

#275

**Ukraine 1998:
Parliamentary Election Exit Poll
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and Steven Wagner**

The Exit Poll was sponsored by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the Ukrainian Media Club, and SOCIS, a Gallup affiliate in Ukraine. The Washington, D.C.-based firm QEV Analytics provided consultations and conducted the analyses of the results. Funding for the Poll was provided by a grant from the Eurasia Foundation.

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This Occasional Paper has been produced with support provided by the Russian, Eurasian, and East European Research and Training Program of the U.S. Department of State (funded by the Soviet and East European Research and Training Act of 1983, or Title VITI). We are most grateful to this sponsor.

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UKRAINE 1998: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION EXIT POLL

Summary

On March 29, 1998, on the day of Ukraine's parliamentary election, the first-ever Exit Poll was conducted in Ukraine. The PoU accurately predicted the votes received by *political* parties and the results were made public on election night. The Exit Poll showed that voter turnout was lower among young adults (under 30 years of age) than older ones, that voter turnout increased with education, and that the rural population was more likely to vote than urban residents were. Additionally, the Poll confirmed the importance of political campaigns, especially for young voters and for small political parties.

Analysis of the Poll showed that the political orientation of voters in Ukraine leans towards the center and the center-right of the political spectrum, with the leftist (*communist*) parties having a smaller constituency than parties in the center and center-right. This finding on the political orientation of voters suggests that the voters' political preference may not be fully replicated in Ukraine's legislative branch; this is not the result of any regulations or a historical legacy, but due to the fragmentation of the parties in the center and the center-right. What also distinguishes voters on the left and the right of the political spectrum was their attitude towards the future. Voters for the center and right-of-center parties were slightly more optimistic than voters for the leftist parties, that is, more likely to expect conditions to improve as a result of the election. Underpinning this optimism may be the voters' attitude towards the election and the political parties: those politically centrist and right-of-center tended to describe the election as honest and were more likely to view their parties as agents of change.

In addition to the informational value of the Exit Poll, it visibly demonstrated the depth and breadth of democracy in Ukraine. This was the first time that voters could select from parties that spanned the political spectrum from left to right. Even though the fragmentation of center and right-of-center parties precluded giving full representation to many votes, the

election confirmed Ukraine's multiparty system. The country's open and free atmosphere made it possible to conduct 10,000 interviews without any incident and voters who participated willingly responded to all of the questions. The communications environment, especially the emerging independent media, provided the means for broad dissemination of Exit Poll results in a timely manner. Thus, the Poll is a testament to the openness and dynamism of Ukraine's *civic* Society, suggesting that in Ukraine democracy is irreversible if the public is given the choice.

Introduction

This report is based on an analysis of the Exit Poll conducted in Ukraine on March 29, 1998, on the day of Ukraine's inaugural parliamentary election under the new Constitution. This was the first time voters in Ukraine were given a choice of political parties. Of the 450 seats in the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine's parliament), one-half of the deputies (225) were elected by votes cast for a political party; the ballot listed thirty parties and in order to win a seat a party had to receive at least 4 percent of the electoral vote. The other half of the deputies (also 225) were elected directly by popular vote and winning candidates needed a simple majority.

This was also the first time an exit poll was conducted in Ukraine. Essentially, an exit poll documents the profile and opinions of voters. Much of the information is of a confirmatory nature, affirming what is generally known and attesting to the insight of political analysts and commentators. The uniqueness of exit poll data is its quantified nature and the scientific methodology of sampling and data collection that allows for projection of results from the sample to voters in general. Therefore, an exit poll provides accurate measures that can complement existing anecdotal information. In some cases, results of a poll may be in conflict or tension with preconceptions or generalizations about public attitudes and preferences. In this, an exit poll can serve as a reality check, identify the spuriousness of

broad conclusions about voters, generalization that is frequently made on the basis of fragmentary and anecdotal information. Therefore, in terms of use, findings from an exit poll can serve in five distinct ways: predict the results of an election well in advance of the release of the official results; provide baseline documentation about voters; identify factors that can assist in strategic planning of political campaigns; render a reality check of perceptions and generalizations; and outline an agenda for dialogue between political leaders and the electorate.

The Exit Poll from Ukraine has been critically reviewed for methodological soundness. The findings are empirical evidence and can be used to objectively and critically review conventionally accepted conclusions about voters and their expectations. Thus, the PoU, as well as surveys in general, augment the information base and **minimize** the need for relying on anecdotal data. For example, analysis of the Exit PoU can identify population subgroups that are most and least likely to vote, information useful in developing and streamlining voter outreach programs, and baseline documentation to guide campaign strategies.

In terms of scope, the Exit Poll was limited and measured opinions on *only* a few issues (the Poll had only eight questions, including demographics). The small number of questions was dictated by conditions, especially Ukraine's telecommunications network, and by concerns about fieldwork. The data needed to be limited since the results of 10,000 interviews had to be delivered from around Ukraine to a central computer in Kyiv; the only available electronic transmission of data was via telephone using personal calls. Equally important was a concern that the lack of familiarity with exit polls could make voters reluctant to answer questions and it was hoped that a few short questions would not pose an impediment to the completion of interviews. (For more detailed discussion on these issues, see pages 16-17).

This report contains question-by-question results and cross tabulations by respondent characteristics, specifically: the

demographic profile of the voters; assessment of the election; expectations for the immediate future; and when voters decided on their party vote.

The report also discusses the appeal of leading parties, the overall political leaning of voters, and whether any of the political parties are seen as agents of change. A concluding section presents a short historical overview of the Exit PoU—its planning, methodology, and management.

The Exit PoU was sponsored by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the Ukrainian Media Club, and SOCIS, a Gallup affiliate in Ukraine; the Washington, D.C.-based firm QEV Analytics provided consultations and conducted the analyses of the results. Funding for the PoU was provided by a grant from the Eurasia Foundation.

Data Base

The data base for this report are the responses of a nationally representative sample of 10,000 voters in Ukraine. The Poll was fielded on March 29, 1998, the day of Ukraine's parliamentary election. The Exit Poll accurately predicted the vote for political parties; Poll results were released at midnight and were the main feature of "Election Night 1998," a **three-hour** nationwide television show hosted by Studio 1+1.

On March 29, 1998, at 400 randomly selected polling districts, interviews were conducted with a sample of 10,000 voters as they were leaving the voting place. This sample represents the views and the opinion of the voting public in Ukraine. The sample design used a **stratified**, multi-stage approach and was prepared separately for urban and **rural** populations. Interviews were allocated to each oblast and to Crimea, the distribution of interviews proportional to the electorate in each of the regions. The management of all aspects of fieldwork was the responsibility of **SOCIS-Gallup**. (For detail on the sample design, see pages 16-17, and footnote 7.)

The Exit Poll was designed to provide timely indicators of the party vote and to measure overall attitudes towards the election process. The questionnaire con-

tamed eight questions. Four questions measured opinions on the election, specifically: for which political party an individual voted; when the choice on the party was made; if the election was fair and honest; and what the expectations were for the immediate future. Four questions recorded personal attributes: sex, age, level of education, and ethnic identity. To expedite interviewing, when they were asked to name the party for which they voted, respondents were given a copy of the ballot. The ballot listed thirty parties and the last entry was "do not support any political party (or bloc)." After each party name, the ballot listed individuals who would become deputies if the party received the 4 percent threshold vote (to win a seat, a party had to receive at least 4 percent of the vote). (The Appendix contains the English text of the ExitPoll questions and an English translation of the ballot listing the political parties, pages 18–19.)

