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"The shaping of new towns . . . in the USSR," it has been observed by Soviet scholars, "is an extremely heterogeneous process. It takes various forms, depending on the place of the given area in the national economy and the totality of local circumstances."[1] One is well advised to bear this diversity in mind when considering the affairs of the Soviet Union's more than one thousand new urban settlements, which among them contain (depending on the definition) from one tenth to better than one quarter of the entire urban population. Falling under the rubric of new towns (novye goroda) are communities which range in size from dusty crossroads of fewer than ten thousand souls to spread-out agglomerations of more than half a million. They can be found in every section of the country, on previously barren sites and on ones which have been occupied for centuries, within the zones of influence of metropolitan centers and far out in the wilderness. Some—like the booming towns of the Tiumen oil and gas fields in western Siberia—are as new as their name implies. Others—the Magnitogorsks, Novokuznetsks, and Karagandas—are progeny of Stalin's early five-year plans now well into an uncertain middle age.

With all due respect for this diversity, it is possible and useful to point to certain common features of Soviet new towns. All of them have either been created or have undergone virtually their entire spurt of growth under Soviet rule. Most of them possess an economic base which is primarily industrial (73 percent of the total in 1972, as compared to 18 percent based on administration and servicing of agricultural districts, 6 percent on

transport, 2 percent on recreation, and 1 percent on science).[2] More than that, most new towns, in their formative years at least, depend on the momentum generated by one or several large manufacturing or extractive enterprises, often subordinated to a single industrial ministry. "The rhythm of life in them is almost entirely defined by their industrial giants, each of which has its own, as they say, great boss (velikii khoziain)."[3] For this and other reasons, it can be said—without denying the achievements of what one onlooker has termed one of the most massive planned resettlement programs in human history[4]—that most Soviet new towns have been susceptible to a common collection of developmental ills.

"It is easier to put an artificial satellite into orbit around the earth than to work out a general design for building our city," one Soviet official stated in 1957, several weeks after the launching of the first Sputnik.[5] His despondent comment was in reference to the Siberian city of Bratsk, the most ambitious new-town project of the day. Like most of its counterparts, Bratsk had been founded as an appendage of a major industrial installation, in this instance the huge Bratsk Hydroelectric Station on the Angara River. By 1957, with the city's population already swelling over 50,000, no fewer than eight draft plans for the city had been considered and rejected for one reason or another. In the absence of effective local authority, housing was being erected at will by a multitude of construction agencies, none of them interested in installing utilities or putting up service buildings. A big interurban highway had, by indirection, become the town's main thoroughfare. Bratsk did acquire a general plan in 1958, but this had to be drastically revised on two occasions in the following decade. Although

some visitors to Bratsk noted improvement, in 1973 an article in Izvestiia could remark on the contrast between "a first-class hydro station" and, cheek by jowl with it, a city (now of more than 200,000 people) which "in its current state is a child of decades gone by."[6]

Without a doubt, decades gone by had afforded numerous precedents for the Bratsk experience. The most celebrated of the heavy-industry towns of the first years of industrialization, Magnitogorsk in the southern Urals, displays the pattern as well as any. "The development of Magnitogorsk presents one of the clearest illustrations of the disjunction between city-building plans and the real conditions and tempos of industrial development."[7] Initial blueprints for a town of about 50,000 were drafted hastily in 1929, hard on the heels of the decision to create the Magnitogorsk Metallurgy Combine. By 1931, a year after the projected capacity of the combine was boosted sixfold, in excess of 100,000 construction and production workers were living in tents and ramshackle barracks on the town site. Work began on two apartment districts on the east bank of the Ural River, but it was apparent from the moment the blast furnaces came into production that the blocks of permanent housing, down wind from the combine and bounded by steep hills, would be enveloped in a dense pall of factory smoke. After four years of contentious discussion, Magnitogorsk's planners resolved in 1933 that the city's growth should be redirected to the west, across the river and the water reservoir formed for the combine. Yet ratification of this decision by central planners was delayed until 1940 and large-scale execution had to wait until after the war. By 1950, as Magnitogorsk struggled to undo earlier oversights, its chief architect wrote graphically in Pravda of housing construction which failed to meet targets, of severe air and water pollution, of "an intolerable lag in

