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The Agrarian "Strike" of 1932–33

by D'Ann Penner

D'Ann Penner is an Assistant Professor in the Department of History at the University of Memphis. The author would like to thank the American Council of Teachers of Russian, the International Research and Exchanges Board, the Social Science Research Council, the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, and the Hoover Institution for enabling her to undertake the research anchoring this study.

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INTRODUCTION

"In a noble effort to liberate the human race from violence and oppression [Communist regimes] broke all records for mass slaughter, piling up tens of millions of corpses in less than three-fourths of a century."[1] So wrote Eugene Genovese, the provocative Marxist historian of the American South, in an article urging left-leaning scholars to examine the "disasters" as well as the "achievements," the "crimes" as well as the "heroism" of socialist experiments in the twentieth century.[2] Between 6.7 and eight million of the corpses Genovese refers to were "piled up" during the Soviet famine of 1932–34.[3]

In comparison with the first eight months of 1933, premature deaths from severe malnutrition, malaria, and typhus occurred on a rather modest scale in the springs of both 1932 and 1934.[4] Most of the 1933 deaths were concentrated in the country's most productive wheat belt—Ukraine, the North Caucasus Territory (including the Kuban, Stavropol, and Don provinces), the Volga Territories (especially the Lower), and the Volga German Republic—and Kazakhstan.[5] Two of the regions hardest hit, Ukraine and the North Caucasus Territory, not only had the largest stretches of fertile soil but also the most consistently favorable climatic conditions in the country.[6] As Oskolkov pointed out, of the Kuban's twenty counties included in the North Caucasus Territorial Committee's February list of starving counties, "almost all of them were the counties which [traditionally] enjoyed the most abundant grain crops."[7] During previous lean years, Russian peasants had traditionally fled south, especially to the Kuban. Workers in Belarus were particularly stunned by the presence of so many emaciated Ukrainian villagers wandering their city streets and country roads in the summer of 1932 in part because, as they dramatically opened their letter to *Pravda* and the Ukrainian and All-Union Central Committees, they could not remember a time when "Belarus had fed Ukraine."[8]

It is in part the mystery of how the country's richest grain-producing areas without an act of God could have been laid low by a famine of unusual proportions that gave rise to the interpretation of the artificially organized famine. The hypothesis of an artificial famine organized and carried out by Stalin and his "henchmen" to squelch nationalism and resistance was propelled into the spotlight by Robert Conquest in 1986 with his *Harvest of Sorrow*.[9] Among the numerous positive or at least polite reviews of Conquest's effort were two particularly sharp denunciations of his source base and skill as a historian, the most thorough of which was by Stephan Merl, who suggested that the famine was more likely an accident, the result of failed economic policies, quota-setting defects, and regional differences.[10] The most recent western historian to try to make sense of the famine, Mark Tauger, has moved further in the direction of normalizing the famine by positing a "real" grain shortage caused not only by failed economic policies but also by poor weather conditions and a cast of government characters typed as poorly informed, reasonably flexible, and almost humanitarian.[11] The proponents of what I will call the "intentionalist" interpretation argue that the harvest of 1932, though not spectacular, was sufficient to keep the population alive until the harvest of 1933.[12] The famine was deliberately organized (or caused and utilized), the intentionalists argue, for the purpose of teaching the peasants a lesson. The content of the lesson varies according to historian: to subdue nationalism, to encourage better work habits, to disabuse the peasant of his lingering notion that the grain he grew was his own, or to force recalcitrant individualists to join collective farms.[13]

Within the "intentionalist" famine school, however, there are two parties, divided by their answer to the following question: did the Soviet government have a detailed plan worked out beforehand from which it orchestrated the famine, or was the famine simply caused by government policy and then "organized" in an ad hoc way towards its own goals? "There was nothing accidental, unforeseen, or elemental about [the famine of 1932–33]. Everything was decided, foreseen, and properly planned," wrote Petro Dolyna, an advocate of the

orchestrated famine version, a lay historian, and an eyewitness of the famine, who interviewed other survivors in a West German displaced-persons' camp between 1946 and 1947.[14] "A political decision made in a far-off capital around conference and banquet tables" before the first round of grain requisitioning is envisioned.[15] A series of decrees passed from July 1932 through January 1933 is presented as evidence of the government's intention to severely restrict peasant mobility with the apparent goal, as seen through the eyes of the starving peasant, of keeping him or her "trapped" in his village.[16] No decree ordering the murder of a predetermined number of Ukrainians or even peasants by starvation has yet been discovered;[17] even the latest International Ukrainian Commission has concluded that the famine probably was not a "well-thought-out in advance strategy."[18] Nonetheless, several leading Russian scholars still feel that the terms "organized" and "artificial" are applicable, inasmuch as it took an intervention by men to create the conditions for a famine where there would not otherwise have been one.[19]

The "artificial" plank of Conquest's argument has been challenged by Mark Tauger who demonstrated that the harvest of 1932 was smaller than official statistics have suggested, in part, he believes, because of previously overlooked natural causes. The smaller harvest of 1932, he concludes, made the famine "essentially inevitable."[20] The "organized" line of the intentionalist interpretation was challenged in the early reviews of Conquest's book on rational grounds. Why, Merl queries, would the Communist government deliberately organize a famine that claimed the lives of some of its traditional allies—poorer peasants, shock workers, and Red partisans?[21] In the interpretation that has come the closest to normalizing the Soviet famine, the Soviet government is portrayed as having sought to help unfortunate villagers by lowering their quotas and providing them with "aid" in the spring of 1933 in order to "alleviate" their plight.[22]

Getty, Merl, and Tauger have suggested that the centerpiece of the "artificially organized" school, *Harvest of Sorrow*, is a simple piece of cold war rhetoric; the hypotheses postulated and the sources utilized, they argue, can be traced to the views espoused and the documents produced by Ukrainian émigrés, as if that simple fact should be enough to overturn the argument almost singlehandedly.[23] In point of fact, the interpretation of the famine as "artificial" and deliberately "organized" predates the onset of the cold war and can be traced back to 1933 itself. Several foreign correspondents and diplomats living in Ukraine and Moscow came away convinced, like Muggeridge, a correspondent who had witnessed several famines, that "it was not just a famine . . . This particular famine was planned and deliberate."[24] More importantly, the "émigré" view is the peasants' view. "The Soviet goverment is o.k.," remarked Anna Bondarenko, a collective farm worker in Shakhtinsk county in June of 1933. "What's bad is that it created a famine."[25]

Villagers' belief that the famine was deliberately organized, of course, proves nothing. Nationalists have long argued that the English government deliberately attempted to use the potato famine to subdue the Irish people. In occupied Greece in 1941, according to Mark Mazower, "it was generally believed that behind the starvation lay a deliberate German policy of genocide."[26] In neither case has popular opinion been supported by relatively impartial scholars with access to and command over the relevant archival documents. Nonetheless, even if the Soviet famine was exclusively the result of natural causes and bureaucratic bungling—and it was not—the peasants' version would be worth examining in detail because the Soviet government's handling of the 1932 grain crisis and the famine that followed decisively changed the way peasants who experienced the famine's strongest waves viewed the regime.[27]

The grain shortage of 1932, I will argue in Part I of this study, resulted from

a combination of grandiose, ill-conceived government policies tenaciously enforced and villagers' increasingly potent resistance. The Party, not prone to candid self-criticism and well aware of villagers' resistance, blamed the deepening agricultural crisis primarily on the peasants, who, as Stalin explained to Mikhail Sholokhov, "had undertaken an *ital'ianka*," or a slow-down strike.[28] The Party's breaking of the peasants' "strike" will be the subject of chapter 2.[29]

My primary geographical focus will be on villager-Party struggles in what I have called the Don region—the northern half of what in 1932 was known as the North Caucasus Territory, which included all the counties of the former Don province and four Kuban counties (Eisk, Kushchevsk, Staro-Minsk, and Belo-Glinsk). Many of the flaws of past interpretations are in part a result of historians' attempts to generalize about the Soviet famine while focusing almost exclusively on one region, usually Ukraine. Therefore, I will frequently stress the similarities and contrasts between government policies and villagers' responses in three of the four areas marked by the greatest concentration of deaths from starvation, namely Ukraine, the North Caucausus, and the Lower Volga Territory.[30]

Sel'skoe khoziaistvo, eto—ne zavod, v kotorom mozhno zalozhit' bolt. Isportil odin—vybrosil, vtoroi zalozhil. Vybrosil, tretii zalozhil, a chetvertyi vse-taki vytashchishch'. V sel'skom zhe khoziaistve portit' nel'zia.

— Director of the Glubokinsk State Farm to Kaganovich, 2 November 1932

PART I: VILLAGER-PARTY RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE "STRIKE"

The amount of grain harvested and delivered to the government in the fall of 1932 was not only less than the Central Party expected, but also less than official statistics have indicated. The central crisis of 1932–33 was not so much an economic crisis, however, as it was a political crisis in villager-Party relations with serious economic ramifications. Before the complicated and interconnected causes of the grain crisis of 1932 can be understood, or the famine of 1933 classified as "inevitable," the reasons for the grain shortage prior to the announcement of the 1932 grain quotas must be examined. The primary factors causing the grain crisis lay at the center of the Party-village nexus: government policies and peasant reactions from 1929–32 created conditions unfavorable to agricultural stability, let alone development.

The announcement of the 1932–33 grain procurement plan, I will argue, represented a turning point in Party-villager relations. Villagers' united, effective, and determined resistance to the new plan was interpreted and responded to by the Central Party as a declaration of war against the Party, the cities, and the Red Army. The dynamics between the Party and the collective farm workers in the second and critical phase of the grain-harvesting and -collecting season escalated the grain shortage from crisis to famine.

The first post-collectivization harvest (1930) in the Soviet Union was excellent, prompting Stalin to declare the country's grain problems "solved" once and for all. His belief in the superiority of socialist forms of production vindicated, he more than doubled the amount of grain exported during the next two years. Even according to disputed official statistics, the so-called "barn yields" of grain production in the Soviet Union between 1930 and 1933 dropped from 83.5 million metric tons in 1930 to 69.9 in 1932.[1] A severe decline in grain productivity, an extravagant export policy, and grain not harvested in the fall of 1932 positioned, according to Stalin's estimate, 25–30 million rural people on the brink of starvation.[2]

LOWERED PRODUCTIVITY

A Factor Important for its Insignificance

Until forced to issue seed loans to the North Caucasus Territorial and Ukrainian Central Committees in February 1933, the Soviet government did not even use the weather as a distancing trope; it placed all of the blame for the food supply difficulties squarely on resisting villagers.[3] It took a young American historian, eager to turn the famine's reigning interpretation on its head, to insert the weather question into the historiographical debate. Conquest (and others) had stressed the relative absence, especially in comparison with other non-famine years, of particularly poor weather. Tauger contends that the smaller harvest was in part the result of poor weather, previously underemphasized by Robert Conquest because of his tendency to rely on the accounts of émigré writers, whose (probably faulty, Tauger implies) memories tended to recall both the weather and the crop in a rather romanticized light.[4]

It was the opinion of several knowledgeable, contemporary experts who had spent time in the major grain-growing regions that, while the crops were undoubtedly poor, untimely rain and scattered areas of drought were comparatively minor causes. In its final report written in January 1933, the Commission appointed by the Central Executive Committee Presidium to study the progress of Soviet, economic, and cultural development (*stroitel'stvo*) in the Northern Caucasus Territory concluded: "The final figures on the productivity of every grain culture (except for rye) show

that the gross yield per hectare was significantly lower in 1932 than it was in 1931." The report chronicles with great frankness the multiple causes of the downward trend; the Commission did not find the weather factor significant enough to include.[5]

Perhaps the most objective observer of the standing 1932 Soviet wheat crop was Andrew Cairns, a Scottish-Canadian wheat expert, who, in his role as Director of the Grain Department of the Empire Marketing Board in London, spent approximately three months between 10 May and 22 August touring the agricultural regions of Western Siberia, Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and the Volga Regions because he believed his time better spent "wandering about the country than writing a report in Moscow."[6] Cairns was well qualified to evaluate standing wheat crops because of his own agricultural training and personal experience;[7] he was uniquely suited to evaluate agricultural conditions in the Soviet Union because of his inquisitiveness, his Russian language skills, and his extensive 1930 tour, which gave him a basis for comparison. Most of the crops he observed were viewed from a train window, through which his eyes were fixed from the first to the last crack of light each day. Moreover, Cairns arranged forays by auto from several major cities, observing the lay of the land in the villages between the model farms to which he was taken. He knew Russian well enough to understand conversations even when the speakers hoped their talk was too complicated for him, and well enough to converse with high-ranking Party officials and peasants, which he frequently did, getting off at every train stop, stopping the car in the middle of non-model collective farms, and rising early in order to mingle unaccompanied by officials with villagers and workers in the urban bazaars.[8] Cairns, in his final summary cable to the Empire Marketing Board, written in mid-August, emphasized non-weather-related factors, mentioning the late rains only in passing.[9]

In evaluating the importance of the weather, two caveats should be kept in mind. First, poor crops, especially under adverse political conditions, such as direct military action (Greece, 1941) or enemy blockades (India, 1943), are not always caused by unfavorable weather. Cairns noted that while the crops around Kiev and Dnepropetrovsk were quite poor, the color of the wheat indicated that it had received timely and adequate rainfall.[10] In Dnepropetrovsk, he commented on the excellence of the wheat crop where the land had been "well prepared."[11] Side-by-side fields experiencing identical weather conditions under different governing organizations produced crops of sharply differing quality. Located 50 kilometers from the Kavkazskaia station in the Kuban was a German-Russian Seed Joint-Stock Company, an Agricultural Concession, commonly referred to as "Drusag." Founded in the mid-1920s, Drusag was managed by German specialists, who hired local and migrant villagers, many of whom were displaced *kulaks* as foremen and field workers. One road walked along by Cairns lay between a Drusag field and a State Farm field. On the Drusag side of the road was, in Cairns's words, a "magnificent field of wheat (it looked from a distance as if it would yield 20 centners per hectare)"; on the other was a "very fine field of thistles with about enough wheat to yield 1 to 2 centners."[12] In Saratov, wheat at the Experimental Station attached to the Grain Institute averaged 15 centners per hectare, while the best government collective in the entire Volga area averaged only 6.[13]

Second, perfect weather would have been extremely unusual. At least one district, and usually several, of what I call the Don region, from 1921 through 1928, suffered from extensive drought and untimely rain each year; by comparison, 1932 was an average-to-good year.[14] In the Volga region, droughts were a common occurrence.[15] The relevant question, as Kondrashin points out, is not whether droughts occurred in 1932, but rather how severe they were and how extensive were the damaged areas.[16]

For the country as a whole, drought was more significant in both 1931 and 1934 than in 1932, and it did not even come close to the severity of the 1891, 1921, 1946, or 1972 droughts.[17] In the North Caucasus Territory, there were scattered counties afflicted by one or more of the following: a hard November frost (Sal'sk, 1931), a summer drought (several Kuban counties), and 10–20 days of steady rain at harvest time (Morozovsk, Veshensk, and Sal'sk).[18] Non-weather-

related factors (to be discussed below) increased the crops' vulnerability to early frost and August rains. Even in the areas suffering from relatively unfavorable weather, the size of the 1932 crop was not always smaller than the 1931 crop. In Veshensk county, for example, where rain fell uninterruptedly for three weeks in August, 57,000 tons were gathered in 1932, exactly the same amount as in 1931.[19] In Ukraine, with the exception of hot, dry winds in the south-central part, the weather was basically favorable.[20] In 1931, the hinterlands of Saratov and Stalingrad suffered "mid-level drought," while only one county, Bezenchuka, suffered from a "severe drought." 1932, the most relevant year, was a drought-free year, and in 1933, only Bezenchuka county was afflicted by a "very severe drought," while all the other counties in both the Lower and Middle Volga regions enjoyed "normal weather conditions." By contrast, in 1890 and 1921, drought in the Volga regions encompassed most counties and was classified as "very severe," the highest rating. As Kondrashin underscores, one of the unusual features of the 1933 famine is the fact that "the onset of famine in 1932–33 in the villages of the Lower and Middle Volga was, for the first time in their centuries-old history, not initiated by drought."[21]

The Direct Causes

The standing crops were unexpectedly poorer than in previous years as a result of four direct causes. The first, according to the VTsIK Commission reporting on the SKK, was the overall reduction in sown acreage.[22] Estimates of the percentage of land not planted in 1932 as opposed to 1931 range from 14 to 25 percent.[23] Cairns was repeatedly struck by the amount of "uncultivated land, formerly in crops" throughout both Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus.[24]

Even the planted acres were sown with fewer-than-ideal kilograms per hectare, a second objective factor pointed out by the VTsIK Commission.[25] In Veshensk county, according to Sholokhov, collective farm workers planted only part of the seed grain in the spring of 1932.[26] The director of the Glubokinsk state farm, under pressure from Central Party officials at the November meeting of state farm directors, admitted that his workers had pilfered a considerable amount of the seed grain in the spring.[27] The amount of grain per hectare undersown in some cases reached 40 percent less than ideal.

The spring seeding period in Russia was extremely short, eight days by the estimate of the experts at Drusag. In the North Caucasus Territory, the spring sowing campaign lasted from thirty to forty-five days in 1932, according to the report of the VTsIK Commission. At the Verblud state farm (Sal'sk county), Cairns's Canadian friend, McDowell, confided that it had taken them four weeks instead of the usual two. In Ukraine, Cairns's impression that the spring wheat had been planted unusually late was confirmed by a table lying on the President of the District Collective Farm Center's desk which he scanned during an office quarrel over acceptable collective farms in the area. According to the unpublished table, as late as 15 June, only 72.7 percent of the plan had been completed.[28] This third objective factor is important because, as Cairns pointed out, "wheat sown after the end of May would, under normal Russian weather conditions, give a very low yield." Moreover, the later the wheat is sown, whether winter or spring wheat, the more vulnerable it is to early frosts and August rains. At Drusag, for example, where the winter wheat had been sown on time, the hard November frosts did not damage the wheat.[29]

The fourth objective factor, both Cairns and the Commission agreed, was the unusual number of tough weeds in the fields across Ukraine and the North Caucasus, which played a major role in reducing harvest yields.[30] The peasants and local officials of one Ukrainian village visited by Chamberlin in the autumn of 1933 concurred.[31] The MTS reporter working in Novo-Dereviansk (Staro-Minsk county) noted that in 1933, the corn fields that had been weeded twice yielded between 12 and 14 centners to the hectare, whereas those weeded only once averaged 5–7 centners.[32] According to Vasil'ev, head of the Political Department at the Bol'she Orlovsk Machine-Tractor Station (MTS), even old-timers had not seen so many weeds (*Donnik-burkun*) in over fifteen years. The importance the collective farm workers of Bol'she Orlovsk attributed to the weed problem in 1933 is demonstrated by the

fact that even while bloated from malnutrition, they still chose to weed their fields two (and even occasionally three) times, in order, as Vasil'ev put it, "to not be left breadless again."[33] Weeds divert nutrients from the planted crop all summer, thereby reducing the yield. Weeds and combines do not mix: some weeds—jimson weeds, for example, which become wood-like at maturity—are tough enough to break a sickle section; most weeds are capable of plugging up the cylinder. At the Gigant state farm, one of the Soviet Union's finest even in 1932, a member of the Central Executive Control Commission found that "practically all the combines were standing still, choked full of green weeds."[34]

The four factors described above resulted primarily from a deficit of three essential elements in the three areas marked for especially rapid collectivization: interested, experienced farm workers; tractive power; and grain (seed grain, fodder, and bread). The shortages in turn resulted from a conjuncture of Central Party policy decisions made from November 1929 through April 1932 and villagers' varied responses to them. Three types of Party policies undertaken between November 1929 and April 1932 contributed to the crisis: unpopular, short-sighted, and far-sighted but ill-conceived and poorly implemented. Villagers' responses to the policies—usually motivated by a desire to register their disapproval or, increasingly as the years passed, to survive—compounded the situation.[35]

The most significant, unpopular policy implemented by the Soviet government, perhaps during its entire rule, was the decision to undertake total collectivization at once with or without (and mainly without) the villagers' consent.[36] Even after the famous "Dizzy" proclamation announcing that collectivization was supposed to be a matter of free will, collective farmers in the areas marked for rapid, total collectivization were not legally allowed to leave their collective farms until after the harvest was in for the year. Even then tremendous moral and economic pressure was brought to bear on the petitioning-to-leave collective farm workers, convincing most to remain within the collective fold. Farmers throughout the Northern Caucasus Territory protested involuntary collectivization with a variety of covert and overt actions, especially during the window of opportunity in April, when they believed the Central Party was in fact chastising overzealous and wayward local boys. "The struggle of the farmers against collectivization did not terminate with our forced joining of the collectives," recalled one village-born Ukrainian émigré. "On the contrary, we became even more stubborn in the following years."[37]

Villagers' resistance to collectivization, it has often been assumed, was a product of their collective "backwardness" and their supposed "suspicion" of new technology.[38] In fact, the Party's emphasis on and support of mechanization and agronomic expertise from late 1924 to 1927 was the one plank many of the previously undecided Don farmers found most attractive in the Bolshevik platform.[39] Farmers in the Don area resisted the involuntary imposition of collectivized agriculture because they were convinced by all the visible evidence in their counties that the living conditions and production rates in collective farms were (and would continue to be) incontrovertibly inferior to their own. They were especially opposed to becoming a mass of hired hands, reduced to the level of taking orders from a Communist boss (probably urban or young, or both) and deprived of the decision-making process they thrived on. Given that they had fought precisely against the need to bow and scrape for a richer life, their determined resistance from 1930 to 1933 is more accurately understood as a defense by farmers of their own revolutionary goals.

One of the forms of protest most relevant to the grain crisis of 1932 was the widespread slaughter of livestock in all collectivized areas.[40] Another was the mass migration to cities of able-bodied villagers, initially predominantly those fearful of dekulakization.[41] Additionally, in the Don region, newly collectivized farm workers who remained in the village changed century-old work habits virtually overnight, working sloppily and half-heartedly, if at all.[42] Collective farm workers in Ukraine reacted similarly. Kravchenko, for example, was "shocked" by the way "large quantities of implements and machinery, which had once been cared for like so many jewels by their

private owners," in the autumn of 1932 "lay scattered under the open skies, dirty, rusting and out of repair." The collective farm's horses were "standing knee-deep in dirt, 'reading newspapers,' as the peasant phrase has it when cattle stand without feed in the stalls."[43] The collective farm workers in the Volga regions, if Kondrashin is right, may provide the exception to this tendency, as they reportedly worked as conscientiously in 1930 and 1931 as they had in former years, "secretly hoping that the situation would change for the better soon." Their "peasant nature," Kondrashin argues, would not allow them to do otherwise.[44]

The villagers' changed attitudes toward the weeding of "their" fields is one of the more telling examples of the stark changes wrought as a result of forced collectivization. In the summer of 1928, farmers in several counties of the Don, Donets, Sal'sk and Kuban districts were forbidden to work in their fields until after new grain procurements assignments were fulfilled.[45] "While the weeds [were] crowding out the wheat in the fields, we [were] forbidden to leave the market town," wrote Ia. D. Perlik, a village correspondent, and Ia. N. Kalinin, probably a Cossack farmer from the market town of Staro-Minsk.[46] Peasant and Cossack farmers alike were distressed at the thought of their wheat being overcrowded by weeds and outraged at the idea of being under virtual (and at times literal) arrest at a time of year when, in the words of one protesting letter writer, "every day is precious."[47] By contrast, in May of 1930, students of the Novocherkassk Agricultural Academy working in what they described as a "typical Kuban Cossack market town," Voronezhsk, reported that "while some adults work in their gardens, most are lazing about doing nothing . . . On beautiful, sunshiny days, while hundreds of hectares are being overwhelmed by tall weeds, perfectly healthy men, sitting with fishing poles in hand, line the shores of the Kuban river or, shovels in hand, wander about the steppe."[48]

The production problems generated as a result of villagers' antagonism toward forced collectivization were especially compounded by two of the Communist Party's more short-sighted policy decisions from 1929 to 1932. The first round of dekulakization alone (and there were several rounds) deprived the Soviet Union of a significant percentage of its most talented, hard-working farmers.[49] In practice, there were two types of *kulaks*, political and economic, both of whom were deported. In the Don region, there was no scarcity of proud *kulaks* in the political sense of the word, that is farmers actively and unabashedly opposed to the Soviet government and its policies irrespective of economic status. They were especially numerous in the Cossack communities and they were drawn from all social ranks.[50]

The men labeled as *kulaks* by Party policy makers, who developed a mechanical, economic formulation for identification and implementation among the masses, were generally the 3 to 5 percent of villagers who had paid the most taxes during the last three years of NEP. These economic *kulaks*, in the opinion of their fellow villagers, were the men who "departed for the steppe in early March, as soon as the last snows had melted away, living and working there until deep autumn, regardless of the weather . . . allowing themselves no more than three hours of rest a day, all the while faithfully paying their taxes year after year."[51] A fair number of them, especially in the peasant villages along the Don, had, in the words of Vasilii I. Spivak, a farmer from the Stavropol district, "worked side by side with hired hands, poorer and middling farmers to defend and then build up Soviet power."[52] "When peasant blood flowed from Moscow to the Black Sea," S. I. Prodan, a better-off peasant farmer from Peschansk protesting his lost voting right in 1928, reminded the editor of *The Soviet Ploughman*, "no one said, 'only hired hands, poor or middling peasants need bother to defend Soviet power.'"[53] The objections of the economic *kulaks* to the prospect of collectivized agriculture were identical to those of their slightly less prosperous neighbors who also fought tenaciously against collectivization. Indeed, the so-called *kulak* farmers (not, of course, the relentlessly defiant Cossacks) were often the first, not the last, to agree to enter the collective farms, not because they believed in principle in the superiority of collectivized farming but because they were by nature greater risk-takers, that is, more willing to

try new things, and because they preferred to compromise with the Soviet government both to avoid exile and to retain the opportunity to participate in the new Soviet era. The Communist Party, by undertaking dekulakization along rigid, economic lines, independent of the individual's revolutionary history, deprived itself not only of the most industrious, creative, flexible, and experienced farmers in the country, but also of many loyal supporters as well.

