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Moscow and Regional Security Proposals

for the Middle East

by Galia Golan

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The breakup of the Soviet Union and developments preceding this event appeared virtually to remove the Soviets and their successors from such regional matters as the Arab-Israeli conflict. Russia and the new states became increasingly preoccupied with their domestic— especially economic and ethnic—problems, unable to play more than a symbolic role in international political affairs. These economic and ethnic problems, however, are likely sooner or later to influence the foreign policy considerations of these states, with the possible effect of bringing one or another of them back into the regional context. Moreover, the continued impasse in the Arab-Israeli peace talks begun in the fall of 1991, as well as the accompanying instability of the region, provided incentive for some, particularly in Russia, to continue to search for a means of resolving this conflict, if not to be an active party to the peace process itself. Thus before and even after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the opening of Arab-Israeli talks, the proper—and possibly original—approach to resolution of the conflict remained a matter of some discussion.

Two approaches to the Arab-Israeli conflict had developed in the Soviet Union once Gorbachev's "new thinking" revolutionized Soviet foreign policy in the second half of the 1980s. The first approach was basically a modification, albeit a significant modification, of the pre-Gorbachev position which had aimed at convening an international conference for the achievement of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.[1] The motivation for and interest in such an objective had varied from time to time in the pre-Gorbachev era, but on the whole the policy had been generated by the zero-sum relationship with the United States. While the Soviets did have an interest in regional stability in an area close to their southern borders, their behavior was entirely dominated by their competition with the West, dictating policies which occasionally operated against the maintenance of stability, or worked to promote its opposite—that is,

policies of implicit or tacit cooperation designed nonetheless to promote a Soviet presence in the region.[2]

Soviet interest in resolution of the conflict had varied drastically from period to period, depending to a large degree upon the relationship of the USSR with the United States, globally as well as regionally, and the dominant idea in Moscow at any given time as to how to pursue this competitive relationship in Third World areas and regional conflicts. The policies of the pre-Gorbachev era were thus by no means static or even fully consistent, but from at least the late 1960s onward they had focused on the politics of a negotiated settlement of the conflict as a vehicle for ensuring continued Soviet presence, including military, in the region.

In the era of "new thinking," Soviet-American relations and regional stability were still to dictate Soviet policy in the Middle East, but in quite a different way, leading to a modification of Moscow's basic approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. With the abandonment of the ideological basis of foreign policy and of the zero-sum game approach, cooperation with the United States was not only facilitated, but even deemed essential. For both practical and theoretical reasons, the model of an interdependent world dictated both cooperation and stability. Indeed, regional stability would become necessary not only to avoid escalation (a problem recognized in the pre-Gorbachev era as well), but also to prevent any obstacles or dangers to superpower cooperation and the creation of the new world order ushered in by the close of the Cold War.

Notwithstanding domestic, particularly military, opposition to "new thinking," the new interpretation of Soviet-U.S. relations and regional stability generated a genuinely cooperative Soviet policy for the achievement of an Arab-Israeli settlement. This cooperative policy was based on such new elements as dealing directly with Israel (including a dramatic improvement of relations), a somewhat evenhanded attitude toward a settlement calling for a "balance of interests" (including Israeli security as well as Palestinian rights to self-determination), and a virtually totally flexible position regarding the substance and procedures for reaching such a settlement, even to the

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point of agreeing to step-by-step negotiations (bilateral as well as multilateral) for an interim agreement, if not the preferred and eventual comprehensive accord.[3]

While these positions clearly constituted a significant modification of the former Soviet policy, they were still based on an approach that focused on political resolution of the conflict—that is, negotiations for a settlement as the only approach to the issue. A second, entirely new approach, however, was suggested by some experts in Russia even before the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was an approach which did not rule out a negotiated settlement of the conflict or even seek to supplant or postpone such negotiations. Rather, it offered an alternative path generally perceived to be parallel to efforts at reaching a political settlement; it was a path which also might indirectly lead to or facilitate an eventual political settlement. This was the path of regional accords, primarily regional security accords.

Regional security ideas were originally proposed by Eduard Shevardnadze during his trip to the Middle East in February 1989. These ideas may have been conceived at the time within the traditional approach merely as a means to respond to Israel's demands for security in a political settlement of the conflict. Shevardnadze actually presented the "chicken and egg" dilemma of the need to end the arms race in the region and the need to eliminate the cause of the conflict, concluding that there should be a "two track, parallel process of scaling down the arms race and at the same time moving toward a peace settlement that eliminates the causes of conflict."[4] Yet shortly before his resignation, the Soviet Foreign Minister said that it was "not possible to stop the militarization of the region without an all-embracing Arab-Israeli settlement...For it is precisely the confrontation between the Arabs and Israel which has been going on for forty years that pushes both sides towards overarming."[5] These comments came in the context of a response to criticism over his policy in the Gulf Crisis and demands for linkage of the two conflicts. Nonetheless, they may have reflected a view that security arrangements could at best follow as part of a political settlement but could not precede such an accord.

There were rumors that Shevardnadze's proposals for regional security in the Middle East were actually drafted by Terasov, deputy head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Middle East Department responsible for dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict, or by Sergei Rogov, the person in charge of military issues at Institute of the USA and Canada and formerly charged with Middle Eastern affairs at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. It was Terasov who brought the proposals to Washington and Rogov who brought them to Jerusalem, both in early summer of 1990, but it was definitely Rogov who continued to push the proposals in the year that followed. The same ideas were raised again by Kolotusha, who had replaced Terasov's former boss and Middle East Department Head, Poliakov, at the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Kolotusha broached the subject with visiting experts from the Israeli Foreign Ministry in September 1990.[6]

It was Shevardnadze, however, who had earlier reintroduced the suggestions after a lull of over a year during a visit to Moscow by Syrian President Assad in April 1990. The Soviet Foreign Minister may also have raised these ideas in talks with Secretary of State Baker in early 1990. That they were indeed proposals supported, if not actually initiated, by Shevardnadze was suggested by the fact that he raised similar ideas for the Asia-Pacific region during his September 1990 trip there, after having presenting similar proposals more generally to the United Nations in August 1990.[7] Out of office in May 1991, he said that he favored "parallel actions: the uprooting of the causes of the oldest conflict on the one hand, and the formation of security and confidence-building structures in the region, on the other."[8] In fact, he said he had been urging this kind of approach "from the very beginning" by means of a regional conference.

