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LENINGRAD: A POLITICAL HISTORY 1934-1953

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Colloquium
Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies
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Preliminary Comments and Excerpts

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PRELIMINARY COMMENTS

Included in this colloquium paper are excerpts from the introduction and from several chapters of a longer study covering the Zhdanov period of Leningrad's history. The study concentrates on the trials and tribulations of Leningrad, its leaders, and its inhabitants under Stalin's rule from 1934 to the latter's death in 1953. Running through it is a reconsideration of the role of Zhdanov in the Stalin regime.

The motivation for choosing Leningrad rather than Moscow, the capital, or Kiev, "the mother of Russian cities", is several-fold as is the relevance of the study for the present. The city was the tsarist capital of modern Russia. In the Soviet period, though no longer the national capital, it was always headed by a top, or rising, political leader until Zhdanov's death in 1948. Long before the revolution the city had become a cultural center, a scientific center, architectural wonder, and a source of innovation for the rest of the country. It was the well-known "window on the West", a symbol of enlightenment and of the real world. Along with the intellectualism of the city there existed on a greater scale than elsewhere a "proletarianism" by which the revolutionary leaders set great store. The machine-building, instrument-making, and especially skilled manufacturing of the city's enterprises before the revolution and its growing labor force provided the "true revolutionaries" for three revolutions. The partnership of intellectualism and proletarianism also nurtured a tradition of opposition to arbitrary rule. This, however, would come to plague the city during the Soviet period.

Moreover, a history of adversity, both natural and man-made, seemed to have imparted to its inhabitants a certain stoicism, accompanied by a grim determination to rise above their adversities.

These factors contributed to an intense loyalty and community sense in the population of the city which seemed even to infect Soviet political leaders assigned there from elsewhere. This in turn tended to complicate their individual political relations with the Kremlin in Moscow. Problems in the treatment of the city arose naturally because of its potential to outshine the capital, Moscow, and because of its reputed role as an opposition center, whether true at a particular moment or not. Many are inclined to view Leningrad as a living being, endowed with a certain mystique--perhaps exaggerated by some observers--molded by Russian history and not yet obliterated by the Soviet experience.

Emerging first from this study is a local case history of the problems which Stalinist repression and the unresponsive political system imposed on the functioning of a major Soviet city. For Leningrad the story is even more poignant because of the talents, resources, and potential of the city wasted by the politics and excesses of the Stalin period. Zinoviev, while the city's boss, pleaded the case of Petrograd with minimal success and Kirov's later espousal, perhaps making some headway, was cut short by assassination. It is difficult to find Leningrad enjoying its rightful priorities until some while after the death of Stalin.

In the early 1960s, before Khrushchev's ouster, Leningrad historians were laboring hard to demonstrate in their writings what positive achievements were accomplished in the enterprises, schools, and institutions of the city during the Stalin period. This was initially a part of the party-

inspired, self-serving operation nationwide to demonstrate that in spite of the cult of Stalin, the Soviet people led by the party had persevered in the historical task of building socialism. If not cut short by Khrushchev's fall, the effort might have provided further insights on the period, and undoubtedly much work that was completed now sits in files or archives unpublished. On reading the Leningrad writings, however, one is more persuaded that the authors were thinking of St. Petersburg's (and Leningrad's) traditions and history which inspired the city's continued drive for achievement rather than the leadership of the party.

Reconsideration of the role of Zhdanov under Stalin has been stimulated by new information published by the Medvedev's and others and also by the reassessment of Stalin's role which has transpired since his death. Many Western observers in the immediate postwar period viewed the so-called Zhdanovshchina as one of the worst manifestations of the Stalinist system. Much of this reputation was derived solely from Zhdanov's postwar strictures on cultural and ideological questions. There was, moreover, insufficient appreciation at the time of the enormity of the responsibility that Stalin personally bore for repressive and other actions taken during his rule. There is little doubt that Zhdanov was a faithful subordinate and carried out Stalin's wishes to the letter. But, within the spectrum of Soviet leaders of the time, all responding with alacrity to Stalin's demands and some anticipating them more than others, Zhdanov does not seem to fit the category of Kaganovich and Beriya, for example, nor of Molotov and Malenkov.

It seems questionable, moreover, that after suffering through the wartime blockade with the people of Leningrad that Zhdanov would, unfeelingly, with no scruples or hesitation, blast the Leningrad literary journals,

Zoshchenko, Akhmatova, and other Leningrad writers as he was forced to do in 1946 (Nadezhda Mandelstam recalls that during the war Zhdanov called Tashkent personally on a special government line to make sure that Akhmatova was well taken care of). The castigation rather was dictated by Stalin's pique, fueled by literary establishmentarians, over such things as Akhmatova's tumultous reception at her 1944 poetry reading in Moscow on the way back to Leningrad from Tashkent, plus his suspicions regarding Leningrad, similarly played on later by Malenkov and Beriya in the "Leningrad Case".

More important in assessing Zhdanov's role at this time is a differentiation of what went on while he was alive and what transpired following his death in August 1948. Loren Graham, in an appendix to his Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union, made a long overdue start in setting the record straight, marshalling the evidence to show that Zhdanov did not pursue an ideological witchhunt in the natural sciences. Moreover, taking up where Graham leaves off, it can be demonstrated that it was precisely the arts and the social sciences, i.e., the more highly ideological fields, to which Zhdanov confined his attacks. Therefore, when Lysenko intensified his struggle against the geneticists in 1947 and in 1948, Zhdanov, and his son in particular, resisted it, as Graham notes, and only Stalin's personal intervention won the day for Lysenko.

Intrusions in the other natural sciences occurred after Zhdanov's death when Malenkov had taken over many of his responsibilities. Moreover, the initiation of more repressive measures accompanying these campaigns in the arts and sciences did not occur while he was alive. Similarly, the broadening of the ideological campaign to focus on "rootless cosmopolitans",

which was directed mainly at Jewish intellectuals, dates from early 1949. While Zhdanov certainly acted as the initial spokesman for the anti-foreign theme running through the postwar ideological attacks and one cannot be certain that things would have gone differently had he lived longer, the above seems to suggest that he might have been a restraining force on the extent of the ideological campaign and the repressions which followed.

Finally, this study of Leningrad and its people, hopefully will abet a finer general perception abroad of the consciousness of Soviet society in the Stalin era. Impressions gained of the individual thought patterns, motivations, and aspirations of Leningraders cannot be restricted to them but are representative of a larger segment of Soviet citizenry. In spite of constraints imposed by ideology and limitations on freedom of information, their social and political attitudes were not necessarily primitive, backward, or dominated by "fundamentalist" and historical prejudices and fears. While such views were not to be ruled out in the case of many individuals, including certain Soviet political and military leaders, a thinking segment of the Soviet public, embracing all levels of society, continued to show a perceptive, realistic, and innovative line of thought in the tradition of prerevolutionary Russia. Samizdat, the dissident movements, and the experience of our visiting scholars and students with the Soviet public in Leningrad and elsewhere for the last twenty years also suggest this is so.

Leningrad: The Aura and the Onus

In reviewing the past of Leningrad as Petersburg, St. Petersburg, or Petrograd, one is at once struck by the spectrum of paeans to and censure of the city and its "era" by observers, native and foreign alike. Moreover, even while extolling the spell cast by the city, the thrust of the tributes frequently contains an element of ill-fate, tragedy, or doom. From its inception the city was viewed by some Russians as an alien city, as typified by the curse of Peter's embittered wife that "this place shall be empty. . .." The old Muscovite aristocracy of the Dolgorukys and Golitsyns were active in the power struggles following Peter's sudden death in 1725 and, gaining control of the new Supreme Privy Council, succeeded in returning the court and government to Moscow. From 1728-32 it remained there until Anne, the newly chosen empress, rallied the Guards around her, tore up the restrictive "conditions" governing her acceptance of the crown, abolished the Supreme Privy Council, and returned the capital to Petersburg.

Later, at the beginning of the 19th century, Pushkin was to take the side of Petersburg and memorialized it in the Bronze Horseman, characterizing Moscow as an old dowager fading before the new tsarina Petersburg. In the following years, however, the rivalry of Petersburg and Moscow did not diminish and became somewhat of a symbol of the struggle between the

Westerners and the Slavophiles to provide Russia with a national consciousness and direction.

To two prominent foreign visitors who traveled to Russia in the middle of the 19th century, Petersburg was not so impressive either in its westerness nor as a reflection of the real Russia. The Frenchman, Marquis de Custine, did not enjoy his collocutors nor the environment in Petersburg and even speculated that Russia's destiny would be greatly enhanced if the capital were to be returned to Moscow. The German, August von Haxthausen, was almost scathing in his comments comparing the cities:

> It has often been observed that one cannot gain an accurate impression of Russia from a sojourn in Petersburg. Petersburg has been called an attractive window which Peter I opened in order to look out upon Europe and let in western European air. Petersburg is a European city throughout with less national character than, for instance, London and Paris. It has somewhat more Russian churches, than those of other denominations and is inhabited by Russian soldiers, civil servants, some Russian burghers and quite a few Russian peasants, as well as by Germans, Finns, French, and English, etc. Petersburg is not even located on national Russian territory but on Finnish soil. The Russians are merely colonists, who have been living there for scarcely 140 years. . ..
>
> Moscow has a meaning for the Russian people unlike that of any city for any people. It is the focal point of all the national and religious sentiments of the Russians. There is not a Great Russian in the vast empire, in Archangel or in Odessa, in Tobolsk or in Novogorod, who would not speak of Moscow, 'the Holy Mother,' with deep respect and enthusiastic love. . .. This profound attachment, however, is innate not only in the common uncultured Russian; I have seen it in every social class, the upper and lower classes, the educated and the uneducated. Several blase inhabitants of Petersburg may be the sole exception to this role.

Haxthausen felt that Napoleon did not anticipate the degree that Russian consciousness would be stirred by his expedition against Moscow, and had he selected Petersburg or southern Russia instead, the outcome might have been different.

But, returning to the euolgizers, Andrei Bely in the introduction to his novel St. Petersburg, published in 1910 mused:

> Our Russian Empire consists of a multitude of cities: capital, provincial, district, and autonomous cities; and furthermore, of a metropolis, and a mother of all Russian cities. The metropolis is Moscow; Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Petersburg, Saint Petersburg, or Piter (it is all one), is also part of the Russian Empire. . .. Petersburg differs impressively from them all. If you insist on affirming the uncouth legend that Moscow has a population of a million and a half souls, then you will have to admit that the real capital should be Moscow, because only capitals have a population of a million and a half; in the provincial cities there are no such populations—there never were and never shall be. If you believe this uncouth legend, then Petersburg is not the capital.
>
> If Petersburg is not the capital, then there is no Petersburg. Then its existence is merely imaginary.
>
> But Petersburg is not merely imaginary; it can be located on maps—in the shape of concentric circles and a black dot in the middle; and this mathematical dot, which has no defined measurement, proclaims energetically that it exists; from this dot comes the impetuous surge of words which makes the pages of a book; and from this point circulars rapidly spread.

A German Communist poet, Max Bartel, shortly after October (probably before the capital shifted to Moscow), rhapsodized in a more revolutionary vein:

> Petrograd, beacon universal like a red flame flowing,
> Your people, a people magnificent, their own destiny determining!
> You are unique. And nations gather round you for the revelry,
> Without reflection to live and die for a moment of liberty.

In our own day George Kennan eulogized the city:

> The city of Sankt Petersburg—St. Petersburg, Petrograd, Leningrad, call it what you will—is one of the strangest, loveliest, most terrible, and most dramatic of the world's great urban centers. . .. The city is, and always has been, a tragic city, artifically created at great cost in human suffering, geographically misplaced, yet endowed with a haunting beauty, as though an ironic deity had meant to provide some redemption for all the cruelties and all the mistakes.

Out of the travails of St. Petersburg, however, have come the continual advances and achievements which made the city a grand capital and intellectual center before the revolution. Adversity only seemed to whet the talent and spirit of its inhabitants.

One of the leading architects and city planners of Leningrad, N.V. Baranov, in 1948 noted that Leningrad was only 245 years old and young in comparison with many of the largest European cities. But this historically rather short period was sufficient for the "constructive genius of the Russian people to create a city, miraculous in its architectural aspect, on the marshy, boggy banks of the Neva, despite exceptionally unfavorable natural conditions. . .." The city on the Neva, he said, symbolizes the national pride of the Russian people and is one of the most beautiful cities in the world.

> In the stone, granite, and cement of the splendid streets, squares, bridges and embankments, in the palaces and parks, unrivalled in their beauty, and in the marvelous museums and monuments are colorfully expressed many pages of the history of our country, the military glory of Russia, and the national achievements of science, technics and art. . .the eminent architects who participated in the construction of the city effected a beautiful blending of structures with natural surroundings. As a result of such skillful conjunction, the matchless silouette of Northern Palmyra emerged, well known throughout the whole world.

On a more practical plane Baranov cites the "Russian capital" as the forerunner for the construction of large cities with its new types of squares, embankments and prospects, "which found their pedigree in Petrograd and considerably later found their analogy in Paris, Vienna, and Berlin." The principles of contemporary city planning were realized on the banks of the Neva, he claims, and Petersburg was the practical school of a new epoch of city building.

The intensity of the love and worship of Leningraders for their city is irrepressible and even reflected in unexpected writings such as Marshal Meretskov's 1965 tribute to Leningrad's defense, Nekolebimo, Kak Rossiya. Under this title, a line from Pushkin's Bronze Horseman, he summarizes the nearly two and a half centuries of Petersburg and Leningrad:

> . . .the glory of Russia and the glory of this city are inseparable in the consciousness of the people. . ..The most talented architects created splendid architectural ensembles and turned this city into one of the most beautiful in the world. The Admiralty, Hermitage, Academy of Art, Palace Square, the Field of Mars, the Neva and Fontanka embankments, the palaces and parks of Pushkin, Pavlovsk, Peterhof, Oranienbaum, matchless in their beauty, evoke rapture in all who come to this city.
>
> From the first days of its founding Petersburg became the hearthstead of scientific thought, culture and art. In it lived and flourished the brilliant scientists Lomonosov, Mendeleyev, Timiryazev, Sechenov, Pavlov. Here the great Russian writers and composers Pushkin, Gogol, Nekrasov, Dostoyevskii, Saltykov-Shchedrin, Glinka, Mussorgskii, Borodin, Rimskii-Korsakov created their immortal works. The masters of Russian painting, Kramskii, Surikov, Bryullov, Repin worked here. . .in the palaces and museums were collected the best work of the talented Russian people.

> From the beginning of the past century Petersburg became a most important center of revolutionary and later the labor movement. Here in 1825 from the Senate square the Decembrists openly threw out their challenges to czarism. Here the revolutionary democrats Belinskii, Gertsen, Chernyshevskii, Dobrolyubov nurtured their ideas. . . .
>
> Leningrad—city of three revolutions. In it, the first Russian revolution of 1905-07 and the February bourgois-democratic revolution of 1917 began. And in the October days of 1917 the socialist revolution started. From here, from the city of Lenin, cradle of the Great October socialist revolution, resounded the historic word of the creation of the first socialist state in the world. . . .
>
> During the years of Soviet power Leningrad became one of the most important economic centers of the Soviet Union. The machine building industry received special development. New giant industrial enterprises rose up. Old enterprises were subject to reconstruction. Leningrad was turned into one of the centers of technical progress. In its enterprises electric motors and powerful diesels, textile machinery and chemical products, high pressure boilers, and first class ships were produced.
>
> The industry of the city of Lenin gave our country the first tractor, the first blooming mill, the first turbine, the first synthetic rubber. Machines manufactured in Leningrad are well known in many factories and enterprises, in state farms and collective farms of our country. 'There is not a single corner in the Soviet Union—said S.M. Kirov—where the product of Leningrad industry has not gone.'

It was the poet, Osip Mandelstam, however, both before and after the Revolution who was obsessed with and perhaps agonized most over the fate of the city and the Petersburg period of Russian history. In Hope Abandoned Nadezhda Mandelstam recalls her husband's early forebodings on this score, but his concern went beyond that of just the city and embraced the whole of mankind. He related to her an incident which occurred at the July 1917 demonstration in Petrograd when his comments about "the end of culture" and on the nature of the Bolshevik Party ("an inverted church") which had organized the

demonstration, were heard by two leading Bolsheviks, Zinoviyev and Kamenev. His shoddy treatment in Petrograd in the early 20's by Zinoviyev, he felt, stemmed in part from this incident. As his general situation worsened, there was constant spying on him and in 1923 publication of his works was banned. Petersburg she describes as his native, "beloved, utterly familiar" city, "but a place he could only flee from," which he did, only to return and then flee again. His explanation was "living in Petersburg is the same as lying in a coffin" (Akhmatova, similarly, called Petersburg "a city in mourning").

The dying city had become a frequent theme in his poetry, she notes, —nearly all of Tristia and much of Stone—and Noise of Time and Egyptian Stamp as well as a few poems of the 30's touch on it. But the genesis she finds in a 1916 poem about his own death which sees Petersburg as "a city of doom, where life consisted of waiting for the end." And dying Petersburg and the end of the Petersburg period of Russian history was equated by Mandelstam with the fall of Jerusalem. In late 1917 he wrote of the young Levite who foretold the destruction of the latter city and then in early 1918 penned his own "mournful lament on the end of Petersburg." Two later prose pieces provide what his wife calls the "gloss" on his imagery in these poems. In the first, a lecture on the death of Scriabin, he says the chief sin of the epoch is that the whole of modern history "has turned away from Christianity to Buddhism and theosophy." Paraphrased by his wife:

> Petersburg. . .had run through the gamut of the various forms of apostasy from Christianity, giving them expression in all the fashionable trends of the decade before the Revolution; what is more, the city had shown by its very history that it would be the first to bear the brunt of the reckoning.

The sequel to the Scriabin piece, she says, was his 1922 article "Word and Culture" which speaks of the inevitable consequences of this sin, the destruction of the human race. "Mandelstam here calls Petersburg the most advanced city because it was the first to exhibit symptoms of the end." He speaks of an earth without people and saw the future as a kingdom of the spirit devoid of mankind.

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The fate of Petrograd as capital of the Soviet Union was sealed soon after the Revolution. The advance of German troops as far as Pskov, the deteriorating food situation, and geographical location of the city, all contributed to the decision of the Council of People's Commissars in late February 1918 to move the capital to Moscow "temporarily." Actually with the signing of the peace treaty with Germany on March 3 and its ratification by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets on March 14, one of the main motivations for the shift was eliminated. Moreover, from March 6-8, 1918 the VII Congress of the Bolshevik Party took place in the Tavricheskii Palace, but regardless, the govemment moved on March 10, and Moscow was declared the capital on March 12.

The issue of the rivalry between Petrograd and Moscow was now drawn on new lines and subsequent Soviet history has been colored by it to this day. Petrograd continued to be loosely referred to as the "northern capital" of the Russian republic and initially became the center of a large group of gubernıyas (Vologda, Novgorod, Pskov, Arkhangel, and Olonets) which were joined into a Union of Communes of the Northern Oblasts, with a Central Executive Committee and Council of Commissars as its executive arm, and the usual roster of commissariats, even a Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

The political boss of the city and its environs for the next thirty years would be a senior or rising young member of the Politburo, i.e., Zinoviyev, Kirov, and Zhdanov. When Zinovieyev was appointed chairman of the executive committee of the Comintern, most of the staff was organized and headquartered in Petrograd because Zinoviyev was there, although an office was also maintained in Moscow. It is interesting that later in 1922, after it was clear that Moscow would remain the capital, Zinoviyev, with Cominternish zeal, managed to envision an even more glorious role for Petrograd in the future:

> We are clearly aware of the fact that Moscow must remain and will remain the first capital and main political center of Soviet Russia—as long as it is a matter of revolution on a national scale. But we do not for a minute have any doubt that to the extent new Soviet republics will spring up—first and foremost in central Europe—the most important political role will begin to shift again from Moscow to Petrograd. This perspective should not be lost sight of. (Tsyperovich, G., Budushcheye Petrograda, Petrograd, 1922, pp. 3-4).

