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Few historical topics are more important than economic modernization in the Russian polity. Like other experiences in economic development, the Russian experience has been highly complex. Certainly one component has been the role of the entrepreneur. Yet, this role itself is a very complex one; failure to separate the many components of the role and to define them analytically has probably caused even more mischief in Russian studies than in examinations of other polities. This essay rests on considerable thought and a limited amount of research on topics close to the theme of entrepreneurial response. There is no intention, however, of presenting a research report on entrepreneurs in the Russian polity, or even laying an adequate groundwork for such research, which ought to be pursued in many directions. The purpose is clarification of the problem, insofar as that preliminary step can be taken by reflection and discussion. At certain points in the analysis a modest element of comparison is introduced. These comparisons are far from fully elaborated, hence they may eventually turn out to be superficial analogies. Given the relative isolation in which so much of Russian area studies has proceeded, even preliminary suggestions of novel analogies to developments elsewhere appear to be appropriate. No attempt has been made to present a unified theoretical framework. While the focus on the multiethnic character of the polity leads to

specific emphases, alternative theoretical viewpoints are suggested where they appear especially relevant.

The special aspect of the entrepreneurial response examined here is its ethnic complexity. In the preceding paragraph the terms "Russian polity" and "Russian" were used repeatedly. These terms are appropriate, both formally and substantially, for consideration of the 19th century (the period treated in this essay), for the Soviet period, and for long periods prior to 1800. Since the end of the 16th century the empire's legitimizing symbols, and usually its formal title, have been Russian. A very large majority of members of the ruling elites has accepted this symbolic identification with Russia as a polity even when they were not themselves ethnic Russians, and may not have had a very high regard for Russian culture. Given this identification, it was natural and easy for writers who did consider themselves to belong to the ethnic Russian culture (i.e., who identified with the Russian language and culture in addition to the polity symbols) to imply that the empire consisted of an ethnically homogeneous society comparable, say, to France's or Great Britain's. This trend, as Jaroslaw Pelenski has pointed out, became noticeable as early as the 16th century, but it seems to have been particularly influential among 19th century economic historians, whether they were dealing with their own or the preceding century.[1] Thus the entrepreneurial biographies based on Ministry of Justice archives

and the Kupechaskaia Uprava presented by N. Chulkov[2] suggest virtually exclusively Russian ethnic origin. Without questioning the validity of the author's observations, one might expect him to have shown some awareness of the atypical nature of his Moscow sample. More influential writers like Tugan-Baranovsky convey a similar misleading impression through their choice of background materials.[3] For the last forty years at least most Soviet discussions of 18th and 19th century entrepreneurs have also stressed the Russian component--as have many émigré historians so influential in the direction scholarship has taken in the West.

Up to a point this stress is reasonable. As Joseph Schumpeter once suggested, study of social phenomena in an ethnically homogeneous environment is the logical first step.[4] Ethnic Russian entrepreneurial elements such as the Old Believers and others of peasant origin, as will appear below, are both interesting and important objects of study. Yet a balanced appraisal of the overall course of Russian economic development might do better to take into account Erik Amburger's conclusion that even in the centuries before the empire's greatest expansion native Russian foreign trade was important only in commerce with the underdeveloped lands to the south and west.[5] If this generalization can be extended to the 19th century entrepreneurial response, we must scrutinize other ethnic elements. For some purposes--as will appear shortly--ethnic background is not a crucial consideration. To the extent,

however, to which entrepreneurial propensity derives from socialization in a specific cultural milieu, the assumption of Russian ethnic homogeneity is highly counterproductive. Nor (despite the essential contribution which Fred Carstensen's presentation makes to this symposium) is the matter entirely one of foreign contributions to Russian-polity entrepreneurial development. It will not do to consider entrepreneurs born abroad to be foreigners, as most Russian historians do, if their early socialization occurred within the empire.[6] The critical problem, which is the main one posed by this essay, is the way in which distinctive subcultures (or, it may be argued, the cultures of separate societies co-existing on the territory of the Russian Empire) socialized some of their members to become entrepreneurs differing significantly from other entrepreneurs in the developing economy.

II.

Before approaching this problem directly, it is useful to address, briefly, some preliminary questions. What is an entrepreneur? Is early socialization really a critical differentiating factor in producing an "entrepreneurial personality"? Is this personality crucial, as compared to structural characteristics, in a developing economy? What was it about the Russian imperial polity which provided opportunities for culturally diverse entrepreneurs? How did the presence of these heterogeneous elements affect the interaction of economic, social, and political development? These are very large questions;

other symposium contributors undoubtedly provide more significant answers to several than I can hope to suggest. Still, clarity concerning my assumptions requires some attempt to answer the questions; it seems preferable to begin with the last ones, which most directly bear upon the whole system.

Certainly a major characteristic of the Russian polity was its slow, uneven development. As I have treated elsewhere the relation of economic development to the extremely uneven Russian social development, I shall not pursue the theme at this point.[7] It will become clearer later in the essay, however, that uneven social modernization strongly affected the significance of differing entrepreneurial roles. From a somewhat different point of view, though, it was the uneven, "leap-like" nature of Russian development which led to incorporation of different ethnic milieus favorable to entrepreneurial personalities in the Russian polity and provided the field for their fructifying exercise. The inflated romance of the conquest of Siberia, plus the more significant history of the foundations for expansion laid by tsars from Ivan III to Peter I, often obscure the fact that most economically valuable territory was acquired between 1772 and 1815, i.e., in a single generation just preceding the beginnings of entrepreneurial expansion. To be sure, Old Believer entrepreneur families had long been subjects of the empire, as had been the Volga Tatars and most of the Baltic Germans. Many more Germans were added during the partition of Poland, as was a notable Polish contingent, and above all the large reservoir of potential

