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Relativistic Patterns in Totalitarian Thinking:

an Inquiry into the Language of Soviet Ideology

by Mikhail Epstein

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Socrates: Then it is not for every man, Hermogenes, to give names, but for him who may be called the name-maker; and he, it appears, is the law-giver, who is of all the artisans among men the rarest.

Plato

...The spontaneously evolved speech has been turned into a national language. As a matter of course, the individuals at some time will take completely under their control this product of the species as well.

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less."

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master - that's all."

Lewis Carroll

Mastery of language exists only as mastery of its worst and most inadequate possibilities.

Martin Walser

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INTRODUCTION

The crucial issue of the survival of ideology in our postmodern era brings into focus the concept of relativity. The defining feature of postmodernist thought is the absence of any particular centralist patterns which claim objective truth or absolute value. The generic quality of ideology, on the other hand, is considered to be an absolute commitment to some system of ideas which is strictly opposed to all other idea systems. Is it possible that ideological thinking will survive the postmodernist kingdom of playful relativity, preserving all necessary ideological definitions of mandatory and absolutist modes of thinking?

This question was recently raised by Bernard Susser in *The Grammar of Modern Ideology*: "The question was, how do sophisticated ideological thinkers justify the certainties they claim about past and future, man and society, in the face of the relativist skepticism that is the common coin of modern intellectual consciousness. Posed in this way, the problem appeared singularly intriguing, for ideology was the unique exception to the modernist rule; no other discipline or mode of discourse made such strident truth claims or clung to its certainties in so uncompromising (and non-modernist) a fashion."[1]

One could hardly disagree with such a formulation, with the exception of one term—modernism. It seems more appropriate to identify "relativist skepticism" with postmodernism than with modernism because the latter is known exactly for its "strident truth claims," as in the philosophy of Marx and Nietzsche or in the art of futurism and surrealism. Unfortunately, the answer given by Mr. Susser is not persuasive. "Ideology claims certainty because it is its social function to do so. ...An ideology that was nonchalant or equivocal about the activities it enjoyed or prohibited would be no ideology at all... Ideology and modernism were to each other as an immovable object to an irresistible force."[2] Susser assumes that ideology follows a standard of certainty while the modern age follows a standard of

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1. Bernard Susser, *The Grammar of Modern Ideology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988), 3.

2. *Ibid.*, 3-4.

relativism—their modes of thinking remain completely alien to each other. As Kipling said, "East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet..." Thus, the question of how Eastern ideology can survive in the epoch of Western relativity loses its intriguing appeal.

My answer, if only preliminary and partial, is quite different. Far from being antithetical to post-modernism, ideology supplies a unique forum for the post-modernist interplay of all conceivable ideas. Paradoxically, Soviet Marxism, the philosophy least expected to be involved in postmodernist debate, can provide an explanation. The ideology of Soviet Marxism has always enjoyed the reputation of being one of the most conservative and anti-modern system of beliefs of the twentieth century. Totalitarianism was assumed to exclude the sort of relativism that flourished in Western culture and laid the basis for the transition to the postmodernist condition. However, *glasnost'* and *perestroika* have shed new light on this ideological system which, if regarded in the process of its formation, reveals a stunning example of relativism inscribed into totalitarian thinking. Totalitarianism itself may thus be viewed as a specific postmodern model which came to replace the modernist ideological stance elaborated in earlier Marxism. The difference between classic Marxism, which is recognized as a breakthrough in philosophical modernism, and Soviet Marxism in its Stalinist and especially Brezhnevian versions, can be described precisely in terms of the modernist-postmodernist relationship. The latter tended to absorb and assimilate the former, eventually overcoming classic Marxism's original system of historical certainties and utopian beliefs.

The following discussion will attempt to answer a series of interrelated questions: What are the principal patterns of ideological thinking in general and of Soviet Marxism in particular? Is the allegedly "scholastic" system of Soviet ideology alien to the mainstream of Occidental thinking, or does it reproduce or perhaps precede some of the most striking intellectual developments of the West? How are relativist patterns introduced into the structure of totalitarian ideology, transforming it into a variant of postmodernist thinking?

Ideology is perhaps more strongly connected with language than any other kind of social activity. Language is the main vehicle of communication, and the mission of ideology is to rule the process of communication and organize people into communities governed by specific ideas. Karl Marx himself noted that "ideas do not exist in separation from

language."[3] Marxist ideology, especially in its Soviet version, confirms the force of this union of language and ideas.

Language is the most honest witness of ideological contradictions, which in Soviet Marxism were painstakingly concealed from the consciousness of the population in order to mold more successfully its collective subconscious. **Ideological language** became the decisive tool of the Soviet regime's systematic construction of such "ideal" phenomena as the "Soviet man" and "Soviet mentality." Yet, despite its crucial influence on Soviet society, ideological language—or "**ideolanguage**"—has not been properly investigated in the Soviet Union as a single, comprehensive phenomenon. Until now, only individual aspects of Soviet Marxist ideolanguage have come under consideration: in the 1920s, ideolanguage was investigated as "the language of revolution," in the 1930s, as "social dialect" or "class language," and in the 1960s and 1970s, as the *publitsistika* style. But the essential overall patterns of ideological language have thus far been neglected, and the analytical framework reduced to one historical epoch, one social stratum, or one functional style (see Bibliographical Supplement, p. 89).

In fact, the "language of the revolution" is only one stage in the development of Soviet Marxist ideolanguage, "proletarian dialect" only one of its sources, and *publitsistika* only one of its thematic realms. Ideolanguage goes beyond these particular aspects, it is something constant and universal, with its own logic, imagery and archetypes rooted in human consciousness. The author proposes the term "ideolinguistics" for this field of analysis, a field as important for understanding the nature of language and the development of society today as were sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics in the 1960s and 1970s.[4]

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3.   *Arkhiv Marksa i Engelsa*, vol. 4 (Moscow, 1935), 99.

4.   The concept and term "ideolinguistics" were proposed in the author's article "Sposoby vozdeistviia ideologicheskogo vyskazyvaniia," in *Obraz dvadtsatogo veka* (Moscow: Institut nauchnoi informatsii po obshchestvennym naukam, 1988), 167-216. See also Mikhail Epshtein, "Otsenochnost' v liksicheskoi sisteme iazyka," *Iazyk sovremennoi publitsistiki* (Moscow: Goskomizdat, 1989), 28-47.
       It goes without saying that I cannot claim to have discovered this field; my task here is to clarify its specific boundaries. Among recent works elaborating various aspects of ideolinguistics, one should mention the following, listed in chronological order of their publication: Theodor Pelster, *Die politische Rede im Westen und Osten Deutschlands* (Düsseldorf, 1966); Claus Mueller, *The Dialectics of Language: A Study in the Political Sociology of Language* (New York, 1970); Colin H. Good, *Die deutsche Sprache und die Kommunistishe Ideologie* (Frankfurt, 1975); Dominique Labbé, *Le Discours Communiste* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1977); Roger Fowler et. al, *Language*

Most of the author's observations in this paper will be based on ideological practices of the pre-Gorbachev era in Soviet Marxism. As the following discussion will make clear, however, *perestroika* and *glasnost'* did not abolish the fundamental patterns of Soviet ideological thought. Instead, these policies made more explicit the rhetorical devices of Soviet Marxism which the previous two or three generations of ideologists had concealed. With *perestroika*, the ideological relativism inherent in the totalitarian mode of thinking oversteps the boundaries of totalitarianism—an outwardly coherent and intolerant system of political thought—and displays a host of controversial meanings which were previously hidden inside the self-contradictory doctrines of Stalinism and Brezhnevism. The advent of *glasnost'* and *perestroika* appears to have laid bare the hidden foundations of Soviet ideocracy and made possible the deconstruction of its Babylonian sign system. A unique opportunity exists for linguistic and epistemological analysis of the patterns of the most long-standing totalitarian ideology of modern times.

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and Control (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979); Gunther Kress and Robert Hodge, *Language as Ideology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979); Paul E. Corcoran, *Political Language and Rhetoric* (St. Lucia, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1979); Dwight Bolinger, *Language, the Loaded Weapon* (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1980); O. Reboul, *Langage et Idéologie* (Paris: P.U.F., 1980); *Essais sur le Discours Soviétique: Semiologie, Linguistique, Analyse Discoursive*, III (Université de Grenoble, 1981); Maurice Cranston and Peter Mair, eds., *Langage et Politique* (Language and Politics) (Brussells, 1982); Michael J. Shapiro, ed., *Language and Politics*, (New York: New York University Press, 1984); Patrick Seriot, *Analyse du Discours Politique Soviétique* (Paris: Institut d'Études Slaves, 1985); Françoise Thom, *La Langue de Bois* (Paris: Julliard, 1987); Françoise Thom, *Newspeak; The Language of Soviet Ideology*, trans. Ken Connelly (London: The Claridge Press, 1989); Ruth Wodak, ed., *Language, Power, and Ideology; Studies in Political Discourse* (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1989).

While some works in this field have been published in the USSR, the majority of Soviet texts are, in the author's opinion, excessively influenced by "Marxist-Leninist Ideology" and too engaged in the dispute with "bourgeois ideology" to offer objective investigation. See: Iu. V. Kovalenko, *Iazyk i Ideologiia: Filologicheskie etiudy*, Vypusk I (Rostov-on-the-Don, 1974); T.B. Kriuchkova, *Iazyk i ideologiia: K voprosu ob otrazhenii ideologii v iazyke* (Leningrad, 1976), *Iazyk i ideologiia: Kritika idealisticheskikh kontseptsii, funkstionirovaniia, i razvitiia iazyka* (Kiev, 1981); *Funkstionirovanie iazyka kak sredstva ideoligicheskogo vozdeistviia* (Krasnodar: Kubanskii gosudarstvennii universitet, 1988).

The weakness of Soviet literature is offset by works published abroad by Russian emigrés. These works include: L. Rzevskii, *Iazyk i Totalitarizm* (München, 1951); Andrei i Tat'iana Fesenko, *Russkii iazyk pri Sovetakh* (New York: Rausen Bros., 1955); Roman Redlikh, *Stalinshchina kak dukhovnii fenomen*, Part II: Sovetskii iazyk (Frankfurt/Main: Possev, 1971); Il'ia Zemtsov, *Sovetskii politicheskii iazyk* (London: Overseas Publications Interchange, Ltd., 1985) [English translation: *Manipulation of a Language; The Lexicon of Soviet Political Terms* (Hero Books, 1984)]; Il'ia Zemtsov, *Real'nost' i grani perestroiki: Spravochnik* (London: Overseas Publications Interchange, Ltd., 1989).

CHAPTER 1. THE BOUNDARIES OF IDEOLINGUISTICS

The principal theoretical problem of ideolinguistics is how to define the relationship between ideology and language. Two theoretical approaches dominate this field: one emphasizes the homogeneity of ideology and language, the other treats ideology and language as heterogeneous phenomena. It seems neither theory expresses the entire truth. In contrast to the assumptions of both homogeneity and heterogeneity, the author will argue that ideology and language are two phenomena which can neither be equated to, nor torn apart from one another. This section will attempt to demonstrate that the dialectic interaction of ideology and language defines the specific subject of ideolinguistics, laying the groundwork for the analysis of Soviet Marxist ideolanguage which follows.

Let us now examine the heterogeneous and homogeneous approaches. Exponents of heterogeneous theory include Alfred Korzybski, Stuart Chase, S.I. Hayakawa, and other representatives of the so-called "general semantics" school. This philosophical school was founded by Alfred Korzybski, who developed a comprehensive critique of the ideological abuse of language.[5] In Korzybski's theory, the phenomenon of ideology is treated as a pathology of language because it involves deep-rooted misunderstandings and logical mistakes in word usage. Meanings of words are improperly broadened and abstracted from concrete references. These empty abstracts, which do not correspond to reality, are then easily manipulated in order to provoke love and hate with respect to purely fictitious objects.

Semantic analysis claims to show that ideological terms such as "democracy," "communism," "fascism," and "capitalism" are devoid of any specific meaning. Each speaker supplies such words with his own meaning, resulting in ideological battles which, in real life, often progress to the point

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5.   Alfred Korzybski, *Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics* (Lancaster, PA: Science Press Printing Company, 1933). Works based on the central tenets of Korzybski's thought can be found in *ETC, A Review of General Semantics*, a quarterly published since 1943 by the International Society for General Semantics in San Francisco, California.

of military clashes.[6] Semanticists recommend certain logical procedures to heal language from this ill-intentioned substitution of concepts and deterioration of meaning. One procedure would require that each pronouncement include an indication of its own incompleteness and non-identity with its object. Such words as "Germany" or "Russians," for example, are abstractions; expressions like "Germany chokes freedom" or "the Russian people are virtual slaves" are vague and ambiguous. It is necessary to identify a more specific subset before such expressions can become meaningful: "Well, some persons called Germans are choking the activities of other Germans... But 'Germany' is not doing any choking."[7] Another procedure would require that the same word, if used in a different context, be accompanied by indexes. For example, "war_1 is not war_2," would prevent confusion over different meanings of this word in such expressions as "Germany is eager to engage in war" and "the war between cinema and TV is the main cultural collision of the recent decades."[8] Phrases such as "et cetera", "and the like", "and so on," should be used as often as possible to indicate that reality may go beyond specific linguistic expressions.

On the whole, general semantics proceeds from the assumption that language can be improved rationally. This liberal optimism goes back to the philosophy of John Locke who, in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690; Book 3, chapters 9-11), focused on the criteria for the verification of speech. In this perspective, ideology is alien to the essence of language, an irrational distortion of its rational structures.

An opposing approach was developed in the works of Russian and French thinkers. V.N. Voloshinov, in his book *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* (many researchers actually attribute this work to Mikhail Bakhtin or "Bakhtin's school"), outlined a neo-Marxist, comprehensive theory of ideology which encompasses all linguistic phenomena. His theory holds that any system of signs is completely ideological: "The field of ideology coincides with the field of signs. They

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6. See Stuart Chase, *The Tyranny of Words* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1938), 182-206, 334-349.

7. *Ibid.*, 328-332.

8. "A rule can then be formulated as a general guide in all our thinking and reading: police $officer_1$ is not police $officer_2$... This rule, if remembered, prevents us from confusing levels of abstraction..." S.I. Hayakawa and Alan R. Hayakawa, *Language in Thought and Language*, 5th ed., (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1990), 125-126.

may be equated... A word accompanies and comments on every ideological act.... All this makes a word a fundamental object of the theory of ideologies."[9] In Bakhtin's view, there can be no language activity which extends beyond the bounds of ideology. His approach to language as an "ideological substance" is based on the assumption that "in living pronouncements each element not only signifies but also evaluates... The objective (*predmetnoe*) meaning is formed by evaluation... Evaluation has the creative role in changes of meanings."[10]

This theory of language as completely charged with ideology was further developed in French structuralism. Structuralism views ideology not as imposed on language from the outside, but as the immanent property of language itself. Language is considered to undergo the process of ideologization every time it is transformed into speech. Ideology is thus not an anomaly, but a norm of every pronouncement which somehow relates to the world of values. French semioticians A. J. Greimas and J. Courtes make a clear distinction between paradigmatic and syntagmatic articulation of a world of values, known as "axiology" and "ideology," respectively. In their view, ideology can neither be avoided nor banished from language because language is constantly assimilating some values while expelling others. These authors imply that axiology is a stable system of values while "ideology is a permanent quest for values..."[11]

This trend in structuralist thought—ideology as the quest for values—was initiated by Roland Barthes. In *Elements of Semiology*, Barthes discusses ideology within the framework of so-called "connotative linguistics." Connotation is usually understood to be the expressive/evaluative meaning of a word, as distinct from denotation, which indicates an objective, conceptual meaning. According to Barthes, ideology is a secondary system of connotations which is built over a system of denotations. For example, the word "Motherland" denotes "the country in which one was born and of which one is a citizen". The connotation of the word may be defined as "patriotic pride," or "faithfulness to the land of the ancestors," or "love for

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9. V.N. Voloshinov, *Marksizm i filosofiia iazyka; Osnovnye problemy sotsiologicheskogo metoda v nauke o iazyke* (Leningrad, 1930), 14, 19, 20, 27.

10. Ibid., 107.

11. A.J. Greimas and J. Courtes, *Semiotics and Language; An Analytical Dictionary*, trans. Larry Crist et. al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 149.

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compatriots." "As for the signified of connotation, its character is at once general, global and diffuse; it is, if you like, a fragment of ideology..."[12] In other words, every denotative meaning in its turn may be a sign relating to an ideological meaning (which appears as the signified of still another signified). Here, the word "Motherland" is the sign, "country" is the first signified (denotation), and "pride" is the second signified (connotation). Barthes concludes, "We might say that ideology is the form... of the signifieds of connotation."[13]

General semantics and structural semiotics offer opposite approaches to ideology. For Stuart Chase, ideology is a "tyranny of words" from which one can and must liberate oneself. For Roland Barthes, ideology is "a linguistics of connotation," in which every speaker inevitably inscribes his own meanings. But ideology should be neither opposed to nor equated with language because these extremes abolish the main question raised by ideolinguistics: what is the specificity of ideological use of language? If every evaluative component of speech is classified as ideological, then the distinction between different modes of evaluation is lost.

Clearly, expressions such as "Oh, what bad weather!," "The movie was fascinating," "*The Divine Comedy* is the greatest masterpiece of world literature," and "Communism is the bright future of all humanity," are evaluative in their own right. Does this mean that all of these expressions are ideological pronouncements? If the answer is yes, then the concept of ideology covers such a broad range of phenomena that it loses all specificity and theoretical usefulness. It would be frivolous to detect the same ideological character in Soviet Marxist expressions and momentary, emotional proclamations of an individual. If, however, we agree that ideology does not include evaluations based on personal emotions or whims, and only one of the above-mentioned expressions is genuinely ideological (the latter one), then the specific relationship between ideology and language can be explored. On the other hand, if ideology is a perverse use of language which can and must be abandoned, then the proper theory of

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12. Roland Barthes, *Elements of Semiology*, trans. A. Lavers and C. Smith (London: Jonathan Cape, Ltd., 1969), 91.
   Semiotics interprets a sign as a unity of two components: the signifying (a letter, a symbol, a word) and the signified (a concept, an idea, a notion).

13. Ibid., 92.

ideological language loses its focus. From this point of view, ideology is just an obstacle to communication and understanding and has nothing to do with the inner essence of language.

In the 1960s, the methods and problems of syntactical research, in particular generative and transformative grammar, prevailed in linguistics. In the seventies "semantics," the analysis of semantic primitives, universals, and primary lexical functions, dominated. Only in the late seventies and early eighties did the accelerated development of pragmatics become evident and lead to the formation of a specific discipline—"pragmalinguistics."[14] As distinct from semantics, which studies signs in their relationship to the signified, and syntactics, which studies signs in their relationship to each other, pragmatics studies signs in their relationship to the person or collective who uses or perceives them. This theory attempts to show how signs express the attitude of the speaker or of the listener towards the signified. In contrast, general semantics and structuralism are oriented towards semantic and syntactic aspects of the sign, respectively.

Charles Morris, one of the founders of pragmatics, indicated that in addition to signs-designators, whose aim is purely descriptive, other types of signs also exist. Among these signs are appraisors, which make evaluations; prescriptors, which aim at evoking some type of reaction; and formators, which aim at the systematization and organization of the entire behavior of the recipient. This classification of signs allows for analytical distinctions between different types of discourse, including political and propagandistic discourse.[15] The most productive contribution of pragmatics, however, turned out to be not its classification of signs, but its concept that signs possess a flexible pragmatic function which can be actualized in any meaningful pronouncement, depending on the conditions of communication.

The pragmatic relationship between language and its users includes social, psychological, and ideological aspects. In this author's

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14. "During the past twenty years, one has witnessed a gradual shift in the kinds of facts linguistic practitioners professed to be interested in. Roughly, this shift is describable as from syntax through semantics to pragmatics." Jacob L. Mey, "Introduction" in *Pragmalinguistics: Theory and Practice*, Jacob L. Mey, ed. (Paris: Mouton Publishers, 1979), 10.

