#266

Public Opinion Surveys and Political Culture in Post-Soviet Russia

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Blair Ruble:

Today we are going to be hearing from representatives of three different generations in the behavioral revolution within Soviet and post-Soviet studies. On Monday, we will hear from yet a younger cohort, younger than even Bill [Reisinger]. James Alexander, who is Assistant Professor at the University of Illinois in the Political Science department, will be speaking on popular perceptions in politics in the Russian provinces. It is quite accidental that we have this sequencing, but I think it is important to note that there is a tradition of behaviorally-oriented social science research on the former Soviet Union. Some of the people who made that revolution happen are at the table today.

Well, three decades ago, a group of young Turks set out to revolutionize Communist studies in the West. They wanted to do so by trying to introduce some of the methods and lessons from the behavioral revolution. As anybody in this room who happened to be in a graduate program during the 1970s knows, their work really created a great deal of excitement. Fred Fleron was one of the critical young Turks, one of the key people in that he wrote some of the major articles that forced a lot of rethinking of how we approached Soviet politics. Fred and his friends tended to be at Indiana University at the time and they left a remarkable legacy, but there were also rumors of an Indiana mafia taking over the field. I think they proved to be much more benign than the Russian mafia but at the time, that was not at all apparent to many folks.

Fred himself is the author, editor, and co-editor of seven books, and numerous, literally dozens, of articles and book chapters. I mentioned that he did his graduate work in Indiana, his undergraduate work was at Brown, and his dissertation was on the Soviet political leadership system of 1952–1965. He was more than ready to make the transformation to post-Soviet studies when the Soviet Union collapsed.

We will then hear from Jeff Hahn, who represents something of a middle cohort in this behavioral revolution. Jeff teaches political science at Villanova University and has been a leader, as I am sure you all know, in the study of local government and political culture in Russia. His book, *Soviet Grassroots*, is a classic for anybody who is interested in Russian local government. If you have not read it, you should. He is coauthor and editor of several other volumes, including *Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics* and *Democratization in Russia*. His articles have appeared in numerous journals. He was also a practicing politician, which separates him from many people in our field. He even managed to get himself reelected in local government, and I know that that actually has made a difference in how he interacts with Russian politicians. Jeff was Director of the Carnegie Corporation's project on democratization of legislative institutions in Russia a major portion of which focused on Yaroslavl. He is one of the guilty parties for the burst of publications about that Russian city, which I am sure many of you have not made your life's career or are getting tired of hearing about, but you will hear a little bit more about it today. Jeff graduated from Penn and he received his Ph.D. from Duke.

Our third speaker, William Reisinger, has been teaching at the University of Iowa for a decade or so. He completed his undergraduate work at Oregon, then went on to the University of Michigan where the behavioral revolution had certainly hit long before Bill arrived. His study of energy policy in the Soviet bloc alliance, *Energy and the Soviet Bloc*, was published

by Cornell, and again it was one of those books that those of you who follow the study of Soviet and post-Soviet politics really must read. He is co-editor of numerous volumes and also has dozens of articles and chapters in various books. I think it is safe to say that he has been in the forefront of his generation's attempt to bring social science methodology to the study of Russian politics.

So it is with great pleasure that I am honored to turn the floor over to these three gentlemen and we will begin with Fred.

Frederic Fleron:

Thank you, Blair. It is a pleasure to be here this afternoon. I want to begin by pointing out that this seminar was advertised in the April calendar of the Kennan Institute as "Post-Soviet Political Culture in Russia." What it really is about is "Public Opinion Surveys and Political Culture in Post-Soviet Russia." There is an important difference in these two titles.

Over the years, much has been written about Russian and Soviet political culture. A few years ago, I began to compile an inventory of the defining characteristics of Russian and Soviet political culture that I encountered in my readings—just so I would know where to go back and find these things. First there were a dozen or so, and then a score or two, and then many scores of them. At last count I have over a hundred different defining characteristics in my inventory that seems to grow every week and every month. Here is a small sampling of what I found in the works of leading students of Soviet politics. Russia has been characterized as a country with a tradition of deep-grained conservatism, and even authoritarianism, an absence of strong and consistent democratic traditions, "a fear of disorder and chaos," an emphasis on order, stability, and predictability, "a reluctance to engage in autonomous political activity," an obsession with secrecy, the "absence of a secular and bargaining political culture," a "suspicious attitude toward representative democracy," an "indifference to the rule of law," and a "lack of political tolerance." This list is no doubt quite familiar to students of Russian history and politics. Indeed, this view has become part of our "folkways" about "Russian political folkways."

Clearly, these are characteristics of a political culture inimical to democracy. As a result, not a few writers have concluded that prospects for successful democratization in Russia are rather dim. Despite this pessimistic prognosis flowing from traditional Sovietology—and quite to the surprise of many observers—surveys of Russian public opinion in recent years have found considerable mass support for democratic political norms. What are we to make of this evidence?

In our assessment, it is important to remember that this evidence is not anecdotal or impressionistic, it is what we call "solid data." It has been compiled according to accepted canons of modern, empirical social science research; therefore, it is both public and replicable. Hence, it is quite different from the anecdotal, impressionistic, and sometimes historical evidence of those who claim that Russia is not fertile soil for the growth of democratic institutions and practices.

This is why the title of our seminar here today makes a difference. Today we will talk about hard evidence. That is why our subject is "Public Opinion Surveys and Political Culture in Post-Soviet Russia." I will set the stage for Professors Hahn and Reisinger with a brief overview of empirical findings from public opinion surveys on economic reform and commitment to democratic norms and principles (based on Fleron and Ahl 1997), followed by a few remarks on some methodological issues not yet addressed or resolved by

the practitioners, which I think might affect outcomes. Then I will relinquish the podium to my two colleagues who will present results from their recent field research.

Here is a brief overview of the major findings from survey research on Russian public opinion relating to these issues from the period 1989–1995. I draw on this summary from a paper that I authored with my graduate student, Richard Ahl, about six months ago, which will be published next year sometime. First, there does seem to be an emerging, if imperfect, consensus on aggregate levels of support for democratic norms and economic reform. Strong support for most democratic norms was reported in early studies, and declining support in more recent studies. Some democratic norms (for example, competitive elections, free press, multi-party system) garnered considerable support, while others (political tolerance and the valuation of liberty and free speech over order) received much weaker support. Since 1992, support for democratic norms has declined.

Second, with respect to support for economic reform and a market economy, there is also an emerging consensus: that support is limited and is also declining. The evidence is most clear with respect to economic reform. In the early 1990s there was still considerable support for key features of the *Soviet* economic order and, as the post-Soviet era unfolds, the Russian populace appears to be evaluating key features of the *Soviet* economy in an increasingly positive manner.

In order to throw these findings into sharper focus, it might be useful to examine support for specific issues related to economic reform. Two of the most widely examined issues in the surveys are the locus of responsibility for personal welfare and, second, tolerance of growing disparities in individual income and living standards. Generally speaking, the early evidence painted a mixed picture with respect to locus of responsibility for personal welfare. But the weight of evidence on this issue supports the view that the *Soviet* social safety net has retained significant mass support. Regarding tolerance of increasing differences in individual income, a familiar pattern emerges: there was some willingness to accept growing disparities in the period 1989–1991 and subsequently a rejection of growing disparities.

In sum, with respect to economic reform, the weight of evidence points to the conclusion that there was limited, but eroding support for a Western-style economy in Russia. It may be that early support for economic reform represented short-term optimism about the prosperity assumed to accompany market economies and democratization.

At the outset, survey researchers were generally impressed by the generally high levels of support expressed for most democratic norms. Concluding his analysis of survey data collected in the Yaroslavl Oblast in 1990, Jeff Hahn wrote:

> Russian respondents... showed substantial support for democratic values. A clear majority favored competitive elections and a multi-party system and were highly interested in political life around them. On the whole, the picture of Russian political culture that emerges from this study is not strikingly different from what is found in Western industrial democracies.

Hahn, along with Gibson, Duch and Tedin (1992) and Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992), represented an optimistic "first wave" of survey researchers. Their pioneering studies examined support for a variety of norms thought to be associated with a political culture supportive of democratic institutions including political efficacy, political trust, political interest, support for a multi-party system, political knowledge, political tolerance, valuation

of liberty, support for the norms of democracy, rights consciousness, support for dissent and opposition, and priority of free speech over public order.

After this optimistic "first wave," however, evidence began to mount that levels of commitment to democratic norms were in many cases more modest than originally thought, and probably declining (Fleron 1996, Brym 1996). This was in part due to varying levels of commitment expressed for particular democratic norms. *Political interest*, for example, is one element of a democratic political culture for which Russian respondents have exhibited consistently high levels of support. Support for *competitive elections*, on the other hand, is an example of declining commitment to a key democratic norm. With respect to *political efficacy*, the empirical evidence has again been mixed. Generally speaking, the issue on which Russian and Soviet respondents consistently exhibit the least democratic stance is *political tolerance*. In fact, low levels of political tolerance is one of the most unambiguous findings in the survey literature published to date. A reasonable summary of the evidence on commitment to democratic norms would have to highlight the ambiguous nature of much of the evidence and the apparent decline of support for some democratic norms.

By itself this information is interesting and useful and its significance is revealed when viewed in the light of how Russians define democracy and prioritize issues. The evidence suggests that many Russians associate democracy primarily with personal economic outcomes. These Russians have only an *instrumental* commitment to democracy, and this fact underscores the fragility of democratic commitments. Under such circumstances, future support of democracy may well hinge on the ability of economic reforms to satisfy the personal material well-being of significant publics. In the absence of such economic improvement, the consolidation of democracy will be undermined unless Russian citizens adopt a more principled commitment to democratic norms (Diamond 1996:33). Considerable effort has focused on identifying the demographic correlates of pro- and anti-reform sentiments in the Russian population. Generally speaking, the demographic characteristics most commonly associated with pro-reform sentiment are higher education levels, youth, and residence in urban areas.

This summary has identified several of the important conclusions that emerge from Western survey research on Russian public opinion from late 1989 until late 1995. First, there was widespread lack of support for economic reform. The political significance of this is highlighted by the tendency of Russian respondents to place a high priority on economic issues and to define democracy primarily in terms of personal economic outcomes. The evidence on political values is more mixed, and in hindsight probably warrants less optimism than originally generated by the early surveys. Finally, there is considerable consensus on the demographic correlates of opinion on both political and economic reform.