As outlined by Shevardnadze in Cairo in 1989, the proposals themselves were presented as part of possible guarantees to allay Israeli security concerns with regard to a political settlement. Such guarantees could be provided, according to Shevardnadze, by a *"regional military risk-reduction center"* (in Damascus he added "under the auspices of the United Nations"), to be supplemented by *mutual inspections and on-site monitoring*, including *short-notice suspect site inspections*, by the parties to the conflict. Specifically, such on-site

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activity would be designed to allay suspicions with regard to the development of chemical and nuclear weapons. The region should be declared *a nuclear- and chemical-free zone.* In addition, *demilitarized zones and the thinning out of military forces in areas adjoining disengagement lines or borders* would also facilitate mutual and international verification. Finally, *verification and cooperative measures for the prevention of terrorism or other subversive activities should also be applied.*[9]

Saddam Hussein's boasting about his large chemical warfare capability and threats to bomb half of Israel may have been the catalyst for the re-emergence of Shevardnadze's proposals in the spring of 1990.[10] Reflecting the Iraqi threat, this time the proposals were in the form of regional security arrangements rather than specific guarantees for Israeli security. At this time Shevardnadze spoke not only of a regional center to reduce military danger, but also of arms limitations, including limits on missiles and missile technology transfers, and of turning the Middle East into a region "free of nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction."[11] Foreign Ministry briefings previewed these proposals in calling for a Middle East free of nuclear, missile, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction, but the Foreign Ministry spokesman told the Arab League representative in Moscow that "naturally weapons should be eliminated simultaneously with a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict."[12]

These additions to the proposals also reflected other proposals such as the Egyptian call for a ban on weapons of mass destruction in the region and Spanish-initiated talks on Mediterranean security, as well as developments in Soviet-American and European disarmament talks during the intervening year. Immediately after his Middle Eastern tour, Shevardnadze told the Vienna Conventional Arms Control talks on 6 March 1989 that disarmament in Europe had to be synchronized with a Middle East settlement because of the appearance of intermediate-range missiles in that region ("precisely the same class that is being eliminated in Europe").[13]

Concerned, apparently, about Israeli development of the Jericho II missile with a reported range of 900 miles, the Israeli launching in

1988 of a space satellite (followed by Ofek-1 and Ofek-2 in April 1990), with the Shavit three-stage booster rocket calculated to be capable of conversion to a two-stage ballistic missile with a range of over 1500 miles,[14] Saudi acquisition of the Chinese CSS-2 missile with a range of 1600 miles, Iraqi adjustment of the SCUD-B missile to a 560-mile range, and reports of Egyptian work (with Argentinian help) on a Condor II missile[15] and a Vector missile (each with a 500-600-mile range), the Soviets called for controls on the transfer of missiles and missile technology to the Third World. The United States was equally concerned and in the Baker-Shevardnadze talks in July 1989, the subject of Soviet adherence to the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was reportedly raised.[16] Possibly in response, the Soviets subsequently raised the matter, generally at least, in the U.N. First Committee in October 1989. In February 1990 they finally indicated their willingness to adhere to the export guidelines of MTCR during talks between the two foreign ministers in Moscow.[17] Similarly, progress had been made between the superpowers on the matter of chemical warfare as talks continued in Geneva on a chemical weapons ban. The missile proliferation accord, together with agreements on chemical weaponry and prevention of nuclear proliferation, were confirmed in a joint statement issued at the close of the 31 May-3 June 1990 summit in Washington.[18]

The optimistic atmosphere at the June 1990 summit generated the conviction that the major bilateral issues between the superpowers, including the START agreement and the accord on conventional weapons in Europe, would soon be completed, paving the way for concentration on regional issues. While the Middle East was unlikely to take precedence over Afghanistan and Cambodia, the Soviets did bring their ideas on Middle Eastern regional security directly to Washington and Israel, with a proposal to Washington that the matter be tackled at a regional security conference under U.N. auspices.[19]

There was no public Soviet (or American) reference to a Middle Eastern security conference at the time, but Shevardnadze brought somewhat new proposals to the United Nations at the end of the summer of 1990. Reflecting the progress made at the superpower level on arms controls and proliferation, as distinct from the gloomy

regional scene, his ideas, although not directly related to the Middle East as such, rendered arms control issues independent of political settlements. In a 14 August 1990 letter to the U.N. Secretary General, Shevardnadze called for restrictions on arms sales and supplies of conventional weapons as well as limitations on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[20] He advocated the principle of "reasonable defense sufficiency" (as adopted by the Soviets under "new thinking" for their own military policy) rather than the creation of an offensive capability and overarmament. He explained in his subsequent speech to the United Nations, that "no nation should have the exclusive prerogative or absolute freedom to determine its own level of armament...[there must be] an accommodation of reciprocal concerns and a balance of armaments at the lowest possible levels."[21]

The letter called for creation of an effective multilateral regime governing the nonproliferation of missiles and missile technology and a prohibition on the supply of certain types of conventional weapons considered to cause excessive or indiscriminate damage. Transparency was also called for, with an international registry of arms sales and supplies to be created at the United Nations and examination of arms sales to be conducted in the legislative bodies of the member states of the United Nations. Information was to be provided the United Nations on supplies of the main categories of weapons such as combat missiles, tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, warships, and the like. Another suggestion was the possibility of member states annually publishing information on the scale and country spread of export supplies of arms and military equipment, as well as aid provided for their production (including the upgrading or creating of facilities for military purposes, training, and other services of a military nature). Importing countries were also provide to information on the acquisition of weapons.

A standardized U.N. statistical reporting system for military expenditures was recommended which might also help determine the military potential of both arms-producing and arms-importing states. Accords were also to be elaborated with regard to re-export of arms and illegal arms so as to include measures which would strengthen national systems for monitoring the production and export of arms.

Reciprocal action between customs services and law enforcement services was seen as a potential part of this monitoring process. Measures connected with black markets and illegal circulation of weapons were particularly relevant for combatting terrorism and drugs as well.

Shevardnadze did make the connection between these proposals and regional conflicts by suggesting that "regional approaches to the restriction of international arms flows" be contemplated, with due consideration to "states' requirements for self-defense and also to the specific features of each region." Specific procedures for self-restriction and mutual restraint on the part of suppliers and/or recipients in regions of ongoing conflict would be components of political settlements. Restriction and/or a moratorium on supplies and purchases on a reciprocal basis would be part of a package of commitments for a political settlement. The principle of transparency, including the conclusion of corresponding agreements and the submission of necessary information to the U.N. Secretary General, would "bolster the quest" to settle regional conflicts. There might even be a mechanism created under the U.N. Secretary General for investigating instances of suspected violations of Security Council decisions or international accords in the realm of restrictions on arms supplies. In his speech to the United National General Assembly, Shevardnadze added that while the United Nations should play the primary role in this kind of investigation, the organization would need "effective support from regional security structures" which he hoped would emerge in the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere as they had in Europe.

