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THE U.S.S.R. AND THE SOURCES OF SOVIET POLICY

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INTRODUCTION

This collection of papers is drawn from contributions to a series of seminars on "The U.S.S.R. and the Sources of Soviet Policy" held in Washington, D.C. between April 14 and May 19, 1978 under the joint sponsorship of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies of The Wilson Center.

Ambassador George F. Kennan gave the impetus to the seminars in a speech delivered before the Council on Foreign Relations on November 22, 1977, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the publication of his "X" article in Foreign Affairs on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct". In his speech, Ambassador Kennan regretted that the current debates over Soviet policies and intentions often produce more heat than light in spite of the fact that a quantity of new information on the U.S.S.R. has become available in recent years. He stressed the need for policy makers and scholars to confront and assess these data, and to integrate their conclusions into their conception of the U.S.S.R. today. Finally, Ambassador Kennan recommended that the fruits of such an assessment be made available through seminars, in which recognized experts would present authoritative briefings for the benefit of American opinion leaders from various professions, parties and factions.

With the generous support of The Ford Foundation, six seminars took place under the chairmanship of Ambassador Kennan and Mr. Winston Lord, President of the Council on Foreign Relations. The twelve papers included in this collection represent the highlights of these sessions. Since the character of these papers was defined in good measure by the charge to their authors, a word on this subject is in order. First, the various experts were asked to condense the large body of pertinent information on their subject into concise presentations. This inevitably involved a loss in detail for which the authors cannot be held responsible. Second, the contributors were asked to concentrate on long-term developments and prospects, rather than the immediate concerns of the moment, however pressing they may be. Third, the expert briefers were asked to direct their presentation toward a highly knowledgeable but non-specialized audience of opinion leaders and policy makers, rather than fellow specialists. Each paper was thus intended to serve as a basis for the discussions among the various seminar participants, as well as an independent statement on the given subject.

All the briefings were considered "on the record" and were made available in typescript at each session. Since they were not intended for a mass audience, however, the papers will not be published in book form. Instead, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Kennan Institute are making a selection of the papers available in this less permanent format. Additional copies are available upon request from either institution.

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The U.S.S.R. and the USA

by

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Let me begin with an historical review of U.S.-Soviet relations rather than plunge into such immediate questions as Shaba province and Ethiopia. In considering the appropriate point at which to begin such a review, I think it best to restrict ourselves primarily to the Brezhnev period, beginning in 1964, since the main features of the present situation date from that era. When Brezhnev's regime, or the collective leadership, came to power, it faced four problems: first, the new problem of China and the threat that that country posed to the Soviet Union; second, the more traditional problem of relations with the Western powers, including the United States; third, the problem of military inferiority in the strategic realm; and fourth, the economic weaknesses of the Soviet Union and their impact upon Soviet foreign policy, primarily through the issue over the importation of technology and the establishment of economic credit.

It is well to begin our review with the China problem, because we cannot evaluate Soviet-American relations without reference to it. They do, after all, evolve in a geo-political context, and one of the primary features of that context is the military and territorial vulnerability of the Soviet Union along its border with China.

One of the chief characteristics of Brezhnev's regime and of Brezhnev himself is that they have taken this problem seriously. They have accepted the split in ideology and the split between the two parties; they have treated China as a rival power rather than a contending Communist party. In fact, they have taken China so seriously that in the dissident literature both Amalrik and Solzhenitsyn felt compelled to warn the Soviet leaders of the dangers of what they perceived to be a policy that was obsessed by China and which in fact could lead to a war. Indeed, a main feature of Brezhnev's policy has been a persistent build-up of Soviet military power opposite China. Soviet strength has been roughly quadrupled from about 12 understrength divisions to around 48 divisions of varying strength. This represents an enormous change from 1964. By 1969 this improvement in the Soviet military capability became a part of Soviet diplomacy.

It is worth remembering that the present border talks that were agreed upon in 1969 grew out of the crisis of that summer, which some people believe involved the possibility of a serious clash of arms, if not outright and deliberate Soviet military intervention in China. The point I want to make is that the Soviets have felt during this period that they were confronted on two fronts, both East and West, and that their problems in the West were related to their problems in the East. Recently Brezhnev, in his address in Vladivostok during his Far Eastern tour, said: "It is no secret that both to the West and to the East of our frontiers there are forces which are interested in the arms race and in working up an atmosphere of fear and hostility." What I find rather
intriguing about that remark is that it links together these two separate forces to the East and West as if they were, in effect, one strategic problem. Surely, I believe, one of the nightmares of Brezhnev's foreign policy has been the possibility that a coalition or combination of forces would be achieved between his two principal opponents, the Chinese on the one hand and the United States and Western Europe on the other.

This leads us to the second aspect of Soviet diplomacy in this period between 1964 and roughly 1974: the settlement that the Soviet Union achieved in Europe by means of the treaties signed with Willy Brandt. If we had to pick a period for the beginning of detente, it would not be, in my view, the Nixon summit, but August 12, 1970, and the signing of the Soviet-West German treaty. The language of this treaty still seems striking, when we consider that from about 1946 until 1970 the Soviets devoted a great deal of their attention and energy to demanding that the West recognize the results of the Second World War, or as they would often say, to draw a line under it. That treaty included the following provisions, among others: "[The parties] undertake to respect without restriction the territorial integrity of all states in Europe within their present frontiers. They declare that they have no territorial claims against anybody nor will they assert any such claims in the future. They regard today and shall in the future regard the frontiers of all states in Europe as inviolably such as they are on the date of signature of the present treaty."

Viewed in historical perspective, this document was quite an accomplishment for Soviet diplomacy. The treaty said in effect that the division of Germany is legitimate; that the division of Europe, at least as far as the territorial questions were concerned, would be permanent. The effect of this 1970 treaty was to make it incumbent upon the three Western powers to reach some kind of agreement with the USSR on Berlin, because the West German government had applied a linkage in which the ratification of the Soviet treaty could be achieved only if it were to be preceded by a Berlin agreement. That Berlin agreement, the first phase of which was reached in September, 1971, had an interesting aspect: the breakthrough in those negotiations occurred in August of 1971, which was one month after the visit of Henry Kissinger to Peking. I simply make the point that the two strands of Soviet foreign policy were to some degree coordinated in this period leading to the onset of what might be called "detente."

It is also interesting that it was at this time, in the summer of 1970, that the Soviets made the proposal, which was not accepted, that the United States join with the Soviet Union in an agreement to prevent accidental and provocative attacks by third powers. The anti-Chinese thrust of this proposal was obvious.

There seems to be a fairly clear trend in Soviet strategy in this period, e.g., to achieve some quiescence on the Western frontier while simultaneously improving the military situation, and at the same time
engaging in a dialogue of some kind on the Eastern frontier, so as to assure that the USSR was involved in the triangular diplomacy that had begun in 1971.

Two other aspects ought to be mentioned about Soviet policy in this period. First, the economic aspect. It has almost always been one of the theories of American policy that economics would provide some key to the evolution of Soviet-American relations. In fact, there have been two contending views on this. The first view held that economic relations should precede political settlements so as to soften the Soviet attitude and to create an atmosphere in which political settlements could be negotiated. The second view held that economic relations should be held out as a carrot, a reward to be conferred after a political settlement had been reached. It was this second view that the Nixon administration adopted. Having done so, it then discovered that it could not deliver the promised carrot when the time came. Indeed, the resulting backlash represented by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and the Stevenson Amendment proved to be the first of several setbacks to the line that was being pursued by Henry Kissinger on the one hand and by Brezhnev on the other.

Events since then have created a major paradox. The U.S. went into this period of détente with the view that economics could be used as an incentive or reward. Even though the particular economic carrot has now been withdrawn by the U.S., the Soviets have continued to draw economic benefits from a political détente in Europe to such a degree that it has now become as important to Western economies as it is to the Soviet Union. The following lines from Helmut Schmidt's Alastair Buchan Lecture to the ISS indicate this: "In 1975, for instance, due to the world recession, German exports dropped by almost four percent in nominal terms, whereas the exports to the Soviet rose by 46 percent, thus making a valuable contribution towards improved use of capacities and a better employment situation in my country." So we have reached a point where it is no longer clear whether it is the West or the East that benefits most from the economic relation or whether it gives either side any particular leverage vis-à-vis the other.

Let us turn now to the military aspect of our relations with the USSR. Despite many warnings over the period of the late 1960s and early 1970s that we were approaching or had already entered a period strategic parity, it seems to me that this period actually resulted in some disorientation and confusion. First, we witnessed at that time a lashing out against the SALT agreements, which were scarcely the heart of the problem. Second, we witnessed a lashing out at the internal character of the Soviet regime, and especially its internal repression. The idea that we would reward Moscow with economic credits became less and less acceptable to Congress and to the public at large. Added to this was the belief (which I do not consider well founded) that the Soviets had somehow instigated the Middle East war of 1973 or had at least deliberately failed to warn the U.S., and thus violated one of the principles that had been signed at the summit in 1972.
In any case, the military dimension of the relationship has come increasingly to the fore so that at present it has become the predominant problem to many observers. The curious phenomena is that from the Soviet viewpoint many of the aspects of this military "problem" are the results of unilateral American decisions rather than Soviet-American agreements or Soviet deeds. For example, the gap in megatonnage and the gap in missile throw-weight is usually cited as an example of disparities. But this is in fact a result of decisions made by Secretary McNamara long before the Soviet program began to take shape.

The Soviets would argue that, despite these indicators, if one considers the trend in warheads and deliverable weapons since 1969, the United States has in fact increased its lead enormously. Moreover, the complaints about the imbalance in Central Europe, which the Russians regard in part at least as a political issue stemming from their own special position in that region, must sound strange to the Soviets when they consider the fact that the gross national product of the NATO countries is vastly greater than the gross national product of the Warsaw Pact nations. Even in military manpower NATO and Warsaw Pact forces are roughly equal. Nonetheless, there are implicit limits on the number of U.S. troops stationed in Europe, just as there are on the size of the West German army, and on the number of British forces that are stationed or could be stationed in Germany. Similarly, the French position contains several aspects that are vexing to the U.S. Again, the Soviet remind us that these are Western problems not totally created by the Soviet Union.

Even in naval forces, the Russians must feel a certain puzzlement. They might reasonably claim that comparisons of the number of ships that do not take into account that the USSR in coming years will face the same problem of bloc obsolescence that we did. Hence, they feel, the simple comparison does not accurately reflect the balance of power.

Nevertheless, there has been a relentless increase in Soviet military power, and the Soviet view is that they were entitled to this build-up, that it is a right that comes with being a superpower and also that the imbalances that have been created are not totally of their own making. Indeed, if we take the CIA analysis of military spending by the United States and the Soviet Union in dollars over the last ten years, the amounts are almost exactly the same. The difference, of course, is that a large share of our resources went into Vietnam. But again, from the Soviet viewpoint, this is not a situation which the USSR created.

This brings me to a final factor and one that is difficult to evaluate, namely the lack of consensus in the West on how to deal with the Soviet Union and the benefits that Soviet diplomacy has gained from this lack of consensus. Indeed, there seems to be a schizophrrenia in the West. On the one hand, there is considerable alarm
about the Soviet military position, but on the other hand, there seems to be a reluctance to engage in a counter buildup of military power, or even to limit the export of the relevant technology. There is certainly a desire to implement the provisions of the Helsinki agreement, both in letter and spirit, but there is also a reluctance to press such issues very hard. There is support for SALT in the United States and Europe, but there also seems to be about an equal concern that SALT will somehow compound our own strategic problems and lead to a change in the military balance. Finally, there is some sense of alarm over Africa, but there is no accepted strategy on how to deal with it. In short, the present seems to be a very confusing period.

In the United States, we have no sure sense of what we wish to accomplish in our relations with the Soviet Union. On the Soviet side there must also be uncertainties compounded by the certain knowledge that there will be a change of leadership in the not-too-distant future. Moreover, these Soviet uncertainties about their own leadership may be matched by Soviet apprehensions over the U.S. In the six years since the 1972 summit, they have dealt with three different Presidents. President Nixon could not deliver on the economic agreement that was struck after the 1972 summit. President Ford could not deliver on the Vladivostok agreement of 1974. And then in 1977, with a new administration, the Soviets were given indications that the U.S. was embarking on a different approach to U.S.-Soviet relations, first, in its new emphasis on human rights, and second, in its attitude towards SALT.

Let me conclude by saying what I think the current prospects are, given all these uncertainties. The choices that are available to the United States seem to me to be four. First, we always have the choice to do nothing. In listing this I do not mean to be sarcastic. This may in fact be the preferred option. There is something to be said for a deliberate policy of watching and waiting on account of the Soviet leadership problem.

Second, we could return to a more aggressive pursuit of detente, that is, push ahead with the SALT agreement with or without a summit meeting. A strong argument for such a policy at this time is that it might be more prudent to reach agreements that could be signed and sealed with Brezhnev rather than to wait and gamble on the attitude of his successor.

Third, we could move toward a more confrontational posture. The argument that is often made in defense of this possibility is that we cannot deal with the Soviet Union except from a position of strength, and that strength has been waning and must be rebuilt if we are to have a reasonable relationship.

Finally, there is the most likely outcome, which is a mix of all of these, with elements of confrontation coexisting with elements of a relaxation of tension. But in the longer term it seems to me that we
have to deal with the problem of what we would gain should we be forced or should we choose to go into a new phase of military competition with the Soviet Union. I would like to conclude this presentation by asking what would we expect to get out of such a policy vis-à-vis the USSR if it were actually adopted? Would we be back to the proposition that began these meetings, or at least the original view of George Kennan, that over a period of time Soviet policy can be contained? Could we then expect any evolution in Soviet thinking, and if so, what?

I believe that this remains the central question that we must ask: whether the U.S. should seek a policy of detente, a policy of confrontation, or some mixture of the two.
The U.S.S.R. and the Third World

by

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This paper is designed as a briefing on Soviet policy toward the Third World. In compiling this brief review I have tried to accomplish four things:

- to describe a few of the Soviet experiences that have shaped the diverse Soviet policies and involvements in the Third World
- to discuss Soviet economic and military programs in the Third World
- to discuss briefly the recent Soviet/Cuban involvement in the Horn of Africa; and
- to draw some conclusion as to the nature of current Soviet policy toward the Third World.

I have not addressed U.S. relations with the Third World or attempted to describe an appropriate U.S. response to Soviet activities.

Past Soviet Experiences with the Third World

Soviet policy toward and engagement in the Third World has roots in Russian imperial history and in the early Soviet period. Ideology and State interests have competed for dominance in determining the course of Soviet policies. But it is not within the scope of this study or my competence to search in Russian history for clues to Soviet motives for projecting power into the Third World. Instead, I shall consider the manner in which Soviet experiences in the Third World since the mid-1950s might have conditioned Soviet policies of today.

After World War II the Soviets sought opportunities to take advantage of the dissolution of the colonial empires. Lenin had led them to expect not only an embrace from the former colonies but a significant trembling in the metropoles. The first major Soviet efforts in the Third World were eminently "Khrushchevian"--innovative, personalized, ideologically justified, ill-conceived and ultimately failures. The Soviets' successful entry into Nasser's Egypt coincided with the new opportunities that emerged from the Bandung Conference (1955). Khrushchev recognized these opportunities at the 20th Party Congress (1956) saying that "the disintegration of the imperialist colonial system is a postwar development of world historical significance." In the next decade Khrushchev professed
to see the emergence of "national democratic states," mainly in Africa and Asia, headed by "progressive" or "revolutionary democratic" leaders who were not yet socialist but were perceived to be on the track toward socialist development. These charismatic leaders were honored in Moscow and their nations received the first significant Soviet economic assistance and military aid.

In the 1960s the Soviets received one disappointment after another: from the Congo crisis, to the disintegration of the "Casablanca bloc" (Guinea, Chana, Mali, Morocco, and the UAR) and the ouster or shift in orientation of most of the "revolutionary democrats." Moreover, Soviet aid paled before programs of the U.S. and the former "metropoles". Their first parries into the Third World were inept and based on naive premises. The Soviets--like the U.S.--learned that the course of events in post colonial Africa and Asia was unpredictable, that their own ability to transform assistance into influence was limited, and that nationalism, economic and political underdevelopment and residual Western traditions in these new societies imposed major obstacles to Soviet objectives.

The second major experience that shaped Soviet policies toward the Third World was the split with China. As the break with Peking developed, Moscow sought to buttress its relations in the rest of Asia. India eventually became the centerpiece of that strategy after the Soviet split with China. During 20 years a relationship has developed with India that has been useful to both countries. By far the largest recipient of Soviet aid and one of the largest buyers of Soviet arms, India has managed effectively its dealings with the Soviets, who have grown to live with India's independence. The Soviets not only failed to promote Communism in India, but they have come to prefer an independent, non-aligned India to another giant Communist competitor on the Asian continent. If the break with Peking led Moscow to establish a balanced state-to-state relationship with India, it also gave impetus to Soviet efforts to compete with China nearly everywhere else in the Third World. The containment of Chinese influence has been one of the major objectives and motivating factors in determining Soviet policy toward the Third World.

The third set of experiences that shaped the Soviet view of the future arose from Soviet involvement in Cuba and Vietnam. Like Korea in an earlier period, the threat or reality of U.S. military engagement in both cases imposed special constraints on Moscow. Indeed, the prospect or the actuality of U.S. military action was perhaps the critical factor in the Soviet approach to such "national liberation struggles." At the same time, the experiences in Cuba and Vietnam underlined for Moscow the fact that their only effective tool for gaining influence in the Third World was probably military assistance and arms transfer.
From more than fifteen years' contact with Castro, Moscow must have derived at least two important lessons:

1) that large scale military support to a revolutionary regime that is under fire can bring significant political influence, but the sustenance of such a regime can be costly in economic terms (over $9.9 billion since 1961).

2) that the revolutionary and ideological zeal of a client Communist state can both be troublesome for Soviet policy (Fidelismo in Latin America and the missile crisis in the 1960s) and supportive (in Africa and the non-aligned in the 1970s) of it.

Whatever problems have existed in the relationship, it is clear that Cuba over the past decade and a half has unlocked a number of doors for the Soviets in the Third World. Cuba became the first and only major revolutionary/Communist regime in the Third World and received full Soviet support for the development of its socialist programs. Moreover, it became an effective and consistent supporter for the Soviets in the non-aligned movement through which many key decisions in international organizations are influenced and even determined. Finally, Cuba helped reactivate Soviet participation in African affairs and, most important, provided the combat troops to make the military involvement effective. Clearly, then, the Soviets would like to find and support a few more Cubas; not too many, however, since it is understood in Moscow that such ventures can be costly.

The Soviets probably had the cost of the Cuban experience in mind when they moved so cautiously with the Allende Government in Chile. By the time Allende became President of Chile (November 1970), the Soviets had dropped their pretension to being the guiding force and guarantor of Communist parties or the radical left in Latin America. Allende needed economic assistance on a large scale to survive. His quandary offered the Soviets a unique opportunity to demonstrate that Marxist parties could come to power peacefully and yet would be supported by Soviet economic might.

Yet for all this, Soviet economic aid to Allende was minimal. Nor did the Soviets embrace him ideologically, choosing to refer only to Chile's "revolutionary renovation" or "radical reconstruction" rather than to its "socialist transformation."

The final irony of the Soviet decision not to support the Unidad Popular was that during the very year (1973) that Allende was overthrown by Pinochet, the Soviets were preparing to embrace warmly the return of Juan Peron as president of Argentina. No contemporary figure so epitomized the Latin American strong man of the Right. But the Soviets clearly saw in Peron a man with whom they could work, and one who could give them a role in one of the potentially wealthiest nations of the Third World. Peron,
after all, had a reputable background of independence from the U.S., and presented no ideological challenge to Soviet policy. It was not surprising, therefore, that he sought Soviet help in establishing an economic and trade relationship between Argentina and the USSR. Within a short time, Soviet offers of credits and cooperation to Argentina exceeded those offered by the USSR to Allende. Indeed, Argentina under Peron became the largest recipient of Soviet aid in the Western Hemisphere after Cuba.

The fourth complex of experiences that has given a special cast to Soviet policies has been the Middle East. If the major Soviet security concerns lay to the East and West, the major area for the expansion of political and economic influence and for superpower competition in the Third World has been the Middle East. In the 1973 war, the Soviets were able to respond to Arab requests with an airlift of supplies and arms that compared favorably in terms of speed and dependability with what the United States could have done. Over 800 military support flights were flown to Egypt and other Arab nations. This was a new, more muscular manifestation of the Soviet Union's capacity and readiness to behave like the other superpower.

Finally, the most important factor in the development of Soviet attitudes toward the Third World has been the United States. The initial Soviet thrust into the Third World was trade in order to prevent the U.S. from drawing these newly emerging states into a system of anti-Soviet alliances. The Soviets developed a large scale navy that was intended, in the first instance, to counter U.S. attack carriers and nuclear submarines. By the late 1960s, however, the expanding navy had taken on an additional rationale and had become an important factor in the Soviet presence in the Third World. More important, the entire shape of Soviet programs for developing countries increasingly resembled U.S. bilateral programs--lucrative arms sales to steady customers, selectivity in bilateral economic assistance and emphasis on trade opportunities.