Stalin could hardly be blamed for the treatment accorded Petrograd by the authorities in Moscow during the early 20's, but a myth suggesting his distaste for the city had begun to develop in the later 20's after the so-called Leningrad opposition had been routed. The fact that there is no public record of him visiting the city after his quick trip there following the assassination of Kirov in late 1934 strengthened the myth. (Stalin was able to travel with great secrecy and tended to do so, therefore the record of his travel to Leningrad as well as to other Soviet cities might be quite different than it appears on the public record. Leningrad was not the only city that had rare visits.)

The Leningrad Encyclopedic Handbook, written for the 1957 celebration of the founding of St. Petersburg, contains a somewhat enigmatic description of Stalin's relationship to the city before and after the revolution. It relates in some detail his prerevolutionary visits to the city, first enroute to and returning from the 1905 Party conference in Tammerfors with other delegates from Tbilisi; secondly in 1909 after escaping his exile in Solvychegodsk, only to be rearrested and returned to exile. Then from 1911-12 he escapes three times and the handbook stresses, each time returns to Petersburg; during this period he is described as forming a close relationship with the party organization in the city, editing and contributing to Bolshevik periodicals, working in the election campaign for the 4th Duma, organizing strikes, and so forth. After his arrest and exile in 1913 he did not return for four years until immediately after the February revolution in 1917 and then

apparently remained in Petrograd until the capital was moved to Moscow in March 1918.

Briefly then the narrative notes his assignment to Petrograd on May 17, 1919 as representative of the Defense Council to assist in the defense against the troops of Gen. Yudenich, remaining almost two months until July 5 when he is sent to Smolensk as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front.

> (Victor Serge who had arrived in Petrograd in January 1919 as an exchangee from France and helped organize Zinoviyev's staff of the Comintern, notes in his memoirs that the customary diners at the table reserved for senior officials of the Northern Commune at the Astoria Hotel included Zinoviyev, Yevdokimov, and others, 'and sometimes Stalin, who was practically unknown.')

After this he makes only one or two day appearances in Leningrad in April 1926 and July 1928 for speeches to the party committee and its aktiv and again for unstated purposes in 1933 and 1934, the latter presumably being his personal investigation of the Kirov assassination. Another Leningrad history notes only that Stalin "very seldom visited Leningrad."

The sad state into which Petrograd had fallen following the revolution and during the civil war was to persist for a number of years in spite of appeals of the Petrograd Soviet to central authorities and to other parts of the republic for assistance. As Zinoviyev indicated in the Tsyperovich study, cited above, one approach to the problem of Petrograd was for the Russian republic to look on the city as a sort of relic of the Revolution, "a very honorable one, but still a relic"; to let equalization triumph in the

treatment of all cities—this would be the bureaucratic approach and Petrograd would be doomed to a "slow vegetation." If on the other hand, he said, Petrograd were accorded the extraordinary and priority attention it deserved, in ten years at most Petrograd would pay back to the republic one hundredfold what would be given to it now. Zinoviyev cited the industrial proletariat of the city, the like of which "is not left anywhere in the republic," a number of unfinished enterprises and construction projects, the potential of the port for the whole country, and the cultural heritage of the city as the justification for privileged treatment.

Zinoviyev undoubtedly did not get all he wanted from the central government, particularly as the city gained more and more of a reputation in the early and mid-20's as a source of opposition to the regime in Moscow. It was only after Kirov took over the leadership of the Leningrad Party organization in 1926 that the city began to receive more significant attention from the center.

The Kirov years in Leningrad possibly were the best years for the city in a political sense, although there were still difficulties in the aftermath of routing Zinoviyev's "new opposition" and the Leningrad connection. Vigilance campaigns and the growing secret police power were taking their toll among many with any ties with the old regime or abroad. Yet in a sense Kirov's presence gradually brought the city to a status more in line with other major Russian cities in regard to the extent of political pressure and police repression. With the assassination of Kirov, however, in December 1934, the travails of

Leningrad began anew. All legality went to the winds as the Leningrad prisons were emptied either by shooting or dispatch of inmates to distant corrective labor camps and immediately filled with new political suspects.

There is little to indicate that Zhdanov's presence as the new Leningrad Party leader mitigated any of these problems, and the great purges followed soon after, devastating the ranks of the Party, military, intellectuals, economic officials, workers, and peasants throughout the Soviet Union. Leningrad suffered its share. It is in this period, however, that the Zhdanov coterie of rising young leaders begins to form and it is distinguished by the quality of its members—to name a few—N.A. Voznesenskii, Kosygin, Ustinov, A.A. Kuznetsov, Popkov, Rodionov, Patolichev and Shcherbakov. Some of these moved to leading positions in Moscow before the war and some after and some have survived to this day. In the course of World War II, other names were added,both military and civilian, who distinguished themselves in the siege of Leningrad.

But fate (as well as Malenkov and Beriya) was not to allow Leningraders and Zhdanov all the benefits they deserved for the glorious 900 day defense of the city against the Germans. Stalin's postwar crackdowns in cultural and intellectual fields centered on Leningrad initially, with Zhdanov forced to play the goat here and in the break with Yugoslavia (perhaps hastening his death in 1948). Simultaneously, the notorious "Leningrad Case" was fabricated to bring down some of the best of Zhdanov's colleagues,

with repurcussions both at the center and in Leningrad. Only the death of Stalin brought some respite to the city.

But, even in death, Stalin, who seemed to fear and continually put down Leningrad and Leningraders throughout his rule, left so unstable and tortuous a succession period that the 250th anniversary of the founding of Petersburg, which should have been celebrated on May 16, 1953, was postponed for four years and finally celebrated from June 22 to July 7, 1957 (even the schedule for this celebration became extremely tentative in early June when the post-Stalin regime went through its greatest leadership crisis, culminating in the ouster of the "anti-Party group" of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and others from leading positions in the Soviet party and government).

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One group of historians who took their cue from the exhortations of the XXII Party Congress in 1961 for a more intensive examination and thorough rewriting of the political history of the Stalin period were the Leningrad historians. They followed up the December 1961 meeting on ideological questions in Moscow with a conference of their own at Leningrad University and in 1962 began to prepare a wide variety of historical essays and studies, including factory and plant histories, filling in the gaps and correcting distortions in Soviet and Party history and particularly the history of Leningrad.

One of these collections of essays shows well the developing euphoria and contains a strong and frank indictment of the treatment of Leningrad under Stalin. The author, N.A. Kornatovskii, hailed the "energetic efforts of the Central Committee and N.S. Khrushchev personally and the historic resolutions of the XX Party Congress, confirmed and elaborated by the XXII Party Congress, which fully rehabilitated the glorious Leningrad Party organization, all its cadres and its aktiv." He noted the "violent blows" inflicted on the Leningrad communists during the Stalin period and the similar treatment dealt the development of historical research on all aspects of the city's life. Writing about Leningrad aroused "stinging retorts," and not infrequently historians began to be regarded with suspicion if they indicated an intent to study archival and documentary materials of the provincial, city, or raion Party organizations or the Leningrad Soviet:

> Any attempt to seriously research any question whatsoever on the life of the city was regarded as a clearly tendentious intent to set Leningrad against all the rest of the country, and to cultivate ideas of separatism, selfdependence, and localism. Even such a topic as "Leningrad—city of three revolutions" met objections "on principle." In this instance references to V.I. Lenin and official Party documents were considered at least irrelevant (Istoriya Rabochego Klassa Leningrada, ed. V.A. Ovsyakin, Leningrad, 1962, p. 10).

Kornatovskii rejoiced that "now all avenues are open" for searching the archives and using documentary materials and that favorable conditions exist for scientific work on all aspects of Leningrad. He felt that Leningrad historians with a wealth of original source material available will be able to:

> . . .provide a fully objective study which will raise high the authority of the Leningrad communist party organization, Komsomol, trade unions, and organs of power. Profound analysis will demonstrate that Leningrad communists never were adherents of localism and separatism and never set themselves in opposition to the whole party. On the contrary, they always were a reliable support for the Party's Central Committee, always actively fought for the Party's general line, and demonstrated examples of mass heroism and courage in battles at the front and in resolving national economic tasks. Facts from party history indicate that Leningrad communists conducted an irreconcilable struggle against all inner-Party oppositional fractions and groupings. In the ranks of the Party organization, which included the leading strata of the many thousand workers' collectives of the city, there was always sufficient strength for timely discernment of tendencies harmful to the Party. The Petrograd communists, for example, during the election of delegates to the VIII Party Congress, subjected the anti-Party tendencies of Zinoviyev to severe criticism, blackballed him, and did not elect him a delegate to the congress. The Leningrad Party organization revealed the foul double-dealing methods of the Zinoviyevites in 1925 and in the course of the XIV Party Congress declared its indignation over the anti-Party activities of the "new opposition," and was in complete solidarity with the decisions of the Party Congress, and expelled the opportunists from Leningrad. (Ibid., pp. 10-11).

Kornatovskii then caps his panegyric with prize quotes from Lenin regarding the working class of Petrograd (presumably the ones considered "irrelevant" in Stalin's time):

> May 1918 — Piter is not Russia. The workers of Piter are a small part of the workers of Russia. But they are one of the best, progressive, most class conscious, most revolutionary, most firm, the least complaisant toward empty phrases, toward feeble despair, and towards bourgeois intimidation, of the ranks of the working class and all laborers of Russia. And in the critical minutes of the life of the people, time and again these small-numbered leading ranks of the progressive classes attracted all to them, stirred up the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses, and performed the greatest historic feats.
>
> July 1918 — To do this there is nobody except the workers of Piter, for there are in Russia no others so class conscious as the workers of Piter.

> October 1919 — The whole two-year history of the Soviet struggle with the bourgeoisie of all the world, unprecedented in difficulty and unprecedented in victory, shows us, on the part of the workers of Piter, not only the model for fulfillment of duty, but a standard of highest heroism and of revolutionary enthusiasm and selflessness, previously unseen in the world.

And finally on the second anniversary of the revolution, Lenin sent "first" greetings to the Petrograd workers, which they deserved because "as the vanguard of the revolutionary workers and soldiers, and as the vanguard of the toiling masses of Russia and all the world, the Petrograd workers were the first to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie and raise the banner of proletarian revolution against capitalism and imperialism."

The question of Leningrad opposition was a sensitive issue for the Leningrad historians in the Khrushchev period, who were endeavoring to correct the image of the city as being the seedbed of Party opposition. Their task was complicated by the desire to suggest subtly that under Stalin the Leningrad Party organization had been labled oppositionist unjustifiably but at the same time avoid any implication therefrom that the opposition of Zinoviyev and company was also exaggerated by the Stalinists. Another party historian V.M. Ivanov, like Kornatovskii, was preoccupied with this question and in 1965 published a study of "the Leningrad Party organization in the struggle against the Trotsky-Zinovieyev opposition from 1925-27."

Ivanov noted that virtually the whole of party historical literature prior to the XX Party Congress in 1956 ignored local party organizations and the ordinary party member at the grass roots. Names of hundreds of thousands

of "rank-and-file warriors," the party activists, he says, who carried out the party's decisions and ensured "victory over dissenters" are not cited, either because the researcher wasn't interested or because these heroes, themselves, became victims of baseless repression and their names were erased from the history of the party.

> Some important historic events and episodes have been ignored or interpreted imprecisely, without a profound analysis of archival and other documentary material. Regardless of obvious facts, for example, it was asserted that 'the Trotsky-Zinoviyev opposition originated in. . . the Leningrad Party organization, it depended upon the Leningrad Party organization.' Such assertions, as a matter of fact, are a repetition of the slander on the Leningrad Party organization to which in its time the Trotskyite opposition had recourse and now bourgeois historians and publicists fall back on, seeking to portray opposition in the VKP(B) as an 'expression' of the mood of the best part of the Party and the working class. These assertions not only derogated the dignity of the Leningrad organization, which always remained faithful to Leninism, but also served as one of the 'ideological' bases for those accusations which were made against a number of Leningrad workers by the adventurist Beriya and his accomplices in connection with the so-called 'Leningrad Case.' (Ivanov, V.M. Iz Istorii Borby Partii Protiv "Levogo" Oppor-tunizma, Leningrad, 1965, pp. 13-14.)

Unfortunately, the high hopes expressed during the early 60's by Kornatovskii, Ivanov, and others for an intensive, thorough and ongoing rewriting of the political history of the Stalin era foundered in the aftermath of Khrushchev's removal from power in 1964. While a good start was made during this period and much continues to be produced in samizdat, political and Party history is again a barren academic discipline. The post-Khrushchev regime was no longer so confident of their earlier assertions that the Party as an institution could withstand and "be strengthened" by an intensification of this type of self-examination and criticism.

The Leningrad Trials

On December 1, 1934, the Leningrad readers of Pravda, whose copies were usually in their mailboxes or posted on the streets by mid-afternoon, found that the feature article for that day was "On Overcoming the Contradictions Between City and Countryside". The article, by coincidence, was authored by one of the party's rising young political economists, N. A. Voznesenskii (who would be called to Leningrad by Andrei Zhdanov early the following year to head the city's planning commission). Virtually none of the readers would have imagined that Leningrad's present party chief, the popular Kirov, was to be assassinated in Smolny a few hours later that afternoon and that from this point onward Stalin would take steps to ensure that no political process or forces at work in the country would succeed in stymying his inclination for complete power. Similarly, none could have even imagined that almost fifteen years hence the author of the Pravda article himself would be the main victim of the infamous "Leningrad Case", which like the Kirov assassination, plagued the city and its inhabitants for years, in the later instance at least until the death of Stalin.

* * * * *

The Assassination. Word of the Kirov assassination at 4:30 p.m. was broadcast by Radio Leningrad in the early evening, and the evening and night shifts in Leningrad factories and institutions stopped work briefly for commemorative meetings. On the following day, December 2,

meetings continued and the press was full of eulogies and institutional statements, but the only facts of the assassination thus far revealed by official communique were:

> On December 1 at 4:30 p.m. in Leningrad, at the Leningrad Soviet Building (formerly Smolny), the Central Committee and Leningrad Committee, VKP(B) secretary and member of the Ts.I.K. presidium, comrade Sergei Mironovich Kirov, perished at the hand of a killer sent by enemies of the working class. The gunman was arrested. His identity will be ascertained.

No doubt the arrival of Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov and Zhdanov in Leningrad the morning of December 2 became known by word of mouth to many Leningraders as well as those who marched past to view Kirov's body that afternoon in the Uritskii palace. Stalin's presence was not revealed publicly until the December 3 newspapers appeared, containing a terse statement to that effect and a description of the Uritskii ceremony. The Moscow funeral delegation headed by Khrushchev had arrived shortly after Stalin, et al., but nothing was published indicating the presence of other officials such as Poskrebyshev, Yezhov, Yagoda, Kosarev, Vyshinskii, and leading NKVD officers, who had been reported by unofficial sources as being in Leningrad during this week. Among the more notable figures who did not accompany Stalin there were M. I. Kalinin, chairman of the Central Executive Committee (i.e., chief of state), whose roots in Leningrad were longstanding as a revolutionary worker there in the Putilov works, as well as A. Yenukidze and G. Ordzhonikidze, old friends of Kirov as well as Stalin. Somewhat intriguing, L. M. Kaganovich (who as a Central Committee secretary might stand to profit most from Kirov's demise) would have been expected in his capacity as Moscow party boss to head the Moscow funeral delegation to Leningrad.

Khrushchev recalls in his memoirs how Kaganovich summoned him to the Kremlin the evening of the assassination to tell him what had happened and instructed him to assemble a delegation of sixty representative workers and party members to go to Leningrad and accompany Kirov's body back to Moscow for the funeral and burial on Red Square. Khrushchev's comments on the entire proceedings are somewhat vague and suggest that he was not yet fully clued in at the top level except by what he could learn from his association with Kaganovich in the Moscow Party organization. He did not seem to perceive anything special as to how other leaders felt about Kirov's death. He noted that Stalin had "enormous self-control" and his expression was "absolutely impenetrable" while standing by the bier (this conflicts with other reports that he cried on occasion and kissed Kirov's cheek). Kaganovich, however, he observed, was "badly shaken, even frightened" from the beginning. Khrushchev later notes that when Stalin and Molotov were out of Moscow on any occasion during this period, Kaganovich and Ordzhonikidze were left in charge; this possibly explains the absence of Kaganovich and Ordzhonikidze from the delegation sent to Leningrad.

The only additional facts published by the press on December 3 were included in a brief NKVD statement (which had already been broadcast by radio the previous afternoon) indicating that preliminary investigation had established that the name of the "villian, the killer of comrade Kirov, is Nikolayev (Leonid Vasilevich), born 1904, and a former employee of the Leningrad RKI." It stated that the investigation was continuing. The December 3 press also gave the funeral timetable for the next two days, indicating that at midnight that day the train carrying Kirov's body,

accompanied by Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Zhdanov, and others, was to leave Leningrad for Moscow, arriving at 10:30 on the morning of December 4. Viewing of the body in the Dom Soyuzov would begin at 1:00 p.m. and was to continue until 10:00 p.m. on December 5, when the body would be removed for cremation.

The December 4 press lifted the veil of official secrecy only slightly regarding the investigation in Leningrad. A statement on the circumstances of the assassination was carried revealing that Nikolayev was hiding in Kirov's reception room and, as Kirov passed through to his office, slipped up behind and fired the bullet into his head. Kirov was described as mortally wounded and unconscious and had been taken into his office for first aid. The remainder of the statement details the futile efforts of the doctors called to the scene to save his life and gives the results of the postmortem, i.e., Kirov's health condition, direction of bullet (from back and slightly upward at close range), damage to his head from hitting the hard floor, and so forth. More interesting to the reader, however, were two items run alongside this statement, one summarizing a December 1 decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee and the other, another communique from the NKVD.

The summarized decree, which was to be published in full the following day, ordered a speed-up of the investigations underway of terrorist cases, (it specified a limit of 10 days with the indictment to be delivered to the accused one day before trial), appeals of death sentences in such cases would not be accepted, and the NKVD was to carry out such sentences immediately following the court decision. Khrushchev, in his secret speech to the 1956

Party Congress, said that this decree was issued "on Stalin's initiative" under the signature of Yenukidze, the secretary of the Central Executive Committee, without Politburo approval. This approval came two days later, "casually", and the full decree was published on December 5 with both Kalinin's and Yenukidze's signatures. Khrushchev pointed out that this decree became the basis for mass acts abusing socialist legality and made it impossible for persons who were convicted of terrorism in completely fabricated cases and on the basis of confessions extracted by force, to have the cases reexamined.

The NKVD communique on December 4 revealed first that the Leningrad Oblast NKVD chief, F. D. Medved, one of his deputies, F. T. Fomin, and six of his subordinates (A. S. Gorin, P. M. Lobov, D. I. Yanishevskii, G. A. Petrov, M. S. Paltsevich, and A. A. Mosevich) had been sacked for neglect of their duties in safeguarding state security in Leningrad and their cases turned over to the courts for trial. Ya. S. Agranov, Yagoda's deputy, was ordered to take over temporarily as head of the Leningrad office. Nothing was said at this time of the fate of I. V. Zaporozhets, Medved's principal deputy, who was vacationing in the south on the day of the murder. Secondly, the communique stated that cases of 39 "white-guard" terrorists in Leningrad and 32 in Moscow, all listed by name, had been sent forward on December 2 to the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court for consideration. Announcement of the Leningrad and Moscow "white guard" cases and the Belorussian and Ukrainian, soon to be revealed, had the immediate effect of suggesting publicly that it was an assassination inspired by foreign forces, providing assistance to hostile elements of the old regime within the country.