Jewish talent, virtually absent from the Russian Empire before the First Partition of Poland.[8] Russian protection for the "Armenian commercial people" in the Transcaucasus was widely recognized to be an innovation with important international economic implications.[9] More important than the incorporation of these new elements, perhaps, was the vast extension of fields for entrepreneurial talent of all backgrounds. The large area of Polish economic activity was within the Russian Empire by 1815, and the old but still valuable Oriental trade routes to the Caucasus were under firm Russian political domination. In addition, a vast region of economic exploitation, never before significantly tapped, lay available in the steppes north of the Black Sea.[10]

The establishment of the Pax Russica alone, making possible rationally calculable commerce in what had been (apart from the early Mongol period) a region of desperate commercial gambles, tended to release pent-up economic energies. The situation resembled the Moslem Arab conquest of the southern and eastern Mediterranean lands after centuries of barbarian incursions. As the outstanding French economic historian of this period has pointed out, the commercial expansion of the Arab Empires regrouped and utilized the "old peoples of the classic Orient and the Mediterranean.... The world of ports, caravans, shops, commercial firms."[11] The process, as an American historian argues, may have been facilitated by the sober, bourgeois commercial qualities inculcated by Islam.[12] The first centuries of Arab expansion, however, were characterized by predominance

of minority cultures in commercial expansion. Few--even among the Russian historians mentioned above--would contend that Orthodox Russians in the dominant political elite of the Russian Empire were as fitted by cultural attitudes for commercial and industrial expansion as were the Arab rulers of the seventh century. If anything, the early stages of the industrial revolution required more specialized entrepreneurial qualities than did medieval commercial expansion. Nowhere in Western Europe did an elite of bureaucrats, military officers, and landowners, as contrasted to the large native bourgeoisies inherited from the early modern era, play the predominant part in industrial development. It is a trite understatement to remark that the Russian ethnic bourgeoisie was much too small to take adequate advantage of the great opportunities afforded by the coincidence of Industrial Revolution abroad and the huge new areas available within the Russian Empire.

Some of the specific reasons why socialization by Russian merchant families did not produce entrepreneurial personalities fully suited to these opportunities will appear below. Here one need only point out that a major barrier, affecting all European bourgeoisies in inverse proportion to their weight in the social order, was lingering feudal denigration of economic activity. Consequently, the bourgeois was constantly tempted, having achieved a modicum of material success, to abandon his entrepreneurial activity (and withdraw his capital) in order to adopt a noble way of life. Because of their small

numbers the Russian bourgeois would have been particularly exposed to this temptation to "class suicide" even if all other things had been equal. In fact, things were not equal. Middle-class consciousness was proverbially weak. The Russian Imperial system placed a particularly strong emphasis on officially recognized rank, while the chin system made access to this rank--over two or three generations--exceptionally easy for financially successful Russian Orthodox families. Almost as significant, toward the end of the 19th century was the disdain for economic activities among the Russian intelligentsia, the counter-"Establishment" which might otherwise have served to promote entrepreneurial capacities.

The master theorist of our subject, Alexander Gerschenkron, has advanced the concept of an inspiring doctrine as a substitute for entrepreneurial socialization in countries like Russia:

> To break through the barriers of stagnation in a backward country, to ignite the imagination of men, and to place their energies in the service of economic development, a stronger medicine is needed.... even the business man, even the classical daring and innovating entrepreneur, needs a more powerful stimulus than the prospect of high profits. What is needed to remove the mountains of routine and prejudice is faith...[13]

David McClelland makes very much the same point:

> There is no real substitute for ideological fervor. A country or at least a significant portion of its elite has got to want economic achievement badly enough to give it priority over other desires.[14]

While writers like these are ready to specify the development ideology (Legal Marxism for Gerschenkron, List's doctrines for

Theodore Von Laue),[15] their propositions are more useful for explaining how a favorable climate for entrepreneurs can arise than in locating the origins of entrepreneurial talent. In effect, what Gerschenkron and Von Laue argue is that the structural requisites for industrial take-off were developed in late 19th century Russia because the regime was affected by favorable ideologies, although (as will appear shortly) Von Laue also allows for the intervention of personality attributes.

More generally, resort to structural explanations of Russian economic development is the dominant mode in the historiography of the subject. This is one reason why information on entrepreneurs' personalities is a relatively neglected topic, which requires considerable digging and interpolation even in a preliminary sketch like this essay. Gerschenkron's and Von Laue's ideological explanations would probably be labeled "idealist" by most Marxists, but official Soviet Marxism is also essentially a structuralist explanation. Social forces (the well-known relationships of production) resulted in circumstances conducive to economic enterprise; at that point in history the requisite personalities appeared. It is possible to translate this type of analysis--prescinding from the specific "forces" posited by Marxism-Leninism--into the language of role theory. One might hypothesize that the societal structure produced certain types of entrepreneurial roles, which in turn molded the appropriate behavior of those recruited (or self-selected) for the roles.[16] Indeed, it would

appear that the most recent trend in role analysis has been to emphasize the dominant effect of role definition upon any holder (within an indeterminately broad range of acceptable personalities) as contrasted to the formative effect of early socialization. For example, it is argued that a body like the U.S. Senate structures its roles in such a way that an astounding variety of personalities among those elected Senators (a few obvious deviants come to mind) accommodate. The process of accommodation is a learning process, but in contrast to theories of the dominance of early socizlizing experiences, the role-dominance hypothesis assumes a large measure of conscious choice in individual accommodation to the role definitions.