One aspect of Soviet economic policy toward the Third World that has not developed along the lines of U.S. policy is in the area of multilateral and institutional ties. The most remarkable phenomenon of the past decade has been the degree to which international financial institutions (IMF, IBRD, UNDP and regional banks), multinationals (banks and corporations) and international organizations (OPEC, UNCTAD, GATT, WHO, FAO, commodity groups, etc.) have dominated the outlook energies and development of the Third World. The non-warring Third World states whose borders are relatively stable deal with the dominant issues of the day (food, energy, development, trade, technology, health, education) not bilaterally with the superpowers but through an expanding international network in which the Soviet Union is inactive and largely irrelevant.
If the Soviets failed to follow the U.S. lead toward the internationalization of development programs and if they failed to commit significant resources to Third World economic development, they perhaps learned too well from our military sales and assistance programs. The most disturbing aspect of Soviet relations with the Third World today is their readiness to transfer significant quantities of military equipment buttressed by advisers and, in two recent cases, Cuban combat troops. It is in this area that Soviet policy has become most threatening and destabilizing.

**Soviet Programs and Presence in the Third World**

One method of gauging Soviet involvement in the Third World is to measure the expansion of Soviet diplomatic relations, the increase in military and economic assistance, and the growing number of technicians placed in developing countries. This "penetrationist" school of Sovietology holds that the growth of Soviet presence has resulted in a comparable increase in Soviet influence and power. What the "penetrationists" do not usually measure, however, is the comparable growth in the presence of other powers or the increasing capacity of Third World states to control Soviet inputs and manage or mismanage their own affairs.

Rather than present such statistics, let us look instead at the cumulative totals of Soviet economic and military assistance over the last ten to twenty-five years. Between 1954 and 1976 the USSR extended a total of $11,800 billion in economic assistance, $6.7 billion of it in the last ten years (Table I). From a base of $291 million in 1967, the value of Soviet aid commitments peaked at $1.2 billion in 1971 and again in 1975, but dropped to $390 million by 1977. Actual drawdowns on these agreements have remained remarkably constant for a decade: between $300-$700 million per annum. Of the nearly $12 billion in Soviet aid extended since 1954, only about $7 billion has actually been used by recipient countries. (Cuba has received $10 billion since 1961.)

Compare these modest figures to the scale of international lending. In 1977 alone, loans to less developed countries were as follows: World Bank, $7.3 billion; other regional banks (ADF, ADB, and IADB), $2.3 billion; U.S. commercial banks, $52.3 billion; and U.S. bilateral assistance, $5.6 billion. As the resource flow to the Third has expanded enormously over the last decade buttressed by the increased wealth of the oil exporting states, Soviet participation in this growth has been marginal and, except in a few countries, unnoticed.

Although instructive, these overall figures do not answer the fundamental question of just how much influence the ruble has bought. Excluding Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea, a look at the top 20 recipients of the Soviet economic assistance since 1954 gives an indication of the relationship between lasting friendship
and the ruble (Table II). Among the first five recipients, India is non-aligned, while Egypt, Turkey and Iran have close ties with the United States. Afghanistan to now has maintained a non-aligned policy—it is too soon to judge whether Afghanistan's new leadership will desire to preserve their country's balanced approach to international affairs. Algeria (6), Iraq (7) and Syria (9) have good relations with Moscow, but could hardly be considered Soviet pawns. No. 11 is Argentina, which stands ahead of Chile (12) for the various reasons discussed earlier. Other countries on the list, such as Somalia (14), Indonesia (15), and Ghana (40), are symbolic of traumatic reverses in Soviet relations with the developing world.

What is most evident in the pattern of recent Soviet economic assistance, however, has been the emphasis on developing closer economic ties with neighboring countries or countries in the near periphery, particularly in South Asia and the Arab World. Similarly, the role of ideology in economic ties has been deemphasized over the past decade. At the 25th CPSU congress in 1976, Kosygin announced that Soviet cooperation with developing countries should take the form of a "stable and mutually advantageous division of labor." The purpose of such a policy was not just to win political and ideological influence. It was to establish long-term economic relations and broaden the base of Soviet economic relations with the world.

The Soviets have learned that economic investments in nations with ideologically compatible leaders does not always prove effective. Moreover, the proximity to the USSR of some nations offered opportunities for longer term, more stable economic relations even when those states were capitalist-oriented. At the same time, it is clear that the Soviets also hope that by establishing more stable economic relations with such countries as India, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, etc., hostilities could eventually be diminished and perhaps greater political (even ideological) compatibility achieved.

While Soviet economic assistance has been a relatively minor and stable factor in the evolution of Soviet efforts to seek influence in the Third World, their military programs and arms transfers have expanded steadily. Table 3 indicates that the value of Soviet military agreements have increased progressively over the past decade from $525 million in 1967 to over $4 billion last year. The value of arms deliveries grew from $500 million to $3 billion over the same period. The record of Soviet arms transfers is a reliable measure for determining the USSR's relationship with developing states. Out of the top 20 recipients of Soviet arms over the past decade (Table IV), the obvious candidates -- Vietnam (1), Cuba (9), and North Korea (8) all appear in the top ten. Others in the group, including Syria (3), Iraq (4), Libya (6) and Algeria (10), have close relations with Moscow and generally support Soviet positions. Only Egypt (2), India (5) and Iran (7) have either non-aligned or have closer ties with the United States.
In the second group of ten, the list of recipient countries presents a more varied picture. Among these are China (11), Somalia (13), Peru (14), Nigeria (17), Sudan (18), Uganda (19) and Guinea (20), most of which have distanced themselves from the Soviet Union. Only Angola (12), North Vietnam (15) and perhaps now Afghanistan (10), could be said to be close to the Soviets.

In 1976, the Soviet bloc had over 10,000 military technicians in Third World countries, less than 10 percent of these were from Eastern Europe—the rest from the Soviet Union. Most of these technicians were concentrated in Iraq, Syria, Algeria and Somalia. Increasingly, military personnel from Third World countries are receiving training in the Soviet Union. In 1976 over 4,000 persons were so trained, the largest group of them coming from the countries indicated above, plus Libya and Tanzania.

Soviet arms agreements in 1977 were up considerably over 1976. A major increment, of course, came from Soviet sales to Addis Ababa of over $800 million, but lucrative agreements were reached also with Algeria, India, Libya and Syria—deals which together came to nearly three and one-half billion dollars. The main recipients of Soviet military assistance have been in the Middle East, South Asia and, more recently, sub-Saharan Africa. The only significant recipient of Soviet military assistance in Latin America has been Peru, where the Soviets continue to emphasize military sales at a time when Peru is practically bankrupt and needs economic support which it can seek only in the West.

Soviet Involvement in the Horn of Africa

Angola was the first example of the most recent Soviet tactic in the Third World. There, the Soviets—together with the Cubans—dramatically shifted the balance of power in 1975 by providing significant material and combat support for Neto's MPLA. In less than two months the combination of Cuban troops and heavy Soviet military aid turned the tide in favor of Neto and permitted him to establish control in most of that country.

We next saw the Soviet-Cuban formula applied in Ethiopia: a development which needs to be seen, however, against the complex background of the Soviet presence and role in Somalia. Over a decade, the Soviet Union provided more than a billion dollars worth of weapons and technical assistance in Somalia, in the process creating the military force which enabled Siad Barre to prepare and carry out the infiltration and subsequent invasion of the Ogaden. After 1976, however, the Soviets thought that the Mengistu revolutionary regime in Ethiopia might be added to Somalia as a client in the Horn. Mengistu's Ethiopia was ideologically attractive to the Soviets, perhaps reminding them of
Castro's Cuba after the fall of Batista. After all it presented the picture of a revolutionary leader preparing to reconstruct the social order of his country along radical lines using military force, and in an atmosphere of siege.

Somali irredentism over the Ogaden, however, had been a source of tension for decades, and ultimately proved to be the stumbling block for Soviet policy in Somalia. Late in the summer of 1977, the Soviet government tried to dissuade the Somalis from large scale incursions into Ethiopia and sought to reduce the chances for open military conflict between the two countries.

This tardy Soviet effort failed. After having been ejected from Somalia, the Soviets turned their full support to Ethiopia which had broken its military relationship with the U.S. In responding to Mengistu's plea for assistance against invasion from Somalia, the Soviets abandoned for the moment any hopes of retaining a presence in both countries. In the latter part of 1977, the Soviets supported the government of Ethiopia with a large scale air and sea lift, sustained over a period lasting several months. This operation, which involved more than a billion dollars' worth of sophisticated military equipment and tanks, together with an infusion of 10-15,000 Cuban combat troops, turned the tide of the military campaign. A notable feature of the effort (not seen in Angola) included the establishment of a Soviet command structure to coordinate the logistics and possibly the tactical movements of both ground and air elements of the Cuban and Ethiopian forces.

So much has been written about the aggressiveness of Soviet policy in the Horn of Africa that any further recitation here will add little. Soviet involvement in Ethiopia was not uninhibited adventurism, however. Indeed, it can be said that Soviet policy displayed some self-limiting elements. The Soviet government did apparently seek to dissuade the Somalis from invading the Ogaden. Moreover, the Soviets did not encourage and may have counseled against Ethiopian and Cuban troops crossing the border into Somalia. Also, large scale retribution against the Somali population in the Ogaden has not yet taken place, although we do not know whether Soviet advice in any way responsible for this. Finally, the Soviets and the Cubans thus far seem to be reluctant to commit their own personnel to military operations in Eritrea, and have called for a political solution to the secession problem there. The Soviets will probably not restrain their Ethiopian clients, but the question is whether they and the Cubans will choose to remain aloof.

There is some evidence that Soviet policy in black Africa operates under a loose Organization of African Unity constraint in the sense that it aims for, and is perhaps limited by, the need to establish legitimacy in the eyes of other regional powers. Hence, the Soviets have deliberately sought to avoid involvements which
would open them to the charge of participating in the adjustment of African boundaries by force. Naturally, then, the Soviets follow closely the lead of the front line states on the Zimbabwe and Namibia issues.

To conclude, looking at Soviet objectives and intentions in the region, one can draw certain tentative conclusions:

(1) As early as 1976, the Soviets had seen in the Mengistu revolutionary government an ideologically promising regime which might help establish their presence in Africa.

(2) Once the USSR was ejected from Somalia, Soviet support for Ethiopia was kept within limits consistent with OAU policies on territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders.

(3) Soviet operations in Ethiopia vividly demonstrate their possession of a logistical force and command structure which, in conjunction with Cuban manpower, can be used to intervene in politico-military disputes far from the Soviet homeland. This indicates to the U.S. and others that the Soviet Union regards itself as a superpower and is prepared to enjoy the prerogatives of a superpower whose interests are far flung and which must be accommodated in the resolution of regional conflicts it deems important to its own interests.

(4) The Soviets and Cubans now appear to be determined to retain a large military presence in Ethiopia in order to serve as a prop for the Mengistu government, and presumably to help in shaping the course of Ethiopia's internal development, as they have been doing in the case of Angola. Conceivably, as noted above, the Soviets hope to develop a relationship with Ethiopia rather like that which they have had for so long with Cuba. Yet it must be stressed that the Mengistu is not Fidel, and the size, diversity, and massive needs of Ethiopia will present the Soviet leadership with a formidable and perhaps overwhelming challenge.

Conclusions - Current Soviet Policy

Several conclusions appear justified from the foregoing:

The diverse, opportunistic and erratic character of Soviet involvement in the Third World suggests no basic commitment to Third World development or to a comprehensive engagement with Third World problems.

The force driving the projection of Soviet power into the Third World flows from Soviet state interests in a secure periphery and in assuming both the role and image of a superpower. In Africa the Soviets are responding to perceived opportunities to expand their influence.
Ideology, too, is a factor. The generally opportunistic approach of the USSR to the Third World and failure to engage in the "North-South dialogue" seems conditioned in part by Lenin's predictions that the crisis of imperialism arises out of the breakdown of relations between colonies and the metropoles. Naturally, then, the Soviets do not see themselves as party to this and hence that they have a relatively free hand. It is worth stressing that in such cases as Cuba, Vietnam and perhaps Ethiopia, where the state and ideological interests of the USSR coincide and reinforce one another, Soviet commitment and activity is apt to be particularly high.

The Soviet decision to remain outside the major international financial and trade institutions and programs for resource transfers severely limits the capacity of the USSR to influence and shape events in much of the Third World. This is particularly true in the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia. Although the Soviets may find it in their economic and political interests to become involved bilaterally in developmental and trade questions, as they have with India and some nations near their borders, they seem disinclined and economically ill-equipped to participate in most international institutions. They must sit out the North-South dialogue because it is precisely in that setting where they are economically outclassed and impeded by their ideology.

The most troublesome aspect of Soviet behavior in the Third World has been, and is likely to continue to be, their efforts to seek influence by stressing arms transfers, military relations and, on occasion, facilitating the introduction of Cuban or other forces into regional conflicts. At least in the short term, military power translates into political influence in parts of Africa. M'gabe and Nkomo, for example, are likely to be more intransigent when bolstered by the formidable and tested Soviet/Cuban force. For the same reason, Neto and Mengistu are likely to become more difficult neighbors. Most serious is the specter of deep racial conflict in Southern Africa in a situation where the front line states are backed by Soviet might. In a crisis situation, moreover, the presence or potential of Soviet power could again play an important, possibly critical, role in the Middle East.

There are also some limits and constraints on Soviet power in the Third World. In those parts of the Third World where economic issues dominate and where borders and regions are relatively stable, Soviet military power is marginal or irrelevant. In Africa, the Soviets are likely to try to be seen as working within political limits which make difficult the development of an OAU consensus against their involvement. To the extent that the Soviet presence become increasingly divisive within the OAU or the use of their power exceeds African tolerance, they risk expulsion or rejection from important regions in Africa. Most important, the great powers have consistently underestimated the capacity of countries in the Third World to assert themselves effectively
against outsiders and to preserve their own national integrity. The developing Arab, non-aligned, and Western concerns over Soviet behavior are likely also to give the Soviets pause.

The Middle East remains for the Soviets the most critical area of interest in the Third World and the one where the potential for superpower confrontation is highest. Indeed, their adventures in Africa, in part, flow from their frustration in not playing a major role in the Middle East. There is a certain logic to the return of Soviet attention to Africa since it is the part of the world in greatest flux. But there is also a paradox in the Soviet return to Africa since it is the scene of the greatest debacles of Soviet policy. Such a volatile environment is likely to cause further setbacks.

An important test for future Soviet effectiveness in Africa will be in Ethiopia. Here, too, the Soviets face a dilemma. Should they be effective in assisting the consolidation of Mengistu's power and the establishment of a Soviet client state on the Cuban model, the Soviets and a revolutionary client will further alarm Ethiopia's neighbors, including Black Africa. The Soviets could become not only a more controversial and feared intruder but they could also find a high cost in assuming some of Ethiopia's economic burden. Should the Soviets not make a major commitment to Ethiopia and seek instead to enlarge their role in Southern Africa they could find themselves in unmanageable conflicts and racial wars and in the process could risk losing their footing in Ethiopia.

In the ebb and flow of conflict and stability in the Third World it is often the perception of the power balance that is as important as the actual application of power or the importance of the conflicts themselves. Soviet perceived successes in the recent years in Angola, Ethiopia and possibly Afghanistan may be ephemeral. But these successes give encouragement to foreign adventures by a conservative Soviet leadership troubled at home and feeling the need to legitimize its ideological credentials abroad; at the same time, they will cause concern among America's allies and friends who are, or consider themselves to be, threatened by Soviet power; moreover, they bring into question the value and terms of detente between the superpowers.
**Table I**

**Soviet Economic Aid to Less Developed Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Extended (US $ Million)</th>
<th>Drawn (US $ Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954-1976</td>
<td>11,769</td>
<td>6,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1976</td>
<td>6,704</td>
<td>4,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1,229</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>390 (prelim)</td>
<td>500 (prelim)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table II**

**Soviet Economic Aid to Developing Countries 1954-1976**

(By order to total value of aid extended)

Total $11,769 million

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. India</td>
<td>1,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Egypt</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Afghanistan</td>
<td>1,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Turkey</td>
<td>1,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Iran</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Algeria</td>
<td>715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Iraq</td>
<td>699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Pakistan</td>
<td>652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Syria</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Bangladesh</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Argentina</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Chile</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Guinea</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Somali</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Indonesia</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Ethiopia</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. North Yemen</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Morocco</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Sri Lanka</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Ghana</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea are not listed because of their special relationship to the Soviet Union.*
### Table III

Soviet Military Agreements and Deliveries To Less Developed Countries (US $ Million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agreements</th>
<th>Deliveries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955-1977</td>
<td>24,875</td>
<td>20,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1977</td>
<td>20,375</td>
<td>16,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>2,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>4,000 (prelim)</td>
<td>3,000 (prelim)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table IV

Soviet Military Arms Transfers To Developing Countries, 1967-76 (By order of total value of transfers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>2,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen (Aden)</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The U.S.S.R. and Ruling Communist Parties

by

Klaus Mehnert

Technical University, Aachen
I would like to present a word of warning, rather than of encouragement. I would ask you to imagine that one day you read in the evening news that Brezhnev and Hua Kuo-feng have met somewhere in Siberia and agreed to coordinate the policies of their two countries.

Vladivostok, whose very name "Ruler of the East" has angered the Chinese for a century, has been renamed "Friendship City"; Seoul has been captured by assault; a road has been cut to the Indian Ocean across Afghanistan, which is now part of the Soviet empire; Finland has been occupied; and other lightning events have taken place within the past twenty-four hours.

This may well seem wildly improbable to you, but I would urge you not to exclude such a possibility. Forty years ago the possibility of a Hitler-Stalin pact seemed equally remote, yet such a pact was reached. Again, during the late 1950's it took us a long time to accept the fact that the Soviet and Chinese were quarreling, just as now it seems equally improbable that someday they might overcome their differences again. Such abrupt changes of direction are not impossible, and must be actively considered if we are not to neglect our responsibilities.

It is not necessary for me to repeat the history of the Sino-Soviet quarrel. You know that between 1949 and 1957 the Soviet Union gave assistance to the Chinese effort to build up that country, but that beginning in 1957 they began to drift apart. By the following year the Chinese had committed themselves to their own style of Communism and the quarrel intensified, climaxing in 1969 with the border fights along the Amur. Sino-Soviet relations have remained more or less on that plateau to the present. The recent news of further border tension thus fits the longer pattern.

Chinese fear of the USSR's presence along their 7,500 kilometer border caused them to turn to the United States in 1971-2. I was among those who were delighted by President Nixon's announcement that Mr. Kissinger had just returned from China and that soon he, the President, was going to visit China, which he did in February, 1972. But since then, much has changed. Now Mao's hatred of the Soviet Union was deep. It arose not so much because of the length of their common border - after all, there are other long borders in the world - but because of Mao's conviction that the Russians had reverted in many respects to what he called "capitalist ways". He probably understood that the industrial manager in the USSR probably enjoys more power over his workers than did his pre-revolutionary predecessor, since the former has the trade union on his side, fighting for management rather than the worker.

Mao, with his fanatical dedication to the idea of equality, was offended by the continuing hierarchical organization of Soviet society. Mao believed that no man should rule another, and that this goal could actually be accomplished through an unending series of revolutions. He believed that the Soviet Union had abandoned this idea in favor of the bureaucratic state, the hierarchical state managed by a self perpetuating new class. The possibility that a similar evolution could occur in other
Communist states, including China, no doubt hardened Mao's determination to resist it. Hence his hostility to the USSR.

Mao's attitude dominated Chinese down to his death in September, 1976. Since then, a new group of men has come to power, bringing with them an outlook that is very far indeed from Mao's. The insistence on creating a new man and the insistence that revolution must come before production was thrown overboard. Chou En-lai's view, expressed in his last great speech in early 1975, that China must become a fully modern industrial nation by the year 2000, is repeated again and again. The old idealism has given way to a new belief in discipline. Exams, which were formerly considered repressive, have been reintroduced into the universities. A red heart is no longer enough. Practically every field is being changed to reflect the new outlook, and even the wage structure is being brought into line.

The new leaders are doers. They want to build a new country. In their own view they are Communists, of course, but they insist on the need to make socialist China powerful, both economically and politically. Hence they are not primarily interested in ideology, which is still important but taken for granted.

All these changes remove the main reason for hating the Soviet Union. It is likely, then, that among the new people are those who say that if the first priority is to build up the country, why should China be kicking the Soviets in the shins every morning and evening? Why should millions of armed Chinese soldiers be kept on the border at enormous expense when the means for developing the country are so limited? Such people could reasonably ask why China should not improve relations with the USSR so that these resources could be directed toward modernizing the country.

To be sure, there are many reasons why this decision has not been taken and why it is not likely to happen today or tomorrow. One could speak of the feud over the islands in the Amur and the Ussuri, and the question of the so-called Kazakevich Channel. There is also the Sino-Soviet competition in the Third World, where the Soviet and Chinese model of socialism are in direct conflict. True, one could imagine the two of them dividing the world much the way the Portuguese and Spaniards did at the end of the 15th century with the help of the Pope, establishing spheres of influence that are still evident on the map of South America.