the construction of schools and hospitals," of a dire shortage of retail outlets and consumer facilities, of poor design work perpetrated by Moscow and Leningrad organizations, and of the indifference of the metallurgy combine, the principal proprietor of housing and local services, to the needs of the community. Magnitogorsk's problem, he argued, had deep psychological and institutional roots: "the underestimation of the need to plan for the integrated development of the urban economy, the lack of proper and full-fledged supervision, the absence of a city organ which would regulate in the general interests of the city the volume and type of work done by [other] agencies."[9]

The travails of modern-day new towns are strikingly reminiscent of those of the new cities of earlier generations. Accounts by Soviet journalists, scholars, and officials seem often to differ only in detail from the record of previous decades. They point to a recurring new-town syndrome with four basic features.

The first has to do with housing. Although comprehensive statistics are not available, it seems safe to say that the quantity of housing in young cities generally falls short of national norms and averages. In western Siberia, the region of most intensive new-town development, per capita housing supply in 1978 was 88 percent of the average for European Russia; in eastern Siberia it was 81 percent. In Tiumen oblast in 1976, per capita housing space amounted to 9.8 square meters, 82 percent of the national average. In the oil and gas-producing districts of the oblast, it was a mere 6 square meters, 50 percent of the Soviet mean.[9] While much of this shortfall assuredly is planned for and expected by national authorities, construction organizations are repeatedly berated both for failing to realize housing construction targets and for fulfilling quotas only in a wasteful rush at the end of the

planning period. Criticism of low housing quality—poor materials, outmoded designs, and shoddy workmanship—is also commonplace. As recently as 1975, 49 percent of all state-owned housing in towns and cities in Siberia and the Far East (which, to be sure, are not coterminous with the country's new towns) was without running water, 52 percent lacked sewage facilities, and 49 percent lacked central heating. In the urban USSR west of the Urals, such conveniences were missing 30, 34, and 30 percent of the time, respectively.[10]

A second major area of difficulty is the supply of social, cultural, and consumer services (often grouped together in Soviet discussion as the sotskultbyt sector). Selective statistics leave no doubt that in many new towns these personal services are available in substantially lower quantity and quality than in other urban centers. Again, much of this shortfall is planned, with the stated intention of eventual catch-up with national standards. For new-town residents, however, the wait may seem interminable. For instance, polyclinics were provided in the oil and gas settlements of Tiumen in 1976 at only 32 percent of the national norm, schools and hospitals at half, and day nurseries and kindergartens at one third.[11] The inhabitants of Surgut, Nizhnevartovsk, and Nefteiugansk, three of the largest new communities in the oblast, have available to them retail outlets at 39 percent of the normative level and dining facilities at only 50 percent. "In the evenings there are often lineups in the stores. It is not always possible to get a decent meal in the dining halls. There are frequent shortages of various kinds of goods."[12] Unhappiness over service provision may actually grow even as absolute levels of service improve. This was the case in Almetevsk, an oil center on the Kama River established in 1950, where between 1967 and 1974 "the widening of the [service] networks did not keep up with the growth of

demands." While more residents than before were pleased with schools and services for children, dissatisfaction had mounted over daily, personal services (40 percent of residents), culture and recreation (35 percent), and eating facilities (60 percent).[13]

Soviet survey research has established that these first two problem areas are the outstanding causes of disaffection among new-town residents and of the labor turnover (tekuchest kadrov) which so dismays economic planners. One survey of twelve new communities in Tiumen oblast showed that 46 percent of out-migrants cited dissatisfaction with housing as one of their three main motives for departing. Thirty-eight percent cited availability of food and consumer goods and 35 percent referred to cultural and everyday services, whereas only 18 percent mentioned wages and salaries and 17 percent climactic conditions.[14]