The idea of an international register of arms sales and transfers at the United Nations had been proposed a year earlier by Moscow, as had some of the other, more general, suggestions described above.[22] Their reappearance now in the more concrete call for a Convention on the Restriction of International Arms Sales and Supplies, to be drafted at the Geneva disarmament talks and submitted to the next session of the U.N. General Assembly, was probably related to the growing debate within the Soviet Union over Moscow's arms deliveries—a debate which was greatly intensified by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Some thirty-eight percent of Soviet citizens polled just after the invasion considered the Soviet Union at least partially responsible for the Iraqi action because of the arms supplies. While the popular argument focused on this aspect, foreign policy specialists maintained that arms sales had not benefited the Soviet Union financially inasmuch as most Third World states were unable to meet their payments. Thus arms sales were characterized as having been one big foreign aid program, in addition to being morally and politically detrimental.[23] The demand was increasingly made for a Supreme Soviet debate on the issue, a proposal which appeared in Shevardnadze's letter to the United Nations.[24] Various Soviet officials such as Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskii, who had responsibility for arms issues, publicly and enthusiastically supported the idea.[25]

On the other side of the domestic debate were, obviously, persons from the military and military-industrial complex, fortified by party conservatives and Russian nationalist elements interested in maintaining Soviet status and positions around the world. One military respondent in the debate claimed that Soviet arms sales actually accounted for fifteen percent of hard currency earnings (Western estimates had been in the area of twenty percent) and, therefore, were necessary for the lagging Soviet economy.[26] Moreover, net gains from potential sales of weaponry no longer needed in Europe promised to provide a strong incentive for continuing the policy. For purely economic reasons, even supporters of *perestroika* argued that arms sales fell withing the domestic dictates of foreign and military policy. An article in *Argumenty i Fakty*, for example, saw a place for high-profit sales of sophisticated, hi-tech products, which might include ballistic missile technology.[27] When presenting his original proposals in 1989, Shevardnadze had claimed that the Soviet Union would not succumb to such temptations in the Middle East because "tensions in this region cost us dearly in all respects, including financial."[28] Although his meaning was not entirely clear, it was uncertain that he would have been able to implement this promise even had he remained in office.

With Shevardnadze's letter, essentially three categories of security proposals had been suggested by Moscow: Category I) those which would come from within the region, that is, the type of arrangements offered by Shevardnadze in Cairo; Category II) those which would come from outside the region, that is, from suppliers such as those proposed to the United Nations; and Category III) those which would necessitate both regional and international action, that is, nonproliferation and development accords to which regional actors as well as arms suppliers would adhere. These categories were not mutually exclusive, and the various Soviet proposals included combinations of the three. The possibility for implementation, however, had a great deal to do with the category involved.

A Soviet Foreign Ministry official, Vadim Udalov, made this amply clear in his statement that, ideally, the military balance in the region should be corrected in the direction of a coordinated reduction of military potentials to the level of defensive sufficiency, as urged by Shevardnadze.[29] However, as Udalov argued, such an approach was "practically impossible" without a "mechanism of stable dialogue between all the states" involved. And to create this, it would be necessary to overcome the problems associated with the continued military confrontation, that is, achieve a political settlement. This "vicious circle" could be broken, he claimed, by non-regional actors, specifically the USSR, the United States, and Europe, by limiting arms deliveries to the region to achieve a lower level of balanced forces. He added a number of more original proposals to this, however, such as military involvement of non-regional actors in a regional security system. Udalov suggested that such a system might be initiated by the integration of NATO into the United Nations for use as a regional substructure in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Allowing that Soviet and American military presence might possibly need to continue, Udalov proposed that this be subject to U.N. control with the purpose of eventually eliminating direct military presence of either superpower in favor of joint multinational U.N. forces, including naval forces.[30]

Udalov concluded that militarization of the region would continue as long as the primary reasons for the military buildup

persisted, but could be reduced to the minimum necessary for mutual deterrence. At the same time, the basic reasons for militarization (i.e., the Arab-Israeli conflict) might be "neutralized" by creating "sufficiently powerful incentives capable of uniting the states of the region in solving common vital problems." The suggestion concerned the promotion of interaction in such fields as economy, ecology, transportation, tourism, humanitarian relations, and so forth parallel to confidence-building measures in the military sphere and steps toward demilitarization of the region.[31]

In this last suggestion one can discern a link between the various security ideas raised by Shevardnadze and the possibility of a broader approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict through regional security and regional issues. The Gulf crisis increasingly highlighted the need for a regional security system, giving rise to consideration of a regional approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict as well. Indeed, there were numerous signs during the crisis that such ideas would be placed on the agenda. Primakov, who emerged as the key figure in Soviet Middle East policy, commented in November 1990 on the need to establish "a new security structure designed to stabilize the entire region, guaranteeing the safety of both Israel and its Arab neighbors."[32] At both the September 1990 summit and the late January 1991 foreign ministers' talks in Washington, the language employed in joint statements with the Americans referred to "regular" or "effective security structures" in the region.[33] No elucidation of these security structures was provided, however.

The Soviet plan for the post-war Gulf repeated in highly abbreviated form (at least as made public), the basic ideas of the Shevardnadze letter to the United Nations concerning proposals combining categories I and II above: arms limitations at the supplier source, reducing arms levels to defensive sufficiency, eliminating the supply of offensive weapons (including missiles and missile technology), and prevention of the spread of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction based on the adherence of the states in the region to nonproliferation agreements on nuclear and chemical weapons.[34] The possibility of a U.N.-administered navy for the Gulf was mentioned and the expansion of security arrangements in

the Gulf to include the whole Middle Eastern region advocated. Yet, demonstrating the more traditional approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the plan posited the creation of a regional security system on the successful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The only indication that arms limitations and regional security ideas might be viewed instrumentally was the suggestion at the end of the published version of the plan that the creation of a regional security system would be a process rather than a single treaty and its achievement would assure the safety of the countries in the region.

Speaking at the May 1991 U.N. conference on disarmament in Japan, Petrovskii, too, reiterated the main points of Shevardnadze's proposals to the United Nations. He added the two specific matters of a ban on the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and limitations on supplies of conventional weapons, as well as restrictions on weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and the like.[35] Petrovskii offered as a model the restrictions placed upon Iraq by Security Council Resolution 687, whereby everything associated with the country's nuclear activities, including storage of fissionable materials, was to be placed under strictest international (United Nations) control, with on-site inspection. The most significant point, however, was Petrovskii's emphasis upon the need for regional approaches with regard to all questions of disarmament and arms limitations. He called for a post-crisis security system in the Middle East based on the political contribution of resolution 687.[36] He defined this contribution as the stimulation of the "establishment of a legal, organizational, material, and technical basis for preventing ...conflict."

With this, Petrovskii brought Moscow's security proposals full circle back to Shevardnadze's first ideas of a regional crisis control center modeled on the newly initiated "conflict prevention center" of the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Further employing the CSCE example for regional security, he suggested confidence-building measures, beginning most likely in the non-military sphere and working up to security issues, as well as the possibility of combining regional disarmament measures with peacekeeping operations to provide assurances while reducing military tensions.