15. Charles Morris, *Writings on the General Theory of Signs* (Paris: Mouton Publishers, 1971), 203-232.

opinion, it is necessary to define the ideological kernel of pragmatics as a specific field. This would create the subfield of ideolinguistics, filling the gap in the existing system of linguistic disciplines. Ideolinguistics would explore a middle ground between language and ideology in the way in which sociolinguistics and psycholinguistcs have examined interdisciplinary problems on the border between language and society and language and psychology.

Although sociolinguistics studies language in terms of its social functions, ideology has its own peculiarities which cannot be reduced to sociological issues.[16] Ideology is a sort of bridge between human mentality and social life and offers its own broad realm of investigation. Moreover, ideological factors sometimes have more importance for the development of language than do sociological or psychological factors. In the Soviet Union, for example, ideology more actively determined the lexical system of language than did the difference between social strata. Blue- and white-collar workers, intellectuals and peasants, all experienced the incessant barrage of ideological language despite their social distinctions. Thus the theory of ideology cannot be treated as a subset of sociology; it is a special discipline in its own right.

The theory of ideology likewise cannot be dissolved into psycholinguistics. The latter studies the process of encoding and decoding verbal messages in different situations, as well as patterns of learning, logical operations, associative connections, and so forth.[17] Noam Chomsky indicates that "the study of language may very well, as was traditionally supposed, provide a remarkably favorable perspective for the study of human mental processes....It seems to me, then, that the study of language

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16. A classic example of the sociolinguistic approach can be found in W. Labov, *Sociolinguistic Patterns* (Philadelphia, 1972), which explores phonological variants in the speech of New Yorkers; these variants are correlated with social differences (education, profession, income). For a general introduction to the discipline, see W. Bright, ed., *Sociolinguistics* (The Hague, 1968); J.A. Fishman, ed., *Readings in the Sociology of Language* (The Hague, 1968); P.P. Giglioli, ed., *Language and Social Context* (Harmondsworth, 1972); J.J. Gumperz, *Language in Social Groups* (Stanford, 1971); *Sotsial'no-lingvisiticheskie issledovaniia* (Msocow, 1976); A.D. Shveitser, L.B. Nikol'skii, *Vvedenie v sotsiolingvistiku* (Moscow, 1978).

17. The term "psycholinguistics" was coined by C.E. Osgood and T.A. Sebeok in 1954. This discipline is outlined in such books as S. Saporta, ed., *Psycholinguistics: A Book of Readings* (New York, 1961); T.G. Bever, J.J. Katz, and D.T. Langendoen, *An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Ability* (New York, 1976); H.H. Clark and E.V. Clark, *Psychology and Language* (New York, 1977); D.J. Foss and D.T. Hakes, *Psycholinguistics* (New York, 1978).

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should occupy a central place in general psychology."[18] The theory of "deep structures" and language universals elaborated by Chomsky himself represents a significant contemporary contribution to the rapprochement of linguistics and psychology.

Yet thinking is not only logical, it is ideological as well. The exploration of deep structures in ordinary language helps to reveal the logical foundations, inborn schemes, and abstract rules of thinking. The exploration of ideological language leads to an understanding more of the teleological than the epistemological aspects of thinking: an idea is a product of mind in the perspective of its situational use and final ends. Ideology, then, is a practical way of thinking which organizes social life. In the system of linguistic disciplines, ideolinguistics is closer to sociolinguistics, while the generative grammar of Chomsky, which is oriented towards a pure theoretical mentality, is closer to psycholinguistics. (Chomsky himself regards "the study of linguistic structure as a chapter of human psychology."[19]) The difference between ideolinguistics and psycholinguistics also takes into account certain general aspects of language: Chomskian psycholinguistics is primarily based on syntactical research, while ideolinguistics must necessarily focus on lexicology.