In spite of these differences, the view that these two world powers, China and the USSR, could not agree to get together again is unwarranted. Surely it would be difficult, given their conflicting ambitions, but we have seen that dramatic shifts can in fact occur. Even if the legacy of the Sino-Soviet split is deep, the primary causes of the schism have been removed. On its side, the Soviet Union has tried for years to patch up its quarrels with China. The document that Pravda published on March 21, 1978, reviewing the various Soviet efforts to settle the problems with China is indicative of this. They have good reason for which to alleviate what they consider to be the Yellow peril on their
border. From Brezhnev down to the last worker, fear of China has become virtually a trauma in Soviet life. They remind us that "we" (e.g., the USSR) are standing guard for you, Germans, Americans, everybody - but they would prefer to deal with the problem by improving relations if at all possible.

Mao taught his comrades from the beginning that one must identify who is enemy number one at any given time, and then try to unite with all others that enemy. When Mao was fighting the Japanese, they were enemy number one and hence he cooperated with Chaing Kai-shek. There were problems, of course, but it should be remembered that it was Mao, acting through Chou En-lai, who freed Chaing Kai-shek in 1936 when he was captured by his own lieutenants. This was not done out of love for Chaing Kai-shek but because Mao was willing to make common cause with him against enemy number one, Japan. The minute Japan was defeated, the enemy number one became Chaing Kai-shek. No sooner was Chaing Kai-shek out of the country than America became the prime enemy with the outbreak of the Korean war. During those years Mao willingly united with anyone who was opposed to the United States. But by the end of the war in Vietnam America had ceased to be the threat that it had been earlier.

Who is China's primary enemy today? In Number 45 of the Peking Review (1978) one finds 35 pages on the evils of the Soviet Union. But as I have noted, this could change, and if it does China's attitude toward America, toward NATO, toward Europe, toward all other countries, will also change.

I find it regrettable that Soviet attitudes toward America have changed so much over the years, since we have to live with them, after all. But all honeymoons must end, meanwhile, America's relations with China are perhaps not on so firm a footing either. Earlier I thought that the United States and China could reach some compromise on the question of Taiwan. Now, however, I feel that a compromise is out of the question. The United States is not going to abandon Taiwan and the Chinese are not about to abandon their claim either. It is not likely that a new relationship could be established with this problem in cold storage, as it were. One step that could usefully be taken would be to abandon the policy of benign neglect that the US has adopted. It costs little to pay attention. You are dealing with very sensitive people, who have been pushed around for a hundred years by the imperialist powers and had pieces of their country torn away and turned into semi colonies. Their sensitivities are understandable, and can be met by taking the Chinese seriously. On your side, you would benefit from knowing which of your policies cause hurt and which do not.

The decisive point regarding the Chinese attitude toward the United States is whether this country is a tiger, as they thought in 1971 and 1972, or a paper tiger, as they are beginning now to suspect. In no other country will you find so much discussion and criticism of every indication of American weakness as in China. The B-1 bomber decision and various other measures have strengthened the Chinese suspicion that
America is a paper tiger, that offers nothing to build upon when the chips are down. China originally made its approach to the United States out of a desire to balance the power of the USSR. Since making this approach, however, the Chinese have come to feel that the weight of the US as reflected in its international determination and prestige is diminishing. Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, and other events have convinced the Chinese that America is no longer what she was in 1971-2.

My great fear is that at some point the Chinese might conclude the following: "We're being spat upon by the whole world for courting the Americans and yet are getting nothing in return. We have not acquired the counterweight to the USSR that we hoped for. Under the circumstances, is it not better to improve our relations with the Soviet Union?" This could be easily accomplished. The Soviets are stretching out their hands, even to the point virtually of apologizing for the most recent border incident. The minute the two parties decide to improve their relations, they could readily sort out their differences in North Korea and even Vietnam and Cambodia, where they could simply declare that the former will look toward Moscow and the latter to Peking. The minute that China and the USSR agree to improve their relations with one another, such issues will be readily resolved, I am confident.
The Internal Role of the Soviet Military

By

Roman Kolkowicz

Center for Arms Control and International Security
University of California, Los Angeles
The Founding Fathers of Marxism-Leninism had only a vague notion about the role of the military in a post-revolutionary society. Although Marx, Engels and Lenin contemplated differing roles for revolutionary armed forces, they were in agreement on one fundamental axiom: "In a communist society no one will even think about a standing army. Why would one need it?" After all, to Lenin "a standing army was an army that is divorced from the people." The idea of a massive, professional, standing army in a post-revolutionary society was considered anathema, a heretical concept that violated fundamental aspects of revolutionary ideology.

The erstwhile revolutionary "heresy" has become the orthodoxy of Soviet politics. Indeed, the Soviet military today is a vast and complex institution whose interests strongly influence and shape much of the country's social, economic and even political life. The military has become a state within a state: it is a primary consumer of scarce resources, of skilled manpower and scientific-technological talent; the military runs a vast educational network that parallels and often excels that of the civilian sector; the military has become a visible and pervasive presence in society through its control of a network of mass voluntary, para-military youth organizations, military preparedness and civil-defense training activities. The military is also strongly represented in the highest decision-making bodies of the Party, the government and economic-planning bodies.

What are the implications of this steady growth of the military's role and influence in the Soviet Union? Does it perhaps suggest an eventual militarization of the Communist Party and government? Is this evidence of a concerted program for war-preparedness and offensive intentions? Are we witnessing the emergence of a garrison state, a nation-in-arms, a modern Sparta in Marxist tunics? Whether our perceptions of internal Soviet political processes were shaped by Cold-War antagonisms or the more benign perceptions and fantasies of detentism, we have rarely concerned ourselves with such questions regarding the military's internal role and influence. We have seen the Red Army essentially as metal eaters, weapon carriers and trigger pullers for the Party. To be sure, several theories and models of Party-military relations had gained some renown in the West. Rather than rehash these rather parochial and scholastic debates, however, I will instead put forth a statement on which most experts agree, namely, that the Soviet military is a vast, powerful institution. On this basis, I shall then proceed to describe some of the roles it plays in the internal life of the state.

The Soviet Union is in many ways an ideal country for the fostering of military values, interests and goals, and for the military to play a vital internal role. The history of Imperial Russia and of the Soviet Union is a tale of conquest, invasions, wars, violence. It is therefore understandable that Russian leaders place a great trust in their military and rely on
it to defend the country from foreign aggression. However, while the military's role as the defender of the country has been clearly understood by one and all, there is much less understanding in the West of the important internal roles of the military. The vast size, the geographic/linguistic/ethnic/racial diversity of Russia had perennially presented administrative and political problems for Moscow, and led to a strong reliance on the military for the maintenance of internal stability, national coherence and the legitimacy of Moscow's authority. The military was considered to be loyal to the center and able to provide the necessary instrument for bureaucratic and political control. The replacement of the imperial autocracy with Bolshevik authoritarianism or totalitarianism did not significantly alter the military's role under communist rule. It was not without effect, however. The military's roles, internal and external, continued to develop and grow, initially in a tacit, subterranean manner suitable to the Stalinist regime; and subsequently in a more open manner, with the military assuming public, social and political roles commensurate with its position in the state.

Some Internal Roles of the Military

The logic and political dynamics of modern "mobilizational" (totalitarian) political systems like the Soviet Union, create overriding preferences for the:

- centralization of political, institutional, economic and military authority;

- standardization of rules, processes, laws, producer/consumer habits and distribution patterns;

- eradication of deviances, diversities and idiosyncrasies that inhibit and constrain standardization-centralization objectives;

- integration of the diverse political, economic and social entities under the ruling Party's banner.

The military had been seen early on by Party leaders as an excellent instrument for the systematic and rapid execution of these primary objectives. Stalin and his successors considered the military an institution that could help eradicate some of the pernicious, entrenched remnants of the bourgeois/imperial past, inculcate desirable habits and patterns in new generations of young people, and assist in a swift integration of the diverse Russian society. Thus, to the evils of ethnicity, regionalism/parochialism, separatism, and traditionalism, the military could counterpose, by means of training, and discipline, the values and policies of Russification, patriotism, communization, centralization, integration and modernization. In other words, the army with its national network of installations, schools, and bases would serve as a school for Communism, and would thus in a short time create the New Soviet Man. And it would achieve all this as a by-product of its primary mission, the defense of the country, and do it economically at that.
The Soviet military indeed performed many of these vital integrative and modernizing functions in the early decades of Soviet history. In recent years the military has expanded both the scope and direction of this educational function by taking a leading role in the inculcation of patriotic and military values among the masses.

The "Militarization" of Society

There are several ways in which the Soviet population becomes exposed to military discipline and war preparedness.

1. Pre-induction military training: The Soviet army combines the advantages of a volunteer army with compulsory military service. The Soviet military establishment encomasses over 3.5 million men in direct active duty, to which we may add other military and para-military components (such as Command Staff, Training Cadres, KGB/MVD militarized units, DOSAAF cadres, etc.) that would bring the total to above 5 million. About one-third of the manpower in the armed forces consists of career officers and NCO's, and the other two-thirds is made up of conscripts under the universal military service law of 1967. Since only about one-half of the 18-year-olds in the manpower pool are inducted into the army, the military seeks to prepare the non-inductees for military/war contingencies through various programs.

The military preparation of the young begins at age 10-15 through the Young Pioneers programs, embracing about 16 million. Members of the next older group are organized through the Komsomol into permanent military detachments of Eaglets (Orlenok) constituting a quasi-militia of 16-18 year-olds. They receive compulsory military training at their secondary schools and through mass-volunteer organizations of DOSAAF. The latter comprises about 40 million people, distributed in about 300,000 primary organizations. The vast majority of instructors in these para-military training programs consists of reserve officers who teach on a full or half-time basis. Some of the training is quite advanced, including piloting jet planes, operating radars, parachuting, sentry duty, etc. The performance standards are rather uneven and vary from organization to organization.

2. Civil defense: This program embraces the whole Soviet population. It is directed by a senior general in the Defense Ministry, and has been expanding in scope and intensity in recent years. Through the civil defense programs, the military fosters and maintains a war-preparedness attitude, certain kinds of discipline, and para-military habits in the populace. The programs have received more serious attention from the Party and the military lately and have subsequently been expanded and intensified. In 1971, civil defense training was extended downward from the fifth to the second grade of primary schools and made mandatory in technical and higher institutes of learning. The population has been increasingly incorporated into civil defense formations with specialized functions. These formations increasingly cooperate with regular army units, and thus serve as quasi-military units, providing intensive training and exercises for the most efficient evacuation
of populace and placing increasingly more intensive psychological/indoctrinational pressures on the populace to adapt to a war-preparedness milieu.

The "Militarization" Of the Economy, Science, Technology

The defense establishment has enjoyed a preferential position in the planning of economic and scientific goals and priorities in the Soviet Union. This special treatment of the military goes back to the early years of the Soviet state, when the expectations of a world revolution failed to materialize and the Soviet Union found itself to be the only socialist country, encircled and isolated within a hostile environment. Stalin then radically transformed Soviet agriculture and manufacturing in order to develop rapidly a modern defense industry that was to serve as the basis for a large and powerful military establishment. Economic planning under the Stalinist Five-Year Plans was built around the needs and demands of defense, and was described by a western economic expert as follows:

First, allocate to the military establishment the resources (labor, materials, capital) needed to fulfill strategic requirements...Second, maximize the flow of resources into the heavy industrial sector. Third, distribute residuals of unrequired and unsuitable resources among other sectors, such as agriculture and light industry.

The current economic planning in Russia is not quite as rigidly pro-defense; nor does it follow the stilted and arbitrary Stalinist models. However, the defense establishment remains the favorite institution, whose interests and demands are usually defined by the Politburo as the highest priorities within the state. Recent Western estimates generally agree that the defense sector continues to absorb a large share of the GNP (11-13% vs. US 6%). It is estimated that Soviet defense expenditures grew at an annual rate of 10% in the period 1958-70, and at 8-10% in the period 1971-75, and that the share of the Soviet GNP allocated to defense was 10-12% in 1955, 8% in 1958, 12% in 1970, and 14-15% in 1975; further projections see an 18% in 1980. Recent estimates of the defense budget of the Soviet Union show a constant upward movement from 110 billion in 1974, to about 127 billion in 1976, to projections of 140+ billion in 1978-79.

The defense establishment has clearly established its primacy in the economy as well as in the research and development, scientific and educational sectors of the state. The Soviet defense industry forms a separate sector of the economy. It enjoys "first priority in the allocation of materials, engineering-technical personnel, who along with the workers are better paid than those in the civilian economy." The Ministry of Defense enjoys a special position in the economic-technological sectors of the state. It has what David Holloway has called "consumer sovereignty -- the ability to impose its wishes and preferences on the whole production process -- an economic privilege possessed by no other group. The military also dominates the planning and priorities of the scientific and research and development sectors of the state.
The military educational system contains 125 military higher schools (13% of all higher schools in the country) leading to an observation by Colonel William Odom that one in every seven college-level institutions in the USSR is an officer-commissioning school roughly analogous to West Point, Annapolis, and Colorado Springs. A large military intelligentsia has been created in what is the most extensive and intensive officer educational system in the world.

The military has jealously guarded its special position in the society and economy. Military spokesmen have at times publicly defended this position by sharply attacking even leading Party members. Thus military leaders levelled vitriolic criticism against Khrushchev shortly after his ouster because Khrushchev had tried to curb the escalating defense budgets and reduce the wasteful practices that defense industry establishments were hiding under the veil of secrecy. The military openly accused Khrushchev of dangerous and harebrained advocacy of the "primacy of the stomach" and "goulash communism." What had Khrushchev actually done? In 1964 he had maintained that "the tasks of the defense industry could be solved more successfully with less expenditures" and that "we are now considering the possibility of a further reduction in the size of our armed forces...to reduce military expenditures next year" because "the defense of the country is at suitable levels."

Khrushchev's successors were eager to go on record as rejecting these anti-defense ideas, and asserted that "the Communist Party continues to believe that it is its sacred duty to strengthen the defense of the USSR." Later, Brezhnev gingerly sought to remind the military that "the national economy must develop harmoniously, it must serve to achieve...a constant rise in the people's living standards." He concluded that "further development of heavy industry must be subordinated to the requirements...of the whole economy." For these statements the Party leader received a public reminder from the Chief of the General Staff, Marshall Zakharov, who used the device of an attack on the fallen Khrushchev to serve notice to the new political leaders. Zakharov asserted that "subjectivism (arbitrary interference by political amateurs in matters of defense) is particularly dangerous in military affairs...and it is the sacred duty of the military cadres to protect these military sciences from everything that detracts from their authority." And to drive his point home with particular authority, he cited Lenin in support of the primacy of defense interests in economic planning for the country: "The Soviet people have in the past not for a moment failed to carry out V. I. Lenin's legacy: 'always be on the alert, protect the defense capabilities of the country and our Red Army like the apple of our eye'."

It may be instructive to recall that a decade before Khrushchev's ouster, Party leader and prime minister Malenkov earned the military's undying hostility because he argued that "our main task is to ensure the further improvement in the material well-being of all Soviet people,(which makes it) necessary to increase significantly investment of resources for the projection of consumer goods." The military and its supporters attacked Malenkov, arguing in the secret organ of the General Staff that "heavy industry is the foundation of foundations of our socialist economy" and that the main priority for the Soviet Union was "the further development of heavy industry."
Conclusions

Even this brief account of the internal role of the military conveys a picture of its pervasive presence, institutional interpenetration and expanding social, economic and political weight within the state. How can one account for these developments?

1. The expanding scope of Soviet foreign and defense policies: Starting from a rather vulnerable, defensive and contained position, the Soviet Union has in the past two decades broken into the global arena, on land, oceans and in space, having in the process sharply expanded its interests and commitments abroad. The primary vehicle for this expansion has been the defense establishment: Soviet arms, military technology, military experts and advisors have become the most effective export and influence-building commodities of the Kremlin. The Soviet military has benefit from these developments. Much of the momentum for the extensive arms production and political expansion programs came in the aftermath of the Cuban missile fiasco in 1962. The trauma of Cuba had deeply scared the military and the Party, and established the primacy of arms production as necessary to catch up with the West and to reestablish Soviet military credibility. The slogan "No-More Cubas" conveys the Soviet intent never again to be humiliated by American military might, and a new willingness to flex the military muscle of the USSR in the Third World. By contrast, the slogan "No More Vietnams" reflects our own national resolve not to remain the gendarme of the world and reflexively oppose communist/revolutionary challenges as in the past. Thus, America's contraction and Soviet expansion in the international arena leave the Soviet military with an even greater role.

2. The ossification of the Party and the waning of revolutionary elan: Over the years the CPSU has become a vast managerial bureaucracy that oversees a complex, industrial/urban society whose citizens ritualistically recite the old revolutionary slogans but who in fact crave consumer amenities. The Party leadership is old, routinized, and consensus-minded. It is a leadership that is rooted in the status quo and intent on postponing important decisions regarding a variety of challenges -- from the ethnic minorities, from the various sectors of the government, from the several corners of the larger Socialist Commonwealth. In looking for sources of loyalty to the Party and its ruling elites, the leaders clearly are aware that the military has a record of being reliable, conservative, Russified/nationalistic and loyal; and therefore, in the final analysis the Party oligarchy's potential protector against the excessive pressures and demands for change.

3. Problems of transition and succession: In periods of transition, the military emerges as a powerful, silent arbitrator of succession arrangements and choices. The Party leaders undoubtedly remember that it was Malenkov's denial of the military's budgetary and of its economic and political interests in the aftermath of Stalin's death, Khrushchev's "harebrained" policies of economizing and his advocacy of consumerism that unified the military against the then-Party leaders and thus helped bring about their eventual ouster from power.
Political-bureaucratic interpenetration of Party and government: The military and the defense-industrial sector are represented directly in a number of important Party and governmental policy-making bodies. There they can substantially advocate special interests and participate in vital decisions affecting the whole system. In the post-Stalinist leadership, participation in the collective, consensus-based policy-making process conveys power. The following indicators are revealing of the military's position in this respect:

- The defense establishment has about 45 representatives on the Central Committee of the Party (12%).

- It is represented in the highly important Defense Council (formerly Higher Military Council) where Party, government and military leaders deal with the most vital matters of defense policy.

- The defense sector is heavily represented in the Council of Ministers, where it sprawls over eight separate ministries, ranging from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Medium Machines (euphemism for nuclear programs building).

And of course, until Marshal Grechko's death, the military had a professional officer representing it in the Politburo. Since then, the man who speaks for the military has been a civilian -- Ustinov -- but one with a lifetime involvement with defense matters.

We ought to therefore ask what is the military seeking, now that it has gained such powerful influence within the Soviet Union? Are we likely to see significant changes in the military's relationship to the Party? If the military's role under Stalin was one of unchallenged dependency, and if current Party-military relations are based on inter-dependency, are we likely to see a military bid, in the foreseeable future, toward independence from Party control? My guess would be negative--the military is not likely to embark upon Bonapartist adventures or palace coups. The military and the current Party leadership have established a modus vivendi that suits both partners. The Brezhnev policy line appears to be one of controlled expansion into the Third World, of normalization of relations with the industrial world, and of controlled consumerism at home. To a considerable degree it is in the interest of the military to support these three policy lines: expansion abroad legitimizes the steady growth of the defense establishment; detente does not threaten military interests and gives them access to western technologies; and the controlled consumerism and its attendant threat of embourgeoisment gives the military the important role of spartan educator and keeper of the nation's patriotic and revolutionary ideals.

The Soviet military sees its internal role as a conservative, nationalistic, disciplined force, pursuing institutional interests that coincide with and support those of the Party and the country. However, the Soviet military has also accumulated a vast arsenal of modern weapons, skilled soldiers, and advanced technology based in a society that has been indoctrinated in the need for war-preparedness. This vast arsenal is growing at a
remarkable rate, apparently uninfluenced by the policies and fantasies of detente and arms control. The military and its vast armory seem to be in search of a purpose, a goal that would go beyond the static balances and inertias of deterrence.
Soviet Military Capabilities: Status and Trends

by

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My task here permits me to begin with a rather straightforward analysis of Soviet military capabilities. Fortunately, I can leave to others the more difficult task of how the Soviet military establishment participates in and influences Soviet governmental decisions. Nor am I charged with doing a "net assessment" of US/NATO and USSR/Warsaw Pact capabilities, although inevitably I will make a few comments that bear on the relative balance.

Soviet uniformed personnel today total about 4.9 million. About a half million are police and security forces. Of the remaining 4.4 million, about 40 percent are in the general purpose ground forces; 7 percent in tactical and military transport aviation; about 8 percent are in the navy; the remaining 45 percent are distributed among long-range aviation, strategic rocket, homeland air defense, and general support forces. The Soviets also have over half a million civilians in their armed forces establishment. By comparison, the United States has about 2.1 million people serving in uniform, and about 1 million civilians working for the Department of Defense.

In 1968, total Soviet military manpower was 3.8 million to 3.4 million, excluding guards and others. This means that in the last ten years there has been about a 30 percent increase in the number of Soviets under arms.

This trend in manpower is but one indicator of growth. As we turn to other military trends in the USSR, you will note that a similar growth is the predominant characteristic over the last decade—growth in the size of Soviet forces, in the modernity and sophistication of military equipment, in operational effectiveness, and in the ability of project military power to points far distant from the Soviet Union.