To ensure that the Exit Poll sample reflects as accurately as possible the profile of the voters in Ukraine, data were weighted, and, thus, removing fieldwork biases, such as respondent selection, non-completion of interviews, refusals, and the like. Weights were developed separately for each oblast, Crimea, and Kyiv; weights were calculated on the basis of official election results using the total number of votes cast (in each oblast, Crimea, and Kyiv) and the number of votes cast for the ten leading parties. Weighting minimally affected the results, as would be expected, since the Exit Poll accurately predicted the vote. However, weighting ensured the representativeness of the sample and that the findings of the Exit Poll—the responses of the sample of 10,000 voters—could be confidently projected unto all of the electorate who participated in the 1998 Parliamentary elections.¹

Demographic profile of voters

On March 29, 1998, some seventy-two percent (71.6 percent) of Ukraine's electorate took part in the country's first parliamentary election held under the new Constitution. The Exit Poll, fielded on that day, sought to fill-out the profile of the voters and to provide timely indicators of the votes cast for political parties.

The Poll showed different levels of voter turnout among demographic groups. In some cases the differences were minimal, but in others, turnout differed markedly among population subgroups (Table 1 on following page).

Generally, men were more likely to vote than women.

Young adults, those under 30 years of age, were less likely to vote than their elders—turnout among those under 30 dropped to 62 percent, whereas it was around 72 percent among the older age groups. Voter turnout of the ethnically Russian population was below the national figure and dropped to one-half among other national minorities.

Rural settlements generally had a higher turnout than did urban centers. Data suggest that turnout was inversely related to city size—smaller proportions of the electorate voted in large cities than in smaller towns. Illustrative of this pattern is the electorate in Kyiv and Simferopol. In both of these politically significant cities, voter turnout was much lower than it was in their respective regions: in Kyiv voter turnout was 59 percent, while it was 72 percent in the Kyivka oblast; in Simferopol 51 percent came out to vote, while 65 percent voted in Crimea.

Looking at the voting by educational groups, data suggest that voter turnout increased with education and was lowest among those with only a primary education. In large measure, this affirms the known phenomenon about the importance of education for a liberal political system and demonstrates the importance of education for a vital civic society.

Voter turnout differed geographically, from 80 percent to the low sixties. It was highest in the west and the northwest and lowest in the east and the southeast, including Crimea. Within many of the geographic areas, turnout was roughly comparable in the oblasts, but in the northern and western regions differences among the oblasts were notable. In the western region, the Lvivska oblast had a much lower voter turnout than the neighboring oblasts and in the northern region, turnout was lowest in the Kyivska oblast (see Table 2 on the following page).

Table 1. Voter **Turnout**, 1998 Election
(in *percent*)

Demographics	Voters	Population	Voter Turnout	Difference in Turnout
Sex:				
Male	48	46	75	Slightly Higher
Female	52	54	69	Slightly Lower
Age:				
Under 30	20	23	62	Lower
31 - 55	47	46	73	No Difference
Over 55	32	32	72	No Difference
Ethnic Identity:				
Ukrainian	74	75	71	No Difference
Russian	21	23	65	Lower
Other	4	6	48	Much Lower
Residence:				
Urban	64	68	67	Lower
Rural	36	32	81	Higher
Nationwide			71.6	

SOURCE: Voter profiles based on the March 29, 1998, Exit Poll. Population estimates are from: sex, Statistical Bureau of Ukraine, Annual Report 1997; age and ethnic identity, the Statistical Bureau of Ukraine based on the 1989 census and updated by SOCIS; residence from the 1997 nationwide survey sponsored by the International Foundation for Election Systems.

Table 2. Voter **Turnout** by Oblast, 1998 Election

Region: oblast/city	% Voting	Region: oblast/city	% Voting
Northern:		Western:	
Zhytomyrska	78.06	Temopulska	84.429
Chernihivska	77.91	Ivano-Frankivska	79.84
Kyivska	71.84	Lvivska	73.609
North Eastern:		South Western:	
Sumska	74.901	Chernivetska	73.12
Kharkivska	66.08	Zakarpatska	69.044
Eastern:		Southern:	
Luhanska	67.97	Mykolaivska	66.1
Donetska	61.32	Khersonska	67.743
South Eastern:		Odesska	67.09
Zaporizka	67.56	Crimea	64.84
Dnipropetrovska	66.79		
Central:		Kyiv	59.34
Poltavska	76.73	Sevastopol	50.84
Vynnytska	75.986	Total for Ukraine	71.59
Kirovohradska	75.9974		
Cherkaska	74.19		
North Western:			
Rivnenska	80.4608		
Khmelnytska	80.48		
Volynska	78.667		

Source: Center for Social Psychological Studies and Political Management, "Elections'98. Documents, Statistical Data, Analysis." 1998. Kyiv.

Assessment of the 1998 election

By more than a three-to-one margin, a majority of voters described the election as "proceeding honestly; without irregularities (fraud)," rejecting the proposition that it was "proceeding dishonestly [and that] the results will be fraudulent" (17 percent agreed with the negative assessment). A positive view of the election prevailed among all demographic groups, albeit by varying margins. Opinions ranged from a high of over two-thirds (69 percent) among rural residents to around one-half (48 percent) among young women, those 30 years of age and younger. Among ethnic groups, those ethnically Ukrainian had a more favorable opinion of the election than did Russian group (compare 60 percent of the ethnically Ukrainian to 49 percent of the ethnically Russian group).

Positive views of the election increased with age, from 50 percent of those under 30 years of age to 61 percent of those 56 and over.

Favorable opinions about the election declined with education--61 percent of those with a primary education and 54 percent of those with a higher education described the election as honest.

rate. Data were collected as voters were leaving the voting place and respondents may have been uncomfortable to judge the election process before its completion; before the counting and reporting of the votes. The high non-response rate also may reflect the newness of the election process--after all, this was the first time voters were given a multiparty slate. The high non-response rate also suggests caution in interpreting the results; notwithstanding the net positive opinion about the election, the finding cannot be viewed as an endorsement of the electoral process.

Expectations for the immediate future

Many voters tended to be hopeful about the immediate future and expected the newly elected Parliament to bring about the much needed changes. Close to one-half (46 percent) believed that as a result of the parliamentary election, conditions in Ukraine "would improve." Over one-fourth (28 percent) were convinced that "nothing would change," and a few (5 percent) said that "conditions will worsen." A sizeable proportion--one-fifth--would not or could not comment on their expectations of the new parliament.

Table 3. Assessment of the 1998 Election: Exit Poll, March 29, 1998

Election Was:	Age				Education			Residence	
	TOTAL	Under 30	30-55	56+	Prim.	Sec.	Higher	Urban	Rural
Honest	57%	50%	58%	61%	61%	58%	54%	51%	69%
Not Honest	17%	22%	17%	14%	12%	17%	19%	20%	11%
Don't Know	25%	28%	24%	26%	27%	24%	26%	29%	19%

Among all of the demographic groups, one-fourth or more expressed no opinion on how the election was proceeding. Even among the most highly educated, who generally have a much lower non-response rate, one-fourth (26 percent) did not express an opinion. A high non-response rate is uncharacteristic of Ukraine, much higher than what is usually recorded in nationwide surveys. The very high non-response rate is troubling because of its magnitude and the fact that it did not shift among demographic groups, especially by education. There may be extenuating reasons for the high non-response

Table 4. Expectations of the New Parliament Exit Poll, 29 March 1998

Percent of voters who thought Parliamentary election would:	
Improve conditions	46%
Change nothing	28%
Worsen condition	5%
Don't know	22%

The distribution of opinions on how the election will impact conditions was somewhat similar among all demographic groups, except for the variations in the nonresponse rate.

