The Female Industrial Labor Force: Dilemmas, Reassessments and Options in Current Policy Debates

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In the current Soviet preoccupation with raising the productivity of increasingly scarce labor resources, the more effective utilization of female labor has taken on special urgency. With a labor force which is currently 51.5 percent female, and participation rates which approach the demographic maximum in the European regions of the USSR, improvements in the quality and efficiency of female labor are essential to the achievement of larger economic goals. This task is rendered exceptionally complex, however, by the interdependence of female roles in the occupational and family systems. Declining birthrates, rising rates of divorce, and other signs of general social instability have already provoked acute alarm among specialized elites as well as policy-makers, prompting serious discussions of whether the Soviet family itself, the fundamental unit of the social system, is in the midst of a profound crisis resulting from excessively rapid changes in women's roles. It is, therefore, increasingly evident that not only will significant changes in the training, distribution, and productivity of the female labor force require basic modifications in a broad array of social institutions; such measures are also likely to further exacerbate what are already perceived to be acute social problems.

The emergence in recent years of a searching reassessment of female roles in the labor force and the family is thus a direct consequence of the perceived tension between what have traditionally been the two overarching preoccupations of the Soviet leadership: performance and cohesion. It

reflects a growing recognition, both by the relevant specialized elites and by policy-makers, of the strategic interaction between economic performance and social dynamics, as well as a growing disposition to optimize that interaction. Current controversies surrounding problems of female labor therefore address a fundamental issue of current Soviet politics: the extent to which the effort to maximize economic performance is congruent with the maintenance of a reasonable level of social cohesion and stability, as well as with an acceptable level of population growth.

Explicit Soviet recognition of the dilemmas posed by these conflicting priorities is a relatively recent phenomenon. Until the late 1960s, Soviet writings treated high rates of female labor force participation as unambiguous evidence that socialism and sexual equality went hand in hand, and insisted that Soviet policy had created optimal conditions for the harmonious combination of women's dual roles.[1] In recent years, however, a veritable deluge of books, articles, and dissertations have testified to the economic, social, and demographic costs of present arrangements. Differing from their predecessors in tone as well as volume, they move swiftly from ritual self-congratulation to sweeping self-criticism in depicting the virtual exploitation of women workers on the job and at home. Relying on a variety of new research methodologies, including survey data and interviews, they document in elaborate detail the tensions between women's dual roles, the inadequacy of present arrangements to sustain them, the constraints they place on occupational mobility, and their harmful effects on the health of women workers and the stability and well-being of their families.[2]

Similar themes, treated with somewhat greater restraint, have occupied a succession of scholarly conferences, trade-union meetings, and Party gatherings in the past few years convened to analyze their causes, consequences, and possible remedies.[3] Given added impetus by the observance of

International Women's Year in 1975, this growing array of publications and conferences testifies to rising levels of concern as well as to the existence of a number of conflicting diagnoses, recommendations and goals.

Furthermore, there is ample evidence to suggest that these concerns are shared at the very highest levels of official responsibility. In 1976 alone, a series of major organizational and policy initiatives pointed to the prominent place that problems of female labor and byt (everyday life) have come to occupy on the list of official priorities. A number of specific measures "to improve the conditions of labor and everyday life of working women" were included in the 10th Five-Year Plan outlined at the 25th Party Congress in March 1976; the State Committee on Labor and Wages was reorganized under a new chairman and assigned a broader mandate reflected in its new title, the State Committee on Labor and Social Questions; and in October of 1976, new standing commissions were created in both chambers of the Supreme Soviet as well as in the Soviets of each republic to address the special problems of women workers and mothers. Brezhnev implicitly committed himself to still further efforts in his address to the Trade Union Congress in March 1977, acknowledging:

"We men . . . have thus far done far from all we could to ease the dual burden that [women] bear both at home and in production."[4]

At the core of current dilemmas is the fact that the massive entry of women into the Soviet industrial labor force occurred in the context of economic priorities which imposed particularly heavy burdens upon the household, in the context of social norms and institutional arrangements which assigned women a primary role in the family system, and in the context of political priorities which demanded a high rate of population growth. While many of the problems addressed in Soviet writings are common to a whole range of contemporary industrial societies, the influence of these three factors has given a distinctive cast to the pattern of female roles in the USSR while posing

profound problems for current Soviet policy.

This paper will examine the major economic and social problems raised by the interdependence of female work and family roles in the USSR. Drawing on both national statistical data and the results of recent small-scale sociological investigations it will attempt to construct a profile of the female industrial labor force and to outline the most salient features of its role in both the national and the household economy. On the basis of a structural analysis of the articulation of work and family roles, and the policy dilemmas which result, it will conclude with a review of the spectrum of reassessments and proposals presently under consideration and with an analysis of the broader implications of alternative solutions.

I. The Woman Worker and the National Economy

Determinants of female labor force participation

From the earliest days of the revolutionary state, an explicit commitment to the full participation of women in social production has provided the ideological underpinnings of Soviet policy. However, it was not until the second decade of Soviet power that the interaction of economic and demographic factors transformed a politically desired objective into a pressing economic need.

The massive influx of women into the nonagricultural labor force in the Soviet period was touched off by the First Five-Year Plan. Until 1930, economic dislocation and high rates of unemployment affected female workers with particular severity, and their share of the nonagricultural labor force did not exceed 25 percent of the total. The economic expansion inaugurated by the First Five Year Plan created a dramatic increase in the demand for labor, while a combination of falling real income and a growing deficit of males increased the availability of women for industrial employment. Between

1932 and 1937 some 82 percent of all labor recruits were women, and by 1940 the proportion of women workers and employees in the socialized sector had risen to almost 40 percent (Table 1). The increase in the proportion of women in many traditionally male branches of industry was particularly striking. In coal mining and iron production, where women constituted under 10 percent of the labor force in 1929, their proportion reached 25 percent in 1938; in chemicals, rubber, and machinery production it rose from 15 to 37 percent; in oil mining it reached 30 percent in 1938; and in the lumber and wood industries 43.9 percent of the labor force in 1939 was female.[5]

This trend was, of course, given additional impetus by World War II, when a new wave of women workers replaced the millions of men mobilized for the front and remained to fill the gaps created by wartime losses. The cumulative casualties of war and civil war, of collectivization, purges, deportations, and ultimately of World War II, created an increasingly severe deficit of males. In 1946 there were only 59.1 males for every 100 females in the 35-59 age group. Even by the time of the 1959 census, 54.9 percent of the Soviet population was female, with the figure reaching 63.4 percent of the age cohort 35 and over. Because the demand for labor vastly exceeded the supply of males, women became a valuable addition to scarce labor reserves.

Moreover, the severe imbalance in the structure of the Soviet population affected the supply of female labor as well as the demand for it by obliging large numbers of women to become self-supporting. Political deportations and wartime losses transformed wives and widows into heads of households, while the scarcity of men deprived a high proportion of Soviet women of the opportunity to marry. Almost 30 percent of Soviet households in 1959 were headed by women, leading a distinguished economist to observe that "women could not but work, because their earnings are the basic source of income for the family."[6] To this day, regional variations in the proportion

Table 1

Female Workers and Employees in the National Economy, 1922-1976

Year	No. of Female Workers & Employees	Women as % of Total
1922	1,560,000	25
1926	2,265,000	23
1928	2,795,000	24
1932	6,000,000	27.4
1940	13,190,000	39
1945	15,920,000	56
1950	19,180,000	47
1955	23,040,000	46
1960	29,250,000	47
1965	37,680,000	49
1968	42,680,000	50
1970	45,800,000	51
1972	48,707,000	51
1974	51,297,000	51
1976 (estimated)	53,700,000	51.5

SOURCE: Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR: 1922-1972 (Moscow, 1972), p. 348; for 1932, Solomon Schwarz, Labor in the Soviet Union (New York, 1951), p. 72; for 1972-1976, "Zhenshchiny v SSSR," Vestnik statistiki 1, January 1977, p. 86..

It should be kept in mind that women constituted 34.9 percent of the total population in 1959 and 63.4 percent of the age cohort 35 and over.

of economically active women are highly correlated with differences in marital status.

The massive influx of women into industry associated with the first two Five Year Plans, and then with World War II, was followed by a third wave of recruits between 1960 and 1970. Acute labor shortages caused by the slowing of population growth and the exhaustion of rural manpower reserves prompted an intensive effort launched in the early 1960s to draw housewives into the labor force. Increases in minimum wage levels and pension benefits simultaneously raised the cost of remaining outside the labor force. In response to these efforts over 16 million women were added to the total of workers and employees between 1960 and 1970, swelling the ranks of the white-collar and service sectors, virtually exhausting households as a further source of labor supply, and bringing the total number of women workers and employees to almost 46 million.[7] An additional increment of 7 million women in the past six years has raised the current figure to almost 54 million, with women constituting 51.5 percent of workers and employees, just under 45 percent of whom have joined the labor force since 1960.

Current levels of female labor force participation are sustained by a combination of economic pressures and psychological as well as monetary rewards. Even in families fortunate enough to have a male wage-earner, the fact that the Soviet wage structure and pension system is not designed to support a family of dependents itself encourages female employment. For example, the average monthly wage in 1972 was less than two-thirds of what was required to support a family of four at the officially established level of "material well-being." As two labor economists put it:

> The supply of female labor is more elastic [than that of males]. It depends to a greater degree on the extent to which a family's requirements are satisfied by the earnings of the head of the family (the male) and by income from public consumption funds. The lower the level at which these requirements are being satisfied, the more the family needs earnings from its women.[8]

At the same time, high rates of female employment have been strongly supported by an official ideology that insists on the value of work in fostering the independence, personal satisfaction and social status of women. These values are widely, although by no means universally, shared by women themselves. While a number of recent opinion surveys have testified to the dominant role of economic need in the work commitment of women factory workers other motivations, such as the desire to participate in a collective, or the wish to be financially independent of a husband, also play a significant role.[9] Under these circumstances, even Soviet economists have been at a loss to predict the long-term effects of greater affluence on female labor force attachment. On the one hand, to the extent that current participation rates represent a response to severe economic pressures, a reduction might be anticipated as living standards improve, particularly among the least skilled categories. On the other hand, while a certain number of women of working age in higher income categories have withdrawn from the labor force, and while this trend may intensify with further economic development, there is also a countervailing tendency at work in the positive association of high education and professionalism with strong labor force attachment.[10] Clearly, future policies affecting the terms of female participation will have a decisive impact on long-term trends.