More recent research reported in the September 1996 USIA report by Richard Dobson (1996) indicates that beginning in October 1995 Russian public opinion on many of these issues has turned the corner. Negative feelings toward a market economy are decreasing, as are negative feelings toward government performance and price liberalization. Whether or not this trend will continue, remains to be seen. Professors Hahn and Reisinger will shed some light on the more recent trends.

Let me close by making a few observations on some methodological issues which I think affect our ability to interpret what is going on. Contemporary survey research on Russian public opinion has provided us with important and exciting evidence to challenge much

of the received wisdom of Sovietology concerning the prospects for democracy, but much remains to be done in the realms of theory and methodology. The significance of that research is great, for nothing less than a realistic assessment of the likelihood of a successful transition to democracy in Russia is at stake. As Jack Gray (1977) put it twenty years ago, during earlier crises in the twentieth century "Russian political culture provided no effective barriers to the re-creation of an autocracy prepared to control the thought of citizens, maintain power through a system of secret police, and brook no rival power in society." Has Russian political culture changed to the extent it could provide effective barriers to such a challenge in the future? How will Russia respond to what Bill Daniels (1987) has called "the negative effects of an attempt to change a country too far and too fast in ways that run counter to its deep political folkways?"

The jury is still out regarding answers to these important questions. Public opinion surveys conducted during late 1989 and 1990 found considerable support for democratic institutions and processes. This led several authors to draw optimistic conclusions regarding changes in Russian political culture. However, such conclusions must be tempered by the results of surveys undertaken between 1992 and 1994 which demonstrated an erosion of support for democracy presumably as a result of significantly worsening economic conditions, increased corruption, rising crime rates, and a precipitous decline in personal safety and security. Perhaps this erosion was a response to the way in which democracy has been conceptualized and pursued in Russia since 1991, or that it is now more acceptable to express "red-brown" opinions.

If so, it suggests that perceptions of democracy are ephemeral in nature and appear to be greatly influenced by short-term factors such as assessments of material conditions and personal economic well-being. This, in turn, suggests that initial optimistic results may have been a function of the wording of questions and the timing of surveys, as well as the decisions of both Gorbachev and Yeltsin to combine political and economic reform. We must be on the lookout for other factors that may have similar short-term impacts on opinions, and perhaps political culture as well. Alternatively, it is quite possible that surveys conducted recently are more reflective of deeply held values and attitudes *not* supportive of democracy than those done in 1990–1992 since Russians are now more accustomed to free speech without negative repercussions. At this point, we simply do not know which one of these interpretations actually reflects post-Soviet reality.

In order to arrive at a realistic appraisal of continuity and change in Russian political culture and values supportive of democracy, we must give greater attention to a number of factors and relationships. As I suggested in my 1996 *Europe-Asia Studies* article, sensitivity to the emotive appeal of key terms such as "democracy," "elections," and "tolerance" must be accompanied by awareness of the distinctions between ideal and real cultural patterns, general and specific beliefs, abstract ideas versus ideas embodied in social processes, as well as the relationship between political culture and more general cultural patterns. Scholars must figure out ways to tap into these important distinctions in order to get at the more basic dimensions of political culture in Russia and thereby avoid the risk of being misled by those that are more ephemeral in nature.

Because of their inherent limitations, individual public opinion surveys may not be able to tell us much of significance. But longitudinal data and panel surveys tapping these more basic dimensions of political culture could at least offer insights into the durability of various

factors at the opinion level. Coupled with the analysis of overt behavior—voting behavior, citizen activism and participation (Bahry and Way 1994), and the vitality of intermediary associations—they could also tell us important things about the relationship between what people say and what people do.

In studying both opinions and behavior more attention must be given to specific political context. Local economic conditions, ethnic factors, the power and competence of local elites, differing perceptions of political and social space, and historical and cultural factors may result (or have already resulted) in the formation of important and diverse subcultural variations quite at odds with perceptions gleamed from national surveys, however "representative" they might be. Hence, regional and local differences in Russia's ethnically delineated republics and in the administratively delineated provinces demand further analysis.

None of this is intended to undermine the significance of survey research on Russian public opinion. Yet only by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of these pioneering early efforts will we be able to take full advantage of future opportunities for empirical research about important intellectual and practical issues in a country that just a few years ago could be examined only by what Margaret Mead called "anthropology from afar."

Blair Ruble:

Thank you. Jeff?

Jeffrey Hahn:

Thank you for your introduction, Blair. Given your references to our ages, it appears to be appropriate that I wore the dinosaur tie that my fifteen year old son gave me on my fiftieth birthday. However, given the complete context of your remarks, I think I ought to give my dinosaur tie to Fleron here. I should warn you I just returned from Russia about forty-eight hours ago, so for me it is about midnight now. And since I have not had any vodka yet, I probably won't make as much sense as I might otherwise in a midnight discussion with Russian friends. But I will try, so be patient with me.

The data tables (see pages 26–33) that were so readily grabbed up are, I warn you, preliminary tables. I would warn strongly against using them without asking me because there are errors in them (of a mathematical nature) which I am in the process of correcting.

Blair Ruble:

They are limited in number. If you do not have one, maybe you can share with a neighbor.

Jeffrey Hahn:

I brought about fifteen or so and I gave one copy to each of the panelists as well. I will make glancing references to them as I go through.

Blair Ruble:

Jeff, since everyone doesn't have one, maybe you can read out the numbers when you get to it appropriately.

Jeffrey Hahn:

Okay, well let me get on with it because I have a bit that I want to cover and I'm not sure how much detail I am going to be able to get into, but I will try. When Fred called me and invited me to do this panel with him, I had just finished the article to which he referred, which he wrote with Rich Ahl, called "Does the Public Matter for Democratization in Russia: What Do We Learn from the Third Wave Transitions in Public Opinion Surveys?" I highly recommend it to you. I find it to be a magisterial review of the literature and a very thoughtful analysis of what the findings seem to be telling us. And so, what I thought I would do today is to

respond to that using my own research on political culture in Russia, which is replicated now twice. There are three waves of it, starting in 1990, 1993, and 1996. It is from Yaroslavl, and is a thoroughly representative sample. Yaroslavl is a Russian city, about ninety-five or more percent Russian. While I cannot in all honesty claim that it is necessarily representative of how Russians think elsewhere in Russia, I also have no reason a priori to think it is so atypical that it cannot at least be suggestive to us with respect to our understanding of how Russians think about politics.

I want to use particularly the latest wave from 1996 to look at some of the findings which Fred has just gone over. To do this, I have adopted the following kind of organizational mechanism. I am currently on a research grant, thanks to the wonderful help of the National Council for Soviet and Eastern European Research that is enabling me to write a paper that will analyze these data in greater depth. But I thought I would use [the following] as an organizational device. As I have been going through and rereading or reading for the first time the voluminous literature that is coming out on this subject, I listed seven empirical questions which I, after having looked over all this literature, regard as *the* questions with respect to public opinion surveys and political culture in post-Soviet Russia. What I propose to do is to take these seven questions in turn and indicate what I believe Fred Fleron and Rich Ahl had to say; indicate secondly what my data are showing; and thirdly, any other generalizations which are not covered but might be at least useful to put on the table for further discussions.

So let me begin with what I regard as my first empirical question. The first question I thought was basic which is "What is the level of support for democratic reform in Russia?" In Fleron and Ahl, Fleron has already indicated that they found a lack of support for market reforms with strong support for the Soviet-era safety net. They found on the question of democracy that results were mixed; that support for democracy varied with the given values that were being discussed, whether it was elections or multi-partyism, which had a relatively higher level of public support; or political tolerance, or minority rights, which perhaps had a lesser level of support.

In my own work, as Fred was kind enough to cite, I have found much more support for democratic values and institutions among Russians than the cultural continuity literature would have led us to expect. When I talk about the cultural continuity literature, I am referring to the work which argued that there is a sort of pervasive, prevailing, and continuing authoritarianism in the Russian political culture which would make them less well pre-disposed to adapting to democratic political institutions. My own work using measures of diffuse support of democracy similar to those used in Western political culture, I found, as Fred noted, responses sufficiently similar with other Western industrialized societies to suggest that there would indeed be adequate support for the introduction of democratic institutions.

Secondly, I did however find rather high levels of political alienation and low levels of political trust which is also true by the way, in studies undertaken in the United States. These were offset, on the other hand, by rather high support for elections and for a multi-party system and rather high levels of political interest.In 1993 I introduced several new variables which were designed to get at the degree to which people supported political participation, to which they wanted to have a strong leader, to which economic envy or distaste for the accumulation of wealth was part of their attitudes, and the degree to which there was support for free market reforms. What I found was that support for

political participation was reasonably high, was also combined with very strong support for the idea that Russia needs a strong leader, and that strong leaders can do more for Russia than laws. I found high levels of what I called economic envy, that is to say an attitude favorable towards egalitarianism combined at the same time with a surprisingly high level of support for basic attributes of a free market system. What I want to say overall in response to this first question, "What is the level of support for democratic reform in Russia?" is that in fact, sufficient support remains in Russia to sustain democratic institutions despite some of the erosion that Fred has noted and to which I will turn shortly. I might make one other point before I leave this particular question because it concerns political intolerance. Fred has indeed argued that that variable was one which stuck out very strongly as distinguishing the Russian political culture. I am not sure I entirely agree with him. Gibson's 1993 and 1996 articles and Abele and Macintosh's 1996 paper suggest that while yes, levels of political intolerance in Russia are high, higher than you find in the West, in fact, they are perhaps even a little lower than you find among East European countries. And as Gibson has argued, in any case, they are not so high as to constitute a lasting impediment for further democratization in Russia.

The second empirical question which I wanted to address is whether support has changed over time. Fred has already indicated and emphasized in his presentation declines in the level of support found earlier for both political and economic reform and has suggested that to the extent that public opinion and political culture acts as a "deterrent to weak challenges to democratic rule," if I remember correctly, that the role of the public in democratic consolidation may be less efficacious than previously. My own study was a replicate study. It was carried out in 1993 and 1996 replicating the data from 1990. I want to briefly touch on what the results show. First, I did find erosion. If you want to look at Tables I through VII (see pages 26–31), they summarize the indicators that I used: political efficacy, political trust, and political support for elections. Tables I through VII indicated that on all of these variables we saw an erosion of diffuse support, political efficacy, political trust, electoral commitment, and political interest. There has been an overall increase in only one variable, support for multiparty politics. "Did support remain the same or grow?" It is not reported there, so the figures were 51 percent in favor in 1990; 54 percent in 1993 and 1996 respectively. On more specific measures, erosion was also visible, political participation had declined, voters' willingness to believe the worst about their leaders increased. They believed increasingly that these folks were either using their influence for their friends or were taking bribes. The attitudes on economic and political reform that I referred to, economic envy, free market support, and strong leader support, also hardened over this period of time.