The proportion of those not expressing an opinion decreased as educational attainment increased (26 percent of those with a primary education, but 20 percent of those with a higher education gave no response).

The highest recorded non-response was among women over 55 years of age. In all other gender and age groups, roughly one-fifth gave no response, while among the

oldest group of women, it was 26 percent (levels of "don't know": 21 percent of men under 30; 20 percent of men 30-55; 20 percent of men over 55; 21 percent of women under 30; and 22 percent of women 30-55). (For a discussion how optimists tended to vote along party lines, see "Parties Seen as Agents of Change" section, pages 15-16.)

Decision on party vote

The Exit Poll sought to determine when individuals made up their minds about their party vote. In response to the question "when did you decide for which party you would vote," seven possible answers were recorded: "long before the election; when the campaign started; before the election- more than a month, one month, one week, or one day;" and in "the voting booth." Only a few voters (3 percent) could not or would not say when they made their decision.

Half of the voters made up their minds well in advance of the parliamentary campaign. A plurality (41 percent) knew "long before the election" and an additional 14 percent decided when the campaign started. Among the rest, most made up their minds one month (20 percent) or one week (11 percent) before the election. Only one-in-ten made the decision one day before the election or on election day (5 percent and 6 percent respectively)

Table 5. Deciding on the party vote: Exit Poll, 29 March 1998

When decided on party vote	Total	18-30	Age 31-55	56+
Well in advance of the election	41%	28%	40%	51%
When campaign started	14%	14%	14%	14%
Before election:				
More than or one month	20%	25%	20%	15%
One week	11%	16%	12%	7%
One day	5%	6%	5%	5%
At voting place	6%	7%	5%	6%
Don't know/No response	3%	3%	3%	2%

There were slight differences in the time line on party vote among demographic groups and notable one among age groups. Overall, urbanites were slightly more likely than rural residents to have decided on their party vote well in advance of the campaign (43 percent of the urban versus 39 percent of the rural residents), a difference that may be accounted for by educational level and the age profile of the two populations. Among educational groups, the best educated were slightly more likely to have decided well before the campaign than the less educated (made up their minds before the campaign--44 percent of those with a higher education, 40 percent of those with a secondary, and 41 percent of those with a primary education).

As already mentioned, voters of different ages had different time lines in deciding on their party vote. Young voters, those under 30 years of age, tended to make their decision much later than older adults did. One-half (51 percent) of those over 44 years of age decided well in advance of the election, whereas only 28 percent of those under thirty did so. Moreover, the largest proportion of young voters (under 30) decided one month or one week before the election (41 percent). Similar to other age groups, only a small proportion of young voters (7 percent) decided on a party when voting.

There are also significant differences on the time line by party vote. A definite majority of voters for the two leading parties, the Communist Party and Rukh, made up their minds well in advance of the campaign (68 percent and 62 percent, respectively). In contrast, the decision to vote for the other parties was made later. Only about one-third to one-fourth of the voters for the other parties-i.e., other than the Communist Party and Rukh-made up their minds before the campaign began. Most voters for these other parties tended to make up their minds during the campaign, ranging from 46 percent of voters for the Reform and Order Party to 33 percent of those who voted for the Progressive Socialist Party.

The different time lines along party lines may reflect the influence of party

Table 6. Deciding on Vote by Political Parties: Exit Poll, March 29, 1998

Decided on Party Vote	Total	Communist	Rukh	Social Peasant Bloc	Green	People's Democratic	Hromada	Soc. Democratic	Prog Soc. Bloc	Reform & Order
Before Campaign	41%	68%	62%	34%	25%	32%	27%	23%	37%	27%
When Campaign Started	14%	11%	12%	15%	15%	13%	18%	23%	13%	16%
Before Election: One Month	20%	10%	12%	22%	30%	25%	29%	31%	21%	28%
One Week	11%	5%	6%	15%	15%	16%	14%	11%	12%	18%
One Day	5%	2%	3%	7%	6%	8%	5%	6%	9%	5%
At Voting Place	6%	3%	4%	6%	7%	6%	6%	6%	7%	6%
Don't Know	3%	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	2%	--

campaigns. However, data is not available to confirm or deny this hypothesis, to examine if party campaigns reinforced voting decisions and how attentive voters were to campaign messages. Therefore, findings on the time line cannot be used to evaluate campaigns or messages. What the Exit Poll unambiguously showed was that large numbers of voters do make up their minds during the campaign.

The Exit Poll data also attested to the need of parties to have strong organizations, implement outreach programs, and develop grass roots support well in advance of an election. Extensive and on-going interaction with the public is characteristic of the American political party system. A day after the November 4, 1996, presidential election, a political activist observed "we took one day off and tomorrow we begin to prepare for the election cycle for our gubernatorial race in November 1997. During the next 362 days, we will raise operating funds and identify volunteers who will be trained in canvassing voters, distributing literature, and acting as channels of communications. When the campaign starts, the volunteers canvass their neighborhood and host meetings so that neighbors can meet their candidates. During a campaign, volunteers make an

average of 600 telephone calls in one week to known and potential supporters."⁷²

Votes for political parties

To predict the election, the Exit Poll measured for which political party individuals voted. To expedite interviewing, respondents were given a copy of the ballot (see Table 7). Only a few (2 percent) could not or would not say for which political party they voted, a non-response rate confirming field staff reports that voters willingly participated in the poll.

None of the parties can be viewed as having broad national appeal. The Communist Party has an unquestioned lead, but a lead that does not give it a national mandate since it captured only one-fourth of the vote. In distant second place is Rukh, closely followed by the Socialists-Peasant Bloc. Other parties that received the 4 percent threshold vote nationwide were the Socialist-Peasant Bloc, the Greens, the People's Democratic Party, the Hromada Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the Progressive Socialist Party. (This rank-order of political parties, along with the percent of votes for each party, represents the Exit Poll results released on election night.)

Nor does anyone party stand out as an uncontested leader in any one oblast, except in the Luhanska oblast where the

Table 7. Votes for Political Parties, 1998 Exit Poll Results"

Vote	Political Parties as listed on ballot
2%	1. Bloc "Party of Labor and United (Ukrainian Party of Labor , Ukrainian Liberal Party)
1%	2. Party for Regional Renaissance of Ukraine 1
	3. Bloc "Less words" (All-Ukrainian Political Unit "State Independence of Ukraine." Social National Party of Ukraine)
5%	4. Party of All-Ukrainian Association Hromada
**	5. Republican Christian Party
1%	6. Ukrainian National Assembly
**	7. Party of the Defenders of the Homeland
6%	8. Party
4%	9. Agrarian Party of Ukraine
6%	10. Green Party of Ukraine
26%	11. Communist Party of Ukraine
1%	12. Union Party
2%	13. Bloc Christian Democratic Party & Christian People' Union)
2%	14. Bloc of Democratic Parties - NEP (people's Power, Economic, Order) (Ukrainian Democratic Party, Party of Economic Renaissance)
3%	15. Bloc "Working Ukraine" (Ukrainian Party of Justice, Civil Congress of Ukraine)
**	16. acial Democratic Party
	17. Bloc "European Chose of Ukraine" (Ukrainian Liberal Democratic Party, Ukrainian peasants' Democratic Party)
3%	18. Bloc "National Front" (Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, Ukrainian Conservative National Party, Ukrainian National Party)
1%	19. Social-Libe.ral Association SLON (Interregional Reform Bloc, Constitutional - Democratic Party)
10%	20. Ukrainian People's Movement Rukh
1%	21. All-Ukrainian Party of Workers
1%	22. Party for the National Economic Development of Ukraine
5%	23. P ople's Democratic Party
1%	24. All-Ukrainian Party of Women' Initiatives
1%	25. Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party
9%	26. Bloc "For Truth, for the People, for Party, Ukrainian Peasants' Party)
4%	27. Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (united)
3%	28. Reform and Order Party
**	29. Party of Spiritual, Economic and
4%	30. Ukrainian Progressive Socialist Party
5%	1 do not support any of the political parties (electoral blocs)

"Percentage differences of Exit Poll and official results are due to rounding

** Less than one-percent.

Communist Party; received close to one-half of the votes. The rank order of political parties and the magnitude of votes differ notably from oblast to oblast. Generally, the leading party received about one-third of the vote, the party in second place less than ten percent, and an additional 3-7 parties received votes in the single digits, usually less than 6 percent (see Table 8 on the next page).

