#256

Russian and American Think Tanks: An Initial Survey

Conference papers from a November 1993 workshop at the Kennan Institute

"Consulting on the Policy of Reform: A Workshop for New Russian Think Tanks," was held at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies and independent research institutes throughout Washington, D.C., during the week of 8–12 November 1993. The conference was cosponsored by the Kennan Institute; Interlegal Research Center, Moscow; Interlegal USA, Inc., New York; and the Samuel Rubin Foundation, New York; with funding provided by the Eurasia Foundation of Washington, D.C.

The Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies
The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

The Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies is a division of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Through its programs of fellowships, meetings, and publications, the Institute encourages scholarship on Russia and the former Soviet Union, embracing a broad range of fields in the social sciences and humanities. The Kennan Institute is supported by contributions from foundations, corporations, individuals, and the United States Government.

Kennan Institute Occasional Papers

The Kennan Institute makes Occasional Papers available to all those interested in Russian studies. Occasional Papers are submitted by Kennan Institute scholars and visiting speakers, particularly those who wish to receive timely feedback on their work. Copies of Occasional Papers and a list of papers currently available can be obtained free of charge by contacting:

Occasional Papers
Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies
370 L'Enfant Promenade, SW, Suite 704
Washington, D.C. 20024-2518
(202) 287-3400

This Occasional Paper has been produced with support provided by the Russian, Eurasian, and East European Research and Training Program of the U.S. Department of State (funded by the Soviet and East European Research and Training Act of 1983, or Title VIII). We are most grateful to this sponsor.

The views expressed in Kennan Institute Occasional Papers are those of the authors.

Edited by Peggy McInerny

RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN THINK TANKS:

AN INITIAL SURVEY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

I would like to thank the Kennan Institute, the Eurasia Foundation, Interlegal USA, and the Samuel Rubin Foundation for their support in realizing the workshop "Consulting on the Policy of Reform: A Workshop for New Russian Think Tanks." This workshop, which took place from 8–12 November 1993, allowed a group of Russian experts who direct independent research institutes in Moscow to learn about the political environment, practical activities, and research products of think tanks in the United States. The workshop provided us with numerous opportunities to discuss the issues of political culture that sustain U.S. think tanks with such American experts on these institutions as James Allen Smith of the Howard Gilman Foundation of New York and Kent Weaver of the Brookings Institution. It also permitted us to explore the way in which these organizations develop their research agendas, conduct fundraising, and manage their activities. The papers that follow were written for the first session of the workshop, a day-long meeting held at the Kennan Institute. Over the next four days, we visited nine different think tanks in the city, as well as the Russian Area Studies Program of Georgetown University, where I was currently teaching.

When I began to plan this workshop, I had four basic goals. These were: 1) to introduce independent Russian research institutions and their directors to their U.S. counterparts; 2) to examine the research products, research agendas, and institutional structures of U.S. think tanks; 3) to learn from the experience of the American think tanks by examining their social roots, the conditions that made their establishment and growth possible, issues of management, and the different models that permit these institutions to play a role in political decision making; and 4) to explore opportunities for possible cooperation between U.S. and Russian independent research institutions.

The introduction of Russian researchers and institutions to their counterparts in the United States took place at a highly professional level and proved very useful for the Russian participants. A detailed description of each of the participating Russian think tanks, together with the curriculae vitae of the directors and individual papers were disseminated to American colleagues in Washington-based institutions. We encountered sincere interest and appreciation of the information we had to share, as well as a willingness to sustain professional and personal contacts at every institution we visited. This was the first time many of the Russian think tanks and their directors were officially introduced to their analogues in the United States and our visits provided them an excellent introduction to the independent U.S. research community in Washington, D.C.

Undoubtedly, our most important achievement was to learn various skills, methods, and concepts from American think tanks—from the importance of an institution's governance structure, to the way in which research agendas are established, to the organization of peer review procedures for research products, to issues of fundraising and public relations. I will briefly sketch here each of the workshop sessions and highlight specific features that the Russian participants found of most interest.

At the Center for Strategic and International Studies we learned that CSIS does not have a large endowment and must raise funds every year—definitely the case for Russian institutions. In order to continue to raise funds, CSIS must present to potential funders well-organized projects that have a direct impact on practical decision making concerning domestic and foreign policy. Of special interest to the Russian participants was the practice of creating congressional research groups in which representatives of both parties consider leading issues in American politics. Such groups create "common ground" for bipartisan discussion and provide highly professional published recommendations that are often used by policymakers. Also of interest was the CSIS department of East European and Russian studies, which has several current projects in Russia and other CIS countries. For many of us, our visit to CSIS was the most memorable and perhaps the most productive of the workshop due to shared research interests and the applicability of the CSIS experience to most of the Russian institutions represented.

At the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University (Nitze School of Advanced International Studies), we learned a peculiarity of this particular type of think tank model: the researchers themselves are generally responsible for raising the funds for their individual research projects. At the American Enterprise Institute we participated in a discussion of different models of think tanks and the specific role played by conservative think tanks in the "political market" of U.S. social science. Our hosts there presented a comparative analysis of the activities of the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation. The Russian participants were extremely impressed by the wide variety of different strategies, tactics, and types of published materials that reach out to different audiences used by these institutions—from thick books to beautifully published annual reports, from modest newsletters to briefing papers for the press, to published articles to public events.

During a luncheon at the RAND Corporation, the Russian participants expressed a special interest in learning about the internal expertise of RAND in order to raise the quality of their research products to RAND standards. We were extremely lucky to have had Jeremy Azrael with us, who is responsible for RAND's initiative to develop analytical capabilities for the Russian government in Russia, and learned about the project firsthand. Our meeting with administrators and researchers of the United States Institute of Peace taught us something unique about its funding: the money given to the Institute by the U.S. Congress becomes independent the minute it is transferred into the Institute's account. This permits the Institute a great deal of freedom in designing its research projects, freeing it from the headaches of fundraising and tailoring research to fit the interests of sponsors. Not only did we learn from our colleagues at USIP, we had an opportunity to share our analysis of the October 1993 crisis in Russia from the different perspectives of our respective think tanks.

At the Brookings Institution we could not but note the importance of its history and the major stages of its development as one of the classic private think tanks in American society. In practical terms, we learned about publicity

matters and the way in which Brookings arranges support for its research among local communities of businessmen and politicians. One fascinating detail we learned was that a final research product is sometimes advertised before the product is ready in order to prepare its potential audience.

At the Progressive Policy Institute we had the privilege of speaking with its president, William Marshal, who presented the history, logic, and strategy of a think tank attached to and working for a certain political movement (Clinton's "new Democrats"), a movement that has succeeded in attracting part of the conservative electorate. As Russian think tanks are in many cases highly politicized and sometimes even work within certain political movements, the experience of the Progressive Policy Institute was extremely relevant and prompted a number of questions and an interesting discussion among the Russian researchers.

A meeting with professors and students of the Russian Area Studies Program at Georgetown University allowed us to recognize the tremendous advantages that a small, specialized think tank would enjoy in an established and prestigious university. Professors and students specializing in Russian studies were extremely interested in taking advantage of our knowledge concerning the 1993 election campaign and we organized a public debate about the political blocks participating in the campaign and their potential electoral appeal. The discussion was fascinating even to myself because on most points, the Russian participants had different attitudes, arguments, and even philosophies that represented the specific theoretical and political backgrounds of their institutions. For example, Anatoly Kovler and his institution (Center for Comparative Law, Institute of State and Law, Moscow) have been deeply involved in drafting the new constitution and he naturally defended the necessity of its adoption. Vyacheslav Igrunov and researchers of his Institute of Humanities and Political Studies recently joined the block of economist Grigorii Yavlinskii, who strongly opposed the adoption of the new constitution. Gleb Pavlovsky, leader of a non-parliamentary opposition movement, had strong arguments for boycotting the electoral campaign altogether. The discussion that followed served to clarify the positions of the participating think tanks within the Russian political spectrum.

At the Heritage Foundation, we had an opportunity to learn from its expertise in intensive and efficient use of the mass media, public relations, public lectures, and other social events that allow its researchers to deliver their message on policy issues to politicians, the mass media, other experts, and the general public. The Russian participants were impressed by the fact that for every researcher at Heritage, there are three to four support staff who package or repackage the researcher's product to make it available to the public and the media.

Overall, the workshop confirmed my impression that opportunities for cooperation between American and Russian researchers exist on two different levels: individual cooperation and institutional links. Although individual cooperation has occurred many times, institutional interaction requires a different level of understanding, mutual interest,

special conditions and special structures. There are potentially great opportunities for institutional cooperation between Russian and American think tanks, but at present, existing structures and programs do not promote it. One result of the workshop was the renewed commitment of the Russian participants to cooperate among themselves in an "intellectual corporation" initially formed in November–December 1992 as a way to network and unite intellectual resources in Russia. After attending all of the workshop sessions, we agreed to work to make the corporation a practical organizational structure for mutual support, public relations, and the marketing of research products produced by our respective think tanks.

Due to the stormy development of Russian politics, it is difficult to establish a strict boundary between political analysts and politicians today—many of the Russian participants in the workshop came from strong research backgrounds, but were on the edge of full-time involvement in political work in November 1993. It was thus sometimes difficult for them to specify when they were acting as researchers and when as politicians. Two participants, Vyacheslav Igrunov and Vladimir Lepëkhin, were subsequently elected to the State Duma and are now able to facilitate links between new think tanks and the new power structures of Russia. Another participant, Georgy Satarov, was later appointed advisor to the Russian president on parliamentary and public organizations matters.

In conclusion, I should note that the Russian researchers who participated in the workshop found that Russian and American think tanks had more in common than they had anticipated. Not only do these institutions share an interest in a number of relevant issues, we believe that Russian think tanks in the future will be able to provide useful insights and experience for their American colleagues. Institutional cooperation does not begin easily, but additional efforts in this field may be rewarding in the future. Interlegal has promised the Russian workshop participants to continue to develop an "intellectual corporation" as a mutual support structure that will eventually include organizations from outside of Moscow and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Nina Belyaeva

CONSULTING ON THE POLICY OF REFORM: A WORKSHOP FOR NEW RUSSIAN THINK TANKS

NOVEMBER 8–12, 1993

Cosponsored by the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies; Interlegal Research Center, Moscow; Interlegal USA, Inc., New York; and the Samuel Rubin Foundation, New York; with funding provided by the Eurasia Foundation, Washington, D.C.

Monday, 8 November 1993

Workshop Session I.
The Regent's Room, third floor, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20560.

Panel I.

Introductory Remarks: **Blair A. Ruble,** Director, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies.

Moderator: **Nina Belyaeva,** President, Interlegal Research Center, Moscow; Adjunct Professor, Russian Area Studies Program, Georgetown University; and Adjunct Professor, Department of Russian and East European Studies, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

"Think Tanks in American Political Culture," **James Allen Smith,** Executive Director, The Howard Gilman Foundation, New York; author, *The Idea Brokers*; and author, institutional histories of The Brookings Institution and The Center for Strategic and International Studies. Commentator: **Brad Roberts,** Editor, *The Washington Quarterly.*

Panel II.

Moderator: **James Allen Smith,** Executive Director, The Howard Gilman Foundation, New York.

Dr. Smith led participants in a discussion of the structure and function of American independent research institutes, touching upon the following issues:

- Funding/Government Contracts
- Communication with the Policy-making Elite (Domestic and Foreign Policy)
- Issues of Governance: Legal Status of the Independent Think Tank; Structure of the Governing Board; Protection of Institutional Autonomy
- Research Networks: Internal and External.

Panel III.

Moderator: **Blair A. Ruble,** Director, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies.

"Interlegal Research Center and the Role of Emerging Think Tanks in Policy Consulting in Russia," **Nina Belyaeva,** President, Interlegal Research Center, Moscow; Adjunct Professor, Russian Area Studies Program, Georgetown University; and Adjunct Professor, Department of Russian and East European Studies, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

"INDEM Center and the Analysis of Political Consciousness and Parliamentarism in Russia," **Georgy Satarov,** Head, INDEM (INformatics for DEMocracy) Center for Applied Political Studies, Moscow; Director-General, Russian Socio-Political Center, Moscow; and Member, Presidental Council of the Russian Federation.

"PostFactum News Ageny, the Mass Media, and the Development of Political Pluralism in Russia Today," **Gleb Pavlovksy,** Editor-in-Chief, *20th Century and the World,* Moscow; Co-Director, Analytical Center "20th Century and the World;" and Senior Adviser (former President), PostFactum News Agency, Moscow.

"The Russian Institute and Monitoring the Formation of New Russian Business Elites," **Vladimir Lepëkhin,** Director, Russian Institute, Moscow; Coordinator, Russian Association of Political Experts and Advisors; and Member of the Board, "Institute of Development" Foundation, Moscow.

"The Institute of Humanities and Political Studies and the Study of Political Life in the Russian Provinces," **Vyacheslav Igrunov,** Director, Institute of Humanitarian-Political Studies, Moscow; Head, Information Department, Russian Federation Committee on National Policy;

and Contributor, *20th Century and the World.*

"The Russian Academy of Sciences and Independent Social Science Research in Russia Today," **Anatoly Kovler**, Senior Researcher, Interlegal Research Center, Moscow; Director, Center for Comparative Law, Institute of State and Law, Russian Academy of Sciences; and Head, Political Parties and Political Marketing Desk, Russian Academy of Management, Administration of the President of the Russian Federation.

Tuesday, 9 November 1993

Workshop Session II.
Meeting and luncheon with researchers and administrators of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

CSIS
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 887-0200

Host: Richard Murphy, Director of Public Relations.

Workshop Session III.
Meeting with researchers and administrators of the Foreign Policy Institute, Johns Hopkins University.

Foreign Policy Institute
Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies
The Johns Hopkins University
1619 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 663-5773

Host: Charles Fairbanks, Research Professor of International Relations.

Wednesday, 10 November 1993

Workshop Session IV.
Meeting with researchers and administrators of the American Enterprise Institute.

American Enterprise Institute
1150 Seventeenth St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 862-5800

Host: Thomas Skladony, Director of Communications.

Workshop Session V.
Luncheon at the RAND Corporation.

RAND Corporation
2100 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 296-5000

Host: Scott Harris, Senior Policy Analyst.

Workshop Session VI.
Meeting with administrators and researchers of the United States Institute for Peace.

United States Institute of Peace
1550 M Street, N.W.
Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20005-1708
(202) 457-1700

Host: Patricia Carley, Program Officer.

Thursday, 11 November 1993

Workshop Session VII.
Meeting with researchers and adminstrators of The Brookings Institution.

The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 797-6000

Host: Drew Portocarrero, Brookings Council Manager.

Workshop Session VIII.
Meeting with the President of the Progressive Policy Institute.

Progressive Policy Institute
316 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E.
Suite 555
Washington, D.C. 20003
(202) 547-0001

Host: Will Marshall, President.

Workshop Session IX.
Meeting with professors and students of the Russian Area Studies Program (RASP) of Georgetown University.

Russian Area Studies Program
232 Intercultural Center (ICC) Building
Georgetown University
37th & O Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20057
(202) 687-6080

Host: Harley Balzer, Director, RASP.

Friday, 12 November 1993

Workshop Session X.
Meeting and luncheon with researchers and administrators of the Heritage Foundation.

Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
(202) 546-4400

Host: Ariel Cohen, Salvatori Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies.

Workshop Session XI.
Press briefing, Regent's Room, third floor, Woodrow Wilson Center.

Regent's Room, Third Floor
Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars
1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W
Washington, D.C. 20560
(202) 357-2429/ Woodrow Wilson Center
(202) 287-3499/Kennan Institute

Host: Blair A. Ruble, Director, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies.

THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN THINK TANKS

by James Allen Smith

The term "think tank" is a curious phrase. The images that it conjures up in the popular mind are ambiguous. Some people imagine think tanks as ethereal retreats, isolated and insulated from the real world, places where theorists dreamily contemplate the future. Others envision think tanks as practical institutions where high-powered intellects are hard at work devising solutions to the tough problems that politicians and government bureaucrats are loathe to confront. Still others see them simply as comfortable intellectual abodes, a secluded rural estate or tony urban townhouse where erstwhile politicians and former policy advisers bide their time after they and their parties have been voted out of office. And some simply see contemporary think tanks as noisy, self-promoting organizations that are constantly trying to push ideas from the margins of intellectual life into the mainstream of political discourse. Those are the most widely held views, and each is not without a kernel of reality.

It is not at all surprising that "think tank," a generic and colloquial term that has evolved over the past half century, has many layers of ambiguity for Americans. When appropriated by other languages and other political cultures, its meanings become even more ambiguous. The term—and the kinds of American institutions it describes—defies easy definition.

"Think tank" was first employed by Americans as military jargon during World War II, when it was used to refer to a secure room where military officers could plan and discuss strategy; such a room in the Pentagon in the 1940s apparently looked like an empty swimming pool and people descended into the "tank." On the eve of the Cold War, newly created nongovernmental research organizations such as the RAND Corporation began to work on military research and development contracts. They were the first private research institutions to be described as think tanks. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, especially with the arrival of the RAND "whiz kids" in Washington, D.C., during the administration of President John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson's subsequent reliance on outside experts for creating domestic social programs, the term was soon applied to all nongovernmental organizations that supplied research expertise to the federal government. More recently, after the conservative counterrevolution of the 1970s and 1980s gave birth to a new breed of ideologically aggressive research and advocacy centers, the term "think tank" began to alternate with newly coined and rather infelicitous phrases such as "advocacy tank" and "do tank."

The term will always remain imprecise. It is a colloquialism, and it tries to describe a malleable set of institutions. "Think tank" lumps together very different types of organizations. The term encompasses staid, academically-oriented think tanks where distinguished scholars write books which may some day shape the way policymakers think about a problem—the Brookings Institution is the prototype of such an organization. It also refers to contract research organizations that are hired to take on research projects for the Energy Department, the Defense Department, the Agency for International Development, or

other governmental agencies—the RAND Corporation and the Urban Institute are among the best known in this category. The term also embraces organizations that tend to work on more urgent issues, setting up academic study groups, task forces, and prestigious commissions, and issuing reports and recommendations for direct consumption in the White House or the Capitol—the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) operates in this mode. The name "think tank" is also applied to organizations that adopt a strongly ideological approach; while engaged in research, writing, and publishing, their overt aim is political advocacy and argumentation—in this category, the Heritage Foundation is the best known on the right and the Institute for Policy Studies is the best known on the left. In Washington, D.C., the label "think tank" can easily be affixed to more than 100 institutions; across the country, there are, by my best estimate, some 1,200.

Although many new think tanks have been established in the United States in the last twenty-five years (approximately two-thirds of Washington's policy research organizations have been founded since 1970), private efforts to organize expertise reflect aspects of American political culture that are much more deeply rooted. Indeed, the history of political experts and advisers in the United States is a much longer story than the modern term "think tank" would suggest.

Despite the underlying anti-intellectualism that has perennially characterized political life in the United States, intellectuals have been drawn into politics since the earliest days of the American republic. While our egalitarian sentiments have cherished the practical insights of the common citizen and scorned the expert and intellectual, politics and governance were nonetheless treated as matters of science by the Founders and their intellectual heirs. Among thoughtful Americans, a science of society has always held out the promise of tempering democratic discord and uncertainty.

This persistent search for a social science gained momentum in the second half of the nineteenth century. In those decades the transformation of an insular, agrarian society into an urban, industrial nation gave a sense of urgency to the study of social, political, and economic problems. By the early years of the twentieth century a new pragmatic approach to the study of society had taken shape. The emerging social science yielded new professional associations of economists and political scientists, university departments devoted to post-graduate training and research, journals dedicated to socially relevant research and practical reform, and national organizations examining a wide range of social and economic issues. In the early years of this century, academic specialists trained in the increasingly distinct disciplines of economics, political science, and sociology were routinely appointed to various governmental advisory commissions.

The earliest American think tanks—the Russell Sage Foundation in New York (founded in 1906), the research and training institutes (1916 and after) that coalesced to form the Brookings Institution in Washington, the Twentieth Century Fund (1919), the National Bureau of Economic Research in New York (1919), and dozens of research bureaus examining urban and state policy concerns—were born within this

context. These institutions represented a new effort to make professional social science research available to elected and appointed officials as well as to the broader public. Their approach was pragmatic, preferring fact-gathering over theorizing, and driven by the search for solutions to immediate problems.

To understand how and why Americans have used private institutions to organize knowledge to serve public ends, it is important to underscore several distinctive aspects of this nation's political and intellectual life. American think tanks emerged in a very specific institutional context and, at different moments, have been shaped by discrete historical circumstances. Any general lessons to be drawn about this set of institutions must be moderated by an understanding of the particular political and cultural context in which they have operated. Even the nation which has most closely shared the American democratic experience, namely Great Britain, has not created as robust a universe of independent research institutions; nor have other western democracies. What particular traits of the American political system have caused these institutions to emerge in such large numbers?

The long-enduring constitutional framework of the United States provides the starting point for any analysis of the working environment of American think tanks. Put simply, the United States is not a parliamentary democracy. The separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches of government creates a tension in the policy-making process that has consistently driven both branches to seek expert advice. The Brookings Institution, the prototypical Washington-based think tank, was conceived in the 1910s primarily to help the president and his executive agencies gain a better understanding of budgeting and accounting methods and modern administrative procedures. Concerned about the weakness of the presidency, the founders of Brookings sought to wrest control of the budget-making process from congressional committees and to bring scientific management techniques from business corporations into public agencies.

Other major think tanks, such as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), founded in the 1940s, and the Heritage Foundation, established in the 1970s, were created with a commitment to helping legislators and their then relatively small staffs. The founders of both AEI and Heritage felt that intellectual analysis and research were abundantly available to the executive and that there was an imbalance in the intellectual contest between the branches. They provided briefing papers and legislative analyses to like-minded congressmen and their staffs.

Since early in the twentieth century, think tanks have prodded each branch of government to set up their own research and analytic departments. At times, think tanks have also worked between the executive and legislative branches, easing the flow of information between the two and initiating mechanisms for the two branches to discuss emerging issues and coordinate policy responses. The Center for Strategic and International Studies has specialized in these sorts of activities. CSIS has even found that, despite the expansion of government in recent decades, an increasingly fragmented committee and subcommittee structure in Congress and a balkanized executive branch bureaucracy have provided new

opportunities to create channels for the flow of information and to establish new arenas for interagency and interbranch policy discussions.

Competition between the branches of government has driven a parallel competition among think tanks. However, the traditional American disdain for governmental bureaucracies and the suspicion of intellectuals has tended to keep experts on the margins of government—working in privately funded institutions—throughout much of the nation's history. Compared to Germany, France, and Great Britain, the United States was slow to develop a civil service. Until the post-war era, it remained reluctant to create governmental research institutes or to support analytic work within government departments. Although excellent work is now done by the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of Management and Budget, and elsewhere, there remains a lingering suspicion of research emanating from the government. Consequently, over the years a number of nongovernmental think tanks have earned reputations for independent judgment and scholarly soundness that give their reports and recommendations great credibility in policy discussions. Their reports are cited by policymakers; journalists turn to them for commentary and analysis; and their best publications often find their way into the college classroom as student textbooks.

The belated development of a civil service tradition and the preference for relying on political appointees for jobs that in other countries would most probably have remained in the hands of permanent civil servants have opened the door (sometimes seen as a revolving door) for people working outside government. The absence of a permanent administrative class on the British or continental model has thus resulted in a very porous political system and more fluid career patterns for individuals engaged in research and analysis. Consequently, research organizations that function on the periphery of government play a far more significant role in the United States than in other nations, with policy experts typically entering and leaving government posts quite frequently.

American think tanks depend to a high degree on the fluidity of career patterns and the eagerness with which American academics and intellectuals often move from one institution to another. The routine flow of people into and out of government is only one feature of that flexibility. Equally important is the relative openness of hiring process in American universities, especially when compared to the European or Japanese systems. Business and government consulting contracts also add a lubricating element to the career flow among different institutions.

Throughout much of the twentieth century American think tanks have had another advantage, one that is a consequence of the nation's rather peculiar two-party system. At the national level, American parties have tended to be electoral coalitions rather than organizations with a distinctive ideological identity and coherent governing programs. Only very recently, with the formation of the Democratic Leadership Council and, in 1989, the Progressive Policy Institute, for example, have American parties or factions within parties established their own research organizations with close partisan affiliations. More typically, candi-

dates and factions within parties have turned to individual researchers in think tanks or to university scholars for *ad hoc* advice during electoral campaigns and presidential transitions. At election time, policy proposals must be formulated and revised hastily; for the electoral victors, staff recruitment and the initiation of policy changes must proceed at a frantic pace. Because of the nature of our two-party system, the American electoral process is remarkably open to the participation of individuals working outside government and within the community of think tanks and universities.

The Constitution of the United States, the traditions of civil service and political appointments, and the nature of the American party system define the terrain within which think tanks operate. However, it is the deeply ingrained philanthropic habits of the American people, embodied in private foundations, individual donations and bequests, and corporate philanthropic contributions, that allow think tanks to move and operate on that political landscape. Large-scale foundation giving began in the first decades of this century and helped to define the shape and function of independent policy research institutions.