Thus the idea of applying the CSCE model to the Middle East as a process, instead of waiting for a political settlement of the conflict, was apparently under consideration. While such an idea might combine all categories of arms control and security measures (those originating with the suppliers, those originating in the region, and combinations of the two), it was suggested that a process be initiated which might "outflank" the conflict, as it were, by backing into a political solution from the regional approach. The "CSCE-type process" had already been suggested for Asia (in a *Pravda* article published in February 1991, with reference to Shevardnadze's proposals for the Asia-Pacific region); there were now those who proposed it for the Middle East.[37]

The two strongest champions of this approach in Moscow appeared to be elements of the Planning and Assessments staff in the Foreign Ministry and the team associated with Sergei Rogov, the well-connected, former Middle Eastern specialist in charge of military matters at the Institute of the USA and Canada. Rogov, who may have been involved in the preparation of the original proposals by Shevardnadze, brought the ideas to Israel and elaborated them in a much more detailed exposition in the course of exchanges with security specialists in Israel and, presumably, in Moscow. His team consisted of persons from his own institute: Lt. General (ret.) Mikhail Milshtain, Col. General (ret.) Georgii Mikhailov, Dmitrii Evstafiev,[38] and Tat'iana Karasova (of the Oriental Institute). The Rogov *et al.* proposals are the most carefully thought out and rigorously analyzed program presented thus far; for this reason they deserve detailed examination.[39]

In a paper prepared by the Rogov team for the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Global Security, the Gulf war is viewed as having focused regional attention sufficiently on the need for crisis prevention, de-escalation mechanisms, and security guarantees that it created, at least temporarily, mutual interest in some measure of arms control. The paper argued that, rather than seek an immediate political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, concentration should be placed on the prevention of tension and crises, confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), reduction of armed confrontation

and the arms race, and preparation of the political conditions for a peace settlement, with the last seen as one "basket" of the proposed security system. The building of a security system should, as in the European and Soviet-American cases, ease the way to a political accord, if one recognizes the political and not just technical meaning of this type of interaction between enemies. Arms control talks should, as Milshtain pointed out in a conference in Israel, be viewed as a process whereby, according to the team, drastic attitudinal change can occur with regard to generations-old political (and national, territorial, religious) conflicts. Thus the process might become self-sustaining (less dependent upon outside assistance), and eventually lead to a more substantial solution to the conflict.

Presumably in response to criticism raised when Rogov first introduced his ideas to his Israeli counterparts,[40] the paper prepared by the team noted the major differences between the circumstances in the Middle East as distinct from those which prevailed and enabled CSCE to succeed. These differences were identified as the absence of war over a forty-year period, the existence of recognized borders without territorial disputes, the absence of "military victory" as an option, the absence of peripheral or marginal conflicts which might impact on the major conflict, and the existence of a military balance for the whole region as distinct from the Middle Eastern problem of managing several balances of forces simultaneously. One might argue that some of the above distinctions, such as the existence of recognized borders and the absence of marginal conflicts, actually did not pertain in the European case significantly more than they do in the Middle East, but the Rogov team was wise to note basic differences which prevented what they called a "block" approach to Middle East discussions or an automatic duplication of the European security system as the framework for confidence-building and security in the region.

The purpose of a regional security system, according to the Rogov team, was seven-fold: prevention of proliferation and use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as missiles for their delivery; confidence-building measures and transparency to prevent surprise attack; reduction of military tension; containment of the arms race to limit possibility of large-scale military conflict; prevention of

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escalation of border clashes and regional conflicts; limitation of the impact of internal political conflicts on interstate relations; and, finally, creation of conditions for a political settlement. An eighth component of the future security system was designed to eliminate terrorism. These goals were to be achieved in stages through step-by-step procedures dealing with measures of various kinds, from the political-psychological to the purely military.

The first stage aimed at preparing the ground for negotiations on arms control and confidence-building measures and preparing incentives for the states in the region to participate in such negotiations. This stage would be dominated by external actors, notably the superpowers, and consist of the following: intensive and broad discussions (bilateral Soviet-U.S. as well as multilateral discussions, both under the aegis of the United Nations) of security measures and guarantees, CSBMs, and arms control; use of economic and political incentives to interest regional actors in arms control and security measures; initially, establishment of regulatory mechanisms for arms transfers to the region, particularly transfers of missile technology and nonconventional technology, on the part of the main arms suppliers, to be followed by the '"new exporters'" (China, Brazil, Argentina and others); creation of a monitoring system with access allowed to regional actors for certain types of information; creation of a United Nations Security Council multinational peacekeeping force; and finally, an international conference on security and arms control chaired by the Soviet Union and the United States.

The second stage would bring the regional actors into the process more directly in response to measures already initiated by the outside parties. Steps to be taken by the regional actors included: accords banning nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; limitations on the import of certain types of conventional weapons; disengage-ment zones and zones of limited military presence; regional structures for monitoring and verification; agreement on approaches to the reduction of armed forces; and offensive weapons ceilings.

In examining the various components of the eventual security and arms control system, the Rogov team made a number of concrete

proposals which went beyond or added detail to previous proposals. For example, with regard to limitations on arms transfers to the region, it was recommended that the CSCE states limit, and possibly completely ban, export to the Middle East of weapons withdrawn from active service under the conditions of the Paris Treaty. Verification procedures might be performed by a Center for Control of Arms Transfers using the methods, or actually becoming a part, of COCOM,[41] together with an international arms register. Following exporters' agreements, importers in the region would form a regional agency for arms transfer control to gather information and eventually acquire the right to verify this information. In addition, exporters would create procedures for notification of planned arms transfers, and agree to refrain from purchasing certain types of offensive weapons and adhere to purchase quotas or bans on re-export of other types of weapons. Eventually, controls over domestic weapons production should be introduced, including a ban or limitations on production of certain types of weapons. Outside states would be encouraged to ban licensed production of certain weapons (although weapons already in production were unlikely to be included).

Also recommended was the strengthening of various nonproliferation accords, meaning not only adherence by all exporter states to MTCR and of all regional states to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the forthcoming treaty banning chemical weapons, but also the use of sanctions against those regional states unwilling to abandon plans for operational nuclear capability. In addition, there would be agreement to refrain from purchases of new missiles beyond the range of 50 kilometers, except for MLRS-type systems and air defense systems (by implication the recommendation would include controls on upgrading of missiles as well). A regional coordinating body would supervise control and verification of these agreements.

Limitations on conventional weapons were deemed far more difficult, with little that outside powers could contribute beyond participation in a multinational supervisory force. In addition to the expansion of already existing demilitarized zones, new fully or partially demilitarized buffer zones might be created along borders and

demarcation lines, with only border guards or multinational troops permitted and tanks, heavy artillery, and missiles excluded. Other areas would be void or limited with regard to offensive weapons and/or troop movements. Restrictions would apply to airspace and certain types of aircraft as well, including limits on large-scale air exercises and a ceiling on the number of planes in flight.