The student of entrepreneurial behavior should be aware of the alternative theoretical ways of approaching role and personality, but the subject is obviously too vast--and too much in flux--for treatment here. Instead, I shall concentrate on the earlier theoretical position, which posited the dominance of early socialization. Although, as elaborated at the end of this essay, there was considerable scope for ethnic cultural differentials in adult role accommodation in the actual circumstances of the Russian polity, early socialization affords the strongest and most obvious opportunity for developing peculiar ethnic personalities. In his famous exposition of the cultural basis for the entrepreneurial personality, Max Weber discusses at length the influence of Calvinist and similar religious milieus, but he always assumes the dominance of early

socialization: "the chances of overcoming traditionalism are greatest on account of the religious upbringing."[17] More recent exponents of the basic Weberian model such as David McClelland, Everett Hagen, and Fred L. Strodtbeck are nearly all adherents of schools of social psychology which posit the dominance of socialization in childhood and adolescence, if not infancy.[18] Even restricting these assumptions to a minimum (by assuming that adolescence may be the most critical period), one is left with a powerful school of interpretation which necessarily accords priority to differential ethnic influences where strong ethnic subcultures exist. Strodtbeck's interpretation, essentially faithful to the Weberian model, ascribes the following attributes to the entrepreneur:

(1) Rejection of a mystical, personal relationship with God which might lead to efforts at advancement by "magical" manipulation.

(2) Belief, on the contrary, that God's decisions are eternal and orderly, hence a stable basis for rational calculation by anyone who understands the revealed order of the universe.

(3) Belief that the individual's transcendental fate is predestined and that the nature of this predestination is ascertainable by the extent to which strict performance of duty is crowned by worldly success.

(4) High achievement motivation arising from dissatisfaction with accomplishments ("no defined stopping place"), hence concentration on the secular role performance in areas where material results are readily apparent.

While Weber appeared to assume life-long attachment to a peculiar religious milieu, it is clear that he believed the individual would persist in anxious performance even after long separation from the religious milieu (particularly the family) in which he had received his socialization. The classic example is Benjamin Franklin. In David Riesman's expressive phrase, the Calvinist type of personality was extremely "inner-directed."

Strodtbeck and his colleagues question whether the Calvinist model is fully appropriate for the structural conditions of highly developed economies--for even the most extreme model based on cultural influences cannot ignore structural change. In the English speaking countries and Northwest Europe, where Weber derived his models, economic development eventually entailed a drastic shift from the small-scale, independent entrepreneur to large organizations. For the later stages of development the revised Weberian model may include the following attributes (I follow Strodtbeck less closely here than in his interpretation of the original model):

(1) Rational calculability, as in (1) and (2) of the original model, though perhaps with less conscious religious underpinning.

(2) Dissatisfaction with any given level of accomplishment, leading to a constant "future orientation." As in the Weberian model this dissatisfaction derives indirectly from early socialization; but the concern is commonly attributed to the immediate reference group, i.e., one's peers' evaluation of one's role performance; thus the trait corresponds to

Riesman's "other directedness."

(3) A correspondingly high degree of concern for interpersonal relations of an instrumental nature at the organizational level, with cultivation of the communication skills (verbal and non-verbal) requisite for effective relations.[19]

(4) Continued concern outside the organizational context for a specific reference group established as dominant early in one's socialization. Because this concern is not (at least consciously) instrumental but affective, the personality retains a strong "inner-directed" component. In the multiethnic polity one can expect most of this affect to be directed toward ethnic cultures, but the trait is not essentially different from the persistent adherence of an Englishman to the norms inculcated by his adolescent public-school peer group.

(5) High geographic mobility, involving (despite the persistence of inner-directedness based on initial socialization by the family) rejection of familist values like unwillingness to face physical separation or emphasis upon extended family well being at the expense of personal advancement. Obviously the mobility factor is especially important in a very large polity.

I shall examine the application of these models in more concrete terms shortly; it has been necessary to present them at some length here because their features are crucially related to peculiar structural aspects of the Russian polity.

Largely because of the authoritarian political intervention, economic organizations were exceptionally large in early stages of Russian industrialization. It may well be, as Bert Hoselitz and others have argued, that such contrived structures are "functionally" important for conserving scarce entrepreneurial talent in Roman Catholic and Orthodox polities where the dominant religious culture is not conducive to entrepreneurial qualities.[20] Whatever the functional significance (if any) of Russian resort to organizational "gigantism," it anticipated in important respects a much later stage of bureaucratic economic organization in the West. This structural anticipation required, therefore, much of the role emphasis on interpersonal relationships at a rather superficial level, as posited in the revised Weberian model. The requirement for communication skills was obviously enhanced by the polyglot nature of Imperial society, and in a rather more subtle way by the necessity for temporary, instrumental bridging of cultural chasms.

The special organizational mode of development in the Russian polity suggests that the entrepreneurial role there may have been complicated in other ways as well. It has always been hard to define a complicated role like the entrepreneur's. While the classic entrepreneur was concerned with founding, owning, and directing an enterprise which constituted a small portion of a given area of production, the typical Russian businessman operated in an oligopolistic organization like those in modern capitalist economies. He was often a manager rather than an owner, and (as Schumpeter pointed out a half century ago) the managerial role tends to become subdivided among roles with professional attributes.[21] This professionalization

of the entrepreneurial role poses numerous problems. One is the extent to which the manager in a large organization differs from the bureaucratic administrator. The difficulty is especially severe in examining the Russian Empire, where much enterprise was carried on by large organizations which were either government bureaus or under close governmental supervision. A second problem concerns the degree to which one must consider, as components of the managerial role, specialized professions like engineering and the type of socialization these professions entailed. I have discussed these problems from the point of view of public administration elsewhere; here I shall endeavor to keep the focus as sharply as possible on entrepreneurial role as set forth in the models outlined above. But one should never lose sight of the fact that in the revised Weberian model, particularly as applied to the Russian polity, the entrepreneur is essentially an analytic category.