Unquestionably, the Soviet government's grain and livestock procurement policy was its most short-sighted practice from 1930–32. The grain procurement campaign of 1932 has received the most attention by historians, who emphasize the total amount of grain taken out of the village in the fall.[54] This is the way it looked to the peasants experiencing the famine from the village floor: "The famine occurred because all of the grain, down to the last kernel . . . was taken away and given to the government."[55] In Conquest's view, "the method of setting . . . grain quotas far above the possible" was a deliberate strategy on the part of the government intent upon quashing rising nationalism and resistance.[56] Tauger has countered by pointing to the fact that less grain was collected in 1932 than in 1930 or 1931.[57] Recently, several Russian scholars have put forward a more complicated interpretation of the famine that revolves largely around what they refer to as the government's grain procurements' strategy from 1930–32. To focus attention primarily on the grain procurements' campaign of 1932, they have argued, is to miss the central point: the cumulative effect of the grain procurement campaigns from 1930–32 crippled villagers' ability and will to produce.[58]

In the North Caucasus Territory, according to the calculations of Oskolkov, while the gross grain yield rose from 49.3 million centners in 1928 to 60.1 million centners in 1930 (or by 21.9 percent), the amount of grain extracted by the state increased from 10.7 million centners to 22.9 million (by 107 percent). As Oskolkov pointed out, the North Caucasus Territory fulfilled not only its original but also an additional plan tacked on in September by handing over not only its "surplus, but also a part of its seed grain, fodder, and food provisions from the harvest of 1930."[59] As a result, several counties experienced severe food crises and required seed grain loans in the spring of 1931.[60]

In the North Caucasus Territory, the 1931 harvest broke productivity records for the Soviet era, as the 1930 harvest had done in Ukraine. The 1931 grain yield was approximately 69.7 million centners, 30.6 million centners of which were delivered to the State, or a little over 43 percent and almost three times as much as in 1928.[61] The grain left in the region after the procurements was sufficient to meet the needs neither of the territory's livestock nor its collective farm workers.[62] Collective farm workers, even in a number of Kuban counties, were out of bread by early March, an extraordinary thing for the Northern Caucasus Territory. "We work but we have no idea what for," a delegate from Novo-Pokrovsk county who was attending the Third Territorial Conference of Collective Farm Workers asserted. "We have no idea how we are going to live in the future. We labored an entire year and all we got for our efforts were marks on a piece of paper" *(odni trudodni)*.[63] A "People's investigator" working in Labinsk county confirmed the existence of numerous cases of illness resulting from under-nutrition among collective farm workers.[64]

In the spring of 1932 in the Volga regions, "even many exemplary collective farm workers with an abundance of labordays, along with their children have been surviving on potatoes alone," wrote S. V. Pikainkin, chairman of the Kurgansk village soviet, to M. Kalinin, chairman of the All-Union Central Executive Committee.[65] Worst of all was the situation in Ukraine, where, as Stalin wrote to Kaganovich and Molotov on 18 June 1932, "a number of good-harvest counties are facing ruin and famine."[66] In a letter to Stalin written in April of 1932, Ukrainian collective farm workers from Globinsk county stated that they had not seen bread since 1 January.[67]

The need to finance heavy industry and mechanize agriculture as quickly as possible was the central policy makers' first assumption that found expression in the procurement policy.[68] Tractors, binders, and combines, both imported and Russian, were brought into the North Caucasus Territory in record numbers.

The VTsIK Commission reporting on the state of affairs there as of January 1933 noted that when translated into "horse units," between 1930 and 1932 the Territory gained the equivalent of 378,300 "horses" in the form of tractors and combines.[69]

Soviet-style mechanization, however, did not solve, at least initially, the newly created production problems—it compounded them. In the 1930s, combines were not always more efficient than threshers, especially where weeds grew rampant and the grain ripened unevenly. Both combines and threshers are equipped with silves and chaffers which separate the weeds from the wheat. Dry weeds, however, are more easily separated from the wheat than live (wet) weeds. A binder/thresher combination allowed immature wheat a chance to finish ripening, while the weeds dried, because wheat was usually threshed two to three weeks after it was bound into sheaves. Wet weeds mixed with immature wheat heated and spoiled when placed in a large pile or in a grain bin, a frequent problem in the early 1930s. In Simferopol, Cairns was amused by the spectacle of "thirty-seven people . . . working on a large pile of [prematurely] threshed barley; some turning it over to keep it from heating (as it had been cut too soon and contained about 20 percent of moisture), others fanning the weeds out of it with four small hand mills, and others shovelling wet grain out on to the ground out of six enormous tractor trucks. In the afternoon," he concluded, "an enormous pile of grain on the ground at the elevator [was] being worked over, to keep it from moulding, by an enormous crowd of workers." The Russian foremen in charge, however, "sneered" at Cairns's suggestion that a binder and reaper ("obsolete" in their view) might be more efficient, given the conditions, than a combine.[70] At the model German Concession in the Northern Caucasus, Cairns was told by Dr. Weimar, the stacking of grain by horses was more cost effective than the use of combines by a factor of two.[71]

Additionally, the Russian combines in particular were notorious for the high percentage of wheat they left in the field. In 1932, the Drusag management invested in ten Russian combines; after experimenting with them, the management put them aside, because, according to Dr. Ditloff's estimate, they picked up only 60 percent of the wheat. The workers at Drusag, all Russian peasants working for the same wage—plus decent hot meals—as the neighboring sovkhoz workers were, in Cairns's opinion, the most content he had seen in all of Russia, so the likelihood of "sabotage" in this case was remote. Moreover, the Drusag wheat fields were weed-free. At Verblud, a State farm in Sal'sk, it was estimated that the combines left 20 percent of the grain in the fields.[72] And the director of the Glubokinsk State farm, a man with eleven years of agricultural experience, estimated that between the thresher and the combine, no less than 25–30 percent of the wheat had been lost in the fields.[73]

A second assumption shared by the central policy makers who set procurement quotas is expressed most pithily in one of the slogans for 1932, namely "Collective farms exist for the benefit of the proletarian government, not the proletarian government for collective farms."[74] The government's position, as summarized by Khataevich in a letter to Molotov in November 1932, was "to take any and all [*liuboi*] grain out of the collective farms no matter where it's found, paying no attention to whether it's surplus [*tovarny*] or not." Khataevich, while conceding that the line was, of course, correct, suggested: "the struggle for grain should have in mind not only the collection of grain already grown, but also the increase of grain production generally." This, he continued, can only be guaranteed by taking into consideration the consumption needs of the collective farm workers. Molotov responded: "Your position is wrong to the core and un-Bolshevik." "The needs of the government," he concluded, "must always come first."[75]

Prior to 1933, the fact that collective farm workers could end up with less than a living wage no matter how many days they worked was of little interest to the central government. As Mikoyan responded to V. V. Ptukhi, secretary of the NVKK, who was trying to alert the Central Party to the difficult position of most of the peasants in his territory: "The question is not one of norms, how much grain will remain for consumption and so on. The main point is that we must tell

collective farms to fulfill their government plans first, and then to worry about their own plan."[76] "You'll have plenty of waste products (*otkhody*) left over to feed your workers and your cattle" was Iurkin's sarcastic retort to the prognastications of the local cost of the extra 500 tons demanded by the Center.[77]

The VTsIK Commission's final report on the 1932 harvest in the North Caucasus Territory was not objective in its assessment of blame, which it onesidedly pinned on peasants acting under "*kulak* influence."[78] Conquest's narrative of the famine drama by contrast has been reasonably criticized for its neglect of peasants' resistance. There was, according to J. Arch Getty, "plenty of blame to go around."[79] The Soviet government's belief that the peasantry was primarily to blame for the food production crisis is equally (if not more) imbalanced. The order of things, however, is worth bearing in mind, for, as Brovkin rejoined Getty, "first there was the new onslaught on the countryside, then came peasant protest, and then came a decrease in production."[80] The progression of the livestock and labor shortages over the course of three years illustrates the reciprocal nature of the crisis.

In the opinion of the VTsIK Commission reporting on conditions in the North Caucasus Territory in January of 1933, the Territory had lost 42 percent of its horses and 57 percent of its oxen between 1929 and 1932.[81] Ukraine, according to Merl, lost an even greater percentage of its livestock. Cairns, on the basis of published figures, estimates that one central Ukrainian district from the end of 1928 to the end of 1931 lost 57 percent of its horses and 70 percent of its cattle.[82] In the Lower Volga Region, the total number of horses decreased by a factor of 2.1, in the Middle Volga Region, by 1.9.[83]

The initial livestock shortage was indeed the result of the farmers' response to collectivization. Between 1931 and 1932, however, in the North Caucasus Territory the percentage of horses fell by another 25.2 percent. In some counties, Matveevo-Kurgansk (former Taganrog district) to take one example, the number of horses dropped in one year from 23,500 to 11,200.[84] The 1931 decrease resulted from a combination of meat procurement orders and a grain deficit in the villages despite the splendid 1931 crop. In the spring of 1932, collective farm workers were underfed, a state some villagers attempted to remedy by selling or killing livestock from the collective herd to sate their own hunger.[85] As Merl pointed out, "the state, by extracting 45–46 percent of the grain produced [in 1931] in both Ukraine and the North Caucasus Territory, undermined the basis of production, since the excessive grain withdrawal came chiefly at the expense of fodder for the horses."[86] In the northern Kuban Cossack market town of Kisliakovsk, by a collective farm worker's estimate, 80 percent of the remaining cattle was in very poor shape.[87] The livestock population was further reduced during the spring planting season as a result of livestock being overworked while malnourished. The goal of mechanization not only served as justification for leaving insufficient quantities of fodder in the countryside, it also encouraged a reckless abuse of livestock by non-rural supervisors under pressure to fulfill plans.[88] The German consul in Kiev described to Sir Esmond Ovey the way "shock brigade workers . . . merely chose the best horses, worked them to exhaustion, and then took others."[89] Despite the large number of imported farm machines, in "horse units," between 1930 and 1932, a total 768,000 "horses" were lost, leaving an overall deficit of 384,700 "horses."[90]

The VTsIK Commission estimated that between 1930 and 1932 the percent of able-bodied agriculturalists decreased by approximately 12 percent.[91] According to Kondrashin's estimates, in the Lower Volga Region approximately 283,400 villagers (6 percent of the total) left the region between 1930 and 1932.[92] The labor shortage has its origins in the Party's decision to dekulakize the countryside. In the North Caucasus Territory, 3.5 percent of the households in the grain-growing counties were dekulakized. Of these 40,000 households, "25,000 kulak families and other 'counter-revolutionary elements'" were deported from the Territory.[93] Additional worried villagers responded by moving from their native villages before being moved.[94]

From the spring of 1931 until the introduction of the passport system in December, 1932, however, it was the living

conditions created by the Central Party's decision to extract increasing amounts of grain from the regions that prompted able-bodied men and women to abandon farming and their villages in search of a better supplied life for themselves and their families in the cities. According to one of the managers at the understaffed state farm near Drusag, "the food and living conditions on the farm were so bad that the workers would not stay."[95] In the Lower Volga Region, from the 1931 harvest, collective farm workers were (from official records) on average given 101 kilograms, which amounted to approximately 280 grams of bread per day.[96] In 1932, 476,000 villagers responded by leaving their hungry villages for better-supplied regions farther east.[97]

The planting season was doubled (and in places tripled) because the remaining workforce was responsible for working a higher percentage of acres than in previous years.[98] In the North Caucasus Territory, "the plowing norms are being fulfilled at a rate significantly lower than the plan called for," a central OGPU report writer explained, "because of the extreme emaciation of the draught animals."[99] Severely undernourished men and women were not able, even had they been willing, to work at full speed.[100] The acres planted were "undersown" with grain as a result of a seed grain shortage brought about by over-procurement or because hungry collective farm workers decided to compensate for their own lack of bread by eating some of the seed grain themselves.[101]

The weed problem, the blame for which was laid solely on lazy collective farm workers and *kulaks* by the VTsIK report, also illustrates the interconnectedness between the deficit elements and the mutual (but not equal) responsibility of the state and its workforce. A clean seed bed is the easiest way to prevent weeds and is the product of thorough, deep tilling followed by immediate planting which gives the wheat seed a head start over the dormant weed seed. Almost as remarkable to Cairns and Schiller as the pervasiveness of weeds was the uniform poor quality of the tilling done in both the fall of 1931 and the spring of 1932.[102] Slower-starting weeds in a thick stand of wheat will die or be comparatively spindly from lack of sunlight; a thinned-out wheat crop, either from a winter kill or inadequate seed supply at planting time, provides free spaces for the weeds to thrive and overtake the wheat. Thus, the government's procurement strategy, which depleted the amount of grain available for cattle and sowing, helped to create conditions favorable to the proliferation of weeds. Finally, weeds can and were fought in the Russian fields of the twenties and thirties by manual labor. At Drusag, for example, the directors took advantage of the streams of hungry laborers offering their labor at a discount in order to clear their wheat and soybean fields of weeds.[103]

GRAIN EXPORTED

Hunger was an all too familiar "guest," as Russian peasants sometimes described it, in peasant homes in pre-revolutionary times. Russian villagers traditionally set aside personal grain reserves and sometimes helped organize collective grain reserves in anticipation of future weather-related catastrophes. In one Kuban Cossack market town, for example, Cossacks answered the question posed by a visiting Communist Cossack from Slaviansk —"Is the Party's hegemony over the social life of the village and the country necessary?"—with the following story: "Before 1920, our emergency grain fund always had around 2,000 poods. Since then, the fund has been governed and managed by Communists and there isn't a single kernel of grain left. You tell me," he challenged, "is Party leadership beneficial to us or not?"[104] The exchange took place in 1925; by 1933, individuals caught with private, "rainy-day" reserves were routinely shot or exiled for "hoarding," as were collective farm directors attempting to set aside as much as a seed-grain cache before fulfilling the government's yearly quota. By forbidding advance local initiatives, the government assumed moral responsibility for the creation of an emergency grain fund at the national level.

In *Harvest of Sorrow*, Conquest downplayed the significance of exports, directing attention instead (following Kravchenko) to the government grain reserves scattered in small holding bins throughout the country.[105] After the opening of the archives, Conquest boldly

estimated the total amount of the scattered grain reserves at 4.53 million tons. Recently, Davies, Tauger, and Wheatcroft have challenged Conquest's figures; by their calculations, Stalin had only 1.14 million tons of grain in reserve stocks as of 1 July 1933.[106] If the Soviet government did not possess adequate grain reserves on the eve of the famine, the shortage was due to the amount of grain it chose to export from 1928 to 1932.

Typically, historians of the famine have focused attention on the amount of grain exported in 1933. Two respected Soviet scholars, N. A. Ivnitskii and E. N. Oskolkov, have argued that the 1.8 million tons of wheat the Soviet government exported in 1933 were sufficient to prevent the famine.[107] Tauger, by contrast, has suggested that the relevant figures come from the first half of 1933. If the government had not exported 354,000 tons during the first six months of 1933, he estimates, two million lives would have been saved.

Several points need to be made: first, deaths from malnutrition and epidemic diseases associated with severe malnutrition did not cease in June. In the North Caucasus, for example, the number of deaths in August 1933 was nearly three times as high as it had been in 1932 (31,808 vs. 11,675) and twice as high in September. The number of deaths in August was not quite 3,000 less than the March totals.[108] At a minimum, when considering the number of lives that could have been saved by exporting less or in a different seasonal pattern, the number of tons exported should be expanded to include the third quarter of 1933. I would include the last quarter of 1932, as the important factor is the amount of grain available between harvests.

Second, Tauger's estimates are based on survival requirements significantly higher than those posited by most contemporary experts. Schiller, for example, estimated that 500 grams of bread daily would have been sufficient, for over the course of three years people had become used to undereating.[109] In the village of Kisha, a local doctor, after having examined emaciated, bloated collective farm workers, recommended a daily ration of "600 grams of bread, 400 grams of potatoes, and 50 grams of fat, in view of the fact that serious malnutrition-related illnesses have started to become threateningly common." Thus, even by using Tauger's 354,000 tons, four million lives could have been saved.

Third, wheat though probably the most important item exported in 1933, was not the only product whose retention would have saved lives. Milk products, especially butter, continued to be exported. How much was exported seems less important than how much was taken from the village. In 1930, 70–85 percent of the total was usually removed from the village. In places, it seemed that all of the milk was handed over to the state.[110] During the famine, milk levies may have actually risen; the villagers of Valuevka complained of a 20 percent increase.[111] The presence or absence of dairy products often made the difference between survival and starvation, especially for children.

Finally, and even more important from the standpoint of the shortage of grain within the country, is the amount of grain exported during the previous four years. The first "five-year" export plan for agricultural products, according to Osokina's calculations, was filled by 167.2 percent. From 1928 through 1932, shortfalls in other areas (wood, coal, and cattle) were made up for by exporting more agricultural products. Whereas in 1925 and 1926, the NEP years with the most favorable harvests, total grain exports amounted to only 1.9 and 2.5 million tons respectively; in 1930, 4.84 million tons of grain were exported.[112]

The dramatic upturn in exports in 1930 coincided with the excellent harvest of 1930, which was hailed by Stalin as proof of the superiority of collective farming. Russia, it was optimistically announced, no longer had a "grain problem." Stalin apparently put more stock in the correlation between collectivization figures and the amount of grain at the government's disposal than he did in crop estimates and harvest yield statistics. Because collectivization percentages were increased in 1931, it stood to reason that more grain could be exported (5.8 million tons), despite the objectively worse (overall) harvest of 1931. In a telegram to V. Kosior (member of both the Ukrainian and All-Union Central Committees), Stalin and Molotov expressed their disgust at the Ukrainian

Central Committee for having gathered 20 million poods less as of January 1932 than they had by January 1931, in light of "the much higher level of collectivization and increased number of state farms."[113]

Economic historians have argued for the primacy of pressing economic considerations that forced the Communist Party to export grain in the middle of a mass famine.[114] There is little doubt that the Soviet government always wanted more hard currency for its industrialization plans than it had at its disposal. In 1933, however, the price of wheat on the world market plummeted to such an extent that even though the physical amount of wheat exported by the Soviet Union in 1933 rose by 35.8 percent, the amount of money garnered increased by only 7 percent.[115]

The reason for the continued export of wheat is tied less to economic considerations than, as Dalrymple suggested thirty-two years ago, to the question of government pride.[116] In Stalin's eyes, the perceived success (or failure) of the Soviet experiment abroad was linked to wheat exports. Schiller believed the Soviet government strove to conceal news of the famine from reaching the outside world because "the Soviet government [had] gotten itself so bogged down by the [incessant] five-year plan propaganda, which focused on exaggerated confirmations of victory, that the admission of an economic catastrophe such as the famine would be tantamount to an absolute declaration of bankruptcy . . . ."[117] As Stalin wrote S. I. Syrtsov in 1929, "We can't import grain now because we have too little hard currency. But even if we did have enough hard currency, we still wouldn't have imported grain because to do so would have undermined our credit abroad."[118] The government could have maintained its credit by exporting grain, Ivnitskii suggests, while importing other foodstuffs, which could have been paid for by selling some of the gold held in reserve.[119]

The link between exporting and pride was not limited to the upper echelons of the government. In the spring of 1932, Mikoyan discovered that while no fish was available on the shelves of government cooperatives in Murmansk, the local officials were preparing to export fresh cod to Hamburg. The point, in Mikoyan's judgment, was to "show off."[120] Kravchenko, upon discovering that milk was being churned into butter for export abroad during the heart of the famine, imagined Europeans (having not yet been abroad himself) looking at Soviet butter and exclaiming: "They must be rich to be able to send out butter."[121]

In China, a similar situation developed where an exceptionally good harvest following directly on the heels of the beginning of the mass collectivization drive emboldened the leaders to export extravagantly. In the year of the first premature deaths from starvation, 1959, net grain exports rose from 2.94 million tons in 1958 to 3.96 million.[122] The almost seven million tons of grain exported from 1959 to 1960, according to the estimate of several Chinese specialists, represented "enough food energy (twenty-two trillion kilocalories) to feed sixteen million people a diet of 2,000 calories per day for nearly two years."[123] In countries where hungry villages part with government-demanded grain only by dint of compelling physical pressure, the role of the government in creating internal grain shortages should not be underestimated.

