

NUMBER 96

NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS
IN AZERBAIJAN, 1905-1920

Tadeusz Swietochowski

Conference on

"NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN TRANSCAUCASIA"

Co-sponsored by

Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies,
The Wilson Center

and

American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies

April 24-25, 1980

Tadeusz Swietochowski

NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS
IN AZERBAIJAN, 1905-1920

The 1828 Russo-Persian treaty of Turkmanchai completed the quarter-century-long process by which the semi-independent khanates in northern Azerbaijan were annexed by Russia. Azerbaijan now became permanently divided into its Russian-held part and the southern section, remaining with Persia. Almost half of the Azerbaijani-speaking Moslems passed under Russian rule, a proportion which included the majority of Shi'ites and a large minority, approximately 35%, of Sunnis, concentrated in the northern and western areas of Russian Azerbaijan.¹ The two sectarian groups represented divergent political and cultural orientations. The Shi'ites continued in their attachment to Persia while the Sunnis gravitated toward Daghestan and to a lesser degree, toward Turkey. The depth of the sectarian split was reflected in the nineteenth-century wars waged by Russia, when the Tsardom was able to use Shi'ite volunteers against Turkey in 1828 and 1853-1855 as well as against Shamil's ghazavat (holy war) in Daghestan.² By contrast, the Sunnis tended to support Shamil, sometimes taking up arms, and showed restiveness at the time of Russo-Ottoman conflicts.³

For all its proclivities to the "divide et impera" principle, Russian rule in the long run became the main integrating factor as well as the agent for change in the traditional society of Azerbaijan. One of the first consequences of the conquest was the gradual dismantling of the khanate's structure. Two polities within which the Azerbaijanis had lived in the past disappeared one after another

during the 1830's and 1840's effectively weakening deeply rooted local particularisms. In place of the large number of diverse, petty principalities, uniform Russian territorial administration was introduced. By the late 1850's this reform had resulted in consolidating the bulk of Azerbaijan into two gubernias (provinces), Baku and Elizavetpol (Ganja).⁴

Slower in coming, but of even greater impact was the economic change. By 1870 the country was fully incorporated into the Russian market, chiefly as the supplier of raw materials. Of these by far the most important was oil, produced in the vicinity of Baku, a city which grew into a big urban centre with multinational population. With the coming of the oil boom Azerbaijan experienced rapid if one-sided economic growth concentrated in the Baku area while the countryside was only slowly evolving from its traditional pattern of economy.⁵

Of crucial significance for the native effort in the building of an Azerbaijani community across lines of regional and sectarian identities was the rise of the intelligentsia, a group which emerged from the contact between Islamic and European civilizations. One of its first and the most renowned of its representatives, Mirza Fathali Akhundzada, encapsulated in his writings the leading ideas of what was to become the credo of the modernizing elite: the spread of education, the formation of a literary language comprehensible for the mass reader, and secularism as a means of overcoming sectarian divisions. The aspirations of the nineteenth-

century intelligentsia were primarily those of an enlightenment movement. One of its most tangible achievements was the Turkic literary revival replacing Persian as the most widely used written language. Linked to this process was the creation of modern communications media - the press and the theatre, and of the network of modernized or "jadidist" primary schools. Generally, the intellectuals of the Sunni minority tended to be more committed to the programs of change, and also more articulate politically than their Shi'ite counterparts. The Baku Akinchi (Ploughman), the first Turkic language Turkic newspaper in Russia, was not free of anti-Persian accents and in the eyes of the Tsarist officials was pro-Ottoman enough to have it closed down in 1877, in the midst of the war with Turkey.⁶ During the 1880's the Sunni published Kashkul (Darvish bowl) was the first to propose the use of the name "Azerbaijani Turk" instead of Transcaucasian Moslems.⁷

The trend away from Persian cultural traditions was bitterly opposed by conservative elements and criticised even by some Western educated intellectuals. A prominent Azerbaijani writer and a future Turkish nationalist Ahmad bay Aghaoghli in the 1890's still referred to his countrymen as the "société persane" and castigated the Akinchi group as the "lost people."⁸ Yet he shared in the intelligentsia's commitment to secularism, which gradually succeeded in weakening the sectarian rift to the extent that in the twentieth century it ceased to be a politically divisive factor.

In the decade preceding the 1905 Russian revolution there

appeared rudiments of ideologies that were to mold Azerbaijani political life. Panislamism, rooted in the consciousness of the umma - the universal community of all Moslems - called for the unity of Islamic peoples threatened by the encroachments of Europe.⁹ In no sense exclusive of Panislamism, but more ethnocentric, were Turkism and Panturkism: one emphasized the ethnic identity of Turkic peoples, the other promoted their cultural and linguistic unity.¹⁰

Of a more European frame of reference was the nascent Azerbaijani liberalism. It was represented by the Russian language Baku newspaper Kaspiy whose editor was Ali Mardan bay Topchibashi, and the owner Zaynal Tagiyav, a rich oil man acting as the spokesman for the rising native bourgeoisie. The Kaspiy considered itself as a part of the Russian liberal movement aiming at the establishment of a constitutional regime.¹¹

After 1900 some Azerbaijanis found their way to the Baku chapter of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (RSDWP) and in 1904 the young, radically-minded members of the intelligentsia set up the Moslem Socialist organization, Himmat (Endeavor).¹²

None of these incipient ideologies was capable of arousing the Moslems to mass action when the year 1905 created possibilities for political self-expression. Of all ethnic groups in Transcaucasia, the Azerbaijanis remained the least revolutionized and they were shaken from their docility only by intercommunal violence. From the Azerbaijani standpoint the 1905 revolution became largely

the story of the "Tatar-Armenian war".

The antagonism between the two communities had been simmering for a long time and it kept growing with the changes in the Azerbaijani economy. The religious and cultural differences were aggravated by such factors as the grievances of the weak Moslem middle classes suffering from Armenian competition, the conflict of interests between the unskilled "Tatar" laborer and the Armenian entrepreneur or merchant, and the hostility of the predominantly rural Moslems to the urbanized Armenians, many of them recent immigrants to Azerbaijan. ¹³ As remarked by a contemporary traveller, "the Tatar hatred is directed against Armenians more than against Russians, the Armenians are more numerous than the Russians. The Armenians are permanent inhabitants, the Russians come as soldiers, officials, temporary employees, and leave after a few years." ¹⁴

The difference in the two communities' social structure was paralleled by the level of their political organization. The Armenians had produced a dynamic nationalist movement spearheaded by the Dashnaktsutiun party. Its members formed the main Armenian fighting force when the wave of violence swept throughout Transcaucasia, starting from Baku in February 1905. The clashes continued well into the next year at the cost of some ten thousand casualties. ¹⁵

Although there occurred many cases of indiscriminate killing, they bore little resemblance to the Armenian massacres in Turkey of 1894-1895. Reporting currently from Transcaucasia, an Armenian-

American publication wrote that "the view of the Armenians as harmless sheep uncomplainingly stretching their necks to the slaughter is not borne out by the facts.... It is also untrue that the Armenians have always been the chief sufferers." ¹⁶ In a retrospective view of the events, a historian of the Armenian national movement makes the point even clearer: "The Tatars, though numerically superior to the Armenians, and having the sympathetic support of the Tsar, were no match for the superior organization and leadership of the Dashnaktsutun. Though the years 1903-1905 were among the bloodiest in Armenian history, they resulted in unqualified Armenian victory." ¹⁷

The blows suffered at the hands of the Dashnakist fighting squads gave a crucial stimulus to the political awakening of the Azerbaijanis. "The Armenian war" generated for the first time a united action for a cause transcending regional and sectarian loyalties. The unity was still symbolized by the display of the green banner of the Prophet, but the religious appeal served as the traditional manner of mobilizing the community for an essentially national objective. Although the slogans sounded, "Death to the Infidel," the reference was specifically to the Armenians, excluding Russians or other Christians.