Another line of interpretation suggests that persons who are marginal in status are attracted to roles (such as entrepreneur in Russian Imperial polity) which the dominant group neglects, but which are otherwise rewarding. A classic variant of this interpretation has entire subcultures turning to such roles when excluded from dominant status. Everett Hagen identifies various types of "withdrawal of status respect" which lead to marginality; one type is "denigration of valued symbols," which he applies specifically to Russian Old Believers.

Hagen also argues that the deviant (marginal) group fosters innovative individuals by protecting them from censure by the larger society.[22] Probably in the present context the marginality interpretation and social-psychological interpretations embodied in the revised Weberian model cannot be distinguished in operational terms. Indeed, some such mechanisms as those posited in Weber's model are essential as intervening variables if the marginality hypothesis is to be developed into a fully explanatory theory. The most important consideration here is that the values held by the dominant Russian ethnic elite relegated some other ethnic groups to marginal positions throughout the 19th century, and all other ethnic groups to marginality during parts of that century. One should never forget, therefore, that the values and perceptions of the dominant Russian ethnic elite constitute a major factor in the dynamics of entrepreneurial response even among non-Russians. In the following outline application of the revised Weberian model to specific ethnic groups, the dynamic element (i.e., change over time) cannot be elucidated fully, but it is crucial to note that the model is adaptable to a dynamic context.

III.

Lack of space precludes even sketchy attention to three of the groups mentioned earlier as potential suppliers of entrepreneurial talent--Poles, Armenians, and Volga Tatars.

Alexandre Bennigsen is preparing a major analysis of the last group, and considerable research on the roles held by Poles in the broader Empire is under way. I wish that I could feel as confident that systematic analysis of Armenians' experience was in prospect. Such analysis would be especially useful because that experience might be compared directly to numerous other adaptations of Armenian culture to foreign polities. I must confine myself to the three cases where materials are readily available; fortunately, these were the most important sources of 19th century entrepreneurial talent.

Since our symposium member William Blackwell is the outstanding American authority on the Russian sectarian component of 19th century entrepreneurial talent, I would be presumptuous to discuss this topic at length. In particular, I shall prescind from discussing the extent to which various sectarian doctrines coincided with the Calvinists'. Omission of credal analysis appears to be legitimate also because, as noted earlier, the alternative marginality interpretation explicitly identifies Old Believers (the most significant sectarian group) as a subculture which tended to produce innovators like entrepreneurs. What is more important, therefore, is to summarize the ways in which the actual entrepreneurial performance of sectarians accords with the two entrepreneurial models.

There seems little doubt that community and familial milieu of the Moscow Old Believers inculcated traits of frugality, orderly calculation, and curiosity, which were

conducive to capitalist enterprises. Ethnic Russians played the major part in the development of the textile industry, a classic instance of small-scale, independent initiative, in which the entrepreneurial role was dominant and well defined. Not all of the Moscow region textile manufacturers were Old Believers, but before 1850 most of those who were not came from similar artisan or peasant backgrounds and from families which appear to have followed similar life styles.[23] Independent generation of capital resources (often on a communal basis) later enabled these families to establish banks and to embark upon somewhat larger entrepreneurial ventures.[24] Continuing strong adherence to the religious peculiarities which had constituted the basis for their socialization in entrepreneurial qualities is indicated by the fact that many successful Old Believer industrialists provided religious training for their employees.[25]

On the other hand, sectarian entrepreneurs exhibited several characteristics which were ill-adapted to the organizational type of enterprise associated with major early Russian development as well as the revised entrepreneurial model. The high degree of familism apparently militated against strong individual initiative. Familism also probably contributed to relatively low geographical mobility, though the Old Believers also encountered difficulties getting official travel and residence permits.[26] But the intense pride in their Moscow traditions appears to have limited the activities of this entrepreneurial

component, especially in the crucial St. Petersburg and Odessa "melting pots" discussed below. Ethnic Russian entrepreneurial families also tended to reject professionalism. Few considered it necessary for their sons to obtain higher engineering education.[27] In this respect the Russian textile industrialists closely resembled contemporary native French textile manufacturing families, which also found formal high education superfluous.[28] In both cases, however, this insistence on the undifferentiated entrepreneurial role limited the extent to which early entrepreneurial families could play a major role in large, impersonal economic organizations. Hence one can at least hypothesize that major ethnic Russian elements were unsuited for transition from small-scale, individualized local enterprise to the expanding economy. Moreover, apart from their sectarian affiliation, by the late 19th century these native Russians who faced no ethnic disabilities were also particularly susceptible to the attraction of official careers in the chin system. Some established Old Believer families did convert to official Orthodoxy to attain these privileges for their children. Several Russian authors do, indeed, consider the draining off of talent to bureaucratic and aristocratic activities to have been the prime limitation upon cumulative development of an ethnic Russian bourgeoisie.[29]

The significance of these observations concerning the ethnic Russian entrepreneurs or at least their sectarian members becomes evident as one examines contrasting Jewish patterns. An immense amount of work should be done on the

sociological history of East European Jews. Much of the historiography on the subject is diffuse and anecdotal, partly because (as a recent historian of East European Jews in Germany remarks) members of the community with more analytic interests have preferred to examine anything but their own group.[30] Several of the most penetrating analyses have been conducted as explorations of the backgrounds of American Jews, with correspondingly little concern for temporal and geographic variations among Jews in the 19th century Russian polity.[31] Nevertheless, enough material is readily available to permit tentative generalizations about the relation of distinctively Jewish socialization to the entrepreneurial models.