So yes, there is indeed evidence to support the notion that there has been an erosion of support taking place over the six year period. There are two points, however, that I want to emphasize. And if you take the time to look at the numbers in more detail, you will see, in fact, the erosion that has taken place has been relatively minor and gradual. For political alienation, for political trust, it has been more rapid on the national level. On the local level, there really has not been a drop. In some areas there has been no drop, as in the case of support for multiparty systems or levels that are similar to what you find in the West, such as political interest levels which are actually higher than what you would find in the United States over this period. I am going to suggest later that the structure of

political participation is really not that different from what you would find in the West.

Finally, although the scales that I referred to earlier used in 1993 and 1996 show less support for political participation and a free market, more support for getting a strong leader, and more support for egalitarian values, on a number of economic variables and on minority rights, the weight of public opinion continues to be rather encouraging. I do not have time, I would love to respond with numbers, perhaps in the discussion, but there is some encouraging news on that front. With respect to evidence of decline, I would like to cite Dick Dobson in particular because he is here and I want to recognize what a fine paper he has put together. It is called: "Is Russia Turning the Corner: Changing Russian Public Opinion from 1991–1996." I urge you to get a copy of it if you can because what Dobson found was a significant decline of support from 1991–1995 but a turning of the corner, of some evidence that there was a reversal of this decline, in 1996. Reisinger and others in 1995 noted the decline on all measures of political participation, as did I. Gibson, on the other hand, has found relatively little evidence of erosion. I think it would be reasonably fair to say on the whole that changes do appear to have taken place in an negative direction, but not dramatically so.

Third issue: "What has been the effect of economic problems on Russians' political attitudes?" Fleron and Ahl noted that Russians retain a strong residual support for key features of the socialist system, notably its safety network. While they do not, at least in their article, address whether there is a correlation between these negative perceptions of market economy and political attitudes, they do suggest that Russians define democracy in primarily political terms and that since the economy has gotten worse, it does not bode well for democratic consolidation. In my own work, I have found that the respondents' egocentric economic assessments, their own being better off or not better off personally, really did not explain much of the variance in political attitudes from 1990–1993 but did so to a greater degree in 1993–1996. Moreover, some data from 1996 based on new measures, sociotropic, retrospective, and perspective assessments of economic performance, suggest that indeed economic performance does correlate strongly with attitudes toward politics. On balance, however, and I do think my reading of the literature on this is a bit different from Fred's, I feel in reading the literature that political attitudes explain economic views and assessments better than the reverse. That is to say, attitudes toward political democracy explain more of the variance in assessments of economic performance than vice-versa.

What this boils down to, in somewhat simpler terms, was put in Evans and Whitefield in 1995, who wrote, "A commitment to democracy remains even for those adversely affected by the market." I think I would agree with that. Furthermore, it is my own feeling that if economic assessments were paramount in public support for democratic values and institutions, then given the adverse effects of the economy from 1990–1996, we would expect to see dramatic shifts in support for negative direction, dramatic shifts in support for democracy. And we simply are not seeing dramatic shifts in support for democratic values.

Fourthly: "What is the social basis for political attitudes?" Ahl and Fleron point out that demographic correlates of reform sentiment are indeed predictable in terms of what we have come to expect based on research in Western democratic societies. They argue, and I would agree, that such correlates are congruent with explanations of change in Russia which are offered by modernization theory. Very briefly, my own research suggests that political

attitudes—all the variables that are in your tables—vary predictably, with age, income, SES (socioeconomic status), urbanization, and above all, education. Furthermore, I have found that these socio-demographic correlates of democratic support have remained consistent over six years. There are two footnotes I would add. Women consistently hold more conservative opinions than men and secondly, youth, on some measures, may be less trusting of government than their elders. The literature is fairly consensual with respect to the idea that in fact, the demographic correlates of political attitudes and reformist positions are predictable and similar to what we find in the West, although there is considerable disagreement over what emphasis to put.

Fifth question, empirically: "Are there differences between the attitudes of masses and elites?" Fleron and Ahl emphasize in their paper that the decision to liberalize Russia and to introduce democratic institutions was an elite decision and that the public played virtually no role in it. They argue that the role of the public is limited to helping sustain democracy by "dissuading weak challenges to democratic rule." Nonetheless, they do note briefly that Russian elites are more favorably disposed to reforms than the mass public. My data from 1996 does not expressly address this question. However, I did do an elite survey in 1992. I found very much that it confirms the view that the elites are unrepresentative of the mass public in being significantly more liberal in their political orientations, both with respect to political and economic reform. There is considerable literature out there which confirms these findings or agrees with these findings, including that of Richard Dobson again, Reisinger 1996, Zimmerman in 1995, Miller et al. in 1993, 1995, and 1996, all find evidence that economic views of elites were much more reformist, that elites and masses define democracy differently, that elites have greater value consistency than the mass public, and that in general they are in fact much more liberal.

Just a quick note in respect to Fleron and Ahl's argument. I do not disagree with them that the importance of political culture may be found in the degree to which it acts as a deterrent to weak challenges against democratic rule, but I would add something else. I think it is also important to recognize the value of political culture, a civic culture, if you will, to societal context. What I mean here, to put it more concretely, is that it seems to me it would be very difficult to introduce or to impose democratic institutions on a population which was unready for it, or, as the cultural continuity argument would have it, actively hostile to it in holding authoritarian values. So I do think that it is important to define the political culture role in that respect as well.

Sixthly: "What are the levels of political participation in Russia?" Ahl and Fleron do not directly address this question. They do, however, discuss at length Steven Fish's excellent work on civil society. Fish argues that civil society is weakly developed in Russia because the Soviet era destroyed whatever class basis there might be for associational life in Russia.

I think Table V is the relevant one here dealing with political participation. I have introduced a number of measures. Very quickly, the findings on Table V as I interpret them are these: There has been a modest decline in political participation in all categories from 1990–1996. Second, however, the structure and levels of political participation are not so different from what you would find in the United States. For example, where you find that the only participatory act on which more than 50 percent of Americans report themselves taking part in is voting, similarly in Russia. And really when

you talk about activists, that accounts for 10 percent or less of the population. Third finding: Voting is far more common among the elderly, with complex forms of political participation increasing with demographic variables predictably. That is to say, the more educated, the younger, the more urban, etc., the more likely you are to find greater levels of activism in nonvoting activities. Fourth point: There is a growing group identification, party identification in Russia in my data, at least. In 1994, 77 percent of my respondents had no party identification. After 1993, in 1996, this had declined only about a third, 33 percent who do not have some kind of party identification.

There are other observations I would like to make, but I have obviously abused my time already, so let me get to the last point: "How do Russians define democracy?" Fleron and Ahl conclude that there is a strong element of personal economic well-being in Russians' definitions of democracy. Russians, they say, are like other East Europeans, likely to equate democracy with economic prosperity. They go on to argue that under these conditions, under these circumstances, "Future support for democracy may well hinge on the ability of economic reforms to satisfy material well-being." My own data really do not offer much support for that view, as I have already indicated. First, the literature suggests to me, including my own work, that political commitment to democratic values better explains economic views and assessments of economic performance than the other way around—that is to say, economic assessments and views explaining levels of support for democracy.

Secondly, there is, however, clear evidence in the data to suggest, as Fleron and Ahl have stated, widespread support for the importance of the state. There is a statist element in Russians' definitions of democracy, specifically an overwhelming majority of my respondents felt that government should both guarantee everybody a job and guarantee everybody social insurance. At the same time, the statist element has some possibly positive sides. A similarly high percentage, 92 percent, felt that government also has an obligation to ensure the observance of minority rights. There is, in fact, a broad and sometimes quarrelsome literature which does suggest that Russian definitions of democracy come closer to what might be called a European social democracy with a strong social welfare component. The quarrels over this have occurred principally with respect to the social composition of support for a statist versus a more opportunities-oriented society. But I do think that, in the end, there is a definition of democracy among Russians that comes closer to what in the end one would find among Western Europeans, especially those who are proponents of a social democratic version.

So those are the seven questions. Those are my preliminary answers. I look forward to discussing them further. Thank you.

Blair Ruble:

Bill?

William Reisinger:

Thank you. Well, with those comments as introduction, I really just want to go over some findings with you today. I do have handouts (see pages 34–38). There should be enough so if you share with a neighbor, everyone can see one. While the handouts are going around, I will tell you a little about the surveys that produced the numbers. The University of Iowa has been supervising surveys of public opinion in three former Soviet societies for some years now. My colleagues there, Arthur Miller and Vicki Hesli, and I have been

working with Russian survey firms to do these and I will only be talking about the data from Russia today. The other places we have done interviews are Ukraine and Lithuania. The surveys were done in 1990, 1991, 1992, 1995, and most recently, in February and March of this year (1997). The samples in Russia in the years from 1990–1995 were drawn from only European Russia, so they are not representative of the entire country. This year, however, we did draw a sample and conduct interviews with people throughout Russia, so the interviews are from throughout the entire Russian Federation. The size of the sample this year was 1,800 and we did the surveys—we, meaning the firm Romir in Moscow who conducted the surveys—in such a way that there is a subsample representative of the European portion of Russia that we can compare to previous years. What I will be showing you for 1997 is, however, our data for the entirety of the Russian Federation. I did check, and there are tiny differences between the European and the general Russian portion of our sample. The interviews were in the form of personal interviews conducted at the respondent's place of residence by native Russians. They lasted from forty-five minutes to an hour and fifteen minutes or something thereabout, on average. I can give you more information about the sample or other details of the survey if you would be interested.

I want to briefly run through these figures and one table that have been passed out, so I will be happy to answer questions at the end, when it is question time. I will try to be fairly brief here. Again, this is primarily designed to give you a flavor of some over-time changes in the average on certain questions that our data permit us to examine, and to look a little bit more carefully at the results from a couple of months ago.