A third key problem concerns the spatial integration of the new cities and the installation and operation of the utilities and other municipal services (kommunalnoe khoziaistvo) which are essential to residential living. At the outset, sites for new communities are usually chosen to suit the specifications of the economic agency which will be producing there, not the organizers or occupants of the future urban community: "Very often the location of the new industrial city is chosen without the participation of the city planners who are going to design it."[15] At successive stages of development, it is normal practice for water, sewage, transportation, and other conveniences to be undersupplied, and for them to be furnished in a haphazard and uncoordinated way when they are provided. "We need to build cities, but instead we build settlements, each with its own water supply and heating system."[16] "[The new town] is, in effect, divided into miniature

cities (mikrogoroda), in each of which agencies tend to urban services in their own fashion and with no thought to the general good. So it is not surprising that often new apartment houses turn out to be without water and whole neighborhoods without transport links with the center of the city."[17]

A fourth and final realm of grievance is the esthetic one. The difficulty of measuring this aspect of the urban condition does not prevent Soviet critics from expounding on it in quite categorical terms: "You walk around the districts of our young cities, especially in the east of the country, and you see local Cheremushki [Novye Cheremushki is a residential section of southwest Moscow notorious for the drabness of its construction], deserving this nickname . . . for their dreary similarity to one another. You are led to surmise that they were all drawn by one and the same hand, all put into place by one and the same shoulder."[18]

The best way to begin to understand these problems is to see them as a subset of the long-standing set of difficulties under which all Soviet cities labor. Foremost among these general handicaps is the chronic weakness of the institutions of local government. As has been well documented in the work of William Taubman, Carol Lewis and Stephen Sternheimer, Robert Osborn, Jerry Hough, and others, city soviets and their executive and administrative organs have consistently lacked the legal prerogatives, financial resources, and prestige which would enable them to exert decisive control over the course of urban development.[19] Over the years, the lion's share of the resources devoted to the building of housing and the urban infrastructure has been channeled, not through Soviet cities' formal governments, but through the centrally controlled ministries and agencies within whose jurisdictions lie

the various productive enterprises located in the cities. Apart from skimping whenever practicable on city-building allocations, these external organizations have stressed expenditures with direct payoffs to enterprise directors; housing and day-care facilities, both of which have immediate relevance to the attraction and retention of a capable work force, have stood at the head of the list. Other construction has been undertaken begrudgingly and belatedly, and all building and service programs have been administered with minimal regard for the efforts of city functionaries to integrate them through planning and adjustment mechanisms. While city officials have slowly accumulated greater leverage over economic executives, the process has been drawn-out, uneven, and accompanied by frequent and often plaintive demands by city governments for additional authority and more sympathetic budgetary consideration.

In all these respects, new towns are consistent with the archetype. They, too, have weak governments and attenuated planning powers, and all too often find themselves at the mercy of the industrial ministries. They, too, have no strong protector or patron at the national level. Most new towns in their first decade or two of existence would find a recent account of life in Novopolotsk, a Belorussian city of about 65,000 established in 1963, a fair depiction of their circumstances. Novopolotsk has been built almost exclusively by industrial enterprises which are part of national ministerial hierarchies. Its problems "are caused above all by the unwillingness of the several ministries to undertake 'nonproductive' outlays." The Ministry of the Chemical Industry had as of 1978 spent only 37 percent of the amount planned for housing and services construction. Over a decade and a half it and the Ministry of the Oil Refining and Petrochemical Industry,

the other big employer in town, had between them failed to spend 40 million rubles assigned to them for this purpose. Several other agencies had invested nothing at all. In the area of water, sewage, and other physical services, the picture was the same. "Services here are scattered among the agencies and not directly subordinated to the gorispolkom [executive committee of the city soviet]. All these and many other problems could be resolved in timely fashion if the client ministries showed the necessary understanding of the needs of the work collectives of their enterprises and of the city as a whole. The ministries must not regard these as peripheral problems, ones which are of little relevance to their departments and about which the city organs 'annoy' them."[20] For Novopolotsk and other new towns, the remedies proposed by reformers have been broadly similar to those suggested for other Soviet cities. The city soviet, it is said, should become the exclusive client (ediny zakazchik) for all urban-related construction and should have the right to insist that enterprises on its territory respect its social and economic priorities. Eventually, all housing and local services should be transferred to its direct control.