One Leningrad NKVD official cited on December 4 who is of some interest today is Medved's second deputy, F. T. Fomin. Petr Yakir, in his A Childhood in Prison published in 1972, describes how he met Fomin in the 1960s after release from confinement. Fomin had held an administrative position in the Kolyma camps after his two-year sentence was completed and, in contrast to his Leningrad NKVD superiors, had survived the purges. In 1962 he had published Zapiski Starogo Chekista (Notes of an Old Chekist), but nothing is described of his career beyond the early 1920s. Yakir reports that Fomin was summoned to the Party Control Committee in connection with the investigation of the Kirov case, called for by Khrushchev at the 1956 Party Congress, but did not give any information of interest at these hearings. Fomin told Yakir that he was the first to reach Kirov's side and conducted the interrogation of Nikolayev until later that evening when Agranov flew in from Moscow and took charge of the case. Yakir also learned from another source that at Nikolayev's first interrogation by Stalin on December 2, "Nikolayev turned to one of the persons there and shouted: 'But you promised me...' At that moment someone struck him on the head with the butt of a pistol."

* * * * *

The story of the Kirov assassination and what may have been Stalin's connection with it has been meticulously researched and analyzed, first by Boris Nicolaevsky in "The Letter of an Old Bolshevik" published in 1936 and his subsequent writings; later, after the death of Stalin, by John Armstrong, Robert Conquest, and others; and finally by Roy Medvedev in Let History Judge. The thread that leads from Yagoda to Zaporozhets in Leningrad and thence to Nikolayev seems well-established and only the precise link

between Stalin and Yagoda remains murky. The motivations for Stalin, Kaganovich, Yezhov, and Yagoda, himself, to wish Kirov out of the way, moreover, were well laid out already by Nicolaevsky before the Great Purge Trials. Details continue to be unearthed as Medvedev and various samizdat writers continue to probe, but official re-examination of the circumstances of the assassination ended with Khrushchev's ouster, if not earlier.

The statements of Khrushchev and some of his colleagues at the XX (1956) and XXII (1961) Party Congresses were clearly intended to suggest that the Kirov assassination was instigated indirectly if not directly by Stalin. The allegation of premeditation and cover-up was evidenced by citation of several factors. First, the unusual haste with which the December 1 decree on speeding up handling of terrorist cases was brought into force; second, the two earlier instances of apprehension and release of Nikolayev under suspicious circumstances; and last, the elimination of Kirov's security guard, Borisov, by NKVD operatives before he could be interrogated, followed by "liquidation" of the operatives involved themselves. Z. T. Serdyuk, first deputy chairman of the Party Control Committee, at the XXII Party Congress, like Khrushchev earlier, noted that the December 1 law was adopted on Stalin's instructions on the day of the murder "which, of course, at that time had not yet been investigated". Serdyuk then emphasized that it was followed immediately by a wave of arrests and political trials and points out:

> It is as if they had been waiting for just such an occasion in order, deceiving the party, to set in train anti-Leninist and anti-party methods for preservation of /their/ leading position in the party and state.

The theme of premeditation appeared subsequently in the press and rewritten party histories of the early 1960s. Even more suggestive of Stalin's role was a juxtaposition of paragraphs in the 1962 revised edition of the one-volume CPSU History. At the end of the discussion of the XVII Party Congress in early 1934, the text described how the cult of personality was growing up around Stalin prior to the congress and how he was violating Leninist principles in party life, abusing his position and acting arbitrarily, and was again crude in personal relations. It was then noted that:

> The abnormal situation which the personality cult was creating in the party caused deep concern to some of the communists, above all the old Leninist cadres. Many congress delegates, particularly those who were familiar with Lenin's testament, held that it was time to transfer Stalin from the office of General Secretary to some other post.

The text then immediately takes up discussion of the Kirov assassination, ending with the statement that:

> . . .It was a premeditated crime whose circumstances are still being investigated, as N. S. Khrushchev announced at the XXII CPSU Congress.
>
> The assassination of Kirov had a most adverse effect on the life of the party and the state. It was committed under the personality cult. Stalin seized upon it to begin dealing summarily with people who did not suit him. Numerous arrests ensued. This was the beginning of wholesale repressive measures and the most flagrant violations of socialist legality.

This paragraph on the XVII Party Congress is repeated in almost identical language in a biography of Kirov by S. Krasnikov, published in 1964, and also in a Pravda Feb. 7, 1964 article by L. Shaumyan celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the congress.

The third edition, however, of the one-volume CPSU History, issued in 1969, five years after Khrushchev's fall, excised these paragraphs and reverted to older phraseology regarding the need for "revolutionary vigilance" to prevent alien elements such as Nikolayev from doing damage in the future to the Party and the interests of socialism. This edition (as did the treatment in 1971 of those events in the more detailed multi-volume CPSU History) thereby altered the sense of the section on Kirov's assassination from that of trying it to the cult of Stalin and machinations at the top, as suggested by Khrushchev and Serdyuk, and reduced it to a simple example of poor inner-Party vigilance. The third edition added only a sentence noting that "after the assassination of Kirov a number of measures were introduced violating socialist legality," but even this was dropped from subsequent editions, leaving the general impression in the current version (fifth edition, 1976) that the negative aspects of Stalin's rule began to appear after 1937. Nothing is mentioned indicating that the circumstances before and after the Kirov assassination still need to be clarified.

The Kirov assassination was to be re-examined by a special commission set up after the 1956 congress. Khrushchev had stressed the need for clarification in his secret speech delivered at the congress, but three years later at the Hungarian Party Congress in December 1959, he reportedly explained that his secret speech created such complications within the regime's apparatus that the investigation was postponed. It apparently had been resumed by the time of the 1961 Party Congress as he again called for greater efforts to delve into the as yet unexplained enigmas of the case. Serdyuk, who was undoubtedly involved by virtue of his Party Control Committee past, indicated at the Congress that while the investigation had

not yet been completed, "it must be, and would be done."

Prophetically, in the light of what has transpired in the writing of Soviet party history since his fall from power, Khrushchev on that occasion, warned:

> Comrades! Our duty is to examine painstakingly and thoroughly these kinds of matters involved with the abuse of power. Time goes by, we will die, we are all mortal, but as long as we are functioning, we can and must clear up many things and tell the truth to the party and the people. We are obliged to do everything possible now to determine the truth /pravda/, since the more time passes after these events, the more difficult it will be to restore truth /istina/. It is too late, as they say, for you to return the dead to life. But it is necessary that this matter will be truthfully stated in the history of the party. This must be done so that such occurrences will never be repeated in the future.

Roy Medvedev, in the foreword to his book Let History Judge (first published in 1967 with the second edition issued in 1974) noted that the findings of the special commission created to investigate Kirov's murder had not yet been made public.

Medvedev, however, did considerable investigating on his own to elaborate unknown facets of the case, much of which further suggested premeditation and involvement by Stalin or close colleagues. He cites an incident at Stalin's interrogation of Nikolayev, similar to that of Yakir's noted above; in this version Nikolayev points at Chekists behind him and shouts "but they forced me to do it", before being beat unconscious by pistol butts. After the XXII Congress, according to Medvedev, hundreds of people wrote to the Central Committee providing testimony of their own shedding some new light on the case.

NKVD officials, for example, indicated that they got wind beforehand somehow that a "terrible" assassination was being planned in Leningrad; a subordinate of Yezhov in the Central Committee apparatus noted that Zhdanov (whose party responsibilities then included checking on the NKVD), contrary to all previous routine, had spent a good part of the day of the murder in Stalin's office and at 7:00 p.m. returned with instructions to an assistant to prepare to accompany him to Leningrad; Zhdanov's assistant in Leningrad reported that the wife of Borisov (Kirov's bodyguard, mentioned above) complained to him afterward of NKVD harassment and persecution in an effort to find out whether her husband told her anything before the event; NKVD officials from Moscow were already in Leningrad, on the scene, and had taken charge at the Smolny entrance even before the arrival of Leningrad NKVD chief Medved, who had rushed there posthaste: Nikolayev's prison guard testifies that Nikolayev told him how the assassination had been arranged and that he had been promised his life if he implicated the Leningrad Zinovievites; and there was more, according to Medvedev. He feels that the assassination was an important link in Stalin's usurpation of all power and concludes:

> That is why Stalin's guilt in the assassination, which would have seemed improbable in 1934-35, nowadays appears plausible and, logically and politically, almost proven. On the other hand, Zinoviev's and Kamenev's guilt, which seemed reasonable in 1934-35, today appears quite unlikely.

* * * *

The press on December 5 carried descriptions and pictures of the arrival of Kirov's body in Moscow the previous day, accompanied by Stalin,

et al., and the preparations for the lying-in-state and the funeral in Red Square. It was announced that following cremation that night, the urn would be placed in the Dom Soyuzov again for a further walk-by and viewing from 6:00 a.m. to noon. At 1:00 p.m. the urn would be taken to Red Square for the funeral ceremony at 2:30, followed by final interment in the Kremlin wall. Nothing more was announced concerning progress of the investigation, but, as indicated above, the full text of the December 1 decree accelerating the handling of terrorist cases was published.

On December 6, the day of the funeral, readers of Pravda learned nothing more of what was transpiring in Leningrad. It was announced, however, that a circuit session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court convened on December 5 in Leningrad and heard the case of the 39 "white guard terrorists" sent to it on December 2 and had sentenced 37 to be shot, the cases of the other two being held over for supplementary investigation. On the same day, the case of the 32 Moscow "white guard terrorists" was heard by another Military Collegium session in Moscow, with 29 being sentenced to death and three held over for further inquiry.

Similarly, one day following the funeral the cases of 12 "white guard terrorists" in Belorussia were sent to the circuit session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court for trial on December 11 in Minsk, when nine were ordered executed and three sent back for further investigation. None of these accelerated trials of alleged terrorists had anything to do with the Kirov assassination. Most readers of the press, however, gained the impression that they did, as the regime intended initially, to

lend substance to the then standard charge that "enemies of the working class" abroad had sent Nikolayev to murder Kirov.

The Funeral. Avel Yenukidze, close and longtime friend of both Kirov and Stalin, had been named to head the funeral commission and in this capacity opened the funeral ceremony on Red Square on December 6 (few were aware at this moment that by the end of the month the first hints would appear of Yenukidze's eventual fall from grace, the first of Stalin's higher ranking colleagues to go). His short introductory remarks were heart-felt and personal, sprinkled with the familiar "ty" addressed to the urn, and he then introduced the main speaker, Molotov, who represented the Party Central Committee and the government. The contrast of Molotov's dry unfeeling recital of Kirov's career is apparent even in the press version, and the latter portion of the speech is devoted to assertions of how well they know how to deal with the enemies who had resorted to such deeds and might contemplate further ones. He did not depart from the third person, and Manuilskii, who followed him, speaking for the Comintern, did likewise, as did Kaganovich and Petrovskii a little later.

Mikhail Chudov, Kirov's ranking party deputy in Leningrad, after hailing the latter's achievements in Leningrad, lapsed into the informal "ty" and, warming up, vowed severe revenge on the "wretched remnant of the dying old world" who so treacherously sneaked from the corner to kill Kirov from behind. Kaganovich, speaking for the Moscow party organization, dwelled on Kirov's party attributes and mainly his oratorial talent, "the best in the party", recalling his speech from the mausoleum in Red Square

to the Moscow workers at the time of the XVII Congress less than a year before. Kaganovich also harped on the Molotov line that they would more resolutely than ever make short work of the foul enemies "shooting their arrows in the very heart of the proletarian revolution" and show still greater vigilance in this struggle.

Chudov's wife, L. Shaposhnikova, followed with a moving lament from the workers of Leningrad, who were at that moment standing in silent tribute at their workbenches, comparing the feeling of this loss with that of a dearest friend or a mother on the loss of her own child. Petrovskii and Bagirov, representing the Ukraine and Transcaucasia respectively, were next in turn, with Bagirov mouthing vows of revenge. The last three speakers were representatives of Leningrad factories and collective farms. One of them, Aleksandr Tyutin, secretary of the party committee of the "Red Putilov" Factory, using "ty" throughout, was probably the most feeling speaker of the day, citing Kirov's personal approach to the workers of Leningrad and listing the achievements stemming therefrom: the first Soviet tractor, first blooming mill, Soviet cultivators and "mighty Soviet turbines." He endedurging "our own unforgettable Mironich, to sleep in peace." (Tyutin was to have sleepless nights himself in the following three years as he endeavored to save hundreds of innocent workers in the Putilov works from slanderous charges and unjustified firings.)

Stalin, who had said no word throughout the ceremony, along with members of the Politburo and government, then descended to pick up the urn and take it back behind the mausoleum to the Kremlin wall. To Sergo Ordzhonikidze, perhaps Kirov's closest friend and the last of the leader-

ship to see him alive, went the honor of placing the urn in the niche reserved for it in the wall. Stalin then again mounted the mausoleum with the other leaders to review the brief military march-by, followed by Muscovites, who flowed through the square until late evening, "one million, two hundred thousand" of them paying tribute to Kirov.

In the weeks following the funeral life for many Leningraders resumed its normal course. For about two weeks nothing more was revealed about the investigation, and many were not aware of the extent of the arrests, executions, and deportations going on in the city. Elections to the local soviets, which apparently were delayed slightly by the assassination, took place throughout the country, those in Leningrad on December 12. The volume of the Leningrad history issued by the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences in 1964 underscores this local election in Leningrad as a notable demonstration of the growth of political activism among Leningrad workers; 98 percent of the voters reportedly attended pre-election meetings, and such activism had not been observed in previous elections. The city soviet and the nine raion soviets, elected on this occasion, created sections to assist the schools, cultural, public service, and construction institutions of the city, drawing into this work 6,000 "activists", according to the Leningrad state archives. The same source reveals that 300 deputy groups, subsequently formed in Leningrad enterprises, institutions, and housing units, watched over "fulfillment of the voters' mandate" and participated in the solution of all urgent production questions and economic-political tasks.

There was, naturally, a rush during this period to rename cities, towns, streets, bridges, factories, and institutions in honor of Kirov. The

"Krasnyi Putilovets" factory in Leningrad appears to have been the first to petition for a change in name. As early as December 3 some of the older workers drafted such a proposal to rename the factory "Kirovskii Zavod" and also change the Narva raion to Kirov raion, and forwarded it to the U.S.S.R. Central Executive Committee for approval. On December 15, the Leningrad oblast and city party committees proceeded to decree that these name changes as well as several others would be made in Leningrad, i.e., "Ulitsa Krasnykh Zor" (the street on which he lived) to "Kirovskii Prospekt", the former Troitskii Bridge to Kirovskii Bridge, the Krestovskii, Yelagin, and Kamennyi Islands to Kirovskiye Islands (and establish recreation facilities there). Construction of the new Central Park for Culture and Rest was to be speeded up and it would be named for Kirov. The city of Khibinogorsk in the far north of Leningrad Oblast (which then included Murmansk) was to be renamed Kirovsk. The decree called for publication of Kirov's speeches and articles and erection of a fit memorial to him in Leningrad.

The Central Executive Committee responded on December 17 to the Putilov workers and the Leningrad party decree and approved all the requested name changes. Further name changes in Leningrad followed subsequently, affecting the Mariinskii State Academic Theater of Opera and Ballet, the "Electrosila" plant and four other factories, the Forestry-Technical Academy, the Textile Institute, the military officers' club, the Institute for Improvement of Doctors, and the Military-Medical Academy. Similar name changes were made for towns, institutions and plants throughout the country, the major one being the establishment of Kirovskii Krai on December 5 with Vyatka, its center, renamed Kirov (Kirov was born in Urzhum about 150 kilometers south

of Vyatka). Ironically, the de-Stalinization name changes after 1956 and new regulations on naming cities and institutions, which were promulgated under Khrushchev and eliminated the use of names of discredited leaders, probably resulted in a situation where only Lenin now surpasses Kirov in the name game.

The Zinoviev Angle. On December 15 the combined plenum of the Leningrad Oblast and City Party Committees was finally convened. It was originally intended to be convoked by Kirov on December 2 following his return from the November 1934 plenum of the Party Central Committee in Moscow to discuss the results of that session. Its agenda now was prefaced with selection of Kirov's successor, and consideration of measures to memorialize his name. Chudov, the second secretary, opened the morning's session with a few remarks and the plenum then "unanimously elected as first secretary of the Leningrad obkom and gorkom VKP(B)--secretary of the Central Committee VKP(B) comrade Zhdanov, A.A., recommended by the Central Committee VKP(B)." After hearing city secretary Ugarov's proposals on renaming places and institutions in memory of Kirov, the plenum adjourned until six in the evening.

When the plenum reconvened, its composition was augmented by the "aktiv of the Leningrad party organization" swelling the audience to one of "many-thousand" to hear Zhdanov report on the November plenum of the Central Committee. The decisions taken at the plenum called for abolition of the ration-card system for bread, flour, and meal and a reorganization of the network of political sections in machine-tractor stations and state farms which had been set up in January 1933. Zhdanov spoke to both questions,

and his speech was followed by discussion of the implications for Leningrad in speeches of local party and city soviet officials that evening and the next day.

More significant, however, and ominous, was the indication given in Zhdanov's speech the evening of December 15 that a new turn had taken place in the handling of the Kirov assassination case. While the full text of Zhdanov's speech was not published until December 26, ten days later, the resolution adopted after his speech by the assemblage indicated that the "remnants of the former Zinoviev anti-party group" were now considered the perpetrators of Nikolayev's deed (Kaganovich had addressed a similar gathering of the Moscow party organization the same night Zhdanov was speaking and also used the new formulation). To make sure the message was unequivocal, Pravda's editorial on December 16 stated:

> The December 1 shooting in Smolny of one of the greatest figures of our party and its Central Committee, best companion-in-arms and friend of Stalin, leader of the Leningrad Bolsheviks, Comrade S. M. Kirov--conclusively tore the mask from the worst enemies of the Leninist party and working class--vile remnants of the former Zinoviev anti-party group. Insidious agents of the class enemy showed themselves to be the physical murderers of a leader /vozhd/ of the socialist revolution.

Pravda on December 18 provided detailed propaganda guidance on the "former Zinoviev anti-party group and its remnants".

The new phraseology indicated something was imminent regarding the assassination and on December 22 the NKVD announced the completion of the preliminary investigation and the submission of the case to the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court. According to the announcement the investigation had established that Nikolayev was a member of a terrorist, underground, anti-Soviet group composed of a number of participants in the former Zinoviev

opposition in Leningrad. It had also established that Nikolayev was entrusted with the task of shooting Kirov by I. I. Kotolynov, one of the leaders of this terrorist underground "Leningrad Center". The motive for the assassination was said to be the group's intent to disorganize the leadership of the Soviet government by terroristic acts against the main Soviet leaders, hoping by this means to bring about changes of policy in the spirit of the "so-called Zinoviev-Trotskyist platform". A supplementary motive was said to be the desire for revenge on Kirov personally for his effective routing, "ideologically and politically", of the Leningrad oppositionists. Because the group had no popular support and their casue was hopeless they had resorted to terror. Besides Kotolynov and Nikolayev, the group included N. N. Shatskii, V. V. Rumyantsev, S. O. Mandelshtam, N. P. Myashnikov, S. V. Levin and L. I. Sositskii, all of whom were under arrest along with six additional persons: G. V. Sokolov, V. I. Zvezdov, I. G. Yuskin, N. S. Antonov, A. O. Khanik, and A. I. Tolmazov, in accordance with the Central Executive Committee's decrees of July 10 and December 1, 1934.

The announcement ends with a paragraph which seems intended as a subtle slap at adherents of Kirov's so-called "reconciliation" approach to handling party opposition. All the arrested had on some occasion, it said, been excluded from the party and most of them reinstated later after an official declaration of their adherence to party and government policy. Nikolayev had been excluded slightly less than a year previous for "violations of party discipline" and reinstated within two months after his declaration of penitence. Kirov was well known to have been sharp and effective in his castigation and denunciation of oppositionists but generally was forgiving and lenient in the punishment meted out to them.