GRAIN GROWN BUT NOT HARVESTED

In mid-1932, "the regime was at a crossroads," wrote Arthur Koestler. "Stalin was faced with the choice between two possible methods of overcoming a . . . crisis: either to make the régime more elastic or to make it more rigid."[124] There is some evidence to suggest that at least in May and perhaps for a few months thereafter, the Central Party did consider easing the tension. A Central Executive Control Commission member who overlapped with Cairns at the Gigant State Farm told Cairns that the Party was aware of "the very bad living conditions" which were impairing workers' efficiency. The Party, according to this informant, realized that the situation had to be "greatly improved in the near future."[125] On 6 May 1932, the Central Committee passed two decrees: the first reduced Mikoyan's "dream" grain procurement plan for 1932; the second allowed collective farm workers to sell any remaining products at free market prices after their government obligations had been met. Khataevich, a member of the Central Committee and

secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk District Committee, interpreted these May decrees as the Party's attempt to encourage peasant productivity.[126]

The "free-trade" decree did not bring the immediate results the Party had hoped for. In early May, very few collective farm workers had bread left for their own consumption, much less to sell to others.[127] Several foreign observers believed that the decree had come too late to be effective.[128] Schiller put his finger on one of the two most important points (after four years of broken promises): "Only a long lasting and steady holding of this course could have reestablished the peasants' trust."[129]

The free-trade decree did not really go to the heart of collective farm workers' grievances, which by mid-1932 had changed over the course of two years from demands for independent farming to livable working conditions within the collective farms. Villagers did hope that the announced lowering of the 1932 grain quotas would improve their material conditions. According to Sholokhov, prior to the unveiling of the county's concrete grain quota, collective farm workers in his county had been under the impression that the Party had promised to lower the 1932 plan.[130]

Perhaps the most important cause contributing to the "smaller harvest" of 1932, the cause that more than any other made a mass famine likely (barring a reduction of grain exports and an increase in imports), was the quota-setting strategy chosen by Stalin in June 1932 and the peasants' response to it. "Even though TsK VKP(b) and SNK SSSR passed a decree allowing a small decrease in the grain procurement plan, there is no need to let the villages know about the lowered plan." The point, Stalin explained, was to give the government a 4–5 percent cushion in order "to fulfill the real plan *no matter what it takes.*"[131]

The reason for Stalin's decision cannot be located in some presumed ignorance on the part of a lofty dictactor out of touch with the people's plight, for it was Stalin who pointed out to Kaganovich and Molotov in the same memo the disturbing fact that "a number of good-harvest counties in Ukraine are in a position of ruin and famine."[132] Possibly Stalin, although aware of the devastation caused by the grain procurement assignments of 1931, did not understand that mistakes in agriculture are cumulative. It seemed to the experienced director of the Glubokinsk State Farm that the government was not aware that "farming is not like factory work, where if one bolt is spoiled by virtue of having been misplaced, you can throw it away and put in another one."[133]

The reason directly behind Stalin's decision to conceal from collective farm workers their modestly reduced quotas, it would seem, was his characterization of peasants as dangerously crafty.[134] Peasants, at least in Ukraine, were expected to fulfill an egg quota under the assumption hens laid one egg a day. The Vice-Consulate of Italy stationed in Kharkov was intrigued: how could a hen be expected to "lay an egg unfailingly each day?" he asked. "For every hen that is reported," he was told, "you must logically suppose that there are a further two hens that are not being reported."[135] Both Stalin and Molotov were quite anxious lest an individual farmer or even a collective farmer "put one over on them."[136]

Stalin's "insurance-policy" strategy backfired. "If Ukraine had been given an assignment of 350 million poods right up front," Khataevich wrote Stalin in November, "the plan would more easily have been fulfilled."[137] In the Northern Caucasus Territory, when the news of the 1932 grain quotas reached the hungry villages, peasants and Cossacks dug in their collective heels and prepared for a determined goal-line defense of their grain.[138] In the words of one overheard Kuban Cossack, "This year we need to act a little smarter. Before we give our grain to the government, we should make sure our own needs are covered. Whatever grain is left over, we'll deliver to the government. This past year taught us how we should believe them—the masses are starving."[139] The struggle over grain deliveries to the state in the fall of 1932 reduced the total amount of grain in the country for both peasants and the government.

Mikoyan's dream quota, conjured up in late 1931 was, as Tauger reminds us, lowered on 6 May 1932. It was not, however, in the opinions of each provincial and territorial committee secretary, reduced enough to be realistic.[140]

V. Ptukhi, Secretary of the Lower Volga Territorial Committee, requested that his territory's plan be lowered by 20 percent.[141] Boris P. Sheboldaev, Secretary of the North Caucasus Territorial Committee in 1932, requested a 10–15 million pood reduction for the territory from Stalin. Both requests were turned down.[142]

In some counties, the grain quotas had actually been raised in comparison with the previous year. In Veshensk, the quota was raised by 250 percent. When Sholokhov reproached a group of Cossacks relaxing openly at the harvest's peak, the group's self-appointed spokesperson, a woman, pointed out the extreme weightiness of the 1932 grain quota in their defense.[143] Even in the Volga Territory and the Northern Causasus, almost all peasants and Cossacks had already exhausted their surpluses; many had even sold the things they could live without and slaughtered their milk cows.[144] Only a significant drop in the grain quota, as collective farm workers saw things, could have portended a less hungry winter in 1933.

Another factor motivating Cossacks and peasants to resist in the summer and fall of 1932 was the widespread awareness of the 1932 famine in Ukraine. In Petrovsk county, at a village Soviet meeting called to discuss but more importantly to confirm the grain procurement plan for 1932, the chairman of the mutual aid association warned: "A famine like Ukraine experienced lies ahead for Medvedka too."[145] According to Sheboldaev, peasants "practically everywhere" talked in all openness about the impending famine, frequently referring to the Ukrainian experience.[146]

The existence of villager resistance as a factor in the village-Party relationship of 1932 has been mentioned often enough in the literature. The Soviet literature, following Stalin, called it "*kulak* sabotage."[147] Western historians characterize the resistance as "passive" in tenor. Fitzpatrick, for example, describes the famine of 1933 as "the consequence of an irresistible force (the state's demands for set quotas of grain) meeting an immovable object (the peasants' stubborn passive resistance to these demands)."[148] The least accurate characterization of villager resistance in 1932 was made by Eugene Lyons, a controversial American reporter, who likened it to "a supine despair manifest in indifference, laziness, neglect. None of it was by design."[149]

In fact, resistance in the summer and fall of 1932 took many forms: united and individual, open and stealthy, armed with words, pitchforks, or guns. Quite a bit of it was cleverly designed, almost all of it was intentional. In Samara, Cairns observed, "all day long peasants spoke of the passive resistance they were offering."[150] In memoir accounts, written years after the fact, Ukrainian émigrés of peasant origin proudly spoke of the various "illegal" ways they had attempted to survive a famine they believed intentional and forthcoming. The three most important types, from the perspective of the famine, were: the slow-down strike (or "*ital'ianka*"), the open strike, and the village-wide effort to keep enough grain at home. The first two in particular further decreased the amount of grain available in the country. All three enraged Stalin, Molotov, and Kaganovich.

Of the three essential types of resistance, only working with all deliberate slowness, even carelessly, could be aptly categorized as "passive" resistance. In August, Sholokhov rode his horse over to the Chukarinsk collective farm, where he fully expected to find the collective farm workers deeply engrossed in field work, especially because of the heavy rains in early August. Instead, he found the fields empty and approximately fifty men and women lazing about—some sleeping, other singing, none working.[151] The collective farm workers of Veshensk were not alone in their dawdling and sloppy handling of the threshing processes. In several counties throughout Ukraine, NVK, the Crimea and Kazakstan, losses of grain, by the estimate of one central OGPU reporter (almost certainly inflated), ranged from 25 to 50 percent of the harvest.[152]

Poor work usually stemmed from one of three motivations, not necessarily discrete. Some collective farm workers refused to work diligently on principle because they believed, in the words of one, that "the quality of the work should match the quality of the food."[153] A second possible reason is extreme hunger, which is sometimes accompanied by "paralysis of initiative, dislike of work, restlessness, and resignation."[154] Schiller,

for example, believed collective farm workers "made no particular effort to save the harvest . . . out of the feeling that everything would be taken away from them again anyway."[155] Finally, and most predominantly, villagers hoped to survive by gleaning the grain left in the fields after the grain collectors had returned home. As one Veshensk woman explained to Sholokhov, motioning to the wheat lying in the field, "Our grain doesn't belong abroad. We will eat this kind!"[156] In the summer of 1933, unidentified partisans, probably workers, were overheard commenting: "It's painful in a country as rich as ours to watch the country's bosses [i.e. workers and peasants] walk about hungry while the government exports grain for a song."[157]

The second significant resistive strategy employed during the late summer and early fall was the refusal to work until certain demands were met. Sometimes this occurred individually; other times it resembled an organized, small-scale agricultural strike. By the word "strike" I mean deliberate, openly expressed refusals by more than one person to work further until a clearly enunciated demand is met. The strike as a resistive method has a history among Russian agricultural workers, reaching back at least to 1905. Though peasants usually acted in an organized way without stopping to discuss terminology, the word they sometimes used as a threat was "*bastovat*." In Otradnensk county, for example, a Red partisan was overheard commenting, "soon we will have no choice but to go on strike. Surely we didn't risk our lives in the sand in order to starve to death now."[158] The words OGPU reporters used to describe peasant actions ranged from "*volynka*" to "*zabastovka*."[159]

The collective strikes often developed as a brigade-wide action, frequently led by the brigadir himself.[160] In Bogoroditsk township (*sel'sovet*) the Party cell secretary was also a brigadir. He gathered his workers around him, delivered the group's ultimatum to the collective farm director, and led the march out of the field, where they left the thresher standing, and to their homes.[161]

Between collective strikes and individual refusals, the percentage of collective farm workers actually working in the fields was sometimes as low as 54 percent.[162] Refusals to show up at work until economic demands were met were reportedly widespread from July through October, the most crucial period in the agricultural cycle in an area where a great deal of winter wheat is usually sown.[163] This method decreased the yield of the 1933 crop as well. According to a Drusag specialist, winter wheat planted before 30 September, for example, yields 20–30 percent more than wheat planted between 1 and 15 October. "Not in vain is it said, 'One day can spoil an entire year,'" the Glubokinsk State farm director pointed out to the man he feared to be agriculturally illiterate, Kaganovich.[164]

In 1932, the strikers' demands preserved in the OGPU reports are predominantly economic in nature. The demands of collective farm workers in Petrovka, a peasant village in Azov county, are typical: "When you give us bread, then we will show up at work. If you don't, bring in the harvest yourselves."[165] At stake in the summer and autumn of 1932 was more than the immediate desire to satisfy a growling stomach. There was a very thinly veiled, at times not veiled at all, sense of outrage at the idea of grain growers being deprived of grain, while others were comparatively well fed. Collective farm workers in a village in the Lower Volga region abandoned their field work, apparently finding the words of Mironov, a local collective farm worker, compelling: "collective farm workers aren't given bread . . . The Communists are eating their fill, while they are trying to starve the people to death. Let's get out of here and let the Communists do the work themselves."[166] According to a Czechoslovakian coal mining engineer, "without bread a Russian will not work."[167] Certainly in the North Caucasus Territory, postmen and white-collar workers commonly refused to work when their rations were delayed or reduced.[168]

Other collective farm workers tried to use the strike as a means of negotiating higher wages or payment according to their own timetable. In Bogoroditsk township, for example, the brigade demanded to be given two kilograms of grain per laborday, not one.[169] In Sal'sk county, 46 percent of all the collective farm workers refused to participate in the harvest of technical cultures on the

grounds that they had not yet been given the second installment of their yearly pay.[170]

A third major form of peasant resistance in 1932 that was relevant to the mass famine that followed was the so-called "misappropriation of kolkhoz grain," either individually or, again, as a united village effort. Pilferage was not a direct cause of the famine, inasmuch as it kept grain in the village in protected spaces (unlike the fields, where it was vulnerable to rain and snow). It did, however, reduce the amount of grain readily made available to the government and it especially contributed to the famine in the village by increasing Central Party hostility toward "dishonest" collective farm workers.

The "misappopriation" of grain earmarked for government coffers reached epidemic proportions in the fall of 1932.[171] Émigré writers mention, without embarassment, the almost routine way in which collective farm workers invariably brought something back home, some ears of grain [sic] in a pocket or bag, knowing well that they would get little or nothing for their official working day.[172] "During harvest time, my brother and I had not been idle," Dolot recalled. "We were able to collect enough wheat grain to sustain our lives . . .We knew each path, each bush, and we knew how to avoid being caught."[173] In one ten-day stretch in August, the police nabbed 830 individuals for speculation and petty grain theft in the North Caucasus Territory as a whole; by October, the per-decade count had risen to 1,133.[174] By November, at least in the county of Shakhtinsk, the incidence of grain theft had tripled.[175] The united village efforts were often organized by kolkhoz management and local Communists.[176] The main point in both variants was to guard against the upcoming famine which was commonly believed to be inevitable, not because of crop failure, but because of the government habit of leaving too little grain.

Many local authorities apparently agreed with the sentiment of the chairman of the Red Wheel collective farm, who declared: "Collective farm workers and their children aren't dogs. They have to be fed."[177] In the Cossack market town of Otradnaia (Armavir district), the community effort was led by Nikolai V. Kotov, the twenty-nine year old secretary of the local Party cell, a native of the Don province, and a Civil War hero. Kotov organized the local authorities from the collective farm presidents to the thresher drivers who were instructed to step aside from their machines from time to time, allowing the collective farm workers the opportunity to augment their salary. The aim was to raise the amount of the advance from 491 grams per laborday to one kilogram. Management and collective farm workers had no confidence in the promises of second and third advances.[178] Rumors abounded in the fall of 1932 that the first "advance," 15 percent of the harvest, was all the pay the collective farm workers would see that year.[179] In most cases, they turned out to be prophetic.

The resistance of 1932 differs from the resistance of the previous two years by virtue of the prominence of former Red partisans, local Communists, and local Soviet officials in leadership roles. In Kondrashin's view, former loyalists led group resistance in the fall of 1932 because they felt personally responsible for having helped to establish Soviet power in the country during the Civil War.[180] By 1932, I would add, not only members of the Civil War cadre in the countryside had turned against the Party, but members of the collectivization cadre as well. When Kotov was led out of the courtroom, after having been sentenced to ten years hard labor, his father shouted: "It's o.k. son. We fought together for the collective farms, now we'll fight for the *narod*."[181] This merging of previously separate resistive and loyalist streams of activism into one united river should have alerted the Central Party's attention to the gravity of the situation.

Starvation is the characteristic of some people not having enough food to eat. It is not the characteristic of there not being enough food to eat.

— Amartya Sen, *Poverty and Famines*—[1]

PART II: THE 1933 FAMINE: BREAKING THE "STRIKE"

Primarily as a result of the Soviet government's short-sighted policies and unsuccessful modernizing ventures combined with villagers' resistance, it is possible that, by November 1932, there was not enough grain left in the country to keep all the citizens alive. A food shortage would not, especially under the economic circumstances of 1933, have made a famine inevitable, nor would it have solved the conundrum of why most of the deaths were concentrated in the country's most productive zone. While the Soviet government actually increased the amount of wheat sold in comparison with 1932 by 35.8 percent in order to compensate for the grain's decreased buying power, German farmers burned their grain because of low prices.[2]

An examination of the mortality patterns during the famine's main phase reveals three features relevant to a discussion of the government's intent. The first irregularity is the uneven concentration of the famine in villages within the affected zone. In Ukraine there were villages where, even in the opinion of one émigré lay historian, the percentage of deaths by famine was "quite insignificant," while in others no less than 75 percent of the population had been lost.[3] Peasants, in Chamberlin's opinion, were inclined to over-estimation and often placed losses at a minimum of 50 percent.[4] Contemporary foreign observers and MTS political department heads, however, verified that sharp and uneven population drops occurred. Gradenigo, an Italian diplomat who drove unaccompanied from Kharkiv to Poltava in July 1933, described the village of Vornovka's cemetery where "there were about ten crosses that had darkened with time, next to which there was a field full of freshly planted white crosses." A surviving peasant commented that only forty of 800 villagers were still alive.[5]

A second feature of note is the way in which the Soviet famine of 1933 claimed primarily rural lives.[6] The Greek famine of 1941 illustrates the most "natural," which is not to imply better, famine distribution in the absence of a natural disaster. According to Mazower, "the 1941 harvest of most crops was between 15 and 30 percent lower than it had been before the war. Even these totals might have ensured the survival of the population at subsistence levels." The Tsolakoglu government, however, failed in its attempts to force Greek farmers to part with even their surplus grain, despite the use of demobilized army officers. The officers often sided with the farmers, as did the local police. "In the vital grain-producing areas of Macedonia . . . farmers with 'guns in hand' refused to deliver their crops to the authorities." All told, the government garnered about 25 percent of its goal. As a result, the Greek farming population survived, and even prospered from, the famine of 1941, while the poorest urban workers, especially newcomers, were hardest hit.[7] The favoring of urban people over rural in the distribution of food supplies at the government's disposal is not unprecedented. The British government, as early as August 1942, followed a policy of creating conditions which would allow industrial workers of Calcutta to acquire "essential supplies . . . in adequate quantities and at reasonable prices." Industrial workers were prioritized because the British government deemed them important to its "war time obligations."[8] It did not, however, raid starving villagers of their last morsels of food at gunpoint in order to do so.

Both Tauger and Merl assert that the Soviet famine was not "confined to rural areas." Tauger refers to cities "overflowing with famished children." Starving children did indeed line the streets and train stations of every major city in the affected areas, but they were almost

always orphaned peasant children, who either came to the city in search of food themselves, or were brought there by a desperate or resigned parent, who returned home, in the words of one of them, "to die."[9] Merl's statement rests on the fact that workers in Moscow were hungry in the summer of 1933.[10] According to Osokina, most working class families in Moscow ate more poorly in 1933 than in any other year since 1928. "Their bread, vegetable, and milk rations, however," she points out, "were not curtailed."[11] To Marie Zuk, a Ukrainian survivor on her way to Winnipeg in 1933 via Moscow (but not Stavropol, Saratov, or Volgograd), the markets of Moscow seemed "flooded with the most delicious foodstuffs!" "Only Ukraine seems to have been sentenced to death by starvation by the central government in Moscow," she concluded.[12] Peasants who made it to cities other than Moscow, to borrow an expression from Dolot, "failed to find a paradise of plenty."[13]

In the interest of precision, however, several distinctions must be made. "Starvation," as Amartya Sen reminds us, "is a normal feature in many parts of the world." "Violent outbursts of famine," he continues, must be distinguished from "'regular' starvation."[14] In the Soviet Union of the 1930s, the "'regular' starvation" category should be subdivided further into those who worked with an awareness of gnawing hunger and those who, after consuming the grain rations earned in the summer, were forced to their beds from edema after the New Year. Scattered city dwellers throughout the country did die from a combination of malnutrition and over-exhaustion in the first half of 1933, much as villagers had done and would continue to do from 1930 through 1934 (at least);[15] many went to bed hungry at night and only a few had as much to eat of the things they were accustomed to eating.

White- and blue-collar workers, specialists, and members of the *intelligentsia* were entitled to wages graduated according to skill and to guaranteed bread rations, which began in 1928.[16] The manager of a small cooperative store in Kyiv, for example, reported that his salary of 100 rubles a month was supplemented by a 400 gram ration of black bread daily—200 for the worker, 200 for his son.[17] Workers' wages were commonly delayed, sometimes by as much as a month or more, but they were eventually paid.[18] Even for workers and *intelligenty*, bread rations had been steadily curtailed from 1931 forward.[19] "We work eight-hour days, forego time off, and still don't have the right to two breakfasts," complained industrial workers in Taganrog in March 1933. "Our leaders think that two pounds of bread is excessive for workers, so now they have cut it to one."[20] In the small port city of Eisk, teachers were ready to storm Moscow in order to lodge a complaint when their bread rations were lowered from 600 to 400 grams a day.[21]

Distinctions existed within the legally more protected social category. Even longshoremen, members of a higher category, were observed enhancing their diets by stealing raw grain from their cargo in April of 1933.[22] The least-well-paid category of workers complained quite openly of hunger in the summer of 1932, especially in Ukraine.[23] Among these workers were the unemployed, one of whom, in April of 1933, threw himself under a train in Shakhty to avoid the slower death from starvation he feared inevitable.[24] Extra-legal circumstances, like a breakdown in the supply chain, were common in the spring of 1933.[25] Bread rations, like wages, were not always distributed on schedule, especially in February and March of 1933. In Taganrog, OGPU reporters uncovered evidence of two workers who had died from starvation as a result of a failure in the food-supply system; others, for identical reasons, were clearly undernourished and many refused to appear for work.[26] Nonetheless, émigré and peasant sources concur; unless the legal distribution order was circumvented, even teachers, who were not particularly high in the pecking order, received sufficient food rations to keep them alive.[27] On the whole, urban workers and their dependants did not die *en masse* in concentrated areas of the country.[28]

The disproportionately large percentage of healthy rural men between the ages of twenty and forty who died between February and August 1933 is the third striking feature of the famine's demographic pattern.[29] One bookkeeper in the Kuban bemoaned the fact that "so many working hands were lost to the

graves."[30] "We ended up with an overwhelmingly female set of collective farm workers," wrote one MTS reporter.[31] A male bias is not unusual; even during the Greek famine of 1941, for example, "adults above forty years old seem to have been most susceptible, particularly males."[32] The age of the men stricken down, however, is the third clue that the Soviet famine of 1933 was atypical. High death rates among society's weakest members is typical of unmanipulated famines, which tend to magnify preexisting mortality patterns. In survivors' accounts, the death of grandparents almost without exception precedes the death of other family members beginning as early as the fall of 1930.[33] The extraordinary number of children who died during the 1943 Bengal famine surprised no one, because high infant mortality is a characteristic of normal mortality during non-famine years in India.[34] In the Soviet Union, young children (especially between the ages of one and seven) and seniors died prematurely and in large numbers between 1931 and 1934.[35]

The first two irregularities would seem to bolster the "intentionalist" argument, as sharp food deficits were created by legally sanctioned acts of government plenipotentiaries in the rural region of the country peopled by men and women with the most consistent history of determined and at times even armed resistance. The third irregularity, however, would seem to support Merl and Ulam's contention that the famine was at very least poorly organized, if at all, because its victims were not always drawn from the ranks of the regime's least favorite or most expendable.[36] OGPU reporters and KK-RKI inspectors travelling about the North Caucusus Territory in the spring of 1933, for example, found shock workers, tractor drivers, activists, and poorer peasants facing death from starvation, as well as men and women with only a handful of labordays to their credit.[37] Upon his arrival in Ol'ginsk, the young MTS political head discovered that among the dead and near-dead were several members of the local activist group, who had, in his judgment, "struggled quite actively last year in the effort to fortify the collective farm." "I can't understand how it happened that several of the best collective farm workers died," commented one activist with an extraordinary number of labordays to his credit to the MTS political department head. "I am still hanging on . . . There is no one left to work."[38]

In their assessments of the Soviet government's response to the famine of 1933, the "accidentalist" historians have focused attention on the government's lack of readily available grain resources. I believe that we are better advised to assess the government's intentions vis-à-vis starving villagers by focusing attention on its use of the resources it did have, and on its regulation of villagers' self-help efforts. Several official choices were economically unnecessary and even imprudent; all of them eventually contributed to pushing higher the famine's final death toll.

In its final report written in January 1933, the Commission appointed by the Central Executive Committee to study economic and cultural development in the North Caucasus Territory concluded: "The final figures on the productivity of every grain culture (except for rye) show that the gross yield per hectare was significantly lower in 1932 than it was in 1931." The Commission, focusing at every turn on villager resistance and negligence, blamed the deepening agricultural crisis almost exclusively on the peasants. The Commission's assessment is important because it mirrors Stalin's interpretation of the crisis. Stalin's oft-quoted words to Sholokhov, accusing the collective farm workers of having "undertaken an '*ital'ianka*,' or a slow-down strike, aptly sum up the Central Party's view.[39]

The Party's method of handling the disaster, about which they were well informed, clearly aimed at breaking the peasants' collective resistive will once and for all, thereby going, in the Party's view, to the heart of the agrarian crisis. The primary reasons were threefold: to break the peasant "strike" and thereby end the productivity crisis; to preserve the hegemony of the city over the countryside; and to protect the revolution's reputation.

The Origins of the Famine from the Village Floor

The most basic cause of widespread hunger in rural Russia, both preceding and outlasting the famine of 1932–34, was the way in which collective farm workers' wages were calculated and paid (or not).

