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Neo-Idealist Philosophy in the Russian Liberation Movement: The Moscow Psychological Society and Its Symposium, "Problems of Idealism"

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Introduction: The Moscow Psychological Society and Russian Liberalism

The Moscow Psychological Society, a learned society founded in 1885 at Moscow University, was the philosophic center of the revolt against positivism in the Russian Silver Age. By the end of its activity in 1922, the Society had attracted most of the country's outstanding philosophers and had played the major role in the growth of professional philosophy in Russia.[1] The Psychological Society was founded by fifteen Moscow University professors headed by M.M. Troitskii (1835–1899), an empiricist psychologist whose specialization accounts for the Society's name. The founders, most of whom were, ironically, inclined toward positivism, took little role in the Society after its initial establishment. Rather, its direction was taken over by another group led by Nikolai Ia. Grot (1852–1899),[2] who became chairman in 1888. Among Grot's main colleagues were Vladimir S. Solov'ev (1853–1900), Sergei N. Trubetskoi (1862–1905), and Lev M. Lopatin (1855–1920). By the 1890s the Society had about 200 members, a number which remained fairly constant throughout its existence. In 1889 the Psychological Society began publication of the first regular professional journal devoted to philosophy in Russia, *Questions of Philosophy and Psychology* (*Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii*). Its peak circulation was over 2000, although for most of its history (i.e., until 1918) circulation ranged between 1100 and 1500. In the second year of its existence Grot characterized the journal's prevailing direction as idealist or, "in respect to method, metaphysical."[3]

While the Silver Age revival mounted a broad-based revolt against positivism, in which respect Russia was an integral part of the European fin-de-siècle, neo-idealist philosophy in the Psychological Society was distinctive in the theoretical depth of its critique. As a general outlook, positivism was remarkably pervasive in Russia from the middle of the nineteenth century. In ethics, epistemology, ontology, and social philosophy, neo-idealism emerged as a response to the several characteristics of this positivist background.[4] For the leading philosophers in the Society, neo-idealism was a compelling defense of the self against positivist reductionism and naturalism, a defense that took the form, moreover, of a modernized, theoretically explicit theism, in which the value of the person is seen as rooted in transcendent being (personalism).

An integral part of the importance of the Psychological Society was its advancement of the theoretical foundations of liberalism. Neo-idealism provided a sound basis not only for the autonomization and professionalization of Russian philosophy, but also for the defense of rule-of-law liberalism. It is no exaggeration to claim that the Psychological Society was the theory center behind Russian liberalism. Three classic works of Russian liberalism, for example, were first serialized on the pages of *Voprosy filosofii*: B.N. Chicherin's *Philosophy of Law* (1898–1899) and P.I. Novgorodtsev's *The Crisis in Modern Legal Consciousness* (1906–1908) and *On the Social Ideal* (1911–1917). Moreover, the large number of journal articles and books written by Psychological Society philosophers in explication primarily of neo-idealist epistemology, ethics, and ontology can be seen, at the same time, as laying the philosophic groundwork for the development of Russian liberalism. This connection between

neo-idealism in theoretical philosophy and liberalism in social philosophy was clear and logically compelling, even inevitable, for Society philosophers. More than anything else, it consisted in, on the one hand, the philosophers' conviction in the substantiality of the self, a conviction which inspired the distinctively ontological character of neo-idealism in the Society, and, on the other hand, in the special claims liberalism makes for the dignity of the individual, or in liberal personalism.

Three of the six philosophers Andrzej Walicki treats in his *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism* were among the most influential members of the Society: Vladimir Solov'ev, Boris Chicherin, and Pavel Novgorodtsev.[5] Chicherin and Solov'ev were formally distinguished members.[6] Solov'ev died on the eve of the Russian Liberation Movement, underway from the very beginning of the century and culminating in the Revolution of 1905, and Chicherin was too old to take an active part in it,[7] although their frequent contributions to *Voprosy filosofii* in the 1890s, and their intellectual legacy more generally, inspired the four neo-idealist professors from the Psychological Society who did have leading roles in the Liberation Movement: S.N. Trubetskoi, E.N. Trubetskoi, P.I. Novgorodtsev, and S.A. Kotliarevskii. V.I. Vernadskii, the well-known Russian scientist and another major figure in the Liberation Movement, was also a member of the Society. His philosophic interests offered valuable support for neo-idealism from within the natural sciences. Through the neo-idealist critique of positivism, including, specifically, the promotion of neo-idealism as a far better theoretical justification of liberalism and constitutional reform than positivism could provide, the Psychological Society played its part in the public opinion campaign comprising the main strategy of the Russian Liberation Movement. The philosophers were very much aware of their prominent role, as professors, in helping to shape public opinion. The significance of the Psychological Society in the theoretical development of Russian liberalism, apart from the Liberation Movement, also stands out in its connection with the "Moscow school" of the philosophy of law, headed by Novgorodtsev and made up of his students, including I.A. Il'in, the last president of the Psychological Society.[8]

The four former "legal marxists" who had come to embrace idealism—P.B. Struve, S.N. Bulgakov, N.A. Berdiaev, and S.L. Frank—were more loosely associated with the Psychological Society, although all became formal members, sooner or later. They, too, actively participated in the Liberation Movement. This is especially true of Struve, who, together with Novgorodtsev, organized the Society's important programmatic symposium, *Problems of Idealism* (*Problemy idealizma*). The large volume appeared in late 1902 and helped publicize the connection between neo-idealism and liberalism that the Psychological Society had advanced for fifteen years. In Leszek Kolakowski's judgment, "*Problems of Idealism* was an important event in Russian cultural history."[9] The symposium was conceived in the first stages of the Liberation Movement, when the liberationists (*osvobozhdentsy*) saw in the zemstvo milieu the most promising social support for Russian liberalism. In this way it comprises the theoretical counterpart to the first issues of Struve's *Osvobozhdenie* (Liberation), which began publication earlier the same year (1902). Both were concurrent projects organized by zemstvo constitutionalists and their allies outside the zemstvo, whose cooperation launched the Liberation Movement. The collective authorship of *Problems of Idealism* reflects remarkably well the social composition of the leadership of the Liberation Movement: zemstvo constitutionalists, liberals from the professions, and certain groups from the

intelligentsia (in this case, the legal marxists).

The Moscow Psychological Society itself, one of the learned societies spurring the growth of civil society in late imperial Russia, is a paradigmatic example of the vital importance, in both the social and intellectual history of Russian liberalism, of the pervasive interconnections and cooperation between zemstvo activists (*zemtsy*) and representatives of the free professions (here, philosophy).[10] Liberal professionals themselves often had a zemstvo background. A highly visible example of this combination was the "professor-*zemets*." The Psychological Society was home to several professor-*zemtsy*, including B.N. Chicherin, S.N. Trubetskoi, E.N. Trubetskoi, S.A. Kotliarevskii, and V.I. Vernadskii.[11]

I. Four Neo-Idealist Professors in the Liberation Movement

Common Experience and Ideas in the Psychological Society

The Psychological Society was part of the Liberation Movement not only through *Problems of Idealism* (and the contribution *Voprosy filosofii* likewise made to shaping public opinion), but also through the political importance of four members prominent in the life of the Society and integral to its philosophic culture: S.N. Trubetskoi, E.N. Trubetskoi, P.I. Novgorodtsev, and S.A. Kotliarevskii. The Society was an important focus in the common intellectual and institutional background of these four neo-idealist professors as they took up major roles in the politics of Russian liberalism.

The brothers Trubetskoi were part of the close-knit circle that gathered around N.Ia. Grot when he took over direction of the Psychological Society. A.A. Kizevetter, in his classic memoirs, describes the group of energetic young philosophers who worked most closely with Grot. "All the gifted young people occupied with philosophy . . . immersed themselves at once in metaphysical problems. At the head of these young people were Lopatin, Sergei Trubetskoi and—the most brilliant diamond of this philosophical generation—Vladimir Solov'ev." They embraced Grot, "in all respects well-suited to this tight and friendly philosophical company. It was this company that captured the Psychological Society, transforming it into a philosophical society in the broad sense of the word."[12] They made up part of the "Lopatin circle" (*Lopatinskii kruzhok*), which formed around Lev Lopatin's father, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1823–1900), a prominent jurist, chairman of a department of the Moscow Judicial Chamber.[13] Evgenii Trubetskoi's memoirs include a warm account of the Lopatin circle: "In Moscow at the time (the late 1880s and early 1890s) there was not a home that so brilliantly embodied the spiritual atmosphere of Moscow cultured society as the Lopatin home." The dinners Mikhail Nikolaevich hosted every Wednesday were attended by some of Moscow's leading intellectual figures, including the Psychological Society philosophers (the Trubetskois, Lopatin, Solov'ev, and Grot). E.N. Trubetskoi describes the circle as "moderately liberal" in political outlook.[14]

Prince Sergei N. Trubetskoi was elected to the Psychological Society already in 1887.[15] From 1892 he was very active in the affairs of the Society. That year he became candidate deputy chair and a member of the editorial board of *Voprosy filosofii*.[16] From 1898 he took on increasing editorial responsibilities for the journal,[17] becoming editor in 1900.[18] In 1901 he assumed the office of deputy chair[19] to Lopatin, who had succeeded Grot upon his death in May 1899. Trubetskoi continued to serve the Society as deputy chair and editor of its journal until his own death in September 1905.

By virtue of the profundity and yet accessibility of his philosophy, the importance of S.N. Trubetskoi in the growth of Russian idealism from the last

decade of the nineteenth century was second only to that of Solov'ev. "Trubetskoi's *Weltanschauung* formed under the strong influence of Solov'ev, and the latter looked proudly at him as his pupil," S.M. Solov'ev (Vladimir's nephew) wrote. "Like Solov'ev, Trubetskoi combined in his philosophy Christianity with Platonism and considered the Logos the central idea of Christianity. And like Solov'ev, Trubetskoi was a convinced Westernizer and liberal."[20] Trubetskoi graduated in 1885 from the Historical-Philological Faculty of Moscow University and at once devoted himself to graduate work in philosophy, also at Moscow University, where he began lecturing as a *Privatdozent* in 1888. His *magister* dissertation, *Metafizika v drevnei Gretsii* (Metaphysics in Ancient Greece), which he defended in 1890, established his reputation as a major historian of philosophy. Ten years later he defended his doctoral dissertation, *Uchenie o logose v ego istorii* (The Theory of Logos in Its History), and was made professor (ordinarius) at Moscow University. Lopatin was the official disputant at the defense, which Sergei's sister Olga described as an event not only for the university world. "For the first time in Russian scholarship," she wrote, "a theological theme appeared in light of scholarly-philosophic analysis and the most recent historical criticism."[21] Beginning with its first issue, Trubetskoi published several major essays in *Questions of Philosophy and Psychology*, including "On the Nature of Human Consciousness" (1889–1891), "Psychological Determinism and Moral Freedom" (1894), "The Foundations of Idealism" (1896), and "Belief in Immortality" (1902–1904).[22] His conception of ontological, "concrete idealism" was an important underpinning of liberal personalism and had great impact on philosophic culture in the Psychological Society, as is evident in the meetings and journal articles devoted to him, not only upon his death but many years later.[23]

Trubetskoi's work on behalf of the Psychological Society reflected his commitment to university autonomy. He was convinced that the university should be administered by professors, not bureaucrats, and that students should have the right to academic association. His first steps in this direction were taken in the Psychological Society in December 1895, when Trubetskoi served on a commission to help organize a student section of the Society.[24] Later, he took advantage of the 29 December 1901 "temporary rules" somewhat relaxing the repressive university statute of 1884 to found in February-March 1902 a student society at Moscow University, the Historical-Philological Society, "which to a remarkable degree realized the principle of a free university."[25] The association was an enormous success, attracting in the first year of its existence 800–1000 students, a very significant part of the Moscow student body. According to Lopatin, "without any exaggeration it caught the attention of all educated Russia."[26] Novgorodtsev was Trubetskoi's deputy; Lopatin headed the Society's philosophy section; and in the spring of 1903 Chicherin was elected honorary chairman of the Society.[27] The culmination of Trubetskoi's struggle for the university came on 27 August 1905, when Nicholas II, apparently influenced by a memorandum he asked Trubetskoi to prepare on the state of Russian higher education, issued an *ukaz* granting autonomy to the universities. A week later, on 2 September, Trubetskoi became the first elected rector of Moscow University. He died only twenty-seven days later.

Prince Evgenii N. Trubetskoi (1863–1920) became a member of the Psychological Society in 1890.[28] His intellectual development and career closely followed his brother's. Evgenii enrolled in the Juridical Faculty at Moscow University in 1881 together with Sergei, but unlike his brother, who soon switched to philosophy, Evgenii completed his course of studies in law,

graduating in 1885. He began his academic career at the Demidovskii Juridical Lycée in Iaroslavl, where he taught philosophy of law.[29] Despite his subsequent reputation as a religious philosopher, his university appointments were in the history and philosophy of law, first at St. Vladimir's University in Kiev (1890–1905) and then at Moscow University (1906–1918). Although he did in effect succeed his brother at Moscow, in fact he worked in the Juridical Faculty, not Sergei's Historical-Philological Faculty.[30] His university lecture courses were published as lithographs (a common practice then), some of which were seen as classics in the teaching of jurisprudence.[31]

Like Sergei, Evgenii was a disciple of Vladimir Solov'ev, whom he met during the winter of 1886–1887 in the "Lopatin Circle."[32] From their first meeting, Evgenii wrote, "all my intellectual life was connected with Solov'ev. My whole philosophic and religious *Weltanschauung* was full of Solov'evian content and expressed in formulations very close to Solov'ev."[33] Certain differences, however, involving Solov'ev's utopian project for the unification of Eastern and Western Christianity in a world theocracy under the spiritual authority of the Pope and the imperial domination of the Russian tsar[34] led Trubetskoi to the study of the intellectual history of theocracy in medieval Europe, resulting in two volumes on the "Religious-Social Ideal of Western Christianity in the Fifth and Eleventh Centuries." For the first, on St. Augustine,[35] he earned the *magister*; for the second, on the medieval papacy of Gregory VII,[36] the doctorate. These works, had they not been overshadowed by his subsequent accomplishments in philosophy, would have earned Trubetskoi a solid reputation as a medievalist.

Over the course of his intellectual development, Trubetskoi came to stress separation of church and state as a necessary condition of self-government in a truly liberal society. This principle had obvious great relevance to contemporary Russia, and was advanced in the scholarly and publicistic work of not only Sergei and Evgenii Trubetskoi, but also Novgorodstev and Kotliarevskii. They saw in Solov'ev's theocratic utopianism the mirror image of caesaropapism, the subordination of church to state characteristic of Russian history (the Trubetskois often referred to the "state church" in Russia and lamented its deplorable condition). Neo-idealist philosophers in the Psychological Society, through critical analysis of the utopian period in the life of their most visible colleague, further highlighted the Russian church's lack of autonomy relative to the state and its slight influence on educated society, in the hope of giving church reform a prominent place on the agenda of the Russian Liberation Movement. Appropriately enough, E.N. Trubetskoi was appointed to the Preconciliar Commission (*Predsobornoe Prisutstvie*), convened by the Holy Synod. The Commission met between 8 March and 15 December 1906, to plan the convocation of a national council (*sobor*) of the Russian Orthodox Church that the tsar had approved in March 1905.[37] When the Sobor finally did meet in 1917 (it opened on 15 August), Trubetskoi was elected one of its two lay co-chairs and announced its re-establishment of the patriarchate, which took place on 21 November 1917 in a magnificent ceremony in the Uspenskii Cathedral in the Kremlin.[38] S.A. Kotliarevskii also participated in the Sobor's work,[39] following his appointment on 29 July 1917 as deputy over-procurator of the Synod.[40] Less than a month before the Sobor opened, the Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) party held its ninth congress. Novgorodtsev, then a member of the Kadet central committee, strongly supported changing the party program to designate the Orthodox Church an "institution of public-legal (*publichno-pravovoi*) character." Although some of the delegates rejected the amendments (which the congress nevertheless

approved) as violating separation of church and state, a charge they leveled against Novgorodtsev in particular,[41] their criticism in fact applied least of all to him, who held dear the principle of mutual autonomy of church and state.

Evgenii Trubetskoi was at the center of the Psychological Society's efforts to assess Solov'ev's legacy. Trubetskoi's fundamental work, *Mirosozertsanie Vl.S. Solov'eva* (Vl.S. Solov'ev's Weltanschauung), marked the culmination of a distinctive neo-idealist approach to interpreting Solov'ev, an approach that, in stark contrast to other Silver Age appropriations of him, drew out the liberal elements of his thought, while sharply criticizing the illiberal, utopian ones. Novgorodtsev and Kotliarevskii also developed this approach.[42] It provides an important measure of the distinctiveness of neo-idealist philosophic culture in the Psychological Society. Taking Solov'ev as his point of departure, E.N. Trubetskoi also advanced his own philosophic conceptions, developing the metaphysical and ontological directions in Russian neo-idealism in a powerful synthesis of rigorous academic philosophy (Kantian transcendental idealism) and speculative, religious philosophy.[43] He was a frequent contributor to *Voprosy filosofii*. In addition, he served as candidate deputy chair of the Society between 1906 and 1909 and gave public lectures for the Society's financial benefit.[44] Following his death (of typhus in Novorossiisk in January 1920), the Society, already in the last years of its existence, held a special meeting in his memory.[45]

Of the four neo-idealist professors considered here, Evgenii Trubetskoi was most active in other Moscow philosophical-religious groups. His participation in them brings out certain aspects of the distinctiveness of the Psychological Society. The contrast does not stand out in the "Circle of Seekers of Christian Enlightenment" (Kruzhok ishchushchikh khristianskogo prosveshcheniia), where Trubetskoi shared membership with V.A. Kozhevnikov, S.N. Bulgakov, F.D. Samarin, and G.A. Rachinskii, among others. As Nikolai Arsen'ev recalls, "It was a circle of people closely united in their Christian faith and rootedness in the life of the Orthodox Church, and of people who lived by scholarly, theological and religious-philosophical interests."[46] But differences emerge in another Moscow association in which Evgenii took an active part, the Vladimir Solov'ev Religious-Philosophical Society (*Religiozno-filosofskoe obshchestvo pamiati Vladimira Solov'eva*), founded in late 1905 or 1906. With the generous financial support of Margarita K. Morozova, whose philanthropy significantly aided the development of Russian philosophy in the Silver Age,[47] it survived until the middle of 1918.[48] N.A. Berdiaev describes the Moscow Solov'ev Society as "more serious" than its counterparts in the St. Petersburg Religious-Philosophical Meetings (*Sobraniia*) of 1901–1903 and the St. Petersburg Religious- Philosophical Society that followed in 1907.[49] Even so, the Moscow Religious-Philosophical Society was exotic and sensational, especially in its symbolist organicism and sensualist-orgiastic moments, compared to the "Circle of Seekers of Christian Enlightenment" and the Moscow Psychological Society. Arsen'ev suggests that Trubetskoi was somewhat out of place: "It was more gratifying to hear at the meetings of the Solov'ev Religious-Philosophic Society—to counterbalance the often dominant morbidly-voluptuous hysterics—the authoritative and sober, spiritually courageous presentations of Prince Evgenii Nikolaevich Trubetskoi, full of an internal sense of measure and religious authenticity."[50]

The contrast is all the more evident in that two of the most active members of the Solov'ev Religious-Philosophical Society, V.P. Sventsitskii and V.F. Ern, had earlier in 1905 formed the core of the short-lived "Christian Brotherhood of Struggle," animated by millenarian

utopianism and communistic opposition to private property.[51] S.N. Bulgakov chaired the Moscow Religious-Philosophical Society. Although both were Solov'ev-inspired religious philosophers, Trubetskoi opposed Bulgakov's attempts to found a Christian political party,[52] fearing the diminution of the absolute sphere of the sacred in its political appropriation.[53] In cooperation with the Religious-Philosophical Society as well as the Moscow Psychological Society, Trubetskoi was a major force behind the outstanding success of the publishing house "Put'," set up in 1910. Financed and directed by Morozova, it brought out a whole series of classics in Russian and western religious philosophy.[54]

Pavel I. Novgorodtsev (1866–1924) and Sergei A. Kotliarevskii (1873–1939) became members of the Psychological Society within a few weeks of each other, in February 1898, already on the eve of the Liberation Movement.[55] This is the first indication of the great deal they had in common. Both were social and legal philosophers at Moscow University, shared very similar conceptions of neo-idealism and its implications for social theory, and had parallel parts in the Liberation Movement.

Novgorodtsev, after graduating from Moscow University's Juridical Faculty in 1888, pursued graduate training there in the history of the philosophy of law.[56] He studied in Berlin and Paris, and in 1897 was awarded the degree of *magister* in state law for his dissertation, *Istoricheskaia shkola iuristov, ee proiskhozhdenie i sud'ba* (The Historical School of Jurists. Its Genesis and Fate) (1896). He defended his doctoral dissertation, *Kant i Gegel' v ikh ucheniiakh o prave i gosudarstve* (Kant and Hegel in Their Theories of Law and the State) (1901), at St. Petersburg University in 1902. He had already taught for several years at Moscow University, when in 1903 he was appointed associate and in 1904 full professor, in the history and philosophy of law. He also lectured at the Higher Women's Courses, in the history of philosophy. From 1906 he was professor and director at the Moscow Higher Commerce Institute, which he organized along broad educational lines and made into one of the most popular "polytechnics" in Russia, attesting to the seriousness of his commitment to professionalization in late imperial Russia. By signing the ill-fated Vyborg manifesto (1906), Novgorodtsev forfeited his professorship at Moscow University, although he continued to lecture there in the capacity of *Privatdozent*. In 1911, he resigned altogether, along with more than one-third of the faculty, in protest of the policies of the minister of education, L.A. Kasso. Novgorodtsev's Higher Commerce Institute was able to offer positions to some of those who resigned.[57]

Kotliarevskii defended four dissertations at Moscow University, the first two in the Historical-Philological Faculty: *Frantsiskanskii orden i rimskaia kuriia v XIII i XIV vv.* (The Franciscan Order and the Roman Curia in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries) (1901), for the *magister*, and *Lamenne i noveishii katolitsizm* (Lamennais and Recent Catholicism) (1904), for the doctorate. These works reflect Kotliarevskii's Protestantizing tendency to see in the history of Catholicism a situation analogous to church-state relations in Russian history. Both cases collapsed the separate spheres of church and state in a totalizing monism. He is quite explicit in this claim and in the connection he makes from it to reductive, monistic positivism. In defending neo-idealism against what he describes as the "false realism" of the positivists, who responded in 1904 to *Problems of Idealism* with their own collective effort, *Ocherki realisticheskogo mirovozzreniia* (Outlines of the Realist Worldview),[58] Kotliarevskii compares positivist realism and the Catholic worldview, writing of the latter, "indeed, here also is its own form of monism, and

was not its destruction the first sign of the spiritual liberation of the European peoples?" Reductive positivism, for all its attempts to invoke the authority of the natural sciences, resembles not the true spirit of science, "but the spirit of medieval theocracy."[59] It is clear that Kotliarevskii wants to suggest that positivism in Russia, as expounded in *Ocherki realisticheskogo mirovozzreniia*, is one of the illiberal consequences of conflating the autonomous spheres of church and state. This is the relevance of his first dissertations to the neo-idealist development of Russian liberalism. Kotliarevskii defended his second set of dissertations in the Juridical Faculty: *Konstitutsionnoe pravo. Opyt politiko-morfologicheskogo obzora* (Constitutional Law: An Attempt at a Political-Morphological Survey) (1907), and *Pravovoe gosudarstvo i vneshniaia politika* (The Rule-of-Law State and Foreign Policy) (1909). From 1905 he lectured in history as a *Privatdozent*. With his second doctorate in 1909, he became professor of state law at Moscow University. He also lectured at the Higher Women's Courses (1908–1917).[60]

Pavel Novgorodtsev was the most important social philosopher in the Psychological Society and, arguably, in early twentieth-century Russia. Most of his work appeared in *Voprosy filosofii*. Novgorodtsev himself served on the journal's editorial board from 1903.[61] He was editor of *Problems of Idealism*, published in the series, "Editions of the Psychological Society." Advertising the symposium two days before its actual appearance, on 14 November 1902 he delivered a public lecture before an open meeting of the Psychological Society. The lecture, "K voprosu o vozrozhdenii estestvennogo prava" ("On the Question of the Revival of Natural Law"), summarized his own *Problemy* essay and was well-attended.[62] Novgorodtsev, whose development of neo-idealism was deeply Kantian, delivered one of the three papers at a special meeting of the Society held in Kant's honor (December 1904).[63] At the twenty-fifth anniversary meeting of the Psychological Society in March 1910, he was one of the key-note speakers.[64] In December 1911, on the occasion of the Society's celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the beginning of L.M. Lopatin's scholarly career, it was Novgorodtsev who, on behalf of the Society, presented Lopatin with a *Festschrift*.[65] In recognition of his service to the Society Novgorodtsev was elected its deputy chair in March 1918.[66] By then he was active in efforts to mount an effective resistance to the Bolsheviks. He left Moscow later in 1918, and Russia in 1920. He settled in Prague in 1922, where in May he founded the Russian Juridical Faculty, attached to the Charles University. He died in Prague on 23 April 1924.

Novgorodtsev was the Psychological Society's most consistent and profound Kantian philosopher. It is not surprising, therefore, that his defense of liberalism in social and legal philosophy was firmly grounded in neo-idealist ethics, epistemology, and ontology. Unlike Lopatin, the Trubetskois, and Kotliarevskii, he did not hesitate to acknowledge his debt to Kant. Moreover, Novgorodtsev found no incompatibility in principle between the German philosopher and the ontological direction characteristic of Russian philosophical and religious thought. This enables A.V. Sobolev, the foremost Russian student of his thought, to write, "for Novgorodtsev the person is the ontological center, a spindle of light rays with the help of which it is alone possible to illuminate problems of being and knowledge."[67] True, Novgorodtsev's debt to Kantian theory of knowledge and ethics is most evident in his earlier work, while the influence of Russian Orthodox thought becomes explicit later, in the midst of revolution, civil war, and emigration. Yet, according to his student, I.A. Il'in, "Pavel Ivanovich did not 'become' in his last years a religious man, he always was one. The wise depths of Russian

Orthodoxy, revealed to him in years of strife and suffering, imparted not the first, but a new and, I believe, final form to his religiosity."[68] The inevitable consequence of his synthesis of Kant and Russian ontologism was a conviction in the *transcendence* of the fullness of being. He concisely formulated this liberal principle, which had always guided his thought, in one of his last essays, "Sushchestvo russkogo pravoslavnogo soznaniia" ("The Essence of Russian Orthodox Consciousness"), where he wrote, "The Kingdom of God cannot be constructed within the order of earthly activity, and nonetheless all earthly life must be infused with the thought of this awaited Kingdom."[69] The Russian theologian G.V. Florovskii, who greatly admired Novgorodtsev, suggests that he proceeds here not only from Orthodox consciousness, but from Kantian philosophy of history.[70]

Sergei Kotliarevskii was particularly interested in the intersection between the theoretical and historical development of liberalism, an intersection which he found first of all in the growth of liberalism from dynamic forms of religious life, in societies where such life flourished. This is not to suggest that he did not feel at home in philosophy, for he also contributed to the neo-idealist theoretical substantiation of Russian liberalism. For example, in his defense, read before the Psychological Society in October 1904,[71] of *Problems of Idealism* against *Outlines of the Realist Worldview*, Kotliarevskii formulated with eloquence and precision certain main ideas of neo-idealism, particularly the "contraband" critique of positivism. But most of his contributions to *Voprosy filosofii* took a broadly cultural, not purely theoretical, approach to liberalism. One of the most significant is his 1905 essay, "The Premises of Democracy," which emphasizes that free religious life is one of the main premises. Describing the type of religious consciousness that promotes the development and deepening of liberalism, he writes, "Its binding force consists in the feelings of piety and worship that are inherent to man before the Unfathomable, the Divine. These feelings are sufficiently powerful, sufficiently rich in creative force, to generate an infinite diversity of symbols and forms. The spiritualization of human life—here is the true premise of the principle of the 'kingdom of freedom.' It is impossible to imagine without religion, forging a link between the terrestrial and celestial."[72] The author of these lines, not surprisingly, had a special appreciation for the author of *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. In October 1910, at a Psychological Society meeting commemorating William James, who had been an honorary member, Kotliarevskii delivered a paper on the topic, "James as a religious thinker."[73] The preceding March, at the twenty-fifth anniversary celebration of the Psychological Society, Lopatin himself, in his presidential address, "The Present and Future of Philosophy," had enthusiastically turned the Society's attention to pragmatism and James, "one of today's greatest thinkers." The future of philosophy, Lopatin declared, belongs to pragmatism.[74]

Kotliarevskii contributed to the Lopatin *Festschrift* mentioned above. Interestingly enough, his essay, "On the Relative and the Absolute,"[75] attempts to combine Jamesian pragmatism with Novgorodtsev's insights into the necessary correlation of the categories of the relative and the absolute, which need each other to be what they are. The relative and absolute are basic categories of thought. In this, Kotliarevskii suggests they exemplify the pragmatic conception of philosophy as that which is accessible to every man. The pragmatic approach might facilitate the recovery of the absolute from relativism itself, which both Kotliarevskii and Novgorodtsev thought was enjoying great popularity, by showing that relativism could not exist without at least a latent consciousness of the absolute. A pure relativism is

inconceivable to us, since it would have no awareness of itself as relativism. Kotliarevskii hopes that pragmatism, by making clear the interdependence of the relative and absolute, might help restore the proper balance between these categories.

Kotliarevskii contributed, like Novgorodtsev, to *Out of the Depths* (*Iz glubiny*), the third in the set of related *sborniki* of which *Problemy idealizma* was the first and *Vekhi* the second. Kotliarevskii's *Iz glubiny* essay, "Recovery," is significant because it leaves no doubt that he shared the same ontological conception of neo-idealism advanced by his Psychological Society colleagues. He is optimistic about recent philosophic creativity in Russia, "which clearly gravitates toward ontology." This distinguishes, he suggests, Russian philosophic culture from German absorption in the theory of knowledge (Russian idealists often made this opposition).[76] Kotliarevskii links the Russian ontological direction to ethics: "There are two basic types of moral philosophy. The representatives of one separate the world of noumenal being from the world of phenomenal necessity, leaving man under the authority of an insoluble dualism. Such was the philosophy of Kant. The representatives of the other type find a higher synthesis between them, they affirm the ontological basis of moral norms. Such was the teaching of Plato."[77] This distancing from Kant was common among Russian philosophers who emphasized the ontological implications of idealism, despite their own sometimes very great debt to him (as in S.N. Trubetskoi's case). They tended to read Kant himself through the anti-ontological, phenomenalist currents in German neo-Kantianism. Kotliarevskii's opposition between Kant and Plato is a case in point. It is overdrawn; Kant had a very great admiration for Plato.[78] The German philosopher insisted on the strict delimitation of noumenal being and phenomenal necessity precisely in order to substantiate an ontological basis for moral norms. It is this delimitation (the gist of transcendental idealism) that makes possible a noumenal realm at all.[79] For the Trubetskois, Novgorodtsev, and Kotliarevskii, the premise and highest value of liberalism was personhood, which they discovered first of all, like Kant, in moral consciousness. From the peculiar nature of moral experience, irreducible to the empirical world in space and time, they postulated, like Kant, the substantial, ontological reality of the self.