It is of interest that the last of the announced white-guardist trials had been completed and the executions carried out on December 15 in Kiev, the same date the new formulation is revealed in the speeches of Zhdanov and Kaganovich. According to unofficial versions of the early period of the investigation when Stalin was in Leningrad, Deputy NKVD head Agranov who had been put in charge in Leningrad tried to persuade Stalin that proving a Nikolayev link to white-guardist emigres and foreign agents was the best way for the regime to make a big issue of the assassination. Roy Medvedev, however, indicates that at the very beginning of the investigation Stalin asked the Leningrad NKVD for a report on former Zinovievites; he was provided with a list of a small illegal group which the NKVD had compiled earlier and whose arrests Kirov had refused to sanction. Stalin, according to Medvedev, then made up the lists of the "Moscow Center" and the "Leningrad Center" from this and a similar Moscow list, and all were subsequently arrested. Mikhail Koltsov, who wrote a feature article on the "Leningrad Center" for Pravda in the same issue as the NKVD announcement of indictment presumably had both lists as he mentioned Zinoviev, Yevdokimov, Bakayev, Kuklin, and Gertik, although their arrests in Moscow were not announced until the following day. Besides the five above, the NKVD's December 23 announcement of the Moscow arrests listed ten others: Ya. V. Sharov, L. Ya. Faivilovich, I. V. Vardin, P. A. Zalutskii, I. S. Gorshenin, V. S. Bulakh, L. B. Kamenev, G. F. Federov, A. P. Kostin, and G. I. Safarov. An indication that Agranov's preoccupation with possible white-guardist and external involvement resulted in less zeal than Stalin demanded on the Zinoviev angle is suggested by the failure of the NKVD to have a case ready against seven of the Moscow group, particularly Zinoviev and Kamenev. The NKVD announcement stated that because of "the

absence of sufficient data for referral to the court", Fedorov, Safarov, Zinoviev, Vardin, Kamenev, Zalutskii, and Yevdokimov were being turned over to the Special Conference of the NKVD for administrative exile.

The December 22 and 23 announcements of the impending trials of the Leningrad and Moscow "centers" was the signal for a rash of statements and resolutions from factories and institutions throughout the country, condemning the Kotolynov group and calling for their execution. Simultaneously, the press was increasingly carrying reports of the unmasking and firing of former Trotskyites around the country, and in the following month the phraseology of condemnation concerning the Kirov assassination more and more was simplified to "Trotskyite-Zinoviev counterrevolutionary opposition" or some close variation. Kotolynov and his alleged colleagues were now the main culprits and Nikolayev more of an unwitting tool in their hands. A secret letter of the Party's Central Committee on "Lessons of the Events Bound Up with the Evil Murder of Comrade Kirov" was circulated to all regional Party committees about this time, according to the Smolensk archives, and at the end of December was being discussed in Party organizations throughout the country. The Smolensk archives contained long lists of indiscriminate denunciations of so-called oppositionists resulting from the Central Committee's letter which were undoubtedly typical of Party archives everywhere.

The Party Central Committee also chose this occasion to issue a decree dated December 22, followed up by a Pravda editorial two days later, on the "rotten liberalism of the Dnepropetrovsk party gorkom and revolutionary vigilance". Citing the presence of Trotskyites and national-deviationists in the Dnepropetrovsk State University, the failure of the gorkom to root them

out, and the vacillation of the obkom in regard to the matter, the decree further intensified the nationwide drive for "revolutionary vigilance" to smoke out and eliminate counter-revolutionary anti-party groups of all sorts--Trotskyites, Zinovievites, right opportunists, and national deviationists (Brezhnev, just turned 28, was finishing the Metallurgical Institute in nearby Dneproderzhinsk at this time and in the following three years moved from factory work there to be a leading Dnepropetrovsk Oblast party official).

Neither Zhdanov's nor Kaganovich's speeches on the night of December 15 which were finally published December 26 in the central press presaged this vigilance campaign although both had signaled the Zinoviev angle in the Kirov case. Zhdanov spent only the concluding few paragraphs of a speech, covering more than one newspaper page, in commenting in fairly standard fashion on the assassination and the need for "vigilance", not "revolutionary vigilance". Like other contradictory developments in these and the following months, the mood of the speeches of Zhdanov and Kaganovich had been that of the November plenum, i.e., hailing the fact that successes in economic development since 1928 and the weakening of the "class enemy" both in the internal trade system and in agriculture now permitted abolition of the rationing of bread and grain products and some relaxation in the system of political controls in the countryside. Yet, within the week, an intensified campaign against all class enemies was revived. Zhdanov's visit to the Kirov factory on December 25, with gorkom secretary Ugarov, ostensibly for further discussion of the November plenum with the party <u>aktiv</u> there, turned into a chorus of indignation against Nikolayev and the others accused. Similarly, the following day

Zhdanov appeared at a meeting of the party aktiv of the Leningrad military garrison held in the Uritsky palace, again to report on the November plenum. But the concluding portion of his speech dealt with material from the investigation of Kirov's assassination (presumably the full indictment of Nikolayev, et al., which would be published the following day) and evoked from the remaining speakers on the agenda demands for "merciless retribution with the white-guard Zinoviev band" and increased "revolutionary vigilance in all areas of work".

Trial of the "Leningrad Center". On December 27 the full indictment against the "Leningrad Center" was published. It obviously was a hastily drafted document, "riddled with contradictions" as Roy Medvedev notes, relying in its key points primarily on the testimony of Nikolayev, which was trumped up for him by Agranov and his NKVD subordinates. Of the fourteen accused, only from Zvezdov were NKVD interrogators able to elicit (or force) an admission that could be cited verbatim along with Nikolayev's to prove Nikolayev was a member of the group, although the indictment claimed others had so testified. Zvezdov, however, is not among those identified in the indictment itself as a member of the original Zinoviev anti-Soviet group, yet he is quoted as testifying:

> He (i.e., Nikolayev Leonid) was connected with us for a long period of time, beginning in 1924. He worked at one point directly under the leadership of Kotolynov, when the latter was secretary of the Vyborg Raikom of the VLKSM, and Nikolayev was nurtured by us, nourished by the spiritual sap of our group and undoubtedly grasped all the experience of our fractional struggle against the party and the party leadership.

Of the alleged leaders of the "Leningrad Center", Kotolynov, Levin, and Rumyantsev, only the last was quoted at all in the indictment, and then only to

the effect that the "counterrevolutionary center of the organization of Zinovievites in Leningrad" existed and consisted of himself, Levin, Mandelshtam, Kotolynov, Myasnikov, and Sosnitskii. The interrogators also succeeded in obtaining only tenuous admissions from two non-members, Khanik and Tolmazov (purportedly quoting Rumyantsev) that the hostile attitude of the group toward the Soviet leadership might possibly lead to some such terroristic act as that committed against Kirov.

Virtually half of the testimony cited in the indictment comes from Nikolayev, and it is only from his testimony that the details of the alleged planning of the assassination are elaborated. Nikolayev provides the link with "white guardists" abroad by testifying to meetings with an unidentified foreign consul in Leningrad who supplied 5,000 rubles to aid the cause (the Latvian government was obliged to recall their Consul-General, George Bissenieks, from Leningrad in early January, but denied categorically his involvement). Nikolayev's diary and other statements addressed to various institutions apparently were a bit of a problem for the NKVD, since they all described the assassination attempt as a "personal act of despair and discontent", but this was explained away by the indictment as an effort to hide his connection with Zinovievites.

Of the fourteen only Nikolayev, Zvezdov, and Antonov fully admitted their guilt, according to the indictment. The rest, except for Shatskii, admitted only that they were members of the underground group of former Zinovievites, with some denying that they had any direct connection with the assassination and some indicating they were aware either of the terroristic mood of the group or of plans for the assassination. Shatskii would not admit his guilt in any respect. Kotolynov, while denying direct involvement in the

assassination, admitted that as "an active member and leader" of the group he bore responsibility for the crime.

The trial was held on December 28-29 in Leningrad at a circuit session of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court and was closed to the public. All were convicted of preparing and carrying out the assassination of Kirov, and, according to the TASS announcement, were executed immediately in accordance with the December 1, 1934 law on the handling of terrorist cases. Thus on the eve of the new year, to many residents of Leningrad it might have seemed that the Leningrad part of the case was closed, but to others, aware of the arrests and interrogations proliferating in the city and the growing stream of deportations to the north and east, the future looked dismal and uncertain.

When Stalin had returned to Moscow from Leningrad, he had left Ya. D. Agranov, deputy NKVD chief, temporarily in charge of the Leningrad NKVD Administration, to complete the assassination investigation. Sometime after the Nikolayev trial, Agranov presumably returned to Moscow, and the NKVD reins in Leningrad were turned over to another of Yagoda's deputies, L. M. Zakovskii, who had also been in the entourage that accompanied Stalin to Leningrad on December 2. His appointment was not publicly announced, but his inclusion in the presidium of the newly-elected Leningrad City Soviet at its first meeting on January 5, 1935 indicated that he was now permanently in charge. The appointment of a high-ranking NKVD official such as Zakovskii represented an upgrading of the Leningrad post as compared with the Kirov period and presumably indicated to Zhdanov that Stalin was not going to tolerate the previous situation where Kirov was able to frustrate Yagoda's (and Stalin's) desires in police appointments and investigations of so-called oppositionists in Leningrad. Zakovskii's subsequent record suggests

that he was not greatly inhibited by Zhdanov and the Leningrad party organization and probably had virtual carte blanche from Stalin.

Trial of the "Moscow Center". To wind up the Kirov case there remained the "Moscow Center" to be dealt with, and its investigation was completed in the first half of January, 1935. Now, it was announced by Vyshinskii that Zinoviev, Yevdokimov, Fedorov, and Kamenev, for whom there had not been enough evidence for a case in December, were to be tried after all, because of "new data" which had come to light, in particular, the testimony of Bakayev and Safarov. The latter apparently was most helpful to the NKVD as he was dropped from the list of accused, his case being "set aside for further investigation." Besides Safarov, of the remaining eleven accused on December 23, Vardin, Zalutskii, Balukh, and Kostin were also dropped from the list of accused, but nine new names were added: B. L. Bravo, S. M. Gessen, B. N. Sakhov, I. I. Tarasov, A. V. Gertsberg, A. I. Anishev, N. A. Tsarkov, A. F. Bashkirov, and A. V. Perimov. The indictment was drawn up by Vyshinskii on January 13 and the trial began two days later although the indictment was not published until January 16.

This indictment was even more flimsy as a legal document than that for the "Leningrad Center" and in general terms endeavored to prove the existence of the "underground counter-revolutionary Moscow Center" composed of "leaders of the former anti-Soviet Zinoviev group" and establish its linkage with the "Leningrad Center". The indictment admitted that "the investigation did not establish facts which might provide a basis to directly charge the members of the "Moscow Center" with either agreeing to or giving guidance in organizing the commission of a terroristic act against Kirov. But it insisted that the behavior of the members of the "Moscow Center"

demonstrated clearly that they were aware of terroristic tendencies of the Leningrad group and further "enflamed" them. Seven of the accused, according to the indictment, admitted their participation in the "Moscow Center"; six admitted only their participation in a counter-revolutionary Zinovievite group; and four admitted their complicity in a Leningrad underground counter-revolutionary Zinovievite group. Kamenev admitted that in 1932 he participated in underground counter-revolutionary activity, joined the "Moscow Center", and did not make a final break with Zinoviev as promised. He also admitted not having energetically resisted certain tendencies left over from early oppositional work which provided ground for criminal activity by former anti-Party elements. Zinoviev was said to consider himself guilty of supporting the existence of the center and participating in it.

This was obviously going to be a purely political trial, more so than that of Nikolayev, and would herald the beginning of the series of politically motivated purge trials of the latter 1930s. Along with the language of the indictment, this fact was made even more clear by a lengthy statement of Yevdokimov to the court on January 15 which was published alongside the indictment before any other information on the trial appeared. In his statement Yevdokimov grovels before the judges and confesses a whole range of political mistakes made by himself, Zinoviev, and Kamenev since 1925, i.e., blackening the name of the party, losing touch with reality in the country, taking counterrevolutionary positions in regard to collectivization of agriculture, failing to see the successes of socialist construction, negating the very existence of the Party and its Central Committee, making "malicious counterrevolutionary insinuations" about Stalin, downgrading and slandering

the Central Committee's role in the international workers movement, and so forth. He confesses that their sin, for which they bear full responsibility, is that they systematically poisoned the mind of the public as well as their own adherents, and then, to make a link with the Kirov assassination, asserts:

> When we are charged with terroristic tendencies, I firmly state: Yes, for this we must bear responsibility, because that venom, with which we poisoned those around us for ten years, abetted commission of the crime--the murder of Kirov.

In the end he throws himself on the mercy of the court, asking that it recognize his sincere repentence for these crimes of his since 1925 which inevitably led to Kirov's murder and indicating his acceptance of any decision of the court as his deserved punishment.

The closed trial took place January 15-16 in Leningrad before the circuit session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court and the brief summary in the press on January 18 provided very little more in the way of information than the indictment. It was noted that a number of participants in the group were called as witnesses by the court and apparently, as a result of their testimony, like Safarov earlier, had their cases held over for further investigation. The court, like the indictment, found no basis on which the "Moscow Center's" actions could qualify as instigation of the assassination of Kirov but stated that the proceedings fully demonstrated that the "Moscow Center" knew of and enflamed the terroristic proclivities of the Leningrad group. Zinoviev, as alleged main organizer and most active leader, received a prison sentence of ten years along with three other defendants who were labeled "the most active participants" in the counter-revolutionary

underground group. Then in descending order, five "active participants" received eight years in prison, seven "participants" received six years, and Kamenev and two others, as "less active participants", received five-year terms. Below the announcement of the trial, the press carried an NKVD announcement of a decree of its Special Conference, which in connection with "the case of participants in the counter-revolutionary Zinovievite group" sentenced 49 persons to four to five years confinement in a "concentration camp" and 29 others to exile at various places for two to three years (according to Roy Medvedev the list included a number of once-prominent Party Members). Vardin, Zalutskii, Bulakh and Kostin, who had been dropped from the list of those accused before the trial, were included among those to be confined in concentration camps and Safarov, the willing witness, was on the exile list.

Later, in the 1936 trial of the "Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Center", a little more on the proceedings of this trial came to light, indicating that Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bakayev, and Yevdokimov "did all they could", in the words of Vyshinskii, "to assert and prove that they could not bear more responsibility for this foul murder than moral and political responsibility; but they declared that they were fully and honestly prepared to bear this responsibility and admitted the correctness and the justness of the charges brought against them within those limits." Zinoviev reportedly said that he did not know many of the people in the dock with him and claimed that he learned of Kotolynov's alleged role in the Kirov case only from the indictment for that case.

The drive for heightened "revolutionary vigilance" which the Central Committee had launched in December was apparently in danger of being slightly

blunted by the relatively mild sentences handed out at this trial. The Pravda editorial on the day the sentences were announced, January 18, pointed out that when the indictment had been published "the toilers of our country unanimously demanded from the court drastic punishment for traitors and betrayers of the cause of the working class." Workers and collective farmers, it said, demanded that there would be no mercy shown these people. In fact, the press at this time had been publishing local items from around the country with demands to "shoot them", and later in January during the All-Union Congress of Soviets, there still were "cries" to shoot Zinoviev and Kamenev. The authors of the Pravda editorial, on the other hand, were caught in a box and felt obliged to conclude that the sentences imposed would fully satisfy the public outcry and were what the accused deserved. Stalin and the Central Committee clearly were not satisfied and were concerned over the effect of the trial on the vigilance campaign. On this very same day, January 18, another confidential letter from the Central Committee was sent to all Party organizations throughout the country demanding the mobilization of all forces to destroy enemy elements and to root out counterrevolutionary nests of enemies of the party and the people. This apparently is the point at which the first wave of mass arrests began, especially in Leningrad, but spreading throughout the country.

The one remaining aspect of the Kirov assassination to be wrapped up in January was the fate of the Leningrad NKVD officials who on December 4 had been fired and turned over to the courts to be tried for neglect of their official responsibilities. On January 23 the case was heard in Moscow before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court. To the eight originally accused,

however, had now been added I. V. Zaporozhets, Medved's first deputy, and three additional NKVD officials, A. A. Gubin, M. I. Kotomin, and A. M. Belousenko. Strangely, M. S. Paltsevich was now listed as M. K. Baltsevich, and it was he upon whom special blame is placed for the alleged negligence in Leningrad at the time of the assassination. The summary of the trial reveals only that all the accused had information that the attempt would be made on Kirov's life and did not take proper security measures. Medved, Zaporozhets, and Gorin-Lundin were also blamed for not taking timely steps to expose and suppress the activity in Leningrad of the Zinovievite group. Baltsevich had an additional charge of commission of "a series of illegal actions in the investigation of cases", which was not clarified and he received the longest sentence, ten years in a concentration camp. Medved and Zaporozhets and three of their subordinates received three years, and the remainder, two-year terms. Medved and Zaporozhets reportedly never were treated as prisoners and eventually assumed positions in prison camp administrations in the Kolyma gold fields of the Far East. The lightness of their sentences did not go unnoticed in police circles, and they apparently continued to enjoy some of the perquisites of high police officers. Medved, however, was brought back for interrogation and trial and was executed in 1938. Zaporozhets was interrogated for the Bukharin trial and was supposed to be tried later. He was still indentified in Kolmya, however, in 1939 in the Dalstroi administration, but eventually was arrested and perished.

Political life in Leningrad, such as it was, went forward while the Kirov trials were winding to an end in January. The first sessions of the new soviets, elected in December, at the raion, city and oblast levels, took

place in the first half of January, and delegates were elected for the forthcoming All-Russian and All-Union Congresses of Soviets. Zhdanov was in Leningrad for some of these meetings and addressed the final session of the oblast congress on January 13, but at this point it was difficult to determine how much time he was going to devote to his Central Committee secretaryship and how much to his Leningrad post. On the evening of January 14 the Leningrad delegation left for Moscow. In between the convocation of the two congresses Valerian Kuibyshev died on January 25, 1935 (under what are now considered questionable circumstances) thus removing from the scene another moderate Politburo member of the Kirov ilk.

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The Role of Yenukidze. It was noted earlier that Avel Yenukidze, who headed the Kirov funeral commission, was one of the first of Stalin's close colleagues to fall from grace. The first hint that all did not bode well for Yenukidze appeared in Pravda on New Year's Day, 1935, just one month after the Kirov assassination (most commentary on Yenukidze in the past has failed to note this item and focuses on his Pravda article two weeks later). On the back page Pravda's editors published a brief "correction of mistakes". The mistakes had appeared in material published three days previously to commemorate the Baku strike of 1904 and two of them concerned Yenukidze. The material had referred to him as organizer of an underground printing press in Baku in 1904, and the correction pointed out that this illegal press had actually been founded by Ketskhoveli in 1900. Similarly, in an accompanying article by A. Rayevskii, a Baku party historian, the Baku party organization was said to have been founded in 1899 by Yenukidze and Ketskhoveli--"this was not true"--Pravda said. The Baku Social-Democratic

organization existed already in 1896-97. Even to more politically-sophisticated readers, these minor corrections probably would not have been viewed at this time as the handwriting on the wall for Yenukidze.

Fifteen days later, however, on January 16, many would have had their suspicions aroused by the long feature article in Pravda in which Yenukidze admitted to mistakes in his own writings on the history of Transcaucasian Party organizations, as well as biographical material written with his authorization in the Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar...Granat and the first edition of the Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya. He admitted that in his brochure on Bolshevik illegal printing presses, he had not quite correctly depicted some events of 1904-5 in Baku, in which, as his explanation reveals, Stalin played a role in "unmasking" a Menshevik. In the enclyclopedias, moreover, he had allowed his biographies to exaggerate his role somewhat, in the manner Pravda corrected fifteen days before (undoubtedly the original Pravda material had been taken from the encyclopedias). The most self-abasing and painful for Yenukidze, however, was his admission at the end of the article that he had not always "succeeded in demonstrating adequate Bolshevik steadfastness". He noted that the Bolshaya biography again was completely wrong in characterizing him as one of the most steadfast underground revolutionaries--"actually I wavered, for example, in 1907 in Baku and in 1917 (March-April) in Leningrad." While Yenukidze was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee chosen by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets in January, on March 3 he was transferred to the somewhat figurehead position of chairman of the Transcaucasian Central Executive Committee. At the June, 1935 Central Committee plenum, he was removed from all his

posts and dropped from party membership. It is not clear when he was arrested but little was done to implicate him in the great trials until after the death of his close friend, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, in February 1937.