In response to the superior organization of the Dashnakists, various Azerbaijani groups engaged in chaotic fighting began to coordinate their efforts. In the Fall of 1905 a clandestine political association under the name Difai (Defense) was set up

in Ganja. The initiative came from some local notables and intellectuals, who were joined by Aghaoghli from Baku. The formation of the Difai marked the rise of Ganja as the center of the nationalist movement in Azerbaijan.¹⁸

Although the Difai was formed for the expediency of dealing with the Armenian threat, its leaders, remarkably, tried to blunt the edge of the conflict. Aghaoghli sternly lectured crowds in a mosque that "even wild animals do not devour their own kind" and reminded them that the two peoples for centuries had lived in peace before the coming of the Russians.¹⁹ The leaders of Difai had contacts with their opposite numbers in the Dashnaksutiun and both organizations in turn cooperated with the emigré Young Turkish movement.²⁰ It was the measure of the Ganja group's political perspicacity that the brunt of its attacks were aimed at the shifting and zigzagging Russian policy. Having seemed at first to be favoring the Moslems, the Tsarist bureaucracy with the appointment of I.I. Vorontsov-Dashkov, the Viceroy of the Caucasus, from the spring of 1905, took an increasingly pro-Armenian stand. In its proclamations the Difai blamed Russia for the bloodshed that had occurred but it warned the Armenians that violence on their part would be answered by force. The members of the Difai were engaged in acts of individual terror, their prime target being Tsarist officials, the police, and the military suspect of encouraging the Armenians to anti-Moslem excesses. This first proto-nationalist Azerbaijani organization broke the long tradition of passive acquiescence to Russian

rule in a country which had seen no armed resistance since the time of Shamil.

While the "Armenian War" became a catalyst for the unity of the Moslems and produced the Difai, the Ganja organization was little concerned with working out a positive program embodying a vision of the community's future. Such programs began to be formulated outside of immediate preoccupations with the ethnic strife. The Baku liberals accepted as their form of action petitioning the authorities for reforms and concessions. Their short-term goals as set forth in the addresses to the Viceroy of the Caucasus were strikingly moderate and did not go beyond such requests as the introduction of the Zemstvos, more schools with the instruction in the native language, increased Moslem representation in municipal councils or the permission to open a Moslem theological seminary.²¹ Restrained as they appeared at home, the Azerbaijani liberals were particularly active in the All-Russian Moslem congresses of 1905 and 1906, the first being chaired by Topchibashi. Their preferred strategy was for improvement in the Moslems' position within the framework of Russia as a whole. As did most of the Moslem leaders throughout the Empire, they kept their affiliations to the Russian liberal movement and the Baku-based Moslem Constitutional Party was established in 1905 as a branch of the Russian Kadet (Constitutional-Democrat) organization.²²

To the extent that the liberals attached themselves to the Kadets the Himnat turned into an autonomous section of the RSDWP.

Both Azerbaijani groups were politically oriented toward the cause of the Russian revolution: for the first it held the prospect of a brighter future under the constitutional monarchy, for the latter, under the democratic republic.

As the upheaval in Russia began to ebb, the Himmatists initiated a new orientation in Azerbaijani politics by putting their hopes in the success of another revolution, currently under way in neighboring Persia. From the Russian Azerbaijani perspective there were two meanings of the term Persia: one was that of a large, multiethnic state with which the Azerbaijanis were linked by ties of history, religion and culture. The other, narrower meaning referred to Persian Azerbaijan, the land of common language and ethnic identity. The bonds between the two Azerbaijanians had been far from extinguished by the Russian conquest. In some respects they even grew stronger with the industrial age, as thousands of laborers from the Tabriz province kept arriving every year to find employment in the Baku oil fields.²³ The Russian Azerbaijani merchants, on their part, almost monopolized the growing volume of trade with Persian Azerbaijan, one area of business activity in which they faced little competition from the Armenians. When the Persian revolution against the despotic Qajar dynasty broke out in December 1905 it was followed by the Baku newspapers with seemingly greater interest than even the crisis in Russia. The same newspapers circulated widely in Tabriz, fueling the revolutionary fervor in that city, which turned into the stronghold of the constitutional

movement in Persia.

Of all Azerbaijani groups, the most involved in the agitation among the Persian subjects was the Himmat. The laborers from the Tabriz province became accessible to Socialist propaganda and in 1906 the Himmat's leader Nariman Narimanov set up in Baku their first Social Democratic organization Ijtima-i amiiyun (Social Democracy). Upon the outbreak of the Tabriz uprising against the Shah, Muzaffar al-din, in the same year, the Himmatists assumed the task of assisting the insurgents with shipments of arms from Russia. ²⁴

As the new wave of insurgency in Tabriz in 1908 coincided with the growing Stolypin repressions in Russia, a flow of refugees poured across the border. In all, some eight hundred men from Transcaucasia joined the fighting in Tabriz, the bulk of them ²⁵ Azerbaijanis, many Himmatists. Their involvement amounted to what was the first manifestation of revolutionary Pan-Azerbaijanism, a notion of the unity of land ^{3, 2} divided between Russia and Persia. Little articulated, and hardly a constant factor in political calculations, the Pan-Azerbaijani orientation was to reappear at various times, taken up by diverse movements, not necessarily radical Leftists. It fitted well with the spreading consciousness of Turkism, and the idea of an autonomous Turkic state in Northern Persia was supported by the Young Turks. One of their first actions after the seizure of power in Istanbul in 1908 was to send armed volunteers there under Halil-bey. The triangular connection between

the Young Turks, the Persian Azerbaijani leader Sattar Khan and the Transcaucasian revolutionaries alarmed the Russian officials who feared the rise of an independent Socialist republic in the Tabriz province.

26

In contrast to the revolutions in Russia and Persia, the third of the upheavals that occurred in the space of three years~ the overthrow of Abdulhamidian absolutism in Turkey~ was successful and carried out speedily by a military coup. On July 24, 1908, the constitutional regime was restored, under which the dominant force became the Young Turkish Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The crisis in Turkey was not of such a nature as to call for the influx of volunteers from abroad to fight prolonged battles against despotism and there followed no mass exodus of Azerbaijani revolutionaries on the pattern of their migration to Tabriz. Yet in the long run the Young Turkish revolution produced deep and enduring consequences for Azerbaijan. Under the new liberal regime in Istanbul the apostles of Turkism found a field for unrestricted activity, including the pursuit of their concern about their ethnic brethren abroad. The intellectuals took the lead and in December 1908 a cultural-scholarly association, Turk Dernegi (Turkish Society) was formed for the purpose of propagating Turkism and Pan-Turkism. Russian Turks were invited to participate in its work, and soon their representatives began to take up residence in the Ottoman capital. The Azerbaijani contingent was particularly strong. As much as the Himmatis had been

finding their way to Persia to continue their struggle, arms-in-hand, the luminaries of the Azerbaijani intellectual elite were emigrating to the CUP-run Turkey, now the land of promise for their ideological inclinations and literary ambitions. Their number included such names as Aghaoghli, Ali bay Husaynzada, Nasib bay Yusufbayli, Mammad Hadi and Dr. Karabay Karabakov. They were joined by the former Himmatist leader, Mammad Amin Rasulzada after his expulsion from Persia in 1912.