Foundations that were created from the fortunes of industrialists like John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie, or the Wall Street financier Russell Sage, were managed by professional philanthropists who sought to understand the root causes of social and economic problems. As a result, they devoted the bulk of their resources not to traditional charitable activities, but rather to professional training, graduate education, basic and applied research, and the creation of research institutes. While some of the nation's most venerable think tanks owe their beginnings to the generosity of the early foundations, the latter made their most lasting contribution by creating an infrastructure for training researchers at the graduate level and supporting the basic research that must proceed any practical policy application.

Foundations also proved to be important in supporting specific projects that demonstrated over the long term the value of data collection and analytic research for policymakers. The economic data collected by the National Bureau of Economic Research in the 1920s, for example, pointed the way for the larger-scale, more permanent efforts to monitor the economy initiated by the Department of Commerce in the 1930s. More recently, the budget analyses undertaken by the Brookings Institution—published annually since 1971—demonstrated the value of rigorous economic analysis to Congress. By 1974 Congress had been inspired to create its own analytic department, the Congressional Budget Office.

It is the diversity of financial support—from more than 30,000 foundations in the United States, to countless individual donors, to hundreds of corporations, to government grants and contracts—that supplies a framework for the relative intellectual independence of the nation's policy research institutions. Although constantly seeking funds for salaries and research projects and occasionally susceptible to pressure from funders, American think tanks can rely on a variety of financial arrangements. With a philanthropic sector so fully developed, they can maintain a high degree of intellectual and political autonomy by maintaining diverse funding

sources and never letting one funder become too dominant.

These are some of the most obvious elements that have shaped the external political and intellectual environment in which American think tanks operate. Anyone who tries to transplant this institutional form to another climate should be aware of the ingredients that have nurtured it in the United States. Transplantation should thus proceed cautiously. Even in a nation that has grown accustomed to relying on privately organized centers of policy expertise, these institutions are fragile. Very few have accumulated financial endowments and, consequently, they are constantly under pressure to raise money (one prominent Washington think tank raises ninety percent of its twelve-million-dollar annual budget during the course of each fiscal year). Relatively few offer the job security and career continuity of major universities. Staff members must be continually recruited and research agendas periodically revised in order to reflect the emergence of new policy problems and to continue to attract financial resources from foundations. Most importantly, reputations must be carefully cultivated and protected if a think tank is to remain influential and respected.

These mundane concerns compel us to examine the inner culture of think tanks. A culture is, in essence, an accumulation of habits. Accordingly, we must look at the institutional habits and practices that allow think tanks to survive over the long term, to perform sound analytic work consistently, and to earn reputations that will serve their long-term interests.

Several factors define the internal culture of a think tank, among them the governance structure, procedures for setting a research agenda, the definition of its audience(s), and financial arrangements. Although these may seem tedious and irrelevant topics at a time when some societies are engaged in sweeping transitions toward democracy, they cannot be dismissed as merely administrative or managerial matters. These are the issues that determine whether a think tank will succeed or fail over the long run. They are fundamental to the construction and continuation of civil societies, and they will be essential if think tanks in emerging democracies are to interact with long-established think tanks, foundations, and other nongovernmental organizations in the west. I offer these thoughts and reflections not as a historian engaged in research on these institutions, but as a practical administrator who worked for six years as a program director in one think tank and who now serves as the executive director of a foundation.

There are refreshing elements of spontaneity and fluidity in the habit of free association that traditionally gives birth to nongovernmental organizations. Yet formal governance structures should not be neglected. They are every bit as important to nonprofit institutions as constitutions are to democratic states. What does the term "governance" mean when we speak of nongovernmental organizations? In the broadest sense, governance is about the source of ultimate authority in an institution; governance in a think tank, foundation, or other nonprofit institution concerns the role and responsibilities of a board of trustees.

The legal responsibilities of a nonprofit corporation's trustees are well-defined in the United States. Presumably, those respon-

sibilities will also eventually be set out in statutes concerning the charitable sector in the law of Russia and other emerging democratic states. It is the practical role of trustees that deserves comment here. Trustees play an important complementary function to that of the academic researchers, policy analysts, and writers who inhabit a think tank and carry on its day-to-day work. They have a perspective on practical and political matters that can be very helpful when research projects and strategies for disseminating reports and studies are being devised. An astutely chosen board can help a think tank build bridges to the governmental and business worlds and strengthen relationships with universities and the media. Board members are expected to take part in an institution's fundraising and can serve as a buffer against external political or public pressures.

Trusteeship is a concept that is fundamental to a well-functioning nongovernmental sector. While the founders of think tanks are typically entrepreneurial and independent by temperament, and no doubt reluctant to share decision-making authority with others, they should not overlook the longer-term institutional viability of their enterprise. Trustees are responsible not only for preserving financial resources, but possess a moral obligation as well; their duty is to sustain and renew the vision of an institution's founders. A competent body of trustees assures the continuity of the institution and the credibility of its work.

A think tank's research agenda defines its purpose, its role in the policy-making process, and, ultimately, its reputation. How that agenda is shaped and focused determines a great deal about the research staff it will employ, how that staff will be organized, and what its morale will be. There are at least four general models for organizing research. First, think tanks can operate much like universities where researchers, for the most part, define their own research and writing tasks. They confer with their scholarly colleagues and departmental directors, while the think tank's top managers and trustees are expected to give general assent (and help raise research funds) for the project. Except in rare circumstances, however, the research agenda is set from below by the researchers themselves. Such institutions generally have rigorous standards for reviewing and publishing manuscripts; projects may go on for years, and the ultimate product will be a book. Inevitably, these institutions look ahead at policy developments that are three to five years over the horizon.

Second, think tanks can function as research clearinghouses. Research staff rely on basic research conducted in universities or other think tanks in order to write short reports and briefing papers or edit publications aimed at specific policy audiences. Such institutions are interpreters and translators of academic research, often filtering it through ideological or partisan lenses. They seek to add their voices to the most current legislative or executive branch policy debates. In these sorts of think tanks, it is primarily administrators who define the research agenda, assigning teams of young researchers to projects that may last a few weeks or months. Their perspective is shorter, the pace of writing and publishing more hurried. These institutions succeed only when there is a clearly understood and routine process of

internal consultation for setting the agenda.

Third, a number of think tanks work primarily as contract research firms. Managers and senior research staff members confer with government agencies or private business firms and compete for contracts. The research agenda is set through a process of external negotiation and, ultimately, by success in a bidding process. The research findings and reports usually become the property of the agency or firm that pays for them. Research staff members move from project to project with little time to devote to their own writing. In these institutions, researchers must understand the nature of contract research and serving the client. Managers, in contrast, must do what they can to give researchers a modicum of flexibility, perhaps ten percent of their working hours, for research and writing that they can treat as their own.

Fourth, a handful of think tanks find that they can have a dramatic influence on the policy process, albeit less through their research and publications than through the conversations they spark. These organizations assemble discussion groups that bridge diverse constituencies with the intent of working toward a consensus on practical policy recommendations. They bring together influential policymakers, business leaders, and academic specialists. The agenda in these sorts of institutions is set at the very highest level of the administration. Staff members work to organize meetings and policy briefing sessions, seeing their role as one of educating leaders about the intricacies of a given issue. Their publications are typically in the form of commission reports, edited conference proceedings, and newspaper opinion pieces. It is equally important in these institutions that the staff understand how the agenda is being set and be regularly involved in a consultative process, yet also have opportunities to write and publish under their own name and not serve solely as anonymous draftsmen for collective reports.

While think tanks may look very much alike from the outside, the internal mechanisms that set research agendas and define publishing programs determine the daily work routine of an individual think tank. Those that operate shrewdly and effectively within the policy process are very cognizant of the audiences they intend to reach and of the best means for communicating to those audiences. Books and published reports are important intellectual artifacts, bestowing academic credibility and authority on a think tank and its individual staff members; however, they are not necessarily the most effective tools for reaching policymakers or the public.

Since the 1970s some think tanks have engaged in aggressive efforts to use the print and broadcast media. The most successful see their research staff publish as many as two or three hundred newspaper opinion pieces each year and appear countless times on television interview programs. While such efforts add to the visibility and luster of a think tank, they are largely ephemeral and do not necessarily make significant contributions to the nation's understanding of contemporary affairs.

The lessons that the most successful think tanks have learned about communicating with their audiences are simple. Know what information a specific audience needs and be aware of the best timing for its delivery. Use as

many publishing and broadcast vehicles to carry a message as you can. Set up a series of face-to-face interactions with policymakers and the public, and do so long before a published study or report appears. Policy-making emerges from conversation and debate, and think tanks must operate in both an oral and written culture.

Money is the final topic of this essay, although it is inevitably the first and most worrisome subject for those who preside over think tanks. Where is it going to come from? How much can we get? What strings, if any, are likely to be attached? The most important lesson that can be drawn from those think tanks that have survived for twenty or thirty years and longer is that support must be drawn from a wide variety of sources. A combination of foundation grants, corporate contributions, individual donations, contracts, and fees for publications or other services gives an institution both a higher degree of intellectual autonomy and a better chance of adapting to changing patterns of financial support.

The mix of funding sources is always likely to change over time. The largest American foundations, for example, supported policy research lavishly in the 1950s and 1960s, but began to curtail their funding in the 1970s, especially after their endowments began to decline in value in 1973. Government contracts were relatively generous from the late 1960s through the 1970s, but they began to dry up, at least for domestic social research, in the 1980s after the election of Ronald Reagan. A number of corporations and corporate foundations were eager to support think tanks from the mid-1970s through the early 1980s, but their fascination with policy research waned. There is no sure formula for financial success, but the survivors (and even the most distinguished think tanks have been through perilously hard fiscal times at some point in their histories) have managed to diversify their sources of funding and expect to see the mix of foundation, corporate, and government money shift from decade to decade.

Whether the institution of the think tank can be transported into another political culture, especially an emerging democracy, will remain an open question for many years to come. In the United States, it took decades for them to evolve into their now recognizable forms. Their forms and functions are a result of conditions peculiar to this nation's political institutions and the organization of its intellectual life. Other democratic nations have found different ways to organize applied policy research, and they have certainly discovered more efficient ways to educate, inform, and advise politicians and policymakers.

Observing Washington's think tanks with a historian's detachment and a New Yorker's remove from the clamoring boasts about how one or another think tank may have influenced this piece of legislation or that presidential decision, we can ask what think tanks do, for good or ill, in our national life. Since the turn of the century, clearly, they have prodded government to do more research, to support more research, and to take economic and other social science analysis more seriously. Research may not be decisive in the formation of policy, but it has become an important part of the debate.

The language of policy discussion and the standards of evidence and argumentation have also changed over the years. Al-

though think tanks can be justly criticized for not doing more to educate and enlighten the average citizen, they have played a healthy stabilizing political role. While think tanks typically celebrate innovative ideas, seeing themselves as generators of change, they have also had the effect of slowing the pace of policy innovation. Evaluating past programs and criticizing new schemes, they have raised the threshold over which new policy initiatives must pass. While the voices from think tanks are often disparate, loud, and cacophonous, the long-term impact is usually one of moderate policy change, of piecemeal reform. Thus, from their earliest days in the 1910s think tanks have tended to pull American politics toward the center, working with elites from academia, government, and business to bring about policy compromise and consensus. It is a valuable contribution. If democracy is viewed as a continuing, yet perpetually risky experiment in self-government, then there will continue to be an important role for think tanks. They serve as democracy's laboratories, places where hypotheses and assumptions are examined, professional standards of evidence applied, and the open exchange of ideas sustained.

THINK TANKS AS INSTRUMENTS FOR ENLIGHTENED AND RESPONSIBLE PLURALISM

by Nina Belyaeva

In the midst of referenda, elections, and constitutional reform, many have not noticed the development of an institution that is also certain to have a significant long-term impact on Russia's future: independent research institutions or, as they are commonly known in America, "think tanks." Their work has been intimately connected with the rise of Russia's new civil society—indeed, were it not for many of the individuals in Russia's new think tanks, "Russian civil society" might still be an oxymoron. The history of these institutions is crucial to understanding their potential role in contemporary Russian reform and the growth and influence of Russia's "third sector." These think tanks have the potential not merely to serve as information centers for government policy, but to provide the intellectual resources needed for well-informed, independent civic action.

Although most commentators focus exclusively on the concerns of government policymakers, the truth of the matter is that the foundation for stability in Russia can be found only in a strong, enlightened civil society. Without it, democratic reformers in government will face strong resistance from a populace suspicious of change. Likewise, a civil society ill-equipped for the task of democracy building may actually contribute to the reestablishment of totalitarian rule. In focusing on civil society, I am choosing a very specific function, one not usually considered a role of think tanks at all. Yet I believe it is absolutely critical for Russia to determine the role that intellectuals will play in this new stage of reform, when we vitally need not so much political courage, as deep knowledge and professionalism.

Think tanks, of course, are not original to Russia. As is the case with many democratic institutions, it is possible to look to the American experience for instruction. In so doing, I am not simply proposing that we use American think tanks as a model for Russians to copy. Rather, knowing the problems and strengths of think tanks in America will allow Russian researchers to better understand what to avoid as well as what to emulate. To achieve this end, my study first defines the concept of a "think tank" and describes those issues critical to their function in America. I then examine the evolution of several think tanks in Russia. Finally, I conclude with several proposals as to how think tanks can contribute to the growth of enlightened pluralism in a new, democratic Russia.

Think Tanks in America: Definitions and Issues

Although the phrase "think tank" has its origins in British slang, the institutions we know today as "think tanks" have a distinctly American origin, with roots extending as far back as the mid-nineteenth century.[1] A foreign observer is likely to assume that the definition and phenomenon of think tanks is clearly and widely understood in the United

1. James Smith, *The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 241, note 3.

States, since it is an American term. Indeed, think tanks have increased so rapidly in number, become so deeply involved in policy and public discourse, and are now so well established financially that it is practically impossible to conceive of political life in the United States without them. It seems that their role in American social life and political decision making should leave little doubt about their identity, functions, and definition.

At the same time, however, it is rather surprising to learn that a foreign observer's initial assumptions may very well be wrong. Indeed, little, if any, agreement, exists among researchers and institutions about the definition of just what a think tank is, let alone its proper functions. As several scholars have pointed out, the prime difficulty in defining these institutions centers on the core functions that think tanks perform (or are supposed to perform) and the ultimate contributions they make. Before think tanks really appeared on the scene (in the 1950s), the functions they currently fulfill—research, education, "brainstorming," advocacy—were performed by a variety of other organizations, such as universities, lobbying or advocacy groups, and the military. As American think tanks emerged, they tended to combine and carry out these functions in a new kind of institution that would ideally be capable of contributing more effectively to an understanding of important social, political, and economic problems and their possible resolution.[2]

American think tanks normally exhibit a mixture of the aforementioned functions in differing proportions, with research being the one essential function without which it would be impossible to call an institution a think tank. The absence or presence of this central function can therefore be used as an identifier. In other words, the research function must be essential to the purpose and function of the organization. This does not mean that every organization that carries out some research is a think tank. For example, the League of Women Voters conducts a certain amount of research that helps fulfill its goals, but the absence of research would not mean its end as an organization, since the League would continue its educational and advocacy functions at the grass roots level, nor would it affect research conducted by other institutions. As concerns research-type advocacy groups (for example, Ralph Nader's consumer groups, the Sierra Club, or trade unions), research adds to their effectiveness, but does not constitute the essential purpose of their existence.

In some cases it is difficult to distinguish the nature of the institution doing purposeful research, on the one hand, and "intellectual lobbying," on the other, because both research and advocacy are significant parts of an institution's activities. Some advocacy-type think tanks come very close to the divide. For example, researchers and staff of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) openly say that yes, they have ideas, arguments, and values that they wish

2. The first use of the phrase "think tank" with its present-day connotation appeared in connection with the RAND Corporation and was borrowed from military jargon. See Smith, *Idea Brokers*, xiii. According to Smith, RAND and "think tank" are virtually synonymous.

tion I could find, questioned the status of AEI as a major U.S. think tank or labelled it an "advocacy group," even though its research clearly advocates the interests of private business, which, after all, is announced in the Institute's very name.[3]

Given this interconnection of functions, it would not make much sense to attempt to specify strict proportions or percentages of advocacy versus research in the definition of a think tank. Even if a majority of the institutional energies of, for example, the Heritage Foundation, are employed in the promotion of an ideological agenda, we should not object to it calling itself a conservative think tank because it conducts a considerable amount of research.

Instead of using specific amounts of research as a parameter, it might be better to compare think tanks to lobbyists and consultants. Of course, certain political and legal restrictions that apply to nonprofit think tanks do not apply to private corporate think tanks. Having the legal status of a not-for-profit organization, and often the tax-exempt status of a charitable foundation (which is the case with many independent think tanks, including AEI, RAND, and the Heritage Foundation, allowing them to receive tax-deductible "charitable" donations), think tanks are limited by law from lobbying or participating in elections in support of specific candidates. Yet within such limits much flexibility is permitted, even in terms of direct spending for lobbying purposes.[4] Those who want to teeter on the precipice of what is allowed by the Internal Revenue Service may do so, usually very successfully, with the help of a good tax attorney.

In addition to varying approaches to advocacy, American think tanks are also characterized by differing structures. One can divide them into at least three different types: 1) university based; 2) government based; and 3) self-sufficient non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

University-based institutions are not usually involved in direct policy consulting; they follow their own research agendas in policy studies, usually pursuing agendas with a broad outlook and educational value. Partially funded by universities, they also apply for grants. A select few have large endowments and do not need to raise funds every year, such as the Center for International Affairs at Harvard and the Hoover Institution for Peace and War at Stanford.

Government-based think tanks either are built directly inside various branches of the government or are established by legislatures or executive organs outside of official administrative agencies. The research agendas of such organizations are usually much closer to practical political needs; some of their reports are limited in circulation. Examples include the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress and the United States Institute of Peace.

Self-sufficient NGOs are think tanks established and operated as nonprofit corporations distinct from universities and the government. Some have the status of charities and accordingly must follow the requirements that legislation imposes on charitable associations (i.e., public interest, full

3. To learn more about AEI preferences regarding economic policy, see *The AEI Catalogue of Books, 1992–93* (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1993), 14–28.

4. See, for example, Bob Smucker, *The Non-profit Lobbying Guide: Advocating Your Course and Getting Results* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1991).

nonprofit corporations distinct from universities and the government. Some have the status of charities and accordingly must follow the requirements that legislation imposes on charitable associations (i.e., public interest, full disclosure, independent auditing, etc.). These think tanks can have large endowments or may have to raise funds from foundations and government grants; they may also work on contract for political institutions and governmental organizations. Their research agenda is quite varied, from focusing on specific program areas to investigating general international research subjects. Examples include the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).

Given the variety of structures and agendas, it may well be impossible to elaborate a strict definition of a "think tank" on which everyone can agree. In fact, think tanks are flexible and mobile social institutions, which often depend on public demand or the need for an intellectual response to urgent problems. This flexibility requires them to continually refocus themselves, from the values and principles of their research agenda to their political values and relations with their financial patrons and clients, as well as to the interests of the general public as a whole. They are highly complex organizations whose essence cannot be adequately captured by a narrow definition. Instead, one should resist the temptation to measure precisely whether a research organization fits or does not fit a set of criteria.

It will suffice merely to come up with a descriptive definition that reflects the general characteristics these organizations share. Thus, a think tank is: 1) an institution that is created primarily for the purpose of carrying out research in accordance with professional standards, and 2) an institution in which the researchers examine not only the origin and nature but, most particularly, the possible solutions of a given problem. In other words, they are engaged in applied research.

These functions are absolutely crucial and constitute the minimum criteria for defining a think tank in the traditional, more technical sense of the term. What should be added, however, are two very important functions that have developed recently and are becoming more frequent. These functions are: 1) generating analysis and understanding as a basis for improving economic, political, and social policy problems; and 2) "public brainstorming," or creating an open environment for highly professional public debate, involving government officials, academics, practicing experts, parliamentarians, civil institution leaders, and the media.

The Hoover Institution and the Brookings Institution substitute the first function—generating ideas which are generally applicable to future policy-making—for the function of direct problem solving. This type of research would normally come to the point of "what is to be done," and represents precisely that type of research usually avoided by universities and academic research institutes (i.e., academic-type think tanks), organizations that do not usually like to be involved in direct policy-making. Yet by generating ideas for public policy such as how the tax system should be organized or small business encouraged, these institutes maintain a very important difference between pure academic research and the research of think

tanks. The knowledge produced by the latter—intended for policymakers—should also be applicable to society at large, even if only in the future.

The second additional function—open public debate including top-ranking governmental authorities—is a "house specialty" of Washington-based institutions that organize (and publish the results of) numerous fora, hearings, seminars, and joint bipartisan research groups with members of Congress and government officials.[5]

As the breadth of their scope indicates, then, think tanks are far from a monolithic institution—they have different ideological agendas, approaches to advocacy, research methods, and structures. This intrinsic flexibility highlights the extent to which think tanks themselves reflect the pluralistic culture of civil society in the United States. This diversity, I believe, is a major reason that think tanks have come to play such a significant role in American political life. They provide avenues for vibrant scholarly debate among a broad range of opinions, and do so in a way that creates room for both the present-minded policy advocates and those interested primarily in longer-term issues. This flexibility also provides opportunities for those outside the prevailing spheres of influence to establish intellectual frameworks for intelligent, informed opposition, as evidenced by the work of the Progressive Policy Institute before President Clinton's election. By serving an extremely wide variety of interests and making sizable contributions to policy analysis and political discourse, American think tanks help foster the informed debate necessary for maintaining a healthy democracy.

There is also the undeniable fact that think tanks have had a profound impact on the way in which government itself evaluates its programs and plans future activities. The first example of this impact was the introduction in the Pentagon and the Department of Defense, in 1961, of new, empirically based techniques of formal policy analysis, techniques that Robert McNamara and Charles Hitch brought with them from the RAND Corporation.[6] After contributing to the increased accountability of government, this development led to fundamental changes in the nature and basis of public discourse—politicians of all stripes came to increasingly rely on technical expertise and analysis to buttress their arguments for and against various policies.

Of course, to be useful to partisan politicians, the data and analysis supplied by think tanks must at least appear to conform to prevailing professional research standards. This is not to say, however, that researchers, or institutions conducting research always, or even frequently, seek to clothe ideology in the robes of science (indeed, most of them avoid direct involvement). Rather, it means that politicians increasingly use the findings of think tank researchers to justify their positions. On the other hand, the

5. See, for example, *Strengthening of America Commission, First Report, Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Pete Domenici, Cochairmen* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992).

6. Edward C. Banfield, "Policy Science as Metaphysical Madness," in Robert A. Goldwin, ed., *Bureaucrats, Policy Analysts, Statesmen: Who Leads?* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980), 7–8.

mands for policy and program analysis. This at least partly explains the growth of policy-oriented think tanks whose primary research focus is on pressing social and political problems, and the efficacy of efforts to address such problems.

The influence of think tanks in American society is not free from problems, however. One of the more apparent concerns is the extent to which their pluralism manifests the extreme specialization of researchers in American institutions. This has contributed to concerns that contemporary American researchers suffer from an inability, as the saying goes, to see the forest for the trees. Perhaps the most telling example of this is the inability of policy experts to perceive the imminent collapse, or even the most profound weaknesses, of communist power in the Soviet Union.

Today, this problem continues to manifest itself in a number of ways within the scholarly community. For example, one can observe the reluctance of scholars who are experts in, say, the study of social organization, to comment on another field such as political theory. Separate conferences, separate specialized journals, separate professional organizations, separate personal networks—given the lack of overall perspective such division entails, we cannot be sure that there is not another Soviet-type problem waiting in the wings.

This proclivity toward specialization has also had a profound effect on political debate. As James Smith has observed, the increased number of experts has not only led to the incorporation of the norms of professional social science into political debate—their strict division along precise lines of academic disciplines has "helped to fragment public discourse and make it arcane and intimidating."[7] Even those ordinary citizens who venture farther into the waters of policy analysis soon find themselves overwhelmed by the flood of experts claiming expertise on a plethora of specific issues. Just as often, even state and municipal public officials feel unqualified to implement the policy recommendations of the intellectual elite—or are unimpressed by such studies, which are often irrelevant to the realities of the situation.

Think tanks occupy a similarly ambiguous position vis-à-vis the media. Members of the academic community—both in universities and think tanks—regularly appear on the evening news, "news magazine" shows, and public affairs programs. A few fortunate books from think tanks or written by think tank researchers have become best-sellers, and university professors and government officials take ideas from think tanks and transmit them to the public via the print media and the airwaves. Yet, as Smith notes in his book (and I share his concern), the tendency of both think tanks and the media to market information has considerably gutted the intellectual content of the information made available.[8] Subtlety of analysis is lost in the quest for the politically charged sound bite and the easy-sell quick fix; even such a thoughtful show as "Nightline" compresses complex issues into twenty-three minutes (subtracting commercials) of images and quick interviews. This has had significant implications for the conduct

7. Smith, *Idea Brokers*, 237.

8. Ibid.

of elections, the type of officials Americans are electing, and the nature of public debate. The irony is that even as intellectuals have become a presence in the media, well-informed political debate is in danger of becoming the specialized province of the politician and the policy expert.

The specialized professionalism of American research institutions, then, proves to be a double-edged sword, simultaneously providing the knowledge necessary for informed public debate and policy-making while moving democratic dialogue toward an exclusive circle of researchers, politicians, specialized interests, and pundits. In this respect the American model provides both positive and negative examples.