The substantial self is an immortal one. All four neo-idealist professors had a deep faith in immortality. This was perhaps especially true of Sergei Trubetskoi, who influenced the others in this respect. Kotliarevskii never forgot Sergei's university lecture on Plato's *Phaedo*. "It was no longer a lecture," Kotliarevskii recalled, "it was a true hymn to immortality."[80] Trubetskoi's essay, "Belief in Immortality," was, in Kotliarevskii's view, one of the most profound and captivating things Trubetskoi ever wrote.[81] Evgenii Trubetskoi devoted to the memory of his brother the inaugural lecture he delivered upon moving to Moscow University, "Freedom and Immortality," which argues that liberal values rest, ultimately, in the substantial, immortal soul.[82] Sergei's own philosophic ideas, although he sometimes said otherwise, were deeply indebted to Kant.[83] This suggests that neo-idealism in the Psychological Society might well be described as a type of Platonizing Kantianism.

From the Beseda Circle to the State Duma

The first organized group of the emerging Liberation Movement was the Beseda circle of zemstvo opposition, formed in 1899. Three of its members were from the Psychological Society: S.N. Trubetskoi, E.N. Trubetskoi, and S.A. Kotliarevskii.[84] Through them, Novgorodtsev was closely connected to the circle. Beseda's initial goal was the development of public opinion in the

zemstvo institutions, to help defend local self-government and rural interests against bureaucratic infringement and Sergei Witte's industrialization drive. The threat to the zemstvo was made very real by Witte's confidential (but nonetheless widely discussed) memorandum, written in 1898 and first published (with a long introduction) by Struve in 1901, who gave it the title, *Samoderzhavie i zemstvo* (Autocracy and the Zemstvo). It argued that since the zemstvo was by its nature constitutional and therefore incompatible with autocracy, the tsar should abolish the former if he wished to preserve the latter.[85] D.N. Shipov, a Beseda member and perhaps one of the circle's founders, wrote that upon reading the memorandum in November 1899, "I experienced a feeling of deep indignation."[86] Olga N. Trubetskaia, in her memoirs of her brother Sergei, records that its circulation in late 1899 "strongly revolutionized" educated society.[87] In 1900–1901, several Beseda members were involved in the preparation of petitions to the tsar to articulate zemstvo responses to the Witte memorandum.[88] This activity, along with Beseda's consideration in early 1902—when its agenda had shifted from zemstvo to national political concerns—of a report by N.N. Lvov "on the causes of Russia's present unsettled state and on measures for improving it," clarified the differentiation of Beseda members into two political orientations: the neo-Slavophiles, headed by D.N. Shipov, who sought principally to curb bureaucratic arbitrariness and ensure respect for civil liberties; and the constitutionalists, among whom were the three Psychological Society philosophers.[89]

Together with overlap in personnel, the Beseda circle and the Psychological Society shared a commitment to advancing Russian liberalism through the publication of scholarly works. The Beseda book program began in 1902, the same year that *Osvobozhdenie* started publication and *Problems of Idealism* appeared. It produced seven collections of articles, several in two-volume sets and in more than one edition.[90] S.A. Kotliarevskii contributed to a volume on the constitutional state.[91] Most Beseda books were devoted, however, to concrete problems of rural economy and local self-government, not to the theoretical development of liberalism. For this, Russian constitutionalists had other outlets, including the Psychological Society's *Questions of Philosophy and Psychology* and *Problems of Idealism*. In addition to the purely intellectual side of the circle's book series, Terence Emmons singles out another dimension: "Beseda's publishing enterprise provided an important institutional setting for contacts between zemstvo political leaders and the 'intelligentsia' (the journalists and academics without gentry or zemstvo ties),"[92] contacts which were a crucial part of the social history of Russian liberalism during the period. His evaluation of Beseda's importance in this respect also applies very well to the Moscow Psychological Society and its publications.

Another example of Beseda's faith in the power of the printed word was its decision, made in January 1905, to sponsor the zemstvo constitutionalist newspaper S.N. Trubetskoi had been planning since November 1904, *Moskovskaia nedelia* (the circle had declined to adopt *Osvobozhdenie* as its official organ).[93] Among Trubetskoi's editorial colleagues for the projected paper were E.N. Trubetskoi, P.I. Novgorodtsev, and S.A. Kotliarevskii.[94] Trubetskoi tried to bring out three issues of the paper in May 1905, but all three were stopped by the censors. I.I. Petrunkevich, who was also involved in the project (although politically far to the left of Trubetskoi), reported "that this new organ is very much feared in the censorship committee in Petersburg, not because the editor belongs to the extreme left, but rather because he does not. The voice of reason with its sobering effect might exercise stronger

influence than sheer nonsense."[95] Although *Moskovskaia nedelia* would not see the light of day during Sergei's lifetime, his brother Evgenii soon revived it under the title *Moskovskii ezhenedel'nik* (1906–1910).[96]

Although he would serve as a prominent public spokesman for zemstvo constitutionalism, Sergei Trubetskoi never held an elected zemstvo office, and was one of only two Beseda members without formal ties to zemstvo or gentry institutions (the other was V.A. Maklakov). In part, perhaps, because he steered shy of open political affiliation or defense of class interests, he emerged as a national symbol for rule-of-law liberalism and moderate constitutionalism. He belonged to neither the Union of Liberation nor, apparently, the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists,[97] although he identified with the latter and attended with "great interest" some of its meetings at the Moscow home of Iu.A. Novosil'tsev.[98] Lopatin writes of his political views, "If he was an ardent advocate of constitution, he was no less a convinced monarchist. In these, his most basic views and values, he never wavered. Therefore, in vain do the extreme Russian parties, after his death, try to make of his radiant personality a banner for their own goals and plans."[99] Trubetskoi's article, "Na rubezhe" ("On the Threshold") written in February 1904, just after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, is a remarkable analysis of contemporary Russian state and society and a plea for the transformation of Russia into a rule-of-law state (*pravovoe gosudarstvo*).[100]

Trubetskoi was the main author of an important memorandum explaining the theoretical basis behind, and suggesting possible means of implementing, the resolutions of the great zemstvo congress held in St. Petersburg, 6-9 November 1904 (he was not a delegate to the congress itself). Prince P.D. Sviatopolk-Mirskii, the minister of internal affairs, requested the memo during a meeting with D.N. Shipov, who had been elected chairman of the congress. A conference of *zemtsy* then convened in Moscow to prepare the memo, a task which they asked Trubetskoi to take up on their behalf. The memo was presented to Sviatopolk-Mirskii by Trubetskoi and Shipov on 28 November.[101] Meanwhile, Sviatopolk-Mirskii had been trying to prevail upon the tsar to grant significant reforms, including the introduction of elected representatives from the provincial zemstvos and the larger town dumas into the State Council. The arguments which he employed bore a striking resemblance to Trubetskoi's in several respects.[102]

As it turned out, the reforms acceptable to the tsar, announced in an imperial *ukaz* on 12 December, were far more modest, further alienating the zemstvo constitutionalists from the regime by undermining their belief that reform could be introduced from above. Trubetskoi expressed the demoralizing effects on society by stating that, "The government is believed neither when it threatens nor when it promises."[103] In the aftermath of Bloody Sunday (9 January 1905), Trubetskoi again wrote to the tsar imploring him to "summon elected representatives to participate in state affairs," in an address formulating the minority position of the Moscow Assembly of the Nobility (convening on 22 January), hoping to counter reactionary support for the autocracy expressed in the majority address.[104] He welcomed Nicholas' 18 February 1905 rescript to A.G. Bulygin, the new minister of internal affairs, promising the participation of elected representatives in legislative work, and thought that it marked the Rubicon in the reform process.[105] Among his most abiding concerns were separation of church and state, freedom of conscience, and the necessary autonomy of spiritual and religious life, in which he saw the prerequisites of a liberal society. He hailed the *ukaz* of 17 April 1905 granting religious toleration.[106] Just after the second zemstvo congress, held in

Moscow on 22–26 April 1905, which virtually endorsed the Union of Liberation's program for a constituent assembly elected on the basis of "four-tail" (universal, direct, equal, and secret) suffrage and which also seriously entertained compulsory expropriation of gentry lands,[107] Trubetskoi spoke at a special zemstvo agrarian conference (28–29 April). Kizevetter called the conference "very important," since it established the basic positions behind the agrarian program of the future Kadet party.[108] Trubetskoi suggested that the proposals under consideration required much more deliberation, questioning first of all the exclusive importance attached to compulsory expropriation.[109] He opposed "four-tail" suffrage, especially direct elections.[110]

The "Coalition Congress," held in Moscow on 24–25 May 1905, was apparently the first zemstvo congress that S.N. Trubetskoi attended (he held no zemstvo office), which he did at the special invitation of the congress bureau.[111] Trubetskoi not only composed the congress' petition to the tsar, but on 6 June headed the fourteen-member delegation elected by the congress to present it personally to Nicholas, the first such delegation to be received in this way. Trubetskoi's address urged the sovereign to summon a national representative assembly to work with the Crown in reorganizing Russia's state order.[112] It was at this audience that Nicholas requested from Trubetskoi the report on Russian higher education that resulted in university autonomy.[113] Having been catapulted by the 6th of June to national eminence, Trubetskoi now attended the 6-8 July zemstvo congress in Moscow. The congress, acting under the perception that the 6 June delegation had failed,[114] adopted an unprecedented appeal to the people to reject the "Bulygin Duma" in favor of a legislative (rather than merely consultative) assembly elected on the basis of "four-tail" suffrage. Trubetskoi was very much opposed to such agitation of the population, and tried to convince I.I. Petrunkevich of its dangers in an all-night argument. Many years later, Petrunkevich wrote of Trubetskoi: "In the end he was right and the Moscow December uprising proved this." Quoting these lines, V.V. Leontovich offers the view that, "What separated friends from each other that night was the line dividing liberalism from radicalism. . . . The event that symbolized the whole contemporary situation might be considered Trubetskoi's death just several weeks after that night, while Petrunkevich, the triumphant victor, delivered the first speech in the first Russian parliament" several months later.[115]

The funeral procession following Trubetskoi's death on 29 September 1905, less than a month after he was elected rector of Moscow University, became a huge political demonstration,[116] drawing a crowd of many thousands. At his grave Lopatin mourned the loss of not only a public figure, but "a banner of the peaceful and legal development of our country along the path of free progress."[117] In his memory he wrote, "he could not live without believing in the deep meaning of life, from which in his eyes God, moral truth (*pravda*), and immortality were not empty dreams. Such a religious-philosophic foundation . . . informed the firmness and steadiness of his social-political ideals."[118]

Evgenii Trubetskoi was a bona fide *zemets*, a provincial zemstvo board member from Kaluga,[119] where he owned 917 desiatines of land.[120] He was a member of the organizational bureau, elected at the May 1902 Moscow zemstvo congress, for the planning of subsequent zemstvo congresses, although apparently he actually attended only the last congress (November 1905).[121] Although he did not attend the July 1903 conference in Schaffhausen, Switzerland that planned both the Union of Liberation (formally established in St. Petersburg, January 1904) and the Union of Zemstvo

Constitutionalists (formally established in Moscow, 8 November 1903), he became a member of both. At this time Trubetskoi was teaching in Kiev, where he was one of the leaders of the local branch of the Union of Liberation.[122] The possibilities inherent in Prince P.D. Sviatopolk-Mirskii's "New Course" were first revealed by Trubetskoi's article, "War and Bureaucracy," published in the liberal journal *Pravo* on 26 September 1904. The article, an unprecedented call in a legal newspaper for the government to reform from above in order to prevent revolution from below, launched the constitutionalist campaign in the increasingly free Russian press (which would soon obviate the need for P.B. Struve's *Osvobozhdenie*). According to Evgenii's sister, Olga, "it brilliantly opened an era of new direction in domestic politics."[123] Trubetskoi's article prompted Struve to write an "Open Letter to Professor Prince E.N. Trubetskoi" in *Osvobozhdenie* reaffirming that rather than hoping for reform from above, the Union of Liberation sought to court "no enemies on the left." This policy had just received fresh impetus from the Paris "Conference of Oppositional and Revolutionary Organizations of the Russian Empire," as a result of which, according to Galai, "the Union of Liberation had already entered into a formal alliance with those 'extremist parties' which Trubetskoi feared, and Struve was quick to disclose the new facts of life to him."[124]

Trubetskoi took part in the Union of Liberation's national banquet campaign of November–December 1904, speaking at the large banquet which met in Kiev.[125] More important was his role in the Academic Union,[126] one of the first of the professional and intelligentsia unions emerging from the banquet campaign. Through the Academic Union, Evgenii Trubetskoi would wage his own struggle for university autonomy. Although his brother Sergei seems not to have had a key part in the Academic Union itself, Evgenii did share its leadership with Pavel Novgorodtsev and Vladimir Vernadskii.[127] A series of newspaper articles at the end of December 1904 by the Trubetskois, Vernadskii, the St.Petersburg historian Ivan M. Grevs, and others pressed the need for corporate organization of the Russian professoriate in the Liberation Movement, both in the common interest of constitutional reform and the particular interest of defending higher learning during a period of rapid social transformation.[128] The first result of this press campaign was the January 1905 "Declaration of 342" Russian academics (to which would be added more than 1,650 signatures by August), which boldly stated that only a "fundamental transformation" of the existing system of government in Russia could ensure academic freedom, "the essential condition of true education." The Declaration served as the basis for the program of the Academic Union, the first congress of which met in St. Petersburg on 25 March 1905.[129]

Samuel D. Kassow, in his study, *Students, Professors, and the State in Tsarist Russia*, describes the major contours of "professorial liberalism" in the Academic Union, a well-articulated professional ethos that involved not only the professors' desire to see the Russian nation (which they distinguished from Nicholas' regime) evolve along liberal, constitutional lines, but also their own self-identity as scholars in Russian society. According to Kassow, "Professors who supported democratic and universal suffrage in national politics argued that in the universities it was essential to preserve the rule that only merit and proven scholarly achievement should be the major determinants of power and position. According to Professor Evgenii Trubetskoi, the 'university has always been and will continue to be the sanctum of a spiritual aristocracy: otherwise it will cease to exist.' Far from contradicting the idea of democracy, this conception of the university was a sine

qua non for a successful democratic society. 'Only a university based on this principle,' he warned, 'can serve the interests of the people. . . . The nation and the people need a university that will get its job done.'"[130]

The professors' sense of their special role in Russian society and their strict professional ethos did not bode well for cooperation with the more radical intelligentsia unions, the formation of which gathered momentum after an imperial *ukaz* on 18 February 1905 legally entitled "private persons and institutions" to submit to the government petitions "concerning improvements in the state organization and the betterment of the people's existence."[131] The Academic Union was among the most moderate of the fourteen unions that confederated into the Union of Unions on 8 May. Unlike most of the unions, which would soon adopt the call for a constituent assembly, the professors did not.[132] Pavel Novgorodtsev, who represented the Academic Union at the first congress of the Union of Unions, expressed the professors' ambivalence by stating that he was there only as an observer.[133] Evgenii Trubetskoi later voiced his own misgivings about the Union of Unions by voting against entry of the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists into it (to no effect, although the formal association of the two groups was short-lived).[134]

The radicalization of the Union of Unions as it entered into open competition with the revolutionary parties took on a shrill form at its emergency congress, called on 24 May after the Russian naval catastrophe in the Tsushima Straits. Both the Academic Union and the Zemstvo Constitutionalists boycotted the emergency congress, which called on the people to "bring about the immediate elimination of the bandit gang that has usurped power and replace it with a constituent assembly."[135] At its second congress (25–28 August), the Academic Union endorsed participation in the forthcoming elections to the projected Bulygin Duma, again opposing the position of the Union of Unions. At the congress, Trubetskoi proposed the establishment of private, free universities to supplement or replace (during crisis) the state institutions, to provide greater academic freedom, and to counter the gender, national, and religious discrimination in Russian higher education. The congress approved Trubetskoi's proposal.[136] At its third congress (January 1906) the Academic Union finally took itself out of the Union of Unions (questioning whether it had ever been a member), after which the Academic Union declined in importance. An important gain for the professoriate during this period, apart from the Temporary Rules of 27 August 1905 granting autonomy, was the 20 February 1906 reform of the State Council into an upper house with legislative powers equal to those of the Duma, providing for six deputies to be corporately elected by the Academy of Sciences and the university faculty councils. The Moscow University faculty duly elected Trubetskoi to the second State Council (February 1907–August 1908).[137]

E.N. Trubetskoi participated, as did S.A. Kotliarevskii, in the 9–10 July 1905 meeting of the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists that took the initiative in forming the Constitutional-Democratic (Kadet) party.[138] This step toward party formation was made in anticipation of the impending enactment into law of the Bulygin project (which took place on 6 August) and in recognition, therefore, of the need to organize for the forthcoming electoral campaign, participation in which would, it was understood, abet the transformation of the (consultative) Bulygin Duma into a legislative assembly.[139] Trubetskoi did become a member of the Kadet party, but could not attend (because of the rail strike) the first party congress, held in Moscow on 12–18 October 1905, and was not elected to its central committee (Kotliarevskii was). His attendance at the second party congress in St. Petersburg, 5–11 January

1906, convinced him that he already had to part ways with the Kadets. According to Emmons, "This announcement, in the pages of *Russkie vedomosti*, was accompanied by a bill of charges against the party which in several respects foreshadowed the charges brought against the intelligentsia as a whole in the *Vekhi* (Signposts) articles published in 1909."[140] Among these charges was the claim that the party was insincerely monarchist, although the second party congress had just changed the party program to affirm that, "Russia should be a constitutional and parliamentary monarchy."[141] Trubetskoi also thought that the Kadets were inadequately committed to organic work in the Duma, were inclined to treat the Duma as an instrumental and transitional institution, and were preoccupied with the meaning of the term "constituent assembly," the cherished slogan of the left.[142] Trubetskoi was, no doubt, further provoked by the failure of the party congress to unequivocally condemn the revolutionaries for the December uprising in Moscow (the government was blamed instead). In the middle of November he published an important newspaper article, "Dve diktatury" ("Two Dictatorships"), in which he counseled work in good faith with the government (for all its shortcomings) in the hope of improving and strengthening it, and warned that an armed uprising might well result in civil war.[143]

It cannot be said that Trubetskoi was himself very consistent in following the principles underlying his criticism of Kadet political behavior, for he declined possible opportunities to enter the government, where he might have been able to work from the inside, "organically," for the consolidation of Russia's new constitutional order. Trubetskoi was in fact one of the first two men (the other was D.N. Shipov) the first Russian prime minister, Count S.Iu. Witte, contacted in his attempt to include representatives of society (rather than just bureaucrats) in his cabinet. Shipov and Trubetskoi arrived in St. Petersburg on 19 October 1905 for the negotiations. Trubetskoi was to be appointed minister of education.[144] On 21 October, at Shipov's request, Witte received a delegation from the Kadet-dominated organizational bureau of the zemstvo congresses. After the delegation (F.A. Golovin, G.E. Lvov, and F.F. Kokoshkin) laid down a number of conditions that Witte could not possibly meet, the government (represented by Witte and A.D. Obolenskii) returned to negotiations with the moderate wing of the zemstvo opposition (Shipov, Trubetskoi, A.I. Guchkov, M.A. Stakhovich, and S.D. Urusov). After a week this round as well was at an impasse over a number of issues, including Witte's insistence on appointing P.N. Durnovo minister of internal affairs.[145] For his part, Trubetskoi justified his refusal to enter the government on the grounds that he could not make good on the promises he had publicly made as a leading Kadet.[146]

Immediately after the collapse of these negotiations on a (partially) public ministry, Trubetskoi became closely involved, as did Kotliarevskii, in the process of reforming the 6 August 1905 electoral law in accordance with the October Manifesto, which mandated the expansion of the franchise to include "those classes of the population that at present are completely deprived of electoral rights." One reform proposal was drafted mainly by S.E. Kryzhanovskii.[147] An alternative project was prepared, with Witte's blessing, by a conference of several public men, including Trubetskoi, Kotliarevskii, Shipov, Guchkov, M.A. Stakhovich, and G.E. Lvov. This reform proposal, drawn up in Moscow at the end of October, provided for universal male suffrage (the final draft was compiled by Shipov and Kotliarevskii on 31 October). On 3 November, Trubetskoi, Shipov, Guchkov, and Stakhovich met with Witte to discuss their draft suffrage system. Trubetskoi and his colleagues

also participated in the 19-20 November meetings of the Council of Ministers that considered the whole issue of electoral reform.[148] In the end, it was the Kryzhanovskii reform proposal that served as the basis for the new electoral law of 11 December, although apparently Witte had given universal (male) suffrage some support during Nicholas' special conference at Tsarskoe Selo (5 December) that decided the issue.[149] Later, after the first Duma was dissolved on 9 July 1906, Trubetskoi was involved (though not prominently) in renewed attempts, now under Prime Minister P.A. Stolypin, to include representatives of society in the government.[150] As before, these initiatives came to naught. Trubetskoi responded to the political stalemate by sending a personal letter to the tsar dated 24 July 1906, which urged Nicholas to stem the revolutionary tide (especially peasant unrest) by promptly summoning a new Duma, forming a public ministry, and introducing a broad program of agrarian reform on the basis of compulsory expropriation.[151]

Trubetskoi opposed the Vyborg Manifesto, as did a group of deputies (led by the Octobrists Count P.A. Geiden and M.A. Stakhovich) to the first Duma who had already taken the initiative in forming there a liberal-conservative faction or caucus, Peaceful Renewal, which was legalized as a party in October 1906.[152] At about this time Trubetskoi became a member of the party,[153] and apparently of its central committee as well.[154] Its political program was advanced and defended in *Moskovskii ezhenedel'nik*, the newspaper that Evgenii, together with his younger brother Grigorii, published from 7 March 1906 to 28 August 1910. At first it was to serve as the organ of the "Independents' Club," a short-lived party set up by Evgenii and Grigorii in January 1906. The Club amounted to nothing, but *Moskovskii ezhenedel'nik* became an important intellectual force in propagandizing the moderate liberalism of the right Kadets, the *mirnoobnovlentsy*, and left Octobrists. Among the newspaper's principal shareholders was M.K. Morozova. The Trubetskois' closest editorial colleagues on the paper were S.A. Kotliarevskii, N.N. L'vov, V.A. Maklakov, P.B. Struve, and to a lesser extent N.A. Berdiaev and S.N. Bulgakov.[155] Evgenii Trubetskoi rejoined the Kadets at the party's seventh congress in March 1917,[156] and was active in the resistance to the Bolsheviks.

Novgorodtsev and Kotliarevskii worked closely together in the Russian Liberation Movement. They helped plan *Osvobozhdenie*; attended the July 1903 conference in Schaffhausen, Switzerland, that set the stage for the formation of the Union of Liberation; and were co-opted into the Council of the Union of Liberation immediately after its constituent congress (St. Petersburg, 3–5 January 1904).[157] In addition, they served in "Group A" of the Moscow organization of the Union of Liberation.[158] The Moscow branch was "the central apparatus of the Union, its nerve center and its brain."[159] Group A, the oldest group in the Moscow organization, consisted primarily of *zemtsy* and professors, and was the Union's theory and policy planning center.[160] The expertise Novgorodtsev and Kotliarevskii commanded in constitutional law, comparative politics, and political theory gave them a leading role in Group A's work on a draft constitution for the Russian Empire,[161] which demanded both a constituent assembly as well as preservation of the monarchy,[162] in keeping with the Union of Liberation's strategy of a united front between conservatives and radicals. By the Kadet second party congress (January 1906), the emphasis had clearly shifted to a constitutional monarchy, which Kotliarevskii and F.F. Kokoshkin, both members of the Kadet central committee, championed in party deliberations at the time.[163] Novgorodtsev had another zemstvo connection in Kokoshkin, one of the five professors in the Beseda circle. He had

worked with Novgorodtsev and Kotliarevskii in Moscow's Group A.[164] Novgorodtsev was not a member of the Kadet central committee at this time,[165] but was influential in the Moscow committee of the party.[166] He also served on the Kadet committee for church reform.[167] Novgorodtsev was elected to the First State Duma, as was Kotliarevskii and Kokoshkin.[168]

II. *Problems of Idealism*. Conception and History

Zemstvo Constitutionalists and New Liberals

The convergence of interests between traditional zemstvo constitutionalists and "new liberals" beyond zemstvo ranks that launched the Liberation Movement has been an influential paradigm in the historiography ever since George Fischer's 1958 study of Russian liberalism.[169] The new liberals were associated with certain ideological currents within the intelligentsia, such as "legal marxism," "legal populism" (connected with the short-lived People's Rights Party), and "economism." In addition, the professions were an important source of new liberals. Between traditional zemstvo and the new Russian liberalism, professors had a special role as intermediaries.[170] In them, the distinction often breaks down, as in the "professor-*zemets*." The intransigence of the autocracy convinced leaders of the old and new liberalism to join forces in a public opinion campaign that would persuade the regime to enter the path of constitutional reform. Initially, the Liberation Movement, although orchestrated by both zemstvo constitutionalists and their allies from the professions and intelligentsia circles, hoped to rely primarily on the zemstvo milieu. The goal was to raise zemstvo political consciousness well beyond the relatively few already committed liberals, who numbered not more than 300 district and provincial level deputies at the turn of the century (by Pirumova's count).[171] Later, the concept of public opinion expanded to include the "democratic intelligentsia," and for its allegiance the Union of Liberation entered into competition with openly revolutionary parties. The most important instrument of this public opinion campaign, whether in its early identification with the zemstvo or in its subsequent leftward shift, was Struve's famous émigré paper, *Osvobozhdenie*. There was an integral fit, as I will try to show, between, on the one hand, *Problems of Idealism* and, on the other, the social make-up of the leadership of the Liberation Movement and its initial hope of relying on the zemstvo for the growth of Russian liberalism.

Struve, the most prominent of the new liberals, had long recognized the oppositional potential of the zemstvo. The earliest demonstration of his interest in rallying the *zemtsy* to the cause of constitutional reform was his "Open Letter to Nicholas II," written on their behalf in response to the tsar's infamous speech of 17 January 1895 in which the new emperor dismissed as "senseless dreams" even very modest zemstvo hopes for some form of consultative representation. "In this manner," according to Richard Pipes, "Struve established connections with the constitutional wing of the zemstvo movement, whose principal theoretician he was to become after being ejected from the ranks of Social Democracy."[172] The effect of the "senseless dreams" speech was all the stronger because the great famine of 1891–1892 was still fresh in everyone's mind.[173] O.N. Trubetskaia recalls that the famine was a dividing line in Sergei Trubetskoi's life.[174] He took part in famine relief in Riazan'. This experience, "first-hand acquaintance with the Russian countryside," Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak writes in her study of Trubetskoi, "completed his break with the quasi-Slavophilism of the Moscow tradition and led to the forceful development of liberal political convictions."[175] Evgenii Trubetskoi, like

his brother Sergei a contributor to *Problems of Idealism*, describes in his memoirs the effect the famine and Nicholas II's speech had on the "Lopatin Circle." Trubetskoi characterized the circle as not especially political, but nonetheless sensitive to political questions of the day and moderately liberal in its responses to them. Political conversations in the circle became animated during the famine, "which provoked terrible discontent with the government and gave a strong push to constitutional dreams." Such political excitement also accompanied the first months of the new reign, until the tsar's speech, which immediately depressed the mood in the circle.[176] It was Nicholas II's rebuke to the *zemtsy*, amplified by Struve's "Open Letter," that prompted the revival of zemstvo efforts to confer regularly on a national level; these efforts bore temporary fruit in the Nizhnii Novgorod zemstvo conference held in August 1896, and more permanent results in the founding of Beseda. The introduction Struve wrote soon thereafter (1901) to Witte's *Samoderzhavie i zemstvo* "consolidated Struve's authority in leading zemstvo circles," Shakhovskoi recounts.[177]

In early March 1901 Struve was arrested for involvement in the Kazan Square demonstration in St. Petersburg. He chose Tver, the traditional stronghold of zemstvo constitutionalism, as his place of exile. There he occupied himself with two projects: *Osvobozhdenie* and *Problemy idealizma*.[178] They were concurrent initiatives not only for Struve, but also for Novgorodtsev, D.E. Zhukovskii and, to a lesser extent, for V.I. Vernadskii and Kotliarevskii. Plans for *Osvobozdenie* had been underway between Struve and his various zemstvo contacts (especially I.I. Petrunkevich) since 1900, and were finalized in Tver.[179] After Struve went abroad in December 1901 to set up shop for the émigré journal (it began publication in Stuttgart, 18 June/1 July 1902), a special conference convened in Moscow (February or March 1902) to deliberate its program, funding, and method of distribution. Among those present were Vernadskii, Novgorodtsev, Zhukovskii, and possibly Kotliarevskii.[180] In May 1902 Kotliarevskii was part of a zemstvo delegation that visited Struve in Stuttgart.[181] Although Beseda did not adopt *Osvobozhdenie* as its official organ, its programmatic articles were discussed at a meeting in May 1902.[182] Throughout this period—at the same time *Problems of Idealism* was coming together—the *osvobozhdentsy* followed a policy conceived "primarily to pursue the task of mobilizing the zemstvo institutions in support of constitutional reform and the application of pressure on the government from that quarter."[183] What Emmons characterizes as *Osvobozhdenie*'s "zemstvo campaign" lasted until late 1902; the Struve-Miliukov exchange in the seventeenth issue (16 February/1 March 1903) marked its end, and the beginning of the "intelligentsia campaign."

Novgorodtsev worked most closely with Struve in planning *Problems of Idealism*. At the end of September 1901 Struve sent to him his first conception of the philosophical symposium. In October they consulted in person in Tver, after which Novgorodtsev assumed most of the organizational and editorial responsibility, even more so when Struve left Russia in early December. Struve solicited D.E. Zhukovskii's involvement in the *Problemy* project simultaneously with Novgorodtsev's; it was, in fact, through Zhukovskii that Novgorodtsev first learned of the idea. Zhukovskii, a wealthy *zemets*, financed both *Problems of Idealism* as well as the start-up of *Osvobozhdenie*.[184] He also contributed one of the essays, "K voprosu o moral'nom tvorchestve," to the volume, and later became a member of the Psychological Society itself (in 1914).[185]

Two other *zemtsy* integrally involved in planning *Osvobozhdenie* were also associated with the *Problemy* project: Vernadskii and Kotliarevskii. Vernadskii, a close colleague of

Novgorodtsev, who helped inspire his philosophic interests,[186] offered authoritative support from within the natural sciences for the autonomy of philosophy against reductive positivism and scientism. He was a Tambov zemstvo deputy (district and provincial levels), professor of mineralogy at Moscow University from 1898 to 1911 (making him another professor-*zemets*), served in Group A of the Moscow organization of the Union of Liberation, and was a founder and central committee member of the Kadet party.[187] Vernadskii, "moved by his general sympathy for the *Sbornik*," as Novgorodtsev put it, wanted to contribute to *Problems of Idealism*,[188] but instead chose to publish in the Psychological Society's journal that year a major essay, "On the Scientific World-view," which argued, just like the symposium, for the strict delimitation of separate spheres of human consciousness and experience—empirical and natural scientific on the one hand and moral, idealist, and religious on the other—and against their conflation in positivist reductionism.[189] Vernadskii had a close friend not only in Novgorodtsev but also in Sergei Trubetskoi,[190] who nominated him for Psychological Society membership, to which he was elected in December 1901.[191] Kotliarevskii did not contribute to *Problems of Idealism*, but he did defend its point of view against *Outlines of the Realist Worldview* in his review essay, "Ob istinnom i mnimom realizme" ("On True and False Realism").

