the military. Although the Soviet military as an institution had supported Khrushchev to succeed Stalin, relations between political and military leaders worsened as the result of
Khrushchev's attempts to reduce military spending and to interfere in military doctrine. Khrushchev's position on nuclear warfare, and his insistence that nuclear weapons rendered large ground forces, long-range air forces, and blue water naval capabilities obsolete, alienated large sectors of the Soviet military. Other policies that earned Khrushchev military disfavor were his support of peaceful coexistence with the West and his tolerance of "goulash communism" in Eastern Europe.

The First Brezhnev Decade

During the early Brezhnev period the Soviet Union acquired the material basis for its claim to the status of a global military power. As the result of a massive, across-the-board arms buildup, real changes in the global "correlation of forces" had occurred, in the Soviet view. The Soviet buildup created the basis for arms control with the West and gave the Soviets the ability to counter American influence in the Third World. With newly acquired power, the Soviets articulated a more expansionist military policy, as expressed in the writings of Minister of Defense Marshal A. Grechko and Commander in Chief of the Navy Admiral S. Gorshkov. At the same time, the Soviet achievement of strategic military parity and the existence of deterrence not only enabled the Soviets to carry on with a policy of peaceful coexistence but provided them with incentives to engage in arms control.

The first decade of Brezhnev's leadership was what Jeremy Azrael has referred to as a "golden age" for the Soviet military: the high command got almost everything it wanted in terms of resources, programs, status, and freedom of action in developing Soviet strategic concepts. Brezhnev undertook an intensive effort to strengthen the Soviet armed forces, at the expense of the consumer sector, producing a growth rate in military spending of four to five percent per year. Under Brezhnev's military buildup, the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) were expanded, as they had been under Khrushchev, and the navy, the army, and the air force also received more resources.

In addition, Brezhnev demonstrated greater confidence in the military's political reliability than his predecessor. Marshal Zhukov was rehabilitated, and Brezhnev appointed Marshal Grechko in 1967 to succeed Rodion Malinovsky as minister of defense. Grechko was subsequently elevated to Politburo membership. While acknowledging that this was indeed the military's "golden age," Bruce Parrott interpreted the 12-day delay between Malinovsky's death and Grechko's appointment--during which Dmitry Ustinov was also being considered for the position--as an indication that civil-military relations were not entirely smooth.

Finally, Brezhnev did not share Khrushchev's propensity to interfere in doctrinal matters. He essentially allowed the military freedom in this area and permitted a "doctrinal counterreformation" to take place as the Soviet military repudiated many of Khrushchev's tenets. Segments of the military affirmed that nuclear war could be a rational instrument of policy, that victory was meaningful, that strategic superiority should be pursued, and that the Soviet military needed to prepare for both conventional and nuclear warfare, developing both defensive and offensive missions. Azrael stated that these concepts received Brezhnev's support. In any case, the military was able to make ample use of its monopoly on military-
technical expertise, and it became the leadership's only source of advice on national security policy, Rose Gottemoeller noted. Thus during the first Brezhnev decade, the leadership deferred to military preferences, and a basic policy consensus emerged between the civilian and military leadership. The Soviet military had first claim on resources, and Soviet policy was directed primarily toward military goals.

The Late Brezhnev Period and Beyond

A variety of elements combined to bring about a rethinking of Soviet policy in the late Brezhnev years. International oil price fluctuations and clear indications of economic stagnation in the USSR made the question of resource allocation priorities increasingly difficult to defer. The Soviets retreated from some of their expansionist doctrinal assertions characteristic of the earlier period; this was in part brought about by the death of Minister of Defense Grechko, who had been one of their sponsors. Finally, the Soviets were forced to contend with both changes in conventional military technology and the resurgence of the United States in the military competition. These developments produced policy changes that resulted in tensions between civilian and military elements—tensions that had been absent during the "golden age." The changed relationship manifested itself in questions of personnel, resource allocations, and doctrine. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov figured prominently in the controversy.

The appointment of Ustinov as defense minister after the death of Grechko in 1976 was a political loss for the professional military, depriving it of representation at the highest level of the defense ministry and on the Politburo. This appointment coincided with indications from Brezhnev that more attention would be paid in the future to the satisfaction of consumer demands. After the adoption of the 10th Five-Year Plan (1976-80), the rate of growth of Soviet defense spending decreased from its previous level of four to five percent a year to a level of about two percent, which persisted into the early 1980s.

Beginning in the mid-1970s and particularly in his 1977 Tula speech, Brezhnev began to issue sweeping statements on military doctrine that contradicted many of the military's conceptions. Brezhnev maintained that the idea of victory in a nuclear war was "dangerous madness," that Soviet military power had considerably offset the threat from the West, that the Soviet Union was not pursuing strategic superiority, and that it would not be the first to launch a nuclear attack. Whether these pronouncements were propaganda or policy has been hotly debated in the West; Bruce Parrott suggested that they served both purposes. While the Soviet military recognized and appreciated the propaganda value of such statements, it was also clear that they could be used as a justification for restraining military spending. They also had ramifications for the Soviet position in arms control negotiations.

Marshal Ogarkov replaced Marshal Kulikov as chief of the General Staff in 1977—a move that undoubtedly raised suspicion among the high command, as Ogarkov had adopted positions at variance with standard military thinking, particularly on the issue of arms control. For the first several years as chief of the General Staff, Ogarkov appeared to have good relations with the civilian leadership,
but friction began to surface, as Ogarkov pressed for increased attention to military needs. In a series of articles and pamphlets, he argued that victory was possible in a nuclear war and that the more prepared side would win. Implicitly referring to Brezhnev and the political leadership, he warned that the danger of war should not be underestimated. Ogarkov appears to have been worried that one of the outcomes of SALT II would be curbs on Soviet defense spending, which would make it impossible to carry out programs of force modernization.

A sharp civil-military debate over the 11th Five-Year Plan pitted Ogarkov against the civilian leadership. As Mark Zlotnik observed, it symbolized a more fundamental division between civilian and military leaders. Ogarkov continued to present increasingly alarmist views of the danger of war and the need for increased attention to the needs of defense, while the political leadership argued that the imperialist threat could be managed through diplomacy. The divergence in views is apparent from comparisons of Ogarkov's statements with those of General Secretary Brezhnev, but also with those of Minister of Defense Ustinov. Azrael viewed Ustinov's role in this debate as representing the civilian line against Ogarkov and the interests of the professional military. Rose Gottemoeller, on the other hand, treated these exchanges as intramilitary debates brought about by the conflicting institutional roles of the minister of defense and the chief of the General Staff. The issues, whatever their institutional significance, clearly had civil-military implications. Azrael noted that any possibility that Ogarkov's view would prevail was eliminated by the emergence of Solidarity in Poland, which underscored the danger of paying insufficient attention to consumer expectations. The resulting 11th Five-Year Plan, which was adopted in 1981, assigned priority to growth in light industry and directed one-third of all investment to agriculture.

From 1982 to 1984 Ogarkov continued to state publicly his point of view. Azrael suggested that in continuing to criticize party decisions after they had been ratified through the five-year plan, Ogarkov crossed the limit of appropriate political behavior. His continued defiance caused the civilian leadership to show signs of heightened vigilance, such as the first convocation of a national conference of military party secretaries in nine years; the reassertion of the party's primacy in formulating military doctrine; and the appointment of Sergei Fedorchuk to head of the KGB. Fedorchuk was the former head of the KGB Third Directorate, which monitors the political reliability of military personnel. When a meeting was called between the high command and the Defense Council in October 1982, there were expectations that Ogarkov's removal was pending, but this action was not taken.

When Andropov came to power after Brezhnev's death, it appeared that he might have more sympathy for Ogarkov's cause. However, Andropov's approach to national security policy was essentially to continue the Brezhnev course. He also continued to emphasize the production of consumer goods. Andropov was not successful in preventing Ogarkov from challenging established priorities, but apparently very shortly after taking office he initiated a series of efforts to undermine Ogarkov. Ogarkov was not removed until several months after Chernenko took office, and then, according to Azrael, because of Ustinov's illness and the leadership's fear that it would be unable to prevent Ogarkov's appointment as the next minister of defense.

Azrael suggested that Ogarkov's remarkable political survivability was due to
the leadership's apprehension about provoking a full-scale civil-military confrontation. This, he said, explains why Andropov maneuvered instead to weaken Ogarkov's support within the high command. Zlotnik viewed Andropov as being somewhat more sympathetic to Ogarkov's concerns than was Chernenko, and he pointed to Andropov's pledge to provide the military with "everything necessary"—a phrase that was standard under Andropov, but one which only Leningrad party leader Grigori Romanov, an Ogarkov supporter, continued to use during Chernenko's rule.

**Gorbachev and "New Thinking"**

When Mikhail S. Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, he recognized that the most serious problem facing the Soviet Union was its stagnant economy. According to Caldwell, domestic concerns—that is, economic and political reform—clearly receive priority in Gorbachev's strategy. Gorbachev sees the international situation as relatively nonthreatening at present, and this relaxation in tensions has presented him with a "window of opportunity" in which to improve Soviet relations with the West and reform the Soviet Union's international image.

Gorbachev's expectations are relatively low with regard to the prospects for revolution in the Third World. He appears to be moving toward a more pragmatic Soviet policy in the Third World—one that deals with regional powers that are not necessarily ideologically inclined toward the Soviet Union but are politically and economically important. In addition, an alternative approach to the developed world has emerged in the form of the "Yakovlev line." Advocates of the Yakovlev line consider the traditional Soviet concentration on the United States a failure, and argue that Soviet policy toward the West should focus on Western Europe and Japan. Caldwell saw no evidence of the implementation of the Yakovlev line, noting that the current Soviet focus on arms control has caused Soviet foreign policy to be centered more than ever on the United States. However, one conference participant disagreed, commenting that the Soviet interest in the demilitarization of Europe was an effort to implement the Yakovlev line by opening up opportunities for improved Soviet relations with Western Europe. Another participant observed that Soviet arms control policy during the INF controversy was targeted not on the United States but on NATO, and that the USSR's focus on the "nuclear cement" was intended to bring out the stresses within the alliance, presenting the United States as the obstacle to demilitarization. Such an approach, said the commentator, is fully consistent with the Yakovlev line. Caldwell agreed that the Yakovlev line might be visible in Soviet long-range goals, but that in the short run Soviet policy retained its traditional preoccupation with the United States.

Gorbachev perceives arms control negotiations to be the correct approach to relations with the capitalist states, and he has been willing to make concessions in order to restructure Soviet-American relations. Gorbachev has expressed the view that military power is less relevant to overall Soviet security than was true in the past. In putting forth his new thinking on security policy, Gorbachev has indicated
that substantial changes may be taking place in the Soviet approach to the correlation of forces and power politics.