Setting the Goal: Civil Society in Russia and the Role of Think Tanks

As in America, albeit perhaps for different reasons, Russia's intellectual elite has perennially occupied an ambiguous position in society. It possess the resources for effecting great social change, but has repeatedly found itself unable to bring it about. As a result, members of this elite have traditionally suffered from a gnawing sense of inadequacy. The problems they have faced are complex—the bureaucratic nature of power intrinsic to administering the vast expanse of Russia's territory, the country's staunch traditionalism and resistance to modernization, and the intellectual elite's traditional estrangement from the centers of political power—have all contributed to the feeling of impotence among Russian intellectuals.

In recent years, intellectuals' traditional alienation from the political realm has been lessening. In fact, their opposition to Communist power played a significant role in its undoing and sparked a movement toward closer interaction between experts and the government. Yet, once again, the Russian intelligentsia find themselves in the midst of tension, caused this time by attempts of the government and commercial sectors to establish research institutions under their control and the simultaneous attempts of an entirely new breed of analyst to establish a network of independent intellectual centers. This movement toward the development of independent think tanks in Russia is unprecedented in the country's history and, given decades of authoritarian rule, stands to be a crucial factor in educating both policymakers and the public in the norms of rational, democratic public debate.

This new tension within the ranks of the Russian intelligentsia has its roots in the origin of the new independent research movement. Since the beginning of democratization in Russia, the state's huge ideological machine has been collapsing and with it, the "scientific" centers that worked primarily for propaganda purposes. After their major client for generating ideological support—the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—was gone, thousands of Communist Party and Komsomol schools, institutions, and departments were left without guidance and basically lost their orientation. From academic and scientific centers to departments of Marxism and Leninism, all the old structures had to find a new identity.

This touched not only institutions but also people. A huge army of social scientists and paid party ideological workers, totaling about one million people,

Their options: to link up with the new authorities, whatever the ideology of the latter; or to work independently, looking for new ideas, new markets, new clients, based on the social necessity for political and social knowledge. Beginning in 1989, then, and specifically after the failure of the coup in August 1991, a rapid process of reorganization of the whole system of social sciences began in Russia.

Within this process of reorganization we can see three major trends: 1) the requalification of the former staffs of communist institutions, 2) the renaming of old Communist Party structures into political science centers, and 3) the establishment of entirely new centers, independent of government supervision.

Although the process of developing independent research institutions in Russia is new—hardly three to four years old—it is already possible to say that there have been several distinct periods of growth. The first spanned the beginning of the government's democratic sloganeering from the mid-1980s to August 1991. In this period, when the official communist system was still strong enough to keep at least formal control over ideological institutions, there was a very clear division between official and non-official research centers in the social sciences. Official centers were built within official academies of sciences and other governmental structures (e.g., ministries) with the direct or indirect support, approval, or at least recognition of the authorities and Party structures. Developing independently were mostly informal groups and research centers that emerged as an alternative to official political science. These alternative information centers made it their goal to support the democratic movement in Russia by providing true information, free from ideology and official control, about events in the USSR.

It would be impossible to describe here all of the new independent organizations. Among the more noteworthy was Vyacheslav Igrunov's Moscow Bureau of Information Exchange, which accumulated documents, publications, and descriptions of events from all of the alternative movements emerging throughout the country that were willing to exchange information with each other. Another important organization was the Postfactum News Agency, which had its beginnings as a provider of information to nascent businesses, cooperatives, and individual entrepreneurs. Before it expanded into the full-scale news service it has become today, it specialized in providing information on current rules and regulations, as well as helping workers and clients through the very first steps of building market relations in the country. Other important groups include the Federation of Alternative Information, Interfax (a government service), and the Old Union Social–Political Club.

In addition to formal organizations, there were also plenty of groups at academic centers that informally got together to discuss problems of economic and political development. Numerous small groups of sociologists in Russia's major cities, including Moscow, Leningrad, and Novosibirsk, laid the foundation for some of the reforms we see today. Working among these sociologists were, for example, Gaidar, Chubais, Kardonskii, Vasileev, and Levin, who, together with others, formed the nucleus of the first government-sponsored analytical center, Gaidar's Russian Center for Economic Reform. After August 1991,

the situation changed dramatically. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and governmental structures were no longer able to provide support or ideological guidance to such centers. On the other hand, after Russia moved toward an overtly democratic system, cooperation with official state organs was no longer perceived as immoral, unethical, or violating the norms of independence. This explains why, right after the coup's failure in autumn 1991, a proliferation of new intellectual structures openly formed themselves into legal bodies.

This process could be called the second stage of the development of these independent structures, and it, too, displayed certain trends. Old Communist Party centers working directly under communist auspices did not want to use unpopular names in their titles, but possessed numerous assets—buildings, salaries, and enough money to survive the intermediary period. One after another, they proclaimed their legal and ideological independence and reappeared in the analytical environment with new names, calling themselves political science centers. Their intention was to explain, according to their point of view, what had really happened with democratization and *perestroika.* They were also quite willing to sell these observations to the west, which was hungry for any information it could obtain and not always very selective about the source.

At the same time, independent organizations formed during the early *perestroika* period received their second wind. Free from being compromised or hindered by official Party structures, a number of these centers were specifically contracted by the new democratic government to perform in-depth analytical studies. Additionally, based on the huge demand for clear, specialized analysis, new research centers were formed on the initiative or with the participation of the new power structures, including state officials and combinations of government and commercial structures, such as:

- RF Politika, mostly linked to Yeltsin advisor Gennadii Burbulis and the radical democratic wing of the Russian government and Parliament;
- The International Foundation for Social and Economic Research "Reforma," organized by Shatalin, an expert institute of Russian industrialists and entrepreneurs pursuing the ideology of state enterprises facing market reform;
- The "Parliamentary Center," an organization performing a function similar to that of the Congressional Research Service in the United States.

The third period in the development of independent research centers was the formation of independent political expertise, together with intellectual centers which recognized the importance of quality control in research. This latest phase had its beginning in the spring and summer of 1992. One of the reasons for its development was that by that time, many independent centers were relieved from feeling obliged to support anything done by the new government painted in democratic slogans. As a result, most of these centers became independent not only of the old privileges of official academia but also of the new ideologies, once nonofficial, but now considered official and exclusively true. Moreover, after having experi-

enced an extended period of independent development, many researchers realized that they were working in the same field. Recognizing each other by the quality of their work, they felt the necessity of cooperating with one another and strengthening their work by nurturing professional standards of research and analysis.

The first step in this cooperation was the creation in October 1991 of the Association for Collection and Research of the New Press. This organization consisted of several important groups: V. Igrunov's Institute for Humanities and Political Research, N. Krotov's Institute of Mass Political Movements, the Russian Bibliographic Society (A. Petrik), the Archive of the Independent Press (A. Suetnov), and the Library N.I.P.Ts. "Memorial" (B. Belenkin). Next followed an agreement on cooperation between the institutes of Igrunov, Satarov, Krotov, and the Interlegal Research Center (headed by this author). In January 1992, the association published the bulletin *News of Humanitarian Research*, which explained in detail their professional credo.

At the same time, this network of information and research centers was developing, a network of analytical and expert consulting groups also arose. In December 1991, experts from a number of such organizations published a series of documents culminating in the creation of the intellectual "pool" called the Forum for the Future of Russia, an association of approximately forty philosophers, political scientists, and economists (all between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five) in Moscow. A still more profound stage in this evolution was the formation of the Russian Association of Political Experts and Consultants (AsPEC) on 13 March 1992. In its charter, AsPEC asserted: "Professionalism cannot be left or right, socialist or liberal... It should always and everywhere be professional, built not on emotions but on knowledge. Researchers, scientists, and experts cannot and should not belong to any party—they can definitely have sympathies, but they cannot be propagandists. Their professional duty is to support qualified politicians with constructive programs and high ethical standards, regardless of their party membership, ideology, or religion."

For a year, AsPEC continued to work as a professional club and engaged in constant brainstorming. It did not, however, manage to build a formal association and in all likelihood it will continue to function as a working group for discussions among informed analysts. In so doing, it has played an important role in providing a structure for the expert and analytical environment where all sorts of ideas could be discussed, verified, and endorsed. The most creative ideas crucial to Russia's current development are being discussed in this forum; in fact, the uncertainty and rapidity of political change in Russia demand that its structure remain informal.

In the fall of 1992, independent research centers and expert analytical centers fell into two general pools of organizations: 1) Interlegal, INDEM, the Institute for Humanities and Political Research, the Institute of Mass Political Movements, and the analytical group Twentieth Century and the World; and 2) the network of organizations in AsPEC: the Russian Institute, the Institute of Development, the institute of I. Sundiev, S. Markov's seminar, and the Parliamentary faction called "Change—The New Policy." An agreement among these pools cre-

ated an intellectual "corporation" in November–December 1992 with five signatories: Interlegal, INDEM, the Institute of Humanities and Political Research, the Russian Institute, and the analytical center of *Twentieth Century and the World*. In February 1993, the members of the corporation entered into a joint research project, "Political Pluralism in Russia," the result of which is projected to be a series of monographs, scientific reports, and articles concerning the problems of establishing a multiparty political system, parliamentarism, federalism, a free press, etc.

As things currently stand, independent research centers are beginning to explore the variety of options open to them as they separate themselves from official power structures. The influence of these groups, both within and outside the new "intellectual corporation," cannot be underestimated. No political discussion, no television show on political issues, no parliamentary debate or arguments in legislative committees take place today without using the information and conclusions of various independent research centers, which provide sociological data, public opinion polls, and ratings of key political leaders, as well as in-depth analyses of the economic and political development of specific regions, social strata, national constituencies, and so on. Some of the centers work publicly and openly, whereas others are hidden within executive power structures.

The continually growing influence of think tanks in Russia in large part derives from the failure of the country's elite communist infrastructure. Prior to the *perestroika* era, political research was provided mostly by official academic institutions such as the Institute of the USA and Canada, or by secret research institutions using closed information resources such as the KGB. The collapse of the USSR "Union government" destroyed the role of academia as the chief consultative body for the top political elite. Most of the former academicians involved with old-guard politicians subsequently lost their political influence and were unable to provide new concepts for future developments. Moreover, government analysts and those politicians affiliated with the government—such as Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, and Iavlinskii—could not return to the old academic community and joined the new environment of self-supported intellectual centers. As the demand for political expertise increased and traditional academia, due to its bureaucratic structure and weak financial position, failed to respond, independent research centers increased in number and visibility, attracting talented social researchers from academia as well as analytically inclined politicians.

As in America, the growth of independent research centers has resulted in their having direct influence on decision-making bodies in the countries of the Commonwealth, for the simple reason that the country's new politicians do not have other reliable resources to whom they can turn for information and consulting. The best example of this phenomenon was the economic group within Yeltsin's cabinet known as the "Gaidar team," which became fully responsible for the strategy of economic reform. This particular group quickly formed one of the very first independent think tanks: the International Center for Reform.

Although such direct involvement can have positive effects, the worrying point is that such centers

or teams, unknown not only to the public but also to the professional community, can become directly responsible for political decisions. Lacking expertise and the benefits derived from informed discussion, these groups can make disastrous choices on issues of interrepublican relations that will affect the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. One such example was Yeltsin's decree establishing a state of emergency in Chechen'ia. When Russian militia troops were introduced and then withdrawn from Groznii, Russian–Chechen relations approached the brink of real war. Only by sheer luck were violence and bloodshed avoided.

When later discussed in Parliament, Yeltsin's decree was called "a mistake," a decision made because of "bad advisors." As general instability grows, however, so does the danger of further "mistakes." Accordingly, the need to establish some rules of the game for political advisors becomes imperative in order that peace and stability in the country will not totally depend on whether their recommendations are "good" or "bad." This need for rules of the game is made more urgent by the fact that the power structures in all the Commonwealth republics generally, and within Russia specifically, are split into numerous factions; each of the power structures, even each visible politician, now has its own consulting team, whose analysis, forecasts, and concepts could be used in the current political struggle for the benefit of the "buyer," regardless of their effect on the rest of society.

On the other hand, at a more local level, think tanks face the opposite problem: how can their research influence policy on the level of cities, towns, and villages, especially in the more outlying areas where little or no tradition of academic involvement in government exists? The newly created independent research centers tend to be concentrated in urban areas, where liberal influence is stronger. Other than brief appearances in the media, it is difficult to say what means exist for disseminating policy studies throughout the country's infrastructure or even whether, once local officials receive a think tank's recommendations, such advice would be followed.

This microlevel problem points to another equally important consideration: the attitude of research and policy centers towards Russia's fledgling civil society. The involvement of numerous former independent journalists and activists who primarily concerned themselves with disseminating information outside circles of political power during the Communist era, has fostered an overt interest in directly serving the populace in new independent research centers. The small size of new intellectual circles helps to make the dissemination of think tank research quite direct; for example, the "intellectual corporation" links research institutes with Postfactum, an information agency akin to AP or UPI, but that also disseminates in-depth research reports. Likewise, Interlegal serves as a direct link to the nonprofit community, through both personal consultations and research publications. (It also coordinated an extensive voter information program during the 1993 elections, including panel discussions, free individual consultations, television spots, and the distribution of voter information pamphlets.)

Think tank researchers also have direct personal ties to the

print and electronic media. They frequently write policy articles for popular newspapers such as *Nezavisimaia Gazeta, Segodnia,* and *Izvestiia.* Experts also regularly provide opinions on television and radio news and public opinion programs. Much as in the United States, various experts regularly present certain partisan points of view; by contrast, much of the Russian media does not hold to contemporary American standards of objectivity, allowing Russian newspapers the freedom to more openly espouse particular points of view. This division along partisan lines has fostered a problem similar to that of American punditry—namely, the use of experts to provide convenient quotes to support various party lines.

The partisan nature of commentary in the media reflects the broader plurality of contemporary Russian think tanks. Although some aspire to unite under an overtly nonpartisan umbrella, independent research institutions taken individually represent the full spectrum of political opinion, from communist to radical democratic to capitalist. Again, this roughly parallels developments in the United States, where certain think tanks (e.g., Hoover, Heritage, American Enterprise) have become identified with specific ideological tendencies. Russian culture makes the connection between institutional and political identity even stronger, for the Russian people are quite sensitive about their personal relations, including those at the workplace. As a result, they normally will not join an academic or research collective that does not respond to their values.

This institutional bond has helped some think tanks overcome severe obstacles, including lack of funds. For example, the Gorbachev Foundation had substantial capital at its inception, but was never able to accumulate a productive research team. On the other hand, one of the best think tanks in Russia today, Igrunov's Institute of Humanities and Political Research, is barely able to provide salaries at the minimum level established by the government, but its staff members continue to work there because they value the work itself and each other as a collective. The force of such bonds are made more evident by the fact that such scholars are choosing to pursue research at a time when the lack of funds is spurring many intellectuals to abandon scholarship for better-paying jobs as businessmen, taxi drivers, or even janitors.

Russia's independent research culture, then, is a vibrant, pluralistic movement that represents both new and old intellectual trends. It faces severe financial problems and the temptations that arise from immediate access to power and the public. The fast pace of events and the newness of independence have meant that think tank activity in Russia has proceeded virtually without significant self-examination. Recent developments are a significant first step in this direction, but on the whole, Russia lacks the kind of extensive academic analysis of the think tank phenomenon found in the United States.

Given the increasing public presence of think tanks, for reasons of peace and stability it is necessary to develop some general rules and recommendations for their public disclosure and accountability in order that this important part of the political process does not totally escape public monitoring. Likewise, it is important that think tanks in Russia

develop a precise understanding of the nature of their mission. It is to this task that we now turn.

What is to be Done? Suggestions for the Future of Russia's Think Tanks

Although think tanks in Russia parallel American institutions in a number of ways, several key differences indicate that Russian researchers should be cautious about simply transposing the American experience into their own. First and foremost are differences in historical development. American think tanks arose out of a century of intellectual development along the German research model, beginning in the late nineteenth century. This provided ample time for experimentation, development of widely accepted professional standards, and an evolution of the way in which research institutions perceived their role vis-à-vis the general public. All this was done, of course, in the context of a well-established constitutional democracy and a solid network of relatively well-financed research institutions. In Russia, however, many institutions have been created from scratch—in fact, even the concepts of independent research and democracy are new. This means that whereas American think tanks can provide an example of what to do and what to avoid, inevitably their Russian counterparts will have different emphases.

Think tanks in Russia first need to face the problem of solidifying their own institutional and professional growth. Independent research institutes are rapidly emerging and growing—both in their research capacity and in their ability to influence decision making. In this new environment of opportunity, it is crucial that these institutions not lose sight of the need to work productively for themselves—that is, to engage in data collection, research, and analysis according to the goals set forth in their charters—strengthening their professionalism, nurturing individual scholars, building professional teams, and generally establishing their identities and gaining prestige and popularity. I believe such self-growth to be very important; otherwise, institutions will be unable to establish their own individual identities.

In developing their identities, think tanks in Russia need to form a network among themselves whereby they can develop much-needed standards of professionalism and nurture a mutually supportive network of scholars. These steps could help overcome a scholar's sense of isolation and abandonment in the face of the country's collapsed academic infrastructure and simultaneously allow them to cultivate basic skills such as obtaining grants and accessing western databases. In much the same way that the American academic community was established through professional societies in the late nineteenth century, independent research institutions in Russia should unite to foster their own growth.

At the same time, these research institutions need to establish more extensive links with the rest of the world scholarly community. This involves not only reading the results of research in other countries, but actively participating in the international scholarly community. Such involvement entails attending conferences, delivering papers, publishing abroad, and even engaging in joint research projects with researchers in countries with more developed think tank communities.

My emphasis on dialogue and community raises the question of how to accommodate the ideological pluralism of Russia's think tank culture. Simply put, what should we do about groups that still nurture communist ideology? My suggestion is that we should not sacrifice the principles of pluralism and openness in order to suppress a dying, albeit dangerous, ideology. If anything, democratic dialogue is strengthened by the presence of such a vocal foil. Including representatives of the old network in the dialogue between independent research institutions might even contribute to weakening the influence of the old communist academic tradition, as scholars find themselves having to adapt to new professional standards in order to retain their credibility.

In their relation to society, Russian think tanks must also strive to be effective when consulting with official power structures. I believe it is not the proper function of think tanks anywhere, Russia included, to make decisions about the course of the future development of a country. These decisions are the preserve of the parliament and the government. We should keep a very strict "division of labor" between intellectuals and policymakers, since the work of the two groups has very often been confused.

Yet think tanks in Russia must continue to seek to influence decisionmakers. The historical dramas of Russian reform, from *perestroika* through "shock therapy" to the latest reforms, all have a common root in a weak plan for reaching their proclaimed goals. Both communism and capitalism looked attractive, but propagandists of neither system succeeded in calculating how much it would cost to realize these systems, taking into account all the realities of Russian life. These "calculations" are precisely the job of independent research institutions—no matter if they are charitable, private, or governmental, as long as they are able to provide objective and professional information rather than that which is politically biased or based on artificial and incomplete statistics. These calculations extend to more than constitutional and national concerns; think tanks must also focus on providing microlevel studies as well as developing ways to cultivate productive working relationships with officials at the town and city level. Here the American model is most helpful in providing examples of the impact think tanks have had on local and national public policy.

Equally important in Russia, think tanks should be useful to the general public and not only to themselves, the powers they serve, or those who fund them. For westerners, the virtues of democracy and civil society are self-evident. In Russia, except among the more educated elite, these are new and, to many educated under the old regime, suspect ideas. For the average laborer, "democracy" means rampant inflation and a decline in living standards; "charity" is institutionalized money-grubbing; and "voluntarism" is a sorry substitute for a government that used to take care of everything. For democratic constitutionalism and civil society to take root, the country needs extensive democratic education.

"Usefulness to society"—this is not a perfect phrase, but I can not think of a better one to express the idea that the information taken out of society must be returned to it. This basically adds an educational dimension to a think tank's work: providing public in-

stitutions of various kinds (from parties and political movements to professional unions and charitable associations) with the necessary information and analysis to build "a picture of the world" in which they operate and thus enable them to perform their functions effectively—regardless of the goals (not forbidden by law) of their charters.

The information and knowledge about society produced by think tanks, while presumably serving specific strata of the population, political groups, or branches of government (especially if a think tank was specifically created to meet special needs), should also be circulated freely (unless reports contain state secrets) or at least be accessible to the public. Only free access to analytical and technical information provides civil society with leverage over government policy, as well as access to specific agendas for solving social problems. It hardly needs to be said that access to and use of analytical information makes civil institutions stronger and more effective and that the continuation of this process results in true pluralism. Even more important, this process means an educated pluralism and, therefore, a more responsible one.

Within this concept of usefulness lies one of the major theoretical questions of this paper: to what extent do think tanks themselves have to play this role? Is this their obligation? Should all think tanks play such a role? How can we ensure that they are, in fact, serving this function? Is there a way to judge the result—the effectiveness—of such work?

To me, the "society-serving" function of think tanks is very important to their role of providing educational and technical assistance to other institutions of civil society. In the United States, this type of work is done under the concept of "civil education" by organizations such as the Kettering Foundation, the Council on Economic Priorities, the National Organization for Women, Common Cause, and many others. Such types of organizations are already emerging, gaining recognition, and establishing networks in Russia. The foundation "Human Soul," chaired by Igor' Donenko, is establishing an association of leaders of nonprofit organizations in Moscow. Marina Levina's Association of Parents and Guardians of St. Petersburg has more than fifty affiliations in the St. Petersburg and northwestern regions of Russia. There are about five hundred organizations registered every year in the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation and about three to five thousand voluntary organizations registered at the city level in big cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg.[9]

Russian "public advocacy groups" are quickly growing in experience and vision. Benefiting from mutual learning and education, they are very effective in reaching their constituents. In the United States, groups like the Kettering Foundation are close to these citizen advocacy groups, although they have developed their own capacity to observe, analyze, advise, educate, and train. Such advocacy groups in Russia are able to perform such work on the basis of their own or their neighbors' everyday social practices of solving problems, serving their members, and fighting with the authorities to meet specific agendas. Through becoming more experi-

9. See the *Directories of Public Associations Registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation* (Moscow: Interlegal Research Center, 1992–93), four issues.

enced and educated themselves, they are able to share their practical knowledge with others.

This illustrates how knowledge is being accumulated and shared in Russian society by civil structures themselves, growing from the bottom up. But I would like to approach the issue of equipping civil society with necessary knowledge from the other end, from the top down. In Russia, I believe it is important that think tanks devote considerable effort to making knowledge that has been accumulated at the "top" available to all who need it at the "bottom."

Specially established, equipped, and significantly funded, think tanks are professional institutions for the gathering and analysis of research data relating to social problems, including health, the environment, child care, and unemployment—this is exactly how civic groups might envision think tanks. Yet these institutions mostly provide their services and research results in an "upward" direction—to government structures—and thus special efforts must be made to redistribute this knowledge back to the community level and the grass roots.

Here I want to specify that knowledge does not mean simple information—the raw statistical data, columns of figures, or unique and astonishing facts and events accompanied by brief commentaries of distinguished politicians or journalists that pass for "information." Likewise, I do not mean the sound bites and quick images that have become commonplace in America and Russia. By *knowledge*, I mean the result of analysis and answers to specific questions—a result produced on the basis of specially collected and processed data that was professionally checked, openly discussed, and confirmed by more than one source. It is clear that this can be done only by professionally equipped and qualified institutions that do nothing but monitor those processes in society that they study. Only then would they be able to make a comprehensive picture out of the pieces and provide an overall perspective on the interconnection of its components. This perspective could provide an approach to understanding the subject that social actors could later transfer into short-term goals and a plan of action.

This might well seem complicated, but we are living in a complex world; oversimplifying the strategy and tactics of social work to the famous concept of "small steps," we often confine civic groups to taking steps in one spot or going nowhere. It is my belief that only serious social knowledge provided by professional institutions will provide civic groups and other public structures adequate tools for serious participation in the dialogue with power. Otherwise, governance will always come down to the unequal and unfair struggle between those who know and those who do not. In Russia, where democracy is in its delicate infancy, this could be disastrous.

Professionalism, government, civil society—think tanks in Russia face a large task, but only because their potential for helping the country is equally vast. By serving as bridges between state and society, Russian think tanks can provide various civil institutions—the government itself, mass movements, professional and communal associations, political parties, and public interest groups—with the necessary knowledge, expertise, sociopolitical techniques, and other

intellectual tools to participate effectively in the dialogue with power and with one another, to find compromises, and to protect their interests in nonviolent ways.

If think tanks can fulfill this role even halfway, they will have made a very significant contribution to Russian democratic development.

ADDENDUM: INTERVIEW WITH GEORGY SATAROV

Georgy Satarov is the director of INDEM (INformatics for DEMocracy), a center of applied political studies in Moscow and the author of another paper in this collection. Dr. Satarov was appointed Assistant to Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Parliamentary and Public Organizations Matters on 7 February 1994. This interview was conducted by Nina Belyaeva on 28 February 1994.

BELYAEVA: It is difficult to believe that some time ago we did not even have independent research centers. Today it seems that such centers have always existed. When did this idea first come to you? What was your first, initial motivation when you decided to create INDEM?