Until 1772 Jews were few and severely discriminated against in the Russian polity; but the million Jews incorporated during the Polish Partitions had two centuries experience in commercial and artisan occupations in Poland which prepared them for broader roles--despite continuing severe restrictions--in the Russian Empire. From the standpoint of the marginality interpretation, of course, the very severity of occupational restrictions tended to push Jews into roles which more favored ethnic groups neglected. Geographic restrictions on travel and residence were less ambiguous in their effect, but the most enterprising element among the Jews succeeded in overcoming them. The characteristics of sober frugality, rational calculation, and desire for material progress salient in the original Weberian model were certainly well established. So was the strong achievement motivation arising from constant

dissatisfaction with one's accomplishments. To be sure, most Jews remained poor laborers; but (as a recent student of economic relations in the Jewish Pale points out):

> the Jewish journeyman by no means considered himself permanently a wage earner. As he saw it, were he compelled to suffer the insults of his master one day, the next he might himself become an employer, the master of his own shop. For such changes in status were fairly common practice.[32]

To put the matter another way, the Jew was socialized to the entrepreneurial role because its holders constituted his salient reference group. His chances of joining the group might be low; they were not negligible. In this respect the Jew differed drastically (as will appear) from most of the comparably numerous Germans of the Russian Empire, and probably from the great majority of Russian sectarians who remained peasants, little acquainted with the entrepreneurial accomplishments of a small minority of their co-religionists in Moscow.

In other respects, the modal Jewish personality resembled the revised rather than the original Weberian model. Relations with non-Jews necessarily remained superficial in most cases, but within that limitation the Jewish entrepreneur was obliged to be intensely concerned with interpersonal relations. The negotiating and selling skills which he (or his reference group) had acquired as agents for Polish landlords, as merchants, as tavern keepers, or as waggoners, could be applied to large-scale organizational activity such as railroad companies. There is some evidence that East European Jews lacked, at the start of the 19th century, the extraordinary oral linguistic facility which had characterized other Jewish communities such as the

Sephardic.[33] On the other hand, near-universal male literacy (in Hebrew) was readily converted into general literate accomplishments; there is no doubt that the Jews became proficient in the languages of the Russian Empire as they moved into a broader range of activities. The high respect for "book learning" was also eventually converted into the professional expertise associated with effective direction of large economic organizations. It is true that Jewish communities at first strongly resisted secular educational opportunities, even when these were available, for fear of loss of Jewish ethno-religious character.[34] One reason Jews preferred German higher educational institutions to Russian was that the former did not require a secondary educational certificate instead of the traditional Jewish preparation in the yeshiva.[35] As the century drew to an end, however, Jewish enrolment in Imperial secondary and higher educational institutions, particularly law and engineering, increased rapidly. This trend was particularly noticeable in areas of intense economic activity peripheral to the Pale, wuch as the great port cities of Riga and Odessa, to which Jews were eventually admitted with only minor restrictions. A trickle of Jews has always converted to Christianity in order to take advantage of opportunities in the major Russian Imperial centers. Some outstanding entrepreneurs like Jan Bloch, developer of the Southwestern Railway, still found conversion to be acceptable (it did not keep Tsar Alexander III from referring to his railway as the "Jew road").[36] Certainly

entry of Jews into the economic life of the Russian polity was far from complete by the end of the 19th century. It would be very hard to draw up a balance sheet of their importance, particularly since the role of converted Jews would have to be identified; but the results would probably be highly revealing. In a tentative way one can suggest that Jews had a dominant part in crucial export commodities like sugar, grain, and timber; and a strong but regionally restricted position in textiles and banking; and a modest but significant part in transportation and heavy industry.[37] It is even riskier to speculate about the position of Jews in professional roles peripheral to the entrepreneurial role, in organizations which were not founded or dominated by Jews. Certainly this position was still very weak in 1900; but Jews in the professions appear to have been increasing at least in the Pale and adjoining western and southwestern regions. In other words the Jewish position, overall, was one of preparation for major participation in entrepreneurial direction, or in a broader context of activities, for what I have termed elsewhere "a succession of mobilized diasporas."

The third ethnic group to be considered, the Germans, was in a very different situation. On the one hand, Germans saw their privileges eroding rapidly toward the end of the 19th century. Superficially this erosion was due to the pressure of ethnic Russian xenophobia; but many Germans perceived their loss as partly due to replacement by Jews and other minority groups.

This perception--which I intend to treat at greater length elsewhere--gave rise to mixed feelings, by no means unequivocally anti-Semitic. Many German writers recognized that the extent of their privileges up to mid-19th century had militated against that condition of marginality which pushed other ethnic groups (and foreigners) into entrepreneurial activity. Indeed, a Slavophil writer in 1862 termed the Baltic Germans "the Mamelukes of the Empire." Probably the writer was aware that the Turkic-Circassian Mamelukes had monopolized military, political, and top administrative posts in Egypt for three centuries, but he may not have been aware that during much of that time they ruled in symbiotic relation with a native stratum of merchants and tax farmers.[38] The peculiarity of the German position was that while they (primarily the Baltic and St. Petersburg minorities among them) did indeed occupy a very large proportion of Imperial posts usually associated with ruling status, Germans also provided a very substantial share of the technical and lower administrative skills required to keep the Russian polity going. In terms of economic development, the nature of their contribution was complicated by the social stratification within the German ethnic group.

