

NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT
PERMISSION OF AUTHOR

#30

DUMPING OILS: SOVIET ART SALES AND SOVIET-AMERICAN
RELATIONS, 1928-1933

Robert C. Williams

This paper was prepared for presentation at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies. May 25, 1977.

Williams

DUMPING OILS: SOVIET ART SALES AND
SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS
1928 - 1933

by
Robert C. Williams

Colloquium

May 25, 1977

Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.

DUMPING OILS: SOVIET ART SALES AND

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

1928 - 1933

A report that Secretary Mellon has purchased Van Dyck's "Portrait of Philip, Lord Wharton" was authoritatively denied here tonight. Mr. Mellon has bought no pictures from Russian collections for his art collection.

Special to the New York Times
Washington, D.C., May 10, 1931

It is understood that you have authorized us to purchase for you certain paintings from the Hermitage Collection in Petrograd, and that if you decide to retain them you will pay us a commission of 25% of the cost price.

Carman Messmore, M. Knoedler & Co.,
to Andrew Mellon, April 24, 1930

In 1930-1931 the U.S. Treasury Secretary, Andrew W. Mellon, accomplished one of the great artistic coups of all time. For the low, low price of only \$6,654,052.94 he acquired from the Hermitage in Leningrad twenty-one European masterpieces which he later donated, with the rest of his paintings, to the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C. The "Alba Madonna" by Raphael alone cost \$1,166,400, the highest price ever paid for a single painting at the time. Yet until Mellon's trial for tax fraud in 1935 (he made the mistake of trying to claim his paintings as a charitable deduction on his

1931 income tax, was acquitted of fraud, but paid back taxes), Americans heard only rumors that such purchases had even been made. Mellon himself, when he said anything at all, said that he owned no such paintings, paintings which we now know were lodged securely in his own apartment at 1785 Massachusetts Avenue or in the basement of the Corcoran Gallery in Washington. Even the New York Times, in an editorial written in the summer of 1934, dismissed the idea of such a transaction as pure fantasy:

If this is not the time when an American citizen would be likely to buy the most expensive painting in the world, neither is it the time when the Soviet government would be likely to sell the rarest of its national treasures. Selling off the family heirlooms by a government or individual is a sign of being hard up, and that is an impression which the Soviet regime at the present moment would not care to create abroad.¹

Yet the Times was as uninformed as most Americans. Not only had Mellon made such purchases, but the Soviet government was selling off millions of dollars worth of art treasures abroad to help finance industrialization at home. The U.S. Treasury Secretary was undoubtedly the most important client in these massive sales. But he was not alone.

The great foreign Soviet art sales of 1928 to 1933 were only one part of a desperate official policy of forced exports designed to help pay for industrial imports during Stalin's First Five Year Plan, launched in 1928. The United States was a central target in this policy, since by 1930 American business firms had become major suppliers of

industrial goods for the U.S.S.R., goods usually bought on credit. By selling art in the American market, the Soviet government thus hoped to reverse an increasingly unfavorable balance of trade. The exchange of American tractors and machinery for Soviet timber, furs, hides, and manganese, with its asymmetry of Soviet debts and American credits, had flourished in the late 1920's despite the absence of any formal diplomatic relations. After the autumn of 1929, the trade relationship was more symbiotic. American industry often needed the Soviet market during the Depression as badly as the Soviet government needed American industrial goods. Many businessmen believed that Soviet purchase orders could save American jobs.

Historians generally agree that the United States finally recognized the Soviet government in November 1933 because of three developments: the 1931 Japanese occupation of Manchuria, which provided a common threat to both Russia and America in the Far East; the U.S. desire to reverse the concurrent shift of Soviet industrial purchases to Germany, where credit was more readily available; and the election of a Democratic administration more sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Yet from the Soviet point of view, recognition was the culmination of years of efforts in New York and Washington to encourage Soviet-American trade relations, often involving intense lobbying with high American officials, from the sympathetic Senator William E. Borah to Mellon

himself. The exhibition and sale of art in the United States was a central part of that campaign, not merely to earn desperately needed valuta, but also to encourage the larger trade relationship in commodities other than paintings, jewelry, and antiques. In selling paintings from the Hermitage to wealthy Americans, Stalin was not only earning hard currency to pay for imported Fordson tractors, but winning capitalist allies in high places.

The fact that some wealthy American and European buyers acquired art from the Hermitage and other Soviet museums in the early 1930's is now generally known in the art historical literature, at least in the West.² Yet this literature has usually stressed the role of the buyer, not the seller, and has been more anecdotal than analytical. In Soviet literature, the topic is simply not discussed at all. Missing masterpieces are generally attributed to a 1931 fire in the Hermitage or to subsequent German devastation; in one case a Soviet publication of 1950 mistakenly printed a photograph of Raphael's "Alba Madonna" without realizing that for twenty years it had been not in the Hermitage, but in Washington.³ Only within the last decade has there been an occasional Soviet comment regarding paintings once in the Hermitage but now in Western museums.⁴ Soviet art sales have also not been linked, as they should be, with larger strategies of Soviet foreign policy associated with a more benign attitude toward certain capitalist

countries: the Comintern shift toward the Popular Front against fascism; the disarmament campaign in the League of Nations; and the campaign for American recognition. In fact, the Soviet art sales of 1928-1933 were an integral part of Soviet foreign policy, especially as it pertained to the United States.

I

The Soviet art sales of 1928-1933 reversed the traditional flow of art from West to East. The Imperial Russian government had been a buyer, not a seller, of art. Catherine the Great (1763-1796) was only the first of many Romanov rulers whose agents fanned across Europe in search of art to enrich the great Imperial collections of the Hermitage. Before World War I, Russia's private citizens were also avid buyers of Western art, among them wealthy Moscow merchants like Sergei Shchukin and Ivan Morozov, as well as the more solvent branches of the Yusupov and Stroganov families. In 1909 the Burlington Magazine observed that "St. Petersburg is rich in pictures of old masters, for the most part unknown to art critics."⁵ But these pictures were rarely for sale. Around 1910 the British art dealer Joseph Duveen offered to buy the famous "Benois Madonna" of Leonardo da Vinci from Madame Benois on the recommendation of his appraiser, Bernard Berenson, but was outbid by Nicholas II, who bought it for the Hermitage. In 1911 the Philadelphia collector P.A.B. Widener tried to buy two Rembrandt

portraits owned by the Yusupov family, but discovered that they were not for sale at any price; only after the Russian Revolution would his son Joseph acquire them from an emigre family member in need of cash, Prince Felix Yusupov, the murderer of Rasputin. There were many true masterpieces in the Hermitage; the 1912 catalogue featured a color frontispiece of Raphael's "St. George and the Dragon" (1504), acquired by Catherine in 1772 from Louis Antoine Crozat, Baron de Thiers, and many black-and-white photographs of the paintings later sold to Mellon.⁶ Until 1917 there was little question that the Hermitage was a great museum whose works were not for sale.