The relationship of the three subdivisions of linguistics can be approximately conveyed by the following chart:

```
Society <-------------> Ideology  <---------------> Mind
   |                       |                         |
LANGUAGE              LANGUAGE                  LANGUAGE
   |                       |                         |
Sociolinguistics <-----> Ideolinguistics <-----> Psycholinguistics
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18. Noam Chomsky, *Language and Mind* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972), 98-99.

19. Ibid., 66.

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As the chart demonstrates, ideolinguistics is an intermediary discipline which connects the social and mental aspects of linguistic research. In this interdisciplinary realm, the specific task of ideolinguistics is to investigate the social functions of intellect and intellectual biases in society inasmuch as they are realized in language and determine its use.

CHAPTER 2. WORDS AS IDEOLOGEMS

What is ideology? Although definitions vary enormously, most define ideological discourse as a combination of theoretical knowledge and practical evaluation, as the following four independent sources demonstrate:[20]

Raymond Aron: "Political ideologies always combine, more or less felicitously, **factual** propositions and **value** judgments. They express an **outlook** on the world and a **will** oriented towards the future."[21]

Daniel Bell: "Ideology is the conversion of **ideas** into social levers... What gives ideology its force is its **passion**. Abstract philosophical inquiry has always sought to eliminate passion, and the person, to rationalize all ideas. For the ideologue, **truth** arises in **action**, and **meaning** is given to experience by the **'transforming** moment'."[22]

Encyclopaedia Britannica: "An ideology is a form of social or political philosophy in which **practical** elements are as prominent as **theoretical** ones; it is a system of ideas that aspires both to **explain** the world and to **change** it."[23]

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20. Emphasis is the author's.

21. Raymond Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1957), 236.

22. Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology; On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 400.

23. *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 30 vols. (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1976), 9:194.

Great Soviet Encyclopaedia: "Ideology is a system of views and ideas within whose framework people **perceive** and **evaluate** both their relations to reality and to each other..."[24]

It is essential that an idea taken as a unit of ideology include not only a perception, but also an evaluation of reality. This combination of perception and evaluation differentiates an idea as a unit of ideology from a concept as a unit of scientific thinking (in Russian, the difference between "*ideia*" and "*poniatie*"). For example, **matter** is a scientific concept which can be based on physical observation. When we endow this scientific concept with an evaluative meaning implying that matter is the primary element of the universe preceding all spiritual phenomena, then we have **materialism**, an ideological construction. The idea of materialism includes the objective concept of matter plus a value judgment about this concept. An idea, as distinct from a concept, contains an element of active goal-setting; it is possible to fight for an idea, to be faithful to it, to sacrifice oneself for its sake. It is impossible, however, in all these instances to substitute the **concept** for the **idea**. One does not fight for matter, but for materialism, as do the literary heros of Turgenev and Chernyshevsky.

An idea in an ideological system is not, however, simply a matter of personal taste, an emotional or subjective attitude towards something. Phrases such as "delicious ice cream" or "beautiful hair" are evaluative, not ideological. These phrases express a personal preference for individual items and do not contain any broader, generalized concepts that are essential to ideological thinking. It is the interaction of the conceptual and evaluative meanings in the semantic structure of language that provides for the possibility of its ideological use.

At the lexical level, three classes of words are revealed in language, varying between the extremes of "factual propositions" and "value judgments," to use Aron's terms. The first class contains those words whose significance is purely factual and does not presuppose an attitude on the part of the speaker towards the designated phenomena. The words "house," "forest," "table," "weather," and the verbs "to walk," and "to look," are examples of descriptive, not evaluative, meanings. The second class

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24. *The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, A.M. Prokhorov, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 10:120.

includes words whose meaning is evaluative, but not directed towards a particular fact or object. These may be such words as "good," "bad," "useful", "harmful," "delicious," "beautiful," "charm," "horror," etc. Only a specific context can indicate what fact is evaluated by words in this group. Finally, the third class is being the most ideologically significant. Words in this class indicate a definite fact, while simultaneously evaluating the fact. The descriptive and evaluative meanings are strongly linked in these words. For example, the word "peacefulness" (*miroliubie*) has a positive connotation, while the words "conciliatoriness" or "appeasement" (*primirenchestvo, umirotvorenie*) have a negative one. All three words describe the same act—"striving for peace"—and at the same time endow it with either a positive or negative evaluative meaning.

In many cases, it is difficult to find the appropriate English-language equivalents for Soviet terms. Often this is because Soviet ideological language actually has an entirely different aim than a "normal" language. Instead of placing the emphasis on an exchange of information, the Soviet language attempts to control and restrict the thinking of the speaker and listener.[25] For example, the Soviet ideological words "*oshel'movat'*" and "*zakleimit'*" have the same meaning: "to denounce," "to disgrace." However, the first of these words, *oshel'movat'*, has a negative connotation: to disgrace unfairly in a contemptible manner. The second word, *zakleimit'*, expresses a positive relationship associated with this action: the speaker agrees that someone was disgraced justifiably. We might read in Soviet newspapers: "Pinochet's clique is **denouncing** (*shel'muet*) all the honest freedom-fighters in Chile, especially communists." Or we might read: "The honest people of the entire world are **denouncing** (*kleimiat*) Pinochet for his bloody crimes against the communists." In American English, one can find numerous equivalent words which have a negative connotation: "to defame," "to brand," "to stigmatize." However, there is no single word in the English language that can convey a speaker's approval of the dishonor.

In Soviet dictionaries, definitions of these and similar words usually combine descriptive and evaluative components. The latter may be written in various ways, either in the form of a stylistic note ("contemptible," "disapproving," "lofty," "deferential"), or by including evaluative words in the

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25. For a discussion of the conditions which make the Russian language particularly susceptible to ideological use, see the Appendix.

definition itself ("bad," "false," "alleged," "truthful," "progressive," "criminal," "reactionary," etc.).

Let us compare two definitions in Ozhegov's popular dictionary of the modern Russian language:

"accomplice (*posobnik*) [disapprov.]: a helper in evil, criminal, activities."

"comrade-in-arms" (*spodvizhnik*) [lofty]: a person who participates as someone's helper in an activity in someone's field of endeavor."

While these words possess an identical factual meaning, they express opposite attitudes on the part of the speaker regarding a person who might be neutrally indicated as a helper. Kalinin or Dzerzhinsky, for example, would be called "Lenin's comrades-in-arms" in the Soviet press, whereas Goering or Goebbels would only be identified as Hitler's "accomplices." "Helper" is the neutral factual component to which either positive or negative evaluative components are added.

To sum up, three types of words can be identified in regular language:

(1) "Descriptive" words, which acquire their evaluative meaning only in a broader context: a criminal **agreement**.

(2) "Evaluative" words, which acquire their factual meaning when combined with a descriptive word: a **criminal** agreement.

(3) "Descriptive-evaluative" words whose lexical meaning combines the two components. A "criminal agreement," for example, is compressed into "a collusion" (Russian "*sgovor*"). A typical sentence would read: "Imperialist powers entered into a collusion against the Palestinian people to rob them of their rights for statehood." Here the denotative meaning "an agreement" and evaluative meaning "criminal" are united to make up an ideological meaning of the word "collusion."

The third category of words, which combines the descriptive and evaluative meanings in such an inseparable way that they make one whole lexical meaning, I shall call "ideologems." Words of the first and second categories such as "house","agreement", "good", "bad" are not ideologems. Their meanings are dependent on their context and connections with other words. As for ideologems, their possible context is included in their significance, which is stable and presupposes a definite attitude of the speaker to the signified object. Ideologems are not only nominative, but communicative units of speech; that is, they not only name the facts (objects, actions, or qualities), but communicate some message (an opinion, an idea) of how one should treat these facts.

Let us look at some examples from current Soviet language. The verb *"oshel'movat',"* as I have already explained, means not only "to disgrace," but to do it in such a way that must be condemned by both the speaker and his listeners. *"Ob'ektivizm"* means that a scientist or a scholar is loyal to so-called "minor" facts at the expense of the Party line and "historic tendencies." *"Pochin"* means not only "an initiative" but one that is extremely valuable and demands the support of the masses. The adjective *"opytnyi"* means an experienced person who can work productively, while *"materyi"* means an enemy who has great experience with criminal actions. *"Splochenie"* is the solidarity and unity of all Soviet allies and compatriots, while *"blokirovanie"* refers to the activities of all anti-Soviet forces. For example: "The feast of May 1 is a call to the solidarity (*splochenie*) of all the working people in the world." "All forces of neo-colonialism are now forming a bloc (*blokiruiutsia*) against Libya's independence." All these words serve as vehicles of communication, naming the object and establishing an attitude towards it.

Ideologems, being the elementary particles of ideological thinking, are not simply words, but concealed judgments which take the form of words. Usually a judgment is developed in an entire sentence, where it is divided into the subject and predicate. This kind of judgment is then open to discussion because the link between the subject and predicate is explicitly relative. For example, the typical Soviet ideological judgment that "Vladimir Il'ich Ul'ianov is the greatest man in human history" is debatable. We can combine the subject of this sentence with another predicate such as "the greatest criminal" or, vice-versa, combine the predicate "is the greatest man" with another subject such as Shakespeare or George Washington. But in Soviet Marxist ideolanguage, "Lenin" is already

an ideologem which refers both to a concrete man, Vladimir Il'ich Ul'ianov, and to an abstract evaluative concept, the "greatest man in human history."[26] The factual meaning of the ideologem usually serves as the subject of the judgment, the evaluative meaning, as the predicate. Thus, "Lenin" is a condensed judgment where the subject and predicate are combined in one word.

In the same way, the ideologem *"pochin"* has the subject "initiative" and the predicate "is useful and must be supported." Let us compare two kinds of judgments: explicit and implicit. "The initiative turned out to be inappropriate [We may ask: For what reason?] and resulted in much damage [What sort of damage?]." This is an example of an explicit judgment in which a vacant place remains (shown in brackets) for the substantiation or refutation of the argument. "Adventurism!" (*avantiurism!*) or "arbitrariness!" (*samoupravstvo!*) is an example of implicit judgment in which the subject, "initiative," is closely intertwined with the predicate, "is inappropriate and must be defeated." An ideologem is nothing other than an idea which is hidden in one word (or, sometimes, in one indivisible phrase or idiom). In this way it can be inserted into the listener's consciousness without the possibility of argumentation or objection. One cannot quarrel with a single word.

Thus, such typical judgments as "this *pochin* (good initiative) should be supported" or "this *samoupravstvo* (bad initiative) must be condemned" are mere tautologies: the meaning of the word *"pochin"* already implies that it is necessary, and therefore must be supported. Many Soviet ideological texts are lengthy repetitions of those judgments which are contained in single ideologems, for example: "All Soviet people unanimously approve and support the courageous initiative (*pochin*) of the workers of the Dnepropetrovskii metallurgy plant which took on the obligation to produce an additional 25,000 tons of steel by the anniversary of the October Revolution." The ideological meaning of this whole sentence is equivalent to that of a single word—*pochin*.

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26. S.I. Hayakawa cites several good examples of latent judgments which express the opposite ideological bias: "To many people, the word "communist" has both the informative connotation of "one who believes in communism" and the affective connotation of "one whose ideals and purposes are altogether repellent." Words...applying to believers in philosophies of which one disapproves ("atheist," "radical," "heretic," "materialist," "fundamentalist") likewise often communicate simultaneously a fact and a judgment on that fact. Such words may be called "loaded" -- that is, their affective connotations may strongly shape people's thoughts." Hayakawa and Hayakawa, *Language in Thought and Language*, 48.

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It is not sufficient only to identify ideologems as a special category of language units. We must also analyze and systematize relationships between ideologems in order to discover a model which gives rise to varied ideological uses of language. For the remainder of this paper, the author will use the linguistic terms "denotation" and "connotation" to designate the two components of an ideologem: its factual and evaluative aspects.

CHAPTER 3. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN IDEOLOGEMS

The connections between ideologems are determined by the same relationships of similarity and opposition, synonymy and antonymy which are characteristic of lexical systems in all languages. However, ideologems have double denotative and connotative (factual and evaluative) significance. Hence, all relationships between them are doubled. Instead of antonymy and synonymy, four relationships exist between ideologems: full antonymy; synonymy of denotative meanings, antonymy of connotative meanings; antonymy of denotative meanings, synonymy of connotative meanings; and full synonymy.

(1) Full Antonymy

Full anonymy is the opposition of both the denotative and connotative meanings. I shall call this relationship "**contrative**," and the words which are connected with this relationship, "contratives." The following word pairs could be classified as contratives:

internationalism - nationalism (or chauvinism)	*internationsionalizm - nationalizm* (or *shovinism*)
peacefulness - aggressiveness	*miroliubie - agressivnost'*
collectivism - individualism	*kollectivizm - individualizm*
freedom - slavery (or oppression)	*svoboda - rabstvo* (or *gniot*)
perestroika - stagnation	*perestroika - zastoi*
solidarity - split	*splochenie - raskol*[27]

These ideologems are opposed not only on the denotative plane of their meaning, but on the connotative plane as well. "Collectivism" means the presence of communal awareness between people or the striving towards this awareness; the word carries a positive connotation in Soviet ideolanguage. "Individualism" means the absence of such communal

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27. For the selection of examples, the following dictionaries proved to be helpful: *Slovar' sinonimov russkogo iazyka, V. 2, tomakh* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1970); Z.E. Aleksandrova, *Slovar' sinonimov russkogo iazyka* (Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1969); M.R. L'vov, *Slovar' antonimov russkogo iazyka* (Moscow: Russkii iazyk, 1984); G.P. Poliakova, G.Ia. Solganik, *Chastotnii slovar' iazyka gazet* (Moscow: Moscow State University Press, 1971).

thinking or the striving to abandon it; the word has an extremely negative connotation. All words on the left-hand side of each column above have a positive connotation, while all words on the right-hand side are completely negative. This contrative opposition belongs to the earliest stage of development of Marxist ideology, like the opposition of socialism to capitalism, or labor to exploitation, or of the working class to the bourgeoisie.

I will continue to place words with positive connotations on the left side and words with negative connotations on the right side of each pair of words. This will not only be easier for the reader's perception (one must perceive something before one can perceive its negative), but corresponds to the Soviet ideological dichotomy of left and right, where the left is usually associated with good and the right with bad.

(2) Synonymy of Denotative Meanings/ Antonymy of Connotative Meanings

These ideologems indicate identical or similar phenomena, but give them opposite evaluations. I shall call this relationship "**conversive**."[28] Conversives are as follows:

internationalism - cosmopolitanism	*internatsionalizm - kosmopolitizm*
peacefulness - appeasement	*miroliubie - umirotvorenie*
(or conciliatoriness)	(or *primirenchestvo*)
freedom - license	*svoboda - raspushchennost'*
initiative - arbitrariness	*pochin - proizvol*
	(or *initsiativa - samoupravstvo*)
traditional - backward	*traditsionnyi - otstalyi*

The words "peacefulness" and "appeasement" have the same denotative meaning—a striving to establish peace, but have entirely different connotative meanings which indicate the speaker's attitude concerning this striving toward peace. "The entire world had the opportunity to recognize and appreciate the **peacefulness** of the Soviet people during the post-war

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28. The term "conversive," as used in semantics, refers to the opposite roles of the participants of the same interaction: when A "wins," B "loses;" if A "sells," B "buys." Pragmatic, or evaluative, conversives refer to the opposing attitudes of the participants to the same phenomenon: what A views as "dreams," B views as "ravings" (*mechty - bredni*).

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period," but "Communists will never appease the imperialists by accepting their involvement in the internal affairs of the developing countries."

From the linguistic point of view, the conversive relationship is especially interesting, as connotative meanings become the only factor which differentiate words with a common denotative meaning. This is especially typical of Soviet ideolanguage:

rally - mob	*sobranie - sborishche*
soldier - mercenary	*soldat - naiomnik*
	(or *voin - voiaka*)
comrade-in-arms - accomplice	*spodvizhnik - prispeshnik*
	(or *soratnik - soobshchnik*)[29]
efficiency - small-mindedness	*delovitost' - deliachestvo*

Entire ideological expressions may sometimes maintain parallel denotative structures, but differentiate at the connotative level. "The experienced politician concluded an agreement with the leaders of the rebel detachments" (*Opytnyi politik zakliuchil dogovor s rukovoditeliami partizanskikh otriadov*) can thus be conversed into "The unscrupulous pol made a deal with the ringleaders of the bandit gangs" (*Materyi politikan vstupil v sgovor s glavariami banditskikh shaek*). The law of ideological agreement does not allow elements of these two statements to change places. One could not say "the ringleaders of the heroic partisan detachment" (*glavari geroicheskogo partizanskogo otriada*) because the word "ringleaders" has a negative connotation which does not agree ideologically with the rest of the sentence. This necessity for expressive concord was aptly exemplified in the thirties by the Soviet educator Makarenko. "Try to slip the phrase 'the collective of Krupp factories' past any Soviet audience. Even a Soviet citizen unschooled in sociology will find the juxtaposition of the words 'collective' and 'Krupp' absurd... A collective is a social organism within a healthy society. Such an organism cannot be imagined in the bourgeois chaos."[30] Thus, Soviet

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29. Soviet ideological conversives often express a positive concept by a word formed from a Russian root, while its negative counterpart is expressed by a word of foreign origin: *soiuz - al'ians, razvedchik - shpion, ob'ediniat'sia - blokirovat'sia*. The reverse is relatively rare: *optimizm - prekrasnodushie*.

30. A.S. Makarenko, *Sochineniia* (Moscow, 1958), 7:13.

ideological stylistics does not permit the combination of two words with opposite connotations in one phrase.

The evaluative conversion, changing the connotative meaning while retaining the denotative meaning, is the routine practice of Soviet ideology.[31] Soviet journalists have often used information from Western sources, repeating it word for word, but choosing to substitute words which possess opposite connotative meanings. Experienced Soviet readers, however, perform an almost instinctive ideological conversion which allows them to decipher the original Western text and draw precisely the opposite conclusions than those reached by the journalist. This mental transformation following conversive patterns occurs when, for example, a Soviet citizen reads information about the rebels in Afghanistan or the contras in Nicaragua in Soviet newspapers: "bandit gangs" are deciphered as "rebel detachments."

The celebrated Marxist formula "goods - money - goods," which designates the circulation of capital in bourgeois society, turns out to be appropriate for the circulation of ideas in socialist society. An example would be "soldier - martinet - soldier" (*voin - voiaka - voin*, or *soldat - soldafon - soldat*). The first conversion "soldier - martinet" occurs in the mind of a Soviet journalist when he transforms information about American troops into Soviet ideolanguage. The second conversion "martinet - soldier" occurs in the mind of the Soviet reader when he processes information from a Soviet newspaper which has already conversed the original American report. Soviet political language is thus subjected to a system of double conversion. One can conclude that the law governing the circulation of goods and ideas follow the same pattern; in Soviet mentality, objective facts ("goods") are exchanged for ideological words ("money").[32]

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31. This does not preclude the Western press from using evaluative conversion; after all, the laws of ideological thinking are everywhere identical, although they may have different weight in different cultures. "During the Boer War, the Boers were described in the British press as 'sneaking and skulking behind rocks and bushes.' The British forces, when they finally learned from the Boers how to employ tactics suitable to warfare on the South African veldt, were described as 'cleverly taking advantage of cover.'" Hayakawa and Hayakawa, *Language in Thought and Language*, 46.

32. This analogy of "money" and "ideas" is regarded in more detail in the Conclusion.

(3) Antonymy of Denotative Meanings, Synonymy of Connotative Meanings

This type of relationship is the opposite of a conversive relationship and can be called "**correlative**." Correlatives are ideologems with opposing denotations, but identical connotations:

internationalism - patriotism	*internatsionalizm - patriotizm*
peacefulness - steadfastness (or irreconcilability)	*miroliubie - neprimirimost'*
class struggle - classless society	*klassovaia bor'ba - besklassovoe obshchestvo*
materialism - spirituality	*materializm - dukhovnost' (or ideinost')*
innovation - tradition	*novatorstvo - traditsiia*
vigilance - trust	*bditel'nost' - doverie*

The above are correlatives with opposing denotations, but equally positive connotations. In Soviet ideolanguage, "internationalism" and "patriotism" mean "equal love for all nations" and "exclusive love for one's own nation," respectively. Both have highly positive connotations in Soviet ideology. Below are correlatives which have equally negative connotations:

subjectivism - objectivism	*sub'ektivizm - ob'ektivizm*
thickheaded - spineless	*tverdolobyi - miagkotelyi*
to whitewash - to blacken	*obeliat' - ocherniat'*

Frequently, correlatives serve as homogeneous components of a sentence. For example: "It is indispensable to strengthen the concern about the **internationalist** and **patriotic** upbringing of the younger generation." Or: "Both **innovation** and **tradition** comprise a firm foundation of artistic creativity." And finally, "The struggle against **subjectivism** and **objectivism** in the humanities is a pressing problem for Soviet scholars." At other times, correlatives coalesce in such a way that oxymoronic expressions arise and become popular idioms of Soviet ideology: "the struggle for peace," "solidarity in class struggle," "ideological commitment to materialism," or an "optimistic tragedy."[33] Correlatives and

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33. The title of Vsevolod Vishnevskii's dramatic play which became a symbol of the necessity of suffering in order to achieve the final triumph of communism.

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their oxymoronic epiphenomena are usually explained by the dialectical essence of Marxist thinking, which strives to combine opposites such as "national" and "international," or "objective" and "subjective".

Two correlatives have become very popular in the years since the policy of *perestroika* was launched in 1985: "the plan" and "the free market." For seventy years, the first term was considered sufficient to explain the advantages of the Soviet regulated economy. The second term previously indicated bourgeois economic anarchy, but now is appreciated as a means of reanimating the dormant Soviet economy. Today, these two positive ideologems are correlatives in one incredibly oxymoronic expression: "the planned, or regulated, free market."

(4) Full Synonymy

Full synonymy is the identity (or similarity) of both denotative and connotative meanings. For example, such ideologems as "discipline - organization - consciousness" (*distsiplina - organizovannost' - soznatel'nost'*) have the same denotative meaning and positive connotation in Soviet language. These words can be called **"substitutives"** because, as a general rule, they can be substituted for one another in the same context.[34] "It is consciousness first of all that Communist commissars tried to raise in the ranks of Red Army soldiers during the Civil War." Here "consciousness" can be replaced by "discipline" or "good organization." Substitutives like "anarchy - spontaneity - licence - permissiveness" (*anarkhiia - stikhiinost' - raspushchennost' - vsedozvolennost'*) are used equally to dismiss bourgeois morals and the bourgeois system of production.

As the substitutive relationship has no oppositional elements, it is not included in the main model of ideological thinking considered in the next chapter. The substitutive relationship is, however, essential for bringing the ideological model to life in lexical variations of Soviet ideolanguage and thus will be treated extensively in Chapter 8.

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34. Substitutives are not synonyms in a strict linguistic sense; they may be substituted for each other only on the abstract level of ideological consciousness. Synonymy is a relationship between words, substitution, between ideologems.

CHAPTER 4. THE STRUCTURE OF TETRADS

Three relationships between ideologems—contrative, conversive, and correlative—make up the entire structure of Soviet Marxist ideolanguage. The basic model is composed of four elements (a tetrad), each of which interacts with the others in three separate ways, and can be presented as a diagram. For the sake of clarity, horizontal lines in the diagram are used to indicate contrative relationships; vertical lines, correlative relationships; and diagonal lines, conversive relationships. The meaning of each element in this structure is determined by its relationships with the other elements; it is the relationships which give the structure its integrity.[35]

(+) internationalism   (-) nationalism

(+) patriotism   (-) cosmopolitanism

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
35. In traditional logic, the tetradic structure is generally known as the "logical square." Since antiquity, the logical square has represented the relationship between four types of propositions: affirmative and negative, universal and particular.

The French philosopher and logician R. Blanché points out that "[t]he traditional theory on quantification follows a binary pattern. First, it distinguishes the universal from the particular. Then dividing this first dichotomy with a second, establishes both positive and negative forms for each of these terms. The result is a total of four quantitative concepts." Blanché immediately follows this assertion with his principal qualification: "But common language, whose standard usage continues to be employed, has only three terms at its disposal: all, none, and some; the particular concept lacks the duality known by the universal concepts." [R. Blanché, *Les Structures Intellectuelles* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1966), 35.]

Indeed, the majority of ordinary words expressing "particular" concepts, such as "tree" or "cup," are alien to any duality. Ideologems are easily organized within tetradic structures because they express judgments or propositions more so than do other words.

For a general review and bibliography of the "logical" and "semiotic" square see: Oswald Ducrot and Tzvetan Todorov, *Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Sciences of Language* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1979), 114-117; A.J. Greimas and J. Courtes, *Semiotics and Language: An Analytical Dictionary* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1982), 309-311; and "The Logic of Propositions" in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1972), V.5, 35-36, 45.

In this diagram, the ideologem "internationalism" participates in all three possible relationships with the other ideologems. It makes a contrative pair with "nationalism," a conversive pair with "cosmopolitanism" and a correlative pair with "patriotism." In other words, "internationalism" has opposing denotative and connotative meanings in relation to "nationalism," the same denotative and opposite connotative meaning in relation to "cosmopolitanism," and the same connotative and opposite denotative meaning in relation to "patriotism." Moreover, we can see that not only is "internationalism" linked by three relationships with the other words, but that each of the four words participates in all possible relationships with one another. Thus "patriotism" makes a contrative pair with "cosmopolitanism," a conversive pair with "nationalism" and a correlative pair with "internationalism."

One can trace the same underlying structure of relationships between other Soviet ideological words, bearing in mind that it is sometimes difficult to find the same relationships between synonyms and antonyms in the English language, or in any other language not so deeply permeated by ideology. In the tetrad below, "peacefulness" makes a contrative pair with "aggressiveness," a conversive pair with "appeasement," and a correlative pair with "uncompromisingness."

peacefulness - aggressiveness	*miroliubie - agressivnost'*
uncompromisingness - appeasement	*neprimirimost' - primirenchestvo*

The same structure can be seen in the following tetrads:

innovativeness - backwardness	*novatorstvo - otstalost'*
traditionalism - avant-gardism	*traditsionnost' - avangardizm*
steadfastness - spinelessness	*tverdost' - beskhrebetnost'*
flexibility - thickheadedness	*gibkost' - tverdolobost'*
generosity - miserliness	*shchedrost' - skarednost'*
thriftiness - wastefulness	*berezhlivost' - rastochitel'stvo*
realism - dogmatism	*realizm - dogmatizm*
principled character - unscrupulousness	*printsipial'nost' - besprintsipnost'*

vigilance - gullibility	*bditel'nost' - rotozeistvo*
trust - suspiciousness	*doverie - podozritel'nost'*
efficiency - inefficiency	*delovitost' - beskhoziaistvennost'*
selflessness - selfishness	*beskorystie - deliachestvo*
acceleration - stagnation	*uskorenie - zastoi*
stability - instability	*stabil'nost' - destabilizatsiia*
strict - permissive	*trebovatel'nost' - popustitel'stvo*
tolerant - oppressive	*dobrozhelatel'nost' - pridirchivost'*[36]
freedom - repression	*svoboda - podavlenie*
discipline - anarchy	*distsiplina - anarkhiia*
materialism - idealism	*materializm - idealizm*
spirituality - nonspirituality	*dukhovnost' - bezdukhovnost'*

A binary system can be used to analyze the tetrad as a semantic structure, with the first number of each pair identifying an ideologem's connotative meaning, the second, its denotative meaning. In the first position of each set of numbers, let's use the number 1 to designate a positive connotative meaning, 0 to designate a negative connotative meaning. In the second position, we will use the number 1 to designate the presence of a denotative meaning, 0 to designate the absence of this denotative meaning. All four ideologems can then be coded by using four possible combinations of the digits 1 and 0. For example, the word "peacefulness," which has both positive denotative and connotative meanings, would be designated "11." The first 1 indicates a positive connotation and the second, a positive denotative meaning ("the striving for peace"). The word "aggressiveness" would be marked "00" because it has a negative connotative meaning and denotes the absence of peacefulness. The word "uncompromisingness" would be marked "10" because it has a positive connotation, but denotes the absence of peacefulness. The word "appeasement" would be marked "01" because it has a negative connotation, although it denotes a "striving for peace."

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36. Here, as in some other cases, I have not listed the exact American equivalent of a Russian tetrad or dyad—that would be impossible, but a roughly similar lexical pattern which makes sense to an American reader.

All the tetrads listed above will have the same structure of binary pairs, which may be diagrammed schematically as follows:

$$11 \qquad\qquad 00$$
$$10 \qquad\qquad 01$$

If the first and second number of each pair are different, the relationship between the ideologems is contrative (11-00 or 10-01). If they differ only in the first digits (connotations), the relationship is conversive (11-01 or 10-00). If they differ only in the second digits (denotations), the relationship is correlative (11-10 or 00-01).

We can now see how this structure generates interdependent ideologems. Let us designate the original meaning of an idea or concept as an "archetheme." The ideological mind reworks the original meaning, or archetheme, of the idea into four components, first dividing it into two opposite denotative meanings and then multiplying the two denotations so that each has two connotative meanings. Take, for example, the archetheme "pace of development". Its ideological transformation would result in four ideologems. A denotative split of the archetheme produces two opposing concepts: rapid development and a lack of development. Both of these concepts are subsequently split into two connotative units: positive and negative attitudes to a rapid development (**acceleration - instability**) and positive and negative attitudes to a lack of development (**stability - stagnation**).

Similarly, the ideological transformation of the archetheme "quality of expenditure," would result in four ideologems: positive and negative attitudes towards substantial expenditures (**generosity** and **wastefulness**) and positive and negative attitudes towards savings (**thriftiness** and **miserliness**). In the archetheme "attitude towards nations," an equal feeling towards all the other nations is ideologically approved (**internationalism**) and disapproved (**cosmopolitanism**), just as an exclusive love for one's own nation is approved (**patriotism**) and disapproved (**nationalism or chauvinism**).

The structure of tetrads is a pairing of dualities. Thus tetrads are as simple and persuasive as **2 x 2 = 4**. Herein lies the enormous power of the ideological mode of thinking.

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CHAPTER 5. IDEOLOGY AS HIDDEN DIALOGUE

The tetradic structure described as a theoretical construction above has been present in the linguistic practice of mankind since ancient times. We can draw a vivid example of the ideological use of language from Thucydides's *History of the Peloponnesian War*, which observes changes in word usage during periods of social upheaval:

> "Words had to change their ordinary meaning and to take that which was now given them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a question, ineptness to act on any. Frantic violence became the attribute of manliness; cautious plotting, a justifiable means of self-defense. The advocate of extreme measures was always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected." [37]

Two sets of ideological evaluations belonging to various social groups, political parties, or subjects of speech are presented in this passage. That which one group considers to be a positive display of "courage," the other characterizes negatively as "recklessness." Similarly, the deliberate and careful behavior of one camp is perceived from within as prudence, but may be reproached from without (by the opposing camp) as hidden cowardice. The essence of this ideological controversy can be conveyed by using the following tetrad:

courage - cowardice
prudence - recklessness

As I have already indicated in Chapter 2 (pp. 17-18), the very usage of an ideological word frees the speaker from the necessity of logical proof. The judgment that prudence is better than recklessness, or that courage is better than cowardice, is contained in the words themselves, in their stable connotative meanings rooted in the lexical system of language.

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37. Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, ch. 9, in *Great Books of the Western World* (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), 6:437.

We can observe further that the tetrad is not just an abstract, logical scheme, but composed of dyads which belong to opposing sides. One side can be characterized as radical; it uses the first line of the tetrad to exhort citizens to courageous action and condemn cowardice. The other side is conservative; it uses the second dyad to encourage citizens to exercise prudence and resist recklessness. The above-cited tetrad actually represents the intersection of two dyads, each of which can be used separately by opposing sides in a political struggle.

The structure of opposing dyads helps us to understand how tetrads serve to unify opposing ideological attitudes. For example, the dyad "internationalism-nationalism" may be regarded as leftist; it is the very essence of early Marxist ideology. Another dyad, "patriotism-cosmopolitanism," arose much later, after World War II, when Stalin tried to introduce extremely rightist principles into the Soviet world view. However, Stalin did not eliminate the first dyad (the traditional Marxist approach), rather, he combined the two dyads. The combination of leftist and rightist concepts is typical of totalitarian ideology, which cannot help but be simultaneously "left" and "right"—radical and conservative at the same time. Totalitarian politics uses leftist slogans to defeat the right, rightist slogans to defeat the left.

In modern Soviet political language, specifically that of the late 1980s, two separate dyads have been used by opposing parties: one advocates change and reform, challenging stagnation; the other defends the value of stability, claiming radical reform will completely destabilize society. These dyads can be contrasted as the political views of two Soviet politicians:

Yeltsin's dyad: reform - stagnation
Ligachev's dyad: stability - instability

For Gorbachev and his followers, the above dyads together constitute a tetrad. This tetrad is used extensively in all speeches of the USSR President and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the first being more radical, the second, more conservative:

Gorbachev's tetrad: reform - stagnation
                      stability - instability

In denouncing the political position of former Communist Party Politburo member Egor Ligachev, Gorbachev used the first dyad; in his attacks on Yeltsin, the second.[38]. Gorbachev's speeches are generally constructed to achieve a balance between these two dyads while using the expressive force of all elements in the tetrad. Condemning stagnation, Gorbachev praises stability; proclaiming faithfulness to socialist ideals, he tries to establish a free market.

Gorbachev is famous for confounding Western observers with his political swings to the left and right. The key to the riddle of his political behavior may lie in the tetradic model, which imposes ideological constraints upon political leaders. Usually, a Soviet political leader adopts two positive positions in a tetrad and uses them to oppose leftist and rightist political rivals. Examples of such tetrads would be:

Stalin (right) - Trotsky (left)
Stalin (left) - Bukharin (right)

Gorbachev (right) - Yeltsin (left)
Gorbachev (left) - Ligachev (right)

In the same manner, Lenin first struggled against "patriots" who called for the defense of Russia ("the fatherland") during World War I, then against "internationalists" who suffered "an infantile sickness with leftism" by attempting to ignite a world revolution.

As a language structure, the tetrad can be actualized in three different modes of speech: expressive, analytical, and totalitarian. In the **expressive** mode, the tetrad is actualized in separate dyads, each of which represents the position of a specific political group. A speaker using this mode can be identified as a convinced follower of particular ideological tenets. Thus, radicals would use only the dyad "courage-cowardice," conservatives, only "prudence-recklessness." The second mode is **analytical**. Here the tetrad is examined as a whole in theoretical terms; the speaker

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38. Yeltsin apparently realizes this himself: "Yeltsin speculates that Gorbachev kept him around for political balance. With the prickly, impetuous Yeltsin to his left, the conservative Ligachev to his right, Gorbachev himself seemed the omniscient centrist." Bill Keller, "Boris Yeltsin Taking Power," *The New York Times Magazine*, 23 September 1990, 81.

tries to describe how the mechanism of the tetrad functions from a bystander's point of view. The previously cited passage from Thucydides is an illustration of the analytical mode.

The third and most interesting mode of using the tetrad unites the two preceding methods. In the **totalitarian** mode, the speaker embraces the entire tetrad in his practical vocabulary, but does not use it immediately in its entirety, only in dyadic fragments. The same speaker uses both dyads, "courage-cowardice" and "prudence-recklessness," in turn, defeating moderate ("cowardly") adversaries in one case, and leftist allies (former "courageous" radicals) in another. One subject of speech adopts the role of two opposing subjects and uses both dyads contained in the tetrad.[39] In this way, the totalitarian subject (speaker) acquires a practical advantage against opponents on either end of the political spectrum, using the strength of each side—the evaluative force of its words—to gain a victory over the other.

Niccolo Machiavelli brilliantly formulated the strategy of this kind of political maneuvering: "...you assist at the destruction of one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he shouldn't with your assistance, he remains at your discretion."[40] We can see how Lenin followed Machiavelli's advice: after the February revolution of 1917, Lenin appropriated the slogans of the Socialist Revolutionaries and exhorted the peasants to seize the landowners' property, then, having received the support of the peasants, he seized power in October 1917, promptly removed the Socialist Revolutionaries from power, and destroyed them.

The totalitarian mode of speech is distinguished from the other two in that it is not dominated by political emotionalism, as is the expressive mode, nor is it purely theoretical, as is the analytical mode. The totalitarian type of speech uses the emotions rationally. Having at its disposal the set of all four ideologems for two opposing forces, A and B, the totalitarian

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39. George Orwell's "doublethink" is an appropriate intuitive description of this tetradic model: "...To hold simultaneously two opinions which cancelled out, knowing them to be contradictory and believing in both of them, to use logic against logic..." George Orwell, *1984*, (New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1983), 32.

40. Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, in *Great Books of the Western World*, vol. 23 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), 32.

speaker is capable of seizing complete control over them. In a situation which requires the strengthening of position A and a corresponding weakening of position B, the ideologems "+a" and "-b" are used ("internationalists" vs. "Great Russian chauvinists"). However, if A acquires too much popularity and threatens to dominate the political scene, the speaker changes the names and uses the other contrative dyad, "+b" and "-a" ("Russian patriots" vs. "rootless cosmopolites"). In Machiavelli's words, the Prince "sets up an arbiter, who should be one who could beat down the great and favour the lesser."[41] In a totalitarian state, ideological language itself becomes such an arbiter.

The tetrad provides a speaker with the optimal speech strategy in conflict situations. Applying lexical evaluations against two opposing sides with the aim of weakening both of them, the speaker achieves global advantage. The totalitarian speaker who controls the tetrad does not so much participate in the conflicts as uses them, playing upon their contradictions. The tetrad itself generally remains hidden in separate acts of speech, for if it were used explicitly in its entirety the force of its practical application would be reduced.

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41. Ibid., 27.

CHAPTER 6. LENIN AND THE LOGIC OF IDEOLOGY

Let us now turn to a more extensive examination of the use of tetrads in Lenin's public statements on war, peace, and the nationalities question. An analysis of these statements will reveal the logic upon which Soviet Marxist ideolanguage is built.

In an article that he wrote in 1916, "The Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution," Lenin proclaimed, "Disarmament is the ideal of socialism. In socialist society, there will not be war; consequently, disarmament will be realized."[42] However, in another article written several days earlier, "On the Slogan of 'Disarmament,'" Lenin proclaimed with equal fervor, "Having triumphed in one country, socialism will in no event exclude war in general; on the contrary, it will presuppose war."[43] Lenin unambiguously declared that an object is white, but that this does not exclude the possibility that its color is black. This logic presupposes that the very word "war" has two distinct ideological meanings. The phrase "there will not be war," means that war is aggression, imperialist banditry, provocation, blackmail, an arrogant challenge; in short, war is a crime against all humanity. The phrase "socialism will presuppose war" indicates that war is a sacred duty which is part of the class struggle, a fatal blow which is struck against reactionary forces and is dedicated to the elimination of class enemies.

Lenin openly confirmed this ambiguity of the word "war": "We are not pacifists. We are opponents of **imperialistic wars**..., but we have always considered it an absurdity that the revolutionary proletariat would renounce **revolutionary wars** which may turn out to be necessary to the interests of socialism."[44] [Emphasis is the author's.] Here we encounter the concept of ideological homonymity: there are two words, "war" and "war," which have nothing in common. One is defined as "revolutionary" and has a

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42. V.I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 55 vols. (Moscow: Politizdat), 5th ed., 30:152.

43. Ibid., 30:133.

44. Ibid., 31:91.

positive connotation, the other is defined as "imperialistic" and has a negative connotation.

This duality can also be found in the ideological homonyms "peace" and "peace." "Peace," as opposed to revolutionary war, is classified as "appeasement, heinous opportunism, rotten pacifism, apostasy, a betrayal of the proletariat's class interests." As opposed to imperialist war, however, "peace" signifies "an expression of the people's will, a striving towards friendship and cooperation with all nations, an indication of our long-standing peacefulness and of our higher ideals." In Lenin's words, this kind of peace is "[t]he end of wars, peace between nations, the cessation of robbery and violence, this is indeed our ideal."[45]

In all of Lenin's statements, the use of a tetrad can be detected, even though the tetrad itself remains hidden:

good peace - bad war   peacefulness - imperialistic war
good war - bad peace   revolutionary war - pacifism

Lenin's views on the nationality question also reveal hidden tetrads: "The proletariat is creating the possibility for the full elimination of nationalistic oppression...right up to the definition of the state boundaries according the 'sympathies' of the population, including full freedom for secession."[46] "We desire free unification, and therefore we are obliged to acknowledge free secession."[47] Lenin's dialectic would not be complete, however, if it did not include conflicting assertions: "The interests of socialism are more important than the right of nations for self-determination."[48] "Self-determination is not absolute, but a small particle of the common democratic (now: common socialist) world movement. It is possible that in specific, isolated cases this particle will contradict the whole;

45. Ibid., 26:34.

46. Ibid., 30:21-22.

47. Ibid., 34:379.

48. Ibid., 35:251.

then it will be necessary to overthrow it."[49]   In one article, "The Results of the Discussion on Self-Determination"[50] (1916), Lenin does not simply change his point of view, he simultaneously supports two conflicting opinions. Further evidence for this conclusion can be found in the so-called "dialectical" proclamations of Lenin, where two blatantly conflicting points of view are juxtaposed, as the following two statements on the self-determination will make clear.   "...The unconditional acknowledgement of the struggle for the freedom of self-determination by no means obligates us to support any requirement of national self-determination."[51] "It is impermissible to mix the issue of the right of nations for free self-determination with the issue of expediency of the secession of this or of any other nation at this or any other moment."[52]

All these statements on nationality issues contain a hidden tetrad: a nation may assert its right to self-determination either as a result of "socialist achievement" or of "bourgeois nationalism" (which is contrary to the "socialist unity of nations"). On the other hand, nations may be united either by the force of "socialist internationalism" or "imperialist oppression" and "great power chauvinism." The tetrad can be diagrammed in two variants:

secession of nations - national oppression
unification of nations - national separatism

otdelenie natsii - natsional'nyi gnet
edinstvo natsii - natsional'nyi separatizm

or

right for self-determination - great-power chauvinism
socialist internationalism - bourgeois nationalism

pravo na samoopredelenie - velikoderzhavnyi shovinizm
sotsialisticheskii internatsioinalizm - burzhuaznyi natsionalizm

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49. Ibid., 30:39.

50. Ibid. Compare pp. 20-21 to p. 39 in vol. 30.

51. Ibid., 7:233.

52. Ibid., 31:440.

In this game of ideologems there is a certain logic. Marxist-Leninists usually call this logic "dialectics," but it has nothing to do with the Hegelian conception which uses a triadic construction. In classical German philosophy, the thesis and antithesis conflict with each other and form a synthesis. No such synthesis occurs in Soviet Marxist ideological thinking, which could be called "**tetralectical**," as opposed to dialectical. In Soviet ideology, the two halves of the tetrad change places—the positive becomes negative and the negative becomes positive—but no qualitative change occurs which results in synthesis. The failure to achieve synthesis does not mean, however, that tetralectical thinking is inferior to dialectical thinking. On the contrary, in a practical political sense perhaps tetralectical thinking is superior to its dialectical predecessor.

The structure of ideo-logic merits special research beyond the scope of this paper. There is reason to believe that the tetrad as an ideological model includes essential components of other logics, uniting them in an ideally constructed whole. A comparison of the **structure** of Soviet Marxist ideo-logic with the structures of formal, dialectical, and relativist logics would be especially illuminating. The cursory comparison which follows indicates the principal directions additional research could explore.

The central component of formal logic is the principle of contradiction: $A \neq$ non-A, which is expressed in the contrative relationship of ideologems in the tetrad. "Freedom" is contrary to "slavery" and "discipline" is contrary to "anarchy." The central component of dialectical logic is the principle of the unity of contradictions: $A =$ non-A. This relationship is revealed in the correlative relationship of ideologems, where contradictions display their own unity. In spite of being opposites, "freedom" and "discipline" are both equally approved, while "slavery" and "anarchy" are both rejected. Finally, relativist logic holds that the qualities of an object are dependent on the position of the observer, corresponding to the conversive relationship of ideologems. The same object displays different qualities and is characterized by opposing ideologems depending on the speaker's convictions. What is regarded as "freedom" from a democratic point of view may be assessed as "anarchy" from an authoritarian point of view. Similarly, "discipline" may be perceived negatively as "compulsion" or "compulsion" may be perceived positively as "discipline."

Thus, opposites are arranged in the tetrad in such a way that they:

a) are opposed to each other: A ≠ non-A (contratives);
b) are unified and equated: A = non-A (correlatives);
c) are transformed into each other: A <--> non-A (conversives).

These relationships correspond to the three operations carried out in the domain of different logics. Each operation appears to be illegal in the system of the other logic. For example, formal logic does not allow the dialectical union of opposites. **Tetralectics**, however, legalizes all three logical operations because they form the three relationships inside the tetrad. What seems to be an unsolvable contradiction in the framework of one logic is transferred through the tetrad into another system of logic where the contradiction is easily solved. Tetrads allow "the use of logic against logic," as Orwell's *newspeak* demonstrated.

Thus, "freedom" as proclaimed by Marx-Engels-Lenin is strictly opposed to the "compulsion" and "slavery" practiced in "antagonistic" class societies. "Freedom" can correspond with this same "compulsion," however, when regarded as the "iron discipline" or "revolutionary violence" found in communist societies. One can read in Lenin that no freedom is possible without violence against the exploiting classes. On the other hand, "freedom" can easily be equated with "anarchy" or "license" (i.e., transformed into its negative counterpart) and consequently considered to promote "violence" or "slavery."

The celebrated Orwellian slogans, "FREEDOM IS SLAVERY" and "WAR IS PEACE," which symbolize the totalitarian ideology in his novel *1984*, are, of course, artistic hyperboles. Any follower of "scientific" communism would object, "Our ideology is striving for freedom and helps humanity to overcome slavery." However, in essence Orwell was right. Although "freedom" and "slavery" are contratives, they are mediated by correlative and conversive relationships which actually make them equivalents. "Freedom" demands, as a correlative, "revolutionary discipline," which in totalitarian language is nothing but a substitutive for "revolutionary violence." This latter expression is in turn nothing but a positive conversive of "oppression" or "slavery:"

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┌─────────────────────────┐
│    freedom  is  slavery  │
└─────────────────────────┘
         │  ╲   ╱  │
         │   ╲ ╱   │
         │   ╱ ╲   │
         │  ╱   ╲  │
      discipline  -  anarchy
```