The speed with which Stalin started to move against his oldest friend, Yenukidze, within a month of the assassination, suggests a serious concern over the latter's knowledge concerning the incident. If Stalin was only bothered about how his own role in the party history of the Transcaucasus had been portrayed, as some observers suggest, corrections could have been ordered earlier. The "inaccurate" encyclopedia items, for example, had been available for some time (the Granat one was in a volume compiled between 1927-29 and the volume of the Bolshaya in question was issued in 1932); Yenukidze's brochure on illegal printing presses came out around 1925. Presumably, for this first phase of discrediting Yenukidze, Beriya and his minions in the Transcaucasus were called upon to play a role. Later, after Yenukidze's final fall in June, Beriya's five-hour speech of July 21-22 to the Tiflis party aktiv, "On the Question of Bolshevik Organizations in the Transcaucasus", was run serially in seven issues of Pravda (this later became his notorious pamphlet of the same title which glorified Stalin's role there).

The carping on Yenukidze's historical errors was all the more picayune against the total background of all that Yenukidze had written and said in the 1920s and 1930s on Stalin's role in prerevolutionary Transcaucasia. As Robert Tucker has indicated in his biography of Stalin, few were as knowledgeable as Yenukidze on the early party history of this area. Yet

he certainly wittingly gave Stalin more than his due on the occasion of Stalin's fiftieth birthday celebration in 1929 when most of the top leaders wrote essays in his honor. Yenukidze not only elevated Stalin to the foremost position among the revolutionaries of Transcaucasia but also magnified his role in the 1917 revolution as one of the very foremost organizers and leaders.

While a close friend of Stalin (some say the closest) from early days of revolutionary activity and a member of the entourage that formed during the twenties around Stalin, Yenukidze seemed at times to demonstrate some independence in his actions. He was godfather of Nadya Alliluyeva, Stalin's second wife, and handled her funeral arrangements. He came to be viewed as a moderate of the sort as Ordzhonikidze, Kuibyshev, and eventually Kirov, and even more than Kirov, tended to be forgiving and charitable to many oppositional figures. Alexander Orlov claims that Yenukidze told his NKVD interrogators in 1937 that his whole crime had been trying to dissuade Stalin from staging a trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev and shooting them.

Again, this factor, like the glorification of Stalin's role, seems peripheral. He had been intervening on behalf of oppositionists for several years with Stalin's knowledge. Rather, Yenukidze's fate hinged more on what he knew and was likely to discuss about the assassionation of Kirov with other Party leaders. As long-time Secretary of the Central Executive Committee, he held a position which at that time made him privy to a great deal of information on relations between various leaders and

Stalin's relations with each of them. His position involved responsibility for the administration of the Kremlin, including allocation of apartments and offices, telephone arrangements, housekeeping, medical facilities, and so forth, with security aspects handled by the NKVD. According to Elizabeth Lermolo, in her Face of a Victim, which details her travails as an early arrestee following the Kirov murder, she met and briefly conversed with Yenukidze in a prison transport van near summer's end in 1937. Yenukidze, she says, very definitely "gave me to understand" that Stalin had given the order that brought about Kirov's death and that Yenukidze himself conveyed the order to Yagoda. While there might be some question about the latter point, it is not unlikely that Yenukidze was aware of the plot. He told Lermolo that he intended to make the facts public at the forthcoming trial of the Rightist-Trotskyite Bloc, i.e., the Bukharin trial.

Yenukidze never was able to make anything public since the NKVD scenario for the last great trial called for him to be portrayed as a key intermediary between the Trotskyite-Zinovievite group and Yagoda (who by then was also in the dock) in arranging the deaths of Kirov, Kuibyshev, and Gorky. Yenukidze reportedly was not cooperative in preparations for the trial which was to take place March 2-13, 1938. He and L. M. Karakhan were separated out from the defendants for a separate closed trial which occurred earlier, on December 16, 1937, when the press stated both were sentenced to death for espionage and terroristic activity. Apparently Yenukidze was "steadfast" on this occasion and to such an extent that he could not be broken nor could he be tried in public. The finale to the enigma of Yenukidze and Karakhan was revealed recently by the Bolshaya and is even

more intriguing. Their biographies published in its third edition indicate that Karakhan died on September 20, 1937 and Yenukidze on October 30, 1937, both well before their officially announced execution date, December 16, 1937.

* * * * *

The Ordeal of Leningrad. As indicated earlier, the January 18, 1935 confidential Central Committee circular demanding greater efforts to root out and destroy counterrevolutionary elements is considered the starting point for mass arrests. Arrests and deportations had begun, however, in Leningrad immediately after the assassination on a large scale. The deportations initially had little to do with the Kirov affair, but were necessitated by the accelerated roundup of suspects and questionable elements which overtaxed the capacity of the Leningrad prisons.

The most graphic eyewitness accounts of this period in Leningrad are provided by Elizabeth Lermolo's Face of a Victim and Vladimir Petrov's It Happens in Russia. Lermolo had been exiled to Pudozh, northeast of Leningrad in Karelia, in 1931, for being the wife of a Tsarist officer; she was arrested there and brought to Leningrad on suspicion of being a white-guardist link with Nikolayev; she tells of what she experienced in Leningrad prisons until she was shipped out eastward in January following the Zinoviev trial. She continues the story relating later conversations with both prisoners, former prison guards and police officials from Leningrad she met in following years while under confinement. Petrov fills in the subsequent picture of Leningrad prisons after the January 18 decree, from his arrest on February 17, 1935 until he was shipped out to Kolyma over a year later around the end of April 1936 . Another graphic picture of the travails of Leningrad prisoners and

their families in 1937-38 is provided in Lydia Chukovskaya's Opustelyi Dom (The Deserted House), a fictional narrative against the background of real events, written at the time but remaining unpublished until 1965.

Lermolo was arrested late on the night of December 1, 1934 and flown with other arrestees to Leningrad via Petrozavodsk. She was kept in solitary confinement and underwent questioning by Stalin himself, Agranov, and roughly sixteen investigators every day throughout December and into January. Following the January trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev she was shipped off by train with them and some of Nikolayev's family to the Chelabinsk isolation prison, and later to Krasnoyarsk, without any trial or sentence. A police official in Leningrad described to her the regime under which they worked after December 11--continuous duty, sleeping in the cellar of the NKVD headquarters (The Big House) on Shpalernaya Ulitsa (now Voinova Ulitsa), a "breakneck grind", and "executions...more executions, day in and day out". Later she met the same official in the Verkhne-Uralsk isolation prison, now a fellow prisoner, and learned more of the grisly events of December and January. At the time of the assassination, the Leningrad prisons were overloaded with prisoners charged with a variety of counter-revolutionary crimes; some had been under detention for years and plans had been underway to release a few and ship the remainder to concentration camps. When the December 1 decree was issued, Yagoda ordered Leningrad officials to conclude all investigation of pending cases so the prisons could be emptied within twenty-four hours. While the decree covered only terrorist acts, Yagoda chose to expand its application, resulting in the execution of 600 prisoners in three days, "priests, bishops, some dissident Communists and

unruly Komsomol youths, men and women, the sick and the well." New arrestees started to arrive on December 2 and continued to arrive day after day for one and a half months; others left, either executed or shipped off by convoy to concentration camps. The official estimated: "Three to four convoys every day for three months--each convoy consisting of eight hundred to one thousand persons...." This suggests a range of from 216,000 to 360,000 persons had been transported from Leningrad by March.

When Lermolo was returned from Krasnoyarsk and sent to the hospital at Leningrad's "Kresty" prison near the end of 1936, in connection with continuing investigations for the great trials, she heard from prisoner convalescents more stories of the variety and tenuousness of grounds for arrest. One woman, for example, was the wife of a shop superintendent in the Red Putilov plant, a Communist, who was arrested in December 1934; her explanation for his arrest was not that he was a Zinovievite but was a Kirov protege. Another woman claimed she was not a party member nor in any way acquainted with any of the Nikolayev family, but her sister had been librarian in 1922 at the Young Leninist Club (to which Nikolayev belonged and which was disbanded by Kirov in the late 1920s); this led not only to her arrest, but the arrest of her husband, of the party cell secretary where her sister worked, and of all who had recommended her sister for her job. In general, she said, an arrestee's next of kin, other relatives, friends, their relatives, neighbors, and those listed in one's address book might all be rounded up. Her figure for the number arrested in Leningrad alone for two years was more than 500,000, and she claimed the city was decimated with the hardest hit being the Communists. An NKVD official's word for it, according to Lermolo,

had been "thoroughly cleansed" (Solzhenitsyn commented in Arkhipelag Gulag, "That is how they exiled Leningrad from Leningrad").

That the frantic pace of NKVD work in Leningrad slowed somewhat after February is indicated by an NKVD announcement in mid-March 1935 and by Petrov's description of his interrogations and confinement in the prisons of Leningrad at this time. On March 20 the NKVD revealed that a group of former aristocrats, tsarist dignitaries, prominent capitalists and landholders, gendarmes, police, and others had been arrested and exiled to eastern areas of the USSR for violation of residence regulations and the passport law. Some were said to have been accused of acting in behalf of foreign governments. The list totalled 1,074 individuals and included:

41 former princes
33 former counts
76 former barons
35 former important manufacturers
68 former large landholders
19 former important merchants
142 former high tsarist ministerial dignitaries
547 former generals and senior tsarist and white army officers
113 former higher ranking officials of the gendarmerie, police and secret police

This suggests that the NKVD might have bogged down in trying to implicate arrestees by even the most flimsy connection with anti-Soviet or counter-revolutionary activity and was now resorting to residence and passport regulations to take care of whomever else they wished to remove from the city. Petr Yakir, cited earlier, noted that in 1937, at the time of his arrival in Astrakhan, there were 4,000 families from Leningrad who had been exiled there under this decree.

Petrov, by his account, was victim of the revenge of a rebuffed girl friend, who worked in a sensitive NKVD office in his institute and

had incriminating "counterrevolutionary" evidence placed among his effects in his dormitory. At that time in February 1935 he had considered the rumors of political terror in the country as vague and tended to view the Soviet regime in an optimistic light. To him his arrest was unbelievable, and he expected it to be straightened out in short order, never at all imagining that his ordeal was to last six years. In Leningrad he spent six days following arrest in the "Nizhegorodskyi" prison (now Lebedeva Ulitsa) because there was no room for him at the "Big House" on Shpalernaya. His interrogations began after his transfer to the latter prison, and in contrast to Lermolo's were scheduled every third night, and he remained in solitary confinement for five months throughout the interrogation period. After this, he was moved for six days to a common cell holding over 100 prisoners, in the so-called "Tairov Lane" section of Shpalernaya, until he could be moved to the third major Leningrad prison, the "Kresty", to await his trial. Here the cell held sixteen prisoners which under the tsar had held one. After his trial, Petrov spent the rest of 1935 and the first four months of 1936 in one of the large common cells of the Leningrad Transfer prison on the eastern outskirts of the city awaiting the convoy which would take him to Kolyma.

Petrov provides an illuminating cross section of types of prisoners in the Leningrad prisons and the grounds for their arrests. The headman in the large common cell in Shpalernaya was an army battalion commander who at the May Day parade was found to have a live cartridge in his revolver, which was there by accident but led to a charge of terrorism. The headman described the incumbents of the cell as a motley crowd, mostly students and engineers then, but earlier including a number of workers--also some prominent professors

in return for electrical repair services he performed for the prison commander, Petrov found that former friends in Leningrad were well aware of what was occurring in the city:

> Their answers painted a terrible picture of sweeping reprisals in Leningrad. People had been disappearing one after another and never returned. They were taken from government departments, from plants, from educational institutions, everywhere.

For a city which had only a few years earlier managed to regain its prerevolutionary population level (the population of Petrograd fell to about one-third its 1917 level by 1920, i.e., 720,000), the executions and deportations were not insignificant. Petrov's estimate of the number of prisoners and deportees is 200,000, falling at the lower end of Lermolo's range. The time periods covered by these estimates is unclear and some prisoners included in the totals came from outside of the city itself. The totals suggest, however, that at worst roughly one in five citizens of Leningrad were affected and at best one in ten.

Estimates by some foreign observers at the time varied and some were considerably lower. Anton Ciliga, the Yugoslav communist released from confinement and exile in 1936, reported in his memoir, The Russian Enigma (1938), how he met thousands of workers from Leningrad, sent there after Kirov's murder, with their wives and children, "some thirty or forty thousand of them. . .scattered right across northern Siberia and along the cost of the Arctic Ocean." And they did not call themselves "Zinovievites", but "those from Leningrad". The Lithuanian Minister, Jurgis Baltrusaitis, who was considered the best source by U. S. diplomats in Moscow, knew in April 1935 that at least 21,000 had been exiled from Leningrad. On the other hand,

U. S. Ambassador Bullitt later informed Washington in March 1936 that the British Vice Consul in Leningrad had reported that 150,000 persons had been exiled from the city and 500,000 from Leningrad Oblast. Bullitt found this unbelievable but the figures tally well with those of Lermolo and Petrov cited above.

Soviet sources have only scratched the surface in discussing this period of Leningrad history and the most enlightening of such information, as indicated earlier, appeared in the last few years before Khrushchev fell, inspired by the revelations in speeches at the XXII Party Congress in 1961. It was at that congress that I. V. Spiridonov, First Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee, provided a small indication of the enormity of Leningrad's ordeal:

> The Leningrad Party organization suffered especially great losses from the perversions of the period of the cult of the individual, from arbitrariness and lawlessness. Thousands of honest people, devoted to the party, were subjected to brutal repressions in the period of 1935-1937.

Later, before initiating the proposal for removal of Stalin's body from Lenin's mausoleum, he elaborated slightly:

> The Leningrad Party organization suffered especially large losses of party, soviet, economic, and other workers as a result of the unwarranted repressions, which crashed down on Leningrad after the murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov.
>
> For four years an uninterrupted wave of repressions continued in Leningrad against honest and wholly innocent people. Frequently promotion to responsible work was the equivalent of a step to the edge of an abyss. Many people were annihilated without trial and investigation on the basis of false, hastily fabricated charges. Not only workers themselves, but also their families were subjected to repressions, even absolutely innocent children, whose lives were thus fractured from the very beginning.

> Both the repressions of 1935-37 and the repression of the postwar period--1949-50--were carried out either on the direct instructions of Stalin or with his consent and approval.

While Spiridonov repeatedly uses the 1935-37 time frame, his reference to "four years" comes closer to the time span used in studies published in the early '60s by Leningrad and party historians. The latter, moreover, tend to separate the 1935-36 period from the 1937-38 period, the first being the end of Yagoda's stint as head of the NKVD and the latter encompassing the so-called "Yezhovshchina". Very little is said, however, in the official six-volume Leningrad history concerning the 1935-36 period and the aftermath of the Kirov assassination is described more in general terms, i.e., Stalin's use of it to take revenge on those he did not like throughout the whole country. Regarding Leningrad specifically, it revealed little:

> In Leningrad, and then also throughout the whole country, mass arrests were made and many honest communists were subjected to groundless repressions. The checking and exchange of party documents conducted in 1935-36--a measure which was necessary and proved its value--was also used for the purpose of excluding from the party many people devoted to the cause of socialism. The Leningrad party organization suffered especially heavily as a result of these lawless actions.

The illegal actions and repressions, however, during this period generally affected rank and file communists and non-party workers, employees and farmers rather than higher ranking Party and soviet officials. Various histories of factories in Leningrad published in the '60s cite some of the examples of lawlessness at the local level in 1935 and 1936. The history of the Kirov factory indicated that the "life of the party organization of the plant became more complicated and tense" in the aftermath of Kirov's murder

once the latter became linked with activity of the former Zinoviev opposition. The majority of the communists in the factory were sharply hostile toward former oppositionists, and the deputy director of the factory, Denis Plekhanov, a former party committee official, Grigorii Kotikov, a shift chief of the foundry shop, engineer Yakovlev, and several others were excluded from the party. However, many of those excluded had long ago broken with their past, acknowledged their mistakes, and for a long time had worked faithfully with their collective, and "these severe measures taken with regard to them could in no way be justified."

The history then notes that the party committee of the factory took an even more harsh line toward former noblemen, officials, merchants, and kulaks. In January 1935 alone it insisted that 140 such persons be fired; in addition approximately 700 persons were shifted to the category of "class hostile elements" in their factory personnel record, although "the majority of these were conscientious people." The mere fact that they were placed in this category of persons not deserving political trust provoked feelings of resentment and even animosity toward them. In such an atmosphere, moreover, the study indicates, all too often the attempt was made to label production failures as "intrigues of enemies". In the turbine shop a longtime non-fulfillment of the production program was "capriciously" explained away as due to the fact that the planning-distribution bureau was headed by a "disguised alien", Ryzhevich; many production failures tended to be blamed on one person.

Excessive suspiciousness began to appear from time tome. Karl Ots, the factory director, had to deal with this in the case of a bolt which had, through carelessness, dropped into the gear box of a T-28 tank during pro-

duction, almost causing serious damage. Ots punished the guilty worker with a demotion and transfer to a subsidiary position, but the military representative in the factory had to be persuaded that this was no more than a careless accident. A month later, the army administration concerned revived the question in a letter to Ots, pointing out that it was not the first time that foreign objects had gotten into critical pieces of machinery, and since this seemed to suggest sabotage, the guilty party should be punished.

Ots did not budge as he had already considered the case closed, but he despaired of the unwarranted lack of trust increasingly shown by experienced workers, even communists, toward their comrades and fellow-workers. Ots was shortly transferred by Ordzhonikidze to the Izhorskii plant in Leningrad with a memorial plaque installed at the Kirov works in his honor. Later, however, he also was a victim of the repressions under Yezhov, as was his successor as director of the plant, Mikhail Ter-Asaturov.

The Kirov factory party organization went through the process of checking and exchanging party documents beginning in the spring of 1935. As in the rest of the country, there were many cases of irregularities, including improper data, theft of party cards, improper safeguarding, and forging of documents. The extent of these in the Kirov factory took on a "dangerous character" suggesting that it was "the hand not only of swindlers and rascals but also open enemies of the soviet system, aiming at sabotage." Thus, the checking of documents uncovered many who had gotten into the party by fraudulent means, but it was also acknowledged that many mistakes had been made in the process, including "gross violations of the party's line in regard to its cadres". A great number of communists excluded from the party

had been unjustly included in the category "passive"; in the Kirov factory's first machine-assembly shop, for example, a candidate member, Goroshinova, was classified as "uneducated, hence an inferior activist in our party." According to the history, many of those excluded were reinstated "in due course" following an airing of such mistakes at the December 1935 and June 1936 plenums of the Party's Central Committee. The illegalities, however, intensified in following years with Yezhov in charge of the NKVD, both in the Kirov plant and elsewhere in Leningrad, encompassing both the rank and file and higher officials.

Another factory history, that of the "Krasnoye Znamya" knitted goods and stocking factory, graphically demonstrated another facet of the difficult times in Leningrad following Kirov's death. While this factory had had problems in the past, principally in regard to labor turnover, a considerable expansion was planned and budgeted in 1934 by the Main Administration of the Knitted Goods Industry in Moscow, including new shops and buildings. The work on these began at the end of 1934 and continued through 1935 and 1936. The year 1935, however, opened disasterously for the factory and it appeared headed for a production breakdown and work stoppage. Between January and May, as a result, the factory suffered the invasion of all kinds of commissions and inspectors--53 in all--party, trade-union, press, prosecutors, representatives from Moscow commissariats and administrations, and Leningrad city officials. The visitors reported what had long been well known as the factory's perennial problem--inadequacy as well as large turnover of the working force, and this was due principally to unavailability of living space and minimal facilities to care for very young children (about 90 percent of the factory's workers were women, coming from rural areas). In

that year 3,558 were hired, yet 4,077 discharged, of a working force averaging 15,660.