The terms of female industrial employment

The massive entry of women into the industrial labor force occurred within the context of a particular set of norms and institutional arrangements which had a crucial impact on the pattern of work and family roles.[11] First and foremost was the underlying assumption of women's dual roles. The right to work, and the corresponding obligation, was defined from the start as a condition of citizenship which extended in principle to women as well as to men. The responsibility of women for their own support was expressed

in the structure of Soviet wages, in pension arrangements, and even in family law, where by contrast with legal practice in most Western industrial societies, Soviet codes rejected the treatment of marriage as an institution for the economic support of women, and rendered it virtually devoid of economic consequences for either partner. At the same time, maternity was granted official recognition, and treated as a social function deserving state support.

Secondly, although women were assumed to have dual roles, these roles were not assigned precisely equal weight in Soviet norms. The repudiation of radical visions of communal organizarion premised on the "withering away of the family" was associated, by the mid-1930s, with a growing appreciation of the family's contribution to social stability, economic performance, and population growth. Increasing official reliance on the family for the performance of critical social functions was accompanied in turn by a growing emphasis on female domestic and maternal responsibilities, in effect, superimposing new work and civic responsibilities on a traditional definition of femininity.

Thirdly, the shift of family functions to the larger society that was to provide the structural basis for new female roles was precluded by Stalinist political and economic priorities. By curtailing the development of the consumer and service sectors of the economy, Soviet industrialization strategy compelled the household to supply for itself a wide range of services which are normally shifted to external agencies in the course of economic development. The intensification of labor within the household compelled by new female roles outside it represented in effect, an inversion of traditional Marxist-Leninist theory, transforming certain types of paid professional labor outside the household into unpaid employment within it.

These norms were expressed in a set of institutional arrangements

whose purpose was to facilitate women's performance of both work and family roles. They included, briefly, the expansion of female access to education and professional training oriented toward scientific and technical fields; the promulgation of protective labor measures to accommodate the terms of female employment to domestic responsibilities; and the development of a state-supported network of child-care institutions to supplement the family's role in the care and socialization of children. The result of these norms and institutional arrangements was to create a distinctive pattern of linkages between the family and the occupational system, but one which had fundamentally different consequences for women and for men, and which was expressed in fundamentally different role-patterns both in economic life and in the family.

Patterns of female employment

The pressures and opportunities which resulted in female participation rates approaching those of males in the European regions of the USSR did not also produce comparable patterns of employment. The profile of the Soviet female labor force differs strikingly from that of the male labor force in several important respects, while also sharing a number of features in common with its Western counterparts.

In the first place, a relatively high proportion of female labor continues to be concentrated in agriculture, though it has been declining sharply in recent years. Agricultural occupations account for just over one-fourth of all female employment, some 17-18 million women. Of these, 4.5 million are employed on state farms, and are included among the workers and employees of the socialized sector, while an additional 8-9 million are employed on collective farms and roughly 4.5 million in private subsidiary agriculture.[12]

Of the remaining three-fourths of employed women comprising the 48 million female workers and employees in the nonagricultural sector of the socialized economy, just over one-third or 16,662,000 are employed in industry; 20 percent or 9 million in trade and local services; another 20 percent in education, art, culture, and scientific services; 6 percent in construction, 6 percent in transport and communications, and 4 percent in state and economic administration, and in the apparatus of cooperative and social organizations. (Table 2)

As Table 2 indicates, women are substantially overrepresented in some of these economic sectors and considerably underrepresented in others. Thus, they form over 70 percent of workers and employees in sectors such as trade and communal dining, health, education and culture, and credit and state insurance, and less than 30 percent of workers and employees in construction and in transportation. The female labor force is therefore distinguished from its male counterpart by its domination of the "nonproductive" spheres of the Soviet economy and its underrepresentation in material production. While 29 percent of all male workers and employees are employed in Group B industries and 71 percent in Group A, 45 percent of female workers and employees are located in Group A industries and 55 percent in Group B. Moreover, 70 percent of the women in industrial occupations are concentrated in three fields: machine construction and metallurgy and the light and food industries.

The detailed breakdown of occupations in the 1970 census reveals with even greater clarity the dominance of women in white-collar occupations in industry as well as in the paraprofessions and services, and their underrepresentation in skilled blue-collar work. Thus, women constitute 99 percent of all typists and stenographers, 98 percent of all nurses, 98 percent of nursery school personnel, 96 percent of telephone operators and 95 percent

Table 2

Distribution of Women Workers and Employees and Average Monthly Earnings by Economic Sector, 1975

Economic Sector	No. of Women Workers & Employees	% of Total No. of Women Workers & Employees	Women as % of Total Workers & Employees	Average Monthly Earnings
Construction	3,002,000	5.7	28	176.8
Transport	2,211,000	4.2	24	173.5
Industry (Production Personnel)	1 ,662,000	31.7	49	162
Science & Scientific Services	2,015,000	3.8	50	155.4
Nationwide Average			51	145.8
Credit & State Insurance	423,000	0.8	82	133.8
Apparatus of Government & Economic Administration	1,457,000	2.7	65	130.6
Education	5,904,000	11.2	73	126.9
Agriculture	4,530,000	8.6	44	126.8
Communications	1,042,000	1.9	68	123.6
Housing and Municipal Economy, Everyday Services	2,010,000	3.8	53	109.0
Trade, Public Catering, Materials & Equipment, Supply and Sales	6,763,000	12.8	76	108.7
Arts	207,000	0.3	47	103.1
Public Health, Physical Culture & Social Welfare	4,851,000	9.2	84	102.3
Culture	747,000	1.4	73	92.2
Total	52,539,000	100.0		

SOURCES: Calculated from figures given in Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1975 g. (Moscow, 1976), pp. 542-543, 546-547.

of librarians, while a number of occupations listed in the general census categories are not to be found in the enumeration of occupations employing women.[13] For the economy as a whole, women constitute 59 percent of the non-manual category.

Not only are women distributed unevenly across economic sectors and occupations, but they are also concentrated at lower levels of the vertical hierarchy within each occupation. This pattern has been extensively described elsewhere with respect to the professions, including teaching and medicine,[14] but it is equally the case--and less amply documented--for industrial employment. Soviet sources themselves provide only fragmentary data about the distribution of women among different skill levels in industry, but they clearly indicate that although women have begun to enter the middle and upper ranks of industry, they predominate in low-level, unmechanized, and unskilled jobs. In one set of investigations women were found to constitute 70-80 percent of all workers in the two lowest skill classifications, Grades I and II, and between 5 and 30 percent of workers in the highest, Grades V, VI and above.[15]

Other small-scale studies have yielded similar findings. As Table 3 indicates, among the workers of a Leningrad machine-building enterprise female workers comprised 89.9 percent of all workers in the lowest skill ranking, and 79.9 percent of those at Grade II, while comprising only 7.8 percent of workers at skill level V and 3.8 percent of those in category VI. Exactly 94.5 percent of all the female workers were classified in the three lowest grades, compared to 47.8 percent of the males, while only 5.5 percent of the women and 52.2 percent of the males were grouped in the three highest skill categories. The higher the skill rating, the lower the proportion of women workers.

Table 3

Distribution of Workers in a Machine-Building Enterprise by Skill Classification and Sex

		Percent of Total in Skill Classification					
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Males	100%	5.8	17.2	24.6	26.6	21.1	4.7
Females	100%	29.1	38.6	26.8	4.4	1.0	0.1
Proportion of Women Among Total Workers with Corresponding Classifications		89.9	79.9	66.0	22.6	7.8	3.8

SOURCE: A. Ye. Kotliar and S. Ia. Turchaninova, Zaniatost'zhenshchin v proizvodstve, (Moscow, 1975), p. 68.

Of 1,500 women employed in another machine-construction plant only eight were ranked at Grade V, while in all the machine-building factories surveyed, no women at all were found in the highest skill classification.[15] A similar pattern was found in light industrial enterprises but here the male-female disparities were significantly narrower.

In white-collar positions in industry, the proportion of women is significantly greater than among skilled workers. Moreover, women occupy not only low-level clerical positions but a significant proportion of technical positions as well, Thus, although women engineers constitute only 40 percent of the total, the absolute number of women engineers--over 1 million in 1970--is twice as large as the number of women physicians.

The relatively high proportion of women in technical positions in industry, however, has not been accompanied by the advancement of large numbers of women to positions of managerial authority. Although the proportion of women enterprise directors, rose from an infinitesmal 1 percent in 1956 to 9 percent in 1975, and women constitute almost one-fourth of all heads

of production-technical sections and subgroups, they have not moved into managerial positions in the proportions that one might expect on the basis of their training, work experience, and the existence of large industries, such as textiles, which are largely female. When we bear in mind that women constitute almost 65 percent of the key administrative age cohort, their absence in managerial roles is striking indeed.

Complaints that insufficient attention is paid to recruiting women to responsible positions occur with predictable regularity in official pronouncements, but recent statements reveal a greater sensitivity to its causes. Thus, a meeting of the Ivanovo province Party committee convened to discuss women's participation in economic and political life attributed these failures to the presence of "a certain psychological barrier" that resulted in a situation where "on the one hand, a number of leaders fear to entrust women with responsible positions, and on the other, women themselves demonstrate timidity, doubting their strength and refusing, under various pretexts, a transfer to leading work."[17] Dubious of the utility of mere exhortation, one labor specialist proposed a more radical solution: the adoption of sexual quotas, with the number of women in managerial positions to be proportional to the number of women working under their management.[18] But the factors which contribute to this problem are not amenable to easy solutions.

Differential aspirations and attainments clearly play a role in the limited mobility of women at every level of industry. Different occupational preferences and valuations, reinforced by socialization, distinguish boys and girls from early childhood and result in divergent patterns of educational and occupational commitments. As adults, a lower proportion of women than men express an interest in a career rather than a job; only one-third of women workers in a recent survey expressed a desire to upgrade their skills, compared

with over half the male respondents. The enrollment of women workers in programs to enhance professional qualifications is far lower than is that of males, and virtually ceases with the birth of a child.[19] But lower aspirations also reflect a realistic evaluation of the likely return on investments of additional time and energy, and the greater claims of domestic responsibilities on women's time and energy, as we shall see.

But more subtle prejudices and preferences also impede the professional mobility of women and limit their recruitment to positions of responsibility. A number of Soviet studies report that women are widely believed to have little initiative on the job, to be less creative than males, and to be less suited for managerial positions, although they deny that these views had any basis in fact.[20] A study of a team of scientific workers which found that women as well as men expressed a strong preference for males in superordinate roles and women in subordinate ones, gives striking testimony to the association of authority with males.[21] In an extended discussion of the recruitment and training of industrial executives in the pages of Literaturnaia gazeta, it took a letter from an irate female reader to point out that "for some reason it seems taken for granted that an executive is a man."[22]

Occupational stratification and wages

The predominance of women in white-collar and service occupations, and in the lower ranks of blue-collar workers, and their absence in high level managerial positions, results in a considerable gap between male and female incomes. The absence of comprehensive national data permitting a direct and accurate comparison of the average annual earnings of males and females at comparable levels of education and experience makes any efforts at analysis extremely speculative, but on structural grounds alone substantial disparities might be anticipated.