Why, then, do new towns often seem to have more severe problems than other Soviet cities? Why is their housing stock smaller, their social and physical services poorer, and their visual appearance bleaker? The answer is to be found in the several factors peculiar to new cities which add to and aggravate the disabilities which they share with other urban communities. Since these have been barely touched on in the limited Western literature on Soviet new towns, it is helpful to spell them out here.

One particular vulnerability lies in the very newness which is the defining feature of new towns. It is not possible in a new settlement to

cushion or conceal the unfavourable effects of present decisions by falling back on past investments. One of the reasons ~~is~~ that new towns are more displeasing on the esthetic plane is that the resident or visitor is confronted with recent and monotonous construction unrelieved by the preindustrial (and prerevolutionary) buildings and public places which grace many older Soviet cities. Likewise with social and physical services. The failure of an industrial plant to do its share of civil construction might create barely a ripple in a large and relatively developed city. In a new town, any such shortfall cannot help but be noticed and have repercussions for the plant's work force and, very possibly, for the entire city. Even the much-vexed task of forecasting the dimensions of future growth is fraught with greater hazards in a new center. "Practice shows," to quote the deputy head of Gosplan's department for housing and urban development, D. G. Khodzhaev, "that mistakes in calculating the eventual population of a new town give rise to very serious economic and city-building costs."[21] These costs are heavier in the case of a new city because the base for projection is smaller—meaning that the proportion of the ensuing error is larger. To take an extreme case, Angarsk, an oil-refining city in central Siberia designed in the 1950s for a population of 30,000, mushroomed by 1970 to a population of 204,000. A prediction error of 170,000 persons (these can as a rule be traced to changes in location and refitting plans on the part of industrial ministries) would mean a difference of 5 or 10 percent to a city like Leningrad or Tashkent. To Angarsk, it brought a root-and-branch reorganization, including relocation of the city center and the building of housing estates in new and inconvenient locations. "Unfortunately, as of now it has not been possible for the city to free itself of the deficiencies" following from the original miscalculation.[22]

To the degree that new towns are more apt to be the locale for innovative designs (especially for public buildings), often requiring elaborate documentation and out-of-the-way materials, they are at a disadvantage in the struggle for resources among construction organizations. Construction agencies must begin as early as May of any given year to defend appropriation requests for the following year. If, as frequently is the case with new-town projects, detailed documentation has not received all the necessary clearances, the builders must make do with estimates based on minimum national standards. Often they realize too late that their requirements will diverge from the norm. "The procedure [has] backfired. The new town has been defeated by the pre-existing organization of affairs."[23]

A further and crucial liability of new towns lies in the special weakness of their governments. Even big and long-established cities have great difficulty coping with non-city agencies. The situation of most new towns, with their poorly staffed and inexperienced governments, is far worse. It is mirrored in the brutally frank pronouncement by Gosplan's Khodzhaev on the prospects for new towns gaining the position of exclusive client for housing and related construction: "If such a change . . . can be considered as requiring scrutiny in relation to mature cities, then as far as new towns are concerned this problem is practically non-existent. It is obvious to everyone that the client in the construction of the city must be the ministry and the enterprise subordinate to it on the basis of which the city is being created. After all, during the first stage of construction the city to all intents and purposes has no local soviet."[24] Such an arrangement is not, strictly speaking, obvious to everyone, but surely it has been self-evident to those in a position to veto the repeated suggestions for reform.

The feebleness of new towns' governments is manifest in several specific senses. Few, for instance, possess the capital construction departments which have been set up in older cities to monitor the construction activities of industrial enterprises. Nor do many of the governments of cities less than twenty or twenty-five years old seem to manage more than a small fraction of the housing stock or control more than an equally slight proportion of investment in urban infrastructure.[25] And few appear to have adequate staff for the important functions of architectural and spatial planning. The direness of the need may be judged from the fact that in 1966 Bratsk, then at the peak of its construction phase, had as its chief architect a man with no architectural training; his only post-secondary schooling had been two years at a technical institution for textile engineers.[26] Seven years later, similarly unqualified persons were said to hold this office in many Siberian cities. (The Bratsk architect had been dismissed, only to be hired as chief architect in Ust-Ilimsk, a fast-growing city in the same oblast.) According to Izvestiia's correspondent, "Real architects with intellect and talent will not go to such a low-paying post, and one which possesses such limited prospects and rights."[27] Planning for new towns is almost invariably done by institutes in the network of Gosgrazhdanstroi (the State Committee for Civil Construction and Architecture), most of them headquartered in Moscow or Leningrad. Their limited acquaintance with the local scene is an object of frequent comment in the press.