When it did sell art abroad, the Imperial Russian government was not very successful. Russian paintings, sculptures, and bronzes usually formed a colorful part of the Ministry of Finance's many exhibits at foreign trade fairs before World War I. In America they attracted great attention at Philadelphia in 1876, Chicago in 1893, and St. Louis in 1904. But these were usually works by contemporary Russian artists, not European masterpieces; the best ones were often only on loan, not for sale, and were buried among the sealskins, sable, and wood products designed to attract the Western businessman. Moreover, in 1904 the Russian art exhibit at St. Louis, consisting of more than six hundred paintings, met disaster. The agent of the Ministry of Finance attempted to sell them in New York in 1906 without paying the tariff on

imported art objects, and had his entire collection confiscated by the Bureau of Customs. After moving around from various warehouses in New York, Toronto, and San Francisco, it was finally sold at public auction as "unclaimed merchandise" in February 1912, by order of the Secretary of the Treasury and approval of President Taft.⁷ No further Russian government art exhibits were launched in America until twenty years later, when the first Soviet art exhibit visited New York in early 1924.

Throughout the 1920's there were persistent rumors in the West that the Soviet government was about to sell European masterpieces from the Hermitage and other art treasures from national collections. In fact, the Hermitage was greatly enriched during this period by the nationalization of private art collections. Until 1928 the rumors remained simply rumors. In 1924 the head of the Soviet trade delegation in London, F.I. Rabinovich, wrote that "these rumors are absolutely without foundation. The authorities of the Hermitage and other museums have not the slightest intention of selling any objects of their collections of art."⁸ But by 1928 Stalin's industrialization drive made the exporting of art objects to earn foreign currency not only possible, but necessary. "We were commanded in the shortest possible time," recalled one Hermitage curator, "to reorganize the whole of the Hermitage collection 'on the principle of sociological formations'. No

one knew what that meant; nevertheless, under the guidance of semi-literate, half-baked 'Marxists' who could not tell faience from porcelain or Dutch masters from the French or Spanish, we had to set to work and pull to pieces a collection which it had taken more than one hundred years to create."⁹ As this particular curator, Tatania Chernavina, soon discovered, reorganization was a prelude to foreign sales. In the spring of 1930 she was ordered to remain after hours in the Hermitage, remove Van Eyck's "Annunciation" from the wall, deliver it to a high government official, and hang another painting in its place. Unknown to her, the Mellon sales had commenced.

The Hermitage itself had little to do with these sales. Its staff generally carried out orders only with great reluctance, saddened by the depletion of the collection, but fearful of the consequences of resistance. The head of the West European Painting Section, V.F. Levinson-Lessing, found himself assigned in 1928-1933 as an art appraiser for the Soviet art export agency, Antikvariat, and to the Soviet trade representative in Berlin, the exchange point for most sales. But Lessing was not enthusiastic about his job, and thirty years later was perhaps the only Soviet scholar to allude in print to the very existence of foreign art sales. The man ultimately responsible for the Hermitage and other Soviet museums, Anatoly Lunacharsky, Commissar of Education, also resisted pressure from Stalin to begin selling art

works abroad. In 1930 he edited a book on Selected Works of Art from the Fine Arts Museums of the U.S.S.R. that ultimately proved to be the last publication to include illustrations of such masterpieces as Titian's "Venus at the Mirror" and Velasquez's "Portrait of Pope Innocent X," both later sold to Mellon. On September 28, 1928 Lunacharsky persuaded the Armenian-born Commissar of Foreign Trade, Anastas Mikoyan, to co-sign an order by the Main Customs Administration forbidding the export abroad of valuable art objects, including paintings by "artists whose production is systematically collected in the museums of the U.S.S.R.," or works "necessary for the study of the general history of art." But Lunacharsky himself was under fire at this time, and his efforts proved to be too little and too late. In November 1928, two months after the Customs order, the first Soviet sale of art abroad began at the Rudolf Lepke auction house in Berlin under the direction of Lunacharsky's valued co-signer, Mikoyan.¹⁰ The great Soviet art sales began in public in the autumn of 1928 under the aegis of the Commissariat for Foreign Trade, Narkomvneshtorg, not the Hermitage.

II

The decision to sell art objects abroad in the autumn of 1928 was ultimately the Politburo's. But the principal agent was Mikoyan, and the principal selling mechanism the Commissariat of Foreign Trade. Mikoyan became Commissar in 1926; by the autumn of 1927 he was already exploring the possibility of foreign art sales through the Soviet trade representative in Paris, George Piatakov. Piatakov proposed a "commercial venture" to the well known French art dealer, Germain Seligman, invited him to Moscow, and showed him great storerooms full of crystal chandeliers, malachite tables, jewelry, and paintings. But Seligman was more interested in recovering lost Watteaus and Matisses for France, and the French government was justly suspicious of lawsuits in French courts by Russian émigré former owners of art sold abroad. The deal fell through, although Seligman was told he could have a completely free hand in organizing auctions and deciding on the makeup and sequence of railroad car shipments of art to be sent his way from Moscow.¹¹ Mikoyan then initiated the public auction sales in Berlin and Vienna in November 1928, but the works offered were not masterpieces, and Western dealers knew it. Prices were low, sales were disappointing, and there was a lawsuit by Russian émigrés claiming that the Soviet government was selling stolen property rightfully theirs; their case was upheld in Berlin, but overturned by an appellate court in Leipzig. When

the public sales proved less profitable than anticipated, Mikoyan decided to negotiate private sales of the best works from the Hermitage.