First, the structure of Soviet wages reflects the division of the economy into sectors of differing economic and political priority. The preferred economic sectors--such as heavy industry and construction--are precisely those in which women are underrepresented, while those sectors which have a high concentration of female employees--light industry and the services--are those in which lower wage levels prevail. Although a uniform scale for classifying skills and therefore wages insures a certain uniformity within categories, there are substantial differences between sectors in base rates, wage differentials, and bonuses. Thus, the monthly wages of a chief engineer in the coal industry is 380 rubles, for example, while a chief engineer with similar training and experience would earn 270-320 rubles in ferrous metallurgy, 260-300 in machine-building and only 200-210 in light industry, or 180-200 in the food industry. As Table 2 indicates, the economic sectors in which women tend to predominate--trade and public catering, communications, credit and insurance, education and culture, or public health and social welfare--are also sectors which rank relatively low in terms of average wages, while two sectors that are located at the top of the wage scale--construction and transport--have an exceedingly low proportion of female workers and employees. Within this framework, of course, the concentration of women at lower skill levels within each sector further compounds their basic disadvantage. The virtual absence of women at the highest skill levels, combined with lower seniority and more limited mobility also exerts downward pressure on female wages, while the paucity of women in managerial positions deprives them of valuable opportunities to supplement basic earnings with bonuses.

Superimposed on the differentials between economic sectors are differentials within each sector for different occupational categories which also adversely affect female incomes.

For example, additional remuneration is given to work involving unusual difficulty or danger, and since these are frequently occupations from which women are specifically excluded, an additional element of disparity between male and female wages is introduced. Moreover, blue-collar work tends to be more highly rewarded than many white-collar occupations. In industry, for example, the average monthly earnings of workers in 1975 was 160.9 rubles, compared to 131.3 rubles for the predominantly female white-collar personnel.[23] The effects of this pattern emerged sharply in a 1969 study of a Sverdlovsk factory: modest differences in the educational level of workers and employees were accompanied by wide differences in monthly wages.[24] Just 6 percent of workers but 27.7 percent of employees fell into the lowest wage category (66 to 80 rubles per month) while at the upper end of the wage scale, 41.1 percent of workers and only 0.6 percent of employees earned over 160 rubles per month. This pattern of occupational stratification was inseparable from sexual differentiation: 95.5 percent of the employees were women. Thus, the tendency for women to occupy routine nonmanual positions is also associated with the lower pay characteristic of these occupations, by comparison with skilled manual work in which women are underrepresented.

A similar pattern of economic rewards was revealed in a study of Leningrad machine-building enterprises.[25] The group in which the highest proportion of women would be found was located at the bottom of the scale in income, though at the middle range in educational level. Unskilled manual workers showed the lowest level of educational achievement, but ranked higher in income, while skilled nonmanual workers, another category in which women were likely to be well represented, ranked near the top of the educational scale but below the income level of most categories of skilled workers. Only among the skilled scientific and technical personnel, where women probably formed almost half the total, were education and wages roughly correlated.

The association of female preponderance with low wage levels goes beyond routine white-collar and service employment, and extends even to the professions. Teaching and medicine are themselves among the more poorly paid occupations and until very recently wage increases in these areas lagged far behind the national average. It is fair to conclude that the movement of women into white-collar and professional occupations on a massive scale has been associated with a profound decline in their status and pay relative to skilled blue-collar employment.[26]

In accounting for the disparity between male and female earnings, one last factor deserves mention here. Although Soviet law requires that equal work receive equal pay, there are no mechanisms to ensure that women are placed in positions commensurate with their training and skills. A recent study of industrial enterprises in Taganrog, for example, found 40 percent of female employees with higher or secondary specialized education occupying low-skill industrial positions, compared to 6 percent of the males with equivalent education, while 10 percent of these women and 46 percent of their male counterparts occupied high-skill positions.[27] Indeed, the distribution of the male labor force as a whole, without respect to education, was more favorable than the distribution of this female intelligentsia. Because women confront a narrower range of choices in the job market, and because, in selecting a job, they attach more weight to its compatibility with domestic responsibilities than to its content, women are frequently overqualified for the positions they occupy. The association of education and earnings is further eroded as a result.

On the basis of fragmentary Soviet data, usually based on local surveys of particular groups of enterprises, the average earnings of female workers appear to range from 65 to 75 percent those of males. The narrowest reported differential was found in a relatively homogeneous sample of 15,000

workers in light industrial enterprises in Kiev, where women's earnings amounted to 86 percent those of males.[28] Somewhat larger differentials were reported in surveys of industrial enterprises in Leningrad and Rostov, where the average wage of women workers was found to be 69.3 percent that of males.[29] A third source reports the average monthly income of employed women in the early 1970s as 90-100 rubles per month, which, depending on the precise year, indicates female earnings 62-69 percent those of males.[30]

A last bit of data on the relative earnings of male and female workers comes from a survey of 20,000 newlyweds conducted in Kiev in 1970 in which the average income of the brides (84 rubles a month) amounted to 72 percent that of the grooms (116 rubles per month).[31] Some 27 percent of the men and 68 percent of the women reported earnings of under 100 rubles a month, with 25 percent of the men and 10 percent of the women earning more than 150 rubles.

II. The Woman Worker and the Household Economy

The expectation that women's participation in social production would have a direct and favorable impact on their status and authority within the family was deeply rooted in Marxist-Leninist ideology. It is not surprising, therefore, that Soviet authors have little quarrel with the Western sociological literature which focuses on the resources that men and women bring to marriage as the key to family power.[32] Sharing the view that education, occupational status, income, and social participation have a direct influence on family authority, they contend that by reducing disparities in the distribution of such resources between men and women socialism has guaranteed the independence of women in marriage, enhanced their power within the family, and produced a more egalitarian pattern of family life.

And indeed the Soviet experience would provide a unique opportunity to test the assumptions of resource theory were it not for the countervailing effect of the demographic situation. The severe deficit of males tended to offset some of the potential consequences of increased female labor force participation by reducing women's opportunities to marry, their leverage in the marriage market, and their power within the family. Nevertheless, it is clear that the partial devaluation of female domestic roles and the emphasis on education and employment as the source of social prestige has altered the fundamental bases of female status in the USSR. While it is difficult to isolate the effects of female employment per se on family structure and behavior because of its intimate association with broader socioeconomic processes such as industrialization and urbanization, some preliminary conclusions can nevertheless be drawn about its effects on patterns of marriage and divorce, fertility, and the household division of labor.

Female employment and patterns of marriage and divorce

The combination of early marriage, a large male-female age difference at the time of marriage, and low rates of divorce is widely characteristic of traditional agricultural societies, and is an indication of women's limited status and opportunities outside the family by comparison with the value attached to reproductive potential within it. Female access to education, employment, and independent income, by contrast, tend to enhance women's freedom to enter or leave marriage by reducing the value of the resources gained through marriage relative to those obtainable outside it. Accordingly, some broad conclusions about the influence of female employment on family structure and behavior in the USSR can be derived from a comparison of patterns of marriage and divorce in regions of high female education and participation in the nonagricultural labor force with the patterns which

prevail in regions where such participation is comparatively low. Confining our analysis to the Baltic and the Central Asian republics, which represent two extremes on the Soviet spectrum, and ignoring for the moment the influence of both demographic structure and cultural values, a number of striking contrasts emerge.

First, the proportion of married females is considerably higher in the Central Asian than in the Baltic republics. In Turkmenistan, for example, 959 of every 1,000 females aged 25-29 are married, compared to 758 of every thousand in Estonia.[33] Secondly, a far higher proportion of Central Asian women marry at extremely early ages. Of every thousand 16- and 17-year olds in Uzbekistan in 1970, 47 were married, compared with 8 of their Lithuanian counterparts; for 18- and 19-year olds the corresponding figures were 343 and 106.[34] Finally, the age disparity between spouses was considerably smaller in the Baltic republics. Of all registered marriages taking place in Estonia in 1973, 55 percent of the grooms and 65 percent of the brides were 24 and under, while in Uzbekistan this was true of 61 percent of the grooms and 81 percent of the brides.[35]

A similar pattern prevails within republics if the marriage patterns of urban and rural populations are compared. Both in Central Asia and in the Baltic republics the proportion of urban women married is lower than the proportion of rural women, and the proportion of extremely youthful marriages is lower in urban areas.[36] However, the magnitude of urban-rural differences is smaller in the Baltic than in the Central Asian republics, reflecting the effects of developmental level as well as differences in ethnic composition.

Divorce rates are also positively associated with high female participation in the nonagricultural sector; they are extremely low in Central Asia but reach over 400 per thousand marriages in the major cities of the USSR.

In 1973, for example, the rates of registered divorce were 1.1 per thousand population for all three Central Asian republics, compared to 2.5 per thousand for Lithuania, 3.2 for Estonia and 4.8 for Latvia.[37] As a proportion of registered marriages the figures ranged from 121-130 in Central Asia compared to 267-491 in the Baltic. Urban-rural differences within republics are evident with respect to divorce as well. In the Ukraine, for example, between 1968 and 1970, the number of divorces per thousand marriages was over three times greater in urban areas than in rural ones.[38]

Fragmentary evidence also suggests that the divorce rate may be higher in working class marriages than in those of either kholkhozniks or members of the intelligentsia, higher in socially mixed marriages than in homogamous ones, and that a higher proportion of working class marriages are of short duration than is the case for other social groups.[39] The fact that the initiative for divorce is more likely to come from the wife than the husband, but that the opposite is true when his income is relatively high,[40] offers further evidence of the influence of female economic resources on patterns of marriage and divorce.

A more detailed analysis of the economic and social correlates of patterns of marriage and divorce awaits the availability of more comprehensive Soviet data. Nevertheless the available evidence has led a prominent Soviet specialist to conclude that while female dependence on males has been considerably reduced by the massive participation of women in the labor force, the continuing disparity of economic resources between males and females means that "the material position and social prestige of the husband has not lost its significance at the present time."[41]

Female employment and fertility

Changes in reproductive norms and behavior are also associated with high levels of female employment, and indeed represent one of its most dramatic and unintended consequences in contemporary Soviet society. The broad outlines of current Soviet demographic trends are too familiar to need repetition here; we shall focus rather on a few of its more salient aspects.