- The Communist Party was in first place in 16 of the 24 oblasts and in Crimea and Kyiv.
- The Party had a very strong lead in 10 oblasts-Chernihivska, Kharkivska, Luhanska, Donetska, Zaporizka, Kirovohradska, Chernivetska, Mykolaivska, Khersonska, and Odesska, and in Crimea. In each of these oblasts, the Party was far ahead of the party in second place; in some oblasts the Communist vote was four to five times as large as that of the party in second place (see Table 9 on next page).
- In 3 oblasts--Zhytomyrska, Kyivska, and Vynnytska-- the Communists took a small lead over the Socialist-Peasant Bloc.
- In 3 oblasts, the Communist Party was very close to the party in second place. In the Poltavska oblast the Communist Party was slightly ahead and in the Khmelnytska oblast neck and neck with the Socialist-Peasant Bloc; in the Sumytska oblast, the Communists were slightly ahead of the Progressive Socialist Party.
- In Kyiv, the Communist Party had a close lead over Rukh.
- Rukh took the lead in five oblasts.
- Rukh had a strong first place in two oblasts-- in the Lvivska oblast, where it was far ahead of the Party of Reform and Order, and in the Rivnenska oblast, where Rukh outdistanced the party in second place, the Agrarian Party.
- In the Ternopilska oblast Rukh had a definite lead over the party in second place, the National Front Party.
- Rukh had a close contender in two oblasts, in the Volynska oblast very close to the Agrarian Party and in Ivano-Frankivska, close to the National Front Party.
- In three oblasts, three parties captured the lead--the Hromada Bloc of

Socialist and Peasant Parties, and the Social Democratic Party.

- Hromada was in the lead in the Dnipropetrovska oblast, with the Communist Party in second place.
- The Socialist and Peasant Bloc had a definite lead in the Cherkaska oblast, with the Communist Party taking second place. The Social Democratic Party was in the lead in the Zakarpatska oblast, outdistancing the second placed Rukh by four to one.

In almost all oblasts, anywhere from 6 to 10 parties received the 4 percent threshold vote, except in the Dnipropetrovska oblast, where only 4 parties had the required minimum of 4 percent, and in Crimea where only five parties received the required minimum. The widest dispersion of votes (i.e., the largest number of parties receiving the threshold vote) was recorded in 4 oblasts-- Zhytomyrska, Zaporizka, Kirovohradska, and Zakarpatska-- and in the city of Kyiv. In many of the other oblasts, 6 to 8 parties received at least 4 percent of the vote. The votes cast for the many different political parties underscores the fragmentation of political parties in Ukraine and illustrates the failure of leaders to establish a coalition that could have broad national appeal. (See Table 8 for a listing of political parties by oblast)

The political parties competing in the 1998 election, in terms of political and economic orientation, were unequally distributed. There were a large number of parties in the center and center-right and a few on the left, representing the communist ideology. As a result, the dispersal of the vote affected the centrist and center-right parties more than those on the left. In other words, the fragmentation on the right-- to a large degree--impeded the expression of public will in the country's legislature, an issue which is discussed later in this article (see section "Left-Right Orientation" on pages 13 and 15).

The paragraphs below briefly discuss the profile of voters for the leading parties and the last section describes the main attributes of those who voted against all parties. The profile of party voters may differ from that known about the party's

Table 8. Leading Political Parties in Oblasts, Crimea and Kyiv: Exit Poll, March 29, 1998

Region/oblast/city	1st place	%	2nd place	%	3rd place	%	4th place	%	5th place	%	No Party
Northwestern:											
Zhytomyrska	Communist	25	Soc. P. " Bloc	16	Rukh	11	Greens	6	Agrarian	5	0
Chernihivska	Communist	31	Soc. Peas. Bloc	19	Prog. Soc.	7	Rukh	6	Greens	5	6
Kyivska	Communist	22	Soc. Peas. Bloc	17	Rukh	8	Greens	7	People's Demo.	6	6
North Eastern:											
Sumska	Communist	26	Prog. Soc.	22	Soc. Peas. Bloc	13	Greens	5	Rukh	4	5
Kharkivska	Communist	37	Prog. Soc.	10	People's Demo.	6	Soc. Peas. Bloc	6	Greens	6	6
Eastern:											
Luhanska	Communist	47	Soc. Peas. Bloc	5	Greens	5	Prog. Soc. Bloc		Hromada		5
Donetska	Communist	37	Vpered Bloc	13	Labor+Lib Bloc	6	Greens		Prog. Soc. Bloc		5
South Eastern:											
Zaporizka	Communist	33	Greens	8	Prog. Soc. Bloc		Labor+Lib Bloc	6	People's Demo.	6	5
Dnipropetrovska	Hromada	36	Communist	26	Rukh		Greens	5			3
Central:											
Poltavska	Communist	25	Soc. Peas. Bloc	22	Rukh	8	Greens	5	People's Demo.	5	5
Vynnytska	Communist	26	Soc. Peas. Bloc	20	People's Demo.	13	Rukh	5	Greens	5	6
Kirovohradska	Communist	30	Soc.	18	Labor Bloc	7	Hromada	6	People's Demo.	6	6
Cherkaska	Soc. Peas. Bloc	26	ColJunurust	19	Rukh	8	People's Demo.	6	Greens	5	5
Northwestern:											
Rivnenska	Rukh	31	Agrarian	10	Communist	8	Soc. Peas. Bloc		Greens	6	8
Khmelnytska	Communist	22	Soc.	22	Rukh	9	People's Demo.		Agrarian	6	6
Volynska	Rukh	20	Agrarian	17	Communist	11	Greens		Soc. Peas. Bloc	7	
Western:											
Temopilska	Rukh	31	Nat. Front	23	People's demo.	5	Greens	5	Agrarian	5	
Ivano-Frankivska	Rukh	29	Nat. Front	25	Agrarian	5	Greens	5	People's Demo.	5	5
Lvivska	Rukh	34	Reform+Order	13	Nat. Front	5	Agrarian	7	People's Demo.	6	4
Southwestern:											
Chernivetska	Communist	21	Rukh	16	Soc. Demo.	10	Nat. Front	7	Soc. Peas. Bloc	7	
Zakarpatska	Soc. Demo.	37	Rukh	9	People's Demo.	8	Communist	8	Greens	7	
Southern:											
Mykolaivska	Communist	41	People's Demo.	11	Rukh		Greens	6	Soc. Peas. Bloc	6	
Khersonska	Communist	36	Soc. Peas. Bloc	12	Greens		Comm. Demo.	6	Rukh	5	6
Odesska	Communist	29	Greens	11	Soc. Peas. Bloc		Agrarian	6	Rukh	4	5
Crimea:											
Crimea	Communist	42	Union	12	Rukh		Greens		People's Demo.	5	8
Kyiv:											
Kyiv	Communist	15	Rukh	11	Vpered		Greens		Soc. Demo.		

