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THE INTERLUDE OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

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The Interlude of National Independence

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Cut adrift from central Russia by the revolutions of 1917, Transcaucasia broke apart into three national republics in 1918. The attempts of the Georgians, Azerbaijanis, and Armenians to organize independent states ultimately failed, however, and by mid-1921 the whole region had been absorbed into the Soviet system. Still, it was upon the foundations of those imperfect, transitory states that the Soviet republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia emerged. The Russian Communist Party's deviation in adopting the principle of a federated state structure was required in part to counteract the influence of the nationalist parties and the draw of national sentiment in the successionist provinces. For the Armenians, the transformation of their independent republic into a Soviet national republic remains especially significant, in view of the fact that only on that small sector of the historic Armenian territories has national life and even presence continued since 1920.

Although the three independent Transcaucasian states had many common features, the Armenian republic could be singled out for its enormous comparative disadvantages and its association with the geographically and politically broader Armenian question - a question that had ruffled the table of international diplomacy for four decades. While, for example, Georgia and Azerbaijan could conceivably have become viable, independent states limited to the territories under their actual control in 1919, no such calculation was possible for the little, landlocked Armenian state. To achieve anything more than nominal independence, that republic would have to incorporate the Turkish Armenian provinces and gain an outlet on the sea.

During a century of Russian rule in the Caucasus, the Armenian element had increased by leaps and bounds, the Armenian professional and commercial classes had become preponderant in Tiflis and other cities, and the Armenian rural population had freed itself in many districts from economic servitude to the large landowning Muslim beks and aghas. Yet, the geographic distribution of the Armenians was such that in any equitable partition of Transcaucasia nearly all of their commercial and financial centers would be excluded from the Armenian region, as would several hundred thousand or possibly even a majority of their people. Under tsarist rule, the Russian Armenian provinces had remained undeveloped and not a shadow of the vigorous Armenian financial, professional, cultural, and political life in Tiflis existed at Erevan, a sleepy oriental town of 30,000 in 1914, as compared with more than 300,000 in Tiflis and in metropolitan Baku.¹

These factors help to explain the extreme reluctance of the Armenian leaders, even those of the dominant party, the Dashnaktsutiun, to organize an independent state around Erevan in 1918. The creation of such a state was not the logical outcome of the national cultural revival of the nineteenth century or the revolutionary movement of the past thirty years. The resistance movement had focused on the emancipation of the Turkish or Western Armenian population and the introduction of local self-government or possibly regional autonomy in the Turkish Armenian provinces. Insofar as the Russian Armenian provinces were concerned, most Armenian intellectuals and civic leaders had sought only the implementation of the liberal reforms promulgated but not extended to the Caucasus during the reign of Tsar Alexander II.

The opportunity for independence came at the worst possible historic moment and seemed to be no opportunity at all. The Armenian population of the Ottoman empire had been decimated by the actions of the Young Turk

regime, the extensive Armenian political, cultural, and religious networks had been shattered, and several hundred thousand refugees languished in the Arab provinces, the Caucasus, and South Russia. The very foundation of the emancipatory movement had been deeply, perhaps irreparably, sapped. And although the Russian Armenians had been uplifted by the patronizing attitude of the Russian government during the first year of the world war, they were soon disillusioned by the new repressive measures in 1916, after the Imperial armies had occupied the half of Turkish Armenia which had been awarded Russia in the secret Allied pacts. The Turkish Armenian refugees were prevented from returning to the occupied territories, making it seem as if Tsar Nicholas had taken to heart the motto ascribed to erstwhile foreign minister Lobanov-Rostov, "Armenia without Armenians." The creation of the Provisional Government in 1917 offered a respite, and thousands of refugees did repatriate to the provinces of Erzerum, Van, and Bitlis, but that movement was paralleled by the spread of defeatism and desertion in the Russian armies, turning Armenian dreams into a nightmare by the end of the year.²

Refusing to side with the Bolshevik revolution or to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Council of People's Commissars, the major political societies in the Caucasus, Baku excepted, organized an interim executive board and a legislative body to regulate regional affairs pending the establishment of the so-called democratic order in Russia. These measures, however, did not relieve the Sovnarkom from having to recognize, as a part of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the right of the Ottoman government to reoccupy the Turkish Armenian provinces and to annex the Transcaucasian districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum. Nor did the attempts of the hastily-organized Armenian and Georgian detachments to man the extensive front thwart a Turkish offensive to secure these gains. By May, 1918, the Turkish forces had even breached the Brest-Litovsk boundaries and entered the southwestern sector of the Tiflis guberniia and the Araxes river valley in the Erevan guberniia. It was

then that the Georgians took the initiative in dissolving the Transcaucasian federative government and declaring the independence of their historic territories under German protection. The Muslim leaders followed by proclaiming the creation of the Azerbaijani republic, having received assurances of Turkish benevolence and military support in liberating Baku from the Armenian-Russian coalition there.³

It was under these circumstances that the Armenian National Council in Tiflis had to face the prospect of declaring Armenian independence and accepting a crushing peace treaty in the name of the Republic of Armenia. That new republic had to repudiate all claims to the Turkish Armenian provinces as well as Kars and Ardahan in Russian Armenia, to allow Turkish occupation and probable annexation of the entire Araxes river valley, including the Alexandropol-Julfa railway, and to grant transit and other privileges to the Turkish armies. The Armenian republic began its existence on about 4,500 square miles (12,000 square kilometers) of bleak, rugged terrain, crammed with refugees, devoid of the bare essentials of life, and surrounded by hostile forces.⁴ Unlike Georgia and Azerbaijan, Armenia inherited none of the arsenals, storehouses, administrative machinery, or financial and commercial-industrial resources of the previous regimes. Rather, it became the "Land of Stalking Death," as famine, contagion, and exposure swept away nearly 200,000 people during the ensuing year.⁵

It must have taken the last measure of courage for the Armenian political leaders, bewildered and discouraged, to depart for Erevan, now the Republic's capital, to try to bring some form to the country's "formless chaos," in the words of Prime Minister Hovhannes (Ruben Ivanovich) Kachaznuni. Trapped in this unenviable position, those leaders remained true to their political principles by going through the motions of establishing a parliamentary republic, with the cabinet answerable to the legislature and, theoretically, the legislature to the electorate. Such exercises in the midst of great

national peril and tragedy may have gratified the ideological sentiments of the politicians--yesterday's revolutionary intellectuals--but could have little effect on easing the suffering of the masses. There were those who insisted that the times required dictatorial rule, and, although the champions of democracy in the legislature frequently criticized the high-handed methods of the interior ministry under Aram Manukian's direction, none could dispute the fact that the ministry did produce some modest results in the first months of independence. The conflict between the yearning for democratic institutions and the necessity for authoritative measures was never resolved during the existence of the Armenian republic.⁶

Until the end of the world war, the Armenian diplomatic missions in Constantinople and Berlin attempted, without success, to persuade the Turks or to have the Germans coerce the Turks to withdraw to the Brest-Litovsk boundaries, thereby giving Armenia a little better chance for survival.⁷ The Turko-Azerbaijani conquest of Baku and the accompanying massacres in September, 1918, further demoralized the Armenians.⁸ This, however, was to be the last successful Turkish campaign of the war. The next month the Ottoman empire capitulated by terms of the Mudros armistice, and in December the Turkish armies of occupation finally withdrew from Erevan province, picking clean the fields and villages, down to sickles, doors, and railway ties, and ushering in a winter of death for the thousands of Russian Armenian peasants who hurried back into the Araxes valley to reclaim their lands.⁹

The defeat of the Central Powers transformed Armenia's previous disadvantages into seeming advantages. In Allied eyes, Georgia and Azerbaijan were tainted as collaborators of the defeated enemy powers, whereas battered Armenia stood as the loyal, martyred nation. The wartime anguish of the Armenian people had elicited expressions of outrage and promises of restitution in every Allied country. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George captured the essence of the public indignation in his

promise that Armenia, "the land soaked with the blood of innocents," would never be restored to "the blasting tyranny of the Turk."¹⁰ And among the first acts of the Paris Peace Conference, which convened in January, 1919, was the decision that "because of the historical misgovernment of the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire." The Armenians, together with other communities formerly under Turkish rule, had reached a state of development "where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone."¹¹ Hence, after centuries of foreign domination, Armenia was to emerge as a united self-governing state under Allied protection. There would be prodigious difficulties in view of the decimation of the Armenian population and the ruin of the country, but the regenerative qualities of the Armenians had been tested and tried throughout history, and the anticipated worldwide repatriation and the probable partial Muslim exodus would make possible an Armenian majority within one generation.

On the heels of great expectations often follow greater disappointments. Such was to be the Armenian experience. In negotiation of the Mudros armistice, the British authorities had been inflexible in demands for Allied control of the Turkish waterways, but they made concessions on several points considered less crucial, including evacuation of the Ottoman armies from the Armenian provinces. The Allies simply reserved for themselves the right to occupy any or all of Turkish Armenia in case of disorder.¹² That clause was never invoked, even though the Turkish resistance movement first became manifest in that region and was devoted to the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Asiatic provinces and denial of any concessions

to the Armenians and Greeks. The repeated Allied delays in imposing a peace settlement aggravated the problem, and by the time the Sultan's representatives signed the Treaty of Sèvres in August, 1920, the clauses relating to Armenia were stillborn. Meanwhile, the Erevan republic remained inundated with refugees and was heavily encumbered in efforts to pass from emergency, stopgap measures toward a normal operating procedure and the implementation of political and economic reforms.