The collective authorship of *Problems of Idealism* reflects remarkably well the social history of the leadership of the Liberation Movement. The zemstvo constitutionalists were represented by S.N. Trubetskoi, E.N. Trubetskoi, S.F. Ol'denburg, and D.E. Zhukovskii. The other two *zemtsy* associated with the *Problemy* project (but not contributors) were Vernadskii and Kotliarevskii. The new liberals were represented by the four former "legal marxists" (Struve, Berdiaev, Bulgakov, and Frank), all contributors. Close to them in background and outlook was Bogdan Kistiakovskii, who also contributed to *Problems of Idealism* and became a member of the Psychological Society (later, in 1910).[192] Pavel Novgorodtsev, editor of the volume, was the professor-intermediary between traditional zemstvo and the new Russian liberals. Most of these men (including Vernadskii and Kotliarevskii) took part in the July 1903 Schaffhausen conference, organized by Zhukovskii, in preparation for the formation of the Union of Liberation (the exceptions were the Trubetskoi brothers and Ol'denburg).[193]

Two of the zemstvo constitutionalists involved in the *Problems of Idealism* project, S.F. Ol'denburg and V.I. Vernadskii, connect it to the "Bratstvo Priiutino," a circle of socially conscious, civic-minded students, united by their belief in the transforming power of modern knowledge, who gathered around Sergei Ol'denburg and his brother Fedor at St. Petersburg University in the early 1880s.[194] The Brotherhood, which remained intact long after its members finished at the university, comprised an important part of the generational and intellectual experience of the Kadet leadership.[195] Although the *Priiutintsy* were deeply influenced by populism and felt the need to use it to justify their devotion to *nauka*, Vernadskii (one of them) stresses that their ideal of service to the *narod* did not degenerate into a reductive utilitarianism. Science, in the broad sense of higher learning, preserved its autonomy. In 1916 he described their intellectual outlook: "In the beginning of the 1880s, along with purely socialist moods, other tendencies existed, close to the latter but not included within their boundaries. The purely socialist tendency was permeated by a feeling of social morality, close in its philosophical ideals to scientific positivism, linked with a negative attitude to religion, art, and especially to political life." The non-socialist tendencies, by contrast, "did not share the same attitude toward

religion, art, philosophy, political life, or science which was part of the socialist mood of youth at that time. Many intellectuals considered it difficult to reconcile socialism with other sides of the human spirit that were dear to them—with a feeling for their nation or the state, and even more so with their belief in the freedom of personality."[196] The *Priiutintsy* were among the non-socialist intellectuals. The defense of the autonomy of religion, philosophy and "other sides of the human spirit" against scientistic positivism was one of the central themes in *Problems of Idealism*.

Several of the *Priiutintsy* were close to Lev Tolstoi and were inspired by some of his ideas. They adopted his techniques, for example, in organizing famine relief in Vernadskii's Tambov province in 1891–1892.[197] "But in contrast to Tolstoi," G.V. Vernadskii stresses on the first page of his account of his father's circle, "the majority of members of the Brotherhood considered science one of the highest manifestations of the human spirit, recognizing the value of modern culture in general, and also the necessity of the courts and the state."[198] Prince D.I. Shakhovskoi, one of the most prominent figures in the Liberation Movement, was closest to Tolstoi among the *Priiutintsy*.[199] Yet, before his death in the Soviet Union in 1939, he pursued interests in a philosopher who could not have been more inimical to Tolstoi: Petr Chaadaev.[200]

Of the intelligentsia groups representing the new liberalism, the "legal marxists" were the most theoretically articulate, even before their four most famous representatives became idealists.[201] Legal marxism, in its conception of the historical necessity for Russia to pass en route to socialism through a prolonged stage of capitalism and "bourgeois" freedoms during which the country would be fully Europeanized, was already doctrinally compatible with liberalism. The potential for cooperation with more traditional representatives of Russian liberalism widened as the legal marxists abandoned positivism for idealism and came to see liberal values as ends, not merely means. Already in April 1900, V.I. Vernadskii noted the "curious progress of the marxists" Struve, S.N. Bulgakov, and others, who "are now coming close to the democrats and liberals."[202] In pinning his first hopes for the Liberation Movement on the zemstvo milieu, Struve needed to convince zemstvo liberals that they had nothing to fear from "legal marxism" because it (first of all in Struve himself) had evolved into a consistent and powerful philosophical defense of liberal values. The contributions by the former legal marxists to *Problems of Idealism*, once they became involved in the project, served this end.

The Psychological Society helped provide the intellectual resources the legal marxists needed as they made their way past positivism,[203] for the simple reason that the Society had long spearheaded the philosophical critique of positivism and included among its most prominent members Russia's leading idealist philosophers. In fact, the intellectual trajectory from positivism to idealism had been followed before the legal marxists by several Society philosophers themselves, including Solov'ev, Grot, and the Trubetskoi brothers. In a review of *Filosofiia i ee obshchie zadachi* (Philosophy and Its General Tasks) (1904), Grot's posthumous collection of articles spanning his positivist and idealist periods, E.V. Spektorskii drew the parallel with *Problemy idealizma* and S.N. Bulgakov's famous collection, *Ot marksizma k idealizmu (From Marxism to Idealism)* (1903).[204] Far more important than Grot as a source of inspiration was Vladimir Solov'ev, the Society's most visible philosopher. Bulgakov, for example, included in his autobiographical set of essays (referred to by Spektorskii) an article devoted to Vladimir Solov'ev, to mark his part in the intellectual evolution the volume traces.[205] Bulgakov himself became a member of the Psychological Society in November

1897.[206] A year before, *Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii* hosted part of a developmental polemic between Struve and Bulgakov, a harbinger of things to come.[207] By 1902 Bulgakov had completed his transition to idealism. In February of that year, at a meeting of the Society, he delivered a paper, "Osnovnye problemy teorii progressa" ("Basic Problems of the Theory of Progress"),[208] which would serve as his contribution to *Problems of Idealism*. Berdiaev did not become a Psychological Society member until 1909,[209] although he began to contribute regularly to the journal in 1902. His major programmatic article of 1904, "O novom russkom idealizme" ("On the New Russian Idealism"), names several of the Society's outstanding philosophers—B.N. Chicherin, V.S. Solov'ev, A.A. Kozlov, L.M. Lopatin, and S.N. Trubetskoi[210]—as sources of the idealist *Weltanschauungen* that Berdiaev and his former marxist colleagues had come to embrace. They could look to the Psychological Society not only for theoretical philosophy, but also for the reconstruction of social philosophy on idealist principles. For, as Andrzej Walicki has shown in detail, three of the Society's most prominent members (Chicherin, Solov'ev, and Novgorodtsev) justified liberalism on neo-idealist grounds.[211] *Problems of Idealism* publicized the Psychological Society's work in advancing neo-idealism as the soundest theoretical foundation for rule-of-law liberalism and constitutional reform.

P.B. Struve and Neo-Idealism

In contrast to the different interpretations and uses the other past legal marxists (especially Berdiaev) gave to and made of idealism, Struve was, and would remain, the closest to neo-idealism in its development by several university philosophers in the Psychological Society (Lopatin, the Trubetskois, Novgorodtsev, and Kotliarevskii)—even though he would not become a member until 1912.[212] Struve was the first to make the transition from positivism to idealism, in the long introduction he wrote to Berdiaev's book, *Sub"ektivizm i individualizm v obshchestvennoi filosofii: Kriticheskii etiud o N.K. Mikhailovskom* (Subjectivism and Individualism in Social Philosophy: A Critical Study of N.K. Mikhailovskii) (1901). His formulations there already have much in common with neo-idealism in the Psychological Society, which was distinctive 1) in its broadly theistic or ontological direction (in contrast to the purely epistemological, phenomenalist, and axiological currents common in neo-Kantianism); and 2) in its conviction that the fullness or plenitude of being is transcendent and cannot be realized in space and time (the natural and historical world). The common point of departure for many idealist currents in Russia, including those represented in *Problems of Idealism*, was ethical idealism: the claim that the irreducibility of ethical ideals to empirical reality gave the individual a special autonomy relative to the natural and social environment. From this, Psychological Society neo-idealists went further in drawing the ontological conclusion that the self is not free-floating, anchored neither in this world nor another, but metaphysically grounded. Lopatin's moral philosophy, for example, has been characterized as follows: "This conviction in the ontological significance of ethics flows like a red thread through all of Lopatin's statements on ethical questions."[213] Lopatin and his colleagues stressed the ontological implications not only of ethics, but also of the theory of knowledge. For them, Kant's *transcendental* idealism seemed to entail a *transcendent* ontological reality.[214] Belief in the transcendence of being helped make neo-idealism in the Psychological Society resistant to the utopianization that was not uncommon for other idealist currents in the Russian Silver Age, including those for which Berdiaev and Bulgakov spoke not long after the appearance of *Problems of Idealism*.

In his introduction to Berdiaev's book (written in September-October 1900), Struve argued his new philosophical ideas very persuasively. He was most concerned with the problem of objectivity in ethics. Positivists seek to derive ethics, like everything else, from empirical criteria. The solutions they propose (such as eudaemonism) strike us as patently inadequate because they deny the presence of duty, on which the autonomy of ethics rests. Positivism must reject the authenticity of this sense of moral obligation because to do otherwise would grant it transempirical reality, thereby violating positivist rules for what is real. Positivist prohibitions notwithstanding, moral experience persists. Scientific ethics is a sham because it wishes away this central feature of human identity. "To reject the ethical problem means in essence to defy the immediate consciousness of every person," as Struve puts it.[215] But if ethics cannot be justified empirically, in what does its objectivity consist? If our sense of moral obligation is not reducible to naturalistic explanation, what does it mean to speak of its reality? Or, in other words, what would the reality of duty entail? In a famous passage, Struve answers: "The compulsive presence in every normal human consciousness of the moral problem is beyond doubt, as is the impossibility of an empirical solution to it. Acknowledging the impossibility of such a solution, we at once recognize the objectivity of ethics as a problem, and, accordingly, come to the metaphysical postulate of a moral world order, independent of subjective consciousness."[216]

For Struve, the irreducibility of moral experience to empirical experience, the autonomy of *das Sollen* relative to *das Sein*, thus postulates a higher level of being than natural existence, a trans-phenomenal or supernatural ontological reality that grounds the objectivity of values. In short, conscience is the voice of God. Either duty is a naturalistically explicable psychological illusion, or it is real, in which case it can determine the will, violating natural causation. "Freedom is the capacity to act, without being determined by anything external, foreign, or other; it is independence from the uninterrupted causal chain, and only substance possesses this capacity."[217] In this way, from duty and free will, Struve infers the substantiality of the person, a main tenet of ontological neo-idealism in the Psychological Society. L.M. Lopatin had formulated it in nearly identical terms, in the second volume of his *Polozhitel'nye zadachi filosofii* (Positive Tasks of Philosophy) (1891).[218] Lopatin's philosophical ideas were indebted to Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817–1881), whose defense of personal substantiality Struve now considers "metaphysically incontrovertible."[219] In the autumn of 1901, in the very midst of his work with Struve on *Problems of Idealism*, Novgorodtsev published one of his own studies, *Kant and Hegel in Their Theories of Law and the State*. He praised there Struve's essay: "It is impossible not to welcome this return to the traditions of idealist philosophy. The author expresses one of the most profound demands of our time, all the more giving up the narrow limits of positivism, when he speaks about the necessity of 'metaphysics as a theory of the transcendent, i.e., of that which is not given in experience and cannot be revealed by it.' For us it is especially interesting to note that Mr. Struve comes to this requirement on the ground of a strict delimitation of the limits of science and a clear posing of the moral problem."[220] Clearly, if similarity in philosophical views was any indication, there were solid grounds for cooperation between Struve and the Psychological Society.

No doubt of this was left when, on the basis of the neo-idealist philosophy he had just put forward in his introduction to Berdiaev's book, "Struve constructed a theory of liberalism,

outlined most fully in a marvelous essay called 'What is True Nationalism?'"[221] The essay Pipes celebrates appeared (pseudonymously) in the Psychological Society's journal in the autumn of 1901,[222] at the same time as Novgorodtsev's book on Kant and Hegel and at the height of preparations for *Osvobozhdenie* and *Problems of Idealism*. For Struve, liberalism is the defense of the absolute value of the person, or of personhood (*lichnost'*).[223] For him, this value is absolute in the strongest sense, by virtue of the metaphysical nature of the self as substance, a claim that, as we have seen, Psychological Society neo-idealists tended to think was entailed by the irreducibility of moral experience (duty and free will) to naturalistic explanation. From this it clearly follows that self-determination of the person ought to be the absolute moral basis of any social and political order.[224] This principle of the autonomy of the individual gained increasing acceptance in political theory, Struve observes, after Kant made it the cornerstone of ethics.[225] The guarantee of individual rights is a necessary condition for the possibility of the fullest realization of personhood. "The idea and practice of such rights, in our view, reveal all the deep philosophical meaning and all the enormous practical significance of the remarkable doctrine of natural law, lying at the basis of all *true liberalism*." Natural law is *absolute*, "rooted in the ethical concept of the person and his self-realization, and serving as the measure of all positive law."[226] True nationalism and true liberalism are, for Struve, identical concepts: "In historical development the absolute, formal principle of ethics becomes clear to us—freedom, or the autonomy of the person. . . . Liberalism in its pure form, i.e., as the recognition of the inalienable rights of the person . . . is also the only form of true nationalism."[227]

Novgorodtsev's book on Kant and Hegel was itself serialized in part in *Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii*. It was no coincidence that one of the essays, "Kant's Theory of Law and the State," appeared in the issue immediately preceding Struve's "What is True Nationalism?"[228] Novgorodtsev's article encapsulated the main service of his book, the philosophic substantiation of the revival of natural law in Russia. For Novgorodtsev, a specifically Kantian neo-idealism offered the best defense of the autonomy of natural law from positivist and historicist reductionism. This autonomy rested in moral consciousness, in Kantian practical reason; respect for natural law was a moral obligation or categorical imperative. The source of positive law was the state, as decreed by legislatures; the source of natural law was the self, as given a priori. The force behind positive law was the police; the force behind natural law was duty. Natural law provided a normative framework for the evaluation of existing positive law; it served as an ideal toward which the real ought to constantly strive.[229] In this, natural law was inherently progressive, a conclusion Novgorodtsev stressed.[230] The idea of natural law with changing content, made popular by Rudolf Stammler, was a direct consequence of Kant's ethical formalism: "As an expression of infinite moral aspirations, this idea is not satisfied by any given content or [claim to having] attained perfection, but constantly strives toward the higher and better." The essence of natural law was its critical spirit. "It is a challenge to improvement and reform in the name of moral ends."[231] In this way, for both Novgorodtsev and Struve, natural law was the nexus between ethical idealism and Russian liberalism.

In *Kant and Hegel in Their Theories of Law and the State*, Novgorodtsev does not explicitly draw the ontological conclusion from ethical idealism that the person as a bearer of natural rights is substantial, as does Struve in his writings at this time. In his introduction to Berdiaev's book, for example, Struve states that the principle of the equality of persons as ends-in-themselves rests

ultimately on the substantiality of the human spirit.[232] Novgorodtsev's general silence on metaphysical questions prompted a call for clarification from one of his Psychological Society colleagues, E.N. Trubetskoi. In a review of Novgorodtsev's book, Trubetskoi suggested that, "in his relation to metaphysics is sensed a wavering between fear and attraction. Apparently the issue here is a point of view that is still not fully formed and is in the process of development."[233] Novgorodtsev took up the challenge. In responding to another review of his book, by Leon Petrazycki, Novgorodtsev wrote that, "affirmation of the relativity (*uslovnost'*) of empirical knowledge means for me also the admission of free, creative, uncaused being."[234]

Struve dedicated his essay on true nationalism to Vladimir Solov'ev, reversing his earlier contempt for the famous Russian religious philosopher and metaphysician. Struve's hostility is obvious in a shrill article he published on Solov'ev in 1897, "A Philosophy of Ideal Good or an Apologia of Real Evil?" When Struve reprinted this review in *Na raznye temy* in 1902, he removed the passages that now seemed "unjust," and was forced to explain that, "at that time I still stood on the ground of critical positivism, but now I profess metaphysical idealism and, therefore, have become much closer to Solov'ev than before."[235] Three years later he published a generally laudatory obituary of Solov'ev, in which he claimed that the philosopher's greatness rested not on his speculative and theoretical works but on the series of publicistic articles (1883–1891), devoted to the critique of Slavophile nationalistic isolation of Russia from European culture, that Solov'ev first published in the liberal, Westernizing journal, *Vestnik Evropy*, and later collected in two volumes under the title, *Natsional'nyi vopros v Rossii* (The National Question in Russia).[236] By dedicating his 1901 *Voprosy filosofii* essay to Solov'ev, Struve clearly hoped to associate his own conception of "true nationalism" with the ideas Solov'ev developed in *Natsional'nyi vopros*.[237]

At the beginning of 1901, Novgorodtsev published an essay that directly addressed Solov'ev's contributions to the intellectual defense of Russian liberalism. The issue of *Voprosy filosofii* in which it appeared was dedicated entirely to Solov'ev, who had died on 31 July 1900. In "Ideia prava v filosofii Vl.S. Solov'eva" ("The Idea of Law in Vl.S. Solov'ev's Philosophy") Novgorodtsev wanted to show that the idea of law was precious to Solov'ev and lay at the basis of his moral and social philosophy. "The role of law in human life appeared to him first of all in the light of its higher ideal meaning. To serve the ends of moral progress, to help the ethical principle take hold among people—here was the higher task of law that Solov'ev emphasized."[238] Solov'ev's defense of law, against Slavophile and Tolstoian efforts to denigrate it, could help overcome the contemporary crisis in legal consciousness that Novgorodtsev diagnosed and inspire the neo-idealist development of Russian liberalism. *Opravdanie dobra* (Justification of the Good) (1897), Solov'ev's famous treatise on ethics, had done jurisprudence a great service in vindicating respect for and trust in the idea of law.[239] Like Struve, Novgorodtsev also extolled Solov'ev's censure, in *Natsional'nyi vopros*, of national egoism and its Slavophile roots, as well as his refutation of the "most fantastic of Slavophile fantasies," that for the Russian people political rights are neither important nor needed.[240] In contrast to the Slavophiles, Solov'ev's positive ideal, for the foreseeable future, was the rule-of-law state (*pravovoe gosudarstvo*), his hopes for the ultimate triumph of theocracy notwithstanding.[241] Solov'ev, Novgorodtsev stressed, was a progressive, liberal westernizer.

Freedom of Conscience

Solov'ev was, no doubt, as we shall see, one of the main influences under which Struve arrived at his initial

conception of *Problems of Idealism: a symposium defending freedom of conscience.*[242] In Tver Struve took note of a speech delivered in September 1901 by Mikhail A. Stakhovich, marshall of the nobility of Orel province and a Beseda member. Stakhovich, addressing a conference in Orel on missionary work, spoke of the need for the church to defend freedom of conscience as its own sphere, against intrusion by the state. Struve wrote to Stakhovich thanking him for his "splendid and courageous speech," which he learned of through the attention it received in the newspapers. Struve's letter was intended for circulation among the *zemtsy*, to further prepare the ground for cooperation in working toward a liberal Russia: "You have again demonstrated by this that you belong to people who understand that high social status obliges one not to flatter [the authorities], but to speak the truth (*ne l'stit', a govorit' pravdu*). With joy I welcome in you a talented spokesman of the best intentions of the Russian nobility." Struve then sent to Novgorodtsev in Moscow a tentative table of contents and list of contributors for a collection of articles devoted to freedom of conscience and its importance in idealist philosophy, liberalism, and philosophy of law. All thirteen essays Struve proposed dealt more or less directly with this topic. The authors he suggested included himself, Novgorodtsev, S.N. and E.N. Trubetskoi, K.K. Arsen'ev, M.A. Reisner, V.M. Hessen, R.Iu. Vipper, S.F. Ol'denburg, and even Adolph von Harnack, the famous German historian of dogma.[243] The former legal marxists (except Struve) were conspicuous by their absence at this stage of the project.

Struve's enthusiastic response to Stakhovich makes clear that *Problems of Idealism* was designed, first of all, to raise the level of political consciousness in the zemstvo milieu. Stakhovich was a prominent representative of the "neo-Slavophile" current in the zemstvo movement. In his Orel speech he appealed not only to the heritage of the Slavophiles, A.S. Khomiakov, Iu.F. Samarin, and I.V. Kireevskii, but also to the memory of Solov'ev.[244] This might seem at first glance an untenable combination in view of Solov'ev's criticism of Slavophilism in *Natsional'nyi vopros*. However, Solov'ev's attack was directed primarily (although by no means exclusively) at the nationalistic and Panslavist interpretation of Slavophilism among its epigones, while the classic Slavophiles (followed in this respect by Ivan Aksakov) championed freedom of conscience and expression, as did Solov'ev. The label "neo-Slavophile" or "Slavophile" did not imply that the *zemtsy* to whom it was applied were nationalists or Panslavists, only that they were distinguished by their respect for religion from the constitutionalists in the zemstvo movement, most of whom were probably rather positivistic in their general outlook.[245] The Stakhovich speech convinced Struve that in freedom of conscience he thus had an excellent platform by which he could hope to bring to the side of constitutional reform conservative zemstvo elements (such as those represented in the letter "from zemstvo deputies" that he printed in the second number of *Osvobozhdenie*). Struve appears to have thought, as a new idealist, that the religious outlook of the "Slavophile" *zemtsy*, once tapped and made theoretically explicit, was potentially a major source of Russian liberalism. Certainly his approach was not merely tactical: he recognized that freedom of conscience had been very important in the development of liberalism in Europe and America and thought it was crucial to Russian liberalism. He dwelled on this conclusion in his article, "What is True Nationalism?" There he traces the idea of the inalienable rights of man to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in the proliferation of sects following the Reformation and the consequent growth of religious toleration, freedom of conscience, and separation of church and state. Struve points in particular to

the English Independents and Roger Williams, who for the first time established a government—in Providence, Rhode Island (1636)—on the general principle of toleration and freedom of conscience. Struve informs us of his source: Novgorodtsev, who in his course, "The History of the Philosophy of Law," gives an "extraordinarily clear and elegant exposition of this important moment in the development of man's legal consciousness."[246]

Struve went on to explain in "What is True Nationalism?" that his historical survey revealed the inaccuracy of the doctrine, "very popular in Russian society," that liberalism arose in defense of the political and material interests of the bourgeoisie (of course, Struve had contributed more than anyone to the popularity of this doctrine, marxism). Struve (now) urges, by contrast, that liberalism grew from the demands of religious consciousness. "The first word of liberalism was freedom of conscience. And this ought to be well known and firmly remembered in any country where liberalism has still not said its first word."[247] In its ideal origins and aspirations liberalism transcends class. Clearly, he hoped by this to convince the *zemtsy* that he had overcome the "progressive class" point of view of his legal marxist past. Even his association with the Psychological Society, home to a number of zemstvo liberals, benefited him in this respect.

In defending freedom of conscience as a basic premise of liberalism, Struve proceeded from intellectual conviction, but in enlisting the late Slavophile Ivan Aksakov in support of his views—as he did at some length in "What is True Nationalism?"—he seemed to have acted mostly out of political expediency in order to woo "Slavophile" *zemtsy*, among whom Aksakov enjoyed popularity. Aksakov was no liberal,[248] but he could be selectively appropriated for liberalism. This was done not only by Struve but also by S.N. Trubetskoi and Novgorodtsev. Sergei Trubetskoi lauded his defense of freedom of conscience and the need for church autonomy, speaking in the same breadth of Aksakov and Vladimir Solov'ev as the best of our publicists, "who exposed with such force the sores on our state church with its anti-canonical administration and absence of independent spiritual power and freedom."[249] Novgorodtsev, in a long two-part article, "Gosudarstvo i pravo" ("The State and Law"), published in *Voprosy filosofii* in 1904, enlisted Aksakov in the service of the critique of legal positivism. Novgorodtsev quotes Aksakov's words that, according to formal jurisprudence, "there is nothing in the world except the dead mechanism of the state; that everything is and should be accomplished in the name of and through the means of state power, no matter what form it takes, if only it bears the stamp of external legality; and that, finally, life itself, and consequently the life of the spirit, is one of the branches or functions of the state organism."[250] Walicki, who also renders these lines, writes that Novgorodtsev "obviously hoped in this way to influence the right wing of the zemstvo liberals."[251] Novgorodtsev pursued the same end Struve had three years earlier when, in his "true nationalism" article, he quoted these exact words (with much else) from Aksakov. Novgorodtsev chose not to mention, as did Struve, that Aksakov's remarks were written against B.N. Chicherin's 1861 inaugural lecture at Moscow University, where Chicherin had been appointed to the chair in public law. Aksakov saw in Chicherin an extreme *gosudarstvennik*, not an uncommon perception after the inaugural lecture.[252] Interestingly enough, Struve contrasts Chicherin's étatist, Hegelian approach to law in the 1860s to his later autonomization of law on the basis of a natural rights liberalism, best explicated in his *Filosofiia prava* (Philosophy of Law) (1900). "A significant change," Struve exclaims, "the result of the triumph of idealistic metaphysics over sociological and juridical positivism!"[253]

It is very likely that Struve came to (or was at least reinforced in) his appreciation of the importance of freedom of conscience under the influence of Solov'ev and the Psychological Society. State domination of the church (caesaropapism), the situation that had long obtained in Russia, constrained freedom of conscience, without which was possible neither free and full development of spiritual life nor, in turn, self-government (which requires, first of all, self-governed selves). Sergei and Evgenii Trubetskoi, Novgorodstev, Kotliarevskii, and the Moscow University historian Vladimir I. Ger'e (Guerrier), also a prominent member of the Psychological Society,[254] had long advanced separation of church and state as an axiom of liberalism. In his remarkable analysis of Russian state and society, "At the Threshold," written in February 1904, S.N. Trubetskoi observes despairingly how, in the course of Russian history, "the Orthodox Church becomes the church of bureaucratic caesaropapism." Russian liberalism rests on reversing this historical trend. As Trubetskoi proclaimed, "an independent church and freedom of conscience—here are the demands which any rule-of-law state and, first of all, any state calling itself Christian, must meet."[255] Like Struve and Novgorodtsev, Kotliarevskii pointed to the example of American religious history, to its principle of expanding toleration and to "the recognized diverse forms and symbols under which is felt a unity of content."[256] The interest the Psychological Society professors had in church history, church-state relations, and the role of religion in civic life, an interest that resulted in a considerable historical literature,[257] was a response not only to the illiberal effects of the state-dominated church in Russia, but also to Solov'ev's utopia of world theocracy, in which they could easily see the mirror-image of caesaropapism. As E.N. Trubetskoi put it later, Solov'ev's theocratic project would have violated the "most precious of all freedoms—freedom of conscience."[258]

Solov'ev's own disillusionment with his theocratic utopianism, a process which began dramatically enough with a lecture he delivered before the Psychological Society in 1891, served to highlight that Roman theocracy and Byzantine caesaropapism were different guises of the same infringement of autonomy of church and state. Clearly, *Problems of Idealism* was, from its first conception as a defense of freedom of conscience, integrally related to the top priorities of the Psychological Society.

From the early 1880s, Solov'ev himself sharply criticized the subordination of church to state in Russian history. He leveled this critique in a series of articles between 1881 and 1883, published in Ivan Aksakov's *Rus'*. In the first, "O dukhovnoi vlasti v Rossii," Solov'ev traces the weakness of the church to Patriarch Nikon, who sacrificed spiritual purity for competition in secular power (under Latin influence), and to the Schism (*raskol*) that began in 1666–1667 with official (synodal) acceptance of the changes Nikon had proposed to bring Russian religious practices more in line with the Greek. These changes led to mass defections from the church of people (henceforth known as Old Believers) devoted to the pre-reform rituals. To curb the exodus, the church relied on state violence, deeply compromising its independence and spiritual authority. In the second article, "O raskole v russkom narode i obshchestve," Solov'ev placed part of the blame on the Old Believers themselves, whose parochialism robbed the church of the strength it would derive from a united commitment to universalism. In the third essay, the most lengthy, "Velikii spor i khristianskaia politika," he concludes that the problems of the Russian church go back to Byzantine particularism and caesaropapism.[259]

Facing the weakness of the Russian church, Solov'ev looked to Roman Catholicism, which became the locus of his utopian project of "free theocracy" in the 1880s. His plan for a world theocracy

under the spiritual authority of Rome and the imperial rule of Moscow evoked very little sympathy among contemporaries.[260] Therefore, Solov'ev's admirers welcomed the abandonment, beginning in the early 1890s, of free theocracy as anything other than a remote ideal, "stripped of its millenarian features and reduced to something like a Kantian 'regulative idea' in ethics," as Walicki characterizes the transformation.[261] Solov'ev signaled his disillusionment in a public lecture, "O prichinakh upadka srednevekovogo mirosozertsaniia" ("On the Reasons for the Collapse of the Medieval Worldview"), delivered before the Moscow Psychological Society on 19 October 1891.[262] The speech became a cause célèbre largely because the ultra-conservative newspaper *Moskovskie vedomosti* made a scandal of it.[263] In a letter to K.P. Pobedonostsev, N.Ia Grot wrote, "in general the impression of Solov'ev's friends was that in his lecture he rejected once and for all any solidarity with Catholicism and papistry."[264] The lecture could be seen as an important step forward. If ten years earlier Solov'ev had exposed the baneful effects of state domination of the church in caesaropapism, he now appeared to recognize that theocracy was the flip side of the coin. It was the principle itself of separation of church and state that mattered, the defense of the autonomous rights of the sacred and secular realms that medieval theocracy and the state church in Russia alike denied.

It was under the impact of the famine that Solov'ev began to reorient free theocracy from a practical goal for the near or intermediate future to an ideal that could be realized only after a vast qualitative transformation in the moral, cultural, and economic level of society, or perhaps only beyond history altogether. The famine left no doubt of the huge gap between Russian reality and the theocratic ideal. Solov'ev himself took part in organizing famine relief. He was among the thirty prominent citizens who met at the Petrunkevich apartment in Moscow for this purpose at the end of September or beginning of October 1891,[265] just before his lecture on the collapse of the medieval worldview. In conversations with friends at this time, "he openly spoke of his disappointment in the contemporary state order and of the necessity of representative, constitutional institutions," Evgenii Trubetskoi recalled. "In these circumstances Solov'ev very soon faced the necessity of choosing between theocracy and constitution."[266]

Although Solov'ev appears never to have abandoned altogether the theocratic ideal,[267] further talk of its possible realization took a distant second place to the immediate task at hand: real progress. This is the message behind "On the Reasons for the Collapse of the Medieval Worldview." For all the controversy the lecture raised, its point is straightforward: the medieval worldview was not progressive, the modern one is. Modernity is progressive in its recognition of the autonomy and value of secular activity. In this it is truer to the spirit of Christianity than medievalism, with its "monstrous doctrine" that the only path to salvation is faith in church dogma.[268] Godmanhood cannot be achieved without the active participation of man. "For it is clear," Solov'ev writes, "that the spiritual rebirth of humanity cannot take place apart from man himself. It cannot be only an external fact; it is a *deed* (*delo*) with which we are charged, a *task* which we must solve."[269] Non-believers who work contribute to Christian progress no less than believers, sometimes much more so, as modern times show. If Christians in name only ("nominal Christians") betray Christ's work, then why should it be denied that those who work, although not necessarily in Christ's name, nonetheless serve his purposes?[270] A teasing comment Solov'ev made to E.N. Trubetskoi in 1892 suggests the exent to which he had come to value common work toward progress and the freedom of conscience

that was a necessary condition of it, over divisive confessional questions (and hypocrisy): "You appeal to Christians of all confessions to unite in a common struggle against unbelief; I would, on the contrary, join contemporary unbelievers in a struggle against contemporary Christians."[271]

The culmination of the secularization (valuing the autonomy of the secular sphere) and de-utopianization (relegating theocracy to a remote ideal) of Solov'ev's thought came with the appearance in 1897 of *Justification of the Good*. The treatise produced a great impression on Russian society, requiring a second edition in 1899, raising interest in idealist philosophy and creating a favorable climate for the reception of *Problems of Idealism*. Nowhere in *Justification of the Good* does Solov'ev invoke "free theocracy." Walicki formulates very well the significance of the volume in this respect: "Solov'ev now proclaimed the need for a formal separation of church and state, expressing his hostility to state-promoted religious intolerance in Russia. The cause of religious and moral progress, consisting in the Christianization of political and social life, was thereby radically divorced from the ideal of binding together the spiritual power of the church with the coercive power of the state. On the contrary: the realization of the idea of Godmanhood in history was made dependent on man's maturity, on his full moral autonomy, incompatible with any form of tutelage in the spiritual sphere."[272] Solov'ev had made freedom of conscience a central part of his liberal philosophy of progress.