The American art market offered the best prospects, since for several decades wealthy Americans had been steadily draining Europe of some of its finest art and antique collections. Mikoyan therefore turned to one of the few Americans he knew in Moscow, Dr. Armand Hammer. Hammer had come to Russia in the summer of 1921 along with a number of other Americans associated with the "Bureau" in New York of the first Soviet trade representative, Ludwig C.A.K. Martens. Hammer's father Julius, a well-to-do socialist doctor and owner of a drug supply house, had worked for Martens in 1919 and helped establish the first Soviet-American trading agency, the Allied American Corporation, an offshoot of Hammer's drug company which had been incorporated in Delaware in 1917. Hammer himself, through Martens, obtained a concession to mine asbestos in the Urals, and then in 1925 another to manufacture pencils; in the meantime the Allied American Corporation handled the sales of several dozen American companies, among them the Ford Motor Company, in Soviet Russia in the 1920's. Mikoyan and Hammer had known each other since 1923, when Hammer arrived at Novorossiisk with the first shipment of Fordson tractors. Hammer, whose trading operations had largely been absorbed by the Soviet trading company Amtorg in New York after 1924, was thus an

excellent contact with American business sources. By the winter of 1928-1929 it was also becoming clear that foreign concessionaires were no longer welcome under the First Five Year Plan, and that the Hammer pencil concession would soon be nationalized. Art objects provided an intriguing alternative commodity.

The first Mikoyan-Hammer art venture was a failure. In late 1928 Mikoyan hinted that works from the Hermitage were now for sale, and promised Armand and Victor Hammer a 10% commission on any paintings they could sell in New York. They promptly wired their brother Harry to get in touch with the world's leading art dealer, Joseph Duveen. Duveen, in turn, set up a syndicate of New York art dealers capable of raising sizeable sums of money, told his appraiser Berenson to get ready for a trip to Leningrad, and sent Antikvariat a list of forty Hermitage paintings for which the syndicate was prepared to pay five million dollars. Schapiro, the head of Antikvariat, was insulted. "What do they think we are? Children? Don't they realize we know what is being sold in Paris, London, and New York? If they want to deal with us seriously, let them make serious offers." This particular arrangement fell through, but Mikoyan was still determined to sell paintings in America. In 1929 he told the Hammers that "you

can have the pictures now, all right. We don't mind if you take them for a while. But we will make a revolution in your country and take them back."¹²

The abortive Duveen negotiations were part of a more general campaign by the Soviet government to distribute and sell art objects in America in 1928. The first of many Soviet art exhibits was launched in New York that year by VOKS, the All-Russian Society for Cultural Relations Abroad (known to its critics as the Society for Stuffing Foreign Geese), working through Amtorg. The principal American organizer was a Philadelphia art critic, Christian Brinton, who had signed an agreement with VOKS officials in Moscow in the summer of 1928 to arrange such exhibits and to sell contemporary and folk art for a 10% commission. Eight such exhibits were held in New York and other American cities during 1928-1934, featuring icons, rugs, textiles, toys, woodenware and other objects now familiar to any visitor to Soviet book outlets. In 1929 Amtorg's income from such sales amounted to more than one million dollars, more than double the 1928 figure. In addition, Amkino, a subsidiary of Amtorg, supervised the shipment of Soviet films from Germany to the United States, among them Turksib, The General Line, Potemkin, and Arsenal. None of these cultural efforts earned the currency equivalent to Mellon's paintings, but they had a considerable

political value in preparing American public opinion for better trade and diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.¹³

In 1929, having discovered that New York's best known art dealer was offering low prices for Hermitage paintings, Mikoyan decided to eliminate the middleman and sell directly to a fellow Armenian, Calouste Gulbenkian, head of the Iraq Petroleum Company. Gulbenkian was then a British citizen living in Paris, who had been most helpful, some said, in helping the Soviet government dump oils on the Western market. In 1923 Gulbenkian, a noted art collector, had also loaned Felix Yusupov a half million dollars with which to buy back his two Rembrandts from Joseph Widener (he failed). Now Gulbenkian was interested in buying European masterpieces from the Hermitage. This idea probably originated in 1928 in Paris during conversations between Gulbenkian and Piatakov, Mikoyan's trade delegate there; in 1929 Piatakov returned to Russia to take over the State Bank, and Gulbenkian remained in correspondence with him. By June 1929, with Piatakov's aid, he had signed a contract with Antikvariat to purchase his first works from the Hermitage: Dirk Bouts' "Annunciation," a Louis XVI writing desk, and twenty-four gold and silver eighteenth-century French pieces. "I am very interested in concluding others," Gulbenkian wrote Piatakov, "particularly because I am convinced that the prices I have already paid can be considered to

be the highest obtainable."¹⁴ As in Gulbenkian's later art purchases, the objects were packed by Antikvariat officials in Leningrad under the watchful eye of Gulbenkian's agent, shipped on to the Soviet trade representative in Berlin, and exchanged for a bank draft in pounds sterling, payable to the Soviet trade delegate in Paris.

Despite continual haggling over prices, Gulbenkian bought a number of objects from the Hermitage between the summer of 1929 and the autumn of 1930. He had to buy, he wrote, because of "this passion which is like a disease" to collect art; but his hair was "growing whiter" because of arguments over the prices. Still, by late May 1930 Gulbenkian had purchased Houdon's statue of "Diana" and six major paintings from the Hermitage: Rubens' "Portrait of Helene Fourment," Rembrandt's "Portrait of Titus," and "Pallas Athene," Watteau's "Le Mezzetin," Ter Borch's "Music Lesson," and Nicholas Lancret's "Les Baigneuses." (Gulbenkian ultimately sold four of these to the Wildenstein Gallery in New York, which in 1934 sold the Watteau to the Metropolitan Museum of Art). He later added Rembrandt's "Portrait of an Old Man." Having consummated his purchases, Gulbenkian wrote Piatakov on July 31, 1930 that the Soviet art sales were really a great mistake; "the objects which have been in your museums for many years should not be sold," he maintained, adding that "the conclusion will be that Russia is indeed in a bad way if you are obliged to get rid of objects which will not in

the end really produce large enough sums to help the finance of the state." "Do not forget," he admonished Piatakov, "that those from whom you would ask for credit are precisely the same as the potential buyers of the objects you wish to sell out of your museums."¹⁵ The most important source of foreign credit and potential art buyer, of course, was Andrew W. Mellon.