Amidst these unsettled conditions, the Parliament of Armenia was elected in the summer of 1919 to supplant the previous multiparty appointive legislature, the Khorhurd. In keeping with progressive, democratic procedures, the regulations enfranchised all adults regardless of sex, race, and religion and required that the elections be conducted on the basis of general, direct, equal voting and proportional representation. That the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (the Dashnaktsutiun) would gain an absolute majority was a foregone conclusion. The party had struck root throughout the Caucasus by the turn of the century and had influenced Armenian collective action since the tsarist attempt to expropriate the holdings of the Armenian Apostolic Church in 1903. In 1917, the Dashnaktsutiun had participated in the several Transcaucasian administrative bodies and in mid-1918 had taken the helm of government in Erevan until the end of the war. The disruption of the party network in Russia and the Ottoman Empire, the loss of numerous leaders during the war years, and the involvement thereafter of so many others in the affairs of state drained the Dashnaktsutiun, but its control in the Eastern Armenian provinces was still pervasive.

Even if it had been possible to conduct the electoral campaign under ideal conditions, the opposition parties would have been dwarfed in the new legislative body. The Armenian affiliate of the Socialist Revolutionary party, other than emphasizing the need for integral bonds with Russia and

interracial harmony, offered little that was not already contained in the platform of the Dashnaktsutiun. The small Marxist Social Democrat groups were split into at least five rival factions, composed mainly of students and intellectuals, and handicapped by the absence of a significant proletariat in the Armenian provinces. The liberal Armenian Populist (Zhoghovrdakan) party, like the socialist opposition parties, functioned under the anomaly of having more followers in Tiflis and Baku than in Erevan and of directing organizational affairs through a central body situated outside the Armenian republic. But unlike the Socialist Revolutionaries and Social Democrats, the Populists had shared authority in a coalition cabinet from December, 1918, to June, 1919, and the rank and file members identified increasingly with the concept of national independence. The party had the potential of becoming the catalyst for the various non-socialist elements, particularly if a proposed merger with the Western Armenian Sahmanadir Ramkavar (Constitutional Democrat) party and other nationalist-reformist groups were effected.¹³

The electoral boycott and denunciation of "yellow bourgeois parliamentarianism" by the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democrats were not unexpected. but the election-eve withdrawal of the Populist slate caused deep consternation. Even though the Populist ministers of the coalition cabinet had participated in the declaration of the theoretical unity of Turkish Armenia and Russian Armenia on the Republic's first anniversary, the Populist central committee in Tiflis soon alleged that this had been an illegal act, taken without the concurrence of the Western Armenian bodies abroad. The Populists would therefore refrain from voting.¹⁴

Disappointments and shortcomings aside, Armenia's first national election was conducted as scheduled, June 21-23, 1919. The totals posted by the central election bureau must have gratified the most zealous elements of the Dashnaktsutiun, since the party received nearly 90 percent of the popular

vote, as compared with 5 percent for the second-place Socialist Revolutionary party.¹⁵ Some observers believed that the Dashnaktsutiun had used the guise of a democratic process to tighten its control over the government rather than to place the state on more popular foundations. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation, on the other hand, was not a monolithic organization, since it had provided a broad umbrella in the emancipatory struggle. Hence, while the Dashnakist deputies could be expected to stand unanimously on the principle of free, independent, united Armenia, their divergent social and economic views could easily give rise to internal cleavages and expose the rivalry between the fundamentally conservative and traditionalist Turkish Armenian leaders and the more radical, internationalist Russian Armenian intellectuals.

The Parliament (Khorhrdaran) of Armenia convened on August 1, 1919, in an air of excitement enhanced by the arrival from Rostov, Baku, Tiflis, and Constantinople of several of the recently-elected deputies. On August 10, the legislature confirmed a new council of ministers, headed by Alexandre Khatisian. At forty-five years of age, Khatisian was by disposition and experience a man of government. Laying aside a degree in medicine early in his career, he had entered the public arena, rising rapidly to become mayor of Tiflis and president of the Union of Caucasian Cities. Following the Russian revolutions, he served as a member of the Armenian National Council, the several peace missions, and the Transcaucasian federative government, as foreign minister in Kachaznuni's coalition cabinet, and, since April of 1919, as acting prime minister. Although his own cabinet in August was composed entirely of Dashnakists, except for the military minister, Khatisian believed that his party should uphold the government without interfering in its day-to-day operations and that the principal criteria for civil service should be training and talent. Hence, every state ministry included nonpartisans, Populists, Socialist Revolutionaries, and Social Democrats, several of whom were division and bureau chiefs. Khatisian's critics complained that it was unreasonable

to stand on cumbersome democratic procedures or expect the peasantry to remain patient amidst worldwide social ferment and the apparent reluctance to sweep away the tsarist class structure. Not sterile legalisms, but swift, revolutionary action held the key to Armenian survival. Moreover, the enlistment of so many comrades in governmental work hindered the task of rebuilding the party and raised the spectre of tainting it with the inevitable shortcomings of the administration. By and large, however, Khatisian's views prevailed until mid-1920, and under his direction the departments of government gained increasing independence from the party.¹⁶

The question of party-state relations was debated heatedly during the Ninth world congress of the Dashnaktsutiun which took place in Erevan from late September to early November, 1919. Arguing that direct party control of the government was essential in steering the country through great peril, veteran revolutionary Ruben Ter-Minasian stood at the fore of those delegates demanding unqualified submission of the Dashnakist ministers to the supreme party Bureau. At the other extreme, Khatisian's adherents emphasized the party's history of unrelenting opposition to authoritarian regimes and its wholesome tradition of democratic decentralization. If Armenia was to avoid the Bolshevik malady of party-government synonymity and self-perpetuating elitism, the independence of the state machinery had to be maintained and the Bureau's influence channeled through the Dashnakist faction of the legislature. The exchanges gave way to bitter taunts before it was decided that the party faction, in consultation with the Bureau, would select the candidate for prime minister, who in turn would then secure the faction's approval of his proposed ministerial slate before submitting to the full parliament for confirmation. Comrades in the cabinet were to hold no party post, and members of the Bureau who might enter the government were required to withdraw from active participation in the supreme party organ during that tenure. The Dashnakist faction would discharge its organic legislative

duties without undue external interference, although it would admit the Bureau's right to enforce the decisions of the world congresses. While Ter-Minasian criticized the cumbersome features of the scheme and protested that the parliamentary faction had essentially been given the power to neutralize the Bureau in the affairs of state, Khatisian, Simon Vratzian, and other champions of the distinction between party and government were gratified by the prospect of mutual cooperation rather than unilateral dictation. The election of a new party Bureau, however, underscored the complications of which Ter-Minasian had warned, since four of the seven members were either serving in the cabinet or held government positions abroad. While it was hoped that forthcoming negotiations with non-Dashnakist parties within and outside the Republic would culminate in a coalition cabinet of united Armenia and relieve the Bureau members of their governmental duties, the actual responsibility for directing the party in the interim had to be shouldered by the three remaining members.¹⁷

After one year of nominal independence, the Republic's international status remained obscure. The Allied and Associated Powers, while acknowledging Armenian sacrifices and loyalty during the war, cited technical difficulties in explaining their inability to recognize Armenia as a formal ally and therefore as a member of the Paris Peace Conference. In lieu of diplomatic recognition, the victorious powers showered the Armenians with professions of good will and vague assurances of a secure national future. When the Allied heads of state departed from Paris after signing the German peace treaty in June, 1919, they still had not drafted the Turkish settlement, resolved the question of a mandate for Armenia, or arranged for the repatriation of the Armenian refugees. Meanwhile, rivalry among the Powers intensified in the Near East, giving hope and courage to the organizers of the Turkish resistance. There was, however, some room for optimism, since, with all its vacillation, the Supreme Allied Council never challenged the

presumption that the future united Armenian state would encompass the Turkish Armenian provinces. When Grand Vizier Damad Ferid Pasha pled the Ottoman case in Paris, the Council retorted with a stringent rebuke, ruling out continued Turkish dominion in either the Arab or Armenian provinces.¹⁸

Armenophile societies the world over clamored for support of the Armenians, and tangible international concern was demonstrated in the outpouring of public and private charity to sustain the "starving Armenians" throughout the Near East and the Caucasus.