SATAROV: *Motivation* is probably a key word here. You, too, remember this time, 1989–90, when so much was happening, and it was so natural to try something by yourself, to do something on your own. Since I have always been involved in science and studies, to be "on your own" meant to create an independent research center. My motive was very simple: personal curiosity, based on individual research interest as well as on the normal curiosity of a citizen, about the variants of the developments.

BELYAEVA: How was the initial goal of the center formulated, and has your mission changed through the years?

SATAROV: The major goal was to use the huge research potential of highly qualified specialists appropriately, to utilize their abilities to implement the most advanced scientific methods, because in traditional academic science this potential was often wasted. The other goal was to help in the creation of new democratic institutions by providing them with clear, objective, and interdisciplinary analysis.

BELYAEVA: An independent center is unthinkable without a team. How did you find and recruit your "crew"?

SATAROV: The crew was selected by two major parameters: a very high standard of professionalism and a willingness and ability to work with full devotion, yet not in the most comfortable circumstances. The working collective was filled by mathematicians, computer programmers, political analysts, and sociologists. Most of the people we began with are still with us.

BELYAEVA: A traditional but inevitable question: what are your funding sources?

SATAROV: We have several. The biggest source, one that is gradually disappearing, is donations. We receive some funds from our joint programs and projects conducted with other Russian and foreign partners, for example, a research project with a bank and an education program with the National Democratic Institute of the USA. Funding for specially requested research projects, including those from governmental organs, has recently increased. Another growing source is income from the computer-programming products that we create in the center and sell. I should also mention a grant that we received from Stanford University (for computers, which are still in use).

BELYAEVA: Who are the major users of your research products? What type of relations do you have with your clients?

SATAROV: The most popular arrangement we have with our cli-

ents and partners is a joint activity agreement. Among official clients and buyers of our products, the largest group consists of foreign users, most of whom are research fellows, followed second by official organs of power, and third by the mass media. Some of the results of our work are presented and distributed by our subscription journal, *Russian Monitor: Archives of Modern Politics.*

BELYAEVA: Being a political research center, does INDEM avoid commentary on cutting-edge issues? Do you give your own opinion on current politics? How does your personal opinion influence your final product?

SATAROV: We regard politics only as a field of study, as the object of our research. It is our principle that political preferences are not acceptable in the work of the center.

BELYAEVA: But you will not deny that your clients do have a political position, possibly a very strong one. Do you reject clients with specific political positions? Or, if I can ask the question in a different way, to what section of the political spectrum do your clients belong?

SATAROV: I want to be very brief here: to all reasonable sections.

BELYAEVA: And here comes a tricky question, one that is closely related and may even summarize all the previous questions, one that is extremely important to all of us who are interested in the development of new interdisciplinary research institutions that strongly influence political decisions, but remain formally outside of official power structures. These institutions are often called "independent think tanks." The question concerns this "independence:" is it really possible? What does "independence" mean?

SATAROV: I believe that no formal qualities can prove the "independence" of a research center or serve as a "certified," doubtless guarantee. Independence can only be "inside" the researchers; it is their strong personal opinion, their willingness to keep this independence. For a think tank to bring its proclaimed independence closer to reality, several demands are crucial: a high standard of professionalism and an absolute observance of the research ethics. Also important is diversification of the sources of funding; financial dependence on just one source would make our center very vulnerable.

BELYAEVA: Do you already have partners abroad? Who are they? Whom else would you like to establish working contracts with?

SATAROV: Yes, we have partners abroad: Stanford University, Rupert Starch, the National Democratic Institute of the USA, Cambridge University, as well as several working connections with individual researchers. What is lacking—and what is very regrettable—are professional relations with other sociological centers.

BELYAEVA: A final question: how important is the role of independent think tanks in contemporary Russia? Will this role become more important?

SATAROV: Independent think tanks are important. Their importance is not, probably, on the surface, but their role is growing. And our government structures, all branches of power, are finally beginning to recognize this. And this is cause for some optimism.

PERIODICITY IN THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT OF THE USSR

by Vyacheslav Igrunov

The Institute for Humanities and Political Research (IHPR) was the first nonstate research institute to appear in the USSR during *perestroika.* The Institute was established in 1990 on the basis of the Moscow Public Bureau for Information Exchange (M-BIO), which served as an information-coordinating center for the first political clubs and mass social movements in the USSR.

In 1988–90, M-BIO helped unite the efforts of various liberal democratic organizations and groups, played a significant role in disseminating information on the sociopolitical movement, and created the first system for dissemination of independent periodicals in the USSR. In 1988–89, M-BIO made an important contribution to the establishment of Memorial, the most significant movement of the time. Certain work carried out under the auspices of M-BIO helped prepare the groundwork for the formation of the Interregional Group within the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Subsequently, M-BIO promoted the rise of ecological organizations, social democratic clubs, and other prodemocracy groups all over the USSR.

M-BIO published two newspapers, *Chronograph* and *Panorama,* and a number of bulletins, including *Samizdat.* Intensive activity led to the creation of the first archive of materials relating to the new social movement in the USSR; this archive subsequently provided a model for many similar collections. Using these materials and its own experience as a participant in this social movement, in 1988 M-BIO carried out its first research project and created a data base on new sociopolitical organizations in the USSR for the Institute of Culture of the USSR Academy of Sciences. This research marked the beginning of the active participation of M-BIO members in scientific cooperation with academic institutes in the USSR, cooperation that took an especially intensive form in joint projects with the Leningrad (later St. Petersburg) branch of the Institute of Sociology of the USSR (later Russian) Academy of Sciences. In the West, M-BIO's closest associate was the West German Forschungsstelle Osteuropa in Bremen; Michael Urban of the University of California at Santa Cruz became M-BIO's permanent U.S. partner.

As the social movement in the USSR continued to evolve, M-BIO's efforts to help establish the movement became increasingly anachronistic and pointless. This was one reason behind its transformation into a research institute—the Institute for Humanities and Political Research. The newspaper *Panorama* broke away and became the foundation for an informational expert group of the same name, and M-BIO's daily news service was reborn as the political news service of the Postfactum News Agency.

The Institute for Humanities and Political Research focuses both on the study of contemporary political processes and questions of a more fundamental nature. The Institute does not consider the study of political processes and, in particular, social movements to be simply an academic task and pursues a number of practical goals. Political monitoring conducted by the Institute over the past two years has pro-

vided unique materials for elaborating recommendations regarding the structure of the Russian state as well as domestic and foreign policy questions. Many ministries and social organizations of the Russian Federation regularly use the Institute's materials. Recently, the Institute and Grigorii Iavlinskii's EPIcenter have become the intellectual base for the election bloc "Iavlinskii-Boldyrev-Lukin," and some Institute researchers are running for the State Duma.

The desire to participate in political activities primarily derives from the fact that research results point to another, almost inevitable split in Russian society fraught with the risks of dictatorship and the breakdown of statehood. Institute researchers intend to use their knowledge in an attempt to change the current trends of Russia's political development.

* * * * * * * *

Among other subjects studied by IHPR are the social movements of the USSR and contemporary Russia. One of the most important aspects of studying these movements is to separate their history into distinct periods. Of course, any attempt to single out individual periods must be somewhat theoretical. Nonetheless, a concept of periodization facilitates the systematization of a huge mass of materials on the subject, and this in turn should lead to a deeper understanding of the phenomenon.

In this paper I shall dwell on one such concept of periodization. Western observers and those who plunged themselves into social activity in the USSR during the second half of the 1980s tended to regard the development of pluralism in the USSR as not simply swift, but explosive. Yet by the time the first political clubs made their appearance, Soviet society remained monolithic only on the surface; internally, it had eroded deeply and was split into numerous segments that were barely holding together. As the burden of censorship started to give way in 1987, official ideology—which had been holding the virtually disintegrated society together—collapsed at the first tremors of *glasnost'*, and the parishioners of the Communist church suddenly found themselves lonely and forsaken.

The headlong rush to fill the resulting vacuum led to a multitude of fragmentary interpretations of history and reality which initially served as a guide for the formation of a civil society. It was only the clash of numerous, half-sensible points of view on seemingly unrelated problems that led to the emergence of more or less vague meta-ideologies which split society into a number of indistinct factions. Each of these factions formed itself around a group of ideologists whose views, although fairly unstable, were based on the experience and concepts of preceding decades. In this sense, the "stagnation" era was mother to *perestroika.* It is for precisely this reason that without a description, however cursory, of the development of pluralism in the pre-Gorbachev USSR, one cannot hope to understand the kaleidoscopic spectrum of ideologies in existence when *perestroika,* the starting point of Russia's contemporary political development, was first launched.

Prewar Totalitarianism

Strictly speaking, the USSR was not a single-ideology state even during the period of absolute totalitarianism. The various

periods of its history, however, differ one from one another in terms of both the nature and development of pluralism. The prewar period was a time of political involution; all structures of civil society and all nongovernmental ideologies were eliminated. Even within the dominant ideology, a process of reduction aimed at diminishing the importance of an individual person or individual groups of people in the life of society occurred. Horizontal social links were destroyed and replaced by vertical ones. The chief goal was to build a society in which every person would be reduced to a screw in a single mechanism. Resistance came only from those individuals or groups that were considered enemies of the regime or its ideology. The absence of opposition turned the subject of politics into its object—into a victim. It was this phenomenon that occurred in the case of Bukharin, as opposed to those of Trotsky and Ryutin.

World War II to 1964

The Second World War altered social consciousness in the USSR to a large extent. In a certain sense, a line was drawn under the revolutionary epoch. Of course, revolutionary recurrences took place until the death of Stalin, but these were precisely that, recurrences, which were barely tolerated even by those responsible for implementing the leader's policies. The war made equals of proletarians and the children of kulaks, descendants of the gentry and the clergy—making them all defenders of the Motherland. The monstrous brutality of the repressions made all accept prescribed social ritual; the cult of the leader and Communist ideology became the common standard of public life. All conscious enmity was broken down and suppressed; at best, the only thing that remained which did not claim to be political was memory. Of course, this process of social homogenization was completed only during the Khrushchev era, but a decisive turning point took place during the war.

In the postwar period, a new trend emerged in the development of pluralism. Young people began to aspire to the improvement of socialism, either by developing concepts put forward by the leader of the people or by conducting a critical revision of state ideology from the standpoint of classical Marxism.

It was during this period that the social movement acquired its ideological foundation: in 1956, reformist aspirations were made legitimate by Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" to the twentieth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). After this congress, the number of underground Marxist circles sharply increased. This, along with the first manifestations of relatively wide public protest (against military interference in Hungarian affairs, for example), succeeded in creating a certain area of resistance in which individual groups obtained information about other dissidents and even established contact with one another.

In a totalitarian society, of which the prewar USSR was a classic example, the state controls virtually all spheres of life, including the everyday life of an individual person. After the war, however, this control gradually lessened and, during the 1950s, a relative freedom of choice in clothing styles, standards of moral behavior, and creative activities became possible. The more distant a sphere of life from the realm of ideology, the weaker the state's

control over it became. At the same time, freedom of choice in everyday life helped cultivate independent behavior in an entire generation of people born in the prewar years.

The main feature of this growing pluralism was its legality, a legality with which the state did not always comply; recall, for instance, the sensational campaigns directed against "fops" and "parasites" (nonconformist artists). There were also certain legal shifts in the ideological sphere: the publication of memoirs and such books as *Not by Bread Alone* by Vladimir Dudintsev and *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and the reading of poems near the monument to the poet Vladimir Mayakovsky.

Even underground activities were not illegal in the juridical sense. Rather, the behavior of the state was illegal. Moreoever, a large part of the intelligentsia considered ideological criticism of the regime to be legitimate because such criticism was based on Marxist sources. At the same time, the opposition, united under the name of "true Marxism-Leninism" (according to Andrei Amal'rik's felicitous wording[1]), retained its orientation toward a political transformation of society, at times going so far as to demand forcible change of the existing order.

A dissolution of the ruling hierarchy occurred during this same period due to a redistribution of responsibilities and power. Strictly speaking, the October 1964 coup demonstrated the emergence of new political subjects, with ramified horizontal links that already influenced the situation at the very top of the state pyramid. No less important, although much less visible, was the process by which the economic elite "slipped out" from under tough administrative pressure. This process was accompanied by attempts to elaborate a new economic doctrine, attempts that largely influenced the formation of market concepts in the second half of the 1960s.

Evolutionary changes in social organization and outlook had a decisive influence on the character of the social movement in the USSR, and revolutionary circles were gradually replaced by human rights groups.

The Human Rights Movement, 1965–1981

The year 1965 was a radical turning point in the evolution of the social movement. Following the arrests of Andrei Sinyavsky and Iulii Daniel, an entire movement formed itself around Larisa Bogoraz and Pavel Litvinov, the chief goal of which was to make the state comply with its own legislation. This movement had many sources and centers of formation and was comprised of former prisoners (of the Stalin and Khrushchev eras), *samizdat* poets, nonconformist artists, and academic intellectuals who had grown bolder during the thaw under Khrushchev. A leap from underground dissidence to an

1. Andrei Amal'rik (1938–1980), author of *Involuntary Journey to Siberia, Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?* and *Notes of a Revolutionary,* was an outspoken independent thinker who figured prominently in the "democratic movement" of the 1960s. Exiled to a Siberian collective farm in 1965–66, he was sentenced to three (eventually six) years in a Siberian labor camp in 1970, a term that ended in exile in Magadan. Amal'rik emigrated from the USSR in 1976, only to die in a car accident in Spain in 1980.—Ed.

open resistance to lawlessness took place. It was the openness of the resistance that led to the emergence of *samizdat* as a phenomenon of ideological life. *Samizdat* in turn provided a rich environment in which the main trends of social thought that would determine the political development of the *perestroika* period matured.

All attempts at dividing history into periods are antihistorical—in reality, a multitude of relatively independent processes are moving in different directions. For this reason, boundaries between periods of the history of the social movement in the USSR should be regarded simply as markers or reference points. Although Moscow experienced a certain turning point in 1965, pinpointed most precisely by the activities of Alexander Volpin and the December 5th demonstration in Pushkin Square, in general the social movement throughout the country retained its revolutionary Marxist character. In this regard, we should note that the emergence of a new nationalism also affected the transformation of Marxist groups. Yet even in Moscow, a large number of new protest groups were at the stage of "true Marxism-Leninism" until the late 1980s.

Nevertheless, a change took place and new forms of social protest turned out to be unexpectedly efficient. Only a short time passed (1966–68) before thousands of people became united in the Democratic Movement, which saw itself as a united whole with its own periodicals, its own leaders and its own martyrs. The most characteristic feature of this movement was its renunciation of violence and declaration of political goals. The state encountered in the Democratic Movement a new and unknown phenomenon. When it failed to react to the movement strongly or swiftly enough (from the viewpoint of preserving stability), a great many underground groups began to use human rights slogans in their struggle against the regime.

The internal heterogeneity of participants in this movement remained, however, and with the development of *samizdat*, a pluralist evolution of social thought began. New forms of social and political consciousness became established as a result of clashes between human rights ideology and traditional forms of dissidence such as "true Marxism-Leninism," Protestant religions, and nationalism. By 1970, a dual system of "democrats and patriots" had become established in Moscow, with a complicated spectrum of transitory ideologies described in detail by Amal'rik.

Since 1965, the USSR's social movement has been dominated by the Westernized liberal democratic intelligentsia, who from 1972 onward identified themselves first and foremost as human rights activists. For this reason the entire movement of 1965–82 is usually referred to as a human rights movement, although this understanding does not accord with the facts. In the first place, one should note the heterogeneity that existed during this period. Whereas the years 1965–69 were characterized by a certain ambivalence and uniformity, the period between 1969 and 1972 saw the formation of all the main trends that one could conditionally call meta-ideologies.

After 1973, following a short crisis in the Democratic Movement, a western liberal orientation closely related to the ideology of human rights became dominant. The movement's political orientation, however, retained "back-to-the-soil" concepts; characteristic

of this trend was a collection of essays entitled *Iz-pod glyb* (From beneath the clods of earth). Given the west's obvious support for proliberal dissidents, the most diverse trends in the movement declared that they, too, were defenders of human rights. This orientation also helped moderate direct accusations of anti-Soviet activities or nationalism.

The clear human rights coloring resulted in the gradual exclusion of political projects from the social movement; the disappearance of the term "Democratic Movement" in the second half of the 1970s was highly characteristic of this trend. Bogoraz put forward a new term, "Resistance Movement," which met with support and understanding from many dissidents, yet failed to take root. The explanation of this name was quite simple: we cannot put forward any positive program, but we must oppose violence and lawlessness.

This evolution of the democratic trend in the social movement in the USSR led to a renewal of the importance of political groups. On the one hand, the socialist movement became somewhat more active. In 1982, a large group of socialists whose evolution did not fit the mold of the 1960s and 1970s was arrested in Moscow. On the other hand, a liberal, strong-state trend began to emerge within the social movement itself. Adherents of this trend discussed the principles, conditions, and opportunities for transforming the communist state. The journal *Poiski* (Search) was the best-known manifestation of this trend, although by no means did all, or even most, members of the editorial board and the larger group of people associated with the journal think of themselves as advocates of a strong state. These two trends did not develop significantly, however, and disappeared from the scene during the general decline of the movement.

One may suppose that a lack of alternatives and a feeling of doom played a greater role in the dissolution of the social movement of 1965–82 than did government repression. The same factor largely determined the unpreparedness of the Soviet intelligentsia for the reforms launched by Gorbachev.

Gorbachev, 1982–1985

Following a series of arrests in 1979–82, the human rights movement virtually disappeared as a phenomenon, although the level of pluralism in society remained incomparably higher than before the emergence of the movement in the mid-1960s. Human rights activists from time to time raised their voices, but the growth of the "back-to-the-soil," or native land, movement was more important. This growth was latent, however, and when Pamiat'[2] held its first demonstration in Moscow in 1987, the Moscow intelligentsia was shocked.

Furthermore, since about 1973, a genuine pluralism had been emerging among the thick literary journals that played an exceedingly important role in Soviet society. The role of journalism became even more important in the "dead" season of 1983–86, despite

2. Pamiat' (Memory) was one of the first active "informals" of the *perestroika* period. An historical-patriotic association dedicated to preserving Russia's cultural heritage, the group attracted many Russian nationalists of various stripes before becoming best known for its extreme chauvinist and anti-Semitic views.—Ed.

the fact that the liberal trend had largely been squeezed out.

Perestroika, 1986–1988

A new upsurge of the social movement occurred during *perestroika.* This movement, however, had little in common with that of the two preceding decades. Whereas dissidents were trying to break down the rigid barrier separating private life from the sociopolitical sphere and their activities resulted from a well-developed heterodoxy, the "informals" (as the new social movement activists were referred to) demonstrated an astonishing infantility.

The primary reason for this infantility was that the CPSU leadership, convinced of the need to stimulate peoples' activity, had no idea of the source of this activity nor the need to change existing prohibitions on social endeavor. The first step toward increasing social activity was the expansion of opportunities for amateur associations and, quite unexpectedly, "pc" enthusiasts' groups and community family clubs found themselves at the center of new political activity in the country.

As in the two postwar decades, the new social movement was based on its genetic origin in the dominant ideology. Most informals were virtually unaware of dissidents and had only a weak idea of the preceding historical period; when they did know about dissidents, they treated them with suspicion and enmity. The feeling of a basic oneness with the dominant ideology helped informals in their gradual search for vacant areas in which they could show their initiative.

The great majority of human rights activists (those who remained in the country and retained their freedom) considered *perestroika* a camouflage, a new showcase of totalitarianism behind which the CPSU was attempting to deceive the west and carry out a technological rearmament in order to secure the ultimate triumph of totalitarianism throughout the world. The concept that the Soviet communist system was both stable and, in principle, incapable of reforming itself added to the enormous ideological barrier that separated the informals from the dissidents and prevented the latter from having any substantial influence on the development of the new social movement in the early stage of 1986–88.

In some regards, this period was similar to that of 1965–68, except that both in society and in the press, one could feel the presence of human rights concepts, an aspiration to do away with the "planned" economy, and a leaning toward Western democratic values. Representatives of the intelligentsia who had official status (the "*shestidesiatniki,*" or people of the 1960s) became the first patrons of the informals, fearing for the moment to follow the path of independent political activity themselves. Until late 1988, informal clubs as well as the then rather moderate Memorial movement provided ample opportunity for the formulation of fairly ambivalent concepts for the self-development of this same section of the intelligentsia.

Of course, publications in the ever-more liberal press made an incomparably greater contribution toward the ultimate dissolution of Soviet society. The dissolution of society proceeded at a much faster pace than the development of constructive concepts regarding its reformation. Ideas involving some degree of imitation of European society enjoyed the greatest

popularity, whereas virtually no analysis of the condition and capabilities of Soviet society itself took place.

During the entire period of 1986–88, both the social movement and journalism were dominated by unprofessionalism. Professionals were either absent or afraid to come out into the open. The intelligentsia was prepared to protect informals subjected to repression and persecution but, fearing for its status, was reluctant to participate in the activities of these clubs and movements.

Decline of the CPSU, 1989–1993

The turning point came only in early 1989, when it became possible to block opposition from the CPSU Central Committee and set up the powerful Memorial movement, which the Central Committee continued to view as an alternative party. From this moment on, the elections announced for the Congress of People's Deputies began to be taken seriously and the official intelligentsia began to feel that it was safe to participate in politics, going on to struggle for deputy mandates. In 1989–90, the title of People's Deputy was the most prestigious in the USSR.

During this period, the most active of the informals merged with people's deputies who had been elected from the official intelligentsia to form the Interregional Deputy Group. Concepts that had once been on the fringes of the new social movement now became symbols of the new epoch. Prodemocratic deputies followed Sakharov in supporting the Democratic Union's slogans: abolition of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution and introduction of a multiparty system. Tricolor flags were brought into the Congress assembly hall. The era of the slogan "the CPSU must go" had arrived.

The period 1989–91 was characterized by strong opposition between the CPSU and the democrats, weak differentiation within both factions, and the support of the democrats for separatist nationalism, with Russian nationalism pushed to the margins.

The August 1991 putsch led to a shift in paradigms of the social movement. Although warnings of the "revenge of the *nomenklatura*" were heard from the newly independent democratic faction, the character of the movement was already determined by different concepts.

The disappearance of the CPSU from the political arena weakened one of the most important integrating factors of democratic meta-ideology. Yet the intensive dissolution of the USSR—related to the disappearance of the CPSU—accelerated the integration of the conservative faction, so that the opportunities of both groups to influence political developments gradually evened out.

By 17 March 1991—that is, by the time the referendum on the unity of the USSR was held—the boundary between the opposing parts of the political spectrum had been very clearly revealed. The democratic faction, united within the framework of the Democratic Russia movement, called on people to voice an unequivocal "no" to the unity of the USSR. A no less unequivocal "yes" became the platform of conservative organizations. However, just one month after the referendum, at which a greater part of the Russian population voted in favor of the Union, the unity of the democratic forces dissolved. The "People's Accord" bloc, formed by three democratic parties, accused Democratic

Russia of causing a "breakdown of statehood," by which it meant the breakdown of the USSR.

Until that moment, the party spectrum was, to a certain extent, one-dimensional. The main measurement that delimited parties within that spectrum was the struggle between ideologies (democratic, socialist, national–patriotic, etc.). After the referendum, a geopolitical, or "territorial," dimension began to acquire increasing importance. The tumultuous dissolution of the USSR, and the increased likelihood of a dissolution of the Russian Federation following the attempted coup d'état of August 1991 brought national and territorial matters to the forefront of political life.

A two-dimensional model would be most appropriate for analyzing the spectrum of political parties in Russia today: one dimension would represent a party's ideological position as it relates to a market economy; the other would represent attitudes toward resolution of border disputes and the national–territorial division of Russia. Although this two-dimensional model does not cover the entire chaotic diversity of party positions, it would nevertheless show their distribution with greater precision than the traditional one-dimensional "left–right" scale, which continues to introduce an unbelievable amount of confusion into Russian political consciousness.

Imagine the following (highly provisional) mathematical function as a guide to the party spectrum of contemporary Russia. The horizontal dimension of this table would be comprised of the three most widespread and ideologically motivated variants of attitudes toward a market economy: liberal (presupposing absolute market freedom), moderately socialist (stipulating substantial restrictions on the market), and totalitarian (rejecting a market economy and supporting centralized planning).

The vertical dimension would include three types of attitudes toward the problem of territorial borders and the nation–state status of Russia. The first presupposes utmost support for the self-determination of peoples living within Russian territory. It is consistently anti-imperial and does not make any territorial or political claims on republics that have acquired independence as a result of the dissolution of the USSR. The second attitude, support for a "single and indivisible Russia," is directed against "dissolving" or "dissecting" Russia into independent state formations, yet does not presuppose any struggle for a restoration (complete or partial) of the USSR. Proponents of the third variant are in favor of the complete or almost complete restoration of the USSR.

This spectrum is undergoing strong pressure from Yeltsin's current policies. The two dimensions are being forged anew into a one-dimensional opposition as supporters of moderate reform and proponents of strong statehood join together to oppose the government's "liberalism." Pressure from proponents of strong statehood is gradually leading to a rejection of the radical reforms initiated by Gaidar and a greater concern for Russia's state interests. The Yeltsin administration is intensifying its external political activities and work has begun to reintegrate the post-Soviet space. Contradictions between the administration and the opposition reached such a degree of intensity, however, that by 1993 the only solution remaining was for one to

quit the stage; the problem found its solution in the tragic events of October 1993. Russia is now entering a new period when it will have to make a choice between a long period of authoritarian rule or a revival of parliamentarianism.

THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR: FILLING THE GAP BETWEEN ACADEMIC SCIENCE AND POLITICAL PRACTICE

by Anatoly Kovler

"Academic Science" and the Independent Sector: *A Brief History*

Independent thinking has been in opposition to government from time immemorial in Russia. It is widely known that Aleksandr Radishchev was persecuted, that Aleksandr Herzen and Mikhail Bakunin were forced to remain in emigration for many years, that Pëtr Chaadayev was declared mentally ill, and that Nikolai Chernyshevskii was exiled. In his well-known book *The Roots and Meaning of Russian Communism,* the great Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev (who, incidentally, was himself expelled from Russia in 1922) emphasized that the Russian intelligentsia has perpetually been in opposition to government: "The Russian intelligentsia has ultimately taken the form of a splinter group. It will always speak of itself as 'we' and of the state, authority, as 'they.'"[1]

By compromising with the authorities and censors to a certain degree, historians and philosophers commanded quite a high position in society and created a brilliant cohort of disciples and followers. Sociologists and the fathers of Russian political science were less fortunate. Pitirim Sorokin was imprisoned, Maxim Kovalevskii and Moisei Ostrogorskii were forced into long periods of emigration (the latter's well-known work *Democracy and Political Parties* was first published in France in 1905, but never made it into print in tsarist Russia). Although Russia's first department of political sciences was set up in 1833 (earlier than in many European countries or in America), truly independent political studies were conducted only at the Paris-based Russian Higher School of Social Sciences, established in 1907.

Circles for the political self-education of *narodniki* (Russian populists) and, at a later stage, social democrats were widespread in Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was only in such circles that free debate and scientific investigation were possible. The first independent publishing houses specializing in political literature (mostly in translation) appeared after 1905.

The Bolsheviks who staged the October coup in 1917 were worthy successors to the tsarist tradition of suppressing independent thinking and, in fact, went even further than their predecessors. In the first years of Soviet government, the Bolsheviks were content "merely" to close down opposition newspapers and ban "nonproletarian" parties, leaving some leeway for non-Marxist scholars and the artistic intelligentsia. However, once the Civil War had ended and the New Economic Policy was launched in 1921, the regime's repressive ideological apparatus was strengthened and the onslaught against "bourgeois ideology" began. Glavlit, the state censorship body, was set up by a decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars on 6 July 1922. Late in 1922, dozens of out-

1. N. A. Berdyaev, *The Roots and Meaning of Russian Communism* (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1955), 21.

standing scientists and writers were ordered out of the country on the basis of a list drawn up by a committee that included Lenin's wife, Nadezhda Krupskaia. Without waiting for the same fate to befall them, hundreds of others preferred to emigrate from Soviet Russia or withdraw from scientific activity altogether. The Socialist Academy, the Institute of Red Professorial Staff, and the Institute of Marx and Engels, lavishly financed by the state, took over leadership of the "Marxist theoretical front."[2]

At the same time, measures were taken to prevent the reading of "anti-Soviet" and "anti-Marxist" literature; for decades afterward, such materials were kept in special archives, access to which was strictly limited. Academic institutes for the "development" of Marxist theory were also created, among them the Institute of Philosophy, the Institute of Soviet Construction (subsequently the Institute of State and Law), and the Institute of History. Old-guard scholars of prerevolutionary science in the Academy of Sciences were joined by young pro-Marxists; the authorities and the Academy management clearly favored the latter. Alongside names that to this day are the pride of Russian science stand those names branded with the mark of Cain, among them Vyshinskii, Mitin, and Pankratov.

A very rigid hierarchy characterized the research management structure. The Department of Science and Higher School, with its numerous sectors, each of which supervised the area of science entrusted to it, exercised political and ideological control over research in the social sciences. These departments existed not only within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), but also in regional and even district (in large cities) party committees. Programs for research work, teaching programs, manuals, and the plans of publishing houses had to be sanctioned by Party officials, who issued "directives" to scholars. Naturally, there could be no talk of researchers' independence under such conditions. A three-part censorship was at work: political censorship, Glavlit, and the inner self-censorship of an author himself, who avoided writing or speaking about anything that went beyond the framework of the general Party line. In this way social science was seriously damaged. Temporary or permanent groups of independent researchers and centers, discussed below, ventured to repair this damage after the authorities launched *perestroika* (a campaign that, incidentally, retained many of the attributes of a Party inquisition).

Objectivity requires us to admit that both during the 1956–60 thaw and in the "stagnation" years of the Brezhnev era, Soviet social science did manage to make several breakthroughs in sociology, philosophy, law, and history. First and foremost, the information base of the social sciences was expanded. Thanks to petrodollars, foreign scientific literature and periodicals flowed into the country in large quantities. There was great demand for the collected research papers of the Institute of Scientific Information in the Social Sciences (INION), papers that acquainted the Soviet scientific community with the classics of political thought and contemporary Western thinkers.[3]

2. S. A. Fediukin, *The Struggle with Bourgeois Ideology as the Country Switches to New Economic Policy* (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), 159.

The Institute of the International Workers' Movement and the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences led the field in the study of political parties and social movements. Although most of these works focused on political life in Western countries, the methodology and scientific apparatus they employed were completely up-to-date and were subsequently used to study Russian topics. For instance, as a graduate student at the Institute of the International Workers' Movement, I began a study of the party and election systems in France in 1973 using Western methodology; at the editor's request, I was obliged to clarify in the introduction that the research was allegedly based on Marxist-Leninist methodology.[4]

The acquired skill of exploring "foreign" political life was subsequently required in the study of Soviet and Russian problems, yet without the need to quote, albeit only as a matter of form, the immortal classics of Marxism-Leninism. The development of Soviet political thinking, which frequently clashed with the dogmatists of "scientific communism" and Soviet lawyers, is the plot for another story, reminiscent of an adventure novel.[5] In the 1960s and 1970s, sociology was reconstructed,[6] and new scientific fields such as political and potestarian ethnography, political philosophy, and political psychology emerged.[7]

Works by Soviet authors of this period, no matter how ambiguous and modest they might seem today, caused a serious breach in the thick wall of primitive Marxist-Leninist dogmatism. Mikhail Bakhtin and Vladislav Propp (philology), Aleksandr Losev (philosophy), L. Gumilëv (ethnogeography and the philosophy of history), and N. Lotman (structural linguistics) achieved in their works a seemingly unattainable standard of depth of scientific analysis and genuine creative freedom, in spite of the official repressions they suffered. Regrettably, sociology and political science were less fortunate. Nevertheless, having worked for several years as the scientific secretary of the Soviet Association of Political Sciences, I venture to assert that groups of independent researchers who grappled with, among other topics, the problems of political power (F. Burlatsky), bureaucracy (M. Makarenko), and political psychology and Freudianism

3. The merits of the deceased Nikolai Razumovich need to be recalled here. Razumovich headed the law department at INION for many years and published dozens of collected works by Western and Russian prerevolutionary authors.

4. A. I. Kovler, *France: Parties and Electors* (Moscow: Nauka, 1984).

5. The history of the struggle to legalize Soviet political science begins with F. M. Burlatsky's article "Politics and Science," *Pravda*, 10 January 1965. Also see *idem, Lenin, State, Politics* (Moscow: Nauka, 1970); F. M. Burlatsky and A. A. Galkin, *Sociology, Politics, and International Relations* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974); V. G. Kalenskii, *Political Science of the USA* (Moscow: Nauka, 1969); P. S. Gratsianskii, *Political Science in France* (Moscow: Nauka, 1975); and yearbooks published by the Association of Political Sciences, 1963–93.

6. See *Sociology in the USSR*, volumes 1–2 (Moscow: Nauka, 1966); *Sociology and Ideology* (Moscow: Nauka, 1969); *Sociology and Contemporaneity*, volumes 1–2 (Moscow: Nauka, 1977).

7. See L. E. Kubbel, *Essays of Potestarian-Political Ethnography* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), and V. V. Mshvenieradze, *Modern Bourgeois Political Consciousness* (Moscow: Nauka, 1981).

(V. Roshchin) also formed in this field. Within the association, we formulated problems of democracy and political involvement,[8] self-government, and political alienation and ways of overcoming it.

Criteria for Researchers' Independence

The question arises: what are the criteria for establishing the independence of a researcher and what in this connection can be attributed to the so-called independent sector? There seem to be several such criteria:

- independence from the prevailing ideology in society and from political conformism (at issue is a recognition of the universal principles of democracy);
- independence from regular, politically motivated financial contributions;
- complete financial autonomy and self-government;
- the possibility of pursuing research on the basis of one's own notions of its usefulness;
- the independent choice of partners, including foreign ones; and
- access to sources of strategic and scientific information.

Proceeding from the aforementioned criteria, I will go on to argue that the difference between academic science and the independent sector is becoming increasingly symbolic in today's Russia. But first let us try to outline the features that make it possible to define methodological and ontological specificities of political studies conducted by these two sectors, using the study of political parties and social movements as an example.

Research into Problems Faced by Political Parties and Movements

For many years Soviet science examined public movements from only two points of view: the cooperation of public organizations with the CPSU in building socialism and communism (the concept of the "faithful helper and reservist of the Party") and the organizational and legal forms of relations between the socialist state and public organizations.[9] If the first point of view was of a totally ideologized nature, the second retains its relevancy to this day; this was confirmed anew during the drafting of the new Russian Constitution. The 1977 Constitution accorded the status of an institute to public organizations as well as worker collectives. What had seemed a sheer formality against the backdrop of the absolute power of the CPSU acquired relevance under new conditions. Projects drawn up over many years by theoreticians—lawyers in particular—came in useful here. Academic science reacted at a snail's pace to

8. A. I. Kovler and V. V. Smirnov, *Democracy and Involvement in Politics* (Moscow: Nauka, 1986).

9. See A. I. Lukianov and B. M. Lazarev, *Soviet State and Public Organizations* (Moscow: Nauka, 1961); Ts. A. Iampolskaia, *Public Organizations and the Development of Socialist Statehood* (Moscow: Nauka, 1972); A. I. Shchiglik, *Laws Governing the Formation and Development of Public Organizations in the USSR* (Moscow: Nauka, 1967); *The Constitutional Status of Public Organizations in the USSR* (Moscow: Nauka, 1983); *Public Organizations and Bodies of Public Independence* (Moscow: Inostrannye gosudarstva, 1985).

the appearance of new public movements dubbed "informals," regarding them for a long time as variants of existing public bodies. Two young scholars—Nina Belyaeva, who later became the founder and director of Interlegal, a political and legal center, and Nikolai Fëdorov, who eventually became a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, where he "pushed through" a Law on Public Associations—were pioneers in developing theoretical problems of the new public organizations that did not fit within the traditional scheme of the "transmission belts" of the CPSU.

Political pluralism was gaining strength and there arose a need to assimilate and systematize a vast amount of contradictory information about new parties and movements and to identify the law-governed nature of the political process under new conditions. An original work entitled *Russia Today: A Political Profile in Documents,* compiled by a group of independent experts at the Soviet Association of Political Sciences, partially accomplished this task.[10] The goal of this first attempt to assimilate Soviet pluralism was to summarize in a systematized way (to the extent possible at the time) documents and materials about new parties, new leaders, and new trade unions with minimum commentary by experts, in accordance with the principle: "let the reader work it out for himself."

This successful first experiment was followed up and developed by a series of papers compiled by scientific centers in Moscow and other cities. An ambitious project of the Russian-American University's Institute of Broad-Based Political Movements was entitled *Russia: Parties, Associations, Unions, and Clubs.* This multi-volume study turned out to be a quite detailed reference guide to hundreds of Russia's parties and public movements.[11] The flaw of this project was that it lacked in-depth analysis of political life in Russia and criteria for the selection of parties and movements included in the guide. Moreover, such works of reference rapidly lost their relevance because political life in the country was developing at a faster pace than the publishing process.

The necessity for academic and university science to give a more in-depth interpretation of the country's political palette, with its numerous parties and movements, prompted many researchers to turn to the roots of Russian pluralism and the multiparty system.[12] *A Political History of Russia: Parties and Personalities* (Moscow: Terra, 1993), the work of a group of authors headed by

10. *Russia Today: A Political Profile in Documents, 1985–1991* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1991). The group of experts was comprised of B. I. Koval (leader of the group and editor), V. Pastukhov, V. Stepanian, I. Tarovskaia, and I. Shablinskii.

11. *Russia: Parties, Associations, Unions, and Clubs,* volumes 1–7 (Moscow: Rau-Press, 1991–92).

12. I shall here refer only to works issued in the last two to three years: *Political Parties of Russia: Sketches of History* (Moscow: Institute of Youth, 1991); *Historical Silhouettes* (Moscow: Nauka, 1991) [profiles of Russia's politicians of the early twentieth century]; *Policy Documents of the Political Parties of Russia in the Early Twentieth Century* (Moscow: Russian Academy of Management, 1993); S. A. Stepanov, *Black Hundreds in Russia, 1905–1914* (Moscow, 1992); *The Roots of Modern Political Thinking and the Russian Multiparty System* (Moscow: Russian Academy of Management, 1993).

V. Shelokhaev of the Russian Independent Institute of Social and National Problems, is perhaps the most fundamental work on this topic, giving the fullest representation of political life in Russia in the early twentieth century.

A desire to overcome the "reference" approach was manifested in works written by professors at institutions of higher learning. (When teaching, such authors encountered students' eagerness for a more thorough analysis of the developing process.) The slim volume *Russia: The Development of a Multiparty System,* by Iu. Dmitriev and K. Tokmakov (put out by the independent publishers Manuskript) is distinguished by its serious analysis of the political and legal problems involved in the establishment of a multiparty system.

In addition, the Research Institute of Management of the Russian Economic Ministry published a very limited edition (a mere five hundred copies), of an analytical reference collection entitled *Parties, Movements, and Associations of Russia.* The collection offers an original, and so far unused, methodology for studying Russia's political spectrum—the topology of Russia's political space (a system of coordinates, metrics, statics, and dynamics of the political field) and a theoretical outline (power, politics, and the state)—together with the brilliant essay "Political Play-Acting" and information "passports" on parties, movements, and associations in Russia.[13]

It must also be pointed out that academic and university science have begun to react more rapidly to new phenomena in political life. For instance, the Department of the Theory of Political Parties of the Russian Academy of Management issued—within the shortest possible, one might even say "stakhanovite," time frame—an analytical documentary reference book entitled *The Multiparty System in Russia: Blocs and Coalitions* (Moscow: Russian Academy of Management, 1992).

One should also mention the appearance of comparative political research papers dealing with party life in various republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States[14] and political life in the provinces.[15] This brief overview naturally presents an incomplete picture of the processes involved in the quite rapid, in-depth assimilation of Russia's volatile political dynamics now occurring in academic and university science.

13. Iu. A. Dmitriev and K. K. Tokmakov, *Russia: The Development of the Multiparty System* (Moscow: Manuskript, 1992); *Parties, Movements, and Associations of Russia* (Moscow: Research Institute of Management, 1993).

14. Ye. G. Bazovkin, *Political Parties and Public Movements in the System of Modern Democracy* (Moscow: Russian Academy of Management, 1993) [a comparative analysis of Ukraine and Russia]; V. Ia. Tretiakova, "The Development of a Multiparty System in a Country Where Civil Society Is Being Formed" (Ph.D. diss., Russian Academy of Management, Moscow, 1993). Works devoted to political life in Kazakhstan, Georgia, Armenia, and other former Soviet republics have also been published.

15. *Political Parties, Organizations, and Movements in St. Petersburg* (St. Petersburg: Obrazovanie, 1991); *Political Life in a Region* (Ekaterinburg: Urals University, 1992).

Independent Centers and Researchers

Dozens of centers and groups of researchers that see themselves as part of the "independent sector" are active in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Ekaterinburg, Irkutsk, and other cities of Russia. An analysis of their history and activities was carried out in a series of reference materials produced by Interlegal and Postfactum News Agency, obviating the need for repetition here. Let us simply recall the basic points of these materials.

The majority of independent centers were created during the *perestroika* era, when the nascent democratic movement sought alternative sources of information and impartial analysis of current developments in the country. Official sources provided only a one-sided interpretation of events and, at the time, academic science was moving too slowly to respond to new events and was constantly looking over its shoulder at "supervisors" from the CPSU Central Committee. Such independent centers were, as a rule, initiated by young researchers (not necessarily those with a background in the humanities) or by journalists who felt the need for more in-depth analysis than that presented in the press.

The creation of Interlegal, a center for political and legal studies, resulted from this trend. The center was founded in Moscow in 1989 as an independent, voluntary, and charitable institution. Three organizations—Postfactum News Agency, the cultural center of the weekly *Moscow News*, and the "Justice" legal service of Iuridicheskaia Literatura publishers—were the official founders and sponsors of Interlegal. However, as in the case of other centers, the de facto founders of the center were Nina Belyaeva's close friends and colleagues.

The center set itself fairly ambitious objectives: "Inside the country—to facilitate the development of a civil society with the aid of public groups, associations, and movements, which will provide citizens with an opportunity to participate in responsible, state-level decision making and help them create new democratic structures. In international terms—to make the experience of public movements in foreign countries accessible to the USSR's independent sector and help it become part of the world system of nongovernmental organizations using a wide variety of forms of national diplomacy."[16]

It must be admitted that these ambitious objectives have been not only attained but surpassed, thanks to the varied nature of Interlegal's work. Neither academic science nor independent centers that concentrated on narrower tasks could boast of similar work, including such projects as:

- conducting independent studies of relations between the state and society and the mechanisms of their interaction;
- providing expert scientific examinations of laws and other regulatory acts concerning the status of parties, public movements, and charitable organizations;
- extending legal assistance to citizens and organizations during the creation of public

16. Brad Roberts and Nina Belyaeva, eds., *After Perestroika: Democracy in the Soviet Union* (Moscow: Interlegal Research Center; Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991); Vladimir Pribylovskii, *Dictionary of Political Parties and Organizations in Russia* (Moscow: Postfactum-Interlegal, 1992).

organizations and structures, including drafting charters and other important legal documents;

- analyzing the state and the activity of major political parties and public organizations, as well as consulting on these issues;
- studying how the Law on Elections is applied and consulting on election campaign matters;
- setting up a data bank on political parties and their leaders;
- lecturing and participating in other educational activities;
- publishing; and
- creating a library of legal and sociopolitical literature, including books in foreign languages.

In contrast to other independent centers that have carried out research without a clearly formulated program, Interlegal has adopted and begun to implement a specific program of research. From the organizational point of view, this approach has made Interlegal more like an academic institute. The center planned to pursue the following research programs in 1990:

- the independent sector in its social context;
- citizen involvement in political decision making;
- models of democracy;
- the role of public movements in *perestroika*;
- philanthropy in the USSR and Russia: motives, forms, structures, and priorities; and
- human rights: from civil dignity to legal guarantees.

These research programs resulted in the publication of monographs that were in no way inferior to academic publications in both the English and Russian languages. The best-known is *Putsch: A Chronicle of Alarming Days* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1991), widely acclaimed both in Russia and abroad. Interlegal and Postfactum News Agency jointly publish a series of information and analytical bulletins entitled *Opposition and Government, Human Rights, Charitable Organizations: A Chronicle of Their Activity, Women's Movements,* and *Religious Life in Russia*. Together with the Milan-based Italian Institute for the Study of International Problems, the center has carried out fundamental research into problems of nationalism in the former USSR.

As one can see, the range of research topics undertaken by Interlegal is more than simply diverse for a comparatively small structure, it is comparable to the diversity and volume of research work carried out by an academic institute. For this reason, personnel from academic institutes, including the author of this article, maintain cooperation with Interlegal. This cooperation can also be seen in the preparation of alternative draft laws prepared by independent experts under the auspices of Interlegal.

Working towards Political Practice

Let me note straightaway that for the moment, academic science has greater opportunities to exert influence on political practice and to involve, by virtue of established tradition, degree-holding specialists in drafting government acts and bills. It has these oppor-

tunities because of its high level of professionalism and the close ties between science and government, a very significant part of which derives from the academic community. True, some independent centers have managed to elbow out academics in the last year or two, thanks to personal contacts and, perhaps most importantly, due to the high quality of their work in fulfilling state orders for analytical projects. Frequently, such projects are carried out jointly on contract terms.

An example of such cooperation was the major effort launched to draft a bill on political parties. This work was conducted by Interlegal jointly with experts from academic institutes. The formation of a multiparty system called for clearly formulated legal principles to regulate the relationships of political parties with the state and with civil society. The experience of applying the USSR Law on Public Associations showed that the adoption of a uniform law regulating the activity of all types of associations on one and the same basis first, ignored the specifics of the formation and operation of political movements—setting them alongside amateur, sports, and other associations—and second, was not conducive to vesting parties with the responsibility that society has every right to expect of them. For this reason, Interlegal offered its services to the Russian Supreme Soviet in drafting a bill on political parties as part of a package that included laws on the freedom of association, trade unions, and charitable activities. A concept of the future law was elaborated and discussed with representatives of all registered political parties and the following goals of the law were formulated:

- to record explicitly the mutual responsibility of the state and political parties;
- to award legal status to those political groups that meet the criteria for political parties accepted in international practice;
- to streamline the procedure for state registration of the charters of political parties in strict compliance with the principle of freedom of association and the right of citizens to appeal against registration authorities in court;
- to define the range of political parties' rights, the form of their participation in elections, and the basic principles governing the activity of party groups in representative governmental bodies; and
- to establish a system for state subsidies to political parties as well as strict financial accounting within parties.

Following lengthy talks between the Supreme Soviet and Interlegal, the two bodies concluded a contract under which Interlegal was to elaborate the concept and text of the future law. This was the first official contract between Parliament and an "unofficial" group of researchers independent of state or academic structures in the practice of lawmaking in the country. The group comprised both independent researchers and representatives of the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow State University, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Deputies Astaf'ev, Anokhin, Varov, Bragin, Lysenko, Medvedev, Ponamarëv, and

others joined the group of experts at different stages of its work; representatives of political parties who proposed amendments and supplements to the bill were involved in discussion of the bill at all stages. The draft underwent scientific examination in a number of institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences and in universities in St. Petersburg, Ekaterinburg, and Saratov. Evaluations of the bill were received from specialists in Germany's Bundestag and members of the Italian and Spanish parliaments.

This was the first experience of close interaction between various structures interested in a common problem. Regrettably, the bill that was drafted and approved by the committees and the Supreme Soviet Presidium was frozen for a long time because it was considered "nonurgent;" the draft was retrieved from the bowels of the Committee for Legislative Proposals just a few weeks before the tragic events of October 1993 in Moscow. It was then proposed that the vote on the bill take place in November–December 1993, in the run-up to early elections.

Today, it is clear that Russian democracy has lost a great deal of dynamism in the absence of such an important law. Interlegal's efforts were not, however, entirely wasted: it drafted one more bill on charitable activity (also not adopted), which became the foundation for the Temporary Provisions on Non-State, Non-Commercial Organizations in the city of Moscow. In addition, work on the bill on political parties demonstrated that new prospects can indeed be opened up for the independent sector. Yet the same experience demonstrated that it is very risky for an independent center to "dance to the tune" of a single client.

The Information and Research Market

With Russian politics today in a permanent state of tension, it is obvious that studies of the subjects of political life, namely political parties and public movements, are a much sought-after commodity. Moreover, newspapers and television refer to endless public opinion polls; information on various political organizations and analyses of their activity are continually being published; and reference works on political parties are flooding the market. The status of a staff member at an academic institute, a university professor, an independent physicist, or a political scientist is of virtually no significance to the majority of the mass media, just as the label of an academic or independent center is not important. There is one criterion here: information should be full, impartial, and promptly furnished. True, state structures continue, in keeping with tradition, to put greater trust in academic science, whereas funds, industrial associations, and parties favor independent centers or groups of scholars organized on an individual project basis. It would seem that each of the sectors has "found its niche" (a phrase that has now gained currency in Moscow).

Yet I risk provoking general dissatisfaction at this point by claiming that despite obvious progress in the freedom of information and creativity, a truly independent research sector either has not yet been formed or has already ceased to exist in present-day Russia. If we consider that "official" science at one time served ideological functions of the CPSU, it is clear that science is denied such patronage for the moment

and, with it, its sources of existence. Although academic centers retain their powerful scientific potential, they are being denied the opportunity to receive new foreign publications (previously, they automatically received such publications in vast quantities, although such materials were kept in special archives) and communicate actively with foreign colleagues (previously, the KGB exercised rigid control over travel; today there is no money for it). The state now supplies from its budget not more than 30 percent of the funds required to maintain centers for the humanities. This has resulted in the growing dependence of academic centers on state customers, western benefactors, and national sponsors in the form of banks and funds. The integral theme of research is being deformed and many basic research efforts are being discontinued. Ideological dependence is giving way to financial dependence.