In strategic nuclear forces, as shown on Chart 1, the Soviets have strengthened their posture in every dimension except for air defense interceptors (in which the Soviets have maintained a substantial advantage) and in strategic bombers. If Backfire were included in the bomber chart—and that weapon does possess intercontinental capabilities—it would only reinforce the pattern of growth. The recent tailing off of the missile launcher level on the chart is associated primarily with arms control. The charts indicate that the United States during this same period has increased its strategic nuclear strength along only one dimension, albeit a very important one: numbers of warheads and bombs. The Soviets have thus narrowed the gap in many prime strategic indicators, and have surpassed the United States with respect to several numerical measures.
Quality is another matter. Historically, the United States has relied heavily on technology as a substitute for manpower. The Soviet Union has done the reverse. It is commonly agreed that the Soviet Union lags in certain technological areas relevant to strategic nuclear force effectiveness. Nonetheless, as is to be expected, the Soviet technology is improving. The laws of physics do not respect national boundaries; if any nation has available talent and resources which can be applied to important technological areas, in time it will improve quality and effectiveness in that area of endeavor. The Soviets are doing so now in strategic nuclear forces. Consequently, we anticipate still further improvements in the accuracy and reliability of Soviet strategic nuclear missiles in the 1980s. The Soviet ballistic missile submarine fleet will likewise be strengthened.

In theater nuclear forces, the Soviet Union for the past decade has been increasing its inventory and upgrading sophistication and quality. The result, as General Haig has recently noted, is that the Soviets are closing the gap with the West in this area as well. Thus, the Soviet Union recently added to its operational inventory the SS-20, a sophisticated theater nuclear missile system. This system is expected to replace older, less capable medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The Soviets likewise have developed a credible family of naval nuclear weapons. Today, Soviet theater nuclear forces contain a greater variety of missile delivery systems and more launchers than those of the United States--and more launchers, too, than those possessed by NATO forces actually in the European theater. The significance of this last fact should not be overestimated, however, given the number of strategic nuclear forces the United States is able to bring to bear in defense of our allies.

Indicators of the increases in conventional Soviet armed forces are shown on Chart 2. In the past decade, the USSR has increased its tank inventory from 35,000 to about 50,000--up by more than 40 percent; its artillery (which has always been excellent) from about 12,000 to nearly 20,000 pieces--up 60 percent; its tactical aircraft from under 4,000 to over 5,000--up 25 percent. The emphasis clearly is on firepower and mobility, both characteristics essential for an offensively oriented force. The 30 percent growth in personnel noted earlier only underscores this point. Again in passing, we note the changes in US forces by most of these measures.

In the Middle East War of 1973 we saw US equipment in the hands of the Israelis pitted against Soviet equipment used by the Arabs. During and after those hostilities, we gained a new respect for the quality and sophistication of the Soviet equipment and training. This experience suggests that one cannot assume--as has sometimes been done in the past--that Soviet forces are large in size to compensate for their technological inadequacy. Soviet weapons and systems are not only more numerous than those of the US, but a great many of them are as good of better than comparable US systems. For example, current Soviet tanks and infantry
fighting vehicles are superior to those the United States has in the field today. Their naval units are also impressive. Their tactical combat aircraft, while still inferior to the most modern of US systems, are improving rapidly. Continuous modernization and incremental improvements—rather than technological leaps from generation to generation—have served Soviet forces well in meeting increased technological requirements.

It is not only the numbers and quality of a country's military force that influences military planners. The disposition, that is, the positioning of these forces, is important as well. In this regard, it is said that the growth in Soviet forces reflects their increasing preoccupation with the Chinese threat, and should be of little concern to the West.

There can be no doubt that, in Soviet eyes, the PRC poses a credible and troublesome military threat. In response to this threat, the Soviets have increased their strength along the Chinese border. Even taking this into account, however, NATO cannot be overly assured. Looking within the NATO arena, we find that Soviet military strength, as reflected in the increasing number of Pact forces deployed against NATO, has grown impressively. The 1978 British White Paper, Statement on the Defence Estimates—the equivalent of the US Secretary of Defense Annual Report—presents in a clear pictorial way the growth of Soviet forces in the Eastern Atlantic (Chart 3), and in Central Europe (Chart 4).

The growth of the Soviet military over the past decade has, of course, been underwritten by a considerable concentration of resources in the defense sector. As noted earlier in these seminars, the Soviet defense budget has been increasing in real terms since at least the early 1960s. In the 1970-76 period, the annual rate of real growth has been about 4 percent—roughly the rate of real growth in overall gross national product. The US intelligence community holds that 11-13 percent of Soviet current gross national product is dedicated to defense. Again as noted in our earlier discussions, the share of the Soviet budget devoted to defense is expected to remain constant for the next five years.

* * * * *

Having looked briefly at Soviet military capabilities in terms of manpower and hardware, I would like now to consider how we think the Soviets would employ those forces in combat—should war occur. I will not discuss the likelihood of war—that goes far beyond my present charter or my clairvoyance. But study of Soviet military strategy, doctrine, and field exercises gives us valuable insights into Soviet concepts of warfighting. A great deal of writing on strategy and doctrine has taken place since the landmark Soviet
General Staff discussions in the late 1950s, which first assessed the impact of the "nuclear revolution in military affairs."

There is little question among experts that the concept which pervades Soviet military thinking today is the offensive. This is true at the strategic nuclear level in theater warfare, and in naval operations. It is as much a part of high-level strategic thinking as it is of tactical crew and small-unit operations in the field. But Soviet doctrine is by no means simple or unrefined. It is a highly developed body of thought and practice which guides force development and employment. More important in my view, the Soviets are steadily fielding military equipment that permits them to implement their concept of the offensive. The increases in strategic nuclear missiles, tanks, and artillery are prime examples of this. A decade ago US tactical fighter aircraft could carry larger payloads over longer distances than their Soviet counterparts. This was so because the Soviet air forces were largely oriented towards defense—a situation that no longer prevails. Today, Soviet tactical fighter air capabilities are much more oriented towards offensive actions.

Among the key principles of current Soviet military doctrine are the following:

- War, while no longer inevitable, remains possible.
- Nuclear weapons have not changed the character of war; war continues to be fought for political objectives.
- Capabilities for nuclear warfighting and war-winning are to be achieved; these include the capability to destroy enemy warfighting and warmaking capability and potential. Thus, priority targets will be enemy nuclear capabilities; armed forces; command, control, and communications; and industrial power.
- War-winning also requires the protection of Soviet military capabilities and other assets needed to sustain the war and the Soviet system.
- Nuclear weapons are decisive, and rockets (missiles) are the basic means of delivery. Massive ground forces, however, remain necessary.
- The tremendous impact of nuclear weapons makes the initial period of war decisive; therefore, emphasis will be placed on preemption and surprise.

The desire for a capability to destroy nuclear and other military targets implies an offensive capability which includes strategic missiles with a hard-target kill capability. Soviet doctrine also calls for the development of a formidable strategic defense—to include air defense and civil defense. But for the ABM treaty, it would include missile defense as well. In short, the Soviets appear to be pursuing what is called a damage-limiting strategy, i.e., they seek the capability to destroy those enemy targets that can
inflict damage on the USSR, and they pursue ways to protect the USSR in case an enemy attacks the USSR.

For theater war, Soviet doctrine stresses joint operations: intense offensive strikes—conceivably conventional, conceivably nuclear, or conceivably a combination of both— to take out key enemy military targets: airfields, air defenses, command and control centers, nuclear storage sites, etc. These strikes are to be conducted in conjunction with the coordinated employment of ground forces, combined arms operations, and tactical air in swift offensives to exploit the initial strikes. The Soviets also have an impressive capability to employ chemical weapons and to operate in a chemical warfare environment if they choose to do so. Ground force operations are to capitalize on surprise, mobility, maneuver, concentration of forces, and maintenance of the momentum of the attack.

One aspect of Soviet doctrine that reveals the seriousness of their efforts is the emphasis they place on assuring the continued operation of their own command, control, and communications while attacking that of the enemy. Their doctrine of "radio-electronic combat" indicates a strong commitment to the coordinated use of electronic and lethal means to degrade the enemy's ability to communicate. They have thus identified a critical factor in the ability of modern, highly integrated forces—such as ours—to fight, and have focused on means to reduce its effectiveness.

These Soviet doctrinal concepts call for marked force superiority in the theater, for forces with high firepower and mobility, and for forces capable of fighting in a nuclear environment. Again, Soviet emphasis on armor and motorized infantry—which not only give the Soviets firepower and mobility, but which permit ground operations in a nuclear environment—makes sense in the context of this Soviet doctrine.

Many of the doctrinal precepts such as those for rapid, high-intensity, offensive operations are being practiced in Soviet exercises.

- In Exercise SEVER in June of 1976, joint ground and air forces conducted an opposing forces exercise involving long approach marches, extended defense preparations, and motorized rifle and tank attacks supported by fighter bombers and helicopters. The exercise also included a helicopter-borne landing behind "enemy lines," and an assault river-crossing of a swollen, half-kilometer-wide river with steep banks and no fords.

- In Exercise SHCHIT-76, in Poland during September 1976, numerous live-fire exercises punctuated a maneuver characterized by concentrated armor attacks and counterattacks, coordinated with tactical air strikes, emphasis on air defense, a night attack (with live firing at radio-controlled targets), and a helicopter-supported
river-crossing. A parachute assault, conducted in conjunction with a tank penetration, concluded the exercise with one side having completely encircled the other.

In Exercise KAVKAZ, conducted early in 1976 under severe winter conditions in mountainous terrain, motorized rifle attacks, meeting engagements, and attacks from the march were emphasized; helicopters and tanks were employed in a coordinated attack; and an armored force conducted an operation in many respects like a pursuit; a combined arms attack against an opposing rear-guard action completed the exercise.

In all these exercises, command and control, coordination of air, indirect (artillery and mortar) fires, and direct fires with maneuvering forces were demonstrated. This is not the kind of training that can reasonably be associated with a crude peasant force.

The growing Soviet capability to use airborne and air-mobile operations, their nuclear and chemical warfare capabilities; the growing sophistication of their weapons systems; their doctrinal commitment to surprise, mentioned earlier—all these combine to increase uncertainty in the minds of their opponents. If war begins—particularly during the first few critical hours of hostilities—this high uncertainty would work to the Soviets' advantage.

The Soviet Navy likewise reflects an increasingly offensive orientation. From a force designed for coastal defense and protection of the land army's seaward flanks, the Soviet Navy has been steadily acquiring oceangoing capabilities commensurate with a major global military power. Their global exercises—like OKEAN 75—are impressive undertakings. The doctrine for Soviet naval forces has been described more recently by Admiral Goreskiov in his book on naval strategy, and is reflected in continuing Soviet naval force development.

In addition to the nuclear strike role of the submarine-launched ballistic missile systems, and the traditional land force support role, the Soviet Navy is extending its capabilities and reach in other ways. New capabilities include ships designed to destroy enemy naval forces on the high seas and to protect Soviet nuclear submarines; interdiction of sea lines of communication—quite openly identified in Soviet writing as being of prime importance to NATO forces, and therefore of concern to the Soviet Union; and the emerging naval role in support of the projection of Soviet military power. Soviet naval forces are now apparently not only in the Mediterranean, but in the Indian Ocean and along the West African coast as well.

I do not want to convey an impression that the doctrine, strategy, and improving capabilities of the Soviet armed forces imply imminent war. I do not believe that. But people like myself must necessarily take into account the capabilities of
these forces in our military planning. Those forces are in the
field, and, given the long lifespan of military equipment, are likely
to be available to the Soviets for use for some time. We see that
to some extent today, with Soviet advisers and Soviet surrogate
forces in Angola and Ethiopia. We saw them earlier in Egypt and
other areas, some far from their borders. From the military view-
point, the continuous growth, development, and deployment of
Soviet military forces must be a central consideration for our own
strategy, doctrines, and force structure.

* * * *

I have thus far discussed the positive aspects of Soviet military
power. But it would be misleading to leave this survey of status
and trends without underscoring some problem areas which affect the
Soviet armed forces. Like our own, Soviet armed forces are to some
extent a reflection of the society--warts and all--from which their
recruits are drawn. Many of the current and emerging Soviet military
problems have societal roots which have been noted by others in
these seminars:

- The sharply declining Soviet military manpower pool in
  the coming years presents a major hurdle for Soviet
  leadership. Large Soviet forces are already a heavy drain
  on competent manpower, and it appears that they will re-
  quire a larger proportion of eligible manpower in the
  relatively near future.

- Further, given the growing sophistication of Soviet
  military equipment, it is going to take well-trained
  and relatively high quality people to maintain it.
  That the necessary quality will be available cannot
  be taken for granted, especially in light of the demo-
  graphic shifts we have considered earlier in these
  seminars.

- Ethnic and national differences, including linguistic
  diversity, could become a serious problem; in combat
  this problem could become particularly important.

- As elsewhere in Soviet society, but perhaps more so
  in the armed forces, disciplinary and antisocial
  problems--for example, drunkenness and hooliganism--
  apparently are on the increase. Morale appears to
  be adversely affected by rigid military discipline
  and by living conditions that are austere even by
  Soviet standards. While there is no hard evidence
  that all this is seriously debilitating to Soviet
  military capabilities, the importance of these issues
  to Soviet leadership at even the highest levels is
  apparent in military literature.
- In the realm of logistics—especially troop supply and the maintenance and support of weapons and equipment—Soviet procedures largely are geared to peacetime requirements. The Soviets are not unaware of the need to provide for combat-use rates and losses; however, they have little recent battle experience on which to base their logistic estimates, and their current support infrastructure appears ill-suited for sustained high-intensity hostilities as we understand them.

- Training resources for some key combat skills are very limited. For example, flying time for aircrews is well below what we would call adequate. The use of aircraft simulators and other compensating techniques has not been apparent, though tank and anti-tank simulators have been used.

- The initiative of junior leaders and small units is hindered by extensive controls at all levels and heavy reliance on what we would call "tactical doctrine" and they would call "the operational arts." What this means is that the junior leader's job is largely discipline and control according to norms. Successful leadership is viewed less as a matter of problem-solving, and more a matter of conforming to orders, standard procedures, and the rather rigid doctrine taught and rehearsed in training. This rigidity stands in apparent contrast to doctrinal emphasis on initiative and flexibility.

Such factors go to the heart of the effectiveness of Soviet military personnel in times of stress. It is generally accepted that the Israelis today could acquit themselves well in defense of their country—but Israeli forces are numerically inferior to the forces of their potential enemies. And Andrew Marshall has more than once reminded us that by using measures by which we assess military effectiveness today, the French and British should have stopped the Germans in 1940. I mention this primarily to remind you why military people talk of the "art of war," not the science of war.

**Conclusion**

Let me conclude with a few general observations and speculations. First of all, the problem areas the Soviets face are not in all cases unique to them. So I want neither to understate nor overstate them, but rather to recognize them—just as I did the other aspects of Soviet military power. Second, the overall judgment of Soviet military power by people like me accords with General Brown's Posture Statement to the Congress early this year: "Their [the Soviet] force improvements are steady, deliberate and impressive."
My impression from the two excellent seminars of this series I have been privileged to attend is that at least some political analysts here are relatively optimistic about the future of the Soviet Union--and, by implication at least, of its relations with the West. From our discussion last week, I sensed that at least some of the economists--admittedly practitioners of "the dismal science"--are less sanguine. Without taking sides, let me say that those of us in uniform hope for continued stability and a more firmly anchored peace--but we also believe such will happen only if we remain able to defend ourselves and our allies.

That brings me to several speculations:

- What if the CIA oil analysis is correct? In the early to mid-1980s, the Soviet Union's armed forces will have been further strengthened. Will the Soviets feel an oil squeeze? Will they need new oil fields? If so, how might they seek to acquire them?

- What if the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks falter--if not at this point, then down the road a little further?

- What if the Soviets' "China problem" becomes less--or greater?

I mention these questions because if I learned one thing from the oil price increase following the 1973 Middle East War it is that we should devote more time to thinking of contingencies that may not be highly probable, but which, if they occur, are of great strategic consequence.

Our discussions in this series to date in my view have given no reason for the United States to be less vigilant in the defense of our interests and of our friends. Soviet leaders historically have found their military forces--however crude we may have thought them to be at the time--effective in pursuing their policies. Given the evidence of past and projected Soviet military programs, I have seen nothing that leads me to expect a change in the years immediately ahead.
US AND USSR
STRATEGIC FORCE TRENDS (1967-1977)
[END OF FISCAL YEAR]

Source: United States Military Posture for FY 1979,
by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General George S. Brown, USAF
CHART 2

US/USSR GENERAL PURPOSE FORCE TRENDS [1967-1977]
[END OF FISCAL YEAR]

TANKS

DIVISIONS

ARTILLERY

HELICOPTERS

PRINCIPAL SURFACE
COMBATANTS

GENERAL PURPOSE
SUBMARINES

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

Source: United States Military Posture for FY 1979, by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown, USAF
CHART 3

INCREASES in the STRENGTH of
SOVIET FORCES in the EASTERN ATLANTIC
(the SOVIET NORTHERN FLEET)

SUBMARINES (including Ballistic Missile Submarines)

![Submarine Chart]

CRUISERS and DESTROYERS

![Cruiser and Destroyer Chart]

FRIGATES and ESCORTS

![Frigate and Escort Chart]

FIXED-WING MARITIME AIRCRAFT

![Fixed-Wing Aircraft Chart]

INCREASES in the STRENGTH of SOVIET FORCES in CENTRAL EUROPE

MAIN BATTLE TANKS
- 1968: 7,250
- 1977: 9,500
- 31% increase

ARTILLERY
- 1968: 3,200
- 1977: 4,400
- 38% increase

ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIERS
(including Reconnaissance and Command variants)
- 1968: 5,300
- 1977: 9,500
- 79% increase

FIXED-WING TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
- 1968: 1,655
- 1977: 1,975
- 20% increase

The Domestic Economy

By

Gregory Grossman

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I. The traditional strengths of the Soviet economy in good measure persist and are well known: a huge reservoir of natural, human, and man-made productive resources that is in many ways effectively though generally inefficiently utilized; continued (even if now decelerating) rise of output, productive capacity, and per capita consumption; the channelling of these strengths for a rapid and -- to us -- worrisome augmentation of military might and national power.

The present juncture in the Soviet economy is a very important one owing to a number of mounting serious problems that will dominate policy for at least the next ten years, and that require hard choices in both the economic and the political spheres. The choices are not necessarily made easier by the impending succession of top leadership, and indeed are probably already an integral part of succession politics. Further, these problems and the U.S.S.R.'s responses and reactions to them have major international implications, not the least for this country. It is likely that the Soviets will attempt -- as they have repeatedly in the past -- to use the US and the rest of the West to help solve their economic and political problems.

II. The most visible manifestation of the complex of economic problems is the slowing of growth, a process that has been going on since the fifties but which now is assuming more ominous proportions. This process is illustrated by the following figures, which have been computed and published by the CIA and Dr. Rush V. Greenslade, and which stand for average annual rates of growth in percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plan</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total gross national product</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial output</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross fixed investment</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that the particularly poor performance of the 1971-75 period was affected by the major crop failure of the terminal year but is not entirely attributable to this cause. Moreover, the figures for 1976-80 are adapted from the Soviet official plan targets for 1980. Now that we are almost halfway into the quinquennium it is fairly evident that these targets
will not be met and the trend of retardation will not be reversed during
the current Five-Year Plan. The major questions, however, are: To what
extent -- not "whether" -- will the slowing of growth of the Soviet economy
continue into the near future, to 1985 and 1990? And how can and will the
Soviets respond to the challenges and pressures generated by it?

Let us take up the main retarding factors one by one:

a. Labor. As Dr. Murray Feshbach has shown in the preceding seminar
in this series and elsewhere, the rate of increase of the total Soviet
labor force has already declined sharply and will drop further to virtually
zero (0.3 percent per year) during the 1980's. It will continue to be low
in the subsequent decade as well. There is additionally an important shift
in its composition away from the "European" component of the population to
the Central Asian and Moslem component. The reasons are primarily demo­
graphic.

b. Natural Resources, especially energy resources, in relatively
accessible areas are being rapidly depleted, requiring very large and
costly investment in Siberia. Specifically, it now looks as though energy
supply will be an increasing constraint to Soviet growth for at least
another decade, despite the enormous reserves of fossil fuel in the ground.
Reasons: serious lag in exploration and development of oil fields; high
cost of building pipelines, especially for natural gas (which is in more
ample extractable supply than oil for the near future); similar problems
with the rich coal deposits in Siberia; limited possibilities to sub­
stitute in use other sources of energy for oil, and to conserve energy
generally, at reasonable cost; and a welter of related problems. There
is agreement by some independent experts with the general thrust of the
CIA's projections of last year, if not always with the particulars, while
the latest data from the U.S.S.R. are not inconsistent with it. In other
words, it seems likely that in a few years energy, and especially oil,
production will start declining seriously relative to requirements. These
requirements consist primarily of support for the domestic economic growth,
support for the economies of Eastern Europe and Cuba, and export to gain
hard currency. (It should be noted that in 1977 fuel exports, mostly
petroleum, brought one half of hard currency earned by the U.S.S.R. from
merchandise exports, and about one third of hard currency intake from all
sources, including credits.) The energy constraint could thus be very
serious indeed, politically as well as economically, with the widest inter­
national repercussions. In any case, measures to alleviate the energy
"crunch" will themselves be very costly, both in domestic resources and
in hard currency (for importation of equipment).

c. A similar problem exists with regard to food supply, where a very
costly Soviet "Project Independence" (so to say) is aiming to increase
output rapidly and to minimize its weather-conditioned annual fluctuations.
Here, as with energy, the need is to keep up with rapidly rising demand
both at home and in Eastern Europe and at the same time to save hard currency.
d. Despite impressive Soviet achievements in weaponry and space, the overall technological gap between the U.S.S.R. and the West does not seem to have been substantially reduced in the past 15-20 years. The over-all efficiency of resource utilization is improving only modestly.

e. The slowing of over-all growth, together with high priorities now enjoyed by consumption and defense, have brought the rate of increase of annual investment sharply down (see Table above). Since the share of gross investment in GNP is still very high, however, the annual growth of the physical capital stock is also still very high (around 7 percent); but with time it is bound to decline somewhat owing to the trend in investment. The slowing of the rate of capital formation together with the flattening of the curve of labor growth will jointly bring about a further retardation in the growth of output.

f. Lastly, while one should not underrate the importance of Western trade and credits to the Soviet Union between, say, 1972 and now (this importance, we believe, not being fully reflected in the statistics of trade and credit and their relation to the GNP), the possibility of a significant moderation of the retardatory trend through international economic activities is not too great. This is not to say, however, that Soviet interest in such activities is not likely to remain strong for economic reasons, mostly for specific purposes of high interest to the regime. However, the growing debt service ratio and the energy problem may well cool the ardor of foreign lenders.