In Transcaucasia, geographic and demographic factors made the Armenian republic highly susceptible to coercion. Since most of the country's precarious lifeline from Batum passed through Georgian territory, Armenian efforts to gain the disputed districts of Akhalkalak and Borchalu had to be circumspect. Georgia demonstrated that it could wreak havoc with the flow of American relief supplies under the pretext of essential railway repairs, the lack of rolling stock, or unstable domestic conditions. Nor could the Armenian government ignore the status of the half million Armenians in Georgia. Their tribulations after a brief Armeno-Georgian armed conflict in Borchalu in December, 1918, served as a cogent reminder of their vulnerability.¹⁹ Azerbaijan, like Georgia, had inherited a rich, populous commercial center, which was founded on seemingly inexhaustible oil fields. And if Georgia could pressure Armenia by manipulating rail traffic, Azerbaijan could easily suspend the shipment of crude oil, without which the Armenian transportation system would grind to a halt. Historic racial and religious animosities, compounded by the immediate struggle for the districts of Karabagh, Zangezur, and Sharur-Nakhichevan, shaped the sad course of Armeno-Azerbaijani relations.²⁰

The small, positive achievements in Transcaucasia, from the Armenian point of view, included the establishment of diplomatic relations among the three sister republics and a change in the initial Georgian and Azerbaijani tendency to discount Armenia as a significant political force. Armenia

had incorporated a part of Lori (southern Borchalu) at the end of 1918 and had loosened the Georgian hold on the rest of the district, which became a neutral zone. In the chronic disputes with Azerbaijan, Armenia was outmatched in manpower and resources, but the Armenian officer corps was, according to Allied military observers, the best trained in the Caucasus and could rely on the martial tradition of the mountaineers in the contested districts. Although the Azerbaijani army held key positions in Karabagh, the Armenian militia of Zangezour successfully blocked every attempted Azerbaijani advance into the county. Moreover, Armenia alone was regarded with favor by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of South Russia. Armenian envoys and organizations functioned freely in the vast areas under General Denikin's control, and Russian military and political spokesmen, while refusing to hear of the separation of Georgia or Azerbaijan, privately professed sympathy with the goal of a united Armenia encompassing the historic national territories on both sides of the old Russo-Turkish frontier.²¹

Insofar as the domestic situation was concerned, there was no prospect of strong economic recovery so long as the Armenian republic remained confined to its existing territories. Large shipments of grain normally imported from Russia were choked off because of the unsettled conditions and the hostility between Georgia and the Volunteer Army. During the war years, the limited local harvests had decreased by more than 40 percent, the lands under cultivation declined by a third, and the primitive industrial production and mining nearly ceased. The Turkish invasion and occupation in 1918 compounded these losses, with more than 200 villages plundered, half the vineyards in the Araxes valley ruined, and about 200,000 large horned animals driven away, together with thousands of carts and agricultural implements. Hence, 80 percent of the households of Armenia were left without a single horse and nearly half

had neither cow nor ox. During the spring sowing season in 1919, only a fourth of the farmland was planted, and agricultural income dipped to a sixth of the prewar level.²²

The Republic was stifled under the crush of almost 300,000 refugees, whose four years of abject existence had transformed them into starving, half-crazed mobs, agitated by the unfulfilled promises of impending repatriation and increasingly resentful of their Eastern Armenian compatriots and all officials, whether Armenian or Allied. The municipal administration of Erevan was driven to despair as the population of the capital tripled to 90,000 at a time when the war damage had left fewer living quarters. In the Alexandropol (Leninakan) district, nearly 100,000 refugees clustered together in makeshift shelters or abandoned military barracks, and more people arrived daily from the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan.²³

Under these circumstances, there could be no serious discussion of financial solvency. The combined net income of all government departments was 30 million rubles in 1919, whereas expenditures exceeded a billion rubles. More than 70 percent of the outlay was channeled through the ministries of welfare, provisions, and military affairs--the agencies most directly involved in sustaining the population rather than rebuilding the country. The 23 million rubles allocated to the ministry of education, while not inconsequential, represented less than 3 percent of the disbursement, and the average allowance for the operations of the cabinet and the ministries of foreign affairs and justice was 1 percent. In the absence of a central banking system and a significant reserve of precious metals and exportable goods, the exchange rate of the state ruble plunged by the beginning of summer to a fourth of that of the Russian imperial banknote. With monthly wages averaging 100 rubles, most families were unable to procure adequate supplies of staple foods. The price of a pood (36 pounds) of wheat was 350 rubles; bread, 300-400; rice, 350;

beef, 400; mutton, 560; cheese, 575; lard and butter, 2,000.²⁴ These prices tripled by the beginning of 1920 and continued to spiral for the remainder of the year. Such a level of inflation fed corruption. Extortionary practices of village commissars and militia chiefs brought discredit upon the government, but the swirl of events had not allowed for major administrative reforms. Many unscrupulous bureaucrats of the old regime clung to their posts, and the newer appointees often proved no less odious. Untrained and inexperienced, they were grossly ignorant of local needs and customs. Yet, with the paucity of qualified personnel, the ministry of internal affairs dared not risk still greater disorder by turning out the entire incumbent hierarchy.

The deplorable behavior of many officials shattered the patience of even those who understood and shared in the government's quandary. In caustic newspaper editorials, the Dashnaksutiun demanded revolutionary changes, warning that the public judged its leaders by the functionaries with whom it had immediate daily contact. The peasantry had traditionally regarded administrative organs as oppressive agencies that should be avoided or deceived. Hence, they hid and hoarded vital supplies and tried to evade taxes and other obligations of citizenship. The following admonition typified the criticism leveled at respected comrades in high public office:

The Armenian legislature may propose and adopt such admirable democratic laws as to stir the envy of the parliaments of Europe; the government of Armenia may make wonderful decisions and be committed to public service; the cabinet of Armenia may have--as indeed it does--very trustworthy, capable, and dedicated individuals; but all this is worthless, void of any positive significance, left dangling in air, unless there is the necessary mechanism to enforce the laws, enact the decisions, and give substance to the goal of public service.

As long as our government fails to take stringent measures to renovate the commissar-militia structure, as long as it leaves unmuzzled the arbitrariness and assaults upon the bodies and spirits of the people of Armenia, as long as the various adventurers, extorters, and speculators sally forth from all sides under the guise of "commissars" and "militiamen," the government, regardless of who may head it, will be unable to call up new recruits, combat desertion, safeguard the goods and properties of the population,

uphold honor and dignity, eliminate racial discord, gather and distribute seed-grain, and thus inspire broad public support for the government and administration of Armenia.²⁵

Land reform and agrarian revival were of the utmost importance, especially as the peasantry constituted nearly 90 percent of the population. Large estates were not common in this mountainous country, but the kulak or tanuter class was significant in some districts. The Dashnaktsutiun had always advocated communal ownership by the tillers of the soil and periodic internal reallocation based on household size and need. Hence, the legislature soon set maximum limits of individual proprietorship and created committees to receive and redistribute the excess parcels. Yet, except for the partition of a few estates around Etchmiadzin and Karakilisa (Kirovakan) the reforms remained unimplemented. There were, in fact, instances in which fields seized by the peasantry were restored to their previous owners and state lands were leased to Russian Molokan villages in return for food, farm equipment, and animals. Many poor farmers were forced to sell their plots to speculators, and complaints poured in from every district that Armenia was fast becoming a nation of landless peasants. The government tried to deal with this situation by annulling the sales and establishing boards of conciliation to compensate the buyers, but many of the defrauded peasants had already left or lacked the proper contractual papers with which to lodge a claim. Significant progress in land reform was never achieved under the Republic.²⁶

Most of the six to seven thousand industrial laborers in the Armenian provinces before the world war were employed in agriculturally related enterprises such as distilleries, tanneries, and textile mills. Even that elementary activity ceased during the war, and it was not until 1919 that a slight revival occurred, engendered by public works programs and the initiative of refugee entrepreneurs from Van and Mush. Approximately

5,000 workers were employed in 300 small factories and 400 distilleries by the end of the year. Although the government's labor plank included guarantees against exploitation, little progress was made in alleviating the harsh working conditions. The ministry of welfare and labor called attention to the violation of fair employment practices and ordered government inspectors to enforce the eight-hour work day, the prohibition of child labor, the procedures for dismissal, and other laws designed to protect the workers. Owners and managers were to be warned that failure to comply with these regulations would result in fines and prison terms of up to six months.²⁷ There is no evidence, however, that sentences of that type were ever imposed. Until 1920, labor unrest was limited to economic demands, which were usually couched in expressions of patriotism and loyalty. The Dashnaksutiun tried to keep abreast of the movement by patronizing the professional unions, but it soon became apparent that some of the workers in the railway center at Alexandropol and in the post-telegraph union had been radicalized beyond the control of their union leaders.²⁸

The unremitting struggle for survival obscured most of the small, positive achievements in the Republic. Yet, conditions had improved significantly by mid-1919. With temporary British backing, the Republic incorporated the district of Kars and the southern sector of the Erevan guberniia, expanding from less than 5,000 to more than 17,000 square miles and facilitating the repatriation of most Russian Armenian refugees.²⁹ While the communication and transportation routes were never fully secure, a thousand miles of roads were operative, several segments being upgraded for automobile traffic between Erevan and the district towns, and hundreds of miles of telegraph line were repaired and extended during the summer and autumn of 1919. The first intercity telephone link was opened with service between Erevan and Etchmiadzin. The Armenian Railway Administration, which

had begun to function in 1918 with 2 locomotives, 20 freight cars, and 5 miles of track, had expanded to more than 400 miles a year later, with 2 complete passenger trains, 32 locomotives, and some 500 freight cars and cisterns. Daily service was introduced on the Alexandropol-Kars and the Erevan-Tiflis runs, and in 1919 the volume of freight increased tenfold between January and July.³⁰