So if you look at Figure 1 in the handout, this shows the trend of average scores on several questions that have to do with market orientation; that is, support for various ways of looking at economic institutions and principles that can be either supportive of or in opposition to market principles. For the most part, the trends are either stable or downward. The exception is the rating of private businesses whose average acceptance rate has continued to go up from 1991–1997—that is the big line on the top of the chart. The question of the line that is labeled "G"— it has plus signs as the delimiter is sort of in the middle—that is the question that Fred referred to in his talk as the locus of responsibility question. Should the government be responsible for getting you a job or should people have to get their own jobs? The downward trend on that signifies that more Russians on average in 1997 believe that the government should be responsible for finding people work. Although if the government then does not turn around and give them a salary, I do not know how they benefitted from that, but be that as it may. And again, I am going to go through these rather briefly, so if you turn to Figure 2 then, we will look at a different set of questions. Again, I will be happy to go into these in more detail later. Here are some questions that relate to what I label people's "pro-Communist beliefs," that is, support for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1991 and 1992 and then the Communist Party of the Russian Federation—a very different entity—in 1995 and 1997, and then three additional questions that, in some way or another, tap their favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward the Soviet Union, its practices, institutions, and symbols. As you can see, there is a jump upward from 1992–1995 that indicates a greater sympathy for the Communist ideals, symbols, and things. One thing to note about the top line, the rating of those two parties, is that the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the Communist party of the Russian Federation are different. The Communist party of the Russian Federation, of course, is one party in a

multi-party system. It has behaved as a parliamentary party for the most part, even though some of its platform positions in recent elections have been rather extreme. It is, nevertheless, not necessarily tied to the activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the party/state organization in the Soviet Union. So, that gap between 1992 and 1995 ought to be understood as representing really two quite different things. But, in any case, the rise from 1992–1995, is important and the tailing off, for the most part, of that rate of increase from 1995–1997 is also probably worthy of note here.

Figure 3 then turns to some questions that asked what people thought was dangerous to the country, what kind of threats faced Russia. Crime, unemployment, and inequality were asked about. The scale ranged from one to seven, with seven indicating the highest level of worry about the country and, not surprisingly, there is a high perception of threat or danger to the country on all three scores. One thing I do need to point out though, is that in 1991 and 1992 there were only five possible answers. The scale ranged from one to five, which means even though I adjusted the median point to reflect that difference, in 1995 and 1997 people could spread out their answers a bit more. They could choose a higher level of perception of fear, and that, in part, accounts for the sharp upward rise for average scores in all three questions from 1992–1995. It does not account for all of it, though. Real events from 1992–1995 account for people's perceptions of rising danger from crime. For example, the amount of highly publicized brutal crimes in Russian cities did go up during 1992 and subsequent years. But that noteworthy jump in all three questions is partly an artifact of the way we asked our questions.

Again, there is either a downward trend or a decrease in the rapidity of rise between 1995 and 1997. I note these things in part because Fred and Jeff noted the issues that continued to be debated about whether a corner has been turned, to what degree over time change is momentary or continuous, etc. So you can look at these data with those issues in mind.

In Figure 4, I present responses labeled "democratic attitudes" that are a series of six questions. Let me point out here that what I think unites these six questions is not that they are about what Russians think about democracy as a symbol or as a word, or really what they think about democratic institutions and procedures as much as there are certain attitudes about different ways of organizing society and interpersonal relations and things that social scientists believe that if they are prevalent in a society and deeply held, can be helpful for the consolidation of a democracy. So with one exception, these do not ask people about what they think of democracy, what does democracy mean to them, or what do they think of Democrats—which is a particularly loaded question in Russia. What these questions present is maybe something slightly different than what has quite properly been studied in addition by people interested in Russian mass opinion, which is the attitude toward democracy as a symbol, democracy as a way of running the country, and the institutions of democracy. So really what I have here is democratic attitudes, things that if Russians held them to the same degree that you find in consolidated democratic societies, that would probably be a very good sign.

I want to note three different trends for change over time. First of all, there are some questions that relate to the power or rights of citizens. These are the ones labeled A, B, and F. These, for the most part, stay steady or slightly rise over time and again upward on these scores means more pro-democratic or more supportive of democracy. These are good trends. I think the lesson here being that, for the most part, when

Russians become upset at this or that aspect of democracy or what the Democrats have done when they held sway in the government, that did not mean the Russians thought that "Okay, our voice, our influence, or our rights ought to be taken away." There are a couple of questions, those labeled C and E, that counterpose stability to an abstract word. And in both cases, those decline. During the turbulent years of 1992 on, Russians became more convinced that maybe some stability was a good thing, some strong leadership was a good thing. Frankly, I agree with them. Then, finally, the question about minority rights, which is the top line in that chart labeled D: It shows a decline from 1992–1995, and then stays the same from 1995–1997. It has a little different over-time dimension than the other two categories. So Figure 4 has some quite different trends.

The final thing in the handout is a table with some regression results, a bunch of numbers and asterisks and things. And I know you love that. So what I will do, after explaining what the columns refer to, what the variables are that are being studied, what are the dependent variables, is to express these findings in English. The numbers that are in the left column of each category with the asterisks are the regression coefficients for each variable on the left. In parentheses to the right of that is a standardized coefficient, which is just taking all the different metrics, ages, and years, education in that five- or six-point scale, etc., and putting them in reference to the standard deviation of the variable, so that we can sort of judge bigness of impact a little bit better. In both cases, higher means a stronger impact for all these numbers, of course.

The things being studied that I have labeled in the three right-hand columns as "support for the market," "support for Communism," and "democratic outlooks" are index variables. I took the questions shown in Figures 1, 2, and 4, and combined them arithmetically to form a single variable. In other words, the statistical tests show that those responses tended to intercorrelate; people who are high on one also tended to be high on the others; that they were all, in some sense, tapping a single dimension of outlooks. It made sense to combine them into one variable to produce a broader range of possible answers or possible scores for the different respondents and to, therefore, have a more interesting range of variation to study. The variable labelled "Support for the Market" could range from -1.16 to +1.92. The one labelled "Support for Communism" could range from -1.84 to +1.5, in other words they range in increments of hundreds or so from -2 to +2, the same for the index of the support for democracy.

So instead of putting people into a question where they could only range along five points or seven points or something, these index variables can range more or less in a continuous scale. That allows us to separate those who are strongly pro-Communist, for example, from those who are less so, or even very strongly anti-Communist. I regressed the three variables again, "support for the market," "support for Communism," and "democratic outlooks" against a series of variables that have to do not with people's attitudes but with their place in society: their age, their level of education, where they live, what kind of job they have, etc. There is one question about their attitudes: a variable created out of the questions in Figure 3 about how high they think the danger facing Russia is from various sources. I hope that little overview of Table 1 is clear enough.

Let me then proceed to translate the numbers into English as follows. The first set of results for support of the markets show that those Russians who are significantly more likely to be in favor of market principles and norms are first men, young people, the more highly educated, those Russians who live in cities and urban areas, those with

higher incomes, those who believe that their family finances over the coming year are likely to either stay the same or improve (there are not many of the latter people, but there are a few), and those who see relatively less danger facing Russia from crime, unemployment, and economic inequality. So again, each of those variables had a statistically significant impact on support for the market when holding the other variables constant. Of them, the most powerful impact was age. Younger people are strongly more pro-market on average than older Russians, with the question about the dangers facing the country being a close second.

The middle column there, "support for communism," those who show significantly less support for communism in Russia in 1997 are young people, Russians living in cities and urban areas—especially those in Moscow and St. Petersburg—those who believe their family finances will stay the same or improve over the coming year, and those who see relatively less danger—a list of categories similar to those in the first column about economic attitudes.

Finally, the "democratic outlooks column." Those Russians who are significantly more likely to voice outlooks that in the social science literature are thought to be supportive of democracy would include men rather than women, young people, the more highly educated, those not working in blue-collar occupations, and those who see relatively less danger to the country—with the most powerful explanatory impact being that of education. I believe Jeff said a minute ago that his findings also show that education is highly important, so our recent interviews suggest the same thing.

Let me just categorize a few of my reactions to these recent results. Again, I have only had them for a few weeks, so this is really a first cut at looking at these interesting results. There is a very strong generation gap in Russia. I think that is quite clear. The difference between the young and the old is marked and, again, not surprising to observers of Russian society. One thing I do note in Table 1 is that the impact of age as an explanatory variable is lower for the final column, the "democratic outlooks" than for "pro-market" and "pro-Communist views." I think this suggests that there is less evidence for a consistently anti-democratic culture among those who were socialized during the Soviet era; and that one's views toward democracy depend on other things as well, even for people who grew up and were socialized in the Soviet era.

The variables I employ in the regression, for the most part, are indicators of how the changes of recent years are affecting you: whether you come into the economic, social, and other reforms from 1992 on with key advantages that will allow you to weather these storms relatively favorably, or whether you have been, in effect, wiped out by the harsh economic and social conditions of recent years; whether you have had very little to buffer you from that and have experienced the worst of this transition; whether you think you and the future or your children can have prospects to survive and prosper under the new system; things like that. The lesson we should draw from these and other findings is that a learning process continues to be underway, that what happens in the future in Russia still has the potential to determine the outcome of this fascinating story. Russians are trying to figure out what the new system means to them, what will it do for them, and to what degree should they support it. So, as we look to the future, five, ten years or more down the road, I think what Russian political culture will become and the degree to which Russia's public will support and provide a buffer or supportive barricade to democratic institutions will depend on whether the economy stabilizes and

grows, whether people ever get paid their salaries, whether political competition is maintained—and it seems to be the case that politicians are responsive—whether a strong yet not repressive state can somehow be constructed. In other words, to a large extent, I think Russia's mass politics and Russia's mass political views still depend on decisions and actions of Russia's elites, for better or for worse. And I will end there and be happy to answer any questions.

Blair Ruble:

It is very warm in here and everybody has just been barraged with information, but I think we will open it up to the floor. We have 30–40 minutes. We can take questions and see where we end up. First over here, and after we do some responses, we will go over there. Yes, go ahead.

Question:

Just to introduce some comparative data which is remarkably similar for Latin America, especially for the bigger and more industrialized countries with per capita income comparable to Russia. It is striking that support for democracy when you ask people what sort of government they prefer, overwhelmingly they are in favor of democracy, 85, 88, 90 percent, something like that. Then when you ask the question that a couple of you asked, "What do you mean by democracy?" you get an enormous variety of responses. Some say patronage, others say welfarism, others say jobs, but the one that is the most striking is support for strong government: roughly 65–70 percent of respondents say that; 80–85 percent for democracy; 60–65 percent for strong government.

The question I would like to ask you is if your data shows that those two can be compatible—that is, democracy and strong government—or whether they represent—and this goes back to the Sovietology approach—an alternative fork in the road, or as it is referred to in some of the Latin American data, "the evil option of an authoritarian output." That is, you support democracy in the abstract as long as things are working well and the economy is growing, economic power is expanding, but suppose you get in trouble, or strikes start to occur, or a la Peru, you get violence and chaos and disintegration and rebel groups, and people start shooting at each other, and so forth. Then the autocratic option, which we have recently seen in the past couple of days, starts to look more attractive.