Their legal entitlement to a living wage was even less secure than that of most sharecroppers in other countries, who usually either agree in advance to work for a certain set fee irrespective of the crop's yield or for a percentage of the crop itself.[40] Except in the case of a total crop failure, it would never be possible, legally, to end up with a year's salary of zero. In the Soviet collective farm system of the early 1930s, the government could be considered the "landowner," and the collective farm workers, the sharecroppers. The "landowner" decided what percentage of the crop it needed to finance its industrialization bills for the year. After the collective farm had met its government obligations in full, the grain that remained, minus grain to be set aside for livestock and seed stocks, was to be divided among the workers according to the amount of labordays they had earned throughout the year. In principle, salaries were to be paid in installments, the first immediately following the harvest. Many of the tasks traditionally performed by women—child care, cooking, livestock tending—were calculated at a coefficient of .5 or .75.[41]

In 1932, labordays were paid off at an average ratio of 1.4 kilograms per day in the North Caucasus Territory.[42] In some collective farms, labordays ranged in value from "next to nothing" to 300 grams each.[43] The amount of grain available per family depended on the ratio between working family members and dependents. According to Oskolkov, it was not uncommon for one family member to be responsible for feeding four others. In the Volga regions, most interviewed survivors recalled being paid approximately 500 grams per laborday in 1932.[44] In the fall of 1932, after the grain quotas had been met, many collective farm managers were unable to reckon with their workers.[45] In the fall of 1933, the collective farm workers in Azov county were described by the MTS political department head as being "utterly convinced" that they would, once again, not receive anything at all for the work they had done.[46]

The intentions of the government seemed clear to the rural agriculturalists, who lost relatives and neighbors in the famine because they did not receive enough poods of wheat to tide themselves and their families over until August of 1933. Kondrashin found that only five of the more than 300 eyewitnesses he interviewed did not associate the famine in their villages with the government's act of removing every last kernel of grain.[47] The connection between the local famine experience and the lack of pay in money or kind in villagers' minds is illustrated by the statement of a commune member in Morozovsk county: "After we finish eating the vegetables, if there's nothing to eat, we'll just lie down to die. Probably, the government will cheat us again and not pay us for the days we worked."[48] Technically, collective farm workers did not work directly for the government; they did, however, consider themselves to be government employees, perhaps because the government had given them no choice but to give up individual farming or because of frequent government involvement in the production and extraction processes. The fact that, especially in Ukraine, government procurement campaigns left local stores depleted two years running, added an element of deliberateness to it.[49]

Legally, a unique subset of villagers was created by the government's decision to exert pressure on uncooperative villagers by linking entitlement to food supplies to compliance with government orders. Starting in late November, villages, collective farms, and entire counties were "blacklisted" for failing to meet their grain quotas in a sufficient and timely fashion. In Ukraine, by 15 December 1932, eighty-eight of 358 counties were blacklisted.[50] In the North Caucasus Territory, fifteen market towns and their surrounding environs, peasant villages as well as Cossack *khutors* were blacklisted by 31 December.[51] In the Nizhne-Chirsk county of the Lower Volga Territory, 25 percent of the collective farms were blacklisted.[52]

Consistently, the highest death rates in the famine belt were concentrated in the black-listed areas—collective farms, villages, market towns, and counties which had failed to meet their grain quotas in a sufficient and timely fashion—throughout the Volga regions, the North Caucasus Territory, and Ukraine. Summary MTS reports from blacklisted Kuban and Don counties often mentioned the "especially sharp deficit of human resources" as one of the obstacles they had faced in the spring. In two MTS

summary reports from blacklisted northern Kuban Cossack market towns, the decrease was estimated at 50 percent. In the area surrounding the Kopansk MTS in Eisk county, only 2,922 of the 8,000 villagers present in 1928 remained. The MTS director estimated that no fewer than 1,500 of them had died from starvation in 1933.[53]

In these zones, legal entitlements to all means of survival (not just food) were withheld from November until resistance was broken from rural agriculturalists perceived as "saboteurs," to use Stalin's favorite way of describing villagers who did not behave as he wanted them to.[54] State agents confiscated all grain stores, most of which had been earned as wages by working in the collective farms, and private food stocks (including vegetables grown in private gardens and preserved for the winter). Likewise, all food supplies were literally (and legally) stripped away from individuals excluded from collective farms and individual farmers unable to meet their requirements.[55] Moreover, supplies were removed from the local stores, and villagers were made virtual prisoners of war, legally forbidden to leave their villages and market towns in order to buy food products or seek work in other areas. "They really should allow us to go into the city in order to purchase beet roots, as there aren't any left in the market town," argued a collective farm worker to the head of the Dolzhansk MTS's political department.[56]

The Communist Party's goal was to force recalcitrant villagers to part with their (assumed) illegally hidden grain stores. It did so by abetting the process whereby shortage becomes famine, thereby making famine its partner in the subjugation of the villagers. In the spring, when villagers' resistance was believed to have been vanquished, blacklisted areas were returned to a legal status equivalent to their neighbors'.[57]

Simultaneously, the Soviet government sought to reverse all policies believed to be fostering resistance. It is in this light that the decree reversing the Ukrainization policy should be understood in both the North Caucasus Territory and Ukraine, the two wheat-producing territories furthest behind in their grain procurement obligations.[58] The Kuban Cossacks who spoke Ukrainian did not consider themselves Ukrainians nor did they exhibit a desire to join a Ukrainian nationalist movement. They treated the "*khokhly*," one of the less derisive terms used by Cossacks when referring to Ukrainian-speaking peasants, with as much disdain as did the Russian-speaking Cossacks of Veshensk. The Soviet government, however, had itself classified the Kuban Cossacks as ethnically Ukrainian and now used their own ethnic classification to help explain Kuban Cossack resistance.

The high percentage of Cossacks killed by the famine in the North Caucasus Territory lends further support to the hypothesis that the famine was used as a weapon to end resistance.[59] Kaganovich and other provincial and central leaders emphasized the Kuban Cossacks in November of 1932 in part because of Cossacks' historical record of having resisted Soviet power the most tenaciously, and because, in point of fact, they were the most active resisters in the fall of 1932 and in the spring of 1933.[60] In late November, it took a Red Army division to quell an armed uprising in the Kuban Cossack market town of Tikhoretsk.[61] Local Party workers often made the connection explicit, as in the complaint of a county Secretary working in Egorlyk, a market town, with a reputation "well known by all residents of the North Caucasus Territory as having scrapped longer than the rest against Soviet power." In late February, Cossacks from Egorlyk interpreted the Soviet government's change of seed-grain-loan policy as a sign of capitulation to their demands.[62]

Famine Management

A Well-Informed Government

Any discussion of the government's intentions vis-à-vis agriculturalists in the famine belt must be preceded by a consideration of whether it was acting on an informed basis. Implicit in Tauger's critique of Conquest's anti-government line is the assumption of a direct correlation between government awareness of the famine, on the one hand, and an increase in "aid," on the other.[63] Sheila Fitzpatrick conjectures that "the peasants' representation" of the famine was probably "less well known to the regime . . .

because of the danger and difficulty of transmitting to autocratic leaders information that they do not want to hear."[64]

The view of the Soviet Communist Party as poorly informed, one of the pillars of any serious "accidentalist" theory, would have been mocked by villagers as naïve. Not only did rural collective farm workers and individual farmers die quietly in their home villages, politely out of city dwellers' views, but in report after report, eyewitnesses were struck by the sight of human and animal corpses lining major county roads and railroad tracks.[65] An MTS watchman in Shakhtinsk county was overheard asking: "How can it be that the government doesn't see to what end collective farm workers are coming?"[66] "The leaders absolutely do not want to see that people are dropping like flies and lie scattered along the roads," was the only explanation one female collective farm worker in Eisk county could come up with.[67]

A close examination of provincial and central archival documents between January and August 1933 makes clear that, contrary to Fitzpatrick's concern and Tauger's implication, the Soviet government was well-informed of the developing catastrophe in the country's wheat belt. By the early 1930s, the goverment had a remarkably complex, multi-layered information network. Tales of resistance, repression, and death can be traced in the daily and weekly OGPU reports of the Party's county agents and the reports of both visiting VTsIK instructors, KK-RKI inspectors, and MTS political department heads.[68] These reports contain signs, both direct and indirect, of an approaching major catastrophe.

Between 29 January and 1 February, territorial-level OGPU reports, which were automatically forwarded to Moscow in triplicate, include excerpts from Veshensk county, for example, which alerted the readers to the unfolding disaster in two ways. First, the villagers' own "complaints of famine," which were said to be on the increase, were recorded.[69] Second, the OGPU reporters relayed their own eyewitness experiences. In the market town of Bokovsk, an OGPU agent reported that during his house-to-house tour (motivated by "the goal of uncovering food products"), he had seen a "significant number" of people sick from "systematic undereating."[70] A VTsIK instructor on 5 March wrote a letter to the VTsIK Presidium describing his tour of Tatsinsk county, a county not included on the Territorial Committee's "especially bad-off" list. He estimated that, "as of 25 February, 5 percent of all the households in the county were . . . already bloated from starvation . . . With every passing day," he concluded, "the need increases."[71]

Many of the February and March reports from Party men sent from Moscow to organize and run political departments in the Machine-Tractor Stations were filled with graphic details of the men and women dying in the areas under their charge. These reports were sent directly to *Narkomzem* in Moscow. From Tikhorets county, to take one example, the March report read: "The food-supply situation remains tense. Deaths from undernourishment and starvation have not stopped. Especially deplorable is the situation among the population of the blacklisted collective farm, *Krasny Kubanets*. There the death rate is extremely high, both among adults and children. It is a rare household where, in the course of January, February, and March, one, two or in some cases even three individuals did not die."[72] Even the more official summary reports were riddled with clues about the actual extent of the growing famine. Shteingart, head of the North Caucasus *KraiZU*, wrote in his summary report for 5–10 March to his supervisors in Moscow: "In a whole series of political reports, the question has been raised about the tense food situation and even famine in individual collective farms. Facts are reported of edema and death from emaciation, of the consumption of dogs, rats and frogs, and even of cannibalism."[73]

These reports, made through officially sanctioned channels, corroborated the efforts of high-ranking or respected local authorities ranging from Provincial Committee secretaries to the novelists Sholokhov and Pilniak.[74] In February, Mikhail Sholokhov attempted to talk privately with Stalin in Moscow. After being rebuffed, according to Oskolkov, he wrote Stalin a detailed letter describing the enormous percentage of bloated collective farm workers in Veshensk

county. "And it's only February," he concluded. "Just imagine what it will be like in April."[75]

The Central Committee possessed not only written indications of a food crisis far worse than in 1932, but it also was informed by high-ranking officials and organs of the extent of the disaster. On 23 February, at a closed Bureau session of the North Caucasus Territorial Committee, it was acknowledged that "famine was engulfing forty-eight of seventy-five of the grain-producing counties in the Territory." The Territorial Committee was well-enough informed to divide the afflicted counties into three categories: "especially bad-off," "bad-off," and "other."[76] By early March, well before the famine peaked in May, Stalin received a frank letter from S. Kosior, secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee: "According to the OGPU, 103 counties have been engulfed by the famine. It is doubtful," he wrote, "whether these figures alone give an accurate impression of the real situation." At Kosior's disposal was the report of the head of the Kyiv district OGPU, who wrote of "the thousands who are starving, bloated, dying. The numbers I'm giving you," he mentioned, "are significantly understated."[77]

Perhaps until the materials of the Presidential archive are thoroughly examined, it will be impossible to say precisely whether every member of the Central Committee believed the multitudinous famine reports.[78] Unquestionably Stalin and his allies had enough information available to them from reliable sources to justify an investigation. If the government was skeptical about the famine but concerned about the welfare of its rural citizens, would not an immediate investigation by agents it trusted have made sense? A erector employed by Metropolitan-Vickers, a foreigner with no responsibility for the country at all, unconvinced by the widespread horror stories walked out into a nearby village himself to ascertain the truth.[79] In the Volga area, news of a letter written by a soldier's mother describing cannibalism in her village reached the soldier's commanding officer, who was called in for questioning and placed under arrest for "spreading calumny." Nonetheless, the commanding officer and the division's political leader were disturbed enough by the news that they sent an investigative team of their own to Ivanovsk township.[80]

At the same time, there are several clues that argue against disbelief, the first of which is the remarkably well-directed nature of the propaganda efforts of the time. Rumors of the millions of workers and peasants starving systematically in Japan, America, and Germany were regularly featured in the newspapers of 1932 and 1933.[81] Defenders of the Soviet regime, apparently, were trained to divert attention away from conditions in the Soviet Union by focusing attention on the starving masses elsewhere. At a Samara bazaar, for example, the women complaining openly to Cairns and Schiller of hunger and exorbitant prices were rebuked by a loyalist who informed the crowd that in America people were starving.[82] During the famine in Kuban, a young girl the day before she died asked her teacher: "Why is it that you are always telling us about how in capitalistic countries people are exploited, live in constant need, systematically starve. And here?"[83]

Second, a significant degree of central awareness and at least an impression of the extent of the disaster was required to coordinate the mobilization and deployment of an enormous number of troops drawn from workers, students, and soldiers to compensate for the sharp drop in "human resources" to plant the crops in the spring, weed them throughout the summer, and harvest them in the fall.[84] Likewise, measures implemented to keep starving villagers in their villages and out of public areas (especially cities and train stations) are remarkably similar from one famine-stricken region to another, thereby implying a central level of initiative and direction.[85]

Third, and perhaps most telling, is the Central Committee's response to Sholokhov's April letter to Stalin. In May, an investigative team was sent to Veshensk, ostensibly in order to confirm his letter. The Commission concluded that Sholokhov's letter was essentially correct; so too was the "absolutely necessary political pressure applied to the collective farm workers sabotaging the grain procurement campaign." Government plenipotentiaries, from Territorial Committee members, who had set the tone, to local government employees had,

the Commision reported, "gotten somewhat out of hand." The punishments eventually meted out to those judged "responsible," however, were remarkable for their lack of severity. None were arrested or sent to labor camps. All were forbidden from working in Veshensk county in the future and some from working in the countryside for at least one year; one was even given a promotion.[86] Between 7 August 1932 and 1 January 1933, according to Kirylenko, head of the People's Commissariat of Justice, 54,645 individuals had been arrested for petty theft of the "people's collective property," usually small amounts of grain.[87] The majority of those convicted were sentenced to 5–10 years of hard labor; the death penalty was actually carried out on 1,000 of the 2,110 sentenced to death by firing squad.[88]

Grain Loans and Strike-Breaking

The striking thing about the OGPU reports is the consistent way in which they all give pride of place to a different question, namely whether the villagers' resistant will had yet been broken. Parallel to these reports and guided by them, the giving and retracting of grain loans followed the ebbs and flows of the tide of resistance.

The sequence of both the seed-grain and food loans in February and March is indicative. The North Caucasus Territory met its yearly quota in early January only by relinquishing its seed grain fund to the Center. An effort to compile a new stock of seed grain from local resources was accompanied by the most severe attack on the peasantry in the history of Soviet power. Instead of garnering the desired results, seed grain and evidence of a less defiant spirit, the Party's measures drew two responses. The first was vocalized defiance which is best illustrated by the refusal of collective farm workers to ratify a new procurements' order in a blacklisted village as reported by an OGPU agent: "We are dying from starvation and our children are eating frozen squash. Even if you exile us, even if you shoot us—there still won't be any grain."[89] The other response, which is said to have been widespread, was the *molchanka*, or silent treatment.[90] In late January and early February, villagers refused to prepare for the spring planting season. "Why work at the collective farms, when they confiscated the last of the flour we earned in wages last year?" one villager was overheard asking neighbors by an OGPU agent in Belo-Kalitva.[91] Weeks before the planting season was to begin, out of a concern for the 1933 harvest, the Central Party loaned the Territory some of its previously extracted seed grain. Even this loan failed to motivate swollen-from-hunger collective farm workers to begin the preparatory chores for planting, because, in the words of farm workers from Eisk, "even if we plant, we won't be around to reap the harvest."[92] Following a torrent of similar reports by OGPU and political department heads of MTSs, the first food loans, to be repaid with interest the following fall, began to be distributed.[93] Priority was given first to loyalists, second, to those most necessary to the farm work, and last, to those collective farm workers in especially critical condition. It seemed as if the Party was beginning to understand, in the words of Arthur Quinn, that "too much force and too little force [are] equally ineffective."[94]

When it comes to the Soviet government's involvement in the distribution of scarce grain resources in the spring and summer of 1933, there are two dominant errors in the historiography. One is to overstate the extent to which the Soviet government did not intervene. To take only the most recent example, a self-appointed commission of international scholars which studied the Ukrainian famine from 1988 to 1990 concluded that "the Soviet government undertook no measures of any kind to help Ukraine right up to the summer of 1933."[95] Various types of seed and food loans, all of which were described by the government as "aid," were distributed beginning as early as late February to both Ukraine and the North Caucasus Territory.[96]

The other error, however, is to allow the Soviet government's portrayal of itself as generous, given the circumstances, and almost humanitarian—both of which seem implicit in the government's labeling of the loans as "aid"—to stand as an accurate description of its intervention. Tauger's interpretation of the Soviet government's interest in "alleviating" the famine, once it became aware of the unfolding catastrophe, is faulty at several

points.[97] First, not all of the grain loaned in February was for the villagers. Indeed, M. Umanski, head of the Press Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs assured Duranty that the corn headed to South Russia was "not for the peasants."[98] Most of it was intended for the livestock and for the spring planting campaign. If the Central Party had not required the North Caucasus Territorial Committee and individual collective farms to give up their seed grain funds in order to meet the unrealistic quotas, the need for a loan would not have existed. Moreover, "a seed loan is not aid to the starving," as N. A. Ivnitskii observes. Rather, it reflected the government's rightful concern about the 1933 harvest.[99] If the collective farm workers had not "had (their own!) grain returned to them for planting," Ivnitskii continues, "then, all Soviet citizens, not only peasants, would have been positioned on the brink of starvation."[100]

Second, the amount of aid actually earmarked for collective farm workers and individual farmers was insignificant, or in the words of a collective farm worker in Eisk county, *"kuram na smekh."*[101] Ukraine received 80,000 tons of food-stuffs, which as Ivnitskii points out, averages out to 3 kilograms per person.[101] In Veshensk county, for example, where Sholokhov estimated that no fewer than 49,000 of 50,000 people were starving, the Territorial Committee released 22,000 poods (or 359,920 kilograms) over a three-month period, approximately 2 1/4 kilograms per person per month.[103] V. Korolev, a VTsIK instructor working in the Veshensk area in April of 1933, commented that the amount of the food loan was sufficient "only to ease a bit of the pressure. No serious improvement, however, followed."[104] In Oskolkov's opinion, the total amount of grain allotted for planting, livestock and working collective farmers compensated for only one-fourth of the total grain deficit in the Territory.[105] The simple fact that, according to OGPU estimates, at least 350,000 inhabitants of the North Caucasus Territory died from starvation and famine-related diseases in 1933 stands as a symbol of the effectiveness of the effort.[106]

Third, no attempt was made on the part of the government to loan collective farm management the funds to pay the collective farm workers back wages either in grain or in rubles. The best that was done, at least in Ukraine, was the order given to prioritize collective farm workers with large numbers of unpaid labordays.[107] They, too, however, were loaned grain against the labordays of the 1933 season at an interest rate of 10 percent. Both the Staro-Minsk and the Verkhne-Don Bureaus passed measures on 25 February emphasizing that "for every 100 poods of grain given out, 110 poods are to be collected in the fall."[108] As a consequence, many collective farm workers in at least the hard-hit, blacklisted county of Eisk had eaten all of their 1933 earnings by January of 1934 and were once again bed-ridden from severe malnutrition.[109]

When resistance continued into early March, food-loan distribution instructions were revised. The Territorial Committee found that the "inappropriate and equalizing distribution of seed, fodder, and food loans had led to a slurring over of the ongoing struggle to end sabotage." Henceforth, loans were denied all collective farms and individual farm workers who continued to "resist," that is, who refused, in their own words, to "work on a starving stomach." As the Territorial Committee made explicit on 5 March, the first order of business of every Party and Soviet worker in the territory remained, "to smash every appearance of *kulak* sabotage and wrecking and to nip in the bud each and every attempt to weaken work discipline."[110]

Moreover, the goverment used the villagers' hunger and the human resources at its disposal to ingrain into farm workers' consciousnesses three non-negotiable facts of post-collectivization life. The first point on the Party's agenda was to make clear to villagers that the answer to their problems did not lie outside of their villages. To this end most traditional villagers' famine escape hatches were closed, the first of which was villagers' right to leave their villages in search of work, food, aid, or even food substitutes in the cities and/or other parts of the country. Not only the Ukrainian but also the North Caucasus Territorial borders were closed to peasants by an extemporaneous order signed by Molotov and Stalin on 22 January.[111] Starving peasants, adults and children, who found their way to the cities were deported without delay.[112] The state's reasons for

doing so were complicated and interwoven, but one of the priorities was to gain control over popular mobility which was unproductive to the state.

In the blacklisted villages, even villagers' preserved vegetables had been legally removed in an attempt to undercut the peasant's belief that he could survive independent of the state by virtue of what he raised in his garden.[113] Similarly, independent fishing was forbidden in government waters, while collective farm petitions to fish were granted, provided that the catch would be used to feed those working in the fields.[114] Even after peasants were allowed to purchase for rubles the commercial bread sold only in cities, they were entitled to only 1 kilogram per person.[115] Given that peasants were forbidden to ride on trains without special permission, "the starving peasant [was] practically a prisoner in his own village, as he [had] no horse to travel by, and [was] not strong enough for long distance walking," as Otto Schiller, a German agricultural specialist pointed out in May of 1933.[116] Moreover, city workers, soldiers, and neighbors were legally forbidden to share their food rations with starving collective farm workers.[117] The common thread running through the policies that closed escape hatches was that the only viable option remaining for agriculturalists who wished to escape death in the present and provide for their families in the future was to work conscientiously on the local state or collective farm.

The seed grain transfer from the village to a territorial fund to the center and back again was one of the government's more economically imprudent decisions. Each transfer of grain, especially in the conditions of the 1930s, inevitably reduced the amount of grain available, in part because of spoilage. Especially in the remoter areas, 100 kilometers or more from the nearest rail line, the spring planting season was delayed and the already severely underfed cattle population was further reduced by being required to transport heavy loads long distances.[118] Consequently, the 1933 harvest was even smaller than the 1932 harvest, and incidents of death from starvation in the spring of 1934 were noted in at least several of the northernmost Kuban market towns. The removing of seed grain from the territory did, however, serve to bring collective farm workers to the realization that without government intervention, death was inevitable.

The decision to transfer crews of city workers to the collective farms in the summer and fall of 1933, rather than to make sufficient sustenance available to collective farm workers, makes little sense in a cost-effective analysis. In addition to transportation costs and the disruption caused to factory schedules, city workers, having never undertaken agricultural work before, often did more harm than good, not knowing the difference between a corn plant and a weed.[119] The point was to ingrain in villagers' collective consciousness the Party's view that resisting agriculturalists were replaceable, the same message Kaganovich delivered to Kuban Cossacks when he arrived in Rostov in early November. "We cannot tolerate a situation where Kuban soil, the richest in the country, goes to waste or is overrun by weeds," he announced. "If we were to move in people from the over-populated regions where the land is stingy, they would work like wild animals on this soil. If you don't like working here, we will move you out and them in."[120]

Two additional government measures suggest that government action during the famine of 1933 was hardly motivated by economic necessity. First it forbade private charity on an individual basis within the affected territories, not to mention within the Union at large.[121] This brought no additional money into government coffers, but did serve to increase the total number of deaths. Second, the quantity of wheat available in the country was not increased (and possibly was decreased) by the Party's categorical refusal to make an exception to the state-first, collective farm worker-last rule.[122] As Mikoyan responded to the First Secretary of the Lower Volga Territorial Committee: "The question is not one of norms, how much grain will remain for consumption and so on. The main point is that we must tell collective farms to fulfill their government plans first, and then to worry about their own plan."[123] In the North Caucasus Territory, the number of deaths in August was nearly three times as high as it had been in 1932 and only 3,000 shy of the March totals.[124] The weather in the North Caucasus Territory caused wheat to ripen

unevenly. Viktor Kravchenko, in 1933 a young Party member sent in to help with the harvest in a Ukrainian village, broke regulations and allowed early harvesting and a distribution of mature wheat among the collective farm workers who were nursed back to fuller strength. Not only were lives saved, but the harvest was brought in with greater efficiency and Kravchenko's collective farm met the government's quota ahead of its competitors, where the workers were laboring at half-strength.[125]

While the primary motivation behind the unnecessary and economically imprudent restrictive measures seems to have been aimed at breaking peasant resistance, two supplementary causes can be identified, the first being the Bolshevik government's unabashed commitment to protecting the hegemony of the working class. "For the life of me, I can't imagine and wouldn't allow a situation wherein the working class needed to go without bread for three days," asserted Merkulov, a Party bureaucrat working in the North Caucasus Territory in early March of 1933.[126] This ingrained notion of the rightness of worker privilege extended to the grassroots as well. In April of 1933, in a Sal'sk county center, a local OGPU agent overheard the following complaint: "I, a former worker myself, went to the mill to request grain, and they didn't give me any."[127]

Efforts were made by means of a complicated rationing system to keep workers steadily supplied with bread.[128] Until May, peasants were not legally entitled to buy bread for rubles and even after the legalization of commercial bread sales, bread could only be purchased in the cities in limited quantities. On 1 March, when the famine had not yet even climaxed, Shteingardt (head of KraiZu), acknowledged that collective farm workers and individual farmers would have "a great urge to steal from the seed grain fund." In order to prevent "the *kulak*" from "taking bread from the worker," he suggested that the death penalty be applied "for every pood stolen."[129] Moreover, one of the reasons peasants were prevented from loitering in the cities was to protect city dwellers from the possibility of contamination by infectious diseases known to be raging in peasant settlements.[130]

A third reason for the regime's attempts to keep starving villagers as close to home as possible is probably the government's fear of the possible damage to the revolutionary élan of Party loyalists outside the famine zone and the Revolution's reputation abroad. One of two reasons Stalin gave for sanctioning a decrease in grain procurement quotas to some of the Ukrainian counties on the verge of starvation in the summer of 1932 was their proximity to the Polish border.[131] The military political head who launched a private investigative mission upon hearing a rumor of cannibalism, for example, was appalled at the idea of "people being eaten under Soviet power."[132] A VTsIK instructor assigned to Veshensk county in April 1933 was overwhelmed by the sight of 5–7 individuals dying daily per hamlet from malnutrition. In his final report to his Moscow supervisor, N. Frolovich, he pleaded for central aid to be dispensed, because he could not imagine "a situation in the Republic, wherein we are unable to help people who are dying from starvation."[133]

The Party's handling of the crisis stemmed from its belief that the peasantry had singlehandedly wrought the economic crisis. It was, in a sense, the only logical assumption left, as collectivized agriculture, as they knew from Marx, was more productive by definition than individual farming, and Party policies once approved could not be wrong. The Party's method of handling the disaster, about which they were well informed, clearly aimed at breaking the peasants' collective resistive will once and for all, thereby going, in the Party's view, to the heart of the agrarian crisis.