Unable to satisfy the land hunger, the agricultural administration was nonetheless one of the best staffed and organized departments of government. Functioning with divisions for agriculture, veterinary medicine, water resources, mountain resources, forestry, and state properties, the administration introduced a number of projects that would bring many long-range benefits if the Republic endured. Programs of horticultural instruction were developed, five field research stations and a school of agriculture were opened, a nationwide campaign of animal inoculation was launched and five of sixteen projected ambulatory stations were set up, breeding farms and model dairies were organized in Kars and Lori, workshops manufacturing simple farm implements were operated, and a comprehensive study was commissioned with the goals of harnessing the Zangu, Arpa, Kazakh, Garni, and Abaran rivers for hydro-electric energy and bringing an additional 200,000 desiatins (540,000 acres) of land under cultivation.³¹ A state campaign to plant every field in 1920 resulted in the purchase and distribution of 370,000 poods of seed-grain, which while far short of the projected goal was nonetheless sufficient to produce the largest wheat crop since the early years of the world war.³²

Small but significant gains were also registered in the other state ministries. Under the direction of the ministry of internal affairs, the municipal charters were liberalized and broad prerogatives were granted the city administrations in public works, enlightenment, local economy, and provisions. Rural self-administration through the medium of district and county assemblies had long been an objective of nearly all liberal and

revolutionary societies in the Caucasus, and after months of preparation the first elections for county zemstvos were held in January, 1920, in Erevan, Etchmiadzin, and Alexandropol.³³ In legal affairs, the ministry of justice had to begin the long process of reversing the deep-rooted popular aversion to the courts. Litigation in the Russian language, terrifying preliminary investigations, and the bleak prospect of gaining favorable decisions without influential intermediaries had kept most Armenians away from the courts. It was now necessary to nationalize the legal system and create a judicial hierarchy with courts of cassation and a supreme court. These had been organized by 1920, and in March, after weeks of preparation, Armenia's first trial by jury took place. The case was simple and the jury's verdict was swift in coming, but there was much ado about the event. The newspapers hailed it as a milestone in justice and Prime Minister Khatisian spoke in the courtroom of its significance in the evolution of a democratic republic. The actual legal proceedings were awkward and even amusing, as the prosecutor, public defender, and judges of the tribunal groped for the proper Armenian legal terms, but there was above all a sense of exhilaration. After centuries of submission to the courts and discriminatory regulations of alien governments, the Armenians had succeeded in introducing the jury system in their national language.³⁴

The ministry of public enlightenment and culture was headed by Nikol Aghbalian, a man of boundless optimism who planned to replace the old-style parochial school system with compulsory five-year elementary education based on a progressive curriculum. While the existing harsh realities did not permit the enrollment of all school-age children in 1919-1920, the 420 elementary schools had 38,000 pupils, and with the opening of new gymnasia at Erevan, Alexandropol, Dilijan, and Karakilisa the number of secondary schools increased to 22, with more than 5,000 students. Although these figures do not take into account the erratic operation or closure of some schools because of

lack of heating fuel or because of requisitions for hospitals and orphanages, they nonetheless stand in sharp contrast with the previous year's statistics of 135 elementary and 10 secondary schools, with a combined enrollment of 14,000. Adult literacy classes and people's universities were opened in several cities, and in January, 1920, the State University was inaugurated at Alexandropol, giving cause for new hope and celebration.³⁵

The Armenian republic had made noteworthy progress since the oppressive days of its creation. That this progress was only relative, however, was clearly reflected in a report of J. Oliver Wardrop, the British commissioner for Transcaucasia. After visiting Armenia in October, 1919, he wrote: "Erivan is more depressing than any place I have ever seen." Wardrop, an avid student of Georgian culture, nonetheless praised the dedication of the Armenian leaders and suggested that the Armenians had the qualities to overcome the obstacles if given half a chance. His report included the following appraisal:

After the comparative comfort of Tiflis and the positive luxury of Baku it was painful to see the misery of Armenia. Not only have the people reached the limit of physical privation and suffering, but their moral character has been put under a strain which has in many cases passed the breaking point, and in all has produced lamentable results which must last for a long time. I cannot wonder that our American friends hesitate to take the mandate for such a country where for many years no return seems likely for the financial and other aid indispensable to make human life tolerable. Yet the Armenian people have a stubborn power of resistance, an indomitable tendency to steady work..., so that they will certainly "make good" if they have any kind of chance.

They are not, perhaps, an easy people to get on with, especially at present; they are (according to some of themselves) generally devoid of anything like "charm," rather one-sided in their view, indisposed to admit they have any faults of character or conduct, excessively individualistic (not to say "egotistic"), but they are very clever, hardworking, thrifty, frugal people who cannot fail to achieve physical well-being and prosperity when an opportunity is given them. In any case, they have been faithful allies, and have fought with a bravery and endurance which must forever close the mouths of those who formerly slandered them, and said that it was their metier to be massacred unresistingly and

which justifies their claim to a free political life for which they have a decided aptitude.³⁶

Armenia's prospects for a free political life were dampened in 1920 by the failure to gain external assistance. The Western orientation of the government was predicated on the belief that the support of one or more of the Allied Powers was essential for the establishment of a viable, unified state. After months of vacillation, however, the United States finally rejected the Armenian mandate despite America's long record of humanitarian and religious involvement with the Armenians.³⁷ No other power would shoulder the obligation, so that when the European Allies began at long last to concentrate on the Turkish settlement in 1920 they had already discounted the possibility of including Cilicia and the western half of Turkish Armenia in the new state. In the meantime, Turkophile sentiment resurfaced among European colonial and mercantile circles, which warned of the dire economic consequences of a drastic partition of the Ottoman empire and of the unrest that such a policy would arouse in the Muslim-populated colonies. Jealous and suspicious of one another, the Allied governments were also gripped by internal dissension. When, for example, the Supreme Council granted recognition to the Transcaucasian republics in January, 1920, at British Foreign Secretary Curzon's urging and agreed to equip the Armenian army with surplus arms and equipment, the British War Office headed by Winston Churchill delayed delivery for more than six months in the belief that any material given the shaky Caucasian states would end up in Bolshevik or Turkish hands. Ironically, the War Office's calculated delays contributed in no small measure to the fulfillment of its own prediction.³⁸

While the Allied Powers proceeded with plans to partition the Ottoman empire without facing up to the fact that military enforcement of the terms would be required in Turkish Armenia, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) and other

Turkish resistance leaders sought Soviet support in the struggle against the common enemies. Soviet leaders, in their turn, recognized the potential role that Turkish influence would play in stirring the Muslim colonial world against the Western powers and thereby saving the Bolshevik revolution and the Soviet state. Preliminary contact had already been made through the deposed Ittihad (Young Turk) leaders who had taken refuge in Germany and the Caucasus. Although Kemal considered the Ittihad clique headed by Enver and Talat to be his political foes, he did not hesitate to use their good offices in efforts to draw Soviet Russia into the Turkish struggle for political survival. Kemal and General Kazim Karabekir, the army commander at Erzerum, also dispatched their own agents to contact the Bolshevik underground in Baku with the goal of creating a land bridge between Russia and Turkey. This was to be achieved by placing Azerbaijan in the Soviet sphere, neutralizing Georgia, and crushing Armenia. In Azerbaijan, the dominant Musavat party aspired to permanent national independence but was not immune to Turkish pressure and influence. Several thousand Turkish officers and civilians served in that republic as military cadre, teachers, civil servants, and police officials. Moreover, Ittihad fugitives such as Halil Pasha (Kut), Nuri Pasha (Conker) and Küçük Talat were treated as honored guests. Their role in the sovietization of Azerbaijan was not insignificant.³⁹

The collapse of the White Armies in South Russia brought direct communication between Soviet Russia and Nationalist Turkey a giant step closer. In a message to Kemal at the beginning of 1920, Foreign Commissar Grigorii Chicherin reportedly welcomed the imminent linkage and encouraged the Nationalists to prepare for military action along their southern and eastern frontiers. Kemal wrote his military commanders that the Nationalists had now gained effective leverage against the Allied Powers, for unless those governments made major concessions the Nationalists would ally with Soviet Russia and thereby open the floodgates to Anatolia, the Arab provinces, Persia,

Afghanistan, India, and beyond. Allied recognition of the Transcaucasian states, Kemal continued, was a futile but dangerous attempt to erect a barrier between Russia and Turkey. The scheme would be thwarted, however, by the use of Turkish influence in Azerbaijan and, if necessary, by joint Soviet-Turkish action against any of the Caucasian peoples who refused to cooperate.⁴⁰

In April, after the Nationalist counter-government of the Grand National Assembly had been organized at Angora (Ankara), Kemal wrote Chicherin to acknowledge Soviet Russia as a champion of all peoples subjected to the yoke of colonialism and to give assurances of Turkish support in the struggle against the imperialist powers. In the Caucasus, once Russia had gained sway over Georgia and brought about the expulsion of the last remaining British garrison at Batum, the Nationalists would begin military operations against "the imperialist Armenian government" and exert pressure on Azerbaijan to enter the Soviet state union. To hasten effective collaboration against the foreign interventionists, Soviet Russia should supply the Nationalists with arms, food, technical assistance, and financial aid, including an initial installment of 5 million gold liras.⁴¹

Events were already unfolding swiftly in Transcaucasia. Having decided to sovietize Azerbaijan and having used the good offices of influential Turks such as Halil Pasha in preparation for the near bloodless coup, the Russian government ordered the Red Army to advance across the frontier on the night of April 27/28, 1920. By dawn the first echelons had entered Baku aboard armored trains, drawing the great petroleum center back into the Russian sphere. Armenian reaction to Azerbaijan's sovietization was not all unfavorable. In fact, many Armenians welcomed the change, reasoning that the Christian minority in eastern Transcaucasia would be safer under any form of Russian rule than under the previous oppressive Musavat regime. Some Armenian

officials even believed that the Soviet leaders could be persuaded that a united, independent Armenia would be in the best interests of Russia itself. An Armenian mission departed for Moscow on April 30 to propose a treaty of friendship based on Soviet recognition of the independence of the Armenian republic, inclusive of Karabagh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan, acceptance in principle of the goal of a united Armenian state, and permission for Armenian refugees in Russia to emigrate with all their movable belongings to the Caucasus.⁴²