All components of the tetrad are transcoded and transformed into one another along the vertical and diagonal lines according to the principles of dialectical and relativist logics. Thus, two formally contrary and incompatible ideologems, freedom and slavery, become interchangeable. Orwell's slogans directly juxtapose the initial and final links of this logical chain, omitting the intermediate links. "Freedom is Slavery" is not simply an extravagant formula; the paradox of the slogan reveals how ideo-logic works through a tetradic structure, ending by equating ideas which are proclaimed to be exact opposites.

This ability to equate opposites is the reason why it is so difficult to fight Soviet Marxist ideology by logical means—the ideology is invulnerable to logical critique because it is free to use the components of all conceivable logics in response. If one attempts to prove that this ideology actually justifies aggression, the ideology answers that its final goal is worldwide peace, but that peace cannot be achieved without a decisive struggle and this struggle may require military means. Therefore, so-called "pacifists," who deny the need for a decisive struggle against "imperialism" or "capitalism," encourage an oppressive government to be more aggressive. The structure of the **defensive** argument is always the same: to converse a negative, accusatory term ("aggression") into a positive one ("struggle") and correlate it with another positive term ("peace"). The structure of the **offensive** argument is also derived from the tetrad: to converse a positive term ("peacefulness") into negative one ("pacifism," "appeasement") and correlate it with another negative term ("aggression," "militarism"). Thus the opponent may be categorized simultaneously as a pacifist and warmonger.

Tetradic thinking surpasses **two-elemental** formal logic and **three-elemental** dialectical logic in the quantity of its functional elements as well as the relationships possible between these elements. At the same time, tetradic logic can be distinguished from the amorphous structures of relativist logic, which have an **indefinite** quantity of elements. The diversity of relationships within the tetrad and their integrity as a unit make the tetrad an effective means of subordinating the interpretation of reality to the will of one person or organization.

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CHAPTER 7. THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET MARXISM AND THE LEFT-RIGHT PARTY

Ideology is a powerful instrument for working with the fundamental oppositions which have determined the evolution of philosophical thought throughout the ages. While ideology and philosophy both deal with the same basic concepts—ideas and matter, freedom and necessity, unity and diversity—they do so in very different ways.

For instance, the relationship between reality and ideas, or the material and the ideal, is a basic question of philosophy, the starting point for many of its divergent theories. Some philosophers proceed on the assumption that matter (or being, or reality) are primary; others give the priority to the idea, the spirit, or consciousness. Another group considers that both material and spiritual principles are combined in a dualistic structure of the world. Yet another group believes that it is impossible to establish some universal principle from which all existing phenomena can be deduced. The problem of the real and the ideal, as solved by philosophers, gives birth to such schools as materialism, idealism, dualism, agnosticism, etc. In spite of their disagreements, all philosophies try to reveal the truth as it exists in the nature of things; it is this common goal which makes all the different "schools" branches of philosophical thinking.

Ideology, on the other hand, is not interested in understanding the world; rather, it seeks to change the world by organizing ideas to gain the greatest number of followers. Marx himself unconsciously formulated the difference between philosophy and ideology in his famous thesis: "the philosophers have only **interpreted** the world in various ways; the point is to **change** it."[53] Soviet Marxist ideology interprets the problem of the real and the ideal in non-philosophic terms by using "double dialectics," or tetralectics. The "ideal" and the "material" are conceived not as constituent parts of the universe, but as flexible components within the framework of changing historical conditions. Either component can acquire "primary"

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53. Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 5 (New York: International Publishers, 1976), 5.

meaning in this framework; in some circumstances, "material" interests dominate, in others, "spiritual" elements have the upper hand. Economic forms of class struggle are combined with ideological forms; the "ideological superstructure" becomes of equal or even greater importance than the "material basis" from which it springs. Hence, Lenin's theory of the "decisive link" (*teoriia reshaiushchego zvena*) which changes depending on the situation. Grasping this link enables Marxist-Leninists to control the whole chain, master the situation, and gain victory over opponents.

If Marxist **philosophy** firmly holds that matter is primary and that consciousness is secondary, then Marxist **ideology** solves this basic question in accordance with concrete political goals, which often dictate that consciousness be given priority over matter. In most cases Soviet ideology, as opposed to Marxist philosophy, proclaims that ideas ("progressive," "revolutionary," "socialist," "communist," etc.) are the moving force of all historical transformations. Ideology thus appeals to the Soviet people's high level of consciousness, rather than their low level of material life, which remains as poor as ever.[54]

Like any binary opposition, "materialism" versus "idealism" is only the starting point for further ideological formulations created by the complicated permutation of the original binary pair. Accordingly, ideologems are established which give tactical political advantage to both principles: good **materialism** versus bad **idealism**, and good *ideinost'* ("commitment to ideas") versus bad *bezydeinost'* ("indifference to ideas"). Both "good" principles can then be combined, forming the incredible idiom *"materialisticheskaia ideinost'"* ("commitment to the ideas of materialism"). In the same manner, combining both "bad" principles creates the postulate that *bezydeinost'* (or indifference to ideas) may bring an "unstable" person to the swamp of idealism. In Soviet Marxist ideology, "material" and "ideal" principles can be used separately, simultaneously, or sequentially to give a political actor tactical flexibility in a changing situation.

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54. The Soviet world view is characterized by extreme materialism in theory and extreme idealism in practice. We could even say that Soviet Marxism's overstated materialism is nothing but an ideological phantom, in the postmodern sense of the word. Such "hypermaterialism" is a sort of simulacrum, the product of pure mentality. The self-serving *raison d'etre* for such countless Soviet simulacra as hyperunity, hyperlabor, hyperparty, hyperpeople, hyperpower, and hyperfuture does not differ much from that of Western media. If in the West visual simulacra bring great profit, in the Soviet Union ideological simulacra have long brought great power.

For more information on the concepts of "simulacrum" and "hyper" phenomena, see Jean Baudrillard, *Simulations* (New York: Semiotexte, 1983).

In its early stages, Soviet Marxist ideology as a rule used only contratives in strong opposition to one another: "labor" versus "capital," the "proletariat" versus the "bourgeoisie," "internationalism" versus "nationalism," "collectivism" versus "individualism," and so on. However, as the ideology matured, it introduced new oppositions which transformed the initial dyads into complete tetradic structures. Thus, to the contrative dyad "materialism - idealism," the opposing contrative dyad *"ideinost' - bezydeinost'"* (or "spirituality - nonspirituality"), was added. To the dyad "internationalism - nationalism," was added the complementary dyad "patriotism - cosmopolitanism." Thus, Soviet Marxism argued that internationalism was the goal of the proletarian movement—its highest achievement—and condemned narrow-minded, "bourgeois" nationalism and chauvinism. At the same time, however, the ideology ardently praised patriotism and demanded that citizens love the "socialist fatherland" more than their own fathers, ridiculing "bourgeois" cosmopolitanism and "Ivans" who did not remember their origin and kin. The question arises, should one regard Soviet ideology as "internationalist" or "chauvinist?"

Conditionally speaking, we can distinguish two types of ideologies: fighting ideology and governing ideology, or the ideology of opposition and the ideology of domination. The first is dyadic—no matter how radical or conservative in essence—because it is opposed to another ideology. The second is tetradic; it combines elements of opposing ideologies to maintain its power over the whole society and the various political factions of the ruling group. Marxist ideology originally had a leftist orientation, but as it was transformed into Soviet governing ideology it incorporated many conservative elements (such as civil obedience and patriotic duty) without abandoning its radical roots. On its path to maturity, Soviet Marxist ideology moved from the dyad to the tetrad. Throughout Soviet history, traditional Marxist dyads have been complemented by new Leninist, Stalinist, Brezhnevist, etc., dyads and have developed into full-fledged tetrads.

It is during this process of transition from dyadic to tetradic structure that ideology meets its severest test: the challenge of the so-called "deviations." Each deviation singles out one particular relationship from the tetradic whole and tries to absolutize it as the only truth. In Soviet Marxist ideology, the "left" deviation of the twenties associated with Trotsky singled out the contrative dyad "internationalism - nationalism," ignoring the

correlative and contrative dyads, "proletarian internationalism - socialist patriotism" and "socialist patriotism - bourgeois cosmopolitanism," respectively. The "left" also chose to exaggerate the importance of the "class struggle" at the expense of "peaceful coexistence." The "right" deviation associated with Bukharin emphasized an opposing set of dyads, advocating the "peaceful growing of kulaks in socialism" in place of the "class struggle against kulaks."

Though Stalin had already defeated his main political opponents Trotsky and Bukharin by 1927-28, the idea of "ideological struggle" took especially fierce forms in the late twenties and thirties. These "deviations" were not, for the most part, real forces, but inventions of the ruling ideology, which was rapidly passing from the "dyadic" to the "tetradic" stage precisely at this time. During the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet Marxist ideology needed to portray right and left deviations as one-sided ideological structures in order to distinguish the new, governing ideology from the old, "naive" fighting ideology.

If the Party constantly battled against deviations of both the left and the right, what was its true political identity? The answer is obvious: since it corrected the leftist deviation from the right and corrected the rightist deviation from the left, it was simultaneously a right-wing party and a left-wing party. As the great Russian writer Andrei Platonov noted, the Party line did not admit the slightest creeping toward either the right or the left from the sharpness of the distinct line. Indeed, the Party line was as sharp as a razor, one could not stand on it without being bloodied. Only Stalin managed to stand on it firmly with both feet.

Stalin's public statements illustrate the pendulum effect of Party politics. On January 21, 1930, Stalin published the seminal article "Concerning the Policy of Eliminating the Kulaks as a Class." In this article he insisted:

> "In order to oust the kulaks as a class, the resistance of this
> class must be *smashed* in open battle and it must be *deprived*
> of the productive sources of its existence and development
> (free use of land, instruments of production, land-renting,
> right to hire labor, etc.). That is a *turn* towards eliminating
> the Kulaks as a class....Without it, talk about ousting the
> kulaks as a class is empty prattle, acceptable and profitable

only to the Right deviators. Without it, no substantial, let alone complete, collectivization of the countryside is conceivable."[55]

Here, Stalin justified a turn to the left, or as he described it, "a *turn* away from the old policy of *restricting* (and ousting) the capitalist elements in the countryside towards the new policy of *eliminating* the kulaks as a class." Playing with the words "restricting" and "eliminating," Stalin found in the difference of their meanings an illusory possibility for the existence of a right deviation, which allegedly tried to represent the new policy of collectivization as a continuation of the old, meeker policy of restricting the kulaks. By stressing the need "to eliminate the kulaks as a class," Stalin attacked those "Right deviationists" who were not willing to support such a radical turn to the left.