A Center for Monitoring the Military Situation, with a multinational peacekeeping force made up of external forces, would supervise activities in the ground zones while a Center for Control of Airspace, also manned by outside powers, would supervise airspace. Both would cooperate with a Middle East Arms Control Agency. In a shift to a more defensive military posture, a second stage envisioned further reductions of armaments and troops (including paramilitary and reserve components) accompanied by the dismantling of armored formations. Anti-tank missiles and air defense would remain unrestricted. Reductions in conventional arms would be synchronized with reductions in nonconventional weapons, but ceilings would have to be determined by more sophisticated country-by-country calculations rather than Israeli-Arab parity. Saudi Arabia and Iraq would also have to be taken into account. In the second stage, the *regional* Arms Control Agency would assume the functions undertaken by outside powers.

The team linked CSBMs to transparency, which was designed first to prevent surprise attack and only later to serve to verify arms control agreements. A first step would be publication by the countries involved of data on military budgets and the size and structure of their armed forces, along with preliminary announcement of planned military activities or exercises. Information would also be provided by the outside powers with the aid of satellites and ground stations controlled by the United Nations. These measures could be supplemented by refraining from exercises near borders or disengagement lines or in the West Bank, with limitations on the timing and size of exercises, eliminating large-scale tank exercises. U.N. representatives could observe all exercises, replaced eventually by representatives of the countries in the region.

Until the creation of a regional Arms Control Agency, the Center for Monitoring Military Activities would serve also as an information bank. The Center would operate monitoring satellites and ground stations, conduct ground inspections, provide hot lines for direct communications between the sides, and take diplomatic steps to prevent crises. Eventually the states in the region would also take preventative steps against terrorism. Once CSBMs were more advanced, the countries of the region might agree on a definition of terrorism, a ban on support or aid (including training and refuge) to terrorists, extradition of terrorists, and the preparation of a regional convention on prevention of terrorism.

In conclusion, the team maintained that creation of a "positive security environment" in the region would provide some measure of civilized relations between Israel and the Arabs, thereby facilitating the commencement, finally, of political negotiations. At the same time, a security regime in the region would not only reduce tensions, but provide needed safeguards and guarantees essential to any political accord. Moreover, the beginning of an arms control and security process had the advantage of relying initially more on cooperation of outside powers, especially the Soviet Union and the United States, than on the parties to the conflict. Processes begun by outside powers could lead to regional interactions, with the attendant breaking down of psychological barriers and gradual relief from security concerns. An ambitious but staged approach promised, in the eyes of these Russian analysts, greater potential for settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict than the path previously pursued.

Although there is no available written evidence, other Russian analysts, including persons in the Soviet and now Russian Foreign Ministry, were very sympathetic to this view, as indicated to some degree by the Petrovskii and Udalov comments noted above. Those dealing with long-range planning in particular preferred to broaden Rogov's interest in CSCE, advocating that both a security system and a political settlement be treated as "baskets" in a complex of regional bilateral and multilateral talks dealing with still other "baskets." As in the case of the Helsinki talks, there could be "baskets" for human relations (including human rights and refugees), water resources,

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ecology, economics, energy, and so forth. This direction was indicated but not fully pursued at the multilateral Middle East talks which took place in Moscow at the beginning of 1992. Pessimistic about the chances for an early political settlement, their theory, similar to that of Rogov, was that contact and interchange on regional questions would gradually whittle away Israeli insecurities and Arab suspicions in a process that related to Israel as an integral part of the region. While both approaches relied heavily on state-to-state relations, the references to terrorism in Rogov's security proposals and to human relations in the Foreign Ministry ideas would, theoretically at least, provide for some kind of Palestinian participation. Moreover, regional issues such as water resources and economics would concern the occupied territories as well, necessitating consideration of the Palestinian issue and its eventual linkage with the political settlement as tradeoffs occurred between baskets in the ongoing negotiating process.[42]

It was just this linkage which accounted for the opposition of some Soviet experts to the regional approach, on the grounds that no regional arrangements were feasible in the absence of a political settlement. This was the view held not only, for example, by Middle Eastern specialists at the Oriental Institute,[43] but also by the most senior Soviet Foreign Ministry officials dealing with the region. For example, Bessmertnykh, unlike his predecessor, never made any mention of these ideas and ignored the subject altogether during his historic trip to the Middle East (including Israel) in May 1991. Thus there would appear to have been a serious dichotomy in the approaches of different departments of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the Middle East, which may have carried over into the Russian Foreign Ministry when the two virtually merged early in 1992.

Foreign Ministry reticence may have been based primarily on pragmatism rather than necessarily motivated by "old thinking" with regard to Soviet-U.S. relations or Soviet policy in the Middle East. Indeed, many who maintained an anti-American and anti-Israeli position even in the new era (continuing to perceive Soviet interests in a zero-sum and/or ideological fashion), had in the past and continued in the present to advocate at least nonconventional arms control in the

region (especially in the area of nuclear weapons and missiles) expressly to limit the Israeli nuclear potential. Such advocates of arms control tended to limit their evidence of the need for controls on nuclear and missile development in the Third World to programs in American- or Western-supported countries—mainly Israel—while chastising American arms sales.[44] Thus advocacy of arms control in the Middle East was not necessarily evidence of "new thinking." Indeed, conservatives (and not only conservatives) unhappy with Moscow's apparent subservience to Washington on Middle Eastern, if not other issues, may have seen in this approach the answer to their demands for "an independent line" in the region.

At the same time, for these elements (primarily in the military and military-industrial establishment), regional arms control proposals originating with the United States were considered suspect.[45] Moreover, there may have been a tendency among these elements to focus more on controls on nonconventional weapons so as to continue their policy of arms deliveries in the lucrative spheres of aircraft, armor, and noncontroversial air defense missile systems. This kind of opposition to the broader regional security approach was hinted at by a number of Soviet sources.[46]

The response to President Bush's Middle East arms proposals of May 1991 on the part of this type of opponent of the regional security approach was predictably negative. As in the past, some commentators scored Washington for "duplicity," that is, proposing limitations on arms deliveries to the region while at the same time increasing aid to Israel during Cheney's there.[47] Claiming Chinese and French support (but British concern) for its arms dealers, one commentary said that Bush had immediately introduced an exception to limits on arms exports allowing for the legal right of every state to self-defense. According to the Soviet radio, this exception would permit continued military aid to Israel.[48] That Moscow's proposals spoke of "defensive sufficiency" was ignored. On the whole, however, there was little response to Bush's proposals. *Pravda* refrained from criticism and eventually carried a positive commentary.[49] The Communist Party daily, which had actually become increasingly conservative over the preceding winter, allowed not only that the plan

had aroused an animated, but basically positive, response in the region and contained "a grain of sense." It reported that the Foreign Ministry "reacted with interest" to the U.S. arms initiative. The usually outspoken commentator Aleksandr Bovin, in the decidedly more "new thinking" *Izvestiia*, was much more forthcoming, focusing on the Bush proposals as an occasion to demand an accounting of and change in Soviet involvement in the arms trade.[50]