Despite the difficult, sometimes catastrophic situation, many Russian academic centers have retained their basic scientific potential and high professionalism. Freed from ideological shackles, they steadfastly, as befits the Russian intelligentsia, endure financial hardship, surprising readers with interesting publications. The independence of judgment among authors sometimes demonstrates amazing pluralism, against the backdrop of which many western colleagues seem almost conformist. The enhanced role of academic centers as institutes of independent scientific scrutiny of the decisions and documents of governmental structures has already been outlined. For instance, the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences has fulfilled such requests almost daily in recent years, whether on behalf of the president, the former Supreme Soviet, the government, the Constitutional Court, or the procurator's office. In this sense, law, economic, and political centers have incomparably greater opportunities than in the past to work their way toward political practice, i.e., toward the policy-making process.

As for the numerous independent centers and funds that emerged under *perestroika* in response to the rejection of official, Party-dependent science, they have displayed greater drive and are more closely in touch with reality and civil society but have, alas, failed to avoid a financial and, at times, political dependence on their clients, one even greater than that experienced by the academic sector. Many have already been gobbled up either by state structures or by political parties and associations of entrepreneurs. Founded by small groups of enthusiast-dilettantes and former dissidents, these centers went through a brief period of extraordinary development. Huddled in cramped offices, they produced work that, in terms of its energy and depth of analysis of current events, outstripped that of cumbersome academic centers, TASS, and APN.

But times are changing. Many centers that were at one time understaffed and underfunded have become well-established institutions with elegant offices fitted out with superior equipment (generally of western manufacture, donated by western partners). The quality of their output has risen from the point of view of methodology, information base, and graphic design. At the same time, however, the output has lost the scent of the challenge once

thrown down before the system by uncompromising street urchins. The output of many of these centers bears the distinct mark of made-to-order production, whether that of a western fund, Russian party, or newspaper.

The "independent sector," earlier associated with the informal public movement as its think tank, has risen in status in the same way as the informal movement itself, many of whose leaders now serve in presidential structures, municipal councils, and associations of entrepreneurs. These individuals have not forgotten their colleagues, to whose advice and research works they owe a good deal of their ascendancy. I am inclined to contend that part (I emphasize *part*) of the "independent sector" has already become a component of the ruling Yeltsin establishment. There is no tragedy whatsoever here. The accumulated potential was simply requested by the authorities. Let us congratulate ourselves on this victory. The once clear division between official academic and dependent science and informal independent research efforts has now lost much of its meaning. If the former previously served Party-state structures, the latter have found themselves no less financially and ideologically dependent on private and nonstate political structures (some are also dependent on state structures). As the saying goes, every cloud has a silver lining: both academic science and the independent sector, finding themselves in a situation where they have to survive as the country moves to create a market, objectively face similar conditions. Objectively too, they are moving to forge cooperation with one another. The work on drafting a law on political parties and joint publications and research are examples of this cooperation. The two groups are also brought together by the fact that many individual staff members of academic institutions now experiencing severe financial problems are able to earn extra money at independent centers and funds, whereas former members of the "informal movement" are eager to write their dissertations at academic institutes.

The Outlook for Political Research in Russia

I have already mentioned that along with the aggravation of the political struggle, which is becoming increasingly polyphonic, Russia is experiencing a boom in political research. I have also attempted to substantiate the idea that both academic science and the independent sector have largely lost their former statuses and, for many objective reasons, have been put on an equal footing. On the basis of these considerations, two conclusions suggest themselves. First, responding to society's need to comprehend intractable political problems, both branches of social research will carry on the search for a way to haul Russia out of its deep systemic crisis. Once they have succeeded in saturating the market with information, they will need (based on their obligation to society) to go one step further—to give society and its political leaders scientifically grounded guidelines for reforming society and a comparative analysis of possible variants and alternatives. Second, regarding the prospects for their cooperation, "academics" and "independents" are simply destined to work together. In so doing, both sides stand to gain, as does society as a whole.

Problems in Studying the Contemporary Russian Business Elite

by Vladimir Lepëkhin

The Russian elite has always been a major problem for Russia. The inferiority first of the Russian, and then of the Soviet political elite—in particular, their inability either to provide effective governance or "restructure" themselves in response to socioeconomic processes—was the main reason for Russia's gradual fall from the ranks of economically and politically developed nations. There are in turn several reasons for the inferiority of the Russian political elite.

The first reason is the bureaucratic nature of power in Russia. The size of Russia's territory, the huge number of so-called provinces, and the fact that the patriarchal population has not been tied into the political elite has resulted, and still results, in a special, bureaucratic type of state government. The second reason is traditionalism. Because of the relative narrow-mindedness of the monarchy and the Russian Orthodox Church—and, in Soviet times, of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)—the political elite was incapable of reform in response to modernization and European–American standards held by the most mobile strata of the population (the intelligentsia, industrialists, and entrepreneurs).

The third reason is the specific role of the intelligentsia. Traditionally, and this is specifically characteristic of Russia, the intelligentsia has been alienated from the majority of the population and in eternal opposition to the authorities—both destroying statehood and diluting the political elite. (Recruitment of the Russian political elite has always occurred at the expense of all strata of the population except the most educated.)

One of the processes that necessarily accompanyied *perestroika* was elite replacement: replacement not only of certain representatives of the elite, but of the elite itself—its structure and methods of formation and recruitment. Thus, one can distinguish a new component in the structure of the post-Soviet elite: the business elite (often denoted by the term "new Russians" in the mass media). In fact, entrepreneurs, or more precisely, the prospering, or at least surviving, members of Russian entrepre- neurship, are often mentioned. To begin with, these people shouldered the political elite in the post-Soviet establishment, on whom depend the prospects not only for the Russian economy, but also for Russian statehood.

The Institute for Political Technologies (the "Russian Institute") is an independent research center founded by this author, Ivan Sukhii, Ivan Vasil'ev, and Grigorii Vysokinskii. It specializes in the study of the Soviet and the post-Soviet elite, with a focus on the business elite. Since the Russian Institute began operating in December 1991, the staff has conducted several analytical research and practical scientific projects. The main objects of study conducted by the Institute are the activities of unions, associations, leagues, and other institutions set up by industrialists (heads of state-owned enterprises) and entrepreneurs (representatives of private businesses). The Institute also studies the activities of political movements, organizations, parties, and other political subjects, including lobby groups, "clienteles," and other "pressure

groups" based on the businesses of entrepreneurs.

The Institute does not examine entrepreneurship *per se*, but the process of the political self-determination of entrepreneurs and their direct involvement in political activities. In our view, from the time entrepreneurship originated as a meaningful social stratum until the autumn of 1993, one could speak only of the self-determination of entrepreneurs, not of their participation in politics. Entrepreneurs played no serious role until the autumn of 1993, when they were forced to begin investing in politics and somehow or other take part in parliamentary elections.

I should mention that the researchers of the Russian Institute treat the terms *entrepreneur* and *entrepreneurship* in the widest possible sense. By *entrepreneurship*, we mean novelties of different kinds in the sphere of economic relations and activities. Thus, the *entrepreneur* is in our treatment not only a representative of a private business but also the author of know-how, the investor, and the manager of the project being realized. Outside Russia, the terms *entrepreneur* and *businessman* are analogous; in Russia, however, with its traditional priority of distribution over production, the entrepreneur is, as a rule, identified with the *commerçant*—a person acting exclusively in the sphere of trade. In our view, entrepreneurs in Russia today are the heads and managers of both private and state-owned enterprises (production-, service-, and infrastructure-oriented) functioning within the system of new, market-oriented relations, as well as the owners of property (including intellectual property) used for the purpose of producing some trade product or its equivalent.

By "political self-determination," we mean the recognition by different entrepreneur groups of their respective interests (immediate, basic, sociopolitical, and political) and the accompanying process by which they unite into unions and associations that are both entitled and able to defend these interests in official power structures. It is obvious that the entrepreneur stratum is extremely differentiated; there is no single entrepreneur stratum in Russia today, just as there has never been a single "directors' corps." The interests of different entrepreneur groups are not only different, but are sometimes in direct conflict (if one speaks of immediate interests). However, practically no entrepreneur group recognizes its basic strategic interests. The deep and deepening differentiation between these interests in turn determines the variety and contradictory nature of the political positions taken by entrepreneur groups.

One should bear in mind that in Russia today, regional, sectoral (i.e., having to do with a specific industrial sector of the economy), and functional interests, as well as adherence to various ideologies (such as liberal, centrist, or national-patriotic) determine the union of entrepreneurs into groups, associations, institutions, and even parties much more than do social–corporative interests, whose appearance and recognition is known to be the basic prerequisite for real political self-determination. In a word, entrepreneurs' recognition of their basic interests—their place and role in the system of political subjects—is only at its initial stage; the entire process will be long and thorny. It goes without saying that the study of how a "capital party" is formed in Russia, the involve-

ment of property-controlling structures in governing bodies, and the political issues facing entrepreneurship will be one of the most important and promising areas of applied political science over the next few years.

The research staff of the Russian Institute, while studying the process of political self-determination and the involvement of the business elite in governing bodies, pays special attention to the classification of entrepreneur groups. After distinguishing the specific nature of each group, researchers at the Institute divided entrepreneurs into three primary classifications.

First are the directors (as well as the managers and heads of individual production links) of various state-owned enterprises: enterprises that are formally state-owned, use state subsidies, and work according to state order; enterprises that have state-owned status and enjoy state support (such as state subsidies, credits, quotas, or licences), but are independent in their choice of customers and consumers; enterprises that are independent in the choice of customers and markets, albeit state-owned, but do not enjoy meaningful state support; and enterprises that are turning into joint-stock societies or are in the process of privatization, but are not yet privatized.

The second classification consists of the heads and managers of enterprises and firms of mixed ownership, including joint-stock societies and other privately held and state-owned enterprises, concerns, and corporations. (In these cases, we absolve ourselves of determining the proportion of shareholder and owner proprietorship.)

Third are the owners and managers of privately held enterprises and firms that are engaged in the following areas: material production and construction; services, trade, and brokerage (i.e., commercial businesses), as well as production infrastructure (such as transport, communications, banking, and insurance); and the production of intellectual property (auditing, consulting, informational, analytical, and other activities).

The research staff of the Institute also studies the process by which entrepreneurs unite into unions, associations, and business clubs, as well as the activities of these institutions and their involvement in politics. Political streams, movements, and parties arising from and created on the foundation of entrepreneur unions are studied in detail. Such movements include the Nationwide Union of Entrepreneurs for the New Russia, the Economic Freedom Party, the Revival Nationwide Union, the Free Labor Party, the Consolidation Party, the Industrial Party, and the Democratic Initiative Party. In our view, the main political movements representing the interests of heads of state-owned enterprises are the following:

1. The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Arkadii Volskii, president), which, along with the Revival Nationwide Union Party, was formed in June 1992 and unites directors of enterprises producing consumer goods as well as the leaders of a number of former state trade unions in the Industrial Party;

2. The Goods Producer Federation (Iurii Skokov, chairman), which is holding talks with the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs on setting up a new mass party, the Labor Party,

on the basis of the Revival Nationwide Union Party, the Industrial Party, and the Goods Producer Federation; and

3. The Association of Privately-Held and Privatized Enterprises (Egor Gaidar, president), a progovernment union of the heads of privatized enterprises that enjoy the support of the government and are in the process of becoming privatized or transformed into joint-stock societies.

It is obvious that the "goods producers" have not been competitive in the world markets. Moreover, due to the fall in the population's solvency and the corresponding decline in consumer demand, these producers have been forced to cut production for the domestic market. Bowing to foreign competition on the domestic market, these enterprises are generally candidates for bankruptcy in the event that their support does not become a priority of state policy. Such enterprises have thus supported the Industrial Union faction in the former Russian parliament and backed other political organizations and parties in opposition to the Gaidar government and presidential structures. By contrast, the monopolist enterprises of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs are oriented toward combining the advantages of the state (subsidies) with those of the private sector (independent control over resources and goods). Hence, their politicized structures display a "golden middle" and "centrist" orientation—a pragmatism that borders on ideological vacuum and political amorphousness.

Finally, privatized enterprises are generally engaged by the government and progovernment political structures, primarily by means of the support of members of the Association of Privately-Held and Privatized Enterprises such as Egor Gaidar, Anatolii Chubais, Pëtr Filippov, and Vladimir Shumeiko; and, secondly, by means of the support of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and other members (Oleg Lobov, Oleg Soskovets, and Iurii Shafranik, for example) of the Funds and Chambers of Private Entrepre-neurship. They are also supported by enterprises of mixed private and state ownership, as well as by new financial and industrial groups that have been created on the basis of key industries.

Beginning in the summer of 1992, each of these three groups increased its pressure on the government, parliament, and president. As a result, enterprise directors were drawing subsidies totaling 500 billion rubles per month in autumn 1992 and succeeded in setting up the Council for Industrial Policy under the Russian president on the eve of the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation in December of that year. Their combined pressure resulted in a number of directors corps appointments to the cabinet of ministers: Viktor Chernomyrdin, Vladimir Shumeiko, and Georgii Khizha. The Seventh Congress drew a line in one sense: Gaidar himself was forced out of the government. It was this directorate that, in our view, played the crucial role in establishing the parliamentary majority that led not only to the dismissal of a number of figures whose authority was not recognized by enterprise directors (Gaidar, Gennadii Burbulis, Pëtr Aven, and later Andrei Nechaev), but changed the government's economic course—more specifically, certain of its economic priorities. (Seventy percent of the majority in the former

Russian Federation parliament consisted of representatives of the enterprise directors' corps and regional elites).

As for representatives of private entrepreneurship ("new businesses"), the differentiation is far deeper. Thus, by autumn 1993, about a dozen political movements and groups were present in the Russian political arena, having been set up on the initiative and the foundation of entrepreneur structures. Among these structures, we distinguish three: the Nationwide Union of Entrepreneurs for the New Russia (Konstantin Zatulin, chairman, coordination council), the Economic Freedom Party (Konstantin Borovoi, leader), and the Free Labor Party (Ivan Kivelidi, chairman). If we compare the ideological platforms of these movements, we find that the Nationwide Union of Entrepreneurs for the New Russia is of liberal–conservative orientation, the Economic Freedom Party of liberal orientation, and the Free Labor Party of social–liberal orientation.

At present, the most influential associations of entrepreneurs include the Association of Russian Banks (Sergei Egorov, president), the Moscow Banking Union (Vladimir Vinogradov, president), the International Association of Heads of Enterprises (Mark Masarskii, president), the League of Russian Cooperative [Owners] and Entrepreneurs (Vladimir Tikhonov, president), the Association of Joint Ventures, International Unions and Organizations (Lev Vainberg, chairman, board of directors), and the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Stanislav Smirnov, president). The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Arkadii Volskii, president) and the Commonwealth Association (Igor Turov, president), which recently joined the former, unite both heads of state-owned enterprises and entrepreneurs in the privately held sector and must also be included among the more influential associations. Among promising associations of entrepreneurs are the League of Defense Industry Enterprises (Aleksei Shupunov, president) and the Association of Privately-Held and Privatized Enterprises (Egor Gaidar, president). One should also not dismiss the Goods Producer Federation (Iurii Skokov, president), which has accelerated its activities of late.

One area in which the Institute has worked during recent months is the study of entrepreneur participation in the parliamentary elections of December 1993. Eleven entrepreneur unions took part in the election campaign in November and December 1993: the Nationwide Union of Entrepreneurs for the New Russia (K. Zatulin); the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (A. Volskii); the Association of Russian Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (V. Piskunov); the Revival Nationwide Union (A. Vladislavlev, A. Dolgolaptev); the Free Labor Party (I. Kivelidi); the Association of Privately-Held and Privatized Enterprises (E. Gaidar); the Consolidation Party (A. Tikhonov); the Economic Freedom Party (K. Borovoi); the Transformation Union (V. Korovin); the Democratic Initiative Party (P. Bunich); and the Union of Russian Oil Industrialists (V. Medvedev).

Experts at the Russian Institute carried out a detailed analysis of the participation of these groups in the election campaign, assigning each one an "achievement rating." This analysis was published in part by *Delovoi mir* (6–12 December 1993) and *Novaia*

ezhednevnaia gazeta (17 November 1993).

In addition, our study focused on other economic subjects that were in some way or another engaged in politics: "clienteles," business clubs, unions of entrepreneurs within certain branches of national industry (trade unions), and lobbying structures. It is obvious that the existing political streams, movements, and parties inside the entrepreneur stratum make up the upper surface level, at which the most "advanced" coalitions and entrepreneur unions—"achievers" in the political respect—are positioned. But we can also distinguish four other strata of entrepreneur unions that are playing a still greater role in politics:

1. "Clienteles," or conglomerates of various kinds of entrepreneur structures, which are grouped around various state officials or political figures: the structure of the Russian Supreme Soviet's administrative department around Khasbulatov, the Revival Fund around Rutskoi, the State Property Committee around Chubais.

2. Nationwide, international, and regional unions of entrepreneurs of the functional and industrial-branch type (entrepreneur trade unions of a kind): the Association of Russian Banks; the Russian Commodity Exchange Union; the International Association of Joint Ventures and Organizations; the Russian Stock Exchange Association; the Russian Insurers Association; the Russian Timber Industrialists Association; the Russian Timber Exporters Association; the Advertising Agency Association; the Union of Russian Oil Industrialists. There are more than fifty unions of this type today.

3. Lobbyist structures and firms set up for the purpose of making inroads in state bodies (first and foremost, in the government) on the part of entrepreneur structures. These include not only the ministerial boards traditional to the former USSR, but new social–state structures such as the Council for Entrepreneurship under the Russian Federation government (under President Boris Yeltsin until December 1992), the Council for Industrial Policy under the Russian government, the Council for Foreign Economic Activities under the Russian Foreign Economic Relations Ministry, and the Public Council for Foreign and Defense Policy.

4. Financial-industrial groups, financial unions and companies, and major concerns and corporations capable of accumulating financial and other resources for investment in the political sphere. In contrast to the above unions, whose main goal is to represent the interests of enterprises and firms in their relations with the authorities, such bodies as the Federation of Independent Trade Unions, financial and industrial groups, financial associations, and other structures of the "corporation" type are the principal holders and managers of material resources and are therefore more capable of affecting the situation in society than are "upper-level" associations and entrepreneur trade unions.

As a rule, these four types of entrepreneur unions avoid direct political involvement and direct and unequivocal relations with the political infrastructure. They influence the authorities mainly by lobbying. Meanwhile, new financial groups (the Menatep financial association, the Commonwealth Association, the Most financial group, the Germes concern, the Tiross financial company, the Imperial Bank, Inkombank and Promstroibank,

the Russian Commodity Exchange, the Nipek Corporation financial groups) prefer local, "point" lobbying. The old industrial-branch groups (such as Gazprom, the Norilskii Nikel concern, the Yakutalmaz Corporation, and the Uralmash, Roskhlebprodukt, and Zil joint-stock societies) combine local lobbying with general industrial lobbying activities.

One must also note account that such financial, or financial-trade, associations and companies as Menatep, Most, Olbi, or Mikrodin are only the first echelon of associations of this kind, "exposed" not only due to intensive advertising campaigns, but to active lobbying. As a rule, these associations are supported by three types of financial structures: 1) those that are trade-related, mostly in the export and import spheres (and therefore in need of the quotas, licenses, and privileged credits granted by the government); 2) those that are mastering financial operations involving new commodities—land and real estate—faster than others; and 3) those that are linked to various financial activities, primarily banking and auxiliary activities such as insurance and investments.

At present, the structural institutionalization of another echelon of financial associations—more powerful than the above—is in full swing: that of financial and industrial associations' holding companies. The skeleton of this echelon consists of major monopolist enterprises, industrial-branch and territorial associations, the raw materials market, arms monopolists and those of other strategic and badly needed goods—"enriched" by the various new enterprise structures (such as brokerage firms, banks, and investment funds) united around them.

The most powerful financial associations (the third echelon), however, are those which existed before *perestroika* on the basis of key branches of the economy (e.g., the fuel and energy, automobile, and nuclear power industries; the machine-building and military-industrial complexes; and industrial-branch and interindustrial-branch associations). As reform started, these associations acquired new banking and other financial structures and, in tribute to the current fashion, began renaming themselves as financial–industrial groups and companies. For example, the Gazprom concern (once headed by current Russian premier Viktor Chernomyrdin) is nothing less than the core of the most powerful financial–industrial group in the country, which easily outperforms any other financial association engendered by "new business."

All the financial–industrial groups and commercial conglomerates which have become increasingly intertwined with political structures are nothing but old and new "pressure groups" (or their offspring) and, in our view, should be the main subject of contemporary Russian policy. It is these "pressure groups" that, as can be seen from the above, are the basic subject of study at the Russian Institute. Predicting the political future of entrepreneur movements and associations is especially important in the scientific work of the Institute; the projections prepared by the Institute during the election campaign in the autumn of 1993 were thus hugely popular with entrepreneur groups.

******

The Russian Institute published the following political studies based on its 1993 research:

- *Entrepreneurs and Power in Contemporary Russia (1991–1993): Political Aspects*
- *Strategy and Tactics of Russian Entrepreneur Associations*
- *Lobbying in Contemporary ussia*
- *Leading "Pressure Groups" of New Business*
- *Capital Party: Technology of Creation and Ideology.*

THE ANALYTICAL COMMUNITY AND REFORM IN RUSSIA

by Gleb Pavlovsky

Twentieth Century and the World: An Analytical Center

The analytical center Twentieth Century and the World emerged during the second half of the 1980s within an informal group of authors and political activists centering around the editorial board of the monthly publication *Twentieth Century and the World*. The group (which at that time included historians Mikhail Gefter, Gleb Pavlovsky, Vyacheslav Igrunov, political scientist Andrei Fadin, ethnologists Gasan Guseinov and Denis Dragunskii, sociologist Simon Kordonskii, and lawyer Nina Belyaeva) was fascinated by the idea of constructing a democratic social alternative to the official policy of liberalization handed down from above known as *"perestroika."*

Compared with other groups within the democratic intelligentsia, Twentieth Century and the World was notable for the attention it devoted to cultural and ideological factors in comprehensive state reform and for its conviction that the USSR possessed a genuine social, cultural, and territorial framework that differed from its decorative political shell, termed by those involved in *perestroika* as the "administrative system." The group's members rejected the opinion, widespread in the Moscow liberal stratum, that the latter was artificial and had been politically "forced" upon a resisting majority. All members of the circle that gathered around the *Twentieth Century and the World* magazine were reasonably sure that the weak elements of civil society within the Soviet totalitarian system and its other civilizing factors, including elementary life-support systems, were closely fused with this very system. The abrupt collapse of the USSR would therefore inevitably lead, at the very least, to a deep barbarization of the political process in the east.

These ideas were not limited to discussions and publications. Members of the Twentieth Century and the World group, acting in line with "stochastic constructivism," were constantly establishing autonomous political, economic, and research entities with the purpose of extending the zone of resistance to spontaneous processes. Today this model of political behavior can be regarded as an attempt to stop the geopolitical avalanche, using the landslide as construction material. Nevertheless, some entities created within this model are still active (having now acquired full independence): Memorial; the Moskovskaia Tribuna club; the Institute for Humanities and Political Research; the Interlegal center; Postfactum News Agency; and finally, Twentieth Century and the World itself, both as a publication and as an analytical center.

It was this group, too, that conceived the plan to set up an independent news agency at a national level, one that would legally operate as a private enterprise (known at the time as "cooperative activity"). It was assumed that such an entity would be able to overcome the vacuum of objective data and limit the reign of mythological formulations and primitive liberal dogmas that had already become established among the Soviet intelligentsia at that time.

Development of the Concept of a Nationwide News Agency

Due to procedures for the classification of information and criminal penalties for disclosure of state and military secrets, the USSR information field was greatly stratified, complicating the coordination of activities of individual people and groups. The Postfactum News Agency was built on the premise that the USSR information field was ideologized and characterized by a hypertrophy of explanations. On the one hand, there was a system of normative perceptions supported by the entire way in which the state functioned; on the other, people considered all state assertions concerning reality to be a fiction.

In every period of the life of the Soviet state, there existed a balance between negativist and orthodox myths that allowed people to survive and to act. *Glasnost'* could be regarded as a violation of this balance. The types of activity that surfaced under *perestroika* as a rule turned out to be unsuccessful and to bring with them no satisfactory results. People thirsted for information essential to successful, concrete action. By no means did all people want this information, of course—just those who became involved in politics or who legalized their commercial interests (these people later came to be called the "new Russians").

To satisfy the needs of "new subjects" in successful activity (and in forming the very criteria of success), news agencies had to possess information on *what* existed, *how* it functioned, *why* it happened, and *how to behave* to achieve success. In receiving and accumulating information, an agency needed to be associated with independent research centers as well as state research and information entities. Independent news agencies, it was believed, could in the long run initiate a new information and intellectual environment, hence the idea that organizing the information environment would consolidate opposition circles on the basis of rational blueprints of reality and create a rapidly expanding "oasis" of dominant, nontotalitarian models of behavior that would function as a pressure on the retreating totalitarian sector.

One can easily see the conceptual similarity between this model and the reformist scheme put forward by the Gaidar team. In fact, several members of that team had earlier been active participants in the work of the Postfactum agency.[1] By the time Gaidar's reform government was set up, the Postfactum News Agency had become the second-largest private agency in Russia, with well-established media-monitoring centers, a regional data bureau, and an analytical center. The inclusion of former agency colleagues in the government created the practically irresistible temptation to organize a system of supplying and analyzing information on reform.