The great majority of Germans were peasants in the southern parts of the Empire. While they were exemplary farmers and highly important in small-scale local activities like milling, the peasants had little impact on larger areas of economic development. Low geographical mobility and caution if not suspicion concerning higher education appear (studies now being pursued under the direction of Sidney Heitman may

throw more light on this subject) to have kept the peasant Germans from providing a significant flow of recruits even for German ethnic institutions in the empire. The considerable stratum of noble landowning families centered on the Baltic provinces but scattered to some extent in adjoining gubernii, occasionally exhibited a pragmatic willingness to initiate industrial enterprise. For example, a member of the distinguished Ungern-Sternberg house in Estonia started a textile factory in 1831 to supply cloth to the military.[39] While attracted by aristocratic professions like the limitary and diplomacy, few Baltic nobles even trained for careers peripheral to economic development in science, medicine, or pharmacy. Instead, these fields, where Germans provided a very significant fraction of the empire's professional manpower, were the special preserve of the peculiar Baltic German stratum known as the Literati. Very different from the Russian intelligent in political ideology, the conservative Literati families shared his antipathy to commercial dealings: "These good people smell frightfully of copper coins" a Literati woman scornfully wrote.[40]

Since Baltic shopkeepers frequently took the Literati as a reference group in higher education and upward status mobility, the effect of their depreciation of business was considerable. On the other hand, all the Baltic groups had a keen sense of the unusual career opportunities afforded by the vast Russian Empire. As one wrote in 1870, "we saw a broad field in which our sons and younger brothers had always been able to make a way and a career for themselves with slight effort."

A recent Balt historian also stresses the "risk-taking propensity" required for setting out on careers in distant, alien environments.[41] Certainly geographic mobility was nearly optimal, and (judging from intermarriage and conversion to Orthodoxy at all levels of Germans living among Russian ethnic populations) intergenerational family ties were not so strong as to constitute restricting factors. Despite superficial accommodation (especially while university students) to noble life styles, most professionals continued to stress the traditional German burger's virtues of orderliness, discipline, frugality, calculation, and orientation to the future--all components of the Weberian entrepreneurial model. Medicine, science (especially chemistry), and pharmacy often led to minor entrepreneurial ventures in related fields, but infrequently (apparently) to major undertakings. Excessive caution and the strong feeling that a man should stick to his Fach appear to have been inhibitors. In fact--as far as evidence thus far available goes--Germans in both strictly entrepreneurial roles and top managerial roles in economic organizations (other than certain government hierarchies such as the Ministry of Finance) appear to have been either of foreign origin or men who were unusually detached from their ethnic origins. I shall not attempt to analyze the role of Reich Germans, especially in St. Petersburg. Although the Baltic Germans constituted a significant reference group for these foreigners, social relationships in the first generation

were cool.[42] Those German immigrants who eventually did assimilate to the German ethnic group (most apparently returned to Central Europe; many assimilated as ethnic Russians) commonly sent their sons to the Baltic German Dorpat University or to similar institutions, where they adopted the professional but non-entrepreneurial values of the Baltic reference group.

As hinted in the preceding paragraph, among Germans born in the Russian Empire it was precisely those who were most detached from the German ethnic milieu who appear to have developed the strongest entrepreneurial spirit. On the surface this suggestion implies that German cultural background had a negative relation to entrepreneurial response. In fact, the situation seems to have been much more complex. As just noted, numerous features in that background were fully consonant with both the original Weberian model and its revised version; other elements of the dominant German socialization pattern, especially in the Baltic, negated their effect. Often this negative pattern persisted throughout the lifetime of an individual even though his career was spent at a great distance from the original Baltic reference group. It would be very difficult to demonstrate this proposition by anything resembling a representative sample, since in the nature of the case ethnic Germans detached from their group are hard to identify. Hence one is compelled to resort to anecdote.

The career of Sergei Witte appears to exemplify both entrepreneurial spirit and detachment from the group to extraordinary degrees.[43] Culturally Witte's paternal ancestors

were typical Baltic Germans; his father had attended German educational institutions, including (according to Witte's own assertion) the core Baltic institution, Dorpat University. In the face of this heritage, Witte's claim that the family was originally Dutch is hardly relevant, since many thoroughly acculturated Baltic German families had originated in non-German areas of northwest Europe. Vastly more significant was the influence of his mother's noble Russian family; but the failures of both his maternal grandfather and his father in a mining enterprise related to their official duties in the Caucasus suggests that neither ancestral line was deeply imbued with entrepreneurial values. Witte was in fact a self-made man, supplementing his strong future orientation and intense devotion to work with scorn for polite society and "culture" and a preference for material and financial manipulation. It appears significant that he developed, or at least brought to fruition, these personality traits in the Odessa melting-pot milieu, where he was not only catholic in his ethnic associations but positively cultivated persons like Jewish businessmen.

It is equally suggestive to note how the Odessa environment (taken as the paradigm of urban melting pots in the Russian polity) served to accentuate Jewish personality traits conducive to large-scale entrepreneurial activity while suppressing traits negative from this standpoint. In this case, too, one is obliged to resort to anecdote at this stage of our knowledge. Fortunately, the recent biography of Alexander Helphand (Parvus) is rich in suggestive incident.[44] His family's move to Odessa from a rigidly segregated Jewish community in Belorussia

brought the youthful Helphand into contact with Ukrainians and Russians as well as Jews of a more cosmopolitan culture. Historiography has understandably focused on the multiethnic revolutionary ferment of Odessa in the 1880s as preparation for Parvus' curious relation to the Bolsheviks. But Helphand's strikingly successful career in international commerce preceded his revolutionary exploits: "And when he set out on the road to becoming a rich man, he did so in the manner of the Odessa merchants: grain trade along the shores of the Black Sea was the foundation of his financial success."[45] It is also highly significant that Helphand's intense attachment to German culture (which in 1916 led him to acquire Second Reich citizenship) began in Odessa, whence he proceeded (in 1887) directly to Basel University. The "Odessa connection" appears to have exercised a peculiarly inverse effect on Witte, for whom German culture was a neglected heritage, and on Helphand, for whom it was "the gateway out of the east European spiritual ghetto." One may speculate that Witte, who did not speak German or any other language but Russian well,[46] instinctively rejected immersion in cosmopolitan elite high culture because it might have accentuated the personality traits which would have limited him to a mediocre career. The real linguistic accomplishments of Baltic and St. Petersburg Germans made them valuable to the empire, not only in foreign diplomacy but in Asian proconsular activity. Witte's youth had been spent in the latter environment; ultimately he saw it reduce both sides of his family to genteel poverty, though their accomplishments

in the Caucasus had been real. Just as often, however, complacency in cultural attainments, pride in a cosmopolitan linguistic veneer, were often surrogates for achievement motivation in both Russian and German upper class families. Such cultural emphasis was not even unambiguously valuable in interpersonal relations, for it tended to isolate the upper classes from middle-class foreign businessmen and technicians, energetic men rising from the lower classes, and despised but capable minorities like the Jews. Given his inherited status, Witte could afford to cultivate all of these elements in his shrewd, blunt manner, though he made numerous enemies among the old elites.