Of the Azerbaijani emigrés to Turkey the most accomplished advocate of Turkism was Husaynzada, until recently the editor of the Baku newspapers Hayat (Life) and Fuyuzat (Abundance) in which he had been crusading for the Ottomanization of the literary Azerbaijani language. It was also on the pages of Hayat that he had coined the famous slogan "Turkify, Islamize, Modernize" which was to become the battle cry of Turkism and one day was to be symbolized by the tri-color flag of the independent Azerbaijani republic.²⁷ Upon his coming to Istanbul he exerted a major influence on the rising prophet of Turkism, Ziya Gökalp, who developed and popularized Husaynzada's tri-logistic program.²⁸

With the exception of Husaynzada, the Azerbaijani emigrés did not choose to remain in Turkey permanently. They all, at one time or another, returned home where in their writings they took to propagating the ideas of Turkism, although with various degrees of intensity. Rasulzada, back in Baku in 1913, assumed the leadership of the small band of ex-Himmatists under the name of the

Musavat (Equality) party.²⁹ He guided its evolution from Pan-islamism toward Turkism and in the process provided theoretical foundations for the growing but undefined national sentiments among the public. In an article published by the newspaper Diriliq (Vigor) he tackled the still, for Azerbaijanis, confusing relationship between the terms umma and millat. There was, he argued, a sharp distinction between the two concepts. Umma carried an exclusively religious meaning and expressed the collective consciousness of all Moslems, whereas millat referred to a community based on the common language, culture, and history as well as religion, the latter being only one of its elements. In its true sense millat could not thus mean a religious group; its notion was primarily secular, and its attributes were clearly those of a national-³⁰ity. The secular definition of nationalism was to become the essence of what will later be identified as the ideology of Musavatism. Still, Rasulzada as yet stopped short of spelling out the name for the nationality of his compatriots, but the term "Turkic" with regard to the Azerbaijanis was openly coming to use in the last years before 1914, side by side with the old appellations "Tatars" or "Transcaucasian Moslems."³¹ Furthermore, under the long-range impact of the Young Turkish revolution, the consciousness of cultural and ethnic affinity with Turkey began to acquire the coloring of a political orientation toward the Ottoman state.

This form of Turkism was centered in, but not limited to the narrow stratum of the intelligentsia. Even conservative Azerbaijanis,

suspicious of any nationalism, and harboring Shi'ite prejudices against Turkey, were affected by the surge of Moslem solidarity, with the Ottomans suffering from European aggressions in the Libyan and Balkan wars. An astute observer of the Transcaucasian scene, Vorontsov-Dashkov, wrote in his report to the Tsar on the eve of the World War: "I must note that should we ever have to deal with a separatist movement among any of the peoples of the Caucasus... it could only occur among the Moslem population owing to its numerical superiority over other ethnic groups, and the possibility of an outburst of religious fanaticism fed by the proximity of the Caucasus to the Moslem states." ³²

With Turkey's entry into the war in October 1914, the Moslems of the world were called to the jihad (holy war) against Russia and other Entente powers. Simultaneously, within the CUP leadership the idea of creating Turan, the unified empire of Turkic peoples under the Ottoman aegis, was endorsed. The pro-Ottoman sympathies among the Moslems in Transcaucasia were utilized for the purpose of propaganda or sabotage and the call for insurgency against Russia was quickly answered by the Ajars of Georgia. Further away from the Caucasus Front line, some prominent Azerbaijanis formulated the first known plan for the independence of their homeland. Early in 1915 an emissary of the Difai circles in Ganja, Aslan Khan Khoiski, obtained from the Ottoman Generalissimo Enver Pasa approval for the formation of a Moslem state to consist of the Baku, Ganja and Erivan guberniias as well as of Daghestan

and the Terek territory. The local population was to start an uprising with the assistance of the Ottoman forces from Persian Azerbaijan.³³ It was largely with this prospect in mind that the Ottomans repeatedly made their forays into Northern Persia during 1915.

Yet the disasters suffered by the Ottoman armies early in the year revealed the weakness of Turkey, shattering the insurrectionary schemes. The expectations for a new future in association with Turkey were further dispelled by some other developments occurring in 1915. The same year saw the ruthless suppression of the Ajars by the Russians - clearly understood as a warning for the Azerbaijanis and Daghestanis.³⁴ On the other hand, the new Viceroy of the Caucasus, Grand Duke Nikolai Nicholaevich, who in the fall replaced Vorontsov-Dashkov, promised to be more accommodating to the Moslems than his predecessor. Last but not least, there began the war-time boom in oil prices with its beneficial effects on the Azerbaijani economy.³⁵ In a remarkable psychological about-face, an ability which might well be explained by the ingrained Shi'ite tradition of taqiya (the right to apostasy), the Azerbaijanis buried their pro-Ottoman orientation. The loyalty to Russia and the support for her war effort, not only against Germany but even against Turkey, were now assiduously demonstrated in all quarters, and these Azerbaijani attitudes were not changed by the fall of the Tsardom in March 1917. But a new issue that immediately appeared in Azerbaijani politics in this period of unrestricted freedom of

expression, was that of autonomy, and it was linked to the question: what kind? Cultural or territorial?

The largest political force which emerged in the spring of 1917 was the Musavat, though this was a different party from the handful of ex-Himmatists of the pre-war years. The new Musavat was formed through the merger of the old Baku-based cadre with the Ganja Turkic Party of Decentralization whose predecessor was the Difai. Its full name, reflecting the hybrid product of the union, was the Turkic Party of Decentralization, Musavat.³⁶ In effect, the Musavat consisted of two distinct wings, the Left or Baku, and the Right or Ganja, which continued to differ on tactics as well as on social and economic issues but were held together by two overriding commitments: secular Turkic nationalism and a vision of a future for Azerbaijan as an autonomous republic in association with Russia, reorganized into a federation of free and equal states. The party's platform, adopted in October 1917, stated in its two key points that: "Each nationality possessed of a defined territory, i.e., constituting a majority in a given area, should be granted the right to territorial autonomy. This principle in the view of our Party should be applied to such Turkic lands as Azerbaijan, Turkestan, Kirghizia and Bashkiria.... Nationalities not inhabiting defined territories should be granted the right of cultural autonomy."³⁷ With the program of federalism, the Azerbaijanis entered a new stage of their history - the transition toward nationhood. Yet the willingness to federalize with various partners was to remain

a constant rather than a transitory trait in their political thinking and it was rooted in the doubts as to the viability of their existence as a fully independent state.

Although the Musavat, together with its ally, the liberal Independent Group, could claim an absolute majority of the electoral support, it did not enjoy the nearly monopolistic position comparable to that of the Dashnakists among the Armenians or the ³⁸Mensheviks among the Georgians. The Azerbaijani community turned out to be surprisingly differentiated politically and the main line of division was the question of autonomy. A new party, Ittihad (Union), a conservative, Panislamist group headed by Dr. Karabakov, was opposed to territorial autonomy, seeing it as a step toward local nationalism, which would work for the break-up of the umma. The future of Transcaucasian Moslems should remain in union with a larger Islamic community, in the given case, with all the Moslems of Russia. If an autonomy was to be envisaged it ought to be of a religious and cultural character.³⁹

A third political force of significance, the Himmat, also came out against territorial autonomy on the grounds that such a solution would not be in the interests of the revolution in Russia. Socialism meant joining, not dividing, and what was needed most was the consolidation of democratic forces. The Himmat again showed itself as an exponent of an all-out Russian orientation, but the party's effectiveness was soon weakened by the split that mirrored the condition of the RSDWP in Transcaucasus. The Baku Himmatists,

led by Narimanov, took the side of the Bolsheviks, while the provincial chapters generally followed the Georgian Mensheviks dominant in the region.⁴⁰