**THE ECONOMY AND NATIONAL SECURITY**

According to Ed Hewett, the Soviet Union's technological and economic capabilities have tended to be less advanced than those of its adversaries. To compensate for this discrepancy, the Soviets have created a high-quality "island" of defense production within their economy in order to compete in their most important arena, the military one. The success of this policy of economic partitioning has been undeniable: despite remaining economically backward in relation to its Western adversaries, the Soviet Union has become one of the world's top two military powers.

During the 1970s, however, as the limited utility of military power as a tool of policy became more and more evident, the need for the Soviet Union to be able to compete effectively in politically, economically, and militarily became more apparent. Improving the domestic economy in order to ensure Soviet security has taken on a new urgency. This development has occurred not only because economic competition has become a more vital component of the superpower rivalry, but also because the Soviet economic base may become incapable of supporting the Soviet military, which is utilizing high-technology weapons systems.

While the military is concerned about being able to build the new weapons that will be required in the 1990s and beyond, the political establishment is concerned with broader issues. Gorbachev adheres to a concept of national security according to which a strong economy strengthens Soviet superpower status by expanding its foundations. In addition, Gorbachev, like several of his predecessors, is concerned about declining support for the party, which economic stagnation—particularly the Soviet inability to produce a basic range of consumer goods—may engender.

Gorbachev's strategy for economic reform is still somewhat nebulous. According to Dr. Hewett, the extent to which Gorbachev's perestroika will result in significant change depends to a large extent on the proportion of the economy affected by goszakazy, or mandatory state production orders. One of the probable uses of goszakazy will be to order the production of weapons and other goods for the military, thereby sheltering military industries from an undifferentiated competition for resources and preserving its traditional priority. Depending upon the scale of the application of goszakazy to military industries, this use could amount to retention of the old system of partitioning. It would threaten economic reform, even if Gorbachev is able to bring about a decrease in resources going to the military industries. The VPK (Military Industrial Committee) ministries would remain outside the reform, and civilian industry would lack a competitive incentive to improve its performance. Civilian industry would also be deprived of capital equipment and high quality inputs, most of which would be absorbed by goszakazy, just as they are presently absorbed by the defense industries.

On the other hand, Hewett pointed out, goszakazy could be implemented in a more limited fashion, applying only to some final products and to truly scarce inputs, while the rest of the military industries' economic activity remained subject
to the wholesale market. Civilian enterprises would then be brought into the competition, and VPK ministries would be forced to sell a certain amount to non-military customers. All enterprises, particularly the VPK ministries, would work in both a planned and a competitive environment and would be forced to operate more efficiently. Because the isolation of the high-quality defense sector from the rest of the economy is thought to be a major source of the Soviet Union's economic problems, the success of Gorbachev's economic reform will depend on the proportion of the economy governed by state orders.

**Military Support for Perestroika**

Gorbachev's economic reforms will impose two sacrifices on the military. The military's traditional resource share will probably be affected, as resources are diverted from military spending to the civilian economy. In addition, economic reform will challenge the system of partitioning through which the Soviet defense industry has been insulated from the rest of the economy and which has ensured it a steady, reliable supply of high quality resources. As Robert Campbell and Peter Wiles have suggested, the military will find it difficult to adjust to a new system in which their traditional right "to take what they want" is challenged. Goszakazzy were incorporated into Gorbachev's economic plans in part to reassure the military that it would not lose its priority altogether. But Gorbachev is asking the military to accept economic reform and the associated sacrifices in the short term in exchange for a stronger economy in the future—an economy that will be more capable of supporting a large military effort later.

The military's interest in such a trade off stems from its acute awareness of a technological gap in key areas of future military competition. Soviet military analysts are concerned that the Soviet Union will not be able to produce the weapons of the future without a major modernization of its economic base. As Caldwell noted, Ogarkov and the military "modernizers" were among the first to point to the urgency of investing in scientific and technological progress. Gorbachev has often been seen to be in alliance with the Ogarkov camp, and many analysts believe that the military is a natural base of support for economic reform and perestroika.

Dr. Caldwell argued that however substantially the interests of the military and the General Secretary appear to coincide in the short term, their long-term interests diverge considerably. In addition, Fritz Ermarth observed that, although Gorbachev and Ogarkov have both stressed investment in technology and the denuclearization of the military competition, Ogarkov's objective was to encourage the Soviet Union to concentrate on expensive cutting-edge conventional technologies, whereas Gorbachev's rhetoric indicates a move in the direction of demilitarization. Bruce Parrott noted that while in 1985 the military might have welcomed a trade in current resource allocations for technological progress, in 1987 military support is much less likely because of the radical direction that Gorbachev's programs have taken and the related undermining of the basic social values that have ensured the primacy of the military in the past.

Nevertheless, even if the military has accepted a trade off, or if, as Campbell suggested, it has been imposed upon them, the time frame within which the
military will collect on Gorbachev's promises and the consequences should the expected benefits fail to be realized, remain unclear. In addition, what level of success will satisfy the military, and at what point the military will become restless cannot be determined. Moreover, it is not clear what courses are open to the military if it loses confidence in the leadership's promise of future technological gains.

NEW VIEWS ON NATIONAL SECURITY

One of the most striking developments in the area of Soviet defense policy under Gorbachev has been the adoption of a new foreign policy rhetoric, especially as regards national security. Gorbachev's vision of "a comprehensive system of international security" includes a transition to "reasonable sufficiency" and an emphasis on defense over offense. This vision appears to entail the demilitarization of international security and of Soviet foreign policy, according to Fritz Ermarth. The Soviets have offered to engage in direct talks with NATO on the subject of their respective military doctrines, and they have called for addressing asymmetries in the conventional balance. Gorbachev has repeatedly stressed that national security cannot be guaranteed by military means alone.

Parrott noted that under Brezhnev, there were essentially two positions on security policy. One held that defense potential needed to be strengthened, and the other that diplomacy was an effective and adequate means of countering the United States. Under Gorbachev, the terms of discussion have changed. Brezhnev is now criticized for overestimating the usefulness of military power, and his failures are being attributed to the fact that his diplomacy was too cumbersome and inflexible. Thus for some, the question is not whether increased defense expenditure or diplomacy is the better approach, but rather what kind of diplomacy will be most effective.

As Marc Zlotnik observed, most of the new thinking is emanating from the civilian core of Soviet analysts. Academic analysts, such as Yevgenii Primakov of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), have stressed the need to rethink national security. They have maintained that the traditional course of increasing combat capability is not appropriate. Such analysts have embraced notions such as a "reasonable sufficiency" of military potential. Military spokesmen have acknowledged "reasonable sufficiency" but have attempted to define it differently.

American analysts are now grappling with the question of how seriously to take the new thinking on national security issues. Current Soviet policy is frequently viewed as being driven by economic pressure and is being pursued in the hope that the Soviet Union can be more competitive in the future. Jack Snyder disagreed with this interpretation, seeing broader and more fundamental changes in progress. He said that one of the basic elements of the new Soviet approach to security policy is the recognition that the USSR cannot be secure if its neighbors are not secure. The new thinking on security policy is part of the dismantling of a whole set of institutions remaining from a past stage of Soviet development, when circumstances demanded the pursuit of policies focused on the external threat and the corresponding need to mobilize and to create a military-industrial complex.
These requirements, which have characterized Soviet foreign policy ever since, are no longer deemed relevant or appropriate. As the Soviet Union shifts to a strategy of intensive economic development, Gorbachev is hoping that this approach will create new constituencies of support, reducing the importance of the military in Soviet society as a whole.

Fritz Ermarth took a more skeptical view of Gorbachev's new thinking. Because of the urgency of the USSR's economic concerns, Gorbachev must be taken seriously, but Ermarth observed that in order to have a real economic impact the Soviet force structure would have to be reduced by approximately half. The Soviets have recognized the limitations of military power, and they are seeking new foreign policy tools. To this end, a far more sophisticated and effective rhetoric has become a potent instrument of diplomacy and Soviet foreign policy. However, the essence of Soviet foreign policy has not changed. Various indicators, such as the flow of arms to the Third World, have remained constant.

Marc Zlotnik pointed out that there are as yet no indications of the implementation of a new national security policy, with the possible exception of arms control. He suggested, however, that most of the concepts that are currently in circulation have not been worked out, and even the top leadership lacks a clear sense of their meaning. While he did not think that any real changes in policy had occurred, he pointed to signs of ferment and debate on issues ranging from Third World revolution to nuclear war doctrine.

Parrott suggested that two years ago, the Soviet military believed that Gorbachev's talk was propaganda that would never have a real impact on national security policy. Having witnessed the approach Gorbachev has taken in other policy areas, the military now has much more cause to wonder how far Gorbachev intends to take arms control, denuclearization, demilitarization and new political thinking.

**Civil-Military Relations**

Indications of radical changes in the Soviet approach to security and the prospect of change in the existing pattern of resource allocations have led to fluidity and turbulence in civil-military relations. The virtual exclusion of military officers from Lenin's Mausoleum at Chernenko's funeral was probably the first signal of such unsettled relations.

The assertion of the leading role of the party in all spheres, including the military one, has resurfaced under Gorbachev. This theme has generated military alarm on two counts. On the one hand, increased political assertiveness vis-à-vis the military has been accompanied by indications that the current political leadership will be less supportive of military demands for resources than has been true in the past. Gorbachev has replaced the promise that the party would do "everything necessary" to support military requirements with the more qualified pledge that the party would "make every effort" to see that military requirements were met.

The military is also unhappy about what appears to be increasing political interference in the military-technical side of military doctrine and in other areas that have tended to be the domain of the professional military. The Gorbachev leadership, attempting to decompartmentalize military decisionmaking, has openly
encouraged increased civilian participation as well as civilian control.

Zlotnik asserted that this approach reflects Gorbachev's decisionmaking style, which, in contrast to the consensus approach of Brezhnev, emphasizes competing ideas and a search for alternative sources of information. The traditional dominance of the military's views on defense is being questioned. Parrott described the challenge to the military's monopoly on expertise as the culmination of a trend that began during the second half of the Brezhnev era, as civilians began to discuss the fundamental assumptions on which military policy was based—assumptions about "the adversary" and about the nature of "the threat." Under Gorbachev, there has been a stronger push in this direction. Top political leaders such as Yakovlev and Dobrynin have called for civilian input into questions of a strictly military-technical significance.

According to Zlotnik, the reassertion of the party's leading role in the formulation of military doctrine is one element of this trend, but it has been accompanied by an unusual degree of involvement of Central Committee secretaries in overseeing defense matters. For example, Lukyanov, who was appointed at the January plenum to the Central Committee Secretariat, maintains a role in the party oversight of defense matters within the Ministry of Defense, while Zaikov continues to oversee the defense industries, and Yakovlev is involved in discussions of broader national security issues.