For mobile Jews, precisely the opposite tactic was (perhaps instinctively) most productive: cosmopolitan culture complemented their irrepressible achievement drive with credentials as intermediaries between the Russian polity and foreigners and between the old elites and the rising minorities. Decades before Helphand arrived in Odessa, Jewish communities in the region had seriously considered "standardizing" Yiddish as New High German in order to bring East European Jews into what they understandably regarded as the vanguard European culture.[47] It challenges the historical imagination merely to suggest the outburst of achievement in economic, cultural, and political spheres which a coalescence of Germandom and East European Jewry might have produced.

More prosaically, one should note that the actual contexts in which this coalescence, tragically abortive though it proved

to be, appeared possible were provided by the structures of the Russian polity. In the 19th century Old World no other polity provided the dynamically cosmopolitan melting pots which Odessa, St. Petersburg, Riga, and even Warsaw constituted. More consciously structured educational institutions also fostered coalescence of achievement-motivated elements. Though the St. Petersburg Technological Institute, Odessa University, and the Richelieu Lycée in the latter city made a larger contribution to technology than directly to entrepreneurial achievement, their activity supported economic development. Although the entrepreneurial response in 19th century Russian Empire largely depended on non-Russians, it can be argued that the Russian creation of a great polity was an indispensable precondition.

In its rather discursive way this essay has endeavored to analyze certain problems, identify the conceptual pitfalls, and clarify basic definitions in examining entrepreneurial response in a multiethnic polity. Since my own research interests are peripheral to the main topic, I present these suggestions diffidently. I am still less prepared to propose definite directions others' research might take. Careful evaluation of reports by the Tsarist police might (precisely because of their ethnic biases) provide some useful material. In contrast to the impressive documentary studies of official administration by scholars like Walter Pintner, it seems improbable that 19th century entrepreneurial research would be best accomplished by plunging into the Soviet archives. On the other hand,

printed materials appear inadequate. It is possible that Yiddish-language and more recently Hebrew publications in Israel, which I cannot read, provide much more on Jewish cultural background; but remarks I have seen suggest that this is not the case. Biographical materials, much less historical sociological studies and statistics, have not been assembled in print for any ethnic group. Close analysis of fiction, including the voluminous contemporary Russian novels (a hostile writer like Dostoyevsky provides fascinating insights on German, Polish, and Jewish personalities) would be useful. Private papers and oral history appear to be the most promising, but also the most expensive and perishable sources. The catastrophic loss of Jewish manuscript material as well as human witness during World War II and the subsequent upheavals in the USSR needs no further comment. The Baltic Germans were not nearly so severely affected. Both the written materials and their custodians have now reached a critical point in terms of age, however. I can only express the hope that both German and Jewish survivors, as well as the less concentrated materials for other ethnic groups, will soon receive the attention which their roles in the evolution of the Russian economy deserve.

NOTES

[1]Jaroslaw Pelenski, Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438-1560s). The Hague: Mouton, 1974, pp. 8-10.

[2]N. C[hulkov] "Moskovskoe Kupechestvo, XVIII i XIX Vekov (Genealogischeskiia Zametki)," Russkii Arkhiv, XLV (1907), especially p. 500.

[3]Mikhail Tugan-Baranovskii, Geschichte der russischen Fabrik (trans. B. Minzes). Berlin: Felber, 1900, especially pp. 15, 355.

[4]Joseph Schumpeter, "Die sozialen Klassem im ethnisch homogenen Milieu," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, LXVII (1927), 1-67.

[5]Erik Amburger, "Der fremde Unternehmer in Russland bis zur Oktoberrevolution," Tradition, II (1957), 337; cf. p. 343.

[6]See, for example, William L. Blackwell's comment on Russian historians' view of Ludwig Knoop in The Beginning of Russian Industrialization, 1800-1860. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 242.

[7]"Communist Political Systems as Vehicles for Modernization," in Monte Palmer and Larry Stern (eds.), Political Development in Changing Societies. Lexington: Heath-Lexington, 1971, pp. 127-58. For more specific economic and technological unevenness, see Roger Portal, "Das Problem einer industriellen Revolution in Russland," Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte, I (1954), 208. For comparative development rates, see Angus Maddison, Economic Growth in Japan and the USSR. London: Allen & Unwin, pp. xvi, 31.

[8]S. B. Weinryb, Neusste Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Juden in Russland und Polen: I, Das Wirtschaftsleben der Juden in Russland und Polen von der 1. polnischen Teilung bis zum Tode Alexander II (1772-1881). Breslau: Marcus, 1934, p. v.

[9]Hermann von Petersdorff, Friedrich von Motz. Berlin: Hoffing, 1913, II, 323.

[10]See especially William H. McNeill, Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500-1800. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, p. 186.

[11]Maurice Lombard, Espaces et Réseaux du Haut Moyen Age. Paris: Mouton, 1972, 11th p. of first essay.

[12]Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974, I, 37, 43.

[13]Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Belknap, 1962, p. 24.

[14]David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961, p. 430.

[15]Theodore H. Von Laue, Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.