III

While the private Andrew Mellon was buying art from the Hermitage in 1930-1931, the public Andrew Mellon, as U.S. Treasury Secretary, was dealing with a number of issues related to the unprecedentedly high levels of Soviet-American trade. Since the mid-1920's the United States had become a major supplier of industrial goods and raw materials to the Soviet Union: automobiles, trucks, tractors, nonferrous metals, cotton, and rubber. Most of these sales were made possible by long-term credits extended by American companies to the Soviet trading agency in New York, Amtorg, representing Mikoyan's Commissariat of Foreign Trade. Imports of furs, hides, lumber, and manganese from Russia were miniscule by comparison, so that an unfavorable balance of trade was developing. By 1930 America was second only to Germany as the major creditor of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet government desperately needed to reverse its trade deficit with the United States.

There is little doubt that the Soviet Union badly needed American capital, technology, and engineering know-how under the First Five Year Plan. In 1929 Amtorg suddenly tripled its orders from American companies; in 1930 American exports to Russia reached a level nearly double that of 1928. For the first time since the mid-1920's, the United States replaced Germany as the major source of imports for the U.S.S.R., supplying 25% of the total of all imported goods. The stock market crash of late 1929, with its resultant bank closings and massive unemployment, meant that from the American point of view, trade with Russia was even more desirable. In a depressed market, the Soviet government was a welcome buyer, and competition for Amtorg orders became fierce in the first half of 1930. Soviet-American trade reached an all-time peak of \$114,399,000 that year, mainly because of U.S. exports.¹⁶ After that, the Soviets proved unable to pay for many goods, and in April 1931 turned to Germany for industrial credits.

Mellon's major headache in Soviet-American trade relations in 1930-1931 concerned "dumping," Soviet sales of goods abroad at prices below the "fair" market value. Mellon received a good deal of pressure from American businessmen to issue strict orders against Soviet dumping at precisely the time when he was negotiating his Hermitage purchases. He bought his first paintings in April 1930; in May he issued an embargo

against Soviet matches. In July 1930 he issued another embargo against any Soviet lumber involving the use of convict labor. Between January and April 1931 Mellon consummated the greatest of his Hermitage purchases; in February he ruled favorably to the Soviet government in the case of manganese dumping. Only on April 22, 1931 did he impose a temporary embargo on Soviet asbestos, an embargo promptly lifted in April 1933 by the new Roosevelt administration. Throughout 1930-1931 Mellon proved a reluctant enforcer of the protectionist will of Congress and many businessmen, as expressed in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff on June 1930. By the winter of 1931-1932 he had been driven from office by the threat of impeachment, and sought refuge as Ambassador to the Court of St. James, blamed in large measure for the Depression because of his previous policies.¹⁷

Mellon thus chose a propitious moment to buy his paintings. The Soviet government badly needed to sell goods in the American market to balance its imports. Art objects were being sold in large quantity. During the January-September 1930 period the Soviet government sold 1,681 tons of art objects, jewelry, and antiques abroad; of this, 117 tons went directly to America, and more undoubtedly came indirectly through Europe.¹⁸ These statistics do not even include the secret private sales to Gulbenkian and Mellon, whose value, after all, was in money rather than weight. In 1930 art was a crucial commodity with

which the Soviet government wished to reverse an unfavorable balance of trade. And Mellon's paintings alone amounted to roughly 7% of total Soviet-American trade in 1930.

As a part of Soviet-American trade in 1930-1931, Andrew Mellon's famous purchases were never negotiated directly by the wealthy collector and the Hermitage. The entire process involved Mellon's art dealer in New York, M. Knoedler & Co., and the subsidiary organizations of Mikoyan's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, namely, Antikvariat and the Soviet trade representatives in Berlin and New York (Amtorg). When a purchase was to be made, Mellon would deposit the appropriate amount in pounds sterling at Knoedler's, which would then make payments to the Berlin or New York trade representative, 10% down, the balance upon delivery. The crucial intermediary between Knoedler's and the Soviet government was the Matthiessen Gallery in Berlin, headed by Franz Zatzenstein, whose lawyer, Mansfeld, was the point of contact with the head of Antikvariat in Leningrad and Moscow, Nicholas Ilyn. When the final purchases were negotiated in New York in the spring of 1931, the President of Knoedler's, Charles R. Henschel, dealt directly with Ilyn and an Amtorg representative, Boris Kraevsky, at the Hotel Biltmore. In this manner, and with a good deal of trans-Atlantic cable traffic, twenty-one Hermitage masterpieces and seven million dollars exchanged hands between April 1930 and April 1931.

The fact that Berlin was the point of delivery was not accidental. The Soviet trade delegation was already skilled in this sort of thing, and the Matthiessen Gallery was an essential intermediary. In addition, German diplomatic recognition of the Soviet government under the Rapallo Treaty (1922) provided legal protection in case of émigré lawsuits. Mansfeld in 1932, when Knoedler's was negotiating to buy French modern masters from the nationalized Shchukin and Morozov collections, assured Henschel that "we do not fear any claims of Russians living abroad for pictures legally bought from the Soviet government." Henschel himself, testifying later at Mellon's tax trial, recalled that "the delivery was made in Berlin for the reason that at the time the United States did not recognize the Soviet government, and we thought it was better that delivery be taken by somebody in a country that did recognize the Soviet government, so that there might not be any hitch of any kind in the deal." Finally, as the Soviet Union turned away from America to Germany for credit in the winter of 1930-1931, Mellon's money could be placed in a Berlin account and shifted directly to pay German bills. "After concluding a deal," Zatzenstein wrote Henschel in January 1931, "the Russians instantly want money; to solve this difficult question we arranged with our bank a blocked account. This is to make it possible for the Russians to get immediately a credit on the money, which is owed to

them, for the time until the delivery of the pictures."¹⁹ The same bank teller could literally transfer income from a Titian into payment for a tractor.

Mellon's purchases thus took place at a crucial moment in Soviet-American trade relations. American businessmen wanted embargoes to protect themselves from Soviet dumping; they also wished to sustain the high level of Amtorg orders of 1930. But the Soviet government needed more credits than could be obtained in America, and turned away to Germany. Whether they saw the final flurry of Mellon's purchases in early 1931 as a last opportunity to obtain American credit is impossible to say. It is most likely, however, that by saving his greatest purchases until the end, Mellon not only took advantage of the steadily dropping values of the art market, but also of the desperate Soviet need for credit.