In oblasts where other parties recorded at least 4 percent of the vote: Zhytomyrska- People's Democratic (5 percent); Labor + Liberal Bloc (4 percent); Vpered Bloc (4 percent); Social Democratic (4 percent); Progressive Socialist (4 percent). Chernihivska- People's Democratic (5 percent). Kyivska- Progressive Socialist (5 percent); Social Democratic (4 percent); Agrarian (4 percent); Sumska- People's Democratic (4 percent). Kharkivska- Social Democratic (4 percent); Luhanska-Labor+Liberal Bloc (4 percent); Labor Bloc (4 percent). Donetsk- People's Democratic (4 percent); Reform + Order (4 percent). Zaporizka-Reform + Order (6 percent); Socialist Peasant Bloc (5 percent); Rukh (4 percent); Social Democratic (4 percent). Poltavska-Agrarian (4 percent), Labor Bloc (4 percent); People's Democratic (4 percent). Vynnytska- Progressive Socialist (4 percent); Social Democratic (4 percent); Reform + Order (4 percent). Kirovohradska- Green" (5 percent), Rukh (5 percent); Social Democratic (4 percent); Progressive Socialist (4 percent). Cherkaska-Progressive Socialist (5 percent); Social Democratic (4 percent). Rivnenska- People's Democratic (4 percent); Ukrainian National Assembly (4 percent); Social Democratic (4 percent). Khmelnytska-Greens (5 percent). Volynska- People's Democratic (6 percent); National Front (6 percent). Temopilska-Social Democrats (4 percent); Reform + Order (4 percent). Ivano-Frankivska-Reform + Order (5 percent); Social Democratic (4 percent); Bloc Democratic NEP (4 percent). Lvivska-Social Democratic (5 percent), Communist (4 percent), Chemivetska- People's Democratic (5 percent), Regional Renaissance of Ukraine (4 percent); Greens (4 percent). Zakarpatska- National Front (5 percent), Reform and Order (4 percent); Hromada (4 percent); Vpered Bloc (4 percent). Mykolaivska-Progressive Socialist (4 percent), Labor Bloc (4 percent); Social Democratic (4 percent). Khersonska-Hromada (5 percent), People's Democratic (5 percent), Progressive Socialist (4 percent). Odesska- People's Democratic (4 percent); Social Democratic (4 percent); Reform + Order (4 percent). Kyiv, Reform + Order (6 percent); Socialist Peasant Bloc (5 percent); Progressive Socialist (5 percent); National Front (4 percent).

members and supporters. Such differences do not negate the findings of the Exit PoU, nor should they raise questions about the composition of party members and supporters. The Exit Poll data describes voters who can be attributed, and, therefore, the pool of individuals tends to be much larger than party members or acknowledged party supporters.

The Communist Party drew its support from the eldest age cohort (55 years and older). This age group was more than twice as likely to vote for the Communists as those under 30 years of age. Support for the party decreased notably with education (30 percent of those with a primary education, but 20 percent of those with a higher education voted for the Party). Also, the ethnically Russian population was more likely to support the Communist Party than the ethnically Ukrainian (38 percent of former versus 22 percent of the latter). This difference among ethnic groups, however, may reflect the pronounced regional differences in the vote for the Communist Party.

demographic attributes did not define the voters of Rukh, ethnic identity was a factor. Rukh recorded only a few ethnically Russian voters, which is not surprising due to the party's origin as an association of peoples opposed to communism and committed to the sovereignty of Ukraine. Its national "Ukrainian" attribute remains one of its distinctive features, and, therefore, the low appeal of Rukh among the ethnically Russian population.

What differentiates Rukh voters from those who voted for other parties was the more optimistic outlook of Rukh voters. Rukh voters were much more likely to expect that the parliamentary election will bring about improvements in Ukraine than did voters for most of the other parties.

Bloc

The appeal of the Bloc "For Truth, for the People, for Ukraine," the coalition of the Socialist Party and the Peasants' Party, was roughly similar among age and educational groups, and among men and women. The Bloc received a slightly larger proportion of the rural than the urban vote, and a slightly larger vote among the

Table 9. Voters for the Communist Party: Exit Poll, 29 March 1998

Party	Total	Age			Education		
		18-30	31-55	56+	Primary	Secondary	Higher
Communist	26%	15%	23%	37%	35%	26%	20%

Table 10. Voters for Rukh: Exit Poll, 29 March 1998

Party	Total	Ethnic Identity		Residence	
		Ukrainian	Russian	Urban	Rural
Rukh	10%	12%	12%	8%	12%

Data suggest that the Communist Party appealed to all demographic groups, with broadest appeal to those over 55 years of age, who live in the eastern oblasts, and who have only a primary education.

Rukh

The appeal of the Ukrainian People's Movement Rukh did not differ among men and women, among age groups, or along educational lines. There was a small difference among urban and rural residents, with rural dwellers more likely than urbanites to vote for Rukh. Although

ethnically Ukrainian than the ethnically Russian population.

Green Party

The one distinctive feature of the Green Party was its appeal to youth. Among those under 30 years of age, the party received one out of every ten votes, whereas only a few (3 percent) of the eldest age groups (56 years of age and older) voted for the Greens. The lack of other differences along demographic lines suggests that the party has broad appeal to educational groups and to urban as well as rural residents.

**Table U. Voters for the Green Party
Exit Poll, March 29, 1998**

Party	Total	Age			Education		
		18-30	31-55	56+	Primary	Secondary	Higher
Greens	6%	11%	16%	13%	4%	16%	6%

**Table 12. Voters for the Social Democratic Party
Exit Poll, March 29, 1998**

Party	Total	Age			Primary	Education	
		18-30	31-55	56+		Secondary	Higher
Social Democrat	4%	6%	5%	2%	3%	4%	5%

**Table 13. Voters for the Agrarian Party, 1998
Exit Poll, March 29, 1998**

Party	Total	Residence		Ethnic Identity	
		Urban	Rural	Ukrainian	Russian
Agrarian	4%	2%	7%	5%	2%

People's Democratic Party

The People's Democratic Party drew voters in roughly similar proportions from all demographic groups. Nor did voters for the Democratic Party show any distinctive features on the attitudes measured in the Exit Poll.

Hromada

As already mentioned, the All-Ukrainian Association Hromada was the lead party in the Dnipropetrovska oblast. Generally, the party attracted roughly similar proportions of men and women, from among age and educational groups, as well as from the two main ethnic groups. By attracting equal proportions from among the ethnically Ukrainian (5 percent) and the ethnically Russian (5 percent), the Hromada Party differs in its ethnic vote from voters for Rukh and the Socialist and Peasants Bloc.

Voters for Hromada, by and large, tended to be optimistic about the future and, similar to voters for Rukh, were more likely than others to expect that conditions would improve as the result of the election.

Social Democratic Party

Voters for the Social Democratic Party (united) tended to be educated and young. The appeal of the Party increased with education and decreased with age. In terms of

education, the increase was small; in terms of age, there was a notable cut-off for party support among the eldest age group—only a few of those over 56 voted for the Social Democratic Party. The party received similar proportions of votes from urban and rural residents as well as from among ethnic groups.

Progressive Socialist Party

Voters for the Progressive Socialist Party did not differ by demographics, except that slightly more urban than rural residents voted for the Party.

Agrarian Party

As would be expected, the Agrarian Party drew more voters from rural than from urban areas. Also, those ethnically Ukrainian were more likely to vote for the Agrarian Party than did the ethnically Russian population (see Table 13).