The controversy over the manner of association with Russia was turning academic as Russia sank into chaos and disintegration. Upon Lenin's dispersal of the Constituent Assembly in Petrograd on January 5, 1918, the Azerbaijani parties gave their support to the Georgian Mensheviks' initiative towards establishing a supreme authority over Transcaucasia in the form of the regional seim (diet). The convocation of the seim on February 10 was a prelude to the legal separation of Transcaucasia from Russia, an act insisted upon by Turkey as the condition for the cessation of hostilities on the Caucasus front. In the vacuum resulting from the collapse of the Russians, Turkey became the chief military power in the area and among the Azerbaijanis there again surfaced a pro-Ottoman orientation. It was represented at its strongest by the anti-nationalist Ittihad, ready to substitute Russia for Turkey as the partner in the union.⁴¹ As for the Musavatists, the prospect of a Transcaucasian state offered the immediate fulfillment of their federalism, but their attitude was circumspect. The question was not whether to federalize but with whom. In a statement revealing Musavitist thinking at that time, Yusufbayli said that the Transcaucasian Federation was hardly their ideal. Their preferred objective was Greater Azerbaijan, a state that would also include Tabriz and Daghestan. By entering the seim they

had reluctantly accepted the compromise sanctioning the current line dividing two Azerbaijanis. Significantly, the Musavatist leader expressed a lack of enthusiasm for a union with Turkey, indicating the feeling of superiority not uncommon among educated Azerbaijanis: "In Transcaucasia, owing to a hundred years of Russian rule, civilization is more advanced than in Turkey, and that is why Turkish sovereignty would not be acceptable by us." ⁴²

After many delays, the seim proclaimed on April 22 the Transcaucasian Federation uniting the Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis. A large chunk of Azerbaijan remained outside the Federation's authority as the result of the Bolshevik seizure of power in Baku. Following a violent confrontation between the Moslem population and the Bolshevik-Dashnakist alliance at the end of March, the dictatorship of the proletariat was instituted ⁴³ in the city under the name of the Baku Commune.

Short-lived as the Commune turned out to be - in all, less than four months - it survived the Transcaucasian Federation which fell apart after five weeks of internal strife and external pressures on the part of Turkey and Germany. At the last moment before the break-up the Azerbaijani leaders, as if to salvage some of the protection for an uncertain future offered by federalism, proposed a dualistic state in partnership with the Georgians, the less antagonistic of their Christian neighbors. ⁴⁴ The proposal was rejected and the Federation dissolved on May 26th.

Two days later the Moslem members of the defunct seim having

constituted themselves as the Azerbaijani National Council proclaimed the birth of a new state. The first article of the declaration of independence affirmed that "Azerbaijan is a fully sovereign nation; it consists of the southern and eastern parts of Transcaucasia under the sovereignty of the Azerbaijani people." ⁴⁵

The very name of the state, Azerbaijan, and the fact that its frontiers were not clearly spelled out soon caused objections on the part of Persia. It was suspected in Teheran that the creation of the Azerbaijani republic was a Young Turks' device aimed at detaching from Persia the Tabriz province, already occupied by the Ottomans. ⁴⁶ Subsequently, the Azerbaijani government in its official publications for circulation abroad ^{was to} use the name "Caucasian Azerbaijan."

The period from the declaration of independence to the downfall of the Republic lasted twenty-three months to the day. It breaks up into three distinct phases, of which the first was that of the Ottoman occupation. The Ottoman troops, organized into a force named the "Army of Islam" under Nuri Pasa, entered Azerbaijan ostensibly to wrest Baku from the hands of the Bolsheviks, but they also pursued the goal of Turan. Unlike Georgia and Armenia, Azerbaijan was not recognized by the Istanbul government and the brotherly occupiers regarded her as a territory to be joined to Turkey. Nuri Pasa objected to the composition of the first Azerbaijani cabinet, formed in Ganja by the Independent, Fathali Khan Khoiski, on the ground that it failed to include the Pan-Islamists

of the Ittihad. In protest against Ottoman meddling to the benefit of the "black reaction," the Himmatists withdrew from the National Council, followed by some of the Leftist deputies.⁴⁷ The rump legislature on June 17 produced another Khoiski government, this time acceptable to Nuri Pasa and on the same day fulfilled the next of his wishes: it transferred its prerogatives to the Council of Ministers pending the convocation of the Azerbaijani Constituent Assembly on an unspecified future date. There followed a series of other unpopular measures associated with Ottoman pressure: the implementation of land reform was suspended, the labor unions were suppressed and Socialist activities banned. In general, the policies applied under Ottoman military rule were perceived as eroding the achievements of the Russian revolution.

The ripple effects of the Ottoman interference strengthened the tendencies toward Azerbaijani nationalism at the expense of the pro-Turkish orientation within the ruling elite. Until the end of Azerbaijani independence her relations with Turkey were to be tainted by distrust and whatever remained of Panturkism was reduced to its purely cultural aspects.⁴⁸

Under the Mudros Armistice ending Turkey's participation in the war, the Ottoman troops in Azerbaijan were replaced by the British, an event which opened a new phase in the Republic's history. In the confusion accompanying the change of the occupation forces, there were doubts if any Azerbaijan would be allowed to exist inasmuch as General W.M. Thomson was purportedly arriving

in Baku with the intention of restoring the rule of non-Bolshevik Russia over Transcaucasia.

As prestigious an Azerbaijani statesman as Aghaoghli, until recently an adviser to Nuri Pasa and an advocate of Turanism, voiced an opinion echoing the convictions of many of his countrymen: Azerbaijan was not capable of surviving as an independent entity and had to lean either on fraternal Turkey or on the great Russian nation. Since Turkey was in a state of collapse, there remained no alternative but reconciliation with the Russians whose culture in any case was higher than that of the Ottomans.⁴⁹ What Aghaoghli proposed was, in effect, a drastic shift in political orientation, and such a manoeuvre indeed was carried out with remarkable dispatch, although not in the manner foreseen by him. The government of Khan Khoiski quickly discovered that the British were not eager to hand over power to the Baku kadets who could claim the backing of only a small fraction of the local population. Nor would General Thomson agree with the Russians' contention that Azerbaijan was merely a figment of the imagination of a handful of political adventurers, while the Khan Khoiski government remained the only effective civilian authority throughout the country.⁵⁰

The British, whose long-range objectives in Transcaucasia were anything but clear to themselves, assumed the function of a supervisory power over Azerbaijan. They garrisoned Baku, patrolled the Caspian-Black Sea railroad, and controlled the work at some very key branches of administration - the currency issue, food supply,

transportation and labor relations.⁵¹ On the other hand, unlike the Ottomans they kept away from tampering with the country's politics. Indirectly the British pressure influenced the Azerbaijani political life in two important ways: it provided a sense of security from outside threats - the Armenian claims to the Karabag area and Denikin's designs to reimpose Russian rule - and it stimulated the growth of national institutions on liberal-democratic lines.

The day before the landing of Thomson's force in Baku, November 16, the National Council reconvened and passed a law on the elections to the Constituent Assembly. No date was set for the voting but the Council at once proceeded to transform itself into an interim Parliament enlarged by the coopting of additional representatives from national minorities and political parties. An updated program of the Musavat was presented to the Parliament by Rasulzada. With the onset of the era of democracy the party would continue to be guided by the principles of nationalism and federalism. But at this juncture nationalism was defined as recognition of the truth that the Azerbaijanis, although a part of a larger family of Turkic peoples, constituted a nation of their own. Quite apart from the fact that manifestations of Panturkism would now be bad politics, the Musavat had indeed reached the point of its evolution when it shed the shibboleths of Turkic unity for the idea of the Azerbaijani nation-state. There still remained the fundamental concern about external security, hence the continuous commitment of the party to federalism. Rasulzada

hoped for the eventual establishing of a world order by the League of Nations, but for the present he recommended close regional ties with other Transcaucasian republics and Daghestan.⁵²

The revival of federalism, meant as an answer to the vital question of security, was in any case not a realistic proposition until the neighboring nations sorted out their disputes, of which the most intractable was the Armenian-Azerbaijani quarrel over Mountainous Karabag.⁵³ But for the moment, behind the shield of the Pax Britannica, the Azerbaijani coalition government was able to concentrate on the task of nation building, with some accomplishments in such fields as education, the armed forces and administrative reforms. An asset which could one day make Azerbaijan into the most viable of the Transcaucasian republics economically was the oil wealth, though the asset was mainly of potential value. "There is a very large amount of oil products stored in Baku and waiting for transport to its natural markets in Russia via Astrakhan" wrote Lieutenant General T. Bridges, adding that "one of the chief grievances of the Azerbaijani is that he has not been allowed to trade with the Bolsheviks."⁵⁴

The oil embargo was imposed by the British and the Baku government considered it as the price for their protection from Denikin. Britain, the only power not opposed to the Azerbaijani independence, was, however, in no way committed to upholding it and her involvement in Transcaucasia was both incidental and transitory. As early as the spring of 1919 the British began preparations for with-

drawal of their forces. In his reports Thomson pointed out that this decision awoke widespread fears among the local population and that it was called an "act of perfidy."⁵⁵ The British orientation proved to be based on the shakiest of foundations, yet as the only one compatible with the Azerbaijan and national-statehood program, it lingered on even after the troops were pulled out.