On March 2, 1930, however, just forty days after the publication of the article cited above, Stalin published another, even more important work, "Dizzy With Success." In this article, he excoriated the "Left deviation" with the same characteristic vigor:

"Collective farms must not be established by force. That would be foolish and reactionary...[56]

We know that in a number of areas of Turkestan there have already been attempts to 'overtake and outstrip' the advanced areas of the U.S.S.R. by threatening to use armed force, by threatening that peasants who are not yet ready to join the collective farms will be deprived of irrigation water and manufactured goods.

What can there be in common between this Sergeant Prishibeev 'policy' and the Party's policy of relying on the voluntary principle... Who benefits by these distortions, this bureaucratic decreeing of the collective-farm movement, these unworthy threats against the peasants? Nobody, except our enemies!...

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55. J.V. Stalin, *Works*, vol. 12 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956), 189.

56. Ibid., 189.

Is it not clear that the authors of these distortions,
who imagine themselves to be 'Lefts,' are in reality bringing
grist to the mill of Right opportunism?"[57]

Stalin's second article clearly indicates a sharp turn to the right. The *leftists* are now accused of violating the sacred "voluntary" principles of collectivization.

In essence, both articles comprise a single political maneuver of Stalin: the destruction of all rivals on both the left and the right. It is impossible to ascertain the "true position" of Stalin *vis-à-vis* these "deviations." On the one hand, Stalin claims that the resistance of kulaks must be smashed in open battle (*nado slomit' v otkrytom boiu soprotivlenie etogo klassa*). On the other hand, Stalin insists that collective farms must not be established by force (*nel'zia nasazhdat' kolkhozy siloi*). How can these two opposing statements, "*nado*" and "*nel'zia*" ("must" and "must not"), be reconciled? How can one demand that "non-collectivized" peasants be "deprived of the productive sources of their existence and development" (*lishit' proizvodstvennyx istochnikov sushchestvovaniia*), if the threat "to deprive them of irrigation water and manufactured goods" (*ugrozy lishit' polivnoi vody i promtovarov*) is condemned as a severe political mistake? No rational position exists in between these two approaches to collectivization, yet both are branded as "deviations."

One would suppose that, given this "struggle on two fronts," Stalin identified himself as "centrist." Interestingly enough, however, he did not forget to fight centrism as a "rotten compromise" between right and left deviations. In a 1931 article, "On Some Questions of the History of Bolshevism," he wrote:

"Underestimation of centrism is, as a matter of fact, a
refusal to engage in all-out struggle against opportunism...
Everyone knows that Leninism was born, grew up, and got
stronger in the merciless struggle against opportunism of
every stripe, including centrism in the West (Kautsky) and in

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57. Ibid., 199.

our country (Trotsky and others). Even direct enemies of Bolshevism cannot deny it. This is an axiom."[58]

It is instructive to trace the logic of Stalin's successive political maneuvers. First, he identified himself with the left against the right, then he swung right in order to fight the left, and finally, he attacked the center itself. We can find here two overlapping tetradic structures. In the first tetrad the "centrist" position is praised as the so-called "party line" and is opposed to "perilous deviations;" at the same time, sharp political demarcation and "the struggle on both fronts" is opposed to "rotten centrism" and "unprincipled compromise."

+ center General Party line	- extremes Right and Left deviations
+ extremes Demarcation, a fight on two fronts	- center Centrism, compromise

The second tetrad concerns the "extremes" themselves. On the one hand, the officially approved leftist slogan calling for the elimination of the kulaks as a class, is opposed to the distinctly rightist call for "ousting" (or "restricting") the kulaks and to the call of the "far right" for the peaceful incorporation of kulaks into socialist society. On the other hand, the rightist principle of voluntary collectivization is distinctly positive when opposed to the "inadmissable" leftist threat to use the Army and conduct a "Sergeant Prishibeev" policy.

+ left ("smash," "battle," "elimination")	- right ("opportunism," "half-measures")
+ right ("the voluntary principle," "contact with the masses")	- left ("threat," "force," "bureaucratic decreeing")

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58. I.V. Stalin, *Sochineniia*, vol. 13 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1951), 601-602.

Here we see how tetrads overlap and proliferate in ideological thinking. In the first tetrad "extremes" are opposed to the "center," in the second tetrad, the "left" extreme is opposed to the "right" extreme. Tetralectics constantly works through different conceptual levels, further dissecting those concepts which have already been split into binary oppositions on a more abstract level. The "center" can be both positive and negative in contrast to "extremes," whose evaluation also changes depending on the situation:

<div style="margin-left: 2em">

        + center   - extreme

                               - right   - left

        + extreme   - center

    + left   + right

</div>

One secret of Stalin's influence was his lack of specific political positions; hence, his brilliant mastery of tetralectics. Trotsky and Bukharin had definite positions which made them easy to attack. They were naive from the point of view of totalitarian thinking: in spite of their other tactical skills, both tried to adhere to certain stable principles. While Stalin understood the "x" variable in Soviet Marxist political algebra, Trotsky and Bukharin used a more "classic Marxist" political arithmetic in which all expressions were constants. Alexander Herzen's famous definition of dialectics as the "algebra of revolution" was perhaps a prophetic vision of Stalin's manipulation of the "x" factor.

Karl Marx first described this concept of political mathematics in 1881: "What should be done spontaneously in any specific moment in the future of course depends completely on the given historical conditions in which one will have to act. We cannot solve an equation which does not include the elements of its solution among its data."[59] Marx believed that the information necessary to pin down the unknown variable, the "x" of the equation, would become available at the appropriate moment. Stalin, however, found it advantageous to keep the value of "x" undefined, a variable which could not be reduced to any specific meaning.

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59. K. Marx, F. Engels, *Sochineniia v 50 tomakh*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Politizdat), 35: 131-132.

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In varying historical conditions "x" could mean: to attack the left from the right, to assault the right from the left, or to trample the centrists on their own middle ground. In each case, it is the absence of position which struggles and prevails. The introduction of variables, or blank cards, into the ideological scrabble game increases the stakes, as all positions of one's rivals and opponents can then be utilized. In his fight against rightists, Stalin was more left than Trotsky himself, while in his fight against leftists, Stalin was no less right than Bukharin. Stalin used his enemies' own ideas against them, in the same flexible manner that Lenin used "extreme leftist" slogans of the Socialist Revolutionaries in 1917-1918 and "definitely rightist" bourgeois slogans in 1921-1922 (NEP).

Having defeated both the right and the left, the ideology of Soviet Marxism could assert itself as being a qualitatively new, "left-right" ideology. No political deviation is capable of creating a constructive alternative to such a totalitarian ideology. All deviations—so plentiful in the history of Soviet Marxism—cannot help but speak the native language of the single, "correct" ideology. Deviations thus have a severe "speech impediment:" they are only small, individual parts of the overall ideological structure and, as such, are not able to threaten the ideology's existence. In fact, the one-sidedness of deviations only serves to demonstrate the advantages and correctness of the ruling left-right ideology.

CHAPTER 8. IDEOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS, LEXICAL GROUPS, AND PHILOSOPHICAL OPPOSITIONS

Now that we have elucidated the inner principle of tetradic thinking, we can further develop the model by describing how it works through the lexical diversity of ideolanguage. The reader may already have noticed that the author has consistently placed certain words in the same position in tetrad diagrams. Words such as "internationalism," "collectivism," and "peacefulness" have been placed in the first position on the first line, for example, and words like "nationalism," "individualism," and "aggressiveness" in the second position on the first line, and so on. In fact, each position in the tetrad is occupied not by a concrete word, but by a generalized ideological meaning which can be realized by a multiplicity of words. This section will attempt to demonstrate that, just as each position in the tetrad represents a generalized meaning, tetrads themselves serve generalized ideological functions which correspond to the fundamental oppositions of philosophy.

The "Unity - Differentiation" Opposition

Let us compare several similar tetrads:

peacefulness - aggressiveness   *miroliubie - agressivnost'*
uncompromisingness - appeasement   *neprimirimost' - primirenchestvo*

cooperation - confrontation   *sotrudnichestvo - konfrontatsiia*
fighting spirit - compromise   *boevitost' - soglashatel'stvo*

collectivism-individualism
concern for the individual - depersonalization

     kollektivizm - individualizm
     individual'nyi podkhod - obezlichka

classlessness - class antagonism
class struggle - non-class consciousness

     besklassovoe (obshchestvo) - klassovyi (antagonizm)
     klassovaia (bor'ba) - vneklassovyi (podkhod)

In spite of their lexical differences, it is obvious that all these tetrads modify one set of ideological functions:[60]

positive unification - negative differentiation
positive differentiation - negative unification

Depicted schematically, these functions are:

+ un   - dif
+ dif   - un

Each function represents an entire group of words which are connected by a **substitutive** relationship. This fourth type of relationship between ideologems, which was not incorporated in the tetradic model (see Chapter 2, p. 25), plays an enormous role in the lexical realization of the tetrad. Let us examine a list of substitutives for the four ideological functions diagramed above:

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60. A lexical function may be defined as "an abstract, typical meaning which, like grammatical meaning, is expressed by a rather large amount of words." Iu. D. Apresian, *Leksicheskaia semantika* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), 45.

The theoretical approach to lexical functions was elaborated in the late sixties and early seventies by a group of Soviet linguists: Igor Mel'chuk, Aleksandr Zholkovskii, Iurii Apresian. An example of semantic function is "Magn," which means "very," "high degree" and is expressed in different contexts by such words as "**jet**" (jet-black hair, jet-black eyes), "**pitch**" (darkness), "**deathly**" (silence), "**pouring**" (rain), and so on (*zhguchii briunet, kromeshnaia t'ma, grobovoe molchanie, prolivnoi dozhd'*). I.A. Mel'chuk described approximately forty such functions in his book *Opyt teorii lingvisticheskikh modelei "Smysl - Tekst"* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974).

Deeper analysis has shown the difficulty of describing ordinary language in terms of semantic functions. On the one hand, the number of such functions cannot be limited to specific logical groups; on the other hand, the lexical variety and richness of ordinary language does not yield to functional classification, no matter how many functions are introduced.

Ideological language, however, is more appropriately described in terms of abstract, typical meanings than is ordinary language. All ideological words are divided into "positive" and "negative;" this considerably facilitates their functional description. Ideological language is also devoid of specific words with narrow meanings which resist any generalization, such as "strawberries," "auburn," "to lisp." Thus, the functional approach may prove to be much more applicable to the sphere of pragmatics than to the sphere of semantics, the field from which it originally emerged.

+un

peace	*mir*
unity	*edinstvo*
solidarity	*splochenie*
cooperation	*sotrudnichestvo*
equality	*ravenstvo*
brotherhood	*bratstvo*
classlessness	*besklassovost'*
peacefulness	*miroliubie*
collectivism	*kollektivizm*
internationalism	*internatsionalizm*
friendship of nations	
	druzhba narodov

-dif

hostility	*vrazhda*
split	*raskol*
antagonism	*antagonizm*
confrontation	*konfrontatsiia*
inequality	*neravenstvo*
(bourgeois) competition	*konkurentsiia*
antagonism	*antagonizm*
militarism	*militarizm*
individualism	*individualizm*
nationalism	*nationalizm*
chauvinism	
	shovinizm

+dif

struggle	*bor'ba*
uncompromisingness	
	neprimirimost'
steadfastness	
	nepokolebimost'
fighting spirit	*boevitost'*
class (consciousness)	
	klassovoe (soznanie)
demarcation	
	razmezhevanie
concern for the individual	
	individual'nyi podkhod
(socialist) competition	
	sorevnovanie

-un

appeasement	*umirotvorenie*
compromise	
	primirenchestvo
all-forgiveness	
	vseproshchenie
capitulation	*kapituliatsiia*
non-class (approach)	
	vneklassovyi (podkhod)
forming a bloc	
	blokirovanie
depersonalization	
	obezlichka
wage-leveling	
	uravnilovka

This list is by no means complete, but suffices to demonstrate how tetralectics works with the aid of substitutive ideologems. The traditional philosophical opposites of "unity" and "differentiation" are split into four ideological functions, which in turn are split into a multiplicity of concrete words which give a positive and negative evaluation to both "unity" and "differentiation." The most abstract philosophical concepts are thus integrated into a lexical variety of language.

It is apparent from the above list that substitutives are not true synonyms in the usual linguistic sense. The principle of their unification lies in the pragmatic, not semantic, realm of linguistic analysis (see Chapter 1,

pp. 5-6, 9). Substitutives such as "struggle," "demarcation," "class consciousness," "fighting spirit," etc., express a particular evaluative judgement (here, positive) about a general phenomenon (in this case, differentiation). While they are unified, or classified, by their functional meaning (+dif, −un,etc.), the substitutives differ according to the specific subject area of their referential meaning. For instance, in Soviet ideolanguage the word "struggle" signifies the opposition of "our people" to "their people." The word "demarcation" signifies the opposition between "our people" and "our people," with the latter destined to become "their people." Two words for "competition" exist in Soviet ideolanguage: "*konkurentsiia*," or bourgeois competition, is used to show how "their" people compete against each other; "*sorevnovanie*" used to show "healthy competition" between "our" people.

Each substitutive ideologem may be signified by utilizing a combination of its ideological function (+un, −dif,etc.) and a descriptive marker (placed in brackets) identifying the subject area to which the function applies. When, for instance, the function +dif is accompanied by different markers, it is lexically transformed into a variety of words, depending on the subject area. Let us examine the following three examples:

Subject Area: "us" versus "them"
+dif [us - them] is transformed into the word "struggle"
−dif [us - them] is transformed into the word "confrontation"
+dif [us - us] is transformed into "socialist competition"
−dif [them - them] is transformed into "bourgeois competition"

Subject Area: the "nation" or national feeling
+un [national] becomes "internationalism"
−un [national] becomes "cosmopolitanism"
+dif [national] becomes "patriotism"
−dif [national] becomes "chauvinism"

Subject Area: "society" or social identification
+un [social] becomes "collectivism"
−un [social] becomes "depersonalization"
+dif [social] becomes "concern for the individual"
−dif [social] becomes "individualism"

These groups of symbolic constructions clearly demonstrate that Soviet Marxist ideological language is by its very nature artificial—it would be easy to outline its structure using abstract formulae. With specific formulae of functions and markers, a computer would be capable of composing Soviet ideological texts.

The "Real - Ideal" Opposition

A second important philosophical concept incorporated into ideological thinking is opposition of "the real" and "the ideal." Ideological thinking divides these opposing concepts into four broad functions, each of which is represented by its own group of ideologems:

+real

realism	*realizm*
materialism	*materializm*
objectivity	*ob"ektivnost'*
atheism	*ateizm*
truthfulness	*pravdivost'*
scientific method	
	nauchnost'
sober-mindedness	
	zdravomyslie
historicism	*istorizm*

-ideal

idealism	*idealizm*
spiritualism	*spiritualizm*
subjectivism	*sub"ektivizm*
religion	*religiia*
myth-making	*mifotvorchestvo*
obscurantism	
	mrakobesie
fanaticism	
	fanatizm
dogmatism	*dogmatizm*

+ideal

commitment to ideas	
	ideinost'
spirituality	
	dukhovnost'
having ideals	
	ideal'nost'
adherence to principle	
	printsipial'nost'
heroic spirit	*geroika*
romantic appeal	
	romantika
enthusiasm	*entuziazm*
inspiration	*vdokhnovenie*
winged inspiration	
	okrylionnost'

-real

indifference to ideas	
	bezydeinost'
non-spirituality	
	bezdukhovnost'
devoid of ideals	
	bezydeal'nost'
non-adherence to principle	
	besprintsipnost'
Philistinism	*meshchanstvo*
naturalism	
	naturalizm
empiricism	*empirizm*[61]
positivism	*positivizm*
shackled inspiration	
	beskrylost'

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61. In Soviet ideological language, "naturalism," "empiricism" and "positivism" generally refer to the adherence to scientific facts regardless of Party doctrine and a "class approach."

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All of the above substitutives may be distributed among varying referential subject areas. For example, the words "materialism," "realism," "atheism," and "historicism" give a positive evaluative meaning to the material principle ("the real"), which is viewed as superior to "the ideal." However, these ideologems are utilized in different areas of social consciousness: "materialism" in philosophy, "realism" in literature and art, "atheism" in religious matters, and "historicism" in the area of the social sciences:

+real [philosophy] - materialism
+real [literature] - realism
+real [religion] - atheism
+real [humanities] - historicism

Not only single words, but many phrases and idioms are capable of executing the same ideological function. The following are standard expressions of Soviet literary criticism:

+real function:

"the truth of life"   *pravda zhizni*
"a close connection with reality"   *tesnaia sviaz' s deistvitel'nost'iu*
"the genuineness of that which   *podlinnost' perezhitogo*
    has been experienced"
"an emphasis on the facts"   *opora na fakty*

-real function:

"dragged down by facts"   *plestis' v khvoste u faktov*
"description without feeling"   *beskrylaia opisatel'nost'*
"to be a prisoner of one's   *ostavat'sia v plenu*
    own sensations"   *sobstvennykh oshchushchenii*

+ideal function:

"flight of the imagination"   *poliot voobrazheniia*
"to create a new, spiritualized   *sozdavat' novuiu, odukhotvorionnuiu*
    reality"   *real'nost*
"to soar to higher generalization"   *voskhodit' k vysshim obobshcheniiam*
"artistic transformation of the   *khudozhestvennoe preobrazhenie*
    facts"   *faktov*

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-ideal function:

"delirium"	romanticheskie bredni
"a struggle against common sense"	bor'ba so zdravym smyslom
"a subjective arbitrariness,	sub'ektivnyi proizvol i
contempt for the facts"	prezrenie k faktam
"idle day-dreaming"	prazdnye griozy

Because ideological functions are stable and embrace a variety of single and multiple-word units, it would be instructive to trace the history of at least one of these functions through different ages and cultures. Although expressions may change, the functions remain the same. Entire texts of literary and political works may principally express one or another ideological function; for example, practically all works of the famous Russian literary critic Pisarev embody the "-ideal" function, which represents a nihilistic world-view.

The "Liberty - Organization" Opposition

The next tetrad of ideological functions deals with the philosophical concepts of "liberty" and "organization." Here it should be made clear that in Soviet ideological mentality, the word "organization" indicates that "liberty" is limited by "necessity," "order," and "discipline."

+lib		-org	
liberty	svoboda	oppression	gnet
freedom	svoboda or volia	slavery	rabstvo
freedom-loving		repression	
	svobodoliubie		podavlenie
free-thinking		authoritarianism	
	vol'nomyslie		avtoritarnost'
emancipation		enslavement	
	raskreposhchenie		zakreposhchenie
rebelliousness		submissiveness	
	buntarstvo		pokornost'
independence	nezavisimost'	dependence	podnevol'nost'
insurgency	miatezh(nost')	subjugation	poraboshchenie
democracy	demokratiia	totalitarianism	totalitarizm
activism	aktivnost'	fatalism	fatalizm
self-government	samoupravlenie	tyranny	tiraniia
initiative	pochin	coercion	prinuzhdenie

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+ org		-lib	
order	*poriadok*	anarchy	*anarkhiia*
discipline	*distsiplina*	laxity	*raspushchennost'*
planned character		spontaneity	
	planovost'		*stikhiinost'*
centralism	*centralizm*	provincialism	*mestnichestvo*
necessity	*neobkhodimost'*	arbitrariness	*proizvol, samoupravstvo*
organization	*organizatsiia*	chaos	*khaos*
determinism	*determinizm*	voluntarism	*voliuntarizm*
responsibility	*otvetstvennost'*	connivance	*popustitel'stvo*
vigilance	*bditel'nost'*	carelessness	*bespechnost'*
lawfulness	*zakonnost'*	lawlessness	*bezzakonie*

The "Property" Opposition

       The fourth functional tetrad is based on oppositions which involve the concept of property, such as "to give - to take," "to share - to acquire," "to donate - to become rich." Here the attitude towards the ownership of material goods (generosity-stinginess), as well as the corresponding attitude towards one's own life (bravery - cowardice), should be borne in mind. The names of the four ideological functions produced by splitting the initial "+" and "−" property opposition are derived from the Latin words *"donare"* ("to grant," "to refuse") and *"habere"* (" to possess," "to keep").