First, urbanization is inversely correlated with birthrates, although in this respect as well urban-rural differences are diminishing rapidly. For the USSR as a whole in 1972-1973, 57.5 children were born to every 1,000 urban women between 15 and 49 years of age, compared to 82.7 children to every 1,000 rural women.[42] These figures are associated with a pronounced trend toward one- or two-child families in the urban regions of the USSR; 57.6 of all urban worker and white-collar families in 1972 had only one child, compared to 38.1 percent of rural families, while 8.8 percent of urban and 29 percent of rural families had three or more children.[43] While the single-child family is now the norm in the urban regions of the Slavic and Baltic republics, large families continue to be widespread among the non-Slavic populations. Thus, 1 percent of all worker and white-collar families in the urban areas of the RSFSR have four or more children compared to one-fourth of all such urban families in Turkmenistan.

Part of the difference, of course, is attributable to structural factors which lower urban fertility potential: later marriage age, a lower proportion of married females in the reproductive age cohort, and a higher proportion of divorces, to cite a few of the major factors. However, urbanization also appears to influence reproductive norms directly, and thereby alter reproductive behavior. The expected as well as the actual number of children is lower in urban areas than in rural ones, and lower in large cities than in small ones. A 1969 survey of female attitudes found that urban women

expected an average of 2.19 children, compared to the 3.32 expected among rural women, with the urban figures reaching a low of 1.69 in Moscow and 1.55 in Leningrad.[44] A study of workers and employees in cities with populations of 500,000 and above in 1972 recorded an average expected number of children of 1.79.[45] These urban figures, obviously, fall well below the net reproduction rate, and hold out the likelihood that further urbanization will contribute to even sharper declines in the national birthrate in years to come.

Not surprisingly, though a source of additional concern, is the fact that female employment is itself inversely correlated with fertility. This correlation was first established by Strumilin in the 1930s, when he found that birthrates among housewives were double those of working women.[46] More recent studies indicate a differential of roughly 25 percent between working women and those occupied exclusively in the domestic economy.[47]

The Soviet data also permit us to isolate the specific effects of female occupational status in addition to the broader effects of urbanization and female employment. A breakdown of the number of children per thousand mothers in each of the three major social groups revealed that white-collar mothers had substantially fewer children than workers, among both urban and rural populations. Workers also had slightly fewer children than kholkhozniks, for the USSR as a whole, and for nine of the fifteen republics. And in all but two republics, urban worker families had fewer children than rural white-collar families.[48] (Table 4)

More detailed occupational breakdowns used in Latvian investigations indicate that birthrates are higher among women working in the sphere of material production than among those working in the "nonproductive" sphere. Within that category, industrial workers have the lowest birthrate and those

Table 4

Number of Children per 1,000 Mothers, by Social Class, Selected Republics, 1970

Republic	Number of Children per 1,000 Mother of Corresponding Social Group		
	Workers	White Collar	Kolkhozniki
USSR			
Urban	1,774	1,537	--
Rural	2,377	1,918	2,437
RSFSR			
Urban	1,681	1,470	--
Rural	2,208	1,782	2,281
Ukrainian SSR			
Urban	1,598	1,447	--
Rural	1,864	1,623	1,890
Uzbek SSR			
Urban	2,778	2,116	--
Rural	3,740	3,062	3,942
Azerbaidzhan SSR			
Urban	2,890	2,260	--
Rural	4,055	3,488	3,980
Estonian SSR			
Urban	1,511	1,454	--
Rural	1,766	1,652	1,800

SOURCE: Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie, Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda, Tom VII (Moscow, 1973), pp. 446-449.

working in agriculture the highest. Birthrates are also higher among those women engaged in primarily physical labor, and lower among those whose work is primarily intellectual. The lowest rates of all were recorded for scientific workers and for women working in the fields of culture and art,

the apparatus of state, cooperative and cultural organizations, public health, and social insurance, while higher rates were found among women working in communal and everyday services. Thus, within broader social and occupational categories birthrates vary inversely with female professional level.[49]

Moreover, the desired as well as the actual number of children appears to vary inversely with the occupational position of mothers, according to the findings of a study of newlyweds. A lower proportion of worker-brides desired either no children or one child than their white-collar counterparts, and almost twice as many workers wished to have three or more children than did the women engineers and technicians. The higher the level of professional qualifications the smaller the number of children desired.[50] Thus, further changes in social structure which increase the proportion of women in white-collar employment and which raise their level of qualification will result in a further diminution of birthrates if present trends continue.

Finally, Soviet investigations revealed the presence of a sizable gap between ideal and expected family size. In most cases, the average ideal number of children, in the opinion of the women surveyed, was greater than the average expected number of children. The opposite was the case, however, among women at the lowest levels of income and education, who expected to have more children than they considered ideal. (Table 5)

The relationship of income and fertility has been the object of considerable controversy among Soviet demographers.[51] The fact that a large number of Soviet families have fewer children than they appear to desire has led a number of scholars to conclude that specific material difficulties--most notably limited financial resources, poor housing conditions, and the lack of space in preschool institutions--are responsible for low urban rthrates. Others have pointed to the structure of family income as the

Table 5

Ideal and Expected Number of Children in Family in the Opinion of Women, by Educational Level and Per Capita Family Income

USSR 1969

Group According to Per Capita Family Income	Average	Of these, according to the views of women with the following educational level:			
		Higher and Incomplete Higher	General and Specialized Secondary	Incomplete Secondary	Primary & Lower
		Average ideal number of children			
I (lowest)	4.10	3.98	3.88	3.96	4.29
II	3.01	3.22	2.96	2.97	3.07
III	2.71	2.74	2.63	2.72	2.83
IV	2.58	2.56	2.53	2.63	2.68
V (highest)	2.57	2.51	2.54	2.64	2.77
Average for all 5 groups	2.88	2.67	2.72	2.90	3.25
		Average expected number of children			
I	4.23	3.91	3.59	4.00	4.65
II	2.65	2.78	2.50	2.60	2.87
III	2.15	2.09	2.03	2.20	2.39
IV	1.92	1.84	1.84	2.01	2.17
V	1.87	1.71	1.85	2.03	2.15
Average for all 5 groups	2.41	1.99	2.12	2.47	3.10

SOURCE: V. A. Belova, Chislo detei v sem'e. Moscow 1975, p. 146.

critical factor: the greater the share contributed by the wife, and the higher her level of professional accomplishment and satisfaction, the lower her interest in raising more than one child.[52] The contradictory results which emerge from investigations of the relationship of fertility to family

income are an indication that subjective evaluations of family needs play a crucial mediating role between income and fertility.

The effects of education on reproductive motivations and behavior is also difficult to disentangle on the basis of the available data. It would appear that birthrates are inversely correlated with female educational level, but the possibility of a U-shaped curve is suggested by evidence that a very slight upturn in both desired and actual family size occurs at high levels of education as well as income. (Table 5)

The tendency for increased female education, employment and level of professional qualification to be associated with lower rates of marriage, later marriage age, high rates of divorce, and declining family size, while stable family patterns and high birthrates are found precisely among the least "liberated" Soviet women, have provoked an understandable concern. Not only do these trends challenge the heretofore unquestioned assumption that socialist societies are characterized by a steady increase in population, they also raise the prospect that desired goals may be fundamentally incompatible. As a prominent Soviet sociologist noted ruefully, "While growing prosperity since the end of World War II has strengthened the family, the positive influence is not as direct as had been expected. Life shows that improved conditions and equal rights for both sexes do not automatically strengthen the institution of marriage."[53]

Female employment and the domestic division of labor

The effects of female employment on the internal functioning of the family is a particularly elusive subject. A broad array of Soviet writings attempt to demonstrate that women's entry into social production has resulted in greater female authority within the family, greater male participation in housework, and a more egalitarian pattern of family decision-making.[54] Serious flaws in the conception and execution of these studies, however, limit their

value as barometers of social change.

There is good reason, on the other hand, to focus on the family division of labor as one possible criterion of female status and power. Given the high proportion of households in which women are employed full time, the presumption in favor of an equal sharing of domestic chores and leisure should be particularly strong.

The expectation that high rates of female employment would be associated with an egalitarian division of labor within the family is not borne out by the voluminous body of Soviet time budget investigations whose findings are summarized in Table 6. As this composite portrait indicates, the amount of time devoted to work and to physiological needs is roughly equal for both sexes. In the two remaining categories, however--housework and free time--major differences are evident. Women spend between 2 to 2-1/2 times as much time to housework as men, while men have over 1-1/2 times as much free time as women. Thus, women spend on the average 28 hours per week on housework compared to about 12 hours per week by men, while the figures for free time are roughly the reverse. Within the family, a sharply defined sexual division of labor persists. Certain activities like gardening and repairs are predominantly male; others, like shopping and cleaning house, are predominantly female but are shared to some degree by males; a third group of activities, including cooking and laundry, are performed almost exclusively by women. The time budget data are therefore consistent with the findings of other Soviet studies based on interviews with women workers which concluded that nearly 75 percent of domestic duties fall exclusively to women, while the remainder are shared with husbands and other family members.[55]

Table 6

A COMPARISON OF TIME BUDGETS OF MALE AND FEMALE WORKERS

Time-Budget Categories	Percent of Week Devoted to Given Activity		Ratio of Time Spent by Females in Given Category to That of Males
	Males	Females	
Working Time			
Low	28	27	
High	32	31	
Average	30	29	.96
Physiological Needs			
Low	38	37	
High	42	40	
Average	41	39	.95
Housework			
Low	5	11	
High	10	22	
Average	8	19	2.37
Free Time			
Low	16	9	
High	25	17	
Average	21	13	.62

Sources: L.A. Gordon and E.V. Klopov, Chelovek posle raboty (Moscow, 1972); V.D. Patrushev, Vremia kak ekonomischeskaia kategoriia (Moscow, 1966); G.S. Petrosian, Vnerabochego vremia trudashchikhsiia v SSSR (Moscow, 1965); G.A. Prudenskii, Vnerabochee vremia trudiashchikhsiia (Novosibirsk, 1961); V.A. Artemov, V.I. Bolgov, and O.V. Volskaia, Statistike biudzhetov vremenii trudiashchikhsiia (Moscow, 1967); G.V. Osipov and S.F. Frolov, "Vnerabochee vremia i ego ispol'zovanie," Sotsiologiia v SSSR, Vol. 2 (Moscow, 1966).

The table was compiled by transforming the data presented in the above studies into percentages of time in a seven-day week in the interest of standardization. In the Soviet usage, "working time" includes both actual work and time connected with work, as in travel; "physiological needs" include eating, sleeping, and self-care; "housework" includes shopping, food preparation, care of the household and possessions, and direct physical care of young children; "free time" includes hobbies, public activities, activities with children, study, and various forms of amusement and rest.