I wonder if you would discuss this a little bit, whether you can have a democracy with strong leaders, as Professor Hahn would suggest we might think, or democracy with strong government—that is sort of nationalistic, maybe rejects some of the IMF and the World Bank and even the U.S. restrictions on some of these matters—and whether that is an alternative move that the country may follow—not a very attractive one from the point of view of foreign policy— or whether these can be combined somehow, which seem to be suggested in some of your comments. Could both of you wrestle with that a little bit?

Frederic Fleron:

One of the things about which we confused ourselves early on was when we encountered survey findings about Russia which showed a desire for a strong leader. Some people interpreted that as "Aha! There is an element of continuity with the old traditional culture of wanting the czar and so forth and so on." Interestingly enough, in the context of which those surveys were done, this was discovered a few years later. What Russians meant by a strong leader was an effective leader, someone who would act like a leader, not like a Stalin necessarily, or a czar, or an Ivan Grozny, but an effective leader who would get something done. There is a big difference between those two. And

here is an example of where we confused ourselves by reading the wrong meanings into the particular words. But to get to your larger question of a strong dose of authoritarianism in transitional regimes, that may be required in almost any context because it is an effective way of getting things done. You can have too much democracy, too fast, and it just does not work. And as long as in their hearts people have an affection for democracy, that is good and you can keep moving in those directions but it is difficult to try to do too much at once, both on the political front and the economic front. And more recent studies, a project I am involved in with Harry Eckstein, Erik Hoffmann, and Bill Reisinger, suggest that more synchretic approaches are desirable to take things much more slowly and that there needs to be a balance between various disparate elements in society, particularly between democratic and authoritarian elements in society. That is, it suggests that a healthy dose of authoritarianism might be very useful in order to keep the system together and to be effective.

Question:

In the realm of practical politics, does that point toward a Lenin for example, a presumably democratically elected leader at some point, a sort of tough guy, strong, nationalistic?

Frederic Fleron:

I do not know. I would rather not get involved in the weighing of personalities but just the principle at this point.

Jeffrey Hahn:

The question is a good one and I am anxious to hear Bill's response because he spent some time analyzing exactly this question and he has data that I do not remember from which article exactly, but I did take note of it because I had the same findings. The findings appear to be almost universal. If you look at Table VI or VII if it is available to you, I think there are two points that I want to make in response to your specific question. Number one: There are differences between mass and elites on the question of a strong leader. There is a great deal more support for the idea of a strong leader among the mass populace than among the elites. There are some significant differences. The second thing I want to say is that it does appear that support for a strong leader is compatible with the democratic support variable. If you look at Table VI, for instance, you look at what to me is the most clear-cut question. I asked them to agree or disagree if a few strong leaders can do more for their country than all laws in discussion. And in 1993, 76 percent agreed; in 1996, it was even higher by 1 percent (77 percent agreed). On all the variables that were designed to measure attitudes towards a strong leader, you found support. And in fact, that support grew if anything over that three year period. At the same time, if you look at the table above that deals with popular participation, and you ask "All citizens should have an equal opportunity to influence government. Do you agree or not?" You have got an 80 percent response rate in both 1993 and slightly larger in 1996 saying yes. So here you have a response that is relatively consistent. If you had figures all over the place, you would wonder whether you were getting non-responses but these are pretty much consistent and in the same ballpark. People in two surveys three years apart indicated support for strong leaders and, at the same time, support for popular participation. That indicates to me that there is a compatibility. It is a compatibility that extends to the economic side of things too. If you look at Table VII, one of the questions I asked them was, for instance, "The share of private sector in business and industry today should be increased." In 1993, the percent saying they agreed was 77 percent. By 1996, it had declined somewhat, but it was still a healthy 60 percent who agreed with it.

At the same time, if you look at the resistance to accumulation of wealth, or what I would call an egalitarianism scale, one of the questions is, "If others live in poverty, the government should react so that no one could become wealthy." Here you again have a majority of the respondents agreeing, and more or less the same levels, about two thirds in 1993–1996.

So when I hear the kinds of arguments from people who are saying to me, "Look, your own data show Russians want a strong, authoritarian rule and they hate market systems. They want to have an egalitarian system, that there is this strong residual for authoritarian socialism." I just do not see it. The data are not singing that particular song to me. It is not that incompatible.

William Reisinger:

Well, you know, that is one of the great issues in Western political theory, right? So, I think that Russians have to begin grappling with it seriously and the context is very important for them. Think about the collection of taxes. A strong government ought to collect taxes effectively yet clearly, the Russian government cannot collect taxes right now. Well, to do that, our democratically elected government of the United States gives the Internal Revenue Service tremendous powers to be, at the very least, cranky and mean and kind of intrusive and bothersome and things like that. And for the most part, I think that is the right thing, that does not make the U.S. a non-democracy; it just makes the U.S. a democracy with a strong government that can collect taxes. But there are Americans who think that the Internal Revenue Service goes way too far. They do not want to have our government doing that kind of nasty stuff. So even in a country like the United States, it is not a resolved question. My interpretation of data from earlier years in our surveys was that Russians do, in fact, want strong leaders in the sense of getting the job done, a city that works, Mayor Daly or in this case, Mayor Luzhkov. But I do not see evidence from our surveys, including this most recent one, that suggests that they have the kind of paternalism, but the author attributed paternalism to those in Communist societies. This was about Eastern Europe more than about the Soviet Union, but attributing paternalism as a key feature growing out of Communist institutions and things that would characterize these societies. Paternalism in the sense of, "I do not want to know about politics. You tell me what to do and I will do it. Instead, our data suggests in Figure 4, that on questions when you ask about "Should people have the right to oppose government policy?" in fact, the average score has been to agree with that more so over time. And that our question about "Should people not participate if the leaders are doing Okay?" which is the one labeled B, does not change at all. It is in the middle of our range and it stays almost exactly stable over the five years that we ask the question. So I think that there is a combined element of feeling that the public ought to have the right to be involved in politics and news, exert their voice in the political system, together with wanting things to work, wanting the streets to be maintained and cleared of snow and things like that.

Blair Ruble:

We have about twenty-five minutes left, so I ask people to be a little bit more concise.

Question:

This is a good question for Professor Hahn. You mentioned briefly that party identification was basically not more than 33–66 percent of the population, if I heard you correctly. Which parties get the increase and is there any kind of correlation with other values of democratic tolerance? I realize that is a

fact of the data, but I want to know your opinion on this.

Jeffrey Hahn:

The nature of the question was "What political party do you support?" We then had a list, encoded, and so forth. The first set of figures that I cited were from the 1990–1993 survey, which was carried out in March/April of 1993. Basically, 77 percent chose the "none of the above" option. By 1996, it had dropped to 33 percent or less. I do not have the exact figures, but in that range. I attribute the change to the most commonly well-known parties.

Question:

One of my favorite quotes from Leonardo Da Vinci is, "he argued about words not things." It is extremely easy to drop into arguing about words and not subjects. It is possible to have order without democracy, but it is definitely impossible to have democracy without order. Now order can be of two kinds: rules-oriented or law-oriented. Laws consist of two things: common sense and procedure. Now clearly in Russia, legal procedure is rudimentary, so therefore, laws cannot be enforced through procedure. Therefore, you essentially have to have a benign, forceful leader, such as De Gaulle or the present French president, who has powers of persuasion to act benignly. Until you develop procedure and laws in writing and are ready to enforce them, it is pointless to argue about authoritarian democratic because democratic is meaningless without law.

Jeffrey Hahn:

I agree with you about the importance of law and about the importance of developing respect for procedure. I am not sure I am willing entirely to agree with where I think you are taking it in the Russian context. I am going to depart from using public opinion research to address it. I just returned from Yaroslavl a few days ago. The biggest debate in Yaroslavl was whether to introduce a sales tax. It was a very divisive issue. The oblast eventually adopted legislation permitting the city government to pass a 3 percent sales tax. The city municipality legislature did so, and so you had, in fact, for about three weeks, a sales tax imposed. There was widespread opposition to the sales tax, as you can imagine, from among others, entrepreneurs, as you might expect. The entrepreneurs took the issue to the procurator and said to the procurator, "This is illegal. The city and provincial legislatures do not have the right in law to pass a sales tax." The procurator agreed with them because there was and is now, as we speak, a law being considered at the federal level. What the procurator did was to appeal to the legislature at the provincial and city levels to appeal their laws. The city and provincial levels refused to do so, maintaining the law and sales tax on the books. The procurator at that point, believing that the law was in violation, took it to the court. The court rendered a decision that in fact this legislation, at this point in time, was not legal. The city government then passed a law suspending its legislation pending the decision of the federal government. In short, I asked the chairman of the city council why they did that, and he explained the whole history of it. I quote to you his words. He said, "You have to respect the decision of the court." That, to me, is encouraging. I just want to make one quick point. Yes, you need a strong leader, but you need to have a strong leader operating within a framework of laws. And I think, at least in this particular concrete case, that seemed to me to be happening.

Question:

I am still trying to get clear here. My experience is that if you ask everyday Russians on the street for a definition of democracy, market economy, they have a very unclear picture of what those words mean. They sometimes confuse

the two, the economic system and the political system, so I do not see a large number of Russians having a complete picture of what a democratic system or a market economy means. At the same time, they have a lot of smaller chunks of it, so that if you ask the individual questions that you all seem to be asking, they have a piece of it in that they have some attitudes that have predisposed them towards a market economy or a democratic system. Can you verify that? Do you think that they have a big picture that is a real grasp of the two?

Blair Ruble:

I am going to ask that one of you choose to take the question, since we are beginning to run out of time. Any takers?

Jeffrey Hahn:

I will be glad to. I think that there is evidence to suggest, particularly Miller et al., in particular in the Iowa team of which Bill is a member, found that there is a different definition of democracy depending on whether you are talking to elites who tend to stress responsibility and law more, or whether you are addressing that kind of question to the mass public where they try to emphasize freedom—freedom of speech, personal freedoms, and economic well-being. What was interesting to me in their work was that they asked the question of value consistency: Was there a consistency of belief systems? Somewhere along the lines of the Converse study on mass beliefs systems. And they found that there was greater consistency for elite understanding than for mass understanding, but a surprisingly coherent set of value consistency among the public. And, although there were differences between the belief consistencies of the mass and of the elites, they were not so far apart as would have been predicted by the assumption you began with, which is these folks haven't got the foggiest idea about what they mean by democracy, or at least a consistent notion of what they mean by democracy or market reform.