We have seen that Struve knew Novgorodtsev's published lectures on the history of the philosophy of law. In his introduction to them Novgorodtsev contrasts the modern concept of the rule-of-law state (*pravovoe gosudarstvo*) to medieval theocracy.[273] The secular ideal of the rule-of-law state is the principle of equality before the law, shown by Kant's philosophical justification to be absolute. "As in the middle ages the ultimate dream of church philosophy was the unification of all peoples under the moral authority of the church, so now in the philosophy of Kant the highest goal of history is the unification of all humanity under the rule of one law equal for all."[274] In this, Novgorodtsev expresses a certain sense of misgiving. Neither the sacred nor the secular can, taken in isolation from the other, satisfy the full range of demands of human nature. In an interesting twist to Solov'ev's lecture on the collapse of the medieval worldview, Novgorodtsev writes that the modern secular state cannot successfully resist the Christian spirit which infuses modern moral consciousness. He quotes Solov'ev's words that, "the unbelieving engines of modern progress have acted in the interests of true Christianity," and that, "social progress in recent centuries has been accomplished in the spirit of good will and justice, i.e., in the spirit of Christ."[275] Novgorodtsev speaks of a necessary correlation of the two ideals, sacred and secular, although he is quite tentative about how this might be achieved. However, his ideas unmistakably point to the insight, which he would give profound development throughout much of his future work, that without equilibrium between, and delimitation of, the separate spheres of church and state the principles proper to each are compromised and diluted by cross intrusion and usurpation, or are hypostatized as one sphere looks on itself as absolute in trying to exclude the other.[276] Progress miscarries in utopianism. Freedom of conscience concisely formulates the principle of respect for the autonomy of the parts that enables the balanced and integrated development of the whole (in reference to both self and society), and that prevents utopian derailment. This principle was not limited to the archetypes of church and state, but extended to the various distinct spheres of human consciousness, aspiration, and experience (science and religion, for example). These spheres are legitimate in their own demain; they cannot substitute for each other but are

relatively autonomous parts of a whole in which each has its own place. This was a guiding principle of neo-idealist social philosophy, forcefully advanced in the final version of *Problems of Idealism*.

Progressive Idealism

The connection that Solov'ev had come to stress, and that Novgorodtsev amplified further,[277] between freedom of conscience and liberal progress was, in turn, the key link between *Problems of Idealism*'s initial focus, as Struve conceived it, on freedom of conscience, and the broader approach the symposium took in its published version. There, freedom of conscience was subsumed under the more general thesis that idealism was a far better defense of liberal progress than positivism (assumed to be liberalism's natural champion). Although the expansion of the project's scope had its accidental moments as the list of contributors came to include Struve's former legal marxist colleagues,[278] there was clear logic in it as well. Positivism was in its own way a denial of freedom of conscience in its claim that what is positively given in empirical experience is the only measure of reality, and that therefore spheres of inquiry which do not proceed from positive data have no legitimacy as science (in the German sense of *Wissenschaft* or Russian sense of *nauka*). Solov'ev's expression for official ideology—"state positivism"—captured the similarity. The initial tight focus on freedom of conscience sought to tap primarily the amorphous religious outlook of the Slavophile *zemtsy*. The final version still fit Struve's original premise that the religiosity of the conservative *zemtsy* was potentially constitutional, but in addition the broader approach could hope to convince zemstvo liberals generally, most of whom probably subscribed to a vague positivism, that neo-idealism was a far better articulation of their liberal convictions. The original policy of the *osvobozhdentsy* to pin their hopes on the zemstvo milieu was based on a judgment that that environment offered the most reliable basis for Russian liberalism by virtue of social background and civic experience, not theoretical outlook. *Problems of Idealism*, by theoretically substantiating the liberal values that (it was assumed) the *zemsty* held by life experience, might inspire them to more resolute action in working for a liberal Russia. Struve and Novgorodtsev wanted the best of both worlds for Russian liberalism: zemstvo civic background and neo-idealist theoretical backing.

One of the Moscow Psychological Society's contributions to Russian social thought—a contribution *Problems of Idealism* publicized—was to help reverse the traditional association of positivism with liberalism and of idealist and religious philosophy with reaction. The neo-idealist program in the first stages of the Liberation Movement, hoping to combine the social strengths of zemstvo liberalism with new theoretical foundations, adds another dimension to the distinction between the old and new Russian liberalism. New liberalism can refer not only to the emergence of social support beyond the zemstvo, e.g., within the urban intelligentsia (in the broad sense), but also to the replacement of positivism by *neo*-idealism as the theoretical justification of liberalism. Often the social and theoretical dimensions did not coincide. For example, P.N. Miliukov and E.D. Kuskova were new liberals by social background but theoretically old liberals in their positivism. From the opposite end of the political spectrum, B.N. Chicherin, the grand old man of zemstvo liberalism, was rather a new liberal in the theoretical sense.[279] The Psychological Society was home to other traditional zemstvo liberals who were new philosophical idealists, including the brothers Trubetskoi, Kotliarevskii, and (in some respects) Vernadskii.[280] In the case of the former legal marxists, the new social and theoretical sources of liberalism did coincide, as they did for Novgorodtsev.

Problems of Idealism took up no mean task in challenging the received opinion that idealism was intellectually and politically retrograde. Idealism was perceived as dangerous to science, enlightenment, and social progress, while positivism was thought to be their champion, or at least that is how most *intelligenty*, who set the standards for progressive opinion, represented things. Against the charge that idealism was adverse to the spirit of scientific inquiry and merely a mask for political and intellectual obscurantism, the philosophers could (and did) invoke the authority of Vladimir Vernadskii, who wrote in his 1902 companion article to *Problems of Idealism*: "Today, in an epoch of the extraordinary flowering of scientific thought, the tight and profound connection of science with other currents in the spiritual life of humanity is not infrequently forgotten.... Sometimes it is heard that ... the creative and vital role of philosophy for humanity has ended and in the future must be replaced by science. But such an opinion ... can hardly withstand the test of science itself."[281] *Problemy idealizma* stressed throughout that idealism was intrinsically progressive. Iu. Aikhenval'd, in a fine contemporary review, thought this was the volume's main message. He writes that the majority of the Russian reading public is accustomed to think "that those freedom-loving aspirations, the attractive and bright imprint of which lies on nearly every page of our collection, have their only and necessary basis in a completely different worldview—the positivistic-mechanical. The acknowledged heralds and champions of a free citizenry (*grazhdanstvennost'*) turn out to be advocates of moral-religious views that are ordinarily professed by representatives of a rather different social camp. And in this respect *Problemy idealizma* can provide a great educational service in dispelling the dominant prejudice among us that the spiritualist worldview is incompatible with the cherished precepts of social liberalism."[282]

The public reception of neo-idealism was a paramount concern for its representatives active in the Liberation Movement, the very purpose of which was to bring public opinion to bear against the autocracy. They feared that the positivist *intelligenty* might depict the growth of interest in idealism as a triumph for reactionary forces. This concern may have been heightened by the Liberation Movement's initial reliance on the zemstvo milieu, since for the democratic intelligentsia, zemstvo liberalism stood for defense of narrow class interest, not genuine progress for the *narod*. What is certain is that neo-idealists went to even greater lengths to stress their progressive social views because the former marxists in the group were seen by their past colleagues on the left as traitors, defectors to the enemy camp. "The idealism of our days would hardly have brought against itself such polemics," Novgorodtsev wrote in 1904, "if among its proponents were not persons who had fled marxism."[283] This helps account for the publicity surrounding the appearance of *Problems of Idealism*. Aikhenval'd saw it the same way. The volume attracted the attention it did not so much because of its philosophical ideas, which had long been advanced by the Psychological Society, but because of the previous reputations of some of its contributors, "who until now were known for their work in other fields of theory and practice and who were most often attached to active marxism—these very names concentrate around themselves a new and broad contingent of readers."[284]

At a meeting of the Psychological Society on 11 May 1902,[285] Novgorodtsev proposed that *Problems of Idealism* be published in the series, "Editions of the Psychological Society." The proposal was accepted. The volume saw the light of day on 16 November 1902 in a solid printing of 3,000 copies, and was sold out in a year.[286] Ivanov-Razumnik described its appearance as an "event"

in Russian intellectual history."[287] According to the conditions of publication by the Psychological Society, Lopatin provided a one-paragraph forward to the volume, stating that it expressed the philosophic views of only one group of Society members, but that it deserves the support of the Society as a whole in view of its outstanding interest.[288] "*Problems of Idealism* was a challenging, self-confident manifesto of the neo-idealist revival in Russian thought," Walicki writes,[289] a revival that the Psychological Society had advanced for more than a decade and to which its university philosophers would remain the most faithful.

III. *Problems of Idealism*. Central Ideas

Ethical Idealism, the Irreducibility of the Self, and the Critique of Positivism

Ethical idealism, the claim that ethical ideals do not derive from the empirical world, that "what ought to be" (*das Sollen*) is not reducible to "what is" (*das Sein*), was the common point of departure among the contributors to *Problems of Idealism*. From this starting point, Russian idealism broke into different directions and took on diverse forms. This process of differentiation is already evident in *Problems of Idealism*, but for the moment it was held in check by the common idealist defense of liberalism and the critique of positivism. Meanwhile, some currents represented in the 1902 symposium would soon develop in directions at odds with the neo-idealist defense of liberalism (Berdiaev and Bulgakov), while others did not pursue that defense to its ontological depths, as the Psychological Society professors did.

Problems of Idealism strived to convey the importance, not only for the critique of positivism but for human self-understanding, of the distinctiveness of moral experience relative to empirical experience. The contributors pointed to the glaring contradiction between the positivist criterion of reality—empirical experience—and the persistent human predilection for moral evaluation of it. They were struck by the very availability of a category such as "what ought to be" when the empirical world speaks to us only of "what is," of positive data and facts, not of ideals and standards. The positivist conception of reality discounted these ideals, central to human identity. Russian idealists differed over their origin, but agreed it was not empirical. The apprehension alone of moral obligation (duty) was already something startling; the freedom to act on it was nothing short of miraculous. The capacity of the categorical imperative to determine the will, the capacity to act as one ought, in opposition to impulse, upheld the autonomy of the self against reduction to naturalistic explanation. In all this, the contributors to the symposium drew heavily on Kant's moral philosophy, even where they did not accept his system as a whole. An important intermediary between Kant and *Problems of Idealism* was Solov'ev's major treatise on ethics, *Justification of the Good*.[290]

Ethical idealism, in short, took the distinctiveness of moral experience as refutation of the positivist conception of reality and as testimony to the irreducibility of the self to the empirical world. This gave the person a special dignity, the defense of which was liberalism. As Novgorodtsev affirmed in 1904, "Contemporary idealist philosophy can well indicate that in its practical ideals it continuously emphasizes and advances the principle of the person, its absolute dignity, its natural and inalienable rights. For all the various shades dividing even idealists themselves, it is that point in relation to which they are in full agreement. But in the end do not all living and progressive movements of Russian thought meet on this point?"[291]

Russian idealists of all shades did concur on the dignity of the self, but not all thought that meant substantiality. Among the *Problemy* authors who made significant contributions to Russian philosophical thought,[292] S.L. Frank did

not at this point, and B.A. Kistiakovskii never would, draw ontological conclusions from the irreducibility of the self to empirical experience. The rest did. In 1904, in an important essay, "On Critical Idealism," Frank emphatically rejects the need for any ontological principle whatsoever; for him, free-floating consciousness is absolute.[293] Interestingly enough, Vladimir Solov'ev, the Psychological Society's most visible member, came to reject the idea of personal substantiality, sparking controversy among his colleagues.[294]

Ethical idealism marked the culmination of an important stage in the intellectual evolution of the former legal marxists. Henceforth, Struve's general philosophical outlook changed little, while Berdiaev, Bulgakov, and Frank continued to work toward the respective philosophical and theological accomplishments that made them famous. But the Kantian-inspired recovery of ethical ideals that the legal marxists already undertook in their revisionist period received its highest expression in the pages of *Problems of Idealism*. "Scientific socialism" was no doubt the most reductive form of positivism in Russia, as expounded by G.V. Plekhanov. The necessitarian marxism of the Second International that Plekhanov embraced was based in large part on the Engelsian interpretation of Hegel in *Anti-Dühring*. Plekhanov added to this his own great admiration of Hegel's fatalistic side.[295] A certain similarity does suggest itself between Hegelian identity, the idea that in *Sittlichkeit*, "there is no gap between what ought to be and what is, between *Sollen* and *Sein*," as Charles Taylor puts it,[296] and the deterministic contention of orthodox marxism that the real forces of historical necessity, operating on their own without inspired human agency, will bring about the golden age.[297] The association of Hegel with scientific socialism helps explain why, in both Germany and Russia, revisionist attempts to invigorate marxism with ethical ideals sought to recover the Kantian distinction between *das Sein* and *das Sollen*.[298] In this way the legal marxists had contributed to the critique of positivism, to the autonomization of ideals and values, even before their revisionism precipitated their full conversion "from marxism to idealism," as Bulgakov immortalized the whole development.[299]

For the legal marxists, ethical idealism thus began with a recovery of the ideals that "scientific socialism" castigated as "utopian" within the socialist tendencies it opposed (in Russia, populism). In Struve, this critical rehabilitation of utopianism, as he put it,[300] remained critical, but in Berdiaev and Bulgakov the process derailed soon after the appearance of *Problems of Idealism*. They tended to revert back to, or had not overcome in the first place, the utopian vision of the total revolutionary transformation of society that characterized orthodox marxism. "Scientific socialism," its own protestations notwithstanding, was, of course, far more utopian than the socialists who took matters into their own hands and worked toward the gradual realization of socialism through reform. Berdiaev's and Bulgakov's new utopianism was explicitly millenarian and chiliastic, while the utopianism of necessitarian marxism was a secular transposition of the eschatological impulse under the guise of science. Bulgakov and Berdiaev themselves labeled such positivist conflations of science with religious and metaphysical hopes "contraband,"[301] not fully realizing that the logic of their criticism required that the ideal of salvation be strictly that, a transcendent ideal, not something which could be realized on earth (as in their own utopianism).[302] By contrast, the Psychological Society neo-idealists were generally critical of utopianism as such, stressing its incompatibility with transcendence.

Struve's contribution to *Problems of Idealism*, "Toward Characterization of Our Philosophic Development," is an

overview and self-evaluation of his evolution from marxism to idealism. He presents the results of that evolution in a succinct statement of what he calls the basic error of positivism.[303] Man conceives all that is conceivable in two basic forms, "what is" (*sushchee, bytie*) and "what ought to be" (*dolzhnoe, dolzhenstvovanie*). Causation and necessity completely govern the realm of what is. There is no room there for freedom or creativity. "The present as a whole is determined by the past; the future by the present (and, in turn, by the past); in this way, everything is determined or predetermined." Scientific understanding reduces one thing to another, as its cause, and examines the method of this causal dependence (p. 78). "What is" and "what ought to be" are completely incomparable categories, not reducible to each other. "Meanwhile, the basic idea and at the same time the basic error of positivism consists in the subordination of 'what ought to be' to 'what is,' and in the derivation of the first from the second." This is the monstrous idea of *scientific* ethics. It is rooted "in idolatry before the principle of causation. It forgets that in experience or science we discover the causation and mode of existence [*bytie*], but that being itself [*samoe bytie*], as such, remains for us always unknowable and inexplicable" (p. 79). It is "being itself" that makes possible duty and the freedom to act on it, or ethical idealism.

Struve's argument can be clarified by Kant's distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal. The category "what is" is the phenomenal world; "being itself, as such" is the noumenal. Therefore, the basic error of positivism is the reduction of what ought to be to the phenomenal world. This reduction is uncritical because positivists identify the phenomenal and noumenal, that is, they make unconscious metaphysical claims through unjustified extrapolation from empirical knowledge. Struve insists that philosophic thought be critical, that it not make dogmatic metaphysical claims by confusing the phenomenal and the noumenal. Noumenal being is inaccessible to scientific method (it cannot be known as phenomena are), although its presence is felt in the depths of moral consciousness. "Philosophical thought by its own critical relationship to belief in causation cannot but support direct consciousness of the special nature of moral obligation (*dolzhenstvovanie*), presupposing free and creative activity," Struve writes. From this we acquire the right to metaphysics. "Yes, metaphysics," Struve adds, but critical, Kantian metaphysics (pp. 81–82). Conforming the will to duty is an autonomous act; it breaks the chain of phenomenal necessity and thus constitutes a leap of being to the noumenal level. This, Struve says in so many words, gives us the right to metaphysics, although a critical metaphysics that, while grasping the presence of noumenal reality, recognizes its unknowability.

The critical caution with which Struve approached the metaphysical conclusions he drew from the nature of moral experience is one of the ways he compares to the Psychological Society neo-idealists. Berdiaev's difference from them in this respect comes through at points in his *Problemy* essay, "The Ethical Problem in Light of Philosophical Idealism." It is already evident, for example, in the boldness of his declaration that his philosophical views have now evolved from those in his recent book, *Subjectivism and Individualism in Social Philosophy*: "To philosophical positivism and orthodox marxism I relate still more critically. I recognize that my book reflected the inadequacies of a transitional state of thought from positivism to metaphysical idealism and spiritualism, to which I have now finally arrived."[304] Despite the differences, Berdiaev gives an eloquent formulation of ethics as the common point of departure in the idealist revival. In this he relies on Kant's establishment of "what ought to be" as an autonomous category, given to consciousness a priori,

independent of empirical knowledge. Ethics is an autonomous discipline: it has no need for empirical science since its principles are available to us before experience. Otherwise why would we not merely perceive the world, instead of also evaluating it. "Moral evaluation of what is from the point of view of what ought to be is inherent to every consciousness" (p. 94).

In opposition to the Kantian dualism of what is and what ought to be, positivists deny that consciousness has two separate, parallel sides (pp. 96–97). In place of violently distorting positivist reductionism, Berdiaev calls for the rehabilitation of both sides of human consciousness into an integral whole. Positivist interpretations of human behaviour and motivation, such as hedonism and utilitarianism, reduce everything to some empty empirical criterion like pleasure or happiness; they fail to treat morality as an autonomous force in human conduct. Ethics is its own thing, not something else, like pleasure or happiness. "Happiness itself is subject to *moral* judgment, which determines the quality of happiness, recognizing it as worthy or not of the moral nature of man" (p. 100). One ought to strive not for happiness but for perfection (or to deserve happiness, in Kant's words). Nothing in the empirical world approximates our a priori notion of perfection. It cannot, therefore, be phenomenal in origin but must arise from a connection to the noumenal realm. The moral law is a link to transcendence. "It is a beacon which shines through to us from infinity. . . . It is the voice of God inside man, it is given for 'this world' but it is 'not of this world'" (p. 104).

Self-perfection is, for Berdiaev, the basic idea of ethics (pp. 102, 105, 108). Drawing on Windelband, he develops a distinction between the empirical and ideal or normal self: "Morality is first of all the internal relationship of a person to himself, the search for and realization of his own spiritual self, the triumph of 'normative' consciousness in 'empirical' consciousness." Recognizing one's own spiritual self makes possible, in turn, normative relations toward other persons (p. 106). Freedom is the fulfillment of moral duty, and so the affirmation of one's true self . "From Kant's point of view a person is free when he is determined not by his sensual, but by his moral-rational nature. . . . Freedom is the determination of personality by 'normative consciousness' (ethical norms) in opposition to determination by chance empirical motives. . . . The triumph of the moral good is the triumph of the 'normative' consciousness, the spiritual self" (pp. 132–133). Since ethics consists in the internal relationship of a person to his ideal self, Berdiaev rejects the ethical primacy of "thou" (*ty*) or the "other." Egoism versus altruism is a false opposition; the ideal self stands above these hypostatized poles. "It has already long been time to eliminate the ethical fiction of thou and other, which only hinders a correct posing and resolution of the ethical problem. The relation of one person to another person is ethically derivative from the relation of a person to himself. . . . The highest moral consciousness requires that every person relate to every other person not as 'thou' . . . but as 'self'" (p. 111). This is Berdiaev's interpretation of the Kantian notion of man as an end, never merely a means, and of the equality of persons as ends in themselves.

For Berdiaev, the moral problem takes on a tragic character. The absolute ideal of moral perfection can never be realized in experience. The empirical self cannot fully coincide with its ideal side in historical reality. The result is an eternal challenge to infinite improvement as well as an invitation to speculation about a metaphysical resolution of the impasse. The inevitably of metaphysics has led Berdiaev to now embrace the substantiality of the spirit (spiritualism), as Struve had in the introduction he wrote to his book on Mikhailovskii. Berdiaev differentiates his own approach from Kant's, whose method is to

postulate immortality and the existence of God from ethics. Berdiaev thinks this is too timid, declaring, "I reject Kantian agnosticism and more than the Kantians believe in the possibility of constructing metaphysics by various paths" (p. 107, note). The various paths he suggests are tentative. He refers to the victorious march of the cosmic spirit in Hegelian metaphysics and philosophy of history, which he contends have never been refuted, although at this point he also informs us that "in certain respects, incidentally, I stand closer to Fichte than to Hegel" (pp. 113–114). He often compares his views to Struve's on one question or another, assuring us that they are in basic agreement on everything, except that "my metaphysics has a somewhat different shade than the metaphysics of Leibniz and Lotze, with whom Struve, apparently, especially sympathizes" (p. 132, note). The fact that examples such as these are posturing contrivances was pointed out (with annoyance) by Iu. Aikhenval'd in his review, which I return to below.

"Contraband"

In a way that reflects back to its beginnings as a defense of freedom of conscience, *Problems of Idealism* insists throughout on the strict delimitation of separate spheres of human experience and thought. It was the common concern of the contributors that religion, philosophy, and positive science each be given their own autonomous space and that no one of them usurp the legitimate rights of the others. The conflation of these relatively distinct spheres, or the hypostatization of one at the expense of another, results in various forms of utopianism, from scientism to chiliasm and millenarianism. Neo-idealists often used the term (or, when not the term, the concept) "contraband" to describe the intellectual distortion and muddling that result when elements of one area of thought (ethical or metaphysical) are smuggled into another (empirical or natural scientific). Lopatin introduced the concept in the first volume of his influential *Positive Tasks of Philosophy* (1886). He wrote there that the inevitability of metaphysical suppositions ought to be acknowledged and justified. "Why not call things by their names?" Otherwise, metaphysical ideas can figure in thought only as contraband, distorting it on an unconscious level and preventing clear and precise intellectual discourse. "Is it desirable to perpetuate such contraband of reason? . . . Every unconsciousness in the scientific sphere leads only to confusion of concepts, ambiguity, and lies."[305]

S.N. Bulgakov's essay, "Basic Problems of the Theory of Progress," which opens *Problems of Idealism*, takes up the "contraband" critique of positivism. For Bulgakov, the quest for an integral, whole worldview is inherent to man. Such integrity requires free expression of each of the individual elements in human intellectual and spiritual nature. "Man cannot be satisfied by exact science alone. . . . Metaphysical and religious needs are ineradicable and have never been removed from human life. Precise knowledge, metaphysics, and religion must be situated in a certain harmonious relationship."[306] Positivists, however, deny metaphysics the right to exist. But no less than everyone else, they cannot help asking metaphysical questions, only they fail to do so squarely and honestly. Metaphysics thus enters into their inquiries on an unconscious level, leading to distortion and conflation. This is clear, Bulgakov shows, in the sociological theories of progress that predict the imminent attainment of human perfection on earth. Such theories are, he explains, secular transpositions of religious faith (eschatology in particular) under the guise of science. The result is the "religion of progress," a strange mixture of religious themes (faith in salvation) with scientific pretension. Anticipating subsequent western scholarship on modern European intellectual history, Bulgakov identifies these transpositions as a major

source of utopianism. The solutions positivists devise to the problem of progress are fraudulent because they use contraband, introducing under the banner of positive science elements foreign to it (p. 17). "Thanks to such conflation positive science puts itself in an ambiguous position and, moreover, crudely violates the rights of metaphysics and religious belief. Therefore, what is needed first of all is a careful demarcation of separate elements and problems that are conflated in the theory of progress. It is necessary to return to Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's. The correct posing of the theory of progress . . . must consequently delimit and restore science, metaphysics, and religion in their own spheres and rights" (p. 32).

Bulgakov himself proposes that the problem of progress should be approached from a "metaphysics of history." He maintains that: 1) a theory of progress requires that history have meaning; 2) philosophy of history constitutes a theodicy; and 3) history is a revelation of higher reason, which is simultaneously transcendent to and immanent in history (p. 32). These positions are problematic from a consistently neo-idealist point of view (such as Novgorodtsev's), according to which history as a whole could not be an object of analysis since we are participants in it and cannot, therefore, acquire an Archimedean perspective on it (in this sense, history as a whole is noumenal and inaccessible to reason). Bulgakov is explicit that he has gone well beyond Kantian idealism: "I know that for many Kantians combining the transcendent and immanent appears to be an epistemological contradiction. . . . Together with Hegel, Schelling, Solov'ev, and others I do not see a contradiction here" (p. 32, note). As a result, he can claim that the meaning of history is straightforward: history is the revelation and fulfillment of a creative and rational plan, of cosmic, providential meaning, in which the cunning of absolute reason is triumphant (p. 34). In the end, however, Bulgakov expresses reservations about his idea for a metaphysics of history, as if anticipating the objections of critical philosophy. He grants that absolute reason in history is epistemologically inaccessible to us; our link to it is conscience, the moral law. "Progress appears from this point of view not as a law of historical development, but as a moral task" (p. 37). In this, Bulgakov returns to the safer ground of his contraband critique of positivist conceptions of historical progress. Progress should not be ascribed to history as an automatic natural law, nor should it be awaited as divine dispensation. Rather, we must take responsibility for it.

Struve also considers the problem of contraband in his *Problemy* essay. Like Bulgakov, he finds an example of it in sociology, specifically in Russian "subjective sociology," represented first of all by the populists Petr Lavrov and Nikolai Mikhailovskii.[307] Mikhailovskii sought to integrate in one world-view the categories of "what is" and "what ought to be." According to Struve, he failed at the task because he approached it primarily as a positivist, when it falls instead to the metaphysician. "In the person of the philosophizing Mr. Mikhailovskii there were two essential things that were neither identified nor demarcated, and which therefore only interfered with each other. Positive science was in him unconsciously transformed into metaphysics" (p. 84). Despite this judgment, Struve felt a certain sympathy for the subjective sociologists, because in them ideal (ultimately metaphysical) demands, although not fully articulate, were at least not completely silenced. This was a necessary element in the revolt against positivism, one Struve expressed in his call for the critical rehabilitation of the utopianism for which marxism berated populism. But there was another necessary element in the revolt, and this time, Struve contends, marxism made the positive contribution. In his account, the marxist polemic against subjective sociology singled out the illegitimate intrusion of ethical problems into what the marxists

saw as their own sphere (objective, scientific sociology). Struve explains that in this debate Miliukov, whom he calls one of the most visible Russian positivists, took the side of the marxists, "because he clearly saw in marxism a reaction of the positive-scientific spirit against an alien 'ethical' element intruding into science" (p. 84). Struve's argument is that subjective sociology and marxism each made a positive contribution to the revolt against positivism. In the first case, it was the rehabilitation of ethical ideals and consequent erosion of the view that positive science could answer all human aspirations, and in the second case, it was criticism of the conflation of distinct areas of thought (the contraband critique). The marxist charge that populism was utopian captured both contributions, although in different ways.

The problem is that marxism did not highlight the need for the mutual autonomy of positive science and ethics; it simply denied the existence of ethics altogether. In this, it was much more a case of contraband than was subjective sociology. Struve himself recognizes how strained his argument is that orthodox marxism made a positive contribution to the critique of positivism.[308] But it is interesting that he now saw the conflation of separate spheres of inquiry as so characteristic of positivism that he tried to interpret his own marxist past as preparing the way for the defense of their autonomy. In his self-evaluation, "P.G." acknowledges that subjective sociology had made its own contribution to the autonomization of ethics from positivist reductionism, but he still wants to stress the role of marxism: "Mr. Mikhailovskii's idea about 'what ought to be,' as a category independent of 'what is' in experience and therefore having autonomous value," is recognized by the former legal marxists. "But especially they emphasize that posing this question within the boundaries of positive science and in its terms is illegitimate and does not make sense, that it is an *uncritical confusion of metaphysics with empirical knowledge, or positive science.* Thus it is not true that in the philosophical direction of the thought of such metaphysician-idealists as Struve there is nothing in common with Mr. Mikhailovskii, but it is still less true that this current issuing from marxism capitulates before 'subjective sociology'" (p. 85, his italics).

In this effort to depict his own recent intellectual development as a certain synthesis of subjective sociology and marxism, Struve might have done better to cast the synthesis in terms of "subjectivity" and "objectivity." He could have argued that he drew on the marxian aspiration to objectivity in trying to provide a firmer basis for the ethical ideals that enabled the "critically thinking individual" (Lavrov) to make a difference in history. For Struve, the objectivity of such ideals came to rest ultimately in metaphysics.

Much of Novgorodtsev's work pursued the contraband critique of positivism. He presents a clear statement of it in one of his companion articles to *Problems of Idealism*, "The Significance of Philosophy,"[309] written in 1903 as a concise introduction to his lectures on the history of German idealism, a course he delivered at the Higher Women's Courses and at Moscow University. Disillusionment with Comtean positivism was one of the first indications of the idealist revival, Novgorodtsev observes. Comte had enjoyed great popularity in Russia, but his ideas have become increasingly outmoded with the realization that science cannot, as he hoped, take the place of religion and metaphysics. Novgorodtsev stresses the careful delimitation of science and the autonomization of philosophy from positivist reductionism (paradigmatic in Comte's hypertrophy of science). The integral worldview emerging from this process will accommodate not only scientific interests, "but also so-called metaphysical demands, mystical aspirations, all those dreams and hopes that comprise the deepest basis of our spirit."[310] In the on-going collapse of

positivism, he sees a return to Kant, whose system of transcendental idealism makes possible the noumenal world by limiting science to the phenomenal.