Why then, as Merl queried, did the righteous (according to Bolshevik standards) sometimes suffer, while the wicked occasionally prospered? The famine claimed the lives of Bolshevik favorites, as well as resisters, because starvation is an imprecise weapon, more like a machine gun than a pistol. Because collective farm managers and county secretaries were under intense pressure from the Center to fulfill plans, it was not uncommon for shock workers with hundreds of labordays to their credit to nonetheless stop receiving government aid in the form of food once they were too

weak to work in the fields.[134] In Gukovo-Gnilushansk, for example, Vasily Iurchenko, a shock worker, was overheard by an OGPU agent exclaiming: "What in the world is going on? When I worked, then you fed me. Now that I've fallen ill, I'm supposed to die quietly from starvation."[135]

Many "dishonest" and resisting villagers survived because, even when faced with impending death, they were not malleable like a lump of clay. Two illustrations will suffice. Pilfering was one of the more consistent methods villagers used to survive the famine, a fact which becomes especially clear from the survivors' accounts of the famine.[136] Maria Savel'na Dudarevka, the daughter of a deported Cossack, who remembers the famine of 1933 only too well, lives in a Cossack village approximately 40 minutes by slow bus from Veshenskaia, Sholokhov's hometown, nestled in the northernmost corner of the Donets district. She was sixteen when the Communists, as she said in an interview, "left us to face a death from starvation." As a virtual orphan, Maria was responsible for the care of her three younger siblings, all of whom survived because their father had hidden grain in various hiding places in a nearby stand of trees.[137] Similarly, the unusually high number of men who died between the ages of twenty and forty often did so because they chose to share their small bread rations received by working in the collective farms' fields with their children at home.[138]

Alternatives

If we consider only those options compatible with Bolshevik goals, rapid industrialization and keeping the collective farm system, did the Bolshevik government have a reasonable alternative to the course it took? With regard to the first goal, rapid industrialization, it seems to me that different ways to mechanize agriculture were available to the Soviet government in the early 1930s. The emphasis was on buying the largest and the most expensive tractors and combines available, which did not always mean the "best" in view of the climatic conditions of the North Caucasus Territory. If less grain had been extracted in 1930 and 1931—at the expense not of heavy industry, but of a less grandiose and somewhat more gradual schedule of agricultural mechanization—fewer horses and oxen, not to mention people, would have died.

The Bolshevik goal of ending the production crisis without abandoning the unpopular collective farms could also have been accomplished by a different method. Resistance to unpopular government policies deemed unreasonable by the rural population was not unusual in the North Caucasus Territory in the early 1930s. By 1932, however, the demands of Don and Kuban villagers had changed: no longer were most of the efforts directed at dismantling the collective farm altogether, as had been the case in 1930 and, to a lesser extent, in 1931.[139] The main point of the united efforts by the strikers and the "thieves" was to ensure that a minimum baseline of food be left in the kolkhoz for villagers and animals alike, in contradistinction to the previous year. The change in content of the demands was noted at the November gathering of county secretaries convened by Kaganovich. The secretary from Novo-Pokrovsk county commented: "Last year, whenever I set foot in a Cossack market town, I was bombarded with complaints about the lack of manufactured goods and bread." This year they put the question thus: "Comrades, couldn't you please leave us a single pood per person a month; take the rest, we don't want anything else."[140] The aim of Kotov's collective village action, for example, had been to raise the amount of the advance from 491 grams per laborday to one kilogram.

There were two pivotal moments when a more resilient policy decision could have shifted the tide. The first occurred when the grain quota was announced. Khataevich wrote Stalin in November of 1932, "If Ukraine had been given an assignment of 350 million poods right up front, the plan would more easily have been fulfilled."[141] If villagers had believed that enough grain would have been left in the villages in the fall of 1932, definitely more than in the hungry year of 1931, they would not have undertaken strikes of any kind during the summer. In Otto Schiller's opinion, "If the Soviet state were to succeed in creating favorable living conditions for its citizens, resistance, the stealing of societal property, etc. . . .would drop off to a minimum by itself."[142] An improvement in diet, one MTS head

noted, brought a sharp improvement in the quality of the work.[143] Located 50 kilometers from the Kavkazskaia station in the Kuban was a German-Russian Seed Joint-Stock Company, an Agricultural Concession, commonly referred to as "Drusag." At Drusag, the employees, mainly run-away *kulaks*, worked for wages identical to those of the neighboring state farm workers; the chief difference was that the Drusag employees received ample hot meals daily. They were, in Cairns' opinion, the happiest workers he had seen in all of Russia, and the Drusag yields were consistently much higher than the yields on the neighboring state farm.[144]

The second pivotal moment came in the spring of 1933. Resistance, most government observers agreed, was broken in mid-March, in early May at the latest. From Bogoslovsk county it was reported in March: "All the collective farm workers now say: 'We understand our mistakes and we are ready to work. We will do everything expected of us.'"[145] In his year-end summary report, the political department head of the Staro-Shcherobinovka MTS recalled the scene that had greeted his eyes upon his arrival in the blacklisted Cossack market town near the Kuban/Don border. By his estimate, thousands of collective farm workers were lying bloated in their beds in no condition to begin preparing for the spring planting. His response, buried deep in an archive in Rostov, the only one like it I have uncovered, is reminiscent of Kravchenko's strategy, where an illegal action not only saved lives, but also improved productivity within the collective farm system. MTS workers in Staro-Shcherobinovka literally went from hut to hut in search of "wasted-away and dying people to nurse back to health." Centers were opened that offered over 2000 villagers medical treatment and well-timed nourishment. "Sharp," was the word the political department head chose to describe the improvement in the "mood" of the collective farm workers. It was not uncommon, he noted, for the collective farm workers in his jurisdiction to voluntarily work night and day in order to cope the colossal task facing the living collective farm workers.[146]

Given the magnitude of the losses and the viability of alternatives, why, as Ulam asked, would the Party squander potential soldiers and create animosity at its tail? My research confirms two suggestions made thirty-two years ago by Dana Dalrymple in what remains one of the more sensible overviews of the famine. The first is that, at least some Party members at all ranks believed that peasants, especially the uncooperative and the elderly, were expendable.[147] To Stalin and his allies, "the people that mattered," in Walter Duranty's opinion, "were the men in the Kremlin and all their underlings; the men in the factories and the armed forces; . . . The others were just serfs; reserves of the proletariat, as Stalin called them. Some would die, surely, perhaps even quite a lot; but there were enough and to spare in all conscience."[148] The evidence, both direct and indirect, suggests that Duranty's callous attitude was most likely shared by the Party members whose company he kept. In part, as with livestock, the government, in the words of an Italian diplomat, "imagine[d] that dying peasants can be superseded by machinery."[149] The head of an MTS political department in Eisk county, one of the more devastated of the Kuban counties, wrote, in December 1933: "Half as many farm workers gathered the harvest and planted 20–25 percent more acres than last year. What a remarkable accomplishment."[150]

The second point is that this devaluation of peasant life, as Dalrymple suggested, intersected with dreams of revolutionary grandeur. An exchange between a plenipotentiary working in Belo-Glinsk county and a peasant farmer in 1928 is telling. "What if I bring in all of my grain today," asked the peasant farmer, "and after two months I come in to [the Co-op], having exhausted my own food supplies, and am told—'Come back tomorrow or the day after'—until my entire family drops over from hunger?" The plenipotentiary replied: "I don't think the Republic will suffer from the death of fourteen people."[151] Perhaps Andrew Smith's recitation of a Soviet official's callous comment was not too far off: "Suppose 6,000,000 more people die from hunger, what of it? It is still worth the price of Communism."[152]

I would add a third suggestion. The Bolshevik government was not one to flinch at the idea of rearranging people like furniture. Even before the famine had

ended, the first trainloads of incoming collective farm workers and demobilized Red Army Soldiers from the North arrived. Overwhelmed by their first glimpse of the blackness of Kuban soil, buoyed by government aid and their yet untarnished revolutionary enthusiasm, a significant cadre of newcomers who survived homesickness, malaria, and the hostility of the remaining Cossacks became the regime's southern bedrock.[153]

CONCLUSION

The Bengal Famine of 1943, which claimed an estimated three million lives, was, or so it has been argued, a "man-made" famine, inasmuch as it resulted not from a significant decline in available food due to natural causes, but rather from a sharp change in the legal and economic powers of individuals to command an adequate share of the food supply, or "entitlement," to use the word popularized by Amartya Sen.[1] As has often been the case with twentieth-century famines, the ruling government has been denounced by nationalists and scholars alike for its failure to play a more active and efficacious role in averting disaster and providing relief. In an interesting article, long on passion and short on rigor, Gail Omvedt pushes the criticism one step further, arguing that the British government was responsible for the high death tallies because it failed to stimulate indigenous agricultural development through financial investment in the decades prior to the famine, thereby leaving India dependent on Burmese rice and Japanese cooperation.[2] Even during more ordinary times, in India, "at least a third of the rural population," to quote Sen, "regularly—and quietly—[goes] to bed hungry and malnourished."[3]

Frustrated by the slow pace of India's "war against poverty," scholars of India have often been intrigued by the apparent success of the Chinese government's interventionist approach.[4] China's average life expectancy rate, for example, rose from thirty-four years in 1952 to sixty-nine years in 1982, while India's average life expectancy rate peaked at fifty-two years.[5] The Indian goverment's Achilles heel, it seemed, was the Chinese government's rightful point of pride, namely the alleviation of the daily effects of extreme poverty among the laboring classes.[6]

Recently, however, the more exuberant assessments of China's revolutionary accomplishments have been challenged. Anthropometric surveys conducted in the late seventies, for example, revealed that malnutrition continued to linger in the countryside, long after it had disappeared in China's cities. As Carl Riskin points out, the greatest surge in agricultural productivity came after the communes were dissolved in 1978, when the policies weakening farm incentives were overturned allowing the "positive developments of the collective era," understandably envied by Omvedt, to yield results.[7] Finally, China's path to overcoming what Sen calls "'regular' starvation" cut through what is numerically the most notorious famine in human history, something India has avoided since Independence.[8]

One Ukrainian survivor of the Soviet famine of 1933 "researched famines, looking to history for occurrences comparable to the Ukrainian famine." On the basis of both his adolescent experiences in a small village in Cherkasy and his readings on Irish, Indian and Chinese famines, "Miron Dolot" concluded that the 1933 Ukrainian famine was a "unique event in world history."[9] Unfortunately, on this point, Dolot is wrong, except inasmuch as every event is "unique." The parallels between the most major of the Chinese and Soviet famines of the twentieth century are disturbingly and productively comparable. In both cases, the famines were immediately preceded by decisions to change and, the decision-makers believed, to rapidly upgrade agricultural production on a grand scale irrespective of the farming people's expressed will. At the most basic level, each famine was caused by the government's handling of a serious grain crisis, which itself was the result of a predominantly unnatural disaster caused by failed innovations, short-sighted policies, and effective peasant resistance. While spacial considerations have prevented me from comparing the two famines in this paper, I would like briefly to consider Sen's

well-justified concern in the light of the Soviet experience.

Peasants, foreign observers, and Party officials alike readily likened the Party-peasant struggle of 1932–33 to a war. "To say there is famine in some of the most fertile parts of Russia is to say much less than the truth," wrote Malcolm Muggeridge after his train journey to Rostov in March 1933. "There is not only famine, but a state of war, a military occupation."[10] The Communist Party won the battle. With a handful of exceptions, most of the villagers in the North Caucasus Territory returned, sullenly, to be sure, but *en masse* to their collective farms' fields in the spring and summer of 1933.[11] Villagers' attitudes had changed, for the better in the opinion of the Party's commentators. Gone were the spirited demands: give us bread or bring in the harvest yourself. Instead, severely weakened villagers penned (or signed) carefully drafted letters first detailing the many farm tasks they had finished ahead of schedule, after which they politely requested sustenance in order to continue the weeding they feared their weakness might not allow them to finish.[12]

At the same time, the Party lost the war in at least three senses. First, the economic price of the Party's victory was high. In the North Caucasus Territory, the harvest of 1933 was even poorer than the 1932 one. The famine deepened the crisis in livestock, which in places fell by a factor of three, and this in turn still dogged productivity as late as 1940, as James Millar and Holland Hunter have demonstrated.[13] Moreover, the attitudes toward work which were transformed in the famine days long endured. After the strike was broken, one's refusal to work enthusiastically in the collective fields became a badge of honor.[14] Even though Maria Savel'na is now in her late seventies, she still gets up every day at 4:00 a.m. in order to take her cow to pasture and she retires at midnight. She is in constant motion every minute of the day, tending to one chore or another. With visible pride, she said: "my husband picked me out because, as he put it, though I'm tiny, I'm a determined worker." A day later, she boasted in a backhand manner, that when she was a collective farm worker, the brigader had to come literally every day to her door, and presumably not hers alone, and figuratively "drive" her out of her own yard into the collective field.[15]

Perhaps even more importantly, in the famine-stricken zones the Party lost what remained of both support from the pro-Bolshevik farming peoples of the Don and willingness to collaborate, a loss that would cost the Party dearly in 1941. In my dissertation on the 1920s, I argue that very few farmers along the Don had neutral feelings about the Soviet project. A fair number, especially Cossacks, strongly opposed it; and a surprisingly large number of villagers (mainly non-Cossacks) were attracted to the idea of a worker-peasant (or better still, peasant-worker) state, and they spent much energy on attempts to bring rural reality into closer conformity with the farmers' expectations of a just society. By 1932, however, these previously resistant and loyalist streams of activism merged into one river of resistance, which became powerful enough to compel Stalin and his allies to make a choice: either they could compromise on the terms of collectivized agriculture, or they could employ a weapon more effective than the weapons of exile and execution already dulled from overuse.

What the Party lost is perhaps most succintly summed up by a comparison of assertions of intent in 1927 and 1933 should an invasion of the Soviet Union occur. In 1927, only actively defiant Cossacks looked forward to an invasion of the Soviet Union, reasoning that "no matter which [foreign] government declares war against us, life can only get better."[16] Passively defiant Cossacks, who were farmers first, warriors second, consistently expressed an overwhelming desire for peace at any cost. Young Cossack soldiers stationed in Eisk even offered "to pay more taxes, if the Soviet government should encounter financial difficulties in buying off" the would-be attackers.[17] Most peasant farmers would probably have agreed with the farmers of Ul'ianovsk province, who announced: "We don't want war—we haven't recovered from the last one yet—but we won't give up Soviet power for anything." If it comes to war, they declared, "every last one of us will fight."[18] This was true, in the opinion of Sarzhevskii, a County Committee secretary, even of the so-called

peasant *kulaks*, who said, "'If the Bolsheviks leave [power],'" Sarzhevsky quoted the so-called kulaks, "'we're dead.'"[19] The most quick-tempered of the loyalists, OGPU agents reported, "were upset that the Soviet government wasn't allowing the recruitment of volunteers to fight in China on the side of the Chinese workers and peasants."[20]

In 1933, by contrast, even many of the most fervant peasant loyalists, in some cases members of the cadre who had fought a few years earlier for the introduction of collective farms, demonstratively parted company with the Party. Kotov, the Party secretary in the Armavir district, who had helped to organize a village-wide effort to keep sufficient grain in the village, was arrested and tried for his crime against the Party. As Kotov was led from the courtroom, after having been sentenced to ten years hard labor, his father shouted out: "It's o.k., son. We fought together for the collective farms, now we'll fight for the masses."[21] Moreover, as the OGPU reports of 1933 make clear, even loyalists were considering marching on Moscow, weapons in hand, with the aim of overthrowing the regime.[22]

Finally, the Communist Party made more difficult the achievement of its self-proclaimed goal of turning peasants into socialists. Most of the peasant farmers of the Don region prior to 1930 had been in favor of social equality, the abolition of the market, and a government run by workers and peasants; they were opposed to collectivized agriculture. Only an improvement of living conditions in comparison with the 1920s would have been sufficient to overcome the final hurdle. The sons and daughters of the famine generation would no longer value private farming over collectivized, having become convinced in the progressiveness of socialist agriculture.[23] Nor, however, would the ambitious ones among them tolerate a situation wherein the welfare of the cities continued to be privileged over the welfare of the villages, leading again in 1948 to at least the loss of one million rural lives to famine.[24] Many chose the path followed by Vladimir I. Dudarev, who escaped the village to become a carpenter in Veshenskaia.[25]

There were, I believe, two factors missing in India and present in pre-collectivization China and the Soviet Union that favored the elimination of centuries of endemic poverty. The first, commonly mentioned, was the government's commitment to interventionism, or the belief in the necessity of consolidating and mobilizing sufficient resources in order to change substantially the technological base of agriculture for the popular masses, not just for especially ambitious individuals. The second factor, without which the first could never be sufficient, was the widespread belief by Chinese, Russian, and Ukrainian peasants in the possibility of change leading to improvement.

The decisions made by the Soviet Communist Party to push forward short-sighted, counterproductive, and unpopular plans led to a breakdown in political relations between the peasantry and the Party. From 1925 to 1927, farmers who had fought with the Bolsheviks during the Civil War believed that the Communist Party might reasonably serve as a powerful partner in bringing to fruition the dreams they had actively pursued and risked their lives to make possible from 1917 to 1920. Their support was conditional on the Party's recognition of them as full citizens on par with workers, equally entitled to both opportunity and sacrifice. The schism between the farmers and the Party can be traced to 1928 and the struggle over total collectivization from 1929 to 1932 widened it. The famine removed forever the possibility of reconciliation from the perspective of the adult survivors.

The famine of 1933 was a costly mistake, for which the regime paid in lowered grain exports until 1940 and in territory lost to the Germans in 1941. Moreover, the gains made by the Communist Party in the rural reaches of the Don region came only after the Party began to pursue under Brezhnev a political course bent on improving material conditions in the countryside.[26] In sum, the 1933 famine caused by human actions made more difficult the Communist Party's primary task of building socialism. All economic gains made under socialism were made in spite of the destruction brought about by the famine, not because of it.

Notes to Introduction

1. For their advice or assistance, I thank Thomas Brady, Simmy Cover, Viktor Danilov, David Engerman, Peter Holquist, Nikolai Ivnitskii, Viktor Kondrashin, Christine Kulke, Kara Madison, Terry Martin, Charles Penner, John Randolph, Nikolai Raiskii, Nicholas Riasanovsky, Blair Ruble, Yuri Slezkine, Amir Weiner, Reggie Zelnik, and Millie Zinck. My gratitude extends as well to the American Council of Teachers of Russian, the International Research and Exchanges Board, the Social Science Research Council, the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, and the Hoover Institution for enabling me to undertake the research anchoring this study.
2. Eugene D. Genovese, "The Question," *Dissent* (Summer 1994): 371–76.
3. If we use eight million as a rough estimate of total deaths and 100,000,000 as the total number of rural inhabitants in the Soviet Union in 1932, 16 percent of the population in the affected areas died, 8 percent of all villagers. The term "famine" will be used in this paper only when "an extreme and protracted shortage of food" can be linked to deaths "caused either by starvation or disease resulting from the weakened condition of the population"; the definition is D. Gale Johnson's in "Famine," *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1973), 58. Overall estimates are taken from N. A. Ivnitskii, "Golod 1932–1933 godov: Kto vinovat?" in *Golod 1932–1933 godov*, ed. Ivnitskii (Moscow, 1995) (hereafter "Golod"), 43–66, here at 64; and E. A. Osokina, "Zhertvy goloda 1933 g. Skol'ko ikh?" *Istoria SSSR*, no. 5 (1991): 18–26.
4. In the spring of 1932, to take the most numerically significant example, approximately 10–15,000 people died in Kazakhstan. Ivnitskii, "Golod," 60.
5. All too often, the North Caucasus Territory has been conflated with the Kuban. See, for example, "Italian Dispatches," 419; Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization*, (Oxford, 1994), 75. For the best discussion of the overall geography of the famine, see E. A. Osokina, *Ierarkhia potreblenia. O zhizni v usloviakh Stalinskogo snabzhenia 1928—1935 gg.* (Moscow, 1993), 52–59. Deaths from starvation on a much smaller scale are also noted in the Middle Volga Territory, the Central Black Earth Region, the Urals, and Western Siberia. On the geographical distribution in the Volga regions, see V. V. Kondrashin, "Golod 1932–1933 godov v derevne povolzh'ia" (hereafter "V derevne povolzh'ia") (kand. diss., Moscow, 1991), 133–36. The famine in Kazakhstan again proves to be the exceptional case, as the primary agricultural occupation was cattle raising.
6. Recently Conquest has conceded that between 1932 and 1933 all rural Russians "lived in deplorable circumstances which have, not without foundation, been described as famine like." Still, as both he and Osokina point out, the highest death tolls were in Ukraine, where an estimated three to four million died. Letter from Conquest to the editors of *Otechestvennaia istoria*, no. 6 (1995): 205–6 and Osokina, "Zhertvy," 21. Also on Ukraine, see "Itogovy otchet mezhdunarodnoi komissii po rassledovaniu goloda 1932–1933 godov na Ukrainye," in *Golod 1932–1933 godov*, 6–12 and S. V. Kul'chitsky, "Demograficheskie posledstvia goloda 1933 g. na Ukrainye," *Filosofskaia i sotsialisticheskaia mysl'* 6 (1989), 35–41. The highest death percentages vis-à-vis the total population occurred in Kazakhstan, where an estimated one to two million people died prematurely between 1931 and 1933. Kazakhstan falls completely beyond my scope in this paper. See Ivnitskii, "Golod," 64 and especially Zh. B. Abylkhozhin, M. K. Kozybaev, and M. B. Tatimov, "Kazakhstanskaia tragedia," *Voprosy istorii* 7 (1989): 53–71. In the North Caucasus Territory, at least 350,000 residents, or 4 percent of the total, succumbed; in the Volga Territories, 213,100, or 1.9 percent, of the residents; and in the Volga German Republic, 25–30,000. E. N. Oskolkov, "Golod 1932–1933 gg. v zernovykh raionakh Severo-Kavkazskogo kraia," (hereafter "V zernovykh raionakh"), in *Golodomor 1932–1933 rr. v Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 1995), 113–23, here at 119; Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 261–62.
7. Oskolkov, "V zernovykh raionakh," 116.
8. "Golod 1932–1933 godov na Ukraine: Svidetel'stvuiut arkhivnye dokumenty," *Pod znamenem Leninizma* 8 (April 1990): 64–86, here at 69.
9. The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (New York, 1986).
10. For Merl's review see "Entfachte Stalin die Hungersnot von 1932–1933 zur Auslöschung des ukrainischen Nationalismus?" *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 37 (1989): 569–90,

which has recently been republished in Russian, as "Golod 1932–1933 godov—genotsid ukraintsev dlia osushchestvlenia politiki russifikatsii?" *Otechestvennaia istoria*, No. 1 (1995): 49–61. The other sharply critical review of note was J. Arch Getty's, "Starving the Ukraine," a review of *The Harvest of Sorrow*, "London Review of Books," 22 January 1987, 7.