Blair Ruble:

Okay. I am going to take two questions at once, and then we will begin to try to wrap up.

Question:

I am wondering if, in any of these, a political literacy factor was looked at. In other words, as to what people read, whether they get their news consistently from television, or whether they express no interest in political moves as it relates to their opinions and willingness to engage in political activity. Are there particular publications for those who are reading that relate to their feelings toward authoritarian or democratic approaches, anything where communications work into the studies of what you have been doing?

Question:

There is the view that if there were indeed an economic crisis and the leaders would seize the opportunity, that there would really not really be any kind of strong protest and they could probably get away with it in a crisis or deteriorating situation. Is that view consistent with what the three of you have seen?

Blair Ruble:

Who wants to take the first question? Bill?

William Reisinger:

There are, in all of our surveys, questions about the respondents' attention to news: how many newspapers they subscribe to or read daily, how often per week they listen to television news or radio news, etc. For the most part, those tend to correlate so well with the level of education that they do not separately seem to have a big impact on our explanation for different sorts of attitudes. The problem,

there, of course is that really people who consistently watch news or read lots of newspapers attentively, or at least the news portions of newspapers, even in the United States, are few and attentiveness is correlated with education. It is we policy freaks, not the mass public as a whole. There is room, I believe, for some fascinating research into how more popular forms of communication—media, the television shows that are not labeled news programs, for example, the popular press—how these influence Russians' political views. For the most part, I do not think a lot of attention has been paid to that yet by people doing the survey research. But in any case, that certainly needs to be done. Maybe others know of people who are doing that, but I think I would make that distinction. If you just ask people the question, "How often do you read the newspapers or watch television news, etc.?" you get a wide range of differences. But for the most part, it correlates with education.

Blair Ruble:

Jeff, will you respond?

Jeffrey Hahn:

Marc's question is an interesting one. He is suggesting that general support for democracy is going to be there only as long as things are okay, that if Russians are suddenly confronted with a crisis situation, a strong horseman can come in and impose authoritarian rule. And you are emphasizing the fragility of democratic institutions and values in Russia. I am not sure I would agree with you, Marc, on the basis of what my reading of the data is. To me, what is remarkable is how support for democracy has been resilient as measured by longitudinal surveys. Despite the past six years of economic disaster in which most people are clearly perceiving themselves as being hurt by first, inflation, by the drop in productivity, by all of these factors, nevertheless there has been a remarkable consistency in the level of support for a commitment to democracy. I would attribute this, as Fred seems to me has suggested in his stuff, as I have in mine, and so has Bill, that this resilience is due to long term social and economic changes, modernization that has led to a fundamentally different Russia in 1990–1996 than existed in 1890–1896.

It is indeed possible, as you suggest, that someone may come along and take over by force, and try to reimpose authoritarian political institutions on Russians. But I think if that were to happen, there would be a gap, a disengagement between the social base and the institutional structures that would create political instability in Russia and would eventually lead to some kind of social changes similar to the ones that we have been witnessing for the past six years.

Blair Ruble:

Okay, there are two more questions on the floor and we will begin to wrap up.

Question:

I would like to ask Professor Hahn, just coming back, did you have any postnasal drips from reaction to the news of the Cabinet, the new ministers that have been chosen, and what they might represent?

Blair Ruble:

Before you answer, right here.

Question:

Although the Cold War is over and Russians have much more freedom now to speak frankly than they have ever had in history, I would expect them to be a little reserved about it. What were your experiences in interviewing the people? Was it hard to get them to open up and speak freely and do you think that in the answers that they did give,

they may have held back their most extreme views?

Blair Ruble:

I see Jeff writing. Before Jeff responds, Bill or anyone?

William Reisinger:

I can take the second one.

Blair Ruble:

Okay, who wants to take the first one?

Jeffrey Hahn:

I honestly do not have much of a feel for the changes at the national level of the Cabinet that you are describing. I did interview a lot of the relevant elites in Yaroslavl and the question was never raised, which may in itself be an indication of a certain level of disinterest, or perhaps an expectation of continuity on the part of the new Cabinet officials. Nemtsov was not mentioned, although Nizhny Novgorod was because Nizhny Novgorod has a 5 percent sales tax and they did not have a legal objection to it from their procurator. Consequently, Yaroslavl looked at Nizhny Novgorod's tax situation with some envy, but they did not speak much of Nemtsov. So I really do not have much of a feel. I talked to some of my Moscow friends, but they are all cynics anyway. So I would not put too much stock in their opinion.

May I respond briefly to the second question?

Blair Ruble:

Yes, I think actually if all three of you could respond to the second question.

Jeffrey Hahn:

As I understood the question, it is whether the respondents, or the extent to which the respondents, are giving us answers or are afraid to speak. Even back in 1990, I was struck. A lot of us wondered exactly about that. We thought that Russians who for so long had been afraid to speak openly about political issues would be reluctant to answer questions about their political views. One way to reduce the impact was to make sure that the people who were doing the interviewing were not only native Russian speakers and not Americans, but from Yaroslavl, and that they were middle-aged women for the most part, who are the most ideal interviewers. I did, however, go out just to check and see that things were being done properly on a number of interviews. What struck me, to be honest, was not how reluctant the people were to speak about politics, but how voluminously they spoke about it. Once you gave them a question, you could hardly get them to shut up. They gave you so much information, they took a simple yes-or-no question that you had asked, and they would begin to expound with vigor, with passion. I asked in the first survey and in the others, "Would you be willing to take this survey again?" An overwhelming majority, 85 percent, said "Yes, we would be happy to." So, I see that Richard Dobson is nodding. I am interested to hear Bill Reisinger's impression, but I think that most of the people who do this kind of field work have had a kind of similar experience, that for Russians, it is not a problem getting them to speak candidly.

Frederic Fleron:

That is important, because a basic question that I raised early on with regard to this research concerned the validity of what you were finding out, particularly research done in a society which has had a long history of dual persona—the public persona and the private persona—and were these surveys really tapping the public persona. But if you are telling us that people respond with great enthusiasm and so forth, that lends more credence to the idea that you are getting at the private persona. Do you think?

Jeffrey Hahn:

Yes. I wanted to say this to you for a long time because what strikes me out of all of this, is that you have got so many different teams in the field independently conducting this research, not only cross-sectionally, but longitudinally over time, with such a degree of consistency of responses, that the notion that you are getting private or dishonest responses, to me, cannot be sustained in the light of the kind of evidence that we are gathering independently by so many different teams.

Frederic Fleron:

It is important that somebody say that in print, in public.

William Reisinger:

I agree with what Jeff has just described in terms of reaction. In terms of foreigners, I think it is really important that our surveys—and I believe that almost all of the others that are funded by Western agencies—go to great lengths to ensure that the mass respondents do not know that it is supported by a foreign agency or that foreigners are at all involved. Even in the pre-test phase, when I or others will go along with a Russian middle-aged woman generally to interview people, I stay mute and just listen. And if I am forced to be drawn out by the Russian respondents who tend to want to be social and want to give you tea and other things, if they do draw me out, it is clear that I am not a native and so I am described as a foreign student observing. And so it is not said that I am in any way connected with sponsoring these questions. At the level of elites, some of the time these projects have involved studying legislators, members of the government, and other things. It is less easy to disguise the fact that these are Western questions and they come from Western social scientists. And I believe that deserves more study, that what a member of the Russian Duma answers when they think they are talking to an American public could well be different than what they answer to something that they do not see any connection. But at the mass level, I just do not think the people responding have any clue that there are Western social scientists involved.

Question:

Could I just ask one quick question? Are your findings going to be publicized to the population? Are the Russian people and the Russian media and so forth going to be using these, or are they strictly for yourselves?

Jeffrey Hahn:

To speak concretely, the project, for instance, that Blair and I and Tim Colton and Jerry Hough worked on together, we actually went back and delivered in Russian to the Russians in Yaroslavl, at a two-day conference, the results of our research and we published a book. It was published by the city of Yaroslavl from those conference proceedings.

Blair Ruble:

It has been all over television and radio.

Jeffrey Hahn:

And in fact I was on television last week in Yaroslavl and Blair has been on television there many times. We made all of our information available and tried to provide feedback of what we had observed. In part, it is because doing so is useful to us.

William Reisinger:

I would add too, and I could say this briefly, that there are so many Russian firms doing surveys for so many things—for politicians, for newspapers, etc.—that the Russians now have their own industry on survey research. And so, that is what gets into the other media. Our survey results really do not get into that level. We have shared data

in the past with collaborators who are Russian scholars, and they write up reports out of their think tanks and they circulate among the policy elites in Moscow and things occasionally, but in terms of the public debate in Russia, it is the results you see every week in *Izvestiya* and elsewhere that are really important.

Blair Ruble:

Well, I want to ask an impossible question at the end, so I am going to try to phrase it in a way that you can pick and choose your ground on answering. Based on the survey research that you have been involved in, are there any measures that national political leaders, local political leaders, or the U.S. government can take that would advance market reform and democratic reform *or* undercut democratic reform and market reform? You do not have to answer on all three levels for both cases, but what are the lessons that should be learned for politicians out of this information?

William Reisinger:

Well, I guess what I am drawing from, my studies of these and other things over recent years, is that to the extent you can decouple the word "democracy" from particular policies of transition that have been put into place and promulgated in the last five years, it is probably a good thing. When we ask people, "What do you think of institutions and people?" and one of them is Democrats, it goes down through the floor because the Democrats are the one group of policymakers, including Gaidar and the others, who put through the shock therapy program in 1992 and consequently bear the brunt of blame for the painful results. So the Democrats now have a bad odor and it is because of actual things that happened to individual Russians, and that is unfortunate. To the degree that you can stop trying to promise streets paved with gold as the meaning of democracy, that would be helpful but maybe that is as far as I would go.

Jeffrey Hahn:

It is a difficult question. I think that what we are seeing in Russia is something of a window of opportunity and it is closing incrementally. I responded to Marc Zlotnik's question by suggesting that the situation was not fragile and I do not think it is fragile for the reasons I indicated. On the other hand, it would be foolish to ignore evidence of some erosion over time. It seems to me that when the reform period started, the level of support for these reforms was high, and I am not sure that it is as high as it was, or that there is as much enthusiasm as there was. I think that a lot of it has to do with, for better or worse, some degree of disenchantment, not with democracy, not with a democratic political system, not the affective orientation—to use an Almondian word— but the evaluative one, the evaluation of the regime in place, specifically Yeltsin and his team of "democrats" who have indeed made those terms odious to the public. And I am concerned that we, the United States, in adopting Yeltsin as the individual who is going to be the one to implement the kinds of reforms that we want to see undertaken, in particular, shock therapy and the most rapid development possible of a market economy, may be contributing to the undermining of that enthusiasm, of that affect. And if that is the case, I think we really ought to be a little less pushy about ensuring that *our* agenda is implemented there.