Economic materialism, even more influential in Russia than Comtean positivism, has shared the same fate, Novgorodtsev proclaims. The enthusiasm for orthodox marxism has already spent itself. Its decline—in terms of intellectual influence, Novgorodtsev is right to describe it this way—is further evidence of heightened consciousness toward the ideal. This is clear first of all in the intellectual evolution of the former legal marxists. Novgorodtsev has no quarrel with the historical observation that economic factors have a definite and continuous effect on historical phenomena, writing that "in this modest aspect economic materialism exists even now." But the reductionist premise, which is the gist of the doctrine, that economic materialism is the "universal explanation of all thought, life, and history,"[311] exposed its patent inadequacy as a philosophical system, "and in the end all the main and most talented representatives of the school went off in other directions, in order to seek satisfaction in Kant and Fichte, as well as in the works of Russian philosophical thought, especially in Vladimir Solov'ev."[312]

Novgorodtsev's conclusion, then, is that idealism has arisen from disaffection with the reductionist doctrines of "scientific philosophy," Comtean positivism, and economic materialism. In this, Novgorodtsev no doubt wants to point to the influence of *Problems of Idealism*, for A.S. Lappo-Danilevskii's article focused on Comte and E.N. Trubetskoi's on Marx and Engels. The disillusionment was inevitable: the ideal aspirations inherent to human consciousness resist reduction to the empirical. With the recent turn to idealism, "clear consciousness has emerged that these doctrines take for themselves more than they can give," as Novgorodtsev puts it.[313] This concise formulation captures very well the force behind the contraband critique. First, it conveys that reductive positivism, despite itself, cannot ignore or eradicate the idealist impulse, which is not only ethical but more generally metaphysical in that the idea of "what ought to be" transcends the possibilities of empirical reality. Second, although positivist doctrines fail to block the idealist impulse, in trying they must promise to somehow make good on it—this is what they "take for themselves." But here they are utopian: their science is a form of contraband which abuses the authority of the natural sciences to predict the realization in history of ideal hopes. Following up on this pattern, Novgorodtsev writes, "the first problem over which the narrow formulae of the positivists and economists fell apart was the moral problem,"[314] because it encapsulates all our ideal aspirations that cannot long be resisted. "And with this once more arises the whole set of so-called metaphysical questions, which might temporarily be held in contempt, but to which human thought constantly turns anew, as soon as it comes to consciousness of its deepest foundations and ambitions."[315]

In 1904, leading Russian positivists responded to *Problems of Idealism* with a *sbornik* of their own, *Outlines of the Realist Worldview*.[316] S.A. Kotliarevskii's review of this volume, "On True and False Realism," is an excellent formulation of the contraband critique. First, Kotliarevskii finds that he must help the realist-positivists define their own basic concepts, which they have left unclear. Therefore, he proposes that realism is the claim that all knowledge is empirical; nothing is known a priori. From this epistemological premise most realists (like S.A. Suvorov in *Ocherki*) make the ontological claim that nothing non-empirical exists. Realism is, in short, the reduction of being to natural, empirical phenomena (naturalism). Metaphysics is empty, an illusory (*prizrachnyi*) world.[317] Realists have, however, put themselves in the difficult

position of needing to explain how such illusions (ethical and metaphysical ideals) arise in the first place and exert such hold on us if what is positively given in empirical experience exhausts the possibilities of being. Ultimately, they must dismiss such ideals as a naturalistically explicable psychological illusion, again the unreal world of metaphysics. This explanation cannot satisfy even the realist-positivists themselves; the presence and force of ideals remain, although at a repressed, subconscious level. And with this, Kotliarevskii writes, "banished metaphysics, renounced religion, take their revenge, bursting lavishly into the realm of real science and greatly obscuring its pure realism. . . Most dangerous of all, this metaphysics looms, so to speak, unconsciously, passing under a foreign flag,"[318] or, in other words, as contraband. The "false realism" of scientistic monism is thus inherently unstable. The proper relationship between separate spheres of human experience and inquiry is not mutual usurpation (Kotliarevskii's term) but mutual delimitation, making possible the integrity of "true realism."[319]

Progress and Natural Law

The revival of natural law, its elevation to an ethical ideal that could serve as a measure of and a spur toward liberal progress, was an outstanding example of the neo-idealist autonomization of philosophy from positivist reductionism. This is Novgorodtsev's approach in his *Problems of Idealism* essay, "Ethical Idealism in the Philosophy of Law (On the Question of the Revival of Natural Law)." The specific form of positivist domination in jurisprudence was historicism, a nineteenth-century reaction to Enlightenment conceptions of natural law, which historicists characterized as abstract, overly speculative, rationalistic, and utopian. The turn-of-the-century revival of natural law after the dominance of historicism typifies a pattern in the history of ideas. Novgorodtsev describes how a given intellectual current, suppressed for a time, experiences a revival when an opposing intellectual current has exaggerated its own claims to such an extent that its one-sidedness has become obvious. The cycle then recurs. Both currents offer their own genuine insights and valuable perspectives.[320] In his first book, *Istoricheskaia shkola iuristov: ee proiskhozhdenie i sud'ba* (The Historical School of Jurists: Its Origin and Fate) (1896), Novgorodtsev strived for a balanced approach to the relative merits of both historicism and natural law.[321] His *Problemy* essay concentrates rather on philosophical justification of the urgency of the revival of natural law.

To historicist methodology, which properly takes the historical and sociological context, Novgorodtsev contrasts philosophy, which (he states baldly) focuses on the autonomous human personality. Historicism ought not to be concerned with values and absolute ideals since these are properties of persons, not their environment. In his concern with relativism in values, Novgorodtsev makes some categorical assertions: "The concept of personhood and the absolute principles connected with it are alien and inaccessible to historical method." This is rather the domain of "special philosophical analysis." "Philosophy must establish its rights and show history its limits" (p. 240–241). Among Russian idealists, it would be difficult to find more forceful statements of the need for the autonomization of philosophy from the dominance of historicism and positivism. The special philosophical methods for study of the concept of personhood comprise ethical idealism, of which the revival of natural law was an integral part.

Natural law meets the requirement of the idealistic and progressive side of human nature to look forward to the realization of our present aspirations and hopes. In an allusion to the pressing need for constitutional reform in Russia,

Novgorodtsev wrote, "this requirement is expressed especially vividly in an epoch of crises and turning points, when old forms of life make their delapidation all too obvious, when an impatient desire for new order seizes society" (p. 250). But idealistic and progressive aspirations are a constant feature of human motivation. Novgorodtsev's appreciation of them was a main underpinning of his philosophy of progress and theory of natural law: "Human thought has this capacity of living not only in the present, but also in the future, of transferring there its ideals and aspirations; in this sense the constructions of natural law are an inalienable quality of our spirit and evidence of its higher calling" (pp. 250–251). Idealism designates not only theoretical philosophy but also the progressive, idealistic, and even utopian aspirations in human nature. The progressive ideas of the future are often first conceived in the dreams and bold projects of utopians and visionaries. "The creativity of life is broader than limited human experience, and therefore it is constantly the case that utopian theory turns out to be more far-sighted than sober practice" (p. 263). In this, Novgorodtsev shared the common concern of the new Russian idealists to refute associations of idealism and reaction. In the inexhaustibility of the utopian impulse he saw evidence that consciousness was not limited to the empirical, phenomenal world but connected to absolute, noumenal reality. At the same time, he would soon come to insist that utopian ideals be made ideals in the strict (transcendent) sense. Attempts to realize them in history defeat the genuinely progressive spirit.

Novgorodtsev distinguishes between two interpretations of natural law: idealist, and the claim that it is given by nature as eternal, unchanging norms common to all cultures. Historicists typically define natural law according to the second interpretation. In contrast to this is Rudolf Stammler's concept of "natural law with changing content" and V.M. Hessen's "evolutionary natural law." Since the variability of legal ideals is accepted by all modern advocates of natural law, the historicist characterization is a strawman. But if even natural law evolves, "where then is the break with the historicist outlook?" (p. 254). The distinctiveness of the philosophical approach to natural law consists in the idealist opposition between the categories *das Sein* and *das Sollen*. In looking forward to the future, "thought turns not to what *will be* as a result of natural causes, but to what *ought to be*, in correspondence with the moral law" (p. 254). We envisage a future that unfolds not by historical inevitability, but by our moral evaluation of the present and the course of action deemed necessary to improve it.

According to Novgorodtsev, the task of natural law is to order ideal paths of progressive development. Natural law seeks criteria for moral evaluation of history in the service of a better future. Therefore, it cannot draw its principles from history itself. "To the question of what ought to be, knowledge of what was and is cannot give an answer. Here it is necessary to turn to a priori indications of moral consciousness." This makes the theory of natural law autonomous, "sharply distinguishing it from the purely historical question about the development of law," which can describe its past but not prescribe its future (p. 255). Historicism must recognize that natural law, as a special problem of moral philosophy, does not fall within its proper domain, because historical necessity excludes the very possibility of evaluation and criticism of law (Savigny). By historicist methodology, critique of historical events is no more justified than the critique of the processes of nature (p. 256). History and sociology exceed their bounds in making moral conjectures—this is philosophy's area of competence. Novgorodtsev strenuously objects, for example, to the attempts of Russian "subjective sociology" to

include ethics within its sphere in the hope of redressing exclusive objectivism. The mistake of the subjective sociologists is that, "instead of strict delimitation of the ethical element from the scientific, they permitted their combination. From this arose the unsuccessful concept of *subjective* sociology and the idea, surprising for its philosophical baselessness, of the 'subjective method.' It is understandable that as a whole this construction had to evoke protests from the side of positive science as well as from the side of moral philosophy, for the correct correlation of these two fields consists in their complete delimitation. Ethics manifests its peculiarity namely in that it judges independently of the necessity (*zakonomernost'*) revealed by science; it has its own necessity" (p. 265). This evaluation of subjective sociology has much in common with Struve's; Novgorodtsev points out that the mistake he outlines has already been subjected to irrefutable critique.

Novgorodtsev softens somewhat his attack in granting that historical study of ethics is, of course, fully justified. Law and morality can be examined as historical and social phenomena, although this approach does not reveal their very essence. On the basis of the familiar reduction of "what ought to be" to "what is," positivists make illegitimate knowledge claims. "Thus fully legitimate sociological examination is transformed into an extremely pretentious construction, passing itself off for the explanation of the 'final bases of law and society'" (p. 270). Together with sociological research, philosophic approaches are needed, "not in the least superseding the sociological method nor in the least less important" (p. 273).

Novgorodtsev's own philosophic inquiry into ethics and natural law was deeply indebted to Kant and culminated in a well-developed philosophy of progress. Neo-idealism is inherently progressive and open-ended: for true idealism, the ideal (in epistemology, ethics, and legal and social philosophy) is a transcendent, absolute goal that can never be mistaken for any of its relative approximations. The absolute quality of the ideal relates only to its form, not its content. In this Novgorodtsev follows Stammler's concept of natural law with changing content, which he celebrates as the direct conclusion of ethical idealism. The overriding concern is to prevent the absolutization of the content, i.e., mistaking it (which is temporary and historical) for the ideal itself. The absolute, ideal form is given a priori to consciousness, "but the content of the form must be found, and therefore moral life is continuous creativity" (p. 287).[322] Progress is the constant pull toward the ideal. Since the philosophy of progress is firmly grounded in the absolute (the ideal form), it is also a thorough-going critical philosophy. Positivism and relativism are neither progressive nor critical, since they deny the absolute. They have no standard of criticism and nothing toward which to strive. As is often the case, Novgorodtsev's is a Kantian formulation: "The categorical imperative is the form and a challenge to searching. This form must be fulfilled, and the challenge must lead to a definite result. But never can this absolute form find an adequate content, and never can the moral challenge be satisfied with the achieved result." The often bemoaned "merely formal" character of Kantian ethics and philosophy of law does not strike him as a problem. Rather, "the formal moral principle is recognition of the idea of eternal development and improvement" (p. 288).

The incompatibility of Novgorodtsev's philosophy of progress with conservatism is obvious, but he also drew out its resistance to utopianism (p. 288): the ideal advances as the content catches up. "But this must lead neither to the absolute rejection of the achieved stage nor to doubt in the possibility of progress, but rather to improvement of the given and to searching for the higher" (p. 289). The distinction between the ideal and the

historically real ought not to be despised, for it is clear consciousness of the ideal that spurs continuous real movement toward it. Progressive approximation of the ideal is the only way to be worthy of it. Such idealizing progress is the "justification of the good" (Solov'ev). Utopianism shuts all this down. Another aspect of the critical side of Novgorodtsev's attitude to utopianism was his conception of philosophy as an exacting and rigorous discipline having nothing to do with ideology or utopia. The time has passed when philosophers could take to flights of fantasy (p. 295). This in no way excluded Novgorodtsev's own search for a higher synthesis in metaphysics of "what is" and "what ought to be."

Novgorodtsev always remained true to the neo-idealist defense of progressive, rule-of-law liberalism, giving it further development in his future works. Berdiaev, by contrast, soon drew quite illiberal conclusions from idealism. But for the moment, in *Problems of Idealism*, he too supported the neo-idealist defense of liberalism. At this stage, his fervent individualism had not yet become anarchism. He has a liberal appreciation of the importance of society in the development of personhood. The person has ethical primacy over society (ethical individualism). "But the moral law is embodied in the life of man by way of social progress, the human personality develops and works out its individuality by way of diverse interaction with the social environment, in the social-psychic community of people" (pp. 116–117). The goal and justification of social progress is the full development of the person. The rule of law ensures that the end (the person) is not compromised by the necessary means (society). "The external relations of people must be regulated and formalized. . . . Legal and political progress is nothing other than the realization and guarantee of the absolute natural rights of man [*absoliutnoe estestvennoe pravo cheloveka*]" (p. 117). Here Berdiaev explicitly follows Novgorodtsev and Struve in proclaiming natural law an integral part of the idealist revival in Russia. He seeks to dispel the common association of natural law with the Enlightenment view of the "natural" order of things (Rousseau) by equating the concept of "natural" with that of "normal," corresponding to the ideal norm. "The historical variability and relativity of law cannot be an argument against 'natural law' because 'natural law' is what ought to be, not what is; it is a 'norm' that ought to be [but never is] realized in the historical development of law" (p. 117, note). Likewise with the Enlightenment notion of popular sovereignty: it is the person himself who is sovereign; nothing is higher than his intrinsic value and rights, least of all an abstraction such as the popular will (p. 118).

Berdiaev particularly stressed the progressive social and political implications of idealism. "Philosophical and ethical idealism must inspire and elevate the social- political struggle . . . but it can in no way lead to a passive relation to the surrounding world." Idealism "is a spirit of freedom, spirit of light, it calls forward, to the struggle for the right of man to infinitely improve himself" (p. 119). Like Struve, he points to Vladimir Solov'ev's *Natsional'nyi vopros v Rossii* as a classic example of the idealist critique of reactionary nationalism in Russia. Berdiaev encouraged the growth of civil society in late imperial Russia, noting that the struggle for rights has historically been most effective when waged not by separate people but by civic associations and social groups. The formation of such groups (*gruppirovka*) opens wide perspectives for the human spirit to create a better, freer future. In conclusion he turns again to the importance of natural law: "The new idealist direction, in which I with pride count myself, advances the necessity of the liberating struggle for 'natural law'" (p. 135).

In his disdain for bourgeois culture, Berdiaev, like Bulgakov, in many ways

remained a representative of the traditional Russian intelligentsia. They fit well within Ivanov-Razumnik's interpretation of the history of Russian social thought as a struggle of universal intelligentsia ideals against bourgeois *meshchanstvo* (philistinism). Neither had much sympathy for bourgeois economic liberalism; their liberalism was not "ideological" (in the marxist sense) but a rarefied doctrine of the supraclass intelligentsia. Berdiaev defends liberalism only "according to its ideal essence," and looks to socialism for new methods in realizing the eternal liberal principles of personhood, natural law, freedom, and equality. The tendency toward social-economic collectivism is a useful and even necessary means, although ethical and spiritual collectivism is a terrible evil. For Berdiaev, liberalism represents the interests of the proletariat more than those of the bourgeoisie: "In concrete historical circumstances the struggle for the 'natural rights' of man (*'estestvennoe pravo' cheloveka*) takes the form of a struggle for the oppressed and exploited. In contemporary society, for example, it receives the form of a struggle for the rights of the laboring masses" (p. 118). In general, Berdiaev continued to follow the legal marxist point of view on the social and economic development of Russia (p. 135).

The Autonomy of Philosophy and Value of Its History

Neo-idealism was not only a theory of liberalism but was, first of all, a justification of the autonomy of philosophy as a discipline from positivism. In this, *Problems of Idealism* was clearly the product of its institutional sponsor, for the Psychological Society had promoted the professionalization of Russian philosophy for fifteen years. Novgorodtsev, in his preface to the symposium, declares that "directions that sought to eradicate philosophy or else replace it with constructions based exclusively on the data of experience have lost their leading significance." This, too, is a result of ethical idealism, the awareness that ethical ideals are independent of empirical experience. *Problems of Idealism* dwells on the importance of ethics in the overall rehabilitation of philosophy because the inaccessibility of philosophy's subject matter to positivist approaches is most clear, namely, in ethics. In its domain of the ideal, ethics is not, however, a peculiar philosophical discipline but a typical one; it exemplifies the epistemic autonomy of philosophy as a whole.

We have seen that Novgorodtsev approaches the revival of natural law as a case study of the neo-idealist autonomization of philosophy. His *Problemy* article draws heavily on his 1901 book, *Kant i Gegel' v ikh ucheniiakh o prave i gosudarstve*. The methodological introduction to the book, which Novgorodtsev also published as a separate article in *Voprosy filosofii* under the title, "On the Historical and Philosophical Study of Ideas," is a straightforward statement of the autonomy of philosophy.[323] Novgorodtsev identifies three types of positivist reductionism: historical, psychological, and sociological. None of these explain thought. An autonomous and creative intellectual core remains that cannot be reduced to the set of factors each approach respectively privileges. He does not, of course, deny that these approaches inform the study of ideas, warning only against reduction of ideas to the contexts within which they are articulated and develop. The history of philosophy, for example, helps us to appreciate that, in the words of S.N. Trubetskoi, "genius is not explained without historical conditions . . . but its whole peculiarity consists precisely in the fact that it is not explained by them alone."[324] In addition to the contextual methodologies, Novgorodtsev recommends the analysis of ideas on their own terms by what he calls the philosophical method.[325]

In answering a review of his book on Kant and Hegel, Novgorodtsev counters the view that the history of philosophy is only of historical interest,

an archive of outdated theories. It is rather a living and progressive unveiling of truth.[326] In this, Kant has special importance; he need not necessarily be the culmination of the contemporary development of idealism in Russia, but he ought to serve as the point of departure and reference. Of Kantian philosophy, Novgorodtsev writes, "We are convinced that some of its foundations—in theory of knowledge and in moral philosophy—must remain secure achievements of thought; but together with this we consider necessary the broadest study of the historical past of philosophy and the most active relation to the tasks opening for its future. 'Back to Kant!' means first of all, 'back to serious philosophic education!' This education was missing in the recent epoch of enthusiasm for positivism, and it is necessary now to revive it."[327] The deepening of philosophic consciousness in Russia requires systematic study of the history of philosophy, not necessarily originality, and certainly not originality for its own sake. Novgorodtsev again quotes Sergei Trubetskoi, now from his *Problems of Idealism* essay, "What the History of Philosophy Teaches": "Philosophy seeks truth, not originality. The *independence* of philosophic creativity is determined not by subjective arbitrariness, not by the absence of correct education and positive knowledge, but by profundity, sincerity, and by incorruptibility of philosophic interest and breadth of conception."[328]

Prince Sergei Trubetskoi was one of the Psychological Society's most respected members. His contribution to *Problems of Idealism* states important principles of neo-idealist philosophic consciousness in the Society. For Trubetskoi, the very possibility of philosophy rests on the ideal or transcendental nature of consciousness. Positivists denigrate philosophy as "merely speculative" when its claims cannot be verified by empirical knowledge. Yet, this is Trubetskoi's very point. It is startling that speculative ideals should arise in the first place and exert such hold on us, when the data of empirical experience speaks only of contingent facts. Philosophy, "however we define it, strives toward a universal, *integral understanding of the world*; speculation seeks an ultimate system of knowledge, explanation of the origin and final cause of our existence."[329] Every worldview, positivist and empiricist no less than openly metaphysical, involves integral understanding, the quest for unity and system. The Kantian question Trubetskoi poses is not whether understanding can proceed from pure experience excised of all speculative elements (it cannot), but whether such a priori elements are critically analyzed or remain unconscious and crude metaphysical assumptions, as he says, for example, of empiricist psychology. The idea of pure experience is itself a speculative abstraction; like all systematic thought, it transcends experience in seeking to understand it (pp. 218–219, 221).

The very capacity for philosophy is, in this way, the ground of its autonomy. Its ideals should not arise from empirical experience alone. Their presence therefore seems to entail that experience itself is made possible by transcendental conditions. The speculative ideals of philosophy persist, against positivist injunctions, because they seek to complete in an ever higher unity the synthesizing work of reason that makes experience possible in the first place. In this, as in much of his work, Trubetskoi is heavily indebted to Kant. Consciousness transcends experience by enabling it a priori. As Trubetskoi writes, "our reason—is an innate metaphysician, and it cannot be limited to phenomena alone" (p. 222).[330] However, "if philosophy is necessary, if speculation inevitable, then why can it not achieve its goal?" (p. 224). The answer, it is clear, consists in the nature of the ideal as such. "*Consciousness of the ideal* is given to man, and in this consciousness is the force which gives flight to his thought, lifting it high into

the air; but this very consciousness indicates to him the whole distinction between the ideal and that which he possesses in reality. So long as he sees this distinction, he will not lose consciousness of the ideal and will continue to strive toward it" (p. 225, his italics). We have seen the importance of this insight in the neo-idealist philosophy of progress. Trubetskoi succinctly states its epistemological premise in writing, "philosophy, in the precise sense of the word, is not 'wisdom' . . . but rather 'love of wisdom'" (p. 225). The history of philosophy teaches, in short, that it is consciousness of the ideal that makes us capable of philosophy at all.

The autonomy of philosophy and value of its history is the framework within which Iu. Aikhenval'd reviewed *Problems of Idealism*, and the point of view from which he found it wanting in the case of those contributors whom he calls "recent or new guests in the home of abstract thought."[331] Aikhenval'd's main contention is that the volume does not succeed on its own terms: if the authors intended to base their "civic worldview" (liberalism) on philosophic idealism, "then the speculative significance of this attempt turns out to be not very great and the predominating role in the book falls to the lot of social, not philosophical, elements" (p. 335). This is because several contributors dwell on Russian writers and publicists, rather than the philosophers to whom they could have turned far more often for theoretical substantiation of liberalism. Struve, for example, writes about Mikhailovskii under the title, "our philosophical development." "Mr. P.G. admits an undoubted gulf between the interesting title of his article and its contents, and he must confirm 'the almost complete philosophical fruitlessness' of the very same Mr. Mikhailovskii whom he considers a philosopher, not a publicist" (p. 336). The former legal marxists even include themselves in the history of Russian philosophy. Berdiaev is a particular example of the distasteful tendency they show in evaluating their own philosophical significance. This irritates Aikhenval'd.

Reading the symposium, Aikhenval'd has the impression he is in the presence of dilettantes. "It is as though writers, at one time professing economic materialism, have unexpectedly learned of the existence of moral philosophy, of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, of Fichte. And having learned of these fine things, they, of course, witnessed completely new horizons and had to impart them to their readers" (p. 338). Aikhenval'd prefers scholarship to confession of personal philosophies. He suggests that Lappo-Danilevskii's article on Comte may well be the best in the collection, and he also thinks well of the contributions by Sergei and Evgenii Trubetskoi. Sergei's essay is a "profound justification of philosophy and valuation of its theoretical and practical significance" (p. 343). Novgorodtsev's article is "an exhaustive analysis within the reach of only a jurist" (p. 353). By contrast, the articles by the former marxists are, for the most part, lacking in solid and convincing argumentation. "Epistemology" is often misused. Berdiaev promises to "'pass from epistemological premises to further examination of the ethical problem,'" but instead keeps turning to other problems, such as his relations with Struve and their previous publications (p. 346). On the second page, Bulgakov acknowledges that reason is unable to give integral knowledge, but one page later talks about metaphysics (and later metaphysics of history). In light of all this, Aikhenval'd can only conclude that, "*Problems of Idealism* victoriously struggles with utilitarian morality and gains the upper hand over the 'subjective method' of Russian sociology. But . . . victory over them is easy. *Problems of Idealism* shows well that service to progressive civic ideals and a spiritualist worldview are fully compatible. But no one familiar with the history of philosophy ever doubted this" (p. 356).

IV. Continuations and Differentiations

Problems of Idealism was followed by two better-known symposia, *Landmarks* (*Vekhi*) (1909) *and Out of the Depths* (*Iz glubiny*) (1918). Struve, Berdiaev, Bulgakov, and Frank contributed to all three collections. Novgorodtsev wrote for two of them, as did B.A. Kistiakovskii, S.A. Askol'dov, and A.S. Izgoev. *Vekhi* is a scathing critique of the radical intelligentsia and its positivist ideology, which the volume's contributors blame for the miscarriage of Russian liberalism in the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution. It generated the most famous controversy in Russian intellectual history and has been the subject of extensive analysis and commentary, most recently in post-Soviet Russia. *Iz glubiny* holds the radical intelligentsia responsible for 1917, as *Vekhi* held it responsible for the failure after 1905. *Problemy idealizma* was a more constructive work than its successors: its positive task was the advancement of neo-idealism in support of Russian liberalism, although this required, as we have seen, refutation of the positivists' claim to be the natural champions of progress. *Problemy*'s successor volumes, by contrast, concentrated on the negative task of criticizing intelligentsia consciousness. In this, the *Vekhi* group could, and did, draw heavily on the penetrating critique in *Problems of Idealism* of positivist ideology. For example, in *Vekhi,* Berdiaev relied on the neo-idealist defense of the autonomy of philosophy to show that "philosophic truth" was not "intelligentsia truth." He laments the continuing politicization and ideologization of philosophy at the hands of the positivist intelligentsia (his example is A.A. Bogdanov). Berdiaev recommends Lopatin, the chairman of the Psychological Society, as a true representative of philosophy, although Bogdanov would no doubt always be preferred since "Lopatin's philosophy demands serious intellectual work and does not yield partisan slogans."[332] The contraband critique of positivism also reappears in *Vekhi* (Bulgakov and Frank) and *Iz glubiny* (Novgorodtsev). It informs some of Struve's important writings in this period as well,[333] and most of Novgorodtsev's.

The root criticism *Vekhi* and *Iz glubiny* level against the radical intelligentsia is that its attitudes are fundamentally incompatible with the development of personhood. In this, *Problems of Idealism* and the Psychological Society exercised its strongest influence on the *Vekhi* group: neo-idealist personalism. The autonomy and dignity of the self (the defense of which does not always take the form of personalism, a metaphysical idea) is a necessary, but not sufficient, foundation of liberalism. For this reason, it is risky to say that the group as a whole criticized the intelligentsia from a consistently liberal perspective, since some of the symposia authors combined personalism with plainly illiberal ideas about the organization of church and state, the value of law, and, in general, the relationship between the absolute and the relative (in metaphysics and philosophy of history as well as social philosophy).[334] Among the contributors to *Problemy*'s successor volumes, I believe Novgorodtsev and Kotliarevskii (both wrote for *Iz glubiny*) and Struve, Frank, and Kistiakovskii most deserve the description, "liberal." Kistiakovskii, author of the brilliant *Vekhi* essay, "In Defense of Law," did not endorse the neo-idealist ontological conception of the person; he could find no epistemic warrant for it and thought it was unnecessary for the liberal defense of the dignity of the individual.[335] Only the four neo-idealist liberal professors from the Psychological Society—S.N. Trubetskoi, E.N. Trubetskoi, P.I. Novgorodtsev, and S.A. Kotliarevskii—attached great value to both law and personalism. This is also true of their colleagues, B.N. Chicherin and L.M. Lopatin.[336] In both respects, Struve was the closest to all of them.

Despite the impressive continuities between *Problems of Idealism* and its successor volumes, there are also important differences, which is natural enough given that the *sborniki* spanned sixteen years of intellectual development among their common contributors as well as two revolutions. On the whole, *Problems of Idealism* advanced neo-idealism as a theory of liberalism more consistently than either *Vekhi* or *Iz glubiny*. Of course, neither of the latter two claimed to be theoretical tracts on liberalism, but rather critiques of the intelligentsia's mystique of, and behavior in, revolution. Meanwhile, some scholars, notably Leonard Schapiro,[337] have tried to situate *Vekhi* squarely within the tradition of Russian liberalism, comparing it to one of the best representatives of that tradition, Boris Chicherin. *Vekhi* can, I think, be made to fit the tradition (if not perfectly), but it ought to be kept in mind that Chicherin, the other Psychological Society neo-idealists, and *Problems of Idealism* comprise the tradition itself.

The great divide that separates *Problemy idealizma* from *Vekhi* and *Iz glubiny* is of course the Revolution of 1905, the hopes before it and the bitter disappointments after it. *Problems of Idealism* was conceived and its contributions were written when the founding fathers of the Liberation Movement hoped to rely on the zemstvo milieu in persuading the autocracy to introduce constitutional reform. This initial approach was soon abandoned in favor of "no enemies on the left," a policy endorsed at the July 1903 Schaffhausen conference that preceded the formation of the Union of Liberation. Present at Schaffhausen were most of the contributors to *Problems of Idealism*. They seem to have accepted as necessity a united front between liberals and radicals, convinced by the intransigence of the autocracy that only working in concert with all disaffected groups in Russian society, regardless of whether they had any sense of civic responsibility, could force the tsarist regime to give in. Bogdan Kistiakovskii, who contributed to *Problemy* as well as to *Vekhi*, was at Schaffhausen too. But he took exception to the policy of radicalization, warning against facilitating the replacement, in his words, of the Romanov autocracy with a Leninist autocracy.[338]

Although the neo-idealist critique of positivism was implicitly critical of the outlook of most Russian *intelligenty*, in *Problems of Idealism* this was not given the sharp edge it acquired with *Vekhi*. Such discretion proved fortuitous, once the Liberation Movement lurched left and began soliciting the support of the "democratic intelligentsia." The progressive character of neo-idealism, which its representatives had been so concerned to stress, could now be given a different spin, as if to convince the positivist radicals that despite theoretical differences, the idealists in the Union of Liberation represented no threat to the united front strategy. This was apparently Novgorodtsev's intent when he seemed to regret, writing in 1904, that "in the heavy atmosphere of our social life, theoretical disagreements that divide people who are otherwise close in their social ideals and that, generally speaking, are a necessary condition of the free development of thought, nonetheless take on the character of tragic clashes, providing material for whole social dramas, in which one side inevitably turns out to be in the position of representatives of an evil force, while the other considers itself to be defenders of the true good."[339] Moreover, even the idealists disagree amongst themselves. What matters is that everyone is progressive. This is the implication when Novgorodtsev went on to say: "Contemporary idealist philosophy can well indicate that in its practical ideals it continuously emphasizes and advances the principle of the person, its absolute dignity, its natural and inalienable rights. For all the various shades dividing even idealists themselves, it is that point in relation to which they are in full agreement. But in the end do not all

living and progressive movements of Russian thought meet on this point?"[340]

Thus, in the interests of the united front, the implicit idealist critique of the intelligentsia remained muted. This is not necessarily to say that the neo-idealists, and liberals generally, in the Liberation Movement violated their own principles. It is at least arguable that only something very much like the united front that the Liberationists forged could bring Nicholas II to grant a constitution. After all, their strategy worked. The issue seems to reside more in whether, as Richard Pipes writes, "once unleashed, Bakunin's 'evil passions' might not subside, even after the country had been given its freedom."[341] In any event, the perception in the *Vekhi* group was that the intelligentsia and its influence on Kadet political behavior had caused the miscarriage of Russian liberalism by blocking constructive work with what might otherwise have been a real Duma monarchy. Given this perception, the neo-idealist focus shifted from the theory of liberalism in *Problems of Idealism* to a relentless critique of the intelligentsia in *Vekhi* and *Iz glubiny*. And as neo-idealistic liberalism had been celebrated for its inherent progressive aspirations, now the positivist intelligentsia was condemned for its deeply conservative mentality, unable to adjust to constitutional life and the demands of freedom.