Institutional changes have reflected these considerations. For example, Azrael has described the transformation of the International Department of the Central Committee into a "mini-NSC." The department's own arms control division has been created, headed by Major-General Starodubov, a former General Staff officer in charge of arms control. This division has eroded the military's monopoly on technical information relating to arms control and has provided the political leadership with a means of challenging military recommendations. This has coincided with the adoption of a more flexible arms control approach. Azrael noted that arms control will probably remain a source of civil-military tension. There has been discussion of giving civilian specialists a greater role in the staffing of the Defense Council, and the research institutes of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR have become much more active in discussing military issues.

Gorbachev's "new thinking" on national security encompasses a broader definition of security. He assigns less significance to the use of military power and a greater role to political instruments. This switch bears directly on the civil-military division of labor. As Zlotnik pointed out, although there is no evidence from a Western perspective that changes in Soviet defense policy have been implemented, there is substantial evidence of debate. While the military leadership has supported Gorbachev's "peace offensive" as a way of managing the threat from NATO, it is unclear how Gorbachev intends to implement his ideas.

Zlotnik observed that Gorbachev and most of the present political leadership lack many of the attachments to the military that were characteristic of their predecessors. Within the Politburo, only Chebrikov, Sheberbitsky, and Yakovlev have military experience. The new generation within the top decisionmaking bodies of the Soviet Union tends to have greater confidence in Soviet military strength and to see the international environment as less threatening. It has demonstrated a greater concern for internal problems.
Attitudes within Soviet society as a whole toward the military are also changing. According to Zlotnik, the heroic image of World War II has faded somewhat, being replaced by images of such events as the protracted war in Afghanistan. The military has expressed concern over an upsurge in "pacifist" attitudes within Soviet society. There have been suggestions in the press that students should be exempted from military service as a means of accelerating scientific and technological progress. Such suggestions are symbolic both of a desire to divert resources from military to civilian ends and of a questioning of the basic social values that have supported the military. Parrott cited a recent published exchange between a Belorussian writer and a Soviet general on the immorality of nuclear retaliation as further evidence of a challenge to core values, and he noted as particularly significant the military's apparent inability to suppress such challenges.

The military is under pressure from the civilian leadership for wasting and mismanaging resources. The ongoing shake-up within the high command has left the military less capable of defending its basic interests, according to Azrael. The Mathias Rust incident in May of 1987, which proved highly embarrassing to the military command, highlighted these trends. But Dale Herspring cautioned that the appointment of Yazov to the position of defense minister should not be interpreted as an anti-military action—the appointment of another civilian would have been much more confrontational, he said. Rather, Yazov's appointment is related to his known support for perestroika in the military.

Finally, Parrott argued that while civil-military tensions may escalate, the area in which conflicts will be played out is within the civilian leadership. The military has not been, and is not now, an independent political force within the Soviet system, and it is ultimately dependent upon sympathy from the political leadership. Zlotnik suggested that such sympathy within the leadership may well exist, based on apparent differences between the views of Gorbachev and the more conservative figures such as Ligachev or Chebrikov. In addition, he asserted that the Soviet military is not monolithic, and while Gorbachev's policies may engender discontent, certain elements within the military may welcome change. These differences in outlook have historical precedents.

Political Tensions within the Military

Rose Gottemoeller argued that the declining influence of the military, beginning in the late Brezhnev period, imposed net losses on the military and led to an inevitable surfacing of tensions. The military's main concern is the political leadership's intrusion into the military-technical area of security policy.

Intramilitary conflict must be viewed in terms of issues and organizational structure. Certain issues have engendered conflict within the Soviet military under Gorbachev—including personnel changes, budgetary constraints, doctrinal changes, and political involvement in military theory. The structure of the Soviet military bureaucracy has also been a source of intramilitary conflict. Gottemoeller examined four axes of conflict: between the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense, between the General Staff and the service branches, within the General Staff, and
within the services.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE GENERAL STAFF

Bureaucratic conflicts between the chief of the General Staff and the minister of defense are frequent. Because the General Staff has controlled access to information, it has become a center of expertise, with a special role in formulating doctrine and defining requirements. It is essentially an advocate for military interests. The Ministry of Defense plays a more political role. The minister of defense represents the military on the Council of Ministers and, usually, in the Politburo, and he represents party views to the military. The tension between the responsibilities of these two officials became particularly noticeable during the above-mentioned Ustinov-Ogarkov debates. According to Gottemoeller, however, this relationship is an enduring source of conflict.

Dale Herspring qualified this assertion somewhat, suggesting that while a division clearly existed between Ustinov and Ogarkov, it would be inaccurate to have called former defense minister Grechko anything other than a military man. While there may be structural tension between the two positions, the question of who holds the position of defense minister makes a great deal of difference in how the politics are played out. The appointment of Yazov, a military man who shares many of Ogarkov's views, has quite different implications for the future relationship between the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense than would have been the case had a civilian been appointed defense minister.

GENERAL STAFF AND THE SERVICE BRANCHES

Unlike the service branches of the U.S. military, which compete with each other for resources and missions, interservice rivalry does not exist in the Soviet military. The relationship between the services and the General Staff can be adversarial, but this is not consistently the case. Because the General Staff determines resource allocations and missions among the various services, the services must address their requests to the General Staff. The General Staff can announce changes in strategy or structure that are detrimental to a particular service. However, the General Staff can also cooperate with a service against political interference, in which case intramilitary issues are likely to acquire only secondary significance. At least two services appear to have had service-specific claims which they pressed on the General Staff.

During the 1960s, the Soviet Navy, headed by Commander-in-Chief Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, pressed for a greater naval role in Soviet strategy. Recognizing that the General Staff would not be especially receptive to such an expanded naval role, Gorshkov took his case to the political leadership, describing the benefits that an expanded naval presence could bring to the Soviet state in peacetime. This was received favorably at a time when the Soviet Union was trying to compete more actively with the United States in the international sphere.

An expanded naval presence also had implications during wartime. Naval platforms, deployed far from Soviet territory, would be involved in the first battles of a conflict and could have an early effect on its course. Although it is doubtful
that the General Staff approved, the next two decades saw the emergence of a blue-water navy equipped with some of the largest surface platforms in the world. Gorshkov also lobbied, successfully, for aircraft carriers.

The end of the Navy's successful challenge to the General Staff occurred with the "Stalbo debate." In mid-1981, in a two-part article in the Soviet Navy journal, Morskoi sbornik, Admiral K. Stalbo essentially argued Gorshkov's line, emphasizing the peculiarities of naval warfare as opposed to any other type of warfare. The response came from Admiral V. Chernavin, chief of the Navy's Main Staff, who emphasized combined arms warfare and unified military science. Unified military science was the business of the General Staff--and the service staffs. The General Staff appeared to be reclaiming its role.

In the summer of 1982, Gorshkov argued that the Navy could strike land targets with greater flexibility than could the other components of the Soviet armed forces. He tried again to appeal to the political leadership with regard to the Navy's mission of strengthening friendships abroad. He was less successful this time, and Gorshkov was retired in December 1985. Chernavin, his successor, moved to emphasize the integral role of the Navy within the Soviet armed forces, in particular regarding the role of submarines and naval aviation. Gorshkov's dream of a surface fleet that could challenge the U.S. Navy was set aside. It appeared that the Navy could fruitfully appeal to the political leadership against the General Staff when military power was rapidly expanding, but this approach was unsuccessful when resources were constrained. The General Staff had little use for the Navy's independence from an institutional standpoint, but perhaps more importantly, the combined arms approach was more cost-effective.

Naval-General Staff tensions may have surged again in the aftermath of the American INF deployment, when the political leadership demanded forward naval deployment as an analogous response--a mission for which naval forces were not designed. The General Staff appears to have argued against the plan. Delays in the Soviet SLCM (submarine-launched cruise missile) program, which would have constituted part of the analogous response, indicate that legitimate military requirements may have taken precedence. The Navy's position on this issue was probably divided. Some officers would have had no desire to devote naval capabilities to missions for which the Navy was not suited. Others, recognizing that the Navy's route to expansion was through political missions, may have welcomed such a mission.

Another service that seems to have had grounds for dissatisfaction with the General Staff is the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). From its inception, the SRF was a source of disagreement within the military, as the existing services argued over how to distribute nuclear missile weapons. The Soviet military's ground force and artillery tradition strongly influenced the form in which the SRF emerged, particularly as nuclear warfighting replaced the conventional strategy of World War II. This tradition also ensured the SRF the largest share of investments in strategic nuclear forces and gave it the preeminent position among services.

In the 1970s, Soviet achievement of strategic parity and the USSR's perception that the influence of nuclear weapons was declining caused changes in Soviet strategy. Conventional options were stressed, command echelons were reorganized, and command and control were unified throughout Soviet forces. One implication
of these developments was a change in the status of the SRF, which was moved from the position of first among the service branches to joint membership in the Strategic Nuclear Forces, thereby being equated with bombers and submarines. Although the concept of Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) had existed for quite some time, the term became part of official Soviet terminology when Ogarkov used it in a 1981 Kommunist article. Dale Herspring commented that the real change in terminology came with Ogarkov's appointment as chief of the General Staff in 1977, after which time he stopped referring to the SRF as the primary service. This produced strained relations with SRF Commander in Chief Tolubko, who continued to use the earlier formulation for quite some time.

In August 1986, General Shabanov was the first military officer to refer publicly to the Soviet nuclear forces as a "triad," and this provoked a response from General Yashin, first deputy commander-in-chief of the SRF. Yashin, in obvious advocacy of his service, objected to the use of the term triad as a Western concept, and when asked about the Soviet nuclear forces, mentioned only ground-based missiles as securing the USSR's nuclear deterrent. On the other hand, newly appointed SRF Commander-in-Chief Maksimov has referred publicly to Strategic Nuclear Forces. There thus appears to be an ambivalence within the service itself regarding the appropriate role of the SRF. Those in the SRF who were unhappy with their loss of status did not have the option that Gorshkov had pursued: that of appealing to the political leadership, which had adopted even more radical and unsatisfactory positions on the role of nuclear weapons than had the General Staff. Gottemoeller hypothesized that the SRF was appealing to the Soviet public, using a series of publications and television programs glorifying the role of the SRF in order to convey its message.

The political leadership had drawn different conclusions from the emergence of nuclear parity, and had come to see nuclear weapons as virtually obsolete. This political stance caused the SRF, which might have been more inclined to challenge the General Staff over its loss in status, to join ranks with the General Staff. The SRF upheld the theory of victory in nuclear war, although the political leadership rejected the concept. Questions regarding morale within the military were a factor moving the Soviet military to argue for a theory of victory. This concern united not only the General Staff and the SRF leadership, but also the Main Political Administration, which is responsible for troop training and morale.

Dale Herspring observed that there has been an increasing trend toward intramilitary integration since the late 1960s, and the idea of independent service operations has become progressively less relevant. Most of the changes have been primarily to integrate services further. Integration has been reflected in the area of personnel, as most of the officers who have been promoted in recent times have had "combined-arms" experience. The integrated approach has been mandated by budgetary conditions, under which the Soviet military must do more with less. It is probable that any procurement must be justified in terms of combined arms to be approved. Herspring observed a trend toward less interservice rivalry and more cooperation, particularly as the military comes under greater pressure from the political establishment.