III. These problems find the U.S.S.R. in a situation in which, for internal reasons, the possibility of maneuvering with economic resources and of improving the system as such are quite limited. Thus, one notices no significant restraint on the growth of defense outlays at a time when total resources are increasing considerably more slowly than before. At the same time, the intensity of the consuming public's expectations -- buttressed by the public's very high liquidity -- seems to ensure a high priority to consumption in the over-all pattern of resource use. Consequently, the third major claimant to resources, investment, has experienced a marked decline in its annual rate of growth, with the likely future effects already noted. (Short-term bottlenecks of labor and capacity may have contributed to the levelling off of investment outlay at this time.)

The regime's delicate relations with the consuming public express themselves in such phenomena as rigid price stability with regard to main consumer goods (necessitating extremely large and rising subsidies from the budget), the already mentioned "Project Independence" in agriculture (chiefly to meet the very high income-elasticity of demand for meat), and large expenditure of hard currency to buy grain in years of poor harvest.

These delicate relations encompass also the public as workforce. Not only full employment but virtually absolute job security for the individual now prevail. Labor morale seems to be none too high. Attempts to increase productivity tend to be costly in terms of pay, if indeed they are effective at all. Alcohol consumption is steadily and rapidly rising. In part because of the pressure from both labor and consumers, the chronic condition
of wage and price control with repressed inflation continues, which in turn contributes to inefficiency and to sluggishness in innovation. Moreover, the repressed inflation has helped spawn ubiquitous black markets and corruption of officialdom.

In spite of these circumstances, significant reforms in the institutional structures run up against the vested interests of the powerful and privileged strata of society, which may favor solutions that draw on the West's help as against those that would shake up the domestic status quo.

IV. If the prospect of economic difficulties and their political consequences that have been sketched out here is not false, then the West, and particularly the U.S., would do well to think ahead to the likely Soviet responses. There is a good probability that the Soviets will once again muddle through, provided the scale of the crises are not beyond the reach of this traditional technique. There is a certain probability of tighter political controls on the domestic scene to compensate for the inadequacy of economic resources and the rigidity of the economy, at least until such time as the demographic circumstances become more favorable and until Siberian resources become more accessible (and China less refractory?). There would at any rate seem to be strong reasons for pursuing a policy of detente, Soviet style, for continuing to obtain economic benefits from the West, which, however limited in size, may be of internal political worth to the leadership. Specifically, the help of the West may well be enlisted to render Soviet manufacturing industry more competitive in Western markets, thereby partly replacing the hard-currency losses from declining petroleum exports; at this time the Soviets seem to be pushing just this strategy in regard to their automobile industry (which has already become an appreciable factor in the West European market). Last but not least, there is, of course, also the real danger that resource (especially energy) shortages and domestic political tensions will at some future point tempt the Soviet leadership to use its military might abroad in a more assertive manner.
The Soviet Union and the World Economy

by

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University of Pennsylvania
Over the next decade, concern with oil supplies will be one of the key factors shaping economic policy in the Soviet Union, just as it is in the United States. Energy sources are no less significant for economic and political decisions made in Moscow than they are for decisions that must be made in Washington. Depending on which of a number of tradeoffs the Soviets choose in relation to energy, their economy and trade with the West can move in quite different directions in the years immediately ahead.

For example, if the Soviets can maintain significant exports of oil to the West, then their trade with the West can continue to expand. However, if the Soviet Union has greatly difficulty in tapping its oil reserves—and this is possible in the remote areas of Siberia—then by the mid-1980s, it could become a competitor of the United States and other Western nations for OPEC oil. Such a development would have serious repercussions for both sides.

In addition to Soviet energy policy, the other key factors in Soviet economic growth into the 1980s are their continuing needs for Western machinery and technology and their potential needs to import grain. The relationships of these three factors will strongly influence future Soviet trade policies with the West, including its hard currency indebtedness and its credit rating in the calculations of Western suppliers and bankers.

The Soviet Union has substantially increased its trade with the advanced industrial nations—the U.S., Canada, Western Europe and Japan—during the past ten years in a campaign to overcome its lagging productivity and to spur growth in its domestic economy through massive imports of modern technology and machinery. In 1976 (the latest year for which full reports were available at the time this was written) total Soviet trade with the West (including Japan) was almost six times the 1968 level (three times the 1968 level, accounting for inflation). The result was a dramatic increase in the West's share of total Soviet trade—from 21 percent to 32 percent. Total U.S.-Soviet trade, although making up only one tenth of this total in 1976, grew from 115 million dollars in 1968 to over two and a half billion dollars in 1976.

An important feature of this rapid rise in trade is that Soviet imports from the West have grown much faster than Soviet exports to the West. Starting from rough equality in 1968, nominal (that is, not accounting for inflation) Soviet imports from the West in 1976 were seven times their 1968 level and exports were five times their 1968 level (see Table 1). In 1976, imports from the West accounted

An expanded version of this paper appeared in The Wharton Magazine (Summer 1978 issue) under the title Soviet Hard Currency Trade Prospects—the SOVMOD View. The analysis presented in this paper was carried out as part of a SRI-International study for the Council of Economic Advisors (H. S. Levine and D. L. Bond, Hard Currency Implications of Soviet Grain and Oil Problems, SRI-International TN-CEPR-5814-2, Washington, D.C., January, 1978).
Table 1.

SOVIET TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Trade (Millions of Current U.S. Dollars)</td>
<td>4236</td>
<td>4925</td>
<td>5241</td>
<td>4751</td>
<td>7086</td>
<td>11213</td>
<td>16203</td>
<td>21500</td>
<td>25071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>2194</td>
<td>2430</td>
<td>2461</td>
<td>2882</td>
<td>2989</td>
<td>5089</td>
<td>8224</td>
<td>8233</td>
<td>10588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>2142</td>
<td>2495</td>
<td>2780</td>
<td>2859</td>
<td>4097</td>
<td>6124</td>
<td>6124</td>
<td>13267</td>
<td>14483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Exports</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>-65</td>
<td>-319</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-1108</td>
<td>-1035</td>
<td>-1035</td>
<td>-5034</td>
<td>-3895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold Sales</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Drawings</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>1030</td>
<td>1690</td>
<td>1710</td>
<td>4300</td>
<td>4450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard Currency 1 Holdings</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>-432</td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>-1594</td>
<td>-2313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt Outstanding2</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>1316</td>
<td>1721</td>
<td>2029</td>
<td>2608</td>
<td>3641</td>
<td>4461</td>
<td>7489</td>
<td>10036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt Service Ratio3</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Negative entries represent short-term debt.
2 Medium and long-term debt.
3 (Hard currency interest payments + debt repayments) ÷ (Exports to the Developed West)

* Including less developed countries.

Source: SRI-WEFA Soviet Econometric Model (SOVMOD) Databank. These data are based on official Soviet data as compiled by the US government.
for 37 percent of total Soviet imports, while exports to the West were 28 percent of all Soviet exports. This uneven comparative growth reflects large Soviet purchases of machinery, industrial materials and grain (in 1972-73 and 1975-76 subsequent to poor grain harvests). It contributed to a marked increase in Soviet hard currency trade deficits over the period. Those deficits (which include Soviet hard currency balances in trade with less developed countries) grew from $100 million in 1968 to $500 million in 1970 and then exploded to $6.3 billion in 1975 due largely to massive Soviet grain purchases.

The economic recession in the West—which contributed to a leveling out of 1975 Soviet exports to the West—also adversely affected this deficit. So did the inability of the USSR to rapidly reduce its imports from the West. This problem was due to several factors: limited flexibility of the centrally planned and administered foreign trade system; the existence of multi-year contracts for the purchase of machinery; and the desire of Soviet economic leaders to meet or surpass the goals of the Ninth Five Year Plan, which ended in 1975. Preliminary reports indicate that the Soviet Union was able to reduce its imports from the West in 1977.

One of the ways these deficits were financed was through the sale of gold. These sales have risen substantially in recent years. The current Soviet gold stock is estimated to be about 1,925 metric tons, which at an April 1978 price of about $178 per ounce is valued at approximately $12 billion.

The value of gold sales reflects, of course, both the amount of gold sold and the price of gold in world markets. In 1973, the Soviets sold more gold than they produced. But dramatic price rises for gold in 1974 and 1975 allowed them to cut the quantity they sold in 1974 in half with only a 20 percent reduction in the value of gold sales. In 1975 they sold slightly more than half the 1973 amount, still obtaining an equal value. On the other hand, the subsequent drop in gold sold in 1975 required a 65 percent increase in the amount of gold sold in that year to achieve a 25 percent increase in the value of gold sales.

The greater increase in imports from the West also reflects a willingness on the part of the Soviet leaders, beginning in the late 1960s, to incur increasing debt. Annual Soviet credit drawings from the West doubled between 1968 and 1972 and then quadrupled between 1972 and 1976. Over that entire period Soviet medium- and long-term hard currency indebtedness rose from about $1 billion to $10 billion. At the same time, Soviet hard currency holdings shifted from a small positive amount, $600 million, to a negative short-term monetary debt of $2.3 billion. Thus, the total Soviet hard currency debt at the end of 1976 was over $12 billion. In addition, the Soviets carried an estimated $2 billion in suppliers' credit.
Another concern of the Soviet hard currency debt position shows up in its hard currency debt service ratio, the ratio of annual debt service payments (interest plus principal repayments) to Soviet commodity exports to the developed West. This is an indicator of its ability or inability to carry debt. The ratio rose from a low of 12 percent in 1968 to a significantly higher 23 percent in 1976. (As a rule of thumb, a debt service ratio greater than 25-30 percent is widely viewed by bankers as a signal for caution and close scrutiny when lending.)

This recent record of high Soviet hard currency deficits and growing indebtedness, especially when seen against the background of a marked increase in total East European hard currency debt (estimated to be approximately $40 billion at the end of 1976), has raised concerns about the future of Soviet hard currency dealings. Will the Soviet be able to continue in the future as they have in the recent past; if not, what other courses of action are open to them and what will be their consequences?

Discussions of this question usually focus on the continued willingness of Western lenders to extend credit to the Soviet Union and the possibilities of altering the patterns of Soviet imports from and exports to the West. With regard to credit, there appears to be a general consensus that Western lenders, while having little doubt about Soviet creditworthiness, currently have less desire to extend credit to the USSR. Some US banks are reaching their legal limits for single borrowers and others are reaching their own, informal, country limits based on asset portfolio allocations. Thus, banks are being more cautious with loans to the Soviet Union and are asking higher interest rates. Furthermore, the Soviets themselves may be uneasy about their increasing indebtedness and may be seeking to abate its growth. As a recent article in the British financial journal Euromoney stated (March 1977, p. 62): "It may, in the end, be Soviet concern about its own indebtedness with the West, and the damage this does to its international status, that will limit the long-term level of borrowing, rather than any more cautious approach to the risk on the part of the international banking commodity."

With regard to the import-export pattern, the main elements of Soviet import demand are machinery, other high-technology industrial productions and grain. Given the Soviet desire to raise productivity, and the crucial role that productivity increases play in the Tenth Five Year Plan targets, they will not find it easy to cut machinery imports from the West. They may be pressed, however, by financial and political considerations, to shift some of these machinery purchases to East European suppliers. Grain imports, in the long run, could be reduced by increased agricultural productivity which might result from increased investment in agriculture and better managerial and organizational methods. In the near future, grain imports will, of course, vary with the weather, with a minimum of 6 million tons to be imported annually through the US-USSR Grain Agreement which is in effect through September, 1981.
How to increase the exports of manufactured goods to the West is an issue currently receiving considerable attention in the Soviet Union. Most Western analysts, however, discount this approach as a potentially significant source of hard currency earnings for the near future. The quality and sophistication of such goods are generally not up to the standard required in Western markets. Thus, raw materials are expected to remain the major export to the West. But most analysts also agree that continued rapid expansion of Soviet oil output and export is unlikely. Oil exports to the West are now around one million barrels a day, but a CIA report made public last July predicted a downturn in Soviet oil production after 1980, and warned that before 1985 the USSR could change from an exporter to an importer of oil—and thus perhaps come into competition with the US and Western Europe for OPEC oil.

The Soviets themselves are aware of the difficulties they face in escalating oil production. Existing fields are being depleted, but the opening of new fields in less accessible regions of Siberia and off-shore (where massive but still untapped reserves await development) will be slow and costly. As one measure to maintain output they are turning to Western technology for assistance. The Oil-Gas Expo held in Moscow last October drew sellers of oil and gas extraction and transport equipment from around the world to meet with Soviet Petroleum Ministry officials who were eager to buy. Payment for the equipment must either be in hard currency—earned largely through current Soviet oil exports—or pay-back arrangements in which future oil and gas deliveries are promised in return for the equipment needed today.

Steps are also being taken to reorient both the use of fuel in the USSR and the nature of fuel trade with the East European countries. These changes may significantly alter prospects for oil exports to the West by the early 1980s. With coal reserves that are ample but difficult to exploit quickly, and the world's largest gas reserves (over three times as great as those of the second place United States), the Soviets have embarked on a program of converting their domestic fuel use from oil to coal and gas. This conversion process will be slow, requiring the conversion of existing thermo-electric power generating plants, industrial boilers and furnaces and home heating equipment to solid and gaseous fuel. But the primary problem is the replacement of existing power equipment with new equipment.

Some slowdown in Soviet oil consumption is already evident, and more is to be expected, based partly on certain structural changes in the economy. These include a recent reduction in the growth rates of such energy intensive industries as ferrous metals and construction materials, and the greater emphasis in the Tenth Five Year Plan on re-equipping existing plants rather than building new factories (which under Soviet weather conditions is quite energy-intensive).

Since fuel exports—oil, gas and coal—accounted for over 50 percent of total Soviet exports to the West in 1976, any decreases in oil production could have serious repercussions on Soviet hard
currency positions. This development comes just at a time when Soviet imports from the West, particularly in machinery and grains, are increasingly important contributors to the growth and stability of the Soviet economy.

For example, though the Soviet grain harvest last year of 195.5 million metric tons was the third highest in Soviet history, it was substantially below the level called for in the plan, and was 28 million tons below the record breaking harvest of 1976. In the past, grain harvests, which were significantly below plan, have been accompanied by heavy slaughtering of livestock herds. But last year, herds of all types of livestock increased. It seems clear that Soviet leaders have adopted a policy of importing the feed grains necessary to maintain the growth of livestock and thus insure the steady output of their domestic meat industry. A special study that we conducted indicated that such a policy would require a total value of grain imports of $21 billion over the period of the Tenth Five Year Plan (1976-1980). In return, it was estimated that the increase in meat production and livestock herds would be worth 82 billion rubles. The grain cost of each ruble's worth of additional meat would thus come to only 25 cents, approximately one sixth of a ruble at the official exchange rate.

In our study of Soviet hard currency problems, we made alternative projections of the Soviet economy to 1985 using an econometric model of the Soviet Union called SOVMOJ. (See Appendix). We assumed that grain imports would continue at a level calculated as necessary to sustain continued expansion of meat production in the Soviet Union. Based on the simulated impact of a plausible weather cycle on the Soviet agricultural sector, and assuming that the resulting levels of grain trade would reflect recent Soviet behavior, the following possible pattern of grain imports emerged.

Projected Grain Imports from Developed West
(millions of current $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>3,000 (actual)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1,200 (actual)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>3,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This pattern of grain imports from the West was then combined with three alternative projections of Soviet oil and gas production: 1) the Soviets' own projections of oil output for 1980 and 1985; 2) projections by Western oil and gas specialists from articles appearing in the Oil and Gas Journal; and 3) the projection made by the CIA. For all these projections, the same output assumptions for gas were used, starting at 320 billion cubic meters in 1976 and growing at a rate of 7 percent per year to 588 billion cubic meters
in 1985. The oil projections, however, differed rather markedly, as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Official Soviet</th>
<th>Oil Specialists</th>
<th>CIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976 (actual)</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>620-640</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculation based on the technical literature were then made for Soviet domestic consumption of oil and non-hard currency exports of oil, resulting in an estimate of oil exports to the West. This was combined with an estimate of gas exports to give the final projections of exports to the West.

With the grain import series and the three alternative oil and gas output and export projections, three alternative scenarios were run on the econometric model. Scenario A is based on the official Soviet oil figures, Scenario B is based on projections by oil industry specialists and Scenario C is based on the CIA estimates.

What are some of the major implications of the three scenarios? If the Soviets would be able to maintain their planned rates of growth of oil production through 1985, scenario A indicates that they could import the grain required to maintain "normal" growth of grain and meat supplies without any difficulties in their hard currency trade.

Fuel exports to the West (given the assumptions in the scenarios on limitations of domestic oil use and oil exports outside the West) would rise rapidly, as would net exports to the West and machinery imports from the West. And the Soviet hard currency debt service ratio would remain at a relatively low level, falling below 20 percent in the 1980s.

On the other hand, under the rate of growth of oil output projected by CIA, the Soviet Union would be in severe hard currency difficulties. Fuel exports would fall rapidly in the 1980s, becoming negative by 1985, i.e., the Soviet Union would be a net importer of oil and gas from the West. Machinery imports from the West, as estimated by the model, would also fall rapidly in the 1980s, implying significant negative consequences for industrial growth and modernization. And Soviet hard currency debt problems would become severe. Indeed, the hard currency debt service ratio is estimated by the model to grow from a level of 26 percent in 1980 to 53 percent in 1984 and 99 percent in 1985.

These are clearly intolerable levels, and would assuredly elicit countermeasures by Soviet authorities. One such possible measure is indicated by the precipitous rise in the estimated gold reserves-import
ratio. This rise is a consequence of both a fall, in the 1980s, of Soviet hard currency imports and a rise, assumed in the model projection, of the value of Soviet gold reserves. Therefore, the Soviets could more actively sell gold. However, in scenario C, the model indicates that by 1985 the Soviet hard currency situation would be so disastrous, that even if the Soviets sold off their entire gold stock, they would still be left with a hard currency debt of $10 billion.

The results of scenario B fall in between the other two scenarios. While exports of fuels to the West begin to decrease after 1980, the model projects a continued, though slight, rise in machinery imports from the West. The trade balance with the West is negative through the entire period, and the deficit increases after 1980. This contributes to a rise in the debt service ratio to 30 percent by 1981, and just under 40 percent by 1985.

If this scenario is judged to be the "most likely" of the three, the implication is that the combined interaction of the projected grain and oil difficulties will cause the Soviet Union significant hard currency problems. A debt service ratio substantially above 30 percent would probably lead to sufficient concern in the Western banking community as to endanger the Soviet ability to borrow. Moreover, Soviet leaders themselves would be concerned about their debt position. Thus, Soviet trade behavior would have to be altered.

In terms of the trade-offs among grain imports, machinery imports and fuel exports, the probable policy implication is that the Soviets would not import as much grain over the period as assumed in the scenario. This is considered most probable because the fuel exports are already set on the high side (domestic oil consumption and oil exports to CMEA are assumed low) and machinery imports are felt to be high priority in view of their contribution to Soviet growth.

In the light of our analysis it seems that continued expansion of Soviet trade with the West over the next decade will hinge largely on the ability of the Soviet Union to maintain its exports of oil to the West (or quickly to find substitutes for their exports). An alternative strategy, which is already emerging, is for the Soviets to require that its East European partners pay for some of their oil imports from the Soviet Union in hard currency. If these do not prove sufficient, the repercussions will affect both sides.

The Soviets will be forced to make reductions in imports of Western machinery and equipment and/or grain, thus slowing the flow of new technology from the West, and endangering their plans for a more stable and balanced development of agriculture.