Through energetic efforts and help from Moscow, the plant survived the year and managed to fulfill its quotas. In the following year, through more intensive Stakhanovite campaigns, training-on-the-job programs, improvement of housing and nursery facilities and so forth, the plant administration endeavored to overcome its problems. But all was not good. Even in the knitting goods industry the vigilance campaigns took their toll; at the end of 1935 a group of engineers and foremen in the stocking shop were arrested and charged with sabotage, specifically that they "put out of operation stocking equipment"; "subsequently all were fully rehabilitated". Moreover, labor turnover, in spite of all efforts to contain it, continued high--4,933 were hired in 1936 but 4,579 were let go. The plan continued to be plagued with the problem--in 1937, 1,400 more left the factory than were hired, and only in the last prewar years, while the working force still did not increase, its productivity did significantly. Some of this chronic labor shortage undoubtedly was exacerbated by the repressions in those years.

The Leningrad party archives have been permitted in recent years to release to party historians some additional figures on party membership for the '30s and '40s. The history of the Leningrad party organization, published in 1968, covering the years 1917-1945, describes the effect on membership totals of the checking and exchange of party documents carried out from mid-1935 through October 1936. It cites the instructions sent out to local party organizations by the Central Committee in May 1935, instructing them "on the necessity to cleanse their ranks of untrustworthy and hostile elements

with exceptional thoroughness and to increase revolutionary vigilance." By the time the checking of party documents was completed in February 1936 in Leningrad, 27,376, i.e., thirteen percent of the total membership of Leningrad oblast and city were excluded from the party. During the exchange of documents immediately following, 4,322 more were excluded, bringing the total exclusions to 31,698. The figures are more notable when one recalls that just two years previous in 1933 an official "purge" of the party ranks throughout the country was conducted and at that time the Leningrad organization excluded 30,653, i.e., 12.7 percent of the oblast and city membership.

The Leningrad party history underlines the value of this exercise in checking out the party's members, but notes the errors and mistakes occurring in the process similar to those cited in the Kirov factory history. In addition to the exclusion of those considered either hostile to the working class or socially alien elements, a large group of communists were categorized without grounds as "passive", "unfit" and "not justifying confidence" and were excluded. Of all those excluded during the checking of documents, 21.2 percent fell in these categories and during the exchange of documents, 12.5 percent. Among them were many honorable communists who enjoyed the esteem of their working collective. Leningradskaya Pravda on April 3 and June 11, 1937, cited several such examples of those excluded for "passivity" in the Admiralty plant: shockworker P. A. Belozerov with forty years of working experience, civil war veteran I. T. Belyayev, with 35 years' experience, former shop trade-union organizer Ya. P. Kolchin with ten years' experience, and others. Similar cases occurred in the "Bolshevik" factory, on the "October" railway line, and in other enterprises. The oblast and city party

committees decreed that all cases of those excluded for passivity should be reviewed. The party history indicates that many were thereby reinstated, but noted that the process of correcting these miscarriages proceeded slowly and inconsistently.

Also impressive in demonstrating the effects of the post-Kirov ordeal on the Leningrad party are its total membership figures for these years. The statistical handbook issued by the Leningrad Institute of Party History in 1974 reveals that the total membership had reached its highest point by 1933 under Kirov. In the following five years, however, membership fell by nearly half (totals as of January 1):

	Oblast (including city)	City
1933	278,280	220,991
1934	193,262	157,411
1935	184,931	150,251
1936	170,295	141,848
1937	164,063	130,485
1938	149,930	123,140
1939	157,981	130,582
1940	193,090	151,328
1941	199,983	151,793

While some of this drop was caused by the "cleansing" and check and exchange of documents cited above, there was also a freeze throughout the country on taking in new members for almost three years, which was lifted at the end of 1936. Some of the drop in the oblast figure, moreover, was due to territorial adjustments made from 1935-38 in which parts of Leningrad oblast were separated off to become parts of the newly formed Kalinin. Arkhangelsk, Vologda, and Murmansk oblasts. However, these territorial changes would not affect the city total; this continued to fall significantly each year until 1938, when the downward trend finally ended, only to be reversed three years later by

wartime losses in the blockade (the war so devastated the Leningrad membership that even the 1946 total was still lower than the prewar low point in 1938; the total did not reach and surpass the high of 1933 until after the death of Stalin in 1953, presumably slowed by postwar repressions). Moscow, for comparison, suffered heavy losses of membership but its drop from 1933 is only about one-third and consequently it recouped slightly faster before the outbreak of World War II (and also seems to have suffered fewer wartime losses percentage-wise than Leningrad).

* * * *

The Purge of the Leningrad Leaders. When Zhdanov took over the leadership of the Leningrad party organization in January 1935, he inherited Kirov's roster of secretaries in both the oblast and city committees, and virtually all, along with the principal oblast and city soviet officials, remained for the next two years as part of Zhdanov's operation. For the oblast party committee, M. S. Chudov was his second secretary and the remaining secretaries were B. P. Pozern, P. A. Irklis, and P. L. Nizovtsev (the last ceased to be a secretary but continued to work on the oblast staff); for the city committee his second secretary was A. I. Ugarov. The chairman of the executive committee of the oblast soviet was P. I. Struppe and of the city soviet, I.F. Kodatskii. The Leningrad trade-union council head was P. A. Alekseyev and the Komsomol leader, I. S. Vaishlya. At the XVII Party Congress in 1934, Chudov, Kodatskii, and Alekseyev had been elected to full membership in the Central Committee (Chudov for the fourth time), and Pozern, Struppe, and Ugarov to candidate membership. One of the early leaders of the Leningrad Komsomols, P. I. Smorodin, now a raion party secretary, was also elected to candidate membership.

Virtually all these officials had worked in the Leningrad area for

years. Chudov's prerevolutionary activity started among Petersburg printers, and after party assignments in Tver and Rostov in the early '20s, he was sent back to Leningrad in 1928 to be Kirov's principal party aide. Pozern was an old revolutionary who became the leading military commissar of the Petrograd military district during the civil war and was rector of the Communist University in Leningrad until Kirov brought him into more active party work in both the oblast and city organizations. Kodatskii also was a veteran revolutionary, playing a leading role in military operations in Petrograd in 1917, opposing Zinoviev in 1925, and then heading a city raikom under Kirov. Later he headed the Leningrad oblast economic council until being elected "mayor" of Leningrad in 1930. Struppe had been an active communist in Latvia, then Pskov party secretary until Kirov made him head of the oblast party control commission and then chief executive of the oblast soviet. Irklis, Ugarov, Nizovtsev, and P. A. Alekseyev had all risen through the lower ranks of Leningrad officialdom under Kirov.

The first and only major change affecting Zhdanov's main party aides during 1935 occurred in October. Irklis, one of the oblast secretaries, was transferred to the Karelian Autonomous Republic to be oblast party secretary there, and he was replaced by V. I. Shestakov. Shestakov, an experienced factory and party worker in the Kirov period, had been a factory director, then deputy "mayor", and was appointed head of the oblast party commission in 1931. He was a member of the Leningrad delegation to the XVII Party Congress in 1934 and was elected a member of the Central Committee's Party Control Commission at that time. As a result he apparently was transferred to Moscow sometime in 1934 to be deputy head of the Industry Section of the Central Committee. He returned to Leningrad in March 1935, however, to become head of the industry-transport section of the oblast party committee.

The next major change in Zhdanov's Leningrad regime occurred in July 1936 when A. S. Shcherbakov was brought from Moscow and installed as an additional oblast party secretary. Aside from Zhdanov's personal aide, I. M. Kulagin, Shcherbakov seemed to be the first and only of Zhdanov's former colleagues to join him in Leningrad. Shcherbakov had come to Nizhnigorodskii province (later renamed Gorkii Krai) in 1924 right after three years in the Communist University in Moscow. This was the same year that Zhdanov took over party leadership there, and Shcherbakov rose through raion party work to become Zhdanov's propaganda and agitation chief and Murom district secretary before leaving in 1930 to attend the Institute of Red Professors in Moscow. Presumably with Zhdanov's recommendation in 1932 he became deputy head of the Central Committee's Culture and Propaganda Section and at the first Writers' Congress in 1934 was selected to be secretary of the Union of Soviet Writers. With Zhdanov's shift to Moscow from Gorky, following his election at the XVII Party Congress in 1934 as a Central Committee Secretary responsible for ideological matters, Shcherbakov found himself again working for his previous boss and mentor.

While it is tempting to link Shcherbakov's move to Leningrad with purges of the leading officials there in the following years, the circumstances are not clear, and a number of other factors may have motivated the shift. With Zhdanov's sudden appointment as the Leningrad party chief and the need to spend more of his time there than in Moscow, at least in 1935 and 1936, Shcherbakov might not have been as satisfied with his situation as formerly. Moreover, the reorganization of the Culture and Propaganda Section into five new sections in May 1935 possibly resulted in a diminution of his responsibilities--now, instead of being deputy head of a very large and

important section, he was head of just one of the newly-formed and smaller sections, the Section for Cultural Enlightenment Work. Shcherbakov during 1935 worked closely with Maxim Gorkii in his capacity as secretary of the writers' union, and although the relationship between the two is not clear, it may not be coincidental that Shcherbakov left for Leningrad the month following Gorkii's death. There could also have been reasons that Zhdanov wanted Shcherbakov's assistance in Leningrad, in addition to concern over his protege's fate in Moscow. Leningrad was going through an extensive reorganization of the party apparatus in 1935 and 1936, particularly those parts concerned with personnel matters and the propaganda and agitation network, and Shcherbakov's talents in the latter area would be welcomed.

Central Committee resolutions on December 17, 1934, March 27, 1935 and May 14, 1935 called for some reordering of party work at all levels below the center. While they indicated an effort to counter the creeping bureaucracy in the party apparatus up and down the line, some increased centralization was evident in changes affecting personnel matters. Leningrad was a specific and logical target of these measures because of the Kirov murder, and the Leningrad city party committee on March 29, 1935 followed up the Central Committee resolution of March 27, 1935 with a lengthy decree "on the tasks of party-organizational work", which was immediately published in Pravda the next day as a guideline for local party organizations throughout the country.

The reorganization essentially involved the establishment of party cadre sections at oblast, city, and raion levels, and the Leningrad decree spelled out an extensive list of responsibilities for this section which encroached on virtually all other sections in the party apparatus. In addition to its main task of training, assigning and promoting party personnel,

it was to ensure a proper and more democratic use of meetings, to check on fulfillment of decrees at the local level, to improve informational exchange both up and down, to oversee the work of party groups and party organizers in factories, farms, and institutions, and finally to effect a significant improvement in ideological training, "especially in the study of party history". The last point was one in which Zhdanov had been interested and heavily involved the previous year (when Kirov had visited Stalin in Sochi the summer of 1934, he had found Stalin and Zhdanov laboring over a history text, and Stalin had tried to persuade a reluctant Kirov to participate in their discussions). Later in the year the reorganization of the Culture and Propaganda Section of the Central Committee was echoed throughout the lower apparatus; in the Leningrad oblast, city, and raion committees, four separate sections were formed from the "kultprop" section: agitation and propaganda; science, schools and vuzes; cultural-enlightenment; and press. In addition, the city committee formed an industry section and soviet-trade section.

The organizational structure of the Leningrad party organization was also affected by territorial changes instituted in 1936. The nine city raions were redivided so the city encompassed fifteen raions. Changes also occurred in the oblast involving an increase in the number of rural raions and elevation of Sestroretsk and Shlisselburg to the status of cities. Three border districts also were formed: Pskov, Kingisepp, and Murmansk. These changes brought with them, therefore, an increase in the number of local party committees and more fulltime party officials in each locality. At the same time, in the enterprises and higher educational institutions of the city, measures were taken to increase the number of primary party organizations. In the 55 largest shops of 19 industrial enterprises and in ten of the more important faculties of four higher schools, party committees were

formed to replace party organizers. As a result, primary party organizations grew in number from 1,814 on January 1, 1935 to 3,071 on May 1, 1937. Two deputy secretaries were allotted each primary organization and each raion committee. The proliferation of the party bureaucracy resulting from all the above institutional and territorial moves provided a much more fluid situation for demotion, promotion, and elimination in connection with arrests, accusations, and investigations transpiring during this period.

As indicated above, the Soviet studies published which touch on the purge period in Leningrad seem to separate the 1935-36 period from the 1937-38 period, yet in listing the leading figures who perished there is usually no attempt to provide specific dates. The most comprehensive and master list is that appearing in the six-volume Leningrad history:

> Mass repressions, beginning after the assassination of S. M. Kirov, took a most ugly form in 1937-38. Hundreds of the most active party and soviet workers of the city and oblast fell prey to the arbitrariness in Leningrad then, including secretaries of the oblast and city party committees, M. S. Chudov, A. I. Ugarov, P. I. Smorodin, B. P. Pozern, chairmen of oblast and city executive committees P. I. Struppe, I. F. Kodatskii, A. N. Petrovskii, chairman of the oblast trade-union council P. A. Alekseyev, secretary of the VLKSM oblast committee I. S. Vaishlya, responsible workers of the VKP(B) oblast and city committee apparatus I. I. Alekseyev, S. M. Sobolev, M. V. Bogdanov, P. L. Nizovtsev, and many secretaries of raion party committees and the largest primary party organizations . . . .
>
> Leningrad lost many talented managers, organizers and commanders of socialist production, including the manager of Lenenergo, I. F. Antyukhin, directors of the Kirov plant, K. M. Ots and M. L. Ter-Asaturov, director of the Metallicheskii plant, I. N. Penkin, leaders of the largest enterprises of the city, G. A. Desov, G. A. Abramov, K. N. Korshunov, T. K. Kondratev, M. V. Yasvoin, and others . . . .
>
> After the provocative "Tukhachevskii case" the most able commanders and political cadres of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were arrested and perished, including the commander of the Leningrad Military District, P. Ye. Dybenko, the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, A. K. Sivkov, many workers of the staff and political administration of the district, and commanders of units and ships.

It is clear, however, from the death dates published in the third edition of the Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya that there were at least two stages in the repression of leading officials, first in 1936-37 and then 1938-39 with some overlap. The history of the Leningrad party organization suggests this in its brief reference to 1935-36 repressions, citing the Leningrad party archives as its source:

> In the conditions arising out of the cult of the individual the norms of party life and principles of party leadership were violated, and abuses of power were tolerated. Baseless charges were brought against many communists, for which they were removed from their posts and excluded from the party. In 1935-1936 these violations of Leninist norms of party life touched a significant number of workers of the apparatus of the Leningrad party organization. Among them were even such eminent leading officials as obkom second secretary, Ts.K. VKP(B) member M. S. Chudov, Leningrad Soviet chairman, Ts.K.VKP(B) member I. F. Kodatskii, oblispolkom chairman, Ts.K.VKP(B) candidate member P. I. Struppe and others.

At what point in 1936 these three, Chudov, Kodatskii and Struppe found their positions shakey is not clear, since no one at their level seemed to be under a cloud during this period. In fact, the attacks made later on party officials in Leningrad in March 1937, when Zhdanov was reporting on the just completed and notorious February-March Central Committee plenum, were still directed primarily at lower levels, i.e., raion committees. There was no indication either that these three had not attended the Central Committee plenum in Moscow with Zhdanov.

By May, 1937, however, the die was cast. The revelation was dramatically described at the XXII Party Congress in 1961 by D. A. Lazurkina, an old Bolshevik from Leningrad who spent over seventeen years in labor camps and exile after her arrest in 1937:

> ...In May 1937 comrade Zhdanov was Leningrad party obkom secretary. Zhdanov assembled us, the leading officials of

> the obkom and announced: in our ranks, in the Leningrad organization, two enemies--Chudov and Kadatskii--have been exposed. They have been arrested in Moscow. We could not speak. It seemed as if our tongues were frozen. But when this meeting ended and when Zhdanov was leaving the hall, I said to him, "Comrade Zhdanov, Chudov I don't know, he hasn't been in our organization long. But I will vouch for Kadatskii. He has been a party member since 1913. I have known him for many years. He is an honest party member. He fought all the oppositionists. This is inconceivable! It must be verified." Zhdanov looked at me with his cruel eyes and said, "Lazurkina, stop this talk, otherwise it will be bad for you." . . .
>
> And what kind of a situation developed in 1937? Fear, not characteristic for us Leninists, predominated. We slandered one another, not believing we were even slandering ourselves. They made up lists for the arrest of innocent people. They beat us so we would slander. They presented these lists, they forced us to sign, they promised release, they threatened: if you don't sign, we will torture you!

At the end of May 1937, the IV Leningrad City Party Conference was convened and soon after in mid-June 1937 the VI Oblast Party Conference met. A. I. Ugarov and A. S. Shcherbakov gave the main reports respectively. The composition of the newly-elected city and oblast committees, and the secretaries selected by these committees immediately following the conferences, indicated the progress of the purge. The names of Chudov, Kodatskii, and Struppe did not appear in either list and P. I. Smorodin replaced Chudov as Zhdanov's second secretary in the oblast apparatus. This may have come as a surprise to some since Shcherbakov had been chosen to give the main report to the oblast conference and could have been expected to be Chudov's replacement. The decision to transfer Shcherbakov out of Leningrad to the Irkutsk Oblast party organization presumably was taken in the first two weeks of June as he was listed in the newly-elected city committee but not in the oblast committee chosen later. In addition to the three mentioned above, P. A. Alekseyev, the trade-union leader and P. L. Nizovtsev, the former obkom

secretary were not included on either committee and perhaps were already under investigation if not arrest.

The Leningrad NKVD chief, L. M. Zakovskii, reportedly was endeavoring about this time to concoct a new public trial against a "Leningrad terrorist center", which would have implicated most of the Kirov holdovers. According to Khrushchev's secret speech to the XX Party Congress in 1956, Zakovskii hoped to involve Chudov and his wife Shaposhnikova, Ugarov, Smorodin, Pozern, and others in the case and bring them to trial. The trial never came off and Zakovskii himself was arrested in 1938 after Beriya took over the NKVD.

Chudov and Kodatskii were both executed on October 30, 1937, the same day as Yenukidze. It is not clear whether Struppe died the same day, but his death occurred sometime before the end of 1937. Information on the fate of P. A. Alekseyev and Nizovtsev is not available, although neither was heard of after 1937. The number of other high-ranking party figures from other areas who were executed on October 30, 1937 is impressive and probably comprised a list which Stalin and other members of the Politburo approved for execution at this time, presumably without trial. It included, for example, the North Caucasus Krai 1st secretary, B. P. Sheboldayev, Saratov Krai 1st secretary, A. I. Krinitskii, Smolensk Oblast 1st secretary, I. P. Rumyantsev, a prominent leader of the Old Bolshevik Society, S. S. Lobov, member and candidate of the Central Committee, D. Z. Lebed and V. I. Polonskii, former secretary of the Central Executive Committee, A. S. Kiselev, member of the Soviet Control Commission, A. M. Nazaretyan, former Gorky ispolkom chairman and later president of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences, A. I. Muralov, and perhaps also G. M. Pylayev, another leading party official under Kirov and colleague of Chudov and Kodatskii in Leningrad, who was executed four days previous on October 26. N. P. Komarov, another old Leningrad hand who

succeeded Zinoviev as chairman of the Leningrad Soviet, perished on November 27, 1937 with a number of Old Bolsheviks; he too originally was to be implicated in the Bukharin trial in 1938 along with Yenukidze and others but was never brought to trial.