Neo-idealists, like the rest of the participants in the Liberation Movement, had been caught on the horns of a dilemma. The intransigence of the autocracy made it necessary to go beyond the zemstvo and the professions to social strata that had not yet developed a civic consciousness. Although this succeeded in forcing the capitulation of the autocracy, at the same time it weakened the prospects for the development of civil society on which the fate of Russian liberalism ultimately depended. The clarity and force of the neo-idealist defense of Russian liberalism were not enough in a country where the hypertrophy of the state in autocracy deprived liberalism of broad social support. The tragic irony was that the same frail social basis of Russian liberalism that contributed to the strength of liberal theory, by making it all the more necessary, at the same time continued to prevent liberalism from being realized in practice.

NOTES

1. On the Society, see the chapter entitled, "Philosophical Proselytization," in Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak's book, *Sergei N. Trubetskoi: An Intellectual Among the Intelligentsia in Prerevolutionary Russia* (Belmont, Mass., 1976), 63–80, as well as her essay, "Filosofiia, religiia i obshchestvennost' v Rossii v kontse 19-go i nachale 20-go vv," *Russkaia religiozno-filosofskaia mysl' XX veka*, ed. Nikolai P. Poltoratsky (Pittsburgh, 1975), 54–67. A section of the introduction to *A Revolution of the Spirit. Crisis of Value in Russia, 1890-1924*, ed. Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal and Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, trans. Marian Schwartz (New York, 1990), 16–22, also describes the work of the Psychological Society. There is a book of translations from the Society's journal, *Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii: Readings in Russian Philosophical Thought*, ed. Louis J. Shein (The Hague, 1968). The most important source on the Society is its journal—designated here as "VFP"—most numbers of which summarize Society meetings and business. Two brief histories were published in the journal: A.S. Belkin, "Obzor deiatel'nosti Moskovskogo Psikhologicheskogo Obshchestva za pervoe desiatiletie (1885–1895)," VFP 6: 2, kn. 27 (1895): 251–258; and N.D. Vinogradov, "Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk deiatel'nosti Moskovskogo Psikhologicheskogo Obshchestva za 25 let," VFP 21: 3, kn. 103 (1910): 249–262. Also see Ia.K. Kolubovskii, "Iz literaturnykh vospominanii," *Istoricheskii vestnik* (April 1914): 134–149. A.A. Kizevetter, *Na rubezhe dvukh stoletii. Vospominaniia, 1881–1914* (Prague, 1929, reprinted by Oriental Research Partners, Newtonville, MA, 1974), 85–86, singles out the Psychological Society for its importance. The records of Society meetings are preserved at the A.M. Gor'kii Research Library, Moscow State University (MGU). These records are not catalogued archivally, but are contained in two large-leaf binders, without pagination. They are most valuable for 1885–1889, the years of the Society's existence before publication of *Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii*, and have been used in the larger study (a doctoral dissertation) on which the present Kennan Institute Occasional Paper is based.
2. An important source on him and the Psychological Society is *Nikolai Iakovlevich Grot v ocherkakh, vospominaniiakh i pis'makh tovarishchei i uchenikov, druzei i pochitatelei* (St. Petersburg, 1911).
3. N.Ia. Grot, "Eshche o zadachakh zhurnala," VFP 2: 2, kn. 6 (1891), p. i. According to Ivanov-Razumnik, *Istoriia russkoi obshchestvennoi mysli*, II, 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg, 1908), 452, the journal "played a large role in the history of the revival of philosophic thought in Russia. Perhaps it received its special importance because it was not the organ of a certain philosophical group but was, on the contrary, nonpartisan in the philosophic sense. True, the directors of this journal and the large part of its continuous contributors quite definitely adhered to 'idealism' in one of its aspects or another; but at the same time the pages of the journal were always open to the most 'realistic' doctrines and to lively exchange of opinions among opposing philosophic views. Thus in the journal the Hegelian Chicherin and the Marxist Bulgakov met with each other, the not yet neo-Kantian Struve with Vlad. Solov'ev and Prince S. Trubetskoi, mystics with empiricists, romantics with realists; here there was really no place only for shallow positivism and naive materialism. . . Readers thus had before them a kind of 'parliament of philosophic opinions.'"
4. These characteristics include *reductionism*, which dismisses as a meaningless proposition (i.e., neither analytic nor empirical) the possibility of being beyond the positively-given data of sense experience, i.e., phenomena in space and time; *scientism*, the claim, consistent with the positivist reduction of being to natural phenomena, that the methodology of the natural sciences covers everything; and

utopianism, the hope that the application of natural scientific methods to man and society will make human existence as regular and well-ordered as nature. On positivism as a *Weltanschauung*, see Leszek Kolakowski, *The Alienation of Reason. A History of Positivist Thought*, trans. Norbert Guterman (New York, 1968).

5. Andrzej Walicki, *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism* (Oxford, 1987). Moreover, Bogdan A. Kistiakovskii, to whom Walicki also devotes a separate chapter, was associated with the Society (a formal member from 1910), and published in its journal and symposium, *Problems of Idealism*.

6. Both were elected to distinguished (pochetnyi) membership at the same meeting, in January 1891: "Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 2: 3, kn. 7 (1891): 143. The vote for Chicherin was unanimous; three votes were cast against Solov'ev.

7. Chicherin died on 3 February 1904, just after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. His last works, *Filosofiia prava* (Moscow, 1900) and *Rossiia nakanune dvadtsatogo stoletiia* (Berlin, 1900), were powerful intellectual spurs to the Russian Liberation Movement, especially in its initial phase, when the constitutionalists hoped to rely mostly on the zemstvo milieu for social support.

8. I.A. Il'in (1883–1954) was elected chair in May 1920, replacing L.M. Lopatin, who had died in March. On the last years of the Society, see "Deiatel'nost Psikhologicheskogo Obshchestva pri Moskovskom universitete za poslednie 4 goda (1918-1922)," *Mysl'. Zhurnal Peterburgskogo Filosofskogo Obshchestva*, no. 3, (May-June 1922): 186–187. Andrzej Walicki, *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism*, pp. 280-282, distinguishes between Novgorodtsev's "Moscow school" of legal philosophy and Leon Petrazycki's "Petersburg school." Other representatives of the Moscow school included B.P. Vysheslavtsev, N.N. Alekseev, E.V. Spektorskii, V.A. Saval'skii, and A.S. Iashchenko. A.V. Sobolev also refers to Novgorodtsev's Moscow school, in his introductory essays to P.I. Novgorodtsev, *Ob obshchestvennom ideale* (Moscow, 1991, the *Voprosy filosofii* series), and to the selections from Novgorodtsev's work he published in *Novyi mir*, no. 12, December 1991, pp. 202–217.

9. Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, trans. P.S. Falla, II, *The Golden Age* (Oxford, 1978), 422.

10. Terence Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties and the First National Elections in Russia* (Harvard, 1983), 21–72, especially p. 64, emphasizes this aspect of the history of the constitutional reform movement in Russia.

11. The zemstvo service records and other data on these five men can be found in the valuable appendix, "Zemskie glasnye (gubernskie i uezdnye), uchastvuiushchie v zemskom liberal'nom dvizhenii kontsa XIX-nachala XX veka," to N.M. Pirumova, *Zemskoe liberal'noe dvizhenie. Sotsial'nye korni i evoliutsiia do nachala XX veka* (Moscow, 1977), 232–283, and, for the last three, in the equally valuable appendix, "Party Alignments of Zemstvo Activists in 1905 and 1906," to Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties and the First National Elections in Russia*.

12. A.A. Kizevetter, *Na rubezhe dvukh stoletii. Vospominaniia, 1881–1914* (Prague, 1929, reprinted by Oriental Research Partners, Newtonville, MA, 1974), 85.

13. A.I. Ognev, *Lev Mikhailovich Lopatin* (Petrograd, 1922), 5.

14. E.N. Trubetskoi, *Vospominaniia* (Sofia, 1921; reprinted by Oriental Research Partners, Newtonville, Mass., 1976), 179–183. In addition to the philosophers, the regular guests were, first of all, Mikhail Nikolaevich's colleagues from the judicial profession; Moscow University professors, including the historians V.I. Ger'e, V.O. Kliuchevskii, and M.S. Korelin; V.A. Gol'tsev, editor of *Russkaia mysl'*, and S.A. Iur'ev, a well-known Russian *litterateur* from the generation of the 1840's; V.P. Preobrazhenskii; and L.I. Polivanov, a respected pedagogue, gymnasium director, and specialist in Russian

language and literature. All were members of the Psychological Society. Also see N.P. Korelina, "Za piat'desiat let (Vospominaniia o L.M. Lopatine)," *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 11 (1993): 115–121. Nadezhda Petrovna Korelina was married to M.S. Korelin (1855–1899), a historian of Italian humanism and active member of the Psychological Society. After her husband's death, she became secretary of *Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii* in January 1900 and served it the remaining eighteen years of its existence. She was Lopatin's valuable colleague and an important factor in the continued success of the journal.

15. Minutes of the Psychological Society for 14 March 1887, preserved at the A.M. Gor'kii Research Library, Moscow State University.
16. "Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 4: 1, kn. 16 (1893): 112–113; "Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 4: 2, kn. 17 (1893): 110.
17. "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 10: 1, kn. 46 (1988): 71.
18. "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 11: 1, kn. 51 (1900): 57–58, for his appointment as co-editor with V.P. Preobrazhenskii. He became editor upon Preobrazhenskii's death in April 1900: "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 12: 2, kn. 57 (1901): 173.
19. "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 12: 2, kn. 57 (1901): 170.
20. S.M. Solov'ev, *Zhizn' i tvorcheskaia evoliutsiia Vladimira Solov'eva* (Brussels, 1977): 325.
21. O.N. Trubetskaia, *Kniaz' S.N. Trubetskoi. Vospominaniia sestry* (New York, 1953), p. 33.
22. These four essays—"O prirode chelovecheskogo soznaniia," "Psikhologicheskii determinizm i nravstvennaia svoboda," "Osnovaniia idealizma," and "Vera v bessmertie"—are contained in *Sobranie sochinenii Kn. Sergeia Nikolaevicha Trubetskogo*, II, *Filosofskie stat'i* (Moscow, 1908).
23. A special meeting of the Society took place on 7 October 1905 to commemorate him. The speakers were L.M. Lopatin and S.A. Kotliarevskii: "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 17: 2, kn. 82 (1906): 135–138. At this time an entire issue of the journal was devoted to him, VFP 17: 1, kn. 81 (1906). It included articles by P.I. Novgorodtsev, S.A. Kotliarevskii, and L.M. Lopatin. Lopatin's article, "Kniaz' S.N. Trubetskoi i ego obshchee filosofskoe mirosozertsanie," subsequently reprinted in L.M. Lopatin, *Filosofskie kharakteristiki i rechi* (Moscow, 1911), 157–235, is a valuable overview of his life and, especially, thought. In December 1915, the Society held a meeting on the tenth anniversary of Trubetskoi's death, as reported in "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 27: 2–3, kn. 132–133 (1916), p. 183. Lopatin delivered a paper, "Sovremennoe znachenie filosofskikh idei kn. S.N. Trubetskogo," as did Kotliarevskii, "Mirosozertsanie kn. S.N. Trubetskogo." Both essays are printed in VFP 27: 1, kn. 131 (1916): 1–39, 40–50, respectively. Three main sources on Trubetskoi, apart from Lopatin's "Kniaz' S.N. Trubetskoi i ego obshchee filosofskoe mirosozertsanie," are O.N. Trubetskaia, *Kniaz' S.N. Trubetskoi; Kniaz' Sergei Nikolaevich Trubetskoi, pervyi borets za pravdu i svobodu russkogo naroda (V otzyvakh russkoi povremennoi pechati, rechakh i vospominaniiakh ego posledovatelei i pochitatelei)* (St. Petersburg, 1905); and Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *Sergei N. Trubetskoi: An Intellectual Among the Intelligentsia in Prerevolutionary Russia*. A new edition of some of his works has recently appeared: Sergei Nikolaevich Trubetskoi, *Sochineniia*, ed. P.P. Gaidenko (Moscow, 1994).
24. "Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 7: 2, kn. 32 (1896): 174–175. These efforts appear not to have borne much fruit at this time. However, public attendance was so high at the Psychological Society meeting on 12 October 1896, in commemoration of the 300th birthday of Descartes, that a second Descartes meeting had to be held a week later for the students who had volunteered to give up their places to the public.

Grot was so gratified by the turn-out that he sent the Parisian Académie des Sciences Morales a telegram about the great interest the Moscow public has shown in the French philosopher. The French minister of education responded with gratitude. "Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 7: 5, kn. 35 (1896): 687–689. Another indication of student interest in philosophy was a request from the First Student Dormitory at Moscow University for a set of the "Works of the Psychological Society." The request was granted: "Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 6: 5, kn. 30 (1895): 636. There were also plans for a student translation of Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*.

25. O.N. Trubetskaia, *Kniaz' S.N. Trubetskoi*, p. 12.
26. L.M. Lopatin, "Kniaz' S.N. Trubetskoi i ego obshchee filosofskoe mirosozertsanie," *Filosofskie kharakteristiki i rechi* (Moscow, 1911), 165.
27. From the fall of 1903 the Society began to experience the increasingly radical politicization characteristic of Russian society as a whole; it was closed in the fall of 1904. On the Historical-Philological Society, see Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *Sergei N. Trubetskoi*, pp. 94–101; and Samuel D. Kassow, *Students, Professors, and the State in Tsarist Russia* (Berkeley, 1989), 173.
28. He is listed for the first time in "Spisok chlenov Psikhologicheskogo Obshchestva," VFP 1: kn. 3 (1890): 141.
29. E.N. Trubetskoi, *Vospominaniia*, 147–167, describes his teaching there.
30. E.N. Trubetskoi, "Svoboda i bessmertie," VFP 17: 4, kn. 84 (1906): 368, his inaugural lecture at Moscow University.
31. E.N. Trubetskoi, *Istoriia filosofii prava, drevnei i novoi* (Kiev, 1894 and 1898); *Lektsii po istorii filosofii prava* (Moscow, 1907); and *Entsiklopediia prava* (Moscow, 1908 and 1913). On the pages of *Voprosy filosofii*, he published the following articles on law: "Filosofiia prava professora L.I. Petrazhitskogo," VFP 12: 2, kn. 57 (1901); "Novoe issledovanie o filosofii prava Kanta i Gegelia (review of Novgorodtsev)," VFP 13: 1, kn. 61 (1902); and "Uchenie B.N. Chicherina o sushchnosti i smysle prava," VFP 16: 5, kn. 80 (1905).
32. E.N. Trubetskoi, *Vospominaniia*, 179–183.
33. Ibid., p. 191.
34. It is important to note that at this time Trubetskoi's disagreement with Solov'ev did not stem from the utopianism itself of the theocratic project. Indeed, Trubetskoi wrote, "I lived in the atmosphere of the Slavophile messianistic dream of the realization of the Kingdom of God on earth through Russia." (*Vospominaniia*, p. 193.) Their differences were only in the details of how it was to be realized (Roman supremacy was unacceptable to Trubetskoi). Only later did Trubetskoi overcome his own messianistic utopianism, giving him the critical distance to write his brilliant two-volume study, *Mirosozertsanie Vl.S. Solov'eva* (Moscow, 1913).
35. *Mirosozertsanie bl. Avgustina* (Moscow, 1892). It was serialized first in *Voprosy filosofii:* "Filosofiia khristianskoi teokratii v V-m veke," VFP 2: 5, kn. 9 (1891); kn. 10 (1891); 3, kn. 13 (1892); 3, kn. 14 (1892).
36. *Ideia bozheskogo tsarstva v tvoreniiakh Grigoriia VII-go i ego publitsistov—sovremennikov* (Kiev, 1897).
37. On the proposed Sobor, see Nicolas Zernov, *The Russian Religious Renaissance of the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1963), 63–85, who identifies Trubetskoi's participation; John Sheldon Curtiss, *Church and State in Russia. The Last Years of the Empire, 1900–1917* (New York, 1940), 214, 225–227; and Paul R. Valliere, "The Idea of a Council in Russian Orthodoxy in 1905," *Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime*, eds. Robert L. Nichols and Theofanis George Stavrou (Minneapolis, 1978), 183–201.

38. According to A.I. Klibanov, ed., *Russkoe Pravoslavie: vekhi istorii* (Moscow, 1989), 428, the Sobor had 569 members, 299 of whom were laymen. Nicolas Zernov, *The Russian Religious Renaissance of the Twentieth Century*, p. 195, indicates there were six co-chairs and identifies Trubetskoi as one of them. Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal and Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, eds., *A Revolution of the Spirit. Crisis of Value in Russia, 1890–1924* (New York, 1990), 321, state that Trubetskoi read the decree re-establishing the patriarchate. Trubetskoi's participation is also referred to by Nikolai Berdiaev, *Samopoznanie* (Moscow, 1990), 190; and John Shelton Curtiss, *The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950* (Boston, 1953), 35–36, 55.

39. A.I. Klibanov, ed., *Russkoe Pravoslavie*, p. 428.

40. The information about his appointment was communicated to me by A.V. Sobolev, at the Institute of Philosophy in Moscow. A.V. Kartashev was the last over-procurator; in August 1917, on his initiative, the Provisional Government abolished the office and replaced it with the new post of minister of confessions, which Kartashev also occupied.

41. William G. Rosenberg, *Liberals in the Russian Revolution. The Constitutional Democratic Party, 1917–1921* (Princeton, 1974), 204.

42. P.I. Novgorodtsev did so in his major work, *Ob obshchestvennom ideale*, which appeared in three editions between 1917 and 1921 (Moscow, Kiev, and Berlin), after its serialization on the pages of *Voprosy filosofii*. S.A. Kotliarevskii's essay, "Filosofiia kontsa," VFP 24: 4, kn. 119 (1913): 313–338, took the form of a review of E.N. Trubetskoi's book on Solov'ev.

43. See especially his later works *Metafizicheskie predpolozheniia poznaniia. Opyt preodoleniia Kanta i kantiantstva* (Moscow, 1917) and *Smysl zhizni* (Berlin, 1922).

44. "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 17: 5, kn. 85 (1906): 507, for his election as candidate deputy chair. On 15 April 1903 Trubetskoi delivered a public lecture at the Historical Museum on Nietzsche, a topic selected for its popularity: "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 15: 2, kn. 72 (1904): 270–271. Trubetskoi was, of course, very critical of Nietzsche.

45. The "torzhestvennyi" meeting, held in March 1921, is reported in "Deiatel'nost Psikhologicheskogo Obshchestva pri Moskovskom universitete za poslednie 4 goda (1918–1922)," *Mysl'. Zhurnal Peterburgskogo Filosofskogo Obshchestva*, no. 3, (May–June 1922): 187.

46. Nikolai Arsen'ev, "O Moskovskikh religiozno-filosofskikh i literaturnykh kruzhkakh i sobraniiakh nachala XX. veka," *Sovremennik. Zhurnal Russkoi Kul'tury i Natsional'noi Mysli* (Toronto), no. 6, (October 1962): 30.

47. Morozova, widow of Moscow millionaire M.A. Morozov, was of great help to the Moscow Psychological Society: in 1906 she donated 5000 rubles and was elected a member: "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 17: 5, kn. 85 (1906): 506. In 1908 she donated another 1500 rubles: "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestva," VFP 19: 2, kn. 92 (1908): 291. She attended meetings regularly. Morozova became treasurer at the end of the Society's existence, in March 1921: "Deiatel'nost Psikhologicheskogo Obshchestva pri Moskovskom universitete za poslednie 4 goda (1918–1922)," p. 187.

48. Arsen'ev, "O Moskovskikh religiozno-filosofskikh i literaturnykh kruzhkakh i sobraniiakh nachala XX. veka," p. 30. Also see A.V. Sobolev, "K istorii Religiozno-Filosofskogo Obshchestva pamiati Vladimira Solov'eva," *Istoriko-filosofskii ezhegodnik 1992*, ed. N.V. Motroshilova (Moscow, 1993), 102–114.

49. Nikolai Berdiaev, *Samopoznanie* (Moscow, 1990), 148. The standard monograph on the St. Petersburg Religious-Philosophical Meetings and Society is Jutta Scherrer, *Die*

Petersburger religiös-philosophischen Vereinigungen. Die Entwicklung des religiösen Selbstverständnisses ihrer Intelligencija-Mitglieder (1901–1917) (Berlin, 1973).

50. Arsen'ev, p. 36. According to the list of Society meetings A.V. Sobolev provides in "K istorii Religiozno-Filosofskogo Obshchestva pamiati Vladimira Solov'eva," pp. 108–111, Trubetskoi delivered eight lectures there, including his famous essays, "Umozrenie v kraskakh. Vopros o smysle zhizni v drevnerusskoi religioznoi zhivopisi" (November 1915) and "Dva mira v dreverusskoi ikonopisi" (April 1916). These have most recently been reprinted in the handsome volume, *Filosofiia russkogo religioznogo iskusstva XVI-XX vv.*, ed. N.K. Gavriushin (Moscow, 1993). "Mirovaia bessmyslitsa i mirovoi smysl," drawn from a chapter of Trubetskoi's book, *Smysl zhizni*, and published in VFP 28: 1, kn. 136 (1917), was also presented at the Solov'ev Religious-Philosophical Society (January 1917).

51. A.V. Sobolev, "K istorii Religiozno-Filosofskogo Obshchestva pamiati Vladimira Solov'eva," p. 104. George F. Putnam, *Russian Alternatives to Marxism. Christian Socialism and Idealistic Liberalism in Twentieth-Century Russia* (Knoxville, 1977), 70–78, provides a good account of the Brotherhood's ideas.

52. Putnam, pp. 102–103; Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *Sergei N. Trubetskoi*, p. 269, note 33.

53. P.B. Struve expressed similar reservations about the idea of "Christian politics." See Richard Pipes, *Struve. Liberal on the Right, 1905–1944* (Harvard, 1980), 99–100; and Putnam, pp. 104–105. This is one of the ways Struve, among the former legal marxists, was closest to the neo-idealist liberal professors in the Moscow Psychological Society.

54. See the publisher's note, "Ot izdatel'stva 'Put','" in one of its volumes: *Sbornik pervyi. O Vladimire Solov'eve* (Moscow, 1911), a collection of valuable essays delivered at one or the other Moscow Society. Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, "Filosofiia, religiia i obshchestvennost' v Rossii v kontse 19-go i nachale 20-go vv," *Russkaia religiozno-filosofskaia mysl' XX veka*, ed. Nikolai P. Poltoratsky (Pittsburgh, 1975), 62, also mentions the connection between "Put'" and the Moscow Psychological Society.

55. "Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 9: 2, kn. 42: 164–165.

56. The following provide biographical information on Novgorodtsev: Dimitrii Levitskii, "P.I. Novgorodtsev," *Russkaia religiozno-filosofskaia mysl' XX veka*, pp. 298–305; Walicki, *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism*, pp. 293–298; Wilhelm Goerdt, *Russische Philosophie. Zugänge und Durchblicke* (Freiburg/München, 1984), 665–666; A.V. Sobolev, "Pavel Ivanovich Novgorodtsev," P.I. Novgorodtsev, *Ob Obshchestvennom ideale* (Moscow, 1991, the *Voprosy filosofii* series), pp. 3–10; M.A. Kolerov, N.S. Plotnikov, "Primechaniia," *Vekhi-Iz glubiny* (Moscow, 1991, the *Voprosy filosofii* series), pp. 574–575; and Putnam, *Russian Alternatives to Marxism*, pp. 34–36.

57. Kassow, *Students, Professors, and the State in Tsarist Russia*, p. 357. Novgorodtsev himself described the crisis in Russian higher education that began in late 1910, and that, in early 1911, hit Moscow University especially hard: P.I. Novgorodtsev, "Russian Universities and Higher Technical Schools During the War," in P.N. Ignatiev, P.I. Novgorodtsev, and D.M. Odinets, *Russian Schools and Universities in the World War* (New Haven, 1929), 149–150.

58. *Ocherki realisticheskogo mirovozzreniia: Sb. statei po filosofii, obshchestvennoi nauke i zhizni* (St. Petersburg, 1904), was the most significant positivist response to the idealist revival. It included articles by V.A. Bazarov, A.A. Bogdanov, A.V. Lunacharskii, and S.A. Suvorov. On the polemic, see A.A. Ermichev, "'Problemy idealizma' i 'Ocherki realisticheskogo mirovozzreniia'—polemika o sotsial'nom ideale," *Filosofiia i osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v Rossii*, eds. A.A. Ermichev, S.N. Savel'ev (Leningrad, 1989), 167–184.

59. S.A. Kotliarevskii, "Ob istinnom i mnimom realizme," VFP 15: 5, kn. 75 (1904): 624–644; here, p. 634. This is a review essay of *Ocherki realisticheskogo mirovozzreniia.*
60. M.A. Kolerov, N.S. Plotnikov, "Primechaniia," *Vekhi-Iz glubiny*, pp. 570–572, provide biographical information about Kotliarevskii.
61. "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 15: 2, kn. 72 (1904): 270.
62. "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 14: 1, kn. 66 (1903): 157.
63. "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 16: 1, kn. 76 (1905): 146–147. His paper, "Kant, kak moralist," appears in the same issue of the journal.
64. "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 21: 3, kn. 103 (1910): 225. His address, "Obshchestvennyi ideal v svete sovremennykh iskanii," appears in the same issue of the journal.
65. "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 23: 1, kn. 111 (1912): 180, 183–185. The *Festschrift* is *Filosofskii sbornik. L'vu Mikhailovichu Lopatinu k tridtsatiletiiu nauchno-pedagogicheskoi deiatel'nosti. Ot Moskovskogo Psikhologicheskogo Obshchestva. 1881–1911* (Moscow, 1912).
66. "Deiatel'nost Psikhologicheskogo Obshchestva pri Moskovskom universitete za poslednie 4 goda (1918–1922)," p. 186.
67. A.V. Sobolev, "Pavel Ivanovich Novgorodtsev," P.I. Novgorodtsev, *Ob obshchestvennom ideale*, p. 5.
68. Quoted by Dimitrii Levitskii, "P.I. Novgorodtsev," *Russkaia religiozno-filosofskaia mysl' XX veka*, ed. Nikolai P. Poltoratsky, p. 304.
69. P.I. Novgorodtsev, "Sushchestvo russkogo pravoslavnogo soznaniia," *Pravoslavie i kul'tura. Sbornik religiozno-filosofskikh statei*, ed. V.V. Zen'kovskii (Berlin, 1923), 22. A translation of this essay can be found in *A Revolution of the Spirit*, eds. Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal and Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak.
70. G.V. Florovskii, "Pamiati P.I. Novgorodtsev," *Novyi mir*, no. 12, (December 1991): 218, reprinted from *Rossiia i Slavianstvo* (Paris), 27 April 1929. Walicki, *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism*, pp. 340–341, also stresses the continuity in Novgorodtsev's thought.
71. "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 16: 1, kn. 76 (1905): 144. Three contributors to *Ocherki realisticheskogo mirovozzreniia* attended the meeting as guests: S.A. Suvorov, A.A. Bogdanov, and V.M. Friche. Kotliarevskii's review appeared in the next issue of *Voprosy filosofii*: "Ob istinnom i mnimom realizme," VFP 15: 5, kn. 75 (1904): 624–644.
72. S.A. Kotliarevskii, "Predposylki demokratii," VFP 16: 2, kn. 77 (1905): 104–127, here, pp. 126–127.
73. "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 22: 1, kn. 106 (1911): 125. Kotliarevskii's essay, "Dzhems, kak religioznyi myslitel'," appears in VFP 21: 5, kn. 105 (1910): 697–719.
74. L.M. Lopatin, *Nastoiashchee i budushchee filosofii* (Moscow, 1910), 35–45. This essay is reprinted in his *Filosofskie kharakteristiki i rechi*, pp. 87–119.
75. S.A. Kotliarevskii, "Ob otnositel'nom i absoliutnom," *Filosofskii sbornik. L'vu Mikhailovichu Lopatinu k tridtsatiletiiu nauchno-pedagogicheskoi deiatel'nosti*, pp. 97–107.
76. S.A. Kotliarevskii, "Recovery," *Out of the Depths (De Profundis). A Collection of Articles on the Russian Revolution*, trans. and ed. William F. Woehrlin (Irvine, California, 1986), 145–155; here, p. 153.
77. Ibid., p. 154.

78. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, unabridged ed. (New York, 1965), 310–313. In general, Platonic philosophy, Kant writes (p. 313), "is an enterprise which calls for respect and imitation." And it is in his moral and social philosophy, as well as in his religious thought, "that Plato's teaching exhibits its quite peculiar merits."

79. The neo-idealist reception of Kant cannot be considered in detail here, although I try to devote to it the attention it deserves elsewhere in my work on the Psychological Society.

80. Quoted by O.N. Trubetskaia, *Kniaz' S.N. Trubetskoi*, p. 58.

81. S.A. Kotliarevskii, "Mirosozertsanie kn. S.N. Trubetskogo," VFP 27: 1, kn. 131 (1916): 46.

82. E.N. Trubetskoi, "Svoboda i bessmertie," VFP 17: 4, kn. 84 (1906): 368–377.

83. Lopatin tried to explain this away, writing that Trubetskoi was, in his major essays in *Voprosy filosofii*, "more a Kantian than the premises of his *Weltanschauung* permitted." L.M. Lopatin, "Kniaz' S.N. Trubetskoi i ego obshchee filosofskoe mirosozertsanie," p. 233.

84. Terence Emmons, "The Beseda Circle, 1899–1905," *Slavic Review* 32: 3 (September 1973): 489–490, for the Beseda membership list. Five members of the circle were professors (p. 467); three of them were the Psychological Society philosophers.

85. Shmuel Galai, *The Liberation Movement in Russia, 1900–1905* (Cambridge, England, 1973), 47–51.

86. D.N. Shipov, *Vospominaniia i dumy o perezhitom* (Moscow, 1918), p. 128. Further consideration, however, led Shipov to the judgment that Witte's purpose in arguing that autocracy and local self-government were incompatible was, in fact, to demonstrate the inevitability of a constitution (pp. 129–130). Shipov was a strong defender of zemstvo autonomy but his neo-Slavophile social philosophy rejected the need for a constitution. Therefore, his second reading of Witte's memo distressed him as much as the first. A.A. Kizevetter, *Na rubezhe dvukh stoletii*, p. 331, similarly suggests that it is too easy to see Witte as simply an apologist for autocracy: "Is not someone who demonstrates that on behalf of preserving the autocracy it is necessary to destroy any public independence—in essence a disowner of autocracy."

87. Trubetskaia, *Kniaz' S.N. Trubetskoi*, p. 34. Trubetskoi himself refers obliquely (but transparently enough) to the Witte document in a penetrating analysis of Russian state and society, written just after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War: "In the course of a quarter century they have tried to convince us that autocracy is incompatible with zemstvo self-government, with freedom of conscience and the press, with free public assembly, with inviolability of the person, with a universal (*vsesoslovnyi*) civil order, with an independent and public court, with university autonomy. Not only the opponents of autocracy, but still more its appointed guardians have unanimously demonstrated this. And it has been inarguably and incontrovertibly proved not by arguments, not by pamphlets or ministerial memoranda and official documents, but by the facts themselves." S.N. Trubetskoi, "Na rubezhe," *Sobranie sochinenii Kn. Sergeia Nikolaevicha Trubetskogo*, I, *Publitsisticheskie stat'i* (Moscow, 1907), 459–460.