The 1991–1992 Information Project

The disintegration of the USSR washed away systems for collecting, analyzing, and interpreting

1. This interaction was, however, not without conflict. The Gaidar version of economic liberalism was subjected to sharp criticism by the agency's analysts; in its special expert file "Boris Yeltsin—Leader of Great Russia?" (May 1991), the analytical center of the agency was the first to pay attention to the national-autocratic and authoritarian accents of the Yeltsin regime.

information about the country's condition, systems that had been developing throughout its entire existence. By 1989 the general state system for gathering and analyzing statistical and economic information was already disrupted. Moreover, systems for gathering, analyzing, and interpreting sociopolitical information had been organized to service the totalitarian state and proved completely useless for collecting information on the processes currently under way in the territory of the ex-USSR. Managerial and commercial decisions made in a virtually total information vacuum generally turned out to be erroneous and only added to the economic and political crises. Given these circumstances, under the aegis of the so-called "government of reform" an idea surfaced to pool the efforts of public organizations, commercial entities, and state bodies of the Russian Federation and other CIS states to create a system for collecting, analyzing, and interpreting information.

The idea was, first, to arrange a system for collecting and analyzing primary factual, sociological, and economic information in the territory of the former Soviet Union and, second, to obtain a carefully weighted, expert evaluation of the economic and sociopolitical situation in those states that had emerged within the territory of the former USSR, based on a comparison of assessments made by organizationally independent expert groups. The project was elaborated with the participation of the Russian government, represented by the Working Center for Economic Reform, the Postfactum News Agency, the Institute for Humanities and Political Research, and the Relcom joint-stock company.

It was planned that the information collected by the agency would be forwarded through communications channels to expert groups which, using this material in conjunction with their own information, would formulate assessments and compose their own forecast documents. The documents issued by each group of experts were to be channeled to the Expert Council, which would draw up a final evaluation and forecast, relying both on the experts' evaluations and its own information. Such products included the following: 1) weekly analytical reports prepared separately by the expert councils of each foundation and placed at the disposal of all partners in the project; 2) fortnightly analytical surveys of the "state of the country" prepared by the united Expert Council that coordinated evaluations and forecasts of the chief experts; and 3) six-month reviews.

Today it is easy to see that we were somewhat utopian in our estimation of the role of adequate information and analysis. The concept of "civilizing information and analytical servicing" in general shared, and even foreshadowed the 1991–92 constructivist dogma that a new Russian statehood could be built by a group of realistically minded, well-subsidized intellectuals with a ruthless attitude toward the masses. Many of us proceeded from the assumption that the presentation of relevant data on any issue could "provoke" a process of revision of the authoritarian-monetarist model and push "the government of reform" toward a discussion with broad public circles.

Gaidar's "Government of Reform"

The division of state responsibility in November 1991 between the "political government" of Yeltsin and the "economic government of reform" of Gaidar brought unexpected consequences. The group of "power ministries"—the Security Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and, due to the state nature of the electronic mass media and their exclusive role in Yeltsin's coming to power, the Ministry of Press and Information—found themselves at the epicenter of the political government. "Political" ministers had the opportunity to blackmail "economic" ones, the more so in that their public blackmail provided the Gaidar team with arguments for blackmailing the western economic community.[2]

The year 1992 was ushered in by the abolition of price regulations, after which Gaidar's government took one other, more radical step: the introduction of free trade. Gaidar's "government of reform," ideologically based on the "Polish model," pointedly rejected subsidies and price controls and separated actual economic and political processes in Russia and the CIS countries from their management by the state. A number of phantom concepts then filled the gap between actual streams of commodities and money and the imitation of their management, for example, "party pluralism" (an intangibility for the public masses in the capital and most provinces, as well as for the authorities themselves) and "constitutional order" (an order respected by neither of these parties, yet one which maintained the "the rules of the game").

Elimination of the mechanism of state price regulation signaled the beginning of a universal pillage of USSR state property by regional, sectoral, and former Communist Party *nomenklatura* groups. Liberal doctrine ensured their freedom of appropriation and redistribution of state resources—products were converted into hard currency and exported beyond the boundaries of the Russian Federation. Idealistic reformers liberated the social groups formed under socialism from the burden of any sort of administrative or political limitation and even included some of these groups in new distributive oligarchies. The servicing of these oligarchies, however, was assumed by administrative entities of the former Union state.

Although many consequences of "shock" therapy were unexpected by proponents of the "Polish model" (including the resistance of structural social groups within socialist society), such results had been predicted. In the mid-1980s, a group of economists and sociologists including Simon Kordonskii and Vitalii Naishul authored the theory of the administrative market and used it to explain the socioeconomic arrangement of the USSR and the logic of its possible transformation. From the viewpoint of this theory, the reforms of the Gaidar government were neither necessary nor suffi-

2. The "political government" acted as the center of gravity for anonymous groups and lobbyists and was subject to constant rotation that simulated activity. Western investors, more interested in Russia's military-political stability, saw in neither the "Gaidar cabinet" nor the "power cabinet" that was being constantly reshuffled behind the scenes a group capable of ensuring this stability. Moscow has to date failed to produce a single responsible government.

cient, since they relied on initially false ("Sovietological") ideas about the social structure of socialist society, the socialist economy, and socialist institutional arrangements. Monetarist policies and methodology simply could not bring about the results the reformers desired.

If one proceeds from the theory of the administrative market, the outcomes of "radical economic reform" boil down to deepening social stratification, the commercialization of authority (i.e., growing corruption), the discovery of a structural social dynamic, and the destruction of Russia's administrative–territorial structure (leading to its regionalization).

As early as mid-1992, members of the Gaidar team had become convinced that liberalism, even moderate liberalism, was an unacceptable ideological base for the elaboration of state policy. On one side, new economic forces used liberal economic doctrine to demand freedom of action for themselves while excluding competitors from the game (generally by means of state regulation, primarily licensing). On the other side, inconsistent and corrupted liberalism provided a good target for traditionalists.

Territories, Regions, and the Ideology of Restoration

By the summer of 1992, members of the Gaidar government had discovered for themselves the existence of Russia's regional structure, which they had formerly attributed entirely to "the Stalinist administrative-territorial legacy." But the need to provide credit for the delivery of freight to the Russian North and springtime agricultural work performed across the vast Eurasian expanse, as well as to maintain the armed forces of the former USSR on this huge territory, sobered them. The territorial factor, classified as an externality by liberal economic dogma, proved to be active, even decisive, in Russia. Many of Russia's problems as a part of Eurasia stem from the necessity of controlling an enormous and poorly developed space—using the force of central authority to make it an area of subordination, distribution, and control. The state continues to function on the basis of alienating financial and material resources from their owners in order to maintain social stability and support the imperial inheritance, i.e., an impotent army and an ineffective system of management.[3]

Thus in Russia today calls are being heard for the "restoration" of the pre-October Russian Empire, together with the claim that Russia is the "successor" to the USSR. The idea of anti-Communist restoration was wholly borrowed from the countries of Eastern Europe; yet there, unlike in Russia, the idea entailed a restoration of the parliamentary system and relied on those members of the older elite of these societies who either still remembered pre-Communist ways or had received political educations directly from pre-Communist forces. In Russia, advocates of restoration were directly opposed

3. The Chernomyrdin government is directing its efforts toward the preservation of the administrative integrity of the state at the expense of economic liberalization and, above all, toward a slowing of social stratification—essentially localizing this stratification to a narrow stratum of "new Russians" politically dependent on the state.

precisely to those at the summit of the age pyramid and could find acceptance only in a myth that opposed youth and the "new Russians" to the traditionalist majority. This alone made the ideology of restoration prone to conflict and set it in opposition to the masses (as it was "vanguardist"), everywhere sowing conflict; the fate of the Lenin Museum and Mausoleum is only the most notorious example of such controversies. The (rather inconsistent) application of this ideology by the government gave the government itself a narrowly partisan and even conspiratorial nature.

Intertwined in an odd and totally inorganic way with democratic declarations, national democracy was creating an ideological brew that inevitably had to simplify itself one way or another. It is not by chance that inside this amalgam, a number of the creators of official national democratic ideology of the "Second Republic" steadily evolved toward "irreconcilable opposition" to the government (Astaf'ev, Baburin, Rumiantsev, and, to a certain extent, Khasbulatov). Characteristically, anti-Communist advocates of restoration feel no respect for the political tradition and ideas of the first democratic Russian republic of 1917. The democratic press thus accused those who participated in direct negotiations between the conflicting parties in early October 1993 of a "spineless *Kerenshchina*" (the weekly *Sobesednik*) and "opportunism" (*Izvestia*).

The post-October split in the democratic elite separated two traditions which had been mixed. The liberal-oriented forces that oppose the regime of Yeltsin's personal power owe their allegiance to the democratic threads of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Russian political culture, whereas the pro-presidential camp has adopted the course of a direct restoration of the Russian Empire, with overt monarchist intonations evident in the idea of a "strong president" as the source of power in general.

For example, in the semiofficial newspaper *President* (no. 36, October 1993), A. Bukatin proposes a truly monarchist concept of Yeltsin's power as "the power granted from God through His people." In his article "Half a Czardom for a Czar" (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 29 September 1993), Aleksandr Arkhangelskii wrote:

> "The President's step is inevitable. It is merely a little late. I hope not as late as was, in its time, the disbandment of the State Duma (by Nicholas II)... Yeltsin is compelled to do as a monarch can and must do who has the source of his 'legitimacy' in his own self.... Whether the monarchy will be restored or the inner monarchist sentiment remain an unrealized complex of the new Russia—I do not know."

In the newspaper *Vek* (no. 41, October 1993), A. Prokhvatilov wrote, "The old master should rely on a new, broader social base."

Practically one day after firing on the White House under the ideological guise of "anticommunism" and "antinationalism," the presidential bloc adopted a number of the ideas of the parliamentary bloc's extremist wing: ethnic purges in Moscow, reinstitution of the passport system, a new role for the army, pretensions to the role of policeman of Eurasia (pretensions that forced President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan to nearly tear down his September 1993 "ruble pact" with Russia). All these ideas were borrowed from the irreconcilable radical opposition; characteristically, they

have earned the approval of right-wing extremist organizations: "The promise to severely punish 'southern invaders' is the cornerstone of the election campaign of the National Republican Party of Russia, and its implementation (to general approval, which is sad) was practically set in motion by Luzhkov," wrote Lysenko (*Moskovskii komsomolets*, 27 October 1993). "Naturally, I realize this is a demagogic step on the eve of the elections, but it is clear to me that Luzhkov is a pioneer in this matter."

In response, the new opposition is addressing the Russian democratic heritage, in particular the political traditions of the Democratic Movement of the 1960s–1980s, the first Russian republic of February–October 1917, and the antiautocratic ideas of the prerevolutionary liberal democratic opposition. The result is a political choice: the creation of a genuinely new statehood within Russia's existing borders by involving real members of the population—with their regional, ethnic, and religious differences, as well as their traditions and beliefs of the Communist period—in the political process; or the consolidation of various distributive groups of the Second Republic in an oligarchy engaged (especially after 4 October 1993) in an all-around defense from the entire society.

The second case—and it is precisely this model that is being realized before our very eyes in the name of the state—involves the formation of a virtually private system of power, reliance on the arbitrariness of administrative entities, suppression of dissent, and the unleashing of xenophobia, fear, and self-made, decentralized violence in the country (following the pattern of prerevolutionary "Black Hundred" organizations and contemporary Latin American right-wing extremist groups).

In this ocean of instability a citizen will be forced to side with the Moscow power center, which reigns without rules or limitations.

Old Social Stratification and New People

A multilevel system of interests based on new social stratifications has formed in Russia today. The president (together with his government and administration) represents the interests of Russia as the successor of the USSR. The federal ruling stratum worries about the army, borders, customs and other systems, and relations with "near" and "distant" foreign countries. The functionaries from local bodies of authority (the regional elites) are pondering how to feed the population of their regions and how to sell at the largest profit possible the remnants of USSR property in their territories. The "directors' corps" and the former sectoral elite no longer symbolize authority for their subordinates and are today successfully usurping opportunities for power that derive from property rights to those industries under their administrative control.

The "new people" (businessmen and rich people) have acquired a personal speculative fortune. Exporters of rare metals and oil are now trying to convert speculative capital into real estate, land, and production facilities at any cost. The "new Russians" are interested in a strong state, an interest which manifests itself in local activities to create local security systems and individual attempts to "reach" state functionaries, turning them into agents of

influence of such local interests. Local preferences granted to individual "new people" or their groups, however, cancel one another out and are hastening the disintegration of existing state institutions.

The majority of the country's population—that is, the people (including intellectuals)—are utterly marginalized. Representatives of "the people" either gradually become richer and join the "nouveau riche" stratum or fall to the very bottom of the social hierarchy, turning into new lumpens. The stratum of rich people is supplemented by corrupt state functionaries and directors of commercialized enterprises. At the same time, the lower stratum of the social hierarchy is being replenished with people who had earlier belonged to supreme strata, but now find themselves without a function in Russian society.

The pace of social stratification is very great in sociological terms, where time is estimated in generations; people who join a certain social stratum rarely understand their new status in full. Crude differences and oppositions continue to dominate an individual's realization of his/her social status. Moreover, the various social strata are still not arranged economically or institutionally, and people who in their external guise are members of one social group remain internally (in their self-estimation) members of the socially established groups of pre-*perestroika* society.

The "new Russians" were forced to support the president and government in their fight against the Supreme Soviet, fearing that a victory by the soviets would spell physical elimination for members of the new class. At the same time, business people understand very well that this president and this government do not on the whole regard them as citizens. Rather, they are viewed in the same manner as medieval German princes viewed rich moneylenders, pawnbrokers, and Jews. The "new people," unlike regional and sectoral postsocialist leaders, are interested in preserving a single linguistic, cultural, and financial space. This space could become a new Russian state whose boundaries would not necessarily coincide with the borders of the existing Russian Federation. Today the "new people" are acting in alliance with the federal authorities against regionalization; this is a temporary bloc, however, since federal authorities need the restoration of a unitary administrative integrity, whereas the "new people" need a single economic and legal environment.

The "new Russians" have been and still are overestimated as the vanguard force allegedly interested in rationalizing political mechanisms and creating a normal, nonpartisan statehood in Russia within its new boundaries. Commencing with the events of September 1993, the "new Russians" have exposed themselves as all but the most Kremlin-dependant, demoralized, and authoritarian stratum of Russian society. One example of this reality was the following right-wing extremist intonation: "The time of illusions, pluralism, democratic flirtation is gone.... No freedom of speech in the nearest future. All captured defenders of the White House, all those red-faced, sweaty, moronic creatures should either be made to run the gauntlet or put on display in a zoo.... *À la guerre comme à la guerre*" (Dmitrii Bykov, *Sobesednik*, nos. 39–40, 1993).

One cannot totally rule out the restoration of totalitarian "center–periphery" relationships in the

territory of the former USSR. Such a restoration is possible either within the framework of a restoration Communist or restoration nationalist ("imperial") model. At the other end of the scale is the possible disintegration of Russia and the other former republics into regional entities with primitive, marketless economies locked into themselves and in conflict with one another. An intermediary point on the scale would be the preservation of Russia as a state in which local communities, with their remaining administrative market relations, are politically integrated into a federal state with a market economy. After the events of 21 September–4 October 1993, however, the last option is unfortunately nothing more than an optimistic hypothesis.

"Anonymous Power" and the Construction of a New Opposition

The events of October have broken the 1991–93 balance. The quasi-statehood of the second Russian republic has walked off the stage, discrediting all political and social groups connected with it. A genuine danger of discrediting democratic and legal instruments has now surfaced.

Among the positive consequences of October 1993, one might cite the split of the pseudomonolithic (1986–93), politically active, urban intelligentsia (or "democrats"). This split ushered in a new dynamic in the milieu of the political elite. Politicians and public figures who supported Yeltsin's September coup have been discredited, and their isolation is growing with every day. The idea of instituting Russian democratic statehood is currently acquiring a character of conspicuous opposition to the regime personified by Yeltsin.

The "manipulation Utopia" designed by Moscow intellectuals to influence the central authorities has collapsed. "Indirect representation" of the Moscow liberal group has been completely transformed into "anonymous power" within the Kremlin—the power of the president's depoliticized entourage, inside of which a fierce struggle is under way to form the future (post-Yeltsin) "collective leadership." Yeltsin himself is acceptable to members of his own entourage only until he has to depend on them, allowing them to control key state decisions. No doubt, in the event of growing social rejection of Yeltsin's personality as the source of the civil divide, his entourage will make an attempt to replace him at the earliest possible opportunity with a view toward maintaining control over the presidential post.

The opposition does not exist in its previous form. The Supreme Soviet, like the Yeltsin Kremlin, was a particle of a fragmented oligarchy incapable of self-identification. This bloc led the USSR to catastrophe, and later interfered with the formation of a democratic Russian republic. By granting unconstitutional authority to the president, it is precisely the Supreme Soviet and its leadership who bear responsibility for sanctioning the antidemocratic liquidation of the USSR and organizing an unconstitutional center of power.

The success of the parliamentary opposition in the December 1993 (utterly manipulated) elections will itself have no independent significance; the parties of the previously existing political spectrum went bankrupt within two weeks of the Moscow confrontation in October. The authorities are acting promptly, severely, and nondogmatically to involve

in a coalition everyone who does not object to one thing: their prerogative to exclusive sovereignty. Yesterday's "democratic" figures are involved in the framework of the new order and the active defense of its prerogatives; this is an additional demoralization. That the renowned human rights campaigner of the seventies, Sergei Kovalëv, and the nonparliamentary radical liberal activist Valeriia Novodvorskaia find themselves neighbors to right-wing extremist leaders such as Vladimir Zhirinovskii (LDP), Dmitrii Vasil'ev (Pamyat'), and Nikolai Lysenko (National Republican Party) in a single front in support of the president is a manifestation of the downfall of yesterday's "political spectrum."

This reality places partially symmetrical demands on the new opposition. Restoration of an opposition requires a mass, pan-Russian, decentralized movement that to a certain extent ignores yesterday's disputes, united by an ideology of protecting human rights and a rejection of the central authorities' manipulation and *diktat*. Such an ideology today could most likely be antiauthoritarian. An antiauthoritarian movement should become the generator of the extraparliamentary opposition. After the restoration of a normal political spectrum, the movement would most likely separate along liberal, leftist, youth, regional, and other lines.

Today, the informational/analytical and expert community of the democratic wing faces the task of reconstructing political life, which has been virtually abandoned and corrupted by presidential authority. The point at issue is to revive the oppositional spectrum and return society to politics in general. The solution of this task could become the responsibility of a new opposition bloc coordinating forces of public (extraparliamentary) and parliamentary opposition. Independent information and research entities are currently taking an active part in its preparation.

THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL MARKET

by Georgy Satarov

Introduction: The Political Market as a New Russian Reality

After a period of seventy years during which a political, economic, and ideological monopoly dominated the scene, and after desperate attempts to make the transition to political and economic freedom, one can now confidently assert that Russia has gone over to a free political market. This market is not yet civilized, it is suffering from all known childhood diseases, its voice is cracking, and it is still trying to act like a "grown-up." Our political market has not yet created a consumer culture, and as a result, a good number of people in Russia are suffering from a peculiar form of twisted bowels. Yet one thing is certain: the political market is already free. Moreover, its freedom sometimes spills out of the framework of "realized necessity," taking on unruly and absurd forms.

The market of political concepts, political slogans, and political leaders is not simply a metaphor. The political market has its own price fluctuations, supply and demand balance, soaring inflation, bankruptcies, and accumulation of easy money. The analogy is all the more appropriate in that the economic crisis that Russia is experiencing is accompanied by a crisis of political values. Economically, we have just done away with the centralized economy and have not yet managed to push ourselves into a market-oriented one; politically, the depreciation of old values has not yet given way to a stable "new convertible currency." At the same time, it is precisely on the political market in Russia that we have the most aggressive advertising based on the most inadequate market analysis.

The process of change in political values, orientations, concepts, and sympathies taking place in Russia is exceedingly dynamic, as is political life itself. The interest of a researcher studying this process is commensurate with the problems that arise in analyzing such swift changes. The range of problems is so extensive that almost any selection of particular problems may seem arbitrary.

Since 1991, the INDEM (INformatics for DEMocracy) Center for Applied Political Research has been conducting sociological studies of the political perceptions and political consciousness of the Russian population. This article is based on an analysis of two sociological surveys conducted in May–June 1992 and December 1992–January 1993. The surveys were carried out on sample groups of approximately four thousand able-bodied urban and rural residents of the Russian Federation, representative of the general aggregate in seven parameters (sex, age, education, marital status, nationality, native language, and knowledge of languages of other peoples of the former USSR), with an a posteriori error not exceeding 0.057 and a confidence factor of 0.95. Specific aspects of these surveys and structural rating methods are described elsewhere.[1]

1. See G. A. Satarov, "Multidimensional Scaling," in *Interpretation and Analysis of Data in Sociological Research (Moscow: Nauka, 1987); G. A. Satarov, "Structure of Political Preferences of Russian Residents: From Politics to Economy," in Russian Monitor: Archives of Modern Politics* 1 (1992): 135–48; and Iu. L. Kachanov and G. A. Satarov,

Of all the diverse subjects covered by the surveys, the present article will describe the results of studies of Russian residents' political preferences on the basis of their assessments of political slogans. A separate section is then devoted to the perception of centrist values.

Political Preferences: Methods of Analysis

In studying respondents' individual attitudes, we used as our basic materials aggregates of political statements selected from the programs of political parties registered in the Russian Federation as of April and October 1992, respectively. The statements were selected in such a way that, first, all parts of the political spectrum would be represented and, second, political statements would be represented in proportion to their "weight" (i.e., their mobilizing force). The list prepared for the first survey contained fifty statements; the second, seventy-four.

Respondents were asked, among other things, to select the six statements that they supported the most. Respondents' answers were expected to reveal an ensemble of political preferences revealed by the noncontradictory nature of these assessments. For instance, if a respondent supports private enterprise, one may expect him/her to oppose calls for a return to a planned economy.

All respondents had their own individual ensembles of preferences. This, however, did not prevent us from comparing them. Since all respondents are agents in the same political field, there exists a "structure" of social concepts that allows them to coordinate their political practices and, in this particular case, use common categories in perceiving and assessing political developments. This makes it possible to analyze the diversity of individual political preferences in categories of social concepts common to all respondents.

Methodologically speaking, this means in particular that, according to the aggregate of respondent answers, one can divide opinions into several nonintersecting classes that would very likely provoke similar assessments (positive or negative) from respondents, whereas statements belonging to different classes would be assessed differently. This distribution of statements into classes should be "politically meaningful" from the point of view of consistency and a system of common categories. In essence, it is a method of describing the system of political preferences through categories by which individuals realize and reveal their political demarcations.

The statements were classified in such a manner that once a respondent selected a certain statement in a certain class as one of the six that he/she supports the most, he/she would most likely select other statements in the same class. In accordance with our methodology,[2] we analyzed a matrix of differences between statements, that is, the difference between two statements depended on how frequently they were simultaneously selected by respondents. We assumed that these differences reflected the degree of semantic similarity (closeness of connotative meanings) of political slogans. This matrix was processed afterward using several automatic classification methods

"Metamorphoses of Political Consciousness," *Russian Monitor: Archives of Modern Politics* 3 (1993).

2. See Satarov, "Multidimensional Scaling."

in order to compare and check the stability of the results obtained. The meaning of the classification thus obtained, as well as the meanings of individual classes, was determined by the contents of slogans included in each class.

This classification, however, provides no information on how the individual classes correlate with one another or how they correspond with the respondents. A more complex model was used to answer these questions. Let us suppose that the political characteristics of statements may be described by points in a certain coordinate space that has, as axes, latent factors explaining the variety of respondents' assessments of these statements. These factors have the meaning of sought-for categories engendered by "poles" of political delimitation, for example "democracy-totalitarianism" or "separatism-unitary state." Respondents may also be represented by points in the same space: the point corresponding to a certain respondent may be viewed as a point corresponding to a statement that would be ideal for this individual. We assume that the closer a statement-point is to a respondent-point, the more positively this statement would be assessed by the respondent. Our task is to find the a priori unknown latent factors and determine the coordinates of statements and respondents in the space described by these factors on the basis of information about the respondents' answers.

We solved this problem in two steps. First, using the nonmetrical multidimensional scaling method,[3] we determined the number of required latent factors and the coordinates of statements. Respondents were then "submerged" in the statement space obtained during the first stage. We had previously established that in order to do this, it would be sufficient to correlate each respondent to a point with coordinates determined as an arithmetical mean of coordinates attributed to the statements that received the highest assessment (3 or 4) from the respondent. Following this simple procedure, all respondents had points attributed to them in the space. It is important to note that the numerical values of coordinates do not matter so much as the mutual location of points along a straight line. In this case, similar preferences of respondents, revealing themselves in similarity of assessments (sets of selected statements), are represented by points located close to one another spatially.

All respondents were afterward classified in accordance with the previously established classification of slogans; each was referred to a certain class formed by the center of gravity of slogan-points from this class if this center of gravity was the closest to the respondent-point. Having obtained a classification of respondents, we used the structural range quartile rating method.[4] Using this method, we attributed a value ranging from 0 to 1 to each slogan which indicated the likelihood of this slogan taking a lower position in an arbitrary experiment in which the sample and list of slogans may vary. The higher the rating value of a certain slogan, the higher the position it has with regard to other slogans. The method is interesting in that it allows us to compare rating values obtained for differing slogan

3. Ibid.

4. See Iu. N. Blagoveshchenskii, "Procedures for Use in Plotting Complex Ratings of Politicians," *Russian Monitor: Archives of Modern Politics* 1 (1992): 265–70.

lists from different sample groups and at different times.