11. Mark B. Tauger, "The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933," *Slavic Review* 50, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 70–89.
12. Conquest, *Harvest*, 222, 264–65.
13. Examples of the general argument line used in the past in favor of the famine as attempted "genocide" can be found in Conquest, *Harvest*, 323–30; idem., "Letter to editors of OI," 205–6; James E. Mace, "The Man-Made Famine of 1933 in the Soviet Ukraine: What Happened and Why?" in *Famine in Ukraine, 1932–1933*, ed. Roman Serbyn and Bohdan Krawchenko, (Edmonton, 1986), 67–83, here at 79–80. The first extended challenge to the genocide thesis came from Merl, "Entfachte Stalin," 574–80; see also Tauger, "Harvest." On the goal of enforcing better work habits, see Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 187; E. N. Oskolkov, *Golod 1932/1933: Khlebozagotovki i golod 1932/1933 goda v Severo-Kavkazskom krae* (hereafter "Golod,") (Rostov, 1991), 78. On collectivization, see Dana G. Dalrymple, "The Soviet Famine of 1932–1934," *Soviet Studies* XV (January 1964): 250–284, here at 258, 275; for Merl's argument against increased collectivization as a goal, see *Bauern unter Stalin. Die Formierung des sowjetischen Kolchossystems 1930–1941* (Berlin, 1990), 227. On grain control, see Moshe Lewin, "'Taking Grain': Soviet Policies of Agricultural Procurements Before the War," in *The Making of the Soviet System* (New York, 1985), 142–77, here at 174, and Andrei Konovko, "Mor," *Russky arkhiv* 26 (1992): 209–48, here at 242.
14. "Famine as Political Weapon," in *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book*, ed. S. O. Pidhainy (Detroit, 1955), 2: 5–135, here at 113.
15. The phrase was penned by Victor Kravchenko, an émigré author who in 1933 was a young Party activist helping to bring in the harvest in the Dnepropetrovsk district. Here he is clearly striving for a literary and dramatic presentation of unwitnessed, yet presumed, political processes in a city he spent no time in until after 1933. When, however, Kravchenko describes the activities he did participate in and the exchanges he had with Khataevich, first secretary of the District Party Committe, and the collective farm workers in his assigned village, he has more solid ground beneath his feet. I have found much in his chapter, "The Harvest in Hell," not only useful, but also supported by archival reports on the North Caucasus Territory. *I Chose Freedom: The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official* (New York, 1946), 118.
16. See for example Dolyna's recitation and interpretation of a series of laws passed, 30–33, 42; Conquest, *Harvest*, 220–27, 237–38.
17. I. E. Zelenin, "'Revoliutsia sverxu': zavershenie i tragicheskie posledstvia," *Voprosy istorii* 10 (1994): 28–42, here at 38.
18. "Itogovy otchet mezhdunarodnoi komissii," 7.
19. Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 48; I. Zelenin, "Chrezvychainye khlebozagotovitel'nye komissii v 1932–1933 gg. (Ukraina, Severny Kavkaz, Povolzh'e), in *Golodomor 1932–1933 rr. v Ukraïny*, 45–52, here at 48; V. P. Danilov, "Diskussia v zapadnoi presse o golode 1932–1933 gg. i 'demograficheskoi katastrofe' 30–40-kh godov v SSSR," *Voprosy istorii* 3 (March 1988): 116–121, here at 121.
20. Tauger, "Harvest," 89; Tauger, "Commune to Kolkhoz: Soviet Collectivization and the Transformation of Communal Peasant Farming, 1930–1941" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1991), 402.
21. Merl, "Entfachte Stalin," 575–76.
22. Tauger, "Harvest," 73, 88–89. For Ivnitskii's rejoinder to Tauger, see "Golod," 59.
23. Getty, 7; Merl, "Entfachte Stalin," 570–71; Tauger, "Harvest," 70, 76–77. At the same time, Tauger uses émigré sources rather uncritically himself to make some of his points; 82–83, 86.

24. Malcolm Muggeridge, *Chronicles of Wasted Time* (London, 1972), 257. William Henry Chamberlin, a correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian* in 1933, and Gradenigo, an Italian ambassador stationed in Kyiv who drove across Ukraine in the summer of 1933, assessed the famine similarly. Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age* (Boston, 1934), 88–89; Commission on the Ukraine Famine, "Italian Diplomatic and Consular Dispatches," in *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine 1932–1933: Report to Congress* (Washington, 1988) (hereafter "Italian Dispatches"), 395–506, here at 424.

25. OGPU IS (*informatsionnaia svodka*), 28 June 1933, ShFGARO (Shakhtinski filial gosudarstvennogo arkhiva Rostovskoi oblasti), f. R-186, op. 1, d. 421, l. 172. See Dalrymple for other contemporary peasant quotes on this point at 269. For peasant recollections of the famine where the word "organized" is used, see also Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 112. "We couldn't help feeling that we were pawns in some lethal game," recollected "Miron Dolot" (a pen name) in his memoir account of his adolescent experiences in a small village in Cherkasy; *Execution by Hunger: The Hidden Holocaust* (New York, 1985), 151.

26. Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941–44 (New Haven, 1993), 45. My thanks to Peter Holquist for pointing out (especially) this book to me.

27. Sheila Fitzpatrick makes a similar but somewhat different point when she writes that the famine "crystallized a certain view of the Soviet regime in the mind of the peasantry"; *Stalin's Peasants*, 74.

28. Letter from Stalin to Sholokhov, 6 May 1933, RTsKhIDNI (Rossiisky tsentr khranenia i izuchenia dokumentatsii noveishei istorii), f. 558, op. 1, d. 3459, 3–4; published in *Voprosy istorii* (VI) 3 (1994): 22.

29. "Strike," in quotes, will be used metaphorically for the numerous types of villagers' resistance engaged in throughout 1932 and 1933.

30. I have augmented my Don study by reading émigré accounts and published archival sources on the Ukrainian side; on the Volga side, I rely exclusively on the only serious study of the area available, Kondrashin's. I am an expert on neither.

Notes to Part 1

1. For a detailed discussion of the historiography and the issues involved in calculating "biological" and "barn" yields, see Tauger, "Harvest."

2. Stalin made the comment in an offhand way in September 1940 during a discussion of the film, "The Law of Life," by A. Avdeenko. RtsKhIDNI, f. 588, op. 1, d. 5824, l. 66. N. A. Ivnitskii and others estimate fifty million villagers, "Golod 1932–1933 gg.: kto vinovat? (po dokumentam 'Kremlevskogo arkhiva')," in *Golodomor 1932–1933 rr. v Ukraïny*, (hereafter "Kto vinovat,") 35–44, here at 36. The number of people who "starved" (as opposed to those who died from starvation) is relevant because the psychological experience of famine, especially one perceived to be "artificial," affects the survivors as well the dead. See V. V. Kondrashin, "Golod v krest'ianskom mentalitete," in *Mentalitet i agrarnoe razvitie Rossii (XIX–XX vv.)* (Moscow, 1996), 115–23.

3. In an error-riddled article based on Party newspapers, Nobuo Shimomotai correctly emphasizes the way in which the Central Party "saved face" by using the discovery of "bad weather" to justify the advancing of seed grain loans after having adamantly dismissed the possibility for months. "A Note on The Kuban Affair (1932–1933): The Crisis of Kolkhoz Agriculture in the North Caucasus," *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 1 (1983): 39–56, here at 53.

4. Tauger alone believes the weather of 1932 to have been a significant factor; "Harvest," 70. Almost every historian of the famine acknowledges areas of patchy drought or untimely rain in 1932: Schiller, 23 May 1933, *The Foreign Office and the Famine: British Documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of 1932–1933*, ed. Marco Carynnyk, Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, and Bohdan S. Kordan (Kingston, Ontario, 1988), 259; Dalrymple, 263; Conquest, *Harvest*, 222; Moshe Lewin, "Taking Grain," 155–56; V. P. Danilov and N. A. Ivnitskii, "O derevne nakanune i v khode sploshnoi kollektivizatsii," in *Dokumenty svidetel'stvuiut: iz istorii derevni nakanune i v khode kollektivizatsii 1927–1932 gg*, ed. Danilov and Ivnitskii (Moscow,

1989), 9–50, here at 40–41; I. E. Zelenin, "O nekotorykh 'belykh piatnakh' zavershaiushchego etapa sploshnoi kollektivizatsii," *Istoria SSSR* 2 (March–April 1989): 3–19, here at 8, 18; V. V. Kondrashin, "Golod 1932–1933 godov v derevniakh Povolzh'ia" (hereafter "Golod"), *Voprosy istorii* 6 (1991): 176–81, here at 178. Interestingly, the majority of elderly survivors of the famine in the Volga region (70 percent of the 617 survivors) Kondrashin interviewed believed that the harvest of that year was fully sufficient for survival without government interference. Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 47.

5. VTsIK Commission report, 1 January 1933, GARF (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiskoi federatsii) f. 1235, op. 141, d. 1362, l. 204. In the file are several versions of the report; I quote from the least edited one. The report, of course, was top secret and bears no relation to the inflated, officially published statistics. As an official of the Department of Agriculture in Moscow confided to Schiller, "all Russian statistics are compiled in 3 sets—one for publication, one confidential set for the directors, and one very confidential set for the very high officials." *The Foreign Office*, 71. The VTsIK Commission report was of the latter variety.

6. Cairns wrote lengthy descriptive, chronological accounts of all three of his tours first for the Marketing Board, second for the British Embassy staff. The reports have been reprinted in full in the superb document collection, *The Foreign Office* and in *The Soviet Famine, 1932–33: An Eye-Witness Account of Conditions in the Spring and Summer of 1932 by Andrew Cairns*, ed. Tony Kuz (Edmonton, 1989). The latter includes maps of the three tours; I will quote from the former. The quote here is taken from Cairns, *The Foreign Office*, 76. Cairns and the German agricultural specialist, Otto Schiller, frequently met to compare notes. In Cairns's opinion, while Schiller was less critical of Russian agriculture than Cairns, who acknowledged himself to be "more critical of the Russians than is fair," Schiller, "being accustomed to the fine crops in Germany," tended to underestimate Soviet wheat yields vis-à-vis Cairns by, on average, one centner per hectare. Cairns further compensated for his acknowledged bias by adding 1 centner per hectare for good measure. His estimates were still approximately 25 to 50 percent lower than those of Soviet experts. *The Foreign Office*, 73, 126, 131–32, 154.

7. He had a Bachelor of Science Degree from the University of Alberta in Agriculture and a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Minnesota, in addition to the experience of having operated a 960-acre farm with his two brothers in Alberta for at least two years. Ibid., liv and 35.

8. Cairns described his own Russian rather modestly as "extremely bad pigeon Russian"; L. Collier of the British embassy described Cairns's Russian as "fluent." Ibid., 29, 9.

9. 2 August 1932, Ibid., 99.

10. Ibid., 105, 112, 120.

11. Ibid., 123.

12. Ibid., 155–60. Schiller and Muggeridge were also both very impressed by Drusag; Schiller, 23 May 1933, *The Foreign Office*, 259; Muggeridge, *Chronicles*, 259.

13. Cairns's report of Professor Tulikov's comments, 22 August 1932, in *The Foreign Office*, 189–90.

14. On the worst years, see Penner, "Pride, Power, and Pitchforks: A Study of Farmer-Party Interaction on the Don, 1920–1928" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1995), (1921) 114–15, (1924) 221–22, (1926), (1927–28) 400, 530–33.

15. Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 48.

16. Ibid., 47–48.

17. See Stalin's January 1933 speech to the Plenum TsK and TsKK; as quoted in Zelenin, "'O nekotorykh belykh piatnakh,'" 8, 18, and Bohdan Krawchenko, "The Man-Made Famine of 1932–1933 and Collectivization in Soviet Ukraine," in *Famine in Ukraine, 1932–1933*, ed. Roman Serbyn and Bohdan Krawchenko (Edmonton, 1986), 15–26, here at 20; Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 48.

18. For evidence of the hard frost, see Cairns, 3 August 1932, *The Foreign Office*, 144. On rain in late July and early August, see: Oskolkov, *Golod*, 21–23; Cairns, 22 August 1932, op. cit.,

191; letter from the Morozovsk RK secretary to the SKKK secretary (Larin), 20 August 1932, GARO (Gosudarstvenny arkhiv Rostovskoi oblasti), f. R-1485, op. 8, d. 15, l. 170; letter to Cossack relative living abroad by a resident of what before 1920 was known as the 2nd Don district, *Vol'noe kazachestvo*, No. 113 (25 September 1932), 29 and No. 121 (25 January 1933), 28; Upper Don County Committee Bureau (hereafter RKB), 20 August 1932, TsDNIRO, (Tsentr dokumentatsii noveishei istorii Rostovskoi oblasti), f. 34, op. 1, d. 50, l. 59; Sholokhov to Stalin, 4 April 1933, *Voprosy istorii (VI)* 3 (1994), 10; Conference of State Farm directors and Central Committee representatives, 4 November 1932, TsDNIRO, f. 7, op. 1, d. 1287 (hereafter State Farm Directors), ll. 14–15. On drought in the Kuban, see the Briukhovetsk representative's report at the Meeting of County Committee (RK) secretaries and Central Committee representatives, 2 November 1932, TsDNIRO, f. 7, op. 1, d. 1286 (hereafter RK secretaries), l. 12 and Oskolkov, *Golod*, 32.

19. Sholokhov to Stalin, 4 April 1933, *VI*, 8–10.
20. On the hot dry winds, see Zelenin, "'O nekotorykh belykh piatnakh,'" 8, 18; Cairns on Melitopol, 3 August 1932, *The Foreign Office*, 137; William Henry Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age* (Boston, 1934), 85. For the good weather view, see Conquest, *Harvest*, 222.
21. Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 47–52.
22. VTsIK Commission Report on SKK, 1 January 1933, 203.
23. Merl, *Bauern unter Stalin*, 222; Krawchenko, 20. The percentage is even higher when compared with 1930.
24. Cairns to Lloyd, 3 August 1932, *The Foreign Office*, 105, 137, 141. Dolot also mentions "idle" land; 149.
25. VTsIK Commission Report on SKK, 1 January 1933, 200. Oskolkov emphasizes this point as well; *Golod*, 21.
26. Sholokhov to Stalin, 4 April 1933, *VI*, 7.
27. State Farm directors, l. 5.
28. Such was the case in the fall of 1932 in the collective farms under the B. Orlovsk MTS's jurisdiction. RTsKhIDNI, f. 112, op. 29, d. 18, l. 27ob.
29. Cairns, *The Foreign Office*, 144, 111, 128, 120.
30. Ibid., 156, 71.
31. Ibid., 105, 112, 120, 123, 128, 141-2, 147, 149–51, 161; VTsIK Commission Report on SKK, 1 January 1933, l. 200.
32. William Henry Chamberlin, "My Russian Education," in *We Cover the World*, ed. Eugene Lyons (New York, 1937), 205–40, here at 234.
33. RTsKhIDNI, f. 112, op. 29, d. 124, l. 52.
34. MTS report, 10 Dec. 1933, RTsKhIDNI, f. 112, op. 29, d. 18, l. 26ob.
35. Cairns to Lloyd, 3 August 1932, *The Foreign Office*, 149.
36. On peasant resistance generally, see Lynn Viola, *Peasant Rebels Under Stalin* (Oxford, 1996). On Ukrainian peasant protest in the first quarter of 1930, see Andrea Graziosi, "Collectivisation, Révoltes Paysannes et Politiques Gouvernementales," *Cahiers du monde Russe* 35/3 (1994): 437–72 and Valeri Vasil'ev, "Krest'ianskie vosstaniia na Ukraine. 1929–1930 gody," *Svobodnaia mysl'* 9 (1992): 70–78.
37. Much of what follows is drawn from a study in progress of the most fiercely contested phase of collectivization, 1930–1933.
38. Dolot, 90–91.
39. See, for example, Lynn Viola, *Best Sons of the Fatherland* (New York, 1987), 213–18; Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants*, 48; Viktor P. Danilov, *Sovetskaia dokolkhoznaia derevnia* (Moscow, 1977); Moshe Lewin, "Grappling with Stalinism," in *The Making*, 286–314, here at 297–98; idem., "Introduction: Social Crises and Political Structures in the USSR," in *The Making*, 3–45, here at 18.
40. See Penner, "Pride, Power, and Pitchforks," 275–88.

41. See R. W. Davies, *The Socialist Offensive. The Collectivization of Soviet Agriculture, 1929–1930* (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), 267–70; Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants*, 66; Osokina, *Ierarkhia potreblenia*, 55.
42. See Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants*, 82–90.
43. Oskolkov, *Golod*, 21, 33.
44. Kravchenko, 99–100.
45. Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 38.
46. See Bataisk RKP, July 1928, TsDNIRO, f. 11, op. 1a, d. 13, l. 51; Progress report from Badashev to Andreev, 11 May 1928, TsDNIRO, f. 75, op. 1, d. 93, l. 151; Unpublished Farmers' Letters (hereafter UFL) (*Sovetski pakhar'*), Staro-Minsk, June 1928, GARO, f. R-1485, op. 8, d. 139, ll. 55–56; letter by railroad worker N. T. Gorsky, from his home town of Novo-Pashkovsk (Kushchevsk county) to *Sovetski Pakhar'* (unpublished), July 1928, GARO, f. R-1485, op. 8, d. 139, ll. 23–25; Report to the OGPU by the Chairman of the TsKK, Starannikov, following his trip to the Kuban, 20 June 1928, GARF, f. 374, op. 27, d. 1490, l. 32.
47. UFL (*Sovetskii pakhar'*), June 1928, GARO, f. R-1485, op. 8, d. 139, ll. 55-56.
48. UFL (*Sovetskii pakhar'*), June 1928, GARO, f. R-1485, op. 8, d. 139, l. 58.
49. GARO, f. R-1390, op. 8, d. 446, ll. 17–18. The students addressed their letter to T. A. Iurkin, chairman of the All-Union Collective Farm Center in Moscow, which he became after working for two years as director of the "Gigant" State Farm in Sal'sk. Oskolkov, *Golod*, 29.
50. See especially N. A. Ivnitskii, *Kollektivizatsia i raskulachivanie (nachalo 30-kh godov)* (Moscow, 1994), 95–122.
51. In my dissertation I referred to them as "defiant" (in Russian, "*nepokornye*" or "*brosaiushchie vyzov*") Cossacks. For an extended treatment, see chapter 6 of Penner, "Pride, Power and Pitchforks," and Penner, "Vzaimootnoshenia mezhdu donskimi i kubanskimi kazakami i Kommunisticheskoi partiei, 1920–32," *Golos vekov* (1996).
52. UFL, 1925, TsDNIRO, f. 7, op. 1, d. 202, l. 47.
53. UFL (*Sovietskii pakhar'*), 12. January 1928, TsDNIRO, f. 7, op. 1, d. 769, l. 19.
54. UFL (*Sovetskii pakhar'*), TsDNIRO, f. 7, op. 1, d. 769, l. 17.
55. The livestock procurement policy was equally short-sighted. See, for example, Sholokhov's letter to Stalin in April 1932, in *Dokumenty sviditel'stvuiut*, 471–73.
56. Interview of Volga famine survivor, Kondrashin, "Golod," 179. For similar peasant explanations, see Oskolkov, *Golod*, 71; Case history LH52, "Translations of Selected Oral Histories," in *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine 1932–1933: Report to Congress* (Washington, 1988), (hereafter "Oral Histories"), 354; Chamberlin, *Iron Age*, 85.
57. Conquest, *Harvest*, 4.
58. Tauger, "Harvest," 71.
59. Ivnitskii, "Golod," 44; V. P. Danilov, "Kollektivizatsia sel'skogo khoziaistva v SSSR," *Istoria SSSR*, No. 5 (1990), 7–30; Oskolkov, *Golod*, 15–20; Osokina, *Ierarkhia potreblenia*, 55.
60. Oskolkov, *Golod*, 13–16.
61. Osobaia papka, Verkhne-Don RKB, 4 April 1931, TsDNIRO, f. 34, op. 1, d. 6, l. 27; Verkhne-Don RKB, 12 April 1931, ibid., ll. 30-31; Verkhne-Don RKB, 11 March 1931, ibid., l. 15; *Osobaia papka*, Verkhne-Don RKB, 11 February 1931, l. 17; Kamensk County Party Conference, 25 February 1931, TsDNIRO, f. 79, op. 1, d. 50, l. 12; GARO, f. R-1485, op. 8, d. 244, l. 338.
62. I take the figures from Oskolkov, *Golod*, 16–20. Merl too emphasizes the record harvest and the high percentage of grain removal. Merl, "Entfachte Stalin," 577. For the grain procurement saga in the Volga regions, see Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 58–70.
63. On the severe fodder shortage in the SKK, see VTsIK Commission Report on SKK, 1 Jan.uary1933, 167 and Sholokhov to Stalin, 4 April 1933, *VI*, 7. In Ukraine, see Memo from Strang to Simon, 4 May 1932, *The Foreign Office*, 5.
64. OGPU IS, RTsKhIDNI, f. 78, op. 1, d. 419, l. 63.

65. Memo, 10 March 1932, GARO, f. R-1485, op. 8, d. 267, l. 83.
66. PAVO, f. 76, op. 1, d. 183, l. 101 as quoted by Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 73. For similar letters, see also RTsKhIDNI f. 631, op. 5, d. 74, ll. 36–36ob.
67. Quote taken from APRF (Arkhiv prezidenta Rossiiskoi federatsii) as quoted by Ivnitskii, "Golod," 46.
68. The letter is quoted in full in "Golod 1932–1933 godov na Ukraine: Svidetel'stvuiut arkhivnye dokumenty," *Pod znamenem Leninizma* 8 (April 1990), 64–86, here at 65.
69. See esp. Osokina, *Ierarkhia potreblenia*, 122 and Cairns's report of a conversation with a high official of the Central Transport Department, *The Foreign Office*, 129.
70. VTsIK Commission Report on SKK, 1 January 1933, 168.
71. Cairns, *The Foreign Office*, 132, 53–54.
72. Cairns, 53–54, 132, 153–57. Cairns's opinions about the cost effectiveness of horses over tractors, in some circumstances, were formed by his own farming experience in Alberta, where he and his two brothers lost money after investing in two different tractors, and found that their 960-acre farm could be more efficiently worked with horses. Ibid., 35.
73. "Italian Dispatches," 457; *The Foreign Office*, 156, 145.
74. State Farm directors, l. 2.
75. Khataevich to Molotov, November 1932, APRF, as quoted by Ivnitskii, "Golod," 55. Khataevich was referring to an apparently popular "formula," a statement he claimed to agree with. His point, however, was that in order to increase production, the "formula" should in practice be extended to allow for the possiblity of "the proletarian government giving appropriate support" to the fledgling collective farms.
76. Ivnitskii, APRF, 54–55.
77. Oskolkov, *Golod*, 18.
78. State Farm Directors, 4 November 1932, l. 15. *Otkhody* were considered fit for animals by villagers. OGPU SS (*spetssvodka*), 2 January 1934, GARO, f. R-1485, op. 8, d. 292, l. 11.
79. VTsIK Commission report on SKK, 1 January 1933, 200-203.
80. Getty, 8; see also "When the Head is Off . . ." a review of Harvest by Alec Nove, *New Republic*, 3 November 1986: 34–37, esp. 36.
81. Vladimir N. Brovkin, review of *Harvest of Sorrow*, by Robert Conquest, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* XI (June 1987): 234–45, here at 241. Getty, to be fair, does not hold the peasants to be as responsible for the famine as Stalin.
82. VTsIK Commission Report on the SKK, 1 January 1933, 203.
83. Cairns commented on the striking absence of livestock grazing in the fields across Ukraine. The price of butter, Cairns observed, was also highest in Ukraine, another indicator of the greater devastation in Ukraine. Merl, *Bauern unter Stalin*, 221–22. Cairns, *The Foreign Office*, 106, 127–28.
84. The number of *krupny rogaty skot* in both regions was also reduced by a similar coefficient, 2.2 and 1.9 respectively. Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 53–54.
85. VTsIK Commission Report on SKK, 1 January 1933, 199 and 167.
86. On collective farm workers selling collective livestock, see OGPU IS, 21 July 1932, Zimovnikovsk county, GARO, f. 2287, op. 3s, d. 106, ll. 26–27, and Strang to Simon, *The Foreign Office*, 5.
87. Merl, *Bauern unter Stalin*, 221–22.
88. OGPU IS, overheard conversation of a delegate from Kisliakovsk at the 3rd Territorial Congress of collective farm workers, 6 March 1932, RTsKhIDNI, f. 78, op. 1, d. 419, l. 63.
89. Cairns believed that "much of the loss of horses must be attributed to a gross exaggeration of the possibilities of mechanization." *The Foreign Office*, 192.
90. Memo from Ovey to John Simon, 4 May 1932, *The Foreign Office*, 15.
91. VTsIK Commission Report on SKK, 1 January 1933, 168.