While the Soviet studies do not explore systematically the impact of different variables on patterns of time usage, several broad conclusions can be drawn. First, male-female differences in the allocation of time are apparent even among single students living in dormitories.[56] Second, this male-female differential increases with marriage. While the total amount of free time available to married males and females alike is lower than that for singles, the twelve-hour gap recorded for unmarried youth rises to eighteen to twenty hours in young families.[57] It may even be the case that, as a consequence of marriage, men gain more in services than they contribute, while the opposite is true for women. A comparison of broken with intact households indicates that working mothers with one child and no husband present spend from three to eight hours less time per week on housework than working mothers with husbands present.[58] These figures suggest that the share of housework contributed by men does not balance the additional time expended in caring for them.

Third, there does appear to be a positive relationship between female employment outside the home and male help within the household. One study found that, in families where women held no paid outside jobs, men's expenditures on housework were 8.3 percent that of women's, but in families where women held such jobs this proportion climbed to 24 percent.[59]

Fourth, the male-female differential appears to increase with age, although it is difficult to distinguish age from stages in the life cycle which bring additional responsibilities. Indeed, family structure is the major determinant of how much free time is available to adults. The birth of a first child has the most dramatic impact, bringing about a sharp increase in domestic chores and a decrease in the time devoted by women to study. The presence of relatives reduces the expenditure of time on household chores, but only marginally.

Fifth, educational level appears to have an important effect on the allocation of time to domestic chores, but not necessarily on the participation of males in them. A higher level of education is almost always accompanied by a decline in the time devoted to housework. Moreover, this correlation is even stronger for women than it is for men. Education may therefore be associated with a greater tendency to devalue housework, with a greater ability to organize it efficiently, and perhaps most important, with both the incentive and the ability to devote resources to acquiring household appliances and services. Still, the five most prevalent daily activities of women with specialized education differed little from those of women with four grades of schooling or less, but differed considerably from those of comparable males.

The effects of socioeconomic or occupational status are even more difficult to tease out of the Soviet data, but the evidence indicates that the male-female division of labor does not necessarily become more equal at higher levels of the social hierarchy. Contrary to the contention of a number of Soviet social scientists, the reduction of time devoted by women to housework appears to occur not so much as a result of greater male participation but through the acquisition of household appliances and services made possible by higher levels of income. Indeed, it appears that blue-collar males devote more time to housework and spend less time on study and on public affairs than their white-collar counterparts. The latter--particularly those males engaged in demanding careers--devote more time to work, to study, and to social participation, and less time to household chores, than any other category.[60] Thus, the male-female division of labor is not necessarily more equal among the technical and professional intelligentsia; indeed the reverse appears to be the case.

Unfortunately, no data are available that would enable us to analyze the effects of relative male and female income on the family division of labor. A number of Western studies have suggested that the members of families allocate time according to their comparative advantage in the production of market and domestic goods and services, and that comparative advantage is in turn determined by a combination of relative wage rates and efficiency in home production.[61] If this hypothesis is correct, we might expect to find that, in families where the income of the wife is substantially higher than that of the husband, he would play a comparatively greater role in domestic production than in families where the wife's income is lower. Unfortunately, the effects of relative income on the family division of labor has not been systematically studied by Soviet sociologists--nor, for that matter, by Western ones--but if such a trend was indeed emerging in the USSR, it is likely that it would receive prominent mention in Soviet writings.

It would appear, then, that the division of labor within the Soviet family is shaped by ecological factors that limit the effects of increased female resources or egalitarian values. The correlation between egalitarian values and actual behavior is in any case rather weak: in a group of families studied by A. Pimenova, an equal division of household labor was favored by 63 percent of women and 55 percent of men but was practiced in only 12 percent of the families.[62] Thus, the participation of males in household chores may be better interpreted as a necessary response to the situational pressures confronted by the family as a result of the combined burden of work and domestic responsibilities upon women. To the extent that alternative assistance is available--either in the form of help from other relatives or in the form of household appliances and services that the family can afford to purchase--the male contribution is reduced. Similarly, the competition of other legitimate

and valued activities--further education, a demanding career, political responsibilities--also justify a reduction of the male contribution to domestic chores. The relative absence of both these alternatives in blue-collar families may therefore explain the tendency for the domestic division of labor to be more equal.

In the light of these patterns, it may be unrealistic to assume that further economic development will bring with it a dramatic decline in women's household responsibilities and a sharp increase in the time available for recreation and leisure, for improving professional qualifications, and for participating more actively in public affairs. A comparison of family time budgets in the 1960s with those recorded four decades earlier reveals only a modest decline in the time devoted to household chores. Moreover, several Soviet analysts point out that women's domestic responsibilities have actually increased in the interim because there are now fewer adults in the household available to share them, and because new demands frequently supplement, rather than replace, the old.[63] In this respect, the Soviet data appear to support an American study that concluded that gains produced by labor-saving technology in the last few decades have not been translated into substantial increments of female leisure.[64]

The elasticity of domestic responsibilities highlighted in these studies suggests that even future reductions in female working time will not necessarily result in the greatly increased leisure that many Soviet writers anticipate. The additional time is more likely to be devoted to child care and domestic responsibilities than to study, social participation or leisure pursuits. The shift from a six-day to a five-day work week in 1967 yielded a comparatively greater increase in free time for men than for women; the relative share of time that males devoted to domestic chores

actually declined as a result.[65] A recent experiment with shortening the workday of women factory workers yielded similar results.[66] Although the shorter day had the desired effect of providing more time for the supervision and upbringing of children, it also had the unanticipated effect of increasing the time women devoted to household chores. A high proportion of the women who participated in the experiment reported that their husbands took advantage of the opportunity to shift additional household duties to their wives.

The "double burden" resulting from the combination of full-time employment and heavy domestic chores is thus responsible for the limited amount of "free time" available to women workers for raising their professional qualifications. Women's educational efforts virtually cease with the birth of a first child, while the ability of male workers to continue with their studies is not adversely affected by family responsibilities. As two Soviet authors explicitly recognize, men combine employment with study by limiting the time they devote to family chores, at the expense of other members of the household who in effect subsidize these educational pursuits.

> From everything that we know about the structure of urban life, we can assert that [free time] is obtained by increasing the housework of working and non-working women--mothers, wives, and other relatives. This is the "contribution" that they make to their children's and husbands' further education. And much evidence . . . shows that this is no "loan" repaid with interest, but a "free grant." Consequently, a cause that is on the whole progressive is "paid for" not just by society and not just by those of its members who obtain the fruits of a higher education. Combination of work and study has become so widespread in the USSR partly because it has been supported by the other part of society--people who often do not participate in study at all and even suffer a certain loss on education's account.[67]

Consequently, high rates of female labor-force participation in the USSR do not preclude the participation of women in what Arlie Hochschild has described as the "two-person career."[68] By freeing males from the performance of routine household maintenance and child care which would otherwise divert time and

energy from educational, professional, and political pursuits, women workers in effect advance the occupational mobility of males at the sacrifice of their own.

III. The Articulation of Work and Family Roles: A Structural Analysis

On the basis of our analysis of the occupational and family roles of women workers, it is now possible to place them in the context of the broader pattern of roles that integrate the Soviet family with the larger economic system. The partial segregation of male and female roles within this system can be seen as a mechanism that served to cushion the impact of women's entry into new occupational roles on social structure, family organization, and authority patterns.[69]

Distinguishing work and family as two arenas in which Soviet males and females constitute two sets of actors produces four analytically distinct roles that are structurally integrated with each other: female work roles, female family roles, male work roles, and male family roles. Work and family roles are inversely related for men and women alike, and tend to compete with each other for time and energy. The articulation of these two roles, however, differs between the sexes in critical respects.

As we have seen, in the case of women it is family roles that are assigned primacy, and that are permitted to define the nature and rhythms of female employment. Its consequences were frankly acknowledged by a Soviet analyst:

> Women do indeed choose easier jobs, with convenient hours, close to home and with pleasant co-workers and managers, but not because they lack initiative. They choose these jobs because their combination of social roles is difficult. . . .[70]

Women's family responsibilities are permitted to intrude into work roles. As we have seen, the conditions of female employment in the USSR are specifically designed to accommodate family responsibilities to a degree that is virtually unprecedented among contemporary industrial societies. Provisions for pregnancy leaves, arrangements for nursing infants during work hours, and exemptions of pregnant women and mothers from heavy work, overtime or travel away from home are predicated on the view that these are exclusively female responsibilities and that they take a certain priority that work arrangements must accommodate. The illness of family members is responsible for high rates of female, not male, absenteeism. Thus, women tend to view work from the perspective of their roles as wives and mothers; work satisfaction depends less on the content of the work itself than on its convenience in relation to family responsibilities.

This limited insulation of female work roles from family roles results in characteristic patterns of female behavior. As two Soviet specialists in female employment concluded from their interviews with industrial workers, "many female workers stated that when at work they cannot put the house and children out of their mind. The women value jobs requiring simple automatic responses that can be performed adequately despite these mental distractions."[71] Under these circumstances, it is understandable that married women are seriously underrepresented in enterprise activities requiring additional commitments of time and energy, as well as in volunteer movements and in public affairs more generally.

Precisely the opposite is the case for males. For men, it is work roles that take precedence and that are permitted to impinge on family roles; men literally "take work home" with them. An extensive network of evening and correspondence courses attended overwhelmingly by males, the

numerous assignments requiring travel away from home, and the proliferation of Party meetings and responsibilities in which males play a predominant role are all predicated on the assumption that these constitute legitimate claims on male time and energy even if they are carried out at the expense of family responsibilities. Under these circumstances, the limited contribution of males to household chores, like the limited commitment of women to occupational roles, is a manifestation not of individual shortcomings but of socially patterned roles. The fact, as Kharchev put it, that "while men often think about production work at home, women frequently think about domestic concerns at work"[72] reflects a fundamental difference in the structure of male and female work and family roles. The boundaries between work and family are permeable, but in opposite directions for men and women.

Just as work and family roles are interdependent and mutually reinforcing for each sex separately, so too are male and female roles interdependent in both the economy and the family. As we have seen, women are integrated into the labor force in segregated and subordinate roles. Horizontal occupational differentiation and vertical stratification by sex effectively shield male roles from competition by women and limit the situations in which females exercise authority over males. Specifically, norms that classify whole occupations as especially suitable for female labor or that assign women authority primarily when it is exercised over other women create a dual labor market that partially insulates male work roles from the effects of increased female employment and that sustains the predominance of males in positions of leadership and responsibility.