Frederic Fleron:

I was going to connect with a comment somebody made earlier that triggered the idea that maybe Russians are developing their own peculiar idea of democracy. Other countries have done that, and there is no reason for us to suspect that they are necessarily going to develop our form of democracy. I think we would be fools to suspect that they

might. For, after all, in many countries the particular forms that democracy take depend on various historical and cultural traditions. Not all democracies have written constitutions. But unless the government can get control of street crime and the level of corruption and start collecting taxes and doing some of the things that governments are supposed to do, that strikes me as the source of the real problems in the long run.

Blair Ruble:

I would like to bring the session to a close. I think when Fred and his fellow graduate students back in Indiana began writing their articles, there was no body of literature, there were no different generations and cohorts of people approaching the study of this part of the world through behavioral methodologies. I think one thing we have seen in the room in this rich discussion is that there is a body of literature that can be wrestled with and people can contribute to and disagree with, augment, and strengthen. I think that is a testimony to at least one revolution of the late 1960s that has had a lasting impact and I would like to thank one of the original revolutionaries for coming here and actually organizing the session. So thank you.

TABLE I. Comparative Political Efficacy Measures for Local and National Government: Yaroslavl, 1990, 1993, and 1996.

Percentage political efficacy: national	Yaroslavl (1990) (N=975)	Yaroslavl (1993) (N=1019)	Yaroslavl (1996) (N=962)
1. People like me don't have much say about what government does.			
Agree	84.8	89.0	87.9
Disagree	9.0	6.3	6.7
Don't know	6.3	4.7	5.5
2. I don't think public officials care much what people like me think.			
Agree	55.9	72.5	84.9
Disagree	29.4	15.4	7.9
Don't know	14.7	12.1	6.8
3. Sometimes government seems so complicated that people like me can't really understand what's going on.			
Agree	69.4	70.9	74.3
Disagree	23.2	8	18.0
Don't know	7.5	8.4	7.7
4. Generally speaking, those we elect lose touch with the people quickly.			
Agree	61.0	87.4	81.9
Disagree	16.3	3.5	7.9
Don't know	22.6	9.0	9.9
Percentage political efficacy: local			
5. People like me don't have any say about what the local government does.			
Agree	83.3	83.6	82.2
Disagree	10.4	8.5	10.2
Don't know	6.0	7.9	7.6
6. Sometimes local government seems so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.			
Agree	59.7	62.9	58.3
Disagree	30.6	23.8	30.8
Don't know	9.7	13.2	10.9

* The "don't know" response was noticeably more frequent among Russian respondents. This could be interpreted as reflecting greater passivity or lack of interest in matters political. However, a contrary interpretation is also possible. The "don't know" response may represent a particularly thoughtful and interested opinion; e.g., upon reflection, the respondent really "doesn't know" whether "the government cares what people think," etc.

TABLE II. Comparative Measures of Political Trust for Local and National Government: Yaroslavl, 1990, Yaroslavl 1993, and Yaroslavl 1996 (in percent)

Percentage trust: national	Yaroslavl (1990) (N=975)	Yaroslavl (1993) (N=1019)	Yaroslavl (1996) (N=962)
1. How much of the time do you think government makes the right decisions?			
Almost always	18.3	6.4	3.9
Half the time	39.2	38.6	31.9
Rarely or never	26.3	32.4	51.5
Don't know	16.2	22.7	12.9
2. Would you say that government, when it makes decisions, takes care for the well-being of all the people or only for a few?			
Benefits all	36.3	14.3	7.7
Sometimes all	26.2	23.7	24.5
Benefits few	29.6	53.2	62.4
Don't know	7.9	8.8	5.4
3. Do you feel that a majority of those running the government are capable or do you think only a few are?			
A majority	24.7	13.0	8.5
About half	24.9	22.9	22.8
A minority	37.0	46.2	56.2
Don't know	13.2	18.0	12.4
Percentage political trust: Local			
4. How much of the time do you think your city government makes the right decisions?			
Almost always	6.3	12.2	11.5
Half the time	23.1	38.4	41.7
Rarely or never	36.3	19.5	30.6
Don't know	34.3	29.9	16.3
5. Would you say that your local government when it makes decisions takes care for the well-being of all people or only for a few?			
Benefits all	15.2	17.0	13.7
Sometimes all	23.3	31.2	33.0
Benefits few	46.3	38.7	46.9
Don't know	15.3	13.2	6.4

TABLE III. Comparative Levels of Popular Support for Elections: Yaroslavl 1990, Yaroslavl 1993, and Yaroslavl 1996

Percentage support for democratic elections:	Yaroslavl 1990 (N=975)	Yaroslavl 1993 (N=1019)	Yaroslavl 1996 (N=962)
1. A good many local elections aren't important enough to bother with.			
Agree	14.0	27.1	21.8
Disagree	82.5	62.0	66.4
Don't know	3.5	10.8	11.8
2. If a person doesn't care how an election comes out, then that person shouldn't vote.			
Agree	44.2	51.2	36.4
Disagree	50.8	37.5	53.1
Don't know	5.0	10.8	10.5
3. So many other people vote in national elections that it doesn't matter much whether I vote or not.			
Agree	27.5	39.3	28.8
Disagree	68.3	53.7	62.2
Don't know	4.2	7.1	9.1
4. It isn't so important to vote when you know your party [candidate] doesn't have a chance to win.			
Agree	28.2	37.2	36.3
Disagree	62.0	52.2	52.7
Don't know	9.8	10.6	11.1

TABLE IV. Comparative Levels of Political Interest: Yaroslavl 1990, Yaroslavl 1993, and Yaroslavl 1996 (in percent)

Percentage level of political interest*	Yaroslavl 1990 (N=975)	Yaroslavl 1993 (N=1019)	Yaroslavl 1996 (N=962)
Follow politics			
Most of the time	52.3	37.5	30.1
Some of the time	29.5	30.4	34.0
Now and then [rarely]	12.1	20.8	21.4
Hardly at all [never/almost never]	5.6	11.3	12.5
No Answer			2.0

* The full text of the question was: "Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and politics most of the time, whether there's an election or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, now and then, or hardly at all?

TABLE V. Political Participation Levels in Yaroslavl, 1990, 1993, 1996 (Rank order, percent)

	(1990) (N=975)	1993 (N=1019)	1996 (N=962)
1. Voted in March 1990 elections for deputy to Russian CPD	(99.0)*	81.9	75.3**
2. Voted in March 1990 local soviets elections	(99.0)*	78.0	61.1+
3. Discussed political issues in meeting of work collectives	(63.3)	55.1	47.5
4. Attended pre-election meetings	(44.0)	35.5	33.3
5. Participated in election work	(30.1)	32.7	23.9
6. Took part in political demonstrations	(13.2)	12.8	10.6
7. Attended deputy meetings with constitutents	(23.4)	12.4	8.9
8. Written to deputy about political opinion	(6.7)	7.0	5.1
9. Met with deputy in reception hours	(7.6)	6.4	3.5
10. Met with deputy on personal problem at another time	(7.8)	5.5	3.4
11. Met with deputy on a matter of public concern at another time	(5.4)	4.5	4.1
12. Made formal complaints to your deputy to bring to city government	(4.2)	2.7	1.9
13. Expressed political opinion in media	(4.4)	2.7	4.0

* Estimates: voter turnout for elections prior to 1990 was 99 percent as was customary in old style soviet elections.

** 1996 respondents were asked if they voted in the December 1995 elections to the State Duma.

+ 1996 respondents were asked if they voted in the 1994 elections to the city municipal council.

TABLE VI. Attitudes Related to Political Reform; Yaroslavl 1993, 1996 (in percent)

POLITICAL ATTITUDES	1993 (N=1019)	1996 (N=962)
A. Popular Participation		
1. The complexity of today's problems allows only the simplist questions to be exposed to public scrutiny		
Agree	58%	64%
Disagree	42	36
2. A high level of public participation in making decisions often leads to unwanted conflicts		
Agree	76	66
Disagree	23	35
3. All citizens should have equal opportunity to influence government		
Agree	80	82
Disagree	20	18
B. Strong leader		
4. Talented, strong-willed leaders always achieve success in any undertaking		
Agree	81	82
Disagree	19	18
5. A few strong leaders could do more for their country than all laws and discussion		
Agree	76	77
Disagree	25	28
6. There are situations when a leader should not divulge certain facts		
Agree	83	84
Disagree	17	17
SUMMARY SCALES (mean score*)		
A. Popular Participation	x=1.919	x=1.826
B. Strong Leader	x=2.095	x=1.872

* The range is 1.00–3.00. A lower mean score for scale A indicates lower support for popular participation in politics; a lower mean score for scale B indicates greater support for a strong leader. Scale reliability tests were performed to all scales. No scale items which correlated negatively were included. A minimum mean inter-item correlation of .088 was required. All scales exceeded this level. Responses of "Don't know" or "can't say" were excluded from the calculation.

TABLE VII. Attitudes Related to Economic Reform; Yaroslavl 1993, 1996 (in percent)

ECONOMIC ATTITUDES	1993 (N=1019)	1996 (N=962)
A. Accumulation of wealth		
1. An upper limit should exist on earnings so that no one accumulated more than anyone else		
Agree	51	53
Disagree	50	47
2. If others live in poverty, the government should react so that no one can become wealthy		
Agree	63	65
Disagree	37	35
3. Wealthy people should pay more than the poor should		
Agree	93	94
Disagree	7	6
B. Free market economy		
4. A system based on profit brings out the worst in human nature		
Agree	50	52
Disagree	50	48
5. A system of private enterprise is effective		
Agree	68	69
Disagree	32	31
6. State regulation of business usually brings more harm than good		
Agree	55	59
Disagree	45	41
7. The share of the private sector in business and industry today should be increased		
Agree	70	61
Disagree	31	39
8. People accumulate wealth only at the expense of others		
Agree	60	64
Disagree	40	36
SUMMARY SCALES (mean scores*)		
A. Accumulation of Wealth	x=1.948	x=1.927
B. Free Market	x=1.950	x=1.983

* The range is 1.00–3.00. The lower the mean score on Scale A the greater the resistance towards the accumulation of wealth; the lower the mean score on Scale B the more support there is for a free market economic system. Scale reliability tests were performed for all scales. No scale items which correlated negatively were included. A minimum mean inter-item correlation of .088 was required. All scales exceeded this level. "Don't know", "can't say" responses were excluded from these calculations.