+don (to give)		-hab (to possess)	
generosity	*shchedrost'*	stinginess	*skupost'*
bravery	*khrabrost'*	cowardice	*trusost'*
selflessness	*samootverzhennost'*	selfishness	*svoekorystie*
altruism	*al'truizm*	egoism	*egoizm*
philanthropy	*zhertvennost'*	exploitation	*ekspluatatsiia*
magnanimity		acquisitivenesss	
	velikodushie		*stiazhatel'stvo*[62]
readiness to share		hoarding	
	beskorystie		*nakopitel'stvo*
asceticism	*podvizhnichestvo*	utilitarianism	*deliachestvo*

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    62. There are a number of popular Soviet ideologems with the same negative meaning for which exact American equivalents cannot be found: *sobstvennichestvo, knishchnichestvo, priobretatel'stvo, potrebitel'stvo, veshchizm.* All of them refer to the "bourgeois" vice of "consumerism."

+hab (to possess)		-don (to refuse)	
thriftiness	*berezhlivost'*	wastefulness	*rastochitel'nost'*
enterprisingness		mismanagement	
	predpriimchivost'		*beskhoziaistvennost'*
businesslike	*delovitost'*	negligence	*khalatnost'*
zealousness	*rachitel'nost'*	laziness	*lenost'*
practicality	*praktichnost'*	impracticality	*nepraktichnost'*
efficiency	*effektivnost'*	inefficiency	*neeffektivnost'*
prudence	*predusmotritel'nost'*	recklessness	*bezrassudstvo*
zealousness	*rachitel'nost'*	slipshodness	*razgil'diaistvo*

The "Time" Opposition

Finally, the fifth functional tetrad consists of evaluations which are connected with the passage of time. Here the general oppositions of new and old, development and succession, of **novelty** and **tradition**, are ideologically transformed:

+nov		-trad	
the new	*novoe*	the old	*staroe*
innovation	*novatorstvo*	conservatism	*conservatizm*
revolution(ary)		reaction(ary)	
	revoliutsiia		*reaktsiia*
progress	*progress*	regression	*regress*
development	*razvitie*	backwardness	*otstalost'*
renewal	*obnovlenie*	staleness	*kosnost'*
perestroika	*perestroika*	stagnation	*zastoi*
acceleration	*uskorenie*	retardation	*otstavanie*
shock-worker	*udarnik, peredovik*	laggard	*otstaiushchii*
creative spirit		dogmatism	
	tvorcheskii dukh		*dogmatizm*
topical	*actual'nyi, nasushchnyi*	outdated	*ustarelyi*
striving towards the future		remnants of the past	
	ustremlionnost' v budushchee		*perezhitki proshlogo*

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+trad		-nov	
tradition		breaking with tradition	
	traditsiia		*razryv s traditsiei*
continuity	*preemstvennost'*	revisionism	*revizionizm*
stability		subversive activities	
	stabil'nost'		*podryvnaia deiatel'nost'*
the classics		avant-gardism	
	klassika		*avangardizm*
tried and true		newly fashionable	
	ispytannii		*novomodnyi*
veteran	*veteran*	up-start	*vyskochka*
Marxist testament		revision of Marxism	
	zavety marksizma		*reviziia marksizma*

The Classification of Ideologems

A tentative examination of Soviet ideolanguage reveals that the overwhelming majority of ideologems belong to one of the five lexical subsystems listed above. Ideologems can thus be arranged according to the twenty ideological functions contained within the tetrads of these five groups:

1.	+ un	− dif	+ dif	− un
2.	+ real	− ideal	+ ideal	− real
3.	+ lib	− org	+ org	− lib
4.	+ don	− hab	+ hab	− don
5.	+ nov	− trad	+ trad	− nov

At this time, we can only conjecture as to why these five specific sub-systems encompass so many ideological concepts. The oppositions of "unity - differentiation," "the real - the ideal," "freedom - necessity," "giving - acquisition," "development - continuity" are those most deeply rooted in the structure of the human intellect, to which the long history of philosophy attests. We can find expressions of these basic oppositions in the paradoxes of Heraclitus, in Xenon's "aporia," in the Kantian antinomies of reason, and in the Hegelian principles of the dialectic.

It is significant that three of the oppositions discussed in this section approximate three of the Kantian antinomies, those which concern the relationship between "freedom and causality," "unity and divisibility of composed substance," and the "finiteness and infinity" of time. A purely theoretical solution of the problem posed by two opposing concepts is extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to reach. For this reason, human thinking is inclined to subdivide these irreconcilable concepts further, giving each one a set of two opposing evaluations—overcoming the tension of the dual structure by establishing a tetradic framework. The predilection of human beings to do away with logical paradoxes may explain the attraction and power of ideology in society.

A paradox is divided into two opposite, yet individually self-evident, statements which together comprise the basis for totalitarian thinking. Instead of one intractable antinomy of freedom and causality, two indisputable judgments emerge: that freedom is superior to slavery (complete causality) and that organization is superior to anarchy (complete freedom). In this manner, totalitarianism suggests nothing but the solution of the sharpest contradictions of the human mind. The theoretical insolubility of antinomies leads one to believe that only in a specific historical situation can the priority of one particular element of the antinomy be established. Since the thesis and antithesis (freedom and causality, or matter and ideas) are equally valid, their relationship is removed from the sphere of objective truth to the sphere of pragmatic evaluation. The practical determination of this relationship is the core of ideological thinking, which endows each concept with a relative value.

Hegel and Marx both suggested ways of treating these radical antinomies. Hegel tried to solve such a contradiction through the self-development of an absolute idea, which divides itself into thesis and antithesis in order to promote a final synthesis. For Marx, the highest principle was not the ideal absolute, but the historical subject (class, party, or group) which uses both thesis and antithesis to raise itself above its one-sidedness. The Hegelian absolute is located beyond history and thus displays a dialectical triad, as the struggle between thesis and antithesis results in synthesis. Ideology is immersed in the dynamics of the historical process itself. Instead of reconciling thesis and antithesis, it constantly rejects one-sided elements, only to use their energy to ascend to higher and higher levels of totality.

Since this totality is intra-historical (i.e., "within" history), it cannot be resolved in a synthesis of all elements, but exists only in the process of its own self-construction and self-destruction. The totality appears not as an all-comprehensive synthesis where all oppositions are reconciled, but as an incessantly fluctuating system that moves from left to right and back again. The opposites themselves double, alternately approved and condemned, included and excluded, from the totality. Thus Marxist ideology, as distinct from Hegelian idealism, is best described in tetradic, not triadic, terms. While the triadic model accounts for the birth of a new idea and thus is progressive, the tetradic model is circular and envelops opposing ideas without producing anything substantially new.

Marxist ideology fulfilled the need to explain certain peculiarities of Russian history—peculiarities which display a huge diversity of, as well as alternation between, opposing tendencies. Russian history appears to revolve around a stable axis instead of advancing in a particular direction. Revolution and reaction, conservatism and radicalism, monarchy and democracy, authority and the people, leader and the masses, freedom and unity, material and spiritual, idealism and realism—all these theses and antitheses never reach a synthesis in Russia. Rather, they continually succeed one another. Constantly evolving tetradic models suggest a logical expression of this cyclical historical process.

It is therefore natural that the largest groups of ideologically charged words in Soviet ideolanguage can be classified according to the fundamental oppositions of philosophy. All possible methods of solving these basic oppositions are present in the ideolanguage itself, embodied in its system of lexically fixed evaluations.

CHAPTER 9. IDEOLOGICAL SYNTAX: FORMS OF ADDRESS

Although syntax seems to be an ideologically neutral dimension of language, in this section I shall try to demonstrate that the tetradic patterns of totalitarian discourse can be found not only in the lexical realm, but even in such a grammatical sphere as forms of address. These forms usually appear in oral communication in Soviet ideolanguage, but occasionally permeate the written Russian language of the Soviet regime as well. I am not referring here to forms used to address a mass audience in oratorical speech, but to those used between individuals.

The Russian language has two typical forms of address, formal and informal. The formal combines the second person plural pronoun with an individual's forename and patronymic: "*Vy*, Aleksei Nikolaevich." The familiar form of address combines the second person singular pronoun with only the forename, often shortened to become a diminutive (in the same way Americans might change "Stephen" to "Steve"): "*Ty*, Aliosha."[63]

Ideological language, however, most often combines the **familiar** pronoun with the **formal** name and patronymic: "*ty*, Aleksei Nikolaevich." This form of address is the norm between members of the Communist Party, even in the Politburo. Such a combination reflects the two-fold nature of ideological language: in addressing an ideological brother it is impossible to use the *vy* form, but since this "brother" is not a blood-relation, it is necessary to retain some element of formality when addressing him. The element of formality was strengthened when ideological language became the official language of Soviet society. Ideological language is thus simultaneously brotherly and official, a combination of familiarity and formality.

Members of the Young Communists' League (Komsomol) adapt this ideological form of address to correspond to their (younger) age; they drop the patronymic and employ the *ty* form with the formal forename: "*Ty*,

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63. An informative review of Russian modes of address and their changes in the Soviet era may be found in Bernard Comrie and Gerald Stone, *The Russian Language since the Revolution* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1978), ch. 7, 172-199. Unfortunately, the authors do not dwell on the Party and Komsomol "ideolects" of speech etiquette.

Aleksei." In principle, "Aleksei" sounds as formal as "Aleksei Nikolaevich," perhaps even drier. In colloquial speech, the formal first name is used very seldomly, especially between young people of the same age, who normally address one another shortened, or diminutive, forms of their first names: Aliosha, Misha, Lena, and so on. In the famous novel of Nikolai Ostrovskii *How the Steel Was Tempered* (1934), the central character—Komsomol leader Pavel Korchagin—is usually addressed in the typical Komsomol manner, "*Ty*, Pavel," although older people and intimate friends sometimes call him the informal "Pavka."

It is significant that within intelligentsia circles, the most common form of address between young people first meeting or not closely acquainted is the polite, plural pronoun with a shortened first name: "*Vy*, Aliosha." This form of address is the diametric opposite of that encountered in ideological language ("*Ty*, Aleksei Nikolaevich"). It is possible to conclude that both the choice of the form of an individual's name and the choice of pronoun have their own significance. The choice of the form of a person's name is largely a question of the level of officialdom: Komsomol or Party dealings are decidedly formal, whereas dealings between members of the intelligentsia are purposefully informal. On the other hand, the use of a particular pronoun indicates the relationship between the two people. By using the polite pronoun, a person shows respect for his interlocutor as an individual and indicates that he seeks neither to belittle or intrude into the life of his conversation partner. By addressing a man "*Ty* + full name,"[64] ideological language elevates officialdom at the expense of personal dignity and private freedom. The language of the intelligentsia combines precisely the opposite components: informality and politeness.

In terms of ideological evaluation, forms of address constitute a tetradic structure. They have two sets of oppositions: official - informal and positive - negative. From an ideological point of view, official forms of address in ideological language have both positive (full name) and negative (*vy*) modes of expression. Informal address also has ideologically charged positive (*ty*) and negative (short name) forms of address. The schematic of this tetrad could be drawn as follows:

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64. For the sake of clarity, "full name" here refers to an individual's formal forename and patronymic.

+ familiar	−formal
+ formal	−familiar

<div align="center">or</div>

+	**−**
Singular pronoun	**Plural pronoun**
(*Ty*)	(*Vy*)
Full name	**Short name**
(Aleksei Nikolaevich)	(Aliosha)

All previously described relationships between ideologems can be observed here. "*Ty - vy*," as well as "Aleksei Nikolaevich - Aliosha," constitute contrative pairs; they have opposite denotative (official-informal) and connotative meanings (ideologically acceptable - ideologically unacceptable). "*Ty* - Aliosha" is an example of a conversive pair; both elements have an informal meaning, even if one is part of the ideological lexicon and the other is not. The same goes for the other conversive pair, "*Vy* - Aleksei Nikolaevich." It is noteworthy that these two conversive combinations are the forms of address typical in non-ideological usage—the concepts of officialdom and politeness naturally coincide in ordinary language. In non-ideological language, either an individual's full name is used with the plural pronoun, or his or her diminutive is used with the singular pronoun.

Finally, "*Ty* - Aleksei Nikolaevich" constitutes a correlative pair: both the informal and official components have a positive connotative meaning. It is only ideological language which uniquely combines officialdom with familiarity. As examined earlier in Chapter 3 (pp. 24-25), correlatives are usually juxtaposed in ideological speech as grammatically homogeneous units. The juxtaposition of informal and official components in "*Ty* - Aleksei Nikolaevich" is an example of the same kind of correlative combination as "the strengthening of international and patriotic upbringing" or "commitment to materialistic ideas" (*materialisticheskaia ideinost'*).

Each of these oxymoronic expressions is a result of a modification of orthodox Marxism by totalitarian ideology. For example, the original Marxist conception of international proletarian solidarity had to accept the incorporation of patriotic sentiment for the sake of protecting the Soviet state. Likewise, the original orthodox conception of materialism was supplemented by Lenin's conception of "Party spirit" (*partiinost'*) and ideological commitment (*ideinost'*). Finally, pre-revolutionary feelings of proletarian brotherhood called for the use of *ty*, but this class, having attained power, could not help but adopt the traditional forms of address of the state bureaucracy. Thus, the forms of address used in Soviet ideolanguage demonstrate again the oxymoronic nature of totalitarian thinking originating in Soviet Marxism's dual, "official state - revolutionary" structure.

CHAPTER 10. THE SELF-EVALUATION OF IDEOLOGY:
THE META-TETRAD

The rules of ideological syntax are determined by the relationship between ideologems. These ideologems, however, not only evaluate reality, they evaluate one another as well. The system of meta-ideologems—the meta-tetrad—is so vital to the operation of ideological language that it merits special discussion as a lexical subsystem apart from those lexical groups classified in Chapter 8.

The meta-tetrad is the premise for the existence of all other lexical subsystems; it is this "super" tetrad which makes self-reflection and self-evaluation possible in Soviet Marxist ideology as a whole. For example, the ideologems "to blacken," "to smear" (*ocherniat'*) or "to whitewash" (*obeliat'*) impart a negative evaluation to words which already have been used ideologically. Let us take another look at the situation described by Thucydides: A characterizes his own inclination to risky activities as "bravery," while his opponent B characterizes A's inclination as "recklessness." The positive and negative evaluations contained in these words may then be reevaluated and reflected by each opponent. From A's point of view, B is "blackening" his bravery, but from B's point of view, A is "whitewashing" his recklessness; one evaluation becomes grounds for further evaluative judgements and the alteration of defensive and offensive arguments. A uses B's negative term directed against him ("recklessness") in order to disgrace his opponent B ("blackening"). B, on the other hand, uses the positive term which A attributed to his actions ("bravery") in order to disgrace A ("whitewashing").

Verbs like "to blacken," "to whitewash," "to falsify," and "to discredit" are elements of an ideological meta-language which describes (or evaluates) ideologems themselves. In this discussion, I will call ideologems which are described "primary" ideologems, those which describe them, "meta-ideologems." In analyzing the structure of meta-ideologems, we will use the same plus and minus (+ and −) scheme we used for primary ideologems. The first "+" or "−" will describe the connotative meaning of the meta-ideologem, the second "+" or "−" will describe its denotative meaning. As distinct from primary ideologems, which denote specific

objects or concepts ("+freedom" or "−unity"), meta-ideologems are evaluations of evaluations, thus their denotative meanings are indicated not by concrete words, but by a "+" or "−." For example, the meta-ideologem "to blacken" may be designated as "− −" because it gives a **negative** evaluation of something positive, and is thus itself **negative** (a person who *blackens* another person is reprehensible). The meta-ideologem "to whitewash" may be designated as "− +" because it gives a **positive** evaluation of something negative, and so must be evaluated **negatively** itself.

A mutual interdependence exists between ideologems of these two levels ("primary" and "meta") and is regulated by the following rules. If a primary ideologem is *positive*, then a meta-ideologem can give it either a **positive** evaluation and evoke a **positive** attitude in the speaker ("+ +"), or a **negative** evaluation and evoke a **negative** attitude ("− −"). Such *positive* ideologems as "peace," "freedom," "equality," and "progress," may be referred to by meta-ideologems of the "+ +" type: "to proclaim" (*provozglashat'*), "to praise" (*vospevat'*), "to glorify" (*slavit', proslavliat'*). For example, "Marx and Engels **proclaimed** full emancipation not only for the working class, but for all mankind." However, the same *positive* ideologems can also be referred to by meta–ideologems of the "− −" type: "to blacken" (*ocherniat'*), "to find fault with" (*okhaivat'*), "to defame" (*shel'movat'*), "to slander" (*klevetat'*), "to trample upon" (*popirat'*). For instance, "the enemies of our nation are **slandering** the freedom which the Soviet people won in the fierce battles of the Great Patriotic War." These meta-ideologems contain a **negative** evaluation of some *positive* object, thereby also giving a **negative** characterization of the speaker who is "slandering" or "defaming" the positive value.

Negative primary ideologems like "aggression," "violence," "confrontation," "exploitation," and "lawlessness" can be referred to by "+ −" or "− +" meta-ideologems. Meta-ideologems of the "+ −" type—"to unmask" (*razoblachit'*), "to stigmatize" (*zakleimit'*), "to condemn" (*osudit'*), "to denounce" (*oblichat'*)—express a **negative** attitude towards *negative* objects and therefore are themselves **positive**. "One of the primary goals of Soviet political education is to **unmask** the subversive intentions of imperialist circles against the legitimate socialist governments of Eastern Europe." The same *negative* primary ideologems can be referred to by "− +" meta-ideologems—"to relish" (*smakovat'*), "to whitewash" (*obeliat'*), "to sow" (*seiat'*), "to cultivate" (*kul'tivirovat'*), "to advertise" (*prevoznosit'*), "to proclaim" (*proklamirovat'*)—which express an actively **positive** attitude towards *negative*

phenomena and therefore have **negative** meanings. "The mass culture of the West **relishes** violence and permissiveness."

The aforementioned rules of ideological syntax allow us to predict the most probable word combinations. Certain ideologems may be used only with specific meta-ideologems. We can "strengthen" ("+ +") or "trample upon" ("– –") lawfulness (+org): *ukrepliat'* or *popirat' zakonnost'*. We can "condemn" ("+ –") or "sow" ("– +") lawlessness (–lib): *osuzhdat'* or *nasazhdat' bezzakonie*. But it is impossible for ideology to use the following word-combinations: "to trample upon lawlessness" (*popirat' bezzakonie*) or "to sow lawfulness" (*nasazhdat' zakonnost'*). If the verbs "to falsify" (*fal'sifitsirovat'*), "to discredit" (*discreditirovat'*), or "to torpedo" (*torpedirovat'*)—that is, negative meta-ideologems—are encountered in an ideological text, then the object of these verbs will invariably be a word with a positive connotation: "a constructive suggestion" or "a peaceful initiative." Positive meta-ideologems such as "to condemn," "to restrain," and "to unmask," to the contrary, describe negative objects: "criminal actions," "the arms race," etc.

We can now create a table depicting the possible combinations for two levels of ideologems.

Level 1 PRIMARY IDEOLOGEMS	Level 2 META-IDEOLOGEMS
+	+ +
+	– –
–	+ –
–	– +

If the relationship of ideologems in a tetradic structure is as simple as two times two equals four, then the relationship between meta-ideologems and primary ideologems in linear text mirrors the rules of multiplication: multiplying two identical signs produces a positive result and multiplying a positive sign by a negative sign produces a negative result. The tetradic structure of Level 2 ideologems reproduces exactly the ideological functions represented by Level 1 ideologems in a tetradic structure. Thus meta-ideologems carry out four functions which in turn comprise a meta-tetrad:

+pro		−contr	
+contr		−pro	

The essence of ideological thinking is expressed in an even purer and more abstract form by this meta-tetrad than by primary ideologems. On Level 1, ideologems are connected with real phenomena: specific and informative concepts such as "freedom" or "necessity," "innovation" or "tradition". On Level 2, ideological language abandons this diversity of ideas because it does not describe reality, but the ideologems themselves. The denotative meanings of meta-ideologems reflect the connotative meanings of primary ideologems; the meta-ideologem is an "evaluator of evaluations." The double evaluation results in a combination of all "+"s and "−"s, which we see in the structure of the meta-tetrad.