92. VTsIK Commission Report on SKK, 1 January 1933, 203. A June 1932 OGPU report commented on the connection between food "difficulties" and *otkhodnichestvo*. RGAE (Rossiisky gosudarstveny arkhiv ekonomiki), f. 7486, op. 37, d. 235, l. 168.
93. Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 137–38.
94. Ivnitskii, *Kollektivizatsia*, 108.
95. See Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants*, 84.
96. The Foreign Office, 159.
97. In the 1920s, the average, had been 575 grams a day. Kondrashin's own figures based on independent data are even more dismal. The ratio was even worse in the Middle Volga region where the average daily bread ration per villager was 87 grams a day in 1931, 6.8 times less than between 1924 and 1927. Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 66–69.
98. Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 138–42.
99. On the connection between livestock and the spring sowing campaign, see OGPU IS, SKK, 25 April 1932, RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 235, l. 93. Dalrymple emphasized livestock mortality early on; 263.
100. OGPU IS, 25 April 1932, RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 235, l. 93.
101. Lewin, "'Taking Grain,'" 153; Danilov and Ivnitskii, 41.
102. On the seed grain shortage, see OGPU IS, 4 June 1932, 168; and Cairns reports on Verblud and Gigant, *The Foreign Office*, 144, 147–48. Estimates of seed grain pilfered range from 25–40 percent. State Farm directors, 5; Sholokhov to Stalin, 29 October 1932, *VI*, 6; MTS report, B. Orlovsk, 15 November 1933, RTsKhIDNI, f. 112, op. 29, d. 18, l. 27ob.
103. Cairns to Lloyd, 3 August 1932, *The Foreign Office*, 123, 140, 147, 161. See also VTsIK Commission Report on SKK, 1 January 1933, 200.
104. Cairns commented on the Drusag soybean field with "not a weed to be seen any place." Cairns, *The Foreign Office*, 156, 160.
105. Cossack Question Conference, June 1925, SKK, TsDNIRO, f. 7, op. 1, d. 215, l. 240.
106. Conquest, *Harvest*, 265.
107. Conquest, *Slavic Review*, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 318; R. W. Davies, M. B. Tauger, and S. G. Wheatcroft, "Stalin, Grain Stocks and the Famine of 1932–1933," *Slavic Review* 54, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 642–57, here at 656–57.
108. Ivnitskii, "Golod," 61; Oskolkov, *Golod*, 79.
109. RGAE, f. 1565, op. 329, d. 17. Also cited by E. N. Oskolkov, "V zernovykh raionakh," 113–23, here at 119.
110. Schiller, 23 May 1933, *The Foreign Office*, 263. Ammende agreed; 47.
111. OGPU IS, 20 February 1933, Remontnensk county, TsDNIRO, f. 94, op. 1, d. 202, l. 20.
112. On Buriatii, see Osokina, *Ierarkhia potreblenia*, 50. Émigré sources stress the amount of milk removed from the village as well; Marie Zuk, 15 September 1933, *The Foreign Office*, 342; Kravchenko, 119.
113. OGPU IS, 1 May 1933, Remontnensk county, TsDNIRO, f. 94, op. 1, d. 202, l. 42. In Zimovnikovsk county, a village reporter wrote to "Molot," only an insignificant amount of the commune's milk remained in the village. May 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 20, l. 67.
114. Zelenin, "'Revoliutsia sverkhu,'" 36; Lazar Volin, *A Century of Russian Agriculture* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), 183; Osokina, *Ierarkhia potreblenia*, 123.
115. Ivnitskii, APRF, 45.
116. Merl, "Entfachte Stalin," 585.
117. Osokina, *Ierarkhia potreblenia*, 125–26.
118. Dalrymple, 272.
119. Schiller, as quoted by Merl, "Entfachte Stalin," 584.
120. Ivnitskii, "Golod," APRF, 44. Tauger emphasizes this point; Tauger, "Harvest," 88.
121. Conversation with Ivnitskii, 14 September 1996.

122. As related in Osokina, *Ierarkhia potreblenia*, 25.
123. Kravchenko, 122.
124. Kenneth R. Walker, *Food Grain Procurement and Consumption in China* (Cambridge, 1984), 155.
125. Basil Ashton, et al., "Famine in China, 1958–61," *Population and Development Review* 10, no. 4 (Dec. 1984): 613–45, here at 629.
126. Arthur Koestler, *The Invisible Writing* (New York, 1969; first edition 1954), 83.
127. Cairns, *The Foreign Office*, 149.
128. Letter from Khataevich to Molotov, November 1932, APRF, as quoted by Ivnitskii, "Golod," 55. The Central Executive Control Commission member quoted above interpreted the decrees similarly. Cairns, *The Foreign Office*, 149. An alternative way of assessing the degree is to dismiss it as purely "propagandistic" in nature as Zelenin does; "'Revoliutsia sverkhu,'" 34.
129. Zelenin also makes this point; "'Revoliutsia sverkhu,'" 34. On the other hand, the better-off collective farm workers of Riazan and Riazhsk counties (Moscow province) who had vegetables or grain left to sell, generally welcomed the decree. (This too is based on a work in progress.)
130. Esmond Ovey, 4 May 1932, *The Foreign Office*, 15; J. M. K. Vyvyan, third secretary at the British Embassy, July 1932, idem., 97.
131. Otto Schiller, "Die Krise der sozialistischen Landwirtschaft in der Sowjetunion" (Berlin, 1933), 73.
132. Sholokhov to Stalin, *VI*, 10.
133. Emphasis in the original; telegram from Stalin to Kaganovich and Molotov, 18 June 1932, APRF, Ivnitskii, "Golod," 46.
134. Ivnitskii, "Golod," APRF, 46.
135. State Farm directors.
136. J. Arch Getty stresses this "stereotypic view of peasants and their psychology" held by many Bolsheviks in his review of Conquest, 8.
137. 19 May 1932, "Italian Dispatches," 397.
138. Ivnitskii, "Golod," APRF, 47 and 53.
139. According to Ivnitskii, Stalin's written comment was "interesting." Ivnitskii, "Golod," APRF, 56–57. In Ukraine, the plan was reduced in November from 425 to 315 million poods.
140. Kondrashin views peasants' discovery of the 1932 grain quota as a decisive breaking point; exhausting whatever remained of their patience and good will. Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 95.
141. OGPU IS, Slaviansk county, 22 July 1932, RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 237, ll. 237–36.
142. Tauger, "Harvest," 71; Lewin, "'Taking Grain,'" 155.
143. Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 266. Kondrashin estimates that Ptuxi's request, a 16 million pood reduction, is approximately the amount of grain it would have taken to prevent the number of lives actually lost in 1933.
144. Oskolkov, *Golod*, 24–25; Ivnitskii, "Golod," 47–48.
145. Sholokhov to Stalin, *VI*, 10.
146. Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia,"; Oskolkov, *Golod*, 18–20; SW36 and LH30, "Case Histories," 282, 299.
147. SKK OGPU IS, 22 September 1932, RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 237, l. 399.
148. Sheboldaev to Stalin, 20 August 1932, APRF, as quoted in Ivnitskii, "Golod," 48. Workers were also aware, some from personal travels, of the Ukrainian situation; see SKK OGPU IS, Groznyi, 10 July 1932, GARO, f. 2287, op. 3s, d. 106, l. 41; OGPU IS, 30 June 1932, RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 237, l. 227. Collective farm workers in Riazan also believed that the government had "created" a famine in Ukraine.

149. See, for example, S. P. Trapeznikov, *Leninizm i agrarno-krest'iansky vopros*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1974), 389.
150. Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants*, 5.
151. As quoted by Dalrymple, 275.
152. Cairns, 7 June 1932, *The Foreign Office*, 71. The word "passive" is almost certainly Cairns's interpretation.
153. Sholokhov to Stalin, 4 April 1933, *VI*, 10. Shimomotai overstates the case when he writes that "most of the harvest was left unthreshed"; he uses Veshensk to substantiate his claim, but the final amount of grain harvested, by Sholokhov's estimate, was equal to the previous year's; 43.
154. OGPU IS, 16 August 1932, RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 237, l. 339. On the fact of an unusual amount of grain left in the steppe elsewhere, see 15 March 1933, ShFGARO, f. R-186, op. 1, d. 410, l. 168 and MTS memo, 8 October 1933 (referring to 1932), TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 11, l. 14. Kondrashin notes that in the summer and fall of 1932, the peasants of the Volga regions collectively worked worse than they ever had before in their lives. Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 85.
155. Statement of a collective farm worker working in a brigade that was lagging behind the rest, VTsIK instructor's report, 21 April 1933, GARF, f. 1235, op. 141, d. 1522, l. 216ob.
156. Mazower, 43.
157. Schiller, "Die Krise," 73.
158. Sholokhov to Stalin, *VI*, 10; Danilov and Ivnitskii, 40–41.
159. Mood Report, June 1933, RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 120, d. 94, l. 109.
160. OGPU IS, 10 January 1933, GARO, f. R-2287, op. 3s, d. 119, l. 9.
161. RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 237, l. 404; RGAE, f. 8043, op. 11, d. 17, l. 200.
162. Lisienko (Sal'sk), RK secretaries, ll. 38–39; OGPU IS, 23 July 1932, RGAE, f. 7846, op. 3, d. 237, ll. 233–34; OGPU IS, 22 September 1932, Petrovsk county, RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 237, l. 393; OGPU IS, 6 November 1932, Tatsinsk county, GARO, f. 2287, op. 3s, d. 106, l. 224.
163. Lisienko, Sal'sk, RK secretaries, ll. 38–39.
164. Ibid., l. 40.
165. On the mass nature of the phenomenon, see OGPU IS, Konstantinovsk county, 9 October 1932, GARO, f. R-2287, op. 3s, d. 105, l. 9; OGPU IS, 23 July 1932, RGAE, f. 7486, op. 3, d. 237, ll. 233–34; OGPU IS, 29 September 1932, Eisk county, GARO, f. 2287, op. 3s, d. 106, l. 150. Peasants' refusal to work was also commented upon in Ukraine; see OGPU IS, 16 August 1932, RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 237, l. 338; Cairns to Lloyd, *The Foreign Office*, 107, 111, 117, 121.
166. State Farm directors, ll. 1–2.
167. OGPU IS, 27 September 1932, GARO, f. 2287, op. 3s, d. 106, l. 147. Similarly, see also OGPU IS, 29 September and 6 November 1932, Eisk and Tatsinsk counties, ibid., ll. 150, 224; OGPU IS, 23 July 1932, RGAE, f. 7486, op. 3, d. 237, ll. 233–34.
168. As quoted by Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 95.
169. Cairns, *The Foreign Office*, 72.
170. OGPU IS, 1 and 11 February 1933, Veshensk (Bokovsk) and Shakhtinsk counties, GARO, f. R-2287, op. 3s, d. 119, ll. 17, 49; OGPU IS, 25 October 1932, Millerovsk county, GARO, f. 2287, op. 3s, d. 106, l. 199; OGPU IS, 3 January 1933, Shakhtinsk county, GARO, f. R-2287, op. 3s, d. 120, l. 3; OGPU IS, Shakhtinsk county, 5 June 1933, ShFGARO, f. R-186, op. 1, d. 421, l. 112; OGPU IS, Remontnensk county. 20 and 24 February 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 94, op. 1, d. 202, ll. 23, 31.
171. RK secretaries, ll. 38–39.
172. Ibid., l. 40.
173. 20 November 1932, Morozovsk representative, RK Secretaries, TsDNIRO, f. 7, op. 1, d. 1288, l. 21; OGPU IS, Kamensk county, 8 August 1932, RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 237, ll.

296–95. I have found evidence of mass misappropriation of kolkhoz grain on an individual basis alone in the following counties, many of which would be among the hardest devastated by the famine: Verkhne-Don (RKB, 9 August 1932, TsDNIRO, f. 34, op. 1, d. 50, l. 43), Kamensk (OGPU IS, 8 August 1932, RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 237, ll. 296-95 and Sovkhoz directors, 4 November 1932, 1487, ll. 3–4, Eisk [2 September 1932, TsDNIKK (Tsentr dokumentatsii noveishei istorii Krasnodarskogo kraia (TsDNIKK)], f. 163, op. 1, d. 122, l. 24 and MTS *politdonosenie*, December 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 6, l. 54), Mechetinsk (RK secretaries, ll. 22-3); and Novo-Pokrovsk, (ibid., l. 35).

174. Dolyna, 25–26.

175. Dolot, 170.

176. OGPU IS, 22 September 1932, RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 237, l. 407; OGPU IS, 28 November 1932, RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 238, l. 11. These numbers, of course, only give an impression of the number apprehended.

177. Summary criminal report, November 1932, ShFGARO, f. R-33, op. 3, d. 2, l. 8; ibid., RK militsii, November 1932, ShFGARO, f. R-33, op. 1, d. 57, l. 11.

178. For examples of brigadirs leading the efforts, see Sholokhov to Stalin, 29 October 1932, *VI*, 6 and OGPU IS, Millerovsk county, 8 August 1932, RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 237, l. 295. On collective farm chairmen, some of whom were Communists, see RK secretaries, l. 39; OGPU IS, 7 September 1932, GARO, f. 2287, op. 3s, d. 106, l. 102; Eisk RKB, 15 September 1932, TsDNIKK, f. 1297, op. 1, d. 124, l. 45; Konstantinovsk RKB, 13 October 1932, TsDNIRO, f. 55, op. 1, d. 103, l. 8.

179. OGPU IS, Medvedovsk village (Petrovsk county), 22 September 1932, RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 237, l. 399. See also MTS *politdonesenie*, Guliai-Borisovsk, January 1934, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 40, l. 80 and the explanation of A. Avdeenko, a former kolkhoz chairman (Cossack), who was an involuntary participant in the building of the Moscow-Volga canal as a result of his refusal to leave the collective farm workers under his charge without enough bread, in his autobiography *Otluchenie* or, as quoted in Ivnitskii, "Golod," 51–52.

180. The grain delivery quota for the county was the same as in 1931. RK secretaries, ll. 3–4; Oskolkov, *Golod*, 47-49. The Kotov story is also retold in I. I. Alekseenko, *Repressii na Kubani i Severnom Kavkaze v 30-e gg. XX veka* (Krasnodar, 1993), 37–38.

181. See, for example, OGPU IS, 9 October 1932, GARO, f. R-2287, op. 3s, d. 106, l. 166.

182. Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 122.

183. RK secretaries, l. 4. A special commission with joint participants from the North Caucasus Territorial Committee and the Central Committee reviewed Kotov's case, found the sentence too lenient, and recommended death by shooting. Oskolkov, *Golod*, 48.

Notes to Part II

1. Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford, 1981; reprint with corrections, Oxford, 1982), 1 (page citations are to the reprint edition).

2. According to Osokina, wheat was not one of the agricultural items reduced in the export program of 1933; *Ierarkhia potreblenia*, 125–26.

3. Dolyna, 122.

4. See Chamberlin, "Russian Education," 233–34; Dmytro Solovei, *The Golgotha of Ukraine: Eyewitness Accounts of the Famine in Ukraine Instigated and Fostered by the Kremlin in an Attempt to Quell Ukrainian Resistance to Soviet Russian National and Social Enslavement of the Ukrainian People*, trans. and ed. Stephen Shumeyko (New York, 1953), 24, 37; Kravchenko, 129; Case History SW34, "Oral Histories," 387–88.

5. A Polish Vice-Consul visited one village where only twenty-two out of 250 inhabitants were still alive. "Italian Dispatches," 444, 452. The prone-to-underestimate German diplomat, Schiller, believed rumors he heard that two North Caucasus villages, Dimitrievka and Il'inskaia, where the population dropped from 6,000 to 2,000 and 3,000 to 1,500 respectively. Schiller, 23 May 1933, *The Foreign Office*, 259–60.

6. Osokina, *Ierarkhia potreblenia*, 27.

7. Mazower, 26–48.
8. Sen, *Poverty and Famines*, 56; Amartya Sen, "Famine Mortality: A Study of the Bengal Famine of 1943," in *Peasants in History: Essays in Honour of Daniel Thorner*, ed. E. J. Hobsbawm et al. (Oxford, 1980), 194–220, here at 208.
9. MTS report, Veshensk, 14 April 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 36, l. 10; Osokina, *Ierarkhia potreblenia*, 61; Kravchenko, 111; Conquest, *Harvest*, 248; "Oral Histories," 344; Andrei Konovko, "Mor," *Russki arkhiv* 26 (1992): 209–48, here at 232.
10. Tauger, "Harvest," 84-87; Merl, "Entfachte Stalin," 583–84.
11. Osokina, *Ierarkhia potreblenia*, 38–39.
12. Zuk's letter to the Ukrainian National Council in Canada, 15 September 1933, *The Foreign Office*, 342. Koestler also commented on the "enviable" living standard of Moscow in 1932 "compared with any other place in the Soviet Union that I visited in the course of a journey covering several thousand miles." Koestler, *Invisible Writing*, 81.
13. Dolot, 174.
14. Sen, *Poverty and Famines*, 39.
15. The Worker-Peasant Inspectors' and OGPU reports for 1934 list example after example of such cases, giving detailed information on the composition of the family, the number of labordays earned, and the farm worker's attitude toward the collective farm and the Soviet government. See GARO, f. R-1485, op. 8, d. 292 and GARO, f. R-1485, op. 8, d. 295.
16. Zelenin, "'Revoliutsia sverkhu,'" 36.
17. Cairns, *The Foreign Office*, 95–96, 107.
18. Workers' complaints of delayed salaries are too numerous to list; see, for example, Cairns on Rostov's Selmashstroi, *The Foreign Office*, 151–52; OGPU IS, 23 October 1932, GARO, R-2287, op. 3s, d. 104, l. 2; OGPU IS, Taganrog, 23 March 1933, GARO, f. R-2287, op. 3s, d. 119, ll. 83–84; OGPU IS, June 1933, RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 120, d. 94, l. 108.
19. See Osokina, *Ierarkhia potreblenia*; OGPU IS, Remontnoe, 24 February 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 94, op. 1, d. 202, l. 32; Conquest, *Harvest*, 248.
20. OGPU IS, GARO, f. R-2287, op. 3s, d. 119, l. 91.
21. OGPU IS, January 1933, GARO, f. R-2287, op. 3s, d. 119, l. 7.
22. Report by L. Sircana (Royal Vice-Consul), April 1933, "Italian Dispatches," 420.
23. Cairns, *The Foreign Office*, 95–96, 107.
24. OGPU IS, 20 April 1933. ShFGARO, f. R-186, op. 1, d. 336, l. 95.
25. See, for the complaints of: white-collar workers in Remontnensk county OGPU IS, TsDNIRO, f. 94, op. 1, d. 202, l. 36; MTS employees in Eisk, 2 November 1932, TsDNIKK, f. 1297, op. 1, d. 124, l. 81; MTS technicians in Millerovo, OGPU IS, 25 October 1932, GARO, f. R-2287, op. 3s, d. 106, l. 199; industrial workers in Taganrog, OGPU IS, 23 March 1933, GARO, f. R-2287, op. 3s, d. 119, l. 82; party activists, OGPU IS, June 1933, RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 120, d. 94, l. 109.
26. OGPU IS, 23 March 1933, GARO, f. R-2287, op. 3s, d. 119, l. 86. In several smaller cities in the Kyiv district, inspectors found workers in near-starvation conditions in March, 1933. "Golod 1932–1933 godov na Ukraine," 78.
27. Conquest, 230; Case history SW1, "Oral Histories," 379; excerpt from memoir of Kh. Riabokin, who taught at the University of Kharkiv in 1933, as quoted by Solovei, 39–41; OGPU IS, Remontnensk county, 1 May 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 94, op. 1, d. 202, ll. 41–42.
28. The two possible significant exceptions to this general rule could have been Stavropol and Krasnodar, though the sources for the high numbers (50,000 and 40,000 respectively) are less than ideal. Conquest and Tauger quote Ammende, who relies on the testimony of a Drusag employee and an English traveller, neither of whom, obviously, was in a position to count. A typhus or malaria outbreak, brought to the city by a disease-carrying villager, is one possible explanation, as (especially) malaria was rampant in southern Russia from 1932–34. Conquest, *Harvest*, 280; Tauger, "Harvest," 84; Ammende, 98–99; Report by Otto Schiller, German Agricultural Attaché in Moscow, 23 May 1933, *The Foreign Office*, 260.

29. The predominance of men struck contemporary Party observers as well as foreigners. See for example, the SKK KK-RKI senior inspector's report to Larin from Uspensk, a Kuban Cossack market town, 27 April 1933, GARO, f. R-1485, op. 8, d. 272, l. 310; Schiller, 23 May 1933, *The Foreign Office*, 264; and Chamberlin, *Iron Age*, 87. Danilov and Kondrashin confirm that the trend was not confined to the North Caucasus; V. P. Danilov, "Diskussia," 119 and Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 130–32.

30. Oskolkov, *Golod*, 74.

31. MTS report, Kisliakovsk, year-end summary, December 1933, RTsKhIDNI, f. 112, op. 29, d. 66, l. 52. See also MTS PS, Ol'ginsk (Primorsko-Akhtarsk county), 20 April 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 69, l. 6.

32. Mazower, 40. See also Sen, "Famine Mortality," 209.

33. Case History LH46, "Oral Histories," 341; Oskolkov, *Golod*, 71. Contemporary writers also observed this pattern: MTS PS, 14 April 1933, Veshensk county, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 36, l. 10; Report to Larin and Sheboldaev, 16 March 1933, GARF, f. 1235, op. 141, d. 1522, l. 260.

34. Sen, "Famine Mortality," 213.

35. Osokina, *Ierarkhia potreblenia*, 61; Conquest, *Harvest*, 283; Memo from Got'van to Putnin, SKKK secretary, N-Aleksandrovsk county, 15 February 1933, GARO, f. R-1485, op. 8, d. 272, l. 112; SKK KK RKI IS, 15 February 1934, GARO, f. R-1485, op. 8, d. 295, l. 24; GAKhO (Gosudarstvenny arkhiv Khar'kovskoi oblasti), f. R-2762, op. 1, d. 421, l. 64, as quoted by Konovko, 232.

36. Merl, "Entfachte Stalin," 575–76; Adam Ulam, *Stalin: The Man and His Era* (New York, 1973), 349.

37. Year-end MTS summary, 1 December 1933, Novo-Bataisk (Azov county), TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 29, l. 3; Senior KK-RKI inspector's report, Uspensk (Novo-Pokrovsk county), 27 April 1933, GARO, f. R-1485, op. 8, d. 272, ll. 310–11; Memo from Miasnikovsk RK secretary, 2 March 1933, ibid., l. 198; OGPU SS, Gukovo-Gnilushansk township (Shakhtinsk county), 10 and 26 April 1933, ShFGARO, f. R-186, op. 1, d. 336, ll. 80, 109, 112; Millerovsk county, TsDNIRO, f. 78, op. 1, d. 37, l. 14. Émigré survivors from Ukraine observed that some activists and a great percentage of poorer peasants died in their villages; see, for example, Case History LH46, "Oral Histories," 343; Dolyna, 125–26; Conquest, *Harvest*, 258.