IV

Like other Soviet export commodities, art works suffered a sharp drop in prices in 1931-1933. Unforeseen by Soviet planners in 1927-1928, Soviet foreign trade largely collapsed after 1931. Forced exports (desperately needed grain, as well as other commodities) led to increasing lower prices, anti-dumping measures by foreign governments (including Great Britain and Nazi Germany in 1933), shortages at home, and a massive trade deficit abroad. Exports could not balance imports,

credits became increasingly difficult to obtain, and Soviet policy moved away toward economic autarky. As American businessmen discovered after American recognition of the Soviet Union in November 1933, Soviet foreign trade would not recover the unique high points of 1928-1930.²⁰

Soviet art sales thus faced the same pressures as Soviet foreign trade in general. The May 1930 public auction in Leipzig of prints and drawings from the Hermitage netted less than one million dollars; similarly low prices prevailed the following year, when the highest price paid for a single drawing was \$5,000. The May 1931 sale of the entire contents of the Stroganov Palace through the Lepke house in Berlin also brought low prices and a net of only \$613,000, less than the Soviet government had received for several individual works sold to Mellon. Dropping prices were most telling in the case of the Van Eyck diptych "Crucifixion" and "Last Judgement," sold to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York through M. Knoedler & Co. in May 1933; when negotiations began in 1931 the Soviet government was asking \$600,000 for the work, but when they finally sold it two years later the final price was only \$185,000. By the summer of 1933, Soviet art sales abroad had reached the point where the Burlington Magazine bemoaned the "ever increasing impoverishment of the Hermitage. Many works of art have been sold abroad for a profit that to

a great state must be negligible, apparently in accordance with the orders of politicians whose boast it is that they are apostles of culture."²¹ Shortly afterwards Soviet planners, too, realized the diminishing returns of such sales, and they came to an end.

Germany was the normal delivery point of the great public sales of 1928-1933, but in one instructive case Mikoyan used Amtorg in New York to sell directly to an American museum. In the spring of 1932 the director of the Pennsylvania Art Museum in Philadelphia, Fiske Kimball, discovered that he had \$100,000 to spend augmenting the collection. Having heard rumors of the Mellon sales, Kimball promptly telephoned the unofficial Soviet representative in Washington, Boris Skvirsky, on May 23, 1932 and asked if any Hermitage paintings were for sale. On the very same day the Amtorg representative, Alexander Rosenschein, arrived in Kimball's office bearing the 1923 Wiener catalogue of the Hermitage (third edition), Meisterwerke Eremitage. Kimball quickly learned that one or two Titians were for sale, maybe number 43 or number 44; the El Greco number 79? — Rosenschein could not say; how about the Velasquez number 80? No, there was a buyer in London; Rubens' "Portrait of Helene Fourment"? — a definite possibility. Kimball indicated what the museum could pay for various paintings, and Rosenschein returned to Amtorg to consult his superiors in Moscow. In the end, Kimball could only afford to buy Poussin's

"Triumph of Neptune" for a price of \$50,000. This was delivered to American Express in Berlin in the summer of 1932 in the now familiar fashion by the Soviet trade representative, and still hangs in the Philadelphia Art Museum today in its original Hermitage frame.²²

In his talks with Kimball, Rosenschein neglected to mention one minor detail. Many of the paintings he was offering to sell to Philadelphia had already been sold to Gulbenkian or Mellon; Kimball was bidding on paintings no longer in the Hermitage. Whether Amtorg was in the dark, or whether Mikoyan wished to ascertain if private buyers had paid fair prices, one cannot say. There is little doubt that Mellon had paid the highest prices the Soviet government could expect in a depressed Western art market in which they were selling in quantity, but that these were very low prices at which to acquire such masterpieces. In May 1935, testifying at Mellon's tax trial, Joseph Duveen said that at \$503,000 Van Eyck's "Annunciation" had been sold "much too cheaply." He whimsically offered \$750,000 on the spot for it, and volunteered that the Hermitage was "no more the greatest collection in the world, it has gone to pieces. I do not see how a nation could sell their great pictures of that kind."²³ Worse than selling them, they had sold them to someone other than Duveen.

V

In addition to the Hermitage paintings, the Soviet government in 1931 began selling off the confiscated possessions of the Romanovs, including great quantities of jewelry, icons, photograph frames, chalices, Easter eggs and other art objects. Many of these were by the famous court goldsmith and jeweler Peter Carl Fabergé, and had been stored for years at Tsarskoe Selo, Gatchina, and other palaces around Leningrad and Moscow. In January 1931 a German art syndicate calling itself the Import Antique Company began selling such objects through the Wallace H. Day Gallery in New York, but was temporarily stopped by a court injunction on behalf of Grand Duchesses Olga and Xenia; in March the sale went on, but netted only \$69,136.²⁴ That summer Duveen himself traveled to Russia and began buying up great quantities of tapestries and other art objects from the Imperial palaces. But the most successful seller of the "Romanov treasure" turned out to be the same man who had initiated Duveen's interest in the Hermitage in 1928, Dr. Armand Hammer.

Hammer brilliantly perceived in 1931-1932 that the glittering debris of the last Romanovs could be sold in great quantity to wealthy American women fascinated with European royalty and aristocracy, but doomed to live in a democratic society. In December 1931 a State Department memorandum reported that "the Hammers are no longer

interested in any concessions in Russia" and were "now buying for their own account on a moderate scale merchandise intended for sale in the United States." Two years earlier, in December 1929, the Hammers had signed an agreement with Sergei Kamenev, head of the Main Concessions Committee, whereby the Soviet government would take over the highly profitable Hammer pencil factories; in return, the Hammers would receive a compensation of several million dollars, not in hard currency, but in some rubles cash, some three-year Soviet bonds, and permission to leave Russia with their "household effects," which included quantities of art objects (mainly religious and Imperial) acquired cheaply during the New Economic Policy. How and when they acquired it is not clear, but it is worth noting that the Allied American Corporation occupied the Fabergé shop in Moscow after 1922, that the Hammers had been in contact with Duveen for several years, and that their sales occurred in the larger context of massive Soviet art exports.²⁵

In 1932 the Hammers shifted their trading operations from Germany to America. Julius Hammer was arrested in Erfurt on December 11, 1931 on the complaint by German pencil firms that the Hammers still owed them more than \$100,000 for supplies furnished in the 1920's. In addition to this family complication, on April 26, 1932 the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals ruled that the Allied American Corporation was innocent of tax fraud in deducting its 1923 Soviet licensing fees as a business

expense. Thus by the summer of 1932 the Hammers had apparently concluded that it was more appropriate to shift their enterprises to New York. With this in mind, Armand Hammer on July 28, 1932 wired Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt in Albany that:

PRESS DISPATCHES HERE FEATURE YOUR INCLINATION TOWARD
RECOGNITION OF RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT STOP AFTER BUSINESS
EXPERIENCE IN RUSSIA AS AMERICAN CITIZEN LAST THREE YEARS
I HEARTILY FAVOR SUCH RECOGNITION.