Their departure, completed in August 1919, ushered in the phase of full independence, which ironically also spelled the twilight of the Republic. The danger was ^{no longer} coming no more from Denikin who in the second half of 1919 was too absorbed with the offensive on Moscow, and then, having failed in it, too weak to threaten Transcaucasia. Now, a darker cloud grew on the horizon as the Red Army pushed relentlessly southward in pursuit of the Whites. It was not likely that the Reds would stop at the Azerbaijani frontier and against this peril the Baku diplomacy sought frantically for insurances. The attempts at creating a common front of Transcaucasian states did not progress beyond a loose Azerbaijani-⁵⁶ Georgian mutual defense pact. Strenuous efforts expended by the Azerbaijani delegates to elicit support of the Entente leaders resulted merely in the de facto diplomatic recognition and vague promises of arms deliveries.⁵⁷ In a round-about attempt to slip again under the British shield the Azerbaijanis proposed the union with Persia, the country which by the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919 had become virtually a British protectorate. The scheme misfired when Persia refused to ratify the treaty.⁵⁸

The Western orientation of the Baku regime not only failed to

provide external security, but turned out to be a sharply divisive issue internally. Panislamic and Panturkish sentiments, although withered away among the leaders, were alive in the population, more so than Azerbaijani nationalism. In 1919 these sentiments were stimulated by the outbreak of fighting in Anatolia led by Kemal Pasa against the Western powers' domination. In Azerbaijan, the champion of the popular cause of solidarity with Turkey became the Ittihad, while the Musavatist-led coalition government was anxious not to antagonize Britain and declined to give assistance to the Kemalist movement. It cost the Musavat the loss of much of its following at home in addition to incurring the enmity of the Kemalists in Anatolia and of the influential Turkish expatriates in Azerbaijan. ⁵⁹

Full backing for the Kemalists was also declared from the other extreme of the political spectrum, the Azerbaijani Communists. ⁶⁰ Numerically weak, the Bolshevik Himmat was nevertheless acquiring a singular weight as the only native group with which Soviet Russia would seriously discuss arrangements for Azerbaijan's future. The Himmat of 1919 differed in some ways from what it had been two years earlier. The old Baku hard core of Narimanov had dispersed after the fall of the Commune, its members taking refuge in Russia. Then, the very experience of the Commune, born with the massacre of the Moslems, inclined the Himmatists to think of new policies, other than strict Russian centralism which disregarded national distinctions. As for the new crop of Communists at home,

they were mostly in their twenties represented by such men as Haidar Karayav, Mirza Daud Husainov, and Mir Fattah Musavi, who were affected by the experience of Azerbaijani nationhood, much as they hated counterrevolutionary nationalism and the bourgeois state. They accepted as their goal power for the Soviets in Azerbaijan, deeming it as both desirable and inevitable, but they insisted on autonomy for their country and their party within the Soviet system. The position of these Himmatists was supported by their comrades in Russia, some of whom had gained a voice in shaping the Soviet policy toward the Moslems. One of them was Narimanov, who in 1919 headed the Near Eastern section of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and then became the Deputy Commissar for Nationalities Affairs. He revealed himself as an advocate of carrying the revolution to the Moslem East including the lands outside the former Russian Empire. "Let the Soviet power be brought to all states and nationalities professing Islam", he wrote. "In ten years they will achieve⁶¹ what they had not been able to accomplish in a century." The natural base for this undertaking would be Azerbaijan and he called for the Sovietization of his homeland with the assistance of Russia. But at the same time he cautioned that because of "religious and national prejudices" the Azerbaijani workers "are not so revolutionarily disposed as the Russian, Armenian or other⁶² proletariat." Narimanov advised that for Russia a proper policy course would be to proclaim an independent Soviet Azerbaijan and

and he used his influence to bring this issue for review at the highest level. On July 19, 1919 the Politbureau of the Communist Party of Russia (CPR) adopted a resolution "On recognizing the Himmat Party as the autonomous Communist Party with the rights of an oblast' (district) committee and on recognizing Azerbaijan as an independent Soviet republic." ⁶³ There was an obvious contradiction in this statement that the party of an independent country was to be merely autonomous and its status no higher than that of an oblat' organization. Moreover the resolution was made conditional on the approval of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee (kraikom) of the CPR. The decision being relegated to the local authority, it was at the stormy meetings of the kraikom in Titlis that the Himmatists fought for their cause. The Himmat's right to autonomy, they argued, was a logical consequence of the Politbureau's recognition of the Soviet Azerbaijan's independence. They also brought up considerations of tactics: if they were to become members of a Russian organization, as the centralist kraikom wished to have it, their following among the Azerbaijani workers would diminish drastically. Already the Himmatists were being ⁶⁴ branded as traitors working for the restoration of Russian rule.

When their arguments were rejected on the grounds that an accommodation with the Azerbaijanis would have to be extended to other nationalities, the Himmatists were not willing to desist, even at the price of accusations of nationalist deviation and separatism. Instead of getting ready, as they had been told by

the kraikom, for unification with the CPR, they put forward an alternative that smacked of rebellion. There would be separate Communist parties for Moslems and for others: the Himmat would have an exclusively Azerbaijani membership; the organization of immigrants from Persia, Adalat (Justice) would continue in its present status; the Baku chapter of the CPR would be open to all other nationalities. In late October the Himmat and Adalat flatly refused to participate in the Bolshevik caucus in charge of preparations for the uprising.⁶⁵

In the confrontation with the kraikom, the Azerbaijanis' stand was steadfastly backed by the Adalat, an additional source of their resolve. As had been the case with its predecessor, the Ijtimai-amiiyun of 1906, the Adalat was under the Himmat's wing to the extent that on the grass-roots level many of their cells were enmeshed.⁶⁶ The two organizations were further linked by Moslem solidarity against the Russian pressure as well as the new upsurge of Pan-Azerbaijanism. A growing radical agitation, along with the current of separation from Persia, was spreading in late 1919 throughout the Tabriz province - a situation which drew closer together the Azerbaijani revolutionaries from both sides of the border.⁶⁷

In these circumstances the Baku Committee of the CPR advised concessions to the Azerbaijanis in the dispute that raged among the Communists of Transcaucasia. The Committee's head, Anastas Mikoyan, for some time had been warning Moscow of the Moslem distrust:

"Even those who might desire the Soviet type of government are fearful that this would be a foreign, Russian rule and that they themselves would not have access to power," he wrote in one of his reports. ⁶⁸

It was from Moscow that the final word on the controversy came early in January 1920 - there was to be one Communist organization for all nationalities inhabit^{ing} Azerbaijan. The name "Himmat" was to be dropped, and the party was to be called "Azerbaijani," the term carrying both territorial and national connotations. Even at this stage the Himmatists counteracted, by convening, unexpectedly for the Russians, the Constituent Congress ⁶⁹ of the Azerbaijani Communist Party (Az.C.P.). The Congress, which met on February 11, had an overwhelming Moslem majority: the Himmat's representation from Baku equalled that of the CPR, i.e., thirty men each with another thirty from the Adalat and an additional sixty from the Communist cells in provinces which were mostly Himmatist. Moslem strength was also reflected in the composition of the forty-three-man Central committee made up predominantly of the Azerbaijanis with Husainov as chairman. The Congress, which closed a chapter on rivalry between the native and Russian Communists, was concluded with a manifesto calling for the "overthrow of the 'rule of bays, khans, and nationalists,'" ⁷⁰ and the preparations for the seizure of power were stepped up.