Cynthia Roberts focused on the institutional question of the services versus the General Staff. Thinking of the Soviet military as a staff-dominated
organization--as opposed to one that is service dominated--is unwarranted. It is important to answer some broad questions: Is the leadership objective and forward-looking, or is it parochial and blinded? Does the General Staff have real political power to set requirements and establish priorities? Do the services have opportunities to evade staff decisions? She observed that a weak General Staff has a tendency to "logroll" service requests, that not all staffs are objective and forward-looking but that they have historically succumbed to their own biases and have suppressed innovation.

Roberts stated that the services have not fared badly because of the General Staff's control over important data. In the pre-World War II period the services actually had considerable input in establishing mission requirements and tactical doctrine. There are suggestions that some logrolling occurred and indications that the General Staff was not as forward-looking as is thought. The role of the General Staff has undeniably increased during the postwar period, primarily as a result of the development of nuclear weapons. It might be useful to distinguish between nuclear and conventional levels because the General Staff's monopoly on expertise might more logically exist in the area of nuclear weapons than in conventional or general purpose forces. The argument against an American general staff is that such a staff would know little about the specifics of naval operations, ground forces, or tactical air forces. The services thus bring a certain expertise, which provides them with an entree into setting requirements.

**Conflict within the General Staff**

The General Staff is clearly not monolithic. This has become increasingly evident as differences have surfaced over issues of arms control and Gorbachev's "new thinking." Military spokesmen commenting on arms control initiatives typically say that they support political decisions as necessary, although they have "reservations" as military men. Thus Chief of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeev, speaking on the subject of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing, supported the policy and duly noted the risks of nuclear war, but he observed that the policy was injurious to the country's security. Soviet statements have tended to deny military quarrels with policy, despite acknowledging real costs to military effectiveness.

Gottemoeller pointed to an emerging division within the professional military between traditional military officers and a new class of military men who identify more closely with the political establishment and its goals. This new class is essentially charged with breaking down traditional military control over the military aspect of strategy. As such, General Chervov has emerged as one of the main proponents of Gorbachev's "new thinking" on security policy, and he identifies military interests with current Soviet policy.

Akhromeev, on the other hand, has remained somewhat distant from a discussion of political initiatives. He has preferred to disclaim military responsibility for political decisions, portraying the military as serving in an advisory capacity only, and reinforcing the military's claim to specialized expertise. Although he has openly supported leadership policies, Akhromeev has also appeared as a spokesman for the more traditional military professional. In contrast, Herspring seemed to view Akhromeev as a "political" general because of his apparent
sympathy for the leadership position on the insanity of the nuclear arms race and his heavy involvement in events such as the Reykjavik summit.

**CONFLICT WITHIN THE SERVICES**

Passive resistance to innovation within the services is a source of internal conflict. This problem suggests underlying dissatisfaction and resentment within the military, as evident in the aftermath of the Rust affair. Responding to criticism heaped upon them, the Air Defense Forces (PVO) complained of a variety of problems, including an inadequate supply system. Gottemoeller asserted that the pattern of uncooperativeness between operational and support units within the Soviet armed forces is extremely damaging to military effectiveness.

In addition, relations are poor between top Soviet commanders and the lower echelons. High-level intervention has broken down the command structure, concentrating responsibility at the upper levels and engendering resentment in the lower levels. Top command staff meddle in the business of unit commanders in order to ensure that training results meet requirements. This has deprived unit commanders of valuable experience and suppresses any need to show initiative or a sense of responsibility toward their subordinates. These relationships might affect approaches to Soviet military doctrine.
2.

MILITARY DOCTRINE AND POLICY

In many ways military doctrine—which the Soviets define as an official system of views on the nature of war—forms the basis of Soviet military policy. Raymond Garthoff examined changes within Soviet military doctrine and the forces influencing its evolution. Garthoff broached the difficult problem of distinguishing genuine changes in doctrine from declaratory statements intended as propaganda. Garthoff tended to emphasize the rough correspondence between declaratory shifts and real changes of policy.

Stanley Kober commented on a rather different interpretation of the nature of Soviet military doctrine, suggesting that the military develops military doctrine to reflect perceived Soviet weaknesses in order to influence the political leadership to invest in the capabilities considered necessary. In this way, Kober explained the Soviet doctrinal emphasis on nuclear weapons at a time when Soviet nuclear capabilities were relatively weak, and, he said, the shift to emphasize conventional weaponry indicated that the military's nuclear agenda had been met.

Peter Vigor noted that the Soviets have a strong interest in avoiding war with powerful enemies, and he agreed with Kober that it was difficult to imagine a credible scenario for the outbreak of a major war. Gorbachev's thinking on military doctrine may well represent a new threshold in Soviet military policy. The fact that Gorbachev is the first Soviet general secretary with a university education and that he has never served in the armed forces could signal a new approach to military questions, in which the Soviet leadership returns to the basic goal of keeping the USSR out of major wars. Soviet attention to reducing European fear of Soviet attack through conventional arms control agreements and changes in force posture might be evidence of this new approach.

In the 1950s Soviet leaders began to acknowledge the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war, sparking debate over war as an instrument of policy. The recurrent issue was whether meeting virtually limitless military requirements was necessary or justifiable. By the time of the 24th Party Congress in April 1971, the Soviets had ceased to call for strategic superiority, and leaders stressed the dangers of nuclear war. At Tula in January 1977, Brezhnev explicitly disavowed military superiority for a first strike as an aim of Soviet policy, and pledged instead to maintain parity. Since that time, standard doctrine has been that attainment of military-technical superiority is not a Soviet objective.

Strategic Parity and the Denial of Victory

When the Soviet leadership concluded that superiority did not confer the promise of victory or even additional security, a central Soviet military objective became to maintain parity. For the Soviets, parity has a military and political significance much broader than what is implied in the notion of balance. Parity is the basis
of deterrence and is seen as a fundamental element in safeguarding peace. It is also held as one of the greatest achievements of socialism.

Garthoff pointed out that in measuring nuclear balance and strategic parity, each side tends to err on the side of prudence in assessing its own capabilities and to manipulate the external threat in order to justify its own military programs. Thus, a Soviet commitment, however sincere, to accept and uphold parity does not eliminate the need for concern on the part of the Western alliance.

The Soviet professional military literature indicates that in 1969 the Soviets believed that the existing nuclear balance provided for mutual destruction and a precarious deterrence. As a result, the Soviets decided that ballistic missile defenses, which had the potential to reverse the existing state of deterrence, should be limited on both sides. Mutual deterrence was seen as the natural result of a nuclear balance, and both sides stated that strategic parity underlay strategic arms limitations. While it did not amount to an acceptance of U.S. principles of "mutual assured destruction," accepting strategic parity was unprecedented for the Soviet leadership.

Soviet views on the consequences of nuclear war developed along with their expectations of victory. Ideological beliefs in the ultimate victory of socialism conflicted with the admission of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war. After the death of Stalin, the Soviets abandoned their theory about the inevitability of war. Since 1961 they have subscribed to a policy of preventing war and pursuing peaceful coexistence. The victory of communism, they believe, can be achieved without engaging in war.

At the same time, the Soviets maintained that in the event of war, imperialism would be defeated. By the mid-1970s, however, nuclear war began to be perceived as posing a danger to all. In 1981, General Secretary Brezhnev called the hope of victory in a nuclear war a "dangerous madness," a view reiterated by many other influential leaders. But the Soviets were not prepared to state formally that there could be no victor in a nuclear war, until Gorbachev introduced such a statement at the 1985 Geneva summit. The catastrophic consequences of nuclear war for all civilization has become a standard theme in Soviet policy under Gorbachev.

Adjustments in the technical aspects of military doctrine have been slower to surface, according to Garthoff. While a sharp decline occurred after 1972 in references to victory as a wartime objective, many statements continued to refer to the ability to rebuff and defeat an aggressor’s attack. Although the political element of military doctrine came to conform more and more with the principles of detente, those involved in the military-technical side continued to stress decisive offensive operations and displayed a reluctance to preclude the attainment of victory.

By the mid-1980s, even Soviet military spokesmen were questioning the concept of victory and affirming the maintenance of parity as the basis of deterring war. The Soviet leadership came to find "real" security not in the ability to achieve victory but rather in the ability to prevent nuclear cataclysm.
Campaign for No First Use

The Soviets recognized a range of scenarios below the range of general nuclear war. A number of measures were taken to build barriers to nuclear war, including propaganda and foreign policy initiatives and arms control agreements. Increasing attention was also devoted to crisis prevention and management.

The Soviet campaign for no first use of nuclear weapons, which culminated in a 1982 unilateral Soviet commitment to this effect, reflected deliberations within the Soviet military-political establishment since the late 1960s and was part of an overall policy of preventing nuclear war. The idea of the pledge was broached several times to American leaders. The Soviets demonstrated a strong interest in getting the maximum U.S. commitment to the nonuse of nuclear weapons through diplomatic means, through arms control limitations perpetuating a strategic standoff, and through unilateral military programs supporting such a standoff by balancing Western and Soviet nuclear forces with their own at all levels.

In the early 1970s, in addition to their diplomatic efforts, the Soviets considered bilateral and even unilateral pledges of no first use. Although the military establishment had supported efforts to reduce the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in war, some military leaders wished to retain this option and opposed an international commitment. However, sometime in 1973-74 the Central Committee secretly decided that Soviet military plans and preparations would be based on the assumption that the Soviet Union would not be the first to use nuclear weapons.

After the 25th Party Congress in 1976, the Soviets intensified diplomatic efforts on the no first use issue, and between 1979 and 1982 Soviet military publications were stating that no first use was already Soviet doctrine. On June 15, 1982, Brezhnev publicly pledged that the Soviet Union would not be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Limited Nuclear and Nonnuclear Wars

The pledge on no first use comprised part of a revision of Soviet military doctrine initiated during the late 1960s. At that time, the Soviets began to recognize that their attainment of strategic parity gave the United States strong incentives to avert a nuclear war. Soviet doctrine shifted from a policy of preempting nuclear attack to one of "launch under attack," which called for a retaliatory strike in response to an attack by the aggressor. In addition, priority was assigned to preventing the escalation of conflicts to general nuclear war.

Evidence suggests that in the mid-1960s a military debate occurred on Soviet views of limited war. Soviet military analyses paid close attention to a growing Western interest in "flexible response," which provided for the waging of limited nuclear and nonnuclear wars. These discussions of U.S. strategy stressed the dangers of escalation in Europe. The Soviets believed that such a strategy could not succeed in meeting American objectives. But Soviet analysts were equivocal as regards the question of limiting war; the wars in Korea and in Vietnam represented
limited, though unsuccessful, wars for the United States. Attempts to limit nuclear war, it was believed, would prove "fatal to the initiator."