38. RTsKhIDNI, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 69, l. 5.

39. Letter from Stalin to Sholokhov, 6 May 1933, RTsKhIDNI (Rossiiski tsentr khranenia i izuchenia dokumentatsii noveishei istorii), f. 558, op. 1, d. 3459, 3–4; published in *Voprosy istorii* (VI) 3 (1994): 22.

40. For a discussion of "entitlement," see Sen, *Poverty and Famines*, 1–6, 55–80, 154–55.

41. TsDNIKK, f. 163, op. 1, d. 130b, l. 29.

42. Oskolkov, *Golod*, 65.

43. 300 grams, Azov county, MTS report, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 29, l. 4; "not even one gram," see Novocherkassk county, MTS report, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 24, l. 70; "nothing except for community dining" in the fall, B. Orlovsk, MTS report, RTsKhIDNI, f. 112, op. 29, d. 18, l. 26.

44. Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 124.

45. The Soviet historian, S. P. Trapeznikov suggests that the "overwhelming majority" of collective farms in the North Caucasus, Lower Volga and Middle Volga Territories were in this position. Trapeznikov, predictably, located the cause in "*kulak* sabotage, theft, and pilferage of grain." *Leninizm i agrarno-krest'ianski vopros*, 389. The recorded complaints of numerous agriculturalists substantiate Trapeznikov's assertion; see, for example, OGPU IS, July, 3 July 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 21, l. 10; OGPU IS, 28 June 1933, Shakhtinsk county, ShFGARO, f. R-186, op. 1, d. 421, l. 170; GARO, f. 2573 op. 1, d. 125, l. 43. Kondrashin also confirms Trapeznikov for the Volga regions; Kondrashin, "Golod," 180; Kondrashin, "v derevne povolzh'ia," 180.

46. 16 December 1933, RTsKhIDNI, f. 112, op. 29, d. 1, l. 103.

47. See Kondrashin, "Golod," 179; Oskolkov, *Golod*, 71.
48. OGPU SS (Spetssvodka), 4 January 1934, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 114, l. 16.
49. Dolot especially emphasizes repeatedly the way in which different acts which made no sense to villagers were interpreted as "part of the general plan to starve the farmers into a complete submission to the government." In Dolot's village, for example, an order had been given in 1931 to kill and skin all the cats and dogs. Local officials delayed in skinning the dead animals, which prompted the suspicion that the government did not really need the skins. "The extermination of dogs and cats," it was believed, was "another means of depriving the starving farmers of one last possible source of food." Dolot, 152–53.
50. The decrees for Ukraine can be found verbatim in "Golod 1932–1933 godov na Ukraine," 72, and "Itogovy otchet mezhdunarodnoi komissii," 9.
51. Oskolkov, *Golod*, 39, 52.
52. Ivnitskii, "Kto vinovat?" 41; RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 21, d. 337, l. 84; op. 26, d. 54, l. 265.
53. MTS PS, N. Dereviansk, 11 July 1933, RTsKhIDNI, f. 112, op. 29, d. 124, l. 68; MTS PS, Dolzhansk, 6 December 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 26, l. 35; RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 205, l. 32; 1 December 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 26, l. 149.
54. By rural agriculturalists, I mean collective farm workers and individual farmers alike, but not white-collar workers, teachers, or government employees. I have not made an equally thorough study of state farm workers, but my current impression is that though legally entitled to the smallest ration in the village, they were at least able to survive by virtue of the fact that they continued to receive food on a daily basis and wages on a weekly or monthly basis unlike collective farm workers who were paid once or twice a year (or not), usually in the fall.
55. Both Lewin and Kondrashin also draw attention to this factor. Kondrashin, "Golod," 179–80; Lewin, 155. It was not the first time that collective farm workers' salaries had been confiscated; in Veshensk county, collective farm workers were given an additional spring grain procurement assignment that was met only by forfeiting wages. Sholokhov to Stalin, VI, 7. For collective farm workers' assessments of this process, see: OGPU IS, B. Kalitva, 1 February 1933, ShFGARO, f. R-186, op. 1, d. 336, l. 34; OGPU IS, 1 February 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 94, op. 1, d. 202, l. 6; Dolot, 164.
56. February 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 26, l. 34.
57. SKKKB (*Severny-Kavkazski kraikom biuro*), 15 March 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 7, op. 1, d. 1307, l. 20.
58. On the policy of Ukrainization and its reversal, see Terry Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire. The Soviet State and the Nationalities Question, 1923–1938" (Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1996), 563–695.
59. Oskolkov, *Golod*, 55.
60. See for example, the reports of "active White Guardists" from the Upper Don county noted in January of 1933 and commented on in the year-end summary report of 1934, TsDNIRO, f. 34, op. 1, d. 117, l. 9. See also OGPU SS, 10 April 1933, ShFGARO, f. R-186, op. 1, d. 336, ll. 70–71; OGPU IS, Medvedovsk st., 9 January 1933, GARO, f. R-2287, op. 3s, d. 119, l. 11.
61. "V Kazaki. Vosstanie na Kubani," *Vol'noe kazachestvo*, No. 120 (10 January 1933), 28; *The Foreign Office*, 401.
62. Meeting of County Committee Secretaries, March 1933, RTsKhIDNI, f. 166, op. 1. d. 12, l. 28.
63. Tauger, "Harvest," 73.
64. Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants*, 74.
65. Dolot, 186; 7 April 1933, "Italian Dispatches," 416.
66. OGPU SS, 5 and 28 June 1933, ShFGARO, f. R-186, op. 1, d. 421, ll. 117, 172.
67. MTS report, 17 February 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1, d. 26, l. 77.
68. See, for example, the run of OGPU reports from January to August 1933 from Remontnesk county, TsDNIRO, f. 94, op. 1, d. 202. From Shakhtinsk county, see the special

edition OGPU reports for 1933 in ShFGARO, f. R-186, op. 1, d. 336. At the Territorial level, see the third *opis'* of GARO, f. R-2287.

69. SKK OGPU IPS, 1 February 1933, GARO, f. R-2287, op. 3s, d. 119, l. 49.

70. SKK OGPU IPS, 1 February 1933, GARO, f. R-2287, op. 3s, d. 119, l. 49.

71. GARF, f. 1235, op. 141, d. 1522, l. 12. He predicted that by the March the percentage of starving villagers would rise as high as 10 to 15 percent; the latter phrase was crossed out, though still fully legible.

72. Oskolkov, *Golod*, 73–74.

73. TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 5, l. 15.

74. On Pilniak, see Kondrashin, "Golod," 178.

75. Oskolkov, *Golod*, 67. The February letter is not included in the Sholokhov-Stalin correspondence published in *Voprosy istorii*.

76. TsDNIRO, f. 7, op. 1, d. 1307, ll. 47–49. See also Oskolkov, "v zernovykh raionakh," 115.

77. Kosior's letter is reprinted in full in "Golod 1932–1933 godov na Ukraine," 83–84.

78. The one scholar who has had an opportunity to look at some of the relevant materials in Stalin and Molotov's private collections, Ivnitskii, is convinced that they were *"v kurse"* all along the way. Conversation, 14 September 1996.

79. Memo from William Strang to Sir John Simon, 17 July 1933, *The Foreign Office*, 255.

80. The report was confirmed and the soldier was released after he promised not to tell anyone else about it. Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 131.

81. Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 154.

82. Cairns to Lloyd, 7 June 1932, *The Foreign Office*, 70. Members of the crowd countered by pointing to the the well-fed Cairns and Schiller in their midst.

83. The teacher's recollections as retold by Alekseenko, 47. "What is the average number per day of French working-class families starving to death (a) in rural areas, (b) in the towns?" according to Koestler, was one of the commonest questions asked of him after a lecture in the spring of 1933. Arthur Koestler, *God*, 69.

84. 12 October 1933, ShFGARO, f. R-186, op. 1, d. 375, l. 29; Dalrymple, 266; "Italian Dispatches," 452–53; MTS report, Shakhtinsk county, 12 November 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 53, l. 32; "Italian Dispatches," 448–49; Strang to Simon, 26 September 1933, *The Foreign Office*, 311; Kravchenko, 111.

85. I will develop this point more fully in a later section.

86. APRF, f. 3, op. 61, d. 549, l. 10, as quoted in *Voprosy istorii* 3 (1994): 24–25; Ivnitskii, "Golod," 62–63. In China, several provincial leaders were shot for attempting to cover-up. Bernstein, 366–68.

87. According to Ivnitskii, an analysis of 20,000 of the files showed that 83 percent of those sentenced were collective farm workers and individual farmers. Ivnitskii, "Kto vinovat?" 43.

88. Ibid., 42.

89. OGPU IS 29 January 1933, GARO, f. R-2287, op. 3s, d. 119, l. 45.

90. Beloglinsk MTS report, 15 March 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 34, l. 11; TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 5, l. 35; GARF, f. 1235, op. 141, d. 1522, l. 261.

91. OGPU IS, ShFGARO, f. R-186, op. 1, d. 421, ll. 91–92. OGPU IS, Remontnensk county, 14 February 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 94, op. 1, d. 202, l. 12.

92. TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 26, l. 77; TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 69, l. 5; RTsKhIDNI, f. 112, op. 29, d. 18, ll. 22ob-21; TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 5, l. 35; TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 29, l. 26.

93. GARF, f. 1235, op. 141, d. 1522, l. 52; MTS report, St. Shcherbinovka, RTsKhIDNI, f. 112, op. 29, d. 185, l. 52.

94. Arthur Quinn, *A New World: An Epic of Colonial America from the Founding of Jamestown to the Fall of Quebec* (New York, 1995), 30–31.

95. "Itogovy otchet mezhdunarodnoi komissii," 6–7.

96. See Conquest, *Harvest*, 262, 223; Ivnitskii, "Golod," 59.

97. Tauger, "The 1932 Harvest," 88.

98. As quoted by Ovey to Simon, 13 March 1933, *The Foreign Office*, 217. Umanski, of course, exaggerated in the interests of maintaining a diplomatic silence, but he was not far from the truth.

99. In 1933, Ukraine and the North Caucasus Territory were two of the main grain-producing regions of the country.

100. Ivnitskii, "Golod," 59.

101. RTsKhIDNI, f. 166, op. 1. d. 12, l. 139. Similarly, see OGPU SS, 1 February 1933, B. Kalitva, ShFGARO, f. R-186, op. 1, d. 336, l. 35; MTS politsvodka, 14 April 1933, Veshensk county, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 36, l. 10.

102. Ivnitskii, "Golod," 59. On Ukraine, see also (photocopies), Kravchenko, 118. Chadai to Kravchenko: "Finally and most important, Comrade Kravchenko, there's the situation of the people themselves. They're dying like flies. . . finally they sent me 13 poods. But I'm not Moses or Jesus. I can't feed thousands of people with 13 poods."

103. Sholokhov to Stalin, 4 April 1933, 17.

104. Report to Nikolai Frolovich, prezidium VTsIK, 17 April 1933, 789, ll. 138–9. For similar reports of the serious discrepancy between the size of the need and the amount of grain loaned, see the memo from the Miasnikovsk RK secretary, 2 March 1933; OGPU IS, 10 April 1932, Remontinsk county, TsDNIRO, f. 94, op. 1, d. 202, l. 35; the Eisk MTS politotdel head's report at the Territorial level meeting, 1–2 March 1933, RTsKhIDNI, f. 166, op. 1. d. 12, l. 113; B. Orlovsk MTS's year-end summary report, RTsKhIDNI, f. 112, op. 29, d. 18, ll. 25–26.

105. Oskolkov, *Golod*, 77.

106. Oskolkov, "V zernovykh raionakh," 119.

107. Decree passed by TsK KP(b) U on the guidelines to be used in distributing food-supply assistance, 13 March 1933, as quoted in "Golod 1932–1933 godov na Ukraine," 81.

108. Extraordinary session of the St-M RKB, 25 February 1933, 1913, l. 46; V-D RKB, 25 February 1933, 848, l. 88.

109. Spetssoobshchenie MTS politotdel, Eisk county, 3 January 1934, 1622, l. 9; OGPU SS, 3 January 1934, Eisk county, 2139, l. 16.

110. TsDNIRO, f. 7, op. 1, d. 1307, ll. 92–99; for follow-through orders at the county level, see Verkhne-Don RKB, 3 April 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 34, op. 1, d. 82, l. 5; Taganrog, 21 April 1933, TFGARO, f. R-165, op. 1, d. 171, ll. 25ob-26.

111. E. N. Oskolkov, *Golod 1932/1933: Khlebozagotovky golod 1932/1933 goda v Severo-Kavkazskom krae* (Rostov, 1991), 75–77; N. A. Ivnitskii, "Golod 1932–1933 godov: Kto vinovat?" in *Golod 1932–1933 godov*, ed. N. A. Ivnitskii (Moscow, 1995), 43–66, here at 61.

112. Oskolkov, 77; Osokina, *Ierarkhia potreblenia*, 61.

113. I. E. Zelenin, N. A. Ivnitskii, V. V. Kondrashin, E. N. Oskolkov, "Pis'ma v redaktsiu o golode 1932–1933 godov i ego otsenke na Ukraine," *Otechestvennaia istoria* 6 (1994): 256–63, here at 258–60; VTsIK instructor's report from Veshensk, 17 April 1933, GARF, f. 1235, op. 141, d. 1522, l. 139; Protokol Staro-Minsk RKB, 20 January 1933, TsDNIKK, f. 1075, op. 1, d. 79, l. 13; OGPU IS, Remontnesk county, 19 January 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 94, op. 1, d. 202, l. 56.

114. "Revolutsionnaia zakonnost' na sovremennom etape" (Moscow, 1933). For the community exceptions, see Protokols Staro-Minsk RKB, 1 and 10 February 1933, TsDNIKK, f. 1075, op. 1, d. 81, ll. 2, 16.

115. OGPU SS, May 1933, GARO, f. R-2287, op. 3s, d. 119, ll. 148, 166, 170, 172, 183, 216.

116. 23 May 1933, *The Foreign Office*, 261–62.

117. Sholokhov to Stalin, 4 April 1933, *VI*, 14; Commission on the Ukraine Famine, "Translations of Selected Oral Histories," in *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine 1932–1933: Report to Congress* (Washington, 1988), hereafter "Oral Histories," 237–393, 271, 296; Miron Dolot, *Execution by Hunger: The Hidden Holocaust* (New York, 1985), 194.

151. UFL (*Sovetski pakhar'*), Received 27 and 28 January 1928, TsDNIRO, f. 7, op. 1, d. 769, l. 59. Similar quotes from various corners of the Union abound. See Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," ll. 73–74.
152. As quoted by Ammende, 152.
153. By the middle of February, 1933, approximately 50,000 men and women had already been relocated into the Territory. Oskolkov, *Golod*, 56.

Notes to Conclusion

1. See especially Sen, "Famine Mortality," 194–220.
2. Omvedt was at the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics (Poona, India), when the article was published. "The political economy of starvation," *Race and Class* 17, no. 2 (Autumn 1975): 111–30, here at 112–13.
3. "How Is India Doing?" in *Social and Economic Development in India: A Reassessment*, edited by Dilip K. Basu and Richard Sisson (New Delhi, 1986), 28–42, here at 33.
4. Omvedt, 128–29.
5. Sen, "How is India Doing?" 38. Carl Riskin, "Feeding China: The Experience since 1949," in *The Political Economy of Hunger: Selected Essays*, edited by Jean Dréze, Amartya Sen, and Athar Hussain, (Oxford, 1995), 401–44, here at 412.
6. Barnett R. Rubin, "Journey to the East: Industrialization in India and the Chinese Experience," in *Social and Economic Development in India*, 67–88, here at 68.
7. By "positive developments," Riskin means: "the extension of irrigated area, the adoption of improved varieties of wheat, rice, and other grains, the development of chemical fertilizer and pesticide industries, and the leveling and terracing of fields via winter 'farmland capital construction' work"; 412, 419–20.
8. Ibid, 40; Rubin, 68; Sen, *Poverty and Famines*, 7, 39.
9. Dolot, xiv–xv, 34.
10. Muggeridge, *Chronicles*, 257. See also L. Sircana, Royal Vice-Consul of the Italian Embassy on NC, 8 April 1933, 8098, 417; Dolyna, 44. Dalrymple, 269–70.
11. (80-95 percent) Veshensk MTS report, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1, d. 36, 1. 129; OGPU IS, Shakhtinsk county, May 1933, (100 percent) ShFGARO, f. R-186, op. 1, d. 421, 1. 77; Tatsinsk MTS report (100 percent), 1 April 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1, op. 1. d. 80, 11. 10–11.
12. See for example, Konovko, 242–43.
13. Merl makes this point in *Bauern unter Stalin*, 224; as did Schiller, 8009, 266. In Kisliakovsk, the number of horses decreased from 2,500 in 1932 to 750 by May of 1933: TsDNIRO, f. 112, op. 29, d. 66, 1. 52; in Novo-Aleksandrovsk county, the number of horses dropped from 1760 to 752; RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 205, 1. 32; in Uspensk (Kuban), 60 percent of the horses died between 1 January and 20 April; GARO, f. R-1485, op. 8, d. 272, 1. 311. Holland Hunter, "Soviet Agriculture with and without Collectivization, 1928–40," *Slavic Review* 47, no. 2 (Summer 1988): 203–26; James R. Millar and Alec Nove, "A Debate on Collectivization: Was Stalin Really Necessary ?" *Problems of Communism* 25 (July–August 1976): 49–62.
14. See Pis'ma iz stanitsy K. Kub., 1933, "V Kazaki. Pis'ma iz rodnogo Kraia," *Vol'noe kazachestvo* No. 140 (10 November 1933): 23.
15. Private conversation with author, June 1992.
16. OGPU IS, 15 and 21 June 1927, TsDNIRO, f. 7, op. 1, d. 595, 11. 52, 91.
17. Don OKP, 1927, TsDNIRO, f. 5 op. 1, d. 99, 1. 35b. The soldiers at the Eisk camp were drawn from the Staro-Minsk, Kushchevsk and Eisk counties.
18. TsK IS, 20 July 1927, RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 32, d. 110, 1. 10. On the peasants of Staro-Minsk and their preference to avoid war, but willingness to defend their country if the need

arose, see GARO, f. R-1798, op.3, d. 66, l. 36. From Vorontsovo-Nikolaevsk, see Sal'sk District OGPU IS, 28 June 1927, TsDNIRO, f. 97, op. 1, d. 76, l. 111.

19. "*Esli uidut bol'sheviki, to nam smert'*." This also demonstrates how seriously non-Cossaks took Cossack threats. Gathering of RK secretaries, Don district, 21 July 1927, GARO, f. R-1798, op. 3, d. 66, l. 31.
20. OGPU IS, Sal'sk district, 1927, TsDNIRO, f. 79, op. 1, d. 79, l. 1.
21. RK secretaries, l. 4. Oskolkov, *Golod*, 48.
22. OGPU, 17 November 1932, Veshensk county, GARO, f. R-2287, op. 3s, d. 106, l. 242; OGPU IS, Slaviansk county, 17 January 1933, GARO, f. R-2287, op. 3s, d. 119, l. 26; OGPU IS, Remontensk county, 20 February 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 94, op. 1, d. 202, l. 23; OGPU IS, Eisk county, GAKK, f. R-692, op. 1, d. 9, l. 53.
23. I have had many conversations on point with Maria Savel'na's son, Vladimir Ivanovich, a convinced socialist.
24. See especially V. P. Popov, "Ekonomicheskoe i sotsial'noe polozhenie Sovetskogo obshchestva v 40-e gg." (na primere rossiiskoi derevni) (dokt. diss., Moscow, 1996.)
25. On the de-peasantization of the villages nationwide, see N.S. Ivanov, "Raskrest'ianivanie derevni (seredina 40-kh godov—50-e gody)," in *Sud'by Rossiiskogo krest'ianstva*, (Moscow, 1996), 416–35.
26. The milkmaids of Poltava (in Azov county) pointed this out to me; private conversation with author, May 1994.

118. Sholokhov to Stalin, 4 April 1933, *VI*, 17; TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 5, l. 48; TsDNIRO, f. 7, op. 1, d. 1307, ll. 92–93.
119. Dolyna, 99–100; "Oral Histories," 355.
120. RK secretaries, l. 89.
121. Sholokhov to Stalin, April 1933, *VI*, 14; Conquest, *Harvest*, 246; Case Histories LH13 and SW36, "Oral Histories," 271, 296; Dolyna, 99–100; Dolot, 194.
122. OGPU SS, Remontnensk county, 10 July 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 94, op. 1, d. 202, ll. 73–74; Dolyna, 98–99; OGPU IS, July, 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 21, l. 239.
123. Oskolkov, *Golod*, 18.
124. RGAE, f. 1565, op. 329, d. 17. Also cited by E. N. Oskolkov, "V zernovykh raionakh," 113–23, here at 119.
125. Kravchenko, 117–30; Case history SW36, "Oral Histories," 295–96.
126. State farm directors, 4 November 1932, l. 11.
127. OGPU IS, Remontnoe, 23 April 1933, TsDNIRO, f. 94, op. 1, d. 202, l. 42.
128. Merl, "Entfachte Stalin," 581.
129. Meeting of RK secretaries, state farm and MTS politotdel directors, 1–2 March 1933, RTsKhIDNI, f. 166, op. 1. d. 12, l. 149.
130. Konovko, 233; Oskolkov, *Golod*, 77.
131. The other reason was "justice." Ivnitskii, APRF, "Golod," 47.
132. Kondrashin, "V derevne povolzh'ia," 131; see also Kravchenko, 94–95, 105, 125.
133. GARF, f. 1235, op. 141, d. 1522, l. 140.
134. OGPU IS, Remontnesk county, 10 April 1932, TsDNIRO, f. 94, op. 1, d. 202, l. 35; Konovko, 243; TsDNIRO, f. 7, op. 1, d. 1307, ll. 96–99; case history LH30, "Oral Histories," 279–81; TsDNIRO, f. 94, op. 1, d. 200, l. 39; Memo from KKK-RKI inspector, Uspensk, 27 April 1933, GARO, f. R-1485, op. 8, d. 272, l. 311.
135. OGPU IS, 26 April 1933, ShFGARO, f. R-186, op. 1, d. 336, l. 109.
136. Dolot, 168–69; TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1, d. 53, l. 7; Oskolkov, 46; Schiller, *The Foreign Office*, 262–63.
137. Private conversation with author, July 1991.
138. OGPU IS, 17 January 1933, GARO, f. R-2287, op. 3s, d. 119, l. 26; Conquest, *Harvest*, 245; Sholokhov to Stalin, 16 April 1933, *VI*, 18–19.
139. I draw here from a work-in-progress on resistance to collectivization from 1930 to 1932.
140. Meeting of County Secretaries, 2 November 1932, TsDNIRO, f. 7, op. 1, d. 1286, l. 33.
141. According to Ivnitskii, Stalin's written comment was "interesting." Ivnitskii, "Golod," APRF, 56–57. In Ukraine, the plan was reduced in November from 425 to 315 million poods.
142. "Die Krise der sozialistischen Landwirtschaft in der Sowjetunion" (Berlin, 1933), 74. Sholokov concurred.
143. Bokovsk township, RTsKhIDNI, f. 112, op. 29, d. 17, l. 187.
144. Cairns, *The Foreign Office*, 155–60. Schiller and Muggeridge were also both very impressed by Drusag; Schiller, 23 May 1933, *The Foreign Office*, 259; Muggeridge, *Chronicles*, 259.
145. RTsKhIDNI, f. 166, op. 1. d. 12, l. 4.
146. RTsKhIDNI, f. 112, op. 29, d. 185, ll. 50–52.
147. See the dialogue between Safronov (Popovnicheskaia MTS) and Putnin: "We've had cases where the arrested have died. — How many? —5—Who is dying, oldtimers?" RTsKhIDNI, f. 166, op. 1. d. 12, ll. 52–53.
148. Muggeridge, *Chronicles*, 255–56.
149. "Italian Dispatches," 459.
150. TsDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1. d. 26, l. 35.