A parallel pattern of roles is found within the family itself. Norms that sustain a sexual division of alabor within the family by defining housework and child care as pre-eminently "women's work" also serve to insulate

the male role from pressures for increased participation in domestic work as women take on paid employment. The effect is to create a domestic counterpart to the dual labor market in which, as Pleck suggests, one part of the labor supply does not take on certain types of work even when there is a surplus of them, while the other part is overburdened and leaves needed work undone. At best, men "help" with housework and child care; no fundamental redefinition of male roles is involved.

The sexual division of labor within both the occupational system and the family, combined with the differential permeability of the work-family boundary for males and females, acted as buffers which reduced and cushioned the strains created by changing female roles. By limiting the impact of macro-societal changes associated with female employment outside the home on the sphere of family relationships, it facilitated the adjustment of males to changes in female roles. In Parsonian terms, the dual linkages that female employment created between the occupational and family systems were partly deprived of their potential for conflict by maintaining residual elements of a sexual division of labor in both.

Nevertheless, the effects of the structure of work and family roles that we have been describing were not altogether benign. The asymmetry between changing female work roles and relatively stable male family roles created two specific foci of strain: the conflict between males and females over the division of domestic responsibilities, and tension between female work and family roles.

The unequal division of domestic labor between husbands and wives in conditions of full-time female labor-force participation has been identified by a number of Soviet analysts as a major locus of female dissatisfaction and resentment, an important contributing factor in marital instability, and

a potential source of increasing disenchantment with the institution of the family itself. The tensions it creates have received eloquent expression in contemporary Soviet fiction. Natalia Baranskaia's evocation of a "week like any other" in the harried life of a young Soviet scientific worker, wife and mother captures the findings of innumerable time-budget studies in one dramatic image of the family evening: the husband, poring over newspapers and professional journals; the wife, her scientific research forgotten, swallowed up in laundry, mending, child care, and the family supper.[73]

While tension and conflicts over the division of labor and therefore the distribution of free time, are indirectly alluded to in a number of Soviet writings, at least one sociologist has come very close to conceptualizing it as a structural problem involving fundamental conflict between groups:

> The overall shortage of free time gives rise to a very curious phenomenon--a kind of struggle among different groups for free time. It is conducted in two forms. In the first place, certain groups, in order to provide themselves with comparatively more leisure time, resort to the shortening of certain necessary obligations. For example, the technical intelligentsia as a whole, and especially the men among them, spend significantly less time than others with their children; of course, they gain some time in this way, but the cause of childrearing hardly gains by it. In the second place, there is a direct struggle for free time among various groups. In the latter case it can be observed that certain groups not only refuse to fulfill certain necessary obligations, but shift them to the shoulders of other groups. This is precisely the way in which men act in relation to women, making use of the long-standing traditions of <u>byt</u>. [74]

In this remarkable statement is a recognition that the allocation of free time, and implicitly the sexual division of labor itself, has an important political dimension. To the extent that time is a scarce and valuable resource--and indeed there is a growing recognition of its economic value among Soviet planners--it is the object of genuine competition and conflict.

This competition has the potential to become especially acute in Soviet conditions precisely because of the degree to which female employment has eroded the traditional rationale for a sexual division of labor in the family. Although few Soviet social scientists have been tempted to pursue further the structural causes and theoretical implications of the sexual division of labor, they have been sufficiently alarmed by its contribution to marital conflict and family instability to define it as one of the two most critical and urgent problems stemming from the present structure of family and work roles.

The second such problem is the extreme tension between female work and family roles as they are presently defined. International studies of family time budgets have demonstrated that working women everywhere devote less time to domestic labor than do housewives, and in this respect Soviet women are no exception. But the pressure to reduce family commitments has far more ominous implications for larger Soviet priorities and objectives, for, as we have seen, it also entails the deliberate limitation of family size. Low birthrates in the regions of high female labor-force participation and the predominance of one-child families in urban milieus, are the most dramatic and, from the point of view of the Soviet leadership, the most extreme, undesirable, and indeed threatening manifestations of women's resistance to the combined pressures of work and family roles. By impinging on the entire range of economic, political, and military preoccupations and priorities of the current Soviet leadership, such manifestations have compelled a fundamental reconsideration of a whole spectrum of policies involving the scope and definition of female roles. It is to an analysis of these perceptions, reassessments and recommendations, and their implications for public policy, that we now turn.

IV. Current Dilemmas and Options

In light of the economic and demographic trends we have outlined, it is apparent that the irreplaceable contribution of the female labor force to both production and reproduction presents the Soviet leadership with a classic policy dilemma. For Soviet development has induced two mutually contradictory processes. By opening a new range of educational and professional options for women, it has encouraged them to acquire new skills, values, orientations, and aspirations which compete with traditional domestic roles. At the same time, the continuing high value attached to the family, combined with the large investments of time and energy needed to sustain it, encourage the limitation of female work commitments, which in turn produces an industrial labor force which is extremely low in productivity and skill, and which constitutes a serious drag on the economy as a whole. The result is an acute degree of role strain, high levels of physical fatigue, and unsatisfied aspirations in both work and family roles.

Moreover, these tensions are unlikely to diminish of themselves in the immediate, or indeed foreseeable future. Undeniably, increased investments in consumer goods and services will lighten the burdens of daily life under which female workers have long labored, although these improvements are likely to come slowly indeed. However, the cumulative effects of current economic and social trends are likely to have other, more negative consequences as well. To the extent that a severe deficit of males, coinciding with a fundamental transformation of economic and social structure, created unprecedented opportunities as well as pressures for female occupational mobility, the return to demographic "normalcy" for younger age cohorts, in the context of a relative saturation of elite positions, is likely to slow

both the impetus and the real opportunities for the advancement of women in the educational and occupational structure. In addition, the evolution of the economy itself may have an unfavorable impact on patterns of female employment. Increasing technical complexity will make new demands on the labor force in the years ahead, and in the absence of fundamental changes, including reforms in the system of vocational education and on-the-job training, women are increasingly likely to be forced out of skilled employment in industry and the professions and to be absorbed in ever-larger proportions into routine white-collar and service occupations.[75] Such jobs may prove more readily compatible with family responsibilities but far less commensurate with women's training, ability, and aspirations.

It is, of course, quite possible that the present Soviet leadership will continue to straddle the issue, hoping that slow but incremental improvements in working conditions, child care, and the provision of consumer goods and services will alleviate the worst of the problem. While it is therefore conceivable that the status quo can be maintained indefinitely, there is reason to believe that among both specialists and policy-makers the dilemma is increasingly perceived as requiring a more immediate and definitive set of choices.

One set of options proposed for the consideration of policy-makers would attempt to elevate the social status and material rewards associated with reproduction at the partial expense of female labor force participation. Alarmed by the growing disparity between what they consider an optimal rate of reproduction and the actual rate, a number of prominent Soviet demographers (of whom the most outspoken have been Boris Urlanis of the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Viktor Perevedentsev of the Academy's Institute of the World Labor Movement) urge that highest priority

be given to developing a comprehensive population policy "regardless of any considerations that may be advanced from an economic, ecological, sociological or any other point of view."[76] Incorporating measures to enhance fertility potential, to alter social values in favor of larger families, to eliminate the material obstacles to larger family size, and to use pension benefits to reward childbearing as well as production, the central thrust of this pro-natalist position, as well as its most controversial dimension, is its effort, in the words of one Soviet author, "to transform maternity, in one degree or another, into professional, paid social labor."[77] Direct financial subsidies, tailored not to the direct costs of children but to the opportunity cost of female labor, would be relied upon to induce new mothers to withdraw from the labor force for periods of up to three years, while a sliding scale of benefits tied to wage levels would assure the more equal distribution of fertility outcomes among different social strata. The high costs of such a program would be offset by its long-term contribution to labor supply, as well as by the more immediate savings generated by a cutback in pre-school facilities.

Measures such as these could have potentially far-reaching consequences for the position of the female labor force as a whole. Were they actually to have the desired demographic effect, long interruptions in labor force participation would adversely affect skills and future productivity, create a partial loss of the considerable investments in women's education, increase the resistance of employers to hiring and training them for skilled and responsible jobs, and create difficult problems of re-entry.[78]

Less radical in this context, but with potentially similar costs and benefits, would be measures to expand the scope of part-time work. Advocated by many as an alternative to extended maternity leaves, it would enable women

to maintain continuity of employment while increasing the time and energy available for childrearing and household work. Although its introduction on a large scale raises a host of unresolved problems, recent pronouncements indicate that the present leadership intends to expand the opportunities for part-time employment in the next few years.[79] If this is indeed the case, it is likely to occur in industries with high proportions of female workers, through the creation of special sectors and assembly lines which will segregate part-time workers from the full-time labor force, and in routine white-collar and service occupations. It is, therefore, likely to increase the concentration of women in unskilled and poorly remunerated jobs, while providing the rationale for shifting a greater share of domestic responsibilities to their shoulders.

A contrasting set of policy options flows from the premise that economic progress and national power depend on the quality of the labor force rather than on its size, and that the more effective utilization of female labor rather than the stimulation of fertility is the overriding economic and political priority. Improvements in the organization and technological level of the production process, more energetic efforts to improve the skill levels of female workers, including innovative approaches to on-the-job training better suited to working women with families, the serious enforcement and further extension of protective measures, the adaptation of new technologies to the physiological needs of women workers, and the more rapid promotion of women to positions commensurate with their skills and experience would effectively increase the labor force attachment, productivity, and aspirations of women workers.

The creation of a preferential work regime for young mothers would be consistent with this approach, rather than the expansion of part-time work. A slight reduction in working hours without loss of pay has been

advocated by a number of authors, who propose that free time be treated like wages and disproportionately large increases granted to the most deprived categories.[80] Finally, the rapid expansion and improvement of child-care institutions take on added urgency in light of their contribution to raising labor force participation and reducing turnover.

An approach such as this would also have distinct implications for the role of working women in the family. Rather than increasing the sexual division of labor, as is likely to be the case if the first set of options were pursued, it would provide the rationale for greater sharing of family responsibilities. As several scholars have indicated, the increased participation of males in family roles is the necessary counterpart to the expansion of female public roles in order to restore a symmetry in the articulation of work and family roles disrupted by Soviet industrialization.[81] They have therefore called for more systematic intervention by state, Party, and public organizations to eliminate traditional stereotypes and emphasize the joint and equal responsibility of both spouses for the care of the household and children.

As this brief outline has attempted to demonstrate, structural changes in the occupational and family systems are interdependent. Future changes in female work and family roles, therefore, cannot help but have repercussions for the pattern of male roles as well. Ultimately, to paraphrase Zoia Iankova,[82] the main goal is not merely to redistribute tasks that hinder the personal development of male and female workers alike, but to eliminate them by introducing fundamentally new ways to carry them out.

Notes

[1]For the classic statement of this position see Vera Bilshai, Reshenie zhenskogo voprosa v SSSR (Moscow, 1956).