Moscow sent a Foreign Ministry disarmament delegation to the ensuing talks in Paris and described its deliberations as an "unprecedented event."[51] Both *Pravda* and TASS reported that at their meeting, the five permanent members of the Security Council agreed not to sell arms to areas where the arms might threaten regional stability and to exercise restraint regarding such exports.[52] Yet Soviet participation in the talks was not even mentioned, and earlier Soviet proposals were noted only in passing in one of the (skeptical) reports on Bush's speech leading up the Paris talks. Rather, Soviet reporting was scant and most restrained with regard to future prospects for arms control in the Middle East, quoting participants to the effect that this was just the beginning of "a long, complex, and delicate process" which would demand "a sober and pragmatic approach from all sides." Admittedly, little more attention was accorded the talks in Western or Middle Eastern capitals. However, in view of the general absence of Soviet references to their various proposals of the preceding year and Bessmertnykh's failure to raise them during his talks with leaders in the region, it appeared that in Shevardnadze's absence from power, the more innovative, CSCE-type approach did not find wide acceptance in Moscow. Apparently limited to less influential circles in the Foreign Ministry and academia, such an approach neither supplanted nor even supplemented the more traditional approach of directly seeking a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict after Shevardnadze's resignation.

Nonetheless, the existence of the proposals and even limited support for a CSCE-type approach to the Middle East could produce an alternate path for policy-makers in Moscow. The regional security proposals may well be resurrected, along with ideas for regional "baskets" as part of multilateral talks conducted within the framework

of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. The primary question of linkage, however, would still remain, that is, the possibility of dealing with regional issues independently of the achievement of a full and final Arab-Israeli settlement would remain problematic.

The response of regional players was not entirely clear. Israel's reaction to the various proposals of 1991, including those by President Bush, was relatively positive. Israeli Defense Minister Arens indicated that he would consider ending the flow of weapons to the region "a very positive step," saying that Israel faced increasing economic difficulties in keeping up the arms race.[53] Responding to Bush's proposals of 1991, Arens said that Israel had long before suggested convening a conference of suppliers and Middle Eastern recipients to discuss limitations on conventional weapons imports. He added that furthering the issue of arms control would, he believed, "add momentum to the peace process."[54] Speaking again only of conventional weapons, Arens said that an arms control agreement in the region was indispensable and urged cessation of exports to the region, as a political settlement seemed unlikely ("in view of the dictatorial regimes in the Arab countries," he explained).[55] In a speech in the United States just prior to a meeting with Shevardnadze in December 1990, Shamir, too, indicated that Israel was "ready to start a serious study of all these problems of disarmament, a nuclear-free zone and all the arrangements in order to limit and annihilate any possibility of the use of nonconventional arms in the area."[56]

Egypt had also indicated its interest in regional security, having proposed steps toward ridding the region of all weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and nuclear weapons.[57] Cairo claimed to have received Jordanian agreement to the idea of two separate regional conferences, one on chemical warfare and one on nuclear weapons, and hoped (prior to the Gulf crisis) to receive similar agreement from Syria and Iraq.[58] Following President Bush's initiative of May 1991, a Saudi paper published in London pointed out that the proposed measures would leave Israel with the nuclear bombs which it already possessed (allegedly 200), while the Arabs, who had none, would have to destroy their missiles and chemical stocks.[59] Unless Israel also had to destroy its bombs, it was unlikely, according to the

paper, that the Arabs would agree to any part of the deal. This view was shared by Egypt and Syria, both of which declared their rejection of the Bush proposals if Israel were permitted to retain its nuclear weapons.[60]

The Saudi article also said that Israel wanted to ban imports of conventional weapons while maintaining its own conventional arms industry. Presumably the author believed the Arabs' arms industries inferior to those of Israel. The article did say, however, that arms controls could proceed concurrently with or follow a political settlement, provided long-range missiles were dealt with first. Priority was also given to conventional weapons, reducing likely military dangers until a peace agreement paved the way for removing nonconventional weapons of all types. Nonetheless, the Saudi ambassador in Washington and the Syrians reportedly maintained that disarmament was impossible without a peace agreement first.[61]

Notwithstanding the matter of the order of dealing with conventional as distinct from nonconventional weapons, and objections to any Israeli nuclear advantage, the above comments suggest some support within the region at the time for at least parallel arms talks. Moreover, informal Israeli contacts with at least Jordan and possibly other states over the years with regard to energy and water issues suggested that discussion in connection with such "baskets" would not be out of the question. The Israeli Foreign Ministry issued a background briefing on water problems encouraging a regional approach to this question as part of the peace process.[62]

It was not a simple matter of procedures, however, for a CSCE-type approach would touch at the very heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict: Israel's security concerns and, therefore, reluctance to jeopardize its military position without a peace treaty; and Arab rejection of Israel as a legitimate member of the region, implicit in any talks of regional issues or arrangements, without resolution of the conflict. The same "chicken and egg" type of problem, however, had existed at the outset of CSCE, just as motivations in East-West talks had varied from state to state and period to period, along with the atmosphere surrounding those talks. Thus, in the eyes of some

Russian officials and analysts, the experience of CSCE could, and should, be applied to the Middle East.

NOTES

1. On past Soviet policies, interests, and motivation in the region, see Galia Golan, *Soviet Policies in the Middle East From World War Two to Gorbachev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

2. On tacit cooperation, see Galia Golan, "Soviet-American Cooperation in the Fertile Crescent," in Roger Kanet and Edward Kolodziej, eds., *The Cold War as Cooperation* (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 121-148; or George Breslauer, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1967-1972: Unalterable Antagonism or Collaborative Competition?," in A. George, ed., *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry*, (Boulder: Westview, 1983), pp. 65-103.

3. See Galia Golan, "The Soviet Union and Regional Conflict in the Middle East: The Arab-Israeli Conflict," in Harry Kreisler and Robert Price, eds., *The Superpowers and Regional Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming).

4. TASS, 23 February 1989.

5. *Pravda*, 13 December 1990.

6. *Jerusalem Post*, 23 September 1990.

7. TASS, 4 September 1990 (to the Asia-Pacific Region Conference); TASS, 14 August 1990 (letter to U.N. Secretary General); see also Shevardnadze's speech to United Nations General Assembly, TASS, 25 September 1990.

8. INTERFAX, 21 May 1991.

9. TASS, 23 February 1989 (speech in Cairo) and TASS, 19 February 1989 (press conference in Damascus, in which only the chemical and nuclear-free zone plus a "regional center for reducing the danger of war" were mentioned).

10. Moscow radio "Peace and Progress" in Arabic, 4 April 1990, commented that "Iraq's threat to use chemical weapons gives rise only to amazement in this situation," adding that "The way Saddam Hussein himself imagines bombing half of Israel without touching half of Jordan or Lebanon, not to mention the Palestinians, is very amusing...The threat to use these [chemical] weapons is inhuman and unethical." (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, 5 April 1990, pp. 28-29.)