Some analysts stressed the need to prepare to meet a foreign attack using conventional weapons. Such discussions, which became more frequent after the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964, focused on local wars and the possibility that escalation might be avoided through Soviet restraint. These discussions also mentioned the need for Soviet military scientists to study the requirements for waging conventional war.

While maintaining its public opposition to the notion of limited war, Soviet leaders also recognized it was necessary to prepare to wage war. Discussions of the possibility of fighting limited nuclear war, involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons, even in Europe, stressed the danger of escalation. Scenarios of limited wars envisioned a greater role for conventional arms and corresponding forms of armed conflict. The Soviets appeared to have concluded that the danger that limited nuclear war would escalate to general nuclear war was high but not inevitable. However, they saw greater possibilities for limiting war to the conventional level.

By the late 1960s, the debate over giving priority to preparing for wars limited to conventional weapons was decided, and discussions of conventional warfare became more frequent. Revised editions of books published in the 1960s were reissued, omitting passages precluding the possibility of conventional war. While the Soviet leadership did not rule out limited nuclear responses, it viewed them as a dangerous option to be avoided.

INF Deployment

The 1979 decision by NATO to deploy intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe struck a blow at Soviet efforts to reduce the likelihood of escalation to nuclear war. While the West has tended to regard Soviet actions as attempting to decouple Western Europe and the United States, Garthoff observed that the Soviets insisted on coupling by asserting that any limited use of nuclear weapons would unleash nuclear war. The Soviets appear to be not so much tempted by limited use of nuclear options as concerned about possible American resort to such options. Soviet behavior in negotiations indicated that they were more interested in reducing theater nuclear forces across the board than in preserving their own capabilities. Finally, the INF deployments contributed to the hardening of Soviet doctrine on the question of limited nuclear war, as even limited war might involve nuclear attacks on the Soviet homeland. Ustinov, Ogarkov, Kulikov, and Akhromeev have all argued that there can be no limited nuclear war. Garthoff suggested that this public position probably reflects Soviet doctrine, which has always regarded the possibility of viable limited nuclear war as improbable. However, it is also likely that Soviet doctrine remains sufficiently flexible to allow limited nuclear responses.
Attitudes toward World War

The contingency of world war has dominated Soviet defense policy throughout the postwar period. Michael McCGwire remarked that Soviet views on world war continue to influence every other aspect of Soviet military policy, including arms control. These views have undergone substantial evolution since 1950.

During the 1950s, the Soviet requirement in a world war was to defeat the capitalist bloc through a major offensive into Western Europe that would vanquish NATO forces and deny the United States a bridgehead from which to attack the USSR. The Soviets considered the Eastern front to be stable.

The Soviets met the new threat of strategic bombing by establishing a national air defense system in 1948. They developed a doctrine of preemptive attack against U.S. bases on the Soviet periphery, initially envisioning the use of conventionally armed medium-range aircraft but later the use of nuclear missiles. They sought to break the U.S. strategic monopoly through the development of their own land-based ICBMs. They introduced nuclear weapons at the theater level by the late 1950s in order to augment firepower and match NATO's capability. Until 1953 the Soviets considered a U.S. attack almost inevitable. But by the end of the 1950s, as Soviet power increased and the status quo gained acceptance, they had discounted the threat of a premeditated U.S. attack.

In the late 1950s, Soviet military theory was reassessed in terms of the integration of nuclear weapons into theater ground forces operations and the role of such weapons in a war between the superpowers. The Soviets concluded that such a conflict would inevitably develop into a full-scale intercontinental exchange, a decisive clash whose outcome would be decided by the results of the initial nuclear exchanges. This reassessment led to the establishment of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) in 1959.

In case of war, the main Soviet objective was to preserve the socialist system and destroy the capitalist system. Destruction of the capitalist system would require a nuclear strike on North America. Thus it was vital that the Soviets strike first in order to diminish the weight of a U.S. strike on the USSR. This strategy would enhance the prospects of survival of the socialist system. This amounted to a policy of preventive attack, based on strategic nuclear superiority. The USSR also sought to develop an anti-ballistic missile system. Driven by these goals, the Soviets demonstrated no interest in arms control negotiations.

After attaining victory in a world war, the Soviet Union would need to preserve the productive resources of Western Europe as an alternative socioeconomic base in order to rebuild the economies of the Warsaw Pact nations. The importance of Western Europe as a socioeconomic base focused attention on the Western sea-based nuclear delivery capability, which increased with the advent of the Polaris system in the 1960s. These sea-based systems could be withheld until the end of conflict to dictate the outcome of a war or to deny the Soviets the use of Western Europe.

The Soviets moved to counter this capability directly through deployment of naval forces within weapons range of U.S. nuclear strike platforms, forcing the United States to use nuclear weapons at the beginning of a war or not at all. The shift to forward naval deployment, begun in 1963, created a need for overseas bases.
in peacetime. The Soviet Union sought client states in the Third World, and it was rewarded with access to naval facilities in Egypt and Somalia.

Also during this period the wide rift between the Soviet Union and China positioned China as a Soviet rival rather than ally. Part of Soviet war planning thus probably entailed striking China with nuclear weapons, while sparing Manchuria as an alternative socioeconomic base.

**Deterrence during the 1970s**

According to MccGwire, in the second half of 1966, the Soviets concluded that because of the number and diversity of U.S. nuclear systems a preemptive strike would have only marginal benefit. In addition, they recognized that the Soviet ICBM force had a good chance of deterring a U.S. strike on Soviet territory. Thus it was determined that a world war would not necessarily be nuclear and that even if it was nuclear, war would not necessarily entail massive strikes on Russia.

Thus the new Soviet wartime objective became to avoid the nuclear devastation of the USSR. This objective meant, however, forgoing the destruction of the capitalist system through nuclear strikes on the United States, as such strikes would invite the destruction of the USSR. But with the U.S. military-industrial base intact, it became even more essential to deny the United States a bridgehead in Western Europe. The new approach also meant that the Soviets had to think in terms of a two-phase war. The first phase would see the defeat of NATO in Europe and the establishment of an extended defense perimeter, while the objective of the second phase would be to prevent the return of capitalist forces to the Eurasian continent.

In 1967-68 the USSR set out to restructure its ground-air forces in order to provide them with a capability to disable NATO nuclear delivery systems by conventional means and to mount a "blitzkrieg" offensive into Western Europe. This capability was more or less in place by the late 1970s. It was supplemented by a campaign to persuade NATO to accept a policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons and to persuade the United States that theater use of nuclear weapons would inevitably escalate to massive intercontinental exchanges.

Given the objective to improve its conventional capabilities, the Soviet Union was in no position to negotiate conventional force limitations. Since the primary mission of the Soviet ICBM force was deterrence, negotiating a lower level of strategic parity better served Soviet objectives. Strategic arms reductions appeared as an attractive option. Deterrence also explained the reversal of the Soviet position on ABM defenses: it had become more important to stop the development of an American ABM system, which could threaten the credibility of the Soviet deterrent, than to build a marginally effective Soviet system.

The revised set of objectives also had implications for naval forces. The Soviets needed an "insurance force" deployed at sea. The Delta insurance force had to be deployed in protected waters close to home and had to have missiles capable of striking North America from those positions. The force should be protected by ships and submarines that were capable of sustained combat warfare. But under the new strategy, the requirement to pose a permanent counter to U.S. seabased strike systems was relaxed, and the search for overseas bases in the Third World
lost its previous urgency.

In the Far East, the Soviet objective continued to be to avoid fighting a war on two fronts, but it was now necessary to deter China using conventional forces. This consideration probably explains the increase of Soviet forces on the Sino-Soviet border from 20 divisions to 45. In the second phase of a world war the Soviets would seek to achieve a reasonably stable political solution, possibly through the detachment of Manchuria. It was also necessary for the Soviets to ensure that China did not become an avenue of assault for the United States. This requirement mandated the establishment of a secondary defense perimeter.

The implications of the new strategy were far-reaching. First, nuclear preemption ceased to be a key element of Soviet strategy. Second, the authority for nuclear release, which previously had been assigned to the military high command, with decisions to be made on operational grounds, would be tightly held by the top political leadership. Third, the requirement for numerical superiority of nuclear forces, which had characterized Soviet policy during the 1960s, disappeared once the destruction of capitalism was no longer an objective. However, conventional superiority in the theater was still essential. Finally, change occurred in Soviet perceptions of the political nature of a future world war, which would no longer necessarily be a "fight to the finish" between the two systems. This change made the assurance of victory less important.

NEW APPROACHES TO SECURITY DURING THE 1980s

In the 1979-83 period, the Soviet Union faced the possibility of conflict with the United States in the area north of the Persian Gulf, or the Soviets' Southern TVD (tier of military operations). The question to be addressed was whether, in the event of war, escalation to world war could be avoided. If escalation was inevitable, then Soviet forces were correctly positioned for an offensive thrust into Europe. If it was not inevitable, the Soviets would want to avoid such a thrust, as it might precipitate world war, and instead, seek to "hold" in the West, as they had previously sought to hold in the Far East.

During this period, the Soviets appear to have determined that escalation to world war was not inevitable and to have made further doctrinal change. The establishment in 1984 of High Commands for the Western, Southwestern, and Southern TVDs--much as the High Command for the Far East had been established--suggests such a doctrinal shift. The Soviets would now need to be prepared to hold in the east, hold in the west, and fight to the south.

McCGrwire asserted that such a doctrinal shift could be expected to have major implications for the Soviet military posture in the Western TVD and for the Soviet approach to conventional arms control, as it would no longer be necessary to mount a continental-scale offensive to the west. The relaxation of the requirement to mount an offensive into Europe also opened up new approaches to national security. The political costs of their offensive posture and the economic and technological realities of their domestic situation were factors to be considered.

Ted Warner cautioned that the hierarchy of objectives that appears to have been adopted in the late 1960s should not be seen as entirely replacing the earlier hierarchy. He questioned whether adoption of a new strategy implied any decrease
in force requirements. Regardless of their preference for operations with conventional weapons, the Soviets understand that circumstances may force them to contend with conflict on the nuclear level. Thus they still must prepare for the contingency of theater or global nuclear war, which means retaining a capability for fighting a nuclear war with a plausible strategy for victory.

McCgwire and Garthoff agreed that the new hierarchy of objectives meshed with the former one but did not replace it. However, they pointed out that because of limited resources, the Soviets are forced to prioritize their objectives and requirements. In this regard, the post-1966 strategy, with its associated requirements, took precedence over the earlier strategy, whose requirements cannot necessarily be met.