88. Terence Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties and the First National Elections in Russia* (Harvard, 1983), 90; and E.D. Chermenskii, "Zemsko-liberal'noe dvizhenie nakanune revoliutsii 1905–1907 gg.," *Istoriia SSSR* 9: 5 (Sept.–Oct. 1965): 44. Beseda was corporately independent of these efforts: Emmons, "The Beseda Circle," 464–465 (note 10).

89. Emmons, "The Beseda Circle," pp. 473–474, on the Lvov report and the two political orientations.

90. Ibid., pp. 482-485.

91. *Konstitutsionnoe gosudarstvo: Sbornik statei*, ed. I.V. Gessen, A.I. Kaminka, and the editors of Pravo (St. Petersburg, 1905), as cited by Emmons, "The Beseda Circle," p. 483 (note 69).

92. Emmons, "The Beseda Circle," p. 486. Chermenskii, "Zemsko-liberal'noe dvizhenie nakanune revoliutsii 1905–1907 gg.," p. 50, also makes this important point, as does D.I. Shakhovskoi, "Soiuz Osvobozhdeniia," *Zarnitsy*, 1909, no. 2 (Part II), 104–105.

93. Of his first plans for the paper, Sergei wrote to his brother Evgenii: "It is necessary to think about a real program for the immediately approaching future, about the formation of a 'governmental party of the future,' which is needed to maintain order and for intelligent reforms. The organization or crystallization of forces is required." See Trubetskaia, *Kniaz' S.N. Trubetskoi*, pp. 87–88. According to Emmons, "The Beseda Circle," pp. 479–80, "The paper was frankly introduced to the circle by Trubetskoi as a 'party organ.' 'Its orientation,' he declared, 'will be constitutionalist, without a nod in the direction of the Slavophiles,' whom it would indeed 'be necessary to criticize sharply in the very first issues.' Although the paper was to be aimed at 'all levels of the population,' with its liberal constitutionalist solutions, it is clear from the discussion that the primary targets were the zemstvo and gentry constituencies."

94. Trubetskaia, *Kniaz' S.N. Trubetskoi*, p. 120.

95. Ibid., pp. 126–127.

96. A Soviet monograph is devoted to *Moskovskii ezhenedel'nik*: N.A. Balashova, *Rossiiskii liberalizm nachala XX veka. Bankrotstvo idei "Moskovskogo ezhenedel'nika"* (Moscow, 1981). Balashova also refers to Beseda's planned sponsorship of *Moskovskaia nedelia* (pp. 19–20).

97. This was perhaps the organization he had in mind in saying, "the party to which I have the honor of belonging." *Sobranie sochinenii Kn. Sergeia Nikolaevicha Trubetskogo*, I, *Publitsisticheskie stat'i* (Moscow, 1907), p. 144; and Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *Sergei N. Trubetskoi*, p. 128.

98. Trubetskaia, p. 118.

99. L.M. Lopatin, "Kniaz' S.N. Trubetskoi i ego obshchee filosofskoe mirosozertsanie," p. 166.

100. It is dedicated to B.N. Chicherin, who had just died, and whose classical liberal philosophy of law greatly influenced Trubetskoi's views. Trubetskoi uses the term "pravovoe gosudarstvo" in the essay, which was censored and appeared only posthumously, in *Moskovskii ezhenedel'nik*. S.N. Trubetskoi, "Na rubezhe," *Sobranie sochinenii Kn. Sergeia Nikolaevicha Trubetskogo*, I, pp. 458–492.

101. Trubetskaia, pp. 89–90. Trubetskoi's role is highlighted in most of the literature on the Liberation Movement: Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties*, p. 94; Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *Sergei N. Trubetskoi*, pp. 136–138; Abraham Ascher, *The Revolution of 1905. Russia in Disarray* (Stanford, 1988), 64–65; George Fischer, *Russian Liberalism. From Gentry to Intelligentsia* (Harvard, 1958), 189–191; Shmuel Galai, *The Liberation Movement in Russia*, p. 231; K.F. Shatsillo, *Russkii liberalizm nakanune revoliutsii 1905-1907 gg.* (Moscow, 1985), 303–304. The memo itself can be found in *Sobranie sochinenii Kn. Sergeia Nikolaevicha Trubetskogo*, I, pp. 389–397.

102. Sviatopolk-Mirskii's proposed reforms were advanced in a lengthy document drafted by S.E. Kryzhanovskii, dated 23–24 November. Very much like Trubetskoi's memorandum on the zemstvo congress resolutions and, even more so, his (censored)

essay, "Na Rubezhe," written the preceding February and quite possibly known to Mirskii and/or Kryzhanovskii, the minister's report pressed for the rule of law and the end of bureaucratic arbitrariness and unaccountability, arguing that this would not only not limit but would indeed strengthen the autocracy; linked the strength of the state to the conditions it provides for the autonomy and development of the individual; suggested the abolition of communal land ownership in the interests of fostering peasant respect for private property and hence law, leading to universal citizenship rights; proposed that these reforms be worked out and implemented with the participation of elected representatives; stressed that the tsar should seize the initiative in introducing the reforms; and justified the need for reform within Russian historical development. True, these views were not, of course, distinctive to Sviatopolk-Mirskii/ Kryzhanovskii and Trubetskoi alone, and as a whole the Kryzhanovskii document had much in common with the the minority (Shipov) position at the November zemstvo congress and did not go as far as Trubetskoi's constitutionalism, but the method of argumentation on the indicated points seems too close to Trubetskoi's to be coincidental. In any event, the delivery of Trubetskoi's report two days before Sviatopolk-Mirskii and Nicholas met on 30 November to discuss the proposals for reform may have reinforced Mirskii's confidence in them before the tsar. On the Mirskii/Kryzhanovskii reform proposal, see Andrew M. Verner, *The Crisis of Russian Autocracy. Nicholas II and the 1905 Revolution* (Princeton, 1990), 124–129, and Shatsillo, *Russkii liberalizm nakanune revoliutsii 1905-1907 gg.*, pp. 304–306.

103. Trubetskaia, p. 260.
104. Trubetskaia, pp. 107–109; Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *Sergei N. Trubetskoi*, pp. 140–141; Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties*, p. 96. The report can be found in *Sobranie sochinenii Kn. Sergeia Nikolaevicha Trubetskogo*, I, pp. 397–399.
105. Trubetskaia, p. 111, for the Rubicon metaphor, and Bohachevsky-Chomiak, p. 141.
106. Trubetskaia, p. 126.
107. On the April 1905 zemstvo congress, see Roberta Thompson Manning, *The Crisis of the Old Order in Russia. Gentry and Government* (Princeton, 1982), 97–101.
108. A.A. Kizevetter, *Na rubezhe dvukh stoletii*, p. 384.
109. *Sobranie sochinenii Kn. Sergeia Nikolaevicha Trubetskogo*, I, pp. 400–401. On the zemstvo agrarian conference, also see Manning, 125–126, and Thomas Riha, *A Russian European. Paul Miliukov in Russian Politics* (Notre Dame, 1969), 76, according to whom, "the eighty participants included practically all the future Kadet agrarian experts." According to O.N. Trubetskaia, "Iz perezhitogo," *Sovremennye zapiski* (Paris), no. 64, (1937): 315–316, Trubetskoi was categorically opposed to compulsory expropriation.
110. Trubetskaia, *Kniaz' S.N. Trubetskoi*, pp. 127-128.
111. Ibid., p. 131.
112. Ibid., pp. 131-147; Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *Sergei N. Trubetskoi*, pp. 146–159. The text of the speech and other delegation transcripts can be found in *Sobranie sochinenii Kn. Sergeia Nikolaevicha Trubetskogo*, I, pp. 129–134.
113. The report is included in *Sobranie sochinenii Kn. Sergeia Nikolaevicha Trubetskogo*, I, pp. 401–412. Also see Trubetskaia, *Kniaz' S.N. Trubetskoi*, pp. 148, 153; Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *Sergei N. Trubetskoi*, pp. 168–169. On the temporary rules of 27 August 1905 granting university autonomy, see Kassow, pp. 228–232.
114. E.D. Chermenskii, *Burzhuaziia i tsarizm v pervoi russkoi revoliutsii* (Moscow, 1970), 91–92.

115. V.V. Leontovich, *Istoriia liberalizma v Rossii, 1762–1914* (Paris, 1980), 417. Trubetskoi objected to P.N. Miliukov's presence at the July congress, because he "incited the radicals" there. See Trubetskaia, p. 148, and Riha, pp. 81–82. The congress chose not to boycott the expected elections to the Duma, participation in which was to effect the desired transformation in its powers. In response to a government inquiry, Trubetskoi prepared another memorandum on behalf of the zemtsy, accounting for this most recent congress. On the July congress also see Manning, pp. 119–121.
116. Kizevetter's description, p. 399.
117. *Kniaz' Sergei Nikolaevich Trubetskoi, pervyi borets za pravdu i svobodu russkogo naroda*, p. 49.
118. Quoted by Trubetskaia, p. 169.
119. Emmons, "The Beseda Circle," p. 490. Unfortunately, E.N. Trubetskoi's memoirs do not cover the Liberation Movement. Bohachevsky-Chomiak provides a biographical and intellectual introduction to him in her edition of his *Vospominaniia* (Newtonville, Mass., 1976), i–vi.
120. N.A. Balashova, *Rossiiskii liberalizm nachala XX veka*, p. 26. One desiatine is equal to 2.7 acres.
121. Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties*, Appendix, "Party Alignments of Zemstvo Activists in 1905 and 1906."
122. Emmons, "The Beseda Circle," p. 469.
123. Trubetskaia, p. 87.
124. Galai, *The Liberation Movement in Russia*, p. 220; on Trubetskoi's article also see Chermenskii, *Burzhuaziia i tsarizm v pervoi russkoi revoliutsii*, p. 35, and Shatsillo, *Russkii liberalizm nakanune revoliutsii 1905–1907 gg.*, p. 262.
125. Shatsillo, p. 299.
126. According to Kassow, p. 216, Trubetskoi played "an important role in the organization of the Academic Union."
127. M.A. Kolerov, N.S. Plotnikov, "Primechaniia," *Vekhi-Iz glubiny* (Moscow, 1991, the *Voprosy filosofii* series), p. 574, place Novgorodtsev on the bureau of the Academic Union. On Vernadskii's role, see Kendall E. Bailes, *Science and Russian Culture in an Age of Revolutions. V.I. Vernadsky and His Scientific School, 1863–1945* (Bloomington, 1990), 98–100.
128. Kassow, pp. 217–218, and Bailes, p. 97.
129. Kassow, pp. 219–223.
130. Kassow, p. 243. Trubetskoi opposed the 6 August 1905 electoral law to the projected Bulygin Duma for, apparently, a more democratic one (Kassow, p. 225).
131. Quoted from Ascher, *The Revolution of 1905*, p. 113.
132. Kassow, p. 223.
133. Kassow, pp. 226–227.
134. Chermenskii, p. 104. The decision was taken at the 9–10 July meeting of the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists, where Trubetskoi spoke out in particular against the danger of terrorism posed by the Union of Unions. See Riha, p. 83.
135. Quoted from Kassow, p. 227; on the boycott also see Galai, p. 253.
136. Kassow, pp. 228, 234–235; Vernadskii also supported the idea of private universities (Bailes, p. 100).
137. Kassow, pp. 295, 297, and Balashova, p. 26.
138. Chermenskii, p. 102.

139. Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties*, pp. 37–39; Galai, pp. 258, 260.
140. Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties*, p. 73.
141. Ibid., p. 56.
142. Ibid., p. 73; Pipes, *Struve, Liberal on the Right*, p. 32.
143. Ascher, *The Revolution of 1905*, pp. 296–297. The article appeared in *Russkie vedomosti*, 16 November 1905.
144. V.I. Startsev, *Russkaia burzhuaziia i samoderzhavie v 1905–1917 gg.* (Leningrad, 1977), 10–11.
145. Ibid., pp. 11–20.
146. Chermenskii, p. 155; Howard D. Mehlinger and John M. Thompson, *Count Witte and the Tsarist Government in the 1905 Revolution* (Bloomington, 1972), 77–78. Trubetskoi produced the following impression on Witte: "This is a pure man, full of philosophic views, with great knowledge, a splendid professor, as is said, a real Russian man, in the unspoiled (Union of Russian People) sense of the word, but a naive administrator and politician. A perfect Hamlet of the Russian revolution." Quoted by Startsev, p. 14.
147. Verner, *The Crisis of Russian Autocracy*, p. 281.
148. Startsev, pp. 40–42; Chermenskii, p. 211.
149. Verner, pp. 283–289.
150. Startsev, p. 115. Trubetskoi was thought a suitable candidate for the post of procurator of the Most Holy Synod. Kizevetter, p. 439, seems to give Trubetskoi too great a role in singling him out as one of the actual participants in the Stolypin negotiations (whereas, according to Startsev, he was only mentioned as a candidate for ministerial appointment). Moreover, Kizevetter appears to mistakenly date the negotiations at the beginning of August.
151. Startsev, pp. 122–123; Chermenskii, pp. 313–314. Also see Abraham Ascher, *The Revolution of 1905. Authority Restored* (Stanford, 1992), 211–213. In both volumes of his study of the Revolution of 1905, Ascher values Trubetskoi's observations and insights.
152. Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties*, p. 358.
153. Pipes, *Struve, Liberal on the Right*, p. 179; Chermenskii, p. 336.
154. Balashova, p. 29.
155. Ibid., pp. 18–29.
156. William G. Rosenberg, *Liberals in the Russian Revolution. The Constitutional Democratic Party, 1917–1921* (Princeton, 1974), 86.
157. Shatsillo, *Russkii liberalizm*, pp. 158, 204. Novgorodtsev (but not Kotliarevskii) was again co-opted onto the Council after the Union's second congress (October 1904).
158. Emmons, "The Beseda Circle," p. 469.
159. Richard Pipes, *Struve, Liberal on the Left, 1870–1905* (Harvard, 1970), 345.
160. D.I. Shakhovskoi, "Soiuz Osvobozhdeniia," *Zarnitsy*, no. 2 (part II) (1909): 122–123.
161. Shatsillo, pp. 259–260. In these deliberations S.A. Kotliarevskii was nearly alone in insisting that the constitution provide for women's suffrage.
162. George Fischer, *Russian Liberalism. From Gentry to Intelligentsia* (Harvard, 1958), 171–173.
163. Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties*, p. 57. Riha, *A Russian European*, pp. 93, 106, 117, lists the members of the Kadet central committee elected by the first, second, and third party congresses.
164. Emmons, "The Beseda Circle," p. 467; Shatsillo, pp. 259–260.

165. Rosenberg, *Liberals in the Russian Revolution*, p. 132, lists him with the central committee elected by the eighth party congress (May 1917).
166. "Novgorodtsev (Pavel Ivanovich)," *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar'*, dopolnitel'nyi tom II (St. Petersburg: F.A. Brokhaus and I.A. Efron, 1906), 295.
167. Putnam, *Russian Alternatives to Marxism*, p. 190, note 19.
168. Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties*, pp. 313–314, 322, 285.
169. George Fischer, *Russian Liberalism*, especially pp. 85–116. Gregory L. Freeze, "A National Liberation Movement and the Shift in Russian Liberalism, 1901–1903," *Slavic Review* 28: 1 (1969): 81–91, clarified the picture by stressing that the leadership itself of the Liberation Movement did not shift "from gentry to intelligentsia," since from the beginning it took the form of an alliance of *zemtsy*, *intelligenty*, and representatives of the learned professions (especially jurists and professors). The shift consisted in their reappraisal of the dynamics and available social support for the Liberation Movement, from initial reliance on the zemstvo milieu to a policy of "no enemies on the left." This paradigm is employed extensively in the most recent study of the Liberation Movement: Shatsillo, *Russkii liberalizm*.
170. Shatsillo, p. 52.
171. N.M. Pirumova, *Zemskoe liberal'noe dvizhenie. Sotsial'nye korni i evoliutsiia do nachala XX veka* (Moscow, 1977), 91. In a very useful appendix (pp. 232–281) she identifies 241 of them. Meanwhile, the (counter) reformed Zemstvo Statute of 12 June 1890 assigned the number of zemstvo deputies at the district level to 10,236 and at the provincial level to 1,618, as reported in Kermit E. McKenzie, "Zemstvo Organization and Role within the Administrative Structure," *The Zemstvo in Russia. An Experiment in Local Self-Government*, eds. Terence Emmons and Wayne S. Vucinich (Cambridge, England, 1982), 44.
172. Pipes, *Struve, Liberal on the Left*, p. 156.
173. Kizevetter, p. 195, makes this connection.
174. Trubetskaia, *Kniaz' S.N. Trubetskoi*, p. 19.
175. Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *Sergei N. Trubetskoi*, p. 105.
176. E.N. Trubetskoi, *Vospominaniia*, pp. 179–183.
177. Shakhovskoi, "Soiuz Osvobozhdeniia," p. 85.
178. M.A. Kudrinskii, "Arkhivnaia istoriia sbornika 'Problemy idealizma' (1902)," *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 4 (1993): 157–165, presents invaluable research on the historical details of the *Problems of Idealism* project. The author of the article is in fact not "Kudrinskii," which is a misprint in *Voprosy filosofii*, but M.A. Kolerov.
179. Shatsillo, pp. 65–66; Galai, p. 116.
180. Shatsillo, pp. 73–74; Kizevetter, pp. 336–337; Galai, p. 116. G.V. Vernadskii, "Bratstvo Priiutino," *Novyi Zhurnal* 28: kn. 96 (1969): 164–165, states that between 1900–1902 "several" such conferences took place in Moscow, usually at Vernadskii's apartment.
181. Shatsillo, p. 76.
182. Shakhovskoi, "Soiuz Osvobozhdeniia," p. 104; Emmons, "The Beseda Circle," p. 475.
183. Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties*, p. 24.
184. M.A. Kudrinskii (Kolerov), "Arkhivnaia istoriia sbornika 'Problemy idealizma' (1902)," pp. 158–160, for the details in this paragraph. Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal and Bohachevsky- Chomiak, in their Introduction to *A Revolution of the Spirit*, p. 21, also identify Zhukovskii as the financier of *Problemy idealizma*.
185. "Moskovskoe Psikhologichekoe Obshchestvo," VFP 25: 3, kn. 123 (1914): 353. On Zhukovskii, see Pipes, *Struve, Liberal on the Left*, pp. 311–312.

186. They met in Paris in 1890, after which Vernadskii "was to remain strongly idealist for the next few years," when he came to believe in personal immortality, although later he vacillated in this belief, according to Bailes, *Science and Russian Culture in an Age of Revolutions*, pp. 49–50.

187. For his zemstvo service record see N.M. Pirumova, *Zemskoe liberal'noe dvizhenie*, pp. 264–265 (*Prilozhenie*), and Bailes, pp. 87–88. Emmons, "The Beseda Circle," p. 469, puts him in Group A. On Vernadskii as a founder of the Kadet party, see Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties*, pp. 64, 418 (note 138).

188. Kudrinskii (Kolerov), "Arkhivnaia istoriia sbornika 'Problemy idealizma' (1902)," p. 161.

189. V.I. Vernadskii, "O nauchnom mirovozzrenii," VFP 13: 5, kn. 65 (1902): 1409–1465. On 20 August 1902 Vernadskii wrote to his wife: "I'm now working out one of the first introductory lectures to my course [on the history of physical-chemical and geological sciences], which perhaps I will publish separately in 'Voprosy filosofii.' The lecture is about the relation of science to philosophy (and in part religion) in the development of thought . . . . These old ideas, arising in me long ago, have become especially clear these days thanks to conversations with Pavel Ivanovich (Novgorodtsev) (with whom I do not completely agree)." Quoted by Kudrinskii (Kolerov), p. 161 (ellipsis his). Vernadskii was part of the reception of Kant in the Psychological Society, delivering one of the three papers at its jubilee Kant meeting in December 1904, as reported in "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 16: 1, kn. 76 (1905), pp. 146–147. Vernadskii's paper, "Kant i estestvoznanie XVIII stoletiia," appears in the same issue, pp. 36–70. The recent valuable collection, *Kant i filosofiia v Rossii*, eds. Z.A. Kamenskii and V.A. Zhuchkov (Moscow, 1994), contains an essay by V.I. Shubin entitled, "Kant i Vernadskii."

190. Bailes, p. 34.

191. "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 13: 1, kn. 61 (1902): 633–634.

192. "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 21: 2, kn 102 (1910): 194, for his election.

193. Shatsillo, *Russkii liberalizm nakanune revoliutsii 1905–1907 gg.*, p. 158, for Schaffhausen attendance. Pipes, *Struve, Liberal on the Left*, p. 334, makes the connection between the *Problemy* authors and Schaffhausen. Referring to the four former "legal marxists," he writes, "In the winter of 1902–1903 members of this group published an important symposium, *Problems of Idealism*, in which they attempted to provide a generalized metaphysical and religious foundation for liberal politics." The other two contributors to *Problemy*, A.S. Lappo-Danilevskii (who wrote a 100-page article on Comte) and S.A. Askol'dov (who wrote on "Filosofiia i zhizn'), had no significant role in the Liberation Movement, insofar as I know.

194. S.F. Ol'denburg later became an orientalist, permanent secretary of the Academy of Sciences, and minister of education under the Provisional Government. G.V. Vernadskii, "Bratstvo Priiutino," *Novyi Zhurnal* 28: kn. 96 (1969): 156, identifies him as a deputy to the St. Petersburg City Duma; Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties*, p. 65, identifies him as a *zemets*. His *Problems of Idealism* essay is entitled, "Renan, kak pobornik svobody mysli." F.F. Ol'denburg studied Greek language and philosophy at university, where he wrote his senior (*kandidatskii*) thesis on Plato. He then directed a school in Tver. See G.V. Vernadskii, "Bratstvo Priiutino," *Novyi Zhurnal* 27: kn. 93 (1968): 152–153. I.M. Grevs, another Priiutinets, considered F.F. Ol'denburg the spiritual center of the group (Ibid., p. 161).

195. Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties*, pp. 66–67, stresses this in his account of the Priiutino Brotherhood.

196. Quoted by Bailes, *Science and Russian Culture in an Age of Revolutions*, p. 28.

197. G.V. Vernadskii, "Bratstvo Priiutino," *Novyi Zhurnal* 28: kn. 95 (1969): 205; Bailes, pp. 61–63.

198. G.V. Vernadskii, "Bratstvo Priiutino," *Novyi Zhurnal* 27: kn. 93 (1968): 147. Bailes, p. 28, quotes nearly identical words of Vladimir Ivanovich himself.

199. Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties*, p. 66.

200. The most significant result of Shakhovskoi's research into Chaadaev, his great uncle, was his discovery in 1935 of five unknown "Philosophical Letters," which Shakhovskoi published in the journal *Literaturnoe nasledstvo* that year. During this time Shakhovskoi prepared two editions of Chaadaev's works, neither of which saw light of day. P.Ia. Chaadaev, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii i izbrannye pis'ma*, tom I, ed. Z.A. Kamenskii (Moscow, 1991), 680–681.

201. The conversion of the "legal marxists" to idealism has long been considered a milestone in Silver Age intellectual history, and is one of its best known chapters. In addition to Richard Pipes' classic two-volume study of Struve, see Richard Kindersley, *The First Russian Revisionists. A Study of 'Legal Marxism' in Russia* (Oxford, 1962) and Arthur P. Mendel, *Dilemmas of Progress in Tsarist Russia. Legal Marxism and Legal Populism* (Harvard, 1961). Hereafter, I follow Kindersley's suggestion: inverted commas properly enclose "legal marxism," but it would be tedious to persist with them.

202. Quoted by Shatsillo, p. 60.

203. As Rosenthal and Bohachevsky-Chomiak, "Introduction," *A Revolution of the Spirit*, p. 20, write, "The philosophers were their first, and natural, allies in the process. A concrete result of that collaboration was... the symposium *Problemy idealizma*."

204. Spektorskii's review is reprinted in *Nikolai Iakovlevich Grot v ocherkakh, vospominaniiakh i pis'makh tovarishchei i uchenikov, druzei i pochitatelei* (St. Petersburg, 1911), 374–386; here, p. 374. Evgenii V. Spektorskii (1873–1951) was professor (from 1913) and later rector at Kiev University, president of the Philosophical Society there, and an active émigré scholar after the Revolution in the theory of the social sciences, philosophy of law, and philosophy of religion.

205. S.N. Bulgakov, "Chto daet sovremennomu soznaniiu filosofiia Vladimira Solov'eva?" *Ot marksizma k idealizma. Sbornik statei*, 1896-1903 (St. Petersburg, 1903), 195–262. This essay was first published in VFP 14: 1–2, kn. 66–67 (1903).

206. "Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 8: 5, kn. 40 (1897): 815.

207. S.N. Bulgakov, "O zakonomernosti sotsial'nykh iavlenii," VFP 7: 5, kn. 35 (1896): 575–611. Struve's response was: "Svoboda i istoricheskaia neobkhodimost'," VFP 8: 1, kn. 36 (1897): 120–139. Arthur P. Mendel, *Dilemmas of Progress in Tsarist Russia*, p. 167, writes that in Struve's article, "Legal Marxism took its first hesitiant step . . . toward neo-Kantian idealism." Bulgakov at the time was still committed to positivism and marxism.

208. "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 13: 3, kn. 63 (1902): 862.

209. "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 20: 2, kn. 97 (1909): 332.

210. N.A. Berdiaev, "O novom russkom idealizma," VFP 15: 5, kn. 75 (1904): 683–724, here, pp. 695–696.

211. Walicki, *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism*, treats Chicherin under the rubric of the "old liberal" philosophy of law and Solov'ev and Novgorodtsev as representatives of new liberalism, a contrast that involves not so much differences between philosophical foundations (all three were idealists) but rather between their own social backgrounds (zemstvo in Chicherin's case and urban professional in the other

two) and in the social content of their respective liberal philosophies (classical liberal versus the new right to a dignified existence). This distinction helps explain why Solov'ev and Novgorodtsev were far more popular among the former legal marxists than Chicherin. Chicherin, a Hegelian, cannot be called a neo-idealist without qualification. Yet, his *Filosofiia prava*, first serialized on the pages of *Voprosy filosofii* in 1898–1899, on the eve of the Liberation Movement, "appeared not as the work of an epigone but, rather, as a milestone on the new road," Walicki writes (p. 161). "It was indeed such a revival of the old philosophical idealism, which took account of new trends in philosophy and the theory of law, and could therefore be treated as representing a neo-idealist current in legal philosophy."

212. "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 23: 2, kn. 112 (1912): 357.

213. S.A. Levitskii, *Ocherki po istorii russkoi filosofskoi i obshchestvennoi mysli*, II (Frankfurt/Main, 1981),18. L.M. Lopatin, "Teoreticheskie osnovy soznatel'noi nravstvennoi zhizni," VFP 2: 1, kn. 5 (1890): 34–83, is an excellent statement of his moral philosophy; the last part of the essay, "Ideia bessmertiia dushi," is a defense of the substantiality (irreducible ontological reality) of the soul.

214. This is especially clear in two major essays by S.N. Trubetskoi, who was deeply indebted to Kant in both theoretical philosophy and ethics: "O prirode chelovecheskogo soznaniia" (1889–1891) and "Osnovaniia idealizma" (1896). Both essays were first published in *Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii*, and reprinted in *Sobranie sochinenii Kn. Sergeia Nikolaevicha Trubetskogo*, II, *Filosofskie stat'i* (Moscow, 1908), 1–110, 161–284, respectively. Sergei's brother Evgenii was more polemical in his approach to Kant, but he also accepted the rudiments of transcendental idealism. He develops the ontological implications of transcendental theory of knowledge in *Metafizicheskie predpolozheniia poznaniia. Opyt preodoleniia Kanta i kantianstva* (Moscow, 1917). Lopatin was no Kantian but could explicate Kant with great skill. In his "Uchenie Kanta o poznanii," *Filosofskie kharakteristiki i rechi* (Moscow, 1911), p. 65, he writes, "another service of Kant consists in the fact that he with inimitable depth of thought established the enormous, radical significance of the unity of consciousness for the very possibility of experience." In "Teoreticheskie osnovy soznatel'noi nravstvennoi zhizni," p. 81, he argues that if the natural, phenomenal world depends on the transcendental functions of consciousness, then it is difficult not to ascribe basic ontological reality to consciousness. Lopatin's lectures and essays on Kant are collected in his *Kant i ego blizhaishie posledovateli* (Berlin, 1923).

215. Petr Struve, "Predislovie," to Nikolai Berdiaev, *Sub"ektivizm i individualizm v obshchestvennoi filosofii: Kriticheskii etiud o N.K. Mikhailovskom* (St. Petersburg, 1901), liv–lv.

216. Ibid., p. liv. Pipes, *Struve, Liberal on the Left*, pp. 293–307, provides a fine reconstruction of Struve's philosophy of liberalism.

217. Struve, "Predislovie," p. xxxii. Richard Kindersley, *The First Russian Revisionists*, pp. 118–122, analyzes Struve's argument from duty and free will to substantiality of the self, or the entailment of ontology from ethics.

218. L.M. Lopatin, *Polozhitel'nye zadachi filosofii. Chast' vtoraia: Zakon prichinnoi sviazi, kak osnova umozritel'nogo znaniia deistvitel'nosti* (Moscow, 1891), especially pp. 213–224.

219. Struve, "Predislovie," p. xxxiii.

220. P.I. Novgorodtsev, *Kant i Gegel' v ikh ucheniiakh o prave i gosudarstve. Dva tipicheskikh postroeniia v oblasti filosofii prava* (Moscow, 1901), 98–99 (note). The words he quotes from Struve (he does not give the citation) can be found on p. xxxv of Struve, "Predislovie." Novgorodtsev's preface is dated 9 October 1901.

221. Pipes, *Struve, Liberal on the Left*, pp. 300–301.

222. P. Borisov [P.B. Struve], "V chem zhe istinnyi natsionalizm?" VFP 12: 4, 'kn. 59 (1910): 493–528.
223. I am indebted to Jaroslaw K. Dobrzanski, who is working on Struve at the University of Notre Dame, for suggesting "personhood" as a precise rendering in certain philosophical contexts of "lichnost'."
224. P. Borisov (P.B. Struve), "V chem zhe istinnyi natsionalizm?" pp. 503, 511.
225. Ibid., pp. 504, 520.
226. Ibid., p. 507 (italics Struve's).
227. Ibid., p. 512.
228. P.I. Novgorodtsev, "Uchenie Kanta o prave i gosudarstve," VFP 12: 3, kn. 58 (1901): 315–361.
229. Novgorodtsev, *Kant i Gegel' v ikh ucheniiakh o prave i gosudarstve*, pp. 146–147. In the journal article, "Uchenie Kanta o prave i gosudarstve," see the corresponding section on natural law, pp. 350–361. Walicki devotes an entire chapter of his *Legal Philosophies* to "Pavel Novgorodtsev: Neo-Idealism and the Revival of Natural Law," pp. 291–341; on Novgorodtsev's *Kant i Gegel' v ikh ucheniiakh o prave i gosudarstve*, see pp. 304–306.
230. Novgorodtsev, *Kant i Gegel' v ikh ucheniiakh o prave i gosudarstve*, pp. 148–149.
231. Ibid., pp. 150.
232. Struve, "Predislovie," p. lxviii. Also see his essay, "K voprosu o morali," from October 1901, reprinted in his collection of articles, *Na raznye temy* (St. Petersburg, 1902), 508–521, especially p. 520.
233. E.N. Trubetskoi, "Novoe issledovanie o filosofii prava Kanta i Gegelia," VFP 13: 1, kn. 61 (1902): 602.
234. P.I. Novgorodtsev, "K voprosu o sovremennykh filosofskikh iskaniiakh. (Otvet L.I. Petrazhitskomu)," VFP 14: 1, kn. 66 (1903): 138.
235. Struve, "Filosofiia ideal'nogo dobra ili apologiia real'nogo zla?" *Na raznye temy*, pp. 187–197 (here, p. 187). Pipes, *Struve, Liberal on the Left*, p. 294, and Kindersley, *The First Russian Revisionists*, p. 145, also point to Struve's about-face on Solov'ev.
236. Struve, "Pamiati Vladimira Solov'eva," *Na raznye temy*, pp. 198–202, especially pp. 200–202.
237. This did not prevent him, however, from attempting to appropriate for Russian liberalism Ivan Aksakov's defense of freedom of conscience (pp. 513–519). See below.
238. P.I. Novgorodtsev, "Ideia prava v filosofii Vl.S. Solov'eva," VFP 12: 1, kn. 56 (1901): 114.
239. Ibid., pp. 125–126.
240. Ibid., p. 119.
241. Ibid., p. 120.
242. The following details and quotations in this paragraph are from Kudrinskii [Kolerov], "Arkhivnaia istoriia sbornika 'Problemy idealizma' (1902)," pp. 157–158.
243. Kudrinskii (Kolerov), p. 158, provides the initial table of contents. Most of the proposed contributors were zemtsy and/or professors. Kudrinskii (Kolerov), p. 159, reports that through K.K. Arsen'ev (whom Pipes, *Struve, Liberal on the Left*, p. 341, calls "the idol of Struve's youth"), Struve became acquainted with the "Bratstvo Priiutino," one of his connections, in turn, to Novgorodtsev. According to Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties*, p. 65, from the late 1880s Arsen'ev organized regular "evenings" and colloquia in St. Petersburg between zemtsy and nonzemstvo

professionals and intellectuals that were attended by, for example, Struve and S.A. Kotliarevskii.