This incapacity of new towns' formal governments is partially offset by the informal coordinating powers of the city and regional organs of the Communist Party. "In the final analysis," the first secretary of the Bratsk city party committee, A. Elokhin, wrote in 1979, "all the sore questions

come to us." These sore points included, he said, construction questions, where the party organ was compelled to act "to ensure normal conditions of work and leisure for the people." Yet it was clear from Elokhin's illustrations—and many others could be cited on this point—that the Bratsk party executives could not count on automatic compliance with their preferences on city-building questions. Although it must be presumed that on almost any given question the party officials could have had their way had they committed their resources to an all-out battle, over a whole spectrum of issues they had been outmaneuvered and outlasted by the ministries.[28] Elokhin's long-time predecessor, Viktor A. Tarasov, has described in vivid terms the kind of bargaining style to which city party officials seem usually to confine themselves:

> The city's vital interests demand that its heat supply be increased. It is necessary to begin constructing the Galachinsk boiler station, which would solve the problem [and which was first discussed in the mid-1960s]. It must be built, but under our circumstances it is natural that it be done on a cooperative basis. (When he hears these words, the knowledgeable resident of Bratsk begins to tremble!) So, no sooner has the discussion of cooperation begun than each ministry, sparing neither energy nor time, proves that its share must be less than the share of its neighbor, that no matter how many resources are required for an even apportionment it cannot spare them. And such discord ensues that a resolution of the problem seems simply unthinkable. This is how a full year is wasted on defining the respective shares.
>
> An analogous situation came up with the organization of a <u>vuz</u> [a higher educational institution]. We have here a branch of a polytechnical

> institute, which long ago outgrew the limits of a branch. We have long and insistently raised the question of its conversion into an independent institute. For this it is necessary to build an academic building. But who has the money for this? The Ministry of Higher Education says, "You are citizens of Bratsk, build it on a shared basis." So again we travel to Moscow, and again we go from ministry to ministry, and again we write out dozens of protocols of dozens of meetings where representatives of the departments argue furiously about whose share should be less and who needs the vuz more.
>
> It is difficult to work this way, and as the years go by it gets more difficult.[29]

A final contribution to the misfortune of new towns is made by the failure of Soviet planning techniques to make allowance for the special social and economic characteristics of new cities. For one thing, ministries and other central agencies set aside funds for housing and related construction "without mutual coordination and without taking sufficient account of the demands of the economies of particular regions." In regions where isolation, climate, and wage rates make construction costs higher—and new towns are more and more commonly being located in such areas—"the ministries and departments are not interested in fully utilizing the resources earmarked by them for housing and social-cultural construction."[30] Instead, ministry officials either shunt resources into civil construction elsewhere in the country (where an equivalent number of rubles will build more apartments and day-care centers) or invest them directly in production facilities. Another device making for inflexibility is the system of national construction norms in effect since the mid-1950s. Designed, ironically enough, to ensure uniform and thereby equitable treatment for the residents of all cities in

the Soviet Union, these regulations prescribe standards for the supply of housing and service facilities as a function of one readily available indicator—the population of the given city. Most new towns have, among other peculiarities, a skewed age structure, in particular an overrepresentation of young, single people and young families with children. Yet these and other special needs are ignored in the construction norms (as, for that matter, are the needs of other kinds of cities with different problems). "The very same norms for the construction of children's facilities are in effect for Bratsk and Voronezh [an established city in European Russia]. Yet in Voronezh the birth rate is one third of what it is in Bratsk, and pensioners are much more numerous. The number of places in schools, children's training centers, clubs, and hospitals in Bratsk is either close to the calculated norms or exeeds them. However, students go to schools in three shifts, there are not enough places in the kindergartens, and the hospitals are overloaded."[31]