The second stage of the repressions seems to date from sometime soon after the Leningrad party conferences in May and June 1937 and eventually reached the remaining senior officials who had served under Kirov. The Leningrad party history states:

> . . .In 1937 and the first half of 1938 many executive, party, soviet, komsomol officials, managerial and military cadres, and workers on the ideological front in Leningrad were removed from membership in leading organs, fired from their jobs, excluded from the party and repressed. In only one year, from June 1937 through June 1938, nearly 2,000 communists were excluded from the city party organization, including 19 members of the city committee and revision commission and five members and candidates of the bureau of the city committee. Without any discussion whatsoever many executive officials of the obkom and gorkom, the chairman of the city ispolkom, A. N. Petrovskii, secretaries of the VLKSM obkom and gorkom, the first secretaries of almost all city raikoms VKP(B), and a series of rural raikoms of the oblast, commander LVO, P. Ye. Dybenko, chief of the Political Administration of the Baltic Fleet, A. K. Sivkov, and many others were excluded from the party and removed from the posts they occupied. Many talented managers, including director of the Kirov and later the Izhorsk plant, K. M. Ots, Director of the Kirov factory, M.L. Ter-Asaturov, director of the Metallicheskii plant I. N. Penkin, the manager of Lenenergo, I. F. Antyukhin and others were arrested. Not a few honest officials suffered as a result of slanderous calumnies which were made use of by unscrupulous careerists, deceiving the party for their personal ends.

Pozern and Smorodin were arrested sometime during this period and perished on February 25, 1939 (Roy Medvedev identifies Pozern in late 1937 as Leningrad oblast prosecutor). A similar fate befell Shestakov, Vaishlya, I. I. Alekseyev, Sobolev and Bogdanov, but the dates of their deaths have not been revealed.

Sivkov had been removed as commander of the Baltic Fleet by November as his replacement's name, I. S. Isakov, appeared in the list of those elected to the Supreme Soviet in December 1937. On the other hand the election list also indicated that Dybenko still was in command of the military district and Petrovskii was still Leningrad's "mayor". Dybenko was replaced by M. S. Khozin in the first half of 1938 and was executed on June 29, 1938. Petrovskii was replaced as "mayor" in October 1938 by A. N. Kosygin but his death date has not been revealed.

Ugarov was a special case as he was transferred to Moscow on February 11, 1938 to replace Khrushchev as Moscow Oblast and City party chief when the latter was sent to the Ukraine. His tenure was shortlived, however, as he was replaced in both posts before the year was out by his recent Leningrad colleague, Shcherbakov. Ugarov was executed with Pozern and Smorodin on February 25, 1939 (as in the case of the October 30, 1937 executions--as Conquest has pointed out--there were a rash of executions from February 23-26, 1939 including former Politburo members Kosior, Postyshev, and Chubar, Komsomol chief Kosarev, Kazakh first secretary Mirzoyan and Marshal Yegorov, Army commander Fedko, and corps commander Khakanyan).

The nucleus of the Zhdanov circle that was to work with him through the war and afterward was forming in Leningrad during these years. Some were to be caught up in the so-called "Leningrad Case" fabricated by Malenkov and Beriya after the war and others were more fortunate and survive to this day. N. A. Voznesenskii's services were requested in January 1935 by Zhdanov, and the Central Committee agreed to the assignment as head of the Leningrad city planning commission. He also became Kodatskii's deputy during his stay

of nearly three years. At the end of 1937 the Central Committee beckoned, Zhdanov reluctantly acquiesced, and Voznesenskii returned to Moscow to find himself suddenly named head of the State Planning Commission after a very short period as deputy head. The Zhdanov-Voznesenskii connection was preserved through their joint responsibilities in governmental and defense collaboration and Central Committee work, and in Leningrad through the latter's brother, A. A. Voznesenskii, professor of political economy and later rector of Leningrad University.

Following the city and oblast plenums of May and June 1937 more new names began to appear. A. A. Kuznetsov was elected to both the city and oblast party committee and succeeded Smorodin as oblast second secretary later in the year. Kuznetsov had worked in the Leningrad area since 1924, first in Komsomol organs and then switching to party work. In February 1938 he shifted to the post of second secretary of the city party committee, replacing Ugarov, and remained Zhdanov's right-hand man throughout the war, following him to Moscow in 1946 to become the Central Committee Secretary concerned with police matters. Also elected to both oblast and city committees was N. G. Ignatov. who, following army and OGPU service, had been assigned to the Central Committee for its Marxism-Leninism course and then sent in 1934 to Leningrad. There he became secretary of the party committee in the Goznak paper plant (one of the main plants producing banknotes, currency, and forms for government documents) and in 1937 was selected to be 1st secretary of a city raikom. Like Shcherbakov, however, he was transferred out of Leningrad soon afterward to Kuibyshev and then Orel to head the party organization there during the war. He returned to Leningrad immediately following Stalin's death, however, presumably to restore order in the party there following the inroads of the "Leningrad case". Like

Shcherbakov and Kuznetsov, he was later elected a Central Committee secretary and under Khrushchev shifted to Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers (at the XXII Party Congress he provided some of the more interesting revelations on the coup attempt of the anti-party group in 1957). The present-day Soviet Premier, A. N. Kosygin, came to Leningrad in 1930 for training at the textile institute, and, after graduation, went into textile work there and in 1937 was director of the Oktyabr spinning and weaving mill. In 1938 the changes came fast as he became head of the industry-transport section of the oblast party committee and then succeeded Petrovskii as "mayor" of Leningrad in October. After only three months as "mayor" Kosygin was called to Moscow and appointed Peoples' Commissar of the Textile Industry. In Leningrad, his place as "mayor" was taken by P. S. Popkov who remained in this position throughout the war. The shifts in January and February 1938 also brought into prominence T. F. Shtykov, who replaced Kuznetsov as oblast second secretary when the latter shifted to the city secretaryship. Shtykov remained a close colleague of Zhdanov throughout the siege, eventually shifting to military work on various of the Leningrad fronts. In April 1938 Ya. F. Kapustin was named the Central Committee's first "party organizer" for the Kirov Factory. Kapustin, an engineer in the factory, had been slandered in late 1937 and almost railroaded out of the party. He became a city party secretary shortly before the outbreak of the war, and remained there throughout. D. F. Ustinov, currently the Soviet Minister of the Defense, worked in Leningrad from 1934 on, after finishing the military-technical institute, in various capacities in military research and technology, heading the "Bolshevik" factory from 1938 until 1941 when he was named Peoples' Commissar of Armaments in Moscow. Shcherbakov, as indicated above, had become Moscow oblast and city secretary in late 1938, in 1941 (at the age of 40) became

a Central Committee secretary as well, and in 1942 put on two new hats, chief of the Main Political Administration of the Red Army and chief of the Soviet Information Buro, thereby becoming the wartime propaganda czar. Thus by early 1938 the Zhdanov circle, in Leningrad and at the center in Moscow, had begun to take shape.

Marshal Zhukov and Leningrad

Zhukov's relationship to Leningrad and the Zhdanov circle is an intriguing one. He was not a Leningrader but had attended the Higher Cavalry School in Leningrad in 1924-25 and his recollections of the city in his memoirs while very brief seem to be nostalgic. He apparently had not been closely associated with Zhdanov at any time until the month-long stint in Leningrad in September-October 1941. His direct role in the city's defense although of short duration was an extremely significant one, during Leningrad's undoubtedly most fateful month. The situation around the city had become critical in August and the possible contingency of being forced to abandon Leningrad was on the mind of many including Stalin. While it is tempting to suggest as some have done that Stalin's antipathy for Leningrad inclined him toward giving the city short shrift at this time, there is little evidence to support this view. Stalin was consistent in demanding the defense of Soviet cities to the last, and Leningrad was no exception. Similarly, the view that Molotov and Malenkov argued for abandoning the city, the latter partly because of his political rivalry with Zhdanov, remains speculative. If they did have these views, they were overruled by Stalin after their August-September visit to the city. Certainly the decision to dispatch a military figure of Zhukov's stature to Leningrad to take command of the defense is the most persuasive indication of Stalin's conviction that the city could be saved.

The events leading up to the Zhukov appointment are still beclouded by slightly varying versions and misdating on the part of both

Leningrad historians and military leaders involved. The problems that arise in trying to sort out the chronology of events that follows in August and September arise both from incomplete information and also from willful manipulating of some of the facts provided.

The first wave of articles and books discussing more candidly the Leningrad siege appeared after 1957 and continued to a year or so after Khrushchev's ouster. While full of previously unpublished material they were colored by the campaign to denigrate Stalin, ignore Molotov and Malenkov, and also to impose a sort of "brownout" on the role of Zhukov. Not only Stalin's faulty estimate of the likelihood of the initial German attack but his meddling in minor military decisions and ignoring of the advice of his front commanders is played up by certain writers. Zhukov's assignment to Leningrad as front commander in September is not even mentioned by some; D. V. Pavlov, the State Defense Committee's food emissary in Leningrad, for example, in the first (1958) and second (1961) editions of his pioneering work on the blockade, says not a word about Zhukov (yet in his third [1967] edition, he adds several pages which describe what a painful thing it was for Voroshilov to leave Leningrad at this time and provides a brief but positive tribute to Zhukov's contribution). Even Maj. Gen. Fedyuninskii, who was personally selected by Zhukov to accompany him to Leningrad, only mentions the arrival and departure of Zhukov in his memoirs, published in 1964. A history of the Leningrad Party organization in wartime published in 1965, moreover, cites Zhukov's brief presence and then in a footnote bitterly challenges the assertion of Alexander Werth, writing for the "Saturday Review" in 1962,

that "only the personal actions of Army General G. K. Zhukov changed the course of the struggle" at the gates of Leningrad.

On the other hand, the second wave of revised editions and new memoirs published in the late '60s and subsequently, provides quantitatively more, but less negative, descriptions of Stalin's role, and Zhukov's achievements are elaborated. Zhukov's memoirs themselves although uneven and perhaps somewhat edited, fill in certain gaps and are supplemented by Vasilevskii's memoirs. Air Marshal A. A. Novikov in 1970 cites Zhukov's great role in the defense of Leningrad and notes that "unfortunately the role of Zhukov in the defense of Leningrad up to now has not been appraised in our military-historical literature. Even Georgi Konstantinovich himself in his memoirs, out of modesty concerning this, is silent, allotting unjustifiably little space to the story of his activity in the post of commander of troops of the Leningrad front." These later works, however, also reflect an effort to counter some of the assertions, for example, in the books of Harrison Salisbury and Leon Goure on the siege. Consequently, doctoring up has occurred, which further muddies the water and still leaves room for some speculation on the situation in both Leningrad and at the center in Moscow.

* * *

On July 30, 1941, after over a month of struggling with the increasingly complicated German advance on all fronts and efforts to find a workable command structure both at the fronts and in Moscow, Stalin recalled Shaposhnikov to again take over as Chief of the General Staff. Zhukov, who was sent back to the field to head the newly created "Reserve

Front," had differed angrily with Stalin on a defensive tactic that involved surrendering Kiev, which was unthinkable to Stalin, and had then requested his assignment to the front. Voroshilov and Zhdanov were summoned from Leningrad the same day for an extensive review with Shaposhnikov and Stalin of measures to strengthen the defense of Leningrad. According to Vasilevsky, then attached to the General Staff, the Supreme Command had data indicating that, while the German attack had with much difficulty been temporarily stopped, the enemy was speedily preparing for the seizure of Leningrad with three striking forces, moving from the west and south toward the city. Whether the Supreme Command had any indication this early that they might worry less about the Finns from the north pushing beyond the old border toward Leningrad is not clear, but the immediate concern seems to have been with the German three-pronged thrust (the whole Soviet command structure set up July 10 facing the Germans from the Baltic to the Black Sea comprised three main sectors [napravleniye] subordinate directly to the Supreme Commander, Stalin: the Southwestern, Western, and Northwestern; the last of which, attempting to stem the German drive toward Leningrad, was headed by Voroshilov with Zhdanov as the Party representative on his staff and was directly responsible for two fronts, the Northwest and Northern, and the Baltic and Northern Fleets).

Precisely what specific operational changes were decided upon at the Moscow meeting with Stalin and Shaposhnikov are not known, but they probably included further strengthening of the forces facing the German thrust with units taken from the Finnish front and a few dispatched from

elsewhere in the country. Vasilevsky indicates that one matter of concern was strengthening the staff of the Northwest Sector command and that Voroshilov had asked that Vasilevsky be assigned to him as his chief of staff. Vasilevsky averred to Shaposhnikov that he considered the incumbent, M. V. Zakharov a talented, thoroughly prepared operational officer but he was willing if Voroshilov insisted. The latter apparently did not insist or was overruled, but Zakharov was replaced by Maj. Gen. A. S. Tsvetkov and Vasilevsky was promoted to Deputy Chief ot the General Staff and chief of its Operations Administration.

What if anything was decided at this two-day session about defense measures for the city itself also is not clear; earlier, on July 24, at a meeting of the Leningrad Party aktiv a special commission for defensive work had been established and confirmed by the Northwest Sector Command under the chairmanship of city party secretary, A. A. Kuznetsov, and consisting of N. V. Solovev and P. S. Popkov, the provincial and city governmental heads, academicians N. S. Semenov and B. G. Galerkin, Lt. Gen. Shevaldin, commander of the Leningrad Military District, and I. M. Zaltsman, director of the Kirov factory. The commission supervised the construction of the band of defensive works encircling Leningrad to the south and west and mobilized over 300,000 workers and scientists, who could be spared from their regular work for the construction task. Even earlier at the end of June the Leningrad People's Home Guard had been established, the first in the country, and formation and training of divisions and units proceeded apace through July (224,000 Leningraders were drawn in the following months into this and other voluntary units

destined for the fronts or the internal defense of the city). On July 1 the oblast and city party committees had set up a Commission of Leningrad Defense headed by Zhdanov and including the leading party and city governmental officials, but there is scant information on what this commission was doing although it was still functioning in August.

There was little in the first three weeks of August to encourage the defenders of Leningrad. The Germans moved relentlessly eastward and northward toward and around the city, driving a wedge between the Northern and Northwest Fronts; the Finns for their part were splitting the Northern Front in two. The Leningrad party history published in 1965 was more critical of Stalin's role during this period than other commentators. It noted that not a day passed but what the Supreme Command in Moscow was concerned with some operational order regarding the Leningrad area; and both Stalin and Shaposhnikov carefully followed developments in the Northwestern Sector, correcting plans of adjacent fronts and augmenting and shifting forces and equipment to the extent circumstance permitted. But in his constant effort by whatever means to achieve a speedy stabilization of the Leningrad front and a reliable defense there, "Stalin now and then incorrectly evaluated the real correlation of forces and the situation," unjustifiably characterized the Leningrad commander "a specialist in retreat," and accused the military council of the front of being "occupied with only one thing--how to retreat."

Concern both in Leningrad and at the Supreme Command in Moscow over the state of affairs reached a high point by August 20. In Moscow on or about this date it was decided to send to Leningrad

a special commission of the Central Committee and the State Defense Committee, consisting of Molotov, Malenkov, Kosygin, navy chief, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, the air force commander, P. F. Zhigarev, and artillery chief, Gen. N. N. Voronov (Voroshilov and Zhdanov were also considered members of the commission on the spot). The commission's tasks were to delve into both military and civilian aspects of the city's defense, i.e. the military command structure, anti-aircraft and anti-tank defenses, land and naval artillery cooperation, and evacuation and food supply problems of the city.

At the same time in Leningrad the Party aktiv was convoked in Smolny for the second time since the start of the war to discuss the much more serious threat now hanging over the city. Voroshilov outlined the military situation at the fronts in funereal terms but wound up with an enthusiastic exhortation to throw back the enemy--that they had the artillery strength to do so--and "Leningrad will become his grave." Zhdanov followed, declaring that the moment had come to put "your Bolshevik qualities" to work. Both his speech and Voroshilov's apparently have not been released from party or military archives, if they were preserved, and the only records available are D. V. Pavlov's handwritten notes on the occasion. Zhdanov ended with his famous ringing cry:

> The enemy is at the gates. It is a question of life or death. Either the working class of Leningrad will be enslaved and its finest flower destroyed, or we must gather all the strength we have, hit back twice as hard, and dig Fascism a grave in front of Leningrad. All depends on us. Let us be strong, organized, powerful, and victory will be ours.

An appeal to the population of Leningrad was quickly drafted by Zhdanov's assistant, A. N. Kuznetsov and the city's party military section head, cleared by Voroshilov and then Zhdanov, who informed the Party Central Committee in Moscow of it. Moscow decided it should be simultaneously published in all central newspapers as well as Leningradskaya Pravda on August 21. This "historic document" was signed by Voroshilov, Zhdanov, and Popkov, the "mayor" of Leningrad.

Also on August 20 the city party committee and city executive committee took action to deal with the critical situation facing Leningrad and adopted a resolution "On the Organization of the Defense of Leningrad," which was then confirmed by an order of the Northwestern Sector Command, i.e. Voroshilov and Zhdanov. Under this resolution and order a Leningrad Military Defense Council was established, headed by Maj. Gen. A. I. Subbotin, commander of the Leningrad People's Home Guard, and including city party officials, A. A. Kuznetsov, L. M. Antyufeyev, Ya. F. Kapustin, and the "mayor" P. S. Popkov. On the same day this council went into action to draw up a detailed plan providing for inner defense of the city, formation of additional worker's units, street-fighting and anti-tank measures, and readiness for paratrooper landings.

In addition to the critical military situation in which Leningrad found itself on August 20, therefore, there was developing a complicated organizational problem of what would now be called crisis-management. As was standard Soviet pratice, the Northwestern Sector Command and the two fronts subordinate to it, all had military

councils, the Northwestern Sector Command's headed by Voroshilov and Zhdanov and the Northern Front's, headed by Lt. Gen. M. M. Popov and N. N. Klementev, both latter councils located in Leningrad (the Northwest Front command, staff headquarters and military council had been forced eastward and, as indicated above, its front separated from the Northern Front by German forces driving around the city from the west and south). The Leningrad Home Guard had a military council and the Leningrad Military District Troops Administration which existed until late August also had a military council, and other military councils were formed from time to time for specific frontline areas. Now, a new Leningrad Military Defense Council had been established which was to coordinate inner city defense matters with the Northwestern Sector Command and the Northern Front Command. At the same time the special high-level commission of the Central Committee and State Defense Committee was expected from Moscow within a few days.

Soviet commentators on this period have varied in their evaluations of the organizational problems, and some, particularly more recent ones, probably were endeavoring to give a picture of a more smoothly running military and civilian management arrangement than was the case. Artillery chief Voronov was the most specific in citing the organizational shortcomings in the Leningrad military command arrangements.

Stalin's angry intercession on August 21 regarding the Leningrad Military Defense Council has been described in most detail by D. V. Pavlov, who apparently was present when Voroshilov and Zhdanov were on the phone with Stalin. It was also treated by the Leningrad Party

wartime history, the writers of which apparently reflected chagrin over the black mark with which the city party committee was assessed by Stalin for setting up the council. Other later sources usually quote Pavlov in brief. Stalin objected to the creation of the council without his permission and the absence of Voroshilov and Zhdanov from membership in the body. The latter two in turn defended the action of the city party committee as meeting the needs of the actual situation, protesting that it was an auxiliary body which would relieve the overburdened staff of the Northwestern Sector Command of certain defense tasks so they could concentrate on crucial military operational matters. Stalin not only rejected their arguments but went on to sharply reprimand Voroshilov and the city party committee for organizing poorly armed workers' units and to order abolition of the system of electing battalion commanders and commissars in the home guard units. At Stalin's insistence a new Leningrad Defense Council was formed on August 24 with Voroshilov and Zhdanov heading it with the rest of the council the same except that Antyufeyev apparently was dropped. The new council had to reissue its proclamation on formation of the battalions and units of the home guard for inner defense, putting them on "barracks status," with the requirement to work their normal eight hours in their plant or institution followed by three hours of military training.

Pavlov allows that technically Stalin may have been correct in wishing to have unity of command but was confusing the functions of the bodies involved so that Voroshilov was forced to deal with problems which could be handled by other competent personnel. Whether Stalin had in mind the major changes in the military command structure of Leningrad which

were being contemplated when he vented his wrath on Voroshilov and Zhdanov is not clear but this might have been a factor influencing his outburst.