In their propaganda the Communists played on the doubts, fears and disillusionments that took hold of the public: if good

relations with Russia were indispensable for the existence of Azerbaijan, could they be expected to materialize under any other rule but that of the Soviets? The change of the regime in Baku would lead to the resumption of the export of oil - now pumped into the sea - thus ending at once the economic crisis. Soviet power would not, however, mean the loss of Azerbaijani independence - quite the contrary, given the elitist character of the nationalist leadership: "What they call independence is of benefit to only 5% of the nation, the capitalists, big land-owners and some others - what we call independence will be enjoyed⁷¹ by 95%." Only then would the Azerbaijani people become truly independent instead of living under the present rulers, who in fact were the puppets of the British. But Britain was far away and not concerned about the fate of Azerbaijan. "English imperialism cannot and never will give independence to our country. If England had sincerely wished to make other peoples independent, why, one could ask, did she destroy the independence of the Turkish state and now is trying to strangle the people of Turkey?"⁷² Using a more straightforward tone, Narimanov in an open letter to the Prime Minister, Yusufbayli, reminded his old-time acquaintance that "for Soviet Russia the union with Georgia or Armenia is not a matter of particular importance, but Baku - that is the very life⁷³ of Soviet Russia."

There was undoubtedly an increase in the Communist following among the population, but even more persuasive than the effect of

this propaganda were the realities of Azerbaijan's situation. As the victorious Red Army approached the Azerbaijani border, absorption by Russia was increasingly seen as imminent. Within the ranks of the Musavat, the division between the two wings re-emerged sharper than ever before, and the Left's spokesman, Mammad H. Hajinski, urged for a "placate Russia" policy, with the tacit backing of Rasulzada.⁷⁴ Even the conservative Ittihadists found reason for turning pro-Bolshevik: the Red Army, they wanted to believe, would march across Azerbaijan to Turkey, and then to other Moslem lands to liberate them from the yoke of Western imperialism. Such views were encouraged by the Turkish expatriates, among them Nuri and Halil Paşas, eager to see the demise of Azerbaijan as a barrier between Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey.⁷⁵ Once again Turkey's political interests clashed with Azerbaijani nationalism.

During March and early April the Soviet forces occupied Daghestan and began to concentrate on the Azerbaijani frontier. This fact alone portended that the end of independence was at hand. Meanwhile the Baku regime had been sinking in its final crisis. On March 27 the Armenians took advantage of the situation by rising in revolt throughout the Karabag area. Three days later the Yusufbayli cabinet resigned and Hajinski began his futile task of putting together a new government with the participation of the Communists.

As for the Communists, they were set on seizing power by

themselves while the Red Army waited across the border ready to march in. To avoid unfavorable repercussions in the Moslem world, the Az.C.P. asked that the Soviet troops should not enter Azerbaijan earlier than twenty-four hours after the uprising had started.⁷⁶

The downfall of the Republic turned out to be an anticlimax to the months of mounting tensions. The Az.C.P., having mobilized its fighting squads, on April 27 issued a proclamation that the "treacherous, criminal, counterrevolutionary government of the Musavat party was overthrown and that the only lawful authority had now become the Provisional Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee (Azrevkom)" headed by Narimanov.⁷⁷ Nonetheless, Azrevkom was still anxious to secure an appearance of legality for the take-over. The same day, the Parliament was handed an ultimatum demanding the surrender of all its powers within twelve hours. As the deputies deliberated, reports poured in that the Red Army was moving toward Baku. This news came as a surprise to the Communists, since the Russians disregarded the twenty-four-hour waiting period, presumably having little confidence in the strength of the Az.C.P. At night the Parliament adopted the text of a declaration publicly acknowledging various assurances that had been offered by the Azrevkom. Some were of a face-saving character intended to facilitate the surrender; the independence of Azerbaijan under Soviet power was to be upheld; the Communist rule was to be provisional and the form of government was to be determined without

any outside pressure by the Soviet of Azerbaijani Workers, Peasants and Soldiers. Other assurances concerned the safety of the outgoing regime's personnel.⁷⁸ The Parliament declared acceptance of these terms and with this act of abdication the experiment in an independent Azerbaijani statehood came to an end, one hour before the ultimatum's deadline.

Conclusion

In 1905 Azerbaijan was still merely a geographical name for a stretch of land inhabited by a people whose group identity consisted of being Moslems. The period between this date and the fall of the independent Republic in 1920 witnessed the rise of a novel type of community for the Moslems - the nation. These fifteen years would have seemed an astonishingly short time for such a transformation, had Azerbaijani society not been prepared for it by the preceding century of Russian rule.

From 1905 on, there followed in rapid succession a series of historical events and upheavals that immensely accelerated Azerbaijani political development. Three revolutions in Russia, one each in Persia and Turkey, World War I, and two foreign occupations - the Ottoman and British. Against this backdrop, the universalistic umma consciousness was giving way, at least among the intelligentsia, to Turkism, and the evolution culminated in Azerbaijani nationalism.

In the wake of the turbulences of history there also emerged orientations toward outside power centers, a characteristic of Azerbaijani politics in this period of pursuit of national aspirations.

The orientations shifted frequently and the same group of politicians could be Pro-Russia, pro-Ottoman and pro-British, depending on which power happened to be dominant in Transcaucasia at the time. By contrast, the alternatives of regional associations such as the Transcaucasian Federation, or the unions with Daghestan and Persian Azerbaijan proved to be difficult or impossible to implement, and in any case offered no substitute for the security of a link to a greater power.

Not surprisingly, the period of independence turned out to be one of insecurity and internal dissension. The emergence of a nation did not amount to the viability of statehood. But then, an independent state was not, in truth, the consciously pursued objective of the Azerbaijani national movement. Rather, its sights were set on the more realistic prospect of autonomy within a federalized Russia. Such was the goal hoped for by the Musavat in 1917, and two years later, of the Himmatists who, unlike the Panislamists, were not immune to nationalism. In the face of the inevitable absorption by Soviet Russia, the native Communists strove to achieve for Azerbaijan the best terms possible. Albeit reluctantly, their claims were recognized by the new conquerors.