Garthoff pointed out that prioritization is necessary because it has become increasingly difficult to meet any strategic requirements, while political support for "insurance" against nuclear contingencies may be declining. Warner noted that if the new emphasis on reasonable sufficiency indicates the political leadership's conclusion that nuclear war is not winnable and its willingness to instruct the General Staff not to prepare for nuclear war, this posture would represent a dramatic departure from previous policy. However, he stressed that this conclusion does not appear to have been drawn yet.

Warner took issue with the suggestion that deterrence as it was adopted after 1966 conflicts with the Soviets' earlier objective of destroying America. He said that while some academics speak of "minimum deterrence," the Soviets have always viewed deterrence in terms of the threat of crushing retaliation.

Warner saw no evidence of restraint in force-building to indicate that the Soviets' perception of their strategic requirements had changed. While the Soviets may have built fewer central strategic weapons than they had planned to, they still have enough to cover twice the target set that existed before the 1960s' shift in objectives. Under Gorbachev, the Soviets have been far more forthcoming on the subject of strategic arms reductions. This approach has not seriously challenged the General Staff because even dramatic reductions would leave sufficient weapons to meet Soviet military requirements for most contingencies. If reduction of strategic nuclear weapons to zero or even to 5 percent of current arsenals is actually envisioned, this would again indicate a major change, but evidence of such an intent remains to be seen.

McCgwire responded that the driving factor in Soviet acquisition of strategic nuclear weapons has not necessarily been deterrence but rather matching the United States. Through arms control negotiations, the Soviets have sought reductions in the U.S. arsenal.

**Views toward Theater War in Europe**

Notra Trulock and Phillip Petersen, who addressed the theater dimension of Soviet military strategy, noted that theater warfare in Europe has occupied a prominent place in Soviet military theory for most of the postwar period, as the Soviets have believed that most of their wartime strategic objectives would be achieved on the Eurasian landmass. Central to Soviet planning is the concept of the strategic
operation in a continental theater of strategic military action (TSMA), considered to be the most difficult and complex form of strategic action. While Soviet military spokesmen are reasonably confident about the level of their current theater capabilities, they are concerned about the impact of a forecasted "qualitative leap" in the development of military affairs in line with emerging military technologies and doctrinal developments occurring within both alliances.

The Soviets appreciate the value of military power in influencing the calculations of their Western opponents. The Soviets responded to NATO's policy of "flexible response" with force development on both a conventional and a nuclear level. Not only did the Soviets deploy large, more effective, and more survivable theater nuclear forces, they repeatedly threatened to use them in a large-scale, indiscriminate fashion. This threat, which was aimed at Western decisionmakers, followed a Soviet study indicating that, when confronted with the possibility of all-out nuclear combat, NATO might prefer to "give up" rather than continue combative actions. This Soviet threat has influenced NATO calculations.

Soviet wartime objectives are the defeat and destruction of enemy forces, the disruption of the enemy's economic potential, the disorganization of enemy systems of state and military control, and the occupation of enemy territory. The Soviets would seek to defeat NATO forces on the continent but would probably avoid the destruction of Western Europe's industrial base in order to exploit it during the postwar recovery period. In this regard, efforts to break down the NATO alliance could shorten the length of a war and minimize the economic destruction inflicted.

However, Soviet military objectives could be subject to redefinition during the course of a war, since political objectives have always been paramount in Soviet planning. The pursuit of limited strategic objectives is clearly provided for in Soviet military strategy, and the resurrection of the concept of "partial victory" may indicate Soviet recognition of the need for flexibility regarding military-political objectives during wartime.

Basic Soviet strategic concepts have changed little, although the methods and means have changed considerably. Deep operations—which is the simultaneous extension of fire and maneuver across the depth of enemy deployments—has been perceived as the most effective approach to attain rapid, decisive success in theater warfare. Previously, success could be achieved only sequentially, by the combined arms activities of armies and Soviet fronts. With the advent of the nuclear missile, however, massive strategic nuclear strikes into the interior could enable the Soviets to realize strategic objectives in hours or even minutes. However, after reassessing the risks of such employment options, the Soviets returned to a more traditional approach to deep operations.

By the mid-1960s, Soviet military planning viewed the consequences of nuclear war with increasing horror. The Soviets realized that they had overestimated the potential contribution of nuclear weapons to future theater operations. Despite their acquisition of some damage-limiting capacity, the Soviets became increasingly pessimistic about the consequences of a general nuclear war. In addition, they concluded that nuclear strikes in theater warfare would be more likely to hinder theater operations than to advance them. Doubtful of their ability to disarm NATO through preventive nuclear strikes, Soviet planners became more aware of the complexities of military operations in a nuclear environment. Soviet rates of
advance would not be increased by the employment of nuclear weapons, and residual NATO nuclear forces would still be able to disrupt Soviet operations. Thus, the Soviets came to perceive a benefit in delaying nuclear use in any potential conflict.

However, until sometime in the late 1970s or early 1980s, the Soviets were extremely skeptical about their ability to prevent theater war from escalating to the nuclear level. Thus they continued to develop a conventional capability in order to disrupt NATO's nuclear decisionmaking. They also succeeded in persuading NATO to acknowledge mutual disincentives for nuclear use.

U.S.-Soviet agreements of the early 1970s reduced, but did not eliminate, the threat of nuclear war. By 1982, the Soviet leadership was confident that the nuclear threshold of future war had been raised sufficiently to incorporate into Soviet military doctrine a statement that war begun on a conventional level would not necessarily escalate to the nuclear level. The only inevitability regarding nuclear weapons was retaliation in response to an attempted surprise attack.

The Reagan administration's program of modernizing strategic offensive forces, its focus on the conduct of protracted nuclear war, and the broad public speculation on the utility of nuclear weapons caused Soviet leaders to reconsider the nature of the nuclear threat. Soviet references to the inevitability of nuclear escalation and to the destructiveness of a first massive nuclear strike began to reappear in authoritative articles. Concerns over Reagan policy reportedly generated a KGB alert in 1981. However, according to Trulock and Petersen, the "war scare" of the early 1980s could be explained by other factors, such as internal political maneuvering in the succession struggle, the military's attempt to ensure its claim on resources, and the Soviet public diplomacy campaign against deployment of the INF missiles as well as conventional modernization.

By 1985, the Soviets seemed to have renewed confidence in the United States' acceptance of the futility of nuclear use. Statements by such authoritative spokesmen as Akhromeev and Gareev, the deputy chief of the General Staff, suggested that the nuclear threshold was very high and might never be reached.

Currently, the Soviets view the new, highly accurate conventional systems as comparable to nuclear missile weapons. Increasing attention is paid to their use at operational and strategic depths. Moreover, Soviet planners believe that the advent of such conventional weapon systems could serve to raise the nuclear threshold further. Few missions would be inappropriate for nonnuclear systems, and neither side would have an incentive to resort to precision-guided, low-yield nuclear weapons in order to achieve a greater confidence of destruction.

The Soviets believe that it is necessary to prepare for a prolonged conventional war as an alternative to a simple solution achieved through nuclear means. They also recognize that a disarming first strike by either side is improbable. All in all, the Soviet military appears to believe that conventional weapons are a more suitable target for scarce resources. The need to prepare for protracted conventional war also supports the military's claim to its traditional resource base.
Selective Nuclear Options

Soviet planners are still faced with the question of how to respond to a limited use of nuclear weapons by NATO. Retaining selective nuclear options eases Soviet decisionmakers' dilemma. Soviet political and military leaders have probably insisted on a set of options that would be militarily effective, while assuring a minimum amount of collateral damage, to be considered only in the most desperate circumstances.

The Soviets also appear to believe that the application of precision-guided technology to nuclear systems should serve to delineate more clearly the threshold within nuclear operations. This concept has been publicly opposed by both Ogarkov and political spokesmen, who have argued that limited nuclear employment will rapidly lead to massive employment. However, this assertion violates the Soviet "logic of war," according to which the Soviet military and political leadership insists on control over the course of a conflict. Ogarkov's argument was probably directed at those who favored reliance on nuclear weapons over the development of new conventional systems.

New technologies should enable the Soviets to respond more effectively to limited nuclear use by NATO. "Reverse escalation," or massive strategic and operational tactical preemptive or responsive attacks, is a most unlikely response to a NATO strike. Lecture materials from the Voroshilov General Staff Academy make clear that the Soviets have been prepared for many years to conduct limited nuclear operations as the most appropriate response to NATO initiation. The Soviet planning process and force posture are responsive to imposed restrictions on nuclear employment, such as those imposed by region, target type, weapon type, yield, and numbers.

Soviet Views on Future War

Soviet planners have placed a heavy emphasis on forecasting. They are considering a broader set of planning contingencies that take account of emerging military technologies likely to produce "qualitative transformations" in the nature of warfare. The scale of military operations is expected to increase as conventional weapons develop the capacity to perform expanded missions at operational and strategic depths. Theater conflicts, it is believed, will be increasingly prolonged.

Soviet views on the relationship between offense and defense are also evolving. The impending introduction of high-accuracy long-range systems and the development of operational strategies has led to a reevaluation of the role of defense. The defender may not be required to cede the initiative to the attacker or limit his range of action. In addition, the defender may not by required to remain on defense for long before the necessary conditions are created to switch to a counteroffensive. This reevaluation may have some connection with recent pronouncements on the new defensive thrust of Soviet military doctrine.
The Use of Military Power in the Third World

Soviet views on military involvement in the Third World, a relatively recent phenomenon, have undergone fundamental changes since World War II. Under Stalin the developing world held no particular interest for the Soviet Union. Under Khrushchev the Third World became extremely interesting, but the Soviet Union lacked the power projection capabilities to play a large military role there. As the USSR has attained the status of a global superpower, its interests in developing regions have expanded. These interests have been primarily of a political nature, but they have generally been pursued through military means, largely because the USSR has lacked other instruments of power.

Frank Fukuyama discussed the political use of military power, and Robert Litwak and Mark Katz defined four categories of such military power: arms transfers, and demonstrative, cooperative, and direct intervention.


debbie

Political Uses of Military Power

During the 1950s and early 1960s the newly independent states tended to be anti-Western and to look favorably upon the socialist model of development. National liberation movements in the Third World were seen as part of a trend in the correlation of forces shifting inexorably to socialism and diminishing the global influence of the United States. There was no reason to believe that this process would not continue.

Military involvement in the Third World, however, was viewed as a costly contingency to be avoided. The Soviets were extremely sensitive during this period to the risks of world war, and it was generally assumed that the potential for local wars to escalate into world war was high. In addition, the Soviet military did not perceive the Third World as an area in which it had a competitive advantage vis-à-vis the West. Furthermore, the Third World was decidedly less important in a military sense than Europe. Little attention was devoted to the question of military policy in the Third World, although arms and advisers were sent there throughout the Khrushchev era.

During the mid-1970s, however, the Soviet political and military leadership came to see that the West was extremely vulnerable in the Third World. Like his predecessor, Brezhnev was willing to take measures to further the trend of Soviet gains in the Third World.