Political Preferences of Russian Residents: First Survey Results

As a result of the first survey, we obtained five classes of slogans. Listed below are the names of these classes and examples of the slogans they include:

1. Conservative Opposition.

A common feature of the statements in this class is the nonacceptance of private ownership and a disposition toward a centralized, planned economy. Examples: "Land should be recognized as national property, part of the human environment that may not be transferred to private ownership" (Socialist Labor Party). "An immediate centralized restoration of broken economic ties and state economic sector manageability is necessary" (Russian National Union).

2. Pseudo-market Opposition.

The purely "political" part of statements in this class is characterized by sharp criticism of current policy and a disposition toward state patriotism; the "economic" part is characterized by a reserved attitude toward market-oriented reforms. Examples: "It is necessary to elaborate and realize a program aimed at forming, in public consciousness, concepts of state patriotism, the value of friendship between peoples, human solidarity" (Socialist Labor Party). "In conditions of an absolute shortage of goods and services and economic disorganization, attempts to liberate uncontrolled economic processes may result only in aggravating the crisis" (Labor Party).

3. Social Conservatism.

Statements in this class demonstrate a disposition toward paternalist state policies, egalitarian tendencies, and criticism of bureaucratic trends and privileges in the state's machinery. In addition, this group includes statements demonstrating respondents' nonacceptance of revolutionary methods and the use of force. Examples: "The hardships of the transitory period may be alleviated by introducing compensations that would take into account monthly price indices" (Democratic Reform Movement). "It is inadmissible to make Russian statehood and civil accord in the country permanent objects of potential blackmail, hostages of chance happenings and vicissitudes of the alignment of regional political forces and ambitions of regional leaders" (People's Party of Free Russia).

4. Pragmatic Liberalism.

Slogans in this class demonstrate an obvious preparedness for market reforms accompanied by a certain adjustment of the current course and creation of guarantees for unprotected population groups. The political part of these statements is characterized by an attitude toward democratic values that is not indifferent and a rational national and state system. Examples: "The intellectual and material prosperity of the country is possible only when state interference in economics, politics, and private life is firmly restricted by law" (Democratic Party of Russia). "It is necessary to separate the competencies of local and federal authorities, thus providing for the supremacy of each authority level within its jurisdiction" (Russian Party of Democratic Reforms).

5. Romantic Liberalism.

Statements in this class characterize a radical liberal position, including support for total

economic freedom, unrestricted private ownership, and minimal state interference in the economy. Examples: "It is necessary to transfer state property and land free of charge to the private ownership of all (willing) citizens" (Democratic Movement of Reform). "Considering the critical state of the health care and educational systems, it is expedient to introduce a system of medical insurance and to totally renounce free secondary, specialized, and higher education" (Democratic Reform Movement).

Subsequent analysis showed that a single latent factor would be sufficient to explain the diversity of respondents' answers. Polar positions along the axis of the single factor were occupied by statements having a primarily economic character and contraposing two opposing political concepts: planned regulation of the economy and a free market. The classification of slogans corresponded to the results of multidimensional scaling, and respective classes of slogan-points were grouped along the axis in the above order. Finally, we should note that classes 1 and 5, occupying polar positions along the latent factor axis, contain only statements of a primarily economic character.

All this gives grounds for supposing that the only factor we have singled out that describes the diversity of respondents' preferences has been engendered by the delimitation on matters of a primarily economic nature. Differences in assessments of purely political statements have a subsidiary, attendant character. Further on, we shall refer to this factor as a "liberalism scale." Classes 4 and 5 are located at the right end of the scale, class 3 is in the center, and classes 1 and 2 are at the left end.

The percentages in column 4 (volume) are of the overall number of respondents (217 persons, or 5.4%, did not answer this part of the questionnaire). Column 5 shows the average deviation of

Table 1. Characteristics of Typological Classes of Russian Residents' Political Preferences in the First Survey.

Class number	Class name	Class volume	Volume (%)	Compactness	Center of gravity
1	Conservative opposition	108	2.8	0.066	0.827
2	Pseudo-market opposition	729	18.3	0.069	0.586
3	Social conservatism	1,674	41.9	0.120	0.303
4	Pragmatic liberalism	1,154	28.9	0.147	0.274
5	Romantic liberalism	112	2.8	0.165	0.829

coordinates of points belonging to the same class, which describes the compactness or uniformity of views of respondents in each class. Column 6 shows the centers of gravity (arithmetical means of coordinates) of points belonging to each class.

Thus, we have singled out five population groups with different social concepts and political preferences. On the right pole is the small (2.8%) class of "romantic liberals" (class 5) who unreservedly support drastic economic reforms, right up to renouncing free education and health care. This group shows an obvious indifference to purely political statements.

Next to this, slightly closer to the center, is class 4 (28.9%), "pragmatic liberals" who accept reforms with certain reservations, primarily related to guarantees for economically unprotected population groups. Many of them agree that free prices should have been introduced only after the establishment of a strong private sector. This class includes many adherents of enterprises of the collective, shared ownership type. This group supports values of a democratic and rational national–state system and is concerned with scientific and cultural development.

A little to the left of center is the most numerous group, "social conservatives," class 3 (41.9%). A disposition toward paternalist state policies and egalitarian tendencies among its representatives are accompanied by nonacceptance of revolutionary actions, which is highly symptomatic.

To the left of class 3 are two groups of opponents of the regime. The first includes approximately 18.3% respondents. They do not oppose gradual economic reforms, yet accuse the authorities of unpredictability, lacking a reform program controlled by the people, and having mechanically and inadmissibly transferred methods of western economic regulation to Russian soil. This group includes many supporters of the concept of state patriotism. The remaining group, class 1, is located on the extreme left flank and is the smallest (approximately 2.7% of the total). It consists of active adherents of a centralized planned economy.

It would be useful to compare these results with those obtained in surveys conducted in 1991 using similar methodology. The main difference is that, formerly, the basic differentiating factor engendering a variety of political preferences was of a purely political nature; it represented a contraposition of orthodox communism and radical democratic liberalism joined to anticommunism. Economic matters had a secondary, attendant nature. Developments in 1991–92 made the political delimitation factor less important. The hierarchy of all political delimitation factors changed, which resulted in a restructuring of the political space and, accordingly, changed the structure of public political consciousness. This manifested itself also in the fact that the diversity of political preferences is now described primarily by the economic factor, whereas political matters have an attendant nature. There is another difference: the democratic flank has split into two groups. Meanwhile, the numbers in the social conservative group have remained substantial.

Political Preferences of Russian Residents: Second Survey Results

The second survey, conducted over half a year later, demon-

strated a change in the structure of political consciousness. In the first place, this revealed itself in a new classification of slogans described below.

1. National-State Conservatism.

Slogans in this class belong to parties of a Communist and national patriotic orientation; they are characterized by strongly antireformist views and opposition to current policy. Examples: "Land should be recognized as national property, part of the human environment that may not be transferred to private ownership" (Socialist Labor Party). "An immediate centralized restoration of broken economic ties and state economic sector manageability is necessary" (Russian National Union).

2. Ideology of State Supremacy.

This group includes slogans supporting values related either to a restoration of the former USSR or a stronger role for the existing state in all spheres. Examples: "We should renounce 'womanish' foreign policy and be more active in applying pressure to settle the situation in 'hot spots,' no matter what the West's attitude would be" (Russian National Union, Rutskoi). "Russia should establish itself as a world power; peoples and states that have from time immemorial gravitated toward Russia should unite around it" (Russian Workers' Communist Party).

3. Moderately Centralized Reformism.

Slogans in this class support gradual economic reforms with substantial state control and a relatively low liberal component. Examples: "The priority task of economic policies should be to check the production decline" (Civic Union). "The breakup of the integrated economic space as a result of the USSR's liquidation enormously hampers the search for a way out of the crisis and the implementation of reforms" (Civic Union).

4. Democratism.

This class includes slogans expressing the traditional "democratic syndrome." Examples: "A democratic administrative, budget, and tax reform, rather than new powers for the center and executive authorities, is what will stop the upsurge of corruption, the ongoing dissolution of Russia, the lawlessness" (Young Generation—New Policy). "State authority structures should not be formed on a national basis, since it is necessary to proceed from the priority of human rights over the rights of any group, including nations" (Democratic Party of Russia).

5. Moderate State Liberalism.

In contrast to class 3, the values of this class are closer to liberal values, but include state control and exclude hasty reforms. Examples: "Land reform is a long process of gradual transformation of the structures that currently exist in the countryside, during which one should prevent their destruction and avoid discouraging people with one's hastiness, incompetence, and indifference to the trifles of life. We should not allow land reform to result in even a temporary decline of agricultural production" (Republican Party of the Russian Federation). "It is necessary to exempt investments from taxation, establish taxation benefits for socially substantial projects, and at the same time toughen the tax collection system" (Civic Union).

6. Liberalism.

This class includes the principal liberal slogans that call for reducing

the role of the state and providing for and supporting drastic market reforms. Examples: "There needs to be state support for those just starting out as private entrepreneurs; they should be given easier access to means of production and to low-interest credits" (Forum of Russian Reform Supporters). "Russia should be fully integrated into the world market. To integrate our economy into the world economic system means to fill our shops with high-quality goods and provide Russian enterprises with modern technologies" (Forum of Russian Reform Supporters).

When we subsequently applied multidimensional scaling methods to the same data, we found that the diversity of political preferences could be adequately described by two latent factors. Analysis of slogan distribution on the plane of semantic space allowed us to attribute a certain meaning to axes of this space and name them accordingly. Along the horizontal axis, the slogans were arrayed from the traditionally democratic to the obviously national–conservative. The factor (latent variable) corresponding to the first axis was therefore named "democratism." Analysis of slogan-point projections on the vertical axis demonstrated that its opposite poles were occupied by slogans that, on the one hand, insistently emphasized individual interests and, on the other, stressed the role and importance of the state. It would be natural to name this axis "etatism."

The number of dimensions is the most important aspect of the semantic assessment space we have obtained. Semantic structures, when they are established, tend to become as simple as possible. If circumstances change (e.g., if new knowledge is obtained), semantic structures rearrange themselves in order to adjust to the new circumstances, resulting in a temporary complication of these structures. In geometrical semantic models, the number of dimensions is a characteristic of their complexity. Thus, the increase in the number of dimensions from 1 to 2, which we observed during the experiment, allows us to suppose that we have registered a rearrangement of the semantic structure—the structure of preferences—of public political consciousness. Table 2 (following page) shows the characteristics of classes singled out during the second survey.

In accordance with the above methods, these six classifications were used to calculate structural ratings of slogans included in the lists prepared for both surveys. The results of these calculations are utilized in the next section.

The Semantics of Centrism

In describing centrism, I oppose it to radicalism regardless of the political and ideological coloring of the latter. The criteria below are based on this opposition and on the differences revealed in slogans, that is, the differences found in analyzing both the ideological products themselves, published over a certain period (approximately three years), and the generators of these products: political leaders, parties and movements, and the mass media. The criteria introduced have a semantic, rather than ideological, nature. We shall explain below the reasons for this semantic nature.

The first criterion may be formulated in a very simple way: pragmatism. The name in itself, however, does not mean anything; it remains an ordinary formula unless it is operationalized. We maintain that pragmatism re-

Table 2. Characteristics of Typological Classes of Political Preferences in the Semantic Space of Assessments.

Class number	Class name	Volume (%)	Compactness	Share of centrist slogans
1	National-state conservatism	8.4	0.189	0.083
2	Ideology of state supremacy	28.4	0.157	0.200
3	Moderately centralized reformism	10.1	0.174	0.438
4	Democratism	18.6	0.125	0.500
5	Moderate state liberalism	30.2	0.130	0.400
6	Liberalism	4.3	0.132	0.444

veals itself in slogans on the political market of present-day Russia in at least two forms.

The first form is the relation of centrist slogans to the present day. Radicalism, characterized by its emphasis on absolute values, addresses either the future (in which these values will win a sweeping victory) or the past (to which one should return without fail in order that these values are victorious). Finally, radical values may exist outside of time due to their absolute nature. Here are some typical examples: "It is only at enterprises owned by free entrepreneurs that a worker can get a fair price for his labor, a just remuneration for his skills and diligence" (Democratic Reform Movement) or "The national composition of representative authorities and mass media must be in strict proportion to the national composition of the overall population" (Pamyat', Russian Liberation Movement).

Centrism, instead, tends to appeal to the present day, to its peculiar features, specific aspects, and requirements. For instance, radicals maintain, "Black is always better than white." Centrists object, "Possibly so, yet now, taking into account the specific nature of the present moment, it would be wiser to believe that white is preferable." An example from "real life": "In current circumstances, holding a referendum on any problem will result in social instability" (Republican Party of the Russian Federation, Democratic Party of Russia, People's Party of Free Russia).

The other form of pragmatism has to do with practical matters, right up to formulas for getting out of the crisis, that usually color centrist slogans. Indeed, if it is difficult to prepare a centrist mixture of Communist and liberal con-

cepts, one may try to find a middle road between the market and state regulation of the economy: a regulated transfer to the market. As for radicals, they prefer speaking of lofty matters; a petty utilitarian outlook is alien to them.

Another criterion is concern for the means of achieving one's goal. Centrists are prepared to devote individual slogans to the means themselves, regarding them as independent values. Naturally, they speak about moderate, cautious, "therapeutic" means. If there are some absolute, timeless values typical of centrism, these first and foremost emphasize evolutionary forms of change and nonacceptance of revolutionary methods. For instance: "Any use of force in settling national territorial conflicts in the current explosive situation is fraught with irreparable tragic consequences" (Republican Party of the Russian Federation).

Whenever centrists refer in their slogans to both a goal and a means of attaining it, the emphasis is generally placed on the latter. Radicals, instead, are either totally indifferent to means or, when mentioning them (and, of course, the means they propose are drastic, intense, and revolutionary), do so in passing, as something obvious. Finally, radicals often confuse purposes and means, substituting one for the other, which is only natural, given their indifference to the matter. A typical example: "Neither land nor large property in Russia may belong to foreigners. The process of privatization should be suspended until mechanisms are created which will provide for property to be placed in Russian hands" (Russian National Assembly).

A third criterion of centrism is whether or not a link between politics and economics is taken into account. A more thorough analysis may show that this linkage is probably a particular case of the second criterion, to the extent that policies may serve as a means of realizing economic aims and vice-versa. Yet the indisputable importance and fundamental nature of these two categories makes it necessary to single out this particular case as an individual criterion of centrism. Radicalism either sees no difference between economics and politics or substitutes one for the other (these approaches are interdependent). At the same time, radicalism typically stands up for political (economic) concepts without thinking about their economic (political) consequences or, alternatively, their prerequisites. Radical liberalism is a typical example; it considers economic aims much more important than the political means of attaining them. Centrism, on the other hand, tends to coordinate political and economic matters in its slogans, carefully differentiating between them in order either to "cleanse" the former of the latter or, alternatively, to indicate the correlation of causes and consequences. For instance, "The country should not pay for a way out of the crisis by impoverishment of the greater part of its population, a sharp social stratification based not on labor contribution to creation of national wealth but on speculation and unjust distribution, which is fraught with serious social upheavals" (Socialist Labor Party).

We used the above criteria as filters to differentiate between centrist and radical statements (slogans). Obviously, in this case centrism means something other than an affiliation to the political camp of the person who gener-

ated a given text. It means the presence of a certain syndrome in the slogan—an aggregate of semantic indicators that are (consciously or unconsciously) implanted in the text so that it is perceived on the market of ideas in the manner the author (consciously or unconsciously) attributes to an established political niche (in this case, the centrist niche).

Our social practices are characterized by an absolutely defective vertical political line of communication, due to which latent conventional criteria of centrism, including semantic indicators, are established and used in a stable fashion exclusively by the political class. In other words, only a small stratum of practical politicians, experts, journalists, and politically minded members of the public automatically and steadily differentiate the "centrism currency" from all others. To recognize and assess a centrist slogan, an untrained person may need additional information, such as an indication of its source (leader or party) or direct prompting: "this is what centrism is."

In our experiment, respondents were concerned with the pure semantics of slogans, even without a pragmatic context (if one does not consider respondents' lives as such). This made it possible to formulate the following question: how and to what extent does conventional political consciousness perceive semantic indicators of centrism in political texts?

Centrism on the Russian Political Market

Let us now consider the dynamics of the supply of centrist slogans in the period between the two surveys. Since the people who drew up the lists of slogans were unaware of their ultimate purpose and were guided only by considerations of representing themselves, it is appropriate to assign ourselves this task. The results of the comparison are presented in Table 3.

The difference between average rating values for centrist and other slogans in winter 1992 is assessed by a t-criterion, which stands at 1.115. This corresponds to a probability of error, with the zero hypothesis rejected, not exceeding 0.12. This is not a great margin of error, yet one must bear in mind not only the numerical

Table 3. Comparison of Data on Assessment of Centrist Slogans in the Two Surveys.

Survey	Spring-Summer 1992	Winter 1992 1993
Number of slogans	50	74
Share of centrist slogans	0.100	0.380
Average rating of all slogans	0.463	0.476
Average rating of centrist slogans	0.463	0.500
Average rating of other slogans	0.463	0.462

value of the difference, but compare it with the zero difference of the first survey. The difference appears even more significant if one considers the ten most popular slogans in the two surveys. In the first survey, these included only two centrist slogans (with only one among the three most popular). In the second survey, there were eight centrist slogans among the first ten and the first three were all centrist. The three most popular slogans and their ratings are as follows:

"The priority task of economic policies should be to check the production decline" (Civic Union), 0.774.

"It is essential to provide for the survival of sectors (transport, power industry, communications), the destruction of which would undermine the state economy" (Civic Union), 0.743.

"Any use of force in settling national territorial conflicts in the current explosive situation is fraught with irreparable tragic consequences" (Republican Party of the Russian Federation), 0.738.

In addition to the above trend, one could not but notice another: eight slogans were included in both lists and the ratings of four of them changed substantially. Let us consider these slogans and their ratings in the first and second surveys, respectively.

"It is only at enterprises owned by free entrepreneurs that a worker can get a fair price for his labor, a just remuneration for his skills and diligence" (Democratic Reform Movement): 0.290, 0.601.

"Land should be recognized as national property, part of the human environment that may not be transferred to private ownership" (Socialist Labor Party): 0.612, 0.393.

"Thanks to freedom of trade, all resources are striving to occupy an optimal position in the economic system, and this results in the disappearance of shortages of commodities and services as resources find their way to places where they are valued more highly and, accordingly, will be exploited most efficiently" (Democratic Party of Russia): 0.173, 0.257.

"Considering the critical state of the health care and educational systems, it is expedient to introduce a system of medical insurance and to totally renounce free secondary, specialized, and higher education" (Democratic Reform Movement): 0.312, 0.510.

These changes are evidently indicative of a certain shift toward the liberalization of public political consciousness. Two factors are probably at work here: propaganda and concrete changes; in particular, a sharp increase in the number of people employed at private and joint-stock enterprises.

One can see, therefore, that in the course of half a year, there has been a sharp increase in the supply of centrist slogans, accompanied by a certain increase in demand. Does this mean, however, that demand has become established for centrism as a political position differentiated by political consciousness? Our analysis makes it possible to check this hypothesis.

Table 2 describes each typological class by two figures. The first is the share (percentage) of respondents described by the syndrome corresponding to this class, meaning that these respondents selected slogans forming the syndrome of this class in the course of our survey. The other figure represents the share of centrist slogans in the list of slogans forming the

syndrome of the class. The table shows that centrist slogans are clearly unevenly distributed in classes that correspond to different poles of the current political spectrum.

This empirical fact may be interpreted in the following way. Perception of centrism is primarily characterized by a lack of association with national–state conservatism and (to a lesser extent) the ideology of state supremacy (class 2). In other aspects, the perception of centrism has no specific features, that is, it does not involve correlating a slogan to a certain portion of political space. These observations may be explained in two ways. The first explanation is that conventional political consciousness is not yet accustomed to perceiving centrism as an independent and substantive political entity. The second is that semantic indicators used in a nondeliberate manner by the political class to demonstrate its affiliation to centrism does not achieve its purpose in the process of vertical communication. The higher demand for centrist slogans may be explained by the combined action of two factors. The first is people's concern about the economic situation, which makes them more attentive to slogans addressing the present moment and to concrete formulas for overcoming hardships. The second factor is that the rising value of liberal slogans, on the one hand, and the appearance of etatism as a factor explaining the diversity of people's political preferences, on the other, may indicate that a certain law is at work in public political consciousness: in periods of economically oriented social development, individual values prevail over social ones; this prevalence is accompanied by lower interest in abstract political concepts, an aspiration for stability, and nonacceptance of extremism. These are typical features of liberal–conservative consciousness, and their appearance outside the political class is without doubt an important, substantial development among the numerous metamorphoses taking place in Russian society.

About the Authors

NINA BELYAEVA was born in 1957, graduated from Moscow State University Law School in 1981, pursued post-graduate studies at the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and completed a Ph.D. in law at London University Law School in 1986. Ms. Belyaeva is a research fellow at the Institute of State and Law and president of Interlegal, an international charitable foundation for political and legal research in Moscow. Founded in 1989 as a non-profit organization, Interlegal promotes and supports the establishment, growth and development of the independent sector and civil society in Russia and the other newly independent states of the former USSR.

VYACHESLAV IGRUNOV was born in 1948 and studied the economy of labor at the Odesssa Institute of the National Economy from 1969 to 1973. In 1967, he founded an underground library of books published by amateur authors; the library existed in twelve Soviet cities until 1982. Arrested in 1975 for "circulation of slanderous allegations discrediting the Soviet social and state system," Mr. Igrunov was released from prison in 1977. After working as an economist in an Odessa industrial association in the mid-1980s, he founded the Moscow Information Exchange Bureau (M-BIO) in 1987, where he served as director until 1990, when he created the Institute of Humanitarian and Political Studies. Mr. Igrunov was a founding member of the "Memorial" and "Moskovskaia Tribuna" groups during the *perestroika* era. The Institute of Humanitarian and Political Studies conducts research on the political process within its cultural context, focusing on political monitoring (sociological surveys, regional studies, and political analysis), the mass media, and public movements and parallel culture. Mr. Igrunov was elected a Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation in December 1993.

ANATOLY KOVLER was born in 1948, studied at the Moscow State Institute of Foreign Relations (1966–1971) and completed post-graduate studies at the Institute of the International Working Movement (now the Institute of Political Science). He completed a *kandidat nauk* in history in 1978, and a *doktor nauk* in law in 1991. He has worked at the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences since 1980, where he has been Senior Researcher; Head, Department of Foreign Law; and is today Director, Center of Comparative Law. A member of the Russian Association of Political Sciences since 1976, Dr. Kovler has also been a senior researcher at Interlegal since 1989.

VLADIMIR LEPËKHIN was born in 1959 and graduated from the philosophy department of Moscow State University (MGU) in 1985. He has taught political science at MGU since 1990. In December 1991, he founded the Institute of Political Technologies (the "Russian Institute"), an independent research institute that specializes in the study of entrepreneur groups in the Russian Federation. Based in Moscow, the Institute has branches in St. Petersubrug, Irkutsk, Ekaterinburg, and Volgograd. Since March 1992, Mr. Lepëkhin has been the coordinator of the Russian Association of Political Experts and Advisers.

GLEB PAVLOVSKY was born in 1951 and graduated from Odessa University in 1973 with a specialization in history. Mr. Pavlovsky was a founding editor of the *samizdat* journal *Poisk* in Moscow; arrested in 1982 for publishing in *samizdat*, he was sentenced to a prison term and then sent into exile. He returned to Moscow in 1986, where he became one of the organizers of the Social Initiative Club, a maintstay of the "informals" movement during the *perestroika* era. In 1989, he became a member of the editorial board of the journal *Twentieth Century and the World*, where he is currently editor-in-chief. In 1989, Mr. Pavlovksy helped to found POSTFACTUM Information Agency, the first independent national news agency in the former USSR, later serving as the agency's president and chairman of the board.

GEORGY SATAROV was born in 1947, graduated from the Department of Mathematics of Moscow State Pedagogical University in 1972 and completed a Ph.D. in technical sciences in 1985 at the All-Union Research Institute for System Studies, USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, USSR Academy of Sciences. Dr. Satarov taught at Moscow State Pedagogical University from 1973 to 1990, when he founded the INDEM (INformatics for DEMocracy) Center. He became Director-General of the Russian Sociopolitical Center in 1993. INDEM studies the activities of democratic institutions, including the Russian parliament (past and present), governmental bodies, parties, political movements, the electorate, and the political elite; it publishes results of its research in the journal *Russian Monitor*. Dr. Satarov was

appointed Assistant to the Russian President on Parliamentary and Public Organizations Matters on 7 February 1994.

JAMES ALLEN SMITH is the Executive Director of the Howard Gilman Foundation in New York. He is the author of *The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite* (New York: Free Press, 1991), as well as individual institutional histories of the Brookings Institution and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.