Despite his modesty in compressing a decade of business in Soviet Russia to three years, Hammer soon embarked on his own project, selling the "Romanov treasure" in America.²⁶

The Hammers sold in quantity. By late 1932 they were marketing their wares through retail department stores in St. Louis and other American cities. In October 1932 Armand Hammer published his Quest for the Romanov Treasure, a memoir of his Russian experiences and a recommendation for business dealings with the Soviet government; the book told little about how the Hammers had actually acquired their art, but was a splendid advertisement for the impending New York sales through Lord and Taylor. Using the double-headed eagle symbol formerly employed by Fabergé, the Hammers opened their New York sales in January 1933 with an illustrated catalogue of "crown jeweled objects of art" (brocades, vestment, silver, porcelain, glassware, icons, and jewelry). A number of wealthy American women began buying at bargain prices, and the Hammers initiated a profitable enterprise

which led a year or so later to the founding of the Hammer Gallery in New York as an outlet for Russian art. But in the end the Hammer sales also reflected the low prices of the Depression.²⁷ Only the rich could afford the trinkets of a vanished and nostalgic Romanov world.

The Hammer sales of 1932-1933 really marked the end of massive Soviet art sales in America, and the start of more conventional means of marketing art through dealers and galleries abroad. The great German art auctions came to an end with the Hitler regime in 1933, and Soviet exhibits in America after recognition had less to do with sales and more to do with cultivating Soviet-American friendship through contemporary Soviet arts and crafts. The last major sale to an American occurred in 1937-1938, at the height of the Purges, when Ambassador and Mrs. Joseph E. Davies were able to purchase large quantities of icons, chalices, and contemporary paintings in Moscow and Leningrad just before the government reinstated the restrictions of 1928 on art exports; but the aim of these sales was to win the political friendship expressed in Mission to Moscow (1941), rather than hard currency.

The normal exchange of Russian art and American money continued through the purchases of diplomats and tourists, and occasional sales abroad. But never again would the Soviet government sell its national art treasure in such quantity or quality on the Western art market.

VI

We know now that the Soviet government sold art in great quantity in 1928-1933 to help pay for industrial imports, a policy barely recognized in the West at the time and rarely admitted in the Soviet Union to this day. Art was simply a desperately needed commodity, and Germany the best point of exchange; in 1933 Zatzenstein reported that money from art sales often went directly to "buying 'frozen mark credits' in Germany at 25% discount and turning these over to the Russians who use them to pay German bills."²⁸ But America offered the best market for this art, in terms both of available buyers and needed credits. When Mellon bought his paintings, both the place and the time were unique; the Soviet government was a forced seller, and Mellon a unique buyer. Within a year he would be out of office, and Soviet art exports would decline sharply.

During 1928-1933 there was a consistent and energetic campaign by the Soviet Union in the United States to exhibit and sell art. Whether it had any real effect on American recognition of the Soviet government, it was intended to encourage and perpetuate a trade relationship that was mutually beneficial by 1930. In 1933 that campaign was coming to an end, as the Soviet government reversed its forced export policies to emancipate itself from falling prices and tightening credits. Exhibits of Soviet art would continue; sales of

valuable European masterpieces would not. Dumping oils on the Western art market reflected both the desperation of Soviet forced exports and the collapse of art values during the Depression. When prices fell far enough, the sales ceased. But they helped many Americans realize that under the Stalin revolution of collectivization and industrialization, the Soviet Union was to be more pitied than feared.

TABLE I

SOVIET EXPORTS OF ART, ANTIQUES, AND JEWELRY

1924 - 1933

Year	Total Art Exports (1,000 rubles)	U.S.	%
1924	59	—	—
1925	157	69	44
1926	193	181	94
1927	439	120	27
1928	2,830	1,127	40
1929	4,588	2,505	55
1930	6,272	2,809	45
1931	2,677	893	33
1932	1,868	76	4
1933	662	82	12

Source: Vneshnaia trgovlia, 1924-1933.

TABLE II

HERMITAGE PAINTINGS SOLD TO M. KNOEDLER & CO.

FOR ANDREW MELLON: APRIL 1930 - APRIL 1931

Painting				
1)	Hals	"Portrait of a Young Man"	April 1930	\$ 559,190
	Rembrandt	"A Girl with a Broom"		
	Rembrandt	"A Polish Nobleman"		
2)	Rubens	"Portrait of Isabella Brant"	May 1930	223,562
3)	Van Eyck	"The Annunciation"	June 1930	502,899
4)	Rembrandt	"A Turk"	July-	1,284,952
	Rembrandt	"A Woman holding a Pink"	November	
	Van Dyck	"Philip Lord Wharton"	1930	
	Van Dyck	"Portrait of a Flemish Lady"		
	Van Dyck	"Suzanna Fourment and her Daughter"		
5)	Raphael	"St. George and the Dragon"	January 1931	745,500
	Velasquez	"Pope Innocent X"		223,562
6)	Botticelli	"Adoration of the Magi"	February 1931	838,350
	Rembrandt	"Joseph accused by Popiphar's Wife"		167,543
7)	Veronese	"The Finding of Moses"	March 1931	402,333
	Van Dyck	"William II of Nassau and Orange"		
	Hals	"Portrait of an Officer"		
	Chardin	"The House of Cards"		
8)	Perugino	"The Crucifixion"	April 1931	195,612
9)	Raphael	"The Alba Madonna"	April 1931	1,710,557
	Titian	"Venus with a Mirror"		
Total for twenty-one paintings:				\$6,654,053

Table II (continued)

Current location: National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C.

Sources: M. Knoedler & Co., archives; National Gallery of Art, object files; 36 U.S. Board of Tax Appeals, Docket No. 76499, promulgated December 7, 1937, p. 1046; Art News, February 23, 1935, pp. 3-5.