[2]Among the most illuminating of these studies are N. M. Shishkan, Trud zhenshchin v usloviiakh razvitogo sotsializma (Kishinev, 1976); A. E. Kotliar and S. Ia. Turchaninova, Zaniatost'zhenshchin v proizvodstve (Moscow, 1975); V. B. Mikhailiuk, Ispol'zovanie zhenskogo trud v narodnom khoziaistve (Moscow, 1970); N. A. Sakharova, Optimal'nye vozmozhnosti ispol'zovaniia zhenskogo truda v sfere obshchestvennogo proizvodstva (Kiev, 1973); Z. M. Iuk, Trud zhenshchiny i sem'ia (Minsk, 1975); Z. G. Zdravomyslov, V. P. Rozhin, and V. A. Iadov, Chelovek i ego rabota (Moscow, 1967).

[3]The recommendationsof a symposium on women's employment and the family held in Minsk in June 1969 are contained in A. G. Khathev and S. I. Golod, Professional'naia rabota zhenshchina i sem'ia (Leningrad, 1971). The papers presented at two major scholarly conferences are collected in N. Solov'ev, Iu. Lazauskas, and Z. A. Iankova, eds., Problemy byta, braka i sem'i, (Vilnius, 1970), and Sovetskaia Sotsiologicheskaia Assotsiatsiia, Institut konkretnykh sotsial'nykh issledovanii AN SSSR, Dinamika izmeneniia polozheniia zhenshchiny i sem'ia, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1972). An account of a special plenum of the Ivanovo Party obkom convened to address problems of female employment and byt is published in Partiinaia zhizn' 16 (August 1975).

[4]Pravda, March 22, 1977.

[5]A. Broderson, The Soviet Worker (New York, 1966), pp. 62-63.

[6]Cited in Murray Feshbach and Stephen Rapawy, "Labor Constraints in the Five Year Plan," Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies (Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 449. The massive impact of war losses is further indicated by the fact that only 62.3 percent of women aged 40-44 were married in 1959, and 54.9 percent of women aged 45-49. Frederick Leedy, "Demographic Trends in the USSR," Soviet Economic Prospects, p. 441.

[7]According to the 1959 census, of the nearly 13 million able-bodied adults not productively employed, 89 percent were women, most of whom lived in smaller urban areas where employment opportunities were limited and child care facilities largely unavailable; Feshbach and Rapawy, p. 494.

While households supplied 41.5 percent of the total growth of employment between 1959 and 1965, most of this was in the European regions of the USSR. In Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, by contrast, they accounted for only .8 and 1.8 of the growth. Female participation rates in the nonagricultural sphere are significantly lower in the Uzbek, Kazakh, and Turkmen republics where Moslem traditions are hostile to the outside employment of women, and where industrialization and urbanization have been accompanied by a large influx of workers of other nationalities. Great difficulties have been encountered in recruiting native women into industry, and a high proportion of all female workers and

employees in these republics are Russian or Ukrainian. According to the calculations of Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, in Uzbekistan in 1962 a total of 65,000 Uzbek women were employed in industry of a total Uzbek population of over five million. In Tadzhikistan the proportion of native women in industrial employment was about 13 percent of the total number of women, or roughly 4,000, little changed from 1937. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia (Baltimore, 1970) p. 128.

[8]V. Guseinov and V. Korchagin, "Voprosy trudovykh resursov," Voprosy ekonomiki 2 (February 1971), pp. 45-51.

[9]Thus, in recent opinion surveys working women cited "material need" as a more central motivation in their employment than "broadening of horizons" or "civic satisfaction." The most extensive discussions of the motives of female employment are G. V. Osipov and Ia. Shchepan'ski, eds., Sotsial'nye problemy truda i proizvodstva (Moscow, 1969), pp. 444, 456; and A. G. Kharchev and S. I. Golod, Professional'naia rabota zhenshchin i sem'ia (Leningrad, 1971), pp. 38-69.

[10]A number of surveys to ascertain the proportion of women who would continue to work even if their income were no longer vital reported that between 70 and 85 percent of respondents replied affirmatively, and that the proportion was higher among white-collar than blue-collar workers. See Mikhailiuk, Ispol'zovanie zhenskogo trud, p. 24; Z. A. Iankova, "Razvitie lichnosti zhenshchiny v sovetskom obshchestve," Sotsiologicheskii issledovanie 4 (October-November-December 1975), p. 43; A. I. Pimenova, "Semia i perspektivy razvitiia obshchestvennogo truda zhenshchin pri sotsializme," Nauchnye doklady vysshei shkoly: filosofski nauki 3 (1966), pp. 36-39. Eighty-five percent of the respondents in a survey of female factory workers responded negatively when asked if they would prefer to work at home for the same pay; G. A. Slesarev and Z. A. Iankova, "Zhenshchiny na promyshlennom predpriiatii i v sem'e," in Osipov and Shchepan'skii, Sotsial'nye problemy truda, p. 422.

[11]For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, Women in Soviet Society (Berkeley, forthcoming), chs. 2-4.

[12]Based on data from Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1975 g. (Moscow, 1976) pp.440 This calculation assumes that slightly over 50 percent of kholkhoz workers, and virtually all persons engaged exclusively in private subsidiary agriculture, are female.

[13]Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie, Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda, vol. 6 (Moscow, 1973), pp. 165-169.

[14]Lapidus, Women in Soviet Society, ch. 5; see also the author's "USSR Women at Work: Changing Patterns," Industrial Relations, vol. 14, May 1975, pp. 186-193.

[15]Shishkan, Trud zhenshchin, p. 137.

[16]Kotliar and Turchaninova, Zaniatost' zhenshchin, p. 67-68.

[17]Partiinsia zhizn' 16 (August 1975), p. 44.

[18]V. N. Tolkunova, Pravo zhenshchin na trud i ego garantii (Moscow, 1967), p. 103.

[19]Kotliar and Turchaninova, Zaniatost' zhenshchin, pp. 76-84. Even the women enrolled in such programs were far more pessimistic than the men about their future professional prospects.

[20]M. Pavlova, Literaturnaia gazeta, September 22, 1971.

[21]V. N. Shubkin and G. M. Kochetov, "Rukovoditel', kollega, podchinennyi," Sotsial'nye issledovaniia 2 (1968), pp. 143-155.

[22]Literaturnaia gazeta, September 15, 1976, p. 10.

[23]Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1975 g., p. 546.

[24]L. G. Kamovich and O. V. Kozlovskaia, "Sotsial'nye razlichiia sredi rabotnikov umstvennogo truda na promyshlennom predpriatii," in Sotsial'nye razlichiia i ikh preodolenie (Sverdlovsk, 1969), p. 101.

[25]O. I. Shkaratan, "Sotsial'naia struktura sovetskogo rabochego klassa," Voprosy filosofii, No. 1, 1967.

[26]For a suggestive general treatment of this issue see Walter Connor, "Blue Collars, White Collars and Inequality," paper presented at the 8th World Congress of Sociology, Toronto, Canada, August 1974.

[27]E. B. Gruzdeva, "Osobennosti obraza zhizni intelligentnykh rabochikh," Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir 2 (March-April 1975), p. 94.

[28]Sakharova, Optimal'nye vozmozhnosti, pp. 28-31. Another survey of male and female incomes in 650 families conducted by the author found that the ratio of female to male incomes ranged from 18 percent of women's incomes higher than men's in one factory to 79 percent of women's incomes lower than men's in another.

[29]Mikhailiuk, Ispol'zovanie zhenskogo trud, p. 69.
A. L. Pimenova, "Sem'ia i perspektivy razvitiia obshchestvennogo truda zhenshchin pri sotsializme," Nauchnye doklady vysshei shkoli: Filosofii nauka, No. 3, 1966, p. 40.

[30]Shishkan, Trud zhenshchin, p. 24. This source does not specify precisely either the category of employment in question ("working women") or the precise year. Using the average income figures for 1970 would indicate a figure for women 69 percent that of males; for 1972, 62 percent.

[31]L. V. Chuiko, Braki i razvody (Moscow, 1975), p. 87. Although the average age of the males was two years greater, their brides tended to have slightly higher levels of education. Note also that average monthly earnings for workers and employees in 1970 were 122 rubles; Narodnoe khoziaĭstvo SSSR v 1975 g., p. 546.

[32]The classic statement of the resource theory of family power is Robert O. Blood, Jr. and Donald M. Wolfe, Husbands and Wives: The Dynamics of Married Living (Glencoe, 1960), chs. 2 and 3. A thoughtful critique of the general literature is found in David Heer, "The Measurement and Bases of Family Power: An Overview," Marriage and Family Living 25 (May 1963), pp. 133-139, and Constantine Safilios-Rothschild, "The Study of Family Power Structure: A Review 1960-1969," Journal of Marriage and the Family 32 (November 1970), pp. 539-552.

[33]Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda, vol. 2 (Moscow 1972), pp. 263-268.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie, Naselenie SSSR 1973 (Moscow, 1975), pp. 172-173.

[36]Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi 1970, vol. 2, pp. 263-268.

[37]Naselenie 1973, pp. 150-165.

[38]L. V. Chuiko, Braki i razvody (Moscow, 1975), p. 134.

[39]Ibid., pp. 139-144, 152.

[40]A. G. Kharchev, Brak i semia v SSSR (Moscow, 1964), p. 212; Chuiko, Braki i razvody, p. 145.

[41]Chuiko, Braki i razvody, p. 142.

[42]Naselenie 1973, p. 136.

[43]Zhenshchiny i deti v SSSR (Moscow, 1975), pp. 92-96. The inclusion of collective farm families would decrease the proportion of one-child families in the rural total, and increase the proportion of families with four or more children.

[44]V. A. Belova, Chislo detei v sem'e (Moscow, 1975), p. 129, 109.

[45]V. A. Borisov, Perspektivy rozhdaemosti (Moscow, 1976), p. 110.

[46]S. G. Strumilin, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, vol. III, p. 140.

[47]Sh. Shlindman and P. Zvidrin'sh, Izuchenie rozhdaemosti (Moscow, 1973), p. 74.

[48]Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda, vol. VII (Moscow, 1973), pp. 446-449. See also Shlindman and Zvidrin'sh, Izuchenie rozhdaemosti, pp. 72-77.

[49]Ibid., pp. 76-77.

[50]Chuiko, Braki i razvody, p. 113.