Opponents to all parties and blocs

As mentioned earlier, in addition to the thirty political parties the ballot offered the option "do not support any of the political parties (electoral blocs)." Not surprisingly, the "anti-parties" group was negative about the election and pessimistic about the immediate future. They tended to describe the election as unfair and to predict that conditions would worsen after

Table 14. Anti HParties **Voters**
Exit Poll, March 29, 1998

Party	Total	Age			Election Was		Improve	Conditions Will	
		18-30	31-55	56+	Fair	Not Fair		Remain Same	Worsen
"No Party"	5%	6%	5%	3%	3%	11%	2%	9%	14%

the election. Also, YOWlg adults, those Wlder 30 years of age, were much more likely to fall in the "anti parties" group than those S6 years of age and older.

These data sugge t that opponents to political parties may well be the most pessimistic of voters and their anti-party vote probably expressed their dissatisfaction with conditions in the country, a well as the activities of political parties.

Left-right orientation of voters

To examine the political leaning of all voters who took part in the 1998 ~~parlia-~~mentary election, political parties were placed in two distinct groups--the communist, leftist parties, and the centrist and right-of-center (the anticommunist) parties. This broad-based grouping of parties allowed identification of the political orientati.on of voters and, by including all who participated in the election, provided a more complete view of the political values and attitudes of Ukraine's voters.³ This analysis offered a more manageable picture of voters by reducing the focal pOint of analysis from thirty parties to three groups: lithe left"-the voters for the communist parties; "the right"-those who voted for the center and center-right parties, and the "anti- party" group, those who voted the last option, against parties and electoral blocs.⁴

When taking aU of the votes into accoWlt, the non-communist parties had an edge--51 percent of the voters feU in the ~~rightist~~ group and 44 percent in the leftist group. This distribution was typical of urban and rural residents, and among men and women. However, political orientation differs among age, educational, and ethnic groups. Pro-right entiments decreased with age, increased with education, and were more widely expressed by the ethnically ~~Ukrainian~~ than ethnically Russian group (see also Table 15 on next page).

Twice as many yoWlg adults (Wlder 30 years of age) voted for the centrist and center-right parties than for parties on the left (63 percent to 30 percent). The middle-aged group (31 to S5 years of age) also favored the right, but by a much smaller ~~margin~~ (53 percent right to 42 percent left). in contrast, a slim majority of the eldest age group (56 and over) voted for the leftist, communist parties (56 percent left to 41 percent right).

The distribution of left-right political orientation among those with a higher education was almost a mirror image of those with only a primary education. Among those with a higher education, a small majority voted for centrist or right of center parties, whereas among those with a primary education a small majority voted for the left.

The ethnically Ukrainian group favored centrist and right of center parties by a definite ~~margin~~ (5S percent center and center-right to 41 percent left), whereas the ethnically Russian group voted for the leftist parties by a wide margin (56 percent left to 37 percent center and center-right).

Placing voters into three groups summarizes the differences in when voters decided their party vote (see findings on pages 6-7). As Table 16 on the next page shows, individuals who voted for the centrists and center-right parties (the right group) tended to make up their minds during the campaign, while those who voted for the leftwere more likely to have been committed prior to the campaign. This overview of voter's ~~time~~ line dramatically illustrates the relevance and importance of campaigns for the centrist and right-of-center parties.

The political *profile* of oblasts also differed notably, as would be expected since regional diifferences in party vote were pronowlced. The distribution of voters by political orientation in the oblasts

Table 15. Political Orientation by Demographic Groups.
Exit Poll, March 29, 1998

Attribute (Total)	Left (44%)	No Party (5%)	Right (51%)
Sex			
Male	42%	5%	52%
Female	46%	4%	50%
Age			
18-30	30%	7%	63%
31-55	42%	5%	53%
56+	56%	3%	41%
Education			
Primary	55%	3%	42%
Secondary	45%	6%	50%
Higher	38%	4%	57%
Residence			
Urban	45%	5%	52%
Rural	43%	5%	52%
Ethnic Identity			
Ukrainian	41%	4%	55%
Russian	56%	6%	37%
Other	44%	5%	51%

Table 16. Decision on Party Vote by Political Orientation.
Exit Poll, March 29, 1998

Decided on Party (Total)	Left (44%)	No Party (5%)	Right (51%)
Well in advance of election	56%	2%	42%
When campaign started	41%	3%	56%
Before election:			
Over one month	34%	5%	61%
One month	33%	4%	63%
One week	37%	4%	59%
One day	37%	9%	54%
At voting place	36%	5%	59%
Don't know	17%	58%	24%

Table 17. Political Orientation by Oblasts.* Exit Poll, March 29, 1998

Region--oblast/ city (Nationwide)		Left (44%)	No Party (5%)	Right (51%)
Northern:	Zhytomyrska	49	--	51
	Chernihivska	62	6	31
	Kyivska	48	6	46
Northeastern:	Sumська	66	5	29
	Kharkivska	56	7	37
Eastern:	Luhanska	65	5	30
	Donetska	58	6	37
Southeastern:	Zaporizka	48	5	46
	Dnipropetrovska	35	3	61
Central:	Poltavska	55	5	40
	Vynnytska	53	6	41
	Kirovohradska	61	4	35
	Cherkaska	56	5	39
Northwestern:	Rivnenska	18		75
	Khmelnytska	51	5	44
	Volynska	23	--	78
Western:	Ternopil'ska	7	--	93
	Ivano Frankivska	6	5	89
	Lvivska	7	4	90
Southwestern:	Chernivetska	33	7	61
	Zakarpatska	11	--	8
Southern:	Mykolaivska	59	--	41
	Khersonska	53	6	41
	Odessa	47	5	48
Crimea		60	8	33
Kyiv		26	7	67

*The tables on this page are based on 9,762 cases, since 241 did not respond.

summarizes the overall political preferences of voters and indicates the pool of potential voters for a candidate on the left and the right.

Vast majorities of residents in the northwestern, western, and southwestern regions were politically centrist or center-right, as were voters in the Dnipropetrovska oblast and in Kyiv. In the northwestern region, however, voters in the Khmelnytska oblast did not follow this pattern. In the oblast residents politically leaned more to the left than the right (51 percent to 44 percent). In two northern oblasts—Zhytomyrska and Kyivska—residents were roughly evenly divided between the right and the left, as they were in the Zaporizka oblast in the southern region. In the rest of the oblasts and in Crimea, by varying margins, residents politically leaned in favor of the left.

Finding on the political orientation of voters confirmed the very extensive fragmentation of parties on the right and center-right of the political spectrum. This does not mean that Ukraine should or should not have fewer parties, since there is no magic number of how many parties are best for a country. Some successful democracies, such as the U.S., traditionally have had two national parties and a few small third parties; some established democracies have more than a dozen political parties. The issue is not how many parties there should be, but how this fragmentation affected the election results.⁵

The analysis of the Exit Poll demonstrated that the overall orientation of voters in Ukraine is more right than left leaning. However, this overall leaning is not reflected in Ukraine's legislative branch. The country's 1998 parliamentary election provided voters with a few choices on the left and over twenty choices in the center and center-right. This distribution was so numerically unbalanced that the choices, in effect, became too diffused to be meaningful. Moreover, the first 4 percent received by a party is essentially a 10 percent vote and, with so many parties on the right and center-right, the "lost votes" can add up. As a result, fragmentation in Ukraine in fact denies the expression of the public will. The fault for this is not with the

others, but with the inability of leaders to accept the political reality that to be elected to national office, it is necessary to secure broad-based support.

Parties seen as agents of change

The Exit Poll confirmed what many opinion analysts have argued, that demographic attributes do not fully explain voting preferences. Although, as already noted, the Exit Poll was limited by necessity in its scope (of issues measured), the few attitudinal questions underscore the importance of attitudes in understanding the voting public.