TABLE III

ANDREW W. MELLON'S ACCOUNT AT M. KNOEDLER AND CO.

APRIL 1930 - APRIL 1931

Date of Deposit	Pounds	Dollars
April 28, 1930	115,000	\$ 559,190.00
May 27	46,000	223,562.50
June 4	103,000	502,899.34
July 26	17,250	83,988.44
August 12	63,250	308,089.55
November 1	72,000	349,832.50
November 22	28,750	139,619.69
January 16, 1931	241,500	1,172,485.00
February 25	207,000	1,005,893.13
March 17	82,800	402,332.88
April 4	40,250	195,602.41
April 6	352,000	1,710,557.50
Total		\$6,654,052.94

Source: Respondent's Exhibit Y-11, Official Report of Proceedings before the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals. A.W. Mellon, petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Docket No. 76499.

Note: Payments of Mellon to Knoedler's and of Knoedler's to the Soviet government were both made in pounds sterling.

TABLE IV

HERMITAGE PAINTINGS SOLD ABROAD (EXCLUDING MELLON)

Sale Date	Artist	Work	Buyer/Current Location
January 1930	Rubens	"Portrait of Helene Fourment"	Gulbenkian/Lisbon
May 1930	* Rembrandt	"Portrait of Titus"	Gulbenkian/Rijks-
	Rembrandt	"Pallas Athene"	museum
	* Watteau	"Le Mezzetin"	Met.Mus. of Art, N.Y.
	* Ter Borch	"The Music Lesson"	
	* Lancret	"Les Baigneuses"	
October 1930	Rembrandt	"Portrait of an Old Man"	Gulbenkian/Lisbon
	Bouts	"The Annunciation"	
May 1931	Rembrandt	"Christ and the Samaritan"	
(Stroganov)	Rubens	"Allegory of Eternity"	Timken Gallery
	Rubens	"Madonna"	Pelikanwerke,
	Van Dyck	"Nicholas Rockox"	Hannóver
		"Balthazarine van Linick"	
		"Bust of a Young Man"	
		"Jan Malderus" (ascribed)	
		"Antoine Triest"	
		"Study of a Horse"	
	Vernet	"Romantic Seacoast"	
	Wouwerman	"Riders Jousting"	
		"Large Encampment"	
	Van		
	de Velde	"Charging Riders"	
		"Landscape with Herd"	
	Wynants	"Road in the Dunes"	
1932	Poussin	"The Triumph of Neptune"	Philadelphia Art Museum
	Tiepolo	"Banquet of Cleopatra"	Nat. Gal. of Victoria, Melbourne
1933	Rembrandt	"Peter denying Christ"	Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam
	Van Eyck	"Crucifixion" and "Last Judgement"	Met.Mus. of Art, N.Y.

Table IV (continued)

1934	Platzer	"The Concert"	Germanisches Museum, Nurnberg
	Burgkmair	"Hans Schelenberger"	Wallraf-Richartz- Museum, Koln

* sold to the Wildenstein Galleries in May 1930 for £ 100,250 by Gulbenkian.

Sources: Jose Perdigao, Calouste Gulbenkian, Collector (Lisbon, 1969), 101-122; Sammlung Stroganoff, Leningrad (Berlin, 1931); archives, Philadelphia Art Museum; archives, Metropolitan Museum of Art; private correspondence.

TABLE V

FABERGÉ JEWELRY AND OTHER ART OBJECTS SOLD BY
DR. ARMAND HAMMER TO MRS. LILIAN PRATT
LORD AND TAYLOR, 1933

Photograph frames

Nicholas and Alexandra	\$ 150
Alexandra and Tatiana	240
Alexandra on a chair, sewing	60
Aleksei	275
Grand Duke Mikhail	240

Easter eggs (small)

jade	\$ 450
gold	450

Boxes

red enamel cigarette case	\$ 350
gold oval box	850
gold and silver box	300
Labradorite heart-shaped box	850
octagonal nephrite box	450

Icons

Our Lady of Iberia	\$3500
St. Panteleimon	1000
Madonna and child	325
Dormition of the Virgin	450
Ss. Mary, Nicholas and Alexander	350
Madonna of Smolensk	3500
St. George	95
Madonna, Child, and Saints	3500
Holy Virgin and Child Enthroned	300
Our Lady and Jesus Christ	3500

Handles

jade parasol	\$ 150
crystal cane	150
crystal parasol	350
amethyst parasol	250
nephrite cane	300

Miscellany

Alexandra's gold watch	\$ 750
jade calendar device	1200
scarab pin	1200
1896 bronze medal	30
silver beaker	300

Table V (continued)

Source: Archives, Virginia Museum, Richmond, Virginia; Sale catalogue, "The Hammer Collection of Russian Imperial Art Treasures from the Winter Palace, Tsarskoye Selo, and other Royal Palaces" (N.Y., 1933).

FOOTNOTES

1. New York Times, August 18, 1934, p. 8.
2. The secondary literature includes John Walker, Self-Portrait with Donors (Boston, Toronto: Little-Brown, 1969), pp. 108-121; J. Perdigao, Calouste Gulbenkian, Collector (Lisbon: Gulbenkian Museum, 1975), 115-121; Germain Seligman, Merchants of Art: 1880-1960; Eighty Years of Professional Collecting (N.Y.: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1960), 169-176; S.N. Behrman, Duveen, (N.Y., 1972).
3. K. Moiseyeva, "The Hermitage, Storehouse of World Art," VOKS Bulletin, 63 (1950), pp. 56-59.
4. V.F. Levinson-Lessing, curator of the West European Painting Section of the Hermitage, identified works formerly in the Hermitage but now in the National Gallery in his The Hermitage Leningrad; Medieval and Renaissance Masters (London: Paul Hamlyn, 1967), pp. viii, ix, xvi.
5. A. Troubnikoff, "Art in Russia," Burlington Magazine, LXXI, 14 (February 15, 1909), pp. 320-325.
6. A. Benua (Benois), Putevoditel' po kartinnoi glavii imperatorskago ermitazha (St. Petersburg, 1912).
7. Bureau of Customs case files 25634 and 25892, Record Group 36, National Archives, Washington, D.C. See also R.C. Williams,

"The Russians are Coming!": Art and Politics at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition," Bulletin of the Missouri Historical Society, XXXI, 3 (April 1975), pp. 159-173 and "America's Lost Russian Paintings: Frank C. Havens and the Russian Collection of the 1904 St. Louis Exposition," Soviet History, forthcoming.