The three-man delegation of Levon Shant, Hambardzum Terterian, and Levon Zarafian arrived in Moscow on May 20 and soon began discussions with Foreign Commissar Chicherin and Assistant Commissar Lev Karakhan. The two officials gave assurances that Soviet Russia had no desire to subvert the Armenian government and would assent to the transfer of the refugees to Armenia. The Armenian republic, they agreed, should include the disputed territories of Zangezur and Nakhichevan, while the fate of Karabagh could be decided through arbitration or plebiscite. Armenia, on the other hand, should recognize the need for Soviet Russia and Nationalist Turkey to collaborate against the Western imperialists and should desist from any measures that might hinder communication and cooperation between the two revolutionary movements. Chicherin implied that at least a part of Turkish Armenia should be included in the Armenian republic and offered Soviet mediation in bringing about an equitable settlement with the Turkish Nationalists. Encouraged by the cordial reception and swift pace of the discussions, the Shant delegation wired the Erevan government on June 10 that agreement in principle had been reached on the major issues and all that remained was the need to work out the details and give substance to the treaty.⁴³

The anticipated treaty, however, did not materialize. The delay of a positive response from Erevan may have been attributable to difficulties in

communication but possibly also to the Armenian government's concern that the premature announcement of a friendship treaty with Soviet Russia might adversely affect the disposition of the Allied Powers, which had recently determined that the Armenian republic should be awarded most of the Ottoman provinces of Trebizond, Erzerum, Bitlis, and Van. But there was more to the Soviet decision to interrupt the negotiations and insist upon their continuation in Erevan. A Nationalist delegation was en route from Angora with proposals for a Soviet-Turkish alliance, the new Soviet Azerbaijani government bitterly opposed any modus vivendi that would give Nakhichevan, Zangezur, and possibly even Mountainous Karabagh to Armenia, and Armenian comrades such as Anastas Mikoyan and Avis Nurijanian had intensified their denunciations of the Erevan government before the party leaders in Moscow.⁴⁴ A bloody Dashnakist reign of terror, the Caucasian comrades claimed, had been unleashed against Bolsheviks and their sympathizers who had supported the attempted coup d'état known as the May rebellion. The subject of extensive literature, intense controversy, and significant historical reevaluation, the May uprising and its background can be presented here only in concise, simplified form.

Throughout 1919 the Bolshevik organizations in the Caucasus had been torn by dissension over the problem of nationalism. The Baku comrades were among the first to suggest that the most effective way to break the grip of the dominant petty bourgeois parties was to accommodate national sentiment by calling for the creation of a Soviet Azerbaijani republic--and by inference, Georgian and Armenian Soviet republics--federated with Russia. Most veteran Bolsheviks in Georgia and Armenia, having vociferously denounced Musavat, Menshevik, and Dashnakist separatism, branded the proposal as a repugnant ideological deviation. The protracted controversy was ultimately decided in favor of the Baku position, as Lenin and the central committee concurred that

revolutionary labors in the de facto border states would be greatly facilitated through advocacy of separate Soviet republics and even separate national party organizations joined at the regional level as affiliates of the Russian Communist Party.⁴⁵

In contrast with Azerbaijan, Armenia had no significant proletariat or any of the objective conditions considered necessary for a Marxist revolution. The country was overwhelmingly agrarian and had been so terribly devastated that even veteran Bolsheviks such as Arshavir Melikian argued that, instead of militant revolutionary activity, there should be a long period of peaceful agitation and education of the masses. While the younger Communists repudiated their teachers and demanded the immediate overthrow of the Dashnakist "lackeys of imperialism," Bolshevism did not gain a significant following in Armenia before 1920.⁴⁶ In fact, when the Georgian Mensheviks cracked down on their Marxist competitors, the Armenian government granted haven to many Armenian Communists and provided them employment as teachers and civil servants. This influx in 1919, together with the efforts of professional cadre sent by the party's regional committee produced a loose organizational network, with the auto and rail garages in Alexandropol becoming the most active link. Still, at the end of the year, there were, according to Soviet statistics, fewer than 500 Bolsheviks in all Armenia.⁴⁷ During the first party conference at Erevan in January, 1920, the twenty-two participants restructured the Armenia Committee (Armenkom) of the Russian Communist Party and charged it with the responsibility of coordinating preparatory measures to overthrow the government. Resolutions and exhortations aside, most local Bolsheviks continued to believe that success could be achieved only with the supportive intervention of the Red Army. The Armenkom's own behavior between January and May reflected this attitude, in deed if not in word.⁴⁸

The sovietization of Azerbaijan in late April and the approach of the

Red Army toward the Armenian frontiers excited and emboldened the Bolsheviks. By that time, some elements of the army and citizenry had been radicalized because of the Allied failure to extend measurable political and military support, the inability of the government to meet the basic needs of the populace, the repressive actions of politically-inspired bands, and the general fatigue of many Eastern Armenians and their yearning for a return to normalcy under the accustomed wing of Russia. During the May Day celebrations in Erevan, the Dashnakist-organized meetings were countered by Bolshevik orators and marchers, while in Alexandropol a public rally turned into an angry manifestation of anti-Dashnakist and anti-governmental sentiment. Securing the neutrality or tacit sympathy of the local army garrison, the Alexandropol Bolsheviks seized the railway station on May 2 and organized the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia (Revkom) there five days later. Then, on May 10, the Revkom declared Armenia a Soviet republic and the "Dashnak government of mauserist and imperialist speculators" liquidated.⁴⁹

Disturbances of lesser proportions and shorter durations also occurred at Sarikamish, Kars, Dilijan, Nor-Bayazit, and several other towns and villages. Yet, the conspirators did not act with the requisite resolve and aggressiveness. The Armenkom in Erevan was caught off guard by the Alexandropol rising and failed to respond decisively to the unexpected situation. Even the more militant Revkom assumed a basically defensive stance, not venturing out of its armored-train headquarters or taking advantage of the friendly disposition of the Russian Molokan and Muslim villages around Alexandropol. The inability of either the Armenkom or the Revkom to provide clear direction and to capitalize on the temporary confusion of the government made suppression of the movement inevitable. On the night of May 13/14, loyal troops and Turkish Armenian partisan units moved into Alexandropol, dispersing

the Revkom. Several rebel leaders were executed, and many more fled to Baku. But the Armenian Bolsheviks had received the baptism of fire and contributed a small pantheon of martyrs, memorialized in Soviet literature and monuments.⁵⁰

The May revolt resulted in widespread demoralization within the country and loss of trust and prestige abroad. The gradual, evolutionary policies of Alexandre Khatisian were discredited, and on May 5 his cabinet was replaced by the entire Bureau of the Dashnaktsutiun. The Bureau justified its violation of the restrictions imposed upon it by the party's world congress on grounds that the very existence of the Republic was in jeopardy. The loyalty of all non-Bolshevik parties during the uprising and the spirit of unity in the celebrations marking the Republic's second anniversary strengthened the Bureau's position. During the summer of 1920, Hamazasp Ohandjanian's Bureau-government drove the Bolsheviks underground or out of the country and turned the regular army and Turkish Armenian detachments against the previously defiant Muslim-populated districts from Zangibasar and Vedibasar in the vicinity of Erevan to Sharur in the lower Araxes river valley.⁵¹ The triumphant sweep to the south, after two years of a policy of containment, vindicated Ruben Ter-Minasian's position in the eyes of many previous skeptics. But if patriotic dictatorship was the answer to Armenia's problems, there was not enough time to prove the experiment. Turkish preparations for war had been in progress since early summer, and in September, 1920, shortly after the first round of direct Soviet-Nationalist negotiations, Mustafa Kemal gave the order to attack.

The strain in Armenian-Soviet relations after the May rebellion contributed to the interruption of the negotiations in Moscow. At the beginning of July, Chicherin informed Shant that Boris V. Legran, an official of the foreign affairs commissariat, was assigned to resume the parleys in Erevan and to do whatever possible to resolve the disputes between Armenia and its neighbors.