Analysis of the Exit Poll suggested that the public in Ukraine, to a large extent, is issue-oriented and that personal values and attitudes are a determining factor in electing a political party. The data suggest that the centrist and right-of-center parties were seen as having the potential to bring about the much needed changes in Ukraine. Overall, optimistic voters—those who believed that condition in Ukraine would improve after the election—tended to vote for parties on the right and center-right rather than parties on the left. Also, voters for parties on the right were more positive in their assessment of the election than those on the left.

Table 18. Attitudes and Political Orientation*
Exit Poll, March 29, 1998

Issue (Total)	Left (44%)	No Party (5%)	Right (51%)
Conditions will:			
Improve	44	2	55
Remain same	44	9	47
Worsen	44	14	42
Don't know	45	5	50
Election was:			
Honest	43	3	54
Not honest	44	11	46
Don't know	47	4	49

*Table based on 9,762 cases, since 241 did not respond.

The relationship between optimism and overall political orientation is evidenced by comparing expectation for the future among voters for the leading political parties. Predictions about what changes the new parliament will bring not only suggested an overall positive view of political parties, but also placed a responsi-

bility on the deputies, for the data suggest that many considered the deputies and their parties potentially capable of improving conditions in Ukraine.

On balance, voters for the left had little if any expectation that their party would or could change conditions in Ukraine. Among voters for the communist parties, opinions divided roughly evenly among the three predictions of the future—with as many predicting that conditions will improve, will remain the same, as will worsen. In contrast, those who voted for the leftist or center-right parties, especially Rukh and Hromada, believed that the party could be instrumental in altering conditions. The pattern of voter opinion on the right being more optimistic than those on the left did not hold for the Progressive Socialist Party—among the voters for this party, more were optimistic than pessimistic about the immediate future. (See Table 19 below).

Table 19. Parties and Expectations of Change.

Exit Poll, March 29, 1998

PARTY	CONDITIONS WILL:		
	Improve	Remain Same	Worsen
Communist Party	25%	25%	27%
Rukh	12	7	5
Socialist/Peasant Bloc	9	9	11
Green Party	5	7	4
People's Democratic Party	6	5	4
Hromada Agrarian	6	4	3
Progressive Socialist Party Agrarian	6	5	2
Social Democratic Party	5	4	3
Reform and Order Party	4	3	2
Agrarian Party	4	3	5
National Front Party	4	3	4
Other	28	27	27
No Party	2	9	14

The differences in how the two political groups—the left and the right—viewed the

immediate future overall were small. This is not surprising in view of the widespread pessimism about overall conditions in the country and the economy. However, what is notable is the pervasive pessimism of those who voted against any and all parties. This group by a margin of seven-to-one predicted a worsening of conditions in Ukraine. This suggests that, by and large, in Ukraine political parties have a positive image and that the opponents to the party system may be representing the most disaffected members of the electorate and the most disillusioned with the political party system.

Planning the Exit Poll, Methodology and Communications

Now a few words about the planning and the design of the Exit Poll. Initial discussions, collegial exchanges of viewpoints and expectations, took place in May 1997 in Washington D.C.⁶ Plans were made, costs estimated, and the needed information identified. Various options were considered for the design of a sample and the questionnaire. An overall plan was sketched with a view to what was feasible and practical. Methodological issues appeared to be more easily resolved than communications problems, which, at times, presented a seemingly insurmountable challenge: how could interviewers scattered throughout Ukraine "connect" with a computer in Kyiv? In other words, how could the results of 10,000 interviews be delivered to a computer in Kyiv for processing and aggregating so that findings could be presented two hours after all of the interviews were completed. The optimal solution as completely rejected as too costly (the creation of an electronic network using laptop computers in the field). This optimal solution, in addition to its immediate benefits, could have significantly contributed to opening electronic communication networks in Ukraine.

Of equal concern at the planning stage was the possible reluctance of voters to be questioned as they were leaving the polling station or interference by officials with interviewing close to the polling place. Although political polls have become a part of the Ukraine's civic culture since the country's independence, interviews conducted right outside the voting place would be a new experience for voters as well as for the election officials.

Towards the end of 1997, plans for an exit poll had to be put on the back burner, primarily because of funding difficulties. The Democratic Initiatives Foundation, however, persevered and continued discussions about an exit poll. A week before the election, the Eurasia Foundation provided a grant to the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Ukrainian Media Club, the sum of which could not fully cover a poll. However, professionals who had discussed the poll for months offered their services gratis, substantially decreasing the costs. The Ukrainian opinion research firm SOCIS, a GalJup affiliate in Ukraine, conducted the poll at cost and absorbed all administrative expenses; QEV Analytics, a survey research firm in Washington, D.C., donated analytical and consulting services; Ukrainian sociologists and pollsters participated in the project without compensation and discussed findings on a television broadcast on election night. The television station Studio 1+1 made the Exit Poll results the main feature of its "Election Night 1998 Show." Thus, thanks to the generosity of the professionals who were persuaded of the benefits of the poll, the Exit Poll was conducted and the results were disseminated.

The methodology used in the Exit Poll was finalized one week before the election. On Monday night, March 23, Ukraine's leading pollsters and sociologists met and agreed upon the methodological approach—the sample design, the selection of respondents, and the question text. Standard opinion research methods were used, ensuring that the collected data (the responses of the sample) could be projected to all voters who participated in the election. The sample design used a stratified, multi-stage random approach. The allocation of interviews (to the oblasts and Crimea) was based on the total population of voters in each region; the distribution of the sample was done separately for the rural and the urban populations. Polling places at which interviews were conducted were randomly selected; at each polling place 25 interviews took place. There was no statistical data about voters since the March 29 election was the first multiparty one and Ukraine had been redistricted. Therefore, respondents were selected using two different ap-

proaches: one-half of the sample (5,000) was identified by the quota system—developed on the basis of data from the 1994 post election survey and the 1998 survey data on voting intention—and the other half of the sample was selected randomly.⁷

In terms of collecting data and transmitting the information to Kyiv, the March 29 Exit Poll was nothing short of a feat, requiring innovative and creative management approaches by a dedicated staff.

When polling places opened on March 29, 1998, 400 interviewers arrived at 400 randomly selected polling districts, which were scattered throughout Ukraine and included each oblast and Crimea. The 400 professional interviewers approached and queried 10,000 voters as they exited the polling place. To ensure that results accurately captured the voting public, voter turnout of a previous election was used as a model to allocate interviews throughout the day: 12 were conducted before noon, 8 in the afternoon (between noon and 4 PM), and 5 in the evening (between 4 and 8 PM). Each respondent was asked 8 questions—4 about the election and 4 about personal attributes (see Appendix for text). The interviewing process proceeded without incident and voters willingly responded to the questions.

The answers of the 10,000 respondents were delivered to the Kyiv SOCIS office via voice by telephone—the only available electronic link between Kyiv and the field. To manage the data processing, interviewers tabulated the responses and reported the results to the Kyiv office after completing a "wave" of interviews (i.e., the 12 in the morning, 8 in the afternoon, and 5 in the early evening). In Kyiv, data were received and recorded, and the figures were entered into a computer for aggregation by oblasts, by eleven geographic regions, and for Ukraine as a whole. As planned, aggregate data for oblasts, regions, and Ukraine as a whole were released at midnight on March 29, 1998, during the Election Night Show. The plans for the Show itself were finalized the preceding Friday evening.

Following election day, the questionnaires were delivered to the Kyiv SOCIS office where the responses were coded, entered into a computer, and a data file created, the file used by QEV Analytics to prepare this paper.