[16]I discuss this complex sociological problem at some length in The European Administrative Elite. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.

[17]Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (trans. Talcott Parsons). New York: Scribners, 19 , p. 63.

[18]David C. McClelland, et al., Talent and Society. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1959, pp. 135-94. For an especially cogent

critique of Weber's neglect of political, social, and material factors in favor of "internal history" see Fernand Braudel, Ecrits sur l'Histoire. Paris: Flammarion, 1969, p. 269.

[19]I discuss the communication advantage of "mobilized diasporas," which is probably more salient in commercial and administrative activities than in strictly entrepreneurial work, in "Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas," American Political Science Review, LXX (1976), 393-408.

[20]Capital Formation and Economic Growth: A Conference of the Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955, p. 390.

[21]Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 22.

[22]Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Economic Change: How Economic Growth Begins. Homewood: Dorsey, 1962, p. 249.

[23]William F. Blackwell, The Beginning of Russian Industrialization, 1800-1860. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, pp. 189 ff.; Pierre Kovalevsky, "Le 'Rascol' et Sa Rôle dans le Développement Industriel de la Russie," Archives de Sociologie des Réligions, II (1957), No. 3, pp. 37-56; Roger Portal, "Industriels Moscovites: Le Section Cotonnier (1861-1914)," Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique, IV (1963), 28.

[24]Ibid.; Blackwell, op. cit., p. 212.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Portal, "Industriels," op. cit., p. 28.

[27]Ibid., p. 37.

[28]Jean Lambert-Dansette, Quelques Familles du Patronat Textile de Lille-Armentières (1789-1914): Essai sur les Origines et l'Evolution d'une Bourgeoisie (Thesis, University of Paris, Faculté de Droit). Lille: Raoust, 1954, pp. 522 ff.

[29]Josef Kulisher, "La Grande Industrie aux XVII^e et XVIII^e Siècles: France, Allemagne, Russie," Annales d'Histoire Economique et Sociale, III (1931), 17; P. A. Berlin, Russkaia Burzhuaziia v Staroe i Novoe Vremia. Moscow: "Kniga," 1922, p. 30; cf. the biographies in Chulkov, op. cit.

[30]S. Adler-Rudel, Ostjuden in Deutschland, 1880-1940. Tübingen: Mohr, 1959, p. 103: "those whose calling so frequently consisted of observing and describing human, political, and social occurences nearly incidentally referred to the fate of their own group." Jakob Lestschinsky, editor of Schriften fur Wirtschaft und Statistik (Berlin: Yiddish Scientific Institute, Sektion für Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1928), remarked (p. 11) that all previous Jewish historiography had been descriptive with little concern for economic factors in the Jewish communities themselves; Salo Baron's recent lengthy treatments continue to rely for economic and social data primarily on Lestschinsky's work and the forty-year old work by Weinryb cited above.

[31]For example, some of the material in the chapter by Strodtbeck in McClelland, op. cit.; Mark Zborowski, "The Children of the Covenant," in David C. McClelland (ed.), Studies in Motivation. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955; and Natalie F. Joffe, "The Dynamics of Benefice among East European Jews," Social Forces, XXVIII (March 1949), 239-47.

[32]Ezra Mendelsohn, Class Struggle in the Pale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 9.

[33]Salo W. Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews, XVI. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976, p. 439, note 53.

[34]Abraham J. Brawer, Galizien wie es an Österreich kam: Eine historisch-statistische Studie über die inneren Verhältnisse des Landes im Jahre 1772. Leipzig: Freytag, 1910, p. 104; Jewish attitudes in Courland and Livonia in the early 19th century were similar.

[35]Adler-Rudel, op. cit., p. 12.

[36]Von Laue, op. cit., p. 50.

[37]For very incomplete statistics, see Lestchinsky, op. cit.; Weinryb, op. cit.; and A. I. Iuditskii, "Evreiskaia Burzhauziia i Evreiskie Rabochie v Tekstil'noi Promyshlennosti Pervoi Polovine XIX v.," Istoricheskii Sbornik, 1935, No. 4, pp. 107-33.

[38]Quoted in "Wir und die Anderen," Baltische Monatsschrift, VII (1863), 457; cf. Walter J. Fischel, "Über die Gruppe der Karimi-Kaufleute: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Orienthandels Ägyptens unter den Mameluken," Studia Arabica, I (1937), 78.

[39]L. A. Loone, "Iz Istorii Promyshlennogo Perevorota v Estonii," Voprosy Istoriia, 1952, No. 5, p. 87.

[40]Reinhard Wittram, Drei Generationen: Deutschland-Livland-Russland, 1830-1914. Göttingen: Deuer, 1949, p. 243. For a more extended analysis, see my chapter on "Mobilized Diaspora in Tsarist Russia: The Case of the Baltic Germans," in Jeremy Azrael (ed.), Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices. New York: Praeger, (forthcoming)

[41]E. B., "Zur Lage," Baltische Monatsschrift, XIX (1870), 8; Wittram, op. cit., p. 254.

[42]Julius W. A. von Eckardt, Aus der Petersburger Gesellschaft, 3rd ed. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1881, p. 11.

[43]Von Laue, op. cit., especially pp. 35-49; The Memoirs of Count Witte (trans. Abraham Yarmolinsky). New York: Doubleday, Page, 1921, pp. 75 ff.

[44]Z. A. B. Zeman and W. B. Scharlau, The Merchant of Revolution: The Life of Alexander Israel Helphand (Parvus), 1867-1924. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

[45]Ibid., p. 192.

[46]Von Laue, op. cit., p. 38.

[47]Alexander Orbach, "The Russian Jewish Press of Odessa, 1860-71: Towards a Secularization of Jewish Culture in Tsarist Russia" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin Department of History, 1975), pp. 8, 131.