+ +		− −	
+ −		− +	

The following list summarizes the substitutives which carry out the four functions of the meta-tetrad.

+pro		−contr	
to praise	*vospevat'*	to find fault with	*okhaivat'*
to glorify	*proslavliat'*	to defame	*shel'movat'*
to proclaim	*provozglashat'*	to encroach	*posiagat'*
to exalt	*vozvelichivat'*	to discredit	*diskreditirovat'*
to augment	*priumnozhat'*	to undermine	*podryvat'*
to elevate	*vozvyshat'*	to debase	*unizhat'*
to ennoble	*oblagorozhivat'*	to disgrace	*porochit'*
to beautify	*krasit'* or *ukrashat'*	to blacken	*ocherniat'*

+contr		−pro	
to unmask	*razoblachat'*	to whitewash	*obeliat'*
to brand	*kleimit'*	to advertise	*prevoznosit'*
to condemn	*osuzhdat'*	to relish	*smakovat'*
to sweep away	*otmetat'*	to sow	*seiat'* or *nasazhdat'*
to nail down	*prigvozdat'*	to provoke	*provotsirovat'*
to denounce	*oblichat'*	to cultivate	*kultivirovat'*
to debunk	*razvenchivat'*	to proclaim	*proklamirovat'*

Once again we see the untranslatable essence of Soviet ideological terms, whose connotative meanings are far more specific and "pre-determined" than those of their American English equivalents. For example, we are forced to use the same English verb, "proclaim," for two different Russian verbs, *provozglashat'* and *proklamirovat',*" even though the first Russian verb is positive ("to proclaim truth, freedom") and the second, extremely negative ("to proclaim something false, illusory, unrealizable").

It is important to note that meta-ideological functions are not always expressed by verbs, they can also take the form of interjections, nouns, and adjectives, as seen below:

Interjections:	"long live!"	*da zdravstvuet!*	(+pro)
	"hurrah!"	*ura!*	(+pro)
	"hands off!"	*ruki proch!*	(+contr)
	"down with!"	*doloi!*	(+contr)
Nouns:	"proclaimer"	*provozvestnik*	(+pro)
	"comrade in arms"	*spodvizhnik*	(+pro)
	"apologist"	*apologet*	(−pro)
	"adherent"	*adept*	(−pro)
Adjectives:	"respectable"	*respektabel'nyi*	(−pro)
	"fashionable"	*feshenebel'nyi*	(−pro)

In spite of their seeming simplicity, the adjectives "respectable" and "fashionable" serve as meta-ideologems in Soviet ideolanguage: they give ironic (**positive**) praise to *negative* phenomena ("a respectable bourgeois," "a fashionable resort for moneybags [*tolstosumov*]") and thus have a **negative** connotation.

The meta-tetrad "++ −− +− −+" is in its own way a structural nucleus of Soviet ideological language; a nucleus capable of division and reproduction at higher and higher levels of self-consciousness. This ability of the basic structure to reproduce itself confirms that ideological thinking is not confined to one level; rather, it is capable of working on any level of consciousness. Ideological thinking can counter criticism by moving to a higher level of abstraction and encompassing the negative evaluations directed against it by subjugating them to its own logic.

Critics of Soviet Marxist ideology can label it "scholastic," "dogmatic," "authoritarian," "nationalistic," "aggressive," or "non-class." These evaluations directed against Soviet ideology do not undermine its foundation—they simply become prisoners of the ideology's own logic and are assigned a place within the tetradic model. The breadth of this model allows the ideology to further extend its totalitarian activity by means of self-reflection and self-reproduction. Any type of criticism only serves to raise the tetradic model to a higher level of generalization, allowing it to reproduce in much the same way as cancerous cells reproduce themselves within an organism.

Chapter 11. Soviet Marxism in Postmodernist Perspective

Soviet Marxism is an enigmatic, hybrid phenomenon in the history of human consciousness. Like postmodernist pastiche, it combines within itself very different ideological doctrines, including, among others:

- Marxist teaching about class struggle and communist revolution

- Teachings of the French Enlightenment directed against the church and clergy and justifying revolutionary terror

- Slavophile ideas of the spiritual advantages of the Russian nation, destined to resolve all Western European controversies and unite the whole world

- Ideas of revolutionary democrats and Populists (Nikolai Chernyshevsky, Nikolai Dobroliubov, Pëtr Tkachev, and others) who proclaimed the Russian peasant commune the germ of the future social structure under socialism

- Nikolai Fëdorov's ideas about armies of labor overcoming the laws of nature, resurrecting the dead, and exploring and populating cosmic space

- Tolstoy's idea of simplification, calling the intelligentsia to return to the conditions of human existence of simple working people

- Mythological beliefs about the coming of the golden age and immortal heroes whose blood and suffering will become a foundation for the happiness of future generations.

Viewed from this broad perspective, Soviet Marxism escapes all specific definitions and appears to be an arbitrary aggregate of widely varying ideas that chiefly serve the pursuit of maximal power. An ideology

is usually perceived as a set of ideas which are connected and together give a very specific, coherent picture of the world. This postulate of inner consistency, self-sufficiency, and wholeness is, however, absent in totalitarian ideology. The fact that Soviet Marxism incorporates ideas from so many different sources has been indispensable to its power and survival. Just as the Bolsheviks proclaimed a Party of a completely "new type," Soviet ideology was celebrated as an ideology of a "new type" and contrasted to all previous ideologies.

Traditional logic can be applied only to the "specific" or "partial" ideologies which are not self-contradictory and express the outlook of some concrete individual or collective. Classical Marxism, the French Enlightenment, American transcendentalism, Russian Slavophilism, and Tolstoyism are examples of particular ideologies whose messages are pure to the point of sterility. Each elaborates a very stable hierarchy of values which never contradict one another. This generation of "specific ideologies," so characteristic of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was succeeded in the twentieth century by a new generation of "thinking machine" ideologies, produced in much the same way as technology creates newer, improved generations of computers. This new mode of ideological thinking has been accurately called "total," or "totalitarian." Total ideologies, as distinct from specific ideologies, are not limited to a single set of ideas and therefore are not bound to proclaim the same stable views. The history of totalitarian ideologies is a series of betrayals—ideology betrays its own prerequisites and its own assertions of yesterday. Totalitarian ideologies must betray and be betrayed in order to maintain their all-encompassing grip on society. Ironically, the "total" ideologies constantly complain that they are betrayed by leaders and followers who deviate from the purity and cohesiveness of the "orthodox" line (which coincides with the will of the absolute leader).

Most previous theories of ideology, including those elaborated in the Marxist tradition, proceed from the idea that specific ideologies are forms of false consciousness. Such theories describe ideology as "...a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously indeed but with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all. Hence he imagines false or apparent motives."[65] Of course, every specific ideology does give

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65. Engels, Letter to Mehring, 14 July 1893.

priority to certain ideas, the worth of which can be disputed as subjective bias or a deviation from reality. Thus Slavs have their advantages over Western European nations, but the English and French also have certain undisputed advantages over Slavs; this line of reasoning reveals the limitations and subjectivity of the doctrine of Slavophilism.

However, the definition of ideology as a false consciousness cannot be applied to totalitarian ideologies, which reconcile and incorporate very different, even opposing, ideas. Totalitarian ideologies embrace all aspects of contending ideas, encircling and assimilating the whole of reality until reality becomes indistinguishable from the ideology which transforms it. As Herbert Marcuse remarked in his discussion of Soviet Marxism, "... ideology thus becomes a decisive part of reality even if it [is] used only as an instrument of domination and propaganda."[66] The difference between false and real images loses all relevance because ideology itself becomes a comprehensive way of life. Since ideology creates reality in its own image and likeness, ideology's image of reality becomes indisputable. In a totalitarian society, ideology cannot but be a faithful reflection of reality because reality itself is a faithful reflection of ideology. Internationalist ideology cannot but be truthful in a society where all national traditions are broken or neglected, just as patriotic ideology cannot but be truthful in a society separated from the entire world by an "iron curtain."

A classic example of the fusion of ideology and reality in a totalitarian regime is the origin of "*subbotniks*" in the USSR. On Saturday, April 12th, 1919, fifteen workers of the Moskva-Sortirovochnaya depot voluntarily repaired three locomotives without pay. This modest job grew under Lenin's pen into "The Great Beginning," a grandiose image of emancipated workers volunteering their labor for the good of the happy future of humanity. From that moment on, communist "*subbotniks*" (voluntary in form, mandatory in fact) became a permanent ritual in the Soviet Union and brought billions of rubles into the State Treasury. Was Lenin's idea about *subbotniks* false or genuine?

Soviet Marxist ideology is totalitarian because it erases the difference between idea and reality, as well as that between opposing conceptions. Ideas become indistinguishable not only from reality, but from

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66. Herbert Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1971), 16-17.

each other. "Internationalism," "materialism," "communism," "socialism," "Marxism," "Leninism," "five-year plans," "collective farms," and "space exploration" merge into one concept and become signs of the same paramount signified. This signified may be rendered equally as "truth," "strength," "greatness," "victory," or simply, "hurrah!" Even opposing ideas lose their distinction. Ask an average Soviet citizen to explain the difference between internationalism and patriotism—I wager he will find it difficult to answer. For the majority of Soviet people, these conflicting concepts have been transformed into one "ideologically correct" expression. Soviet ideology has assimilated so many words that all words come to constitute a single language unit, signifying nothing but the ideology itself. "Materialism," "spirituality," "freedom," "discipline," "tradition," "innovation" all refer to a single penultimate concept: "the triumphant and all-powerful ideology." Whereas specific ideologies developed their own particular systems of signs for interpreting reality, totalitarian ideology is itself the only reality to which all ideological signs and interpretations refer.

I am inclined to believe that Soviet Marxism, which for seventy years survived as the dominant ideology of the Soviet Union and accommodated itself to enormous historical change, has become de-ideologized in direct proportion to its ideological expansion. This ideology has exceeded and absorbed all other systems and is now approaching the limits of ideological imagination. Over the course of seven decades, Soviet Marxism has lost its specificity as a particular ideology and has become instead an all-encompassing system of ideological signs which can acquire any significance desired. The era of *glasnost'* and *perestroika* has not changed the "multi-ideological" essence of Soviet mentality. Rather, it has brought the ideology even beyond the limits of totalitarianism and transformed it into a new type of ideological consciousness, one which might be called post-communist, or universal.

Under *perestroika*, practically all meanings and all words have become ideologically charged, yet at the same time, they do not express the values of any particular ideology. For example, the classic Marxist opposition of "private property" versus "public property" long identified the basic difference between capitalism and socialism. Today, however, according to the process of ideological maturation discussed in Chapter 7, the original dyad "private property - public property" has been submerged into a tetradic structure and its meaning completely obfuscated. By adding the dyad "citizen's property - state property" (the first stimulated through

perestroika, the second responsible for the inefficiency of the Soviet economy), the "total" ideology creates a tetradic structure which enables it to be "socialist" and "capitalist" at the same time:

public property - private property
citizen's property - state property

obshchestvennaia sobstvennost' - chastnaia sobstvennost'
sobstvennost' grazhdan - gosudarstvennaia sobstvennost'

Obviously, "citizen's property" is nothing but a positive evaluation of what was previously condemned as "private property," and "state property" is a denunciation of what was previously extolled as "public property." To introduce private property into economic reality proved to be easier than to bestow this very expression with a positive meaning. Ideology must retain its sacred words regardless of what economic development occurs. Market reform concepts, instead of destroying the ideology, have inevitably been subsumed by it.

Soviet Marxist ideology today is acquiring an increasingly universal character deprived of any particular system of opinions; it continues to manipulate different ideologies, managing to combine capitalist and communist ideas without ceasing to function. As a result, ideology becomes simply a habit of thinking, a manner of expression, the prism through which all views and expressions are refracted, functioning as a medium of thinking which does not depend on particular views and ideas—a sort of universal network which may be compared to the communications networks of Western nations.

If, as Marshall McLuhan put it, "the media is the message," then ideology is the message of all modern Soviet media. What sort of ideology? It does not matter. In today's Soviet Union, ideology exists unto itself, a form of discourse independent of any specific content, be it scientific, religious, aesthetic, or otherwise. Practically no one in the Soviet Union would interpret a statement regarding a specific element, say a religious or artistic pronouncement, at face value. Such statements are perceived above all as ideological pronouncements for which religion or literature simply provide a convenient vehicle. Over the course of seventy years of Marxist rule, even economics has turned out to be a matter of pure ideology. No

specific economic cause, law, or regularity can be definitively identified as the reason for the regime's periodic transitions from one economic policy to another—from the amalgamation of all kolkhozes to their disintegration, from the requisitioning of farm produce to taxes in kind, from intensified cultivation of potatoes to urgent cultivation of corn. All these changes in economic policy were the result of the interplay of different ideas, not economic realities.

Marx and Engels used to say that in all pre-communist social formations, there was no such thing as a history of ideas because ideas in those societies served only as false miraculous reflections of economic history. Following this logic, we must conclude that after a socialist revolution, there is no other history than that of ideas—economic history ceases to exist. The entire hierarchy is reversed: ideology becomes the base and economics the superstructure. Under Soviet socialism, the life of ideas is self-sufficient and self-propelling, while economic issues arise out of their ideological foundations. Supposedly, the genuine significance of a "socialist" revolution is not just its reversal of the power of the lower and upper classes in a society, but the reversal of the society's base and superstructure as well. It is hardly surprising, then, that Soviet Marxist ideology has become the underlying force of all economic, political, and aesthetic movements in the USSR, relating to each of them as a whole relates to its parts. Engels and Lenin were clever to emphasize that in different countries and under different circumstances, ideology might take the place of economics as the basic structure of the whole society. This was precisely the case in communist countries—economics and ideology changed roles and ideas, not economics, determined material life and produced the "real."

In Western society, postmodernism is often regarded as a continuation of the logic of "late capitalism," a condition in which all ideas and styles acquire the form of commodities and become "manageable" and "changeable." In the Soviet Union, postmodern relativity of ideas arises from its own ideological, not economic, base. All those concepts previously alien to the essence of communist ideology, such as "private property" and the "free market," are now freely entering this ideological space, stretching it beyond its limits—allowing the ideology to embrace its own opposite. This is a process of de-ideologization, but not in the sense of Daniel Bell's understanding of the phenomenon in his famous book, *The End of Ideology*. In the Soviet Union, de-ideologization means the end of the "particular" ideology which originally had a definite class character, social ideals, and

aimed to inspire the proletariat to launch a socialist revolution and construct communism. The current de-ideologization of Marxism in the USSR is a process of the universalization of ideological thinking as such, its final move from the realm of militant modernism to a more playful, relaxed, postmodern mentality.

This de-ideologization, or super-ideologization, of Soviet Marxism raises a vital question: are there two distinct postmodernisms, one Western and one Eastern, or is there a single, shared postmodernism? The best answer, in the author's view, is that "one-and-a-half" postmodernisms exist. The postmodern condition is essentially the same in the East and West, although it proceeds from opposite foundations: ideology and economics, respectively. Late capitalism and late communism are polar opposites in terms of economic structure and efficiency, but economics alone does not determine culture as a whole. The fundamental underlying patterns of cultural postmodernism in the East are not economic, they are ideological. Communism has proved to be a more radical challenge to capitalism than was originally thought, not only did it change the mode of production, it changed the relationship of base and superstructure in society.[67]

A comparison of capitalist economics and communist ideology is imperative for elucidating the postmodernist traits common to both societies. Such a "cross" examination would be more interesting than a parallel comparison; if one compares communist and bourgeois ideologies, or socialist and capitalist economics, little can be found beyond commonplace oppositions. It is far more relevant—even from a Marxist-Leninist perspective—to examine the common ground between communist ideology and capitalist economics, as the two perform identical functional roles in their respective social structures. The circulation of goods in capitalist society is essentially identical to the circulation of ideas in communist society. Ideology, like capital, allows for the growth of surplus value, or, in this case, surplus evaluation. In a communist society, every concrete fact of the "material" world is treated ideologically, as evidence of some general historic tendency—its significance increases from one instance of ideological interpretation to the next.

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67. For a critical discussion of this issue, see the chapter entitled "Basis and Superstructure—Reality and Ideology," in Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism*, 106-107.

The famous formula of a capitalist economy which Marx suggested in *Das Kapital* is "commodities - money - commodities," or "money - commodities - money." The same formula can be applied in modified form to the ideology of Soviet Marxism: "reality - idea - reality," or "idea - reality - idea." Facts are exchanged for ideas in communist society in the same way as goods are exchanged for money in capitalist societies. Ideas, as a sort of currency, acquire an abstract form of "ideological capital." They do not constitute material wealth, but the "correctness" of communist ideology. This "correctness," or absolute truth, compensates people for their labor ("heroic deeds and sacrifices"), as well as recoups the cost of so-called "particular" mistakes resulting from Party policy.

What happens in the late stage of communist development? Why does it move toward a "postmodernist condition" along the same path followed by "late capitalist" societies? Totalitarianism was a superlative machine for accumulating and exploiting all sorts of ideas: leftist and rightist, revolutionary and conservative, internationalist and patriotic, etc. However, this machine spawned a phenomenon bigger than itself. Just as capital eventually outgrows the capitalist "machine" and becomes a self-sufficient entity, Soviet ideological capital has outgrown the "machine" of a particular personality or system of ideas and has become an omnipresent mentality, appropriating any fact to serve any idea. Such is the current state of Soviet society under *glasnost'*. Marxist ideology, the most powerful of all modern ideologies, is losing its identity and becoming only one possible interpretation of reality (in the Soviet Union, it would be the least probable one!). The expansion of Marxist ideology overcame Marxism as a form of modernity and created the postmodern condition in the USSR.

The overarching expansion of Soviet ideology occurred in the Brezhnev era, when the difference between facts and ideas was practically erased. Ideology was gradually transformed from a system of ideas into an all-encompassing ideological environment which retained all possible alternative philosophical systems as latent components within itself. Existentialism and structuralism, Russophilism and Westernism, technocratic and ecological movements, Christian and neo-pagan outlooks—everything was compressed into the form of Marxism, creating a sort of post-modernist pastiche.

The Gorbachev era is magnifying this postmodernist condition of Soviet society by encouraging the growth of tens, hundreds, even thousands,

of new ideological systems, each of which playfully uses all the buzzwords of Soviet Marxist ideology for its own ends. Gorbachev himself is a very ideological being; in his domestic speeches one can find nothing but ideology. Don't ask him, however, what sort of ideology he proclaims. It is simply ideology, nothing more. Usually, it follows the routine tetradic patterns: "democrats" are criticized for endangering "stability" and "unity," while "conservatives" are criticized for threatening the ideals of "reconstruction" and "acceleration."

In the USSR today, there exists a continuous, complete ideological environment which is transpersonal, transcollective, transparty, and ultimately, transideological, because no particular ideological position remains consistent or comprehensive. Soviet ideology has developed beyond any particular rational or irrational system; it is reality itself - chaotic, charming, exciting, disgusting, boring, physically threatening, maddening. No other reality exists except that of ideology: there is little food (but plenty of ideas about how to feed the country) or clean air (but an abundance of ideas on how to make it clean). Communist ideology has succeeded in creating an "ideological personality" and, through the triumph of pan-ideology, has abolished communism itself.

Thus post-communist ideology is universalist rather than totalitarian. Totalitarian ideology incorporates all available ideas and claims to be a unified and coherent system, sharply opposing left and right deviations. Universalist ideology tries to eliminate all oppositions and use the entire range of various ideas as if they were complimentary. The transformation of all oppositions into complementarities was the ideological strategy of Gorbachev under *perestroika* and, although it undoubtedly brought him success, it could not prevent real rightists and leftists from fighting this ideology of compromise from both sides.