For the West, such a development would mean the obvious loss of sales of both industrial and agricultural products. Moreover, in the event of the failure by the Soviet Union to maintain adequate oil production after 1980, there would develop an additional strain on world oil supplies.
 DeVlAIAtIOn OF ACTUAL AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT FROM NORMAL

NORMAL & ACTUAL GRAIN OUTPUT
VALUE OF LIVESTOCK

VALUE OF MEAT OUTPUT
### Projected Grain Imports from Developed West
*(millions of current $)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Actual Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1,512</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1,543</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,967</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3,009</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>3,069</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1,737</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Projected Soviet Oil Output
*(million metric tons)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>A. Official Soviet</th>
<th>B. Oil Specialists</th>
<th>C. CIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>620–640</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**

- **Official Soviet:** 1980: 10th Five Year Plan; 1985: according to The Times (London), July 27, 1977, this is the tentative Soviet target for 1985.
- **Oil Specialists:** Petroleum/2000, August 1977, p. 503.
- **CIA:** Prospects for Soviet Oil Production, April 1977, p. 1 (high estimate).
EXPORT OF FUELS TO THE DEVELOPED WEST

OUTPUT OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS & GAS
NET EXPORTS TO THE DEVELOPED WEST

IMPORTS OF MACHINERY FROM THE DEVELOPED WEST
Population and Manpower Trends in the U.S.S.R.

By

Murray Feshbach

Foreign Demographic Analysis Division
Bureau of the Census
The structure and dynamics of the population of the Soviet Union during the remaining quarter of this century will be significantly different than they have been in the years since the Second World War. Whereas population and manpower trends as a factor in Soviet economic growth in analyses have to now largely been ignored or downplayed by Western scholars, their importance can no longer be ignored.

The changes are a result of past demographic catastrophes and of postwar demographic developments. It should be understood that the estimates and projections up to the middle 1990's, which I am presenting are based entirely on the number and distribution of persons already born. Those for the period up to 2000 are based on projected births for only the next few years. The short-run determinants and consequences of demographic trends do not change sharply. The projected figures for persons already born are based on observed trends in mortality and the assumption that there will be only minor changes in the future; therefore, assuming that no major catastrophes occur, we can have a relatively high degree of confidence in the overall figures. Less precision can be claimed for the projected births and the regional projections. Nonetheless, the enormous importance of regional considerations in all aspects of population and manpower will, it is hoped, be clear from the following data.

Total and Regional Population

According to the estimates and projections prepared by the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, the Soviet population as a whole can be expected to grow by almost 130 million persons between 1950 and 2000, from 180 up to 308 million persons (Table 1). Due largely to the postwar decline in the birth rate for much of the country, the rate of growth of the population will drop by the last decade of the century to about one-third the 1951-1955 rate, i.e., from 1.7 percent to 0.6 percent per year. The projected total of 308 million for the year 2000 is much lower than Soviet projections of 340 to 350 million persons made a decade ago.

The overall figures mask very disparate rates of growth by republic or region. At the beginning of 1977, the population of the most important republic, the Russian Republic (RSFSR), was 135,453,000 or 52.5 percent of the population of the country as a whole. By the beginning of the next century, it is projected that the Russian Republic's proportion of the total will drop to only 48.0 percent, even though there will be an absolute growth of some 12 million persons in the Russian Republic between these dates. In contrast, the share of the five Central Asian republics of Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan will increase dramatically. The population of this group of republics will almost double, from 33 million persons at the beginning of 1970 to 64 million at the beginning of the year 2000. The proportion of the Soviet population in these five republics will increase by over one-half, from 14 percent to 21 percent. The three Transcaucasian republics of Armenia, Azerbaidzjan, and
Georgia will also increase rapidly, adding another 5 to 6 percentage points. The significance of demographic changes in these eight republics will become clearer as we proceed to discuss vital statistics, nationality data, and current and future civilian and military manpower.

**Vital Statistics**

Dramatic changes have taken place in the Soviet crude birth and death rates since 1950. The birth rate has dropped by over 30 percent, whereas the death rate declined until 1960, but has since increased almost to the 1950 level of 10 per 1,000. The birth rate is expected to increase from 18 per 1,000 in 1976 to 19 per 1,000 in 1980 because of a relative increase in the population in the ages of childbearing but after that the crude birth rate should decrease to 16.1 by the year 2000.

Again the aggregate figures conceal major regional differentials. In 1970, the four core Central Asian Republics (i.e., excluding Kazakhstan) recorded birth rates of about 33.5 per 1,000, approximately twice as high as the national average. Projections for the year 2000 show a drop in the birth rates of the four core republics to a range of 23 to 27 per 1,000, still higher than the projected national rate of 16 and much higher than the 14 for the Russian Republic.

Due to the aging of the population, the death rate should increase from its 1976 level of 10 per 1,000 up to 11 per 1,000 in the year 2000. However, unusually high increases in the death rate which have taken place recently should also be noted. The rise in the death rate is more than would have been expected due to the aging of the population. This is likely due to three factors. As I have argued in the 1976 Joint Economic Committee volume on the Soviet economy and elsewhere, there has been an astonishing rise in infant mortality and a very significant increase in the age-specific mortality rates of males aged 20-45, which have accelerated the rise in the crude death rate. Our projection of 11 per 1,000 in the year 2000 may be too low if the present high mortality levels of infants and young males (due largely to alcoholism) continue. The rising mortality rates may be the underlying reasons why the Soviet Union no longer publishes life expectancy estimates for any year later than 1971/1972 and infant mortality rates for any year later than 1974.

**Aging of the Population**

One of the major consequences of the drop in the birth rate is the relative aging of the population. In the Soviet Union, the population of able-bodied ages is defined as all males 16 to 59 years of age and females 16 to 54 years of age, inclusive. Males aged 60 and over and females aged 55 and over are considered to be part of the pension or "over-age" population. Children 0 to 15 years of age are considered to be the "under-aged" population. The share of the over-aged population is expected to double between 1950 and 2000, from 10 percent up to 19 percent. The share of the under-aged population is expected to decline from 32 percent in 1950 to 25
in 2000 and that of the able-bodied population from 57 to 56 in the same period.

Because of different trends in fertility and, to a lesser extent, in mortality, regional population structures will become more sharply differentiated over the next 25 years. The again of the Russian Republic's population, primarily due to the reduction in the birth rate, is reflected in an increase in the share of this republic's over-aged population from 15 percent in 1970 up to 22 percent in 2000. At the same time, in the four core republics of Central Asia, where the birth rate remains high the share of the over-aged population will drop from 10.2 percent in 1970 to 8.2 percent in 2000. Young persons aged 0-15 in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and the Transcaucasia are expected to account for 37 percent of the national total in 2000, up dramatically from 26 percent in 1970. The share of 0-15 year olds in the Russian Republic will decline from 50 percent in 1970 to 41 percent in the year 2000. The numbers of young people in these eight southern republics are projected to increase by 50 percent from 19,354,000 in 1970 to 28,957,000 in 2000. The share of this region in the overall and especially the younger population will continue to rise into the next century if these projections are reasonably correct.

**Nationality**

Many of the underlying causes for the changes indicated in the total population and its regional components lie in nationality differences. The traditional way of life and the high birth rates which it tends to sustain have not changed significantly among most of the Muslims of the Soviet Union. Thus, the total population of the U.S.S.R. grew by 15.8 percent during the intercensal period between 1959 and 1970 and the population of Muslim origin grew by 42 percent, or over two-and-one-half times the national rate (Table 2). Meanwhile, the Great Russian population increased from 114,114,000 persons in 1959 to 129,015,000 in 1970, or by 13 percent, significantly less than the national average.

The Russians represent a declining share of the total population. If the rate of growth between 1959 and 1970, the last two census dates, is extrapolated to the year 2000, then the Great Russian share will decline from 53 percent in 1970 to barely 50 percent of the total population estimated for that date. If one were to include the other two basic Slavic nationalities -- the Ukrainians and Belorussians -- the share of this combined Slavic group will decline from about 74 percent in 1970 to about 66 percent in 2000.

Linear extrapolation probably understates the changes that will occur. A Soviet analyst, G. A. Bondarskaya, gives some hypothetical estimates for the year 2000 which are the only Soviet nationality projections ever published. She explicitly states that her estimates assume a continuation of current gross reproduction rates for each nationality and a single set of mortality rates for all nationalities, which she admits is unrealistic. Nonetheless, from these estimates we can see the implications of current trends. She presents a graph from which it is possible to estimate roughly that by 2000 the Great Russians will number almost 35,000,000 less than
the 179,137,000 derived by extrapolating 1959-1970 trends (Table 2). The lower figure is a result of current fertility patterns and an older age structure.

If Bondarskaya's estimates were to prove correct, then the Great Russians would represent only 46 percent of the population. If we were to include the other Slavic peoples, the combined group would still represent less than 65 percent of the total. Simultaneously, however, according to the Bondarskaya projection, the Muslims would increase from one out of seven Soviet citizens in 1970 to about one out of every three in the year 2000. I believe that the actual trend will fall somewhere between these two projections. An alternative estimate yields a ratio of one out of four by the year 2000, still a very high proportion of Muslims among the total population. This calculation is based on the assumption that the rate of increase in the population of the four core Central Asian republics, which we project to be 119 percent, can be applied to the entire Muslim population. According to our preferred projection, out of 308 million persons in the Soviet Union in the year 2000 76.8 million would be of Muslim origin.

Civilian and Military Manpower

Because of all these factors, the demographic aspects of manpower will undergo radical quantitative and geographical shifts in the next three five-year plan periods.

Until the decade of the 1970's began, Soviet economists considered that there existed a pool of potential labor which could be tapped for the State sector. This pool was felt to consist of non-working members of households, collective farmers, and some persons from among the under- and over-age groups. In 1976 however, the Deputy Chief of the Labor Department of the Soviet State Planning Committee indicated that "almost 100 percent" of the new increments to the labor force in the current plan period would be young persons entering the able-bodied ages. Therefore, in effect, this source does not foresee possible major increases in the number of pensioners returning to work.

The net addition to the population of able-bodied ages in the Ninth and Tenth Five-Year Plan periods (1971-1980) is estimated to be 23,341,000 persons. However, in the next two plan periods only slightly more than one-quarter of this number, i.e., 5,294,000 will be added over the entire 10 years (Table 3). The average annual increase of 529,400 in the 1980's is only one-quarter of the annual rate in the 1970's, and is also less than three-quarters the previous low average annual increase of 739,000 in the Seven-Year Plan period (1959-65). At that time the annual increment of young people was so low that the military felt impelled to draft two cohorts in 1961 to maintain the then current level of the Armed Forces. What will be done in the 1980's?

Before turning to the military aspects of the manpower problem it must be noted that the eight republics of the southern tier of the country will
provide substantially more than 100 percent of the increments of persons of able-bodied ages in the period 1981-1995 because of net decreases elsewhere. In the Russian Republic, there will be a net decrease over the entire 15-year period. This is particularly important because in 1972 that Republic produced 62 percent of the nation's gross value of industrial production. It is believed that there is little prospect of large-scale migration of the natives of the Central Asian region to Russian cities during the next decade. Thus, it is understandable that the need to improve productivity and efficiency in order to achieve the economic goals of the current 5-year plan was underscored by General Secretary Brezhnev at the XXVth Party Congress. While on the surface he was addressing the current plan, he undoubtedly was keeping future labor (and capital) prospects in mind. If the labor shortage is serious now, then what will the level of urgency be in the 1980's?

The regional differentials in birth and population growth rates will have a major impact on both the size and nationality structure of the supply of new draftees. By the end of the century about one-third of the 18-year old male cohorts will come from the eight southern republics as compared with about one-fifth in 1970. At the same time, the Russian Republic's potential supply of 18-year old males will drop to 44 percent in the year 2000 as compared with 56 percent in 1970 (Table 4). These changes mean that the military will need to train increasing numbers of less trustworthy non-Slavic, primarily rural recruits from the border regions in the Russian language and to adapt them to the technology of modern armed forces.

In sum, then, we have seen that major shifts have been taking place and will continue to occur in Soviet demographic trends. Because of these changes and especially the underlying regional differentials, these demographic factors have far reaching importance for manpower resources in the U.S.S.R. for the remainder of this century.
Table 1. ESTIMATED AND PROJECTED TOTAL POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R. AND SELECTED REPUBLICS, 1970 TO 2000  
(Numbers are in Thousands as of January 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
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<td>265,049</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>289,206</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>308,050</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>319,048</td>
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<td>R.S.F.S.R.</td>
<td>130,036</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>137,946</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>144,830</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>147,834</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>147,640</td>
<td>45.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Asia and Kazakhstan</td>
<td>32,789</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>41,617</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>52,695</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>64,005</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>73,073</td>
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<td>Kazakhstan</td>
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<td>20,507</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>22,369</td>
<td>7.0</td>
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<td>15,759</td>
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<td>26,572</td>
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<td>Transcaucasia</td>
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<td>5.4</td>
<td>16,929</td>
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<td>12,317</td>
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<td>Azerbaydshan</td>
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<td>10,081</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
<td>6,202</td>
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<td>6,373</td>
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Source: Unpublished estimates and projections by the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce in March 1977, Medium series. An alternative constant series has been derived on the assumption that the fertility levels of 1975 will remain identical until the year 2000, and that mortality will decline during the projection period at a rate equivalent to an increase in life expectancy at birth of 2.5 years. All republic projections are based on the assumption that there will be no net migration between them.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalities</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>Percent of total</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>Percent of total</th>
<th>A. Extrapolated 1959/70 growth</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>Percent of total</th>
<th>B. Bondarskaya hypothetical estimate</th>
<th>Percent of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>208,827</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>241,720</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>(356,126)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
<td>(312,000)</td>
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<td>Slavic</td>
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<td>76.3</td>
<td>178,820</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>(244,229)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>(68.6)</td>
<td>(201,364)</td>
<td>(64.5)</td>
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<td>Great Russians...</td>
<td>116,114</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>129,015</td>
<td>53.4</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>(50.3)</td>
<td>(144,697)</td>
<td>(46.3)</td>
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<td>Belorussians......</td>
<td>7,913</td>
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<td>3.7</td>
<td>(13,336)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>(3.7)</td>
<td>(11,226)</td>
<td>(3.6)</td>
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<td>Ukrainians.......</td>
<td>37,253</td>
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<td>40,753</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>(14.5)</td>
<td>(45,643)</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>(30.6)</td>
<td>(104,809)</td>
<td>(33.6)</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>(3.7)</td>
<td>(11,300)</td>
<td>(3.6)</td>
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<td>(4.3)</td>
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<td>(6,686)</td>
<td>(2.1)</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>(1.3)</td>
<td>(4,899)</td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
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<td>3.8</td>
<td>(29,823)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>(8.4)</td>
<td>(29,148)</td>
<td>(9.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others.</td>
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<td>11,097</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1 (36,000)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>(10.1)</td>
<td>1 (34,587)</td>
<td>(11.1)</td>
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</table>

1 Derived from average of 1959 and 1970 shares that "Other Muslims" represents among all Muslims in both years.

Source:

2000: A. Extrapolation based on nationality growth during intercensal period of 1959 to 1970;
B. Approximate estimates based on G. A. Bondarskaya, Rozhdayemost v SSSR (Etnodemograficheskiy aspekt), Moscow, 1977, pp. 92-93. Also see Roman Szporluk, 'Why Some Sociologists Are Alarmed in Russia,' International Herald Tribune, September 1, 1977, p. 4, based on a New York Times article.

(Based on data as of January 1, in thousands)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Plan period</th>
<th>U.S.S.R.</th>
<th>R.S.F.S.R.</th>
<th>Central Asia and Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Transcaucasus</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Total increase</td>
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X Not applicable.


(Data as of July 1, in thousands)

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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Number of 18-year old males</td>
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(Percent of Own Country Total)

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<td>100.0</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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Soviet Attitudes and Values: Current Perspectives

By

Alexander Dallin

Department of History
Stanford University
Introduction

Soviet attitudes and values constitute the vaguest and vastest of all topics examined in this series of seminars. To a greater extent than in other areas, we are dealing here also with judgements rather than demonstrable facts. Of necessity, these comments must be highly selective. Let me preface by observations with three general points:

1. There are genuine developments in Soviet society -- affecting attitudes and values -- which are largely autonomous of the authorities, i.e., unintended, often unforeseen and unwelcome. (This is true, for instance, of demographic patterns and of alcoholism.)

2. Changes do occur and will continue to occur in Soviet society: the widespread myth of the immutable nature of Russian attitudes and behavior tells us more about our preconceptions and about previous difficulties in observing the Soviet scene than about present realities.

3. We are able to observe and study Soviet attitudes and values, even if we cannot systematically conduct survey research and cannot always foresee their scope or consequences.

To begin with, I would reject both of the following extreme notions:

1. It is a mistake to believe that Soviet policy is impervious to domestic needs and pressures or to perceived constraints from parts of Soviet society; but

2. It is no less misleading to argue that what we commonly call "dissent" is only the tip of a political iceberg which is bound to bring about the disintegration of the Soviet system.

In my judgment, Soviet citizens overwhelmingly accept the existing order as legitimate: for most of them, it is the only system they know; they have all been taught to identify with it; some have been its beneficiaries. But if most of them do not seek a change of systems, many and probably most Soviet citizens wish for a variety of in-system changes -- attitudes which may over time move some of them toward greater alienation.

There are in fact serious and multiple tensions and cleavages -- among various elements within the Soviet population, as well as between social groups and the regime (or particular institutions). Such tensions need not always be dysfunctional or divisive but they prove to be so.

It scarcely needs to be mentioned that sixty years of Soviet rule have failed to produce either a communist society or a "new Soviet man" with a socialist value system. Soviet society is stratified, with substantial
inequalities of income, status, power, and opportunity. It is beset by a multiplicity of problems, ranging from apathy to crime, from deviance to growing ethnicity, from perceived stagnation to a quest for privacy.

**Complexity, Consumerism, Conservatism**

Among the multitude of processes affecting Soviet society, it may be useful for us to focus on a few interrelated ones, which can conveniently be considered under the labels of complexity, consumerism, and conservatism.

Let us remind ourselves of the scope and speed of Soviet "modernization" -- from also-ran to super-power -- as exemplified in massive industrialization, urbanization, education and the accompanying social, economic, military, and institutional development. Greater complexity and diversity are bound to be by-products of this process. It is bound to produce a greater differentiation of individual roles and functions, and hence greater diversity in what different individuals would put uppermost among desired goals: the result is tension among the priorities of "good communists" in different jobs, positions of responsibilities, career ladders, geographic and ethnic units, generations, and bureaucratic hierarchies. A factory manager in Uzbekistan, a physicist in Novosibirsk, a tractor driver in the Ukraine, a party propagandist in Leningrad are likely to want different things first -- differences apt to find political expression over such perennial issues as the allocation of scarce resources and the state budget.

The limited plurality of preferences which thus emerges within the authoritarian structure tends to contribute to the further erosion of the already fading faith in the existence of a single, incontestable and official truth. In this sense (and in a number of others), nothing fails like success. The very fact that the Soviet Union has reached the stage of social and economic complexity makes a return to Stalinism well-nigh impossible: the system could not rely on mass terror, nor ignore demands for housing, consumer durables, or services, without paying an immense price.

The very fact that science, technology, and education have made remarkable strides contributes both to greater interest in the world abroad and to greater access to television sets, wider knowledge of foreign languages, and more widespread and intense interaction with opposite numbers abroad in many occupations and professions. The fact that the party has more or less successfully led the process of forcible industrialization to completion, contributes to more widespread doubts concerning the redundancy of the party's role in the years ahead, and reinforces the legitimacy of diverse priorities in resource allocation. At the same time, wholehearted support becomes more essential to the regime when the stress is no longer on mere compliance or efficacy but increasingly on efficiency, sophisticated innovation, and other goals whose attainment require good will rather than duress.

Two good examples of problems raised by technological advances are the unintended consequences of stepping up the production of private cars and the introduction of xerox copying machines. In the first case, there is already ample evidence of pressures for networks of mechanics, spare parts (including black-market sources), and service facilities, and also official complaints about changes in attitude on the part of automobile owners,
who reportedly spend inordinate time taking care of their cherished vehicles, seek to spend vacations by driving -- whether alone or with their families -- thus removing themselves from the "collective" to which they belong. In the second case, the authorities are caught between the chronic need for relief from incredible bureaucratic overloads and inefficiencies, on the one hand, and the (not entirely unfounded) political suspiciousness of permitting access by "ordinary citizens" to duplicating or copying facilities (access otherwise not allowed). The resulting efforts at greater controls or guards cannot be considered lasting "solutions."

In the broadest sense, the same problem arises with the introduction of the computer into Soviet economic planning: does it threaten and obviate the role of the political boss and decision maker, or does it help the latter make better decisions? Ultimately this intensifies the tension between "objective" and "subjective" approaches -- the latent conflict between "Red" and "Expert" in communist societies (to use the shorthand labels used by the Chinese).

It is now the incumbent office-holders and party officials who are likely to be the fiercest defenders of the status quo, the greatest practitioners of conservatism opposing innovations which, they perceive, might threaten their status, privilege, and role. Thus the new Soviet elite that has benefited from development and differentiation -- an elite that felt threatened by Nikita Khrushchev's improvisations and reorganizations but has been made to feel more secure by the policies and practices of the Brezhnev era -- seeks the persistence of privilege and, by the same token, is inclined to oppose policies apt to produce crises, at home or abroad, and to require more than minimal risk-taking.