Appendix

Questionnaire

Exit Poll, March 29, 1998. Ukraine, Parliamentary Election

1. In these elections for the Verkhovna Rada, you voted for the party lists. Please tell me for which party you voted? You can simply tell me the party's number, which appeared, on the ballot. (Show card, *i.e. a copy of the party list ballot*)
2. When did you decide for which party you would vote?
 - supported the party long before the election
 - when the campaign started, more than 3 months before the election
 - more than a month before the election
 - ~~one~~ month before the election
 - one week before the election
 - one day before the election
 - decided at the voting place
 - hard to say
3. How would you describe this election?
 - it is proceeding honestly, without irregularities
 - it is proceeding dishonestly, the results will be fraudulent
 - hard to say
4. In your opinion, will this Parliamentary election improve conditions in Ukraine?
 - ~~conditions~~ will improve
 - nothing will change
 - ~~conditions~~ will worsen
 - hard to say
5. Sex
 - male
 - female
6. Please tell me to which age group you belong:
 - up to 30
 - up to 50
 - 56 and over
7. Please tell me the level of your education
 - Elementary
 - Secondary/Secondary Special and Technical
 - Incomplete and complete higher
8. Please name your ethnicity
 - Ukrainian
 - Russian
 - Other

Region

Oblast

City or Village

Appendix

Party List Ballot, 1998 Parliamentary election in Ukraine (shown to Exit Poll respondents)

1. Bloc "Party of Labor and Liberal Party" United (Ukrainian Party of Labor, Ukrainian Liberal Party) Scherban et al
2. *Party for Regional Renaissance of Ukraine*, Rybak et al.
3. Bloc "*Less words*" (All-Ukrainian Political Unit "State Independence of Ukraine." Social National Party of Ukraine), Vansowska et al.
4. *Party of All-Ukrainian Association Hromada*, Lazarenko et al.
5. *Republican Christian Party*, Porowski et al.
6. *Ukrainian National Assembly*, Vitovych et al.
7. *Party of the Defenders of the Homeland*, Kazakevych et al.
8. *Ukrainian Islamic Party*, Babin et al.
9. *Party of Ukraine*, Vachuk et al.
10. *Green Party of Ukraine*, Kononow et al.
11. *Communist Party of Ukraine*, Symonenko et al.
12. *Ukrainian Party*, Savchenko et al.
13. Bloc "*Vpered Ukraina*" (Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party & Christian People's Union), Musiaka et al.
14. Bloc of Democratic Parties-NEP (*People's Power, Economy, Order*) (Ukrainian Democratic Party of Economic Renaissance), Yaworiwsky et al.
15. Bloc "*Working Ukraine*" (Ukrainian Party of Justice, Civil Congress of Ukraine), Herasymov et al.
16. *Social Democratic Party*, Buzduhan et al.
17. Bloc "*European Choice for Ukraine*" (Ukrainian Liberal Democratic Party, Ukrainian Peasants' Democratic Party), Prysiazhniuk et al.
18. Bloc "*National Front*" (Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, Ukrainian Conservative National Party, Ukrainian National Party), Lukianenko et al.
19. *Social-Liberal Association SLON* (Interregional Reform Bloc, Constitutional-Democratic Party), Hrynov et al.
20. *Ukrainian People's Movement / 'Rukh*, Chomovil et al.
21. *All-Ukrainian Party of Workers*, Stoyan et al.
22. *Party for the National Economic Development of Ukraine*, Matvienko et al.
23. *People's Democratic Party*, Pustovoytenko et al.
24. *All-Ukrainian Party of Women's Initiatives*, Dazenko et al.
25. *Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party*, Zhuravsky et al.
26. Bloc "*For Truth, for the People, for Ukraine*" (Ukrainian Socialist Party, Ukrainian Peasants' Party), Moroz et al.
27. *Ukrainian Social Democratic Party* (united), Kravchuk et al.
28. *Reform and Order Party*, Pinzenyk et al.
29. *Party of Spiritual, Economic and Social Progress*, Burdak et al.
30. *Ukrainian Progressive Socialist Party*, Vitrenko et al.

I do not support any of the political parties (electoral blocs).

Notes

1. Mr. Steven Wagner, President of QEV Analytics, and Mr. Wade Anderson, Director of Research of QEV Analytics, developed and applied the weights using official voting results as reported by the Central Election Commission in "Election of the National Deputies of Ukraine, March 29, 1998. Protocol." April 7, 1998, the CEC Report No. 16 and April 8, 1998, the CEC Report No. 19, addendum 1.
2. Ms. Barbara F. Varon, Chair of the Providence District Democratic Committee, Fairfax County, Virginia.
3. Analyses of opinion data show a strong correlation between attitudes and identification with a political party. In other words, individuals who share a set of attitudes tend to identify with the same political party. Factor analyses of survey data from Ukraine tested and confirmed this relationship, see the U.S. Information Agency report by Skoczylas and Wagner "Confidence in Government, Liberalism in Ukraine and Belarus: A Comparative Analyses," June 25, 1993 (M-158-63), pages 7-9.
4. The three groups were: the left, those who voted for the leftist, communist parties; the right those who voted for parties politically and economically centrist and right-of-center; and the no party group, those who voted against all parties and electoral blocs. The "left" group included: Party of the Defenders of the Homeland, Communist Party of Ukraine, Union Party, Bloc "Working Ukraine, All-Ukrainian Party of Workers, Bloc "For Truth, for the People, for Ukraine" (Ukrainian Socialist Party, Ukrainian Peasant's Party), and the Ukrainian Progressive Socialist Party. The "right" group included: Bloc "Party of Labor and Liberal Party," Party of Regional Renaissance of Ukraine, Bloc "Less Words," Party of All-Ukrainian Association in Hromada, Republican Christian Party, Ukrainian National Assembly, Ukrainian Islamic Party, Agrarian Party of Ukraine, Green Party of Ukraine, Bloc "Vpered Ukraina," Bloc of Democratic Parties NEP, Social Democratic Party, Bloc "European Choice of Ukraine," Bloc National Front, Social-Liberal Association SLON, Ukrainian People's Movement Rukh, Party for the National Economic Development of Ukraine, Peoples' Democratic Party, All-Ukrainian Party of Women's Initiative, Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party, Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, Reform and Order Party, Party of Spiritual and Economic Renewal.
5. For an excellent analysis of the emergence of political parties in Ukraine and public support from the various parties in the 1998 parliamentary election, see Mykhailo Pohrebynsky and Oleksiy Tolpyho "People and Parties-United?" *Politen! Portrait of Ukraine*, No. 21, 1998, pages 29-42.
6. Present at the initial exploratory meetings were Mr. Steven Wagner, President of QEV Analytics (a Washington, D.C.-based research firm), Mr. Ilko Kudleriv, Director of the Kyiv-based Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Ms. Elehle Natalie Skoczylas, Vice President of International Development of QEV Analytics, and Mr. Wade Anderson, Director of Research of QEV Analytics.
7. Mykola Churilov and Svitlana Pototska "Elections-98 in a Sociological Measures. 10,000 Voters Queried by SOCIS-GaUp on Election Day: The Conduct of the First 'Exit Poll' in Ukraine." *Sociology: Theory, Method, Marketing*, May-June, 1998/3; pp. 75-87. Evhen Holovakha "Election -98 in a Sociological Measures. The First 'Exit Poll' in Ukraine: Thoughts of an Expert." *Sociology: Theory, Method, Marketing*, May-June, 1998/3; pp. 88-92. Iryna Bekeshkina "The Election-98, A Process of the Self-Determination of the Population." *Of Ukraine*, No. 21, 1998, pp. 18-28.