Legran soon entrained for Baku, accompanied by Halil Pasha, who had been pleading the Nationalist case in Moscow and was returning with a large Soviet consignment of gold to be delivered in Anatolia. It was not until early August that Shant's delegation was able to procure transportation to the south and not until mid-September that the Armenian envoys returned tardily to Erevan. Meanwhile, Soviet-Turkish negotiations were being conducted in Moscow.⁵²

Mustafa Kemal and other leaders of the Grand National Assembly were gratified by the Soviet disposition to extend military and financial assistance but were wary of the political ramifications. While Chicherin's messages praised the heroic Turkish struggle for independence and welcomed cooperation against the imperialist powers, they also implied that the fate of areas of mixed Armenian, Kurdish, Laz, and Turkish habitation in the eastern provinces should be regulated on the basis of the prewar population and the principle of self-determination, taking into account all those people who had been forced to flee. The Soviet government was prepared to serve as a mediator in attaining a just and equitable boundary settlement between Turkey, Armenia, and Persia.⁵³ In May, a Turkish delegation headed by Foreign Commissar Bekir Sami Bey departed for Moscow to deal with such complications and, more importantly, to formalize relations and hasten the shipment of desperately needed arms and currency.⁵⁴

During the negotiations, which began shortly after Bekir Sami's arrival on July 19, Chicherin and Karakhan readily offered Soviet military and financial aid and concurred that a landbridge between Russia and Turkey should be created quickly. Karakhan revealed that the XIth Red Army was already under orders to occupy the Karabagh-Nakhichevan corridor. The Soviet officials nonetheless urged the Angora government to resolve the Armenian question, which had aroused worldwide concern, by assenting to a frontier rectification that

would give the Armenians the districts of Van, Bitlis, and Mush and allow Turkey to occupy the strategic mountain passes near Sarikamish. A mixed commission could determine the exact boundaries and facilitate the work of repatriation and any exchanges of population. Adamantly refusing to make territorial concessions for promises of material assistance, Bekir Sami only agreed to apprise his government of Chicherin's suggestions. He maintained that Soviet aid should be dispatched immediately as a sign of good faith and that a preliminary treaty on non-territorial issues should be concluded. This position was supported by Stalin, who was unsympathetic toward the Armenian case, and by Lenin, whose main concerns at that time were the difficulties on the Crimean and Polish fronts and the broader question of relations with the West.⁵⁵

Hence, on August 24, two weeks after the Sultan's plenipotentiaries in Paris had signed the Treaty of Sevres, which required Turkey to recognize the independence of Armenia and to cede to it the eastern border provinces, a draft Soviet-Turkish accord was initialed in Moscow. All previous treaties between Russia and Turkey were declared null and void, Russia would decline to recognize any international act not ratified by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and both sides were to make every effort to open an unobstructed avenue between the two countries for the flow of men and matériel. Other provisions related to trade and transit, the status of nationals of one country living in the other, and future diplomatic relations. Separate protocols on Soviet military and economic aid were also prepared. Yusuf Kemal (Tengirsek), a member of the Turkish delegation, carried the treaty, together with the first of a promised five million gold rubles, to Trebizond. From that Black Sea port, he wired the terms to Angora on September 18. In their reports to Mustafa Kemal, Bekir Sami and Yusuf Kemal drew attention to the reserved attitude of Chicherin and Karakhan but added that Lenin was sympathetic and

had given the impression that once the threats from Poland and General Wrangel had been eliminated, Russia would assume a more aggressive role in the Caucasus.⁵⁶ Two days after receiving the terms of the draft treaty, Mustafa Kemal authorized General Karabekir to begin the offensive against Armenia. This was the theater chosen by the Nationalist leaders to impress upon the world their rejection of the Treaty of Sevres.⁵⁷

Capturing the border posts and Sarikamish by the end of September, Karabekir then coordinated the campaign against Kars. According to military specialists, the mighty fortress city could withstand a lengthy siege, but in one of the worst military fiascos in Armenian history, Kars fell amidst uncontrollable panic and desertion on October 30, 1920. The Armenian will to resist had been broken, and by November 6 the Turks had advanced into Alexandropol, forcing Ohandjanian's government to accept a truce based on the Brest-Litovsk boundaries and permitting Turkish occupation of Alexandropol and its environs. Additional Turkish demands on November 8 for the surrender of large quantities of arms and matériel and for control of the entire railway from Alexandropol to Julfa elicited a final desperate defense effort, but within a week Armenia was compelled to acquiesce. Alexandre Khatisian departed for Alexandropol to begin negotiations with Karabekir Pasha for an Armeno-Turkish treaty of peace.⁵⁸

Despite the need for a Russo-Turkish alliance, the Soviet government viewed the Turkish offensive with apprehension and tried unsuccessfully to halt the fighting through its good offices. The resulting friction did not obscure the desirability for cooperation with Turkey, however, and preparations to dispatch additional arms and money to Anatolia were not interrupted. Meanwhile, on October 11, Boris Legran and his Soviet mission finally arrived in Erevan to resume negotiations with the Shant delegation. Previously, Legran had been denied entry into Armenia pending Shant's return from Moscow. This

had not, however, prevented communication between the two sides, and on August 10, Armenian envoys Arshak Djamalian and Artashes Babalian concluded an accord with Legran in Tiflis. Armenia accepted the provisional Red Army occupation of Zangezur and Nakhichevan, whereas Soviet Russia acknowledged the independence and sovereignty of the Armenian republic and assented to its administration of the railway running from Erevan through Nakhichevan to Julfa. The guidelines for resolving the Armeno-Azerbaijani territorial disputes would be included in the forthcoming treaty to be negotiated in Erevan between Legran and Shant.⁵⁹ Ironically, Armenia's acquiescence in the encroachment of the Red Army came on the same day that Avetis Aharonian affixed his signature to the Treaty of Sèvres, creating united, independent Armenia-- at least on paper.⁶⁰

Even though Shant returned to Erevan on September 14, Legran did not arrive there until October 11, two weeks after the Turkish offensive had begun. Conditions had changed so drastically that he now called upon the Armenian government to renounce the Sèvres treaty, permit the free movement of men and supplies between Turkey and Soviet Russia and Azerbaijan, and seek Russian mediation in the conflict with Turkey. The Red Army, Legran urged, should be invited to protect the country. Unwilling to turn away from the long-sought European solution to the Armenian question or to condone foreign military occupation, Ohandjanian's cabinet nonetheless did accept the offer of friendly intercession. Moreover, according to terms of the draft treaty signed by Legran and Shant on October 28, Soviet Russia was to relinquish all sovereign rights over the former Russian Armenian provinces and influence Turkey to bring about the union of a part of Turkish Armenia with the Armenian republic. The status of Mountainous Karabagh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan was to be settled by mutual concessions or plebiscite. Russia was to have free transit privileges through Armenia and, if Zangezur and Nakhichevan were awarded to Armenia, was

to be granted telegraph, radio, and other facilities to maintain communication with friendly or allied governments.⁶¹ When Legran put the draft treaty before the Communist party's Caucasian Bureau (Kavburo) in Baku, serious objections and reservations were expressed. Since Kars had now fallen and there was no time for consultations in Moscow, Legran returned to Erevan to demand Armenia's sovietization. Comrade Budu Mdivani accompanied him to serve as the Soviet mediator in the Armenian-Turkish conflict, but General Karabekir summarily rejected the attempted intercession.⁶²

Defeated and discredited, Armenia's Bureau-government gave way on November 23 to a coalition headed by Simon Vratzian. To that last cabinet fell the heavy obligation to conclude peace and preserve the physical existence of the Armenian people at almost any price. Still, for a few days, Vratzian tried to persuade Legran that sovietization would invite greater tragedy, since Armenia would be blockaded by Georgia and deprived of external economic aid at a time when Russia itself was gripped by famine. Renunciation of the Sèvres treaty, moreover, would be tantamount to a sentence of death on the Armenian question, bringing to nought the untold sacrifices in the national movement for emancipation. On November 30, Legran announced that the decision to sovietize Armenia was irreversible. He demanded that Armenia break all bonds with the Western imperialists and unite with the Russian workers and peasants.⁶³ A few Armenian Bolsheviks had already crossed the frontier on November 29 from Azerbaijan into Karvansarai (Ichevan), where they proclaimed Armenia a Soviet republic and appealed for the intervention of the Red Army.⁶⁴

In these circumstances, Vratzian's government bowed to the inevitable and appointed Dro Kanayan and Hambardzum Terterian to arrange for the transfer of power. The treaty signed by Legran and the Armenian representatives on December 2 gave some ground for hope. Armenia became an independent Soviet

socialist republic, and Soviet Russia acknowledged as indisputable parts of that state all lands that had been under the jurisdiction of the Armenian government prior to the Turkish invasion, Zangezur included. Russia was to take immediate steps to furnish the requisite military force to consolidate and defend the republic. Neither the army command nor members of the Dashnaktsutium and other socialist parties were to be persecuted for their previous activities. Power would pass temporarily to a military revolutionary committee composed of five members appointed by the Communist party and two left wing Dashnakist members, selected with the approval of the Communist party. Until that body was organized, the government would be entrusted to Dro, the military commander, and to comrade Otto A. Selin, the plenipotentiary of Soviet Russia.⁶⁵ For the government of independent Armenia, all that remained was to issue its final decree: "In view of the general situation in the land created by external circumstances, the government of the Republic of Armenia, in its session of December 2, 1920, decided to resign from office and to relinquish all military and political authority to Dro, the commander in chief, now appointed as minister of war."⁶⁶