At the same time, this new elite is something of a functional equivalent of a middle class (which had been notoriously weak in Russia in earlier times) -- with all its highly unrevolutionary characteristics. Among the best-off, travel abroad is in fact a kind of conspicuous consumption; others tend to adopt philistine, perhaps jingoistic attitudes. What both groups share increasingly with the urban rank and file is the quest for "things" -- in effect, consumerism. (Since "materialism" cannot be made into an official pejorative in the Soviet Union, the phenomenon tends to be called veshchizm, or "thingism." ) The relative deprivation in this regard -- ranging from meat and dairy products to appliances and furnishings -- is of course a legacy of the Stalin era. And, as in other countries, the relative satisfaction of demand has evidently produced a remarkable rise in expectations.

Even in the younger age brackets, where greater idealism might be expected, the result (as indicated by Soviet opinion polls) is a quest for goods and gadgets. Soviet university students, for instance, place on a list of what they would like most, items such as motorbikes, stereos, and tape recorders. Needless to say, television is increasingly absorbing the leisure time of Soviet males, while Soviet females put vacuum cleaners and washing machines, processed and packaged food, and other services high on their list of desires and needs.

It is generally taken for granted in the Soviet Union that the assurance of welfare -- and this would include both goods and services and
opportunity -- is properly and inevitable among the tasks of the state. In the long run, of course, the perceived legitimacy of the regime is bound to be a function of the extent to which the authoritarian structure permits and facilitates both the achievement of "progress" (which is typically linked to advances in economy, technology, science, and medicine) and the emergence of an acquisitive society -- in short, it depends significantly on the way the system performs.

Contradictions and Ambiguities

Given the increasing complexity of Soviet society, sweeping generalizations about attitudes and values are less and less satisfactory. There are, in fact, many unresolved tensions among values held simultaneously by the same people, and also among diverse attitudes adopted by different groups of people. A growing all-Soviet nationalism appears to be gathering support at the same time as the tendency to identify with subnational units -- either ethnic or geographic is also on the rise. An insistence on "law and order" is manifest, and at the same time anti-social behavior is on the rise. Elitism and egalitarian attitudes have long coexisted uneasily in communist attitudes. The Red/Expert dichotomy has been remarked upon above.

Potentially perhaps the most serious among the many overlapping cleavages in Soviet society is that which takes place along nationality lines. The situation is one of such complexity that justice cannot be done to it here. Suffice it so say that there are conflicting pulls -- some that make for increasing assimilation, amalgamation, and integration of non-Russians and non-Russian areas into the Soviet-Russian "mainstream", others intensity centrifugal, separatist tendencies, be it in the quest for more elbow-room, in pursuit of cultural autonomy, or for political distinctiveness. Most authorities would agree that the centrifugal impetus -- though varying from area to area -- is stronger than the integrationist forces.

A fuller treatment would of course need to specify the roles played by the Soviet equivalent of America's interest groups. In the USSR, with the exception of the military establishment, these are largely informal identifications of people in the same occupations or bureaucracies. Even with very inadequate knowledge of their attitudes, it is possible to show that different groups tend to differ substantially on a variety of important issues. Whereas scientists and creative intellectuals may favor liberalization in cultural as well as other policies, there is little indication that the rest of the Soviet elite shares such views. Attitudes toward the United States and detente (such as it is) appear to vary significantly, presumably as different groups and individuals perceive whether their self-interest would or would not be served by greater interaction with the outside world, greater technology transfer, further arms control agreements, and so forth. While the full spectrum of opinion is hard to convey, it may be affirmed that on every single question on which Soviet opinion has been probed, different -- and often contradictory -- attitudes and opinions are reported.
Implications and Conclusions

There are at least three reasons why attitudes and values in the Soviet population, even where they seem apolitical, are policy-relevant: (1) Soviet decision makers are bound to take into account what they perceive as domestic pressures and constraints; (2) given the sweeping nature of the state's role in the economy and society, decisions in any one sector are bound to impinge on the others; and (3) given the scarcity of resources in a number of key areas, alternative options regarding the allocation of these resources are invariably among the most contested political issues in the Soviet system.

I have tried to suggest that there are a number of contradictory trends at work, and that while a widespread sense of improvement exists, large sectors of the Soviet population remain unsatisfied with either the "bread" or "circuses" provided by the regime. The contradictory tendencies need to be restated here. There is substantial support for low risk-taking in Soviet foreign policy, as suggested above. Side by side with this view, there is a widespread impatience with do-nothing immobilism, with seeming lack of daring on the part of super-annuated bureaucrats, and a desire for more chauvinistic behavior. If the ideological zeal has markedly lessened, the new "responsiveness" of the Soviet leadership makes it more difficult for the regime to stomach setbacks or to institute sharp changes in policy abroad without paying a price at home.

While there is considerable pressure for more interaction abroad -- be it on the national level of trade, technology, and travel, or on the individual level of blue jeans, Olympic games, and TV programs -- there is also fear of the consequences of such a process because of the suspected contagion of alien ideas and values, security problems, and the sense in some Soviet quarters that the Brezhnev regime has as yet little to show for its policies in this sphere.

Among the various implications of this for the United States, one aspect deserves particularly to be noted here. I suspect that analysts and policymakers in Washington, in dealings affecting the Soviet-American relationship, assume either that US actions can be rendered directly efficacious or alternatively that American behavior somehow will impact positively on the Soviet elite's general and operational assumptions regarding the US. The choice between these two criteria often makes for different policy preferences here. This is somewhat analogous to the Soviet view of the US response to the Angola and Ethiopian situation: Moscow correctly foresaw that the US would not respond to Cuban/Soviet involvement by direct action. But Moscow apparently ignored or seriously underestimated the effect of this involvement on American opinion, including suspicions of Soviet intentions and implications for the US defense posture. This misperception may ultimately prove quite costly for the "moderates" among the Soviet leadership.

The Soviet domestic scene is part of our "audience" whether we like it or not, whether we think of it or not. By what we do and what we don't do, by what we say and what we don't say, we reinforce or weaken assumptions and
images among different Soviet strata; we validate or undercut arguments among them. If this invites a still more difficult conduct of American foreign policy, it also promises a more realistic and sensitive awareness of a large, often silent, mass for whom American conduct can be of great consequence.
APPENDIX

Table I: Annual Income: Percentage of Families (1970, in rubles)

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<tr>
<th>Annual income per person</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
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<td>up to 600 rubles</td>
<td>32.6 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>601-900</td>
<td>31.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>901-1,200</td>
<td>17.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1,201-1,500</td>
<td>9.1</td>
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<td>1,501-2,100</td>
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<td>over 2,100</td>
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Table 2: Growth of per capita disposable income (1950-75, in rubles): U.S. estimates

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<td></td>
<td>220.50</td>
<td>282.75</td>
<td>386.00</td>
<td>493.00</td>
<td>685.15</td>
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Table 3: Household stocks of consumer durables, USSR, per 100 families

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<td>Radios</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>78</td>
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<td>TV sets</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>Bicycles</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washing machines</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>65</td>
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Table 4: Percentages having bath, telephone, and car, U.S. and USSR

(P stands for Pskov, J stands for Jackson, Wyoming)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of each group having</th>
<th>Private Bath</th>
<th>Telephone</th>
<th>Private Car</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled labor</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled labor</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>2</td>
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Soviet Attitudes and Values: Prospects for the Future

by

James H. Billington
The Wilson Center
We move into deep, dark and difficult territory when we probe into people's attitudes, values, and beliefs. We have trouble enough finding and articulating out own--let alone penetrating those of a culture as opaque as the Russian. In this--as in some other respects--the so-called era of detente may have actually increased our ignorance. For, in addition to perpetual obstacles to understanding (the secretiveness of Soviet society and the manipulable vanities and cultural parochialism of most American interlocutors with the Russians), there has been an intensification of a process within the Soviet-American dialogue that I would describe as funneling.

Ostensibly increased and diversified American contacts with the USSR seem increasingly channeled through ever narrower control points within the USA Institute, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the like. The American connection becomes, in effect, at least partly a form of patronage for internal distribution within the Soviet system by a small element of the Soviet power structure. This element may very well play a more reactionary role inside Russia not only than we assume--but than would the other Russians whom they keep us from seeing.

I may be contradicted by inside knowledge, to which I have no access, or corrected by studies I may not have seen; but I have the impression that as they contact us, the funnel is simply reversed--again to their advantage. Soviet interlocutors from a small number of central control points now spray their contacts out widely into a diffuse American constituency whose cumulative and collective experience never seems to be systematically inventoried let alone appraised. Even within Washington one still wonders half a decade after the grain deal, if one administration, one branch of government, or even one department within a branch fully shares with the next everything Dobrynin said to it as he roams freely through our corridors of power--while our own ghettoized and often bypassed representatives in Moscow squint for a little light at the end of their funnel.

The beginning of wisdom in this unhappily asymmetrical state of affairs lies partly in the better gathering and collating of data. I believe there is also a conceptual need to recognize that deep contradictions are inherent in the object being studies--and are not merely a function of inadequate information. Acceptance of contradiction will help us realize that there can be no simple answers about the USSR--including, paradoxically, any certainty that there are no answers.

The basic contradiction in the Soviet Union is the relatively simple contrast between outward power and inner weakness. Outwardly it is the last, the largest and the most powerful of the great multinational empires of the pre-modern era. Inwardly it is a land of disturbed emotions--born of suffering, impacted by silence, uncleansed by sunlight. Within the lifetime of the present Soviet leaders impressive material accomplishments and physical transformations
have certainly been made. But at the same time some 50 million people have been killed on their own soil by unnatural causes, and near total destruction visited on all three of the great monotheisms of Judaism, Christianity and Islam—all of which were freshly flowering in Russia when Brezhnev was a boy. Marxism-Leninism—the secularized heir to this prophetic line of historical religions—came into power during Brezhnev's adolescence, was used to justify everything that followed, and has itself now ossified into the intellectual labor-saving device of an arteriosclerotic dacha despotism.

Whether arguing that we in America should adjust to it or adjust ourselves to confronting it, both the As and the Bs in our not very great debate have assumed that the "it" worth talking about was essentially only the military power of the Soviet Union. I would argue that—as a practical-political necessity of equal importance—we must move behind the stern, outer face of material Soviet power to investigate the inner face of what Soviets themselves refer to as their spiritual culture. We must be open to the testimony of their art—not just the artfulness of our testimonies.

Within that art, I would begin not with high culture but with a favorite form of their popular children's art: the matrosha or wooden doll containing other dolls within it. I would suggest it as a metaphor for Russians and even for Russia itself: an image which transforms Churchill's reference to a "puzzle wrapped in a riddle inside an enigma" into a research program rather than a counsel of despair.

Authentic matrjoshas (unlike those sold to tourists) often depict the face on each doll as different from the others outside it. The expression on each face is real (and at any given time the only visible one for the whole). But there may be only 1/8 of an inch of wood behind it: and the real nature of the matrosha is thought to be found only on the final face which alone lies on solid wood.

This layered, matrosha quality of Russian reality—with real conflicts often occurring within and not just between individuals and groups—makes the future particularly unpredictable and our culture-bound techniques of Kremlinology, interest group analysis and the like frequently fruitless.

The central question for the West in this period of political transition is: What will the face look like on the solid wood of the next generation of leaders when time peels away the presently visible outer layers? I believe that there is a second layer already visible behind the outer face of increased military power and the still invisible face of the next leadership.

This is the second or inner face of the present leadership itself, which is one of insecurity, perplexity, and simple entropy. It is the weary expression of a human energy crisis at the top. To change the metaphor, the ship of state though well armed is running out of steam. There is the shortage of labor, the systematic failure of agriculture,
the systematic inability to translate R and D into effective production, the deferral of basic maintenance and turnover within both the economic and political system—and a loss of dynamism almost everywhere except in priority military-related technology on the one hand and the burgeoning second economy on the other. The situation is objectively serious to them even if largely unnoticed by us as we concentrate our attention on the outer face of power—the armament on the decks, the cruising capacity of the ship, the effect of technological tow lines from the West.

Much attention has been paid of late to the dragging anchor of the police bureaucracy and to the flapping sail of dissident agitation. The former, of course, relates to the outer face of power. The latter has a special importance for our probe into the future face of Russia, because (quite apart from the intrinsic human interest of unfurling a banner in Red Square), the fact of flapping indicates that invisible fresh winds are already blowing and might provide new sources of power and dynamism if anyone could find a way of tying them down to the deck.

The crucial question in determining the face of the next generation of Soviet leaders is how far they will go in working with these new forces of potential energy that are evident in the society as a whole but are not yet integrated with the realities of power.

The new forces blowing in the wind, which new leaders will surely feel tempted to work with, are essentially the two imperatives of efficiency and identity. The powerful, contradictory pulls exercised by these two seemingly universal aspirations of modern man will largely determine the character of the emerging generation of leaders.

Efficiency is a seemingly irresistible ideal, which is pre-programmed into industrial society—and is particularly appealing to the new post-war generation in the USSR. For them, heroic struggles for social construction and wartime resistance are overtold tales from the past; the deferral of gratification in the name of remote goals seems increasingly intolerable; and a new consumer-oriented ethos is accompanied by creeping pragmatism and rising expectations fostered by a period of 30 years almost without precedent in Russian history: of continuous peace, relative prosperity, steady growth in formal education and dramatic recent increase in informal knowledge about the outside world.

Though the coming generation of leaders is no longer young, its formative background will be profoundly—almost unimaginably—different from that of Brezhnev and Suslov. From a generation formed by the unprecedented traumas of the thirties and forties, the torch of power must pass to a generation formed in the equally unprecedented (by Russian standards) tranquility and stability of the fifties and sixties. This emerging, middle-aged generation never had the safety-valve outlet of a youth rebellion. But it would be a mistake to assume that the impulse was not there or that passion and idealism has been totally corroded by cynicism among those who work silently within the system. The cynicism about politics that accompanies the quest for efficiency
in Russia has an essentially moral thrust. It was the faith, after all, of Diogenes in search of an honest man; and, just as the cynics were the most moral of men in pre-Christian antiquity, they may prove to be the harbingers of a new morality in a largely post-Christian Russia.

The cult of efficiency feeds on the professional pride which struggles in a thousand undramatic ways to enlarge the sphere of integrity within which one can work free arbitrary ideological interference and parasitic bureaucratic control. The quest for efficiency does not necessarily lead to convergence with the West. But it is a Westernizing force of increasing importance. It cannot easily be either successfully suppressed or selectively coopted by a new generation of leaders; for they will have to work laterally against the basic inclinations of their own age group--as distinct from vertically as the older, Brezhnev generation has been able to do with a certain cachet of authority carried over from earlier struggles and sacrifices.

What complicates the natural tendency to extrapolate from this picture a future line of clear progression towards less despotic rule is the importance of the second goal of the coming generation, identity, which the new generation may seek even more urgently than efficiency.

I don't like the word "identity", but one needs a term more inclusive than "nationalism" to suggest the gut importance of the search for meaning that is personal and cultural even more than narrowly political. The psychological term may help suggest the growing compulsion of Soviet citizens to make some kind of sense of their shared sufferings; to find out who they really are. At the same time the quest for identity suggests that there are imperatives to human growth that cannot be understood by any account that confines itself simply to measuring material growth.

In the modern world this means nationalism--the most repeatedly underestimated and imperfectly analyzed force in modern politics. The nationalism of the ethnic minorities is the most complicated unresolved identity problem within the Soviet system. But since this subject is discussed in the other papers (and indeed in this week's newspapers), I will concentrate on the most important problem of national identity in the USSR--one that is made dialectically more urgent by unrest among the ethnic minorities--the quest for national identity within the still dominant Russian nationality itself.

This, perhaps the most important single internal problem of the Soviet regime, would take volumes to properly describe and intelligently analyze. So let me confine myself to three important propositions that I believe to be almost certain about the remarkable middle-aged identity crisis among Russians in the USSR--and end with three propositions that are much more speculative. I would hope, at a minimum, to move discussion of this phenomenon beyond the stereotyped liberal fears of some Russian fascism on the one hand or conservative fantasies of some Slavophile escape from modernity on the other.
1. The matter of Russian identity is of crucial political
importance. Its resolution will almost certainly be as apolitical
as its origins. For this problem, which had been essentially re-
solved under Lenin and Stalin, was created by Khrushchev's downgrading
of Stalin's validating myths of apostolic infallibility without pro-
viding any real explanation of the Stalin era, restitution for its
wrongs, or structural guarantees against a recurrence. I believe
that a large and increasing number of the post-war generation now
about to come to power began in the late Khrushchev era to conclude
that the system was not self-corrective; and that this conclusion has
given political bite to the widespread search for a deeper Russian
identity (typified by the astonishing growth of the authentically
private Society for Preservation of Historical Monuments to some
12.5 million members).

Samizdat and dissidence are only a small fraction of a much larger
and only partly outlawed search by intelligent, non-ruling elements in
the USSR to continue the de-Stalinization that was artificially
arrested by Brezhnev. This search takes the form—in a society unable
to speak about the present--of debating the future in terms of the past.

2. The result has been--and this is my second proposition--the
creation of a rich and diversified critical and creative life in Russian
society engaged in a much wider range of debate over social and even
political alternatives than Russia has known in fifty years. The new
generation of independent critics have revived and reinserted into the
mainstream of Russian culture three elements of strength from the
Russian past that Stalin had almost succeeded in destroying: (a) the
literary traditions of old Russia including particularly satire, the
least understood abroad of all the great Russian literary genres;
(b) the religious traditions of old Russia as an alternative basis
for moral and aesthetic standards to either socialist realism and
rationalization or Western modernism; and (c) spiritual links with
the Russian countryside and its brutalized peasantry, the discovery
of whose plight has enriched the literature and activated the social
consciences of many young Russians in much the way the discovery of
the black by urban intellectuals did in America 15 year ago.

As in America, there followed a reformist, civil rights movement--
weaker politically to be sure, but infused with a moral passion and
religious idealism that may be possible only for those who have lived
so long without them. Perhaps even more important has been the forma-
tion of a large-scale oral counter culture in a society that has always
tended to believe that truth varies in inverse proportion to the amount
of government prose written on a given subject. With the international
guitar of protest folk singing having long-since replaced the balalaika,
and with oral information given greater permanence and broader circu-
ation by maguitizdat, the new generation has access to a wider variety
of information and interpretation than ever before. In the oral
counter-culture as in the flourishing new Soviet cinema, the national
minority cultures lead the way, but tend to feed into and enrich the
general Russian ferment.
3. My final--and perhaps most controversial--proposition is that these and other creative new developments that have been taking place in the inner layers of the Soviet matrosha will create the possibility for a much wider range of realistic alternatives in economic and political policies of the next generation of Soviet leaders--and even perhaps in the very ideology of the Soviet system itself. In contrast to the strict limits that have prevailed in recent years on the innovative possibilities of the Soviet system--constraints present throughout most of Russian history--I see a wide range of possible future developments that could make the USSR either a much more menacing or a much less menacing adversary than today. But new leaders are unlikely to be able to leave it much the same as they found it as Brezhnev has done.

In turning purely speculatively to this spectrum of future possibilities one senses the greater likelihood of more menacing developments in the early period of the generational transition (which may, of course, be already underway and a partial reason for recent negative trends). It is not just a result of the instinct to rally round the tomb in a regime where succession raises basic problems of legitimacy. The sheer weight of arms combined with lack of recent experience in using them could--if provoked by nationalist unrest or Chinese bellicosity--help convert the search for Russian identity into the nationalistic militarized dictatorship that many predict. And, of course, a rapprochement with China would be much more likely under new leadership. If negative developments seem probable in the short run, more interesting and hopeful possibilities seem increasingly likely under new leadership over the longer haul. These could include not just agricultural decollectivization and the widespread reintroduction of the incentive principle and administrative decentralization, but also--say--ideological accommodations with Russian religious tradition or the conversion of the original instrument of the Leninist revolution--the Soviets--into a serious forum for political debate.

So the next generation of leaders may confront us with a matrosha of their own, revealing some new expression of hardness that conceals once again friendlier forms inside. One can only hope that the future American dialogue with Russia can improve on that launched by the last administration, which seemed to feel that the older, outer face of power was the only one worth talking to--or in the early days of the current administration which seemed to believe mainly in sending signals to younger forces of moral aspiration inside the matrosha.

American policy makers must learn to speak effectively and simultaneously to both those in power and to the generation destined shortly to attain it. Many more people should be involved in contacts between the two superpowers, which are too important, too many-sided in nature, and too polypotential in effect to be left in the hands of only a few. We should challenge the funnels that separate us and should learn to listen far better than we do to the variety of signals that one multinational continent-wide civilization undoubtedly has to send the other in an increasingly interdependent world.
Our attitude is important for another, little-understood reason: the curious way in which Russian culture has often tended to imitate its principal adversary. The Eastern Slavs took their religious culture from Constantinople after raiding it, and their modern governmental institutions from the Swedes after fighting them. Their original models for industrial transformation came from America—just as many innovations they have made (and others yet to come) are taken from the scorpion in the bottle that they know best.