11. *Izvestiia*, 29 April 1990, reporting on Shevardnadze's meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Sharaa during Assad's visit to Moscow.

12. TASS, 13 April and 4 April 1990.

13. Thomas Friedman, *New York Times*, in the *International Herald Tribune*, 25-26 March 1989.

14. See Joseph Nye, "Arms Control After the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 5, 1989, pp. 58-59; Potter and Stulberg, op. cit., p. 546; M. Mikhailov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, 19 June 1990("'Jericho,' 'Shavit,' and Others"). There are slightly varying figures for ranges on these and other missiles, depending upon the source. The Soviets themselves listed the rockets in Iraqi use, together with their ranges, in *Krasnaia zvezda*, 7 July 1990. A good Western source is Martin Navias, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World," Adelphi Papers 252, Summer 1990, p. 29.

15. This program was reportedly halted in part because of the MTCR, according to Janne Nolan, "The Global Arms Market After the Gulf War: Prospects for Control," *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1991, p. 127.

16. David Ottoway in *The Washington Post*, 5 July 1989 said the topic was to be raised. See also, Marc Palevitz, "Beyond Deterrence: What the U.S. Should Do About Ballistic Missiles in the Third World," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1990, pp. 49-58. The signatories of the accord were Canada, France, Britain, Italy, Japan, West Germany, and the United States, with Spain signing on in December 1989. MTCR

referred to exports of missiles with a range of over 300 kilometers (190 miles) and payloads of more than 500 kilograms. Nye has pointed to the flaws in MTCR, which is merely an export control understanding between a very limited number of nations with no international monitoring bodies or mechanisms. Further, even member states have applied export restrictions in a loose manner so as to maintain profitable commercial deals. (Nye, "Arms Control After the Cold War," pp. 59-60.) Similar problems were also pointed out in *Pravda*, 13 June 1991.

17. See *Krasnaia zvezda*, 1 October 1989; news briefing by then Soviet Foreign Ministry Information chief Gennadii Gerasimov, TASS, 20 October 1989; and Aleksandr Belonogov's statement "New Security Model and the United Nations" to the United Nations General Assembly First Committee, USSR Press Release, 17 October 1989; Barbara Starr, "Soviets Join MTCR," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 3 March 1990, p. 379; William Potter and Adam Stulberg, "The Soviet Union and the Spread of Ballistic Missiles," *Survival*, Vol. XXXII, No. 6, 1990, p. 549. According to Potter and Stulberg, at the April 1990 Baker-Shevardnadze meeting the Soviets expressed an interest in formally joining the MTCR accord, but have not done so as yet.

18. International Atomic Energy Agency, "Information Circular," 382, 4 July 1990, pp. 1-5.

19. Terasov spoke of the United Nations, and Shevardnadze later publicly spoke of such a conference for the Asia-Pacific region under U.N. auspices, but there were informal indications that the Soviet Foreign Minister would have been open to Soviet-American sponsorship in the Middle East as had been agreed to for proposed Israeli-Palestinian talks in Cairo. *Haaretz*, 27 July 1990 presented the regional security conference idea as American in origin, initiated at the Pentagon (in response to Egypt's proposals) and now supported by the State Department.

20. *Izvestiia*, 16 August 1990.

21. TASS, 25 September 1990.

22. Statement by Aleksandr Belonogov (then deputy head of the Soviet U.N. Delegation), to the United Nations General Assembly First Committee, 17 October 1989 entitled "New Security Model and the United Nations" (USSR Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Press Release). This statement had mentioned nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles and missile technology. The last, as implied by the context of the statement, responded to Israel's launching of a satellite.

23. Andrei Kolosov, described only as a political analyst, wrote in April 1990: "The claim that arms deliveries yield us enormous hardcurrency profits seems, at this juncture, nothing more than a myth. Of course individual transactions are profitable, but they have long been canceled out by all sorts of debts and gratuitous deliveries." ("Reappraisal of USSR Third World Policy," *International Affairs*, No. 4, 1990, p. 40.)

See also, Iurii Kornilov, *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 31 January 1990, or comments on statistics published in *Izvestiia*, 1 March 1990, or Andrei Kolosovsky (assistant deputy Foreign Minister and possibly the same person as the above Andrei Kolosov), "Risk Zones in the Third World," *International Affairs*, No. 8, 1989, pp. 44-45, and his even earlier "Regional Conflicts and Global Security," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniia*, No. 6, 1988, pp. 32-41; A.V. Kozyrev in *Izvestiia*, 21 February 1990; Georgii Arbatov, "The Country's Army or the Army's Country?" *Ogonëk*, No. 5, 1990; Petr Litavrin, "The Issue of Arms Trade Limitations," *SSHA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiia*, No. 1, 1989, pp. 13-20; or speaking of the 90 billion ruble (some Western estimates are as high as $130 billion) debt owed the Soviet Union, Evgenii Kiselev quoted Admiral Grishin, Deputy Minister for Foreign Economic Relations, to the effect that revelation of the debt owed the Soviets for arms deliveries would cause "another outburst of emotion among the public" and "an information bomb." (Moscow television, "120 Minutes," 7 August 1990.)

24. See, for example, Aleksandr Bovin, Moscow television, 2 July 1989 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, 5 July 1989, p. 16).

25. *Izvestiia*, 26 June 1990. Deputy Foreign Minister Belonogov, responsible for the Middle East, said later "our entire concept of military cooperation with the countries of the Middle East has to be revised and conclusions drawn" in light of the crisis. (Interview with Belonogov in *New Times*, No. 33, 1990, p. 6.)

26. Maj. Gen. G. Kirilenko in *Krasnaia zvezda*, 21 March 1990. Condemning "self-flagellation over our past," deputy head of the Africa Institute and Middle Eastern specialist Aleksei Vasiliev chastised some who were "wallowing in their newly acquired piety and calling the USSR's ... weapons sales 'immoral.'" (*Pravda*, 23 August 1990.)

27. V. Spandaryan, "Where Does the Currency Go?," *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 29, 1989, pp. 4-5 cited in Potter and Stulberg, op. cit.

28. TASS, 23 February 1989.

29. Vadim Udalov, "Interconnection between the Situation in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East," *Disarmo & Sviluppo*, November 1990, pp. 108-109. (Udalov worked in the section of the Soviet Foreign Ministry dealing with scientific coordination. He was speaking at the International Commission on Security and Disarmament Measures for the Mediterranean, sponsored by the Italian affiliate of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Municipality of Prato, 10-14 October 1990.)

30. Russian Republic Foreign Minister Kozyrev also proposed the creation of a permanent U.N. military force with superpower participation, a proposal which Shevardnadze supported under the aegis of the U.N. Military Staff Committee and under the authority of the Security Council. (Kozyrev in *Krasnaia zvezda*, 14 August 1990; Shevardnadze's speech to United Nations General Assembly, 25 September 1990, both obviously in response to the Gulf crisis.)