None of this should be taken as suggesting that the lot of each and every new town is cast in an iron mold from the very beginning. The question of new-town development is most definitely a political question. The problem as a whole, and the fate of particular cities, is discussed publicly in press and journal articles and in legislative forums. It is far from irrelevant to note that the public debate has for many years been well-nigh monopolized by opponents of the status quo who argue for policies more congenial to the governments and denizens of new towns. New-town officials air their fair share of grievances (they could in fact do so even in Stalin's lifetime, though with less latitude than now), and changes are made in

response to such complaints. They can count on the backing of a broad circle of sympathizers on newspaper editorial boards and in the social science institutes of the Academy of Sciences.

For the most part, however, the politics of new towns is fought out behind the closed doors of the multisegmented Soviet bureaucracy. Here the industrial ministries, the chief targets of urban appeals, have been bequeathed formidable advantages by past practice. Yet neither these assets nor the attitudes of ministerial officials are immutable or unshakable. Some economic agencies seem to insist on maintaining their stranglehold on urban housing and services no matter what the circumstances. In other cases, ministries have proved willing to see their hegemony lessen and to lend a more responsive ear to the solicitations of city officials. At any stage of the new town's growth, its leaders may prevail on industrial bosses to transfer assets to them or to pool resources with other firms and with the city in order to provide services of common benefit. One can easily find references to this occurring even in quite youthful communities. What is important to realize is that the chances of change improve markedly as the city ages, if for no other reason than that time brings to almost all Soviet new towns far greater economic diversity than is found in the town's incipient stage. New enterprises and new ministries give the city soviet more room to maneuver and bargain than in earlier times. Equally important is the likely evolution of viewpoint within the previously dominant ministry. Once its industrial plant has been fully constructed and put into operation, "The leading ministry . . . often is not interested in continuing its [city-building] mission or in being responsible for operating urban services, and therefore strives to transfer the resolution of all such questions to the local soviets."

At this juncture, new understandings must be reached among the interested parties about who is to finance and manage vital services. "There are many examples of this process being completed in an intelligent and orderly way, without violating the natural path of development of the city. There are also, unfortunately, other cases where it has proceeded painfully and with very harmful consequences."[32]

At this turning point, and at other times as well, political acumen and persistence on the part of the local authorities can make a significant difference. In Magnitogorsk, for instance, the city soviet had succeeded by 1970 in gaining control of 35 percent of the housing stock (it had operated about 1 percent in 1960, and was far from satisfied with the 35 percent). "Five years of correspondence and negotiations" with the metallurgy combine and the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy had brought about a favorable decision on the provision of natural gas to the city's utility grid, and the factories had in 1968 liquidated their separately managed consumer outlets.[33] Ground has now been broken for a new cultural and administrative center for the city on the west bank, where the bulk of the housing stock is now situated. As of 1979, per capita housing space in Magnitogorsk exceeded the national average. In the "heated arguments" which frequently surround these questions, the city's chief architect "has almost always come out the winner, because she knows how to demonstrate the professional correctness of her positions."[34] (Architectural correctness counted for little in Magnitogorsk's early years; the city had no architectural planning officials at all until 1947.) In Komsomolsk-na-Amure, a chaotically built heavy-industry town in the Far East founded in 1932, the city soviet in the late 1960s won jurisdiction over 70 percent of the housing fund and established a central heating system and new

offices for road repair, apartment maintenance, and parks. The city's 1969 plan foresaw the closing in of its large vacant spaces and the construction of a number of badly needed amenities. In Krivoi Rog in the Ukraine, where the factory-centered construction of earlier times had dispersed the city along 100 kilometers of river bank, the city soviet's capital construction administration in 1976 served as client for 90 percent of new construction. In Karaganda, the Kazakhstan coal-mining center whose development was perhaps as disorganized as any new town's, the city government is now the exclusive client for all civil construction, something which would have been inconceivable a generation ago.[35]