This is not a secure, mandarin culture with a long unbroken identity like the Chinese—but an insecure and polyglot Eurasian empire with a love-hate relationship to the West that has often tended to concede the role of leadership and creative innovation to whatever adversary it seeks to "overtake and surpass". Thus, if a new generation might indeed consider the wide range of innovative options I have suggested, we have added reasons for trying harder at efforts we ought to be making anyhow—to work harder on perfecting our own example at home and to communicate more broadly, openly and imaginatively abroad—particularly with those whose fate is—for better or worse—directly intertwined with our own for many years to come.
The Apparatus of Power

by

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We often speak of the changes that occurred in the Soviet political system after Stalin's death, and we often compare the "Stalin political system" with the "post-Stalin system". Clearly Stalin's death was a historic turning point in Soviet history, but if the last 25 years are treated as a unit, we lose sight of the very important differences between the Soviet system of the Khrushchev period and that of the Brezhnev years. The results of this focus are very unfortunate. First, it is the changes in the last 10-15 years that are most-policy-relevant for those concerned about the impact of detente on the evolution of the Soviet Union. Second, if we are not fully conscious of the major changes that took place in the structure of power in the Soviet Union after Khrushchev's removal, we are in a poor position to understand the choices and dilemmas that face the Soviet elite after Brezhnev's departure from the scene. The purpose of this paper will be to look at these changes and at some of their possible implications.

I

In formal institutional terms of the Soviet political system of the late 1970s is quite similar to the Soviet system of the mid-1960s and even more similar to that of the early 1950s. In the most formalist terms the Soviet Union has a parliamentary political system, with the Council of Ministers being responsible to the Supreme Soviet in the same sense that the British cabinet is responsible to the British Parliament. However, from the earliest years of the Soviet regime, the top committees of the Communist Party--the Central Committee and the Politburo--became the top policy-making committees in the Soviet political system. Communists in the governmental institutions were required to carry out decisions made in the central collective party organs. The Politburo became the real cabinet of the system, the General Secretary the real Prime Minister, and the Central Committee the real (if usually inactive) parliament to which the General Secretary is ultimately responsible.

These basic circumstances were quite unaffected by Khrushchev's removal. The new leadership did reverse several of Khrushchev's organizational experiments, but these actions did little more than reconstitute the institutional arrangements of pre-1957. The Central Committee and Politburo continued to be the top policy-making bodies in the system; the Council of Ministers continued to supervise the ministries and state committees that constituted the executive branch of the system; the Communist Party continued to have a specialized Secretariat attached to the Central Committee to oversee the government and to collect information, prepare memoranda, and supervise the drafting of Politburo and Central Committee decisions; such institutions as the trade union, the Young Communist League, and the Academy of Sciences continued to play much the same role that they had before; the key positions in the government as well
as the trade unions and the Academy of Sciences remain in the nomenklatura of the Central Committee—that is, the removal of incumbents and the appointment of successors must be approved within the central party organs. If one were to judge on a formal institutional basis alone, one would say that the main change that occurred after 1964 was some reduction in the republic's role in industrial decision-making (with the abolition of the regional economic council) and in education and the regular police (with the creation of national ministries in these realms)—in short, some recentralization of power, although of a rather limited nature.

It is vital that we analyze the structure of power in the Soviet Union on a number of different levels and that we always keep clear in our minds the level of analysis on which we are speaking. The fact that the Soviet Union has a kind of parliamentary-cabinet system in the relationship between the Politburo and the Central Committee makes such a sophisticated analysis particularly important. Frequently when Americans compare the Soviet political system with the American, they note the lack of any checks-and-balances between the executive and legislature in the Soviet Union, the lack of any effective written constitution, the absence of a Supreme Court that can declare Politburo decisions unconstitutional. What needs to be remembered is that the absence of these provisions do not in themselves indicate an undemocratic political system or unrestrained government. In a formal sense they are absent in many parliamentary systems, notably, of course, the British.

When we say that the British political system features restraints on government and a pluralistic distribution of power, we are not referring to formal limitations on the power of the cabinet and the Parliament. Rather, we mean that, in practice, the political leaders feel restrained from taking certain actions and that, in practice, power or influence is not concentrated solely in the political leadership. The top leadership has the theoretical ability to take any decision (it has long been said that the British Parliament has the power to do anything except change a man into a woman or vice versa), but, in practice, they tend to be responsive to major social forces as they take their decisions.

This is a critical level on which to analyze the Soviet system as well. With institutions that formally are very democratic but actually quite authoritarian, enormous evolution can take place within the political system with minimal change in the institutions. Even the establishment of full-Western-type democracy could conceivably take place under Lenin's old slogan "All Power to the Soviets," in which case the Supreme Soviet would probably begin functioning the way suggested in the Soviet Constitution. Less drastic change (even that which occurred after Stalin's death) is even more likely to stay within the existing institutional framework.
II

The analysis of the more informal, non-institutional structure of power in the Soviet Union—or in any country—is always a complex and difficult task. The basic problem is that power is not a definable thing, but a relationship. It varies from situation to situation and from time to time, even within a given country. It is "exercised" not simply through direct coercion or pressure, but also through the judgment of many persons about the future consequences of a proposed action. If rulers fear riots, if they are worried about low productivity in work or poor performance in the army, these concerns mean that some of the interests of the masses must be taken into account and that, in practice, the masses have at least a modicum of power.

It would be wrong to see the Soviet political system, even under Stalin and Khrushchev, as one in which all power was concentrated in the leader or the Politburo. Under Stalin, decisions were shaped to some extent by the social forces that provided political support for the regime and that were crucial to the drive for industrialization. Moreover, the institutions that were assigned the job of executing the dictator's will took on a life of their own. As Merle Fainsod wrote at the end of the Stalin era,

"Each of [the bureaucracy's] specialized parts manifests the characteristics of bureaucracy everywhere. It seems to transmute skill into influence and power. It views every decision from the vantage point of its own particular interests, and it strives to defend and expand the area of its own dominion. Behind the monolithic facade of totalitarianism, the plural pressures of bureaucratic power continue to find dynamic expression . . . . These organizations cannot be dismissed as mere robots . . . . They are power structures in their own right."

Nevertheless, in comparative terms the degree to which real power was concentrated in the hands of the leader was very great not only under Stalin, but under Khrushchev as well. Yet, while everyone is quite aware of the great power exercised by Stalin, it should not be forgotten that Khrushchev too occupied an extraordinarily strong position in the Soviet political system. Khrushchev could no longer terrorize the top political elite, but he was able to build a political machine through the same mechanisms that Stalin had used.

With Khrushchev—even more than with Stalin in his last years—one has the sense of a person convinced of the perfectability of man and society, who was convinced, too, of the validity of his own views, and who was quite willing to override objections in pushing through his ideas for change. In almost every policy area, he initiated important actions that were opposed by the major institutions dealing with it; in industry, he abolished the ministries and scattered their officials to regional economic councils; in agriculture, he conducted an annual reorganization, and after 1959 he sharply cut back the increase in agricultural investments in the not-to-be-realized hope
that the reorganizations would prove to be a panacea; in the defense realm, he undertook a reduction in the size of the military establishment; in foreign relations, he placed missiles in Cuba, issued ultimata on West Berlin, and pounded his shoe at the United Nations in a way that alarmed the foreign policy specialists, and so forth. The pattern of these decisions bore little resemblance to that usually produced by the compromises and logrolling endemic to committee decision-making.

Although it is universally recognized that great changes occurred in the informal structure of power after Stalin's death, the fact of similar change after Khrushchev's removal is often not appreciated. Indeed, when change is perceived, it is thought to be in the direction of recentralization—an interpretation that is true in formal terms, but that is 180° from the mark in the more meaningful informal sense. In a number of respects (a cautious and gradual trend towards a more egalitarian distribution of income and somewhat more individual freedom and citizen participation in political life) the basic policies of the Brezhnev era have been continuations of those of the Khrushchev years, but Brezhnev adopted a fundamentally different attitude towards the institutions, officials, and scientific experts within the Soviet establishment. In all of the examples cited of Khrushchev's intervention in specialized policy areas, Brezhnev essentially reversed the policy in the direction that the major specialized officials and experts desired. The leadership, like the British Parliament, retained the ultimate power to do what it wanted, but Brezhnev's in practice, served more as a broker. "One of [Brezhnev's] best qualities," the first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party stated in 1976, "is that he does not clothe himself in the mantle of a superman, that he does not try to do everyone's thinking and working." The result was a very significant diffusion of power away from the top leadership in comparison with the Khrushchev, let alone the Stalin, regime.

Judgments about the informal structure of power in any country must always be somewhat tentative, but the direction of the change in the structure of power from the Khrushchev period to the Brezhnev period is one on which all serious students of the Soviet system agree, although, to be sure, in somewhat differing language. Some speak of the petrification of the Soviet system; others speak of the establishment of bureaucratic dominance; others speak of society asserting itself vis-a-vis the state; others speak of movement toward a more pluralistic political system; the Soviets themselves speak of a renunciation of "voluntarism" and the adoption of a "scientific approach to decision-making." But the difference in phraseology should not obscure the fact of agreement on one central point: Brezhnev simply does not correspond to our old image of a Soviet dictator who ruthlessly forces through social transformation on the basis of his ideological preconceptions, and to some extent real power has devolved to lower levels in the bureaucracy and/or society.

The more difficult question to answer is: to whom has power diffused? Of course, to a considerable extent this question is unanswerable in any country, for power varies from time to time and
from issue to issue, and no simple summary statement can be true, regardless of its nature. Thus, during the Brezhnev years the pattern of investment in reclamation shows the effects of intervention by top leaders; Brezhnev also has a major impact upon decisions relating to the Soviet-American relationship. By contrast, transportation policy has given every indication of being dominated by the railroad industry for years, both because of lack of attention by the higher leadership and because former railroad officials occupy the key posts dealing with transportation policy in the Central Committee apparatus, Gosplan, the Institute for Complex Transportation Problems, and the People's Control Committee. The power of societal groups, too, can vary with the issues. The ability (and propensity) of young peasants to leave the village for the city has given the peasants considerable de facto power on investment decisions and on wage and social policy, but the peasants seem to have made little dent vis-a-vis the agricultural hierarchy's vested interest in collectivization.

The locus of real influence has also varied over time. For example, Brezhnev had almost no contact with non-Communist foreigners in the 1960s and left key negotiations to Kosygin. But in the first half of the 1970s he virtually monopolized the key negotiations with the United States and West Germany. On other questions, changes in the personality of the top lieutenants seems to have had an impact on the power structure. Thus, the death of the Minister of Defense, Rodion Malinovsky, in 1967 seemed to remove an obstacle to a major generational replacement of personnel in middle levels of the Ministry of Defense--a change that surely had policy implications as well.

The influence of societal groups has also increased. A number of indicators (for example, college admission policies) strongly suggest that the rise of Dubchek and then the Polish riots has made the Brezhnev leadership more sensitive to worker interests, while the gradual decline in the rate of increase in industrial growth strengthens the hands of those in the late 1970s who argue that the trend towards wage egalitarianism needs to be reversed to provide greater incentives. In another area, the rise in the environmental movement in the United States was accompanied by the rise of a similar movement in the Soviet Union--one that was clearly initiated within the intelligentsia rather than within the party leadership and that altered somewhat the balance of power between the forces committed to industrial growth and the forces emphasizing other values.

If one is to summarize the most prominent developments in the distribution of power in the Brezhnev period, I would point to the diffusion of power to specialized complexes or "whirlpools" which deal with the various policy areas. Sovietologists often talk about conflicts between "the Party" and "society," between "the Party apparatus" and "the government," even between "Red" and "expert." It seems to me that the relevant political divisions seldom follow these lines. Rather the alignments and politics of the system usually cut across major institutions and follow policy lines.
Thus, one can detect the presence of a military-defense industry complex that includes the military, the defense industry, the Central Committee secretary (Riabov) and Central Committee departments supervising them, the defense industry departments of Gosplan and the first deputy chairman leading them, the defense industry scientists and designers, the defense industry trade unions (and the workers in them), the Komsomol secretary for physical culture and the military, some of the regional party officials from the major defense industry centers, and defense-related specialists in other institutions (e.g., State Committee on Science and Technology, the State Committee on Wages and Social Policy, the People's Control Committee).

One can also discern the existence of an agricultural complex which includes the four ministries in the agricultural realm, the Central Committee secretary for agriculture (Kulakov) and the agricultural department of the Central Committee, the agricultural scientists, the agriculture trade union (and the peasants), the agriculture department of Gosplan and the two deputy chairmen supervising it, party and governmental officials from rural areas (or specialized local officials dealing with agriculture in industrialized regions), and agriculture-related officials in other institutions. Other complexes are found in other policy realms, and each complex contains narrower sub-complexes. Thus, the foreign policy complex seems to have fairly clearly defined sub-groupings on major areas of the world such as the United States and Africa.

It should be emphasized once more that I am deliberately over-simplifying a political reality that is far too complicated to be summarized in capsule form. The boundaries of the complexes are neither precise nor unchanging, and some persons participate in several. A crucial question from an American point of view is the extent to which those in the military-defense industry complex are also influential members of the foreign policy complex and sub-complexes.

If this image is correct, the complexes are crucial in the policy process. On substantive issues of a more specialized nature, the politics takes place largely within the complex. Discussions of defense policy are largely limited to those involved in defense and foreign policy, while agricultural issues are debated in overwhelming part by those in the agricultural complex. On politics that involve priority--first and foremost, the budgetary process--the major political conflict takes place between complexes (or sub-complexes). The party, governmental, planning, and trade union officials in agriculture tend to be allied in pushing for more resources for agriculture, and they tend to be pitted against those in other complexes. A few persons--notably intellectuals--try to participate on questions well outside "their" complex, and some issues (e.g., environmentalism or income distribution) tend to cut across the normal complexes.
This kind of "politics of the complexes" has long been a feature of Soviet politics. The striking feature of the Brezhnev era, in contrast to both Stalin and Khrushchev, has been the marked tendency for the leader to defer to the consensus within the respective complexes.

However, Brezhnev is not merely a barometer who automatically registered every consensus within the respective complexes. For example, there is a good deal of evidence that many within the African policy sub-complex have not been happy about the sequences of Soviet policies towards Somalia and Ethiopia. Yet, his emphasis on a "scientific approach to decision-making" means, in practice, the creation of broad commissions to discuss and draft decisions, consultation with all the "interested" institutions, and, most important, a tendency to rely on the "scientific" judgments that emerge from this process. Reliance on such "scientific" judgments means reliance on the judgment of the establishment within the complexes that provides the members for the commissions.

What seems to be lacking in the regime's enthusiasm for a "scientific approach" is the Marxian sense that a group's attitudes and policies often reflect their economic interests. There seems to be a belief that specialists are basically disinterested experts—that commissions of doctors can be trusted to present an objective assessment of the program needed to satisfy the country's health needs, that the transportation commissions choose objectively between an expensive new railroad in the Far East and an expansion of the highway network, that the military have proposed the type of troop placements on the Western front and the type of modernization of those forces that are required for national defense. There seems not to be much of a suspicion that the advice of the doctors, of the military, or of the railroad-dominated transportation complex might unconsciously be serving the interests of those respective groups rather than simply the public interest. Nevertheless, whoever's interests are being served, deference to the advice of the complex means a de facto diffusion of power to the complex. A Westerner can hardly avoid the suspicion that this diffusion of power sometimes has consequences that are beneficial to the complex.

III

To say that there has been a considerable diffusion of power to specialized complexes in the Soviet Union already has certain policy implications for the United States. In the first place, this development, coupled with the continuation of the trends of the Khrushchev era towards a greater toleration of individual freedom and a more egalitarian social policy, should reassure those who have worried that detente would strengthen the repressive forces within the Soviet political system. It should also help to explain the strength of the Soviet reaction to the American human rights program, especially as it was presented in the early days of the Carter administration. When movement of the Soviet Union towards a system
with somewhat more freedom and a more pluralistic distribution of power was only met by an escalation of American criticism, unaccompanied by any acknowledgement of progress, the Soviet leadership came to fear that little short of the abolition of the Soviet system would satisfy the Americans.

In the second place, the diffusion of power suggests a decline, at least temporarily, in the fanatic, ideologically-inspired determination of the leadership to transform human nature and society at all costs. Although conceivably the persons who have gained added influence on foreign policy might turn out to be more antagonistic to the United States than past leaders, a lessening of fanaticism in the domestic sphere is likely to be associated with a lessening of the ideological drive to transform the outside world as well.

The question which remains of intense interest, of course, is the permanence of the changes that have occurred. Will Brezhnev's successor also serve as a Brezhnev-type broker? Or will the next leader either re-institute the type of intervention associated with Khrushchev or, on the contrary, promote further diffusion of power, even a pluralism that extends beyond the complexes.

Some analysts explain the diffusion of power in the Brezhnev era by suggesting that the political leader has lacked the ability to challenge the bureaucracy, that the political system has become so ossified that no General Secretary can do more than Brezhnev has and that little will change when Brezhnev leaves the scene. However, such a view seems to me overdrawn. Only fifteen years ago we were emphasizing the weaknesses of the restraints on the Party leader and marvelling at his ability to abolish the industrial ministries, bifurcate the party apparatus, and so forth. With no changes having occurred in the basic institutional characteristics of the system, with there being an objective need for widespread replacement in the top administrative-political elite and the potential for the creation of a political machine in the process, it seems premature to conclude that our earlier analyses can be forgotten.

In my opinion the major change that occurred in 1964 was in the personality and psychological make-up of the leader. We have assumed in the past that a Communist leader would inherently be interested in attaining total power to mold society to conform to his values. As Khrushchev failed to realize, however, total power in that sense is not the same as total power in the sense of total job security. Indeed, the two can be contradictory, for a drive to impose radical policy views is bound to create powerful enemies. What we have seen in Brezhnev is a man who has been concerned with power in the sense of securing his position and who has exercised great skill in taking the steps necessary to achieve his goal.

The success of Brezhnev is likely to be an object lesson to any successor, and beyond that any successor is far more likely to have a personality like Brezhnev's than Khrushchev's. Men who
rise through a bureaucratic society are likely to develop the skills of bargaining and accommodation and to have different inner drives from men who go into the pre-revolutionary underground or wage civil wars.

As we try to judge whether a Soviet successor is more likely to have the personality of an Eisenhower or a Johnson, we should recognize the need for great caution. The consistency with which American specialists have been fascinated with speculating about the Soviet future has been equaled only by the consistency with which they have failed to predict the major changes that have occurred in the Soviet system. The normal caution that this record should engender should be reinforced by an awareness that the next succession may be a very sensitive one. Brezhnev has studiously avoided the appointment of likely successors to the posts that provide good bases for a bid for the top leadership, and this threatens greatly to complicate the turnover the generations that should accompany Brezhnev's departure. Moreover, once a successor is named, the advanced age of the Politburo and the Central Committee--and the need for rejuvenation in the early 1980s--will make it difficult for the political elite to prevent a new General Secretary from building a strong political machine unless they are willing to tolerate real stagnation within the administrative elite. With so many uncertainties interacting at a point of time that cannot be predicted, it is difficult to be certain about any scenario.

My personal feeling is that the next General Secretary--or the General Secretary after next, if a conservative representative of the Brezhnev generation is able to hang on as a transition leader--is likely to be more activist than Brezhnev, more willing to do battle with at least a few of the major complexes. With Brezhnev projecting a very cautious image and with his regime losing energy in the second half of the 1970s, there is likely to be elite sympathy for a candidate who projects a more activist image. Brezhnev established his authority by serving as a symbol of normalcy, but his successor will find it difficult to establish himself without identifying himself with some program for change. If the major currents of opinion within the upper strata in 1964 centered on a weariness with constant, hare-brained experimentation, those currents today include much more yearning for change, and a politician seeking to duplicate Brezhnev's record of longevity will have to adapt himself to the changes in social forces that have occurred.

The most interesting speculation is of a more long-range nature. The evolution in the political process that has occurred since Stalin's death has been in many ways quite appropriate for a system of policy-making by complexes. If a leadership wants sound judgments from a complex, there needs to be communication within it so that ideas can be advanced and explored. And, in fact, the censorship has come to vary greatly with the audience to which an idea is addressed. Media that reach a mass audience
are tightly controlled, but the censorship on policy debates (at least, properly-expressed policy debates) within the specialized journals and books has been greatly relaxed.

But what if the leadership loses faith in the disinterestedness of the specialized complexes? What if it perceives that its own power has been drained off to the complexes and begins to feel that this power is being exercised for the benefit of the vested interests within the respective complexes? How will it broaden the range of options to be considered without falling prey to the kind of frenetic, often uninformed intervention in which Khrushchev indulged?

An obvious step would be to broaden the framework of discussion: to draw in individuals and groups that lie outside the respective complexes in hopes that some would launch attacks on some of the most self-interested assumptions of those in the complex. It would probably take a major shock to produce a major change (e.g., an energy shortfall for which the energy complex had done insufficient long-term planning), but as we try to survey the possible options in the Soviet future, we should not neglect the paradoxical possibility that a leadership interested in exercising real power might find a considerable relaxation of censorship a way of increasing its power rather than reducing it.

Nevertheless, speculation about either the succession or the long-range evolution of the Soviet system is no more than that. The record of specialists on the Soviet Union as court astrologers over the years has been incredibly bad, and no one would cite my predictive record to demonstrate that there have been shining exceptions to this rule.

The strength of the scholar should be in analyzing what has happened and what is happening. Yet if we understand that there has been a real diffusion of power during the Brezhnev era, that this in considerable part reflects the personality and "electoral strategy" of the General Secretary rather than a fundamental institutional change, that the General Secretary's strategy for political longevity has included an avoidance of any preparation for the succession, and that the diffusion of power creates major problems at the same time it solves others, then we will be far less likely to assume that nothing can change when Brezhnev leaves the scene. Perhaps more important, we will be better able to understand the consequences of our own actions and to play a role that is constructive in terms of the values of human rights and a less threatening international competition.