Perhaps the most striking postmodernist trend found in universalist ideology is its ability to surmount historical differences and eliminate the dimension of time. Louis Althusser made the stunning pronouncement that "ideology *in general has no history*...or, what comes to the same thing, is eternal, i.e. omnipresent in its immutable form throughout history."[68] Althusser's famous definition of ideology as "the imaginary

68. Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 160-162.

relationship of individuals to their real condition of existence"[69] seems too broad, too vague—it does not allow one to distinguish ideology from other realms of consciousness such as mythology, religion, art, dreams, utopia, etc. In this author's view, ideology is a very specific sphere of consciousness: the doubling and reversal of mental oppositions which cannot be reconciled in purely theoretical terms and therefore need to be permanently evaluated and reevaluated in order to create a hierarchy of values. It is this permanent play of evaluations which pushes mature ideology beyond history to converge with postmodernism and its rejection of any specific ideology.

Specific ideologies with stable hierarchies of values and ideas have histories which arise out of the differences between them. Totalitarian ideologies, which reverse every idea to become its diametric opposite, indeed tend to become one ideology, "omnipresent in its immutable form throughout history." Finally, universalist ideology is so total that it expands infinitely to incorporate all possibilities of ideological thought. Despite the variety of specific ideologies, it is hardly disputable that there exists only one ideological consciousness, as distinct from religious, mythological, scientific, or artistic forms of consciousness. The process of building totalitarian ideologies from specific ideologies makes the resulting, accumulated ideology increasingly coincide with the entire spectrum of ideological consciousness as such, realizing all its potentialities. It is this process of enveloping multiple ideologies into one, all-comprehensive, omnipresent ideology that makes the phenomenon of "de-ideologized ideology" possible.

The aim of this work was to discuss the ideology of Soviet Marxism in postmodern perspective, to deconstruct the units of this ideology and disclose the intended and unintended lack of significance in ideological pronouncements. The ideology of Soviet Marxism is usually considered to be the most rigid and stagnant component of twentieth century intellectual development. I have tried to argue that this rigidity is a form of the postmodernist elimination of time and significance, one which works through a constant play of meanings and redistribution of evaluations. I believe there is no more relativistic system of ideology than the Soviet ideological system: it constantly changes and expands its set of ideas in order that its power remains unchallenged. In order to win the world, this ideology is ready to lose its identity.

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69. Ibid., 162.

CONCLUSION

I would like to finish this rather dry scholarly presentation with a somewhat lighter essay. Soviet money is very beautiful: it is green, blue, red, lilac, and decorated with fine multi-colored lines and iridescent patterns. Soviet money is intended above all to satisfy the aesthetic needs of its proprietor. It is very pleasing to have beautiful money, and therefore not necessary to spend it. This money is much brighter and more attractive than the dull, dusty goods which it can purchase in Soviet shops. In America, the flagship country of capitalism, the situation is quite the reverse. American bills are so dull that one wants to get rid of them as soon as possible, to exchange them for bright, eye-catching products displayed in store windows. Money, under socialism, is just a series of pictures in the style of op-art, artistic miniatures, distributed in billions of copies to satisfy the need of the citizen for pocket portraits of Lenin and sights of the Moscow Kremlin.

No society, however, can do without some kind of conventional currency which functions as the general equivalent of all values. What can be considered real money and used to acquire tangible goods in a socialist society? This question has yet to be answered. The political economy of socialism remains to be established, although a discipline under this title has long been studied in Soviet universities. This Soviet discipline assumes that "the basic economic law of socialism ensures the complete well-being and free all-round development of all members of society through continual growth and improvement of social production." This definition could explain, with the same success, the basic aesthetic law of socialism or the basic sexual law of socialism, because these, too, serve to satisfy the growing needs of society and provide its members complete well-being. The political economy of socialism was never created because under socialism, economics is only the superstructure, while ideology (the superstructure under capitalism) has become the base.

For all that, what is the general equivalent of ideas, if money is the general equivalent of goods? Language is such an equivalent, attaching various ideological labels to phenomena. With the aid of language, people have the opportunity to enrich themselves and impoverish their enemies—

ideologically. The ideological value of different words can even change. The value of "internationalism," for example, once had the greatest exchange rate in Soviet society. Then it fell to the lowest rate of "cosmopolitanism." The highest rates are now reserved for Russian nationalist bills: "motherland," "memory," "patriotism." These securities do not represent numbers, only words, but nevertheless are the currency used in the Soviet Union to buy power, work, life, and further satisfaction of all growing needs.

Words and money have much in common. Each may relate to such concepts as inflation, devaluation, speculation, and the rise and fall of the exchange rate. It appears that a flexible relationship and mutual interdependence exist between a sign and its significance, or a bill and its value. A proprietor can use the difference between a bill and its value to enrich himself; in the same way, an ideologist can use the difference between a sign and its significance to gain surplus evaluation. The same phenomena can increase in value if signified as "ideological commitments," or become worthless if signified as "idealistic biases." Language is a system of rising and falling prices, a semantic stock exchange, which allows a skilled player to accumulate enormous ideological capital. By attaching different labels to different facts, the ideologist appropriates the difference between their values. One can play the market to multiply one's own stocks or reduce the stocks of one's rivals.

When one hears that "the October Revolution has liberated the toiling people from capitalist oppression," or that "a fascist *putsch* has brought innumerable sufferings upon the toiling people," one cannot help but agree. Why? Because the very words "revolution" and "*putsch*" already contain a final judgement; the first word is a commendation, the second a condemnation. A standard ideological device is to designate the same or similar phenomenon with opposite evaluative signs and extract ideological surplus value from the evaluative difference of their meanings. The difference between "revolutionaries" and "*putschists*" is purely emotional and evaluative, ideologists use it to accumulate ideological capital. "*Putsch*" is a negative value, a great loss, while "revolution" is a winning ticket, one which has brought Soviet power great benefits over a period of seventy years.

Capitalism rules the citizen with the help of a **check** (*cheka* in Russian), while socialism rules with the help of the **Cheka** (the Soviet secret police). The difference is in the first letter of the two words: one is lower case, the other, upper case. Socialism adores capital letters, it lives off the

profit derived from their verbal capital. Thus the repeated use of words such as "Fatherland," "October," and the "Communist Party" by the Soviet regime. The total significance of each of these words is superior to its direct meaning, the difference constitutes surplus value under socialism. The basic law of socialism is the surplus significance of all phenomena. These phenomena do not simply exist, they also represent highly valued historical laws and progressive tendencies.

Soviet money is indeed beautiful, but not because of its picturesque bills—these are nothing more than soft currency. Soviet money should be considered the most beautiful in the world because it is composed of bright, expressive words and not dry numbers. Of course, such money cannot help you acquire commodities, but can provide you with power. Imagine the whole world plastered with bills printed with the words of Soviet Marxist ideolanguage: "revolution," "reaction," "nation," "freedom," "honor," "glory," "spirituality," "heroism," "sacrifice," "the bright future." These words are the genuine units of Soviet hard currency. What can be acquired with such words cannot be measured. Quality, not quantity, is of primary significance. Soviet Marxist ideology has proven rich enough to acquire fiery souls hating capitalism and striving for "the bright future," rich enough to appropriate the mighty forces of progress and youth in the world. How miserable is capitalist money, which can only buy that which is sold! There is a type of money that can be used to buy something which is not sold—the world can be bought with "beautiful money."

APPENDIX:
THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF THE RUSSIAN
LANGUAGE TO IDEOLOGICAL USE

The abundance of ideologems in Soviet usage may be explained by the structural properties of the Russian language itself. In linguistic terms, Russian is properly called "synthetic," because two kinds of meaning, the **semantic** relationship of a word to the signified phenomenon, and the **pragmatic** relationship of the speaker to the word he or she uses, are combined in one word.

Usually, languages with synthetic structure, such as Russian, are opposed to languages with analytic structure, such as English. In the former, **semantic** and **syntactic** meanings are expressed in **one lexical unit**, while the latter requires **separate lexical units**. For example, the Russian term "*bratu*" contains both the semantic meaning "brother" and the grammatical meaning of direction, which in English are conveyed by two separate words (preposition + noun): "(*otdai*) *bratu*" - "(give) to brother." The distinction between synthetic and analytic structures may also be observed in the relationship between semantic and pragmatic meanings. The Russian word "*zakleimit'*" means "to denounce" with cause; "*proklamirovat'*" means "to proclaim something falsely or without proper grounds." Semantic and pragmatic meanings are combined in one Russian word, but expressed separately in English ("with cause" or "falsely" indicate the attitude of the speaker towards the actions, which are neutrally designated as "to denounce" or "to proclaim").

Interestingly, a comparison between Russian and French, another analytical language, leads to the same conclusion. "Neutral French words have [Russian] equivalents with distinctly negative or positive expressive nuances...Very often one French word which is stylistically neutral finds a parallel in several Russian words with various stylistic qualities (negative, positive, neutral)," observes the Soviet linguist V. G. Gak.[70] For example, the French word *entente* is devoid of nuance, but can only be

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70. V.G. Gak, *Sopostavitel'naia Leksikologiia* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye othosheniia, 1977), 99.

rendered in Russian by several words containing opposing evaluative meanings: positive - *soglasie*, negative - *sgovor*, neutral - *soglashenie*. The French word *fameux* has at least three Russian equivalents: positive - *znamenityi*, negative - *preslovutyi*, neutral - *izvestnyi*. Here, again, an evaluative component is incorporated into the semantic core of a Russian word, while in French it constitutes a separate lexical unit.

According to the author's rough calculations, about one-fifth of the entries in Ozhegov's dictionary of modern Russian (approximately 10,000 words), are synthetic in their semantic-pragmatic dimensions. The precise amount could be calculated using the dictionary definitions and style tags containing specific pragmatic labels. These are not merely words, but word-judgements, or evaluative statements. This is an indication of how deeply Soviet ideology has pervaded the structure of the Russian language. It could also be argued, vice-versa, that the synthetic structure of the Russian language gave birth to the abundancy of Soviet ideologems. This seems to be a classic example of the "chicken and egg" dilemma.

A short digression concerning the history of Russian "bilingualism" might also be useful here. Where are the roots of Soviet ideological language? Why was it fated to grow on the soil of the Russian language? One could advance the argument that the ideological bias of the Russian language had longstanding cultural preconditions. Since its birth in the ninth century, Russian culture has used two languages: the vernacular, oral Russian and literary Old Slavonic. A duality of styles, or "doublespeak," became a guiding force of Russian literary development—the same idea could be expressed both colloquially, in Russian, and sublimely, in Slavonic. The word *vorota* indicated gates such as those which enclose a peasant's yard. A different word, however, *vrata*, was used to denote the gates of Heaven. Even today, the Russian word *golova* refers to an anatomical head, while the Slavonic *glava* refers to the head of an organization.

The duality of vernacular Russian and Church Slavonic led Mikhail Lomonosov to create his theory of the three styles in the eighteenth century. He defined the high style as Church Slavonic, the low as Russian, and the middle as a balance between the two. In an attempt to become closer to the people, the great nineteenth century authors Krylov, Griboedov, Pushkin, Lermontov, and Gogol adopted vernacular Russian as the basis of their literary language. The 1830s and 1840s thus marked "the

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collapse of the old system which presupposed the isolated and privileged position of old Slavonisms as high, 'poetic' means of speech. The time for a mature and self-supporting language had arrived."[71] But, as the saying goes, "nature hates a vacuum." It was particularly during the 1840s that the Russian lexicon adopted a large group of social and political terms from French and other European languages: communism, socialism, proletariat, solidarity, emancipation, innovator, progress, bourgeoisie, exploitation, reaction, conservative, obscurantism, and so forth. Through the efforts of "progressive" public opinion, these terms immediately acquired positive or negative connotations which have remained stable until the present. These words carry the same value, whether found in Chernyshevsky's revolutionary-democratic journalism, Dobroliubov's literary criticism, Lenin's revolutionary writings, or the front page of today's *Pravda*.

In the European languages from which they were borrowed, these social and political words retained the ability to assume different evaluative meanings in different contexts. However, the foreign origin of these terms prevented their smooth assimilation into Russian—they remained outside the system of changing connotations in Russian colloquial speech and literary styles. These terms came to comprise their own distinct lexical system which eventually replaced Church Slavonic as the language of ideological orthodoxy and the ruling elite. This ideolanguage, systematically imposed on all social opinions and journalistic styles, crisply divided the dictionary into positive and negative concepts. In this way, bilingualism remained the distinctive feature of Russian cultural tradition.

Despite the introduction of the foreign political lexicon in the 1840s, Old Slavonic remained the ceremonial and rhetorical language of Czarist manifestos and the semi-official press up until the Bolshevik revolution. This ceremonial language used such solemn and sublime words as "the Most High" (*Vsevyshnii*), "Fatherland" (*otechestvo*), "holding supreme power" (*derzhavnyi*), and "to hoist banner" (*vodruzit' stiag*). The October revolution was a decisive event in the development of the political power of language—it not only eliminated the last remnants of Old Slavonic, it appropriated many of its expressions to serve the victorious ideology of Marxism-Leninism. Many superlative forms of the old regime, such as the "most evil foe" (*zleishii vrag*), or the "most complete obedience" (*polneishee*

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71. Iu. S. Sorokin, *Razvitiia slovarnogo sostava russkogo literaturnogo iazyka 50-90 godov 19 veka* (Moscow, 1965), 30, 31.

povinovenie), or imperative forms such as "Long live!" (*da zdravstvuet!*), survived the transition to the language of a new ruling elite.[72]

An interesting difference between czarist ceremonial style and Soviet ideological language is the latter's more explicit evaluative bias. Old Slavonic elements, although sublime and solemn, could refer to any phenomena, positive or negative. By contrast, ideological language began to use the high stylistic elements to designate only definitely positive phenomena: "the Party's promulgations" (*prednachertaniia partii*), "treasure-house of the people's wisdom" (*sokrovishchnitsa narodnoi mudrosti*), "to keep one's communist honor as the apple of one's eye" (*berech' chest' kommunista kak zenitsu oka*). Simultaneously, vulgar lexical elements began to signify negative phenomena. Previously, the enemies of the state and their acts were named solemnly: "sedition" (*kramola*) or "foe" (*nedrug*), but in the Soviet era, they received much harsher epithets such as "fascist degenerates" (*vyrodki*), "Trotskyist scum" (*svoloch*), and "counter-revolutionary vermin" (*gady*). The evaluative bias of the lexical system thus became even stronger in ideological language than in the czarist ceremonial style.

By virtue of its two historical sources, vernacular Russian and Old Slavonic, the Russian language possessed a foundation for "double-speak." This duality saddled Russian words with a definite stylistic range in addition to specific evaluative meanings; the same phenomenon could be expressed in a high, positive manner or in a low, negative manner. One may conjecture that the "double-speak" of early Russian culture created the linguistic preconditions which made Soviet "double-think" possible.

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72. As the Soviet scholar Panfilov has observed, "in the epoch of stylistic changes evoked by the Great October Socialist Revolution and by virtue of those transformations in the country to which it gave birth, the ceremonial, rhetorical style ended its existence as a specific style of Russian literary language. Its legacy was adopted by the publicist style, which turbulently developed during the first years of the revolution." Strange as it may seem, Panfilov does not conceal that the new ideological language (or publicist style, as he calls it) acquired the same functions as the czarist rhetorical style. A.K. Panfilov, *Lektsii po stilistike russkogo iazyka*, (Moscow, 1972), 95.

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SUPPLEMENT

The following short bibliography on Soviet ideological language includes works by Soviet authors whose contributions are relatively unknown in the West. The entire body of Soviet scholarship on ideological language is divided into six theoretical models for which some representative works are then cited in chronological order of their publication.

1. THE LANGUAGE OF REVOLUTION

The study of ideological language began in the twenties, when it was mostly represented as "the language of the October Revolution" or the language of "socialist transformation of society." Although the first authoritative investigation in this field was initiated by a French Slavonic scholar (André Mazon, *Lexique de la Guerre et de la Révolution en Russie, 1914-1918*, Paris, Édouard Champion, 1920), it was soon succeeded by a number of qualified Russian scholars. In this period, theoretical emphasis was put on neologisms, the turbulent innovations in the vocabulary and phraseology of post-revolutionary society, whereby hundreds of new words and unprecendented idioms came into usage. Historical context and extralinguistic factors were considered most important. Some publications of this period were more linguistic journalism than scientific research; they discussed such questions as the culture of speech and changing norms of literacy.

Gornfel'd, A.G. *Novye slovechki i starye slova.* Petersburg: Kolos, 1922.

Kartsevskii, S. *Iazyk, voina i revoliutsiia.* Berlin, 1923.

Vinokur, Grigorii. *Kul'tura iazyka.* Moscow, 1925.

Selishchev, A.M. *Iazyk revoliutsionnoi epokhi. Iz nabliudenii nad russkim iazykom poslednikh let (1917 - 1926).* Moscow: Rabotnik Prosveshcheniia, 1928.

2. SOCIAL DIALECT

In the thirties, "the language of revolution" was replaced by the new theoretical model of "social dialect" or "class language." "A sign becomes an arena of class struggle" (Voloshinov, *Marksizm i filosofiia iazyka*, p. 27). Academician Nikolai Marr, the father of Soviet socio-linguistic studies, wrote:

> "...National language, common to the whole nation, does not
> exist. It is class language that exists. Various national
> languages of the same class have identical social structure
> and have more affinity, than languages of different classes
> inside the same country, the same nation."

(N. Marr, *Selected Writings*, 2:415)

Thus, Marr argued that the democratic Georgian language is closer to the democratic Armenian language than to the aristocratic Georgian language, even though Georgian and Armenian belong to different language families. "There is no language which would not be a class language, and therefore there is no thinking which would not be class thinking." (Ibid., 3:91)

While proletarian dialect introduced many lexical and metaphoric components into ideological language, the latter drew even more components from scientific, official, and even Church Slavonic language than from proletarian dialect. Also, ideological language equally addresses all strata of society and functions as a literary norm rather than as a specific class dialect.

Voloshinov, V.N. *Marksizm i filosofiia iazyka. Osnovnye problemy sotsiologicheskogo metoda v nauke o iazyke.* Leningrad, 1930. (Voloshinov, V.N. *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, trans. L. Matejka and I.R. Titunik. New York, 1973.)

Ivanov, Anatolii i Iakubinskii, Lev. *Ocherki po iazyku.* Moscow, 1932.

Marr, N. Ia. *Iazyk i sovremennost'.* Leningrad, 1932.

_____. *Izbrannye trudy v 5 tomakh.* Leningrad: Sotzekgiz, 1933-1937.

Zhirmunskii, Viktor. *Natsional'nyi iazyk i sotsial'nye dialekty.* Leningrad, 1938.

3. PUBLICIST STYLE

In the early fifties Stalin initiated a famous discussion about language in order to substitute outmoded "class theory" or *"vul'garnyi sotsiologizm"* for a theory of language as a phenomenon common to the whole nation. Since that time, ideological language has been studied as a "stylistic function of the Russian national language," namely, the "publicist style," one among several other styles such as "scientific," "official," and "artistic." Of course, *publitsistika* (social and political journalism, writing on current affairs) is not the only sphere where ideological language manifests itself. In the USSR ideological language has a much broader scope than pure journalism: it pervades literature, the arts, economics, the humanities, and all other fields of study. Even today, a great amount of academic work in Soviet linguistics, including doctoral dissertations, is devoted to the publicist style of the Bolshevik and Soviet presses, although the very term seems to be a euphemism for "ideological language."

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4. THE LANGUAGE OF NEWSPAPERS

The "language of newspapers" is a technical and somewhat
narrow field within the realm of publicist style. Although philosophical
aspects of ideological language are eliminated from this sort of research, its
focus on the specific style of the daily press allows for a fairly detailed,
sometimes statistical, approach to the peculiarities of Soviet ideological
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5. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TERMINOLOGY

Another technical approach concerns the history of those social and political terms which comprise the lexical substance of ideological language. Investigations of the socio-political lexicon in both the pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary epochs are very useful for understanding the changing patterns of ideological thought, although they tend to reduce its scope to esoteric discussions of particular words and idioms.

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6. BOURGEOIS PROPAGANDA

Paradoxically, the Soviet scholarly community most closely approaches the specificity of ideological language when treating its Western counterpart—the tricks and devices of "bourgeois propaganda." The same "tools of deception" which are used in "bourgeois propaganda" provide insights into the subjectivity, logical traps, predominance of value judgements, and other pitfalls of Soviet propaganda.

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