If the maturation of the new town has major implications for the ministries and the local government, it seems also to have a serious impact on the perceptions and priorities of the local and regional officials of the ruling party. There is reason to believe that party executives in older new towns tend to feel obliged to intervene decisively against ministerial actions which they would have condoned at an earlier phase of development. In a rapidly burgeoning area, the party official may be under as much pressure as the plant director or the deputy minister to downplay social needs in favor of economic ones. In a city or region whose economic expansion has tapered off, on the other hand, the party functionary is apt to interpret his mandate in different terms, especially if the consequences of past neglect are visible in the form of physical deterioration or difficulties in retaining skilled employees.

The evidence on this shift in perspective is fragmentary. It comes to us in anecdotes and in the form of statements such as the following comment (dating from 1976) by Vasilii I. Sitnikov, a secretary of the party committee

of Kemerovo oblast in south-central Siberia. The oblast encompasses the Kuznets Basin, which is the home of Kemerovo (established 1925), of Novokuznetsk (1931), and of a score of factory towns built in the 1930s and 1940s:

> Without conceding anything on the tempo of development to the pioneering regions, we probably differ from them most in the character of our expectations. It is difficult to tempt us with the scale of new construction, since we already have so many productive units in operation and under construction that we can allow ourselves a certain fastidiousness (razborchivost) in deciding the fate of this or that [investment] proposal. Now it is important for us to grow not quantitatively but qualitatively, to pull up housing, municipal, and service construction, to do everything possible so that people in the Kuzbass live well.
>
> Unfortunately, we are not yet free of the disorder of 'departmental onslaught.' . . . The Ministry of Light Industry built a knitted-goods factory in Belovo [established 1938] and it was in a febrile condition from the very first days. Why? This was a new branch for us, for which we had to invite specialists, but we had no apartments or dormitories or kindergartens, nothing except a factory. So we ended up with light industry but heavy cares. The same kinds of difficulty have been experienced with the Kiselevsk Footwear Factory and the Kemerovo Silk Fabric Combine.
>
> The industrial department of the obkom [oblast party committee] has been especially assigned by the bureau to work out the problems of proportional development of production and of the social and services infrastructure. We are compelling (vynuzhdaem) the ministries to

appropriate more resources for social needs. We are taking a very wary attitude toward the proposals of the agencies. For example, the minister of the electrotechnical industry came to us and said, "Let us build a second electrical equipment plant in Prokopevsk [established 1931]." But we told him, "There are no workers there, and the builders are having a hard time reconstructing the mines. Right here next to it we have the town of Myski [established 1956], which has an electrical station, water, a construction industry. The town needs development, so will you go there?" We argued for a long time, but apparently we convinced the minister. He told his designers to work out several variants and find the most favorable one.

In other words, if earlier we gladly took everything that was offered to us, now we have a shrewd look at energy and labor resources and at social effectiveness. To meet every suggestion, we come up with demands of our own—so much for housing, so much for sewers, water mains, sotskultbyt, and so on. Many do not find our conditions convenient, but once construction is under way they do not create additional difficulties for us.[36]

No one conversant with the Soviet Union's bureaucracy or the history of its cities will mistake this for a harbinger of a sudden turnabout. But it is not rash to conjecture that the kind of attitude sampled here will become more prevalent in the 1980s and beyond. For one thing, the scale of new-town development is diminishing. From now until 1990 there will be twelve to fifteen new towns a year, barely half the annual rate of the 1960s.[37] A steadily growing proportion of new towns thus will cease to be new at all, and will come increasingly to resemble the faded centers of Kemerovo oblast. The other trend making for some optimism is a more subjective one. By now,

the evidence on the economic toll exacted by unsatisfactory urban environments has accumulated to the point of being overwhelming. Inadequate housing and local services lead to labor turnover and labor shortages, as study after study has confirmed. As the country's overall manpower shortage becomes acute in the years to come, more and more party officials in new-town areas—and, most likely, economic administrators as well—will have reason to agree with Sitnikov on the "additional difficulties" that follow from unbalanced development.