Rear Admiral (ret.) Aleksandr Astafiev also proposed that the Soviet Union and the United States withdraw their nuclear weapons carriers from the Mediterranean and then initiate the creation of a multinational navy under the United Nations flag. (*Disarmo &*

Sviluppo, "The Strategic Situation in the Mediterranean Area," November 1990, p. 17.)

A Soviet proposal for a U.N. naval force was presented in 1987 during the Iran-Iraq war, primarily as a move to oust the U.S. Navy from the Gulf. As pointed out by a Soviet diplomat, the Gulf states opposed the idea at the time both because they saw it as a way of undermining pressures on Iran to accept a cease-fire and because they did not in fact view a foreign naval presence in the Gulf as a threat to their independence but rather as international guarantees of the freedom of navigation. (Viktor Poliakov,"Options for the Persian Gulf," *International Affairs*, September 1989, pp. 126-130.)

31. Udalov, op. cit., pp. 109-110.

32. *New York Times*, 16 November 1990; interview in *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 7 November 1990.

33. *Pravda*, 10 September 1990 ("regular"); *Izvestiia*, 30 January 1991 ("effective").

34. *Izvestiia*, 19 March 1991. This was the plan presented to U.S. Secretary of State Baker during his talks in Moscow; it was also sent to the Arab states. Arab sources indicated that the plan also included some of the measures proposed by Shevardnadze before the crisis, such as demilitarized zones, limits on troop concentration, advance notice of military maneuvers and other confidence-building measures originating within the region (category I). (*Jerusalem Post* and *International Herald Tribune*, 11 March 1991.)

35. V. Petrovskii, "International Relations After the Cold War and Challenges to Multilateral Disarmament," Kyoto, May 1991 (unofficial translation). Allowing that this was a complicated matter politically as well as militarily, Petrovskii proposed a step-by-step process to produce an elaborate multilateral mechanism for controlling the production of fissionable materials and to organize monitoring and inspection for verification purposes.

36. Aside from the strict supervision of the United Nations, resolution 687 calls for inviolability of the international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, U.N. observers to monitor the demilitarized zone established on both sides of the border, reaffirmation of adherence to the 1925 convention banning chemical and biological warfare and the 1968 nuclear nonproliferation treaty, destruction of chemical and biological weapons plus ballistic missiles (all subject to U.N. on-site inspection and verification). The resolution defines these and other steps taken in Iraq as steps toward the establishment of the Middle East as a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and missiles and a global ban on chemical weapons. (US Information Service, reprinted in *Survival*, XXXII, No. 6, 1990, pp. 274-278.)

37. Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, *Pravda*, 23 February 1991. In the West, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal proposed a CSCE-type conference on the Mediterranean, and American specials have suggested the process also be applied to the Middle East. (John Marks and Peter Constable, "Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East," A Project of Search for Common Ground, Washington, D.C., 1991; Robert Freedman, "The Mideast Needs a Helsinki Process," *The Washington Jewish Week*, 14 March 1991.)

38. Evstafiev was one of those who criticized Moscow's policy of arms sales to the Third World in a biting article in *Komsomolskaia pravda*, 4 September 1990. Yet, in a position quite different from the one taken in the Rogov paper, Evstafiev recommended as a solution not only a different military export policy, but also Soviet military attention to a capability against a threat from the south, or, as he put it, "an army capable of operating in any region."

39. The proposals were originally presented by Rogov in a presentation at the Jaffee Center seminar, Tel Aviv University in December 1990.

40. In his talks in Israel in June 1990.

41. The Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls for East-West trade, an informal organizational of western countries created in 1950 to control exports to communist countries.

42. For similar western proposals, see Marks and Constable, "Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East."

43. Rogov's colleague at the Institute of the USA and Canada appeared to share this sentiment when he wrote in February 1991, for example, that "in view of the absence of a comprehensive Near East settlement, however, the idea of a nuclear-free zone cannot become the object of practical actions." (Valerii Davidov, "Will the 21st Century Be a Century of Nuclear Missile Pygmies?," *SSHA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiia*, No. 2, 1991, pp. 3-13.

44. See for example, *Pravda*, 19 December 1989, 18 March 1991; *Krasnaia zvezda*, 10 October 1990, 22 March 1991, 26 April 1991, 31 May 1991,and 19 June 1991 (the last by Mikhailov of the Rogov team); A. Prokhozhev, "A Vital Necessity," *Aziia i Afrika segodnia*, No. 3, 1990, pp. 2-3; Moscow Radio World Service in English, 14 May 1991 (commentary by Vladislav Koziakov, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, 17 May 1991, p. 23).

45. For example, *Krasnaia zvezda*, 26 April 1991, and the response to President Bush's May proposals, discussed below.

46. See Andrei Grachev (a reform-minded deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department), "A War for Peace," *New Times*, No. 17, 1991, p. 22; Davidov, op. cit.

47. Aleksandr Pogodin, Moscow radio world service in English, 5 and 9 June 1991 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, 10 June 1991, p. 12 and, 10 June 1991, p. 20).

48. Moscow radio world service in English, 8 July 1991 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, 11 July 1991, pp. 17-18).

49. *Pravda*, 30 May 1991 based on TASS. The full TASS report carried more details of the Middle Eastern proposals. The commentary appeared on 18 June 1991.

50. *Izvestiia*, 7 June 1991.

51. TASS, 11 July 1991.

52. *Pravda*, 11 July 1991.

53. *Jerusalem Post*, 17 September 1990.

54. *Kol Israel* in Hebrew, 1 June 1991.

55. Interview in *Die Welt*, 12 June 1991 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Near East and South Asia*, 14 June 1991, pp. 17-18). Government Press Office chief Yosef Olmert contradicted this view at a Press Office briefing in Jerusalem, saying, "you cannot separate arms control, in any way, from political processes." (*Mideast Mirror*, 13 June 1991, p. 14.)

56. *Jerusalem Post*, 13 December 1990.

57. See the Egyptian proposals presented in June 1990: *Report of the Secretary General*, "Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East," United Nations General Assembly, A/45/435, 10 October 1990.

58. Ze'ev Schiff, *Haaretz*, 27 July 1990.

59. Abd al-Jabbar Adwan, *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, London, 3 June 1991 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Near East and South Asia*, 14 June 1991, pp. 2-3.)

60. Saudi Defense Minister in Cairo and Egyptian Foreign Minister in Syria, *Mideast Mirror*, 10 June 1991, pp. 10-11. Israeli military analyst Ze'ev Schiff pointed out that Israel would retain its existing nuclear arsenal only temporarily, and as existing bombs became obsolete, an

agreement would eventually be signed to destroy what remained. (*Ha'aretz*, 5 July 1991.)

61. Ibid.

62. *Mideast Mirror*, 12 June 1991, pp. 10-11.