Soviet military leaders thought that the Soviet Union could reap benefits in the Third World at relatively low cost. Soviet military writers stated that the USSR could prevent local wars from escalating into world war, and they demonstrated far greater confidence in their ability to intervene successfully at precisely the time that the United States became less willing to intervene. Soviet activism in the Third World did not appear to detract from Soviet efforts in arms control talks with the United States, in which progress continued to be made in this area, despite Soviet military intervention in several nations during the 1970s.

The Soviet military leadership began actively to champion the "liberation mission" in the Third World. This stand is evident particularly in the statements of Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy Admiral S. Gorshkov and Minister of
Defense Marshal Grechko. Specific methods of Soviet intervention were rarely discussed, although it was recognized that sending arms and advisers was often not sufficient. Finally, military intervention seemed like a low cost means of advancing Soviet interests—and one that the United States was unlikely to oppose.

Under Gorbachev, the Soviet use of military power in the Third World has been reassessed. The priority assigned to tackling domestic problems, the global assertiveness on the part of the United States, and the absence of opportunities in the Third World were factors contributing to the new appreciation of the costs of Soviet policies in the Third World. The economic costs of providing military and other aid to a handful of extremely expensive clients; the limited political gains in terms of influence, and the many reversals and setbacks, such as occurred in Egypt; and, not least, the perceived impact of Soviet adventurism on U.S.-Soviet relations were also considered. Soviet military involvement in the Third World ceased to be seen as a low-cost investment yielding high dividends.

Basing ties with Third World nations on pragmatic, rather than ideological, grounds is part of the new Soviet approach to the Third World. Soviet leaders appear to be less interested in regimes that are ideologically correct but economically unsound, and more interested in improving economic relations with the more developed Third World countries such as Brazil and Argentina. Soviet policy on arms transfers appears to have taken on a more commercial character. Overall, references to the "liberation mission" are far fewer than was the case in the early 1970s.

The Military-Strategic Role of the Third World

Frank Fukuyama drew attention to the changing strategic role of the Third World. Fukuyama concluded that the Third World was never militarily important to the Soviet defense establishment, with the possible exception of the Navy. The Soviet Navy developed an interest in the Mediterranean in order to follow U.S. seaborne strategic missiles, both for the conduct of defensive ASW and for the offensive mission of deploying attack submarines. As technology has progressed, the Soviet Navy's needs have changed. The strategic need for Third World bases has diminished, given that Soviet Typhoon submarines can strike their targets from the Soviet coast.

Furthermore, the General Staff's attitude toward the Third World has evolved. During the 10th Five-Year Plan (1976-80) and the slowdown in the rate of military spending, the Navy was hit first with the need to cut back. The Stalbo debate of the early 1980s resulted in part from the conflict between Gorshkov's agenda for the Navy and the new situation of resource constraint. As Katz pointed out, the Soviet military in general is not likely to be an institutional advocate of intervention or counterinsurgency operations.
3.

ARMS CONTROL

Matthew Evangelista found evidence of both continuity and change in the Soviet approach to arms control under Gorbachev, although he noted that elements of change have tended to attract more attention. Gorbachev's broadening of the definition of national security to take greater account of diplomatic, political, and economic factors has influenced Soviet arms control policy. Evangelista challenged the conventional notion that Soviet arms control serves military objectives, arguing that some of Gorbachev's policies seem rather to compete with military interests.

The Nuclear Dimension

On January 15, 1986, Gorbachev announced a plan to eliminate nuclear weapons in three stages by the year 2000. During the first stage of this plan, to begin in 1986, the United States and the Soviet Union, over a period of five to eight years, would cut their nuclear weapons capable of reaching the other's territory by 50 percent, down to a level of 6,000 warheads. The proposal also called for the total elimination of medium-range missiles in the European zone, a pledge by the Soviet Union and the United States not to transfer nuclear missiles to other countries, a commitment by the British and French not to build up their nuclear arsenals, a moratorium on nuclear testing, and the renunciation of space-based missile defense systems.

During the second stage of the Soviet plan, which would begin in 1990, the other nuclear powers would freeze their arsenals and agree to refrain from placing nuclear weapons in other countries. The Soviet Union and the United States would continue to reduce medium-range systems and would freeze tactical nuclear systems, or those with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers. After the United States and the USSR had completed their 50 percent reductions, other nuclear powers would begin eliminating their tactical nuclear systems. The bans on space weapons and on nuclear testing would become multilateral, and the development of nonnuclear weapons based on "new physical principles" would be banned.

Finally, during the third stage, beginning no later than 1995, all remaining nuclear weapons would be eliminated. Notably, the major obstacles to be overcome in fulfilling Gorbachev's plan--namely, the achievement of a ban on space weapons and a comprehensive test ban, and the freezing of British and French nuclear arsenals--would be faced during the plan's first stage.

NEW APPROACHES AND PROPOSALS

Evangelista asserted that most of Gorbachev's approach to arms control can be traced to earlier precedents. But Evangelista also found much new in Gorbachev's unilateral gestures, his bargaining flexibility, his verification proposals, and his
espousal of restraint in weapons development.

On August 6, 1985, Gorbachev imposed a unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, which was followed by a freeze on and the limited withdrawal of SS-20 deployments in Europe. While Khrushchev and Andropov had both resorted to unilateral testing moratoriums, Gorbachev's announcement was made with the almost certain knowledge that the United States would not follow suit--which was not the case in the past.

Under Gorbachev, a change has occurred in Soviet negotiating style, bringing many Soviet positions closer to American ones. The Soviets have acceded to the "zero option" at the INF negotiations, a global ban on medium-range systems, the removal of SS-20s from Asia without compensating reductions by the United States, and removal of shorter-range operational tactical missiles from Europe as well.

The Soviets have tended to be less flexible in talks on space-based and strategic nuclear weapons. They recognize that should they fail to achieve a ban on ballistic missile defense systems, increasing their ICBM force would be their most effective countermeasure. Still, the Soviets have demonstrated a great deal more flexibility than most observers had predicted, as, for example, on the question of the definition of laboratory research. The Soviets have also unexpectedly demonstrated a willingness to accept deep reductions in strategic nuclear forces in return for restrictions on SDI.

Stuart Goldman pointed out that Evangelista's statement was somewhat misleading and attributes more magnanimous impulses to the Soviets than are probably operating in this case. The Soviets have not stated that they will commit to radical reductions of strategic nuclear forces based on a promise from the United States not to deploy SDI. Rather, they are asking for a precondition to an agreement on strategic reductions--an agreement that will result in the reduction of strategic systems that threaten the USSR.

In his January 1986 speech, Gorbachev proposed verification through national technical means and through on-site inspection. Under Gorbachev, the USSR has established three important precedents regarding verification measures. At the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe in September 1986, the Soviets accepted provisions for aerial "challenge" inspections to verify compliance with confidence-building measures concerning the size of military exercises. This move constituted the first time that intrusive measures of verification were incorporated into an arms control agreement. American scientists were invited to install seismic monitoring devices near Soviet test sites, establishing a precedent for cooperative measures of verification. In September 1987 the Soviets also permitted American congressmen to visit the Abalakova radar site near Krasnoyarsk.

Another new development under Gorbachev is the stated policy of showing "independent restraint," or forgoing the development of weapons systems that the United States is pursuing, such as SDI. Even the rhetorical denial of an intention to emulate the adversary's weapon technology represents a break with past practice. Andropov had clearly stated that the Soviets would match every American weapons development and would not be forced into making military concessions. Again, Stuart Goldman introduced a caveat, suggesting that a Soviet decision not to emulate the United States in developing SDI technology could well be the result of limited technological capability or a propaganda ploy, rather than an illustration
of restraint.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES

Evangelista denied that Soviet engagement in arms control has ever signified an acceptance of the principles of stability based on mutual vulnerability—which is the logic of mutual assured destruction. But he also denied that the Soviet Union uses arms control only in order to constrain Western developments and obtain unilateral advantage. He contended that the Soviets have made important concessions in their present arms control policy, requiring the sacrifice of some military capability, and they have demonstrated that broad political goals can override the narrow interests of the Soviet military.

The elimination of the SS-20 missile, which was deployed to offset American forward-based systems, is hard to explain on the basis of Soviet military doctrine. Moreover, although the Soviet military has shown increased interest in conventional operations, Gorbachev's arms control proposals also include reductions on the conventional level. Although Ogarkov has favored nuclear arms reductions, he supports investment in advanced technological conventional weapon systems, which Gorbachev has repudiated as weapons based on "new physical principles." Unlike his predecessor, Akhromeev has adhered to Gorbachev's line on the development of such systems.

John Van Oudenaren disagreed with Evangelista, pointing out that rational leaders pursue arms control policies that serve military objectives. This is precisely the behavior that one should expect from the general secretary. Regardless of any changes, Soviet arms control policy should be, and is, consistent with military objectives; it is not in competition with them. Arkady Shevchenko noted that the changes in military policy were substantial and had conditioned changes in arms control policy.

POLITICAL GOALS

Gorbachev has implicitly acknowledged that past Soviet actions contributed to a deterioration in the USSR's relations with other nations and exacerbated the arms race, Evangelista noted. Recent Soviet initiatives reflect this new view. The elimination of all SS-20s targeted on Europe and the Soviet interest in restructuring the offensive orientation of conventional forces suggest that the political dimension of security is viewed as increasingly important.

Van Oudenaren agreed that arms control policy is related to military and political goals. Gorbachev came to power at a time of general disillusionment with the Brezhnev view of arms control--also the "Richard Perle" view—that arms control would lead inexorably to the improvement of the Soviet military position. Challenges from the INF deployments, the SDI program, and the Reagan Administration's military buildup have given Gorbachev reason to be skeptical of past Soviet approaches.

Gorbachev has attempted to seize the political initiative and reshape the arms control agenda, using three basic strategies. First, he has selected his own arms control issue in order to avoid being trapped within the Western agenda. According
to Van Oudenaren, Gorbachev used the test ban issue for this purpose. He also unveiled a new rhetoric reflected in the disarmament proposal of January 1986 and the introduction of "new political thinking" into arms control discussions. Finally, he has used summits and high-level meetings to portray himself as the leader behind arms control.

Thus Gorbachev has succeeded in changing the political context so that he can pursue arms control seriously and on his own terms. For instance, acceptance of the zero-zero proposal in the INF negotiations has been perceived as the beginning of a series of steps toward the denuclearization of Europe and the world rather than as Soviet buckling under an American policy of negotiation from strength.

Conventional Arms Control

Edward Warner and David Ochmanek discerned three main security objectives pursued by the Soviets during the postwar period: to increase Soviet influence over the security affairs of Europe, including reducing the U.S. influence in Europe; to contain West German military power; and to keep NATO military power within manageable limits. Although a certain continuity has characterized Soviet negotiating behavior over the past 40 years, their strategies for meeting basic security objectives and their approach to arms control, including conventional arms control, have changed.