NOTES

1. O. Konstantinov, "Rol novykh gorodov v razvitii sistem rasseleniia SSSR," in V. V. Pokshishevskii and G. M. Lappo, eds., Problemy urbanizatsii i rasseleniia (Moscow, Mysl, 1976), p. 152.

2. I. M. Smoliar, Novye goroda: Planirovochnaia struktura (Moscow, Stroiizdat, 1972), p. 8. The best sources for general information on Soviet new-town development are this book and Smoliar et al., Generalnye plany novykh gorodov (Moscow, Stroiizdat, 1973).

3. Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia, 1972, no. 1, p. 48.

4. Jack Underhill, "Soviet Policy for New Towns and Its Implementation, Achievements, and Problems," in Gideon Golany, ed., International Urban Growth Policies: New-Town Contributions (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1978), p. 397.

5. Izvestiia, August 25, 1957, p. 4.

6. Ibid., June 2, 1973, p. 2.

7. V. N. Lakhtin, Sistema rasseleniia i arkhitekturno-planirovochnaia struktura gorodov Urala (Moscow, Stroiizdat, 1977), p. 54. The discussion of Magnitogorsk follows Lakhtin, and V. I. Kazarinova and V. I. Pavlichenko, Magnitogorsk (Moscow, Gosstroiizdat, 1961), chap. 1.

8. Pravda, August 29, 1950, p. 2.

9. Statistics in Voprosy ekonomiki, 1978, no. 9, p. 50; Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva, 1979, no. 3, p. 21; Pravda, June 19, 1976, p. 2.

10. Planovoe khoziaistvo, 1975, no. 1, p. 60.

11. Pravda, June 19, 1976, p. 2.

12. Ibid., February 27, 1979, p. 2.

13. Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, 1976, no. 2, p. 14.

14. Ibid., p. 63.

15. B. V. Muravev et al., Novye industrialnye goroda (Leningrad, Stroiizdat, 1975), p. 9.

16. Pravda, January 7, 1977, p. 2.

17. Ibid., April 13, 1973, p. 2.

18. Izvestiia, August 5, 1966, p. 6.

19. See William Taubman, Governing Soviet Cities (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1973); Carol W. Lewis and Stephen Sternheimer, Soviet Urban Management (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1979); Robert J. Osborn, Soviet Social Policies (Homewood, Ill., Dorsey Press, 1970); Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1979), chap. 13. Some of the implications for new towns are drawn out in Taubman, chap. 7, and in Jack Underhill, Soviet New Towns, Housing and Urban Growth Policy (Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1976).

20. Planovoe khoziaistvo, 1978, no. 1, pp. 114-115.

21. Ibid., 1979, no. 2, p. 70.

22. Muravev et al., p. 13.

23. Pravda, May 18, 1973, p. 2.

24. Planovoe khoziaistvo, 1979, no. 2, p. 75.

25. In Bratsk in 1977, ministerial expenditures on urban construction and services were five times greater than the budget of the city executive committee. Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva, 1977, no. 4, p. 126.

26. Izvestiia, August 5, 1966, p. 6.

27. Ibid., June 2, 1973, p. 2.

28. Ibid., March 6, 1979, p. 3.

29. Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva, 1979, no. 5, pp. 51-52.

30. Planovoe khoziaistvo, 1978, no. 4, p. 57.

31. Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva, 1977, no. 4, p. 125. On this point, see E. I. Korenevskaia, Mestnye sovety i sotsialnoe planirovanie (Moscow, Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1977), p. 71.

32. Planovoe khoziastvo, 1979, no. 2, p. 74.

33. Izvestiia, February 1, 1970, p. 3. The article cited here is, nonetheless, very critical of the metallurgy combine's refusal to go further in meeting city needs.

34. Arkhitektura SSSR, 1979, no. 7, p. 33.

35. These cases are described in Izvestiia, February 14, 1970, p. 2; Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia, 1976, no. 3, pp. 25-29; no. 9, pp. 27-33.

36. Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva, 1976, no. 6, pp. 18-19.

37. Planovoe khoziaistvo, 1979, no. 2, pp. 68-69.