Notes

- 1) For the first, incomplete data on the Moslem population of Transcaucasia, see: Obozrenie rossiiskikh vladenii za Kavkazom v statisticheskom, topograficheskom i finansovom otnosheniakh, (St. Petersburg, 1836), IV, p.361 ff. More complete data are included in, Kavkazskii Statisticheskii Komitet, Sbornik svedenii o Kavkaze, (Tiflis, 1871), I.
- 2) Ismailov, M.A., "Ob uchastii Azerbaidzhansev v riadakh russkikh voisk v russko-iranskikh i russko-turetskikh voynakh pervoi treti XIX veka", Akademiia Nauk Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR, Trudy, IV, (1954), pp.10-27.
- 3) For archival sources on the Azerbaijani support for Shamil, see: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Kolonial'naiia politika rossiiskogo tsarizma v Azerbaidzhane v 20-60-kh godakh XIX veka, (Moskva, 1937), II, p.8
- 4) For a monographic study of the Russian administrative reforms, See: Mil'man, A.S., Politicheskii stroi Azerbaidzhana v XIX - nachale XX vekov, (Baku, 1966)
- 5) For a comprehensive survey of the 19-th century Azerbaijani economy, see: Sumbatzade, A.S., Promyshlennost' Azerbaidzhana v XIX veke, (Baku, 1964)
- 6) For a detailed discussion of the Akinchi, see: Baidamirov, B.S., "Akinchi gazetinin maydana qalmasi ve onun Azarbayjan ijtimai-igtisadi fikir roluna dair", Akademiia Nauk Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR, Izvestiia, Seria Obshchestvennykh Nauk, (1963), no.5, pp.107-118; consult also: Bennigsen, A., Lemerrier-Quelquejay, Ch., La presse et les mouvements nationaux chez les musulmans de Russie avant 1920, (Paris, 1960), pp.27-30
- 7) Kashkul, (Tiflis), (1884), no.22
- 8) Nouvelle Revue, (Paris), (1893), no.80, p.526
- 9) For a general survey of Panislamizm, see: Tunaya, T.Z., Islamcilik cereyani, (Istanbul, 1962). On Panislamism in Russia, see: Arsharuni, A., Gabidullin, Kh., Ocherki panislamizma i pentiurkizma v Rosii, (Riazan, 1931)
- 10) On Turkism and Panturkism, see: Arsharuni, Gabidullin, op.cit., Zenkovsky, S., Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, (Cambridge, Mass. 1960) Velidi, T.Z., Bugunku Turkili ve yekin tarihi, (Istanbul, 1947)
- 11) On Azerbaijani liberalism, see: Seidzade, D.B., Iz istorii Azerbaidzhanskoi burzhuazii v nachale XX veka, (Baku, 1978), p.43 ff. On the Kaspiy, see: Hajibayli, D., "The Origins of the National Press in Azerbaijan", Asiatic Review, (1930), no.88, pp.149-157; on Tagiev's role in Baku politics, see: Novikov, A., "Zapiski gorodskogo golovy", Obrazovanie, (1904), no.9, ptII, pp.126-127
- 12) On the rise of the Himmat see the account of one of its founders, Afandiyev S.M., "Himmatin yaranmasi", Azarbayjan elmi savhasi, no.1-2, (1932), pp.83-89. For a survey of its history consult Swietochowski, T., The Himmat Party. Socialism and the National Question in Russian Azerbaijan 1904-1920. Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique, XIX, (1978), pp.119-142.
- 13) For a discussion of the Armenian position in the Azerbaijani economy and relevant statistics, see: Ischanian, B., Nationaler Bestand, berufsmassige Gruppierung und Gliederung der kaukasischen Volker, (Berlin, 1914); Pichkian, G., "Kapitalisticheskoe razvitie neftianoi promyshlennosti v Azerbaidzhane", Zakavkazskii Kommunisticheskii Universitet, Istoriiia klassovoi bor'by v Zakavkazii, (Tiflis, 1930). Also: Sumbatzade, op.cit., pp.461-464
- 14) Villari, L., Fire and Sword in the Caucasus, (London, 1906)

- 15) "Bor'ba s revoliutsionnym dvizheniem na Kavkaze v epokhu stoly-pinshehiny. Iz perepiski P.A. Stolykina s Gr.I.I. Vorontsovm-Dashkovym", Krasnyi Arkhiv, XXXIV, (1929), no.3, p.209
- 16) Armenia, (1906), no.2, pp.30-31
- 17) Atamian, S., The Armenian Community. The historical development of a social and ideological conflict, (New York, 1955), p.116
- 18) On the rise of the Difai, see: Keykurun, N., Azerbaijan istiklal mucadelesinin hatiralari, (Istanbul, 1964), pp.10-14; Ibragimov, Z., Revoliutiia 1905-1907 gg. v Azerbaidzhane, (Baku, 1955), p.144
- 19) Keykurun, op.cit., p.14
- 20) Aliiev, G., "K voprosu o pomoshchi azerbaidzhanskoi demokratii mlado-turetskomu dvizheniiu", Tiurkologicheskii Sbornik, (Moskva, 1975), 187-191. The article offers an unusually favorable evaluation of the Difai
- 21) Tarjuman, (1905), nos. 26128, 31. Consult also Orujov, H.A., "1905-ji ilda Azerbayjanda zemstvo kampanyasi", Akademiia Nauk Azerb.
- 22) Seidzade, op.cit., p.34
- 23) The number of immigrants from Persia in the Baku area during the years 1905-1906 is estimated at 20-25,000; see Gasasov, G.M., "Iz istorii internatsional'nykh svyazei bol'shevikov Azerbaidzhana z iranskimi revoliutsionerami (1905-1911 gg.)", KPAs., Institut Istorii Partii, Asarlar-Trudy, no.26, (1967), p.76
- 24) On the origins of the Persian Socialist movement, see: Ibrahimov, T.A. Iran Kommunist Partiyasinin yaranmnasi, (Baku, 1963), p.78; some documentary evidence on Narimanov's involvement in organizing the Persian revolutionaries is quoted in Gasasov, op.cit., pp.75-76
- 25) See: Bor-Ramenski, E., "K voprosu o roli bol'shevikov Zakavkaz'ia v iranskoi revoliutsii 1905-1911 godov", Istoriik-marksist, (1940), no. 10, pp.89-99. For a contemporary account, see: von Hahn, C., "Der Kaukasus und die Revolution in Asien", Asien, (1909), no.8, pp.117-118
- 26) Kazemzadeh, F., Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914, (New-Haven, 1968), p.532
- 27) Gokalp, Ziya, Turkculuk esaslari, (Ankara, 1339), pp.9-11; Jaschke "Der Turanismus der Jungturken", Die Welt des Islams, XXIII; (1941), p.6.
- 28) On Husaynzada's influence on Ziya, see: Heyd, U., Foundations of Turkish Nationalism. The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gokalp, (London, 1950), pp.107-108
- 29) On the origins of the Musavat, see: Resuloglu, M.A., "Musavat partisinin kurulusu", Milli Azerbaycan Musavat Partisi, Bulteni, (1962), no.4, pp.8-14; Guseinov, M.D., Tiurskaia Demokraticheskaiia Partiaa Federalistov "Musavat" v proshlom i nastoiashchem, (Tiflis, 1927), p.6
- 30) Excerpts from the article are included in, Mirza-Bala, Milli Azerbaycan hareketi, (Berlin, 1938), p.75
- 31) The Tsarist bureaucracy gradually desisted from using the term "Tatars" with regard to all Turkic peoples in the Empire. Instead the name "Tiurki" or Turkic peoples was increasingly accepted. Thus, Azerbaijani deputies to the Third State Duma were officially called "Tiurki".
- 32) Vorontsov-Dashkov, I.I., Vsepoddanneishii otchet za vosem' let upravleniia Kavkazom, (St.Petersburg, 1913), p.9
- 33) Jaschke, op.cit., p.16
- 34) For an Azerbaijani protest in the State Duma against the war-time persecutions of the Moslems, see: "Die Stimme der Russischen Mohammedanen in der Duma", Korrespondenz der Nachrichtenstelle fur den Orient, August 27, 1915