Conventional arms control can be divided into structural arms control and operational arms control. Structural arms control refers to measures that limit the size and composition of armed forces, while operational arms control deals with peacetime constraints on the activities of the armed forces, declaratory pledges on their use, and measures of crisis avoidance and management.

During the 1950s to the late 1960s the Soviet Union faced a cohesive Western alliance, led by a militarily mobilized United States and was strengthened by an economically resurgent West Germany. Soviet objectives were to gain recognition of the postwar division of Europe and to contain the defense potential of the Western coalition. The Soviet approach to both structural and operational arms control reflected these goals.

Structural and Operational Arms Control under Khrushchev

After failing to get the West to agree to a European collective security system, the Soviets became champions of "general and complete" disarmament during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Their proposals throughout this period envisioned multiphased reductions in the armed forces and conventional arsenals of the major powers. As regards Central Europe, the standard Soviet formulation included a ban on the production or stockpiling of nuclear weapons in East and West Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The Soviets also called for the reduction by one third of the conventional forces of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union stationed on German territory, and the reduction of the forces of these powers stationed elsewhere on the continent. In 1959, the Soviets advanced a number of proposals for nuclear weapons free zones in the Far East and Pacific.
Basin, the Balkan-Adriatic region, and in Scandinavia and the Baltic area.

Compliance with the proposed measures would be monitored through an international system of control, which would operate under the United Nations Security Council and which would supposedly allow unimpeded access to military units, military equipment and ammunition storage sites and factories, and military bases. The Soviets asserted their willingness to allow extensive, intrusive verification measures, including on-site inspection, but made it clear that discussion of such measures could take place only in the context of disarmament agreements. Their objections to on-site inspection as an instrument for "legalized spying" persisted until 1986-87.

Soviet proposals regarding operational arms control during this period centered on measures to prevent surprise attacks. In April 1957, they proposed "control posts" to detect dangerous concentrations of forces—an idea they continued to advocate throughout the 1960s. From 1956 to the early 1960s they proposed agreements allowing aerial photography of designated zones; however, in the early 1960s they ceased to advocate an aerial reconnaissance regime in order to prevent observation of their strategic missile sites.

The Soviet Union also sought to alter the relationship between the two opposing blocs through political declaratory measures. The Soviets repeatedly called for the replacement of the two alliances with an international collective security system. In 1955, they began proposing the conclusion of a nonaggression pact, a pledge of no first use of nuclear weapons, and a freeze on the defense budgets of the major powers—proposals that have all become familiar themes in Soviet arms control policy.

**European Security Conferences during the Late 1960s**

After Khrushchev’s ouster in 1964, Brezhnev and Kosygin adopted a more conservative approach. In arms control, they sought to codify the nuclear status quo rather than to alter the existing force structure. They also pursued a conventional force modernization and expansion program, which they supplemented with occasional political-declaratory proposals. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, with the emergence of detente, the West was more receptive to Soviet calls for a European security conference, but NATO insisted that the conference deal with concrete—as opposed to declaratory—measures to promote security and stability in Europe; and that Moscow agree to separate negotiations aimed at reducing the level of conventional forces in Central Europe. Soviet acceptance of these conditions resulted in the opening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki in July 1973. The CSCE was followed by negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Vienna the following November.

At the MBFR talks, differences in the perspectives and goals of the East and West quickly became apparent. NATO’s aims were to reduce existing imbalances in the number of personnel and tanks, to seek reductions in Soviet forces and a residual ceiling on these forces as distinct from those of other Warsaw Pact states, to focus cuts on ground forces, and to reach an agreement on specific verification and confidence-building measures in order to ensure compliance and to decrease the possibility of surprise attacks. Soviet aims, on the other hand, were to retain their
existing advantages and alleviate their concerns about non-U.S. NATO forces—primarily West German forces—and NATO tactical air forces and nuclear capabilities. They also sought to preserve the existing degree of secrecy concerning Warsaw Pact deployments and combat readiness.

These divergent agendas were reflected in each side’s opening proposals. The basic difference centered on whether reductions should take place in terms of equal percentage reductions or asymmetrical reductions leading to a common ceiling. By June 1978, after several exchanges of proposals, both sides had in principle agreed to two-phased reductions in which the first phase would center on reductions in U.S. and Soviet forces only. For the first time the East called for substantially asymmetrical U.S. and Soviet reductions during Phase One and accepted other provisions of the Western negotiating approach; however, reductions were made contingent upon Western acceptance of Eastern data regarding the size of existing forces. These data, in contrast to Western data, indicated near parity in the manpower of the two blocs in the area. Because agreement on the initial force counts is considered essential to verifying compliance on reductions, this dispute has continued to plague the MBFR talks.

In a December 1985 proposal, the West attempted to circumvent the data dispute by calling for a small, symbolic Phase One reduction of U.S. and Soviet troops accompanied by the exchange of detailed force data and followed by a series of on-site inspections. While modifying some of its stands, the East rejected the proposals for exchanging data and offered no alternative for resolving the dispute.

Key elements of the Soviet approach to conventional arms control have emerged during the course of 15 years of negotiation, and the two sides have reached certain points of agreement. Reductions will be two-phased, focusing on U.S. and Soviet forces. Reductions will be asymmetrical, but very small. During the first phase all direct participants must pledge to freeze their force levels and to engage in reductions in the subsequent phase. Forces on both sides will be reduced to a common manpower ceiling: 700,000 for ground forces and 200,000 for air forces. In addition, the Soviets have sought to include tactical nuclear weapons in the reductions. They have agreed that verification measures other than national technical means are necessary, but have not specified what kinds of measures would be acceptable. However, the MBFR negotiations may well be superseded by a new forum for conventional force reductions as proposed by the Soviets in Budapest in 1986.

The Soviet agenda in the Helsinki talks repeated a familiar interest in obtaining formal Western recognition of the territorial and political situation in postwar Europe. The Western position, which the Soviets eventually agreed to, included security measures to increase confidence and stability. During negotiations, Soviet positions aimed at minimizing the effectiveness of Western confidence-building measures (CBMs). The conference produced the Helsinki Final Act, which included a requirement to provide 21 days notification of ground force maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops, an agreement to invite observers to such exercises and to notify participating countries of smaller maneuvers, an agreement that these measures would apply to the whole territory of all European states and to a 250 kilometer zone along the Soviet Union's western border, and the scheduling of a follow-up meeting to be held in Belgrade in 1977.
At the Belgrade meeting—which the Soviets had originally opposed—the Soviet Union refused to discuss confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) and proposed a separate set of negotiations to discuss declaratory security measures, while NATO proposed to strengthen and expand the confidence building measures that had been agreed to in Helsinki. The only tangible result of the meeting was an agreement to hold a follow-up meeting in Madrid in 1980. In Madrid, the participants negotiated a mandate for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE).

The CDE opened in Stockholm in early 1984, but no real progress was made during the first year, as the Soviets used the conference as a forum to criticize NATO INF deployments and to push favorite political-declaratory proposals. NATO tabled a series of CSBM proposals aimed at increasing the "transparency" of military activities. In the summer of 1985, the Soviets proposed their own measures, which basically restricted the flexibility of NATO's forces while having little impact on Warsaw Pact activities. In the end, compromises were reached, and the CSBM regime was substantially strengthened.

**GORBACHEV'S CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AGENDA**

Warner and Ochmanek distinguished between "visionary" and concrete conventional arms control proposals. While Gorbachev has advanced countless proposals of a visionary nature, or frequent political declaratory proposals, changes on the concrete level of Soviet conventional arms control policy are more difficult to discern.

Gorbachev devoted little time in his sweeping January 1986 statement on disarmament to issues of conventional arms control. He mainly reiterated positions already agreed upon at the MBFR talks, such as support for small initial reductions with a subsequent freeze on NATO and Warsaw Pact force levels, and the creation of "permanent monitoring points" to observe movement into and out of the reduction zone. As regards confidence and security building measures, Gorbachev repeated a Soviet proposal that all parties agree to a ceiling on the size of military exercises.

Gorbachev's application of "new political thinking" to national security policy has affected the visionary side of conventional arms control. "Reasonable sufficiency" has been introduced as a central theme, and the Soviets have agreed to give up numerical superiority in weapons categories where the Soviets are ahead, if NATO is willing to the same. Focusing reductions on the most offensive weapons—such as the main battle tank—in the zone of direct contact, thereby reducing the danger of surprise attack and eliminating the potential for the successful conduct of offensive operations, has also been discussed. Given the offensive character of Soviet operational doctrine for theater warfare, these developments appear somewhat revolutionary.

The real test of Gorbachev's sincerity will come in negotiations on structural arms control. As the MBFR talks enter their final days, mandates for new negotiations on force reductions "from the Atlantic to the Urals" and for another round of talks on confidence and security building measures can be expected. Gorbachev's most specific proposal to date was made in Berlin in April 1986 and was set forth in detail after a meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative
Committee in Budapest in June. This proposal offered a two-phased reduction of Warsaw Pact and NATO forces and armaments, the first phase of which would cut 100,000 to 150,000 personnel from the forces of each side. During the second round, the air and ground forces of both sides would be reduced by half a million. The plan also envisions substantial reductions in tactical nuclear weapons. While the proposal contains several new elements, its emphasis on equal reductions represents a step backwards from an agreement in principle at the MBFR talks to reduce ground forces to a common ceiling of 700,000 men.

To bridge the gap between utopian statements and modest proposals, the Soviets have tended to advocate "declaratory arms control measures," such as no first use, the freezing of military budgets, and the nonuse of force. These have a certain propaganda value and little impact on Soviet military capabilities. Soviet advocacy of nuclear weapons free zones creates political difficulties for NATO, while garnering public support for Moscow's positions.

Gorbachev has also proposed a far-reaching security system for the Pacific region that includes the dissolution of military groups, the elimination of foreign bases, and the withdrawal of troops from other nations' territories. In his 1986 Vladivostok speech, he called for the application of reasonable sufficiency to conventional forces in Asia, making possible mutual radical reductions along the Sino-Soviet border. He has urged the negotiation of CSBMs for Asia and a set of international security guarantees for shipping and air traffic on the Indian Ocean, apparently related to an earlier call for an international convention to combat air and sea terrorism. Several of Gorbachev's specific proposals, such as limitations on the activities of naval forces, appear to be designed to make it difficult for the United States to project its power abroad, while having only marginal impact on Soviet activities.

On-site inspections to monitor compliance represent one area in which the Soviets have indicated a willingness to make concessions. At Stockholm, the Soviets agreed to a package of CSBMs that would commit both alliances to provide advance notice of all ground force exercises involving 13,000 or more troops, or 300 or more tanks; to invite all signatory countries to send observers to such exercises; and to permit up to three short notice inspections of their forces each year, to be carried out by teams from countries not allied with the inspected country.


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*Dr. Azrael's paper was read in his absence by Dr. Parrott.