Table VIII.A Correlates of Political Culture in Yaroslavl, 1990

	1 Education	2 Occupation	3 Income*	4 Socioeconomic Status Scale*	5 Age	6 Gender	7 Material Well-Being*
Political participation	.20	n.s.	NA	NA	.09	n.s.	NA
Political efficacy	.26	.15	NA	NA	.11	-.09	NA
Political trust	-.12	-.13	NA	NA	.13	n.s.	NA
Support for elections	.09	.10	NA	NA	.15	.10	NA
Political interest	.24	.12	NA	NA	n.s.	-.13	NA
Multiparty system	.18	.11	NA	NA	-.10	-.16	NA

*NA=Not available. No statistics are reported for income and SES in 1990 because the income variable used in that year is not comparable with the measure used in 1993 and 1996. The variable "material well-being" was not asked in 1990.

Table VIII. B Correlates of Political Culture in Yaroslavl, 1993

	1 Education	2 Occupation	3 Income*	4 Socioeconomic Status Scale*	5 Age	6 Gender	7 Material Well-Being*
Political participation	.25	.20	n.s.	.25	.11	n.s.	n.s.
Political efficacy	.30	.24	.10	.26	n.s.	-.12	.14
Political trust	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.14	n.s.	.13
Support for elections	.15	.12	n.s.	.11	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Political interest	.10	n.s.	n.s.	.06	.09	-.08	n.s.
Multiparty system	.30	.22	.11	.26	-.10	-.09	n.s.

Table VIII. C Correlates of Political Culture in Yaroslavl, 1996

	1 Education	2 Occupation	3 Income*	4 Socioeconomic Status Scale*	5 Age	6 Gender	7 Material Well-Being*
Political participation	.24	.09	.11	.13	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Political efficacy	.20	.12	.13	.08	.11	-.07	.14
Political trust	n.s.	-.09	-.19	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.20
Support for elections	.16	.09	.12	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.11
Political interest	.19	.06	.10	.08	n.s.	n.s.	.07
Multiparty system	.36	.09	.13	.19	-.11	-.13	.14

Source: Author's survey

Note: A Pearson's R correlation coefficient is reported in all cases. A .05 level of probability or lower was the standard for statistical significance. Since ordinal or interval levels of measurement were used for all variables, the direction of the association is always positive, that is, as predicted by the hypothesis (e.g., lower education is correlated with lower levels of participation, but at -.12 higher education is associated with lower levels of trust). The approach used here and the large number of missing data probably underestimate the correlation.

TABLE IX. Correlates of Attitudes Toward Political and Economic Reform*
Yaroslavl, 1993 (N=1019); 1996 (N=962)

	Popular Participation		Strong Leader		Economic Envy (Accumulation of Wealth)		Free Market Economics	
	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996
Education	.16	.13	n.s.	-.11	-.22	-.25	n.s.	.07
Occupation	.16	.08	n.s.	n.s.	.10	.11	n.s.	n.s.
Income	n.s.	.10	n.s.	n.s.	.07	.13	n.s.	n.s.
SES Scale	.13	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.18	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Age	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.31	-.33	n.s.	n.s.
Gender	-.08.	n.s.	.11	n.s.	.10	.11	n.s.	n.s.
Material Situation	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.12	-.20	.10	n.s.

* The four dependent variables used here are scales developed on the basis of questions used in Tables VI, VII. Scale reliability tests were performed for each. The coefficient of correlation used is Pearson's R since all data were ordinal or interval. Only correlations where $p<.05$ are reported (n.s. or not significant, is indicated elsewhere).

FIGURE 1: RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON ECONOMIC BELIEFS, 1991–1997



KEY

There are different sectors of society that could have ownership of various resources in Russia: the government, the employees of the enterprise, or private individuals. For each of the types of enterprises I will read, please tell me whether in your opinion, the government, the employees, or private individuals should own such enterprises:

A. Former kolkhoz & sovkhoz property (farms and farmland) [1=Government Ownership, 2=Employee Ownership, 3=Private Ownership]

B. Large Industry [1=Government Ownership, 2=Employee Ownership, 3=Private Ownership]

C. Now we would like to get your feelings toward certain groups using a seven-point scale, where 1 is a very negative view and 7 indicates a very positive view. You may use any number between 1 and 7 to tell me how favorable or unfavorable your feelings are for each group.... Private Enterprises [1=Low, 7=High]

D. There should be a mechanism regulating income such that no one earns very much more than others. [1=Strongly Disagree... 5=Strongly Agree]

E. Economic reform must be pursued, even if it means significant hardship for the people. [1=Strongly Disagree... 5=Strongly Agree]

F. Some people think that certain groups in society have too much influence on society and politics in Russia and that other groups don't have as much influence as they deserve. For each group listed on this same card, please tell me if they have too much, too little, or the right amount of influence on society and politics... Businessmen [1=Too Much, 2=About Right, 3=Too Little]

G. Some people say the central government of the Russian Federation should guarantee everyone work and a high standard of living, others argue that every person should look after himself. On this card is a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 signifies that the government guarantees everyone work and 7 that every person should look after himself. You may select any number from 1–7. [1=Government Guarantees Work... 7=Every Person Looks After Self]

H. Some people believe that large business profits should not be allowed, others believe that business profits should be allowed to be as large as possible. For the growth of the economy, which is closest to your view? [1=No Large Profits, 2=Large Profits Are Okay]

I. Some people believe that companies should fire workers who do not work hard enough, others think everyone should be guaranteed a job as long as they try to do their best. Which of these do you agree with? [1=Guarantee a Job, 2=It Depends, 3=Fire Those Who Work Poorly]

Source: The University of Iowa New Soviet Citizen and Post-Soviet Citizen Surveys, 1991–1995. (Sampling and other information on the surveys is available upon request.)

FIGURE 2: PRO-COMMUNIST BELIEFS, 1991–1997



KEY

A. Although the Soviet Union no longer exists, some people still think of themselves as Soviets; whereas others have stopped thinking of themselves in those terms. To what extent would you say you think of yourself as a Soviet person? [1=Not at All... 4=A Great Deal]

B. These days Stalin is not given adequate credit for the building of socialism. [1=Strongly Disagree... 5=Strongly Agree]

C. Our society is made up of many different kinds of people. Next we would like to ask you some questions about the many different groups that are part of our society. Any individual may have a great deal in common with some of these groups and very little in common with other groups. On this card is a list of various social groups of people. I would like to find out how much you have in common (share their ideas, interests, their outlook on different events) with these different sorts of people... communists. [1=Nothing... 4=A Great Deal]

D. Now we would like to get your feelings toward certain groups using a seven-point scale, where 1 is a very negative view and 7 indicates a very positive view. You may use any number between 1 and 7 to tell me how favorable or unfavorable your feelings are for each group... The Communist Party of the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. [1=Low, 7=High]

Source: The University of Iowa New Soviet Citizen and Post-Soviet Citizen Surveys, 1991–1995. (Sampling and other information on the surveys is available upon request.)

FIGURE 3: PERCEPTIONS OF DANGER TO COUNTRY, 1991–1997



KEY

What in your view is the most dangerous, that is, leads toward destabilization in our country. For each item I will now mention, evaluate the degree of danger with numbers from 1 to 7, where 1 means no danger at present and 7 means the highest danger:

A. The growth of economic inequality among citizens

B. Unemployment

C. The growth of crime

Source: The University of Iowa New Soviet Citizen and Post-Soviet Citizen Surveys, 1991–1995. (Sampling and other information on the surveys is available upon request.)

FIGURE 4: DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES, 1991–1997



KEY

I am now going to read you a number of statements. For each statement, would you please indicate whether you agree with each fully or partially or disagree partially or fully.

A. It is very important to stop crime, even at the risk of violating the rights of the accused. [1=Strongly Agree... 5=Strongly Disagree]

B. Participation of the people is not necessary if decision-making is left in the hands of a few trusted, competent leaders. [1=Strongly Agree... 5=Strongly Disagree]

C. It is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that they become disruptive. [1=Strongly Agree... 5=Strongly Disagree]

D. The government has the responsibility to see that the rights of all minorities are protected. [1=Strongly Disagree... 5=Strongly Agree]

E. Right now, Russia needs strong leadership more than it needs democracy. [1=Strongly Agree... 5=Strongly Disagree]

F. Any individual or organization has the right to organize opposition or resistance to any governmental initiative. [1=Strongly Disagree... 5=Strongly Agree]

Source: The University of Iowa New Soviet Citizen and Post-Soviet Citizen Surveys, 1991–1995. (Sampling and other information on the surveys is available upon request.)

TABLE 1: RESULTS OF MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS

Explanatory Variables	Support for The Market		Support for Communism		Democratic Outlooks	
Female?	-.072*	(-.052)	-.051	(-.038)	-.060*	(-.064)
Age	-.009**	(-.233)	.011**	(.260)	-.002*	(-.078)
Highest Education Level[1]	.085**	(.166)	-.014	(-.032)	.063**	(.178)
Rural Residence	-.080*	(-.056)	.113**	(.073)	-.053	(-.051)
Residence in Moscow or St. Petersburg	.103*	(.061)	-.100*	(-.057)	.014	(.013)
Family Income[2]	.054**	(.069)	-.002	(.000)	.013	(.019)
Blue Collar Job?	*[not included]*		*[not included]*		-.074*	(-.074)
Has an Extra Job?	.070	(.027)	*[not included]*		*[not included]*	
Family Finances, Coming Year[3]	-.119**	(-.186)	.105**	(.158)	-.010	(-.020)
Perception of Danger[4]	-.055**	(-.221)	.054**	(.200)	-.026**	(-.140)
Constant	1.443		-1.660		.408	
r^2	.30		.20		.09	
Total valid cases	1,298		1,309		1,309	

*=Statistically significant at or below 05 level.

**=Statisticaly significant at or below 01 level.

[1] 1=Primary only, 2=Incomplete Secondary; 3=Completed Secondary, including professional schools or technicums; 4=Partial Higher Education; 5=Completed Higher Education.

[2] Income is measured in millions of rubles per month.

[3] 0=Expected to be much better; 1=Better; 2=About the same; 3=Worse; 4=Much worse.

[4] From 0 (no danger on any of the three questions) to 18 (Highest danger on all).

Source: The University of Iowa New Soviet Citizen and Post-Soviet Citizen Surveys, 1991–1995. (Sampling and other information on the surveys is available upon request.)

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