244. Kudrinskii (Kolerov), p. 157.

245. D.N. Shipov, the head of the neo-Slavophile direction, himself rejected the label and did not think that Orthodoxy was superior to other Christian faiths. See Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties*, p. 407, nt. 20; and Leonard Schapiro, *Rationalism and Nationalism in Russian Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (New Haven, 1967), 148.

246. P. Borisov (Struve), "V chem zhe istinnyi natsionalizm?" pp. 505–506. Struve does not provide a specific citation for Novgorodtsev. In the fourth edition that I have of his excellent *Lektsii po istorii filosofii prava. Ucheniia novogo vremeni, XVI-XIX* (Moscow, 1918), Novgorodtsev's consideration of Williams (on which it is clear Struve entirely bases his account) is on pp. 65–68. Both Novgorodtsev and Struve refer to a series of articles by M.M. Kovalevskii, "Rodonachal'niki angliiskogo radikalizma," *Russkaia mysl'* (January–March 1892).

247. P. Borisov (Struve), "V chem zhe istinnyi natsionalizm?" p. 508.

248. Andrzej Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy. History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought*, trans. Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka (Oxford, 1975), p. 501, striving for fairness, identifies the arguments that could be made on Aksakov's behalf, including his defense of freedom of conscience and speech. "All these facts do not, however, affect the over-all diagnosis that Ivan Aksakov represents a glaring example of the evolution of Slavophilism towards chauvinistic nationalism and extreme social and political reaction," which included anti-Semitism.

249. S.N. Trubetskoi, "Na rubezhe," *Sobranie sochinenii Kn. Sergeia Nikolaevicha Trubetskogo*, I, p. 477.

250. P.I. Novgorodtsev, "Gosudarstvo i pravo," VFP 15: 4, kn. 74 (1904): 405. Novgorodtsev does not quite finish the quotation, as I have here, translating it from the fuller version in P. Borisov (Struve), "V chem zhe istinnyi natsionalizm?" p. 514.

251. Walicki, *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism*, p. 312. Walicki provides a full analysis of Novgorodtsev's essay (pp. 312–318).

252. G.M. Hamburg, *Boris Chicherin and Early Russian Liberalism, 1828–1866* (Stanford, 1992), 225–233, provides a full account of Chicherin's lecture and its reception. According to Hamburg (p. 228), "by expressing only the conservative dimension of conservative liberalism, the inaugural lecture opened Chicherin to the charge that he had abandoned liberalism altogether, that he was nothing but a reactionary anti-revolutionist and, worst of all, a blind worshiper of the state." Hamburg also considers Aksakov's criticism of Chicherin (pp. 230–231), which appeared in the periodical *Den'* (11 November 1861).

253. P. Borisov (Struve), "V chem zhe istinnyi natsionalizm?" p. 513 (note). Walicki, *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism*, p. 137, notes that Struve was wrong in describing Chicherin's earlier views as positivistic.

254. Ger'e was an active member of the Society from its earliest years, and was elected to distinguished membership in January 1899, "in commemoration of Vladimir Ivanovich's outstanding services, well-known to everyone, before Russian philosophical thought." See "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 10: 1, kn. 46 (1899): 68–69, 78. Following the defense of his doctoral dissertation, *Leibnits i ego vek* (St. Petersburg, 1868), he became professor of European history at Moscow University. His works focused on the history of political thought, philosophy of history, and historiography. He devoted three of his later books to church history and the idea of the "Kingdom of God" in medieval historical and political thought: *Blazhennyi Avgustin* (Moscow, 1910), *Zapadnoe monashestvo i papstvo* (Moscow, 1913),

and *Rastsvet zapadnoi teokratii* (Moscow, 1916). These three books were issued under the general title, *Zodchie i podvizhniki "Bozh'ego Tsarstva."* Kotliarevskii reviewed *Blazhennyi Avgustin* in "Kritika i bibliografiia," VFP 21: 1, kn. 101 (1910): 79–82. Ger'e also wrote *Frantsisk (St. Francis of Assisi), apostol nishchety i liubvi* (Moscow, 1908). His work in the intellectual history of theocracy stressed that theocracy can be no less transcendent an ideal than the Kingdom of God itself, not a practical goal of mundane politics. Western Christianity, in the final analysis, recognized this. "The papacy," Ger'e wrote in a review, "even in the epoch of its greatest triumph, did not reject in principle the independence of political power and civil law." See his "K voprosu o sushchnosti teokratii," VFP 10: 3, kn. 48 (1899): 311.

255. S.N. Trubetskoi, "Na rubezhe," *Sobranie sochinenii Kn. Sergeia Nikolaevicha Trubetskogo*, I, pp. 477–478. Also see his unfinished article, "O sovremennom polozhenii russkoi tserkvi," pp. 438–446.

256. S.A. Kotliarevskii, "Predposylki demokratii," VFP 16: 2, kn. 77 (1905): 126. Kotliarevskii's first essay in *Voprosy filosofii* was, appropriately enough, "Religiia v amerikanskom obshchestve," VFP 15: 1, kn. 71 (1904): 1–33.

257. E.N. Trubetskoi, as noted above, devoted two substantial volumes to the intellectual history of theocracy in medieval Europe: *Religiozno-obshchestvennyi ideal zapadnogo khristianstva v V veke: Mirosozertsanie bl. Avgustina* (Moscow, 1892); and *Religiozno-obshchestvennyi ideal zapadnogo khristianstva v XI veke: Ideia bozheskogo tsarstva v tvoreniiakh Grigoriia VII-go i ego publitsistov—sovremennikov* (Kiev, 1897). N.A. Zverev and L.M. Lopatin co-authored a review of the first volume: "K voprosu o mirosozertsanii blazhennogo Avgustina," VFP 4: 3, kn. 18 (1893): 26–40. Novgorodtsev's debut on the pages of *Voprosy filosofii* took the form of a review, co-authored with Ger'e, of the second volume: "K voprosu o sushchnosti teokratii," VFP 10: 3, kn. 48 (1899): 304–311. Novgorodtsev's major work, *Ob obshchestvennom ideale* (Moscow, 1917, first ed.), closely ties utopianism to the desire to transcend normative relations between church and state. S.A. Kotliarevskii also wrote a great deal on religious history, including his first two dissertations. Also see Gere's works cited above. The great historian V.O. Kliuchevskii, another member of the Psychological Society (although definitely not an idealist in his philosophical views), contributed a series of articles entitled, "Zapadnoe vliianie v Rossii XVII v (istoriko-psikhologicheskii ocherk)," VFP 8: 1, 3-4, kn. 36, 38-39 (1897), in which he argued that the impact of western ideas in Russia was so great because the Russian church failed to provide a strong source of indigenous intellectual traditions. Kliuchevskii pointed in particular to the debilitating effects of the seventeenth-century schism, which increased the church's dependence on the state and led to a precipitate decline in its influence on educated society. Deprived of religious *vospitanie*, Russians turned to ideology as a surrogate for spiritual satisfaction that the Russian church could not provide.

258. E.N. Trubetskoi, *Mirosozertsanie Vl.S. Solov'eva*, I (Moscow, 1913), p. 177. Trubetskoi's brilliant two-volume study takes as its overall framework the critique of Solov'ev's utopianism.

259. The three essays have most recently been conveniently collected in V.S. Solov'ev, *Sochineniia v dvukh tomakh*, I, *Filosofskaia publitsistika* (Moscow, 1989, the *Voprosy filosofii* series). For summary and analysis, see E.N. Trubetskoi, *Mirosozertsanie Vl.S. Solov'eva*, I, pp. 437–448; A.F. Losev, *Vladimir Solov'ev i ego vremia* (Moscow, 1990), 342–347; Konstantin Mochul'skii, *Vladimir Solov'ev. Zhizn' i uchenie* (Paris, 1951), 134–144; and Dimitri Strémooukhoff, *Vladimir Solov'ev and His Messianic Work*, trans. Elizabeth Meyendorff (Belmont, MA, 1979), 141–46, 187–188.

260. According to Losev, p. 629, "Of all of Solov'ev's ideas, none was so far removed from contemporary Russian public opinion (*obshchestvennost'*). Everyone considered this Solov'evian theocracy something queer."

261. Walicki, *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism*, p. 191.

262. The censors banned publication of the lecture at the time, together with two articles on the famine (by N.Ia. Grot and L.N. Tolstoi) that were scheduled to appear in the same issue of *Voprosy filosofii*. Solov'ev's lecture was published in the 1901 issue dedicated to his memory: VFP 12: 1, kn. 56 (1901): 138–152.

263. Ia.K. Kolubovskii, "Iz literaturnykh vospominanii," *Istoricheskii vestnik* (April 1914): 139–143, provides an eyewitness account of the lecture and the ensuing controversy. Solov'ev's lecture, the debate on it in the Psychological Society, and two of Solov'ev's letters to *Moskovskie vedomosti* are included in V.S. Solov'ev, *Sochineniia v dvukh tomakh*, II (Moscow, 1989, the *Voprosy filosofii* series), pp. 344–369; the editors of this volume reconstruct the history of this affair (pp. 689–692). On it also see Losev, pp. 481–490, and Mochul'skii, pp. 193–196.

264. Quoted by Losev, p. 488.

265. G.V. Vernadskii, "Bratstvo Priiutino," *Novyi Zhurnal* 28: kn. 95 (1969): 204; also see, more generally, S.M. Solov'ev, *Zhizn' i tvorcheskaia evoliutsiia Vladimira Solov'eva* (Brussels, 1977), 298. Solov'ev's articles on the famine, "Narodnaia beda i obshchestvennaia pomoshch'," and "Nash grekh i nasha obiazannost'," are included in V.S. Solov'ev, *Sochineniia v dvukh tomakh*, II.

266. E.N. Trubetskoi, *Mirosozertsanie Vl.S. Solov'eva*, II, pp. 7, 10. Trubetskoi devotes this entire chapter of his study to arguing that Solov'ev's disappointment in Russian state and society spurred the collapse, or at any rate marked de-utopianization, of his theocratic project (pp. 3–38).

267. I believe Losev is correct in maintaining this, as he does throughout *Vladimir Solov'ev i ego vremia*. Evgenii Trubetskoi, by contrast, argues for the utter collapse of the theocratic ideal in the 1890s.

268. Vl.S. Solov'ev, "O prichinakh upadka srednevekovogo mirosozertsaniia," *Sochineniia v dvukh tomakh*, II, p. 351.

269. Ibid., p. 345, italics Solov'ev's.

270. Ibid., pp. 354–355. Dimitri Strémooukhoff, pp. 247–249, appraises the 1891 Psychological Society lecture as particularly revealing of Solov'ev's new outlook. According to him, p. 250, "The new elements in this attitude are a more active alliance with the liberals, . . . positive criticism of the Church, and finally a new theory in which the manifestation of the Kingdom of God is taking place through progress."

271. Quoted by Mochul'skii, p. 195.

272. Walicki, *Legal Philosophies*, pp. 194–195.

273. Novgorodtsev, *Lektsii po istorii filosofii prava*, p. 3.

274. Ibid., p. 5.

275. Ibid., p. 6. Novgorodtsev does not specify that he is quoting from Solov'ev's "O prichinakh upadka srednevekovogo mirosozertsaniia," no doubt because it was still banned at the time he was writing his lectures. The quotations can be found in V.S. Solov'ev, *Sochineniia v dvukh tomakh*, II, pp. 354–355.

276. Novgorodtsev, *Lektsii po istorii filosofii prava*, pp. 4–6.

277. He does so not only in his *Lektsii po istorii filosofii prava*, but in "Ideia prava v filosofii Vl.S. Solov'eva," and there quite directly (p. 121): all Solov'ev wanted to say in his

October 1891 Psychological Society lecture was that "the general Christian task (*delo*) coincides with that of progress."

278. According to M.A. Kudrinskii (Kolerov), "Arkhivnaia istoriia sbornika 'Problemy idealizma' (1902)," pp. 159–163, Struve very soon discovered in the first, "narrowly political" conception of the project much broader perspectives that offered him and the other former legal marxists the opportunity to defend their intellectual evolution. With that he expanded the focus from freedom of conscience to the "defense of idealism." Berdiaev and Bulgakov at once wrote Struve of their eagerness to contribute to the project. Novgorodtsev invited the participation of A.S. Lappo-Danilevskii, who had connections to the *Priiutintsy*, and S.A. Askol'dov (perhaps on the recommendation of E.N. Trubetskoi). He also wanted L.O. Petrazycki, and expected from him a "very valuable" article. Struve objected rather strongly to Petrazycki's candidacy, after which it was apparently dropped. Novgorodtsev expressed reservations about the participation of M.I. Tugan-Baranovskii and S.L. Frank, proposed by Struve, fearing they might compromise the clear idealist direction he (Novgorodtsev) intended for the *sbornik*. Tugan-Baranovskii declined to contribute. The article Frank wrote for *Problemy*, on Nietzsche, confirmed Novgorodtsev's misgivings (subsequently Frank would, of course, become a profound idealist philosopher). As a student, B.A. Kistiakovskii had been close to legal marxism; after his final break with it in 1899 he impressed Novgorodtsev (thus, either Struve or Novgorodtsev could have involved him).

279. See note 211 above.

280. Vernadskii cannot be described as a neo-idealist; his philosophical views were eclectic. Bailes, *Science and Russian Culture in an Age of Revolutions*, p. 34, writes that the evidence suggests "that there were both rationalist and mystical sides to his nature, although rationalism usually predominated. The nature of his philosophical outlook in this respect is not altogether clear, but one fact is certain: Vernadsky . . . had great respect for the religious side of mankind's nature (even as a stimulus to science) and worked well with religious figures who shared his own ideals for a more progressive and democratic Russia."

281. V.I. Vernadskii, "O nauchnom mirovozzrenii," VFP 13: 5, kn. 65 (1902): 1432.

282. Iu. Aikhenval'd's review appears under "Obzor knig," VFP 14: 2, kn. 67 (1903): 333–356; here, p. 334. Ivanov-Razumnik, *Istoriia russkoi obshchestvennoi mysli*, II, 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg, 1908), p. 467, similarly writes, "Idealism demonstrated that it is possible to combine democratism with a metaphysical and even religious philosophical basis."

283. P.I. Novgorodtsev, "O filosofskom dvizhenii nashikh dnei," *Novyi put'*, no. 10 (1904): 61.

284. Iu. Aikhenval'd, p. 333.

285. Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 14: 1, kn. 66 (1903): 156–157.

286. M.A. Kudrinskii (Kolerov), "Arkhivnaia istoriia sbornika 'Problemy idealizma' (1902)," pp. 163–164.

287. Ivanov-Razumnik, p. 453; his discussion of the volume concentrates on the essays by Berdiaev and Novgorodtsev, pp. 468–481. In recent scholarship, Christopher Read devotes most attention to the symposium, under the appropriate rubric, "philosophical liberalism," in his *Religion, Revolution and the Russian Intelligentsia, 1900–1912. The Vekhi Debate and its Intellectual Background* (New York, 1978), 15–17, 20–21.

288. *Problemy idealizma. Sbornik statei*, ed. P.I. Novgorodtsev (Moscow: Moscow Psychological Society, 1902). Inside front cover.

289. Walicki, *Legal Philosophies*, p. 352.

290. For the Kantian "autonomy of the good" in Solov'ev's tract, see Sergius Hessen's major essay, "Bor'ba utopii i avtonomii dobra v mirovozzrenii F. Dostoevskogo i Vl. Solov'eva," *Sovremennye zapiski* (Paris), nos. 45–46 (1931), especially no. 46, pp. 340–342. Most recently, V.V. Lazarev, "Kategoricheskii imperativ I. Kanta i etika V. Solov'eva," *Kant i filosofiia v Rossii*, ed. Z.A. Kamenskii and V.A. Zhuchkov (Moscow, 1994), 42–80, has drawn attention to Solov'ev's rehabilitation of Kant's clear distinction between "what is" and "what ought to be," a distinction that Hegel's monism collapsed in asserting that "what ought to be" already is. At the same time, Lazarev dwells on what he sees as Solov'ev's main criticisms of Kant, including the argument that an act done by inclination, and not by duty alone, is not necessarily deprived of ethical value. The criterion is not motive, but the internal moral quality of the act. There is no necessary incompatibility between inclination and duty; I can, in fact, desire to do what I know by duty I would be obligated to do, even were I not so inclined. Solov'ev's line of criticism has certain merits (in regard, for example, to holy beings who, presumably, never experience a contradiction between duty and inclination, and yet are no less the good for it), but it glosses over Kant's main point, namely, that freedom consists in the human capacity to determine the will by duty, in opposition to natural inclination, in instances of such opposition.

291. P.I. Novgorodtsev, "O filosofskom dvizhenii nashikh dnei," p. 66. Not all "living and progressive movements" could defend the dignity of the self as securely as neo-idealism, which was precisely the thrust behind the neo-idealist rejection of positivists' claims to be the best philosophical representatives of liberalism. However, the politic Novgorodtsev passes over this in silence now, in the interests of the Union of Liberation's united-front stategy.

292. This measure excludes A.S. Lappo-Danilevskii, S.F. Ol'denburg, and D.E. Zhukovskii, although Lappo-Danilevskii advanced the theory and methodology of history in Russia.

293. S.L. Frank, "O kriticheskom idealizme," *Mir Bozhii* 13: 12 (December 1904): 224–264. Of the self (*lichnost'*), Frank writes (p. 261), "It not only cannot be subordinated to any kind of empirical ends, not only must always be seen in empirical life *as an end in itself, and not a means*, as this was put by Kant's ethics, but it can just as little be made the servant of any kind of transcendent principles or forces surpassing it. The self can have neither an empirical nor metaphysical owner. If human reason has the need to recognize as sacred the whole of life and its bearer, then we once more recall that this whole, from the point of view of critical idealism, is *consciousness*, and its bearer, the *transcendental self*." Despite Frank's great debt to Kant in this essay, nowhere does he appreciate the ontological significance of Kant's concept of the noumenal.

294. Solov'ev departs from the idea of personal substantiality in his three late essays on epistemology, first published in *Voprosy filosofii* (1897–1899) and later collected under the title, *Theoretical Philosophy*. There he criticizes Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* on the grounds that the substantiality of the subject is not revealed in, and cannot be inferred from, consciousness. See V.S. Solov'ev, *Sochineniia v dvukh tomakh*, I (Moscow, 1990),758–797, especially p. 776. Lopatin responded to Solov'ev's *Theoretical Philosophy* in a paper he read before the Psychological Society in October 1899, entitled, "Vopros o real'nom edinstve soznaniia," published in VFP 10: 5, kn. 50 (1899). According to Lopatin (p. 870), "it is difficult to imagine a more decisive expression of a purely phenomenalist (*fenomenisticheskii*) view of spiritual life" than Solov'ev's essay, "Pervoe nachalo teoreticheskoi filosofii" (the first in the set). E.N. Trubetskoi, in his *Mirosozertsanie Vl.S. Solov'eva*, II, pp. 247–259, offers a more benign interpretation of Solov'ev's denial of personal substantiality. Solov'ev ascribed substantiality to God

alone, who (according to Christian dogma) has the power of creation *ex nihilo*. Souls that were in the strict sense substantial could not be created, since they would have always existed, nor would they be capable of self-improvement, since they would already be perfect. These reasons explain why, according to Trubetskoi, "for Solov'ev in the last period of his creativity *God was the only substance in the real sense of the word*," and why the self was not substantial but rather a hypostasis (*ipostas'* or *podstavka)* for God (pp. 247–248, 251). Or, in Walicki's suggestive formulation, "only after death is man finally substantiated in eternal ideality; substantiality, therefore, is the ultimate destiny and not an innate property of the human soul." Andrzej Walicki, *A History of Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to Marxism*, trans. Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka (Stanford, 1979), 389. Significantly, E.N. Trubetskoi places Solov'ev's conception of personal progress toward substantiality within the overall de-utopianization of his thought in this period. Self-perfection must be a process and transcendent goal, not a presumed state by virtue of a premature substantiality. Seen in this perspective, Solov'ev did not advance a radical de-ontologization of the self, only a delay in its ontological self-realization.

295. He expressed this admiration in his praise of Vissarion Belinskii's Hegelian "reconciliation with reality." For an excellent analysis, see Walicki, *A History of Russian Thought*, pp. 417–421.

296. Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge, Eng., 1975), 376.

297. S.L. Frank, "O kriticheskom idealizme," p. 252, compares Hegelianism and marxism in their "complete ethical indifferentism." In both, "the idea of what ought to be (*dolzhnoe*) in itself has no significance."

298. It is interesting to observe that in countries where the positivist background was more empirical than rationalistic, less reductive, and granted more room to the individual, the neo-idealist revival drew more on Hegel: Great Britain (T.H. Green, E. Caird, F.H. Bradley, B. Bosanquet, R.G. Collingwood), Italy (B. Croce, G. Gentile) and America (W.T. Harris and the St. Louis Hegelians, J. Royce, J.E. Creighton and the Cornell School of objective idealism, W.E. Hocking). This general pattern seems to hold for France as well, for there the historical determinism and scientistic sociology (or sociologism) of Comte's positivism easily compares to scientific socialism, and the best-known French neo-idealist Charles Renouvier thought of himself as a Kantian and called his own philosophy 'neo-criticism.'

299. S.N. Bulgakov, *Ot marksizma k idealizma. Sbornik statei, 1896–1903* (St. Petersburg, 1903).

300. The relevant quotation can be found in Mendel, p. 188.

301. S.N. Bulgakov develops the concept of contraband in his *Problemy* essay (see below). N.A. Berdiaev uses it in his article "O novom russkom idealizme," VFP 15: 5, kn. 75 (1904): 700. Walicki shows that Stanislaw Brzozowski, the Polish fin-de-siècle thinker, also used the concept: *Stanislaw Brzozowski and the Polish Beginnings of 'Western Marxism'* (Oxford, 1989), 91.

302. S.L. Frank, "O kriticheskom idealizme," p. 252, clearly suggests the return to utopianism in Berdiaev and Bulgakov as they embraced absolute idealism. "The proximity of Marxism to Hegelianism or, more precisely, the identity of their basic approach to the relationship between what is and what ought to be, is useful to recall right now, when some former Marxists, having recognized the philosophic inadequacy of Marx's doctrine, are, as a result of their metaphysical roving, turning into true students of Hegel."

303. "P.G." (Struve), "K kharakteristike nashego filosofskogo razvitiia," *Problemy idealizma*, pp. 72–90; here, p. 78. Subsequent page references cited parenthetically in text.

304. N.A. Berdiaev, "Eticheskaia problema v svete filosofskogo idealizma," *Problemy idealizma*, pp. 91–136; here, p. 95 (note). Subsequent page references cited parenthetically in text.

305. L.M. Lopatin, *Polozhitel'nye zadachi filosofii. Chast' pervaia: Oblast' umozritel'nykh voprosov*, 2nd. ed. (Moscow, 1911; first ed., 1886), 434.

306. S.N. Bulgakov, "Osnovnye problemy teorii progressa," *Problemy idealizma*, pp. 1–47; here, p. 6. Subsequent page references cited parenthetically in text.

307. According to its subtitle, Struve's essay takes the form of a book review of S.P. Ranskii, *Sotsiologiia N.K. Mikhailovskogo* (St. Petersburg, 1901).

308. He writes that Russian Marxism represented a case of the basic error of positivism, the monstrous idea of scientific ethics, the reduction of "what ought to be" to "what is." "P.G." recalls that, "in Struve was missing at that time the principled philosophic clarity that does not admit such subordination" (p. 85).

309. P.I. Novgorodtsev, "Znachenie filosofii," *Nauchnoe slovo*, kn. 4 (1903).

310. Ibid., p. 112.

311. Ibid.

312. Ibid., p. 113.

313. Ibid.

314. Ibid.

315. Ibid., p. 114.

316. See above, note 58.

317. S.A. Kotliarevskii, "Ob istinnom i mnimom realizme," VFP 15: 5, kn. 75 (1904): 625–626, 631.

318. Ibid., p. 627.

319. Ibid., pp. 642-643.

320. P.I. Novgorodtsev, "Nravstvennyi idealizm v filosofii prava. (K voprosu o vozrozhdenii estestvennogo prava)," *Problemy idealizma*, pp. 236–296; here, p. 237. Subsequent page references cited parenthetically in text.

321. Walicki, *Legal Philosophies*, p. 300, writes that this work "tries to find a compromise solution to the conflict between the natural law tradition and nineteenth-century historicism."

322. Bulgakov also voiced this notion of absolute form and changing content: "Every century, every epoch has its own historical task, determined by the objective course of things. In this way, the moral law is absolute, its dictates have significance *sub specie aeterni*, but its content is always given by history." *Problemy idealizma*, p. 40.

323. P.I. Novgorodtsev, *Kant i Gegel' v ikh ucheniiakh o prave i gosudarstve*, pp. 3–28; "Ob istoricheskom i filosofskom izuchenii idei," VFP 11: 4, kn. 54 (1900): 658–685. Walicki, *Legal Philosophies*, pp. 299–300, summarizes the introduction.

324. Quoted by Novgorodtsev, "Ob istoricheskom i filosofskom izuchenii idei," p. 666, from S.N. Trubetskoi's book, *Uchenie o Logose v ego istorii*.

325. "It is based," he writes, "on the consideration that a certain (intellectual) influence succeeds not only in consequence of favorable external conditions, but also in consequence of certain internal qualities of the received doctrine. . . . It is important to determine the general basis that raises it above the consciousness of a given time and, answering certain general needs of life, makes it the property of a whole order of times. . . . The main task consists in understanding an idea or doctrine not as a reflection of its time, but as a logical construction important for us." Ibid., p. 680.

326. P.I. Novgorodtsev, "K voprosu o sovremennykh filosofskikh iskaniiakh. (Otvet L.I. Petrazhitskomu)," VFP 14: 1, kn. 66 (1903): 122.

327. Ibid., p. 124.

328. Ibid., p. 125, from S.N. Trubetskoi, "Chemu uchit' istoriia filosofii," *Problemy idealizma*, p. 229.

329. S.N. Trubetskoi, "Chemu uchit' istoriia filosofii," *Problemy idealizma*, pp. 216–235; here, pp. 217–218 (his italics). Subsequent page references cited parenthetically in text.

330. The phrase, "the human mind—an innate metaphysician," is Lopatin's: *Polozhitel'nye zadachi filosofii. Chast' pervaia*, p. 433.

331. Iu. Aikhenval'd, "Problemy idealizma," in "Obzor knig," VFP 14: 2, kn. 67 (1903): 333. Subsequent page references cited parenthetically in text. Aikhenval'd was a secretary of the Psychological Society and a member of the editorial board of *Voprosy filosofii*.

332. *Vekhi* (Moscow, 1990, reprint ed.), 13.

333. Pipes, *Struve, Liberal on the Right*, pp. 99–101.

334. Berdiaev is the best example of this. In his essay, "O novom russkom idealizme," VFP 15: 5, kn. 75 (1904), he still employs neo-idealism in the defense of liberalism, including a liberal interpretation of natural law and affirmation that Christian eschatology should not be interpreted as salvation in history (pp. 717–721). Subsequently, however, his idealism developed in directions incompatible with liberalism. This evolution has been reconstructed by Andrzej Walicki, "Russian Liberalism and the Religio-Philosophic Renaissance in Russia," AAASS conference paper, 1991. Walicki shows that Berdiaev fused a redefined notion of natural law with his eclectic ideas of stateless theocracy or theocratic-mystical anarchism. Since this order would function by divine rule-of-law alone, without any state organization or institutionalized forms of power (ecclestiastical or secular), it would be a theonomy rather than a theocracy in the strict sense, "theonomic anarchism." Whatever Berdiaev's new ideas might entail, they had very little to do with liberalism. Rather, his new religious consciousness was a utopianization of the idealism he had embraced in *Problems of Idealism*. In *Vekhi* Berdiaev criticized the positivist intelligentsia for scientistic utopianism, but his own thought had acquired a millenarian, chiliastic tinge. His new religious consciousness was positively inspired by Solov'ev's theocratic utopianism. This presents a striking contrast with the neo-idealist interpretation of Solov'ev in the Psychological Society (P.I. Novgorodtsev, E.N. Trubetskoi, S.A. Kotliarevskii).

335. B.A. Kistiakovskii, "V zashchitu nauchno-filosofskogo idealizma," VFP 18: 1, kn. 86 (1907): 61–62. Kistiakovskii followed the value-theory of the Baden school of neo-Kantianism, where the modality of values is not being but validity. In this connection Herbert Schnädelbach, *Philosophy in Germany 1831–1933*, trans. Eric Matthews (Cambridge, Eng., 1984), 162–163, 180–85, refers to the "ontological dilemma" of the neo-Kantian posing of the value-problem without a ground of being for the good, a free-floating axiology.

336. For Chicherin's defense of personal substantiality, see chapter 5, "Bessmertie dushi," of his *Nauka i religiia*, 2nd. ed. (Moscow, 1901), 135–173. Lopatin wrote nothing directly in legal philosophy, but no less an institutional representative of Russian liberalism than the Moscow Juridical Society valued his philosophy as a defense of law. The Juridical Society formally celebrated Lopatin on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the beginning of his scholarly career. See "Moskovskoe Psikhologicheskoe Obshchestvo," VFP 23: 1, kn. 111 (1912): 196–198.

337. Leonard Schapiro, "The Vekhi Group and the Mystique of Revolution," *Russian Studies*, ed. Ellen Dahrendorf (New York, 1987), 90.

338. Shatsillo, *Russkii liberalizm nakanune revoliutsii 1905–1907 gg.*, p. 153, provides the quotation.
339. P.I. Novgorodtsev, "O filosofskom dvizhenii nashikh dnei," *Novyi put'*, no. 10 (1904): 61.
340. Ibid., p. 66.
341. Pipes, *Struve, Liberal on the Left*, p. 326.