The announcement of Armenia's sovietization did not remove the Turkish menace, since Karabekir threatened to resume the offensive unless his government's peace terms were accepted forthwith. Those terms obliged Armenia to renounce the Treaty of Sevres and all claims to Turkish Armenia and the province of Kars, to accept temporary Turkish jurisdiction in Sharur-Nakhichevan, to recall all representatives from Europe until the Angora government had settled its differences with those adversary states, and to reduce the size of the Armenian army to 1,500 men. In case of need, Turkey would extend military assistance to the remaining small Armenian state. Only after all these terms had been fulfilled would the Turkish army withdraw from the Alexandropol region and establish the Arpachai river as the new

international frontier. Even though his government had officially relinquished power, Khatisian signed the Treaty of Alexandropol (Gümrü) shortly after midnight on December 2.⁶⁷ Denounced and branded a traitor by Soviet and other non-Dashnakist authors, Khatisian justified his action as an exigency measure taken with the knowledge of the new Erevan government and intended to give time for the Red Army to enter Armenia in sufficient numbers to block a further Turkish advance. Realizing that he had no legal jurisdiction, Khatisian hoped that the new Soviet government, with the support of Russia, would repudiate his action and force the Turks to withdraw at least to the prewar boundaries.⁶⁸ As it turned out, these calculations proved ill-founded. The efforts of the Soviet Armenian government to recover a part of the lost territories were supported only with mild diplomatic notes by Soviet Russia, which proceeded toward normalization of relations with the Angora government.⁶⁹

The Military Revolutionary Committee of Armenia arrived in Erevan on December 4, followed two days later by the first echelons of the Red Army. The Revkom, dominated by young, vindictive Bolsheviki, immediately repudiated the treaty negotiated between Legran and the former Armenian government on December 2 and initiated an aggressive course of war communism. Hundreds of former government officials and non-Bolshevik political leaders were imprisoned, the army officer corps was exiled, and a harsh regime of retribution and requisition was imposed. These oppressive policies, coupled with the trenchant anti-Russian and anti-Bolshevik sentiment of the Turkish Armenian refugee population and the collusion of some Dashnakist partisan leaders, produced a surge of rebellion in February, 1921. The Revkom was driven out of Erevan and a so-called Salvation Committee was swiftly organized under Vratzian's presidency to coordinate the movement sweeping the countryside.⁷⁰

Not until Georgia had been sovietized in March were sufficient Red Army reinforcements brought in to suppress the revolt. In April the Salvation Committee and thousands of insurgents and civilians withdrew into Zangezour,

where the battle was continued until a reorganized Soviet Armenian government issued an amnesty and gave reassurances regarding the future status of Zangezur and Karabagh. Lenin had already chided his Caucasian comrades for their overzealousness and advised that conditions in the local republics necessitated a "slower, more careful, and more systematic transition to socialism."⁷¹

Alexandre Miasnikian (Miasnikov, Martuni), a trusted veteran party professional, was transferred from the European theater to head the Armenian government.

In July, 1921, as Miasnikian began to implement the more cautious measures of the New Economic Policy, thousands of anti-Bolshevik rebels and bewildered civilians crossed the Araxes into Iran to begin the bitter lives reserved for expatriates and exiles.⁷²

On the international front, Soviet Russia sacrificed the Armenian question to cement the Turkish alliance. Having rejected all attempts at mediation, Mustafa Kemal even made a play to occupy Batum and the border districts of Akhaltsikh and Akhalkalak in Georgia. The maneuver, apparently intended to win additional concessions regarding Armenia, bore results.⁷³ By the Treaty of Moscow (March, 1921), which established normal relations and friendship between Soviet Russia and the Angora government, Turkey dropped its claims to Batum and the other districts in return for Russian abandonment of attempts to redeem for Soviet Armenia the Surmalu district of Erevan. In that sector, the new Turkish boundary was extended to the Araxes river, thus incorporating the fertile Igdird plain and Mount Ararat. What was more, the treaty provided that Sharur-Nakhichevan would not be attached to Soviet Armenia but would instead be constituted as an autonomous region under Soviet Azerbaijan, even though it was separated from eastern Transcaucasia by intervening Armenian territory.⁷⁴ Whatever qualms Chicherin and Karakhan might still have had were sublimated to the decisive support the Turkish delegation received from V. I. Stalin.⁷⁵ As stipulated by the Treaty of

Moscow, almost identical terms were included in the Treaty of Kars (October, 1921) between Turkey and the three Transcaucasian Soviet republics.⁷⁶ Described by a purged Soviet historian as one of the most oppressive and ignominious treaties in the annals of history,⁷⁷ that document clamped the lid on the Armenian question and locked Soviet Armenia within its limited existing territory. The European Powers put their own seal on the Armenian question two years later by renegotiating the Treaty of Sevres. The Turkish victory in the resultant Lausanne treaties was so thorough that neither the word "Armenia" nor "Armenian" was allowed to appear anywhere in the texts. It was bitterly ironic for the Armenians that, of the several defeated Central Powers, Turkey alone expanded beyond its prewar boundaries and this, only on the Armenian front.

The brief interlude of Armenian independence had ended. Born of desperation and hopelessness, the Republic lacked the resources to solve its awesome domestic and international problems. Yet, within a few months it had become the fulcrum of national aspirations for revival, unification, and perpetuity. Limitations and shortcomings aside, the rudiments of government were created and organic development did occur. The failure to achieve permanent independence left a worldwide Armenian dispersion burdened with unrequited grief, frustration, and resentment. Nonetheless, the Republic of Armenia was superseded by the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, where a part of the nation would strive to etch a place in the sun. The light was often obscured during the subsequent years of toil and tribulation, but the transition to contemporary Soviet society was finally made. Yet, however different the organs of government and the structure of society in the 1980's, the heritage of the actions and the attitudes of the 1917-1921 era still asserts itself forcefully in Soviet Armenia today.

FOOTNOTES

1. M. H. Adonts, Hayastani zhoghovrdakan tntesutiune ev hai tntesagitakan mitke XX dari skzbin [The popular economy of Armenia and Armenian economic thought at the beginning of the twentieth century] (Erevan, 1968), pp. 273-279; A. Shakhmatuni, Administrativnyi peredel Zakavkazskago kraia (Tiflis, 1918), pp. 61-73; Ronald Grigor Suny, The Baku Commune, 1917-1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution (Princeton, 1972), p. 7. See also United States, The National Archives, Record Group 256, File 867B.00, Documents 4, 10, 11, 23, (RG 256, 867B.00/4/10/11/23).
2. Richard G. Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), pp. 40-93; Djon Kirakosian, Zapadnaia Armeniia v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny (Erevan, 1971); V. Arzumanian, Hayastan, 1914-1917 [Armenia, 1914-1917] (Erevan, 1969); Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSR, Razdel Aziatskoi Turtsii po sekretnym dokumentam b. ministerstva inostrannykh del, ed. by E. A. Adamov (Moscow, 1924).
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5. Melville Chater, "The Land of Stalking Death," National Geographic Magazine, XXXVI (Nov., 1919), 393-420. See also Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia, I (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1971), 126-144, and US Archives, RG 59, File 867.48 passim, and RG 256, File 867.00 passim.

6. See Richard G. Hovannisian, "Dimensions of Democracy and Authority in Caucasian Armenia," The Russian Review, XXXIII (Jan., 1974), 37-49.

7. Hovannisian, Road to Independence, pp. 216-238; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 74/1, H. H. patvirakutiun ev divanagitakan nerkayatsutschutiun Tajkastanum, 1914-1918 t.t. [R. of A. delegation and diplomatic mission in Turkey, 1914-1918], File 100/1, H. H. patvirakutiun, 1918: H. Ohandjaniani tghtere [R. of A. delegation, 1918: H. Ohandjanian's papers, 1918], and File 353, H. H. Berlini nerkayatsutschutiun, 1918-1919 [R. of A. Berlin mission, 1918-1919].

8. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., pp. 128-146; Suny, op. cit., pp. 259-352.

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10. Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, Vol. C (1917), col. 2222. See also Richard G. Hovannisian, "The Allies and Armenia, 1915-18," Journal of Contemporary History, III (Jan., 1968), 145-155; Artin H. Arslanian, "British Wartime Pledges, 1917-1918: The Armenian Case," Journal of Contemporary History, XIII (July, 1978), 517-530.

11. United States, Department of State, Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: The Paris Peace Conference, 13 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1942-1947), III, 785-786, 795-796, cited hereafter as Paris Peace Conference.

12. Materials on the Mudros Armistice and its bearing on the Armenians are included in the following representative sources: Great Britain, Cabinet Office Archives, Cab 23/8, Minutes 480(2), 484(3), 486(2), 488(4), 492(9), and Cab 24/67, G.T. 6068 and 6069; Foreign Office Archives, FO 371/5259, E5732/53732/44 War Office Archives, 106/645, "Execution of the Armistice with Turkey;" Great Britain, Committee on Imperial Defence, Historical Section, History of the Great War: Naval Operations, Volume V, prepared by Henry Newbolt (London, 1931), 351-357, 418-421; The Times History of the War, XX (London, 1919), 101-104; Hovannisian, Republic, pp. 55-57; Ali Türkgeldi, Moudros ve Mudanya mütarekelerinin tarihi [History of the Mudros and Mudania Armistices] (Ankara, 1948), pp. 27-73; Frederick Maurice, The Armistice of 1918 (London, 1943), pp. 17-20, 85-87; Gwynne Dyer, "The Turkish Armistice of 1918," Middle Eastern Studies, VIII (nos. 2-3, 1972), 143-178, 313-348.

13. For the background and political and economic platforms of the Armenian political societies, see, for example, Louise Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963); Mikayel Varandian H. H. Dashnaktsutian patmutiun [History of the A. R. Federation] (Paris and Cairo, 1932-1950), 2 vols.; Davit Ananun, Rusahayeri hasarakakan zargatsume [The social development of the Russian Armenians], III, 1901-1918 (Venice, 1926); Arsham Khondkarian, "Opozitsian Hanrapetakan Hayastanum" [The opposition in republican Armenia], Vem, I (nos. 1-2, 1933), 63-82, 68-79, and II (nos. 1, 3, 4, 1934), 76-97, 42-60, 73-95; Vahan Minakhorian, "Andjatakannere" [The Secessionists], Vem, I (nos. 1-2, 1933), 100-111, 90-107; Adonts, op. cit., pp. 302-429.