On August 21 Shaposhnikov, chief of the General Staff had wired Voroshilov asking for immediate response with a plan for action to deal with the increasingly critical situation. On the next day the military council of the Northern Front drew up a comprehensive military operational plan for the defense of Leningrad. Included with this submission to Moscow was a request that the Northern Front be divided into a Leningrad Front and a Karelian Front to recognize the reality of the current situation where it was necessary to direct troop operations on a front which ran from the Baltic to the White Sea and on to Murmansk, and which had been split by the Finns. The Supreme Command accepted this change and issued the order on August 23 for the change (at the same time it removed the Northwest Front from subordination to Voroshilov and Zhdanov's Northwestern Sector Command and placed it directly under the Supreme Command in Moscow). This left Voroshilov and Zhdanov with the two new fronts, the Leningrad Front headed by Popov and Klementev and the Karelian Front to be commanded by Lt. Gen. V. A. Frolov and A. S. Zheltov.

Within a week it was decided to simplify the command structure further and the Northwestern Sector Command was abolished and Voroshilov and Zhdanov assigned to head and concentrate their attention on only the Leningrad Front, with Popov being demoted but retained as chief of staff for the front. The ill-starred Leningrad Military Defense Council was abolished and its functions transferred to the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, thereby unifying and

simplifying the military and civilian command structure for the front.

During this week of reorganization of the front commands, the special commission arrived from Moscow, headed by Molotov and Malenkov, and remained in the city for ten days. The extent to which the commission participated in the organizational decisions is not clear because its arrival date, judging by the Soviet sources available, could have been any day between August 21 and 29. Artillery chief Voronov states clearly in his memoirs that the commission was dispatched for Leningrad on August 21 and Navy chief Kuznetsov states in his that it departed on the 29th (Salisbury was inclined to accept Kuznetsov's date); both, however, describe exactly the same itinerary by plane to Cherepovets, then by train to Mga where enemy bombings had blown up some of the track and the commission had to walk along through Mga RR station to where the roadbed was intact and an armored train sent by Voroshilov from Leningrad awaited them. Kosygin, who had been in Leningrad earlier in the summer, as indicated by Salisbury, apparently had returned from Moscow, since Voronov clearly indicates that Kosygin accompanied the commission from Moscow. Other sources have less clear formulations as to the timing, such as "in the latter half of August," "at the end of August," or "soon after the meeting of the city party aktiv" (Aug. 20); it seems clear from what some of the sources describe the commission doing that it had arrived by the 25th if not earlier. Voronov as well as the most recent version of wartime Leningrad by Leningrad historians state unequivocally that the commission advised Stalin on creation of the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts; Voronov states that the commission was specifically instructed to decide on the spot whether

so many military councils were necessary, where some military officers sat on several councils and situations existed where "responsible military chiefs took part in meetings so much" that they didn't have time for their other work. Other sources suggest that the commission was influential only in the later decision to abolish the Northwestern Sector Command. All sources indicate, however, that the commission made recommendations regarding the imposition of 'siege status' and a more stringent curfew in the city (August 23), speedier evacuation measures and improvement of food supplies.

Each of the military members spent most of their time separate from Molotov and Malenkov with their respective military commanders and units. The blackout of what Molotov and Malenkov did, which was dictated by their membership in the "anti-Party group" during the Khrushchev period, has continued to this day although their presence on the commission now is at least acknowledged where it had not been for some years. The commission returned to Moscow around September 1 or soon thereafter, probably without knowing that Mga, the last railway and land link of Leningrad with the rest of the country had been taken by enemy forces a day or so earlier. The measures for railway transport of food supplies to Leningrad which they had worked out no longer could be implemented, and the only route remaining would be across Lake Ladoga or by air.

The circumstances surrounding Voroshilov's replacement by Zhukov have become increasingly confused by more recent memoirs and other commentaries since Salisbury published his version. Undoubtedly the special commission, particularly Molotov and Malenkov,

had some recommendations on this score, although there has been nothing published indicating what they might have been. The decision to divide the Northern Front into the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts, followed later by the abolition of Voroshilov's command, the Northwestern Sector, may have been intended by some as an arrangement to ease Voroshilov out of the picture. Voroshilov, himself, may have looked at it this way, and did not expect to be ordered to take over the Leningrad Front from Popov who had been assigned to head the Leningrad Front when his Northern Front was split in two. Vasilevskii indicates in his memoirs that he was present when Stalin was carrying on a "serious conversation" on the phone with Voroshilov who was requesting that he be replaced by someone younger. At first Stalin would not agree, but Voroshilov apparently kept bringing it up in subsequent calls and, according to Vasilevskii, as the situation around Leningrad continued to become more complicated, the Politburo decided to send Zhukov to the Leningrad Front to replace Voroshilov.

Earlier versions of these last days of August and the first weeks of September which Salisbury had to rely upon, suggest that the Mga and Shisselburg losses and the "passivity" of Voroshilov were the grounds for his removal, and generally indicated the latter's unhappiness over being replaced. Popov and Novikov whose memoirs are published later seem to have mixed feelings about Voroshilov. Popov obviously had been upset by unexpected decisions and criticisms of him by Voroshilov, yet he had praise on other occasions, notably for Voroshilov's repeated and successful demand of Stalin that field commanders be given the right to award medals for heroism on

the spot rather than wait for a lengthy procedure going through the Supreme Soviet Presidium. Novikov and the engineer chief Bychevskii, whom Voroshilov frequently chewed out, both commented upon Voroshilov's courage and ability to inspire the troops. Novikov noted, however, that Voroshilov had a weakness for meetings; Novikov dreaded them and tried by any means to avoid them if possible. One found oneself in interminable discussions which had nothing to do with your affairs, waiting for the proper moment to slip out into the antechamber to check with one's staff and learn what was happening (this is an echo of what Voronov said the special commission had been encharged to root out).

Failure of Voroshilov to inform Stalin promptly of the German seizure of Mga and Shisselburg on August 30 and September 8, respectively has been cited as a serious black mark against Voroshilov because of Stalin's anathema toward any such instances throughout the war. In both cases Voroshilov apparently hoped to recoup the loss and in the case of Mga, at least, his forces were temporarily successful. Mga was first taken by the enemy on August 29 but the Bychevskii version suggests that fighting for the railroad station continued and he dates the next enemy seizure as September 1, but notes that the enemy was thrown back once more but finally came in with added strength on September 2 and settled the issue. In the case of Shisselburg Voroshilov apparently did not communicate the loss on the 8th, and Stalin found out through the German propaganda broadcasts on the 9th which claimed that the Shisselburg fortress was in German hands (this, of course, was not accurate since the enemy had taken the town but not the fortress which held out until the blockade was broken in 1943). This, however, could not have been

a serious factor in Voroshilov's fate, since, according to Zhukov's account, the decision to send Zhukov to Leningrad was taken in his presence on the night of September 8 by Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Shcherbakov and other Politburo members, following a dinner in Stalin's Kremlin apartment. According to Vasilevskii, the Supreme Command concurred in this assignment the following day. The depth of Stalin's concern over Leningrad is also evident in the fact that Gen. Meretskov, who had been assigned since June 23 to the Supreme Command with special responsibility for the Northwestern Sector, would have been a leading and experienced candidate, very acceptable to Zhdanov, to replace Voroshilov, but Stalin chose Zhukov.

Most of the earlier versions of Zhukov's assignment to Leningrad, if it is mentioned at all, cite September 13, which is the date of the official order, as his arrival date, and Fedyuninskii who accompanied him actually claims that they flew off from Moscow early on the 13th (Pavlov says Zhukov arrived on the 12th). Novikov also cites the 13th, but notes that Zhukov uses an earlier arrival date of September 9 in his memoirs and that this is probably true, but Voroshilov was officially still in charge until the 13th. In fact both Bychevskii and Novikov treat Voroshilov as still in command when citing their trips to the Krasnoye Selo Front on the 10th and 11th, accompanying or meeting him there. On the 10th Voroshilov delivered his rallying cry to the black-cloaked naval marines and led them personally in a dramatic push that threw the enemy back temporarily at that location. Novikov describes how Voroshilov's security chief on the 11th was upset by the forward position

in which Voroshilov was exposing himself at Krasnoye Selo, and Voroshilov told him to go and hide if he was afraid--"I won't keep you." Both these incidents probably provided grist for the rumor mill in Leningrad that Voroshilov attempted suicide by risking his life at the frontlines.

Zhukov, however, clearly states in his memoirs that he flew to Leningrad on September 9 and took over from Voroshilov on the next day (the Leningrad wartime history, Nepokorennyi Leningrad, issued first in 1970 for the 25th anniversary of the war's end, also dates Zhukov's stint in Leningrad from September 10 to October 6, 1941). He carried a note to Voroshilov from Stalin saying "Hand over command of the front to Zhukov and fly to Moscow immediately." According to Zhukov, under subsequent instructions from Stalin, Voroshilov left on September 11 for the frontlines to report on how Gen. Kulik and his 54th army were doing in trying to retake Mga, and open up the land route to Leningrad. This brief assignment before returning to Moscow apparently was related to Voroshilov's military council report to Stalin on September 11 relating their difficulties over the past two months in the way of creating shock troop groupings such as Kulik's to throw back enemy breakthroughs, to take the initiative away from him, and to launch an "active" offense. Stalin and the staff of the Supreme Command were not satisfied with the explanation and felt Voroshilov's "passivity" was one of the main shortcomings. How much Popov was blamed is not clear; he remained as Voroshilov's chief of staff for only a week after the latter took over the Leningrad Front in early September and then was suddenly assigned elsewhere by the Supreme Command. Kulik never

succeeded in retaking Mga and he was also reassigned later in September.

Zhukov tells of his arrival, flyng in to Leningrad over Lake Ladoga, where the sky suddenly cleared and their transport was pursued by two Messerschmidts. They succeeded in landing safely and were in such a hurry to reach Smolny that he had no time to inquire why their own cover had not chased away the enemy fighters. Then upon arrival at Smolny's gates, the guards quite properly demanded their passes which of course they did not have. Zhukov identified himself but "orders are orders after all," and they had to wait outside the gates for fifteen minutes until the commandant gave permission to enter and drive up to the door.

It is notable that at the time of his arrival the military council of the Leningrad Front was meeting and the question of whether the city could be saved was uppermost in their minds. All the field and branch commanders, the Baltic Fleet commander and managers of the major industrial plants and enterprises were present, and Zhukov learned that measures were being discussed that were essential in the event Leningrad could not be held, i.e. demolition of the principal military objectives, plants, bridges, etc. Zhukov states:

> Now, a quarter of a century later, these plans seem incredible. But at that time? At that time the cradle of the October Revolution, the city of Leningrad was in mortal danger and the fight was one of life or death.

Zhukov indicates that after a brief conference with Voroshilov, Zhdanov, Kuznetsov, and the rest of the military council, they adjourned, deciding

that for the time being no measures were to be taken. "We would defend Leningrad to the last man." It is clear that Zhukov came with a clear understanding from Stalin that the city could be saved, and he saw no need for discussing even the contingency of its possible fall.

However, back in Moscow, possibly this very same day Stalin was discussing the contingency of Leningrad's possible fall with the naval chief Admiral Kuznetsov, and gave orders for preparations to ensure that none of the Baltic Fleet would fall into the hands of the enemy in case Leningrad fell. Kuznetsov, in his memoirs which were published partially in journal articles and also in book form, obviously had been queried by readers concerning the incident as an indication that Stalin was seriously considering abandoning Leningrad. However, writing both in 1963 and later in a 1971 edition, he answers the question stating that Stalin undoubtedly was considering this possibility or he would not have taken such a serious step to prepare for the contingency, but that this did not mean that the situation in Leningrad was considered hopeless.

When Zhukov took over from Voroshilov the following day, Lt. Gen. Khozin who had accompanied him from Moscow also took over as chief of staff, and his other companion Feyuninskii was immediately sent to inspect the most critical front at Uritsk and Pulkovo heights, southwest of the city. Zhukov and Voroshilov telegraphed Vasilevskii that Zhukov had taken over and asked that Stalin be informed that Zhukov intended to act with dispatch immediately. Zhukov then relates how he worked through that night of September 10-11 with Zhdanov, A. A. Kuznetsov, Adm. Isakov, chief of staff Khozin and all the field and branch commanders; their "collective" discussion resulted in a decision immediately to reinforce anti-tank

defenses in the most critical areas with anti-aircraft guns taken from the city, concentrate all naval military artillery in support of the Uritsk-Pulkovo area, mine and electrify a fortified defense of all vulnerable areas, transfer part of the forces on the Karelian isthmus to the Uritsk front, and form five or six new infantry brigades out of sailors, military cadets, and NKVD units to be combat ready in six to eight days.

One of Zhukov's first requests of the Supreme Command after arriving in Leningrad was to have artillery specialist, Gen. Govorov, assigned to his staff. Govorov had early links with Leningrad when he enrolled there in 1916 in the shipbuilding section of the Polytechnical Institute and then was mobilized at the outbreak of war into military training. Zhukov became aware of his talents in the late '30s in the Ukraine and particularly during the Soviet-Finnish war as did Zhdanov also. The Supreme Command, however, would not spare Govorov from the Western Sector command, and Voronov, who had just returned from Leningrad with the special commission, was sent back. He stayed for twenty days until the end of September assisting Zhukov in converting the troops from a defensive mode of operation to an offensive one. Govorov's return to Leningrad was to occur over a half year later in June 1942 when he took over the Leningrad front and commanded it to the end of the war.

Voronov considered the fighting of these last weeks in September as of considerable importance both in slowing the Germans and preparing the Soviet troops for offensive operations. He found that commanders and their staffs did not understand the process of shifting troop command from the defensive to the offensive. Problems of organizing interaction

of various kinds of troops and coordinating movement and artillery fire required solution, but Soviet forces did begin offensive operations. While these were not too successful, the enemy suffered losses and couldn't risk shifting forces to other fronts. The enemy moved its long-range artillery closer and a prolonged artillery exchange began. Voronov found during these critical days not a sign of panic in Leningrad and the population was "steadfastly enduring the adversities of wartime (this was in interesting contrast to his reactions a month before when he arrived with the special commission and found many in the city completely oblivious to the crisis it was facing and evacuation barely underway).

By the end of September the German advance had ground to a halt. The fighting was fierce and battle lines moved back and forth during these last weeks of September. Uritsk and Pulkovo heights were captured by the enemy, according to Zhukov, but the Leningrad army groups continued to muster new strength and "again and again they threw the infuriated enemy back to his starting positions." In the last days of the month, Zhukov indicates, they were no longer only on the defensive but had begun active retaliation and mounted counter-attacks which convinced the enemy that the defenses of Leningrad could not be smashed by the forces at hand. Enemy attacks were suspended, a major tank unit was withdrawn to the south, and the Germans continued only the air and artillery attacks on the city, digging in for the winter along the existing front lines. In early October Zhukov is recalled to Moscow to assume command of the Moscow defense.

Zhukov ends his brief treatment of his Leningrad command, apologizing that he is "simply short of words to describe the heroic deeds of

the defenders of Leningrad." He describes himself as extremely proud that he was entrusted with the task of commanding the Leningrad troops when the enemy came up right to the walls of the city. Zhukov was to return with Voroshilov in January 1943 to coordinate operations between the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts that led to the breaking of the blockade. While Leningrad was a moving emotional experience for Zhukov, his direction of the defense of Moscow apparently interested him much more as a military achievement than stabilizing the critical situation in Leningrad. He admits in his memoirs, "when I am asked what event in the last war impressed me most, I always say--the battle of Moscow."

A more interesting aspect of Zhukov's attitudes, however, particularly in relation to the general question of Zhdanov, Leningrad, and the Zhdanov circle, is suggested by his treatment of various individuals in his memoirs. Zhukov is not distinguished in his writing for overly affectionate treatment of colleagues, either military or civilian, who are mentioned in the memoirs. Particularly in the case of civilian officials, most of the references are merely factual citations of appearances, appointments, and so forth, for example in the cases of Politburo members Molotov, Malenkov, Kosygin, Shvernik, Shcherbakov, Khrushchev, and Kalinin and lesser figurs such as Brezhnev, Malyshev, Pervukhin, and Poskrebyshev.

The one exception is his treatment of civilian colleagues with whom he served in Leningrad. He cites the civilian members of the military council of the Leningrad Front, which, besides Zhdanov and A. A. Kuznetsov, included T. F. Shtykov and N. V. Solovev, and "worked vigorously

and creatively in a close-knit team, ignoring exhaustion and hunger." He continues, "today none of these comrades are alive. I want to say that they were all outstanding men of our Party and government. They did all in their power to ensure success in defending the city of Lenin which was now in mortal danger." Later he refers again to Zhdanov, Kuznetsov, Shtykov, Y. F. Kapustin, and N. V. Solovev, "with all of whom I had worked as a team in the crucial days of the defense of Leningrad." Following his brief mention of his presence on the Leningrad Front in January 1943, he returns to the subject again, "at this point I should like to mention the tremendous work done during the days of the epic blockade by the Leningrad Party organization, military councils of fronts and armies, and such of their members as A. A. Zhdanov, V. P. Mzhavanadze, G. P. Romanov, and P. A. Tyurkin. D. V. Pavlov is also singled out for special attention for his food supply work. Since N. A. Voznesenskii was not involved on the Leningrad Front, Zhukov does not mention him here, but his references to Voznesenskii's planning and economic work reflect an appreciation and respect for him. Zhukov also paid a special tribute to N. Patolichev and the Chelyabinsk Party organization for their contribution to the defense industry; Patolichev had developed an association with Zhdanov dating from the 18th Party Congress and consideration was given at the start of the war to shifting the Kirov plant's KV tank production to the Chelyabinsk tractor works but Stalin decided to leave it in Leningrad.

Many of these Leningrad officials cited by Zhukov later perished in the postwar "Leningrad Case" and his praise takes on a special significance because of this context. Several other military leaders made similar

digressions in their memoirs particularly in regard to A. A. Kuznetsov and P. S. Popkov. In Zhukov's case it is also of interest that he does not cite local civilian leaders in other areas where he served--Moscow, for example--although elsewhere the situation was not equivalent to the siege state of Leningrad. Some who were present on the occasion eight months after Stalin's death when Zhukov, in spite of Mikoyan's objections, seconded U. S. Ambassador Bohlen's toast to "peace with justice", felt he was motivated by domestic considerations. One might speculate that there is a depth of feeling on the part of Zhukov regarding the repressions of the Stalin era that needs expression again and again to leave no doubt as to the loyalty of the persons involved. It is not too fanciful to suspect that some of the trumped-up charges against Kuznetsov, Popkov, and the others involved in the "Leningrad Case" included one of abandoning Leningrad to the Germans in this early period. Admiral Kuznetsov has described in his memoirs how Beriya tried in this fashion to use as evidence of treason the orders of Admiral Tributs to prepare ships of the Baltic Fleet for destruction in case Leningrad fell until Kuznetsov revealed that the original order came from Stalin. The contingency plans for mining and demolition of plants and bridges in Leningrad itself could have served a similar purpose for Malenkov and Beriya in fabricating the "Leningrad Case".

A Leningrad writer, Aleksandr Stein, hints the same regarding the "Leningrad case" in his tale of the blockade published in 1965. He recalls seeing in 1962 the blue-white warning posted by the Neva during the war to warn citizens that "it was more dangerous on this side of the street during artillery bombardment" of the city. The notice was now accompanied by another in marble and gold inscribed,

"This notice is preserved in memory of the heroism and courage of the Leningraders during the 900-day blockade of the city." But, he says:

> My Leningrad friends told me that at the beginning of the 50s, painters went through these streets, 'more dangerous during bombardment,' and painted over all the blue-white warnings thoroughly, very thoroughly, so that not even a single letter showed through, including this one by the Neva. The so-called 'Leningrad case' had surfaced. And since many names inseparable from the defense of Leningrad and from the blockade figured in it, even the blockade itself turned out to be in disgrace and under suspicion. The Musuem of the Defense of Leningrad was quickly closed and its director, Rakov, disappeared. So even blue-white notices, recalling needless associations, disappeared.
>
> After the XX Congress the blue-white notice reappeared by the Neva and the director of the Museum of the Defense of Leningrad, Rakov, who had survived, returned and co-authored with I. Alem a comedy '. . . the more dangerous enemy.'