8. Perdigao, Gulbenkian, 106.
 9. T. Tschernavin, Escape from the Soviets (trans. N. Alexander) (N.Y.: Dutton, 1934), 37.
 10. On Levinson-Lessing see Soobshcheniia gosudarstvennago Ermitazh, XXV (Leningrad, 1964), 1964, 3-7; A.V. Lunacharsky, Selected Works of Art from the Fine Arts Museums of the U.S.S.R. (Moscow, 1930); "Order No. 120 of the Main Customs Administration of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R.," September 28, 1928; Rudolf Lepke Haus, Kunstwerke aus den Bestanden Leningrader Museen und Schlosser Eremitage, Palais Mikhailoff, Gatchina (Berlin, November 6-7, 1928).
 11. Seligman, Merchants of Art, 169-176.
 12. Walker, Self-Portrait, 226; J. Brough, Auction (N.Y.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), 92.
 13. C. Brinton, "Proposed Russian Art Exhibit," unpublished memorandum dated September 1928, archives, Philadelphia Art Museum.
- Brinton's exhibit catalogues for Soviet art sales in America include:

The Russian Art Exhibit (N.Y., 1924); The Russian Exhibition of the Soviet Union (N.Y., 1928); Exhibition of Contemporary Art of Soviet Russia; Painting, Graphics, Sculpture (N.Y., 1929); Soviet Russian Art and Handicraft Exhibit (N.Y., 1929); A Catalogue of Russian Icons received from the American Russian Institute for Exhibition (N.Y., 1931); Exhibit of Russian Paintings and Sculpture; Realism to Surrealism (Wilmington, Delaware, 1932); Exhibition of Contemporary Russian Artists (Philadelphia, 1934); The Face of Soviet Art (Philadelphia, 1934). The Amtorg statistics are from Economic Review of the Soviet Union, December 15, 1931, pp. 566-577. Also U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives, 811.00B Society for Cultural Relations with Soviet Russia; 811.00B Motion Pictures.

14. Perdigao, Gulbenkian, 115-116.
15. Ibid., 121.
16. R.P. Browder, The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy (Princeton, 1953), 29.
17. Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, 611.616 Lumber and 611.613 Matches.
18. Vneshnaia Torgovlia, 1930; see Table I.
19. Mansfeld to Henschel, December 22, 1932; Zatzenstein to Henschel, January 14, 1931; archives, M. Knoedler & Co.,

New York. On Henschel's testimony see "Official Report of Proceedings before the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals. A.W. Mellon, petitioner, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent, Docket No. 76499;" thirteen bound volumes of transcripts of courtroom testimony (p. 7670). I am indebted to Judge Bolon B. Turner of the U.S. Tax Court for letting me examine this testimony, and for his valuable recollections of the proceedings.

20. M.R. Dohan, "The Economic Origins of Soviet Autarky, 1927/28-1934," Slavic Review, Vol. 35, No. 4 (December 1976), 603-635.
21. On the German art sales of 1929-1932 see: Kunstwerke aus den Beständen Leningrader Museen und Schlosser; zweiter Teil (R. Lepke Haus, Berlin, June 4-5, 1929); Kupferstiche des XV. bis XVIII Jahrhunderts (C.G. Boerner, Leipzig, May 6-9, 1930); Alte Handzeichnungen des XVI bis XVIII Jahrhunderts aus der Eremitage in Leningrad und aus anderen staatlichen Sammlungen der Sowjet-Union (C.G. Boerner, Leipzig, April 29, 1931); Sammlung Stroganoff, Leningrad (R. Lepke Haus, Berlin, May 1931); Handzeichnungen alter Meister aus den Beständen der Eremitage in Leningrad (C.G. Boerner, Leipzig, May 4, 1932). The Van Eyck prices are given in the object file, archives, Metropolitan Museum of Art. The quotation is from Burlington Magazine, 63 (August 1933), p. 53.

22. Archives, Philadelphia Museum of Art.
23. "Official Report," p. 7530; Duveen testified on May 9, 1935.
24. On the 1931 Day Galleries sales, see the New York Times, January 3, p. 3; January 28, p. 14; February 8, p. 6; February 27, p. 4; February 28, p. 12; March 1, 1931, p. 2; also Art News, "Romanov Sale nets \$69,136," 29 (March 7, 1931), p. 19.
25. "Dr. Julius Hammer and his Russian Enterprises," December 1, 1931 (probably by Robert F. Kelley), U.S. Department of State, RG 59, 800.00B Heiman, Julius. A. Hammer, The Quest for the Romanov Treasure (N.Y., 1932), pp. 211-218. B. Considine, The Remarkable Life of Dr. Armand Hammer (N.Y.: Harper, 1975), pp. 73-74.
26. Raymond H. Geist, U.S. Consul, Berlin, to John E. Kehl, U.S. Consul, Hamburg, January 5, 1932; U.S. Department of State, RG 59, 800.00B, Heiman, Julius. Hammer's letter to Roosevelt is in 800.51 W89 GB/761. On the tax case see "Allied American Corporation, Petitioner, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent, 25 U.S. Board of Tax Appeals Reports," pp. 1276-1282 (Docket No. 31704). Hammer also wrote his friend Senator Henry F. Hollis, then living in Paris, that he had "sold my European interests" and "being too young to retire" wished to devote himself to a "worthy political movement," namely, the

election of Roosevelt as President of the United States; Hollis in turn wrote Louis Howe, a Roosevelt adviser, that Hammer was a "remarkable man" and "the advice of Dr. Hammer regarding affairs in Russia and the best way to deal with the present government would be extremely valuable." Also in 800.51 W89 GB/761.

27. A.M. Stein, "The Story of the Hammer Collection of Russian Imperial Treasures," N.Y. Evening Post, January 3, 1933; also the Lord and Taylor sale catalogue, "The Hammer Collection of Russian Imperial Art Treasures from the Winter Palace, Tsarskoye Selo, and other Royal Palaces" (N.Y. 1933), in the papers of Lilian Pratt, Virginia Museum, Richmond.
28. Zatzenstein's remark was reported to the Metropolitan Museum of Art from Amsterdam in a letter of June 1, 1933; Museum archives.