[51]A summary of the contradictory findings of several studies of the relationship of income and fertility is presented in David M. Heer, "Recent Developments in Soviet Population Policy," Studies in Family Planning, vol. 3, no. 11 (November 1972), p. 262. An all-Union symposium on demographic and family problems held in October 1975 came to a similarly ambivalent conclusion. Some participants noted that small families were more common among high income groups than among those with low incomes. The number of children per family in the highest income group was 2.57 (ideal) and 1.87 (expected) while the corresponding figures for the lowest income groups were 4.10 and 4.23. At the same time, it was argued, there is a tendency emerging for high-income families to have a higher birthrate than those with smaller incomes. A survey demonstrated that in republics of low birthrate, families with a monthly income of 151-210 rubles averaged 2.05 children and families whose income reached 901 rubles or more had 2.49 children. No connection was found between income and number of children, however, in families where the wife had a higher education. V. P. Tomin, "Vsesoiuznyi simpozium po demograficheskim problemam sem'i," Sotsiologicheskie issledovanie 2 (April-May-June 1976), p. 189.

[52]Shlindman and Zvidrin'sh. Izuchenie rozhdaemosti, p. 62.

[53]A. G. Kharchev, Zhurnalist 11 (November 1972), pp. 58-61.

[54]For several examples among many, see A. L. Pimenova, "Novyi byt i stanovlenie vnutrisemeinogo ravenstva," Sotsial'nye issledovanie 7 (1971), pp. 34-45; V. Ivanov, "Dal'neishee izmenenie polozheniia zhenshchiny v rabochei sem'e (na materiale BSSR)," Dinamika izmeneniia, Vol. 1, p. 42; Z. A. Iankova, "Struktura gorodskoi sem'i v sotsialisticheskom obshchestve," Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, 1 (July-September 1974), pp. 100-109. A more comprehensive review of the findings of these studies is presented in Z. M. Iuk, Trud zhenshchiny i sem'ia (Minsk, 1975), pp. 92-93.

[55]Z. A. Iankova, "O bytovykh roliakh rabotaiushchei zhenshchiny," in Problemy byta, braka i sem'i, ed. N. Solov'ev, Iu Lazuaskas, and Z. Iankova (Vilnius, 1970), p. 43; see also G. A. Slesarev and Z. A. Iankova,

"Zhenshchiny na promyshlennom predpriiatii i v sem'e, in G. V. Osipov and Ia. Shchepanskii, eds., Sotsial'nye problemy truda i proizvodstva (Moscow 1969), pp. 430-431, Iankova and Slesarev conclude that in 70 to 75 percent of worker families, women carry virtually the entire burden of domestic labor. The proportion is even higher among the Leningrad and Kostroma families studied by Kharchev and Golod: in 81.5 percent of Leningrad families and 97 percent of those in Kostroma the working wife alone carries the burden of domestic chores, with the bulk of assistance coming from mothers and mothers-in-law rather than husbands; Professional'naia rabota zhenshchin i sem'ia, pp. 70-75.

[56]L. A. Gordon and E. V. Klopov, Chelovek posle raboty: Prilozhenie (Moscow, 1972), p. 14. Male students were found to spend 5 to 6 hours per week on household chores, compared to 18 hours by women students.

[57]Ibid., p. 98.

[58]G. S. Petrosian, Vnerabochego vremia trudiashchikhsiia v SSSR (Moscow, 1965), p. 106. See also Michael Paul Sacks, Women's Work in Soviet Russia (New York, 1976) p. 124.

[59]L. V. Ostapenko, "Vliianie novoi proizvodstvennoi roli zhenshchiny na ee polozhenie v sem'e (po materialam obsledovaniia v vyshnevolotskom raione kalininskoi oblasti)," Sovetskaia etnografiia 5 (1971), pp. 95-102.

[60]B. Grushin, Svobodnoe vremia: aktual'nye problemy (Moscow, 1967), pp. 52-56. Similar findings were reported on the basis of rural data by M. Ponkratova, "Izmeneniia v semeinykh otnosheniiakh sel'skikh zhitelei SSSR," Dinamika, Vol. I, p. 92.

[61]Gary S. Becker, "A Theory of the Allocation of Time," Economic Journal, 75 (September 1965), pp. 493-517; Jacob Mincer, "Market Price, Opportunity Costs and Income Effects," in Measurement in Economics: Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics, ed. Carl F. Christ (Palo Alto, 1963); Reuben Gronau, "The Intrafamily Allocation of Time: The Value of the Housewives' Time," American Economic Review 63, 4 (September 1973), pp. 634-651; George Parkas, "Education, Wage Rates, and the Division of Labor Between Husband and Wife," Journal of Marriage and the Family, 38, 3 (August 1976), pp. 473-483.

[62]A. Pimenova, "Sluzhbi v sem'e," in Problemy byta, brak i sem'i, pp. 150-53. These findings are congruent with those of Western studies which indicate that although egalitarian values are professed more frequently in middle-class than in blue-collar families, and greater deference to males is found among the latter, actual behavior does not always correspond. The basis of deference shifts, with highly educated males defending their low participation in household work on the grounds of their professional responsibilities rather than their sex. Mirra Komarovsky, Blue-Collar Marriage (New York, 1962), pp. 220-235; William Goode, World Revolution and Family Patterns, pp. 21-22.

[63]As Zoia A. Iankova has persuasively argued, women have not simply lost their former duties, they have also acquired new ones. As the requirements of the household have changed, higher standards of household maintenance and new demands in the realm of child upbringing have created new female responsibilities; "O semeino-bytovykh roliakh rabotaiushchei zhenshchiny," Sotsial'nye issledovaniia 4 (Moscow, 1970), p. 77. At the same time, the breakup of extended families means that tasks once shared between two generations of women now fall exclusively upon the wife. These two trends, Iankova argues, have actually resulted in increased burdens for women, which have not been compensated for by the development of everyday services. "O bytovykh roliakh rabotaiushchei zhenshchiny," in Problemy byta, braka i sem'i, pp. 43-44. See also Iuri Riurikov, Literaturnaia gazeta 46 (November 1976), p. 13.

[64]Joann Vanek, "Time Spent in Housework," Scientific American 5 (November 1974), pp. 116-120.

[65]L.A. Gordon and N.M. Rimashevskaia, Piatidnevnaia rabochaia nedeliia i svobodnoe vremia trudiashchikhsiia (Moscow, 1972), pp. 24, 62-69.

With a six-day work week the time expended on household chores by males was half that for women: 16.1 hours per week compared with 30.5 for women.

[66]E. V. Porokhniuk and M. S. Shepeleva, "O sovmeshchenii proizvodstvennikh i semeinykh funktsii zhenshchin-rabotnits," Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia 4 (October-November-December 1975), 102-108. An earlier experiment in Kostroma found that a one-hour reduction of women's working time yielded half-an-hour of free time, with the other half-hour devoted to household chores; V. N. Pimenova, Svobodnoe vremia v sotsialisticheskom obshchestvo (Moscow, 1974), p. 131.

[67]Gordon and Klopov, Chelovek posle rabota, pp. 200-201.

[68]Arlie Russell Hochschild, "Inside the Clockwork of Male Careers," in Women and the Power to Change, ed. Florence Howe (New York, 1975), pp. 47-80.

[69]This analysis owes much to a suggestive paper by Joseph H. Pleck, "Work and Family Roles: From Sex-Patterned Segregation to Integration," presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, August, 1975.

[70]M. Pavlova, Literaturnaia gazeta, September 22, 1971; see also A. G. Kharchev, and S. I. Golod, "Proizvodstvennaia rabota zhenshchin i sem'ia," in Sotsial'nye problemy truda i proizvodstva, eds. G. V. Osipov and Ia. Shchepan'skii, p. 442; and Ia. Andriushkiavichene, "Zhenskii trud i problem svobodnoe vremia," Solov'ev et al., Problemy byta, p. 86.

[71]Kharchev and Golod, Professional'naia rabota zhenshchin i sem'ia, pp. 63-64.

[72]A. G. Kharchev, Zhurnalist 11 (November 1972), pp. 60-61.

[73]Natalia Baranskaia, "Nedelia kak nedelia," Novyi mir 11 (November 1969), pp. 23-55.

[74]B. Grushin, Svobodnoe vremia: aktual'nye problemy (Moscow, 1967), pp. 57-58.

[75]Indeed, this is already the case in medicine; efforts to improve its quality and rewards in recent years are associated with a decline in the proportion of female physicians.

[76]Boris Urlanis, Problemy dinamiki naseleniia SSSR (Moscow, 1974), p. 283.

[77]Cited in Helen Desfosses Cohn, "Population Policy in the USSR," Problems of Communism 22 (July-August 1973), p. 55. For a more comprehensive treatment of these recommendations, see Lapidus, Women in Soviet Society, ch. 8.

[78]For the views of several opponents of such measures, see V. A. Boldyrev, "Tendentsiia razvitiia sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki i demograficheskaia politika," Voprosy filosofii 11 (1974), pp. 84-88; N. Sonin, "Mesto prekrasnoi poloviny," Literaturnaia gazeta 16 (April 16, 1969), p. 11; and V. P. Piskunov and V. S. Steshenko, "O demograficheskoi politike sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva," in Demograficheskaia politika (Moscow, 1974), pp. 15-27.

[79]Recent discussions of part-time employment include A. Novitskii and M. Babkina, "Nepolnoe rabochee vremia i zaniatost' naseleniia," Voprosy ekonomiki 7 (July 1973), pp. 133-140; N. Shishkan, "Nepolnyi rabochii den' dliia zhenshchin v usloviiakh sotsializma," Ekonomicheskie nauki 8 (1971), pp. 42-47; Kotliar and Turchaninova, Zaniatost' zhenshchin, pp. 98-104; E. R. Martirosian, "Pravovoe regulirovanie nepolnogo rabochego vremeni," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo 10 (October 1976), pp. 54-61; B. Sukharevskii, "Nepolnyi rabochii den'; ego granitsy i effektivnost," Literaturnaia gazeta 11 (March 15, 1972), p. 10; V. Kuseinov and V. Korchagin, "Voprosy trudovykh resursov," Voprosy ekonomiki 2 (February 1972), pp. 45-51. A series of proposals for the establishment enterprises of a "special allocation of work stations with shorter workdays and wages paid for the time actually worked" for women with two or more children was submitted to the Council of Ministers in the summer of 1976; see V. Kurasov, Izvestiia July 23, 1976, p. 2.

[80]G. A. Slesarev, Metodologiia sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia problem narodonaseleniia SSSR (Moscow, 1965), p. 136. Citing Marx himself as authority, the authors of the fine study Chelovek i ego rabota argue that "equalization in the social conditions for the development of the personality of male and female workers . . . [requires] the creation of 'privileges' for women"; p. 267. See also pp. 309-312.

[81]N. G. Iurkevich, Sovetskaia sem'ia (Minsk, 1970), p. 192.

[2]Iankova, "Razvitie lichnosti," p. 44.