14. Hovannisian, Republic, pp. 459-468; Zhoghovurd (Erevan), June, 1919; Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Armenii--Armianskii Filial Instituta

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20. Ibid., pp. 78-92, 156-196.

21. Ibid., pp. 360-364, 373-376; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 3/3, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1919 t. [Republic of Armenia, 1919], File 20/20, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1920 t. [Republic of Armenia, 1920], File 71, H. H. nerkayatsutsich Haravayin Rusastani zinial uzheri mot, 1919 t.--1920/21 t. [R. of A. representative to the Armed Forces of South Russia, 1919-1920/21]; and File 373, H. H. patvirakutiun ev rusakan nakhkin nerkayatsutsichner, 1919-1922 [R. of A. delegation and the former Russian representatives, 1919-1922]; Avetis Aharonian,

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57. Karabekir, op. cit., p. 887. Disagreements among the Turkish leaders regarding the most suitable time to attack Armenia are discussed and documented in Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 714-718, 727-731, 764, 766, 769-772, 776-777, 878, 856-857, 860; Hikmet Bayur, "Kuvay-i milliye devrinde Atatürk'ün dış siyaset ile ilgili bazı görüş ve davranışları" [Some views and attitudes concerning Ataturk's foreign policy during the period of the national liberation forces], Belleten, XX (Oct., 1956), 667-678, 683-684, 692-696; Türk Inkilap Tarihi Enstitüsü, Atatürk'ün söylev ve demeçleri [Ataturk's speeches and statements], I (Ankara, 1945), 89-99.

58. K. Sasuni, Hai-trkakan paterazme [The Armeno-Turkish war] (Beirut, 1969); Vratzian, Hanrapetutiun, pp. 413-436, 501-508; Artashes Babalian, "Karsi ankume" [The fall of Kars], Hairenik Amsagir, I (Oct., 1923), 52-68; Hakob Ter-Hakobian, Hayastani verdjin aghete [Armenia's last tragedy] (Constantinople, 1921); Khatisian, op. cit., pp. 245-253; Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 887-902.

59. Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 17/17; Velikaia revoliutsiia, pp. 384-385; Alikhanian, op. cit., pp. 118-127. Turkish officials were dissatisfied that the agreement had left control of the railway to the Armenians. They complained that this prevented unhindered communication between the Soviets and the Nationalists. During the Moscow negotiations, Bekir Sami raised the issue and subsequently reported that Lenin had concurred that this aspect of the August 10 agreement was faulty and needed rectification. See Bayur, op. cit., pp. 679-681; Cebesoy, op. cit., pp. 68-69, 73-74; Biyiklioglu, op. cit., p. 70.

60. For an official published version of the Turkish peace settlement, see Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Treaty Series no. 11, "Treaty of Peace with Turkey, signed at Sevres 10th August 1920," Parliamentary Papers (Accounts and Papers), Cmd. 964 (London, 1920).

61. Esayan, op. cit., pp. 110-117, 132-137; Alikhanian, op. cit., pp. 138-145; Vratzian, Hanrapetutiun, pp. 411-412, and Murji ev sali midjev, pp. 162-164; Terterian, op. cit. (Autumn, 1955), pp. 94-99; Djon S. Kirakosian, ed. Hayastani midjazgayin divanagitutian ev Sovetakan artakin kaghakakanutian pastatghterum (1828-1929) [Armenia in the diplomatic documents of international diplomacy and Soviet foreign policy, 1828-1923] (Erevan, 1972), pp. 457-458. The non-Soviet sources are apparently inaccurate in giving the date of the draft treaty as October 21.

62. Alikhanian, op. cit., pp. 172-177; Vratzian, Hanrapetutiun, p. 436; S. Kuznetsova, "Krakh turetskoi interventsii v Zakavkaz'e v 1920-1921 godakh," Voprosy istorii (no. 9, 1951), pp. 146; S. V. Kharmandarian, "K voprosu ob ustanovlenii sovetskoi vlasti v Armenia," Istoricheskii arkhiv (no. 6, 1958), pp. 99-105; Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, III, 325, 674 n.50; Kirakosian, op. cit., pp. 458-459. Mdivani, who became the Soviet diplomatic representative in Turkey in February, 1921, assertedly explained to Turkish officials that the attempted Soviet mediation was for propaganda purposes in the West and that it

was never seriously believed or even desired that the Turks should give land to the Armenians. See Bayur, op. cit., pp. 682-683. See also Cebesoy, op. cit., pp. 117-119; Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, III, 469.

63. Vratzian, Murji ev sali midjev, pp. 173-184, and "Hushner motik antsialits" [Memories from the recent past], Hairenik Amsagir, II (Nov. 1923), 82-85; Alikhanian, op. cit., pp. 167-170.

64. Velikaia revoliutsiia, pp. 429-434; Alikhanian, op. cit., pp. 178-197; Revoliutsion kocher, pp. 573-578; Komkusi urvagdsar, pp. 305-309; Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, III, 346-348.

65. Iu. V. Kliuchnikov and A. V. Sabanin, Mezhdunarodnaia politika noveishego vremeni v dogovorakh, notakh i deklaratsiakh, III, pt. 2 (Moscow, 1929), 41-42; Velikaia revoliutsiia, pp. 438-442; Vratzian, Hanrapetutium, pp. 438-439; Terterian, op. cit., pp. 100-102; Borian, op. cit., pp. 295-296.

66. Vratzian, Murdji ev sali midjev, p. 188; Oliver Baldwin, Six Prisons and Two Revolutions (London, 1926), photocopy facing p. 32.

67. Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 11/11, Hayastani Hanrapetutium, 1920 t. [Republic of Armenia, 1920], and File 17/17; Poidebard, op. cit., pp. 70-77; Alikhanian, op. cit., pp. 219-235; Kliuchnikov and Sabanin, op. cit., pp. 71-73, 75-76; Gotthard Jäschke, "Der türkisch-armenische Friedensvertrag von Gümrü (Alexandropol)," Die Welt des Islams, n.s., II (no. 1, 1952), pp. 25-37.

68. Khatisian, op. cit., pp. 270-271; Vratzian, "Husher," pp. 96-97.

69. See Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, III, 378-379, 392-396, 397, 452-454, 468, 469, 484-487, 487-488, 507-508; Kirakosian, op. cit., pp. 462-463, 465-467, 485-490, 493-496; Kharmandarian, op. cit., pp. 100-105; Jäschke, "Friedensvertrag," pp. 37-46; Atatürk'ün soylev ve demeçleri, pp. 129-133; Alikhanian, op. cit., pp. 235-252.

70. Baldwin, op. cit., pp. 24-135; Vratzian, Murji ev sali midjev, pp. 275-305, and Kianki ughinerov [Along life's ways], VI (Beirut, 1967), 5-125;

K. Sasuni, Petrvarian apstambutiune [The February rebellion] (Beirut, 1970); Yervant Hayrapetian, "The February 18, 1921, Armenian Revolt," Armenian Review, X-XI (Summer, 1957-Autumn, 1958); H. Marmandian, "The Exile of the Armenian Army Officers," Armenian Review, XI (Spring, 1958), 103-115; Borian, op. cit., pp. 125-135.

71. V. I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 5th ed. XLIII (Moscow, 1963), 198-200; Eudin and North, op. cit., p. 55.

72. A. V. Vardanian, Hayastani Karmir banake kaghakatsiakan krivnerum 1920-1921 tavakannerin [The Red Army of Armenia during the civil battles of 1920-1921] (Erevan, 1960); A. M. Hakobian, Hayastani banvorneri ev giughatsineri haghtanake 1921 tvakani kaghakatsiakan krivnerum [The victory of Armenia's workers and peasants in the civil battles of 1921] (Erevan, 1960); Revoliutsion kocher, pp. 590-610 passim; Mnatsakanian, op. cit., pp. 327-402; Velikaia revoliutsiia, pp. 515-554, 563-570, 575-586 passim; Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov, pp. 126-274; Irazek, [Hakob Ter-Hakobian], Motik antsialits [From the recent past] (Beirut, 1956), pp. 91-153.

73. Cebesoy, op. cit., pp. 147-149; Biyiklioğlu, op. cit., p. 71; Jäschke, "Freundschaft," p. 208.

74. Degras, op. cit., pp. 237-242; Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, III, 364-365, 391-392, 435-436, 468, 469, 597-604; Cebesoy, op. cit., pp. 113-116, 138-156.

75. Cebesoy, op. cit., pp. 139-140, 148; Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 956-964; Borian, op. cit., pp. 162-165, 299-305; Gabriel Lazian, Hayastan ev hai date, haievrus haraberutiunneru luisin tak [Armenia and the Armenian Question, in the light of Armenian-Russian relations] (Cairo, 1957), pp. 197-198, 243-244, 256-259.

76. Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 1000-1022; Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, IV (Moscow, 1960), 176-177, 227-228, 249, 255, 273, 287-288, 292-293, 371-374, 392, 400-4, 420-429, 495-497.

77. Borian, op. cit., pp. 163, 300.