- 35) The impact of the oil boom on the pro-Russian attitudes of the Azerbaijanis during the war is strongly emphasized by some Soviet historians. See: "Sotsial'naiia sushchnost' musavatizma", Pervaia Vsesoiuznaia Konferentsiia Istoriokov-Marksistov, Trudy, (Moskva, 1930), p.504
- 36) Mirza-Bala, op.cit., p.78. Also: Keykurun, N., "Turk Ademi Merkeziyet Firkasinin faaliyetleri ve Musavat partisiyle birlesmesi", Milli Azerbaycan Musavat Partisi, Bulteni, (1962), no.4, pp.19-21
- 37) Mirza-Bala, op.cit., pp. 85-86
- 38) In the November 1917 elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly the Musavat polled 63% of the Moslem votes in Transcaucasia. For detailed figures, see: Suny, R.G., The Baku Commune, 1917-1918, p.178
- 39) For the Ittihad's declaration calling for "freedom of all Moslems from European capitalism and imperialism", see: Belen'kii, S.N., Manvelov, A., Revoliutsiia 1917 g. v Azerbaidzhane. Kronika sobytii. (Baku, 1927). For a discussion of the Ittihad, see: Kuliev, M., Vragi Oktiabria v Azerbaidzhane, (Baku, 1927), pp.35-51; La Chesnais, P., Les peuples de Transcaucasie pendant la guerre et devant la paix, (Paris, 1921), p.101
- 40) Akademiia Nauk Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR, Istoriia Azerbaidzhana, (Baku, 1963) vol.III, p.59
- 41) After a long period of silence kept by Soviet historians on the Menshevik Himmat, a brief but objective discussion of the group appeared in Isenderov, M.S., Iz istorii bor'by Kommunisticheskoi Partii Azerbaidzhana za pobedu sovetskoi vlasti, (Baku, 1958), pp.174-175
- 42) Dokumenty i materialy po vneshnei politike Zakavkaz'ia i Gruzii, (Tiflis, 1919), no.69
- 43) Quoted by Semenov, Iu., "Zakavkazskaia Respublika", Vozrozhdenie, I, (1949), p.136
- 44) For a detailed study of the subject, see Suny, op.cit.
- 45) Avalov, Z., Nezavisimost' Gruzii v mezhdunarodnoi politike 1918-1921 gg., (Paris, 1924), p.57
- 46) For the full text of the Declaration, see: Azerbaycan Yurt Bilgisi, II, (1933), no.17, p.193. French text in: Le 28 mai 1919, (Bakou, 1919), p.8
- 47) Guseinov, I.A., "Istoricheskie znachenie lozunga 'nezavisimy sovetskii Azerbaidzhan'", Azerbaidzhanskii Gosudartvennyi Universitet im.Kirova, Uchenye zapiski, (1957), no.10, p.67
- 48) On the political crisis in Azerbaijan caused by Nuri's intervention, see: Raevski, A., Musavatskoe pravitel'stvo na Versal'skoi konferentsii. Doneseniia predsedateliia musavatskoi delegatsii, (Baku, 1930), pp.3-4; also: Mirza-Bala, op.cit., p.148
- 49) Such a reinterpretation of Panturkism with references made to the disappointing experience of the Ottoman occupation is provided by Rasulzada, M.A., O panturanizme v sviazi s kavkazskoi problemoi, (Paris, 1930). Some statements of Azerbaijani politicians reacting to the Ottoman methods are quoted in Guliev, D.B., "Protiv burzhuaiznoi fal'sifikatsii istorii (K kharakteristike musavatskogo pravitel'stva)", Asarlar-Trudy, (1967), no.28, pp.138-170
- 50) Baikov, A., "Vospominaniia o revoliutsii v Zakavkazii", Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii, IX, (1923), p.150
- 51) Ibid., p.154
- 52) Ullman, R., Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921. Britain and the Russian Civil War, (Princeton, 1968), pp.82-84
- 53) Excerpts of Rasulzada's declaration will be found in Mirza-Bala, op.cit., pp.159-164
- 54) For a detailed study of the Karabag issue, see: Hovannisian, R.G., "The Armeno-Azerbaijani Conflict over Mountainous Karabagh, 1918-1919", The Armenian Review, XXIV, (1971), no.2-94, pp.3, ff; consult also the same author's: The Republic of Armenia. The First Year, 1918-1919, (Berkeley, 1971)

- 54) Great Britain. Foreign Office. FO/371/3662, July 26, 1919
- 55) Ibid., "Appreciation of the situation (in Transcaucasia) as I left it". May, 13, 1919. CAB, 45/107
- 56) Avalov, op.cit., pp. 209-210
- 57) Ibid., p. 244
- 58) Kazemzadeh, F., The Struggle for Transcaucasia, (1917-1921), (New York-Oxford, 1951), pp. 229-230
- 59) On the Turkish presence in Azerbaijan after the withdrawal of the Ottoman armies, see: Hovannisian, R.G., "Armenia and the Caucasus in the Genesis of the Soviet-Turkish Entente", International Journal of Middle East Studies, IV, (1973), no. 2, pp. 139-141; also: Jaschke, G., "La role du communisme dans les relations russo-turque", Orient, VII, (1963), no. 26, pp. 31-44
- 60) Karaev, A.G., Iz nedavnogo proshlogo, (Baku, 1926), p. 60
- 61) Narimanov, N.N., Stat'i i pis'ma, (Moskva, 1925), p. 20
- 62) Kommunisticheskaia Partia Azerbaidzhana, Institut Istorii Partii, Bor'ba za pobedu sovetskoi vlasti v Azerbaidzhane 1918-1920, Dokumenty i materialy, (Baku, 1967), No. 347, p. 291. Hereafter cited as Bor'ba...
- 63) Azərbaycan Kommunist Partiyasının Tarikhi, (Baku, 1958), I, p. 355
- 64) Karaev, op.cit., p. 54
- 65) Ratgauzer, Ia., Bor'ba za sovetskii Azerbaidzhan, (Baku, 1928), p. 61
- 66) The Adalat had also its cells in Persia which in June 1920 were merged into the Communist Party of Iran. For more information on the Adalat, consult: Ravasani, S., Sowjetrepublik Gilan. Die sozialistische Bewegung im Iran seit Ende d. 19 Jh. bis 1922, (Berlin, 1978), pp. 245-266. Also: Ibrahimov, op.cit., pp. 118 ff.
- 67) On the Persian-Azerbaijani separatist movement in 1919-1920, see: Lenczowski, G., Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948, (New York, 1949), pp. 61 ff.
- 68) Bor'ba..., no. 173, p. 138
- 69) On the maneuver of the Azerbaijani Communist to convene on the short notice the Constituent Congress, see: Ratgauzer, Ia., "AKP na-kanune aprel'skogo perevorota", Bakinskii Rabochii, April 27, 1928
- 70) Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi Partii Azerbaidzhana, I, p. 324
- 71) Fugara Sadasi, August 27, 1919
- 72) Ibid., August, 24, 1919
- 73) Narimanov, op.cit., p. 20. For further examples of the propaganda campaign under the slogan of independent Soviet Azerbaijan, see his article "S kakim lozungom my idem na Kavkaz", in ibid., pp. 5-14
- 74) On the division within the ranks of the Musavat in the last weeks of the independence, see: Shafi bey Rustambeyli, "27 Nisan hatirasi", Azerbaycan Yurt Bilgisi, II, (1933), no. 16, pp. 176-180. Also, the same author's: "Iz pechal'nogo proshlogo", Kavkaz, (1935), no. 7, pp. 7-11
- 75) On the activities of the Turkish emigres in Baku on the eve of the Republic's downfall see: Agaev, Kh.b., "Pis'mo Enver Pashe", Kavkaz, (1937), no. 9/45, pp. 25-29; Karabekir, K., Istiklal harbimiz, (Istanbul, 1960), pp. 609 ff.; Jaschke, "La role du communisme...", op.cit.
- 76) A group of Turkish Communists in Baku adopted a resolution which while supporting the idea of the Communist take-over advised that the Soviet invasion of Azerbaijan should be avoided. See: Karabekir, op.cit., p. 610
- 77) Iskenderov, op.cit., p. 440
- 78) The full text of the Parliament's declaration will be found in Kommunist, (Baku), May 6, 1920